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<CENTER><B><FONT SIZE=+2>&nbsp;ICANN&nbsp;</FONT></B>
<HR WIDTH="100%">
<BR><B>Membership Advisory Committee Commentary on the</B>
<BR><B>Principles of the At-large Membership</B>
<HR WIDTH="100%"></CENTER>
<B>IMPORTANT NOTICE, posted May 26, 1999 - This document is an advisory
commentary. It is NOT authoritative and is NOT to</B>
<B>be relied on by
any party.&nbsp; Following public comment, the ICANN Board intends to consider
the Membership Committee's</B>
<B>recommended principles at its next regularly
scheduled meeting in Berlin on May 27, 1999.&nbsp;</B>
<HR WIDTH="100%">
<BLOCKQUOTE>&nbsp;
<BR>"Berlin" and * refer to action taken in Berlin on 25 May 1999.
<BR>See also <A HREF="http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rcs/outreach.html">Proposals
for Outreach</A>
<BR>"<A HREF="http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rcs/macsing.html">Report</A>"
refers to the Singapore Report of the ICANN Membership Advisory Committee
<BR>
"<a href="general/white-paper-05jun98.htm">White Paper</a>" refers to the document
"Management of Internet Names and Addresses" of the US Department of Commerce
<BR>
"<A HREF="http://www.icann.org/bylaws-09apr99.html">Bylaws</A>" refers
to the ICANN Bylaws
<BR>"<A HREF="http://www.icann.org/articles-pr23nov98.html">Articles</A>"
refers to the ICANN Articles of Incorporation
<BR>&nbsp;
<BLOCKQUOTE><B>1. At-large membership should primarily represent those
individuals and organizations that are not represented by the Supporting
Organizations (SOs).&nbsp; The goals of the at-large membership are as
follows:</B>
<P><B>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; (a) to include
any Internet user with access and verifiable identity in order to reflect
the global diversity of users (membership should not be limited to IP address
or domain name holders),</B>
<BR><B>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; (b) to elect
Directors to the ICANN Board by procedures that are valid and authentic,</B>
<BR><B>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; (c) to ensure
that ICANN’s corporate structure operates for the benefit of the Internet
community as a whole, is not captured, and continues to provide fair and
proportional representation of the entire user community,</B>
<BR><B>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; (d) to provide
input from the user community to the ICANN Directors and</B>
<BR><B>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; (e) to do
so in a cost-efficient manner.</B>
<P><B>*The rights of the at-large membership shall be to elect the at-large
directors and to approve changes in the ICANN Articles of Incorporation.&nbsp;
Members should not have the right to unilaterally change the bylaws in
disregard of the SOs,&nbsp; and the right to bring shareholder derivative
suits should be limited.</B></BLOCKQUOTE>
Most of the goals of the at-large membership are based on the standards of open
participation established&nbsp; in the <A HREF="general/white-paper-05jun98.htm">White
Paper</A> (see Governance and Structure).&nbsp; The Supporting Organizations
will represent the special and technical interests while the at-large membership
will provide a voice for the rest of the Internet user population.&nbsp; Limiting
membership to IP address or domain holders would unreasonably ignore the interests
of the majority of the users of the Internet who make significant financial
payments for their access. An open, bottom-up decision-making structure, however,
must be balanced by reasonable steps to assure that the membership is authentic
and representational.&nbsp; See <A HREF="http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rcs/macsing.html#3.0">3.0</A>
of the Report. <BR>
&nbsp;
<P><B>Berlin:&nbsp;</B> The MAC considered some of the risks to ICANN that
would result from a large membership with few entry barriers.&nbsp;&nbsp;
The Committee reaffirmed that&nbsp; the powers of the At-large Members
are to elect at-large directors and to approve changes to articles of incorporation.&nbsp;
Other rights were reconsidered.
<P>If California law specifies rights and duties of members of a corporation
that differ from ICANN bylaws regarding the rights of members,&nbsp; reconciliation
may be needed.&nbsp; Could ICANN have "members" under its bylaws without
necessitating their being formal members as defined by the California code?&nbsp;
The MAC had some concerns about this, even if it were done simply to implement
desired structures.
