

★ 70602836 Security Report - [Stack overflow in external/aac/libMpegTPDec/tpdec_asc.cpp]

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Dec 13, 2017 04:01PM

Created issue.

[summary]

04:01PM

There is a stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability in external/aac , which is part of Android Media Framework.

I've tested this on an ASAN-enabled device and it crashed due to stack overflow. According to my further analysis, this vulnerability will cause out of bound write and will affect the program's control flow. which may probably result in remote code execution.

[details]

In /external/aac/libMpegTPDec/src/tpdec_asc.cpp:563:

```

563int CProgramConfig_LookupElement(
564    CProgramConfig *pPce,
565    UINT            channelConfig,
566    const UINT      tag,
567    const UINT      channelId,
568    UCHAR           chMapping[],
569    AUDIO_CHANNEL_TYPE chType[],
570    UCHAR           chIndex[],
571    UCHAR           *elMapping,
572    MP4_ELEMENT_ID  elList[],
573    MP4_ELEMENT_ID  elType
574)
575{
-----
623     else {
624         /* Accept the additional channel(s), only if the tag is in the lists */
625         int isCpe = 0, i;
626         /* Element counter */
627         int ec[PC_NUM_HEIGHT_LAYER] = {0};          // <===== PC_NUM_HEIGHT_LAYER
is 3
628         /* Channel counters */
629         int cc[PC_NUM_HEIGHT_LAYER] = {0};
630         int fc[PC_NUM_HEIGHT_LAYER] = {0};
631         int sc[PC_NUM_HEIGHT_LAYER] = {0};
632         int bc[PC_NUM_HEIGHT_LAYER] = {0};
633         int lc = 0;;
634
-----
645         switch (elType)
646         {
647             case ID_CPE:
648                 isCpe = 1;
649             case ID_SCE:
650                 /* search in front channels */
651                 for (i = 0; i < pPce->NumFrontChannelElements; i++) {
652                     int heightLayer = pPce->FrontElementHeightInfo[i];          //
<===== if heightLayer is 3, buffer overflow
653                     if (isCpe == pPce->FrontElementIsCpe[i] && pPce->FrontElementTagSelect[i]
== tag) {
654                         int h, elIdx = ec[heightLayer], chIdx = cc[heightLayer];
655                         AUDIO_CHANNEL_TYPE aChType = (AUDIO_CHANNEL_TYPE)((heightLayer<<4) |
ACT_FRONT);
656                         for (h = heightLayer-1; h >= 0; h--) {
657                             int el;
658                             /* Count front channels/elements */
659                             for (el = 0; el < pPce->NumFrontChannelElements; el+=1) {
660                                 if (pPce->FrontElementHeightInfo[el] == h) {
661                                     elIdx += 1;
662                                     chIdx += (pPce->FrontElementIsCpe[el]) ? 2 : 1;
663                                 }
664                             }
665                             /* Count side channels/elements */
666                             for (el = 0; el < pPce->NumSideChannelElements; el+=1) {
667                                 if (pPce->SideElementHeightInfo[el] == h) {
668                                     elIdx += 1;
669                                     chIdx += (pPce->SideElementIsCpe[el]) ? 2 : 1;
670                                 }
671                             }
672                             /* Count back channels/elements */
673                             for (el = 0; el < pPce->NumBackChannelElements; el+=1) {
674                                 if (pPce->BackElementHeightInfo[el] == h) {

