HW防守之日志分析 二

LemonSec 今天

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笔者都是作为CTF解题思路来讲述的日志分析方式,其实在真实的网络攻击中,日志分析方式大同小异,这里引荐笔者的文章。

上期为大家介绍了攻击取证之日志分析(一)中的Web日志分析,因此本期将给大家带来系统的日志分析。众所周知,操作系统有很多,但是市面上一般比较主流的操作系统有Windows、Linux以及Mac。其中比较常见的还是Windows以及Linux,Mac毕竟价格有些高昂。在比赛中,系统日志分析的题目更是少之又少,但有时也会结合在一些其他的题目中,因此了解一下也是必要的。接下来,斗哥将从Linux和Windows的系统日志进行讲解。

Linux操作系统

Linux的系统日志一般存放在/var/log目录下,常见的日志(列举部分)有以下:

日志文件	基本详情
/var/log/messages	关于Linux操作系统信息,还包括了系统启动情况等
/var/log/boot.log	系统启动日志
/var/log/lastlog	记录所有用户的近期信息,也可用lastlog命令查看具体内容
/var/log/maillog	邮件日志信息
/var/log/cron	Cron计划任务相关信息的日志
/var/log/secure	系统安全、验证以及授权信息的日志
/var/log/faillog	用户登陆失败信息,包括失败次数、错误登陆命令等
/var/log/btmp	所有登陆失败信息,包括(远程服务、IR地址等) 【放信号:lemon-s

• /var/log/messages

用于记录系统相关信息,如执行程序、系统错误、启动信息等,一般我们会使用message进行查看可疑程序执行的可疑操作,系统在执行程序时出现错误等,具体日志信息如下:

```
May 14 01:07:59 localhost dhclient[16905]: DHCPDISCOVER on docker0 to 255.255.255.255 port 67 interval 12 (xid=0x13aff75e)
May 14 01:08:11 localhost dhclient[16905]: DHCPDISCOVER on docker0 to 255.255.255.255 port 67 interval 13 (xid=0x13aff75e)
May 14 01:08:24 localhost dhclient[16905]: DHCPDISCOVER on docker0 to 255.255.255.255 port 67 interval 12 (xid=0x13aff75e)
May 14 01:08:36 localhost dhclient[16905]: DHCPDISCOVER on docker0 to 255.255.255.255 port 67 interval 7 (xid=0x13aff75e)
May 14 01:08:43 localhost dhclient[16905]: DHCPDISCOVER on docker0 to 255.255.255.255 port 67 interval 10 (xid=0x13aff75e)
May 14 01:08:43 localhost dhclient[16905]: No DHCPDISCOVER on docker0 to 255.255.255.255 port 67 interval 10 (xid=0x13aff75e)
May 14 01:08:53 localhost dhclient[16905]: No DHCPDFFERS received.
May 14 01:08:53 localhost dhclient[16905]: No working leases in persistent database - sleeping.
May 14 01:09:10 localhost dhclient[16905]: DHCPREQUEST on ens33 to 192.168.153.254 port 67 (xid=0x7f6fa 345)
May 14 01:09:10 localhost dhclient[16905]: DHCPACK from 192.168.153.254 (xid=0x7f6fa 345)
May 14 01:09:10 localhost dhclient[16905]: bound to 192.168.153.151 -- renewal in 899 seconds.
```

对应的格式:

日期 时间 主机 执行的程序[进程ID]: 具体信息

/var/log/boot.log

用于记录系统启动信息的日志,一般用于查看在系统启动时所有相关信息,具体如下:

```
root@localhost log]# cat boot.log
  OK ] Started Show Plymouth Boot Screen.
  OK ] Reached target Paths.
  OK ] Started Forward Password Requests to Plymouth Directory Watch.
     ] Reached target Basic System.
        Mounting Configuration File System...
  OK ] Mounted Configuration File System.
GG[ OK ] Found device /dev/mapper/centos-root.
        Starting File System Check on /dev/mapper/centos-root...
      ] Started File System Check on /dev/mapper/centos-root.
     ] Started dracut initqueue hook.
     Reached target Remote File Systems (Pre).
     Reached target Remote File Systems.
        Mounting /sysroot...
     ] Mounted /sysroot.
  OK
     Reached target Initrd Root File System.
        Starting Reload Configuration from the Real Root...
     ] Started Reload Configuration from the Real Root.
      Reached target Initrd File Systems.
      Reached target Initrd Default Target.
        Starting dracut pre-pivot and cleanup hook... 從 微信号:lemon-sec
  OK ] Started dracut pre-pivot and cleanup hook.
```