<P>Some of the issues were:
<BR>1. Ability of members to bring derivative suits.&nbsp; This right is
provided by California Code, but it is a right that can be abused to the
point of crippling ICANN's ability to function.&nbsp; Given alternative
(and more accessible) review and reconsideration processes built-in to
the ICANN structure,&nbsp; rough consensus that members should not have
right to bring derivative actions, which could be abused.
<BR>&nbsp;2. Right to change the by-laws.&nbsp; Members should not have
the right to unilaterally change the bylaws in disregard of the SOs.
<BR>&nbsp;
<BLOCKQUOTE><B>*2.</B>&nbsp; <B>At-large membership shall be open only
to individual persons.&nbsp;&nbsp; Individuals who are members of the SOs
or their constituencies are welcome to join the at-large membership.&nbsp;
The most feasible protection against capture by interests that are not
representative of the the user community at large is to enroll as many
Members as possible.</B></BLOCKQUOTE>
<P><BR><B>Berlin:&nbsp; </B>After reconsideration, the rough consensus
of the&nbsp; MAC (over strong objection) is that only individuals should
be eligible to be at-large members.&nbsp; This is a reversal from the Singapore
consensus.&nbsp; Many organizations will be accommodated through the emerging
SO structures.&nbsp; Small and mid-sized organizations may participate
through their individual owners and employees.&nbsp; Because it is important
to have organizational support for ICANN, this policy should be revisited
periodically by the Board.
<P>There are many good reasons to restrict voting rights to individuals
(simplicity being an important one), however it is important to recognize
that an organization is a legal entity also and has interests that are
different from those of any individual who may be a part of that organization.&nbsp;
The active involvement and support of organizational users is crucial to
the stability of the Internet consequently, and a right to vote is an incentive
for such participation.&nbsp; To reduce spoofing and fraud, however, organizations
must present evidence of their legal validity.
<P>Because the goal of the at-large membership is to represent interests
that are not already expressed by the SOs, the organizations that elect
or otherwise select SO Directors may not join the at-large.&nbsp; However,
any individuals who are members of such organizations also have personal
interests that are different from those of their organization, and different
from their official role within such organizations, therefore individuals
are welcome in the at-large regardless of their role in the SOs.&nbsp;
If the at-large membership population is small, then this duplication of
special, technical or commercial interests could conflict with the goal
of broad representation,&nbsp; therefore&nbsp; ICANN should take aggressive
action to enroll as many individual users as possible.&nbsp; See <A HREF="http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rcs/macsing.html#2.3">2.3</A>
and <A HREF="http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rcs/macsing.html#5.2">5.2</A>
of the Report.
<BR>&nbsp;
<BLOCKQUOTE><B>3.</B>&nbsp; <B>It is not recommended that membership fees
be assessed at this time.&nbsp; If membership fees should be assessed in
the future, they shall reflect the economic differences of the various
geographic regions.</B></BLOCKQUOTE>
The need for membership fees is dependent on many factors such as the size
of the actual at-large enrollment and ICANN’s other sources of revenue.
Cost recovery and financial stability are legitimate goals.&nbsp; Many
interested parties, however, are already paying fees for addresses and
domain registration and they question the need to pay an additional amount
in order to voice their concerns.&nbsp; Developing nations find such additional
costs unduly burdensome, particularly since the amount of actual use in
such locations is often quite limited by other access factors.&nbsp;&nbsp;
Any scaling of fees must balance this with the costs of administering the
membership and the elections.&nbsp;&nbsp; Fees may reduce the number of
fraudulent registrations but only among populations where the fee assessed
is meaningful.&nbsp; Voluntary donations and other private support is welcome
but should not threaten the independence of the organization.&nbsp; See
<A HREF="http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rcs/macsing.html#3.2">3.2</A>
of the Report.
<P><B>Berlin:&nbsp; </B>The question of fees was revisited in Berlin in
light of public comments received after Singapore.&nbsp;&nbsp; Concern
was expressed that low entrance barriers would result in a large enrollment
of people who were not actively interested but enrolled only because it
was easy to do so.&nbsp; This could bring a halt to at-large elections
if these disinterested members failed to participate in sufficient numbers
to meet minimum quorum requirements.&nbsp;&nbsp; It would also waste expensive
services.&nbsp;&nbsp; On the other hand, because fees are a barrier to
wide participation, scaling fees is not cost-effective due to administration
and currency conversion costs,&nbsp; fees are not universally acknowledged
as a&nbsp; valid measurement of interest and because fees only prevent
capture by the less wealthy, the MAC's rough consensus remains opposed
to the imposition of fees at this time.&nbsp; It was suggested that member
rolls could be culled for non-voters after each election and an absolute
number as a quorum requirement should be investigated.
