# Exploring the Effectiveness of Climate Change Deals through Behavioral Game Theory

Arjun Thiruppathi


# Environmental Economics and Climate Change Agreements

- Climate change is a politicized issue, so traditional economic theories don't work was well in real life scenarios
- This research approaches the question of effectiveness of international change agreements through a study of behavioral economics

## **Kyoto Protocol**

- One of the most notable climate change agreements in history
- Operationalized the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
- ► Technically legally binding, but there was no real enforcement

#### U.S. CO2 Emissions and Climate Change Agreements



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Why did the U.S. withdraw from the Kyoto Protocol?

Why did emissions decrease after the U.S. withdrew?


## Behavioral Game Theory

- Behavioral game theory is a subset of behavioral economics which studies the choices that lead to weakened rationality assumptions
- Scenarios typically involve 2 or more self-interested parties that attempt to find their ideal outcome
- Conclusions don't guarantee a particular outcome, they just show ideal choices

## Ultimatum Bargaining Game

- ▶ 2 individuals are bargaining for something of value, and one of them makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer
- This is a simplified version of how bargaining actually works, but data on how individuals act can be extrapolated to more complex scenarios, within reason
- Bargaining games help measure how individuals feel about the allocation of money between themselves and others

#### Kyoto Protocol targets for the first commitment period



- Developed nations are burdened with a lower emissions target
- The U.S. was expected to decrease emissions by 7%, which would have required significant, and possibly unfair, changes to the economy relative to other countries
- This was a major reason why the U.S. chose to withdraw from the Kyoto Protocol

## Bargaining in Climate Change Agreements

- Negative reciprocity is a characteristic that is often seen in bargaining games, where individuals incur substantial cost to themselves out of concern for fairness and equality
  - This is contrary to the rational decision that game theory predicts an individual would make
- The U.S. did not give in to negative reciprocity, and withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol because of perceived unfairness
- Countries like Bulgaria, Czech Republic, and other smaller Eastern European countries accepted the full -8% emissions target, which was an example of negative reciprocity

## **Explanations for Negative Reciprocity**

- Cultural differences
  - What's fair to one country might not be fair to others the U.S. is more individualistic than Bulgaria
- The "winner's curse" in game theory is a situation where a party overpays for something of value the countries with the lowest emissions percentage target accepted this because it was valuable to them

### Conclusion

- ► The ultimatum bargaining game can attempt to explain strategic decisionmaking behind international climate change
- ► Game theory is a useful tool to study country-level decision making, but actions vary depending on a nations global influence
- ► The U.S.'s choice to withdraw was in line with game theory, but other countries incurred more relative cost

### Conclusion

- With no pressure from the U.N. since withdrawal in 2001, the U.S. has decreased emissions
  - ► There have been many bills passed that help prevent climate change, but agreements like the Kyoto Protocol have less evidence of success
- Future climate change agreements, like the Paris Agreement (created in 2016) do little to directly influence a country's decision making
- ► These agreements may indirectly affect nations by increasing public awareness, which in turn pushes politicians to take action, but awareness of climate change is already well established

### U.S. Climate Change Bills

- ▶ 2003-2007: Bipartisan bills in the Senate
- 2007: Congress mandates emissions reporting
- 2008–2010: Cap-and-trade legislation passes the House
- 2012: Clean Energy Standard
- 2015: Extension/phasedown of renewable energy tax credits
- **▶ 2016: Formation of the Climate Solutions Caucus**
- 2018: Tax credits and carbon pricing
- 2019: Renewed interest in Climate Change

Real change happens on the fiscal policy level

### **Contact Information**

athiruppathi1@student.gsu.edu