The Forge of the Kazakh Proletariat?

The Turksib, Nativization, and Industrialization during Stalin's First Five-Year Plan

ON DECEMBER 31, 1928, A POGROM ERUPTED on the construction of the Turkestano-Siberian Railroad (the Turksib) at its northern railhead of Sergiopol'. Approximately four hundred Russian workers viciously beat any Kazakh they could lay their hands on, including their own coworkers. The attack at Sergiopol' was just one of a number of pogroms, beatings, and acts of "hooliganism" that dominated the construction of the Turksib. This ethnic hostility was a reaction to a second construction project by the Soviet government, the construction of a Kazakh working class. The animus of rank-and-file European workers toward the Kazakhs at Sergiopol' and elsewhere indicates that this project faced considerable resistance from the very proletariat the Kazakhs were supposed to join. Assimilating Kazakhs into the Soviet working class also engendered major resistance from the managers of the construction and from many Kazakhs themselves.

Despite this resistance, the Soviet regime pushed through a policy of hiring preferences, educational mandates, and political intervention that can be termed a type of affirmative action.[1] Moreover, the state deployed its full powers of coercion to discipline opponents of affirmative action. One of the leaders of the Sergiopol' riot was shot for his crimes, and numerous other workers, employees, and even highly placed Turksib managers were reprimanded, fired, or indicted for anti-Kazakh acts. Despite occasional high-level complicity by party, trade union, or construction officials in discrimination, the higher organs (even the Kazakh Party Committee, with its notoriously anti-Kazakh secretary, F. I. Go-

loshchekin) consistently combated "Great Power chauvinism" whenever it appeared on the construction site.

This strong state action to protect the rights of a previously oppressed minority gives an obviously beneficent appearance to the regime's nationalities policy. And yet, this same state promoted a different group of policies that had a nearly genocidal effect on Kazakhs: forced settlement and collectivization.[2] The brutal effects of these policies decimated the same pool of people the Soviet government took such pains to recruit, promote, and train as industrial workers on the Turksib. The paradox is obvious and troubling. How are we to understand the Soviet nationalities policy from these two examples? As a maker of nations or a breaker of nations?

To explore this conundrum, this chapter probes the Soviet Union's policies, particularly those of *korenizatsiia*, or nativization. Nativization was the core policy of an ambitious, complex, and prolonged effort by the Soviet state to build ethnically based nations within the context of a politically and economically unitary state. These policies, envisioned by Lenin and implemented consistently by Stalin, seem contradictory. In effect, they sought to subsume all nations within socialism by encouraging nations to flourish. Efforts at promoting national cultural autonomy extended even to attempts at linguistic assimilation of Russians—Soviet officials and managers were expected to learn the language of the titular nationality they served.[3]

The state's support for nativization, however, should not obscure the importance of individuals as agents, not simply as objects of the Soviet nationalities policy. While the regime could shatter Kazakh traditional identity by destroying their nomadic lifestyle, it could not conjure a native proletariat from thin air. Nativization, especially within industry, would provide a radically different social space for a new ethnic identity to develop. But how and even whether Kazakhs used this space depended on them. They could simply stay away from industrial employment. Moreover, the entire nativization program hinged on encouraging the managers and workers of Soviet industry to accept Kazakh "savages" as proletarians.

The success of Soviet nation building, then, became intimately tied to the industrialization drive of the pre–World War II Five-Year Plans. The construction of the Turksib railroad connecting Novosibirsk with Tashkent provides as good an environment to study this process as any. One of the great construction projects of the First Five-Year Plan (1928–1932), the Turksib embodied the Bolshevik ideal of "building socialism"—creating a modern, industrial society free of class, gender, or ethnic animosities. From December 1926 to January 1931, the railroad's 1,440 kilometers of roadbed were built by upward of thirty thousand workers. Perhaps more important, the railroad became an icon of the regime's commitment to end national oppression and ethnic "backwardness" through economic development and political mobilization.[4]

The Forge of a Kazakh Proletariat?

When construction of the Turksib commenced, Kazakhs already possessed a well-developed ethnic identity closely tied to their nomadic pastoral economy.[5] This Kazakh identity, tied as it was to nomadism, respect for traditional authorities, and clan divisions, was deeply troubling to both the regime and modernizing Kazakh intellectuals Communists rejected this identity, in part, because it seemed to reinforce the power of "exploiters" within Kazakh society.[6] Moreover, nomadism provided the majority of Kazakhs with only bare subsistence. Kazakh herds in the region of the Turksib averaged only 8.7 head of sheep per nomadic household. Given the accepted flock size for the minimum subsistence of a family—roughly sixty head—this figure indicates the extremely precarious condition of pastoralism in the region.[7] Yet, although their own economies were increasingly stressed, the nomads stuck stubbornly to their traditional way of life. They had few choices. Their subsistence economies left them few surpluses for the market, and their only source of income was to work for very low wages as a shepherd for a *bey*. As one official put it, "There are very few Kazakhs at work [i.e., as wage workers] and their wages are very low, sometimes less than one ruble a day." He added that such workers usually had to "economize" on food.[8] This penury, as well as deference to traditional authority, embodied the stagnation of nomadic pastoralism to supporters of nativization.

Many of these supporters were Kazakh intellectuals, often so-called National Communists, who had been coopted by Moscow and who embraced the revolution's call for ending economic backwardness.[9] Moscow's cooptation, unlike its practice in Russian areas of the Union, created a considerable overlap in Kazakhstan between the prerevolutionary Kazakh intelligentsia and postrevolutionary national party cadres. The need to nativize the local party and Soviet officialdom, coupled with the lack of any native attachment to Bolshevism, forced Moscow to be less particular in choosing its party cadres. This continuity, attenuated though it was, between Kazakhstan's prerevolutionary intelligentsia and its Soviet native elite provided a constituency for Kazakh development. Typical of such "National Communists" was T. R. Ryskulov, a leading Kazakh Communist, who played an important role in building the Turksib. Ryskulov dreamed of the Kazakhs leaping into modernity: "Leninism affirms the view that under the leadership of the laboring proletariat backward nations may be led to socialism without having to endure a long process of capitalist development."[10] Most leading Kazakhs agreed with Ryskulov. Kazakh party cadres consistently supported capital investment and industrial transformation of their societies to overcome "colonial exploitation."[11] The *aul* (the migratory encampment), rather than being a romantic embodiment of the people's culture, was a sort of embarrassing relic, or at least a stage of development to be quickly bypassed.[12]

Consequently, local leaders greeted the government's announcement of the Turksib's construction with enthusiasm as a method for transmitting socialist modernity to the "backward" steppe. As Ryskulov put it, "The railroad will un-

doubtedly bring culture and Soviet power into those areas where it is very dubious to talk of Soviet power."[13] There was some basis for such grandiose hopes. By one estimate, 35 percent of the Kazakh population lived within the immediate hinterland of the Turksib.[14] Both Moscow and the Kazakh government wanted to use the railroad's construction to "capture" this population for socialist production. To do so, they hoped to hire thousands of Kazakhs for the construction and to accustom them to industrial labor. If the Turksib's builders and operators were drawn primarily from the local population, a solid core of Kazakhs could be both settled and proletarianized, thereby offering a model for their nomadizing kin.[15] Even officials of the central commissariat charged with building the railroad, Narkomput' (Narodnyi Kommissariat Puti Soobshchenii—the People's Commissariat of Means of Communication), embraced this civilizational mission for the Turksib. Vladimir Shatov, the man in charge of the construction, viewed the Turksib as an embodiment of socialism's promise. Or, as he put it, "The Tsarist government feared bringing new life and culture to the East; This we have to do as Communists."[16] The Turksib would become, in an oft-used phrase of the time, "the forge of the new proletarian cadre of the Kazakh Republic."[17]

To ensure that the Turksib became this forge, local officials spearheaded an effort to get a hard employment quota for Kazakh workers.[18] Ryskulov, who headed the government's Committee to Aid the Construction of the Turksib, emerged as a tireless lobbyists for this goal.[19] Unfortunately, Narkomput' and the central organs, while enthusiastic about the "civilizational" mission of the Turksib, showed rather more coolness toward staffing the construction with natives. Despite its rhetoric, Narkomput' was far more interested in cost than in social engineering and thus resisted hiring untrained Kazakh tribesmen for construction. Initially, the Commissariat proposed importing 75 percent of its workers from European Russia and hiring only 25 percent of its workforce from the "local" (not native) population.[20]

The government and the Communist party of Kazakhstan strenuously resisted this plan. Tellingly, Narkomput' conceded only when it was convinced that Kazakh workers would be cheaper and more resistant to the region's ferocious weather and endemic diseases.[21] Even then, Narkomput' would not commit to a hard quota until ordered to do so by the Russian Republic's *Sovnarkom*.[22] In early 1928, Narkomput' and the Turksib's management signed an agreement with the Kazakh labor commissariat to hire 50 percent of its workers from the native population.[23] That enormous pressure had been brought to bear on the Commissariat to wring this quota out of it and that it still put economic efficiency above the regime's nativization plans boded ill for the program on the Turksib.

Even so, this agreement was a huge victory for the partisans of nativization. The building season in 1927 had been used primarily for surveys, which required few workers.[24] The 1928 plan, on the other hand, called for upwards of 25,000 workers. A quota of 12,500 Kazakh builders would represent a potent increase in the republic's native proletarians. To ensure that the quota was actually met, Kazakh nomads were allowed to register at labor exchanges with the same hiring

priority as Red Army veterans and trade union members. Kazakhs took advantage of these new privileges in droves. As early as December 1927, 5,078 of the 9,653 men registered for work on the Turksib were Kazakh. It seemed that the Turksib was now prepared to forge its native proletariat.

Affirmative Action and Its Discontents

Unfortunately, for both Kazakh National Communists and the regime itself, this forging would be a difficult endeavor. The use of the Turksib as an instrument of nativization faced resistance from three major sources: the society to be transformed into workers, the managers of the Turksib who were to conduct the transformation, and the majority of European workers who were to acquiesce in this transformation. Of the three forms, the most diffuse and largely ineffectual resistance came from traditional Kazakh society. Surprisingly, the most sustained and intractable resistance generally came from the putative supporters of the Soviet regime, its proletarians.

Of the three sources of resistance, the Kazakhs had most reason to fear the Turksib. Railroads had not been kind to nomads, who had been dispossessed from land following the construction of the Trans-Siberian railroad. Additionally, the railnet had been instrumental in crushing the 1916 Steppe Revolt and the anti-Soviet *basmachi* movement during the civil war.[25] Even so, Kazakh society offered no unified response to construction. Reactions toward the Turksib ran the gamut from open revolt to active collusion. At one end of the spectrum were thousands of Kazakh construction workers, guides, teamsters, and camel drovers without whom the Turksib could not have been built. Most Kazakhs, however, were not so helpful. They covered up wells, stole surveyors' stakes, withheld carting services and supplies, and spread wild rumors against the construction.[26] Soon after the announcement of construction, for instance, rumors began to fly that the Turksib would displace Kazakhs from their pastures.[27] Although the Soviet authorities usually blamed these rumors on the machinations of mullahs and *beys* seeking to keep their people chained to the past, Kazakh resentment of the railroad was broadly based. Incidents such as stealing stakes and spreading malicious gossip were so pervasive that they must have represented the hostility of most *auly* to the railroad. Some *auly* actually fled when the Turksib's builders approached them.[28]

A few Kazakhs did not limit themselves to such desultory forms of resistance and fought the railroad openly. These were the *basmachis*, Muslim partisans committed to the overthrow of the Communist system. One Communist activist left an account of the actions of these bands on the northern section of construction:

> [T]he *basmachis* had grown bold. They began to disconcert the workers and attack us in various ways. For instance, they would undermine the railroad ties to cause a train derailing even at slow speeds. The Turksib had difficulties with

> water and often we would wake up in the morning to discover our water tanks emptied and riddled with holes. The bandits became particularly impudent in the spring of 1930. They went as far as shooting at the workers finishing the railroad.[29]

These attacks, however, were worse than futile. The Turksib, thanks to its vast concentration of European workers, Communist cadres, and its own department of the Ob"edinnennoe Glavnoe Politicheskoe Upravlenie (OGPU), represented one of the most difficult targets for an open assault in all of Kazakhstan. A former Turksib worker recalled how *basmachi* bands were handled:

> The communists decided to form a fighting detachment to combat the bandits. From March to May 1930 I was its political commissar. Day and night we stayed in the saddle, tracking the elusive *basmachi*. Finally, in the region of the Lepsy and Matai settlements, we overtook them. The battle was short and merciless. That's when my ability to shoot a machine gun came in handy. The band was destroyed and I returned to construction.[30]

No *basmachi* attack ever caused the suspension of construction.

