INDEX

EXPLANATION PAGE

WHAT IS THE FUTURISM GOOD SECTION? The cards are great—there are many at: common K args, like predictions bad, control impossible, statism bad, scenario planning bad etc.

ADDITIONAL 07 U MICH FILES THAT ARE USEFUL:

REFORM K. Some of the pragmatism/cede the political cards are straight out of the Reform Good K. I wanted to put a few in here but you should be smart and use the Reform K for more complete extensions. That file also has excellent answers to alternative modes of solvency—grassroots activism, identity politics etc.

NIETZSCHE. In addition to the Nietzsche specific answers, there are also cards that defend democracy and reason in general + a few at: authors besides Nietzsche.

SUB-SHARAN AFRICA PIC. The language does not create reality or censorship bad cards etc that are in there are good for any language K.

IR LIBERALISM K. Many more cards that say things like realism inevitable, realism good etc are in that file.

ALL OF THE OTHER K FILES HAVE AT: SPECIFIC AUTHORS. More Foucault in the Foucault file etc.

CEDE THE POLITICAL

This failure to engage the political process turns the affirmative into spectators who are powerless to produce real change.

Rorty 98 – professor emeritus of comparative literature and philosophy, by courtesy, at Stanford University (Richard, "ACHIEVING OUR COUNTRY: Leftist Thought in Twentieth-Century America", 1998, Pg. 7-9)

Such people find pride in American citizenship impossible, and vigorous participation in electoral politics pointless. They associate American patriotism with an endorsement of atrocities: the importation of African slaves, the slaughter of Native Americans, the rape of ancient forests, and the Vietnam War. Many of them think of national pride as appropriate only for chauvinists: for the sort of American who rejoices that America can still orchestrate something like the Gulf War, can still bring deadly force to bear whenever and wherever it chooses. When young intellectuals watch John Wayne war movies after reading Heidegger, Foucault, Stephenson, or Silko, they often become convinced that they live in a violent, inhuman, corrupt country. They begin to think of themselves as a saving remnant-as the happy few who have the insight to see through nationalist rhetoric to the ghastly reality of contemporary America. But this insight does not move them to formulate a legislative program, to join a political movement, or to share in a national hope. The contrast between national hope and national self-mockery and self-disgust becomes vivid when one compares novels like Snow Crash and Almanac of the Dead with socialist novels of the first half of the century-books like The Jungle, An American Tragedy, and The Grapes of Wrath. The latter were written in the belief that the tone of the Gettysburg Address was absolutely right, but that our country would have to transform itself in order to fulfill Lincoln's hopes. Transformation would be needed because the rise of industrial capitalism had made the individualist rhetoric of America's first century obsolete. The authors of these novels thought that this rhetoric should be replaced by one in which America is destined to become the first cooperative commonwealth, the first classless society. This America would be one in which income and wealth are equitably distributed, and in which the government ensures equality of opportunity as well as individual liberty. This new, quasi-communitarian rhetoric was at the heart of the Progressive Movement and the New Deal. It set the tone for the American Left during the first six decades of the twentieth century. Walt Whitman and John Dewey, as we shall see, did a great deal to shape this rhetoric. The difference between early twentieth-century leftist intellectuals and the majority of their contemporary counterparts is the difference between agents and spectators. In the early decades of this century, when an intellectual stepped back from his or her country's history and looked at it through skeptical eyes, the chances were that he or she was about to propose a new political initiative. Henry Adams was, of course, the great exception-the great abstainer from ·politics. But William James thought that Adams' diagnosis of the First Gilded Age as a symptom of irreversible moral and political decline was merely perverse. James's pragmatist theory of truth was in part a reaction against the sort of de-tached spectators hip which Adams affected. For James, disgust with American hypocrisy and self-deception was pointless unless accompanied by an effort to give America reason to be proud of itself in the future. The kind of proto- Heideggerian cultural pessimism which Adams cultivated seemed, to James, decadent and cowardly. "Democracy," James wrote, "is a kind of religion, and we are bound not to admit its failure. Faiths and utopias are the noblest exercise of human reason, and no one with a spark of reason in him will sit down fatalistically before the croaker's picture. "2

CEDE THE POLITICAL

The affirmative's strategy is not political. Instead it is a strategy against politics. This undermines the possibility of liberation.

Grossberg, 92 (Lawrence, Morris Davis Professor of Communication Studies at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, "We Gotta Get Out of this Place: Popular Conservatism and Postmodern Culture", page 278-279)

Finally, the frontier itself is transformed. It is still partly defined by an attitude in which we are all implicated. In this sense, the frontier is in everyone—and with it, the possibility of evil. But now its popular/resonance is rearticulated to "activities" that have to be affectively and morally judged and policed. The enemy is not within people but in specific activities that construct the frontier over in the image of the new conservatism. The frontier becomes a seductive machine, seducing people not only into the need to invest, but ultimately into a series of temporary and mobile investments which locate them within a popular conservatism. The frontier's articulation by the logic of scandal marks a real break with older conservatisms built on some notion of tradition. Here politics is not a solution to problems, but a machine which organizes the population and its practices. What is on the "right" (in both senses) side of the frontier, on the other side of politics, is a purely affective morality (ie., one which leaves no space within which specific actions can be judged as anything other than scandalous). The new conservatism embodies, not a political rebellion but a rebellion against politics. It makes politics into an other, located on the other side of the frontier. Anyone who actually talks about serious problems and their solutions is a dreamer; anyone who celebrates the mood in which the problem is at once terrifying and boring is a realist. It is no longer believing too strongly that is dangerous, but actually thinking that one is supposed to make one's dreams come true. The failure of Earth Day cannot be explained by merely pointing to its status as a feel-good media event, nor by pointing out the increasingly hypocritical appropriation of "green politics" by corporate polluters. It is rather that ecology, like any "politics," has become a question of attitude and investment, as if investing in the "correct" ideological beliefs, even demonstrating it, was an adequate construction of the political. Within the new conservative articulation of the frontier, political positions only exist as entirely affective investments, separated from any ability to act.

CEDE THE POLITICAL

Failure to engage in the political process will result in the takeover by the extreme right, leading to discrimination and war worldwide

Rorty 98 – professor emeritus of comparative literature and philosophy, by courtesy, at Stanford University (Richard, "ACHIEVING OUR COUNTRY: Leftist Thought in Twentieth-Century America", 1998, pg. 89-94)
WE DO NOT ENDORSE GENDERED LANGUAGE

Many writers on socioeconomic policy have warned that the old industrialized democracies are heading into a Weimar-like period, one in which populist movements are likely to overturn constitutional governments. Edward Luttwak, for example, has suggested that fascism may be the American future. The point of his book The Endangered American Dream is that members of labor unions, and unorganized unskilled workers, will sooner or later realize that their government is not even trying to prevent wages from sinking or to prevent jobs from being exported. Around the same time, they will realize that suburban white-collar workers-them- selves desperately afraid of being downsized-are not going to let themselves be taxed to provide social benefits for anyone else. At that point, something will crack. The nonsuburban electorate will decide that the system has failed and start looking around for a strongman to vote for-someone willing to assure them that, once he is elected, the smug bureaucrats, tricky lawyers, overpaid bond salesmen, and postmodernist professors will no longer be calling the shots. A scenario like that of Sinclair Lewis' novel It Can't Happen Here may then be played out. For once such a strongman takes office, nobody can predict what will happen. In 1932, most of the predictions made about what would happen if Hindenburg named Hitler chancellor were wildly overoptimistic. One thing that is very likely to happen is that the gains made in the past forty years by black and brown Americans, and by homosexuals, will be wiped out. Jocular contempt for women will come back into fashion. The words "nigger" and "kike" will once again be heard in the workplace. All the sadism which the academic Left has tried to make unacceptable to its students will come flooding back. All the resentment which badly educated Americans feel about having their manners dictated to them by college graduates will find an outlet. But such a renewal of sadism will not alter the effects of selfishness. For after my imagined strongman takes charge, he will quickly make his peace with the international superrich, just as Hitler made his with the German industrialists. He will invoke the glorious memory of the Gulf War to provoke military adventures which will generate short-term prosperity. He will be a disaster for the country and the world. People will wonder why there was so little resistance to his evitable rise. Where, they will ask, was the American Left? Why was it only rightists like Buchanan who spoke to the workers about the consequences of globalization? Why could not the Left channel the mounting rage of the newly dispossessed? It is often said that we Americans, at the end of the twentieth century, no longer have a Left. Since nobody denies the existence of what I have called the cultural Left, this amounts to an admission that that Left is unable to engage in national politics. It is not the sort of Left which can be asked to deal with the consequences of globalization. To get the country to deal with those consequences, the present cultural Left would have to transform itself by opening relations with the residue of the old reformist Left, and in particular with the labor unions. It would have to talk much more about money, even at the cost of talking less about stigma. I have two suggestions about how to effect this transition. The first is that the Left should put a moratorium on theory. It should try to kick its philosophy habit. The second is that the Left should try to mobilize what remains of our pride in being Americans. It should ask the public to consider how the country of Lincoln and Whitman might be achieved. In support of my first suggestion, let me cite a passage from Dewey's Reconstruction in Philosophy in which he expresses his exasperation with the sort of sterile debate now going on under the rubric of "individualism versus communitarianism." Dewey thought that all discussions which took this dichotomy seriously suffer from a common defect. They are all committed to the logic of general notions under which specific situations are to be brought. What we want is light upon this or that group of individuals, this or that concrete human being, this or that special institution or social arrangement. For such a logic of inquiry, the traditionally accepted logic substitutes discussion of the meaning of concepts and their dialectical relationships with one another. Dewey was right to be exasperated by sociopolitical theory conducted at this level of abstraction. He was wrong when he went on to say that ascending to this level is typically a rightist maneuver, one which supplies "the apparatus for intellectual justifications of the established order. "9 For such ascents are now more common on the Left than on the Right. The contemporary academic Left seems to think that the higher your level of abstraction, the more subversive of the established order you can be. The more sweeping and novel your conceptual apparatus, the more radical your critique. When one of today's academic leftists says that some topic has been "inadequately theorized," you can be pretty certain that he or she is going to drag in either philosophy of language, or Lacanian psychoanalysis, or some neo-Marxist version of economic determinism. Theorists of the Left think that dissolving political agents into plays of differential subjectivity, or political initiatives into pursuits of Lacan's impossible object of desire, helps to subvert the established order. Such subversion, they say, is accomplished by "problematizing familiar concepts." Recent attempts to subvert social institutions by problematizing concepts have produced a few very good books. They have also produced many thousands of books which represent scholastic philosophizing at its worst. The authors of these purportedly "subversive" books honestly believe that they are serving human liberty. But it is almost impossible to clamber back down from their books to a level of abstraction on which one might discuss the merits of a law, a treaty, a candidate, or a political strategy. Even though what these authors "theorize" is often something very concrete and near at hand-a current TV show, a media celebrity, a recent scandal-they offer the most abstract and barren explanations imaginable. These futile attempts to philosophize one's way into political relevance are a symptom of what happens when a Left retreats from activism and adopts a spectatorial approach to the problems of its country. Disengagement from practice produces theoretical hallucinations. These result in an intellectual environment which is, as Mark Edmundson says in his book Nightmare on Main Street, Gothic. The cultural Left is haunted by ubiquitous specters, the most frightening of which is called "power." This is the name of what Edmundson calls Foucault's "haunting agency, which is everywhere and nowhere, as evanescent and insistent as a resourceful spook."10

CEDE THE POLITICAL

Institutional approaches are the only way to avoid the collapse of all movements and effectively challenge the flawed state policies.

Grossberg, 92 (Lawrence, Morris Davis Professor of Communication Studies at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, "We Gotta Get Out of this Place: Popular Conservatism and Postmodern Culture", page 388-389)

The demand for moral and ideological purity often results in the rejection of any hierarchy or organization. The question-can the master's tools be used to tear down the master's house?-ignores both the contingency of the relation between such tools and the master's power and, even more importantly, the fact that **there may be no other tools available.** Institutionalization is seen as a repressive impurity within the body politic rather than as a strategic and tactical, even empowering, necessity. It sometimes seems as if every progressive organization is condemned to recapitulate the same arguments and crisis, often leading to their collapse. 54 For example, Minkowitz has described a crisis in Act Up over the need for efficiency and organization, professionalization and even hierarchy,55 as if these inherently contradicted its commitment to democracy. This is particularly unfortunate since Act Up, whatever its limitations, has proven itself an effective and imaginative political strategist. The problems are obviously magnified with success, as membership, finances and activities grow. This refusal of efficient operation and the moment of organization is intimately connected with the Left's appropriation and privileging of the local (as the site of democracy and resistance). This is yet another reason why structures of alliance are inadequate, since they often assume that an effective movement can be organized and sustained without such structuring. The Left needs to recognize the necessity of institutionalization and of systems of hierarchy, without falling back into its own authoritarianism. It needs to find reasonably democratic structures of institutionalization, even if they are impure and compromised.

The desire for pure politics undermines a litany of meaningful possibilities at overcoming domination.

Grossberg, 92 (Lawrence, Morris Davis Professor of Communication Studies at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, "We Gotta Get Out of this Place: Popular Conservatism and Postmodern Culture", page 396)

Above all, rethinking the possibility of a Left politics will require a new model of intellectual and political authority which does not begin by confidently judging every investment, every practice, every articulation and every individual. It will have to measure both intellectual and political progress by movement within the fragile and contradictory realities of people's lives, desires, fears and commitments, and not by some idealized utopia nor by its own theoretical criteria. It will offer a moral and progressive politics which refuses to "police" everyday life and to define a structure of "proper" and appropriate behaviors and attitudes. An impure politics—certainly, without the myth of a perfect reflexivity which can guarantee its authority (for authority is not an intellectual prize). A contaminated politics, never innocent, rooted in the organization of distance and densities through which all of us move together and apart, sometimes hesitatingly, at other times recklessly. A politics that attempts to move people, perhaps just a little at first, in a different direction. But a politics nonetheless, one which speaks with a certain authority, as limited and frail as the lives of those who speak it. It will have to be a politics articulated by and for people who are inevitably implicated in the contemporary crisis of authority and whose lives have been shaped by it. A politics for and by people who live in the contemporary world of popular tastes, and who are caught in the disciplined mobilization of everyday life. A politics for people who are never innocent and whose hopes are always partly defined by the very powers and inequalities they oppose. A modest politics that struggles to effect real change, that enters into the often boring challenges of strategy and compromise. An impure politics fighting for high stakes.

CEDE THE POLITICAL: AT THE LEFT IS DEAD

Progressive momentum can be built upon with big tent, practical politics—operating at only the level of ideology dooms the movement.

Wilson, 2000 – Editor and Publisher of Illinois Academe – 2000 (John K. Wilson, "How the Left can Win Arguments and Influence People" p. 5- 6)

The trend toward progressive attitudes among Americans has only accelerated. Today, Americans advocate gender equality on a level unthinkable at the time I was born, an era when airline stewardess were fired when they turned thirty, got married, or gained fifteen pounds. Today, racial equality is an ideal widely accepted, even if the reality falls short. Today, equality for gays and lesbians is a politically viable possibility, a remarkable leap for an issue that was virtually invisible at the time of the Stonewall riot. Today, environmental awareness and the enormous number of people who recycle would have been unimaginable to the small group of activists who gathered to celebrate the first Earth Day. Even though the American people have been moving to the left on a number of important issues, the two major political parties have shifted to the right. The left's revival requires both the recognition of the disadvantages it faces and a willingness to fight against those barriers while making use of the advantages that progressives have over the right. The biggest advantage that the left holds is that it doesn't have to be afraid of speaking the truth to the public. Conservatives, despite their assertions of public support, must always be wary of dealing too openly with Americans. That is, every idea on the right must be carefully vetted to ensure the proper spin control. Even "radical" ideas such as Steve Forbes's flat tax must conceal the extent of tax cuts for the rich under the disguise of a universal tax reduction. This book argues that progressives need to reshape their arguments and their policy proposals to increase their influence over American politics. It also contends that the left need not sell its soul or jettison its diverse constituents in order to succeed. Rather than moderation, I urge a new kind of tactical radicalism. Rather than a monolithic left focused on class or labor or postmodernism or whatever the pet ideological project of the day is, I advocate a big-tent left capable of mobilizing all its people. Progressives already have the hearts and minds of the American people. What the left lacks is a political movement to translate that popularity into political action. What the left needs is a rhetorical framework and political plan of action to turn the progressive potential in America into a political force.

Progressive ideals are alive and well in the US.

Wilson, 2000 – Editor and Publisher of Illinois Academe – 2000 (John K. Wilson, "How the Left can Win Arguments and Influence People" p. 2- 4)

The thesis of this book is that a majority of Americans now believe (or could easily be persuaded to believe) in many progressive ideas, even though the power of the progressive movement itself in mainstream politics has largely disintegrated. In reality, progressives are nearly everywhere, with the possible exception of corporate boardrooms, the White House, and Bob Jones University. Progressives look like everyone else, although they appear to be a little more forlorn than most. Unfortunately, the progressive views of the American majority do not translate into political power. Progressives cannot sit back and await the rising masses to thrust the left into power. Rather, progressives need to give their potential supporters a reason to be politically active and intellectually interested in the ideas of the left. If you relied on just the mass media in America or on election results, you would have to conclude that this is a conservative nation. We hear about polls declaring that the American people demand lower taxes, smaller government, the elimination of welfare, the mass execution of criminals, and daily pledges of allegiance to the free market. We see Republicans in charge of Congress, successfully pursuing their goals of putting a prison on every corner and lowering taxes on the wealthy in order to allow economic prosperity to trickle down to everyone else. America must be conservative. It seems logical, doesn't it? If the Republicans hold political power and the "liberal" Democrats are following their lead, this must mean that the majority of Americans share the values of the right. If the "liberal" media agree with this assessment, then it's surely an established fact: progressivism as a mass movement is dead in America**.** Progressivism as an ideology is a powerful force in the American psyche. From environmentalism to feminism to racial equality, Americans believe deeply in progressive ideas. All these ideologies were minority movements just a generation ago; now, however, open opposition to them is considered political suicide in most of the country. Why, then, does a progressive political movement seem so unthinkable? In a political system controlled by the principle of "one dollar, one vote," these progressive views lose out to the more economically powerful ideas held by the conservative status quo. These progressive ideas end up being ignored by mega-media corporations controlled by the same wealthy forces. This book is not an attempt to establish a philosophy of the left. Like any political movement, the left has many different philosophies driving its members. Leftists are concerned about civil rights, gay rights, women's rights, poverty, homelessness, education, imprisonment, empowerment, and much more. Leftists believe in liberalism, Marxism, libertarianism, Christianity, and a wide range of other ideologies. Trying to find a common intellectual ground for everything is impossible, since not every leftist can possibly share the same belief in every issue and in what the top priorities should be. Even trying to define what a leftist is seems to be a difficult task, especially since most of the people who believe in leftist ideas may be unwilling to accept the label. This book is, instead, a guide for political rhetoric and strategic action, a sometimes helpful, sometimes annoying attempt to help the left overcome its own flaws and seek out ways to reach and convince a larger audience about progressive ideas. This is a self-help book for leftists looking for ways to convince the world that what they believe is correct. This book is also a road map showing how the left can turn the public debate to issues they can win. This book originates from a puzzling paradox: over the past several decades, American political attitudes have become dramatically more progressive. Movements for civil rights, women's equality, and environmental protection, once promoted by a radical fringe, are now fully embraced by the mainstream.

AT PERFORMANCE: CEDE THE POLITICAL

Faith in performance is naïve and fails to reshape politics

Rothberg & Valente 97 Molly Anne Rothenberg, Assoc. Prof English @ Tulane and Joseph Valente, Assis. Prof English @ U. Ill, Feb. 1997, College Literature, v. 25, Iss. 1, "Performative chic," p pq

The recent vogue for performativity, particularly in gender and postcolonial studies, suggests that the desire for political potency has displaced the demand for critical rigor.l Because Judith Butler bears the primary responsibility for investing performativity with its present critical cachet, her work furnishes a convenient site for exposing the flawed theoretical formulations and the hollow political claims advanced under the banner of performativity. We have undertaken this critique not solely in the interests of clarifying performativity's theoretical stakes: in our view, the appropriation of performativity for purposes to which it is completely unsuited has misdirected crucial activist energies, not only squandering resources but even endangering those naive enough to act on performativity's (false) political promise. It is reasonable to expect any practical political discourse to essay an analysis which links its proposed actions with their supposed effects, appraising the fruits of specific political labors before their seeds are sown. Only by means of such an assessment can any political program persuade us to undertake some tasks and forgo others. Butler proceeds accordingly: "The task is not whether to repeat, but how to repeat or, indeed to repeat, and through a radical proliferation of gender, to displace the very gender norms that enable repetition itself' (Gender Trouble 148). Here, at the conclusion to Gender Trouble, she makes good her promise that subjects can intervene meaningfully, politically, in the signification system which iteratively constitutes them. The political "task" we face requires that we choose "how to repeat" gender norms in such a way as to displace them. According to her final chapter, "The Politics of Parody," the way to displace gender norms is through the deliberate performance of drag as gender parody.

PRAGMATISM

A critical mass of small reforms is the only way that a radical left agenda is possible.

Wilson, 2000 – Editor and Publisher of Illinois Academe – 2000 (John K. Wilson, "How the Left can Win Arguments and Influence People" p. 121- 123)

Progressives need to be pragmatic in order to be powerful. However, pragmatism shouldn't be confused with Clintonian centrism and the abandonment of all substance. Pragmatists have principles, too. The difference between a pragmatic progressive and a foolish one is the willingness to pick the right fights and fight in the right way to accomplish these same goals. The current failure of progressivism in America is due to the structure of American politics and media, not because of a wrong turn that the movement took somewhere along the way. What the left needs is not a "better" ideology but a tactical adaptation to the obstacles it faces in the contemporary political scene. A pragmatic progressivism does not sacrifice its ideals but simply communicates them better to the larger public. The words we use shape how people respond to our ideas. It's tempting to offer the standard advice that progressives should present their ideas in the most palatable form. But palatable to whom? The media managers and pedestrian pundits who are the intellectual gatekeepers won't accept these ideas. By the time progressives transform their ideas into the political baby food necessary for inclusion in current debates, it barely seems to be worth the effort. Leftists need to seize the dominant political rhetoric, even though it may be conservative in its goals, and turn it in a progressive direction. Progressives need to use the antitax ideology to demand tax cuts for the poor. Progressives need to use the antigovernment and antiwelfare ideology to demand the end of corporate welfare. Progressives need to translate every important issue into the language that is permissible in the mainstream. Something will inevitably be lost in the translation. But the political soul underlying these progressive ideas can be preserved and brought to the public's attention. The left does not need to abandon its progressive views in order to be popular. The left only needs to abandon some of its failed strategies and become as savvy as the conservatives are at manipulating the press and the politicians. The language of progressive needs to become more mainstream, but the ideas must remain radical. In an age of soulless politicians and spineless ideologies, the left has the virtue of integrity. Until progressives become less self-satisfied with the knowledge that they're right and more determined to convince everyone else of this fact, opportunities for political change will not be forthcoming. Progressives have also been hampered by a revolutionary instinct among some leftist groups. According to some left wingers, incremental progress is worthless---that is, nothing short of a radical change in government will mean anything to them. Indeed, for most radical left wingers, liberal reforms are a threat to the movement, since they reduce the desire for more extreme changes. What the revolutionaries fail to realize is that progressive achievements can build on one another. If anything approaching a political revolution actually happens in America, it will be due to a succession of popular, effective, progressive reforms. A popular uprising in the ballot box is possible only if the left can change its political assumptions about smaller, specific issues.

STATE GOOD

Turning away from the state prevents mobilization for good causes.

Goble 98 (Paul, Publisher of RFE/RL, "THE CONSEQUENCES OF DEPOLITICIZATION," Radio Free Europe, October 12, 1998, http://www.friends-partners.org/friends/news/omri/1998/10/981012I.html(opt,mozilla,unix,english,,new**)**, accessed July 07)

First, as people turn away from the state as the source of support, they inevitably care less about what the state does and are less willing to take action to assert their views. That means that neither the state nor the opposition can mobilize them to take action for or against anything. As a result, the opposition cannot easily get large numbers of people to demonstrate even if the opposition is taking positions that polls suggest most people agree with. And the government cannot draw on popular support even when it may be doing things that the people have said they want. That means that the size of demonstrations for or against anything or anyone are an increasingly poor indicator of what the people want or do not want the state to do. Second, precisely because people are focusing on their private lives and taking responsibility for them, they are likely to become increasingly upset when the state attempts to intervene in their lives even for the most benign purposes, particularly if it does so in an ineffective manner. Such attitudes, widespread in many countries and important in limiting the power of state institutions, nonetheless pose a particular danger to countries making the transition from communism to democracy. While those views help promote the dismantling of the old state, they also virtually preclude the emergence of a new and efficient one. As a result, these countries are often likely to find themselves without the effective state institutions that modern societies and economies require if they are to be well regulated. And third, countries with depoliticized populations are especially at risk when they face a crisis. The governments cannot count on support because people no longer expect the governments to be able to deliver.

STATE GOOD: CHECKS CAPITALISM

The state is necessary to check the free market.

Kamiya 97 (Gary, Executive Editor, “Smashing the State,” Salon.com, The Brainwave Project, January 20, 1997, http://www.salon.com/jan97/state2970120.html**)**

Perhaps the most depressing thing about libertarianism is its almost unconscious aversion to the notion that in a representative democracy, we are the government. Of course, our democracy is plagued with big-money corruption and a thousand other problems, but when a significant percentage of people begin to think of government as "them," democracy itself is in trouble. There is a discomforting family resemblance between libertarianism and the militia movement. The libertarian insistence on seeing government as a malevolent or at best obstructionist external force fails to acknowledge its organic, changing nature. Government does, of course, set policy and attempt to dictate the course of events, but much of what it does is respond to, and referee, conflicts in society. Far from being a reified Other, government exists precisely to grapple -- through the instrument of law -- with issues that individuals cannot resolve by themselves. The libertarian failure to recognize the flexibility of law gives a scholastic, how-many-angels-can-dance-on-the-head-of-a-pin quality to many of its arguments. When property rights clash with environmental rights, for example, who adjudicates? Government does, through law: No libertarian solution would produce a different framework. Government will not resolve those problems to the liking of all interested parties -- but neither would any other process. We have big government in large part because we live in an enormously complex society -- because we have big problems. Libertarians are fond of saying the regulatory welfare state is somehow a continuation of despotic power -- as if there were a historical thread running between the Sun King and Sweden's social democracy. This tendentious view, verging on paranoia, is not only ahistorical, it ignores the role modern governments play in moderating corporate power.

SPECIFIC SOLVENCY OUTWEIGHS THE K LINK

Specific solvency outweighs general theory—theories are only as good as their applications and excessively generic arguments are a very weak form of reasoning.

Zournazi and Massumi, 02 - , PhD in cultural theory, philosophy, and politics & professor of communications/literature at the University of Montreal – 2002 (Mary Zournazi and Brian Massumi, "Navigating Movements," *Hope: new philosophies for change*)

Critical' practices aimed at increasing potentials for freedom and for movement are inadequate, because in order to critique something in any kind of definitive way you have to pin it down. In a way it is an almost sadistic enterprise that separates something out, attributes set characteristics to it, then applies a final judgment to it - objectifies it, in a moralising kind of way. I understand that using a 'critical method' is not the same as 'being critical'. But still I think there is always that moralising undertone to critique. Because of that, I think, it loses contact with other more moving dimensions of experience. It doesn't allow for other kinds of practices that might not have so much to do with mastery and judgment as with affective connection and abductive participation. The non-judgmental is interesting, you know, because you are always somehow implicated in trying to make judgments ... To not make judgments in critical thought is a very hard thing to do. It takes a lot courage to move in that direction, because othetwise ... Well, it requires a willingness to take risks, to make mistakes and even to come across as silly. A critical perspective that tries to come to a definitive judgment on something is always in some way a failure, because it is happening at a remove from the process it's judging. Something could have happened in the intervening time, or something barely perceptible might have been happening away from the centre of critical focus. These developments may become important later. The process of pinning down and separating out is also a weakness in judgment, because it doesn't allow for these seeds of change, connections in the making that might not be activated or obvious at the moment. In a sense, judgmental reason is an extremely weak form of thought, precisely because it is so sure of itself. This is not to say that it shouldn't be used.

FUTURISM KEY TO MOVEMENTS

Debates by non-government action about future crises are critical to social movements—distopian visions are mobilizing transnational movements that are effectively pressuring governments into preventing everything from nuclear annihilation to slowing the spread of AIDS.

Kurasawa, 04 (Professor of Sociology, York University of Toronto, Fuyuki, Constellations Volume 11, No 4, 2004).

In the twenty-first century, the lines of political cleavage are being drawn along those of competing dystopian visions. Indeed, one of the notable features of recent public discourse and socio-political struggle is their negationist hue, for they are devoted as much to the prevention of disaster as to the realization of the good, less to what ought to be than what could but must not be. The debates that preceded the war in Iraq provide a vivid illustration of this tendency, as both camps rhetorically invoked incommensurable catastrophic scenarios to make their respective cases. And as many analysts have noted, the multinational antiwar protests culminating on February 15, 2003 marked the first time that a mass movement was able to mobilize substantial numbers of people dedicated to averting war before it had actually broken out. More generally, given past experiences and awareness of what might occur in the future, given the cries of 'never again' (the Second World War, the Holocaust, Bhopal, Rwanda, etc.) and 'not ever' (e.g., nuclear or ecological apocalypse, human cloning) that are emanating from different parts of the world, the avoidance of crises is seemingly on everyone's lips – and everyone's conscience. From the United Nations and regional multilateral organizations to states, from non-governmental organizations to transnational social movements, the determination to prevent the actualization of potential cataclysms has become a new imperative in world affairs. Allowing past disasters to reoccur and unprecedented calamities to unfold is now widely seen as unbearable when, in the process, the suffering of future generations is callously tolerated and our survival is being irresponsibly jeopardized. Hence, we need to pay attention to what a widely circulated report by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty identifies as a burgeoning "culture of prevention,"3 a dynamic that carries major, albeit still poorly understood, normative and political implications. Rather than bemoaning the contemporary preeminence of a dystopian imaginary, I am claiming that it can enable a novel form of transnational socio-political action, a manifestation of globalization from below that can be termed preventive foresight. We should not reduce the latter to a formal principle regulating international relations or an ensemble of policy prescriptions for official players on the world stage, since it is, just as significantly, a mode of ethico-political practice enacted by participants in the emerging realm of global civil society. In other words, what I want to underscore is the work of farsightedness, the social processes through which civic associations are simultaneously constituting and putting into practice a sense of responsibility for the future by attempting to prevent global catastrophes. Although the labor of preventive foresight takes place in varying political and socio-cultural settings – and with different degrees of institutional support and access to symbolic and material resources – it is underpinned by three distinctive features: dialogism, publicity, and transnationalism. In the first instance, preventive foresight is an intersubjective or dialogical process of address, recognition, and response between two parties in global civil society: the 'warners,' who anticipate and send out word of possible perils, and the audiences being warned, those who heed their interlocutors' messages by demanding that governments and/or international organizations take measures to steer away from disaster. Secondly, the work of farsightedness derives its effectiveness and legitimacy from public debate and deliberation. This is not to say that a fully fledged global public sphere is already in existence, since transnational "strong publics" with decisional power in the formal-institutional realm are currently embryonic at best. Rather, in this context, publicity signifies that "weak publics" with distinct yet occasionally overlapping constituencies are coalescing around struggles to avoid specific global catastrophes.4 Hence, despite having little direct decision-making capacity, the environmental and peace movements, humanitarian NGOs, and other similar globally-oriented civic associations are becoming significant actors involved in public opinion formation. Groups like these are active in disseminating information and alerting citizens about looming catastrophes, lobbying states and multilateral organizations from the 'inside' and pressuring them from the 'outside,' as well as fostering public participation in debates about the future. This brings us to the transnational character of preventive foresight, which is most explicit in the now commonplace observation that we live in an interdependent world because of the globalization of the perils that humankind faces (nuclear annihilation, global warming, terrorism, genocide, AIDS and SARS epidemics, and so on); individuals and groups from far-flung parts of the planet are being brought together into "risk communities" that transcend geographical borders.5 Moreover, due to dense media and information flows, knowledge of impeding catastrophes can instantaneously reach the four corners of the earth – sometimes well before individuals in one place experience the actual consequences of a crisis originating in another. My contention is that civic associations are engaging in dialogical, public, and transnational forms of ethico-political action that contribute to the creation of a fledgling global civil society existing 'below' the official and institutionalized architecture of international relations. The work of preventive foresight consists of forging ties between citizens; participating in the circulation of flows of claims, images, and information across borders; promoting an ethos of farsighted cosmopolitanism; and forming and mobilizing weak publics that debate and struggle against possible catastrophes. Over the past few decades, states and international organizations have frequently been content to follow the lead of globally- minded civil society actors, who have been instrumental in placing on the public agenda a host of pivotal issues (such as nuclear war, ecological pollution, species extinction, genetic engineering, and mass human rights violations).

FUTURISM KET TO MOVEMENTS

Debates from non-governmental actors about futurism and crises aversion have been critical to forming movements addressing pollution, genocide, AIDS, racism, and war. Decades of social activism have been motivated by futurism—this history overwhelms their non-empirical theory.

Kurasawa, 04 (Professor of Sociology, York University of Toronto, Fuyuki, Constellations Volume 11, No 4, 2004).

