Game Theory: Numerical Examples

Prof. M.P. Biswal

Department of Mathematics

IIT- Kharagpur E-Mail: mpbiswal@maths.iitkgp.ac.in

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Consider the following two-player zero-sum game. Player A chooses an integer in 1, 2, 3 and Player B chooses an integer in 2, 3, 4. If the chosen numbers are the same, no money changes hands. If the numbers are different, the person who chooses the larger number wins 1 euro, unless the numbers differ by 1 in which case the person choosing the smaller number wins 1 euro. Using the simplex method or otherwise, find the value of the game and the optimal strategies.

Player: B

$$B_1 = 2$$
 $B_2 = 3$ $B_3 = 4$
 $A_1 = 1$ 1 -1 -1
 $A_2 = 2$ 0 1 -1
 $A_3 = 3$ -1 0 1

Player: A $A_2 = 2$

$$A_2 = 2$$

 $A_3 = 3$

$$x_1 = 3/9, x_2 = 2/9, x_3 = 4/9; \nu = -1/9$$

$$y_1 = 4/9, y_2 = 2/9, y_3 = 3/9; \nu = -1/9$$

$$B_1 = 1$$
 $B_2 = 2$ $B_3 = 3$
 $A_1 = 1$ 1 -1 1

Player: A $A_2 = 2$ -1 1 -1 $A_3 = 3$ 1 -1 1

$$x_1 = 1/2, x_2 = 1/2, x_3 = 0; \nu = 0$$

 $y_1 = 1/2, y_2 = 1/2, y_3 = 0; \nu = 0$

$$B_1 = 1$$
 $B_2 = 2$ $B_3 = 3$
 $A_1 = 1$ 2 -3 4

Player: A $A_2 = 2$ -3 4 -5 $A_3 = 3$ 4 -5 6

$$x_1 = 1/4, x_2 = 1/2, x_3 = 1/4; \nu = 0$$

 $y_1 = 1/4, y_2 = 1/2, y_3 = 1/4; \nu = 0$

Player:
$$B$$
 B_1 B_2 B_3
 A_1 10 0 7

Player: A A_2 2 6 4
 A_3 5 2 3

$$x_1 = 2/7, x_2 = 5/7, x_3 = 0; \nu = 30/7$$

 $y_1 = 3/7, y_2 = 4/7, y_3 = 0; \nu = 30/7$

Player:
$$B$$
 Y_1 Y_2 Y_3
 X_1 2 5 4

Player: A X_2 6 1 3
 X_3 4 6 1

$$x_1 = 21/35, x_2 = 13/35, x_3 = 1/35; \nu = 124/35$$

 $y_1 = 13/35, y_2 = 10/35, y_3 = 12/35; \nu = 124/35$

Player:
$$B$$
 Y_1 Y_2 Y_3
 X_1 0 -1 1

Player: A X_2 1 0 -1
 X_3 -1 1 0

$$x_1 = 1/3, x_2 = 1/3, x_3 = 1/3; \nu = 0$$

 $y_1 = 1/3, y_2 = 1/3, y_3 = 1/3; \nu = 0$

Player:
$$B$$
 $Y_1 \quad Y_2 \quad Y_3$
 $X_1 \quad 3 \quad 2 \quad 1$
Player: $A \quad X_2 \quad 2 \quad 4 \quad 5$
 $X_3 \quad 1 \quad 5 \quad 10$

