

Process Algebra to Model Smart Distributed Mobile Real-Time IoT Implementation Perspective for Cyber-Physical Systems

20 Sept 2019

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
Division of Computer Science and Engineering
Chonbuk National University
Republic of Korea

OMiLAB KOREA


MEMO SUMMER SCHOOL

ADOxx Meta-Modeling Platform

Modeling Hierarchy



Model Transformation/Translation




Meta-Modeling Tools

Aspects	AToM3	MetaEdit+	DOME	ADOxx
Platforms	Windows, Unix	Windows, Unix, Sun Solaris, HP	Windows, Linux, Sun Solaris	Windows
Meta-modeling language	ER	GOPRR	The DOME Tool Specification language	ADOxx Meta-modeling Language
Graphical specification?	Yes	No	Partly, the graphical appearance can't be edited in a graphical way	Yes
Hierarchy	Partly, not implement complete yet	Yes, decomposition	Yes, sub-diagram	Yes
Inheritance	No	Yes, (make dependant)	Yes	Yes
Constraint	Python function or OCL	No specific constraint language	Alter language	ADOxx Definition Language, AdoScript
Simulation	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Simulation method and implementation workload	Graph Grammar, an intuitive way, less code by hand	Report definition language, all code by hand	Alter function, all code by hand	Supported by ADOxx or all code by hand
Code generation and workload	Python source code Little code by hand	Can be any language Most code by hand	Can be any language Most code by hand	No
Report generation	No	Yes	No	Yes


Generic Modelling Method Framework

$$\text{Method} = (T+MA) \cdot (L+P)$$




Karagiannis, D., Kühn, H.: „Metamodelling Platforms“. In Bauknecht, K., Min Tjoa, A., Quirchmayer, G. (Eds.): Proceedings of the Third International Conference EC-Web 2002 – DEXA 2002, Aix-en-Provence, France, September 2002, LNCS 2455, Springer, Berlin/Heidelberg, p. 182.

ADOxx Library




A Tool on the Platform



DEMO: PBC


The screenshot displays the ADOxx Modelling Toolkit interface. The title bar reads "ADOxx Modelling Toolkit (savetest) - [ADOxx Start Page]". The menu bar includes "Model", "Edit", "View", "Process tools", "Delta calculus mechanims", "Extras", "Window", and "Help". The toolbar contains various icons for file operations and modeling. The "Explorer - Model groups" pane on the left shows a tree structure with "Models" expanded, containing "Crypto", "CryptoLocker", "IOT", "PBC", "Execution model", "GTS", "Specification", and "Production Cell". The "PBC" folder is selected. The main workspace shows nine model thumbnails arranged in a 3x3 grid. Each thumbnail has a title and a "Last change" timestamp. The thumbnails are: "P&C_tau_ITS (ITS)", "P&C_tau_ITL (ITL)", "GTS-Start S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 End (GTS)", "Execution model 29.07.2015-09:08:14 (Execution Model)", "Execution model 29.07.2015-09:07:20 (Execution Model)", "GTS-Start S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S24 S25 S26 S27 S28 S29 S30 S31 S32 ...", "GTS-Start S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 End-req (GTS)", "ITS_Iot (ITS)", and "ITL_IoT (ITL)". The "Event Logging" window at the bottom shows a list of events with timestamps and messages, including "EVENT_LOG@29/07/2015 12:39:25: S5=<P(Exit,2)B(B(put request:R2),0)C(C(get request:R1),5)R1(R1(get permit:C),0)R2(R2(put permit:B),1), T5,{R2 in B}>" and "EVENT_LOG@29/07/2015 12:39:28: ***** END *****".

SW Engineering




SW Engineering (1991~1996)

- R&D, CCCC, USA (~1996)
 - SRE(SW Re/Reverse-engineering Environment) Tool
 - DECDesign,
 - 5 years (11 yrs x 5 men)
 - USA, Navy, 100,000 ~ 1,000,000 LOC (Scalability)
 - OS: ATES, SDEX-20 → Unix, VMS
 - PL: Fortran, C, Ada83 → C, C++, Ada83, Ada95