The policy of nativizing the Turksib, however, would be tested not so much in battles with *basmachis* as in the recruitment of Kazakh workers. Here, more difficult foes appeared—bureaucratic pettyfoggers, workers' chauvinists, and the rank-and-file Kazakh labor "flitters." Of these, Narkomput's bureaucrats initially represented the most serious roadblock to nativization. The Commissariat's managers waged a stubborn bureaucratic battle to undermine the government's prescriptions on nativization. In fact, most Turksib construction managers, especially its engineers and technical personnel, showed an unalloyed contempt for Kazakhs and the goals of nativization.

Many of the Turksib's managers had been trained prior to the revolution ("bourgeois specialists," in the parlance of the times), and the vast majority were European. These managers often carried strong prejudices against native workers. Most of this prejudice was masked in a rhetoric of efficiency—Turksib managers would often claim that Kazakhs simply did not know how to work. For instance, I. N. Borisov, head of Narkomput's Construction Division, said the Turksib's Kazakh navvies did "twenty per cent of what a good Russian worker would accomplish in previous times—a fifth. This is contemptible productivity."[31] At least Borisov believed that Kazakhs could, with time, become decent navvies. Other Commissariat personnel were less sanguine. Ryskulov complained early in 1928 that Turksib managers simply would not hire Kazakh workers: "There [on the construction site] they say that the Kazakhs are little suited for this type of work and, being weaker, they will earn less."[32] One section chief, engineer Gol'dman, bluntly stated this prejudice against hiring Kazakhs: "Kazakhs are very poor workers from whom nothing will ever come. A proletariat will never arise from such as them."[33] The Turksib's managers enumerated a long list of Kazakh

production sins—they did not know how to use the tools, took too many tea breaks, and quit work suddenly.[34]

While these charges could be supported with examples, Kazakh production difficulties had less to do with laziness and stupidity than with sheer ignorance. Ryskulov pointed out that, when Kazakhs were given the same tools as Europeans and time to learn the proper techniques, both groups had comparable output. A Communist engineer agreed; most of his Kazakh workers quickly mastered the norms once trained.[35] Some Kazakh work gangs, in fact, achieved higher productivity than their European counterparts.[36] The journalist Vit. Fedorovich, on viewing a laboring mass of Kazakh navvies, wrote admiringly that "they worked just like automatons, these former nomads."[37]

The anti-Kazakh rhetoric of efficiency deployed by some Turksib managers was merely a screen for ethnic prejudice. Until 1929, the local construction managers largely ignored the labor regulations and hired whomever they chose. Often their choices had racist overtones and were justified in the most facetious ways. As late as 1930, one section chief, a "bourgeois" specialist, hired forty-six grooms, all European. When questioned on this, the chief claimed that Kazakhs worked poorly with horses, despite the fact that Kazakhs were practically born on horseback.[38] Moreover, as one disgruntled Kazakh noted, "The first to be fired are Kazakhs. The Russians remain even if they have the same skill level."[39] This practice of Kazakhs being "last in, first out" was so common that Shatov demanded repeatedly his managers cease the practice.[40]

Kazakh workers also faced other types of ethnic prejudice from their bosses. The bourgeois specialists, especially, often acted in an openly chauvinist manner. They had ways, as one activist put it, "to create an unfriendly work atmosphere for a Kazakh."[41] Kazakh workers suffered discrimination in work assignments and pay. Since most work was compensated in the form of piece-rates, the two forms of discrimination were intimately entwined. Europeans, for instance, almost always received the easier jobs and usually were the first chosen to receive new tools or be trained to work with new machinery.[42] Such systematic discrimination in assignments showed up in wages; Russians' wages were usually higher than the Kazakhs' by a ratio of three to one.[43] On occasion, this sort of ethnic favoritism was done quite openly, without even the fig leaf of different work assignments. For instance, in summer 1928, new Kazakh navvies were classified a rank lower than starting European navvies—despite the fact that both groups had no production experience. Thanks to such unfair ranking, the Kazakhs earned only two-thirds of the Europeans' wages in this case.[44]

As if such injustice were not trial enough, many European managers heaped all sorts of personal indignities on their Kazakh workers. One foreman became infamous for "acting towards Kazakh workers as if they were cattle." This foreman once struck a Kazakh for no apparent purpose. When the stricken Kazakh asked, "Why'd you belt me?" the foremen replied "Shut up, or I'll punch out your eyes!" Moreover, mockery and contempt oozed from his attitude toward his charges. He refused to take his Kazakhs up the line for their weekly bath: "Why

do you Kazakhs need a bath? You can manage without a bath since there are fifty or sixty of you. Better to take twenty Russians!"[45] These actions, of course, produced indignation among Kazakh workers, who asked, "Aren't we workers like the others?"[46]

Discrimination was pervasive off the job, also. Kazakh living conditions were invariably inferior to the Europeans' poor accommodations. As a rule, they were the last to get whatever shelter, bedding, and other equipment was available.[47] Furthermore, Kazakhs suffered constant outrages at the Turksib's cooperative stores. They were ordered to the back of the line, received goods after the Europeans had first choice, had to accept bread that was cut with the same knife used to cut pork fat (anathema to the Kazakhs' religious practices), and withstood constant verbal abuse from the clerks.[48] Finally, technical specialists of the "older cut" established a sort of apartheid on the worksite; they built dining sheds for Kazakhs alone to eat in (separated from Europeans) because "Kazakhs smell bad."[49] The Turksib's trade union and party organs initially did little to impede this sort of open discrimination. Kazakhs made up only a small minority of either institution's membership.[50]

If managerial discrimination was humiliating and oppressive to the Turksib's native workers, the rage of their European coworkers could be terrifying. The Soviet affirmative-action program created a backlash among previously privileged workers of the dominant ethnicity. This backlash had its roots in the two identities the European workers brought with them to the Turksib. First, rank-and-file European workers resented nativization as a betrayal of the "ruling class." In the late 1920s, both the Soviet Union and Kazakhstan suffered from high levels of unemployment. Throughout the NEP, Soviet workers—mainly members of the trade unions—pushed hard for closed shops and discrimination against nonproletarians. The constant tension between "cadre" workers and peasant seasonal workers stemmed from this turf war, as well as the exclusion of women from most high-paying industrial jobs. Second, European workers brought a chauvinism to the Turksib just as virulent as that of their bosses. Mockery, violence, and race riots cannot be explained only by a desire to defend closed-shop policies. Many of the Turksib's European workers were racists.

That the government's decision to support a hiring quota for Kazakhs caused dissatisfaction among Europeans is hardly surprising, given the urban unemployment and rural underemployment that characterized the labor market in the mid-1920s. Throughout the early period of the Turksib's construction (until the beginning of 1930), the Soviet working class suffered very high unemployment rates. Unemployment was enormous in Kazakhstan, as well.[51] At the beginning of the First Five-Year Plan, in 1927, the labor exchanges in the Turksib's hinterland had thirty thousand registered unemployed, mostly Europeans cadre workers who had just lost their hiring preference to a bunch of thoroughly unproletarian nomads.[52] Even a huge project like the Turksib could not hope to provide jobs for all these men. Thirty thousand disgruntled job seekers turned out to be only the tip of the iceberg, however. When the government announced the building of the Turksib,

a huge wave of unemployed from the central regions of the USSR flooded into the railheads at Lugovaia and Semipalatinsk. This so-called *samotyok* ("self-flow," i.e., getting a job without going through proper governmental channels) became a flood by 1928. As one observer noted, "On some days not scores but hundreds of workers would arrive at Lugovaia station."[53]

By early 1928, more than thirteen thousand unemployed European workers were milling around in Semipalatinsk, only too aware that "their" jobs had been taken by people they considered savages (the workforce was about 40 percent Kazakh at this time).[54] They responded with a campaign of intimidation and harassment against Kazakh job seekers. Kazakhs attempting to sign up for work on the Turksib routinely faced beatings by Europeans. In such an atmosphere, little was needed to transform individual beatings into a more general outburst of violence. This occurred in spring 1928, when an "unemployment riot" broke out in Semipalatinsk. A mob of unemployed went on a rampage and conducted a pogrom against the town's Kazakhs. The authorities quickly restored order once the mob's fury had spent itself—interestingly enough, with the aid of workers who had jobs. But the riot had made its point.

As Shatov himself observed, "It is extremely difficult to give preeminence to Kazakhs in such conditions."[55] To avoid such disturbances, the Turksib sacrificed its Kazakh quota for 1928.[56] Rather than half of the workforce, Kazakhs made up only 26.1 percent of the workforce on the Northern Construction Section during the height of the building season in August.[57] It is worth noting that on the Southern Construction, where there were no riots, the Kazakh share of the workforce was consistently lower than their share on the Northern Construction.[58] In fact, here Kazakhs did not even reach 20 percent of the workforce until September.[59] The correlation between the low percentage of hired Kazakhs and lack of riots is probably not coincidental.

Even if a Kazakh got a job on the Turksib, however, the perils of ethnic hatred still awaited him. In fact, the general ubiquity of "chauvinism" on the work site led to repeated calls by Shatov and the regime for such "abnormal" conditions to be stamped out.[60] These pronouncements had little effect—a general level of mockery and contempt toward Kazakhs pervaded the Turksib. One favorite bit of hooliganism was to smear pig fat forcibly on the lips or bread of Kazakh workers to mock their religion.[61] Such mockery was closely correlated to place. The club, the store line, the dining hall, all the places which European workers considered their domain, often acted as settings for racial slurs, mockery, and hooliganism.

Fist fights and the individual beating of Kazakhs occurred commonly at the worksite. In early February 1929, for instance, an assistant locomotive driver, Nikolai Chantsev, beat a Kazakh coal stoker, Zalei Iakubov, and tossed him from the cab of his moving locomotive.[62] As late as mid-1930, and despite a massive campaign to discipline such acts, individual beatings were frequent among certain trades (particularly conductors and brick workers), and *poboishchy*, or organized brawls, between Kazakhs and Europeans were endemic at such major work points

as Tansyk.[63] While the fights were often labeled as hooliganism, ethnic insults usually preceded the blows.[64]

Mockery, discrimination, and even individual beatings, however, did not represent the most terrifying aspect of ethnic hostility on the Turksib. This distinction belongs to the mass attack by European workers on Kazakhs. Although there were several such mass beatings, the Sergiopol' pogrom that closed out 1928 had the most impact. The well-organized culmination of weeks of labor and racial unrest, the pogrom caused deep concern among the party and governmental elite about the future of the construction project.