Societies emerging from the horrors and devastation of two world wars came to recognize that certain dangers (principally wars of aggression, genocide, crimes against humanity, and nuclear armageddon) needed to be averted at all costs. The international community thereby devised a number of institutional responses, such as the Charter giving birth to the United Nations, the signing of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. However, by paralyzing the United Nations system and fuelling a nuclear arms race, the onset and escalation of the Cold War rendered the institutional sphere largely ineffective. In response to this paralysis came the nuclear disarmament and peace movements, which were spurred on by the terrifying realization that human beings had devised the means for their own annihilation and that the two geopolitical blocs were pursuing an exterminist logic; given that human survival could no longer be entrusted to governments or multilateral institutions, citizens had to organize themselves to tackle the problem head-on. In the 1970s and 1980s, widely circulated reports from the Club of Rome and the Brundtland Commission combined with environmental activism brought another global threat to public attention, the prospect of ecological ruin caused by a rampant industrialism that mercilessly depleted the earth's resources and polluted it at an unsustainably destructive pace. Yet it is since the end of the Cold War that the idea of prevention has truly come into its own in both the formally and informally organized domains of global governance. The dissolution of the bipolar stalemate between East and West opened the door to greater inter-state coordination and collaboration, perhaps most significantly at the United Nations Security Council.9 The creation of supranational judicial institutions (e.g., the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Court) are also signal achievements of the post-Cold War world order, for they may well have a latent deterrence effect despite the fact that they are designed to prosecute crimes against humanity ex post facto. The Rome Treaty establishing the International Criminal Court is itself part of an expanding infrastructure of multinational conferences and agreements that has come into being over the past decade or so; governments and NGOs have participated in large-scale, UN-sponsored summits that have yielded agreements or declarations incorporating strong preventive language: the Rio Summit on the environment, the Kyoto Protocol on climate change, the International Treaty to Ban Landmines, and, of most relevance for our purposes, the Declaration on the Responsibilities of the Present Generations Towards Future Generations.10 Furthermore, the unfolding of a process of globalization from below has meant that certain civil society organizations are increasingly vocal in demanding that governments, multilateral institutions and transnational corporations take preventive action or cease to engage in activities and support policies that imperil humankind. In addition, farsightedness has become a priority in world affairs due to the appearance of new global threats and the resurgence of 'older' ones. Virulent forms of ethno-racial nationalism and religious fundamentalism that had mostly been kept in check or bottled up during the Cold War have reasserted themselves in ways that are now all-too-familiar – civil warfare, genocide, 'ethnic cleansing,' and global terrorism. And if nuclear mutually assured destruction has come to pass, other dangers are filling the vacuum: climate change, AIDS and other diseases (BSE, SARS, etc.), as well as previously unheralded genomic perils (genetically modified organisms, human cloning). Collective remembrance of past atrocities and disasters has galvanized some sectors of public opinion and made the international community's unwillingness to adequately intervene before and during the genocides in the ex-Yugoslavia and Rwanda, or to take remedial steps in the case of the spiraling African and Asian AIDS pandemics, appear particularly glaring.

FUTURISM KEY TO CRISIS PREVENTION

Scenario planning is critical in a world where annihilation is a possibility—addressing problems now greatly enhances our ability to avert global catastrophe.

Kurasawa, 04 (Professor of Sociology, York University of Toronto, Fuyuki, Constellations Volume 11, No 4, 2004).

Independently of this contractualist justification, global civil society actors are putting forth a number of arguments countering temporal myopia on rational grounds. They make the case that no generation, and no part of the world, is immune from catastrophe. Complacency and parochialism are deeply flawed in that even if we earn a temporary reprieve, our children and grandchildren will likely not be so fortunate unless steps are taken today. Similarly, though it might be possible to minimize or contain the risks and harms of actions to faraway places over the short-term, parrying the eventual blowback or spillover effect is improbable. In fact, as I argued in the previous section, all but the smallest and most isolated of crises are rapidly becoming globalized due to the existence of transnational circuits of ideas, images, people, and commodities. Regardless of where they live, our descendants will increasingly be subjected to the impact of environmental degradation, the spread of epidemics, gross North-South socioeconomic inequalities, refugee flows, civil wars, and genocides. What may have previously appeared to be temporally and spatially remote risks are 'coming home to roost' in ever faster cycles. In a word, then, procrastination makes little sense for three principal reasons: it exponentially raises the costs of eventual future action; it reduces preventive options; and it erodes their effectiveness. With the foreclosing of long-range alternatives, later generations may be left with a single course of action, namely, that of merely reacting to large-scale emergencies as they arise. We need only think of how it gradually becomes more difficult to control climate change, let alone reverse it, or to halt mass atrocities once they are underway. Preventive foresight is grounded in the opposite logic, whereby the decision to work through perils today greatly enhances both the subsequent room for maneuver and the chances of success. Humanitarian, environmental, and techno-scientific activists have convincingly shown that we cannot afford not to engage in preventive labor. Moreover, I would contend that farsighted cosmopolitanism is not as remote or idealistic a prospect as it appears to some, for as Falk writes, "[g]lobal justice between temporal communities, however, actually seems to be increasing, as evidenced by various expressions of greater sensitivity to past injustices and future dangers."36 Global civil society may well be helping a new generational self-conception take root, according to which we view ourselves as the provisional caretakers of our planetary commons. Out of our sense of responsibility for the well-being of those who will follow us, we come to be more concerned about the here and now.

FUTURISM KEY TO HUMAN SURVIVAL

Futurism is key to human survival. Debates amongst citizens are the only way to reign in the excesses of statism.

Kurasawa, 04 (Professor of Sociology, York University of Toronto, Fuyuki, Constellations Volume 11, No 4, 2004).

In recent years, the rise of a dystopian imaginary has accompanied damning assessments and widespread recognition of the international community's repeated failures to adequately intervene in a number of largely preventable disasters (from the genocides in the ex-Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and East Timor to climate change and the spiraling AIDS pandemics in parts of sub-Saharan Africa and Asia). Social movements, NGOs, diasporic groups, and concerned citizens are not mincing words in their criticisms of the United Nations system and its member-states, and thus beginning to shift the discursive and moral terrain in world affairs. As a result, the callousness implicit in disregarding the future has been exposed as a threat to the survival of humanity and its natural surroundings. The Realpolitik of national self-interest and the neoliberal logic of the market will undoubtedly continue to assert themselves, yet demands for farsightedness are increasingly reining them in. Though governments, multilateral institutions, and transnational corporations will probably never completely modify the presentist assumptions underlying their modes of operation, they are, at the very least, finding themselves compelled to account for egregious instances of short-sightedness and rhetorically commit themselves to taking corrective steps. What may seem like a modest development at first glance would have been unimaginable even a few decades ago, indicating the extent to which we have moved toward a culture of prevention. A new imperative has come into being, that of preventive foresight.

AT: ANY FLAW WITH FUTURISM

Any problem that they identify about futurism will only be worse in a world where we give up. Either others will decide for us or we will be overwhelmed by crises. Futurism may have flaws but scenario planning by citizens is the best hope that we have.

Kurasawa, 04 (Professor of Sociology, York University of Toronto, Fuyuki, Constellations Volume 11, No 4, 2004).

None of this is to disavow the international community's rather patchy record of avoiding foreseeable calamities over the last decades, or to minimize the difficulties of implementing the kinds of global institutional reforms described above and the perils of historical contingency, presentist indifference toward the future, or alarmism and resignation. To my mind, however, this is all the more reason to pay attention to the work of preventive foresight in global civil society, through which civic associations can build up the latter's coordination mechanisms and institutional leverage, cultivate and mobilize public opinion in distant parts of the world, and compel political leaders and national and transnational governance structures to implement certain policies. While seeking to prevent cataclysms from worsening or, better yet, from occurring in the first place, these sorts of initiatives can and must remain consistent with a vision of a just world order. Furthermore, the labor of farsightedness supports an autonomous view of the future, according to which we are the creators of the field of possibilities within which our successors will dwell. The current socio-political order, with all its short-term biases, is neither natural nor necessary. Accordingly, informed public participation in deliberative processes makes a socially self-instituting future possible, through the involvement of groups and individuals active in domestic and supranational public spaces; prevention is a public practice, and a public responsibility. To believe otherwise is, I would argue, to leave the path clear for a series of alternatives that heteronomously compromise the well-being of those who will come after us. We would thereby effectively abandon the future to the vagaries of history ('let it unfold as it may'), the technocratic or instrumental will of official institutions ('let others decide for us'), or to gambles about the time-lags of risks ('let our progeny deal with their realization'). But, as I have tried to show here, this will not and cannot be accepted. Engaging in autonomous preventive struggles, then, remains our best hope. A farsighted cosmopolitanism that aims to avert crises while working toward the realization of precaution and global justice represents a compelling ethico-political project, for we will not inherit a better future. It must be made, starting with us, in the here and now.

AT: FUTURISM/CRISES CAUSE PARALYSIS

Crisis scenarios do not cause paralysis—historically, the most effective social movements have used distopian imagery to compel action.

Kurasawa, 04 (Professor of Sociology, York University of Toronto, Fuyuki, Constellations Volume 11, No 4, 2004).

Returning to the point I made at the beginning of this paper, the significance of foresight is a direct outcome of the transition toward a dystopian imaginary (or what Sontag has called "the imagination of disaster").11 Huxley's Brave New World and Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four, two groundbreaking dystopian novels of the first half of the twentieth century, remain as influential as ever in framing public discourse and understanding current techno-scientific dangers, while recent paradigmatic cultural artifacts – films like The Matrix and novels like Atwood's Oryx and Crake – reflect and give shape to this catastrophic sensibility.12 And yet dystopianism need not imply despondency, paralysis, or fear. Quite the opposite, in fact, since the pervasiveness of a dystopian imaginary can help notions of historical contingency and fallibilism gain traction against their determinist and absolutist counterparts. Once we recognize that the future is uncertain and that any course of action produces both unintended and unexpected consequences, the responsibility to face up to potential disasters and intervene before they strike becomes compelling. From another angle, dystopianism lies at the core of politics in a global civil society where groups mobilize their own nightmare scenarios ('Frankenfoods' and a lifeless planet for environmentalists, totalitarian patriarchy of the sort depicted in Atwood's Handmaid's Tale for Western feminism, McWorld and a global neoliberal oligarchy for the alternative globalization movement, etc.). Such scenarios can act as catalysts for public debate and socio-political action, spurring citizens' involvement in the work of preventive foresight.

AT: PREDICTIONS WRONG

Just because we cannot predict the future with total certainty does not mean that we cannot make educated guesses. And, scenario planning is key to making responsible choices. We are obligated to take care of the planet if we have a significant role to play.

Kurasawa, 04 (Professor of Sociology, York University of Toronto, Fuyuki, Constellations Volume 11, No 4, 2004).

A radically postmodern line of thinking, for instance, would lead us to believe that it is pointless, perhaps even harmful, to strive for farsightedness in light of the aforementioned crisis of conventional paradigms of historical analysis. If, contra teleological models, history has no intrinsic meaning, direction, or endpoint to be discovered through human reason, and if, contra scientistic futurism, prospective trends cannot be predicted without error, then the abyss of chronological inscrutability supposedly opens up at our feet. The future appears to be unknowable, an outcome of chance. Therefore, rather than embarking upon grandiose speculation about what may occur, we should adopt a pragmatism that abandons itself to the twists and turns of history; let us be content to formulate ad hoc responses to emergencies as they arise. While this argument has the merit of underscoring the fallibilistic nature of all predictive schemes, it conflates the necessary recognition of the contingency of history with unwarranted assertions about the latter's total opacity and indeterminacy. Acknowledging the fact that the future cannot be known with absolute certainty does not imply abandoning the task of trying to understand what is brewing on the horizon and to prepare for crises already coming into their own. In fact, the incorporation of the principle of fallibility into the work of prevention means that we must be ever more vigilant for warning signs of disaster and for responses that provoke unintended or unexpected consequences (a point to which I will return in the final section of this paper). In addition, from a normative point of view, the acceptance of historical contingency and of the self-limiting character of farsightedness places the duty of preventing catastrophe squarely on the shoulders of present generations. The future no longer appears to be a metaphysical creature of destiny or of the cunning of reason, nor can it be sloughed off to pure randomness. It becomes, instead, a result of human action shaped by decisions in the present – including, of course, trying to anticipate and prepare for possible and avoidable sources of harm to our successors. Combining a sense of analytical contingency toward the future and ethical responsibility for it, the idea of early warning is making its way into preventive action on the global stage.

Scenario planning is no longer the product of sterile government number crunching. Debates amongst citizens about future crises have created a global early warning next work that has both been proven relatively accurate and able to influence government action.

Kurasawa, 04 (Professor of Sociology, York University of Toronto, Fuyuki, Constellations Volume 11, No 4, 2004).

Despite the fact that not all humanitarian, technoscientific, and environmental disasters can be predicted in advance, the multiplication of independent sources of knowledge and detection mechanisms enables us to foresee many of them before it is too late. Indeed, in recent years, global civil society's capacity for early warning has dramatically increased, in no small part due to the impressive number of NGOs that include catastrophe prevention at the heart of their mandates.17 These organizations are often the first to detect signs of trouble, to dispatch investigative or fact-finding missions, and to warn the international community about impending dangers; to wit, the lead role of environmental groups in sounding the alarm about global warming and species depletion or of humanitarian agencies regarding the AIDS crisis in sub-Saharan Africa, frequently months or even years before Western governments or multilateral institutions followed suit. What has come into being, then, is a loose-knit network of watchdog groups that is acquiring finely tuned antennae to pinpoint indicators of forthcoming or already unfolding crises. This network of 'early warners' are working to publicize potential and actual emergencies by locating indicators of danger into larger catastrophic patterns of interpretation, culturally meaningful chains of events whose implications become discernable for decision-makers and ordinary citizens ('this is why you should care').18 Civic associations can thus invest perilous situations with urgency and importance, transforming climate change from an apparently mild and distant possibility to an irreversible and grave threat to human survival, and genocide from a supposedly isolated aberration to an affront to our common humanity. The growing public significance of preventive message in global affairs is part and parcel of what Ignatieff has termed an "advocacy revolution,"19 since threatened populations and allied organizations are acting as early warning beacons that educate citizens about certain perils and appeal for action on the part of states and multilateral institutions. Global civil society players have devised a host of 'naming and shaming' strategies and high-profile information campaigns to this effect, including press conferences, petitions, mass marches, and boycotts, and spectacular stunts that denounce bureaucratic inertia, the reckless pursuit of profit, or the preponderance of national interests in world affairs.20 The advocacy revolution is having both 'trickle-down' and 'trickle-up' effects, establishing audiences of constituents and ordinary citizens conversant with some of the great challenges facing humanity as well as putting pressure on official institutions to be proactive in their long-term planning and shorter-term responses.

AT: MEDIA DISTORTIONS

They are right that the media is not perfect. But, the proliferation of different types of media makes government cover-ups very difficult and can dramatically shape public opinion. And, there is a healthy skepticism of the media that mobilizes citizens to question further.

Kurasawa, 04 (Professor of Sociology, York University of Toronto, Fuyuki, Constellations Volume 11, No 4, 2004).

None of this would be possible without the existence of global media, whose speed and range make it possible for reports of an unfolding or upcoming disaster to reach viewers or readers in most parts of the world almost instantaneously. Despite the highly selective character of what is deemed newsworthy and state and commercial influence on what is broadcast, several recent attempts to hide evidence of acts of mass violence (Tiananmen Square, East Timor, Chechnya, etc.) and crises (e.g., during the Chernobyl nuclear accident in the Soviet Union or the SARS outbreak in China) have failed; few things now entirely escape from the satellite camera, the cellular telephone, or the notebook computer. And although the internet may never become the populist panacea technological determinists have been heralding for years, it remains a key device through which concerned citizens and activists can share and spread information. While media coverage almost always follows a crisis rather than preceding it, the broadcast of shocking images and testimonies can nevertheless shame governments and international organizations into taking immediate steps. The 'CNN or BBC effect,' to which we should now add the 'Al-Jazeera effect,' is a surprisingly powerful force in impacting world public opinion, as the now notorious Abu Ghraib prison photographs remind us. The possibility that the threat of media exposure may dissuade individuals and groups from enacting genocidal plans or reckless gambles with our future is one of the lynchpins of prevention in our information-saturated age. Are forewarnings of disasters being heard? The mobilization of official intervention and popular interest has certainly been mixed, yet global civil society is having some success in cultivating audiences and advocates coalescing around specific perils (mass human rights violations, ecological devastation, genetic engineering, epidemics, and so on). After Bhopal and Chernobyl, after 'mad cow disease' and the war in Iraq, citizens are scrutinizing, questioning and even contesting official expertise in risk assessment more than ever before.21 Hence, in a world where early warnings of cataclysms are often available, pleading ignorance or helplessness to anticipate what may come in the future becomes less and less plausible.

AT: FUTURISM = NO VALUE TO LIFE

Short-sightedness is what makes life disposable—the techno-strategic logic that they indict is at its worst when we refuse to consider long-term consequences. Future orientation is the only way to make better decisions.

Kurasawa, 04 (Professor of Sociology, York University of Toronto, Fuyuki, Constellations Volume 11, No 4, 2004).

At another level, instrumental-strategic forms of thought and action, so pervasive in modern societies because institutionally entrenched in the state and the market, are rarely compatible with the demands of farsightedness. The calculation of the most technically efficient means to attain a particular bureaucratic or corporate objective, and the subsequent relentless pursuit of it, intrinsically exclude broader questions of long-term prospects or negative side-effects. What matters is the maximization of profits or national self-interest with the least effort, and as rapidly as possible. Growing risks and perils are transferred to future generations through a series of trade-offs: economic growth versus environmental protection, innovation versus safety, instant gratification versus future well-being. What can be done in the face of short-sightedness? Cosmopolitanism provides some of the clues to an answer, thanks to its formulation of a universal duty of care for humankind that transcends all geographical and socio-cultural borders. I want to expand the notion of cosmopolitan universalism in a temporal direction, so that it can become applicable to future generations and thereby nourish a vibrant culture of prevention. Consequently, we need to begin thinking about a farsighted cosmopolitanism, a chrono-cosmopolitics that takes seriously a sense of "intergenerational solidarity" toward human beings who will live in our wake as much as those living amidst us today. But for a farsighted cosmopolitanism to take root in global civil society, the latter must adopt a thicker regulative principle of care for the future than the one currently in vogue (which amounts to little more than an afterthought of the nondescript 'don't forget later generations' ilk). Hans Jonas's "imperative of responsibility" is valuable precisely because it prescribes an ethico-political relationship to the future consonant with the work of farsightedness.27 Fully appreciating Jonas's position requires that we grasp the rupture it establishes with the presentist assumptions imbedded in the intentionalist tradition of Western ethics. In brief, intentionalism can be explained by reference to its best-known formulation, the Kantian categorical imperative, according to which the moral worth of a deed depends upon whether the a priori "principle of the will" or "volition" of the person performing it – that is, his or her intention – should become a universal law.28 Ex post facto evaluation of an act's outcomes, and of whether they correspond to the initial intention, is peripheral to moral judgment. A variant of this logic is found in Weber's discussion of the "ethic of absolute ends," the "passionate devotion to a cause" elevating the realization of a vision of the world above all other considerations; conviction without the restraint of caution and prudence is intensely presentist.29 By contrast, Jonas's strong consequentialism takes a cue from Weber's "ethic of responsibility," which stipulates that we must carefully ponder the potential impacts of our actions and assume responsibility for them – even for the incidence of unexpected and unintended results. Neither the contingency of outcomes nor the retrospective nature of certain moral judgments exempts an act from normative evaluation. On the contrary, consequentialism reconnects what intentionalism prefers to keep distinct: the moral worth of ends partly depends upon the means selected to attain them (and vice versa), while the correspondence between intentions and results is crucial. At the same time, Jonas goes further than Weber in breaking with presentism by advocating an "ethic of long-range responsibility" that refuses to accept the future's indeterminacy, gesturing instead toward a practice of farsighted preparation for crises that could occur.30 From a consequentialist perspective, then, intergenerational solidarity would consist of striving to prevent our endeavors from causing large-scale human suffering and damage to the natural world over time. Jonas reformulates the categorical imperative along these lines: "Act so that the effects of your action are compatible with the permanence of genuine human life," or "Act so that the effects of your action are not destructive of the future possibility of such life."31 What we find here, I would hold, is a substantive and future-oriented ethos on the basis of which civic associations can enact the work of preventive foresight.

AT: FEAR MONGERING BY THE STATE

Debate is the antidote to state fear mongering—scenario planning by informed groups can counter-act official misinformation. And, the alternative is that the governments will continue to scare us but we will be too apolitical and ill informed to counter act lies.

Kurasawa, 04 (Professor of Sociology, York University of Toronto, Fuyuki, Constellations Volume 11, No 4, 2004).

State and market institutions may seek to produce a culture of fear by deliberately stretching interpretations of reality beyond the limits of the plausible so as to exaggerate the prospects of impending catastrophes, or yet again, by intentionally promoting certain prognoses over others for instrumental purposes. Accordingly, regressive dystopias can operate as Trojan horses advancing political agendas or commercial interests that would otherwise be susceptible to public scrutiny and opposition. Instances of this kind of manipulation of the dystopian imaginary are plentiful: the invasion of Iraq in the name of fighting terrorism and an imminent threat of use of 'weapons of mass destruction'; the severe curtailing of American civil liberties amidst fears of a collapse of 'homeland security'; the neoliberal dismantling of the welfare state as the only remedy for an ideologically constructed fiscal crisis; the conservative expansion of policing and incarceration due to supposedly spiraling crime waves; and so forth. Alarmism constructs and codes the future in particular ways, producing or reinforcing certain crisis narratives, belief structures, and rhetorical conventions. As much as alarmist ideas beget a culture of fear, the reverse is no less true. If fear-mongering is a misappropriation of preventive foresight, resignation about the future represents a problematic outgrowth of the popular acknowledgment of global perils. Some believe that the world to come is so uncertain and dangerous that we should not attempt to modify the course of history; the future will look after itself for better or worse, regardless of what we do or wish. One version of this argument consists in a complacent optimism perceiving the future as fated to be better than either the past or the present. Frequently accompanying it is a self-deluding denial of what is plausible ('the world will not be so bad after all'), or a naively Panglossian pragmatism ('things will work themselves out in spite of everything, because humankind always finds ways to survive').37 Much more common, however, is the opposite reaction, a fatalistic pessimism reconciled to the idea that the future will be necessarily worse than what preceded it. This is sustained by a tragic chronological framework according to which humanity is doomed to decay, or a cyclical one of the endless repetition of the mistakes of the past. On top of their dubious assessments of what is to come, alarmism and resignation would, if widely accepted, undermine a viable practice of farsightedness. Indeed, both of them encourage public disengagement from deliberation about scenarios for the future, a process that appears to be dangerous, pointless, or unnecessary. The resulting 'depublicization' of debate leaves dominant groups and institutions (the state, the market, techno-science) in charge of sorting out the future for the rest of us, thus effectively producing a heteronomous social order. How, then, can we support a democratic process of prevention from below? The answer, I think, lies in cultivating the public capacity for critical judgment and deliberation, so that participants in global civil society subject all claims about potential catastrophes to examination, evaluation, and contestation.

AT: FUTURISM IS STATIST

Debates amongst citizens about government policy are proof that futurism is not statist—it is able to mobilize citizens to demand change and imagine alternative political futures.

Kurasawa, 04 (Professor of Sociology, York University of Toronto, Fuyuki, Constellations Volume 11, No 4, 2004).

NGOs and social movements active in global civil society have drawn upon the moral imagination in similar ways, introducing dystopian scenarios less as prophecies than as rhetorical devices that act as 'wake-up calls.' Dystopias are thrust into public spaces to jolt citizens out of their complacency and awaken their concern for those who will follow them. Such tropes are intended to be controversial, their contested character fostering public deliberation about the potential cataclysms facing humankind, the means of addressing them, and the unintended and unexpected consequences flowing from present-day trends. In helping us to imagine the strengths and weaknesses of different positions towards the future, then, the dystopian imaginary crystallizes many of the great issues of the day. Amplifying and extrapolating what could be the long-term consequences of current tendencies, public discourse can thereby clarify the future's seeming opaqueness. Likewise, fostering a dystopian moral imagination has a specifically critical function, for the disquiet it provokes about the prospects of later generations is designed to make us radically question the 'self-evidentness' of the existing social order.34 If we imagine ourselves in the place of our descendants, the takenfor- granted shortsightedness of our institutionalized ways of thinking and acting becomes problematic. Indifference toward the future is neither necessary nor inevitable, but can be – and indeed ought to be – changed. Aside from the moral imagination, and given that the idea of gambling with humanity's future or failing to minimize its possible sources of suffering is logically unsustainable, the appeal to reason represents another main trigger of intergenerational solidarity.

AT: CHAOS INEVITABLE

Chaos is not inevitable—careful future planning has been enormously effective. Medical research, humanitarian law, and environmental regulations are just a few areas where futurism has prevented enormous suffering. Debates amongst citizens are key to assessing probability and effectively planning.

Kurasawa, 04 (Professor of Sociology, York University of Toronto, Fuyuki, Constellations Volume 11, No 4, 2004).

Moreover, keeping in mind the sobering lessons of the past century cannot but make us wary about humankind's supposedly unlimited ability for problemsolving or discovering solutions in time to avert calamities. In fact, the historical track-record of last-minute, technical 'quick-fixes' is hardly reassuring. What's more, most of the serious perils that we face today (e.g., nuclear waste, climate change, global terrorism, genocide and civil war) demand complex, sustained, long-term strategies of planning, coordination, and execution. On the other hand, an examination of fatalism makes it readily apparent that the idea that humankind is doomed from the outset puts off any attempt to minimize risks for our successors, essentially condemning them to face cataclysms unprepared. An a priori pessimism is also unsustainable given the fact that long-term preventive action has had (and will continue to have) appreciable beneficial effects; the examples of medical research, the welfare state, international humanitarian law, as well as strict environmental regulations in some countries stand out among many others. The evaluative framework proposed above should not be restricted to the critique of misappropriations of farsightedness, since it can equally support public deliberation with a reconstructive intent, that is, democratic discussion and debate about a future that human beings would freely self-determine. Inverting Foucault's Nietzschean metaphor, we can think of genealogies of the future that could perform a farsighted mapping out of the possible ways of organizing social life. They are, in other words, interventions into the present intended to facilitate global civil society's participation in shaping the field of possibilities of what is to come. Once competing dystopian visions are filtered out on the basis of their analytical credibility, ethical commitments, and political underpinnings and consequences, groups and individuals can assess the remaining legitimate catastrophic scenarios through the lens of genealogical mappings of the future. Hence, our first duty consists in addressing the present-day causes of eventual perils, ensuring that the paths we decide upon do not contract the range of options available for our posterity.42 Just as importantly, the practice of genealogically inspired farsightedness nurtures the project of an autonomous future, one that is socially self-instituting. In so doing, we can acknowledge that the future is a human creation instead of the product of metaphysical and extra-social forces (god, nature, destiny, etc.), and begin to reflect upon and deliberate about the kind of legacy we want to leave for those who will follow us. Participants in global civil society can then take – and in many instances have already taken – a further step by committing themselves to socio-political struggles forging a world order that, aside from not jeopardizing human and environmental survival, is designed to rectify the sources of transnational injustice that will continue to inflict needless suffering upon future generations if left unchallenged.

AT COLONIALISM: US NOT AN EMPIRE

The is mischaracterized as an empire—reciprocal economic partnerships and democratic agreements are the norm.

Ikenberry, 04. Professor of Geopolitics. G. John Ikenberry. "Illusions of Empire: Defining the New American Order" Foreign Affairs, March/April 2004.

Is the United States an empire? If so, Ferguson's liberal empire is a more persuasive portrait than is Johnson's military empire. But ultimately, the notion of empire is misleading -- and misses the distinctive aspects of the global political order that has developed around U.S. power. The United States has pursued imperial policies, especially toward weak countries in the periphery. But U.S. relations with Europe, Japan, China, and Russia cannot be described as imperial, even when "neo" or "liberal" modifies the term. The advanced democracies operate within a "security community" in which the use or threat of force is unthinkable. Their economies are deeply interwoven. Together, they form a political order built on bargains, diffuse reciprocity, and an array of intergovernmental institutions and ad hoc working relationships. This is not empire; it is a U.S.-led democratic political order that has no name or historical antecedent.To be sure, the neoconservatives in Washington have trumpeted their own imperial vision: an era of global rule organized around the bold unilateral exercise of military power, gradual disentanglement from the constraints of multilateralism, and an aggressive effort to spread freedom and democracy. But this vision is founded on illusions of U.S. power. It fails to appreciate the role of cooperation and rules in the exercise and preservation of such power. Its pursuit would strip the United States of its legitimacy as the preeminent global power and severely compromise the authority that flows from such legitimacy. Ultimately, the neoconservatives are silent on the full range of global challenges and opportunities that face the United States. And as Ferguson notes, the American public has no desire to run colonies or manage a global empire. Thus, there are limits on American imperial pretensions even in a unipolar era. Ultimately, the empire debate misses the most important international development of recent years: the long peace among great powers, which some scholars argue marks the end of great-power war. Capitalism, democracy, and nuclear weapons all help explain this peace. But so too does the unique way in which the United States has gone about the business of building an international order. The United States' success stems from the creation and extension of international institutions that have limited and legitimated U.S. power.

Hegemony doesn't equate to empire—other nations can choose to disengage from US security guarantees.

Ikenberry, 04. Professor of Geopolitics. G. John Ikenberry. "Illusions of Empire: Defining the New American Order" Foreign Affairs, March/April 2004.
Johnson also offers little beyond passing mention about the societies presumed to be under Washington's thumb.

Domination and exploitation are, of course, not always self-evident. Military pacts and security partnerships are clearly part of the structure of U.S. global power, and they often reinforce fragile and corrupt governments in order to project U.S. influence. But countries can also use security ties with the United States to their own advantage. Japan may be a subordinate security partner, but the U.S.-Japan alliance also allows Tokyo to forgo a costly buildup of military capacity that would destabilize East Asia. Moreover, countries do have other options: they can, and often do, escape U.S. domination simply by asking the United States to leave. The Philippines did so, and South Korea may be next. The variety and complexity of U.S. security ties with other states makes Johnson's simplistic view of military hegemony misleading.

AT COLONIALISM: US NOT AN EMPIRE

Global pluralism makes empire impossible—the US has influence but not the control described by the negative.

Zelikow, 03 "Transformation of National Security" Philip Zelikow. Professor of History and Public Affairs, University of Virginia. National Interest, Summer 2003, pg. 18-10 Lexis).

But these imperial metaphors, of whatever provenance, do not enrich our understanding; they impoverish it. They use a metaphor of how to rule others when the problem is how to persuade and lead them. Real imperial power is sovereign power. Sovereigns rule, and a ruler is not just the most powerful among diverse interest groups. Sovereignty means a direct monopoly control over the organization and use of armed might. It means direct control over the administration of justice and the definition thereof. It means control over what is bought and sold, the terms of trade and the permission to trade, to the limit of the ruler's desires and capacities. In the modern, pluralistic world of the 21st century, the United States does not have anything like such direct authority over other countries, nor does it seek it. Even its informal influence in the political economy of neighboring Mexico, for instance, is far more modest than, say, the influence the British could exert over Argentina a hundred years ago. The purveyors of imperial metaphors suffer from a lack of imagination, and more, from a lack of appreciation for the new conditions under which we now live. It is easier in many respects to communicate images in a cybernetic world, so that a very powerful United States does exert a range of influences that is quite striking. But this does not negate the proliferating pluralism of global society, nor does it suggest a will to imperial power in Washington. The proliferation of loose empire metaphors thus distorts into banal nonsense the only precise meaning of the term imperialism that we have. The United States is central in world politics today, not omnipotent. Nor is the U.S. Federal government organized in such a fashion that would allow it to wield durable imperial power around the world-it has trouble enough fashioning coherent policies within the fifty United States. Rather than exhibiting a confident will to power, we instinctively tend, as David Brooks has put it, to "enter every conflict with the might of a muscleman and the mentality of a wimp." We must speak of American power and of responsible ways to wield it; let us stop talking of American empire, for there is and there will be no such thing.

The US focuses on spreading democracy- their claims of empire are outdated.

Boot, 03 ("Neither new nor nefarious: the liberal empire strikes back" Max Boot, fellow of the Council of foreign relations, Current History, Vol. 102, Iss. 667; pg. 361 Nov. 2003. Pro Quest)

If the Europeans, with their long tradition of colonialism, have found the price of empire too high, what chance is there that Americans, whose country was born in a revolt against empire, will replace the colonial administrators of old?
Not much. The kind of imperial missions that the United States is likely to undertake today are very different. The Europeans fought to subjugate "natives"; Americans will fight to bring them democracy and the rule of law. (No one wants to put Iraq or Afghanistan permanently under the Stars and Stripes.) European rule was justified by racial prejudices; American interventions are justified by self-defense and human rights doctrines accepted (at least in principle) by all signatories to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. European expeditions were unilateral; American missions are usually blessed with international approval, whether from the United Nations, NATO, or simply an ad hoc coalition. Even the US intervention in Iraq this year, widely held to be "unilateral," enjoys far more international support (and hence legitimacy) than, say, the French role in Algeria in the 1950s.

AT COLONIALISM: US NOT AN EMPIRE

Multilateralism an inevitable check on the possibility of empire.

Zelikow, 03 "Transformation of National Security" Philip Zelikow. Professor of History and Public Affairs, University of Virginia. National Interest, Summer 2003, pg. 18-10 Lexis).

Everything that America does in the world is done multilaterally. That emphatically includes the policies the Bush Administration considers most important, and even those that are the most "military" in character. The global war against terrorism is being conducted through an elaborate, often hidden, network of multilateral cooperation among scores of governments. A large number of players are interacting on intelligence, law enforcement, military action, air transportation, shipping, financial controls and more. Ongoing military operations in Afghanistan involve several countries, and were multilateral even at the height of American military activity, as the United States relied heavily on relationships with Pakistan, Russia, three Central Asian governments and a variety of Afghan factions. The caricature of the administration's unilateralism usually rests on the recitation of a by now standard list of diplomatic actions that some other governments did not like (Kyoto, the International Criminal Court and so on). Some of these disagreements were handled in a style and manner that seemed insensitive or simply maladroit. Unfortunately, too, the caricature of the administration's unilateralism is willingly fed by some U.S. officials and unofficial advisers who relish the chance to play the role of the truth teller lancing foreign obfuscations. Sometimes they overplay the part, sensing the license they get from working for a plain-spoken president.

AT COLONIALISM: EMPIRE GOOD

Imperialism is good: the defeat of Nazism and the promotion of democracy are a force for good.