<BR>&nbsp;
<BLOCKQUOTE><B>4.</B>&nbsp; <B>Online membership registration procedures
should be favored, however reasonable efforts should be made to authenticate
the identity of applicants.&nbsp; The suggested procedure for registration
is as follows: an online form is filled out by the applicant who <FONT COLOR="#000000">may
thereafter be required to</FONT> supply physical proof of existence.&nbsp;
ICANN will respond by postal mail sending the applicant a membership identification
code to use for voting and other transactions.&nbsp; An applicant shall
provide the following data in the application:</B>
<BLOCKQUOTE>
<LI>
<B>name</B></LI>
<LI>
<B>physical mail address</B></LI>
<LI>
<B>e-mail contact (preferably an individual account)</B></LI>
<BR><B>an organization shall also provide the name of its voting representative,
that representative's e-mail address, and evidence of legal identity</B></BLOCKQUOTE>
</BLOCKQUOTE>
This procedure has worked reasonably efficiently for several other organizations
and it is hoped that it will do so for the at-large membership as long
as ICANN takes reasonable measures to authenticate the identity of applicants
and to delete abusers (see Section <FONT COLOR="#000000"><A HREF="#6.">5</A></FONT>
below).&nbsp; Additional safeguards may be imposed if fraudulent registrations
are excessive.&nbsp; See <A HREF="http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rcs/macsing.html#7.1">7.1</A>
of the Report.
<BR>&nbsp;
<BLOCKQUOTE><B>5.</B>&nbsp; <B>Membership shall expire 30 days afer the
annual election of Directors and must be renewed annually. <FONT COLOR="#000000">Unless
otherwise specified, renewal will generally be effective upon electronic
confirmation by the member of the accuracy of existing registration data.</FONT>&nbsp;
Members shall be required to notify ICANN of any changes of address (e-mail
and postal) during the term of membership.&nbsp; Failure to do so may result
in deletion from the membership list or ineligibility to vote.</B></BLOCKQUOTE>
Annual renewal will avoid clogging the membership rolls with abandoned
memberships that would result in wasted resources and inflate quorum requirements
to levels that might prevent the membership from conducting business.&nbsp;
Renewal should not be unduly burdensome, however.&nbsp; It shall be the
Member's responsibility to keep ICANN apprised of changes in address so
that voting materials will be delivered appropriately.&nbsp; The ability
to delete fraudulent membership registrations is critical to a fairly representation
of the membership.&nbsp; See <A HREF="http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rcs/macsing.html#4.0">4.0</A>
and <A HREF="http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rcs/macsing.html#7.1.4">7.1.4</A>
of the Report.
<BR>&nbsp;
<BLOCKQUOTE><B>6.</B>&nbsp; <B>From time to time, ICANN shall sample the
membership applications in order to determine whether the goals of membership
are being met and whether fraudulent registrations exist in sufficient
number as to call into question the ability of the membership to meet the
goals of Section <A HREF="#1.">1 </A>above.&nbsp; ICANN may take reasonable
steps to assure that these goals are met.&nbsp; Members who submit fraudulent
or inaccurate data shall be deleted from the membership list.&nbsp; Multiple
applications from the same organization or individual shall be deleted
from the list.</B>
<P><B>*ICANN should collect and publish current membership demographics
so that everyone can sense how the membership is constituted.</B>
<BR><B>The first at-large Directors seated by the membership should be
elected on a staggered basis.</B></BLOCKQUOTE>
Fraudulent membership registrations are unacceptable.&nbsp; On the other
hand, the ability to detect fraud on a global basis can be a complicated
and expensive undertaking.&nbsp; Because different kinds of fraud may require
different remedies (e.g., a false membership application is different from
fraud committed by candidates for election) ICANN should have additional
ability and flexibility to tailor the response to the specific problem.&nbsp;
Particularly in the initial membership enrollment period, ICANN should
be monitoring the membership applications in order to detect and take steps
to correct all possible irregularities including, for example, spoofed
applications an under-enrollment in particular regions.&nbsp; See <A HREF="http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rcs/macsing.html#4.0">4.0</A>
and <A HREF="http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rcs/macsing.html#7.2">7.2&nbsp;</A>
of the Report.