Although the regime tried to blame the riot on counterrevolutionaries, in fact gandy dancers (rail layers), the Turksib's most touted "cadre" workers, made up the nucleus of the rioters. The riot, which involved more than four hundred workers, actually took over the town and attacked many other symbols of the regime (sacking the OGPU headquarters and besieging party offices, for instance). The rioters also attacked Kazakhs as beneficiaries of the regime's nativization policy.[65] More than fifty Kazakhs were seriously beaten, although none died. That nativization, not mere hooliganism, played a decisive role in fomenting the pogrom can be seen in the riot's aftermath, all accounts blame the trade unions for not sufficiently educating the European workers on the need for the Kazakh quota.[66]

Given all the hostility, the mockery, the discrimination, and the beatings, who could blame the Kazakhs for resisting the regime's plans to proletarianize them, either by avoiding the Turksib or by leaving it? Kazakhs were staying away or, worse, leaving after only a short stay. In 1928, Kazakh turnover on the Turksib was enormous. No firm figures were kept (in itself a revealing indication of how transient Kazakh labor must have been), but the partial data are suggestive. In 1927, for instance, one Construction Section reserved eight hundred jobs for Kazakhs and went through eight thousand to ten thousand workers trying to fill them. At one point, this section managed to hold Kazakh workers an average of only two to three days.[67] Another work point started out with two hundred Kazakhs and finished with seventy by the end of the season.[68]

To the administration, and especially to its non-Communist managers, this turnover became yet another indictment of the Kazakhs' lack of "production habits"—their basic allergy to "rational labor." Managers alleged that the Kazakhs' "nomadic inclinations" influenced them to work only long enough to make some pocket change and leave.[69] As one foreman complained, "You never know how many will show up for work each day. Yesterday they sign on, and today they leave once they find out they don't like the work or it's too hard."[70] Yet, like the argument that Kazakh workers could not meet European productivity levels, this explanation turned out to be something of a self-fulfilling prophecy. Kazakh turnover did in part stem from the Turksib's alien milieu for many Kazakhs; railroad building was not much like sheep herding. But Kazakhs had worked as railroad workers before and accommodated industrial work rhythms.[71]

Far more important in driving Kazakhs from the worksite was the pervasive atmosphere of discrimination, prejudice, and ethnic violence on the Turksib. In effect, rather than conducting *basmachi* raids or pulling up surveyors' stakes, Kazakhs "voted with their feet."

The Making of a Kazakh Working Class

If the nativization program on the Turksib had been frozen at the end of 1928, the halfway point of construction, a dismal picture would reveal itself. The policy's greatest success thus far had been the creation of a fertile arena for bureaucratic obstruction, racial violence, and Kazakh detachment from industrial society. But the nativization program would overcome all this, thanks to strong pressure from the highest reaches of the party and state apparatus.

The regime's response to the Sergiopol' riot left no doubt that it considered ethnic violence state treason, not interpersonal violence. It arrested a number of the pogrom's ringleaders and, after a well-publicized show trial, handed down strict sentences. One leader was shot, two others had their death sentences commuted to fifteen years, and fourteen others received long sentences in solitary confinement. One (presumably the government informant) was acquitted.[72] Moreover, the Kazakh party and government organs became increasingly intolerant of the Turksib's ineffective nativization policies. The new line from the higher authorities branded failure to meet the Kazakh hiring quota as arising not from "objective" difficulties, such as *samotyok* or Kazakh turnover, but from "subjective" deficiencies, especially the persistence of a "colonial attitude" toward the native population by Turksib managers.[73]

For its part, the Turksib's management belatedly recognized how dangerous ethnic hostility could be to its fulfillment of the production plan.[74] Shatov asked the trade unions, government oversight institutions, and the OGPU "to take the most decisive measures to immediately eliminate from work those unmasked as wreckers," that is, to initiate a purge. Soon, dozens of workers were fired for "counterrevolutionary" sentiments. This campaign, to be sure, did not end ethnic hostility or even mass beatings, but it clearly marked them as a dangerous political action.[75]

Shatov did not limit this supervision to workers. Henceforth, he warned, "all abnormalities, coarseness, red tape, and negligence towards Kazakhs" would be considered a dereliction of duty. Furthermore, he "would not allow the derision or maltreatment of [Kazakhs], ignoring their requests and needs, or speculation concerning their strangeness or cultural backwardness spoken in Russian." The Central Construction Administration promised that any employee guilty of such acts would be dismissed and that "any display of intolerance, chauvinism, or national antagonism will be prosecuted without mercy."[76] One publicist noted the new tone of vigilance: "There are still colonial elements which have stuck them-

selves onto the Turksib; they conceal themselves in a corner and only impotently, maliciously hiss as they see the Kazakhs gradually becoming accustomed to production. Of course, these elements don't dare speak out openly. Caddish behavior and petty hooliganism, these are the weapons of these scoundrels, which often finds a way to dark elements."[77] Clearly, overt acts of chauvinism by managers were now beyond the pale.

Moreover, the older generation of managers' relative immunity from political criteria suddenly evaporated in the political earthquake caused by the Shakhtyi Affair. By the end of 1928, the Turksib management had been thoroughly purged, the old bourgeois specialists giving way to so-called Red engineers, or managers who strongly endorsed the regime's social policies.[78] Now, managers would be held personally responsible for the ethnic hostility manifested in their production units. The Turksib's trade union asked for, and received, authority to single out and punish individual managers "perverting the government's policy on ethnic issues."[79] This authority found its first target in one of the Turksib's leading managers, the section chief Gol'dman, who was well known for his contempt for Kazakhs. Gol'dman not only suffered dismissal for tolerating discrimination against Kazakhs but was charged criminally as a counterrevolutionary.[80] Other managers also felt the wrath of Soviet power for such "defects."[81]

In addition to disciplining discriminatory managers, the Turksib made a concerted effort to recruit and integrate Kazakh workers at the construction site. Its first action was a dose of realism. Because of its abject failure to meet the 50 percent quota, the Turksib pleaded with central authorities for a more attainable number, especially since 20 percent of the Turksib's workforce requirement consisted of skilled positions that the Kazakhs could not fill. The government relented, and the 1929 quota was lowered to 30 percent. This new quota, however, would be monitored carefully.[82] In a second step, the Turksib "privatized" its recruitment efforts by paying recruiters 1.50 rubles for each Kazakh hired from the labor exchanges. This incentive overcame one of the most glaring failings of the old recruitment system—most Kazakhs lived far from the towns and labor exchanges, making it difficult for them to procure Turksib jobs. Under the new recruitment system, the Southern Construction quickly received its initial order of five thousand Kazakh recruits for the 1929 season.[83]

Simultaneously, a small but important group of European workers took it upon themselves to integrate Kazakhs into the worksite. These were the Turksib's activists, its "conscious workers," who openly identified with the regime's politics. They often took on causes unpopular with rank-and-file workers, like shock work and collectivization.[84] These crusaders now campaigned to overcome discrimination in production and in the barracks. One incident is demonstrative of this new activism. At the Southern Railhead, the Kazakh gandy dancers were subjected to a diet of only bread and water due to religious insensitivity. When a Komsomol gandy dancer complained that the Kazakhs could not eat the pork-laden meals of the Russians, the cafeteria management replied:

> "And what are we supposed to do, cook in another pot especially for the Kazakhs? Should we get another wagon-kitchen for two cooking staffs in the track-laying camp? What about the budget?"
>
> The *Komsomol* took his case to the rank and file gandy dancers: "We came to Kazakhstan to lead the Kazakhs from darkness. And they send these lads to learn from us. And we from the very first step separate from them like a Lord from a peasant. We skilled workers from Russia ought to get closer to Kazakh youth. We can still make over the young. Comrades, let's abstain from pork for a while and eat with the Kazakhs from one pot. Then they will little by little come to eat pork with us."

In fact, this suggestion earned the Komsomol only hostile glares from his coworkers (gandy dancers loved their pork fat). Nonetheless, a compromise position of handing out pork fat individually did earn unanimous consent.[85] This story tells much about the worker activists' methods and attitudes. First, rank-and-file workers considered them a bunch of puritan bootlickers, who nonetheless had to be placated because of their party connections. Second, there is no question here of "nativization"—Kazakhs were to be assimilated into the proletariat, and that meant the Russian proletariat ("they will little by little come to eat pork with us").

This Russification is evident in the way the conscious workers sought to overcome the language problem. A source of much mutual incomprehension on the Turksib, which in turn engendered condescension and indignation, was the language gulf on the construction. In 1928, very few Europeans spoke Kazakh, and small numbers of Kazakhs understood even the rudiments of Russian. As one technician complained, "We have a confusion of tongues like the Tower of Babel. . . . the naked savage comes to us and we can only communicate with him by signs."[86] The other side of this linguistic divide was equally frustrated:

> In his native steppe, on the ancient pastures, on the tracks that a thousand times their camels have trod, the Kazakh coming to work on the Turksib has no tongue. All the managers are European. Almost none of them have mastered the Kazakh language. All the section and subsection chiefs cannot speak Kazakh. As a result the Kazakh navvies don't receive the proper direction in work, don't know what their piece-rates are, and cannot get competent advice or valuable specialized instruction.[87]

This was exactly the sort of situation nativization had been designed to avoid. Brigades of Turksib shock workers attacked the problem in their own way. They took on individual Kazakh workers and helped them learn Russian.[88] In fact, the first letters that most Kazakhs wrote on the Turksib in their "Liquidation of Illiteracy" bases were in Russian.[89] This is not to say that nativization was abandoned; courses in Kazakh for Russian line managers were greatly expanded, and a series of training classes cranked out foremen and gang bosses from among the worksite's Kazakhs.[90] Still, the road to social mobility ran through Russian language acquisition. Many of the memoirs of Kazakh workers who rose to prom-

inence during and after the construction of the Turksib mentioned being taken under the wing of a "conscious" worker who taught them Russian, a trade, and how to comport oneself as a proletarian.[91]

These efforts by the Turksib's "conscious workers" were important because of their multiplier effects. Everything that shock workers did on site soon came to be expected from rank-and-file workers. So, just as every work gang had to eventually participate in socialist competition (or risk being branded "alien elements"), soon each brigade of European skilled workers found itself training a Kazakh apprentice. For instance, at Illiiskoe, a major depot, the local shock workers eventually forced every brigade to train a Kazakh pupil.[92] These efforts broke down the ethnic segregation of work brigades and trained substantial numbers of Kazakhs (about three thousand at the beginning of 1931) in European workers' craft skills.[93]

In such a way, Kazakh workers were induced to overcome their hesitancy to operate machinery. As a preindustrial people with little exposure to modern technology, the Kazakh approached machinery with a combination of fear and fascination. Visitors to *auly* along the Turksib were besieged with questions regarding machinery. Although these visitors were fond of pointing out the quaint, "primitive" names the Kazakhs used for machinery (*shaitan-arba*, or "Satan cart," for automobiles, "*kara-aigara*," or "black stallion," for train), still they could not but be impressed by the burst of curiosity.[94] Crowds invariably clustered around cars, while Kazakh clans from deep in the steppe would send out emissaries to report back on what a train really looked like. Fear, too, however, was present—a point invariably noted by Soviet commentators with habitual condescension: "They [the Kazakhs] are big babies. Once a section engineer arrived in a car and took it in his head to offer a ride to a good-sized Kazakh lad. He called over the Kazakh and had him sit down next to him. The car snorted and jerked. Suddenly the Kazakh yelled out, 'Ah, a Satan cart!' as if someone hurled a head in a basket at him."[95]

The process of mastering this fear of machinery for individual Kazakhs on the Turksib could, on occasion, be quite nervewracking. The Kazakh Tansyk avoided jackhammers as some sort of half-alive beast when he first came to the worksite. When his foreman ordered him to take up a jackhammer, the following scene played itself out: "Tansyk was silent. The hammer began to cut into the stone; it knocked off sparks, then shook Tansyk and tore out of his hands. Tansyk wanted to throw down the wild machine, but he was afraid to, and, white with terror from uncontrollable shaking, he continued to press on." Despite these terrors of the damned, Tansyk soon became a skilled jackhammer man; he could reassemble the tool from scratch and made the princely sum of five rubles per day in his new position.[96] Not only foremen and managers but shock workers made it their business to create such technically proficient Kazakhs.

The workers who placed Kazakhs under their tutelage could be irritants, as well as patrons. One union activist, for instance, began a campaign to control Kazakh leisure activity: "they [the Kazakhs] spend the day chattering by the

kumiss shop and play cards in the evening." He wanted to end such frivolous activity in favor of literacy classes and "living newspapers" in the workers' club.[97] There was, indeed, nearly as much condescension in the conscious worker's approach to his Kazakh comrade as in the old "bourgeois" specialists' attitudes. The fundamental difference was that the specialist preferred to dismiss the Kazakh, while the conscious worker wanted to transform him.

