# **Business Cycle Mechanics**

## ... the pathology of the business cycle



What journey ahead??



## What is a business cycle?

The business cycle is an economic phenomenon measured by, in terms of the real GDP growth rate, the movement from a peak to a trough (recession) back to a peak (expansion). A recession is loosely defined to be two or more consecutive quarters when the real GDP growth rate is negative.

Business cycles are investigated by a private research organization called The National Bureau of Economic Research (see http://www.nber.org). The NBER has a more subtle definition of recessions:

"A recession is a significant decline in economic activity spread across the economy, lasting more than a few months, normally visible in real GDP, real income, employment, industrial production, and wholesale-retail sales. A recession begins just after the economy reaches a peak of activity and ends as the economy reaches its trough. Between trough and peak, the economy is in an expansion."

For a detailed explanation of how the NBER determines the turning points of cycles, see http://www.nber.org/cycles/recessions.html

## How we explore the phenomena ...?

Most business cycles follow a given pattern, up to a point: you often see the same triggers for the turning points from one cycle to the next. So therefore we can generalize common features that we tend to see in most cycles. That is the emphasis of the business cycle essay and most of **this** lecture.

Having said that, every downturn and recovery will have unique, nonpatterned characteristics that are peculiar to only that cycle. For example, a downturn may be explained by a very specific catalyst that had either not been seen before, or not seen for a very long time.

For example, the mortgage meltdown that initiated the last global economic crisis was truly unique in its scope and impact.

To really understand the business cycle we must understand both the common repeating element and that component that is truly unique.

## Post WWII business cycles

		Duration i	<b>Duration in Months</b>		
		Contraction: Expansion			
		Peak to	Trough to		
Peak	Trough	Trough	Peak (pre)		
April 1960-2	February 1961-1	10			
December 1969-4	November 1970-4	11	106		
November 1973-4	March 1975-1	16	36		
January 1980-1	July 1980-3	6	58		
July 1981-3	November 1982-4	16	12		
July 1990-3	March 1991-1	8	92		
March 2001-1	November 2001-4	8	120		
December 2007-4	June 2009-2	18	122+		

Note the relative duration of contractions relative to expansions.

Source: National Bureau of Economic Research, current to January 2020.

## Historical average of all cycles

**Duration in Months** 

**Contraction: Expansion:** 

Peak to Trough to

Average, all cycles:TroughPeak1854-1919 (16 cycles)22271919-1945 (6 cycles)18351945-2009 (11 cycles)1158

Note how much milder business cycles have become in the modern (post WWII) era.

Source: Same as previous slide. Data are current to January 2020.

The point here is to examine some general features of all business cycles.

# ... at the trough

- ✓ Low interest rates
  - ... and a monetary stimulus
- ✓ Pent up consumer demand
  - ... average auto age an example
- ✓ Businesses lean and mean

# ... the expansion

- ✓ Consumer-led (durables and real estate)
- ✓ Sometimes 5+% growth very early
- ✓ Real estate often lags
- ✓ Productivity gains can substantially increase the time period and the rate of gain

# ... near the peak

- ✓ Bottlenecks in supply arise
- ✓ Inflation/interest rates rising
  - ... produces an FRS policy reaction
- ✓ Rates of profit are squeezed
  - ... which sometimes impacts the stock market
  - ... which can engender a negative "wealth effect"
- ✓ Sometimes speculative excess



# Unemployment


- ✓ ... rises sharply during the recession
- ✓ ... sometimes continues to rise into the recovery

.. this is sometimes a long lag variable



### "Official" Unemployment Rate

1960-Jan 2020, monthly, % of civilian workforce



Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics database, Series ID LNS140000000, S.A.