<P><B>Berlin:&nbsp;</B> The MAC considered establishing criteria by which
to determine whether the membership was sufficiently representative of
all interests for the first election to be held.&nbsp; The idea is to ensure
a minimally representative and diverse membership and test the assumptions
with reality before a vote is exercised.&nbsp; The following possible objective
criteria were considered.
<P>a.&nbsp; The idea of "critical mass" was discussed.&nbsp; Should the
membership have reached a minimum size to be considered validly representative?&nbsp;
5,000 ws suggested as the necessary minimum size of total membership and
500 was suggested for regional minimums.&nbsp; Although these numbers were
considered realistic and obtainable, the MAC was divided on the propriety
of requiring any minimums at all.&nbsp; There was concern that elections
might be unduly delayed&nbsp; and/or that meeting such quota might result
in padding of the membership with mechanical registrations.&nbsp;&nbsp;
Suggestions were made that the Board set targets (rather than firm rules)
and that specific outreach activities (such as recruitment meetings sponsored
by ICANN in each region) could be completed before the elections.
<BR>b. Electing the at-large directors in stages on a relatively aggressive
timetable&nbsp; is recommended by the MAC on a rough consensus basis.&nbsp;
This will permit improvement of outreach and election mechanisms, many
of which will be tested for the first time.&nbsp; It will also reflect
the continuity and staggered terms established in the ICANN bylaws.&nbsp;
The MAC was divided in its preference for electing directors three-at-a-time
or electing them in two stages of five and four each.&nbsp; Those who favored
a single election were concerned about losing membership interest over
so many elections, the duplication of costs and the need to have a validly
elected Board making policy decisions as soon as possible.
<BR>&nbsp;
<BLOCKQUOTE><B>7.&nbsp;</B><FONT SIZE=-1> </FONT><B>If desired, ICANN may
appoint a committee (a) to assist in soliciting candidates in regions where
there are few candidates or (b)&nbsp; to oversee election details such
as fulfillment of candidate criteria, however it shall not be a function
of such committee to filter, screen or otherwise evaluate candidates on
any grounds other than for failure to supply the required campaign documentation
of <FONT COLOR="#000000">Section
<A HREF="#12.">12</A></FONT><FONT COLOR="#CC0000"><A HREF="#12.">
</A></FONT>below,
in a true, accurate and timely fashion.</B><B></B>
<P><B><FONT COLOR="#000000">*Having completed its task with its report
to ICANN in Berlin, the MAC recommends that the current members be dismissed.&nbsp;&nbsp;
MAC also suggests that the Board convene a new committee to assist in ongoing
AL membership issues such as outreach, recruitment, authentication, and
election procedures.&nbsp; In addition, the Board should consider establishing
a permanent Membership Secretariat to develop and provide continuing services
to the At-large members.</FONT></B></BLOCKQUOTE>
See <A HREF="http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rcs/outreach.html">Outreach Proposals</A>
and <A HREF="http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rcs/macsing.html#6.3.3">6.3.3</A>
of the Report.
<BR>&nbsp;
<BLOCKQUOTE><B>8.&nbsp; Privacy concerns should be foremost in the collection,
safeguarding and use of a Member's data.&nbsp; Except as may be required
by applicable law, no Director, officer or Member of ICANN shall be permitted
to use such personal data for commercial or other private purpose nor shall
any Member's individual vote be made public.</B></BLOCKQUOTE>
Regional protections for personal data vary considerably, however, shareholders
of corporations may be entitled under law to use certain personal information
about other shareholders.&nbsp; ICANN should restrict use of personal data
to the minimum use required by law.&nbsp; See <A HREF="http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rcs/macsing.html#6.4">6.4</A>
of the Report.
<P><B>Berlin:&nbsp; </B>Public comment after Singapore suggested that publishing
a record of each member's vote would be the best method for assuring that
elections were authentically administered.&nbsp;&nbsp; Without disputing
that point, it remained the unanimous vote of the MAC that the protection
of privacy was essential to the success of the membership.&nbsp; It was
recommended that the Board investigate other methods to ensure fair and
credible election results, such as having election review officials or
independent audits.