These various recruitment techniques and the solicitude of the conscious workers achieved considerable success, especially in attracting young, impoverished Kazakh males to the Turksib.[98] These younger Kazakhs often became the construction site's best propagandists when they returned to their *auly* in the winter. One veteran of the railroad, the engineer Kozhevnikov, remembered that many Kazakhs had never seen a railroad but had heard of it from Kazakh navvies returning home.[99] Young men seemed to predominate among the new recruits. Sketchy statistics from late 1931 indicated that a full 30 percent of several stations' Kazakh workers were less twenty-three years old, and most were younger than thirty.[100] One foreman complained that he was getting workers as young as twelve with forged documents.[101] Because of the class war mentality of the time, as well as the constant purges, hiring preference went to Kazakhs without herds. Thus, primarily the *aul's* herdless *"jataki"* found their way onto the Turksib.[102]

These are exactly the Kazakhs who should have broken with *aul* traditionalism. As *"jataki"* without herds or social standing, these men faced bleak futures in the traditional Kazakh way of life. The Turksib offered these young men something sorely lacking in the *auly* until then—social mobility. Many came to the Turksib as unskilled navvies, received training for skilled positions, and eventually rose in the industrial hierarchy. A good example of this dynamic can be seen in the testimony of Uruspek Amangel'dinov. He arrived at site totally illiterate and unable to understand a single word of Russian:

> At that time I was the most curious of the lads in the *aul.* I became familiar with the builders so I became one of them. They persuaded me to come work with them, to hammer in the surveying pegs. The work did not require much wit, but I was in seventh heaven, especially when the route took us past my comrades in the *aul.* That's how I became the foster child of the builders. One of them taught me Russian, another taught me how to lay railroad ties quickly, and a third explained to me how to set up the steel rails. Soon they sent me, barely comprehending the first thing about letters, to the course for railway brigadiers and I studied for six whole months. Two years past, once again I studied in school and graduated as an assistant road master. And such attention, of course, was not put on me alone but to hundreds and thousands of Kazakh lads—future railroad workers.[103]

Amangel'dinov's impression of the Turksib as a huge engine for social mobility is borne out by the data. Already in mid-1929, on the Northern Construction nearly five hundred Kazakhs were enrolled in technical courses. In 1930 alone,

sixty-nine "illiteracy eradication bases" taught more than 2,700 enrolled Kazakhs the rudiments of reading and writing.[104] Furthermore, to fulfill its huge demand for railroad workers, the Turksib adopted a crash training program that heavily recruited among Kazakhs. In summer 1930, among twenty distinct courses that enrolled 899 students, only 260 students were Europeans. The 1931 training plan was even more ambitious—2,470 trainees in all, with only 514 spots reserved for Europeans. This program soon became a massive in-house training effort to educate nearly seven thousand former construction workers to take permanent positions on the new railroad. In the years 1931–1934, the Turksib's courses and apprenticeship programs churned out 8,200 skilled workers, 4,500 of them Kazakhs.[105] The emphasis on training Kazakhs was not merely a political decision. The management found Kazakhs more likely to stay on at the Turksib than to relocate to another railroad, and, at least in some cases, they were more attentive students than the Europeans.[106]

More was involved in the attracting Kazakhs to the railroad, however, than "pull mechanisms," such as social mobility. Several very strong "push mechanisms" also acted on Kazakh jobseekers. As part of its "socialist offensive," the regime attacked traditional pastoral lifestyles with collectivization, forced settlement of nomads, and "dekulakization" of the average nomad. Kazakhs responded to this coercion by slaughtering their herds, attempting to emigrate from the Soviet Union, and taking themselves out of the agricultural economy.[107] Famine soon gripped the steppe. A tremendous tragedy, caused by ignorance, zealotry, and cruelty, undermined the entire nomadic lifestyle. In this environment, the Turksib's wages, especially its guaranteed rations, became increasingly attractive. While construction of the Turksib ended before the full impact of this downward spiral was felt, the years 1929–1930 already presented hardships enough for Kazakhs to want another option than "petite bourgeois" livestock herding.

This push and pull, along with the Turksib's increased attention to Kazakh recruitment, meant a marked increase in the numbers of Kazakhs working on the Turksib. In the 1928 season an average of 2,924 Kazakhs were employed per month on the Turksib; this figure rose to 6,310 in 1929 (the peak building season) and held at 5,417 in 1930 (see figure 1). Moreover, while only forty-three Kazakhs, on average, held management positions in 1928, by 1930 this number had tripled to 145. In 1930 alone, the number of Kazakh skilled workers rose from seventy to 503.

Despite this growth, many supporters of Kazakh affirmative action were disappointed. In April 1930, Ryskulov admitted that the Turksib's affirmative-action program was less than successful: "In this area we have done important work. Yet, neither in extent nor quality, have we guaranteed the fulfillment of the government's decrees on recruiting the local population to work on the Turksib."[108] This disappointment stems not from the numbers of Kazakhs working on the Turksib but from their percentage in the workforce. The Turksib rarely met even its lowered 30 percent quota for hiring Kazakhs. The number of Kazakhs at the worksite hovered between a quarter and a third of the workforce. Even if



Figure 1. Number of Kazakhs Employed on the Turksib (Apr. 1928–Dec. 1930)

the quota is construed more narrowly as a percentage of workers instead of workforce (thereby omitting white-collar workers), the Turksib still failed to meet its quota, reaching a high of 27 percent in spring 1930.[109] Although considerable numbers of Kazakh workers were involved in the building of the Turksib (nearly seven thousand in June 1929), many more who might have been hired, and whom the Turksib had been ordered to hire, were not.

Two factors doomed the Turksib in its effort to maintain its quota. One was the helter-skelter dash to finish the railroad ahead of schedule as a gift to Stalin. The management accomplished this by greatly increasing the numbers of workers over the original labor plan. The 1929 labor plan had called for an average of sixteen thousand workers per month, rather than the twenty-two thousand that were used. Had the Turksib kept to the original figure and recruited the same number of Kazakhs, it would have easily met its quota of 37 percent. Kazakh recruitment tended to be overwhelmed by a desperate desire to grab hold of bodies, any bodies, to fulfill the construction plan. Those jobs, through the 1930 season, continued to be filled by *samotyok*. Second, Kazakh turnover, while declining, remained substantially higher than European turnover. In June 1929, Kazakh labor turnover, at 34.2 percent, was nearly double the European rate of 18.7 percent.[110] These factors greatly complicated the Turksib's efforts to reach its quota. One foreman probably spoke for the entire management when he said, "They tell us we have to use the locals as workers, give wages to the Kazakh poor, and involve the Kazakh nomad in the construction of the railroad. But it's not as easy to do as it seems."[111]

Nonetheless, the affirmative action program that made up the heart of nativization was much more successful than these numbers might indicate. A whole cadre of Kazakhs first gained exposure to industrial civilization working on the railroad. Within a year of the railroad's opening, they already made up 22 percent of its skilled workers. Throughout the 1930s, Kazakhs constituted about one-third of the Turksib's labor force.[112] By 1940, seventy-nine locomotive engineers, 123 assistant engineers, and nearly two hundred train schedulers were Kazakhs.[113] By

mid-decade Kazakhs had cracked the ranks of the higher technical specialties and white-collar employment on the railroad (they made up 8.2 percent of the technical staff and 8.7 percent of the white-collar workforce).[114]

Hidden in these statistics are several stunning success stories. Mukhtar Kaptagaev, for instance, arrived on the Turksib as an illiterate shepherd. He began work as a navvy, became a stonemason, and learned how to read. At this point, he asked to become a boiler stoker (or fireman), and from this position he learned how to become an engine driver, the worker aristocrat of the railroads. Kaptagaev's social rise did not end here, however. He became a leading Stakhanovite and was elected as a delegate to the USSR's Supreme Soviet.[115] Not every socially mobile Kazakh ended up as a delegate to the Supreme Soviet, but Kazakhs' advancement must have seemed substantial to them in any case. Another Kazakh alumnus of the Turksib, Dzhumagali Omarov, rose higher still. A former shepherd who came to the Turksib in 1927 as an "expediter" (in other words, a gopher), Omarov had already risen to the position of assistant section chief in April 1930. After a stint as an engine driver, he was sent to the Transport Academy in 1934, and at the end of the war he had become the railroad's second-in-command. In the years after the war, Omarov became the first Kazakh director of the railroad.[116] Thus, the Turksib not only produced a Kazakh working class but also opened up for Kazakhs the road to middle-class respectability and the industrial elite. This stories could be repeated for literally dozens of Kazakhs who would rise to the level of skilled worker, white-collar manager, and party cadre worker. In a sense, the construction turned out to be not simply the "forge of the Kazakh proletariat" but also the forge of Kazakhstan's *nomenklatura.*

The Turksib caused a cultural revolution among the Kazakh nomads it recruited. The very fact that it presented an alternative to traditional nomadism had a subversive effect on local Kazakh society. The Kazakhs on the Turksib, or so it was alleged, were much more likely to eschew the traditional religious holidays; they rarely used their wages to buy flocks.[117] More important, to the regime and to its supporters, the experience of the Turksib undercut traditional hierarchies and recast the identities of its Kazakh workers within the acceptable Marxist schema. A Kazakh journalist, Gashimbaev, saw the Turksib as a giant engine for raising class consciousness:

> Well, yes, at Dossier and Rider, at Karsakpai there are Kazakh workers but they are individuals, they are not from the depths of the steppe. But here there are thousands! . . . In a year, maybe in a month, these thousands of steppe dwellers will know that the clan is rubbish, a trap very convenient for *beys*, that there are only two clans—workers and exploiters. This will be such a "confiscation" of the *beys'* moral basis that it can hardly be compared to a propaganda campaign alone.[118]

As Gashimbaev had hoped, nomadic Kazakh entered the industrial workforce in huge numbers during the 1930s. By 1934, Kazakhs comprised 64 percent of

the republic's coal miners, 74 percent of its oil workers, 44 percent of its nonferrous miners, and 82 percent of its leather workers.[119] By 1936, Kazakhs made up 41 percent of the republic's industrial workers. Considering that their weight in the republic's population had fallen to little more than 35 percent, these figures show excellent "saturation" of industry by the titular nationality.[120] The new railroad itself played a large role in this transformation, growing thirteen times over the course of the 1930s and 1940s.[121] According to the party line in the early 1950s: "As a result of Stalin's nationalities' policy and the fraternal aid of the Russian nation, Kazakhstan was transformed from a backward outpost of Tsarist Russia. It bypassed capitalist forms of development to become a mighty socialist agrarian and industrial economy with mechanized agriculture, and became one of the most important bases of the non-ferrous metallurgical industry."[122]

Yet this triumphal assertion tells only half the story, and that half not well. The very thing Ryskulov had warned against, the forced settlement of the nomads, occurred. The Soviet government did not simply create the conditions to attract Kazakhs to industry; it pushed the few survivors of the famine and dislocation of the early 1930s out of the only life many of them had known. The quickness of the transformation of Kazakhs from nomads to proletarians was accomplished not just through positive inducements but through a very violent dispossession. Millions starved or emigrated, millions more forever abandoned the nomadic lifestyle that had defined *Kazakshilik*—the quality of being Kazakh. Class and ethnic identity may perhaps be conceived as an "imagined community," but this identity is, of course, limited by what is imaginable. After the famine, the nomadic way of life sank into the realm of the unimaginable.

The Kazakhs certainly did forge a new identity in the industrial establishments of the 1930s, but not one that the Russians handed to them "by fraternal aid." As one trade union representative on the Turksib observed about his Kazakh membership, "they earned their place in the proletariat."[123] Kazakhs also really did seem to replace their clan and tribal affiliations with a new class identity. When S. M. Ivanov, one of Shatov's deputies, out of politeness, asked a Kazakh to name his clan, the Kazakh replied, "We are not from a clan, we are proletarians."[124] Although the temptation is to cast doubt on the veracity of this statement, we should not be so quick to dismiss it. Here, the question "Are we not workers, as well?" has been recast as an assertion of identity. Moreover, the Kazakh was not speaking in a politicized forum where propaganda-speak, or "speaking Bolshevik," could be expected. And Ivanov was genuinely surprised by the answer.