Boot, 03 "American Imperialism? No need to run away from Label" Max Boot, Senior fellow of the Council of foreign relations, USA Today, May 6, 2003.
http://66.102.1.104/scholar?hl=en&lr=&q=cache:sP5soPyDtzAJ:www.attacberlin.de/fileadmin/Sommerakademie/Boot_Imperialim_fine.pdf+author:max+author:boot).

Mind you, this is not meant as a condemnation. The history of American imperialism is hardly one of unadorned good doing; there have been plenty of shameful episodes, such as the mistreatment of the Indians. But, on the whole, U.S. imperialism has been the greatest force for good in the world during the past century. It has defeated the monstrous evils of communism and Nazism and lesser evils such as the Taliban and Serbian ethnic cleansing. Along the way, it has helped spread liberal institutions to countries as diverse as South Korea (news - web sites) and Panama. Yet, while generally successful as imperialists, Americans have been loath to confirm that's what they were doing. That's OK. Given the historical baggage that "imperialism" carries, there's no need for the U.S. government to embrace the term. But it should definitely embrace the practice. That doesn't mean looting Iraq of its natural resources; nothing could be more destructive of our goal of building a stable government in Baghdad. It means imposing the rule of law, property rights, free speech and other guarantees, at gunpoint if need be. This will require selecting a new ruler who is committed to pluralism and then backing him or her to the hilt. Iran and other neighboring states won't hesitate to impose their despotic views on Iraq; we shouldn't hesitate to impose our democratic views.

AT EMPIRE: TERRORISM MUST BE CONFRONTED

Pointing out flaws with imperialism is not enough—there are real threats posed by terrorism that the alternative must be able to solve.

Gitlin, 06 - Professor of Journalism and Sociology at Columbia University - 2006(Todd, The Intellectuals And The Flag, p. 151)

During the Bush years intellectuals have had their work cut out for them exposing the arrogance of empire, piercing its rationalizations, identifying its betrayal of patriotic traditions. But all that said, serious questions remained about what intellectuals of the left wanted: What was to be done about fighting the jihadists and improving democracy's chances? What roles made sense for the United States, the United Nations, NATO, or anyone else? What was required of governments, nongovernmental organizations, foundations, and private initiatives? Given that the Iraq War had been ill advised, what should be done next about Iraq and Iraqis? About such questions many intellectuals of the left were understandably perplexed—and sometimes evasive. Foreign policy wasn't "their problem." Their mode was critical and back-glancing, not constructive and prospective. It was useful to raise questions about the purposes of U.S. bases abroad, for example. It was satisfying, but not especially useful, to think that the questions answered themselves. So the intellectuals' evasion damaged what might have been their contribution to the larger debate that the country needed—and still needs—on its place in the world and how it protects itself. Liberal patriots would refuse to be satisfied with knee-jerk answers but would join the hard questions as members of a society do—members who criticize in behalf of a community of mutual aid, not marginal scoffers who have painted themselves into a corner. Liberal patriots would not be satisfied to reply to consensus truculence with rejectionist truculence. They would not take pride in their marginality. They would consider what they could do for our natural allies, democrats abroad. They would take it as their obligation to illuminate a transformed world in which al Qaeda and its allies are not misinterpreted as the current rein-carnations of the eternal spirit of anti-imperialism. They would retain curiosity and resist that hardening of the categories that is a form of self-protection against the unprecedented.

AT GENDER IR: NO ALT

Critiques of gender relations that do not pose concrete alternatives are destined to fail.

Caprioli, 04 ("Feminist IR Theory and Quantitative Methodology: A Critical Analysis" Mary Caprioli, Dept. of Political Science, University of Tennessee. International Studies Review. Volume 42 Issue 1 Page 193-197, March 2004. http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/0020-8833.00076).

If researchers cannot add gender to an analysis, then they must necessarily use a purely female-centered analysis, even though the utility of using a purely female centered analysis seems equally biased. Such research would merely be gendercentric based on women rather than men, and it would thereby provide an equally biased account of international relations as those that are male-centric. Although one might speculate that having research done from the two opposing worldviews might more fully explain international relations, surely an integrated approach would offer a more comprehensive analysis of world affairs. Beyond a female-centric analysis, some scholars (for example, Carver 2002) argue that feminist research must offer a critique of gender as a set of power relations. Gender categories, however, do exist and have very real implications for individuals, social relations, and international affairs. Critiquing the social construction of gender is important, but it fails to provide new theories of international relations or to address the implications of gender for what happens in the world.

AT GENDER IR: NO LINK

IR feminists vastly over simplify the diverse field of international relations literature—they need a specific link our aff.

Caprioli, 04 ("Feminist IR Theory and Quantitative Methodology: A Critical Analysis" Mary Caprioli, Dept. of Political Science, University of Tennessee. International Studies Review. Volume 42 Issue 1 Page 193-197, March 2004. http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/0020-8833.00076).

Conventional feminist IR scholars misrepresent the field of international relations in arguing that IR scholarship as popularly accepted excludes alternative explanations of state behavior, including feminist inquiry, that go beyond structural, state-focused models. Feminist IR theorists, among others, critique the IR field for its state-centric approach and argue that ''a world of states situated in an anarchical international system leaves little room for analyses of social relations, including gender relations'' (Tickner 2001:146). As a result, they appear to set up a straw man by refusing to recognize the variety within ''conventional'' IR research. Indeed, as Jack Levy (2000) has observed, a significant shift to societal-level variables has occurred, partly in response to the decline in the systemic imperatives of the bipolar era. Certainly the democratic peace literature, particularly its normative explanation (Maoz and Russett 1993; Dixon 1994), among other lines of inquiry, recognizes the role of social relations in explaining state behavior. The normative explanation for the democratic peace thesis emphasizes the societal level values of human rights, support for the rule of law, and peaceful conflict resolution in explaining the likelihood of interstate conflict. Furthermore, dyadic tests of the democratic peace thesis rely ''on an emerging theoretical framework that may prove capable of incorporating the strengths of the currently predominant realist or neorealist research program, and moving beyond it'' (Ray 2000:311). In addition, theorizing and research in the field of ethnonationalism has highlighted connections that domestic ethnic discrimination and violence have with state behavior at the international level (Gurr and Harff 1994; Van Evera 1997; Caprioli and Trumbore 2003a, 2003b).

Arguing that any IR theory overwhelms the specifics of the situation is an over simplification re-creates the very hierarchies feminists are trying to overcome.

Caprioli, 04 "Feminist IR Theory and Quantitative Methodology: A Critical Analysis" Mary Caprioli, Dept. of Political Science, University of Tennessee. International Studies Review. Volume 42 Issue 1 Page 193-197, March 2004. http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/0020-8833.00076).

There is little utility in constructing a divide if none exists. As Thomas Kuhn (1962) argues, common measures do exist across paradigms that provide a shared basis for theory. It seems overly pessimistic to accept Karl Popper's ''Myth of Framework,'' which postulates that ''we are prisoners caught in the framework of our theories, our expectations, our past experiences, our language, and that as a consequence, we cannot communicate with or judge those working in terms of a different paradigm'' (Neufeld 1995:44). Some feminists (for example, Tickner 1996, 2001; Peterson 2002; Steans 2003) appear to embrace this ''Myth of Framework'' by accentuating the differences between the perspectives of feminist and IR theorists based on their past experiences and languages and criticize IR theorists for their lack of communication with feminist IR scholars. Ironically, the ''Myth of Framework'' shares a number of assumptions with Hobbes's description of the state of nature that feminists routinely reject. The ''Myth of Framework'' assumes no middle ground scholars are presumably entrenched in their own worldviews without hope of compromise or the ability to understand others' worldviews. If this is the case, scholars are doomed to discussions with likeminded individuals rather than having a productive dialogue with those outside their own worldview. Scholars who accept the ''Myth of Framework'' have essentially created a Tower of Babel in which they choose not to understand each other's language. The acceptance of such a myth creates conflict and establishes a hierarchy within international relations scholarship even though conventional feminists theoretically seek to identify and eradicate conflict and hierarchy within society as a whole.

AT GENDER IR: PERM

The perm solves best: IR criticism is only effective when it is combined with practical policy making.

Keohane, 98 ("Beyond Dichotomy: Conversations Between International Relations and Feminist Theory" Robert O. Keohane, Duke University. International Studies Quarterly 42, 193-198. http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/action/showPdf?submitPDF=Full+Text+PDF+%2889+KB%29&doi=10.1111%2F0020-8833.00076

The problem with Tickner's dichotomies, however, goes much deeper. The dichotomies should be replaced by continua, with the dichotomous characterizations at the poles. Each analyst of world politics has to locate herself or himself somewhere along the dimensions between critical and problem-solving theory, nomothetic and narrative epistemology, and a social or structural conception of international relations. In my view, none of the ends of these continua are the optimal places to rest one's perspective. Criticism of the world, by itself, becomes a jeremiad, often resting implicitly on a utopian view of human potential. Without analysis, furthermore, it constitutes merely the opinion of one or a number of people. On the other hand, implicit or complacent acceptance of the world as it is would rob the study of international relations of much of its meaning. How could one identify "problems" withough criticism at some level? The issue is not problem-solving vs. critical theory- a convenient device for discarding work that one does not wish to accept- but how deeply the criticism should go. For example, most students of war study it because they hope to expose its evils or to control it in some way: few do so to glorify war as such. But the depth of their critique varies. Does the author reject certain acts of warfare, all warfare, all coercion, or the system of states itself? The deeper the criticism, the more wide-ranging the questions. Narrowly problem-solving work, as in much policy analysis, often ignores the most important causal factors in a situation because they are not manipulable in the short run. However, the more critical and wide-ranging an author's perspective, the more difficult it is to do comparative empirical analysis. An opponent of some types of war can compare the causes of different wars, as a way to help to eliminate those that are regarded as pernicious; but the opponent of the system of states has to imagine the counterfactual situation of a system without states.

AT GENDER IR: 3RD WORLD FEMINISM

Feminism that prioritizes theory over material experience excludes the voices of third world feminists.

Oloka-Onyango and Tamale, 95 "The Personal is Political" or Why Womens Rights are Indeed Human Rights. J. Oloka-Onyango and Slyvia Tamale. Human Rights Quarterly 17.4, 691-731 . Joe Oloka-Onyango is a Senior Lecturer at the Faculty of Law, Makerere University, Uganda, and spent the 1994-1995 academic year as a Visiting Professor at the University of Minnesota.Sylvia Tamale holds law degrees from Makerere University (Uganda) and Harvard Law School. She is currently a doctoral student in Sociology and Feminist Studies at the University of Minnesota, Projest Muse).
In tandem with such an approach, feminists in third world contexts must be wary of cooptation and exploitation--a trait of western societies that appears to not respect boundaries of sex--particularly because the dominant mode of international feminism reflects the dominant character and color of international relations, Bourgeois/white, often predatory, and paternalistic. [26] As Maivân Lâm has recently pointed out in an article aptly entitled, *Feeling Foreign in Feminism*, the agenda of Western feminism appears not only to be off target, but also "filmic." [27] According to Lâm, Western feminism is "too cleanly and detachedly representational, with little connection to the ongoing lives of women who have experienced racial or colonial discrimination. . . ." [28] Vasuki Nesiah is even more critical of the transposition of Western feminism onto the international scene because it ignores "global contradictions" 29 by emphasizing the commonality of women's experience. Instead, she urges theorists to look at gender identities as being "continually reconstituted through social processes."

Feminists that prioritize theory over reform continue the marginalization of third world women.

Oloka-Onyango and Tamale, 95 "The Personal is Political" or Why Womens Rights are Indeed Human Rights. J. Oloka-Onyango and Slyvia Tamale. Human Rights Quarterly 17.4, 691-731 . Joe Oloka-Onyango is a Senior Lecturer at the Faculty of Law, Makerere University, Uganda, and spent the 1994-1995 academic year as a Visiting Professor at the University of Minnesota.Sylvia Tamale holds law degrees from Makerere University (Uganda) and Harvard Law School. She is currently a doctoral student in Sociology and Feminist Studies at the University of Minnesota, Projest Muse).

In a succinct treatment of the issue elsewhere, Hilary Charlesworth points out that feminists "should aim not for respectability and acceptance through developing a specialized branch of women's international law because this would leave the international legal system unchanged. We must work to change *the heartland of international law and its institutions*." [51] However, in her essay in Women's Rights, Charlesworth devotes a scant paragraph to the issue of third world feminism and even then, only in its relationship to first world feminism. [52] A more inclusive examination would have incorporated the views of Southern feminists on the international legal and political regime. [53] Third world discourse must be integrated directly into the critique of dominant structures of knowledge and power in academia, rather than "added in and stirred" as an afterthought. This is particularly necessary in light of the assault on southern institutions of advanced learning and intellectual culture by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank structural adjustment policies (SAPs). [54] Of course, internationalist works that include and are sensitive to the concerns of third world scholars are far better than those which presume to speak to and for them. Unfortunately, the latter are in far greater abundance. Such imbalance imports a special duty among those who experience similar conditions of exclusion in academia to allow for the expression of marginalized voices beyond the "particularities" of their geographical contexts. [55] In short, the "gates" must be opened even wider to ensure that international feminist theory is truly decolonized and thematically internationalized. Otherwise, we remain with the same problem as the debacle of WID--nominal participation and continuing marginalization--or just lip-service to multiculturalism and universal human rights.

AT FOUCAULT: NO IMPACT

Foucault says that power is not inherently evil—it is only a problem when it turns into domination.

Foucault, quoted in an interview published in 97 (Michel, philosopher, professor and chairman of the History of Systems of Thought @ the College de France, Ethics Subjectivity and Truth, Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984, Vol. 1, Ed. Paul Rabinow, 1997, p. 298-299)

Power is not evil. Power is games of strategy. We all know that power is not evil! For example, let us take sexual or amorous relationships: to wield power over the other in a sort of open-ended strategic game where the situation may be reversed is not evil; it's a part of love, of passion and sexual pleasure. And let us take, as another example, something that has often been rightly criticized—the pedagogical institution. I see nothing wrong in the practice of a person who, knowing more than others in a specific game of truth, tells those others what to do, teaches them, and transmits knowledge and techniques to them. The problem in such practices where power— which is not in itself a bad thing— must inevitably come into play in knowing how to avoid the kind of domination effects where a kid is subjected to the arbitrary and unnecessary authority of a teacher, or a student put under the thumb of a professor who abuses [their] authority. I believe that this problem must be framed in terms of rules of law, rational techniques of government and *ethos*, practices of the self and of freedom.

All health policies are not the same—biopower within a democratic context are radically different than their fascism examples.

Dickinson 04 - Associate Professor, History Ph.D., U.C. Berkeley - 2004 (Edward Ross, "Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About "Modernity," Central European History, vol. 37, no. 1, 1–48)

In the Weimar model, then, the rights of the individual, guaranteed formally by the constitution and substantively by the welfare system, were the central element of the dominant program for the management of social problems. Almost no one in this period advocated expanding social provision out of the goodness of their hearts. This was a strategy of social management, of social engineering. The mainstream of social reform in Germany believed that guaranteeing basic social rights— the substantive or positive freedom of all citizens — was the best way to turn people into power, prosperity, and profit. In that sense, the democratic welfare state was— and is — democratic not despite of its pursuit of biopower, but because of it. The contrast with the Nazi state is clear. National Socialism aimed to construct a system of social and population policy founded on the concept of individual duties, on the ubiquitous and total power of the state, and on the systematic absorption of every citizen by organizations that could implant that power at every level of their lives — in political and associational life, in the family, in the workplace, and in leisure activities. In the welfarist vision of Weimar progressives, the task of the state was to create an institutional framework that would give individuals the wherewithal to integrate themselves successfully into the national society, economy, and polity. The Nazis aimed, instead, to give the state the wherewithal to do with every citizen what it willed. And where Weimar welfare advocates understood themselves to be constructing a system of knowledge and institutions that would manage social problems, the Nazis fundamentally sought to abolish just that system by eradicating — by finding a "final solution" to — social problems. Again, as Peukert pointed out, many advocates of a rights-based welfare structure were open to the idea that "stubborn" cases might be legitimate targets for sterilization; the right to health could easily be redefined as primarily a duty to be healthy, for example. But the difference between a strategy of social management built on the rights of the citizen and a system of racial policy built on the total power of the state is not merely a semantic one; such differences had very profound political implications, and established quite different constraints. The rights-based strategy was actually not very compatible with exclusionary and coercive policies; it relied too heavily on the cooperation of its targets and of armies of volunteers, it was too embedded in a democratic institutional structure and civil society, it lacked powerful legal and institutional instruments of coercion, and its rhetorical structure was too heavily slanted toward inclusion and tolerance.

AT FOUCAULT: NO IMPACT

Even if they are right that our policy is biopolitical, the fact that it is carried out by a democratic state makes it profoundly different.

Dickinson 04 - Associate Professor, History Ph.D., U.C. Berkeley - 2004 (Edward Ross, "Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About "Modernity," Central European History, vol. 37, no. 1, 1–48)

In short, the continuities between early twentieth-century biopolitical discourse and the practices of the welfare state in our own time are unmistakable. Both are instances of the "disciplinary society" and of biopolitical, regulatory, social-engineering modernity, and they share that genealogy with more authoritarian states, including the National Socialist state, but also fascist Italy, for example. And it is certainly fruitful to view them from this very broad perspective. But that analysis can easily become superficial and misleading, because it obfuscates the profoundly different strategic and local dynamics of power in the two kinds of regimes. Clearly the democratic welfare state is not only formally but also substantively quite different from totalitarianism. Above all, again, it has nowhere developed the fateful, radicalizing dynamic that characterized National Socialism (or for that matter Stalinism), the psychotic logic that leads from economistic population management to mass murder. Again, there is always the potential for such a discursive regime to generate coercive policies. In those cases in which the regime of rights does not successfully produce "health," such a system can —and historically does— create compulsory programs to enforce it. But again, there are political and policy potentials and constraints in such a structuring of biopolitics that are very different from those of National Socialist Germany. Democratic biopolitical regimes require, enable, and incite a degree of self-direction and participation that is functionally incompatible with authoritarian or totalitarian structures. And this pursuit of biopolitical ends through a regime of democratic citizenship does appear, historically, to have imposed increasingly narrow limits on coercive policies, and to have generated a "logic" or imperative of increasing liberalization. Despite limitations imposed by political context and the slow pace of discursive change, I think this is the unmistakable message of the really very impressive waves of legislative and welfare reforms in the 1920s or the 1970s in Germany.90 Of course it is not yet clear whether this is an irreversible dynamic of such systems. Nevertheless, such regimes are characterized by sufficient degrees of autonomy (and of the potential for its expansion) for sufficient numbers of people that I think it becomes useful to conceive of them as productive of a strategic configuration of power relations that might fruitfully be analyzed as a condition of "liberty," just as much as they are productive of constraint, oppression, or manipulation. At the very least, totalitarianism cannot be the sole orientation point for our understanding of biopolitics, the only end point of the logic of social engineering.

AT FOUCAULT: NO IMPACT

Biopower does not expand authority over the body when it is deployed by a government that also respects rights.

Dickinson 04 - Associate Professor, History Ph.D., U.C. Berkeley - 2004 (Edward Ross, "Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About "Modernity," Central European History, vol. 37, no. 1, 1–48)

At its simplest, this view of the politics of expertise and professionalization is certainly plausible. Historically speaking, however, the further conjecture that this "micropolitical" dynamic creates authoritarian, totalitarian, or homicidal potentials at the level of the state does not seem very tenable. Historically, it appears that the greatest advocates of political democracy —in Germany left liberals and Social Democrats —have been also the greatest advocates of every kind of biopolitical social engineering, from public health and welfare programs through social insurance to city planning and, yes, even eugenics.102 The state they built has intervened in social relations to an (until recently) ever-growing degree; professionalization has run ever more rampant in Western societies; the production of scientistic and technocratic expert knowledge has proceeded at an ever more frenetic pace. And yet, from the perspective of the first years of the millennium, the second half of the twentieth century appears to be the great age of democracy in precisely those societies where these processes have been most in evidence. What is more, the interventionist state has steadily expanded both the rights and the resources of virtually every citizen — including those who were stigmatized and persecuted as biologically defective under National Socialism. Perhaps these processes have created an ever more restrictive "iron cage" of rationality in European societies. But if so, it seems clear that there is no necessary correlation between rationalization and authoritarian politics; the opposite seems in fact to be at least equally true.
Biopower doesn't lead to tyranny

AT FOUCAULT: NO IMPACT (MASSACRES)

Biopower does not make massacres vital—a specific form of violent sovereignty is also required.

Ojakangas, 05 - PhD in Social Science and Academy research fellow @ the Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies @ University of Helsinki – 2005 (Mika, "The Impossible Dialogue on Biopower: Foucault and Agamben," May 2005, Foucault Studies, No. 2, http://www.foucault-studies.com/no2/ojakangas1.pdf)

Admittedly, in the era of biopolitics, as Foucault writes, even "massacres have become vital." This is not the case, however, because violence is hidden in the foundation of biopolitics, as Agamben believes. Although the twentieth century thanatopolitics is the "reverse of biopolitics", it should not be understood, according to Foucault, as "the effect, the result, or the logical consequence" of biopolitical rationality. Rather, it should be understood, as he suggests, as an outcome of the "demonic combination" of the sovereign power and biopower, of "the city-citizen game and the shepherd-flock game" or as I would like to put it, of *patria potestas* (father's unconditional power of life and death over his son) and *cura maternal* (mother's unconditional duty to take care of her children). Although massacres can be carried out *in the name of care*, they do not follow from the logic of biopower for which death is the "object of taboo". They follow from the logic of sovereign power, which legitimates killing by whatever arguments it chooses, be it God, Nature, *or* life.

Biopower does not cause racism or massacres—it is only when it is in the context of a violent or racist government that it is dangerous.

Ojakangas, 05 - PhD in Social Science and Academy research fellow @ the Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies @ University of Helsinki – 2005 (Mika, "The Impossible Dialogue on Biopower: Foucault and Agamben," May 2005, Foucault Studies, No. 2, http://wlt-studies.com/no2/ojakangas1.pdf)

It is the logic of racism, according to Foucault, that makes killing acceptable in modern biopolitical societies. This is not to say, however, that biopolitical societies are necessarily more racist than other societies. It is to say that in the era of biopolitics, only racism, because it is a determination immanent to life, can "justify the murderous function of the State".89 However, racism can only justify killing – killing that does not follow from the logic of biopower but from the logic of the sovereign power. Racism is, in other words, the only way the sovereign power, the right to kill, can be maintained in biopolitical societies: "Racism is bound up with workings of a State that is obliged to use race, the elimination of races and the purification of the race, to exercise its sovereign power."90 Racism is, in other words, a discourse – "quite compatible"91 with biopolitics – through which biopower can be most smoothly transformed into the form of sovereign power. Such transformation, however, changes everything. A biopolitical society that wishes to "exercise the old sovereign right to kill", even in the name of race, ceases to be a mere biopolitical society, practicing merely biopolitics. It becomes a "demonic combination" of sovereign power and biopower, exercising sovereign means for biopolitical ends. In its most monstrous form, it becomes the Third Reich. For this reason, I cannot subscribe to Agamben's thesis, according to which biopolitics is absolutized in the Third Reich.93 To be sure, the Third Reich used biopolitical means – it was a state in which "insurance and reassurance were universal"94 – and aimed for biopolitical ends in order to improve the living conditions of the German people -- but so did many other nations in the 1930s. What distinguishes the Third Reich from those other nations is the fact that, alongside its biopolitical apparatus, it erected a massive machinery of death. It became a society that "unleashed murderous power, or in other words, the old sovereign right to take life" throughout the "entire social body", as Foucault puts it.95 It is not, therefore, biopolitics that was absolutized in the Third Reich – as a matter of fact, biopolitical measures in the Nazi Germany were, although harsh, relatively modest in scale compared to some present day welfare states – but rather the sovereign power: "This power to kill, which ran through the entire social body of Nazi society, was first manifested when the power to take life, the power of life and death, was granted not only to the State but to a whole series of individuals, to a considerable number of people (such as the SA, the SS, and so on). Ultimately, everyone in the Nazi State had the power of life and death over his or her neighbours, if only because of the practice of informing, which effectively meant doing away with the people next door, or having them done away with.96" The only thing that the Third Reich actually absolutizes is, in other words, the sovereignty of power and therefore, the nakedness of bare life – at least if sovereignty is defined in the Agambenian manner: "The sovereign is the one with respect to whom all men are potentially homines sacri, and homo sacer is the one with respect to whom all men act as sovereigns."97

AT FOUCAULT: NAZIS UNIQUE

Nazi biopolitics were unique.

Dickinson 04 - Associate Professor, History Ph.D., U.C. Berkeley - 2004 (Edward Ross, "Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About "Modernity," Central European History, vol. 37, no. 1, 1–48)

Again, Peukert was very aware that he was writing the history of only one kind of modernity, and that the most destructive potentials of modern social engineering discourse were only to be realized in a very specific historical context. The "Final Solution" was, as he remarked, "one among other possible outcomes of the crisis of modern civilization," and one possible only in the context of the concatenation of economic, social, and political disasters through which Germany passed in the two decades before 1933. The fact that Nazism was "one of the pathological developmental forms of modernity does not imply that barbarism is the inevitable logical outcome of modernization," which also created "opportunities for human emancipation." And yet, again, the history that Peukert actually wrote was the history of disaster— a disaster that, frequently, does seem at least highly likely. The "fatal racist dynamic in the human and social sciences," which consists in their assignment of greater or lesser value to human characteristics, does "inevitably become fixated on the utopian dream of the gradual elimination of death," which is "unfailingly" frustrated by lived reality. In periods of fiscal crisis the frustration of these "fantasies of omnipotence" generates a concern with "identifying, segregating, and disposing of " those judged less valuable.68 In the most detailed exposition of his analysis, Grenzen der Sozialdisziplinierung, Peukert argues that, given the "totalitarian claim to validity" of bourgeois norms, only the two "strategies of pedagogical normalization or eugenic exclusion" were open to middle-class social reformers; when the one failed only the other remained. Yet the failure of pedagogical normalization was preprogrammed into the collision between middle-class "utopias of order" and the "life-worlds" of the working class, which were rendered disorderly by the logic of industrial capitalism.69 Again, in Peukert's model it seems to me that it is really only a matter of time and circumstance before the fundamentally and necessarily murderous potential of modernity is unleashed.

AT FOUCAULT: AFF GOOD USE OF BIOPOWER

Biopower is a description of our era—it is neither inherently good, nor bad. Our specific context is more important than their sweeping generalization.

Dickinson 04 - Associate Professor, History Ph.D., U.C. Berkeley - 2004 (Edward Ross, "Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About "Modernity," Central European History, vol. 37, no. 1, 1–48)

This notion is not at all at odds with the core of Foucauldian (and Peukertian) theory. Democratic welfare states are regimes of power/knowledge no less than early twentieth-century totalitarian states; these systems are not "opposites," in the sense that they are two alternative ways of organizing the same thing. But they are two very *different* ways of organizing it. The concept "power" should not be read as a universal stifling night of oppression, manipulation, and entrapment, in which all political and social orders are grey, are essentially or effectively "the same." Power is a set of social relations, in which individuals and groups have varying degrees of autonomy and effective subjectivity. And discourse is, as Foucault argued, "tactically polyvalent." Discursive elements (like the various elements of biopolitics) can be combined in different ways to form parts of quite different strategies (like totalitarianism or the democratic welfare state); they cannot be assigned to one place in a structure, but rather circulate. The varying possible constellations of power in modern societies create "multiple modernities," modern societies with quite radically differing potentials.91

AT FOUCAULT: BIOPOWER GOOD

Biopower is also positive—such as the dramatic decrease in infant mortality.

Dickinson 04 - Associate Professor, History Ph.D., U.C. Berkeley - 2004 (Edward Ross, "Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About "Modernity," Central European History, vol. 37, no. 1, 1–48)

Of course, at the most simple-minded level, it seems to me that an assessment of the potentials of modernity that ignores the ways in which biopolitics has made life tangibly better is somehow deeply flawed. To give just one example, infant mortality in Germany in 1900 was just over 20 percent; or, in other words, one in five children died before reaching the age of one year. By 1913, it was 15 percent; and by 1929 (when average real purchasing power was not significantly higher than in 1913) it was only 9.7 percent.93 The expansion of infant health programs— an enormously ambitious, bureaucratic, medicalizing, and sometimes intrusive, social engineering project— had a great deal to do with that change. It would be bizarre to write a history of biopolitical modernity that ruled out an appreciation for how absolutely wonderful and astonishing this achievement— and any number of others like it — really was. There was a reason for the "Machbarkeitswahn" of the early twentieth century: many marvelous things were in fact becoming machbar. In that sense, it is not really accurate to call it a "Wahn" (delusion, craziness) at all; nor is it accurate to focus only on the "inevitable" frustration of "delusions" of power. Even in the late 1920s, many social engineers could and did look with great satisfaction on the changes they genuinely had the power to accomplish.

AT FOUCAULT: RESISTANCE SOLVES IMPACT

Even if they win that our health policy turns to the dark side of biopolitics, their impact will still be prevented by localized resistance.

Dickinson 04 - Associate Professor, History Ph.D., U.C. Berkeley - 2004 (Edward Ross, "Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About "Modernity," Central European History, vol. 37, no. 1, 1–48)

In the current literature, it seems that biopolitics is almost always acting on (or attempting to act on) people; it is almost never something they do. This kind of model is not very realistic. This is not how societies work. The example of the attempt to create a eugenic counseling system in Prussia should be instructive in this respect. Here public health and eugenics experts— technocrats— tried to impart their sense of eugenic crisis and their optimism about the possibility of creating a better "race" to the public; and they successfully mobilized the resources of the state in support of their vision. And yet, what emerged quite quickly from this effort was in fact a system of public contraceptive advice — or family planning. It is not so easy to impose technocratic ambitions on the public, particularly in a democratic state; and "on the ground," at the level of interactions with actual persons and social groups, public policy often takes on a life of its own, at least partially independent of the fantasies of technocrats. This is of course a point that Foucault makes with particular clarity. The power of discourse is not the power of manipulative elites, which control it and impose it from above. Manipulative elites always face resistance, often effective, resistance. More important, the power of discourse lies precisely in its ability to set the terms for such struggles, to define what they are about, as much as what their outcomes are. As Foucault put it, power— including the power to manage life —"comes from everywhere."105 Biomedical knowledge was not the property only of technocrats, and it could be used to achieve ends that had little to do with their social-engineering schemes.106 Modern biopolitics is a multifaceted world of discourse and practice elaborated and put into practice at multiple levels throughout modern societies.

As Foucault argues, power is fluid. Biopower has created new freedoms as well as new oppressions—context is key.

Dickinson 04 - Associate Professor, History Ph.D., U.C. Berkeley - 2004 (Edward Ross, "Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About "Modernity," Central European History, vol. 37, no. 1, 1–48)

Uncoupling "technocracy" from "discourse" is not yet enough, however. We should also be alive to the ways in which new social practices, institutions, and knowledge generated new choices — a limited range of them, constrained by all kinds of discursive and social frameworks, but nonetheless historically new and significant. Modern biopolitics did create, in a real sense, not only new constraints but also new degrees of freedom— new levers that increased people's power to move their own worlds, to shape their own lives. Our understanding of modern biopolitics will be more realistic and more fruitful if we reconceptualize its development as a complex process in which the implications of those new choices were negotiated out in the social and discursive context. Again, in the early twentieth century many more conservative biopolitical "experts" devoted much of their energy precisely to trying— without any discernable success— to control those new degrees of freedom. For most social liberals and Social Democrats, however, those new choices were a potential source of greater social efficiency and social dynamism. State policy reflected the constant negotiation and tension between these perspectives. Nor should we stop at a reexamination of knowledge and technology. It might make sense, too, to reexamine the process of institution-building, the elaboration of the practices and institutions of biopolitics. No doubt the creation of public and private social welfare institutions created instruments for the study, manipulation, or control of individuals and groups. But it also generated opportunities for self-organization and participation by social groups of all kinds.

AT FOUCAULT: RESISTANCE SOLVES IMPACT

Their K oversimplifies—biopower is not a one-way street—it produces equivalent resistances that check the impact.

Campbell, 98 - professor of international politics at the University of Newcastle - 1998 (David, "Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity," pg. 204-205)

The political possibilities enabled by this permanent provocation of power and freedom can be specified in more detail by thinking in terms of the predominance of the "bio-power" discussed above. In this sense, because the governmental practices of biopolitics in Western nations have been increasingly directed toward modes of being and forms of life — such that sexual conduct has become an object of concern, individual health has been figured as a domain of discipline, and the family has been transformed into an instrument of government— the ongoing agonism between those practices and the freedom they seek to contain means that individuals have articulated a series of counterdemands drawn from those new fields of concern. For example, as the state continues to prosecute people according to sexual orientation, human rights activists have proclaimed the right of gays to enter into formal marriages, adopt children, and receive the same health and insurance benefits granted to their straight counterparts. These claims are a consequence of the permanent provocation of power and freedom in biopolitics, and stand as testament to the "strategic reversibility" of power relations: if the terms of governmental practices can be made into focal points for resistances, then the "history of government as the 'conduct of conduct' is interwoven with the history of dissenting 'counterconducts.'"39 Indeed, the emergence of the state as the major articulation of "the political" has involved an unceasing agonism between those in office and those they rule. State intervention in everyday life has long incited popular collective action, the result of which has been both resistance to the state and new claims upon the state. In particular, "the core of what we now call 'citizenship' consists of multiple bargains hammered out by rulers and ruled in the course of their struggles over the means of state action, especially the making of war." In more recent times, constituencies associated with women's, youth, ecological, and peace movements (among others) have also issued claims on society. These resistances are evidence that the break with the discursive/nondiscursive dichotomy central to the logic of interpretation undergirding this analysis is (to put it in conventional terms) not only theoretically licensed; it is empirically warranted. Indeed, expanding the interpretive imagination so as to enlarge the categories through which we understand the constitution of "the political" has been a necessary precondition for making sense of Foreign Policy's concern for the ethical borders of identity in America. Accordingly, there are manifest political implications that flow from theorizing identity. As Judith Butler concluded: "The deconstruction of identity is not the deconstruction of politics; rather, it establishes as political the very terms through which identity is articulated."