不难发现,该日志记录的是系统启动时的启动信息,比如开启了哪些服务、做了什么操作都能一目了然。

/var/log/lastlog

用于记录了用户近期登陆情况,直接查看lastlog,可能信息不太明显,但是也可以使用lastlog命令进行查看,会比较详细:

```
[root@localhost log]# cat lastlog
ts/0192.168.153.1[root@localhost log]# lastlog
              端口
                      来自
                                     最后登陆时间
root
              pts/0
                      192. 168. 153. 1
                                     日 5月 26 23:23:42 +0800 2019
bin
                                     **从未登录过**
                                     **从未登录过**
daemon
                                     **从未登录过**
adm
                                     **从未登录过**
lp
                                     **从未登录过**
sync
                                     **从未登录过**
shutdown
                                     **从未登录过**
halt
                                     **从未登录过**
mail
                                     **从未登录过**
operator
                                     **从未登录过**
games
                                     **从未登录过**
ftp
                                     **从未登录过**
nobody
                                     **从未登录过**
systemd-network
dbus
                                     **从未登录过**
                                     **从未登录过**
polkitd
                                     **从未登录过**
sshd
postfix
                                     **从未登录过**
                                                   😘 微信号: lemon-sec
                                     **从未登录过**
chrony
dockerroot
```

从上图中可以看出, root用户在5月26日23: 23: 42登陆到终端, IP为192.168.153.1。

/var/log/cron

Linux的计划任务相关信息的日志,我们也会使用它来找寻攻击者可能会写入的一些恶意计划任务,其中可能会带有一些恶意软件等相关信息。

```
[root@localhost ~]# cat /var/log/cron
Jun 12 11:38:01 localhost run-parts(/etc/cron.daily)[13070]: finished logrotate
Jun 12 11:38:01 localhost run-parts(/etc/cron.daily)[13058]: starting man-db.cron
Jun 12 11:38:01 localhost run-parts(/etc/cron.daily)[13081]: finished man-db.cron
Jun 12 11:38:01 localhost anacron[12674]: Job 'cron. daily' terminated
Jun 12 11:49:33 localhost crond[13019]: (CRON) INFO (Shutting down)
Jun 12 11:49:33 localhost crond[13176]: (CRON) INFO (RANDOM_DELAY will be scaled with factor 18% if use
d.)
Jun 12 11:49:33 localhost crond[13176]: (CRON) bad minute (/etc/crontab)
Jun 12 11:49:33 localhost crond[13176]: (CRON) INFO (running with inotify support)
Jun 12 11:49:33 localhost crond[13176]: (CRON) INFO (@reboot jobs will be run at computer's startup.)
Jun 12 11:49:36 localhost crontab[13177]: (root) LIST (root)
Jun 12 11:50:01 localhost crond[13176]: (*system*) RELOAD (/etc/crontab)
Jun 12 11:50:01 localhost crond[13176]: (CRON) bad minute (/etc/crontab)
Jun 12 11:53:08 localhost crond[13176]: (CRON) INFO (Shutting down)
Jun 12 11:53:08 localhost crond[13188]: (CRON) INFO (RANDOM_DELAY will be scaled with factor 13% if use
Jun 12 11:53:09 localhost crond[13188]: (CRON) INFO (running with inotify support)
Jun 12 11:53:09 localhost crond[13188]: (CRON) INFO (@reboot jobs will be run at computer's startup.)
Jun 12 11:53:26 localhost crontab[13221]: (root) LIST (root)
Jun 12 11:53:29 localhost crond[13188]: (CRON) INFO (Shutting down)
Jun 12 11:53:29 localhost crond[13253]: (CRON) INFO (RANDOM_DELAY will be scaled with factor 94% if use
d.)
Jun 12 11:53:29 localhost crond[13253]: (CRON) INFO (running with inotify support)

Jun 12 11:53:29 localhost crond[13253]: (CRON) INFO (@reboot jobs will be run at computer's startup.)

Jun 12 11:53:30 localhost crontab[13254]: (root) LIST (root)

Jun 12 11:54:01 localhost CROND[13257]: (root) CMD (echo "flag{Loudou}" >> /tmp/test.txt)

Jun 12 11:54:36 localhost crond[13253]: (CRON) INFO (Shutting down)

Jun 12 11:54:36 localhost crond[13267]: (CRON) INFO (RANDOM_DELAY will be scaled with factor 46% if use
Jun 12 11:54:36 localhost crond[13267]: (CRON) INFO (running with inotify Jun 12 11:54:36 localhost crond[13267]: (CRON) INFO (@reboot jobs will be 是是是是一个专家的一个
Jun 12 11:54:37 localhost crontab[13268]: (root) LIST (root)
```