<BR>&nbsp;
<BLOCKQUOTE><B>9.</B>&nbsp; <B>At-large voting shall be on the principle
of one-person-one-vote.&nbsp; An organization shall be limited to casting
one vote on behalf of the entire organization.&nbsp; Individuals who vote
for SO Directors in their capacity as representatives of SO-member organizations
shall also have a right to vote for at-large Directors in a personal capacity
if they also register as individual at-large Members.</B></BLOCKQUOTE>
Both individuals and organizations shall be treated equally.&nbsp; No organization
shall receive additional votes due to its size because any of its employees
are free to enroll as individual members.&nbsp; The person who is the official
voting representative of a member organization shall, however, have the
right to register and vote as an individual member as well. See <A HREF="http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rcs/macsing.html#2.3">2.3</A>
and <A HREF="http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rcs/macsing.html#5.2">5.2</A>
of the Report.
<BR>&nbsp;
<BLOCKQUOTE><B>*10.</B>&nbsp; <B>The at-large membership shall consist
of five regional voting pools based on residence.&nbsp; A Member may not
vote in any election that occurs less than one month after the Member has
been registered.</B></BLOCKQUOTE>
<B>Berlin:</B> The MAC has changed its consensus on voting classes since
Singapore to one that supports voting pools whereby residents of each of
the five regions will be able to exclusively select their own representatives.&nbsp;
The committee was divided over the following two proposals:
<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 1) One global voting pool.&nbsp; All members vote
for all open seats.&nbsp; This is simple and straightforward.&nbsp; There
is only one "class" of Board member; candidates must campaign globally.&nbsp;
Regional representation requirements would still ensure a diverse Board.&nbsp;
Geography does not and should not define common interests.
<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 2) One global voting pool that selects four seats
(which retains many of the benefits of 1) above) plus five regional voting
pools (one per region) that elect regional candidates.&nbsp; Idea is to
ensure regional representation by having some candidates elected solely
by their respective regions.&nbsp; This prevents the voters from one populous
region from outvoting smaller native populations in other regions.
<BR>&nbsp;
<P><B>Singapore:&nbsp;</B> Classes are generally inflexible because once
they are established it becomes difficult to alter them to reflect changes
in the character of the membership.&nbsp; The Internet user population
is changing too rapidly for such rigid structures.&nbsp; Any possible benefit
to the public interest that might arise from giving organizations special
voting status is counteracted by the voting complexity that would result
from trying to meet both class distinctions as well as regional representation
requirements.&nbsp; Organizations should be treated on an equal basis with
individuals in terms of electoral power.&nbsp; In order to prevent capture
of an election by massive enlistment of "phantom" applicants, Members must
enroll sufficiently in advance of an election so that there is time to
authenticate the voter.
<P>One concern has been expressed by developing nations that do not have
many online users as yet.&nbsp; They point out that the more populous nations
have enough voting power to select the person they favor as the representative
of another region.&nbsp; One solution to this problem would be to divide
the at-large into regional voting classes, however it was not recommended
because it would entail the burdensome task of authenticating the citizenship
of all Members.&nbsp;&nbsp; See <A HREF="http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rcs/macsing.html#4.0">4.0</A>,
<A HREF="http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rcs/macsing.html#5.2">5.2</A>
and
<A HREF="http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rcs/macsing.html#5.3">5.3</A>
of the Report.
<BR>&nbsp;
<BLOCKQUOTE><B>11.</B>&nbsp; <B>Any individual <FONT COLOR="#000000">who
is a</FONT><FONT COLOR="#CC0000"> </FONT>Member may stand for election
as an at-large Director.&nbsp; In the event that the number of candidates
is so large as to discourage careful consideration by voters, then ICANN
shall have the option of requiring all candidates to provide evidence of
a reasonable amount of support from other Members for their candidacy.&nbsp;
ICANN shall take efforts, to the extent permitted by applicable law,&nbsp;
to encourage participation of candidates from regions where there may be
a shortage of such volunteers.</B></BLOCKQUOTE>
Only a Member may run for election as at-large Director, however any Member
who meets the criteria, and is not otherwise disqualified by other bylaws,
may do so.&nbsp; Article V, Section 9(c) of the <A HREF="http://www.icann.org/bylaws-09apr99.html#V">Bylaws</A>
lists the interests that should be able to nominate candidates and self
nomination allows all of them to&nbsp; participate.&nbsp; If the size of
the membership is substantial, it is possible that the number of candidates
may be so large as to discourage voters from careful and thorough consideration
of all the candidates.&nbsp; In that case, ICANN may have the option of
setting an additional requirement in the form of a show of support by a
number of other Members.&nbsp; Care should be taken in selecting the number
of supporters that may be required so that candidates from regions that
have fewer Members are not unfairly disadvantaged. Should a region be unable
to supply a candidate, ICANN should take a role in reducing barriers to
that participation (within the limits of law which prohibits providing
support for individual candidates).&nbsp; See <A HREF="http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rcs/macsing.html#6.1">6.1</A>
and&nbsp; <A HREF="http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rcs/macsing.html#6.3">6.3</A>
of the Report.