AT FOUCAULT: AFF PRE-REQ TO ALT

Foucault's concept of resistance is only possible in a world without violence—the aff is a pre-requisite for the alternative.

Bevir, 99 – Department of Political Science @ University of Newcastle – 1999 (Mark, "Foucault and Critique: Deploying Agency against Autonomy, Political Theory, Volume 27 No. 1, Page 65 February 1999, JSTOR)

Perhaps we might say, therefore, that power or pastoral-power recognizes the value of the subject as an agent, whereas violence or discipline attempts to extinguish the capacity of the subject for agency. Although Foucault, of course, never describes things in quite these terms, he does come remarkably close to doing so. In particular, he defines violence, in contrast to power, as aiming at domination or as a physical constraint that denies the ability of the other to act: "where the determining factors saturate the whole there is no relationship of power," rather "it is a question of a physical relationship of constraint."27 Similarly, he defines power, in contrast to violence, as able to come into play only where people have a capacity to act, perhaps even a capacity to act freely: "power is exercised over free subjects, and only insofar as they are free," by which "we mean individual or collective subjects who are faced with a field of possibilities in which several ways of behaving, several reactions and diverse comportments may be realized."28 If we thus accept that power always treats the subject as an agent, whereas violence always attempts to extinguish the capacity of the subject for agency, we can see why Foucault's later work on power emphasises that power, unlike violence, necessarily entails a capacity for resistance. To treat someone as an agent, one has to recognise that they can do other than one wishes—they can resist. Power can exist only where people have a capacity to act freely, and so only where they can resist that power. Perhaps, therefore, we should define as violent any relationship—whether overtly violent or not—in which an individual has his action determined for him. Violence manifests itself in any relationship between individuals, groups, or societies in which one denies the agency of the others by seeking to define for them actions they must perform. Power, in contrast, appears in any relationship—although no overtly violent relationship could meet the following requirement—in which an individual does not have his action determined for him. Power manifests itself whenever individuals, groups, or societies act as influences on the agency of the subject without attempting to determine the particular actions the subject performs. Here a rejection of autonomy implies that power is ineliminable, while a defence of agency implies that power need not degenerate into violence. Foucault's final work on the nature of governmentality suggests, therefore, that society need not consist solely of the forms of discipline he had analysed earlier. Society might include an arena in which free individuals attempt only to influence one another. I hope my discussion of Foucault's theory of governmentality has pointed to the way in which a distinction between violence and power might provide us with normative resources for social criticism absent from his earlier work. Provided we are willing to grant that the capacity for agency has ethical value—and this seems reasonable enough—we will denounce violent social relations and champion instead a society based on a more benign power.

AT FOUCAULT: CEDE THE POLITICAL

Endless investigation of power makes real struggles against oppression impossible.

Hicks, **03-** Professor and chair of philosophy at Queens College of the CUNY (Steven V., "Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Foucault: Nihilism and Beyond," Foucault and Heidegger: Critical Encounters, Ed. Alan Milchman and Alan Rosenberg, p. 109, Questia)

Hence, the only "ethico-political choice" we have, one that Foucault thinks we must make every day, is simply to determine which of the many insidious forms of power is "the main danger" and then to engage in an activity of resistance in the "nexus" of opposing forces. 72 "Unending action is required to combat ubiquitous peril." 73 But this ceaseless Foucauldian "recoil" from the ubiquitous power perils of "normalization" precludes, or so it would seem, formulating any defensible alternative position or successor ideals. And if Nietzsche is correct in claiming that the only prevailing human ideal to date has been the ascetic ideal, then even Foucauldian resistance will continue to work in service of this ideal, at least under one of its guises, viz., the nihilism of negativity. Certainly Foucault's distancing of himself from all ideological commitments, his recoiling from all traditional values by which we know and judge, his holding at bay all conventional answers that press themselves upon us, and his keeping in play the "twists" and "recoils" that question our usual concepts and habitual patterns of behavior, all seem a close approximation, in the ethicopolitical sphere, to the idealization of asceticism.

Critiques of power are so localized that they prevent coalition from forming that could genuinely fight oppression.

Cook, **92-** Associate Professor at Georgetown Law School (Anthony E., "A Diversity of Influence: Reflections on Postmodernism, Spring, 26 New Eng.L. Rev. 751, Lexis)

Several things trouble me about Foucault's approach. First, he nurtures in many ways an unhealthy insularity that fails to connect localized struggle to other localized struggles and to modes of oppression like classism, racism, sexism, and homophobia that transcend their localized articulation within this particular law school, that particular law firm, within this particular church or that particular factory. I note among some followers of Foucault an unhealthy propensity to rely on rich, thick, ethnographic type descriptions of power relations playing themselves out in these localized laboratories of social conflict. This reliance on detailed description and its concomitant deemphasis of explanation begins, ironically, to look like a regressive positivism which purports to sever the descriptive from the normative, the is from the ought and law from morality and politics. Unless we are to be trapped in this Foucaultian moment of postmodern insularity, we must resist the temptation to sever description from explanation. Instead, our objective should be to explain what we describe in light of a vision embracing values that we make explicit in struggle. These values should act as magnets that link our particularized struggles to other struggles and more global critiques of power. In other words, we must not, as Foucault seems all too willing to do, forsake the possibility of more universal narratives that, while tempered by postmodern insights, attempt to say *and* do something about the oppressive world in which we live. Second, Foucault's emphasis on the techniques and discourses of knowledge that constitute the human subject often diminishes, if not abrogates, the role of human agency. Agency is of tremendous importance in any theory of oppression, because individuals are not simply constituted by systems of knowledge but also constitute hegemonic and counter-hegemonic systems of knowledge as well. Critical theory must pay attention to the ways in which oppressed people not only are victimized by ideologies of oppression but the ways they craft from these ideologies and discourses counter-hegemonic weapons of liberation.

AT FOUCAULT: GENEAOLOGY

Foucaultian genealogy is trapped in a double bind: its extreme relativism either undercuts its political usefulness or a new master discourse is produced.

Habermas, 87- Permanent Visiting Professor at Northwestern (Jürgen, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, p. 279)

Foucault's historiography can evade relativism as little as it can this acute presentism. His investigations are caught exactly in the self-referentiality that was supposed to be excluded by a naturalistic treatment of the problematic of validity. Genealogical historiography is supposed to make the practices of power, precisely in their discourse-constituting achievement, accessible to an empirical analysis. From this perspective, not only are truth claims confined to the discourses within which they arise; they exhaust their entire significance in the functional contribution they make to the self-maintenance of a given totality of discourse. That is to say, the meaning of validity claims consists in the power effects they have. On the other hand, this basic assumption of the theory of power is self-referential; if it is correct, it must destroy the foundations of the research inspired by it as well. But if the truth claims that Foucault himself raises for his genealogy of knowledge were in fact illusory and amounted to no more than the effects that this theory is capable of releasing within the circle of its adherents, then the entire undertaking of a critical unmasking of the human sciences would lose its point. Foucault pursues genealogical historiography with the serious intent of getting a science underway that is superior to the mismanaged human sciences. If, then, its superiority cannot be expressed in the fact that something more convincing enters in place of the convicted pseudo-sciences, if its superiority were only to be expressed in the effect of its suppressing the hitherto dominant scientific discourse *in fact,* Foucault's theory would exhaust itself in the politics of theory, and indeed in setting theoretical-political goals that would overburden the capacities of even so heroic a one-man enterprise. Foucault is aware of this. Consequently, he would like to single out his genealogy from all the rest of the human sciences in a manner that is reconcilable with the fundamental assumptions of his own theory. To this end, he turns genealogical historiography upon itself; the difference that can establish its preeminence above all the other human sciences is to be demonstrated in the history of its own emergence.

AT HEIDEGGER: NAZI

Heidegger's philosophy is Nazism—the rejection of technology and re-connection with Being offered by National Socialism fit with his arguments.

Wolin, 01 – Distinguished Professor of History at the City University of New York Graduate Center – 2001 (Richard Wolin, *Heidegger's Children*, P. 32)

To say that Arendt's explanation was the more successful, despite its flaws, is hardly controversial. In many respects, Heidegger's own narrative was simply delusory, a retrospectively contrived psychological prophylaxis against his own enthusiastic support for the regime. In Heidegger's view, everything that came to pass-the war, the extermination camps, the German dictatorship (which he never renounced per se)-was merely a monumental instance of the "forgetting of Being," for which the Germans bore no special responsibility. After the war, he went so far as to insist that German fascism was unique among Western political movements in that, for one shining moment, it had come close to mastering the vexatious "relationship between planetary technology and modern man." In Heidegger's estimation, therein lay the "inner truth and greatness of National Socialism." But ultimately "these people [the Nazis] were far too limited in their thinking," he claimed. Pathetically, Heidegger was left to replay in his own mind the way things might have been had Hitler (instead of party hacks) heeded the call of Being as relayed by Heidegger himself. Nazism might thereby have realized its genuine historical potential. Fortunately, the world was spared the outcome of this particular thought experiment.

Heidegger claimed that Nazism was at the heart of his philosophy and he was personally, deeply anti-Semitic.

Wolin, 01 – Distinguished Professor of History at the City University of New York Graduate Center – 2001 (Richard Wolin, *Heidegger's Children*, P. 10-11)

In May 1933, Heidegger sent a telltale telegram to Hitler expressing solidarity with recent Gleichschaltung legislation. There were instances of political denunciation and personal betrayal. Moreover, Heidegger remained a dues-paying member of the Nazi Party until the regime's bitter end. He continued to open his classes with the so-called "German greeting" of "Heil Hitler!" In 1936, he confided to Lowith that his 'partisanship for National Socialism lay in the essence of his philosophy"; it derived, he claimed, from the concept of "historicity" (which stressed the importance of authentic historical commitment) in Being and Time.'" As the rector of Freiburg University, Heidegger was charged with enforcing the anti-Semitic clauses of the so-called "Law for the Preservation of a Permanent Civil Service," which effectively banned Jews from all walks of government service, including university life. Despite his later disclaimers, in his capacity as rector Heidegger faithfully executed these laws, even though it meant banning Husserl, to whom he owed so much, from the philosophy faculty library. In the eyes of Hannah Arendt, this action, which had affected the septuagenarian phenomenologist so adversely, made Heidegger a "potential murderer."" At the time, Husserl complained bitterly in a letter to a former student about Heidegger's growing anti-Semitism: "In recent years [he] has allowed his anti-Semitism to come increasingly to the fore, even in his dealings with his groups of devoted Jewish students," observes Husserl. "The events of the last few weeks," he continued (referring to Heidegger's joining the Nazi Party as well as the recent university ban on Jews), "have struck at the deepest roots of my existence."" In 1929, Heidegger had already complained that Germany was faced with a stark alternative: "the choice between sustaining our German intellectual life through a renewed infusion of genuine, native teachers and educators, or abandoning it once and for all to growing Jewish influence [Verjudung]-in both the wider and narrow sense.'"

AT HEIDEGGER: NAZI

Heidegger's Nazism is inexcusable – his own philosophy stressed that thought can't be divorced from action.

Wolin, 90 - Distinguished Professor of History at the City University of New York Graduate Center - 1990 (Richard Wolin, *The Politics of Being*, P. 33-34)

Although an understanding of Heidegger's political thought should in no way be reduced to the concrete political choices made by the philosopher in the 1930s, neither is it entirely separable therefrom. And while the strategy of his apologists has been to dissociate the philosophy from the empirical person, thereby suggesting that Heidegger's Nazism was an unessential aberration in the hope of exempting the philosophy from political taint, this strategy will not wash for several reasons. To begin with, Heidegger's philosophy itself would seem to rule out the artificial, traditional philosophical separation between thought and action. In truth, much of *Being and Time* is concerned with overcoming the conventional philosophical division between theoretical and practical reason; a fact that is evident above all in the "pragmatic" point of departure of the analytic of Dasein: "Being-in- the-world" rather than the Cartesian "thinking substance." More importantly, though, what is perhaps the central category of Heidegger's existential ontology-the category of "authenticity"- automatically precludes such a facile separation between philosophical outlook and concrete life-choices. As a work of fundamental ontology, Being and Time aims at delineating the essential, existential determinants of human Being-in-the-world. Heidegger refers to these structures (e.g., "care," "fallenness," "thrownness," "Being-toward-death") as Existenzialien. The category of authenticity demands that the ontological structures of Being and Time receive practical or ontic fulfillment; that is, the realization of these categorial determinations in actual, concrete life contexts is essential to the coherence of the Heideggerian project. This conclusion follows of necessity from the nature of the category of authenticity itself: it would be nonsensical to speak of an "authentic Dasein" that was unrealized, existing in a state of mere potentiality. Authenticity requires that ontic or practical choices and involvements-concrete decisions, engagements, and political commitments-become an essential feature of an authentic existence.

Heidegger's Nazism was a logical consequence of his refusal of ethics.

Wolin, 90 - Distinguished Professor of History at the City University of New York Graduate Center - 1990 (Richard Wolin, *The Politics of Being*, P. 65)

The consequences of this decisionistic "ethical vacuum," coupled with the prejudicial nature of Heidegger's conservative revolutionary degradation of the modern life-world, suggests an undeniable theoretical cogency behind Heidegger's ignominious life-choice of 1933. In its rejection of "moral convention-which qua convention, proves inimical to acts of heroic bravado-decisionism shows itself to be distinctly nihilistic vis-a-vis the totality of inherited ethical paradigms.118F or this reason, the implicit political theory of Being and Time-and in this respect, it proves a classical instance of the German conservative-authoritarian mentality of the period-remains devoid of fundamental "liberal convictions" that might have served as an ethicopolitical bulwark against the enticement of fascism. Freed of such bourgeois qualms, the National Socialist movement presented itself as a plausible material "filling" for the empty vessel of authentic decision and its categorical demand for existentiell-historical content. The summons toward an "authentic historical destiny" enunciated in Being and Time was thus provided with an ominously appropriate response by Germany's National Revolution. The latter, in effect, was viewed by Heidegger as 'the ontic fulfillment of the categorical demands of "historicity": it was Heidegger's own choice of a "hero," a "destiny," and a "community."

AT HEIDEGGER: NAZI

Heidegger's Dasein was easily translated into a German Dasein and an excuse for nationalism.

Wolin, 01 – Distinguished Professor of History at the City University of New York Graduate Center – 2001 (Richard Wolin, *Heidegger's Children*, P. 184-185)

What is troubling about Heidegger's standpoint is not that he judges but the basis on which he distinguishes. His lock-step identification with the "German ideology" risks settling in advance all questions of relative historical merit. "Capitalism," "peasant wars," "Negroes"-once the world has been neatly divided into "historical" and "unhistorical" peoples and events, history's gray zones fade from view. That the "Volk" that, in Heidegger's view, possessed "historicity" in the greatest abundance-the Germans-had as of 1934 abolished political pluralism, civil liberties, and the rule of law and was in the process of consolidating one of the most brutal dictatorships of all time, cannot help but raise additional doubts about the "existential" grounds of Heidegger's discernment. Here, one could reverse the terms and claim that Germany of the 1930s suffered from an *excess* of historicity. Conversely, the historical events and peoples that Heidegger slights could readily be incorporated into progressive historical narratives." That he fails to perceive these prospects is attributable to his renunciation of "cosmopolitan history" and his concomitant embrace of a philosophically embellished version of German particularism or socalled *Sondenveg.* From an epistemological standpoint, Heidegger's difficulties derive from his decision to base ethical and political judgments on *factical* rather than *normative* terms; that is, from the *Jemeinigkeit* or concrete particularity of German *Existenz*. The more one reconsiders Heidegger's philosophy of the 1930s, the more one sees that one of its guiding leitmotifs is a refashioning of Western metaphysics in keeping with the demands of the Germanic Dasein." He consistently rejects the "universals" that in the Western tradition occupied a position of preeminence in favor of ethnocentric notions derived from the annals of Germanic Being-in-the-world. The example of the airplane that brings the Fuhrer to Mussolini" is merely a paradigmatic instance of a more general trend.

Heidegger thought that labor camps could be used to attack modernity.

Wolin, 01 – Distinguished Professor of History at the City University of New York Graduate Center – 2001 (Richard Wolin, *Heidegger's Children*, P. 191)

Heidegger's concern with the importance of labor in the new Reich was a matter of philosophical as well as political conviction. A longtime critic of the senescence and disorientation of German university life, he was of the opinion that the labor camps would serve to reintegrate knowledge with the life of the German Volk, whose simplicity and lack of sophistication he revered.*6A s Lijwith remarked, Heidegger "failed to notice the destructive radicalism of the whole [Nazi] movement and the petty bourgeois character of all its 'strength-through-joy' institutions, because he was a radical petty bourgeois himself."*' Heidegger, who hailed from the provincial lower classes, and who, despite his manifest brilliance, was denied a university chair until the age of thirty-nine, found much he could agree with in Nazism's dismantling of the old estates and commitment to upward social mobility." In his view, the value of labor camps as a vehicle of ideological reeducation for politically reticent scholars could hardly be overestimated.

AT HEIDEGGER: HUMANISM KEY TO STOP NAZISM

Their K has it backwards—ethical humanism is key to criticizing Nazism.

Ferry and Renaut, 90 – Professor of Political Science at the Sorbonne and Professor of Philosophy at Nantes – 1990 (Luc Ferry and Alain Renaut, *Heidegger and Modernity*, trans. Franklin Philip, P. 107-108)

Whatever is true of this debate, which, it will be readily agreed, here remains open, one thing is still certain. Heidegger is not close to Nazism because he remained a prisoner of humanism, nor because of his deliberations about authenticity and the distinguishing property of man. For Heidegger, the distinguishing property of man is always transcendence, and on the contrary, it was in the name of this transcendence and thus because he was still a humanist that Heidegger could criticize the biologizing reifications of Nazi anti-Semitism. More generally, it is very much in the name of humanism thus understood, in the name of that strictly human capacity to wrench oneself free of natural determinations, that a criticism of the racist imaenation (in the Lacanian sense) is possible. When, however, Heidegger makes the destiny of Being the destiny of man, when he thus returns to the antihumanist idea of a traditional code (if only that of the history of Being), he founders in inauthenticity, and his fall makes possible the return of the nationalistic myth and the fanatical hatred of modernity.

AT HEIDEGGER: ETHICS TOO VAGUE

Heidegger's "call of conscience" is hopelessly vague.

Wolin, 90 - Distinguished Professor of History at the City University of New York Graduate Center - 1990 (Richard Wolin, *The Politics of Being*, P. 40)

In the thought of Heidegger, it is the category of the "call of conscience" (Ruf des Gewissens) that paves the way for authentic decision or Entschlossenheit, thereby elevating Dasein above the fallenness of the They. Yet, the discussion of the "call of conscience" is disappointingly vague. When the question is posed as to whence the call emanates, the specific content of the call, or how it might be recognized, we are provided with only the most roundabout and tenuous hints. Indeed, Heidegger seems to treat the nebulousness of the call as a virtue. In part, this evasiveness is an honest reflection of the requirements of existential analysis, which should in principle bear no responsibility for supplying "existentiell" particulars. For were specific "ontic" directives provided, the whole question of the "decision" at issue-the Wozu of resolve-would become superfluous. In a very real sense, it is not up to fundamental ontology to make our choices for us. It is "we" who must decide, in accordance with what Heidegger is fond of calling our "ownmost potentiality-for- Being." Nevertheless, these caveats should by no means exonerate existential analysis from the charge of vacuity or insufficient concreteness.

AT HEIDEGGER: UNCONCEALMENT BAD

The alternative of treating truth as unconcealment makes it impossible to judge true from false—this is the sort of error that allowed Hitler to join the Nazis.

Wolin, 90 - Distinguished Professor of History at the City University of New York Graduate Center - 1990 (Richard Wolin, *The Politics of Being*, P. 121-122)

Ultimately Heidegger's theory of truth succumbs to the same problem of criterionlessness that was at issue in the decisionistic approach to human action in ***Being and Time.*** On the one hand, Heidegger seems at first to be claiming that unconcealment is merely an ontological ***precondition*** of truth-which is, as far as it goes, certainly a plausible and valuable insight. In point of fact, however, the nature of truth is conceptualized in terms of the dialectic of concealment and unconcealment that occurs within the phenomenological horizon that has been opened up by a work, a world, etc. In the end, his thoroughgoing antisubjectivism, which is radicalized in the "Turn," results in a type of ineffectual positivism: objects (beings) are no longer to be "judged" (for this would be to subject them to subjective criteria, or, worse still, to "values"), but "disclosed" or "unveiled." Yet, once the lines between truth and error become blurred, the distinction between authentic and inauthentic unveiling essentially evaporates: both are victimized by error in an unspecifiable way. Heidegger could conceivably redeem his theory of truth by an attempt, however minimal, to distinguish a true from an untrue act of unconcealment. A true unconcealment would thus unveil a being "essentially" or as it is "in itself." But no such distinction between genuine and non-genuine unveiling is forthcoming in his work. Instead, error ***(Irrnis***) is paradoxically deemed a mode of unconcealment that is valid in its own right and thus "equiprimordial" with truth. Or again, Heidegger might have claimed that unconcealment presents a type of privileged or ***exemplary*** disclosure of beings; and judgments of truth, in turn, could have been predicated on this exemplary mode of disclosure. But no such claim is made. Instead, all we are left with is an unexalted, positivistic affirmation of "givenness," "beings in their immediacy," "disclosure as such." In this respect, Heidegger's theory of ***Seinsgeschichte*** regresses behind both the Husserlian and the ancient Greek conceptions of truth. For in both cases, truth resides not in the "givenness" of beings as such, but in a supramundane or ***superior*** mode of givenness?* As a result of his obsession with providing a "topography" of truth-with defining the clearing or openness as a sufficient condition for the appearance of truth as "untruth"-to the wholesale exclusion of all traditional predicative considerations, Heidegger lays himself open to extreme judgmental incapacities. And it was this philosophically induced lack of discernment that would lead to his fatal misapprehension of the intellectual as well as the political essence of National Socialism.

AT HEIDEGGER: PARALYSIS

Heidegger's over determined Being so strongly that free will is impossible.

Wolin, 90 - Distinguished Professor of History at the City University of New York Graduate Center - 1990 (Richard Wolin, *The Politics of Being*, P. 153)

Consequently, the major problem with Heidegger's later philosophy is that the doctrine of Being, in its oppressive omnipotence, causes the conceptual space in which freedom can be meaningfully thought to all but disappear. In light of this fact, Jaspers' verdict concerning Heidegger's inability to grasp the nature of human freedom-"Heidegger doesn't know what freedom is"-becomes readily intelligible. For according to the theory of the "destining of Being," all the worldly events we experience undergo a prior, other-wordly, metaontological determination. Like a deus absconditus, Being "essences" or "comes to presence" in ways that are inscrutable to the human understanding. On this point, Heidegger is emphatically clear: "The history of Being-and not the decisions of man himself-"underlies and determines every situation et condition humaine." But if this description of the human condition is correct, then human action is essentially unfree, and the notion of persons as potentially autonomous actors becomes equally incoherent. For the very possibility of a meaningful correlation between human practice and its desired ends has been disqualified in advance: it is not we who are ultimately responsible for the outcome of our actions (for "the advent of beings"); rather, it is the "destiny of Being.

Emphasis on releasement results in paralyzing passivity.

Wolin, 90 - Distinguished Professor of History at the City University of New York Graduate Center - 1990 (Richard Wolin, *The Politics of Being*, P. 147)

As we suggested earlier, the essential thinking of the later Heidegger promotes an "eclipse of practical reason." For his post-Kehre reformulation of the relation between Being and Dasein rebels so fervently against the voluntarist dimension of his own earlier thinking that the very concept of "meaningful human action" is seemingly rendered null and void. If the early Heidegger attempted to rally Dasein to "decisiveness" (Entschlossenheit), the thought of the later Heidegger appears at times to be a summary justification of human passivity and inaction (Gelassenheit)-so prejudicially is the balance between Sein and Mensch struck in favor of the former term. Thus, in the later Heidegger, the campaign against practical reason develops along a two-fold front: not only is the concept of Being grossly inflated, but the powers of human reason and will are correspondingly devalued. In the later writings, Being assumes the character of an omnipotent primal force, a "first unmoved mover," whose "presencing" proves to be the determinative, ultimate instance for events in the lowly world of human affairs. In its other-worldly supremacy, this force both withdraws from the tribunal of human reason and defies the meager capacities of human description: "A Being that not only surpasses all beings-and thus all men-but which like an unknown God rests and 'essences' in its own truth, in that it is sometimes present and sometimes absent, can never be explained like a being in existence; instead, it can only be 'evoked.' "

AT HEIDEGGER: AUTHORITARIAN

Heidegger's philosophy rejects democracy and justifies domination of those deemed "inauthentic."
Wolin, 90 - Distinguished Professor of History at the City University of New York Graduate Center - 1990 (Richard Wolin, *The Politics of Being*, P. 46)

The political philosophical implications of this theory are as unequivocal as they are distasteful to a democratic sensibility. On the basis of the philosophical anthropology outlined by Heidegger, the modern conception of popular sovereignty becomes a sheer non sequitur: for those who dwell in the public sphere of everydayness are viewed as essentially incapable of self-rule. Instead, the only viable political philosophy that follows from this standpoint would be brazenly elitist: since the majority of citizens remain incapable of leading meaningful lives when left to their own devices, their only hope for "redemption" lies in the imposition of a "higher spiritual mission" from above. Indeed, this was the explicit political conclusion drawn by Heidegger in 1933. In this way, Heidegger's political thought moves precariously in the direction of the "Fuhrerprinzip" or "leadership principle." In essence, he reiterates, in keeping with a characteristic antimodern bias, a strategem drawn from Platonic political philosophy: since the majority of men and women are incapable of ruling themselves insofar as they are driven by the base part of their souls to seek after inferior satisfactions and amusements, we in effect do them a service by ruling them from above.77T o date, however, there has never been a satisfactory answer to the question Marx poses concerning such theories of educational dictatorship: "Who shall educate the educator?"

The desire for "authentic" leaders justifies totalitarianism.
Wolin, 90 - Distinguished Professor of History at the City University of New York Graduate Center - 1990 (Richard Wolin, *The Politics of Being*, P. 115-116)

There are many dangers lurking in the statist conception of politics advanced by Heidegger in the preceding citation. The specifically political danger of this theory of the polis/state is that it is latently totalitarian: when the state-and the "destiny of a historical Volk" that is its raison d'ttre-are accorded unchallenged ontological primacy as "the work for the works," the autonomy and integrity of the other spheres of life (social, cultural, religious) disappears: they are gleichgeschaltet or immediately subsumed within the political sphere. The Greeks could solve this potential danger via the institution of direct democracy: by virtue of this medium, political space was opened up to its maximum extent. But in Heidegger's contemporary pan-Germanic "repetition" of the ancient polis, the opposite is true: since his twentieth century polis/ state is integrally tied to the Fiihrerprinzip, it becomes a Fiihrerstaat, a new form of political tyranny, in which political space shrivels up into the person of the Fuhrer and his sycophantic entourage.6 As the remarks just cited suggest, for Heidegger, the concept of a Fiihrerstaat is unproblematical provided there be "rulers alone, but then really rulers." That is, the rulers must be "authentic" and not imposters. And as we will soon see, Heidegger develops a theory of world-historical "leader-creators" in order to ground his partisanship for the Fiihrerprinzip philosophically.

AT HEIDEGGER: NO VALUE TO LIFE

Heidegger's theory reduces the value to life—he forces joyless disconnection from the real world.

Wolin, 90 - Distinguished Professor of History at the City University of New York Graduate Center - 1990 (Richard Wolin, *The Politics of Being*, P. 49-50)

Heidegger's characterization of everydayness is so disproportionately negative that we are seemingly left with no immanent prospects for realizing our authentic natures in the domain of ontic life as such. For on the basis of his phenomenological descriptions, it would seem that the ontic sphere in general- "worldliness" in its entirety-has been "colonized" by the They. Here, we see that Heidegger's pessimistic philosophical anthropology and his "joyless" social ontology ultimately join forces. The result is a radical devaluation of the life-world, that delicate substratum of everyday human sociation which existential phenomenology claims to redeem. At this point, one might raise against Heidegger's social ontology the same charge he levels against Husserl's theory of the pure, transcendental ego: it suffers from an impoverishment of world-relations-a fact clearly evinced in Heidegger's self-defeating celebration of the "non-relational" character of authentic Dasein cited above. For how can the authenticity of a Dasein that is essentially "non -relational" ever attain realization in the sphere of ontic life?

AT HEIDEGGER: NO TRUTH = NAZISM

Critique of the enlightenment justified Nazism.

Wolin, 90 - Distinguished Professor of History at the City University of New York Graduate Center - 1990 (Richard Wolin, *The Politics of Being*, P. 152)

And thus, if upon turning to the text of a 1953 lecture we find the observation: "Thinking begins only when we have come to know that reason, glorified for centuries, is the most stiff-necked adversary of thought" we cannot help but conclude that in his later work, Heidegger has only sunk more deeply into the bog of Logosvergessenheit. This verdict gives cause for dismay, for it suggests that the philosopher has drawn precisely the wrong conclusions from the political events of 1933-1945: instead of participating in the attempt to forge, out of the ravages of postwar Europe, a new conception of reason and truth, Heidegger himself has become an even greater "stiff-necked" advocate of counterenlightenment. His thought seeks refuge in the recrudescence of myth: "openness for the mystery," "the remembrance of Being," and "the mirror-play of the four-fold" (gods and mortals, heaven and earth) becomes the mystified categorial scheme around which his later thinking revolved. The notion that analogous counterenlightenment attitudes and doctrines might have played a key role in the spiritual preparation for the German catastrophe is a thought that has obviously never crossed his mind.57

AT HEIDEGGER: PARALYSIS

Heidegger is unable to translate ontological insights into the real world.

Wolin, 90 - Distinguished Professor of History at the City University of New York Graduate Center - 1990 (Richard Wolin, *The Politics of Being*, P. 164)

Heidegger's inability to conceptualize the sociohistorical determinants and character of modern technology raises the oft-discussed question of the "pseudo-concreteness of his philosophy"; that is, its apparent incapacity to fulfill its original phenomenological promise as a philosophy of "existential concretion." The problem was already evident in the tension between the ontological and ontic levels of analysis that dominated the existential analytic of Being and Time. For there the sphere of ontic life seemed degraded a priori as a result of its monopolization by the "They" and its concomitant inauthentic modalities. As a result, both the desirability and possibility of effecting the transition from the metalevel of ontology to the "factical" realm of ontic concretion seemed problematical from the outset. Nowhere was this problem better illustrated than in the case of the category of historicity. And thus despite Heidegger's real insight into limitations of Dilthey's historicism, the inflexible elevation of ontology above the ontic plane virtually closes off the conceptual space wherein real history might be thought. In truth, it can only appear as an afterthought: as the material demonstration of conclusions already reached by the categories of existential ontology. Consequently, the "ontology of Being and Time is still bound to the metaphysics that it rejects. The conventional tension between existentia and essentia stands behind the difference between everyday (factical) and 'authentic historical existence.'

AT HEIDEGGER: CALCULATIONS GOOD

Old flaws in calculative thought require expanding the reasoning process, not rejecting it.

Wolin, 90 - Distinguished Professor of History at the City University of New York Graduate Center - 1990 (Richard Wolin, *The Politics of Being*, P. 167)

Heidegger's theory of technology ultimately collapses under the weight of its own self-imposed conceptual limitations. And thus, the intrinsic shortcomings of his theoretical framework prevent him from entertaining the prospect that the problem of technological domination owes more to the dearth of reason in the modern world rather than an excess. For in modern life, the parameters of rationality have been prematurely restricted: formal or instrumental reason has attained de facto hegemony; practical reason-reflection on ends-has been effectively marginalized. Instead of the "overcoming" of reason recommended by Heidegger, what is needed is an expansion of reason's boundaries, such that the autonomous logic of instrumental rationality is subordinated to a rational reflection on ends. Similarly, Heidegger's incessant lamentations concerning the "will to will-the theoretical prism through which he views the modern project of human self-assertion in its entirety- only serve to confuse the problem at issue?7 That the forces of technology and industry follow an independent logic.

AT HEIDEGGER: DREAD OF DEATH BAD

Glorification of dreading death became an excuse for violence on the battlefield.

Wolin, 01 – Distinguished Professor of History at the City University of New York Graduate Center – 2001 (Richard Wolin, *Heidegger's Children*, P. 163-164)

One of the concepts from *Being and Time* that Marcuse viewed with suspicion was Being-toward-death. Although its importance has often been underplayed in the vast secondary literature on *Being and Time*, Being-toward-death proves a crucial way station on the road to authenticity. Whereas everyday Dasein (the "they") systematically shuns and avoids confronting the predicament of human finitude, authentic Dasein distinguishes itself by a willingness to confront the phenomenon of death unflinchingly. An awareness of death's inevitability sharpens Dasein's worldly involvements and lcommitments. Since *Existenz* is inherently finite (there is no salvation or eternal life), Dasein's commitment to temporality and worldliness must be radical and total. Yet, as Marcuse notes, Heidegger's ontological characterization of death betrays a specific ontic context: the glorification of the "front experience" in Germany following World War I. For example, in Ernst Jiinger's provocative battle chronicles, *In the Storm of Steel* and *War as Inner Experience*, the confrontation with death in war was elevated to ! the status of a supreme existential rite of passage. It is difficult to dissociate Heidegger's exaltation of Being-toward-death from this postwar cultural context. Ultimately, this ethos, which emphasized the imperatives of "sacrifice" and the importance of Nietzsche's maxim, "Have the courage to live dangerously," found a home in the martial ethos of National Socialism. Heidegger's own political speeches on behalf of the regime are suffused with the rhetorical bombast characteristic of this idiom.

AT HEIDEGGER: PERMUTATION

Action and reflection on consequences of that action are compatible.

Padrutt, 92 – Psychiatrist and President of the Daseinsanalyse Gesellschaft – 1992 (Hanspeter Padrutt, *Heidegger and the Earth*, "Heidegger and Ecology," ed. LaDelle McWhorter, P.31)

Once in a while the conceptual interplay of theory and praxis is put against this attempt. From the philosophical point of view the so-called practical or political dimension of the attempt is rejected, whereas from the ecological point of view the so-called theoretical, philosophical dimension is rejected. But deeper reflection and decisive action do not need to contradict each other. Those who shield themselves from the political consequences might one day be confronted by the fact that no decision is still a decision that can have consequences. And those who believe that they need not bother about thinking fail to recognize that no philosophy is also a philosophy – e.g., a cybernetic worldview – that also has consequences.