$$x_1 = 6/8, x_2 = 1/8, x_3 = 1/8; \nu = 21/8$$

 $y_1 = 6/8, y_2 = 1/8, y_3 = 1/8; \nu = 21/8$

Player:
$$B$$
 Y_1 Y_2 Y_3
 X_1 2 5 4

Player: A X_2 5 3 1
 X_3 4 1 6

$$x_1 = 4/9, x_2 = 3/9, x_3 = 2/9; \nu = 31/9$$

 $y_1 = 4/9, y_2 = 3/9, y_3 = 2/9; \nu = 31/9$

Player:
$$B$$
 Y_1 Y_2 Y_3
 X_1 2 1 3

Player: A X_2 1 4 6
 X_3 3 6 2

$$x_1 = 0, x_2 = 1/6, x_3 = 5/6; \nu = 8/3$$

 $y_1 = 2/3, y_2 = 0, y_3 = 1/3; \nu = 8/3$

Player:
$$B$$
 Y_1 Y_2 Y_3
 X_1 2 4 3

Player: A X_2 4 6 2
 X_3 3 2 8

$$x_1 = 0, x_2 = 5/7, x_3 = 2/7; \nu = 26/7$$

 $y_1 = 6/7, y_2 = 0, y_3 = 1/7; \nu = 26/7$

Player:
$$B$$
 Y_1 Y_2 Y_3
 X_1 5 4 3

Player: A X_2 4 6 2
 X_3 3 2 4

$$x_1 = 0, x_2 = 1/3, x_3 = 2/3; \nu = 10/3$$

 $y_1 = 0, y_2 = 1/3, y_3 = 2/3; \nu = 10/3$

Player:
$$B$$
 Y_1 Y_2 Y_3
 X_1 5 2 3

Player: A X_2 3 5 2
 X_3 2 3 5

$$x_1 = 1/3, x_2 = 1/3, x_3 = 1/3; \nu = 10/3$$

 $y_1 = 1/3, y_2 = 1/3, y_3 = 1/3; \nu = 10/3$

Player:
$$B$$
 $Y_1 \quad Y_2 \quad Y_3$
 $X_1 \quad 2 \quad 4 \quad 3$
Player: $A \quad X_2 \quad 4 \quad 2 \quad 3$
 $X_3 \quad 3 \quad 4 \quad 2$

$$x_1 = 1/3, x_2 = 1/3, x_3 = 1/3; \nu = 3$$

 $y_1 = 1/3, y_2 = 1/3, y_3 = 1/3; \nu = 3$

Player:
$$B$$
 Y_1 Y_2 Y_3
 X_1 20 30 40

Player: A X_2 40 20 30
 X_3 30 40 20

$$x_1 = 1/3, x_2 = 1/3, x_3 = 1/3; \nu = 30$$

 $y_1 = 1/3, y_2 = 1/3, y_3 = 1/3; \nu = 30$

Player:
$$B$$
 $Y_1 \quad Y_2 \quad Y_3$
 $X_1 \quad 4 \quad 5 \quad 10$
Player: $A \quad X_2 \quad 10 \quad 4 \quad 5$
 $X_3 \quad 5 \quad 10 \quad 4$

$$x_1 = 1/3, x_2 = 1/3, x_3 = 1/3; \nu = 19/3$$

 $y_1 = 1/3, y_2 = 1/3, y_3 = 1/3; \nu = 19/3$

	Player: <i>B</i>				
		Y_1	Y_2	Y ₃	Y_4
	X_1	4	3	2	1
Player: A	X_2	1	4	3	2
	X_3	2	1	4	3
	X_4	3	2	1	4

$$x_1 = 1/4, x_2 = 1/4, x_3 = 1/4, x_4 = 1/4; \nu = 5/4$$

 $y_1 = 1/4, y_2 = 1/4, y_3 = 1/4, y_4 = 1/4; \nu = 5/4$

		PI	ayer:	В	
		Y_1	Y_2	Y_3	Y_4
	X_1	6	5	3	2
	X_2	2	6	5	3
Player: A	X_3	3	2	6	5
	X_4	5	3	2	6

$$x_1 = 1/4, x_2 = 1/4, x_3 = 1/4, x_4 = 1/4; \nu = 4$$

 $y_1 = 1/4, y_2 = 1/4, y_3 = 1/4, y_4 = 1/4; \nu = 4$

		Player: B $Y_1 Y_2 Y_3 Y_4$ $X_1 2 1 1 1$				
		Y_1	Y_2	Y_3	Y_4	
	X_1	2	1	1	1	
	X_2	1	2	1	1	
Player: A	X_3	1	1	2	1	
	X_4	1	1	1	2	