<P><B>Berlin:</B>&nbsp; In light of public comment after Singapore suggesting
that membership not be a pre-requisite for candidates, the Committee reviewed
the issue and reconfirmed it's original position.&nbsp; Given that membership
has a very low barrier to entry, it is not an unreasonable requirement.
<BR>&nbsp;
<OL><B>12.</B>&nbsp;<FONT SIZE=-1> </FONT><B>Candidates for ICANN at-large
Director shall provide the following documents prior to the final date
for submitting nominations:</B>
<OL>
<LI>
<B>proof of identity</B></LI>
<LI>
<B>proof of citizenship (necessary to determine regional representation)</B></LI>
<LI>
<B>proof of membership</B></LI>
<LI>
<B>proof of adulthood as defined in the nation of the candidate's citizenship</B></LI>
<LI>
<B>agreement <FONT COLOR="#000000">to be online and accessible to the membership
via the Internet with sufficient frequency to</FONT> fulfill the responsibilities
of office</B></LI>
<LI>
<B>agreement to provide adequate personal time to fulfill the responsibilities
of office</B></LI>
<LI>
<B>agreement to provide for translations to and from the candidate's language
<FONT COLOR="#000000">into
English</FONT> as necessary to fulfill the responsibilities of office (although
it is hoped ICANN will provide translation of all its materials as soon
as that becomes economically practicable)</B></LI>
<LI>
<B>biographical information not exceeding 250 words</B></LI>
<LI>
<B>statement of positions on issues not exceeding 250 words</B></LI>
<LI>
<B>statement identifying sources of income, financial interests and other
possible conflicts of interest</B></LI>
</OL>
</OL>
In order to assure authentic and committed candidates, nominees should
meet a number of objective criteria.&nbsp; Subjective criteria, however
are not recommended.&nbsp; In general, it is believed that for a volunteer
organization to function effectively, it is reasonable to require candidates
to make a strong commitment to fulfill their responsibilities.&nbsp; See
<A HREF="http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rcs/macsing.html#6.2">6.2</A>
of the Report.
<BR>&nbsp;
<BLOCKQUOTE><B>13.</B>&nbsp; <B>ICANN shall post the list of candidates
and the data in items numbered 8 - 10 in Section <A HREF="#12.">12</A>
on its web site no later than 30 days prior to the election.&nbsp; ICANN
may elect to provide online discussion fora or other formats for purposes
of the campaign debate.</B></BLOCKQUOTE>
See <A HREF="http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rcs/macsing.html#6.4">6.4</A>
of the Report.&nbsp; The ability to discuss candidate qualifications and
election issues is critical to detecting candidate fraud and in making
the electorate more confident of its choices.
<BR>&nbsp;
<BLOCKQUOTE><B>14.</B>&nbsp; <B>Election fraud shall consist of at least
the following: providing false or inaccurate information concerning the
candidate's obligations, offering financial or other value in exchange
for voting in a specified manner, or requiring a Member to vote in a particular
manner as an obligation of employment or office.&nbsp; Any Member who participates
in election fraud shall be deleted from the membership registration.</B></BLOCKQUOTE>
In order to have valid, authentic and representative elections, member
registration and voting fraud must be prevented.&nbsp; See <A HREF="http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rcs/macsing.html#3.1.2">3.1.2</A>
of the Report.