AT HEIDEGGER: BEING MEANINGLESS

Discussions of Being are meaningless—the concept is too abstract to be useful.

Rosen, 69 - Borden Parker Bowne Professor of Philosophy at Boston University – 1969 (Stanley Rosen, *Nihilism: A Philosophical Essay*, P. 35)

Being is not a thing (the ontologists say), but the *source* of things. To speak of this source as the sum of all properties common to things is to reduce the source of things to an abstraction derivative from things. It is to make things the source of Being, an absurd reversal of the truth! Speech about things is ontic speech and, as such, diverts our attention away from Being: seduction by ontic speech thus makes fundamental ontology impossible. Being is not an abstraction, because abstractions are derived or constructed from concrete particulars; Being is not a construction, but the source of all possible constructions, hence not abstract but most concrete. Finally, an abstraction is still itself a particular thing, whereas Being, as the origin or ground of particulars, is not. Being is not a thing; rather than call it "anything at all," we would be better advised to say that Being is nothing. Ontology is speech about no thing, and so about nothing. But even further, since human speech is necessarily of, and in terms of, things (and so ontic), ontological speech is also the speech of nothing: it is nothingness speaking about itself, or a gift from nothingness to man, whose own ontic speech obscures the gift even in the act of acknowledging, receiving, or attempting t o dis-cover it.)

Discourse on being is so abstract that it renders us silent—it is nihilistic paralysis.

Rosen, 69 - Borden Parker Bowne Professor of Philosophy at Boston University – 1969 (Stanley Rosen, *Nihilism: A Philosophical Essay*, P. 45-46)

I have been arguing that ontological speech, in the sense attributed to it by those who follow Heidegger's distinction between the ontological and ontic, is in fact silence. Ontologists of this type wish to talk about Being as distinct from beings, and speech will simply not permit this. If this is a defect of speech, and the significance of speech is in the deepest and final sense relative to silence, then there is no reason for what we say or for whether we speak at all, other than the mere fact, although there is equally no reason to keep silent. The result is absurdism or nihilism. Therefore no reason can be given which would justify our falling into such desperate straits. Every fundamental ontological speech of the type in question is not just self-refuting but self-canceling.

AT HEIDEGGER: LINK OVER SIMPLIFIED

Heidegger makes it imposisbel to distinguish between democracy and totalitarianism.

Ferry and Renaut, 90 – Professor of Political Science at the Sorbonne and Professor of Philosophy at Nantes – 1990 (Luc Ferry and Alain Renaut, *Heidegger and Modernity*, trans. Franklin Philip, P. 87-88)

From this viewpoint, it is first of all clear, as we have noted, that this criticism of technology as the global concretization of an idea of man as consciousness and will implies, like it or not, a deconstruction of democratic reamain son and hence, in some sense, of humanism. It is also clear, however, that Heidegger's thinking, even fixed up this way, continues in some odd way to misfire because of its one-dimensionality. Just as, on the strictly philosophical level, it leads to lumping the various facets of modem subjectivity together in a shapeless mass and to judging that the progression from Descartes to Kant to Nietzsche is linear and in fact inevitable; just as, on the political level, it leads to the brutal inclusion of American liberalism in the same category with Stalinist totalitarianism. Now this is no mere matter of taste: anyone has the right to loathe rock concerts, Disney World, and California. Nonetheless, no one may-Hannah Arendt and Leo Strauss, who lived in the United States, did not make this mistake - identify, in the name of a higher authority, the barbarism of the Soviet gulags with the depravities of a Western society whose extraordinary political, social, and cultural complexity allows areas of freedom that it would wholly unwarranted to judge a priori as mere fringes or remnants of a world in decline.

AT SPANOS: CEDE THE POLITICAL

Spanos's rejection of humanism marginalizes his theory and makes leftist coalition impossible.

Perkin, 93 – Associate Professor of English at Saint Mary's University – 1993 (J. Russell Perkin, *Postmodern Culture 3.3*, "Theorizing the Culture Wars," Project Muse).

My final criticism is that Spanos, by his attempt to put all humanists into the same category and to break totally with the tradition of humanism, isolates himself in a posture of ultraleftist purity that cuts him off from many potential political allies, especially when, as I will note in conclusion, his practical recommendations for the practical role of an adversarial intellectual seem similar to those of the liberal pluralists he attacks. He seems ill-informed about what goes on in the everyday work of the academy, for instance, in the field of composition studies. Spanos laments the "unwarranted neglect" (202) of the work of Paulo Freire, yet in reading composition and pedagogy journals over the last few years, I have noticed few thinkers who have been so consistently cited. Spanos refers several times to the fact that the discourse of the documents comprising *The Pentagon Papers* was linked to the kind of discourse that first-year composition courses produce (this was Richard Ohmann's argument); here again, however, Spanos is not up to date. For the last decade the field of composition studies has been the most vigorous site of the kind of oppositional practices *The End of Education* recommends. The academy, in short, is more diverse, more complex, more genuinely full of difference than Spanos allows, and it is precisely that difference that neoconservatives want to erase. By seeking to separate out only the pure (posthumanist) believers, Spanos seems to me to ensure his self-marginalization. For example, several times he includes pluralists like Wayne Booth and even Gerald Graff in lists of "humanists" that include William Bennett, Roger Kimball and Dinesh D'Souza. Of course, there is a polemical purpose to this, but it is one that is counterproductive. In fact, I would even question the validity of calling shoddy and often inaccurate journalists like Kimball and D'Souza with the title "humanist intellectuals." Henry Louis Gates's final chapter contains some cogent criticism of the kind of position which Spanos has taken. Gates argues that the "hard" left's opposition to liberalism is as mistaken as its opposition to conservatism, and refers to Cornel West's remarks about the field of critical legal studies, "If you don't build on liberalism, you build on air" (187). Building on air seems to me precisely what Spanos is recommending.

Spanos's theory has no real-world implications

Lewandowski, 94 - Associate Professor and Philosophy Program Coordinator at The University of Central Missouri – 1994 (Joseph D. Lewandowsi, *Philosophy and Social Criticism*, "Heidegger, literary theory and social criticism," ed. David M. Rasmussen, P. 119)

Spanos rightly rejects the 'textuality' route in Heidegger and Criticism precisely because of its totalizing and hypostatizing tendencies. Nevertheless, he holds on to a destructive hermeneutics as disclosure. But as I have already intimated, disclosure alone cannot support a critical theory oriented toward emancipation. I think a critical theory needs a less totalizing account of language, one that articulates both the emphatic linguistic capacity to spontaneously disclose worlds - its innovative 'worlding' possibilities - and its less emphatic, but no less important, capacity to communicate, solve problems in and criticize the world. The essential task of the social critic - and any literary theory that wants to be critical - is to couple world disclosure with problem-solving, to mediate between the extra-ordinary world of 'textuality' and the everyday world of 'texts'. In this alternative route, literary theory may become the kind of emancipatory oriented critical theory it can and should be.

AT SPANOS: NO ALTERNATIVE

Spanos does not sufficiently connect his genealogy to specific policy recommendations—the alternative fails to influence the real world.

Lewandowski, 94 - Associate Professor and Philosophy Program Coordinator at The University of Central Missouri – 1994 (Joseph D. Lewandowsi, *Philosophy and Social Criticism*, "Heidegger, literary theory and social criticism," ed. David M. Rasmussen, P. 115-116)

The point to be made here is that Heidegger's politics are not the only (or necessarily the largest) obstacle to coupling him with critical theory. Hence much of Spanos's energetic defense of Heidegger against his 'humanist detractors' (particularly in his defiant concluding chapter, 'Heidegger, Nazism, and the "Repressive Hypothesis": The American Appropriation of the Question') is misdirected. For as McCarthy rightly points out, 'the basic issues separating critical theory from Heideggerean ontology were not raised post hoc in reaction to Heidegger's political misdeeds but were there from the start. Marcuse formulated them in all clarity during his time in Freiburg, when he was still inspired by the idea of a materialist analytic of Dasein' (p. 96, emphasis added). In other words, Heidegger succumbs quite readily to an immanent critique. Heidegger's aporias are not simply the result of his politics but father stem from the internal limits of his questioning of the 'being that lets beings be', truth as disclosure, and destruction of the metaphysical tradition, all of which divorce reflection from social practice and thus lack critical perspective. Spanos, however, thinks Foucault can provide an alternative materialist grounding for an emancipatory critical theory that would obviate the objections of someone such as Marcuse. But the turn to Foucault is no less problematic than the original turn to Heidegger. Genealogy is not critical in any real way. Nor can it tame or augment what Spanos calls Heidegger's 'overdetermination of the ontological site'. Foucault's analysis of power, despite its originality, is an ontology of power and not, as Spanos thinks, a 'concrete diagnosis' (p. 138) of power mechanism. Thus it dramatizes, on a different level, the same shortcomings of Heidegger's fundamental ontology. The 'affiliative relationship' (p. 138) that Spanos tries to develop between Heidegger and Foucault in order to avoid the problem Marcuse faced simply cannot work. Where Heidegger ontologizes Being, Foucault ontologizes power. The latter sees power as a strategic and intentional but subjectless mechanism that 'endows itself' and punches out 'docile bodies', whereas the former sees Being as that neutered term and no-thing that calls us. Foucault (like Spanos) never works out how genealogy is emancipatory, or how emancipation could be realized collectively by actual agents in the world. The 'undefined work of freedom' the later Foucault speaks of in 'What Is Enlightenment?' remained precisely that in his work.4 The genealogy of power is as much a hypostatization as is fundamental ontology: such hypostatizations tend to institute the impossibility of practical resistance or freedom. In short, I don't think the Heideggerian 'dialogue' with Foucault sufficiently tames or complements Heidegger, nor does it make his discourse (or Foucault's, for that matter) any more emancipatory or oppositional. Indeed, Foucault's reified theory of power seems to undermine the very notion of 'Opposition', since there is no subject (but rather a 'docile' body) to do the resisting (or, in his later work, a privatized self to be self-made within a regime of truth), nor an object to be resisted. As Said rightly points out in The World, the Text, and the Critic, 'Foucault more or less eliminates the central dialectic of opposed forces that still underlies modern society' (p. 221, emphasis added). Foucault's theory of power is shot through with false empirical analyses, yet Spanos seems to accept them as valid diagnoses. Spanos fails to see, to paraphrase Said's criticisms of Foucault's theory of power, that power is neither a spider's web without the spider, nor a smoothly functioning diagram (p. 22l).

AT SPANOS: NO TRUTH DISEMPOWERING

Spanos's rejection of objective truth removes any way to measure the theory's emancipatory effects.

Lewandowski, 94 - Associate Professor and Philosophy Program Coordinator at The University of Central Missouri – 1994 (Joseph D. Lewandowsi, *Philosophy and Social Criticism*, "Heidegger, literary theory and social criticism," ed. David M. Rasmussen, P. 117-118)

But radicalized or not, Spanos's trading of any possibility of 'determinate truth' for Heideggerian disclosure as eventing of truth/untruth robs his critical theory of the necessary yardstick needed to measure 'emancipation'. Heidegger's disclosure is a cryptonormative truth; it is an event before which any ***critical*** judgment necessarily ***fails.*** Disclosure is ***not*** a process of inquiry, but rather a revealing/concealing that befalls or overtakes us. In his eagerness to draw out the enabling features and 'post'-humanist dimension of Heidegger's disclosure, Spanos fails to see the inevitable and internal limits to truth as disclosure. Gadamer encounters similar problems, despite his keen insights, when he holds on to a Heideggerian disclosure that too often undermines the power of critical reflection. And the postmodern Italian philosopher Gianni Vattimo encounters a related problem when he attempts to take leave of modernity and proclaim a liberating postmodernity via Heidegger's disclosure. But while a purely aesthetic theory interested in 'textuality' can quite justifiably be grounded in truth as disclosure (as American deconstruction or Vattimo's ***il pensiero debole*** is), a truly ***critical*** theory interested in emancipation simply cannot: some types of 'emancipation' are false and need to be rejected. Texts may very well 'disclose' worlds in the same way that, say, the Greek temple does for Heidegger. But a genuinely critical theory needs to be able to say what worlds are better or worse for actual agents in actual worlds - a need, I might add, that Spanos is constantly aware of and typifies in his denunciation of American imperialism in Vietnam (and elsewhere) in Heidegger and Criticism.

AT SPANOS: HUMANISM GOOD

Humanist reforms are more effective than totalizing critique.

Good, 01 - Professor of English at the University of British Columbia – 2001 (Graham Good, *Humanism betrayed*, P. 7)

Liberal humanism, in my view, offers a more cogent critique of capitalist society because it generally accepts capitalism as an economic system that is more productive and efficient than the alternatives. Yet liberal humanism seeks to limit capitalism's social and cultural effects by preserving certain spheres - politics, art, education - as having a limited autonomy from the imperatives of the market. This attitude of partial acceptance and partial critique is much more realistic and effective, for example, in protesting the commercialization of the university, or in preserving artistic standards, than the total rejection of "late-capitalist society" that is common among academic pseudoradicals. Total opposition is more readily co-opted by the system because it forms a mirror image. If the system is all-powerful, how can Theorists explain the possibility or acceptability of their own opposition to it? This problem is usually evaded; but when it is confronted, a doctrine of "necessary complicity" is often evoked. If you disbelieve in your own autonomy as an individual, you must be liable in dark moments to suspect that you are actually working *for* the system. Resistance to the system is part of the system. Total rejection flips into total acceptance and opens the way for a personal exploitation of the academic system. Political correctness covers up careerist realpolitik.

AT SPANOS: VIETNAM GOOD

Communism was spreading in Vietnam – it had to be stopped.

Podhoretz, 82 – adviser to the US Information Agency and laureate of the Presidential Medal of Freedom – 1982 (Norman Podhoretz, *Why We Were in Vietnam*, P. 11)

Indeed, for many people whose original support of American intervention in Vietnam had been based on memories of Munich, Vietnam not only replaced it but canceled it out. To such people - the lesson of Munich had been that an expansionist totalitarian power could not be stopped by giving in to its demands and that limited resistance at an early stage was the only way to avoid full-scale war later on. Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, returning to England from the conference in Munich at which Nazi Germany's claims over Czechoslovakia had been satisfied, triumphantly declared that he was bringing with him "peace in our time." But as almost everyone would later agree, what he had actually brought with him was the-certainty of a world war to come-a war that Winston Churchill, the leading critic of the policy of appeasement consummated at Munich, would later call "unnecessary." According to Churchill, if a line had been drawn against Hitler from the beginning, he would have been forced to back away, and the sequence of events that led inexorably to the outbreak of war would have been interrupted. Obviously, Vietnam differed in many significant ways from Central Europe in the late 1930s. But there was one great similarity that overrode these differences in the minds of many whose understanding of such matters had been shaped by the memory of Munich. "I'm not the village idiot," Dean Rusk, who was Secretary of State first under Kennedy and then under Johnson, once exploded. "I know Hitler was an Austrian and Mao is a Chinese…But that is common between the two situations is - - the phenomenon -of aggression." In-other words, in Vietnam now as in central Europe then, a totalitarian political force - Nazism then, Communism now-was attempting to expand the area under its control. A relatively limited degree of resistance then would have precluded the need for massive resistance afterward. This was the lesson of Munich, and it had already been applied successfully in Western Europe in the forties and Korea in the fifties. Surely it was applicable to Vietnam.

Vietnam was crucial for American hegemony and democracy promotion.

Podhoretz, 82 – adviser to the US Information Agency and laureate of the Presidential Medal of Freedom – 1982 (Norman Podhoretz, *Why We Were in Vietnam*, P. 19-20)

Thus, on June 1, 1956, two years after delivering Schlesinger's favorite speech, Kennedy spoke before the American Friends of Vietnam on "America's Stake in Vietnam." By this time the French had been defeated, and Vietnam had been partitioned under a set of agreements negotiated in Geneva, with a Communist regime under Ho Chi Minh established in the North and a non-Communist government under Ngo Dinh Diem set up in the South. According to the Geneva agreements, Vietnam was to be unified under a government to be elected in 1956, but Kennedy declared that "neither the United States nor Free Vietnam [was] ever going to be a party to an election obviously stacked and subverted in advance" by the Communists of the North and their agents and allies in the South. To Kennedy, Vietnam represented "the cornerstone of the Free World in Southeast Asia," the keystone to the arch, the finger in the dike. Burma, Thailand, India, Japan, the Philippines and obviously Laos and Cambodia . . . would be threatened if the red tide of Communism overflowed into Vietnam. " This was the first of the four reasons Kennedy g ve for "America's stake in Vietnam." The second was that Vietnam represented "a proving ground for democracy in Asia…the alternative to Communist dictatorship. If this democratic experience fails, if some one million refugees have fled the totalitarianism of the North only to find neither freedom nor security in the South, then weakness, not strength, will characterize the meaning of democracy in the minds of still more Asians." It was, Kennedy said, an experiment we could not "afford to permit to fail." The third reason was that Vietnam, in addition to representing, a test of democracy in Asia, also represented "a test of American responsibility and determination" there. Characterizing the United States as the "godparents" of "little Vietnam" and Vietnam as "our offspring" ("We presided at its birth, we gave assistance to its life, we have helped to shape its future"), Kennedy concluded that if Vietnam were to fall "victim to any of the perils that threaten its existence-Communism, political anarchy, poverty and the rest," we would be held responsible and our prestige in Asia would "sink to a new low." Finally (and most prophetically), America's stake in Vietnam was "a very selfish one" in the sense that "American lives and American dollars" would inevitably have to be expended if "the apparent security which has increasingly characterized that area I under the leadership of President Diem" were to be jeopardized.

AT SPANOS: VIETNAM GOOD

Containment was necessary to prevent nuclear war with Russia

Podhoretz, 82 – adviser to the US Information Agency and laureate of the Presidential Medal of Freedom – 1982 (Norman Podhoretz, *Why We Were in Vietnam*, P. 22-23)

The answer was unclear. On the one hand, the most authoritative and highly articulated public statement of the assumptions behind containment, the famous article by the then Director of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff, George F. Kennan (published in 1947 in Foreign Affairs**,** under the pseudonym "Mr. X"), could only be read to imply that in principle at least containment was global in scope. "The main element," said Kennan, "of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies by the adroit and vigilant application of counter-force at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet policy." Nor did Kennan leave any doubt as to the relation between local Communist parties and the Soviet Union: the duty of "all good Communists" everywhere in the world, he wrote, "is the support and promotion of Soviet power, as defined in Moscow." **l 2** Yet on the other hand, three years later, Kennan's boss, Truman's Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, seemed to suggest that the United States did not regard the independence of South Korea as a vital interest." This the Soviet Union, the Chinese, and the North Koreans evidently all took as a signal that the forcible extension of Communist rule to the South would not be met by the application of American counterforce. It seems unlikely that Acheson, who as much as any one individual was the father of containment-"present," as he put it in the title of his memoirs, 'bt the creationw-really intended to send such a signal. But whether there was a misunderstanding here or a lastminute change of mind, the invasion of South Korea on June 25, 1950, triggered an immediate American response. Only two days after the outbreak of the war, President Truman declared that "the attack upon Korea makes it plain beyond all doubt that 4 Communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations and will now use armed invasion and war." l4 Not only was the United States now extending the principles of containment from Europe to Asia, then; it was going even further in practice.

AT DILLON: CALCULATIONS GOOD

Viewing calculative thought as equivalent to domination ensures total political paralysis.

Bronner, 04 Stephen Eric Bronner, Professor of Political Science at Rutgers University, 2004, Reclaiming the Enlightenment: Toward a Politics of Radical Engagement, p. 3-5

"Instrumental reason" was seen as merging with what Marx termed the "commodity form" underpinning capitalist social relations. Everything thereby became subject to the calculation of costs and benefits. Even art and aesthetic tastes would become defined by a "culture industry"—intent only upon maximizing profits by seeking the lowest common denominator for its products. Instrumental rationality was thus seen as stripping the supposedly "autonomous" individual, envisioned by the philosophes, of both the means and the will to resist manipulation by totalitarian movements. Enlightenment now received two connotations: its historical epoch was grounded in an anthropological understanding of civilization that, from the first, projected the opposite of progress. This gave the book its power: Horkheimer and Adorno offered not simply the critique of some prior historical moment in time, but of all human development. This made it possible to identify enlightenment not with progress, as the philistine bourgeois might like to believe, but rather—unwittingly—with barbarism, Auschwitz, and what is still often called "the totally administered society." Such is the picture painted by Dialectic of Enlightenment.. But it should not be forgotten that its authors were concerned with criticizing enlightenment generally, and the historical epoch known as the Enlightenment in particular, from the standpoint of enlightenment itself: thus the title of the work. Their masterpiece was actually "intended to prepare the way for a positive notion of enlightenment, which will release it from entanglement in blind domination."4 Later, in fact, Horkheimer and Adorno even talked about writing a sequel that would have carried a title like "Rescuing the Enlightenment" (Rettung der Aufklarung).5 This reclamation project was never completed, and much time has been spent speculating about why it wasn't. The reason, I believe, is that the logic of their argument ultimately left them with little positive to say. Viewing instrumental rationality as equivalent with the rationality of domination, and this rationality with an increasingly seamless bureaucratic order, no room existed any longer for a concrete or effective political form of opposition: Horkheimer would thus ultimately embrace a quasi-religious "yearning for the totally other" while Adorno became interested in a form of aesthetic resistance grounded in "negative dialectics." Their great work initiated a radical change in critical theory, but its metaphysical subjectivism surrendered any systematic concern with social movements and political institutions. Neither of them ever genuinely appreciated the democratic inheritance of the Enlightenment and thus, not only did they render critique independent of its philosophical foundations,6 but also of any practical interest it might serve. Horkheimer and Adorno never really grasped that, in contrast to the system builder, the blinkered empiricist, or the fanatic, the philosophe always evidenced a "greater interest in the things of this world, a greater confidence in man and his works and his reason, the growing appetite of curiosity and the growing restlessness of the unsatisfied mind—all these things form less a doctrine than a spirit."7 Just as Montesquieu believed it was the spirit of the laws, rather than any system of laws, that manifested the commitment to justice, the spirit of Enlightenment projected the radical quality of that commitment and a critique of the historical limitations with which even its best thinkers are always tainted. Empiricists may deny the existence of a "spirit of the times." Nevertheless, historical epochs can generate an ethos, an existential stance toward reality, or what might even be termed a "project" uniting the diverse participants in a broader intellectual trend or movement. The Enlightenment evidenced such an ethos and a peculiar stance toward reality with respect toward its transformation. Making sense of this, however, is impossible without recognizing what became a general stylistic commitment to clarity, communicability, and what rhetoricians term "plain speech." For their parts, however, Horkheimer and Adorno believed that resistance against the incursions of the culture industry justified the extremely difficult, if not often opaque, writing style for which they would become famous—or, better, infamous. Their esoteric and academic style is a far cry from that of Enlightenment intellectuals who debated first principles in public, who introduced freelance writing, who employed satire and wit to demolish puffery and dogma, and who were preoccupied with reaching a general audience of educated readers: Lessing put the matter in the most radical form in what became a popular saying—"Write just as you speak and it will be beautiful"—while, in a letter written to D'Alembert in April of 1766, Voltaire noted that "Twenty folio volumes will never make a revolution: it's the small, portable books at thirty sous that are dangerous. If the Gospel had cost 1,200 sesterces, the Christian religion would never have been established."9 Appropriating the Enlightenment for modernity calls for reconnecting with the vernacular. This does not imply some endorsement of anti-intellectualism. Debates in highly specialized fields, especially those of the natural sciences, obviously demand expertise and insisting that intellectuals must "reach the masses" has always been a questionable strategy. The subject under discussion should define the language in which it is discussed and the terms employed are valid insofar as they illuminate what cannot be said in a simpler way. Horkheimer and Adorno, however, saw the matter differently. They feared being integrated by the culture industry, avoided political engagement, and turned freedom into the metaphysical-aesthetic preserve of the connoisseur. They became increasingly incapable of appreciating the egalitarian impulses generated by the Enlightenment and the ability of its advocates—Ben Franklin, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, Thomas Paine, and Rousseau—to argue clearly and with a political purpose.1' Thus, whether or not their "critical" enterprise was "dialectically" in keeping with the impulses of the past, its assumptions prevented them from articulating anything positive for the present or the future.

AT AGAMBEN: ALTERNATIVE FAILS

Agamben's "coming community" is too weak to be sustainable.

Gordon 04 (Andrew, Lee and Juliet Folger Fund Professor of History at Harvard University, "Review Study: Rethinking Area Studies, Once More," Journal Of Japanese Studies, Vol. 30, No. 2, 2004, pg. 424-425)

Okada draws on Giorgio Agamben to argue for "singularities to form a community without affirming an identity." Such a community would be premised on a belief "that humans co-belong without any representable condition of belonging" (p. 200). This is an ambitious but doomed quest. The sort of community here envisioned is devoid of the emotional attachments that reinforce strong communities in real life. The sad part—and here I agree with Okada entirely— is that these emotions so easily rest on feelings of exclusion or essentialist notions of identity; the sadder part is that I don't see how the community he seeks could generate loyalties sufficient to allow its survival.

AT AGAMBEN: LINK OVER SIMPLIFIED

Agamben's biopower is over-simplified and prevents us from confronting specific political circumstances.

Virno 02 (Paolo, PhD and Italian philosopher, "General intellect, exodus, multitude," Archipelago No. 54, June 2002, http://www.generation-online.org/p/fpvirno2.htm)

Agamben is a thinker of great value but also, in my opinion, a thinker with no political vocation. Then, when Agamben speaks of the biopolitical he has the tendency to transform it into an ontological category with value already since the archaic Roman right. And, in this, in my opinion, he is very wrong-headed. The problem is, I believe, that the biopolitical is only an effect derived from the concept of labor-power. When there is a commodity that is called labor-power it is already implicitly government over life. Agamben says, on the other hand, that labor-power is only one of the aspects of the biopolitical; I say the contrary: over all because labor power is a paradoxical commodity, because it is not a real commodity like a book or a bottle of water, but rather is simply the potential to produce. As soon as this potential is transformed into a commodity, then, it is necessary to govern the living body that maintains this potential, that contains this potential. Toni (Negri) and Michael (Hardt), on the other hand, use biopolitics in a historically determined sense, basing it on Foucault, but Foucault spoke in few pages of the biopolitical - in relation to the birth of liberalism - that Foucault is not a sufficient base for founding a discourse over the biopolitical and my apprehension, my fear, is that the biopolitical can be transformed into a word that hides, covers problems instead of being an instrument for confronting them. A fetish word, an "open doors" word, a word with an exclamation point, a word that carries the risk of blocking critical thought instead of helping it. Then, my fear is of fetish words in politics because it seems like the cries of a child that is afraid of the dark..., the child that says "mama, mama!", "biopolitics, biopolitics!". I don't negate that there can be a serious content in the term, however I see that the use of the term biopolitics sometimes is a consolatory use, like the cry of a child, when what serves us are, in all cases, instruments of work and not propaganda words.

AT AGAMBEN: NAZIS UNIQUE

Not all politics turn to Nazism—modern power structures are incredibly diverse.

Rabinow & Rose 03 (Paul, Professor of Anthropology at UC Berkeley, Nikolas, Professor of Sociology @ the London School of Economics, "Thoughts On The Concept of Biopower Today," December 10, 2003, http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/sociology/ pdf/RabinowandRose-BiopowerToday03.pdf, accessed July 07, pg. 8-9)

The interpretation of contemporary biopolitics as the politics of a state modeled on the figure of the sovereign suits the twentieth century absolutisms of the Nazis and Stalin. But we need a more nuanced account of sovereign power to analyze contemporary rationalities or technologies of politics. Since these authors take their concept and point of reference from Foucault, it is worth contrasting their postulate of a origin and beneficiary of biopower to Foucaultís remarks on sovereignty as a form of power whose diagram, but not principle, is the figure of the sovereign ruler. Its characteristic is indeed ultimately a mode of power which relies on the right to take life. However, with the exception of certain 'paroxysmal' moments, this is a mode of power whose activation can only be sporadic and non-continuous. The totalization of sovereign power as a mode of ordering daily life would be too costly, and indeed the very excesses of the exercise of this power seek to compensate for its sporadic nature. Sovereignty, in this sense, is precisely a diagram of a form of power not a description of its implementation. Certainly some forms of colonial power sought to operationalize it, but in the face of its economic and governmental costs, colonial statecraft was largely to take a different form. The two megalomaniac State forms of the twentieth century also sought to actualize it, as have some others in their wake: Albania under Hoxha, North Korea. But no historian of pre-modern forms of control could fail to notice the dependence of sovereign rule in its non-paroxysmal form on a fine web of customary conventions, reciprocal obligations, and the like, in a word, a moral economy whose complexity and scope far exceeds the extravagance displays of the sovereign. Sovereign power is at one and the same time an element in this moral economy and an attempt to master it.

Not all biopolitics bring about genocide—it trivializes Nazism to say that all enactments of the state of exception are equivalent.

Rabinow & Rose 03 (Paul, Professor of Anthropology at UC Berkeley, Nikolas, Professor of Sociology @ the London School of Economics, "Thoughts On The Concept of Biopower Today," December 10, 2003, http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/sociology/ pdf/RabinowandRose-BiopowerToday03.pdf, pg. 8-9)

Agamben takes seriously Adorno's challenge "how is it possible to think after Auschwitz?" But for that very reason, it is to trivialize Auschwitz to apply Schmitt's concept of the state of exception and Foucault's analysis of biopower to every instance where living beings enter the scope of regulation, control and government. The power to command under threat of death is exercised by States and their surrogates in multiple instances, in micro forms and in geopolitical relations. But this is not to say that this form of power commands backed up by the ultimate threat of death is the guarantee or underpinning principle of all forms of biopower in contemporary liberal societies. Unlike Agamben, we do not think that : the jurist the doctor, the scientist, the expert, the priest depend for their power over life upon an alliance with the State (1998: 122). Nor is it useful to use this single diagram to analyze every contemporary instance of thanato-politics from Rwanda to the epidemic of AIDS deaths across Africa. Surely the essence of critical thought must be its capacity to make distinctions that can facilitate judgment and action.

AT AGAMBEN: BARE LIFE

The concept of bare life over-determines the power of the state—theories that emphasize resistance are more powerful.

Cesarino & Negri 04 (Cesare, associate professor of cultural studies, Antonio, professor emeritus @ the Collège International de Philosophie, "It's a Powerful Life: A Conversation on Contemporary Philosophy," Cultural Critique, Vol. 57, Spring 2004, pg. 172-173)

I believe Giorgio is writing a sequel to *Homo Sacer*, and I feel that this new work will be resolutive for his thought—in the sense that he will be forced in it to resolve and find a way out of the ambiguity that has qualified his understanding of naked life so far. He already attempted something of the sort in his recent book on Saint Paul, but I think this attempt largely failed: as usual, this book is extremely learned and elegant; it remains, however, somewhat trapped within Pauline exegesis, rather than constituting a full-fledged attempt to reconstruct naked life as a potentiality for exodus, to rethink naked life fundamentally in terms of exodus. I believe that the concept of naked life is not an impossible, unfeasible one. I believe it is possible to push the image of power to the point at which a defenseless human being [*un povero Cristo*] is crushed, to conceive of that extreme point at which power tries to eliminate that ultimate resistance that is the sheer attempt to keep oneself alive. From a logical standpoint, it is possible to think all this: the naked bodies of the people in the camps, for example, can lead one precisely in this direction. But this is also the point at which this concept turns into ideology: to conceive of the relation between power and life in such a way actually ends up bolstering and reinforcing ideology. Agamben, in effect, is saying that such is the nature of power: in the final instance, power reduces each and every human being to such a state of powerlessness. But this is absolutely not true! On the contrary: the historical process takes place and is produced thanks to a continuous constitution and construction, which undoubtedly confronts the limit over and over again—but this is an extraordinarily rich limit, in which desires expand, and in which life becomes increasingly fuller. Of course it is possible to conceive of the limit as absolute pow-erlessness, especially when it has been actually enacted and enforced in such a way so many times. And yet, isn't such a conception of the limit precisely what the limit looks like from the standpoint of constituted power as well as from the standpoint of those who have already been totally annihilated by such a power—which is, of course, one and the same standpoint? Isn't this the story about power that power itself would like us to believe in and reiterate? Isn't it far more politically useful to conceive of this limit from the standpoint of those who are not yet or not completely crushed by power, from the standpoint of those still struggling to overcome such a limit, from the standpoint of the process of constitution, from the standpoint of power [*potenza*]?

AT AGAMBEN: THE CAMP

Suggesting that the camp is everywhere is silly—government power may be expansive but it does not always produce corpses—Nazism was unique.