$$x_1 = 1/4, x_2 = 1/4, x_3 = 1/4, x_4 = 1/4; \nu = 5/4$$

 $y_1 = 1/4, y_2 = 1/4, y_3 = 1/4, y_4 = 1/4; \nu = 5/4$

	Player: B				
		Y_1	Y_2	Y_3	Y_4
	X_1	2	3	1	1
	X_2	1	2	3	1
Player: A	X_3	1	1	2	3
	X_4	3	1	1	2

$$x_1 = 1/4, x_2 = 1/4, x_3 = 1/4, x_4 = 1/4; \nu = 7/4$$

 $y_1 = 1/4, y_2 = 1/4, y_3 = 1/4, y_4 = 1/4; \nu = 7/4$

		PI	ayer:	В		
		Y_1	Y_2	Y_3	Y_4	
	X_1	2	3	5	1	
	X_2	1	2	3	5	
Player: A	X_3	5	1	2	3	
	X_4	3	5	1	2	

$$x_1 = 1/4, x_2 = 1/4, x_3 = 1/4, x_4 = 1/4; \nu = 11/4$$

 $y_1 = 1/4, y_2 = 1/4, y_3 = 1/4, y_4 = 1/4; \nu = 11/4$

Player:
$$B$$
 Y_1 Y_2 Y_3
 X_1 1 -1 1
 X_2 -1 1 -1

Player: A X_3 1 -1 1
 X_4 -1 1 -1

$$x_1 = 1/4, x_2 = 1/4, x_3 = 1/4, x_4 = 1/4; \nu = 0$$

 $y_1 = 1/2, y_2 = 1/2, y_3 = 0; \nu = 0$

		Player: <i>B</i>			
		$Y_1(1)$	$Y_2(2)$	$Y_3(3)$	$Y_4(4)$
	$X_1(1)$	2	-3	4	-5
Player: A	$X_2(2)$	-3	4	-5	6
	$X_3(3)$	4	-5	6	-7
	$X_4(4)$	-5	6	-7	8

$$K = 8, \hat{\nu} = 8$$

$$x_1 = 0, x_2 = 1/4, x_3 = 1/2, x_4 = 1/4; \nu = 0$$

$$y_1 = 0, y_2 = 1/4, y_3 = 1/2, y_4 = 1/4; \nu = 0$$

		Player B	
		S ₁	S ₂
Player A	S_1	3	-1
i layer A	S ₂	-1	9

$$3x_1 - x_2 = -x_1 + 9x_2 = \nu$$
$$3y_1 - y_2 = -y_1 + 9y_2 = \nu$$
$$x_1 + x_2 = y_1 + y_2 = 1$$

$$x_1 = 10/14, x_2 = 4/14; \nu = 26/14$$

 $y_1 = 10/14, y_2 = 4/14; \nu = 26/14$

		Player B			
		S ₁	S ₂		
Player A	S ₁	1	-1		
riayei A	S ₂	-1	1		
Player A					
$x_1 + x_2 = y_1 + y_2 = 1$					

$$x_1 = 1/2, x_2 = 1/2; \nu = 0$$

 $y_1 = 1/2, y_2 = 1/2; \nu = 0$

		Player B		
		S ₁	S ₂	
Player A	S ₁	42	-14	
riayei A	S ₂	-14	126	

$$x_1 = 10/14, x_2 = 4/14; \nu = 26$$

 $y_1 = 10/14, y_2 = 4/14; \nu = 26$

		Player B	
		S ₁	S ₂
Player A	S ₁	4	-4
riayei A	S ₂	-4	4

$$x_1 = 1/2, x_2 = 1/2; \nu = 0$$

 $y_1 = 1/2, y_2 = 1/2; \nu = 0$

Let us consider a pay-off matrix of a 3 by 3 Two- Person Zero-Sum unstable game without any saddle point.