Should we be? Some evidence points to the assertion of new identities in the "forge" of the Turksib. Unlike in the surrounding countryside, clan competition among Kazakhs who worked on the Turksib was so low as to rarely earn mention. Kazakh workers generally were thrown into work gangs of mixed clan and tribal affiliation, yet this caused almost no difficulty on the worksite. Mixing Europeans and Kazakhs in such work gangs, as noted, was much more difficult. Why, however, did Ivanov's Kazakh call himself a proletarian, rather than a Kazakh? In

part, because of the highly charged ethnic atmosphere on the worksite, his ethnicity would have been self-evident and therefore unnecessary of comment. The Kazakh quota, nativization, and vicious ethnic conflict all acted to strongly mark ethnicity on the Turksib. And, of course, being a worker in a workers' state was exactly the identity to which many of the Turksib's Kazakh employees most aspired.

One might speculate that Ivanov's Kazakh identified himself as a proletarian because a supraethnic identity such as "proletarian" allowed him to enter a privileged stratum without surrendering his ethnic identity. Unfortunately, such a neat tradeoff was not possible. Despite the regime's emphasis on nativization, "conscious" Russian workers controlled the image of the proletarian. In this way, Russification, in some ways more pernicious than racist hostility, came in the back door of class. The roots of present-day Kazakhs' concerns with the *mankurty*—the large number of them who have assimilated to Russian language and culture—lies not only in the destruction of Kazakh traditional society but also in the peculiar effects of "nativization." A policy designed to overcome colonial domination and to integrate "backward" nomads into wider socialist society was in some ways spectacularly successful. Kazakhs did coalesce around a larger national identity, and many of them came to embrace a modern, industrial society. Few other "empires" beside the Soviet Union could boast the numbers of native elites trained to assume roles of political, cultural, and economic leadership in the face of the sort of ethnic discrimination that pervaded the Turksib. One finds it hard to imagine an Omarov finding such opportunities for social advancement under tsarism. On the other hand, nativization colonized the Kazakh consciousness far more effectively than tsarism's malignant contempt of its nomads. Kazakh traditional society was crushed with appalling brutality, and the refuge offered Kazakhs, Soviet industry, could offer poor solace to those who saw their way of life destroyed by an alien system. That Russification and assimilation to European norms was the price for inclusion in this system should not surprise us—the Kazakhs, despite the efforts of their National Communists, did not control the rules of the industrial sphere into which they were thrust. The *basmachi* raids on the Turksib represented a response to the Soviet nation and class-building project just as legitimate as Omarov's. In the final analysis, the experience of the Turksib indicates that Soviet nationalities policy acted as both a destroyer of nations and a creator of a new Kazakh nation. Moreover, the Turksib project shows that the formation of social identities, class or ethnic, is the product of a complex and nuanced interaction among the state, social formations, and the individual—that the communities are not only imagined but what is imaginable.

Notes

1. Terry Martin, *The Affirmative Action Empire: Ethnicity and the Soviet State, 1923–1939* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2001). Affirmative action need not be based

only on ethnicity. Indeed, the early Soviet state granted preferential treatment on the basis of class, gender, and age, as well as ethnicity. For class-based affirmative action see Sheila Fitzpatrick, *Education and Social Mobility in the Soviet Union, 1921–1934* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); V. Z. Drobizhev et al., *Sotsial'naia politika Sovetskogo gosudarstva: ukreplenie vedushchei roli rabochego klassa v sotsialisticheskom stroitel'stve* (Moskva: Mysl', 1985). For gender-based affirmative action see Gregory J. Massell, *The Surrogate Proletariat: Moslem Women and Revolutionary Strategies in Soviet Central Asia, 1919–1929* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974); Wendy Z. Goldman, *Women, the State and Revolution: Soviet Family Policy and Social Life, 1917–1936* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), especially pp. 109–118. On preferential treatment for youth see Yuri Slezkine, "From Savages to Citizens: The Cultural Revolution in the Soviet Far North, 1928–1938," *Slavic Review* 51, no. 1 (Spring 1992): 52–76; William J. Chase, *Workers, Society and the Soviet State; Labor and Life in Moscow, 1918–1929* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1987), pp. 150–153.

2. Upward of 1.75 million Kazakhs perished in the years 1931–1933, while more than 500,000 nomadic and seminomadic households were forced to abandon their traditional pastoral economies. Zh. Abylkhozin, M. Kozybaev, and M. Tatinov, "Kazakhstanskaia tragediia," *Voprosy istorii*, no. 7 (1989); Anatoly M. Khazanov, "Ethnic Stratification and Ethnic Competition in Kazakhstan," in his *After the USSR: Ethnicity, Nationalism, and Politics in the Commonwealth of Independent States* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1995), p. 158. Olcott states that 3.3 million Kazakhs died and another 1.2 million were driven into exile by famine but gives no source for these figures; Martha Brill Olcott, "Ceremony and Substance: The Illusion of Unity in Central Asia," in Michael Mandelbaum, ed., *Central Asia and the World: Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1994), p. 19. Both Maksudov and Ellman argue for a lower figure, around 1.3 to 1.5 million. See Sergei Maksudov, *Poteri naseleniia SSSR* (Benson, Ver.:, 1989); Michael Ellman, *Soviet Studies* 51 (1990): 812–813; Ellman, *Soviet Studies* (1992): 914. Finally, a semiauthoritative number of famine victims was published by *Izvestiia* on June 11, 1991. Here the number of dead was placed at 2.5 million. Cited in *Tak eto Bylo: Natsional'nye repressii v SSSR 1919–1952 gody*, vol. I (Moskva: Insan, 1993), p. 41. For more on the famine see T. Nusipbaev and N. Zhiengaliev, eds., *Golod v Kazakhskoi stepi* (Na kazakhskom, russkom iazikakh) (Almaty: Kazak universitet, 1991).

3. For cogent and sophisticated discussions of the genesis and implementation of the Soviet Nationalities policy see Yuri Slezkine, "The USSR as a Communal Apartment, or How a Socialist State Promoted Ethnic Particularism," *Slavic Review* 53, no. 2 (Summer 1994): 414–452; Terry Martin, *The Affirmative Action Empire*, pp. 15–63; Gerhard Simon, *Nationalism and Policy toward the Nationalities in the Soviet Union; From Totalitarian Dictatorship to Post-Stalinist Society* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1986), pp. 20–70; Ronald Grigor Suny, *The Revenge of the Past: Nationalism, Revolution, and the Collapse of the Soviet Union* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), pp. 84–126.

4. The Turksib produced the usual First Five-Year Plan flurry of pamphlets, popular accounts, literary works, and other artistic representations of the Great Leap Forward. The work of Ilf and Petrov for *Gudok* on the subject is probably the most enduring. Typically, the best representation of the Turksib is their farcical lampoon of the dignitaries sent out on a special train to watch the "golden spike" ceremony in *The Golden Calf*. See I. Ilf and E. Petrov, "Zolotoi telenok," in *Sobrianie sochinenii*, vol.

2 (Moskva: Khudozhestvennoe izdatel'stvo, 1961), pp. 289–328. The movie *Turksib* became one of the iconic films of Stalinist cinema through its representation of Communism's goal of transforming the "backward East." See Jay Leyda, *Kino: A History of the Russian and Soviet Film* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1960), pp. 260–261.

5. For the well-developed Kazakh ethnic identity see Kemal H. Karpat, "The Roots of Kazakh Nationalism: Ethnicity, Islam, or Land?" in Marco Buttino, ed., *In a Collapsing Empire: Underdevelopment, Ethnic Conflicts and Nationalisms in the Soviet Union* (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1993); Shirin Akiner, *The Formation of Kazakh Identity: From Tribe to Nation-State* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1995). On the use of the common ethnonym as a signifier of collective identity "Kazak," see Akiner, *The Formation of Kazakh Identity*, p. 11; T. A. Zhdanko, "Ethnic Communities with Survivals of Clan and Tribal Structure in Central Asia and Kazakhstan in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century," in Wolfgang Weisslender, ed., *The Nomadic Alternative: Modes and Models of Interaction in the African-Asian Deserts and Steppes* (The Hague: Mouton, 1978), p. 142. On the common literary tradition creating a "fiction" of Kazakhness, especially the oral tradition, see Thomas G. Winner, *The Oral Art and Literature of the Kazakhs of Central Asia* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1958), pp. 26–29, 45–47; on the common literary language see Isabelle Kreindler, "Ibrahim Altynsarin, Nikolai Ilminskii and the Kazakh National Awakening," *Central Asian Survey* 2, no. 3 (November 1983): 99–116. For good discussions of nomadism's importance to Kazakh identity see Martha Brill Olcott, *The Kazakhs* (Stanford: Hoover Institute Press, 1987), pp. 76–79; and Akiner, *The Formation of Kazakh Identity*, p. 15–16.

6. A Soviet journalist's account of traditional power relations in an *aul* near the Turksib shows clearly why it would upset Marxist sensibilities. He reported the remarks of a *bey* (a wealthy herder often considered equivalent to a *kulak* in Bolshevik demonology) who owned eight hundred rams, 120 horses, and many camels and steers. The *bey*, enunciating values quite consonant with the Kazakh political system of deference for age and authority, bragged, "In my clan there are no disobedient. All the poor and middling serve me." The quote was reported with outrage. S. Volk, *Turksib: Ocherki stroiki* (Moskva: Molodaia Gvardia, 1930), p. 54.

7. RGAE, fond 1884, opis' 80, delo 244, ll. 9–30: Zhurnal zasedanii podkomissii po novym putiam soobshcheniia, 12/2/26, no. 31; ll. 138–59: Doklad Kollegii, "O Turkestan-Sibirskoi Magistrali," 1/27; ibid., delo 251, ll. 20–46: Doklad, "Turkestano-Sibirskaia zhel. doroga"; ibid., delo 349, ll. 56–84: Doklad A. B. Khalatova SovNarKomu RSFSR, 2/4/27, "Materialy k postroike Semirechenskoi zheldor"; ibid., delo 351a, ll. 2–3: Rezoliutsiia po khoziaistvenno-operatsionnomu planu na 1926/27g, 2/2/27; ibid., ll. 4–20: Doklad sostoianiia sel'skogo khoziaistva, zhivotnovodstva, veterinarnogo dela, lesnogo khoziaistva Dzhetysu v 1925–26 godu; ibid., ll. 138–159: Doklad Kollegii, "O Turkestan-Sibirskoi Magistrali," 1/27.

8. TsGA Kaz SSR, f. 131 (Kaz TsP Stroitelei), op. 1, d. 10, ll. 108–110.

9. In fact, many of leaders of the so-called bourgeois nationalist Kazakh Alash Orda movement staffed government and party staffs in Kazakhstan well into the 1920s. Moscow needed native bodies, and it was none too picky about how it got them. Sometimes, bare literacy and a lack of open antagonism to the new regime was sufficient. As F. I. Goloshchekin, Moscow's viceroy in Kazakhstan, stated somewhat plaintively in 1927, the krai party had "recruited into the Party, Soviet, union and economic apparatus all the literate and half-literate Kazakhs that we have." Martin, *The Affirmative Action Empire*, p. 197.

10. Hélène Carrère d'Encausse, "The National Republics Lose their Independence," in Edward Allworth, ed., *Central Asia: A Century of Russian Rule* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), pp. 259–260; V. M. Ustinov, *Sluzhenie narodu*, pp. 34–40; "O 'formirovanii Kazakhskoi natsii' i Kazakhskom Proletariate," in Ryskulov, *Izbrannye trudy*, pp. 119–126; on Ryskulov's hope of "leaping over historical stages," see Tulepbaev, *Sotsialisticheskie agrarnye preobrazheniia*, pp. 12–13, 54. For the quote, see G. F. Dakhshleiger, *V. I. Lenin i problemy Kazakhstanskoi istoriografii* (Alma-Ata: Nauka, 1978), p. 123.