```

Reporter	Type
xiangxiaobo1994@gmail.com	Bug

Priority	Severity
P2	S2

Status
Fixed

Assignee	Verifier
as...@google.com	--

CC

an...@google.com
xiangxiaobo1994@gmail.com
Un-CC me

Android ID

70637599

ASR Eligible

Yes

ASR Payment

6000

ASR Severity

Critical

CVE

CVE-2017-13276

Resolution Notes

--

SPL

--

Status

01

Found In	Targeted To
--	--

Verified In	In Prod
--	<input type="checkbox"/> OFF

```

675         elIdx += 1;
676         chIdx += (pPce->BackElementIsCpe[e1]) ? 2 : 1;
677     }
678 }
679 if (h == 0) { /* normal height */
680     elIdx += pPce->NumLfeChannelElements;
681     chIdx += pPce->NumLfeChannelElements;
682 }
683 }
684 chMapping[chIdx] = channelId; // <===== the size of chMapping
is 8, chIdx can be larger than 8
685 chType[chIdx] = aChType;
686 chIndex[chIdx] = fc[heightLayer];
687 if (isCpe) {
688     chMapping[chIdx+1] = channelId+1;
689     chType[chIdx+1] = aChType;
690     chIndex[chIdx+1] = fc[heightLayer]+1;
691 }
692 *elMapping = elIdx;
693 return 1;
694 }
695 ec[heightLayer] += 1;
696 if (pPce->FrontElementIsCpe[i]) {
697     cc[heightLayer] += 2;
698     fc[heightLayer] += 2;
699 } else {
700     cc[heightLayer] += 1;
701     fc[heightLayer] += 1;
702 }
703 }
-----
878 return 1;
879}

```

In the else branch above, there are five counter lists defined with size 3 in the stack. There logical addresses in memory are next to each other.

```

627     int ec[PC_NUM_HEIGHT_LAYER] = {0};
628     /* Channel counters */
629     int cc[PC_NUM_HEIGHT_LAYER] = {0};
630     int fc[PC_NUM_HEIGHT_LAYER] = {0};
631     int sc[PC_NUM_HEIGHT_LAYER] = {0};
632     int bc[PC_NUM_HEIGHT_LAYER] = {0};
633     int lc = 0;;

```

The heightLayer used to index the counters can be 3 If we well contruct the ASC data, because it is read from the MediaFuffer via FDKreadBits(bs,2), and two bits ranges from 0 to 3. This will result in four bytes(dword) overflow.

```
int heightLayer = pPce->FrontElementHeightInfo[i];
```

The Element Height Infos are assigned in /external/aac/libMpegTPDec/src/tpdec_asc.cpp:124, in CProgramConfig_ReadHeightExt function:

```

123static
124int CProgramConfig_ReadHeightExt(
125
126                                CProgramConfig *pPce,
127                                HANDLE_FDK_BITSTREAM bs,
128                                int * const bytesAvailable,
129                                const UINT alignmentAnchor
130)
131{
132    -----
133
134    if ( (startAnchor >= 24) && (*bytesAvailable >= 3)
135        && (FDKreadBits(bs,8) == PCE_HEIGHT_EXT_SYNC) )
136    {
137        int i;
138
139        for (i=0; i < pPce->NumFrontChannelElements; i++)
140        {
141            pPce->FrontElementHeightInfo[i] = (UCHAR) FDKreadBits(bs,2); // <=====
range from 0..3
142        }
143        for (i=0; i < pPce->NumSideChannelElements; i++)
144        {
145            pPce->SideElementHeightInfo[i] = (UCHAR) FDKreadBits(bs,2); // <=====
range from 0..3
146        }
147        for (i=0; i < pPce->NumBackChannelElements; i++)
148        {
149            pPce->BackElementHeightInfo[i] = (UCHAR) FDKreadBits(bs,2); // <=====
range from 0..3
150        }
151        FDKbyteAlign(bs, alignmentAnchor);
152    }
153}

```

The address of ec[3] is exactly the same as cc[0], the address of cc[3] is actually fc[0], and so on.

As the counter is incremental, and will not get out of bound when used to index other arrays, but If we try to increase the ec[3] and cc[0] at the same time, cc[0] will be exceed its max value, and this will overflow other arrays in the function, and cause unexpected behaviours.

[crash log]

I've tested this bug on the latest AOSP-7.1.2, My build fingerprint is as below:

```
generic_x86:/ # getprop ro.build.fingerprint
Android/aosp_x86/generic_x86:7.1.2/NZH54D/root12021126:eng/test-keys
```