SW Engineering



SW Engineering

Re/reverse
Engineering

1 m x 1 yr

SRE 1.0

Behavior
Ontology

2 m x 1 yr

PRISM 1.0

GTS-Logic

dT-Calculus

3 men x 2 years

SAVE 2.0

Theory

Practice

**ADOxx
Meta-Modeling Platform**

Contents

1. Motivation

2. Modeling

1) Specification: δ -Calculus

2) Verification: GTS Logic

3. SAVE Tool

4. Cyber-Physical Systems Application

5. Summary

6. Discussion

1. Motivation

2. Modeling

- 1) Specification: δ -Calculus
- 2) Verification: GTS Logic
- 3) EMS Example

3. SAVE Tool

4. Cyber-Physical Systems Application


5. Summary

6. Discussion

1. MOTIVATIONS


Mission –Critical Systems

- Properties
 - Distributedness
 - Mobility
 - Communication
 - Process Control
 - Temporality
- Characteristics
 - Complex
 - Large
 - Timeliness
- Examples
 - Telecommunication networks
 - Telemedicine
 - Process automation
 - Multimedia streaming
 - Avionics systems
 - Defense applications
- Requirements
 - Specification
 - Verification



Smart Systems

- Properties
 - Distributedness
 - Mobility
 - Communication
 - Process Control
 - Temporality
- Characteristics
 - IoT
 - Big Data
 - AI
- Examples
 - Smart Home
 - Smart Car
 - Smart Office
 - Smart Building
 - Smart City
 - Smart Factory
 - Smart Society
- Requirements
 - Safety
 - Security
 - Reliability



Accident Rates: USA

- Driving

- The National Highway Traffic Safety Admin
- Traffic Safety Facts Data
 - Year 2008
 - 1.27 fatalities per 100 million vehicle miles traveled
 - Year 1998
 - 1.58 fatalities per 100 million miles


- Flying

- The National Transportation Safety Board
- Preliminary statistics
 - Year 2008
 - 20 accidents for U.S. air carriers operating scheduled service
 - nearly zero accidents per million flying miles
 - No one died, and only 5 people were seriously injured.



<https://traveltips.usatoday.com/air-travel-safer-car-travel-1581.html>

Safety/Security Requirements for SW

Mission-Critical Systems




Smart Systems



Motivation: Secure Requirements

Year **1996**, ESA Ariane Flight 5 Failure

- Description:
 - 1996, ESA Ariane 5 Flight Exploded, at 40 seconds after launch.
- Cause of explosion:
 - A part of the flight SW, reused from Ariane 4.
 - One of the sensors in the flight 5 was designed to return a float point value.
 - But it used the code for the sensor from the Ariane 4 that was to return an integer value, which did not have an exception handler for overflow due to the inappropriate type of the return value.
 - As a result, the exception triggered a signal to the self-explosion of the flight.
- Total cost of the failure:
 - Hardware Cost: 0.37 Billion \$
 - Development Cost: 7 Billion \$.
 - Cluster II: 4 identical satellites to study the Earth's magnetosphere over the course of an entire solar cycle.



Cause: Reused Ada Source Code

Reused Ariane 4 Code for Ariane 5

```
1 procedure LIRE_DERIVE (...) is
2   ...
3   begin
4     ...
5     L_MBV_32:=TBD.T_ENTIER_32S ((1.0/C_M_LSB_BV)*
6                                   G_M_INFO_DERIVE(T_ALG.E_BV));
7     if L_M_BV_32 > 32767 then
8       P_M_DERIVE(T_ALG.E_BV) := 16#7FFF#;
9     elsif L_M_BV_32 < -32768 then
10      P_M_DERIVE(T_ALG.E_BV) := 16#8000#;
11    else
12      P_M_DERIVE(T_ALG.E_BV) := UC_16S_EN_16NS(TBD.T_ENTER_16S(L_M_BV_32));
13    end if;
14
15    P_M_DERIVE(T_ALG.E_BH) := UC_16S_EN_16NS(TBD.T_ENTER_16S
16      ((1.0/C_M_LSB_BH)*
17      G_M_INFO_DERIVE(T_ALG.E_BV)));
18  end LIRE_DERIVE;
```

The internal SRI software exception was caused during execution of a data conversion from 64-bit floating point to 16-bit signed integer value. The floating point number which was converted had a value greater than what could be represented by a 16-bit signed integer.*

```
1 procedure LIRE_DERIVE (...) is
2   ...
3   begin
4     ...
5     L_MBV_32:=TBD.T_ENTIER_32S ((1.0/C_M_LSB_BV)*
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12      P_M_DERIVE(T_ALG.E_BV) := UC_16S_EN_16NS(TBD.T_ENTER_16S(L_M_BV_32));
13    end if;
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15    L_M_BH_32 := TBD.T_ENTIER_32S ((1.0/C_M_LSB_BH)*
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17    if L_M_BH_32 > 32767 then
18      P_M_DERIVE(T_ALG.E_BH) := 16#7FFF#;
19    elsif L_M_BH_32 < -32768 then
20      P_M_DERIVE(T_ALG.E_BH) := 16#8000#;
21    else
22      P_M_DERIVE(T_ALG.E_BH) := UC_16S_EN_16NS(TBD.T_ENTER_16S(L_M_BH_32));
23    end if;
24  end LIRE_DERIVE;
```