11. Even those Kazakhs accused of being under the influence of *beys* and mullahs, such as S. Sadvokasov, did not reject the need for "forced industrialization." In fact, Sadvokasov wrote a stinging denunciation of Soviet investment policy as a continuation of Tsarist colonialism in 1926. See S. B. Baishev, ed., *Istoriia industrializatsii Kazakskoi SSR* (1926–1931gg.), vol. 1 (Alma-Ata: Nauka, 1967), pp. 206–208. There was a wide range of opinions within Kazakhstan's party, but generally Kazakh members, like the "leftist" Sadvokasov and the "rightist" S. Khodzhanov, supported modernization. European officials, such as Goloshchekin, were more likely to stress the prematurity of industrialization for such a "primitive" population, despite the party program. Such men supported industrialization, but they simply took the "Great Power chauvinist position" that Kazakhs should not be the primary beneficiaries of such a program. See N. Dzhagfarov, "Natsional'no-uklonizm: Mify i real'nost'," in *O proshlom—dlia bydushchego: Nekotorye aktual'nye problemy istorii Kompartii Kazakhstana v svete glasnosti* (Alma-Ata: Kmzakhstan (1990), pp. 167–176, 180–181. For an impartial, if deeply uninformed account of the divisions within Kazakhstan's party, see "Natsional'nye momenty politiki v Kazakhstane," *Arkhiv Trotskogo* vol. 2, pp. 197–199. For similar attitudes in favor of industrialization among Ukrainian and Uzbek national Communists see George Liber, *Soviet Nationality Policy, Urban Growth, and Identity Change in the Ukrianian SSR, 1923–1934* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 114–115; Simon, *Nationalism and Policy*, p. 96.

12. For a sense of the condescension towards nomadism see Volk's description of a migratory *aul* he met during his perambulations around the Turksib; Volk, *Turksib: Ocherki stroiki*, pp. 41–42.

13. GosArkhiv UMVD po Semipalatinskoi oblasti, f. 74 (OkrIspolKom), op. 1, d. 19, ll. 385–413; Stenogramma rasshirennogo zasedaniia Prezidiuma KomSoda, 6/19/28.

14. A. Bekkulov and K. Mizambekov, *Stal'nye magistrali Kazakhstana* (Alma-Ata: Kazakhskoe Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo, 1960), p. 24.

15. RGAE, fond 1884, opis' 80, delo 244, l. 243; Vypiska iz Protokola No. 13 zasedaniia Soveta Narodnykh Kazakskoi ASSR ot 12/29/26; RGAE, f. 1884 (NarKomPutSoob), op. 80, d. 351b, ll. 142–162; Stenogramma zasedaniia Komiteta Sodeistviia, 12/22/27; Respublikanskii Partiinyi arkhiv Kazakhstana (PartArkhiv), f. 185 (PolitOtdel Turksiba), op. 1, ed. khr 1, ll. 7–10; Rezoliutsiia po dokladu o polozhenii Kazakskoi rabochei sily i mezhnatsional'nykh vzaimootnosheniiakh na postroike iuzhnoi chasti Turksiba, 7/29; TsGA Kaz SSR, f. 1129 (Uprav. Turksiba), op. 8, d. 53, ll. 88; Prikaz No. 429, "O korenizatsii," 2/19/30.

16. "Priezd tov. Shatov v Alma-Ata," *Dzhetysuiskaia iskra*, no. 34(183), 4/7/27, p. 1.

17. Grigorii Dakhsleiger, *Turksib—Pervenets sotsialisticheskoi industrializatsii* (Alma-Ata: Izdatel'stvo Akademii nauka Kazakhshoi SSR, 1958), p. 49.

18. RGAE, fond 1884, op. 80, d. 244, ll. 134–5: Protokol NKTrud RSFSR, 1/29/27; TsGA Kaz SSR, fond 138, op. 1, d. 1246, ll. 98–99: Protokol No. 14 zasedaniia prezidiuma KazSovProfa, 2/22/27

19. RGAE, fond 1884, op. 80, d. 351b, ll. 142–162: Stenogramma zasedaniia Komiteta Sodeistviia, 12/22/27.

20. This reliance on "imported labor" seems to have been ubiquitous in the 1920s. Roger Pethybridge, *One Step Backwards, Two Steps Forward: Soviet Society and Politics in the New Economic Policy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), p. 397.

21. "K postroike Semirechenskoi zh. d.; Nadbor rabochikh budet proizveden na meste," *Dzhetysuiskaia iskra*, no. 3 (152), 10/1/27, p. 5; see also RGAE, fond 1884, opis' 80, delo 351a, ll. 55–56: Prot. No. 3 zasedaniia KomSoda, 5/vi.27 goda; M. Kh. Asylbekov, "O deiatel'nosti Komiteta sodeistviia postroiki Turkestano-Sibirskoi zheleznoi dorogi," *Izvestiia AN Kaz SSR*, Seriia obshchestvennaia nauka, 6 (1969), pp. 39–40; GosArkhiv UMVD po Semipalatinskoi oblasti, f. 74 (OkrIspolKom), op. 1, d. 19, ll. 385–413: Stenogramma rasshirennogo zasedaniia Prezidiuma KomSoda, 6/19/28; "Vse vnimanie stroitel'stvu," *Dzhetysuiskaia iskra*, no. 48 (197), 5/15/27, p. 3.

22. RGAE, fond 1884, opis' 80, delo 351(b), ll. 66–69: Postanovlenie Sovet Narodnykh Komissarov RSFSR, 12/10/27; "Po SSSR; Pravitel'stvo SSSR o Turk.-Sibe," *Dzhetysuiskaia iskra*, 1927, no. 138 (287), 12/15/27, p. 1.

23. In August there were only 3,408 workers on the Turksib, 40 percent of whom were Kazakhs. RGAE, fond 1884, op. 80, d. 351b, ll. 210–214: Svodka No 5 vyderzhek iz pechati (*Sovetskaia step'*, 1/8/28, "Dzhetysu dait 10,300 rabochikh."); TsGA Kaz SSR, fond 131, op. 3, d. 2, ll. 14–37: Resheniia KraiKomom po Turksibu; ibid., delo 91, ll. 12–22: Protokol No. 6/67 zasedaniia KSPS, 2/7/28.

24. RGAE, fond 1884, op. 80, d. 351b, ll. 47–53: Pis'mo Borisova Rudzutaku, 10/24/27.

25. Sokol, *The Revolt of 1916*, 33–43; Olcott, *The Kazakhs*, 83–99. On the 1916 Revolt see Sokol, *The Revolt of 1916*, pp. 111, 114–128; On the *basmachis* see Olcott, *The Kazakhs*, p. 152; Iu. A. Poliakov and A. I. Chuganov, *Konets basmachestva* (Moskva: "Nauka," 1976).

26. Dakhshleiger, *Turksib—Pervenets sotsialisticheskoi industrializatsii*, p. 45; O. Romancherko, *Kogda otstupaiut gory (O stroitel'stve Turksibe)*, (Mosrow: Politicheskaia literatury, 1968), p. 44.

27. Dakhshleiger, *Turksib—Pervenets sotsialisticheskoi industrializatsii*, p. 45; Romancherko, *Kogda otstupaiut gory (O stroitel'stve Turksibe)*, p. 29

28. Romancherko, *Kogda otstupaiut gory (O stroitel'stve Turksibe)*, p. 30.

29. I. Kruch, "Mne vypalo schast'e," in N. S. Nikitin (compiler), *Turksib—Magistral' sotsializma: Sbornik podgotovlen po initiative i pri aktivnom uchastii veteranov Turksiba* (Alma-Ata: Kazakhstan, 1986), pp. 155–156. These *basmachi* raids were probably not directed against the Turksib per se but rather were an outgrowth of the population's resistance to Stalin's collectivization drive. Lynne Viola notes that this resistance was particularly well organized in Central Asia and peaked at the same time that attacks on the Turksib were most prevalent. See Lynne Viola, *Peasant Rebels under Stalin: Collectivization and the Culture of Peasant Resistance* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 159–160.

30. Kruch, "Mne vypalo schast'e," pp. 155–156.

31. RGAE, fond 1884, opis' 80, delo 351a, ll. 220–242; Stenogramma plenuma KomSoda, 9/28/27.

32. GosArkhiv UMVD po Semipalatinskoi oblasti, f. 74 (Semip. OkrIspolKom), op. 1, d. 19, ll. 385–413; Stenogramma rasshirennogo zasedaniia Prezidiuma KomSoda, 6/19/28; see also TsGA Kaz SSR, f. 83 (Kaz NarKomTrud), op. 1, d. 289, ll. 8–21.

33. TsGA Kaz SSR, f. 239 (DorProfSozh Turksiba), op. 1, d. 3, ll. 136–143; Protokol obshchego uzlovogo sobraniia (Aiaguza), 8/28/30.

34. Volk, *Turksib: Ocherki stroiki*, pp. 55–56.

35. E. Kotenov, "Vesna 1929-go goda na Pervoi Stroitel'noi Uchastke," Z. Ostrovskii (compiler), *Turksib: Sbornik statei uchastnikov stroitel'stva Turkestano-sibirskoi zheleznoi dorogi* (*Moscow*: TransPechat', 1930), p. 221.

36. A. Tavashev, "Rol' Turksib v proletarianizatsii Kazakhstana," in Z. Ostrovskii (compiler). *Turksib: Sbornik statei*, Moscow p. 40.

37. Viti Fedorovich, *Konets pustyni: Ocherki*, Moscow: Federatsiia, 1931), p. 122.

38. TsGA Kaz SSR, fond 131, opis' 2, delo 54, ll. 155–157; Protokol No. 21 zasedaniia Pravleniia DorLinOtdela VSSR Turksiba, 12/29/30.

39. TsGA Kaz SSR, f. 131 (Kaz TsP Stroitelei), op. 1, d. 109, ll. 2–5. Protokol No. 10 rasshirennogo zasedaniia Orgbiuro LinOtdel SevTurksiba, 9/28/27.

40. TsGA Kaz SSR, f. 131 (Kaz TsP Stroitelei), op. 1, d. 109, ll. 54–57; Protokol No. 8 zasedaniia Pravleniia LinOtdela SevTurksiba, 5/18/28; TsGA Kaz SSR, f. 1129 (Uprav. Turksiba), op. 8, d. 50, l. 34; Prikaz SevTurksiba No. 18, "Ob uvolnenii Kazakov," 1/19/29; PartArkhiv, f. 185 (PolitOtdel Turksiba), op. 1, ed., khr. 3, ll. 148–150.

41. Tok, "V mery administrator," *Priirtyshskaia pravda*, no. 21 (272), 1/26/30, p. 3.

42. GosArkhiv UMVD po semipalatinskoi oblasti, fond 577, delo 12, ll. 18–20; Protokol No. 6/17 zasedaniia Semipalatinskogo Komiteta Sodeistviia, 4/10/29; Partiinyi Arkhiv, fond 185, opis' 1, ed. khr. 3, ll. 1–4; Protokol No. 1 zasedaniia Biuro RaiKoma VKP (b) IuzhTurksibstroia, "Rezolutssiia o korenizatsii," 2/27/29.

43. TsGA Kaz SSR, f. 83 (Kaz NarKomTrud), op. 1, d. 289, ll. 64–65; "Postanovlenie SNK KazASSR ot 2 oktiabria 1428 po protokolu Komiteta Sodeistviia stroitel'stvu Turksiba, No. 4.

44. V. Beliakov, "Rabochii vopros na Turksibe," *Sovetskii step'*, no. 225 (1430), 10/10/28, 2–3.

45. The words "Russian" and "European" were used interchangeably on the Turksib, as were "native" and "Kazakh." The "Russians" in question could have actually been Ukrainian navvies, who were employed in great numbers on the Turksib. *Priirtyshskaia pravda*, no. 21 (272), 1/26/30, p. 3.

46. Literally dozens of such managerial chauvinists could be enumerated on the Turksib. See also A. Briskin, *Na Iuzhturksibe: Ocherki Turksiba* (Alma-ata: Kazizdat', 1930), pp. 13–4.