In My asan-enabled devices, I've got the crash log below:

```
12-13 15:24:29.121 2080 2087 I :
=====
12-13 15:24:29.121 2080 2087 I :
12-13 15:24:29.121 2080 2087 I :
12-13 15:24:29.121 2080 2087 I : ==2080==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-
buffer-overflow on address 0xb05ed79c at pc 0xae7731dd bp 0xb05ed768 sp 0xb05ed74c
12-13 15:24:29.121 2080 2087 I :
12-13 15:24:29.121 2080 2087 I :
12-13 15:24:29.121 2080 2087 I : READ of size 4 at 0xb05ed79c thread T2
(gle.aac.decoder)
12-13 15:24:29.121 2080 2087 I :
12-13 15:24:29.122 2080 2087 I : #0 0xae7731dc
(/system/lib/libstagefright_soft_aacdec.so+0xd91dc)
12-13 15:24:29.122 2080 2087 I :
12-13 15:24:29.122 2080 2087 I : #1 0xae71cd1b
(/system/lib/libstagefright_soft_aacdec.so+0x82d1b)
12-13 15:24:29.122 2080 2087 I :
12-13 15:24:29.122 2080 2087 I : #2 0xae6b82ef
(/system/lib/libstagefright_soft_aacdec.so+0x1e2ef)
12-13 15:24:29.122 2080 2087 I :
12-13 15:24:29.122 2080 2087 I : #3 0xae6ad36a
(/system/lib/libstagefright_soft_aacdec.so+0x1336a)
12-13 15:24:29.122 2080 2087 I :
12-13 15:24:29.122 2080 2087 I : #4 0xb2d60503
(/system/lib/libstagefright_omx.so+0x5a503)
12-13 15:24:29.122 2080 2087 I :
12-13 15:24:29.122 2080 2087 I : #5 0xb2d65e30
(/system/lib/libstagefright_omx.so+0x5fe30)
12-13 15:24:29.122 2080 2087 I :
12-13 15:24:29.122 2080 2087 I : #6 0xb26bd093
(/system/lib/libstagefright_foundation.so+0x10093)
12-13 15:24:29.122 2080 2087 I :
12-13 15:24:29.122 2080 2087 I : #7 0xb26c1b8c
(/system/lib/libstagefright_foundation.so+0x14b8c)
12-13 15:24:29.122 2080 2087 I :
12-13 15:24:29.122 2080 2087 I : #8 0xb26be5fc
(/system/lib/libstagefright_foundation.so+0x115fc)
12-13 15:24:29.122 2080 2087 I :
12-13 15:24:29.122 2080 2087 I : #9 0xb26bf0b3
(/system/lib/libstagefright_foundation.so+0x120b3)
12-13 15:24:29.122 2080 2087 I :
12-13 15:24:29.123 2080 2087 I : #10 0xb29aa02f
(/system/lib/libutils.so+0x1202f)
12-13 15:24:29.123 2080 2087 I :
12-13 15:24:29.123 2080 2087 I : #11 0xb29a9883
(/system/lib/libutils.so+0x11883)
12-13 15:24:29.123 2080 2087 I :
12-13 15:24:29.123 2080 2087 I : #12 0xb21f6b43
(/system/lib/libclang_rt.asan-i686-android.so+0x88b43)
12-13 15:24:29.123 2080 2087 I :
12-13 15:24:29.123 2080 2087 I : #13 0xb21d375a
(/system/lib/libclang_rt.asan-i686-android.so+0x6575a)
12-13 15:24:29.123 2080 2087 I :
12-13 15:24:29.123 2080 2087 I : #14 0xb2b3dfe2
(/system/lib/libc.so+0x74fe2)
12-13 15:24:29.123 2080 2087 I :
12-13 15:24:29.123 2080 2087 I : #15 0xb2ae929e
(/system/lib/libc.so+0x2029e)
12-13 15:24:29.123 2080 2087 I :
12-13 15:24:29.123 2080 2087 I : #16 0xb2ae7076
(/system/lib/libc.so+0x1e076)
12-13 15:24:29.123 2080 2087 I :
12-13 15:24:29.123 2080 2087 I :
12-13 15:24:29.123 2080 2087 I :
12-13 15:24:29.123 2080 2087 I :
12-13 15:24:29.123 2080 2087 I : Address 0xb05ed79c is located in stack of
thread T2 (gle.aac.decoder)
12-13 15:24:29.123 2080 2087 I : at offset 28 in frame
```

```

12-13 15:24:29.123 2080 2087 I :
12-13 15:24:29.123 2080 2087 I :
12-13 15:24:29.123 2080 2087 I : #0 0xae77025f
(/system/lib/libstagefright_soft_aacdec.so+0xd625f)
12-13 15:24:29.123 2080 2087 I :
12-13 15:24:29.123 2080 2087 I :
12-13 15:24:29.123 2080 2087 I :