Standards

- ESA:
 - 1975
 - Paris, France
 - 22 member states
 - Budget: 5.250 Billion Euro in 2016.
- ECSS
 - Organization: 1993
- Standardization
 - Management: ECSS-M-00
 - Assurance: ECSS-Q-00
 - Engineering: ECSS-E-00
 - SW:
 - **ECSS-E-40: SW Engineering (Version A: 1999)**
 - Derived from ISO 12207
 - **ECSS-Q-80: SW Product Assurance (Version A: 1996)**
- **ECSS-E-40**
 - SW Engineering
 - SW Engineering Process
 - Model-Based SW Engineering
 - Formal Methods
 - Tool-Based SW Engineering
 - SW life Cycle Process
- Results:
 - ~ 2013년
 - Total 67 launches; 4 failures.



ECSS-E-40C

(~2009)



Year 2018/19 Boeing 737 Max MCAS

- Boeing 737 Max, MCAS SW
 - Boeing's newest family of single-aisle airplanes
 - The fastest-selling airplane in Boeing history
 - About 5,000 orders
 - from more than 100 customers worldwide.
- MCAS
 - The Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System
 - It activates when the sensed Angle of Attack (AOA) exceeds a threshold based on airspeed and altitude.
 - That tilts the 737 Max's horizontal stabilizer upward at a rate of .27 degrees per second for a total travel of 2.5 degrees in just under 10 seconds.
 - How much the stabilizer moves depends on Mach number.
 - At higher Mach the stabilizer moves less, at slower speeds it moves more.
 - The trim system under MCAS is not stopped by simply moving the control yoke.
- Accidents
 - Indonesia Lion Jet 610 [Oct 2018]: All 189 passengers dead.
 - Ethiopian Airline 302 [March 2019]: All 157 passengers dead.
- Possible cause
 - Malfunction at sensors for angle between the wings and the air current.
 - MCAS engaged to handle the situation, and it causes the nose to drop.
 - The pilots tried to hold back the flight control, but failed.
 - The planes crashed



**Close
Investigation**

Boeing 737 Max Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System

Activates automatically when:

- Angle of attack is high
- Autopilot is off
- Flaps are up
- Steeply turning

MCAS pushes the jet's nose down to reduce the risk of stalling



MCAS moves the horizontal stabilizer trim upward at .27° per second up to 2.5° and 9.26 seconds at a time

Deactivates when:

- Angle of attack is sufficiently lowered
- Pilots override with manual trim

 THE AIR CURRENT

<https://theaircurrent.com/aviation-safety/what-is-the-boeing-737-max-maneuvering-characteristics-augmentation-system-mcas-jt610/>



DO-178C (USA)

(~2013)

RTCA, EUROCAE

Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification

DO-178B: Software Requirements and Software Design

DO-178C: + Object-oriented Programming

ISSUE LIST

Recommendation

DO-278
/ED-109

DO-178C

ED-12C

DO-178C
ED-12C
Interface Spec
for
Supplements
and Rationale
Documents

Interface
Spec.

DO-330: Software Tool Qualification Considerations

DO-331: Model-Based Development and Verification

DO-332: Object-Oriented Technology and Related Techniques

DO-333: Formal Methods

Supplement A

Supplement B

Supplement C

Supplement

Supplement N

DO-248B/ED-94B
FAQ/DP/RATIONALE

DO-248C/ED-94C
FAQ/DP/RATIONALE

International Standard Organizations and Their Standards

- ANSI: American National Standards Institute
- AIAA: American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics
- EIA: Electronic Industries Association
- IEC: International Electrotechnical Commission
- IEEE: Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Computer Society, SW Engineering Standards Committee
- ISO: International Organization for Standardization
- RTCA: Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics
- EUROCAE: European Organization for Civil Aviation Equipment
- ECSS: European Cooperation for Space Standardization