47. Respublikanskii Partiinyi arkhiv Kazakhstana (PartArkhiv), f. 185 (PolitOtdel Turksiba), op. 1, ed. khr 1, ll. 7–10; Rezoliutsiia po dokladu o polozhenii Kazakskoi rabochei sily i mezhnatsional'nykh vzaimootnosheniiakh na postroike iuzhnoi chasti Turksiba, 7/29; PartArkhiv, f. 185 (PolitOtdel Turksiba), op. 1, ed. khr. 3, ll. 1–4; Protokol No. 1 zasedaniia Biuro RaiKoma VKP (b) IuzhTurksibstroia, "Rezolutssiia o korenizatsii," 2/27/29, PartArkhiv, f. 185 (PolitOtdel Turksiba), op. 1, ed. khr. 3, ll. 67–68; Protokol No. 22 zasedaniia Biuro RaiKoma VKP(b) IuzhTurksibstroia, 6/30/29, "Rezoliutsiia o korenizatsii;" Briskin, *Na Iuzhturksibe*, pp. 13–4.

48. GosArkhiv UMVD po Semipalatinskoi oblasti, f. 577 (Semip. Okr KK/RKI), op. 1, d. 12, ll. 18–20. Respublikanskii Partiinyi arkhiv Kazakhstana (PartArkhiv), f. 185 (PolitOtdel Turksiba), op. 1, ed. khr 1, ll. 7–10; Rezoliutsiia po dokladu o polozhenii Kazakskoi rabochei sily i mezhnatsional'nykh vzaimootnosheniiakh na postroike iuzhnoi chasti Turksiba, 7/29. TsGA Kaz SSR, fond 131, opis' 2, delo 33, ll. 174–183; Protokol zasedaniia aktiva rabochikh i sluzhashchikh pri RK No. 23 pri punkte Lepsy, 9/14/29. TsGA Kaz SSR, f. 1129 (Uprav. Turksiba), op. 8, d. 79, ll. 146–147; Prikaz No. 750 Turksiba, "O korenizatsii," 11/30/30.

49. Volk, *Turksib: Ocherki stroiki*, p. 55. Given the paucity of bathing facilities on the Turksib, it is doubtful anyone gave off a pleasant odor.

50. On the Kazakh membership of the Unions see TsGA Kaz SSR, f. 239 (DorProfSozh Turksiba), op. 2, d. 33, ll. 199b-204; PartArkhiv, f. 185 (PolitOtdel Turksiba), op. 1, ed. khr. 3, ll. 67–68; Protokol No. 22 zasedaniia Biuro RaiKoma VKP(b) IuzhTurksibstroia, 6/30/29, "Rezoliutsiia o korenizatsii." On the party's Kazakh saturation see PartArkhiv, f. 185 (PolitOtdel Turksiba), op. 1, ed. khr. 6, ll. 1–17; Protokoly No. 4, 6, 7, 7(a), 8, 9 zasedanii priemochnoi komissii po priemu v kandidaty i perevody v deistvitel'nye chleny VKP(b) pri raionnogo komiteta VKP (b) IuzhTurksiba, 8/3, 9/29, 10/14, 11/1, 11/18, 12/25/29.

51. TsGA Kaz SSR, f. 131 (Kaz TsP Stroitelei), op. 1, d. 295, ll. 214–222; "O vovlechenii kazakhov v profdvizhenii (nametka tezisov)," 4/29.

52. V. F. Kopeikin "Rabochii universitet," in *Turksib: Magistral' sotsializma*, p. 111.

53. A. Popov, "Pervye rel'sy v Lugovoi," in *Turksib: Sbornik statei* (Alma-Ata, 1985), p. 85.

54. GosArkhiv UMVD po Semipalatinskoi oblasti, f. 74 (Semip. OkrIspolKom) op. 1, d. 19, ll. 253–280; Stenogramma zasedaniia KomSoda Kaz ASSR, 8/28/28.

55. GosArkhiv UMVD po Semipalatinskoi oblasti, f. 74 (Semip. OkrIspolKom) op. 1, d. 19, ll. 253–280; Stenogramma zasedaniia KomSoda Kaz ASSR, 8/28/28.

56. GosArkhiv UMVD po semipalatinskoi oblasti, fond 141, opis' 17, delo 290, ll. 1–23; Stenogramma zasedaniia Semipalatinskogo Komiteta Sodeistviia, 8/28/29.

57. TsGA Kaz SSR, f. 83 (Kaz NarKomTrud), op. 1, d. 289, ll. 1–5; Protokol No. 21 zasedaniia kollegii Narkomtruda RSFSR, 8/25–8/28; TsGA Kaz SSR, f. 83 (Kaz NarKomTrud), op. 1, d. 289, ll. 64–65; "Postanovlenie SNK KazASSR ot 2 oktiabria 1428 po protokolu Komiteta Sodeistviia stroitel'stvu Turksiba, No. 4; d. 246, TsGA Kaz SSR, f. 83 (Kaz NarKomTrud), op. 1, d. 289, ll. 96–117; Doklad fraktsii VKP(b) TsP VSSR Kaz ob osnovnykh momentakh rabot;, TsGA Kaz SSR, f. 83 (Kaz NarKomTrud), op. 1, d. 226, l. 40; Gos Arkhiv UMVD po Semipalatinskoi oblasti, f. 577 (Semip. Okr KK/RKI) op. 1, d. 12, ll. 33–35; Kopeikin, "Rabochii universitet," p. 111.

58. TsGA Kaz SSR, f. 83 (Kaz NarKomTrud), op. 1, d. 289, ll. 1–5; Protokol No. 21 zasedaniia kollegii Narkomtruda RSFSR, 8/25–8/28; TsGA Kaz SSR, f. 83 (KazNarKomTrud), op. 1, d. 289, ll. 64–65; "Postanovlenie SNK KazASSR ot 2 oktiabria 1428 po protokolu Komiteta Sodeistviia stroitel'stvu Turksiba, No. 4; d. 246, TsGA Kaz SSR, f. 83 (Kaz NarKomTrud), op. 1, d. 289, ll. 96–117; Doklad fraktsii VKP(b) TsP VSSR Kaz ob osnovnykh momentakh rabot; TsGA Kaz SSR, f. 83 (Kaz NarKomTrud), op. 1, d. 226, l. 40; GosArkhiv UMVD po Semipalatinskoi oblasti, f. 577 (Semip. Okr KK/RKI) op. 1, d. 12, ll. 33–35; Kopeikin, "Rabochii universitet," p. 111.

59. RGAE, fond 1884, opis' 80, delo 559, ll. 170–174; Poiasnitel'naia zapiska k likvidatsion. otchetu Turksiba (Semip.-Lug.).

60. TsGA Kaz SSR, f. 131 (Kaz TsP Stroitelei), op. 3, d. 1, ll. 96–99; Protokol No. 6 zasedaniia komissii KazKraiKoma i KSPS ot 7-go septiabria, 1928-go goda; TsGA Kaz SSR, f. 131 (Kaz TsP Stroitelei), op. 1, d. 325, ll. 63–65; Rezoliutsiia 2-go Lineinogo S"ezda VSSR po organizatsionnym voprosam, 7/29; TsGA Kaz SSR, f. 131 (Kaz TsP Stroitelei), op. 2, d. 67, ll. 65–93; "Protokol No. 1-go dorozhnogo sleta udarnikov stroitelei Turkestano-Sibirskoi zh. d. otkrybshegosia 30 noiabr 1930 goda."

61. PartArkhiv, f. 185 (PolitOtdel Turksiba), op. 1, ed. khr. 1, ll. 7–10; Rezoliutsiia po dokladu o polozhenii Kazakskoi rabochei sily i mezhnatsional'nykh vzaimootnosheniiakh na postroike iuzhnoi chasti Turksiba, 7/29; Volk, *Turksib: Ocherki stroiki*, p. 55.

62. TsGA Kaz SSR, f. 1129 (Uprav. Turksiba), op. 8, d. 50, l. 69; "Ob izbienii Kazakhskogo."

63. TsGA Kaz SSR, f. 131 (Kaz TsP Stroitelei), op. 2, d. 28, ll. 196–203; f. 239 (DorProfSozh Turksiba), op. 1, d. 3, ll. 136–143; Protokol obshchego uzlovogo sobraniia (Aiaguza), 8/28/30.

64. Fedorovich, *Konets pustyni*, pp. 42–43.

65. TsGA Kaz SSR, f. 131 (Kaz TsP Stroitelei), op. 1, d. 285, ll. 19–26; Vyvody i predlozheniia PartKomissii po obsledovanymu Aiaguzskoi partorganizatsii v sviazi s natsional'nymi treniami, imeiushchimi mesto na linii Turksiba, early 1929.

66. TsGA Kaz SSR, f. 131 (Kaz TsP Stroitelei), op. 1, d. 285, ll. 19–26; TsGA Kaz SSR, f. 138 (Kaz SovProfSoiuzov), op. 1, d. 2098, ll. 17–21; Protokol No. 66/147 Prezidiuma KSPS'a, 1/17/29.

67. GosArkhiv UMVD po Semipalatinskoi oblasti, f. 74 (Semip. OkrIspolKom) op. 1, d. 20, ll. 182–183; "Kratkii doklad po voprosu nabora i ispol'zovaniia rabochei sily na postroike v stroitel'nyi sezon 1926/1927 goda i poriadke privlecheniia v 1927/28 g.," 9/27; RGAE, f. 1884 (NarKomPutSoob), op. 80, d. 251, ll. 259–261; TsGA Kaz SSR, f. 131 (Kaz TsP Stroitelei), op. 1, d. 325, ll. 12–14; Protokol No. 8/42 zasedaniia Pravleniia LinOtdela SevTurksiba, 3/1/29.

68. GosArkhiv UMVD po Semipalatinskoi oblasti, f. 74 (Semip. OkrIspolKom), op. 1, d. 19, ll. 337–343; Protokol zasedaniia Dzhetysuiskogo KomSoda, 10/4/28.

69. GosArkhiv UMVD po semipalatinskoi oblasti, fond 577, delo 12, ll. 33–35; Protokol No. 1 (12) zasedaniia Semipalatinskogo Komiteta Sodeistviia, 1/17/29.

70. Zinaida Rikhter, *Semafory v pustyne* (Moscow: Mulodaia Gvardiia, 1929), p. 218.

71. Contrary to most accounts of the building of the Turksib, Kazakhs as a whole were not completely new to railroad construction. In fact, on the Central Asian Railroad's spur line to Ekibastus, "almost all the earthwork was done by Kazakh-Kirgiz workers on foot or with horses." By all accounts, conditions on this construction were horrendous. See Dakhshleiger, *Turksib—Pervenets sotsialisticheskoi industrializatsii*, p. 11.

72. TsGA Kaz SSR, f. 131 (Kaz TsP Stroitelei), op. 1, d. 246, ll. 94–96; Doklad Biuro Fraktsii VKP(b) Tsentral'nogo Pravleniia soiuza stroitel'nykh rabochikh o Sergiopol'skim sobytiiakh (Budreiko); TsGA Kaz SSR, f. 131 (Kaz TsP Stroitelei), op. 1, d. 285, ll. 19–26; Vyvody i predlozheniia PartKomissii po obsledovanymu Aiaguzskoi partorganizatsii v sviazi s natsional'nymi treniami, imeiushchimi mesto na linii Turksba, early 1929; TsGA Kaz SSR, f. 1129 (Uprav. Turksiba), op. 8, d. 51, l. 161; Prikaz No. 78 IuzhTurksiba, "O vnimatel'nom otnoshenii k nuzhdam rabochikh stroitel'stva i nedopushchenii natsional'noi rozni," 3/19/29; "Proletarskii sud vypolnil tre-

bovanie proletarskikh mass; O sudom nakazanii vinovnikov izbieniia Kazakov v Sergiopole," *Dzhetysuiskaia iskra*, no. 16 (454), 2/10/29, p. 1.

73. RGAE, fond 1884, opis' 80, delo 251, ll. 259–261; Protokol No. 12 obshchego sobraniia rabochikh Upravleniia postroika IuzhTurksiba, 11/12/28; RGAE, fond 1884, opis' 80, delo 253, ll. 256–259; "Protokol No. 12 obshchego sobraniia rabochikh i sluzhashchikh Uprav. Postroiki IuzhTurksiba, 11/26/28.