12-13 15:24:29.123 2080 2087 I : This frame has 5 object(s):
12-13 15:24:29.123 2080 2087 I :
12-13 15:24:29.123 2080 2087 I : [16, 28) 'ec' <== Memory access at
offset 28 overflows this variable
12-13 15:24:29.124 2080 2087 I :
12-13 15:24:29.124 2080 2087 I : [48, 60) 'cc'
12-13 15:24:29.124 2080 2087 I :
12-13 15:24:29.124 2080 2087 I : [80, 92) 'fc'
12-13 15:24:29.124 2080 2087 I :
12-13 15:24:29.124 2080 2087 I : [112, 124) 'sc'
12-13 15:24:29.124 2080 2087 I :
12-13 15:24:29.124 2080 2087 I : [144, 156) 'bc'
12-13 15:24:29.124 2080 2087 I :
12-13 15:24:29.124 2080 2087 I : HINT: this may be a false positive if your
program uses some custom stack unwind mechanism or swapcontext
12-13 15:24:29.124 2080 2087 I :
12-13 15:24:29.124 2080 2087 I : (longjmp and C++ exceptions *are*
supported)
12-13 15:24:29.124 2080 2087 I :
12-13 15:24:29.124 2080 2087 I : Thread T2 (gle.aac.decoder) created by T1
(Binder:2080_1) here:
12-13 15:24:29.124 2080 2087 I :
12-13 15:24:29.124 2080 2087 I : #0 0xb21d35d5
(/system/lib/libclang_rt.asan-i686-android.so+0x655d5)
12-13 15:24:29.124 2080 2087 I :
12-13 15:24:29.124 2080 2087 I : #1 0xb29a96f4
(/system/lib/libutils.so+0x116f4)
12-13 15:24:29.124 2080 2087 I :
12-13 15:24:29.124 2080 2087 I : #2 0xb29a9ed5
(/system/lib/libutils.so+0x11ed5)
12-13 15:24:29.124 2080 2087 I :
12-13 15:24:29.124 2080 2087 I : #3 0xb26be35f
(/system/lib/libstagefright_foundation.so+0x1135f)
12-13 15:24:29.124 2080 2087 I :
12-13 15:24:29.124 2080 2087 I : #4 0xb2d5cb41
(/system/lib/libstagefright_omx.so+0x56b41)
12-13 15:24:29.124 2080 2087 I :
12-13 15:24:29.124 2080 2087 I : #5 0xae6a9086
(/system/lib/libstagefright_soft_aacdec.so+0xf086)
12-13 15:24:29.124 2080 2087 I :
12-13 15:24:29.124 2080 2087 I : #6 0xae6b24e9
(/system/lib/libstagefright_soft_aacdec.so+0x184e9)
12-13 15:24:29.124 2080 2087 I :
12-13 15:24:29.124 2080 2087 I : #7 0xb2d67755
(/system/lib/libstagefright_omx.so+0x61755)
12-13 15:24:29.125 2080 2087 I :
12-13 15:24:29.125 2080 2087 I : #8 0xb2d3df8c
(/system/lib/libstagefright_omx.so+0x37f8c)
12-13 15:24:29.125 2080 2087 I :
12-13 15:24:29.125 2080 2087 I : #9 0xb2d32d4d
(/system/lib/libstagefright_omx.so+0x2cd4d)
12-13 15:24:29.125 2080 2087 I :
12-13 15:24:29.125 2080 2087 I : #10 0xb20ddb3e
(/system/lib/libmedia.so+0xefb3e)
12-13 15:24:29.125 2080 2087 I :
12-13 15:24:29.125 2080 2087 I : #11 0xb20def21
(/system/lib/libmedia.so+0xf0f21)
12-13 15:24:29.125 2080 2087 I :
12-13 15:24:29.125 2080 2087 I : #12 0xb2a47fd6
(/system/lib/libbinder.so+0x38fd6)
12-13 15:24:29.125 2080 2087 I :
12-13 15:24:29.125 2080 2087 I : #13 0xb2a56dc9
(/system/lib/libbinder.so+0x47dc9)
12-13 15:24:29.125 2080 2087 I :
12-13 15:24:29.125 2080 2087 I : #14 0xb2a568cb
(/system/lib/libbinder.so+0x478cb)
12-13 15:24:29.125 2080 2087 I :
12-13 15:24:29.125 2080 2087 I : #15 0xb2a5707f
(/system/lib/libbinder.so+0x4807f)
12-13 15:24:29.125 2080 2087 I :
12-13 15:24:29.125 2080 2087 I : #16 0xb2a7de5e
(/system/lib/libbinder.so+0x6ee5e)
12-13 15:24:29.125 2080 2087 I :
12-13 15:24:29.126 2080 2087 I : #17 0xb29aa095
(/system/lib/libutils.so+0x12095)
12-13 15:24:29.126 2080 2087 I :
12-13 15:24:29.126 2080 2087 I : #18 0xb29a9883
(/system/lib/libutils.so+0x11883)