## **Policy Stimulators**

On the fiscal side (U.S. Government spending and taxing) - Huge budget deficits from high spending levels relative to taxes:

**CBO Baseline Budget Projection: January 21, 2019** 

		FY2019	FY 2020
	(Billions \$)	(actual)	(est.)
	Outlays (spending)	4,677	4,849
less:	Revenues (mostly taxes)	3,632	3,833
equals:	Budget Deficit	-1,045	-1,016


The budget deficit is then financed through the sale of U.S Treasury Marketable Debt (totals Sept. 2019 Billions \$):

Asset	Maturity	<b>Amount Out</b>	Total
Bills	1 year or less	2,376.4	
Notes	More than 1 to 10 years	9,756.0	
Bonds	More than 10 years	2,311.5	
Other		2,365.2	16,809.1

Source: U.S. Treasury Bulletin, December 2019, Tables FF01 & FD-2

On the monetary side (Federal Reserve Policy) - Easy credit & low interest rate policy, such as "quantitative easing," much of which monetizes these federal deficits:





U.S. and foreign buyers

The FRS system

# Why no bad recession in the early 2000s?


- 1995-2000: Wealth effect of rising stock market
- 2000-2004: Wealth effect of rising home equity
- Easy monetary policy ... record low interest rates (which led to a wild speculation in housing)
- Generous fiscal policy ... heavy tax cuts

## Inflation, deflation, and interest rates

... and the business cycle

#### Select Interest Rates and CPI

Source: All CPI numbers are from *The Bureau of Labor Statistics* 





## Inflation: why a problem?

- Reallocates income and wealth unfairly
  - from lender to borrower
  - from salaried
  - from elderly (unless prepared)
  - to speculators
- Injects tremendous uncertainty
  - curbs investment



# Inflation: (continued)




- Seriously threatens financial markets
  - especially stocks
- Invites a policy response
  - the modern FRS crunch
- As goes inflation, so go interest rates

## Deflation: why a problem?


- Threatens financial institutions and lenders
  - nominal amortized payment obligations are harder to meet, forcing default
  - interest rates are low or negative
    forcing savers towards speculation
- Compounding affect ... buyers postpone purchases
- Injects tremendous uncertainty
  - curbs investment






CPI for urban consumers, U.S. city average, all items, NSA. Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics

### 2019: Still a low-inflation era ...



## CPI and Mortgage and 10-year Treasury Bond Rates: 1972-2019




#### Controversy 2020: income and wealth distribution

	Bottom 50%	50-90%	Top 10-1%	Top 1%	Top 0.1%	Top .01%
1970	\$19,640	\$44,178	\$91,404	\$328,816	\$1,011,357	\$3,689,308
1980	\$22,043	\$47,912	\$100,689	\$368,189	\$1,186,317	\$4,139,295
1990	\$22,468	\$55,288	\$122,262	\$614,184	\$2,279,033	\$8,176,832
2000	\$26,380	\$67,152	\$160,836	\$886,682	\$3,520,058	\$14,141,155
2010	\$25,969	\$67,561	\$162,679	\$1,044,445	\$4,870,471	\$23,706,233
2018	\$27,642	\$75,913	\$187,478	\$1,152,232	\$5,174,621	\$24,178,499

Source: Gabriel Zucman and Emmanuel Saez (Gabriel Zucman/Greg Sargent)

Zucman and fellow economist Emmanuel Saez, his co-author of the new book "The Triumph of Injustice," provided a chart showing how each group of earners' take-home pay has changed since 1970. The wealthiest Americans' assets skyrocketed by millions of dollars even in the first decade of the 21st century—when people in the bottom 50% saw their average take-home income decrease.

Source: Los Angeles Times, December 10, 2019



#### Remember to read:

Figure 1.2 - Today's young adults with debt and a degree earn same as workers with no degree earned in 1989





Table 1.2 - Median Income					
25-to-34 year-olds	Degree without Debt	Degree with Debt	No Degree		
1989	\$75,422	\$67,880	\$49,024		
2013	\$61,886	\$50,727	\$36,523		



Sample slide shown here, but by no means the most important slide. To remember for exam, "generalize the message of this document."



#### Research material from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis ...



https://www.stlouisfed.org/open-vault/2019/august/wealth-inequality-in-america-facts-figures