<BR>&nbsp;
<BLOCKQUOTE><B>15.</B>&nbsp; <B>Voting shall be conducted using Internet-based
methods to the greatest extent possible consistent with authentication
requirements and applicable law.&nbsp; ICANN will work to design a method
of cumulative voting by electronic methods that satisfies the requirements
of applicable law and enhances the likelihood of achieving quorums.&nbsp;
If proxies are used, they shall be limited to specific proxies which authorize
and direct an officer of ICANN to vote exactly as specified in the proxy
document.</B></BLOCKQUOTE>
It is hoped that the use of online voting mechanisms will permit quick,
easy and cost-efficient voting procedures for a world-wide constituency.
Further, the MAC recommends use of a cumulative or preferential type of
procedure if possible.&nbsp; However, there are still some details of applicable
law, such as the requirements for written signatures for example, which
need further study before determining the which method to use.&nbsp; Because
it appears that proxies may be exercised by electronic means, their use
may be a necessary element in any online voting procedure.&nbsp; To avoid
capture, any proxies used shall be specific proxies which allow a Member
to give precise directions as to which candidate(s) should receive his
votes.&nbsp; See <A HREF="http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rcs/macsing.html#7.0">7.0</A>
of the Report.
<BR>&nbsp;
<BLOCKQUOTE><B>16.</B>&nbsp; <B>Article V Section 6 of the ICANN
<A HREF="http://www.icann.org/bylaws-09apr99.html#V">Bylaws</A>
should be amended so that the SOs and the At-large may select their representatives
without regard to the election results of any of the other of them.&nbsp;
The following principles are recommended:</B>
<P><B>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; a) unless
authorized in advance by the Board of Directors, no two Directors from
the same SO may be from the same region, and</B>
<BR><B>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; b) the at-large
Directors must include at least one from each region and may have no more
than 4 from the same region, and</B>
<BR><B>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; c) as a consequence
of establishing independent regional requirements for each component of
ICANN, the cap on the aggregate total of all Board Directors from one nation
should be eliminated.</B></BLOCKQUOTE>
The present ICANN bylaw requires the at-large membership to meet regional
representation requirements after the SOs have selected their representatives.&nbsp;
Since SOs may hold elections at different times, and since Directors may
sometimes be replaced before the end of a term, it becomes very difficult
for the at-large membership to know which of their own candidates will
actually be eligible to serve.&nbsp; The MAC recommends that regional requirements
be maintained, but that each of the ICANN components should meet them independently,
so no one part need await the results of the other's elections.&nbsp; See
<A HREF="http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rcs/macsing.html#5.3">5.3</A>
of the Report.
<BR>&nbsp;
<BLOCKQUOTE><B>17.</B>&nbsp; <B>All general meetings of the at-large membership
shall be open to the public and minutes thereof shall be kept and promptly
posted on the ICANN web site.</B></BLOCKQUOTE>
The <A HREF="general/white-paper-05jun98.htm">White Paper</A> (see provisions
on Governance and on Operations) and Article 4 of the ICANN <A HREF="http://www.icann.org/articles-pr23nov98.html">Articles</A>
call for open and transparent mechanisms.&nbsp; Meetings that are open to the
media and to non-members will allow information to better reach those who are
attempting to find their way online and those who are interested but ineligible
for Membership (such as SO organizations and government bodies).&nbsp; Open
meetings may also encourage wider dissemination of information through media
that are less expensive for many users to access.&nbsp; See <A HREF="http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rcs/macsing.html#2.0">2.1</A>
of the Report. <BR>
&nbsp;
<BLOCKQUOTE><FONT COLOR="#000000"><B>18.</B>&nbsp;&nbsp; <B>Until further
notice, all official communications to and from ICANN concerning the at-large
membership shall be in the English language.</B></FONT></BLOCKQUOTE>
<FONT COLOR="#000000">The cost of translating official communications into
the vast number of languages used by the global community would place an
extraordinary financial burden on ICANN.&nbsp; While translations are highly
desirable and to be encouraged, until such time as translation is affordable
the language of communications shall be English.</FONT>
<BR><FONT COLOR="#000000">See Question 58 in <A HREF="http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rcs/macsing.html#6.0">6.0</A>
of the Report.</FONT>
<P>
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<BR><FONT SIZE=-1>Last updated on 26 May 1999 by committee member <A HREF="mailto:dc@mama-tech.com">Diane
Cabell</A>.</FONT>
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