74. TsGA Kaz SSR, fond 1129, opis' 8, delo 50, l. 12; "Prikaz No. 7 SevTurksiba, 1/11/29, "O sobytiiakh v Sergiopole 31 dekiabria."

75. TsGA Kaz SSR, f. 131 (Kaz TsP Stroitelei), op. 1, d. 246, ll. 94–95; Doklad Biuro Fraktsii VKP(b) Tsentral'nogo Pravleniia soiuza stroitel'nykh rabochikh o Sergiopol'skim sobytiiakh (Budreiko); TsGA Kaz SSR, f. 131 (Kaz TsP Stroitelei), op. 1, d. 285, ll. 19–26; Vyvody i predlozheniia PartKomissii po obsledovanymu Aiaguzskoi partorganizatsii v sviazi s natsional'nymi treniami, imeiushchimi mesto na linii Turksba, early 1929; TsGA Kaz SSR, fond 138 (Kaz SovProfSoiuzov), op. 1. d. 2098, ll. 17–21; Protokol No. 66/147 Prezidiuma KSPS'a, 1/17/29.

76. TsGA Kaz SSR, fond 1129, opis' 8, delo 50, l. 12; "Prikaz No. 7 SevTurksiba, 1/11/29, "Osobytiiakh v Sergiopole 31 dekiabria."

77. Briskin, *Na Iuzhturksibe*, p. 13–14.

78. For details on this transformation see Matt Payne, *Working on Stalin's Railroad: Turksib and the Building of Socialism, 1926–1931* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, forthcoming), ch. 4.

79. TsGA Kaz SSR, fond 131, opis' 1, delo 328, ll. 48–53; Protokol No. 23/2 zasedaniia Pravleniia LinOtdela SevTurksiba, 1/14/30.

80. TsGA RK, f. 131, op. 2, d. 53, ll. 67–76; ibid., f. 239, op. 1, d.b, ll. 136–14 ibid., f. 112 op.8, d.80, ll. 146–147.

81. TsGA Kaz SSR, f. 131 (Kaz TsP Stroitelei), op. 1, d. 246, l. 77; TsGA Kaz SSR, f. 131 (Kaz TsP Stroitelei), op. 1, d. 325, ll. 110–111; TsGA Kaz SSR, fond 131, opis' 2, delo 53, ll. 18; Prikaz No. 24 po upravleniiu i liniiu Turksib zh. d. 1/8/31, "O velikoderzhavnom shavanizme."

82. GosArkhiv UMVD po semipalatinskoi oblasti, fond 577, delo 12, ll. 33–35; Protokol No. 1 (12) zasedaniia Semipalatinskogo Komiteta Sodeistviia, 1/17/29; TsGA Kaz SSR, fond 131, opis' 1, delo 325, l. 55; Protokol No. 3 zasedaniia Pravleniia LinOtdela SevTurksiba, 6/29(?).

83. TsGA Kaz SSR, f. 83 (Kaz NarKomTrud), op. 1, d. 285, ll. 8–21; Doklad, "O rezul'tatakh obsledovaniia voprosov Truda na Turksibe i, v sviazi s stroitel'stvom Turksiba, raboty mestnikh organov Truda," 8/1/28; TsGA Kaz SSR, fond 83, opis' 1, delo 289, ll. 306–308; Doklad NKTruda KSSR, "O verbovke rabochei sily dlia stroitel'stva Turksiba," 1/29.

84. See Lewis H. Siegelbaum, *Stakhanovism and the Politics of Production in the USSR, 1935–1941* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 40–53; Hiroaki Kuromiya, "The Crisis of Proletarian Identity in the Soviet Factory, 1928–1929," *Slavic Review* 44, no. 2 (Summer 1985): 280–297; Kuromiya, *Stalin's Industrial Revolution; Politics and Workers, 1928–1932* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 78–137; Tim McDaniel, *Autocracy, Capitalism, and Revolution in Russia* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), pp. 183–212.

85. Volk, *Turksib: Ocherki stroiki*, pp. 58–59.

86. Fedorovich, *Konets pustyni: Ocherki*, p. 65.

87. Gashimbaev, "Na stroike Turksiba," *Sovetskaia step'*, no. 168 (1373), 7/26/28, p. 3.

88. Romancherko, *Kogda otstupaiut gory*, p. 45.

89. Kopeikin, "Rabochii universitet," and K. Kadyrbaev, "Rabotali i uchali," in *Turksib—Magistral' sotsializma*, pp. 111–112, 141.

90. Volk, *Turksib: Ocherki stroiki*, p. 57.

91. See for instance the stories of Kazakh promotees in S. Ivanov, "Na bystrine . . . ," *Gudok*, no. 287 (12564), 12/13/66, p. 2; G. Maralbaev, "Rozhdennyi Oktiabrem," *Zaria Kommunizma*, no. 44 (4307), 3/4/70, p. 3; Dakhshleiger, *Turksib—Pervenets sotsialisticheskoi industrializatsii*, p. 111; Romancherko, *Kogda otstupaiut gory*, p. 31.

92. Dakhshleiger, *Turksib—Pervenets sotsialisticheskoi industrializatsii*, p. 109.

93. M. Kh. Asylbekov, *Formirovanie I razvitie kadrov zheleznodorozhnikov Kazakhstana*, 1917–1977gg. (Alma-Ata: Nauka, 1973), p. 95.

94. Volk, *Turksib: Ocherki stroiki*, pp. 3–4; One such poem allegedly ran "The black stallion flies, like a bird, with the smoke of a dragon. / It exhales, like a boiling samovar, giving off a column of steam. / The black breast of the land shakes from the passage of Kara-aigr, the land delights in its iron force. / Grateful, he bears to her from afar, such things as she has never seen: / Moscow goods, cars, and books. / What wise man bethought and created you, kara-aigr? / It is our Soviet Power that has given you to us. / Befor we heard only of you from fairy tales. / What kind of ignoramus could argure against your benefits?" While one should be dubious about the authencity of such obviously proregime poetry, the larger point that Kazakhs were singing about the Turksib as something novel and fascinating seems supportable to me.

95. Fedorovich, *Konets pustyni: Ocherki*, p. 66.

96. Aleksei Kozhevnikov, "Tansyk," in *Turksib: Magistral' sotsializma*, p. 201.

97. Iuga, "Net raboty sredi Kazakov," *Priirtyshskaia pravda*, no. 150 (250), 7/3/28, p. 3.

98. TsGA Kaz SSR, fond 131, opis' 2, delo 33, ll. 199b–204; "Otchet o rabote Pravleniia LinOtdela za stroisezona 1929 goda."

99. Ot Turksiba so zapoliarnykh trass; Piatiletkami rozhdennye," *Zvezda Priirtysh'ia*, no. 56–57 (7463), 3.18.67, p. 4.

100. Asylbekov, *Formirovanie I razvitie kadrov zheleznodorozhnikov Kazakhstana*, p. 95.

101. Rikhter, *Semafory v pustyne*, p. 218.

102. "Synu bagache ne mesto sredi rabochikh," *Priirtyshskaia pravda*, no. 135 (235), 6/15/28, p. 3.

103. Ia. Petrov, "Eto uzhe istoriia," *Ogni Alatau*, no. 68, 8/4/63, p. 4.

104. Dakhshleiger, *Turksib—Pervenets sotsialisticheskoi industrializatsii*, p. 109.

105. Kopeikin, "Rabochii universitet," in *Turksib: Magistral' sotsializma*, p. 112.

106. Volk, *Turksib: Ocherki stroiki*, p. 57.

107. RTsKhIDNI, fond 17, opis' 3, delo 697; Protokol No. 35 PB TsK VKP(b), punkt 22, 7/26/28; The standard English language source for the collectivization campaign is Martha Brill Olcott, "The Collectivization Drive in Kazakhstan," *Russian Review* 40, no. 2 (April 1981): 122–43; see also Olcott, *The Kazakhs*, pp. 179–187; The standard Soviet accounts include A. B. Tursunbaev, *Kollektivizatsiia sel'skogo Kazakhstana*, 1926–1941 gg. (Alma-Ata, 1967); idem, "Perekhod k sodelosti kochevnikov i polukochevnikov Srednei Azii i Kazakhstana," *Trudy institut etnografii* 91 (1973): 223–234.

108. T. Ryskulov, "Turksib i snabzhenie srednem Azii," *Priirtyshskaia pravda*, no. 73 (774), 4/1/30, p. 3.

109. RGAE, fond 1884, opis' 80, delo 559, ll. 170–174; Poiasnitel'naia zapiska k likvidatsion. otchetu Turksiba (Semip.-Lug.)

110. RGAE, fond 1884, opis' 80, delo 559, ll. 170–174; Poiasnitel'naia zapiska k likvidatsion. otchetu Turksiba (Semip.-Lug.)

111. Rikhter, *Semafory v pustyne*, p. 218.

112. TsGA Kaz SSR, fond 239, opis' 1, delo 282, l. 10; Protokol zasedaniia DorKom po provedeniiu korenizatsii, kazakizatsii i osedaniia, 12/16/31.

113. RGAE, fond 1884, opis' 31, delo 2346, ll. 24-obv.; Doklad, "X let raboty Turkestano-Sibirskoi zh. d."

114. Asylbekov, *Formirovanie i razvitie kadrov zheleznodorozhnikov Kazakhstana*, pp. 104–105.

115. S. Ivanov, "Na bystrine . . . ," p. 2; G. Maralbaev, "Rozhdennyi Oktiabrem," *Zaria Kommunizma*, no. 44 (4307), 3/4/70, p. 3.

116. G. Isakov, "Zhit' znachit' stroit', Rasskazy o komandirakh," *Gudok*, no. 195 (17030), 8/23/81, p. 2; S. Ivanov, "Na bystrine . . . ," p. 2; G. Maralbaev, "Rozhdennyi Oktiabrem," *Zaria Kommunizma*, no. 44 (4307), 3/4/70, p. 3; K. Filippov, "Turksibu—piatnadtsat' let," *Kazakhstanskaia pravda*, no. 82 (5207), 4/29/45, p. 3; TsGA Kaz SSR, fond 131, opis' 2, delo 20, ll. 10–11; "Protokol No. 38/17 zasedanii Pravlenii Sev-Turksiba, 4/20/30."

117. Volk, *Turksib: Ocherki stroiki*, pp. 45–47; Romancherko, *Kogda otstupaiut gory*, p. 44; Tavashev, "Rol' Turksib v proletarianizatsii Kazakhstana," *Turksib: Sbornik statei*, p. 40.

118. Gashimbaev, "Kolybel' Kazakhskovo proletariata," *Sovetskaia step'*, no. 177 (1382), 8/6/28, p. 2.

119. Baishev, *Istoriia industrializatsiia Kazakhskoi SSR*, p. 17.

120. *Istoriia Kazakhskoi SSR: s drevneishikh vremen do nashikh dnei*, tom 4, 522; These gains, unfortunately, were not maintained. The relocation of industry during the war, the postwar nuclear and space program, the heavy use of Gulag labor, Khrushchev's Virgin Lands Program, and Brezhnev's reliance on imported cadres to run the oil industry all tended to isolate native Kazakhs from industrial employment. A robust, urban middle class developed thanks to the regime's nativization policy but this Russian-speaking, urban-dwelling, modernized middle class soon found a growing rift opening between it and the mass of Kazakhs who were still relatively poorly educated, rural, and Kazakh speakers. For these developments see Anatoly M. Khazanov, "Ethnic Stratification and Ethnic Competition in Kazakhstan," in *After the USSR: Ethnicity, Nationalism, and Politics in the Commonwealth of Independent States* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1995), pp. 156–174.

121. A. Bekkulov and K. Mizambekov, *Stal'nye magistrali Kazakhstana*, p. 27.

122. M. N. Mezinov, "Slavnoe dvadtsatiletie," *Dvadtsat' let Turkestano-sibirskoi zheleznoi doroge* (Alma-Ata: KazIzdat, 1950), pp. 5–10.

123. B. Budreika, "Turksib—shkola profsoiuznoi raboty," *Turksib: Sbornik statei*, p. 95.

124. Volk, *Turksib: Ocherki stroiki*, p. 57.