斗哥特意在计划中添加了一个flag,通过cron日志我们可以很明显的看到,有个flag,当然在真实环境或者是CTF比赛中,当然不会这么简单,但是基本上我们排查问题思路也是如此。

/var/log/secure

此日志是linux 的安全日志,被用于记录用户工作的安全相关问题以及登陆认证情况,如:

```
May 5 14:15:09 localhost polkitd[6133]: Registered Authentication Agent for unix-process:16835:902828
(system bus name :1.25 [/usr/bin/pkttyagent --notify-fd 5 --fallback], object path /org/freedesktop/Pol
icyKit1/AuthenticationAgent, locale en_US.UTF-8)
May 14 00:51:49 localhost polkitd[5952]: Loading rules from directory /etc/polkit-1/rules.d
May 14 00:51:49 localhost polkitd[5952]: Loading rules from directory /usr/share/polkit-1/rules.d
May 14 00:51:49 localhost polkitd[5952]: Finished loading, compiling and executing 2 rules
May 14 00:51:49 localhost polkitd[5952]: Acquired the name org.freedesktop.PolicyKit1 on the system bus
May 14 00:51:51 localhost sshd[6692]: Server listening on 0.0.0.0 port 22.
May 14 00:51:51 localhost sshd[6692]: Server listening on :: port 22.
May 14 00:54:16 localhost login: pam_unix(login:session): session opened for user root by LOGIN(uid=0)
May 14 00:54:16 localhost login: ROOT LOGIN ON tty1
May 14 00:56:13 localhost sshd[16918]: Accepted password for root from 192.168.153.1 port 1935 ssh2
May 14 00:56:14 localhost sshd[16918]: pam_unix(sshd:session): session opened for user root by (uid=0) May 14 01:00:32 localhost unix_chkpwd[16983]: password check failed for user (root)
May 14 01:00:32 localhost sshd[16981]: pam_unix(sshd:auth): authentication failure; logname= uid=0 euid
=0 tty=ssh ruser= rhost=192.168.153.1 user=root
May 14 01:00:32 localhost sshd[16981]: pam_succeed_if(sshd:auth): requirement "uid >= 1000" not met by
user "root"
May 14 01:00:34 localhost sshd[16981]: Failed password for root from 192.168.153.1 port 2005 ssh2
May 14 01:00:38 localhost unix_chkpwd[16984]: password check failed for user (root)
May 14 01:00:38 localhost sshd[16981]: pam_succeed_if(sshd:auth): requirement "uid >= 1000" not met by
user "root"
May 14 01:00:39 localhost sshd[16981]: Failed password for root from 192.168.153.1 port 2005 ssh2
May 14 01:00:42 localhost sshd[16981]: error: Received disconnect from 192.168.153.1 port 2005:13: The
user canceled authentication. [preauth]
May 14 01:00:42 localhost sshd[16981]: Disconnected from 192.168.153.1 port 2005 [preauth]
May 14 01:00:42 localhost sshd[16981]: PAM 1 more authentication failure; logname= uid=0 euid=0 tty=ssh
ruser= rhost=192. 168. 153. 1 user=root
May 16 21:07:21 localhost polkitd[5952]: Registered Authentication Agent for unix-process:17682:382250
(system bus name :1.88 [/usr/bin/pkttyagent --notify-fd 5 --fallback], object path /org/freedesktop/Pol
icyKit1/AuthenticationAgent, locale en_US.UTF-8)
May 22 17:17:29 localhost polkitd[6101]: Loading rules from directory /etc/polkit-1/rules.d
May 22 17:17:29 localhost polkitd[6101]: Loading rules from directory /usr/share/polkit-1/rules.d
May 22 17:17:29 localhost polkitd[6101]: Finished loading, compiling and executing 2 rules
May 22 17:17:31 localhost sshd[6734]: Server listening on :: port 22.
```