```

```

12-13 15:24:29.126 2080 2087 I :
12-13 15:24:29.126 2080 2087 I : #19 0xb21f6b43
(/system/lib/libclang_rt.asan-i686-android.so+0x88b43)
12-13 15:24:29.126 2080 2087 I :
12-13 15:24:29.126 2080 2087 I : #20 0xb21d375a
(/system/lib/libclang_rt.asan-i686-android.so+0x6575a)
12-13 15:24:29.126 2080 2087 I :
12-13 15:24:29.126 2080 2087 I : #21 0xb2b3dfe2
(/system/lib/libc.so+0x74fe2)
12-13 15:24:29.126 2080 2087 I :
12-13 15:24:29.126 2080 2087 I : #22 0xb2ae929e
(/system/lib/libc.so+0x2029e)
12-13 15:24:29.126 2080 2087 I :
12-13 15:24:29.126 2080 2087 I : #23 0xb2ae7076
(/system/lib/libc.so+0x1e076)
12-13 15:24:29.126 2080 2087 I :
12-13 15:24:29.126 2080 2087 I :
12-13 15:24:29.126 2080 2087 I :
12-13 15:24:29.126 2080 2087 I : Thread T1 (Binder:2080_1) created by T0
here:
12-13 15:24:29.126 2080 2087 I :
12-13 15:24:29.126 2080 2087 I : #0 0xb21d35d5
(/system/lib/libclang_rt.asan-i686-android.so+0x655d5)
12-13 15:24:29.126 2080 2087 I :
12-13 15:24:29.126 2080 2087 I : #1 0xb29a96f4
(/system/lib/libutils.so+0x116f4)
12-13 15:24:29.126 2080 2087 I :
12-13 15:24:29.126 2080 2087 I : #2 0xb29a9eaa
(/system/lib/libutils.so+0x11eaa)
12-13 15:24:29.126 2080 2087 I :
12-13 15:24:29.126 2080 2087 I : #3 0xb2a7d08f
(/system/lib/libbinder.so+0x6e08f)
12-13 15:24:29.126 2080 2087 I :
12-13 15:24:29.126 2080 2087 I : #4 0xb2a7cf83
(/system/lib/libbinder.so+0x6df83)
12-13 15:24:29.126 2080 2087 I :
12-13 15:24:29.126 2080 2087 I : #5 0xb30a1e56
(/system/bin/mediacodec+0xe56)
12-13 15:24:29.126 2080 2087 I :
12-13 15:24:29.126 2080 2087 I : #6 0xb2ade32c
(/system/lib/libc.so+0x1532c)
12-13 15:24:29.126 2080 2087 I :
12-13 15:24:29.127 2080 2087 I : #7 0xb30a1c62
(/system/bin/mediacodec+0xc62)
12-13 15:24:29.127 2080 2087 I :
12-13 15:24:29.127 2080 2087 I : #8 0x0 (<unknown module>)
12-13 15:24:29.127 2080 2087 I :
12-13 15:24:29.127 2080 2087 I :
12-13 15:24:29.127 2080 2087 I :
12-13 15:24:29.127 2080 2087 I : SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-
overflow (/system/lib/libstagefright_soft_aacdec.so+0xd91dc)
12-13 15:24:29.127 2080 2087 I :
12-13 15:24:29.127 2080 2087 I : Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
12-13 15:24:29.127 2080 2087 I : 0x160bdaa0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00
12-13 15:24:29.127 2080 2087 I : 0x160bdab0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00
12-13 15:24:29.127 2080 2087 I : 0x160bdac0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00
12-13 15:24:29.127 2080 2087 I : 0x160bdad0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00
12-13 15:24:29.127 2080 2087 I : 0x160bdae0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00
12-13 15:24:29.127 2080 2087 I : =>0x160bdaf0: f1 f1 00[04]f2 f2 00 04 f2 f2
00 04 f2 f2 00 04
12-13 15:24:29.127 2080 2087 I : 0x160bdb00: f2 f2 00 04 f3 f3 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00
12-13 15:24:29.127 2080 2087 I : 0x160bdb10: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00
12-13 15:24:29.127 2080 2087 I : 0x160bdb20: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1
00 00 00 00 00 00
12-13 15:24:29.127 2080 2087 I : 0x160bdb30: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00
12-13 15:24:29.127 2080 2087 I : 0x160bdb40: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00
12-13 15:24:29.127 2080 2087 I : Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte
represents 8 application bytes):
12-13 15:24:29.127 2080 2087 I : Addressable: 00
12-13 15:24:29.127 2080 2087 I : Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06
07
12-13 15:24:29.127 2080 2087 I : Heap left redzone: fa
12-13 15:24:29.127 2080 2087 I : Heap right redzone: fb
12-13 15:24:29.127 2080 2087 I : Freed heap region: fd
12-13 15:24:29.127 2080 2087 I : Stack left redzone: f1
12-13 15:24:29.127 2080 2087 I : Stack mid redzone: f2