		Player: B			
		y 1	y 2	y 3	
	x_1	a ₁₁	<i>a</i> ₁₂	a 13	
Player: A	<i>x</i> ₂	a ₂₁	a ₂₂	a 23	
	<i>x</i> ₃	a ₃₁	a ₃₂	a 33	

where

$$Pr(A_1) = x_1, Pr(A_2) = x_2, Pr(A_3) = x_3$$

 $Pr(B_1) = y_1, Pr(B_2) = y_2, Pr(B_3) = y_3$
 $x_1 + x_2 + x_3 = 1, x_1, x_2, x_3 \ge 0$
 $y_1 + y_2 + y_3 = 1, y_1, y_2, y_3 > 0$

Player A's objective is to maximize the minimum expected gains, which can be achieved by maximizing ν , i.e., it might gain more than ν if the Player B adopts a poor strategy. Hence, the minimum expected gain for player A will be as follows:

If the Player B selects his first strategy B_1 then:

$$a_{11}x_1 + a_{21}x_2 + a_{31}x_3 \ge \nu$$

If the Player B selects his second strategy B_2 then:

$$a_{12}x_1 + a_{22}x_2 + a_{32}x_3 \ge \nu$$

If the Player B selects his third strategy B_3 then:

$$a_{13}x_1 + a_{23}x_2 + a_{33}x_3 \ge \nu$$



This problem can be represented as an LPP:

$$\max : \nu$$

where $\nu > 0$,

$$a_{11}x_1 + a_{21}x_2 + a_{31}x_3 \ge \nu$$

 $a_{12}x_1 + a_{22}x_2 + a_{32}x_3 \ge \nu$
 $a_{13}x_1 + a_{23}x_2 + a_{33}x_3 \ge \nu$
 $x_1 + x_2 + x_3 = 1$
 $x_1, x_2, x_3 > 0$

Further it can be represented as:

$$\min: \frac{1}{\nu}$$

i.e.

$$\min: \frac{1}{\nu}(x_1 + x_2 + x_3)$$

where $\nu > 0, x_1 + x_2 + x_3 = 1$

$$\frac{a_{11}x_1 + a_{21}x_2 + a_{31}x_3}{\nu} \ge 1$$

$$\frac{a_{12}x_1 + a_{22}x_2 + a_{32}x_3}{\nu} \ge 1$$

$$\frac{a_{13}x_1 + a_{23}x_2 + a_{33}x_3}{y} \ge 1$$

$$x_1 + x_2 + x_3 = 1, x_1, x_2, x_3 \ge 0$$

Let

$$\frac{x_1}{\nu} = X_1, \frac{x_2}{\nu} = X_2, \frac{x_3}{\nu} = X_3,$$

LPP:

$$\min: X_1 + X_2 + X_3$$

$$a_{11}X_1 + a_{21}X_2 + a_{31}X_3 \ge 1$$

 $a_{12}X_1 + a_{22}X_2 + a_{32}X_3 \ge 1$
 $a_{13}X_1 + a_{23}X_2 + a_{33}X_3 \ge 1$
 $X_1, X_2, X_3 \ge 0$

where

$$\nu = \frac{1}{X_1 + X_2 + X_3}, x_1 = X_1 \nu, x_2 = X_2 \nu, x_3 = X_3 \nu$$



Player B's objective is to minimize the maximum expected loss, which can be achieved by minimizing ν , i.e., it might loss less than ν if the Player A adopts a poor strategy. Hence, the maximum expected loss for player B will be as follows:

If the Player A selects his first strategy A_1 then:

$$a_{11}y_1 + a_{12}y_2 + a_{13}y_3 \leq \nu$$

If the Player A selects his second strategy A_2 then:

$$a_{21}y_1 + a_{22}y_2 + a_{23}y_3 \leq \nu$$

If the Player A selects his third strategy A_3 then:

$$a_{31}y_1 + a_{32}y_2 + a_{33}y_3 \leq \nu$$



This problem can be represented as an LPP:

 $\min: \nu$

where $\nu > 0$,

$$a_{11}y_1 + a_{12}y_2 + a_{13}y_3 \le \nu$$
 $a_{21}y_1 + a_{22}y_2 + a_{23}y_3 \le \nu$
 $a_{31}y_1 + a_{32}y_2 + a_{33}y_3 \le \nu$
 $y_1 + y_2 + y_3 = 1, y_1, y_2, y_3 \ge 0$

Further it can be represented as:

$$\max: \frac{1}{\nu}$$

i.e.

