

ANDREA TULLI

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EDUCATION

2016-	<i>PhD in Economics, University of Warwick</i> Research interests: Public Economics (primary), Applied Microeconomics, Political Economy
Sept.2018 - Jan.2019	<i>Visiting PhD student, Columbia University</i> <i>Sponsored by Michael Best</i>
2014-2016	<i>MRes in Economics, University of Warwick</i>
2012-2014	<i>MSc in Economics, University of Rome (Tor Vergata)</i>
2011-2012	<i>Exchange student, Humboldt University</i>
2009-2012	<i>BSc in Economics, University of Rome (Tor Vergata)</i>

RESEARCH

Job market paper	Sweeping the Dirt under the Rug: Measuring Spillovers from an Anti-Corruption Measure Using data on Italian public procurement, I show that the dissolution of a municipal government that has been found to be infiltrated by organised crime produces two effects on neighbouring municipalities. First, they issue more contracts under a threshold (40,000 Euro) below which evidentiary requirements become less stringent and transparency decreases, making it more difficult to prove any illicit. Second, they amend fewer contracts, a practice that is a signal of potential corruption. These results suggest that, in response to the dissolution, local administrators exploit less monitored margins of the procurement process and engage less in activities that are signals of potential corruption so as to minimise scrutiny by law enforcement bodies. I provide evidence that this is indeed the case. Using a language-modelling technique, I show that municipalities split large projects into smaller contracts smaller than 40,000 Euros. I also show that the response occurs only in sectors that are more often infiltrated by organised crime.
Working Papers	Free to spend? The effect of fiscal autonomy on local government spending (with Maggie Shi) In recent decades, many countries have devolved expenditure and taxation responsibilities from national to subnational levels of government. This paper considers how granting more fiscal autonomy to local governments affects public spending behavior in the context of Italian municipalities. We leverage a 2012 decentralization policy reform which simultaneously increased municipal tax revenue and decreased transfers to municipalities, thus changing the source of a municipality's revenue but not the overall amount of revenue. Using this policy reform, we instrument for municipal fiscal autonomy and study its effect on municipal procurement spending behavior.
Work in Progress	"Fiscal Rules and Firm Choice: Evidence from Italian Municipalities" (with Audinga Baltruinate)

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

Teaching	Teaching Assistant, Microeconomics 1, University of Warwick
	Teaching Assistant, Industrial Economics 1 & 2, University of Warwick
	Teaching Assistant, Economics 1, University of Warwick
	Teaching Assistant, Principles of Economics 1, Warwick Summer School
Advising	Advising Assistant, for M.Sc. students, University of Warwick
Refereeing	Journal of Law, Economics and Organization
Others	Research assistant for Profs. Pancrazi, Van Rens and Vukotic (<i>Inequality in Diet</i>)
	Organiser of the Econometrics reading group, University of Warwick

AWARDS AND SCHOLARSHIPS

2016-2019	ESRC Doctoral Scholarship
2014-2016	Departmental scholarship for MRes

PRESENTATIONS

2019	Young Economists Symposium at Columbia University
	5th Workshop on the Economics of Organized Crime at Bocconi University
	Seminar at HEC Montreal
	7th SIde Workshop for PhD students in Econometrics and Empirical Economics

SOFTWARE PROFICIENCY

R	Advanced	Matlab	Basic
Stata	Advanced	Python	Basic
Latex	Advanced		

OTHER INFORMATION

Languages	Italian (native)
	English (fluent)
	German (intermediate)
Citizenship	Italian

REFERENCES

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	University of Warwick		University of Warwick
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