```

```
12-13 15:24:29.127 2080 2087 I : Stack right redzone: f3
12-13 15:24:29.127 2080 2087 I : Stack partial redzone: f4
12-13 15:24:29.127 2080 2087 I : Stack after return: f5
12-13 15:24:29.127 2080 2087 I : Stack use after scope: f8
12-13 15:24:29.127 2080 2087 I : Global redzone: f9
12-13 15:24:29.127 2080 2087 I : Global init order: f6
12-13 15:24:29.127 2080 2087 I : Poisoned by user: f7
12-13 15:24:29.127 2080 2087 I : Container overflow: fc
12-13 15:24:29.127 2080 2087 I : Array cookie: ac
12-13 15:24:29.127 2080 2087 I : Intra object redzone: bb
12-13 15:24:29.127 2080 2087 I : ASan internal: fe
12-13 15:24:29.127 2080 2087 I : Left alloca redzone: ca
12-13 15:24:29.127 2080 2087 I : Right alloca redzone: cb
12-13 15:24:29.127 2080 2087 I :
12-13 15:24:29.127 2080 2087 I : ==2080==ABORTING
12-13 15:24:29.128 2080 2087 I :
12-13 15:24:29.128 976 976 I ServiceManager: service 'media.codec' died
```

[poc]

I've write a script to generate a m4a file that can trigger this vulnerability via stagefright cmd tool. I've attached both the m4a file and the script.

There are two points in my scripts:

In gen_esds() function , we can assign how many channel elements are there , In my script, I simply made one front channel element.

```
369         # this three number should not be zero, to trigger the vulnerability
370         num_front_channel_ele = to_bin_str(1, 4)
371         num_side_channel_ele = to_bin_str(0, 4)
372         num_back_channel_ele = to_bin_str(0, 4)
```

right under the num_front_channel_ele, we can set the height_infos of each elements to 3, this will eventually results in the stack overflow we mentioned in this report.

```
414         for i in range( int(num_front_channel_ele,2)) :
415             front_element_height_info_i = to_bin_str(3,2)
```

If you want to modify the script to make more overflows, you should attention to the tag_size , sub_tag_size and sub_sub_tag_size in gen_esds() function, they should be adjusted according to the size of esds chunk. Also, the CRC should be fixed too.

[how to fix]

Set PC_NUM_HEIGHT_LAYER to 4 will simply fix this vulnerability, because no other function uses these height infos. And the definition of macros are all like 4,8,16 to avoid one element overflow, this will satisfy the code style:

```
#define PC_FSB_CHANNELS_MAX 16 /* Front/Side/Back channels */
#define PC_LFE_CHANNELS_MAX 4
#define PC_ASSOCDATA_MAX 8
#define PC_CCEL_MAX 16 /* CC elements */
#define PC_COMMENTLENGTH 256
#define PC_NUM_HEIGHT_LAYER 4 // update this value from 3 to 4
```

I've attached a patch for this issue, hope this will help.