Levi & Rothberg 03 (Neil, Professor of English @ Drew University, Michael, Professor of English @ the University of Sydney, "Auschwitz and the Remnants of Theory: Towards an Ethics of the Borderlands," (11: 1/2), 2003, pg.30-31)

At the same time, Agamben's formulations strike us as problematic and inadequate in several respects. First, by restructuring the "zone of the human" to conform to the condition of the Muselmann, Agamben removes the figure of the Muselmann from the context-the camps-in which he or she is "produced." The Muselmann becomes an isolated figure floating, like a Giacometti sculpture, in an otherwise apparently empty abstract space that Agamben calls "humanity." The Muselmann is meant to bear a certain truth about the nature of ethics "after Auschwitz," but is it not important when trying to articulate such an ethics to reflect on what Auschwitz was?4 Surely such an account should attend to the historical, legal, and political conditions that led to the development of the camp system, including the kinds of features that Zygmunt Bauman focuses on in Modernity and the Holocaust - such as a massive, morally indifferent bureaucratic apparatus that dehumanized its "objects" and distanced its agents from a sense of responsibility for their actions, as well as the obsessive hatred of the Jews that Saul Friedländer has recently dubbed "redemptive antisemitism."5 If the Muselmann would not have existed without these factors, shouldn't an ethics focused upon this figure also take account of them? Interestingly enough, in Homo Sacer Agamben himself argues that "the camp" is the "nomos" (definitive political element) of the modern. In remarking that "[w]hat happened in the camps so exceeds the juridical concept of crime that the specific juridico-political structure in which those events took place is often simply omitted from consideration" (1998, 166), Agamben could be preparing a critique of what is omitted from Remnants of Auschwitz. Homo Sacer argues that the camp is the space where the state of exception becomes normal and where "whether or not atrocities are committed depends not on law but on the civility and ethical sense of the police who temporarily act as sovereign" (1998, 174). This line of argument produces an antinomy in the Agamben oeuvre: for the Agamben of Homo Sacer a camp is a camp if anything is possible within it, no matter whether or not it actually produces Muselmänner and corpses, while for the Agamben of Remnants of Auschwitz the important fact about the Muselmann is simply that such a figure happened, not where and how he became possible. What links the positions of his two works is a level of abstraction that deliberately brackets features of each paradigm ordinarily understood as essential: for the camp, figures such as the Muselmann; for the Muselmann, the conditions of the camp. Both moves permit Agamben to dismantle the boundary between the Nazi camps and the modern world. We have already seen this in relation to the Muselmann, in the wake of whose existence all previously existing moral concepts must be revised. It can be seen also in the examples of modern camps Agamben offers, including, "[t]he soccer stadium in Bari into which the Italian police in 1991 provisionally herded all illegal Albanian immigrants," the zones d'attentes in French international airports where foreigners requesting refugee status are held, and even, he suggests in an earlier version of the essay, gated communities in the USA (1998, 174).6 At such moments Agamben seems to be suggesting that Auschwitz is potentially everywhere, a suggestion that ends up eliding the specific challenges posed both by the Muselmann and the camp system.

AT AGAMBEN: MUSELMANN

Agamben's claim that the Muselmann is the 'complete witness' undermines the historical importance of other positions within Auschwitz. This is the equivalent of denying that other survivors had authentic experiences and must be rejected.

Levi & Rothberg 03 (Neil, Professor of English @ Drew University, Michael, Professor of English @ the University of Sydney, "Auschwitz and the Remnants of Theory: Towards an Ethics of the Borderlands," (11: 1/2), 2003, pg.31-32)

We would also identify a second problem with Agamben's approach: the grounds for Agamben's selection of the Muselmann as the "complete witness" are not clear. Ethics after Auschwitz must take account of the Muselmann, but that does not justify transforming him into a fetish, the sole site of the truth of the camps. If Levi's own testimony is on his own account unrepresentative, that surely does not mean that it has no truth content. The fact that Levi himself distrusts the testimony of, say, former members of the Sonderkommando (the camp inmates who were forced, under threat of death, to operate the crematoria) is no reason to disqualify such testimony out of hand. The power of Claude Lanzmann's astonishing film Shoah derives in no small part from the testimony of a former "crematorium raven" (P. Levi 60). Despite his attempt to develop a complex theory of testimony premised on the relationship between the Muselmann and the surviving witness, Agamben ultimately homogenizes the site of witness by polarizing those positions. While there is warrant for such a reading in Levi's texts (e.g., Levi's notion of "the drowned and the saved"), those texts also include the hypothesis of "the gray zone," a zone of ethical uncertainty in which figures such as the Sonderkommando are paradigmatic. In fact, testimony from the gray zone may prove as illuminating about the ethical challenges of the Nazi genocide as that derived from an understanding of Levi's paradox. Despite the serious reservations expressed by Levi about the testimonies of figures who were forced into the most terrible complicity with the Nazis, such testimonies have been shown to be of great value in understanding the Nazi genocide, and, indeed, in making clear the need for theoretical innovation in order to do so.7 In what remains one of the most profound attempts to "think" the Nazi genocide, historian and social theorist Dan Diner proposes that Nazi action can be most effectively illuminated from the perspective of the gray zone, and particularly that of the Judenräte - the Jewish councils who ran the ghettos and were charged to make decisions about who would be allowed to work and who would be sent to the camps (130-137). The councils negotiated on the assumption that the Nazis were rational - specifically, that they would not want to exterminate a productive labor source while at war. The Nazis utilized this assumption to facilitate the killing process, with which the councils found themselves unsuspectingly cooperating. It is the Jewish councils' experience of participating in their own destruction while acting according to the logic of self-preservation that Diner terms the counterrational. And it is in reflecting on the Jewish experience of Nazi counterrationality that Diner says we encounter the limits of historical understanding. Only at this limit point, according to Diner, can we begin to "think the Nazis" via what he calls negative historical cognition. While we wouldn't want to generalize the standpoint of the Judenräte as the essence of the Holocaust any more than we would that of the Muselmann, when read alongside each other the arguments of Agamben and Diner strongly suggest the importance of multiplying the epistemological standpoints from which we approach the Nazi genocide.

RIGHTS GOOD

Rights are not perfect but do contain a radical element in their promotion of universal human dignity. They can be effectively used to leverage the state.

Daly, Research Fellow in Philosophy, 04 (Frances, Australian National University, "The Non-citizen and the Concept of Human Rights", *borderlands*, http://www.borderlandsejournal.adelaide.edu.au/vol3no1_2004/daly_noncitizen.htm)

At its most fundamental, right is the right to something, and within the realm of natural rights or rights of the human being, it has been principally concerned with rights against oppression and inequality in order to realize a potential for freedom. Citizen rights have at their basis quite different values, namely, a range of political and property rights to be realized within and not against the State. This is not to say that law associated with human rights is not, at times, itself an external form of oppression - but natural or human right is also able to offer something quite different. The term needs to be used advisedly because of the problematic connotations it has – but there is a tradition of natural right containing anticipatory elements of human dignity in which forms of justice as ethically-based community survive, and it is this tradition, I would argue, which needs to be renewed. We can see this in all struggles for human dignity in which unsatisfied demands exist for overcoming the lack of freedom of exploitation and constraint; the inequality of degradation and humiliation; the absence of community in egoism and disunity. And so too can we view this via the necessary reference point that a critique of right provides: by acknowledging the hypocrisy of law or the distance between intention and realization we have an important basis for distinguishing between the problem of right and its complete negation, such as we would see under despotic, fascistic rule. The use and abuse of right is not the same thing as a complete absence of right, and understanding this is vital to being able to comprehend where and in what ways democratic, constitutional States become, or are, fascistic. Natural right, or the right of the human being, occupies a space of interruption in the divide between law and ethicality that can, on occasion, act as to reintroduce a radical pathos within right.

RIGHTS GOOD

Rights do not create a fixed identity. When we appeal to rights in terms of universal justice they are deeply radical and able to create open communities.

Daly, 04 (http://www.borderlandsejournal.adelaide.edu.au/vol3no1_2004/daly_noncitizen.htm, The non-citizen and the concept of 'human rights', Frances Daly, Australian National University 2004).

Legal positivism assumes or sets out the basis for rights within a normative framework of the State that merely takes for granted judicial postulates of the inalienability of rights, the basis of rights in property and assumptions that people are in fundamental accord on matters of right. It is unable to imagine a realm of freedom against the State. But within rights, I would argue, we can detect unsatisfied demands that have nothing to do with essentialist assumptions about ~~'man'~~ or 'citizen'. These demands are concerned with an understanding of human freedom in relation to values of solidarity, justice and the overcoming of alienation; they are historical and contingent, shifting and alive, and are not about a fixed, static, generic essence of the person, or some ahistorical or superhistorical immutable totality. What it is to be human is open and changeable, although not without determinations, commonalities and shared properties that can emerge at various times. With the rise of individualism in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the idea of natural rights of the individual, of liberty, fraternity, and equality of the individual – of 'inalienable' rights and normative ideals – was quite clearly conceived in terms of the citizen. What persisted of a sense of natural justice for all, whose standard had been derived from various sources - in nature, God, a view of reason or human nature - was undoubtedly distorted by a sense of individualism defined in terms of possession and property rights. But this sense was not completely extinguished. It is certainly on the basis of a realm of legal positivism and its doctrines of positive law, a realm which assumes that no element of law or right pre-exists an act of the State, that some of the basic contradictions that Agamben highlights are likely to emerge. For it is the State that institutes types of validity for its laws on the basis of procedure rather than any sense of morality or principles of justice. But there are other pathways to rights, other forms in which principles of justice have been derived and enacted. And if this is the case, why must we then necessarily conclude from a critique of legal positivism that there can be no ethical basis to rights?

Rights must be judged by their specific deployment, not abstract theory. Even if there are flaws between norms and application, rights contain a radical element of universal dignity that can be used to leverage real change.

Daly, 04 (http://www.borderlandsejournal.adelaide.edu.au/vol3no1_2004/daly_noncitizen.htm, The non-citizen and the concept of 'human rights', Frances Daly, Australian National University 2004).

An ahistorical disdain for legal action is merely the obverse of the process of fetishizing legality. Much theory that merely substitutes the idea of the static essence of the person to explain the consequence of good and evil in the world with an equally static, invariant view of authority and the State is, I would argue, ultimately eternalizing such concepts. Undoubtedly, some sort of move beyond categories underscoring divisions within the ways people are entitled to live their lives is necessary. But much of the power of any such critique must depend upon the manner in which the context of this life – the possible experience of acting in the world, or 'form-of-life' - is itself understood. In the absence of any such context, what tends to emerge is a return to the problem of rights reduced to a division of form and content, rather than the overturning of this very problematic. Only in this case, because the content is seen to fall short of the abstraction of, for example, a "whatever singularity", the form is wholly discarded. More importantly, by revisiting this problem via a dismissal of the context of rights, and more specifically of the possibility of traces of the intention towards human dignity, a rich heritage of critique is sidelined. Continues... The use and abuse of right is not the same thing as a complete absence of right, and understanding this is vital to being able to comprehend where and in what ways democratic, constitutional States become, or are, fascistic. Natural right, or the right of the human being, occupies a space of interruption in the divide between law and ethicality that can, on occasion, act as to reintroduce a radical pathos within right.

RIGHTS GOOD

Rights for refugees tap into the radical core of rights—the idea that there is a universal human dignity. Past failures of rights are not reasons to abandon the concept, they are reasons why rights must be more aggressively extended to all.

Daly, 04 (http://www.borderlandsejournal.adelaide.edu.au/vol3no1_2004/daly_noncitizen.htm, The non-citizen and the concept of 'human rights', Frances Daly, Australian National University 2004).

Let us look then at the more specific example of the right of the refugee or right of asylum. In the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of ~~Man~~ and of the Citizen there is a perceived need to set out what are described as "the natural, sacred, and inalienable rights of ~~man~~". These rights, as is well known, concern freedom, equality, the right to liberty, property, security and resistance to oppression, the presumption of innocence, the right to opinion and religious expression and free communication. Likewise, the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights restates these rights and extends an understanding of right to economic, social and cultural rights and, perhaps most importantly from the perspective of this paper, the right to a freedom of movement and residence and the right to seek and enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution. We have already mentioned the institutionalization of these rights in citizen rights, and that this sense of right was a creation of the nation-State. And along with this is the problematic nature of the inclusion of the right of property as an inalienable right, which first arose as the consequence of the division of labour and has little to do with anything inherently human, and the basic difficulty that arises with a sense of innate rights, as all rights have been acquired. We detect as well the formalism of general juridical equality with the much more normative content of the constitutional state of fundamental social division – those whose access to education, security, work and freedom from detention can be assumed, and those whose lack of this assumption is outlined in their right to seek its guarantee. However, it would be a clear distortion of the struggles involved in the emergence of codified natural rights to not also mention that an essential part of a sense of the absolute inalienability of the person was a view of individual freedom within community (the sort of idea we find Rousseau, for instance) and the attempt to exercise limits upon the power of tyrants to curtail that freedom. That there has been a highly variable degree of protection of these rights, or in certain cases no protection of them at all, is naturally problematic but cannot of itself be attributed to the fact of rights themselves. The context of rights is one that is frequently unstable, and, as such, it is important to clearly assess the place of rights within our present conditions of unfreedom. Often as a result of their denial, human rights currently act so as to allow a questioning of the assumed authority of the State. Indeed, without a sense of rights it would be difficult for us to understand the current absence of real freedom. If we consider the contemporary struggles of the 'Sans Papiers' in France, the several hundred thousand people whose refusal of the label 'illegal' and fight for documentation is premised on the basis that the undermining of rights is merely a way of attacking the value of dignity for all, we can see a clear example of the possibility that can be realized through right. The Sans Papiers are well-known for their questioning of the assumptions of immigration policies, such as the existence of quotas, detention camps and deportations, and they argue cogently for an end to frontiers themselves. Madjiguène Cissé argues that the initiatives of those claiming their rights are basic to the survival of communities (Cissé, 1997: 3). This is done on the basis of an appeal to rights of justice and egalitarianism. Indeed, it is not possible to understand this emancipatory struggle outside a conception of rights.

25. Agamben views all such setting out of rights as essentially reintegrating those marginalized from citizenship into the fiction of a guaranteed community. Law only "wants to prevent and regulate" (Agamben, 2001: 1) – and it is certainly the case that much law does – but within rights, I argue, we can also detect a potential for justice. In contrast, Agamben contends that legal right and the law always operate in a double apparatus of pure violence and forms of life guaranteed by a Schmittian 'state of emergency' (Agamben, 2000: 43). And although he recognizes the dire consequences of a state of emergency with the eradication of the legal status of individuals, he views this as the force of law without law, as a mystical or fictional element, a space devoid of law, an 'empty legal space', or 'state of exception' as Carl Schmitt refers to it, that is essential to the legal order (Carl Schmitt, 1985: 6). What is then eliminated here is any sense of how the appeal to rights brings into question institutionalized unfreedom and why this underlying insufficiency between the idea of right and real need is opposed by those attempting to expand the realm of human rights. The problem with this strategy for doing away with any distinction and placing the refugee in a position of pure potentiality is that, instead of liberating or revolutionizing the place of the refugee, it creates an eternal present that is unable to connect the very real reality of difference with a critique of the society that victimizes the refugee in the manner with which we are currently so familiar.

RIGHTS GOOD

Even if the law is not perfect and culture values matter, rights still protect us from oppression.

Altman, 90 (Andrew, (Professor of Philosophy; Georgia State University) *Critical Legal Studies: A Liberal Critique,* page 8)

There are undoubtedly elements of the liberal tradition which exaggerate the extent to which the law alone gives contemporary liberal societies the degree of humanity and decency they have. There are undoubtedly elements of the liberal tradition which exaggerate the power of law to work its will against the entrenched customs and traditions of a culture. We would be wise to keep in mind Tocqueville's lesson about the failures of law in cultural set tings where it has tried to operate in opposition to pervasive and deep-seated social norms. But it would be equally wrong to dismiss the protections offered by the law as superfluous or useless. Between the area in which law is useless because it receives insufficient support from the rest of the culture and the area in which law is superfluous because the rest of the culture provides all of the protections we can reasonably ask for, there is a wide expanse of territory. It is within the borders of that territory that law can and does make a difference. It is within the borders of that territory that legal rights can and do work to protect people from the evils of intolerance, prejudice, and oppression. This is the heart of the liberal tradition in legal philosophy. It is a tradition worthy of allegiance.

Rights are the best path to liberation—if you take their alternative seriously, it would require massive coercion to create a collective voice capable of challenging the law.

Sparer, 84 (Ed, (Law Professor, University of Pennsylvania) 36 Stan. L. Rev. 509, January).

We would do well to follow the radical approach of building upon our core human rights tradition, demonstrating the contradiction between that tradition and our social institutions, and developing ways to fuse human rights into new cooperative institutions of our own making. Such work requires a concern for theory which feeds social movement, but successful social movement comes from the struggle for the realization of our basic rights, not from their disparagement. One must step outside the liberal paradigm into a realm where truth may be experiential, where knowledge resides in world views that are themselves situated in history, where power and ideas do not exist separately. Continues... Central to the argument I have made thus far is the notion that individual autonomy and community are not contradictions at all; rather, they shape and give meaning and richness to each other. Kennedy and other Critical legal theorists of the dominant school recognize the latter thought. At the same time, they argue that the very interdependence of these concepts leads to the fundamental and seemingly unresolvable contradiction they embody. In an oft-quoted passage, Kennedy states: Even when we seem to ourselves to be most alone, others are with us, incorporated in us through processes of language, cognition and feeling that are, simply as a matter of biology, collective aspects of our individuality. Moreover, we are not always alone. We sometimes experience fusion with others, in groups of two or even two million, and it is a good rather than a bad experience. But at the same time that it forms and protects us, the universe of others (family, friendship, bureaucracy, culture, the state) threatens us with annihilation and urges upon us forms of fusion that are quite plainly bad rather than good. A friend can reduce me to misery with a single look. Numberless conformities, large and small abandonments of self to others, are the price of what freedom we experience in society. And the price is a high one. Through our existence as members of collectives, we impose on others and have imposed on us hierarchical structures of power, welfare, and access to enlightenment that are illegitimate, whether based on birth into a particular social class or on the accident of genetic endowment**.** The kicker is that the abolition of these illegitimate structures, the fashioning of an unalienated collective existence, appears to imply such a massive increase of collective control over our lives that it would defeat its purpose. Only collective force seems capable of destroying the attitudes and institutions that collective force has itself imposed. Coercion of the individual by the group appears to be inextricably bound up with the liberation of that same individual. If one accepts that collective norms weigh so heavily in favor of the status quo that purely "voluntary" movement is inconceivable, then the only alternative is the assumption of responsibility for the totalitarian domination of other people's minds -- for "forcing them to be free."

RIGHTS GOOD: NOT MONOLITHIC

Human rights are not a monolith—they can be adapted by local cultures.
Ibhawoh, 00 – Lecturer in African History and International Development Studies at the Edo State University in Nigeria – 2000 (Bonny Ibhawoh, "Between Culture and Constitution: Evaluation the Cultural Legitimacy of Human Rights in the Africa State", human rights quarterly 2.2, Project Muse).

This assumption tends to ignore the fact that societies are constantly in the process of change wrought by a variety of cultural, social, and economic forces. It seems an elementary but necessary point to make that so-called traditional societies--whether in Asia, Africa, or in Europe--were not culturally static but were eclectic, dynamic, and subject to significant alteration over time. Traditional cultural beliefs are also neither monolithic nor unchanging. In fact they could--and were--changed in response to different internal and external pressures. Cultural change can result from individuals being exposed to and adopting new ideas. Individuals are actors who can influence their own fate, even if their range of choice is circumscribed by the prevalent social structure or culture. In doing so, those who choose to adopt new ideas, though influenced by their own interest, initiate a process of change which may influence dominant cultural traditions. Culture is thus inherently responsive to conflict between individuals and social groups. [7] It is a network of perspectives in which different groups hold different values and world views, and in which some groups have more power to present their versions as the true culture. The significance of this is that we proceed from the assumption that certain cultural traditions inherently appearing in conflict with national and universal human rights standards may in fact have the potential of being influenced through a process of change and adaptation to meet new human rights standards.

Human rights concepts are universal but their implementation varies widely.
Donnelly, 07 – Andrew Mellon Professor at the Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver – 2007 (Jack Donnelly, "The Relative Universality of Human Rights", Human Rights Quarterly 29 page 281-306, Project Muse).

Human rights are (relatively) universal at the level of the *concept*, broad formulations such as the claims in Articles 3 and 22 of the Universal Declaration that "everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person" and "the right to social security."[50] Particular rights concepts, however, have multiple defensible *conceptions*. Any particular conception, in turn, will have many defensible *implementations*. At this level—for example, the design of electoral systems to implement the right "to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives"—relativity is not merely defensible but desirable.[51] Functional and overlapping consensus universality lie primarily at the level of concepts. Most of the Universal Declaration lies at this level as well. Although international human rights treaties often embody particular conceptions, and sometimes even particular forms of implementation,[52] they too permit a wide range of particular practices. Substantial second order variation, by country, region, culture, or other grouping, is completely consistent with international legal and overlapping consensus universality.

Rights enable cultural expression.
Donnelly, 07 – Andrew Mellon Professor at the Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver – 2007 (Jack Donnelly, "The Relative Universality of Human Rights", Human Rights Quarterly 29 page 281-306, Project Muse).

Human rights seek to allow human beings, individually and in groups that give meaning and value to their lives, to pursue their own visions of the good life. Such choices—so long as they are consistent with comparable rights for others and reflect a plausible vision of human flourishing to which we can imagine a free people freely assenting—deserve our respect. In fact, understanding human rights as a political conception of justice supported by an overlapping consensus requires us to allow human beings, individually and collectively, considerable space to shape (relatively) universal rights to their particular purposes—so long as they operate largely within the constraints at the level of concepts established by functional, international legal, and overlapping consensus universality.

RIGHTS GOOD: NOT WESTERN

Human rights are not inherently Western.

Donnelly, 07 – Andrew Mellon Professor at the Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver – 2007 (Jack Donnelly, "The Relative Universality of Human Rights", Human Rights Quarterly 29 page 281-306, Project Muse).

The social-structural "modernity" of these ideas and practices, however, not their cultural "Westernness," deserves emphasis.[15] Human rights ideas and practices arose not from any deep Western cultural roots but from the social, economic, and political transformations of modernity. They thus have relevance wherever those transformations have occurred, irrespective of the pre-existing culture of the place.

Human rights not exclusive to Western countries—it si essentialist to imply that other cultures inherently oppose rights.

Donnelly, 07 – Andrew Mellon Professor at the Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver – 2007 (Jack Donnelly, "The Relative Universality of Human Rights", Human Rights Quarterly 29 page 281-306, Project Muse).

It is important to remember that virtually all Western religious and philosophical doctrines through most of their history have either rejected or ignored human rights Today, however, most adherents of most Western comprehensive doctrines endorse human rights. And if the medieval Christian world of crusades, serfdom, and hereditary aristocracy could become today's world of liberal and social democratic welfare states, it is hard to think of a place where a similar transformation is inconceivable. Consider claims that "Asian values" are incompatible with internationally recognized human rights.[24]. Asian values—like Western values, African values, and most other sets of values—can be, and have been, understood as incompatible with human rights. But they also can be and have been interpreted to support human rights, as they regularly are today in Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea. And political developments in a growing number of Asian countries suggest that ordinary people and even governments are increasingly viewing human rights as a contemporary political expression of their deepest ethical, cultural, and political values and aspirations.[25] No culture or comprehensive doctrine is "by nature," or in any given or fixed way, either compatible or incompatible with human rights.

RIGHTS GOOD: CHECK ON STATISM

Rights are the best model for protecting people against modern states and markets—no viable alternative has worked as well.

Donnelly, 07 – Andrew Mellon Professor at the Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver – 2007 (Jack Donnelly, "The Relative Universality of Human Rights", Human Rights Quarterly 29 page 281-306, Project Muse).

The spread of modern markets and states has globalized the same threats to human dignity initially experienced in Europe. Human rights represent the most effective response yet devised to a wide range of standard threats to human dignity that market economies and bureaucratic states have made nearly universal across the globe. Human rights today remain the only proven effective means to assure human dignity in societies dominated by markets and states. Although historically contingent and relative, this functional universality fully merits the label universal—for us, today. Arguments that another state, society, or culture has developed plausible and effective alternative mechanisms for protecting or realizing human dignity in the contemporary world deserve serious attention. Today, however, such claims, when not advanced by repressive elites and their supporters, usually refer to an allegedly possible world that no one yet has had the good fortune to experience. The functional universality of human rights depends on human rights providing attractive remedies for some of the most pressing systemic threats to human dignity. Human rights today do precisely that for a growing number of people of all cultures in all regions. Whatever our other problems, we all must deal with market economies and bureaucratic states. Whatever our other religious, moral, legal, and political resources, we all need equal and inalienable universal human rights to protect us from those threats.

THREAT CONSTRUCTION: PEACE

Debates about threats in the academic world result in better policy-making—real threats can be confronted and risks can be weighed.
Walt 91 – Professor of Political Science, University of Chicago – 1991 (Stephen, INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, p. 229-30)

A recurring theme of this essay has been the twin dangers of separating the study of security affairs from the academic world or of shifting the focus of academic scholarship too far from real-world issues. The danger of war will be with us for some time to come, and states will continue to acquire military forces for a variety of purposes. Unless one believes that ignorance is preferable to expertise, the value of independent national security scholars should be apparent. Indeed, history suggests that countries that suppress debate on national security matters are more likely to blunder into disaster, because misguided policies cannot be evaluated and stopped in time. As in other areas of public policy, academic experts in security studies can help in several ways. In the short term, academics are well placed to evaluate current programs, because they face less pressure to support official policy. The long-term effects of academic involvement may be even more significant: academic research can help states learn from past mistakes and can provide the theoretical innovations the produce better policy choices in the future. Furthermore, their role in training the new generation of experts gives academics an additional avenue of influence.

Risk in the international system is inevitable—the goal should be to weigh the impacts of action vs inaction in the face of a particular threat.
Harvard Nuclear Study Group 83 (*Living with Nuclear Weapons*, p.16-7)

When President John F. Kennedy was shown irrefutable evidence of the Soviet missile emplacement – U-2 photographs of the missile bases in Cube – he and his advisors discussed the matter for six days before deciding on an American response to the challenge. The decision, to place a naval blockade around the island, was not a risk-free response. This, Kennedy honestly admitted to the nation the night of October 22, 1962: My fellow citizens, let no one doubt this is a difficult and dangerous effort on which we have set out. No one can foresee precisely what course it will take… But the great danger of all would be to do nothing. Why did the president believe that "to do nothing" about the missiles in Cuba would be an even greater danger than accepting the "difficult and dangerous" course of the blockade? He accepted some risk of war in the long run, by discouraging future Soviet aggressive behavior. Inaction might have led to an even more dangerous future. This the president also explained that night in his address to the nation: [This] sudden, clandestine decision to station weapons for the first time outside Soviet soil – is a deliberate provocative and unjustified change in the status quo which cannot be accepted by this country if our courage and our commitments are ever to be trusted by either friend or foe. The 1930's taught us a clear lesson: Aggressive conduct, if allowed to grow unchecked and unchallenged, ultimately leads to war. The American government managed the 1962 crisis with skill and restraint – offering a compromise to the Soviets and giving them sufficient time to call back their missile-laden ships, for example – and the missiles were withdrawn from Cuba. The president carefully supervised American military actions to ensure that his orders were not misunderstood. He did not push his success too far or ignore the real risks of war. The point here is not, to make the blockade a model for American action in the future: different circumstances may call for different policies. Rather the point is to underline the persistence of risk in international affairs. Every proposed response to the Soviet action – doing nothing, enforcing the blockade, or invading Cuba – entailed some risk of nuclear war. Kennedy's task – and we think his success – was to weigh accurately the risks entailed in each course and decide on policy accordingly.

THREAT CONSTRUCTION: PREVENTS ESCALATION

Confronting threats early prevents escalation—WWII proves.

Yoon 03 – Professor of International Relations at Seoul National University; former Foreign Minister of South Korea – 2003(Young-Kwan, "Introduction: Power Cycle Theory and the Practice of International Relations", International Political Science Review 2003; vol. 24; p. 7-8*)*

In history, the effort to balance power quite often tended to start too late to protect the security of some of the individual states. If the balancing process begins too late, the resulting amount of force necessary to stop an aggressor is often much larger than if the process had been started much earlier. For example, the fate of Czechoslovakia and Poland showed how non-intervention or waiting for the "automatic" working through of the process turned out to be problematic. Power cycle theory could also supplement the structure-oriented nature of the traditional balance of power theory by incorporating an agent-oriented explanation. This was possible through its focus on the relationship between power and the role of a state in the international system. It especially highlighted the fact that a discrepancy between the relative power of a state and its role in the system would result in a greater possibility for systemic instability. In order to prevent this instability from developing into a war, practitioners of international relations were to become aware of the dynamics of changing power and role, adjusting role to power. A statesperson here was not simply regarded as a prisoner of structure and therefore as an outsider to the process but as an agent capable of influencing the operation of equilibrium. Thus power cycle theory could overcome the weakness of theoretical determinism associated with the traditional balance of power. The question is often raised whether government decision-makers could possibly know or respond to such relative power shifts in the real world. According to Doran, when the "tides of history" shift against the state, the push and shove of world politics reveals these matters to the policy-maker, in that state and among its competitors, with abundant urgency. (2) The Issue of Systemic Stability Power cycle theory is built on the conception of changing relative capabilities of a state, and as such it shares the realist assumption emphasizing the importance of power in explaining international relations. But its main focus is on the longitudinal dimension of power relations, the rise and decline of relative state power and role, and not on the static power distribution at a particular time. As a result, power cycle theory provides a significantly different explanation for stability and order within the international system. First of all, power cycle theory argues that what matters most in explaining the stability of the international system or war and peace is not the type of particular international system (Rosecrance, 1963) but the transformation from one system to another. For example, in the 1960s there was a debate on the stability of the international system between the defenders of bipolarity such as Waltz (1964) and the defenders of multi-polarity such as Rosecrance (1966), and Deutsch and Singer (1964). After analyzing five historical occasions since the origin of the modern state system, Doran concluded that what has been responsible for major war was not whether one type of system is more or less conducive to war but that instead systems transformation itself led to war (Doran, 1971). A non-linear type of structural change that is massive, unpredicted, devastating to foreign policy expectation, and destructive of security is the trigger for major war, not the nature of a particular type of international system.

THREAT CONSTRUCTION: THREATS REAL

Some states are genuine threats.

Kydd 97 – Professor of Political Science of California, Riverside, SECURITY STUDIES, Autumn 1997 p. 154

As for the Second World War, few structural realists will make a sustained case the Hitler was genuinely motivated by a rational pursuit of security for Germany and the other German statesmen would have responded in the same way to Germany's international situation. Even Germen generals opposed Hitler's military adventurism until 1939; it is difficult to imagine a less forceful civilian leader overruling them and leading Germany in an oath of conquest. In the case of the cold war, it is again difficult to escape the conclusion that the Soviet Union was indeed expansionist before Gorbachev and not solely motivated by security concerns. The increased emphasis within international relations scholarship on explaining the nature and origins of aggressive expansionists states reflects a growing consensus that aggressive states are at the root of conflict, not security concerns.

THREAT CONSTRUCTION: REPS IRRELEVANT

Representations of state action cannot change realism, and even if they could, we have no way of knowing if they new system would be any better.

Mearsheimer, 95 – Professor of Political Science, University of Chicago – 1995 (John, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, p. 91-2)

The most revealing aspect of Wendt's discussion is that he did not respond to the two main charge leveled against critical theory in "False Promise." The first problem with critical theory is that although the theory is deeply concerned with radically changing state behavior, it says little about how change comes about. The theory does not tell us why particular discourses become dominant and other fall by the wayside. Specifically, Wendt does not explain why realism has been the dominant discourse in world politics for well over a thousand years, although I explicitly raised the question in "False Promise" (p. 42). Moreover, he shed no light on why the time is ripe for unseating realism, nor on why realism is likely to be replaced by a more peaceful, communitarian discourse, although I explicitly raised both questions. Wendt's failure to answer these questions has important ramifications for his own arguments. For example, he maintains that if it is possible to change international political discourse and alter state behavior, "then it is irresponsible to pursue policies that perpetuate destructive old orders [i.e., realism], especially if we care about the well-being of future generation." The clear implication here is that realists like me are irresponsible and do not care much about the welfare of future generations. However, even if we change discourses and move beyond realism, a fundamental problem with Wendt's argument remains: because his theory cannot predict the future, he cannot know whether the discourse that ultimately replaces realism will be more benign than realism. He has no way of knowing whether a fascistic discourse more violent than realism will emerge as the hegemonic discourse. For example, he obviously would like another Gorbachev to come to power in Russia, but a critical theory perspective, defending realism might very well be the more responsible policy choice.

AT ECO-FEMINSIM: ELIMINATES CAPITALISM

Eco-feminism would require the elimination of capitalism.

Mellor 97 – Senior Lecturer in Sociology, Newcastle upon Tyne Polytechnic – 1997 (Mary, FEMINISM AND ECOLOGY, p. 162)

Eco-feminists incorporate an implicit or explicit rejection of capitalism in their critique of western society, although very few adopt a socialist analysis in the Marxian sense. Carolyn Merchant has argued the case for a socialist analysis of the ecological crisis couched in terms of socialist feminism: 'Socialist feminism views change as dynamic, interactive and dialectical, rather than a mechanistic, linear and incremental…A socialist feminist environmental ethic involves developing sustainable, non-dominating relations with nature and supplying all peoples with a high quality of life'(1990:105). Merchant points out that 'socialist feminism environmental theory gives both reproduction and production central places', thus denying the centrality of the Marxian analysis of production. In a later book Merchant advocates a 'radical ecology' as the basis of a socialist position in which social movements such as bioregional movements, grassroots struggle and mainstream environmental campaigning have largely replaced social class as political agents.

AT ENVIRONMENT KS: CAPITALISM GOOD FOR ENVIRONMENT

Capitalism protects the environment.

Lewis 92 – Professor, School of the Environment, Duke University – 1992 (Martin, GREEN DELSIONS, p. 10)

Only a strongly expending economic base can generate the capital necessary to retool our economy into one that does not consume the earth in feeding itself. Ecological sanity will be expensive, and if we cannot pay the price we may well perish. This proposition is even more vital in regard to the Third World; only steady economic expansion can break the linkage so often found in poor nations between rural desperation and land degradation. Genuine development, in turn, requires both certain forms of industrialization as well as participation in the global economy. The most widespread eco-radical position now is that Third World environments can only be preserved if poverty is alleviated through certain kinds of development initiatives. Third World peasants, they correctly argue, are forced to deforest and overgraze their landscapes precisely because of their poverty.

The transition would destroy the environment—hungry people would hunt animals to extinction and older, dirtier tech would be used again.

Lewis 92 – Professor, School of the Environment, Duke University – 1992 (Martin, GREEN DELUSIONS, p. 117)

If the most extreme version of the radical green agenda were to be fully enacted without truly *massive* human die-off first, forests would be stripped clean of wood and all large animals would be hunted to extinction by hordes of neo-primitives desperate for food and warmth. If, on the other hand, eco-extremists were to succeed only in paralyzing the economy's capacity for further research, development, and expansion, our future could turn out to be reminiscent of the environmental nightmare of Poland in the 1980's, with a stagnant economy continuing to rely on outmoded, pollution-belching industries. A throttled steady-state economy would simply lack the resources necessary to create an environment benign technological base for a populace that shows every sign of continuing to demand electricity, hot water, and other connivances. Eastern Europe shows well the environmental devastation that occurs when economic growth stalls out in an already industrialized society.