不难发现,上面记录了一些服务如polkitd、login、sshd等,无论成功与否,均会被记录到此日志中,有时我们也可以通过它来判断服务器是否被攻击(如暴力破解、调用一些系统方法等),以下举个被爆破之后的日志:

```
localhost sshd[16056]
                                        Failed password for
                                                            root
Jun 12 15:23:14 localhost sshd[16056]: Connection closed by 192.168.153.167 port 53024 [preauth]
Jun 12 15:23:14 localhost sshd[16056]: PAM 2 more authentication failures; logname= uid=0 euid=0 tty=ss
h ruser= rhost=192. 168. 153. 167 user=root
Jun 12 15:23:14 localhost sshd[16040]: Failed password for root from 192.168.153.167 port 53002 ssh2
Jun 12 15:23:14 localhost sshd[16040]: Connection closed by 192.168.153.167 port 53002 [preauth]
Jun 12 15:23:14 localhost sshd[16040]: PAM 2 more authentication failures; logname= uid=0 euid=0 tty=ss
h ruser= rhost=192.168.153.167 user=root
Jun 12 15:23:14 localhost sshd[16055]: Failed password for root from 192.168.153.167 port 53022 ssh2
Jun 12 15:23:14 localhost sshd[16055]: Connection closed by 192.168.153.167 port 53022 [preauth]
Jun 12 15:23:14 localhost sshd[16055]: PAM 2 more authentication failures; logname= uid=0 euid=0 tty=ss
h ruser= rhost=192.168.153.167 user=root
Jun 12 15:23:14 localhost sshd[16049]: Failed password for root from 192.168.153.167 port 53020 ssh2
Jun 12 15:23:14 localhost sshd[16049]: Connection closed by 192.168.153.167 port 53020 [preauth]
Jun 12 15:23:14 localhost sshd[16049]: PAM 2 more authentication failures; logname= uid=0 euid=0 tty=ss
h ruser= rhost=192.168.153.167 user=root
Jun 12 15:23:14 localhost sshd[16057]: Failed password for root from 192.168.153.167 port 53026 ssh2
Jun 12 15:23:14 localhost sshd[16057]: Connection closed by 192.168.153.167 port 53026 [preauth]
Jun 12 15:23:14 localhost sshd[16057]: PAM 2 more authentication failures; logname= uid=0 euid=0 tty=ss
h ruser= rhost=192.168.153.167 user=root
Jun 12 15:23:14 localhost sshd[16041]: Failed password for root from 192.168.153.167 port 53004 ssh2
Jun 12 15:23:14 localhost sshd[16041]: Connection closed by 192.168.153.167 port 53004 [preauth]
Jun 12 15:23:14 localhost sshd[16041]: PAM 2 more authentication failures; logname= uid=0 euid=0 tty=ss
h ruser= rhost=192.168.153.167 user=root
Jun 12 15:23:14 localhost sshd[16038]: Failed password for root from 192.168.153.167 port 52998 ssh2
Jun 12 15:23:14 localhost sshd[16038]: Connection closed by 192.168.153.167 port 52998 [preauth]
Jun 12 15:23:14 localhost sshd[16038]: PAM 2 more authentication failures; logname= uid=0 euid=0 tty=ss
h ruser= rhost=192, 168, 153, 167 user=root
Jun 12 15:23:14 localhost sshd[16039]: Failed password for root from 192.168.153.167 port 53000 ssh2
Jun 12 15:23:14 localhost sshd[16039]: Connection closed by 192.168.153.167 port 53000 [preauth]
Jun 12 15:23:14 localhost sshd[16039]: PAM 2 more authentication failures; logname= uid=0 euid=0 tty=ss
h ruser= rhost=192.168.153.167 user=root
Jun 12 15:23:15 localhost sshd[16036]: Failed password for root from 192.168.153.167 port 52994 ssh2
Jun 12 15:23:15 localhost sshd[16036]: Connection closed by 192.168.153.167 port 52994 [preauth]
Jun 12 15:23:15 localhost sshd[16036]: PAM 1 more authentication failure; logname= uid=0 euid=0 tty=ssh
ruser= rhost=192. 168. 153. 167 user=root
Jun 12 15:23:15 localhost sshd[16045]: Failed password for root from 192.10
Jun 12 15:23:15 localhost sshd[16045]: Connection closed by 192.168.153.167 port 53010 [preauth]
```