Aerospace/ Avionics Systems	Railway Systems	Nuclear Power Plants	Automobile Systems	Embedded Systems	Defense Systems	Quality Business Mgmt
ECSS-E-40 DO-178C IEEE 12207 AIAA G-010- 1993 CMMI	EN-50128	IEC-60880	ISO-26262 IEC 61508	IEC-61508	MIL-STD- 882E	ISO9001


SMART SYSTEMS

Industry 4.0 & Smart Systems

- Smart
 - Home/Office/Car
 - City/Factory/Building
- Characteristics
 - Big Data
 - Intelligence
 - Automation
- Requirements
 - Safety
 - Security
 - Reliability

IoT: Internet of Things


- Trend
 - Automation
 - Ubiquitous
 - Smart
- Character
 - Identification
 - Sensing
 - Networking
 - Processing
- Technology
 - RFID,
 - Middleware
 - Searching/browsing
- Goal: Convergence
 - Private sectors
 - Industries
 - Business
 - Financial/banking
 - Health care
 - Traffic systems
 - Public sectors
 - Admin sector
- Requirements
 - Specification
 - Verification
- Main issues
 - Security
 - Privacy



IoT Standard

- Smart City, Smart Life, and Smart World
- International standard for IoT applications
- ITU (International Telecommunication Union)
 - 15 June '15, Geneva
 - ITU-T SG20: IoT Standardization
- Plan for standardization
 - M2M(machine-to-machine) communication
 - Ubiquitous sensor network
 - Mechanism for IoT app. interoperability
 - E2E(end-to-end) architecture
- Goal: IoT standard plan
- Application area: International
 - 1) Industrial sector
 - Health care
 - Electronic device
 - Traffic systems
 - 2) Business sector
 - Financial systems
 - Banking systems
 - 3) Administration systems
 - Local government
 - Central government
- Target
 - 2020: To connect 50 Billion things

What kind of Requirements?



Motivation: SW Engineering Requirements from ECSS Standard

SW Engineering Process Models

R1

Prescriptive Process Model

Waterfall Model

Incremental Model

RAD Model

Evolutionary Model

UP Model

Agile Process Model

Extreme Programming

ASD Model

DSDM

SCRUM

Agile Modeling

R2

Generic Engineering Process

Communication

Planning

Modeling

Construction

Deployment

Modeling/Formal Methods

R3

Logic

Z

Temporal logic

I/O Automata

CASL
(Common Algebraic
Specification Language)

State Machine

LTL
(Linear temporal logic)

CTL
(Computational tree
logic)

ASM
(Abstract state Machine)

Actor model

Process Algebra

Pi-Calculus

CCS

CSP

δ -Calculus

R4

TOOLS


R5

Object-Oriented Paradigm

A Process Framework

Production Cell

BEE-UP




Umbrella Activities


- SW Project Management
- SW Quality Assurance
- SW Configuration Management
- Risk Management Management

Prescriptive SE Process Model


Waterfall Model




Incremental Model




Rapid Application Development (RAD) Model



Prototyping Model




Spiral Model




Agile SE Process Model


Extreme Programming (XP) Model




Adaptive Software Development (ASD) Model




Dynamic Systems Development Method (DSDM) Model




SCRUM Model



Feature Driven Development (FAA) Model



R1 & R2: FMM: Formal Method Model




Formal Methods

Types	Typical Methods	Characteristics	Cons
Data/Logic-Based	Z Temporal Logic CASL, etc.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Formal - Text-based - Consistency - Validity - Completeness - Soundness 	
State Machine-Based	Statechart Modechart Petri Net Timed Petri Net, etc.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Reachability - Graph-based - Structured/Hierarchy - Reactive System - Priority - Temporal properties 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Abstraction - Mobility - Syntax
Process Algebra-Based	CCS CSP ACP ACSR LOTOS Pi-Calculus Mobile Ambient, etc.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - In The Large - In The Small - Formal/Algebra - Abstraction - Equivalence: weak/strong - Bisimulation - Resource - Priority - Time - Mobility 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Understandability - Visualization

P3: Formal Methods and Mathematical Structures

M3

PRISM for Behavior Ontology



SAVE(Specification, Analysis, Verification, Evaluation)

M2


Knowledge Engineering

ADOXX

R4: SAVE & PRISM

Knowledge Engineering

Tool 2: PRISM for Behavior Ontology



Tool 1: SAVE (Specification, Analysis, Verification, Evaluation)

R5: Object-Oriented Paradigm