AT ENVIRONMENT KS: CEDE THE POLITICAL

Ecological utopianism prevents us from forming practical coalitions and risks distopian extremes.

Lewis 92 – Professor, School of the Environment, Duke University – 1992 (Martin, GREEN DELSIONS, p. 250)

But for all of its attractions, utopia remains, and will always remain, "no place." Although the vision is easy to conjure, the reality is elusive. In fact, those political regimes that have struggled hardest to realize utopian plans have created some of the world's most dystopian realities. Unfortunately, American as a people seem uniquely drawn to such fantasies, and a right-wing variant of utopianism has even guided our recent national administrations; as Robert Kuttner (1991:5, 157) shows, laissez-faire itself is an ideologically driven utopian scheme that has dire consequences for the earth's economy and ecology. As Michael Pollan (1991:188) eloquently demonstrates, eco-radicalism and right –wing economic theory are more closely allied than one might suspect: "Indeed, the wilderness ethic and laissez-faire economics, as antithetical as they might first appear, are really mirror images of one another, each proposes a quasi-divine force – Nature, the Market – that, left to its own devices, somehow knows what's best for a place, Nature and the Market are both self-regulating, guided by an invisible hand. Worshippers of either share a deep, Puritan distrust of man, taking it on faith that human tinkering with the natural or economic order can only pervert it. So political extremists of all stripes offer utopian visions, which credulous idealists find remarkably attractive, but considering he disparity of the vision offered – the perfect market of laissez-faire, the perfect society of socialism, or the perfectly harmonious environment of eco-radicalism – it is not surprising that the utopians in the end only increases our social and intellectual rifts, steadily diminishing our chances of avoiding an ecological holocaust.

AT ENVIRONMENT KS: DESTROY CPAITALISM

Environmental radicalism is inherently anti-capitalist.

Lewis 92 – Professor, School of the Environment, Duke University – 1992 (Martin, GREEN DELUSIONS, p. 9-10)

Ultimately, green extremism is rooted in a single, powerful conviction: that continued economic growth is absolutely impossible, given limits of a finite planet. Only if this notion is discredited can the edifice of eco-radical philosophy be shaken. It can logically be shown that the supposed necessity of devising a steady-state economy is severely misconstrued. Economic growth, strictly speaking, is defined as an increase in the *value* of goods *and* services produced. Yet as noted almost twenty years ago by Mancur Olson (1973:4), radical greens have a significantly different conception, one that largely ignores services and that substitutes for mass value. To read some of their tracts, one could only conclude that economic growth requires producing ever larger quantities of steel, wheat, and similar material goods (for example, Ornstein and Ehrlich 1989:227).

AT ENVIRONMENT KS: ECO-PRAGMATISM

Pragmatic flexibility is key to protecting the environment.

Farber 99 – Professor of Law, University of Minnesota – 1999 (Daniel, ECO-PRAGMATISM, p. 198)

As we have seen, one of the greatest challenges of environmental law is the pervasive uncertainty that surrounds environmental issues. Sometimes all we can do is to make the best decision we can with whatever information we have at hand. When hard numbers are unavailable, this may mean taking reasonable safe-guards against serious, but unquantifiable, risks, perhaps placing the burden of proof on the polluter. When we do have better information, we can use the environmental baseline of chapter 4, taking all feasible measures against significant risks unless the costs are clearly disproportionate to possible benefits. But in the long run, the structure of decision making may be more important than what test is applied in individual cases. We need to create structures of decision making that allow us to take advantage of increased knowledge over time. Such structures may include various forms of decentralization, administrative strategies that allow options to be kept open, and deregulatory authority to eliminate outmoded regulatory requirements. These types of flexibility should not be seen as hostile to environmentalism. Instead, they are ways of maintaining the vitality of environmental protection. Rather than being a strength, excessive rigidity could lead to collapse under pressure of constant change. A more flexible regulatory system, in the long run, may provide a higher level of environmental quality.

Pragmatism is key to crafting laws that can genuinely protect the environment.

Farber 99 – Professor of Law, University of Minnesota – 1999 (Daniel, ECO-PRAGMATISM, p. 199)

The premise of this book is that environmental law is here to stay. Admittedly, prediction is a hazardous enterprise. Maybe environmental law will vanish in some political conflagration. So far, however, it has shown strong staying power, having survived the Reagan Revolution (as well as the "Gingrich Aftershock") virtually unscathed. It would be tragic if we did lose our national commitment to the environment, but currently this outcome seems unlikely. It is now time to consider how to shape our regulatory system to implement this commitment most effectively for the indefinite future. In mapping out the future of environmental law, we need to consider not only how to make the best environmental decisions at any given time, but also how to create a sustainable environmental law that can endure over the long haul. To be sustainable, environmental law must accommodate not just environmentalism, but also other key values. Otherwise, it will slowly erode. In this book, I have advocated a pragmatic approach to environmental regulation, but one grounded in environmentalism. The key norm is that we all presumptively entitled to a safe environment and to the preservation of nature. This norm is now firmly embedded in our political culture. But the norm is tempered by an awareness of competing goals.

AT BORDERS: INEVITABLE

Borders are inevitable because states use them for security.

Starr, 06 (Harvey, Dag Hammarskjold Professor in International Affairs and Chair of the Department of Political Science at the University of South Carolina. "International Borders: What They Are, What They Mean, and Why We Should Care" SAIS review vol. XXVI no.1, Winter-Spring,Project Muse).

In a recent article on the nature of borders and their relationship to international conflict, this author noted:
The location of states, their proximity to one another, and especially whether or not they share "borders," emerge time and again as key variables in studies of international conflict phenomena: from major power general war, to the diffusion of international conflict, to the analysis of peace between pairs of democracies... From Boulding's (1962) ideas of "behavior space," "loss-of-strength gradient" and "critical boundary" to the simple but profound concern of geographers that humans interact most with those to whom they are closest (Zipf 1949), there are powerful theoretical reasons to be interested in borders and how they affect international relations.1 Broadly, the concept of "border" has been an important one throughout world history. The concept of a border as the demarcation of two sovereign states was essential to the Westphalian state system that developed following the Thirty Years War. This example illustrates two related aspects of borders derived from realism's approach to international relations: borders as legal phenomena and borders as related to security. [End Page 3] International law and legal matters have never been key concerns of realism. However, territoriality is a central component of state security and is fundamental to the (more or less deterministic) geopolitical setting that also affects the security of states.

Borders have an enormous and inevitable impact on international affairs.

Starr, 06 (Harvey, Dag Hammarskjold Professor in International Affairs and Chair of the Department of Political Science at the University of South Carolina. "International Borders: What They Are, What They Mean, and Why We Should Care" SAIS review vol. XXVI no.1, Winter-Spring,Project Muse).

Borders matter. Even in today's "turbulent," post-Cold War world of growing democracy, ever-extensive interdependence, and globalization, borders still serve a wide variety of functions across the areas of security, economics, politics, and social interactions. Even as some aspects of international law challenge or erode traditional notions of sovereignty, borders delineate areas of legal competence. Borders provide one key element in the structure of the global system: mapping the number and arrangement of the territorial units upon which all humans live. Borders permit a spatial approach to international or global politics by setting out the location of states and their absolute and relative distances from each other. Borders act as factors of constraint on human interaction, as well as factors that facilitate human interaction. Borders have significant effects on international politics, both by their presence and by their meaning to humans (either peoples, policymakers, or scholars). In turn, the internal and external politics of peoples, sub-state organizations, and states affect the creation, dissolution, and meaning of borders. As I have argued in earlier work, analysts of international politics cannot ignore the spatial dimension of human relations.

AT BORDERS: SOLVES WAR

Respect for borders has prevented major wars.

Zacher, 01 (Mark, *International Organization*, Vol. 55, No. 2. (Spring, 2001), pp. 215+ Jstor).

The decline of successful wars of territorial aggrandizement during the last half century is palpable. In fact, there has not been a case of successful territorial aggrandizement since 1976. Furthermore there have been important multilateral accords in support of the norm and frequent interventions by international organizations to force states to withdraw from foreign countries. Clearly, a central source of the norm has been the industrialized world's fear that territorial revisionism could ignite a major war that would cause great human suffering. Several scholars have observed that this revision against the imposition of physical pain has been central to the strengthening of a variety of security and human rights regimes. The experiences of the two world wars, a general understanding of territorial revisionism's encouragement of major wars, and a fear of nuclear weapons drove the development of the territorial integrity norm at key points in its multilateral legitimization.

AT BORDERS: AFRICA

Their description of African borders as only products of colonialism ignores numerous other factors that went into their construction.

Mbembe, 2000 (Achille, *Public Culture* 12.1 (2000) 259-284, Visitng Professor of History at Yale University "At the Edge of the World: Boundaries, Territoriality, and Sovereignty in Africa" Project Muse).

Moreover, to state that current African boundaries are merely a product of colonial arbitrariness is to ignore their multiple geneses. In fact, their establishment long antedated the Congress of Berlin held in 1884, whose objective was to distribute sovereignty among the different powers engaged in dividing up the continent. Their protogenesis goes back to the period of the trading-post economy, when Europeans set up agencies on the coasts and began to trade with the natives. The establishment of this economy explains, in part, some of the physical characteristics of African states, and first of all the distinction between the littoral areas and the hinterland that so deeply marks the geographical structure of various countries, or again the enclosure of vast enclaves situated far from the oceans. Boundaries gradually crystallized during the period of "informal empire" (from the abolition of the slave trade up to the repression of the first resistance movements), thanks to the combined action of traders and missionaries. The rise of boundaries took a military turn with the construction of forts, the penetration of the hinterland, and the repression of local revolts. Far from being simple products of colonialism, current boundaries thus reflect commercial, religious, and military realities, the rivalries, power relationships, and alliances that prevailed among the various imperial powers and between them and Africans through the centuries preceding colonization proper. From this point of view, their constitution depends on a relatively long-term social and cultural process. 19 Before the conquest, they represented spaces of encounter, negotiation, and opportunity for Europeans and Africans. 20 At the time of conquest, their main function was to mark the spatial limits that separated colonial possessions from one another, taking into account not ambitions but the actual occupation of the land.

Even if African borders are arbitrary, they have become part of the social landscape and are not going to change.

Atzili, 07 (Boaz, Research Fellow in the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. "When Good Fences Make Bad Neighbors: Fixed Borders, State Weakness, and International Conflict", International Security, 31.3 page 139-173 Project Muse).

Africa's borders are particularly intriguing. Despite the arbitrariness with which many state borders in Africa were drawn, they have remained largely fixed.25 From its inception in 1963, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) has endorsed the norm in accordance with the principle of preserving the colonial territorial status quo.26 In practice, as Jeffery Herbst notes, "the vast majority of [African borders] have remained virtually untouched since the late 1800s, when they were first demarcated." The OAU's determination to uphold the norm was demonstrated, for instance, in the 1967–70 civil war in Nigeria, when the organization sought to prevent Biafra's attempts to secede.27

AT FEAR OF DEATH: MOBILIZES PEOPLE/COMPASSION

Fear spurs compassion, mobilizing people to protect each other and giving meaning to life.

Greenspan, 03 (Miriam Greenspan – Pioneer in the Area of Women's Psychology – 2003 ("An Excerpt from Healing through the Dark Emotions: The Wisdom of Grief, Fear, and Despair by Miriam Greenspan," www.spiritualityhealth.com/newsh/excerpts/bookreview/excp_5513.html)

"Fear is a very powerful emotion. When you feel fear in your body, it's helpful to relate to it as an energy that can be mobilized for life. It may feel like a constriction in your chest, throat, or abdomen. Breathe through it without judgment and allow yourself to feel it as a very strong force. If you pray for help, you can begin to expand this energy we call 'fear' and use it for healing and transformation. "In this regard, we can take our model from the heroes of Flight 93 who. realizing that they were bound for death, stormed the plane and brought it down without hitting a civilian target. One cannot even imagine being able to do this without fear. Fear for the lives of others was the energy that mobilized them to do something meaningful with their last moments of life. Some of these people said good-bye to their husbands and wives and wished them happiness before they left this earth. They had found some peace in their last moments, peace in the midst of turbulence. And they found it through their last wish, which they heroically put into action: to help others live. "Perhaps there is nothing that can redeem the dead but our own actions for the good. This is a time to find out what we want to do for the world and do it. And, as every trauma survivor knows, this is the way to make meaning out of pain, perhaps the most effective way: to draw something good out of evil. The heroes of September 11 point us to the choice we each have: to help create a state of global peace and justice that we, like they, will not see before we die. It is in giving ourselves to this vision, out of love for this world that we inhabit together, that we stand a chance of transcending the human proclivity to damage life. And that we honor those we have brought into this world and who must inherit it. . . . "Our only protection is in our interconnectedness. This has always been the message of the dark emotions when they are experienced most deeply and widely. Grief is not just "my" grief; it is the grief of every motherless child, every witness to horror in the world. Despair is not just "my" despair; it is everyone's despair about life in the twentyfirst century. Fear is not just 'my' fear; it is everyone's fear — of anthrax, of nuclear war, of truck bombs, of airplane hijackings, of things falling apart, blowing up, sickening and dying. "If fear is only telling you to save your own skin, there's not much hope for us. But the fact is that in conscious fear, there is a potentially revolutionary power of compassion and connection that can be mobilized en masse. This is the power of fear. Our collective fear, which is intelligent, is telling us now: Find new ways to keep this global village safe. Find new forms of international cooperation that will root out evil in ways that don't create more victims and more evil. Leap out of the confines of national egos. Learn the ways of peace. Find a ceremony of safety so that not just you and I but all of us can live together without fear."

AT FEAR OF DEATH: FEAR KEY TO VALUE TO LIFE

Fear of death is key to value to life – recognizing death is inevitable allows us to create a world of love.

Kelsang 99 (Geshe, internationally renowned teacher of Buddhism (, http://www.tharpa.com/background/fear-of-death.htm)

A healthy fear of death would be the fear of dying unprepared, as this is a fear we can do something about, a danger we can avert. If we have this realistic fear, this sense of danger, we are encouraged to prepare for a peaceful and successful death and are also inspired to make the most of our very precious human life instead of wasting it. This "sense of danger" inspires us to make preparations so that we are no longer in the danger we are in now, for example by practicing moral discipline, purifying our negative karma, and accumulating as much merit, or good karma, as possible. We put on a seat belt out of a sense of danger of the unseen dangers of traffic on the road, and that seat belt protects us from going through the windshield. We can do nothing about other traffic, but we can do something about whether or not we go through the windscreen if someone crashes into us. Similarly, we can do nothing about the fact of death, but we can seize control over how we prepare for death and how we die. Eventually, through Tantric spiritual practice, we can even attain a deathless body. In Living Meaningfully, Dying Joyfully, Geshe Kelsang says: Dying with regrets is not at all unusual. To avoid a sad and meaningless end to our life we need to remember continually that we too must die. Contemplating our own death will inspire us to use our life wisely by developing the inner refuge of spiritual realizations; otherwise we shall have no ability to protect ourself from the sufferings of death and what lies beyond. Moreover, when someone close to us is dying, such as a parent or friend, we shall be powerless to help them because we shall not know how; and we shall experience sadness and frustration at our inability to be of genuine help. Preparing for death is one of the kindest and wisest things we can do both for ourself and others. The fact of the matter is that this world is not our home. We are travelers, passing through. We came from our previous life, and in a few years, or a few days, we shall move on to our next life. We entered this world empty-handed and alone, and we shall leave empty-handed and alone. Everything we have accumulated in this life, including our very body, will be left behind. All that we can take with us from one life to the next are the imprints of the positive and negative actions we have created. If we ignore death we shall waste our life working for things that we shall only have to leave behind, creating many negative actions in the process, and having to travel on to our next life with nothing but a heavy burden of negative karma. On the other hand, if we base our life on a realistic awareness of our mortality, we shall regard our spiritual development as far more important than the attainments of this world, and we shall view our time in this world principally as an opportunity to cultivate positive minds such as patience, love, compassion, and wisdom. Motivated by these virtuous minds we shall perform many positive actions, thereby creating the cause for future happiness.

AT FEAR OF DEATH: KEY TO SURVIVAL

Fear of Death is key to human survival – confronting death is key to state and individual existence

Beres 96 (Louis Rene, Professor of Political Science and International Law at Purdue University, Feb., http://www.freeman.org/m_online/ feb96/ beresn.htm).

Fear of death, the ultimate source of anxiety, is essential to human survival. This is true not only for individuals, but also for states. Without such fear, states will exhibit an incapacity to confront nonbeing that can hasten their disappearance. So it is today with the State of Israel. Israel suffers acutely from insufficient existential dread. Refusing to tremble before the growing prospect of collective disintegration - a forseeable prospect connected with both genocide and war - this state is now unable to take the necessary steps toward collective survival. What is more, because death is the one fact of life which is not relative but absolute, Israel's blithe unawareness of its national mortality deprives its still living days of essential absoluteness and growth. For states, just as for individuals, confronting death can give the most positive reality to life itself. In this respect, a cultivated awareness of nonbeing is central to each state's pattern of potentialities as well as to its very existence. When a state chooses to block off such an awareness, a choice currently made by the State of Israel, it loses, possibly forever, the altogether critical benefits of "anxiety."

Fear is key to value to life, survival and transcending evil.

Greenspan 03 (Miriam, Pioneer in the Area of Women's Psychology, Healing Through the Dark Emotions: The Wisdom of Grief, Fear, and Despair, Excerpt of Chapter Three - How Dark Emotions Become Toxic, http://www.miriamgreenspan.com/excerpts/chapterThreeEx.html)

Grief, fear, and despair are primary human emotions. Without them, we would be less than human, and less likely to survive. Grief arises because we are not alone, and what connects us to others and to the world also breaks our hearts. Grieving our losses allows us to heal and renew our spirits. Fear alerts us to protect our survival, extending beyond our instinct for self-preservation to our concern for others. Despair asks us to find meaning in the midst of apparent chaos or meaninglessness. Making meaning out of suffering is the basis of the human capacity to survive evil and transcend it. The purposefulness of these dark emotions is evident when we can experience them mindfully, tolerate their intense energies, and let them be.

AT FEAR OF DEATH: DETERENCE GOOD

Fear of nuclear weapons has prevented their use – deterrence has checked conflict.

Rajaraman 02 (Professor of Theoretical Physics at JNU, 2002 [R., "Ban battlefield nuclear weapons," 4/22/2, *The Hindu*, http://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/2002/04/22/stories/2002042200431000.htm[

There were a variety of different reasons behind each of these examples of abstinence from using nuclear weapons. But one major common factor contributing to all of them has been an ingrained terror of nuclear devastation. The well documented images of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the awesome photographs of giant mushroom clouds emerging from nuclear tests in the Pacific and the numerous movies based on nuclear Armageddon scenarios have all contributed to building up a deep rooted fear of nuclear weapons. This is not limited just to the abhorrence felt by anti-nuclear activists. It permeates to one extent or another the psyche of all but the most pathological of fanatics. It colours the calculations, even if not decisively, of the most hardened of military strategists. The unacceptability of nuclear devastation is the backbone of all deterrence strategies. There is not just a fear of being attacked oneself, but also a strong mental barrier against actually initiating nuclear attacks on enemy populations, no matter how much they may be contemplated in war games and strategies. As a result a taboo has tacitly evolved over the decades preventing nations, at least so far, from actually pressing the nuclear button even in the face of serious military crises.

AT FEAR OF NUKES: FEAR KEY TO PEACE AND SURVIVAL

Fear of nuclear war is key to stopping WMD use and prevents military adventurism.
Futterman, 91 (JAH, Livermore lab researcher, 1995, Mediation of the Bomb, online, http://www.dogchurch.org/scriptorium/nuke0

I could say that if I didn't do it, someone else would, but that answer was rejected at Nuremberg. (It's also a better reason to leave the weapons program than to stay.) I continue to support the u business with my effort for many reasons, which I discuss throughout this piece. But mostly, I do it because the fear of nuclear holocaust is the only authority my own country or any other has respected so far when it comes to nationalistic urges to make unlimited war. As William L. Shirer states in his preface to *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich* (Touchstone Books, New York, 1990), "Adolf Hitler is probably the last of the great adventurer-conquerors in the tradition of Alexander, Caesar, and Napoleon, and the Third Reich the last of the empires which set out on the path taken earlier by France, Rome and Macedonia. The curtain was rung down on that phase of history, at least, by the sudden invention of the hydrogen bomb, of the ballistic missile, and of rockets which can be aimed to hit the moon." Now this contrasts with the argument of those who would "reinvent government" by putting up bureaucratic roadblocks to maintaining the reliability of the US nuclear arsenal through research and testing. They reason that if the reliability of everyone's nuclear arsenals declines, everyone will be less likely to try using them. The problem is that some "adventurer-conqueror" may arise and use everyone's doubt about their arsenals to risk massive conventional war instead. An expansionist dictatorship might even risk nuclear war with weapons that are simpler, cruder, less powerful, much riskier (in terms of the possibility of accidental detonation) but much more reliable than our own may eventually become without adequate "stockpile stewardship."[14] But the inhibitory effect of reliable nuclear weapons goes deeper than Shirer's deterrence of adventurer-conquerors. It changes the way we think individually and culturally, preparing us for a future we cannot now imagine. Jungian psychiatrist Anthony J. Stevens states, [15] "History would indicate that people cannot rise above their narrow sectarian concerns without some overwhelming paroxysm. It took the War of Independence and the Civil War to forge the United States, World War I to create the League of Nations, World War II to create the United Nations Organization and the European Economic Community. Only catastrophe, it seems, forces people to take the wider view. Or what about fear? Can the horror which we all experience when we contemplate the possibility of nuclear extinction mobilize in us sufficient libidinal energy to resist the archetypes of war? Certainly, the moment we become blasé about the possibility of holocaust we are lost. As long as horror of nuclear exchange remains uppermost we can recognize that nothing is worth it. War becomes the impossible option. Perhaps horror, the experience of horror, the consciousness of horror, is our only hope. Perhaps horror alone will enable us to overcome the otherwise invincible attraction of war." Thus I also continue engaging in nuclear weapons work to help fire that world-historical warning shot I mentioned above, namely, that as our beneficial technologies become more powerful, so will our weapons technologies, unless genuine peace precludes it. We must build a future more peaceful than our past, if we are to have a future at all, with or without nuclear weapons — a fact we had better learn before worse things than nuclear weapons are invented. If you're a philosopher, this means that I regard the nature of humankind as mutable rather than fixed, but that I think most people welcome change in their personalities and cultures with all the enthusiasm that they welcome death — thus, the fear of nuclear annihilation of ourselves and all our values may be what we require in order to become peaceful enough to survive our future technological breakthroughs.

AT FEAR OF NUKES: PEACE AND SURVIVAL

Fear motivates people to pursue constructive means to sustain peace and prevent large-scale catastrophe.

Lifton 01 (Robert Jay, Distinguished Professor of Psychiatry and Psychology at John Jay College, Illusions of the second nuclear age, World Policy Journal. New York: Spring 2001. Vol. 18, Iss. 1; pg. 25, 6 pgs)

The trouble is that in other ways the dangers associated with nuclear weapons are greater than ever: the continuing weapons-- centered policies in the United States and elsewhere; the difficulties in controlling nuclear weapons that exist under unstable conditions (especially in Russia and other areas of the former Soviet Union);2 and the eagerness and potential capacity of certain nations and "private" groups to acquire and possibly use the weapons. In that sense, the nuclear quietism is perilous. Or, to put the matter another way, we no longer manifest an appropriate degree of fear in relation to actual nuclear danger. While fear in itself is hardly to be recommended as a guiding human emotion, its absence in the face of danger can lead to catastrophe. We human animals have built-in fear reactions in response to threat. These reactions help us to protect ourselves-to step back from the path of a speeding automobile, or in the case of our ancestors, from the path of a wild animal. Fear can be transmuted into constructive planning and policies: whether for minimizing vulnerability to attacks by wild animals, or for more complex contemporary threats. Through fear, ordinary people can be motivated to pursue constructive means for sustaining peace, or at least for limiting the scope of violence. Similarly, in exchanges between world leaders on behalf of preventing large-scale conflict, a tinge of fear-sometimes more than a tinge- can enable each to feel the potential bloodshed and suffering that would result from failure. But with nuclear weapons, our psychological circuits are impaired. We know that the weapons are around-and we hear talk about nuclear dangers somewhere "out there" -but our minds no longer connect with the dangers or with the weapons themselves. That blunting of feeling extends into other areas. One of the many sins for which advocates of large nuclear stockpiles must answer is the prevalence of psychic numbing to enormous potential suffering, the blunting of our ethical standards as human beings. In the absence of the sort of threatening nuclear rhetoric the United States and Russia indulged in during the 1980s, we can all too readily numb ourselves to everything nuclear, and thereby live as though the weapons pose no danger, or as though they don't exist.

AT NUCELAR NUMBING: PLAN SOLVES IMPACT

Advocating a plan to address harms of nuclear war overcomes impact of numbing.

Sandman and Valenti 86 (Peter and JoAnn, Professor of Human Ecology at Rutgers and Preeminent Risk Communications Expert published over 80 articles and books on various aspects of risk communication, Scared stiff — or scared into action, , Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January 1986, pp. 12–16, http://www.psandman.com/articles/scarstif.htm)

WHEN THE MOVEMENT against nuclear weapons celebrates its heroes, a place of honor is reserved for Helen Caldicott, the Australian pediatrician who revived Physicians for Social Responsibility (PSR) in 1978 and made it the vehicle for her impassioned antinuclear crusade. In countless communities since then, Caldicott has briskly narrated the devastation that would result if a small nuclear warhead exploded right here and now. Thousands of activists trace their movement beginnings to a Helen Caldicott speech, wondering if it wouldn't help reverse the arms race just to make everyone sit through that speech — and each week hundreds of activists do their best to give the speech themselves. Nonetheless, PSR Executive Director Jane Wales, while acknowledging a huge debt to Caldicott, said in 1984 that the time for the "bombing runs" (as insiders call the speech) was past. "We knew it was past when someone interrupted the speech one evening, actually interrupted it, and said, 'We know all that, but what can we do?'" In a 1985 newsletter, similarly, Sanford Gottlieb of United Campuses to Prevent Nuclear War warned that many students were "being numbed by the emphasis on nuclear blast, fire and radiation" in courses on nuclear war and were therefore "feeling more impotent and depressed than before the class began."(1) Perhaps the first broad awareness that shock therapy may not be the best therapy came, ironically, in 1983 in the weeks preceding the broadcast of the television film The Day After, when Educators for Social Responsibility and others worried that the program might do children more harm than good. The Day After turned out to be less frightening than expected, but other films (Threads, Testament, and Caldicott's own The Last Epidemic) raise the same worry — and not just for children. In the following analysis of the fear of nuclear Armageddon and its implications for antinuclear advocacy, we will argue that most people are neither apathetic about nuclear war nor actively terrified of it but rather, in Robert Jay Lifton's evocative phrase, "psychically numbed"; that it is ineffective to frighten audiences who have found a refuge from their fears in numbness; and that there exist more effective keys to unlocking such paralysis. THE CENTRAL ENIGMA of antinuclear activism is why everyone is not working to prevent nuclear war. Activists who can understand those who disagree about what should be done are bewildered and frustrated by those who do nothing. Such inaction is objectively irrational; as Caldicott asked in a 1982 cover article in Family Weekly, "Why make sure kids clean their teeth and eat healthy food if they're not going to survive?"(2) Advocates of all causes chafe at their neighbors' lack of interest. When the issue is something like saving whales or wheelchair access to public buildings, the problem is usually diagnosed as apathy. Psychiatrist Robert Winer argues that the same is true of the nuclear threat, which most of us experience as remote, impersonal, and vague. For Winer, "one of the genuinely tragic aspects of the nuclear situation is that immediacy may be given to us only once and then it will be too late to learn."(3) There is obviously some truth to this view. When asked to describe their images of nuclear war, people do tend to come up with abstractions — and those with more concrete, immediate images are likely to be antinuclear activists.(4)

AT NON-VIOLENCE: COULD NOT SOLVE THE HOLOCAUST

Examples of non-violent resistance to the Nazis too small scale to be considered as an effective historical example.

Futterman, 91 (JAH, Livermore lab researcher, 1995, Mediation of the Bomb, online, http://www.dogchurch.org/scriptorium/nuke0.html)

The Nazis, who with their "Master Race" ideology admitted only so-called "Aryans" to the category of human, provide an example counter to that of the British. There were some successful acts of non-violent confrontation against the Nazis, like King Christian of Denmark's public declaration that he would wear the yellow star if it were introduced in his country. He did so in response to the Nazi practice of ordering Jews to wear yellow-starred armbands so that the Nazis could more easily isolate them from their surrounding society. That many Danes followed their king's example helped camouflage many Jews until they could escape to Sweden in fishing boats. [5] Now this resistance worked partly because the Nazis considered the Danes to be "Aryans" like themselves. Had the Poles tried the same thing, the Nazis would have been perfectly happy to use the event as an excuse for liquidating more Poles. Rather than awaken the Nazis' moral sense, non-violent confrontation on the part of the Poles would probably have enabled the Nazis to carry out their agenda in Poland more easily. The other reason these acts succeeded was that overwhelming violence of the Allies had stretched the Nazi forces too thin to suppress massive action by a whole populace, and eventually deprived the Nazis of the time they needed to find other ways to carry out their "final solution." In other words, non-violence resistance alone would have been very slow to work against the Nazis, once they had consolidated their power. And while it slowly ground away at the evil in the Nazi soul, how many millions more would have died, and how much extra time would have been given to Nazi scientists trying to invent atomic bombs to go on those V-2 rockets? The evil of Nazism may well have expended itself, but perhaps after a real "thousand-year Reich," leaving a world populated only by blue-eyed blondes. In other words, if the world had used non-violence alone against the Nazis, the results may have been much worse those of the war.[6]

AT NON-VIOLENCE: VIOLENCE KEY TO PEACE

Non violence does not work against most enemies—genocide and mass murder will result.

Rummel, 81 (R.J., professor of political science at the University of Hawaii, The Just Peace, http://www.hawaii.edu/powerkil1s/TJP.CHAP 10.HTM)

Now, peacemaking is not necessarily the best and most immediate response to conflict. Doubtlessly, some conflicts are unnecessary, some needlessly intense and long-lasting. But some also are a real and unavoidable clash, the only means through which one, as a partisan, can protect or further vital interests and achieve a more satisfactory and harmonious just peace. For example, war against Hitler's Germany from 1939 to 1945 cost millions lives, but it prevented the greater misery, the terror, the executions, the cold-blooded murders which probably would have occurred had Hitler consolidated his control of Europe and subjugated the Soviet Union. We always can end a conflict when we want by surrender. But some ideas are more important than peace: Dignity. Freedom. Security. That is, peace with justice--a just peace. There is another relevant qualification. The term "peacemaking" is well established, and I used it accordingly. Unfortunately, the verb "make" can imply that peace is designed and constructed, as a house is planned and erected brick by brick or a road engineered and built. This implication is especially seductive in this age when society is seen as manmade (rather than having evolved),9 and many believe that communities should be centrally planned and managed. But peace is not constructed like a bridge. Peace emerges from the balancing of individual mental fields. What the leaders of a group or nation honestly believe, actually want, truly are willing to get, are really capable of achieving are unknown to others--and perhaps only partially to themselves. Nonetheless only they can best utilize the information available to them to justly satisfy their interests. For a third party to try to construct and enforce an abstract peace imposed on others is foolhardy. Such a peace would be uncertain, forestall the necessary trial-and-error balancing of the parties themselves, and perhaps even create greater conflict later. The best peace is an outcome of reciprocal adjustments among those involved. At most, peacemaking should ease the process. A final qualification. Pacifists believe that violence and war cannot occur if people laid down their arms and refused to fight. But this ignores unilateral violence. Under threat, a state or government may try to avoid violence by submission. The result may be enslavement, systematic execution, and elimination of leaders and "undesirables." The resulting genocide and mass murder may ultimately end in more deaths than would have occurred had people fought to defend themselves. I agree that in some situations nonviolence may be an effective strategy for waging conflict,10 as in the successful Black civil rights demonstrations of the 1960s in America; or the successful nonviolent, civil disobedience movement for Indian independence from Britain begun by Mahatma Gandhi in 1922. In some situations refusal to use violence may avoid unnecessary escalation and ease peacekeeping. However, there are also conflicts, especially involving actual or potential tyrants, despots, and other such oppressors, in which nonviolence cannot buy freedom from violence by others or a just resolution of a dispute. Then a down payment on such a peace requires public display of one's capability and a resolve to meet violent aggression in kind.

AT CUOMO: NEGATIVE PEACE KEY TO POSITIVE PEACE

Preventing nuclear war is the absolute prerequisite to positive peace.

Folk, 78 Professor of Religious and Peace Studies at Bethany College, 78 [Jerry, "Peace Educations – Peace Studies : Towards an Integrated Approach," Peace & Change, volume V, number 1, Spring, p. 58]

Those proponents of the positive peace approach who reject out of hand the work of researchers and educators coming to the field from the perspective of negative peace too easily forget that the prevention of a nuclear confrontation of global dimensions is the prerequisite for all other peace research, education, and action. Unless such a confrontation can be avoided there will be no world left in which to build positive peace. Moreover, the blanket condemnation of all such negative peace oriented research, education or action as a reactionary attempt to support and reinforce the status quo is doctrinaire. Conflict theory and resolution, disarmament studies, studies of the international system and of international organizations, and integration studies are in themselves neutral. They do not intrinsically support either the status quo or revolutionary efforts to change or overthrow it. Rather they offer a body of knowledge which can be used for either purpose or for some purpose in between. It is much more logical for those who understand peace as positive peace to integrate this knowledge into their own framework and to utilize it in achieving their own purposes. A balanced peace studies program should therefore offer the student exposure to the questions and concerns which occupy those who view the field essentially from the point of view of negative peace.