$$\max: \frac{1}{\nu}(y_1 + y_2 + y_3)$$

where $\nu > 0$,

Let

$$\frac{y_1}{\nu} = Y_1, \frac{y_2}{\nu} = Y_2, \frac{y_3}{\nu} = y_3,$$

LPP:

$$\max : Y_1 + Y_2 + Y_3$$

$$a_{11}Y_1 + a_{12}Y_2 + a_{13}Y_3 \le 1$$

 $a_{21}Y_1 + a_{22}Y_2 + a_{23}Y_3 \le 1$
 $a_{31}Y_1 + a_{32}Y_2 + a_{33}Y_3 \le 1$
 $Y_1, Y_2, Y_3 \ge 0$

$$\nu = \frac{1}{Y_1 + Y_2 + Y_3}, y_1 = Y_1 \nu, y_2 = Y_2 \nu, y_3 = Y_3 \nu$$

Let us consider a pay-off matrix of an unstable game without any saddle point.

Player:
$$B$$
 y_1 y_2 y_3
 x_1 3 -4 2

Player: A x_2 1 -7 -3
 x_3 -2 4 7

$$Pr(A_1) = x_1, Pr(A_2) = x_2, Pr(A_3) = x_3$$

 $Pr(B_1) = y_1, Pr(B_2) = y_2, Pr(B_3) = y_3$
 $x_1 + x_2 + x_3 = 1, x_1, x_2, x_3 \ge 0$
 $y_1 + y_2 + y_3 = 1, y_1, y_2, y_3 > 0$

Using the Max-min criteria, row minimum is obtained as:

$$(-4, -3, -2).$$

Then the Max-min value is obtained as: -2. Using the Min-max criteria, column maximum is obtained as:

Then the Min-max value is obtained as: 3. Hence

$$-2 < \nu < 3$$
.

Further a constant K=3 is added to all the elements of the Pay-off matrix. A new Pay-off matrix is presented as:

		Player: B			
		y 1	y ₂	y 3	
	x_1	6	-1	5	
Player: A	<i>x</i> ₂	4	-4	0	
	<i>x</i> ₃	1	7	10	

$$Pr(A_1) = x_1, Pr(A_2) = x_2, Pr(A_3) = x_3$$

 $Pr(B_1) = y_1, Pr(B_2) = y_2, Pr(B_3) = y_3$
 $x_1 + x_2 + x_3 = 1, x_1, x_2, x_3 \ge 0$
 $y_1 + y_2 + y_3 = 1, y_1, y_2, y_3 > 0$

Player A's objective is to maximize the minimum expected gains, which can be achieved by maximizing ν , i.e., it might gain more than ν if the Player B adopts a poor strategy. Hence, the minimum expected gain for player A will be as follows:

If the Player B selects his first strategy B_1 then:

$$6x_1+4x_2+x_3\geq \nu$$

If the Player B selects his second strategy B_2 then:

$$-x_1-4x_2+7x_3\geq \nu$$

If the Player B selects his third strategy B_3 then:

$$5x_1+10x_3\geq \nu$$



This problem can be represented as an LPP:

$$\max: \nu$$

where
$$\nu > 0$$
,

$$6x_1 + 4x_2 + x_3 \ge \nu$$

$$-x_1 - 4x_2 + 7x_3 \ge \nu$$

$$5x_1 + 10x_3 \ge \nu$$

$$x_1 + x_2 + x_3 = 1, x_1, x_2, x_3 > 0$$

Further it can be represented as:

$$\min: \frac{1}{\nu}$$

i.e.

$$\min: \frac{1}{\nu}(x_1 + x_2 + x_3)$$

where $\nu > 0, x_1 + x_2 + x_3 = 1$

$$\frac{6x_1+4x_2+x_3}{\nu}\geq 1$$

$$\frac{-x_1 - 4x_2 + 7x_3}{\nu} \ge 1$$
$$\frac{5x_1 + 10x_3}{\nu} \ge 1$$

$$\frac{5x_1+10x_3}{2}\geq 1$$

$$x_1 + x_2 + x_3 = 1, x_1, x_2, x_3 \geq 0$$

Let

$$\frac{x_1}{\nu} = X_1, \frac{x_2}{\nu} = X_2, \frac{x_3}{\nu} = X_3,$$

LPP:

$$\min: X_1 + X_2 + X_3$$

$$6X_1 + 4X_2 + X_3 \ge 1$$

 $-X_1 - 4X_2 + 7X_3 \ge 1$
 $5X_1 + 10X_3 \ge 1$

$$X_1, X_2, X_3 \geq 0$$

$$\nu = \frac{1}{X_1 + X_2 + X_3}, x_1 = X_1 \nu, x_2 = X_2 \nu, x_3 = X_3 \nu$$

LPP:

min:
$$X_1 + X_2 + X_3$$

$$6X_1 + 4X_2 + X_3 \ge 1$$

 $-X_1 - 4X_2 + 7X_3 \ge 1$
 $5X_1 + 10X_3 \ge 1$

$$X_1,X_2,X_3\geq 0$$

Optimal Solution:

$$X_1 = 6/43, X_2 = 0, X_3 = 7/43; \nu = 43/13$$

 $x_1 = 6/13, x_2 = 0, x_3 = 7/13; \nu = 43/13$

$$\nu = \frac{1}{X_1 + X_2 + X_3}, x_1 = X_1 \nu, x_2 = X_2 \nu, x_3 = X_3 \nu$$

Player B's objective is to minimize the maximum expected loss, which can be achieved by minimizing ν , i.e., it might loss less than ν if the Player A adopts a poor strategy. Hence, the maximum expected loss for player B will be as follows:

If the Player A selects his first strategy A_1 then:

$$6y_1-y_2+5y_3\leq \nu$$

If the Player A selects his second strategy A_2 then:

$$4y_1-4y_2\leq \nu$$

If the Player A selects his third strategy A_3 then:

$$y_1+7y_2+10y_3\leq \nu$$



This problem can be represented as an LPP:

where
$$u>0,$$

$$6y_1-y_2+5y_3\leq
u$$

$$4y_1-4y_2\leq
u$$

$$y_1+7y_2+10y_3\leq
u$$

 $y_1 + y_2 + y_3 = 1, y_1, y_2, y_3 > 0$

Further it can be represented as:

$$\max: \frac{1}{\nu}$$

i.e.

$$\max: \frac{1}{\nu}(y_1 + y_2 + y_3)$$

where $\nu > 0$,

$$6y_1 - y_2 + 5y_3 \le \nu$$

$$4y_1 - 4y_2 \le \nu$$

$$y_1 + 7y_2 + 10y_3 \le \nu$$

$$y_1 + y_2 + y_3 = 1, y_1, y_2, y_3 > 0$$

Let

$$\frac{y_1}{\nu} = Y_1, \frac{y_2}{\nu} = Y_2, \frac{y_3}{\nu} = Y_3,$$

LPP:

$$\max: Y_1 + Y_2 + Y_3$$

$$6Y_1 - Y_2 + 5Y_3 \le 1$$

 $4Y_1 - 4Y_2 \le 1$
 $Y_1 + 7Y_2 + 10Y_3 \le 1$
 $Y_1, Y_2, Y_3 > 0$

$$\nu = \frac{1}{Y_1 + Y_2 + Y_3}, y_1 = Y_1 \nu, y_2 = Y_2 \nu, y_3 = Y_3 \nu$$

LPP:

$$egin{aligned} \mathsf{max} : Y_1 + Y_2 + Y_3 \ & 6Y_1 - Y_2 + 5Y_3 \leq 1 \ & 4Y_1 - 4Y_2 \leq 1 \ & Y_1 + 7Y_2 + 10Y_3 \leq 1 \ & Y_1, Y_2, Y_3 \geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

Optimal Solution:

$$Y_1=8/43,\,Y_2=5/43,\,Y_3=0;\,
u=43/13;\,\hat{
u}=4/13$$
 $y_1=8/13,\,y_2=5/13,\,y_3=0;\,
u=43/13;\,\hat{
u}=4/13$ where

$$\nu = \frac{1}{Y_1 + Y_2 + Y_3}, y_1 = Y_1 \nu, y_2 = Y_2 \nu, y_3 = Y_3 \nu$$