Best Regards,

Elphet and Gong Guang of Alpha Team, Qihoo 360 Technology Co. Ltd.

Component:	Public Trackers > Android External Security Reports	04:01PM
Status:	New	04:01PM
Reporter:	xiangxiaobo1994@gmail.com	04:01PM
+CC:	an...@google.com , xiangxiaobo1994@gmail.com	04:01PM
Type:	Bug	04:01PM
Priority:	P2	04:01PM
Severity:	S2	04:01PM
Title:	Security Report - [Stack overflow in external/aac/libMpegTPDec/tpdec_asc.cpp]	04:01PM
Status:	01	04:01PM

output.m4a

544 B [Download](#)

m4a-maker.py

19 KB [View](#) [Download](#)

tpdec_lib.h.patch

848 B [View](#) [Download](#)

mi...@google.com <mi...@google.com> #2

Dec 14, 2017 08:08AM

Assigned to as...@google.com.

+Blocked by: [70637599](#)

07:58AM

Thank you for submitting this report. We've filed an internal report for the Android engineering team to investigate further (specified by the Android ID label). Please follow coordinated disclosure practices, such as keeping this report confidential until we have had time to assess your issue, and if necessary, release a update for Android devices.

08:08AM

The typical lifecycle for a confirmed security vulnerability is as follows:

1. Initial severity rating assessment (subject to change after review by component owners) (1)
2. Development of an update
3. Assignment of CVE
4. Shared under NDA, as part of coordinated disclosure, to Android partners for remediation
5. Release in a public Android security bulletin
6. Android Security Rewards payment (if applicable)

Note: Most of these steps will be communicated through the labels found on the sidebar.

Taking the following actions up front will assist us in timely processing of your report:

1. Sign the Google Contributor License Agreement (2)
2. Let us know how you would like attribution to be noted (if necessary)
3. Provide a PoC (Required for complete rewards submissions)

Thank you,
Android Security Team

(1) Android severity guidelines: <https://source.android.com/security/overview/updates-resources.html>

(2) Contributor license agreement: <https://cla.developers.google.com/cla>

Status: New Assigned
Assignee: <none> as...@google.com
Android ID: <none> 70637599

08:08AM

tk...@google.com <tk...@google.com>

Dec 21, 2017 07:00AM

+Hotlist: 468630
ASR Severity: <none> Critical

07:00AM

mj...@google.com <mj...@google.com> #3

Feb 22, 2018 07:23AM

Hello,

We will be releasing a patch for this issue in an upcoming bulletin. It will first be released to partners, then in the Android Security bulletin the following month.

If you haven't already, please complete the Google Contributor License Agreement for Individuals, so we can use your patch and test code:

<https://cla.developers.google.com/cla>

We'd also like to recognize your contribution at <https://source.android.com/security/overview/acknowledgements> and in the security bulletin, please let us know how you would like your name and information to appear.

We may also make this bug publicly accessible when the fix is submitted to AOSP. Please let us know if you would like to keep the bug private instead.

Thanks,

Android Security Team

mr...@google.com <mr...@google.com> #4

Apr 3, 2018 06:44AM

Congratulations! The rewards committee decided to reward you USD \$6000 for reporting this Critical severity vulnerability. We are paying for the bug report and PoC.

To collect the reward, if you haven't already, please complete the Android Contributor License Agreement for Individuals, so we can use your test code:

<https://cla.developers.google.com/cla>

You will receive an email with details on the next steps to collect the reward. As a reminder, please continue to keep this vulnerability confidential until it is officially disclosed (we will update you when disclosure takes place).

Thanks,

Android Security Team

br...@google.com <br...@google.com>

May 24, 2018 03:22AM

Marked as fixed.

CVE: <none> CVE-2017-13276
Status: Assigned Fixed

03:22AM

03:22AM

mi...@google.com <mi...@google.com>

Jul 24, 2018 08:06AM

br...@google.com <br...@google.com>

Oct 16, 2018 03:29AM

ASR Eligible: <none> Yes

03:29AM

ASR Payment: <none> 6000

03:29AM