可以从上图中很容易发现该服务器正在被IP为192.168.153.167的攻击机在短时间内对root用户进行多次尝试ssh登录。

讲完Linux,就得讲一讲Windows了,Windows大家肯定比较熟悉,因为我们现在的笔记本也基本都是Windows操作系统,但是说起查日志,可能还是相对比较少,但在Windows服务器中,日志还是挺关键的,确切的说不管在什么操作系统中,日志都是很重要的。


话不多说,开始和大家一起分析分析Windows日志。

Windows操作系统

Windows日志一般在事件查看器中可以进行查看,通常分为五个:应用程序、安全、Setup、系统、转发事件。并且这五个中又以应用程序、安全以及系统日志较为常见,因此在本期中,将介绍这三个。

• 应用程序日志


此日志顾名思义便是记录了应用程序的运行情况,包括运行出错、甚至于出错的原因,如:



它指出了错误应用程序名称、版本、具体时间错,并且还指出了错误的模块以及异常代码,故而,我们可以通过这些信息,进行对应的故障排查,具体如何排查可通过适当的资料等进行,斗哥在此便不做过多说明,需要提的是它在Windows中保存在Application.evtx文件中,如果在CTF比赛中,看到这个文件,那么可能就是让你进行应用程序日志分析了。

• 安全日志

此处的安全日志和Linux的安全日志相似,但是它只记录用户登陆情况、用户访问时间以及访问是 否授权等,通过它我们可以轻松的发现是否存在爆破风险(一般在短时间内发现大量登陆失败,即 可认为该账号被爆破了)。



上图显示的是正常的日志,并且它所给的信息也非常详细(以一个登陆失败为例)。


```
使用数:
    安全 ID:
              SYSTEM
    MPS:
             LAPTOP-SM7STCJI$
            WORKGROUP
0x3E7
    W/P16:
    發型 ID:
登录が至
登录失败的帐户:
              NULL SID
    6/16: -
    MPS:
    (東京東) 整束40
(AC000006D
                   登录期间出槽。
           0xC0000380
    子状态:
进程信息:
    適用方进程 ID: 0x768
    调用方进程名: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
```

```
网络信息:
    源网络地址 127.0.0.1
    MIND:
          0
许信息份验证信息:
            User32
    整款进程:
    身份验证数据包: Negotiate
    (#181845-
    数据包名(仅用 NTLM):
    案明长度:
登录请求失败时在尝试访问的计算机上生成此事件。
"使用者"字段描明本地系统上请求整景的帐户,这通常是一个服务(例如 Server 服务)或本地进程(例如 Winlogon.exe 威 Services.exe)。
"登录类型"字段指明发生的登录的种类。最常见的类型是 2 (交互式)和 3 (网络)。
"进程信息"字段表明系统上的哪个帐户和进程请求了整章。
"网络信息"李拉维明元报券受请求来自哪里。"工作站会"并非巴里可用,而具在某些情况下可能会留为空白。
"身份验证信息"字段提供关于此特定整带请求的详细信息。
    · "传递服务"指明零位直接服务参与了此程录请求。
                                                                                    & 微信号: lemon-sec
    · "数据包名" 指明在 NTLM 协议之间使用了哪些子协议。
   - "彼明长度"指明生成的会活或明的长度。如果没有请求会活觉明、则此李段为 0。
```

它详细到可以发现使用者信息、登陆类型、登陆失败的账户、失败信息、进程信息、内网信息以及详细身份验证信息等,十分方便。它在操作系统中保存在Security.evtx文件下,我们也可以通过双击它打开安全日志。

• 系统日志

系统日志则是记录了操作系统安装的应用程序软件相关的事件。它包括了错误、警告及任何应用程序需要报告的信息等。



相比于Linux 的日志,Windows对于系统日志的记录,也是挺详细的,我们可以通过它来进行一些分析判断,它存在于System.evtx文件中。

本期小结

本期的日志分析就介绍到此,主要为系统日志分析,这在分析取证中还是蛮重要的。