AT TERROR TALK: LANGUAGE KEY TO WIN WOT

Labeling terrorist as such is key to fighting the war on terror.

Ganor, 01 (Boaz, Director of the International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism "Defining Terrorism," http://www.ict.org.il/articles/define.htm, May 16)

We face an essential need to reach a definition of terrorism that will enjoy wide international agreement, thus enabling international operations against terrorist organizations. A definition of this type must rely on the same principles already agreed upon regarding conventional wars (between states), and extrapolate from them regarding non-conventional wars (betweean organization and a state). The definition of terrorism will be the basis and the operational tool for expanding the international community's ability to combat terrorism. It will enable legislation and specific punishments against those perpetrating, involved in, or supporting terrorism, and will allow the formulation of a codex of laws and international conventions against terrorism, terrorist organizations, states sponsoring terrorism, and economic firms trading with them. At the same time, the definition of terrorism will hamper the attempts of terrorist organizations to obtain public legitimacy, and will erode support among those segments of the population willing to assist them (as opposed to guerrilla activities). Finally, the operative use of the definition of terrorism could motivate terrorist organizations, due to moral or utilitarian considerations, to shift from terrorist activities to alternative courses (such as guerrilla warfare) in order to attain their aims, thus reducing the scope of international terrorism. The struggle to define terrorism is sometimes as hard as the struggle against terrorism itself. The present view, claiming it is unnecessary and well-nigh impossible to agree on an objective definition of terrorism, has long established itself as the "politically correct" one. It is the aim of this paper, however, to demonstrate that an objective, internationally accepted definition of terrorism is a feasible goal, and that an effective struggle against terrorism requires such a definition. The sooner the nations of the world come to this realization, the better.

AT LANGAUGE KS: CEDE THE POLITCAL

A focus on discourse substitutes philosophical musing for material politics.

Taft-Kaufman, 95 - Professor, Department of Speech Communication And Dramatic Arts, Central Michigan University – 1995 (Jill, "Other ways: Postmodernism and performance praxis," The Southern Communication Journal, Vol.60, Iss. 3; pg. 222)

In its elevation of language to the primary analysis of social life and its relegation of the de-centered subject to a set of language positions, postmodernism ignores the way real people make their way in the world. While the notion of decentering does much to remedy the idea of an essential, unchanging self, it also presents problems. According to Clarke (1991): Having established the material quality of ideology, everything else we had hitherto thought of as material has disappeared. There is nothing outside of ideology (or discourse). Where Althusser was concerned with ideology as the imaginary relations of subjects to the real relations of their existence, the connective quality of this view of ideology has been dissolved because it lays claim to an outside, a real, an extra-discursive for which there exists no epistemological warrant without lapsing back into the bad old ways of empiricism or metaphysics. (pp. 25-26) Clarke explains how the same disconnection between the discursive and the extra-discursive has been performed in semiological analysis: Where it used to contain a relation between the signifier (the representation) and the signified (the referent), antiempiricism has taken the formal arbitrariness of the connection between the signifier and signified and replaced it with the abolition of the signified (there can be no real objects out there, because there is no out there for real objects to be). (p. 26) To the postmodernist, then, real objects have vanished. So, too, have real people. Smith (1988) suggests that postmodernism has canonized doubt about the availability of the referent to the point that "the real often disappears from consideration" (p. 159). Real individuals become abstractions. Subject positions rather than subjects are the focus. The emphasis on subject positions or construction of the discursive self engenders an accompanying critical sense of irony which recognizes that "all conceptualizations are limited" (Fischer, 1986, p. 224). This postmodern position evokes what Connor (1989) calls "an absolute weightlessness in which anything is imaginatively possible because nothing really matters" (p. 227). Clarke (1991) dubs it a "playfulness that produces emotional and/or political disinvestment: a refusal to be engaged" (p. 103). The luxury of being able to muse about what constitutes the self is a posture in keeping with a critical venue that divorces language from material objects and bodily subjects.

AT LANGUAGE K: GENERIC

Suppressing language because it is offensive preserves its injurious meaning – using the words in new ways makes them more humane.

Kurtz and Oscarson 03 (Anna and Christopher, Members of National Council of Teachers of English Conference on College Composition and Communication, "BookTalk: Revising the Discourse of Hate," ProQuest)

However, Butler also argues that the daily, repeated use of words opens a space for another, more empowering kind of performance. This alternative performance, Butler insists, can be "the occasion for something we might still call agency, the repetition of an original subordination for another purpose, one whose future is partially open" (p. 38). To think of words as having an "open" future is to recognize that their authority lies less in their historical than in their present uses; it is to acknowledge that people can revise the meaning of words even as we repeat them; it is to embrace the notion that the instability of words opens the possibility that we can use them to (re)construct a more humane future for ourselves and others. Because words can be revised, Butler contends that it would be counterproductive simply to stop using terms that we would deem injurious or oppressive. For when we choose not to use offensive words under any circumstance, we preserve their existing meanings as well as their power to injure. If as teachers, for instance, we were simply to forbid the use of speech that is hurtful to LGBT students we would be effectively denying the fact that such language still exists. To ignore words in this way, Butler insists, won't make them go away. Butler thus suggests that we actually use these words in thoughtful conversation in which we work through the injuries they cause (p. 1.02). Indeed, Butler insists that if we are to reclaim the power that oppressive speech robs from us, we must use, confront, and interrogate terms like "queer."

Censorship will be co-opted by conservative elements to destroy minority rights – instead language should be used to subvert the conventional meanings of the words.

Nye 99 (Andrea, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Wisconsin Whitewater, "Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative; In Pursuit of Privacy: Law, Ethics, and the Rise of Technology," Jstor)

Once the state has the power to legislate what can be said and not said, she argues, that power will be coopted by conservative elements to defeat liberal causes and minority rights. State power will also curtail the freedom of speech of private individuals that is the very basis for effective antidotes to derogatory name calling. DeCew, however, painstakingly reviews the legal and philosophical history of privacy rights as well as current debates about its scope and status before she takes on the question of whether feminists have any interest in preserving a private sphere. For DeCew, too, a major target is MacKinnon, specifically her argument that leaving alone the privacy of home and family means leaving men alone to abuse and dominate women. DeCew argues that decisions that protect the use of sexually explicit materials in the home, consensual sex practices in private, and personal decisions about abortion are in the interest of women as well as men, even though in some cases, such as wife beating, there may be overriding considerations that justify state intervention. Both authors argue persuasively for a more careful look at the dangers lurking behind calls for state action. For Butler, the danger is that the state becomes arbiter of what is and is not permissible speech, allowing rulings that the erection of burning crosses by the Ku Klux Klan is protected speech but that artistic expressions of gay sexuality or statements of gay identity are actions rather than speech and so are not protected. The danger DeCew sees is that once the right to privacy is denied or narrowly defined, the state can, on the grounds of immorality, move into women's personal lives to interfere with sexual expression, whether homosexual or heterosexual, or with the right to choose an abortion established in Roe v. Wade. Both DeCew and Butler, however, provide alternative remedies for the admitted harm that state action is intended to redress. For DeCew, the right to privacy is not absolute; like freedom, it can be overridden by other rights —thus the state can intervene in domestic abuse cases because of the physical harm being done. Butler's remedy for harmful hate language is more deeply rooted in postmodern theories of the speaking subject. Given the postmodern view that the subject can never magisterially use a language with fixed meanings according to clear intentions, it is always possible to subvert the conventional meanings of words. What is said as a derogatory slur—"nigger," "chick," "spic," or "gay," for example —can be "resignified," that is, returned in such a manner that its conventional meaning in practices of discrimination and abuse is subverted. Butler gives as examples the revalorization of terms like "black" or "gay," the satirical citation of racial or sexual slurs, reappropriation in street language or rap music, and expressions of homosexual identity in art depicting graphic sex. These are expressions that any erosion in First Amendment rights might endanger.

AT LANGUAGE K: GENERIC

Placing representations and discourse first trades off with concrete political change and makes no difference to those engaged in political struggles.

Taft-Kaufman, **95** Jill Speech prof @ CMU, Southern Comm. Journal, Spring, v. 60, Iss. 3, "Other Ways", p pq

The postmodern passwords of "polyvocality," "Otherness," and "difference," unsupported by substantial analysis of the concrete contexts of subjects, creates a solipsistic quagmire. The political sympathies of the new cultural critics, with their ostensible concern for the lack of power experienced by marginalized people, aligns them with the political left. Yet, despite their adversarial posture and talk of opposition, their discourses on intertextuality and inter-referentiality isolate them from and ignore the conditions that have produced leftist politics--conflict, racism, poverty, and injustice. In short, as Clarke (1991) asserts, postmodern emphasis on new subjects conceals the old subjects, those who have limited access to good jobs, food, housing, health care, and transportation, as well as to the media that depict them. Merod (1987) decries this situation as one which leaves no vision, will, or commitment to activism. He notes that academic lip service to the oppositional is underscored by the absence of focused collective or politically active intellectual communities. Provoked by the academic manifestations of this problem Di Leonardo (1990) echoes Merod and laments: Has there ever been a historical era characterized by as little radical analysis or activism and as much radical-chic writing as ours? Maundering on about Otherness: phallocentrism or Eurocentric tropes has become a lazy academic substitute for actual engagement with the detailed histories and contemporary realities of Western racial minorities, white women, or any Third World population. (p. 530) Clarke's assessment of the postmodern elevation of language to the "sine qua non" of critical discussion is an even stronger indictment against the trend. Clarke examines Lyotard's (1984) The Postmodern Condition in which Lyotard maintains that virtually all social relations are linguistic, and, therefore, it is through the coercion that threatens speech that we enter the "realm of terror" and society falls apart. To this assertion, Clarke replies: I can think of few more striking indicators of the political and intellectual impoverishment of a view of society that can only recognize the discursive. If the worst terror we can envisage is the threat not to be allowed to speak, we are appallingly ignorant of terror in its elaborate contemporary forms. It may be the intellectual's conception of terror (what else do we do but speak?), but its projection onto the rest of the world would be calamitous....(pp. 2-27) The realm of the discursive is derived from the requisites for human life, which are in the physical world, rather than in a world of ideas or symbols.(4) Nutrition, shelter, and protection are basic human needs that require collective activity for their fulfillment. Postmodern emphasis on the discursive without an accompanying analysis of how the discursive emerges from material circumstances hides the complex task of envisioning and working towards concrete social goals (Merod, 1987). Although the material conditions that create the situation of marginality escape the purview of the postmodernist, the situation and its consequences are not overlooked by scholars from marginalized groups. Robinson (1990) for example, argues that "the justice that working people deserve is economic, not just textual" (p. 571). Lopez (1992) states that "the starting point for organizing the program content of education or political action must be the present existential, concrete situation" (p. 299). West (1988) asserts that borrowing French post-structuralist discourses about "Otherness" blinds us to realities of American difference going on in front of us (p. 170). Unlike postmodern "textual radicals" who Rabinow (1986) acknowledges are "fuzzy about power and the realities of socioeconomic constraints" (p. 255), most writers from marginalized groups are clear about how discourse interweaves with the concrete circumstances that create lived experience. People whose lives form the material for postmodern counter-hegemonic discourse do not share the optimism over the new recognition of their discursive subjectivities, because such an acknowledgment does not address sufficiently their collective historical and current struggles against racism, sexism, homophobia, and economic injustice. They do not appreciate being told they are living in a world in which there are no more real subjects. Ideas have consequences. Emphasizing the discursive self when a person is hungry and homeless represents both a cultural and humane failure.

AT LANGUAGE KS: CENSORSHIP HURST THE LEFT

Free speech is critical—censorship will backfire on the left.

Wilson, 2000 – Editor and Publisher of Illinois Academe – 2000 (John K. Wilson, "How the Left can Win Arguments and Influence People" p. 163)

The left must stand strongly on the side of free speech. Because there is so much censorship of progressive ideas, it can be tempting for the left to turn the tables and to try to silence far right advocates. But repression is unnecessary: progressive ideas are more popular than conservatives ones, and all the left needs to do is get a fair and open hearing. Censorship is not only wrong, it's also a losing strategy for the left. Progressive attract more attention if they're the censors. Because conservative censorship is largely taken for granted, news about intolerance on the right isn't usually publicized. But when someone on the left seems guilty of censorship, the rights publicity machine quickly starts up. That's why the right was able to push the myth of political correctness in the 1990s and invent the idea of a wave of left-wing oppression sweeping college at a time when there was more freedom of thought than ever before, and infringement of free speech on campuses by conservative forces was more prevalent than anything committed by the left. Progressives certainly need to better publicize incidents of censorship, but the left must also realize that the right will always win the suppression battles. It has all the resources and the media on its side. When some leftists are willing to make exceptions to the First Amendment to silence conservative hate mongers, it becomes even more difficult for progressive to draw attention to the censorship of left-wing ideas. The only winning strategy is to maintain a consistent commitment to freedom of speech.

AT: DELEUZE AND GUATTARI

The negative's conception of the alternative and its need to function alone ensures its failure—Deleuze and Guattari opposed total opposition of the state and the nomad—treating the nomad as a complete outsider is narcissistic and impossible.

Mann, 95 (Professor of English at Pomona, Paul, "Stupid Undergrounds," PostModern Culture 5:3, Project MUSE)

Intellectual economics guarantees that even the most powerful and challenging work cannot protect itself from the order of fashion. Becoming-fashion, becoming-commodity, becoming-ruin. Such instant, indeed retroactive ruins, are the virtual landscape of the stupid underground. The exits and lines of flight pursued by Deleuze and Guattari are being shut down and rerouted by the very people who would take them most seriously. By now, any given work from the stupid underground's critical apparatus is liable to be tricked out with smooth spaces, war-machines, n - 1s, planes of consistency, plateaus and deterritorializations, strewn about like tattoos on the stupid body without organs. The nomad is already succumbing to the rousseauism and orientalism that were always invested in his figure; whatever Deleuze and Guattari intended for him, he is reduced to being a romantic outlaw, to a position opposite the State, in the sort of dialectical operation Deleuze most despised. And the rhizome is becoming just another stupid subterranean figure. It is perhaps true that Deleuze and Guattari did not adequately protect their thought from this dialectical reconfiguration (one is reminded of Breton's indictment against Rimbaud for not having prevented, in advance, Claudel's recuperation of him as a proper Catholic), but no vigilance would have sufficed in any case. The work of Deleuze and Guattari is evidence that, in real time, virtual models and maps close off the very exits they indicate. The problem is in part that rhizomes, lines of flight, smooth spaces, BwOs, etc., are at one and the same time theoretical-political devices of the highest critical order and merely fantasmatic, delirious, narcissistic models for writing, and thus perhaps an instance of the all-too-proper blurring of the distinction between criticism and fantasy. In Deleuze-speak, the stupid underground would be mapped not as a margin surrounding a fixed point, not as a fixed site determined strictly by its relation or opposition to some more or less hegemonic formation, but as an intensive, n-dimensional intersection of rhizomatic plateaus. Nomadology and rhizomatics conceive such a "space" (if one only had the proverbial nickel for every time that word is used as a critical metaphor, without the slightest reflection on what might be involved in rendering the conceptual in spatial terms) as a liquid, colloidal suspension, often retrievable by one or another techno-metaphorical zoning (e.g., "cyberspace"). What is at stake, however, is not only the topological verisimilitude of the model but the fantastic possibility of nonlinear passage, of multiple simultaneous accesses and exits, of infinite fractal lines occupying finite social space. In the strictest sense, stupid philosophy. Nomad thought is prosthetic, the experience of virtual exhilaration in modalities already mapped and dominated by nomad, rhizomatic capital (the political philosophy of the stupid underground: capital is more radical than any of its critiques, but one can always pretend otherwise). It is this very fantasy, this very narcissistic wish to see oneself projected past the frontier into new spaces, that abandons one to this economy, that seals these spaces within an order of critical fantasy that has long since been overdeveloped, entirely reterritorialized in advance. To pursue nomadology or rhizomatics as such is already to have lost the game. Nothing is more crucial to philosophy than escaping the dialectic and no project is more hopeless; the stupid-critical underground is the curved space in which this opposition turns back on itself.

AT BADIOU: ETHICS

Badiou's concept of ethics fails because it is impossible to make qualitative distinctions between different sorts of evil—leading to absurd results.

Brown, 04 (Nicholas, University of Illinois at Chicago, Or, Alain Badiou and Slavoj Žižek, Waiting for Something to Happen, CR: The New Centennial Review 4.3 (2004) 289-319).

This apparatus is a powerful lens, and there can be no doubt that Badiou is describing something important; perhaps it is even an aspect of evil. But is it really Evil (Mal) itself? Badiou's evil, like his truth, is indifferent to content, a merely formal label. In its formalism, its insistence on fidelity to any Event whatever—on "ethical consistency" itself as a value—Badiou's good is almost an aesthetic rather than an ethical category. (At one point, in an echo of Kant's purposeless purpose, ethical consistency is even described as "disinterested interest.") While there is something undeniably attractive in ethical consistency (and something ugly in its lack), the most important thing for a modern ethics may be to push these sentimental considerations aside. The value of ethical consistency is authorized by Lacan's well-known dictum not to give up on one's desire [ne pas céder sur son désir]. But we should not forget that this maxim derives from the reading of Antigone in Séminaire VII. Yes, Sophocles' Antigone, in her awful ethical consistency, is a captivating figure. Brecht's Galileo, on the other hand, in his opportunism and wavering inconsistency, is a bit distasteful. But Antigone is a reactionary, and Galileo invents physics. Further, Badiou has no way of sorting out different evils beyond his tripartite division. Ethics tells us what Nazism and scientific obscurantism have in common. But an ethics would have to be able to tell them apart. The distinction between, say, the abandonment of a social movement by its leader and the abandonment of a poem by its author cannot be made without some kind of qualitative supplement. Since, as we shall see, Badiou's philosophy is predicated precisely on the subtraction from consideration of all qualitative predicates, this supplement can only be vulgar, non-philosophical. Perhaps the supplement it requires is the language of human rights, which, whatever its faults, can tell the difference between a concentration camp and a creationist textbook.

AT BADIOU: POLITICS FAIL

Badiou is not politically useful because his alternative is too vague—he says that the event side steps the state but any alternative politics must be able to reform the state to succeed.

Brown, 04 (Nicholas, University of Illinois at Chicago, Or, Alain Badiou and Slavoj Žižek, Waiting for Something to Happen, CR: The New Centennial Review 4.3 (2004) 289-319).

Badiou's ontology cannot usefully displace the dialectic. Because the Event must descend like a grace, Badiou's ontology can only describe situations and never History. Since the event emerges from outside of the state of the situation, it is rigorously untheorizable: as we saw above, it is theorized as untheorizable. Despite every protestation to the contrary, Badiou's system cannot address the question "What is to be done?" because the only thing to do is to wait for the Event. What happens when the precipitation of the Event is precisely what needs to be done? Yes, we can be faithful to a previous event, as Badiou says Lenin was to the Paris Commune. But surely this solution mitigates the power of the Event as the irruption of the void into this situation. The dialectic, on the other hand, conceives the void as immanent contradiction. While both contradiction and void are immanent to the situation, contradiction has the tremendous advantage of having movement built in, as it were: the Event does not appear out of an immanent nowhere, but is already fully present in itself in the situation, which it explodes in the movement to for-itself. Meanwhile, the question of the dialectic leads us back to the twofold meaning of "state": both the law and order that govern knowledge, and law and order in the everyday sense. This identification authorizes Badiou's antistatism, forcefully reflected in his own political commitment, the Organisation Politique (whose members do not vote), which has made limited [End Page 306] but effective interventions into the status of immigrant workers. In Badiou's system, nothing can happen within the state of a situation; innovation can only emerge from an evental site, constitutively excluded from the state. But can a principled indifference to the state ground a politics? The state surely has the function of suppressing the anarchic possibilities inherent in the (national) situation. But it can also suppress the possibilities exploited by an anarchic capitalism. It is well known that the current rightist "small-government" movement is an assault on the class compromise represented by the Keynesian state. To be sure, one should be suspicious of that compromise and what it excluded. But it also protected workers against some of capitalism's more baleful effects. As with Ethics, Badiou is certainly describing something: the utopian moment of a total break with the state may be a part of any genuine political transformation. But, unless we are talking about the sad old interplay of transgression and limit—which posited the state as basically permanent, with transgression as its permanent suspension—this anarchic moment says nothing about the new state of affairs that will ultimately be imposed on the generic set it constructs. Surely the configuration of that state will be paramount—in which case state power has to be fought for, not merely evaded.

AT BADIOU: POLITICS FAIL

Badiou's system fails—he has no way to overcome the enormous power he attributes to capitalism.

Brown, 04 (Nicholas, University of Illinois at Chicago, Or, Alain Badiou and Slavoj Žižek, Waiting for Something to Happen, CR: The New Centennial Review 4.3 (2004) 289-319).

But what is strange is the vehemence with which Badiou maintains his distance from the economic—from what classical Marxism called the "base," the elements of a situation that pertain to its own reproduction. It is perfectly orthodox to say that there can be no purely economic intervention in the economy: even with the best intentions, the World Bank could not solve the problem of Third World poverty. However, in Badiou's system the economy is not merely reduced to one aspect among many, but actively dismissed from consideration. Material reproduction is reduced to the sneering Lacanian contempt for "le service des biens," the servicing of goods which pertains to the human animal beneath good and evil. Why should Badiou fully endorse Marx's analysis of the world economy ("there is no need for a revision of Marxism itself," [Ethics, 97]) while keeping Marx's entire problematic at arm's length? In fact, capitalism is the point of impasse in Badiou's own system, the problem which cannot be actively thought without grave danger to the system as a whole. Capital's great power, the tremendous ease with which it colonizes (geographic, cultural, psychic) territory, is precisely that it seizes situations at their evental site. In their paraphrase of a brilliant but much-maligned passage in Marx's Grundrisse, Deleuze and Guattari insist that "capitalism has haunted all forms of society, but it haunts them as their terrifying nightmare, it is the dread they feel of a flow that would elude their codes."2 Is this flow that eludes every society's codes not identical with generic multiplicity, the void which, eluding every representation, nonetheless haunts every situation? Does not capitalism make its entry at a society's point of impasse—social relations already haunted by variously dissimulated exploitation—and revolutionize them into the capital-labor relation? A safely non-Orientalist version of this would be the eruption from modernist art's evental site—the art market, which belonged to the situation of modernism while being excluded from its represented state—of what we might call the "Warhol-event," which inaugurates the transition from the formal to the real subsumption of (artistic) labor under Capital. It makes perfect sense to say that this transition is the truth of the [End Page 308] Warhol-event. As we saw earlier, the real subsumption of labor under Capital, the conversion of every relation into a monetary relation, is the origin of formal equality: that is, the foundation of universalism. And far from pertaining to mere animal life beneath the level of the truth-procedure, capitalism itself fits perfectly the form of the revolutionary Event. It would then appear that capitalism is, like religion, eliminated from the art-politics-science-love series only by fiat. And why is this? Because the economic, the "servicing of goods," cannot enter Badiou's system without immediately assuming the status of a cause. Excluded from direct consideration, capitalism as a condition of set theory is perfectly innocuous; its preconditional status belongs to a different order than what it conditions. It opens up a mode of presentation, but what is presented existed all along: look at Paul, for example. But included as the product of a truth-procedure, capitalism immediately appears as the basis for all the others: it is, in fact, the revolutionary irruption of Capital (in whatever society) that conditions any modern process of science, art, love, or politics. If Badiou's system were to consider capitalism directly, some elements, those pertaining to the "base," would appear to have more weight than others—the "superstructure." The effects of such an inclusion of capitalism in Badiou's system—an inclusion which nothing prevents—would be catastrophic. Radical universality (as opposed to the historically conditioned universality imposed by the emergence of capitalism) would become unthinkable. The "eternity" of truth would yield to historicism.

AT BADIOU: POLITICS FAIL

Unfortunately for Badiou, his great enemy of capitalism fits perfectly within what he considers a truth event—the alternative merely re-creates the status quo.

Brown, 04 (Nicholas, University of Illinois at Chicago, Or, Alain Badiou and Slavoj Žižek, Waiting for Something to Happen, CR: The New Centennial Review 4.3 (2004) 289-319).

Badiou cannot think Capital precisely because Capital has already thought Badiou. And let's face it: despite Badiou's inspiring presentation, nothing is more native to capitalism than his basic narrative matrix. The violent seizure of the subject by an idea, fidelity to it in the absence of any guarantee, and ultimate transformation of the state of the situation: these are the elements of the narrative of entrepreneurial risk, "revolutionary innovation," the "transformation of the industry," and so on. In pushing away material reproduction, Badiou merely adapts this narrative to the needs of intellectuals, who, in Badiou's conception, have a monopoly over much of the field of truth.

Failure to cope with the power of capitalism dooms any ethical system to failure.

Brown, 04 (Nicholas, University of Illinois at Chicago, Or, Alain Badiou and Slavoj Žižek, Waiting for Something to Happen, CR: The New Centennial Review 4.3 (2004) 289-319).

The problem with this ethics—as Brecht showed us, with ethics in general—is that, under capitalism, the only fully consistent ethical position is ruthless self-interest. There is no ethical position that is both minimally compassionate and fully ethically consistent. Mauler in Saint Joan is doomed to make money from all of his generous impulses; the good woman of Szechwan can only help her neighbors by taking advantage of them. In fact, this split constitutes part of capitalism's dynamism. The ideological force of capitalism is that so many people are given a subjective interest in maintaining the stability of capitalism, even if this interest involves competing with neighbors who share an "objective" interest in ending it. Any "opting out" is at present simply quixotic, and only possible on the basis of substantial privilege. Plainly, professors want tenured positions, for the same reason the unemployed want jobs: because they exist. (As for playing the stock market, this criticism buys neoliberal rhetoric hook, line, and sinker: most academics who "play the stock market" do so because universities, like many other U.S. employers, have shifted the burden of risk from their own retirement systems onto the individual employees.)

AT BADIOU: PERMUTATION

The state and the revolutionary political subject can cooperate in Badiou's conception of the alternative.

Hallward, 03 (*Badiou: a subject to truth*, Peter Hallward, University of Minnesota Press Minneapolis / London 2003, Professor of Modern European Philosophy, Centre for Research in Modern European Philosophy, Middlesex Univeristy).

We know that Badiou's early and unequivocally hostile attitude to the state has considerably evolved. Just how far it has evolved remains a little unclear. His conception of politics remains resolutely anticonsensual, anti–"re-presentative, " and thus antidemocratic (in the ordinary sense of the word). Democracy has become the central ideological category of the neo-liberal status quo, and any genuine "philosophy today is above all something that enables people to have done with the 'democratic' submission to the world as it is." 66 But he seems more willing, now, to engage with this submission on its own terms. La Distance politique again offers the most precise points de repère. On the one hand, the OP remains suspicious of any political campaign—for instance, an electoral contest or petition movement—that operates as a "prisoner of the parliamentary space." 67 It remains "an absolute necessity [of politics] not to have the state as norm. The separation of politics and state is foundational of politics." On the other hand, however, it is now equally clear that "their separation need not lead to the banishment of the state from the field of political thought." 68 The OP now conceives itself in a tense, nondialectical "vis-à-vis" with the state, a stance that rejects an intimate cooperation (in the interests of capital) as much as it refuses "any antagonistic conception of their operation—a conception that smacks of classism." There is no more choice to be made between the state and revolution; the "vis-à-vis demands the presence of the two terms and not the annihilation of one of the two." 69

AT BADIOU: ALTERNATIVE UNWORKABLE AND COMMUNIST

Badiou's alternative of radical egalitarianism is unworkable and is based on a failed model of communism.

Hallward, 03 (*Badiou: a subject to truth*, Peter Hallward, University of Minnesota Press Minneapolis / London 2003, Professor of Modern European Philosophy, Centre for Research in Modern European Philosophy, Middlesex Univeristy).

Badiou's politics have always been about "collective emancipation, or the problem of the reign of liberty in infinite situations" (DO, 54; cf. TC, 60). His political goals have remained consistent over the years, since "every historical event is communist, to the degree that 'communist' designates the transtemporal subjectivity of emancipation, the egalitarian passion, the Idea of justice, the will to break with the compromises of the service des biens, the deposition of egoism, an intolerance of oppression, the wish to impose a withering away of the state. The absolute preeminence of multiple presentation over representation." 84 What has changed is communism's mode of existence. In Badiou's earlier work, the practical (if ultimately unattainable) goal was always to effect the actual, historical achievement of stateless community. Today, in order to preserve politics' "intrinsic relation to truth" (DO, 48), Badiou has had to let go of almost any sort of political engagement with the economic and the social. He continues to declare a wholly egalitarian politics, but as reserved for a strictly subjective plane. The unqualified justice of a generic communism, first proposed in Marx's 1844 Manuscripts and conceived in Badiou's own terms as the advent of "pure presentation, " as the "undivided authority of the infinite, or the advent of the collective as such" (AM, 91), remains the only valid subjective norm for Badiou's political thought. This subjective norm has become ever more distant, however, from the day-to-day business of "objective" politics: the programmatic pursuit of the generic ideal is itself now dismissed as a "Romantic" dream leading to "fraternity terror" (AM, 101).

AT HARDT/NEGRI: ALTERNATIVE → TERRORISM

Hardt and Negri's alternative is an endorsement of terrorism – the multitude's revolt against capitalism is empirically violent.

Balakrishnan, 2000 (Political Science Professor at University of Chicago and member of the editorial board of New Left Review , Gopal, "Hardt and Negri's Empire", New Left Review, September-October, http://newleftreview.org/A2275)

In addition to having a career as an influential political philosopher, with widely–translated books on Spinoza and Marx to his credit, Negri is a convicted terrorist. In 1979, the Italian government arrested Negri, at the time a political science professor at the University of Padua, and accused him of being the secret brains behind the Red Brigades, the Italian version of the Weathermen in the U.S. or the Baader–Meinhoff Gang in West Germany—left–wing groups that during the 1970s sought to overthrow capitalism through campaigns of terrorist violence. Italian authorities believed that Negri himself planned the infamous 1979 kidnapping and murder of Aldo Moro, the leader of Italy's Christian Democratic Party. Just before Aldo's execution, his distraught wife got a taunting phone call, telling her that her husband was about to die. The voice was allegedly Negri's. Unable to build a strong enough case to try the philosopher for murder, Italian authorities convicted him on lesser charges of "armed insurrection against the state." Negri's theoretical work was in keeping with his terrorist activities. He had become the leading voice of Italy's ultra–Left by advancing an inventive reinterpretation of Marx's Grundrisse that located the agent of social revolution not among the industrial proletariat, largely co–opted as it was by capitalist wealth and bourgeois democratic freedoms, but among those marginalized from economic and political life: the criminal, the part–time worker, the unemployed. These dispossessed souls, Negri felt, would be far quicker to unleash the riotous confrontations with the state that he saw as necessary to destroying capitalism

Hardt and Negri's alternative justifies terrorist attacks.

Wolfe, 01 (Alan, director of the Boisi Center for Religion and American Public Life at Boston College, "The Snake", The New Republic Online, October 4th, http://www.powells.com/review/2001_10_04)

We cannot know, of course, whether Hardt and Negri, in the light of the recent atrocities at the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, will want to change their minds about the progressive potential of Islamic fundamentalism. But their book gives no grounds on which such attacks can be condemned. For if being against the West is the sine qua non of good and effective protest, well, no one could accuse the murderers in New York and Washington of not being against Western hegemony. And if it is true, as Hardt and Negri blithely claim, that efforts to find legitimate reasons for intervening in world affairs are only a smokescreen for the exercise of hegemonic power, then the way is cleared for each and every illegitimate act of global intervention, since in the postmodern world of this book no justifiable distinctions between good and evil acts can ever be made.

AT HARDT/NEGRI: ALTERNATIVE → TERRORISM

Hardt and Negri are so eager to oppose capitalism that their alternative embraces terrorism and misogyny
Wolfe, 01 (Alan, director of the Boisi Center for Religion and American Public Life at Boston College, "The Snake", The New Republic Online, October 4th, http://www.powells.com/review/2001_10_04)

The authors of Empire see no reason to exclude explicit reactionaries, including religious fundamentalists, from the catalogue of post-Fordist movements that they admire. Fundamentalists, they write, are often portrayed as anti-modernist, but this is Western propaganda. "It is more accurate and more useful...to understand the various fundamentalism [sic] not as the re-creation of a pre-modern world, but rather as a powerful refusal of the contemporary historical passage in course." Neglecting to mention the Taliban's treatment of women, Hardt and Negri go out of their way to reassure readers of the genuinely subversive nature of the Islamic version of fundamentalism. These movements are motivated not by nostalgic attempts to reconstruct the past, but by "original thought." They are anti-Western, which means that they are anti-capitalist. Properly understood, they are postmodern rather than premodern, since they engage in a refusal of Western hegemony, with the proviso that fundamentalism speaks to the losers in the globalization project and postmodernism to the winners. Hardt and Negri even leave the impression that, if they had to choose between the postmodernists in Western universities and the fundamentalists in Iran, they would prefer the latter: "The losers in the process of globalization might indeed be the ones who give us the strongest indication of the transformation in process."

Hardt and Negri support terrorists over democracy—it is political lunacy.
Balakrishnan, 2000 (Political Science Professor at University of Chicago and member of the editorial board of New Left Review**,** Gopal, "Hardt and Negri's Empire", New Left Review, September-October, http://newleftreview.org/A2275)

Apolitical abstraction and wild–eyed utopianism, a terroristic approach to political argument, hatred for flesh and blood human beings, nihilism: Empire is a poisonous brew of bad ideas. It belongs with Mein Kampf in the library of political madness. Do Empire's many fans really believe their own praise? Does Time really think it's "smart" to call for the eradication of private property, celebrate revolutionary violence, whitewash totalitarianism, and pour contempt on the genuine achievements of liberal democracies and capitalist economics? Would Frederic Jameson like to give up his big salary at Duke? To ask such questions is to answer them. The far left's pleasure is in the adolescent thrill of perpetual rebellion. Too many who should know better refuse to grow up. The ghost of Marx haunts us still. For all its infantilism, the kind of hatred Hardt and Negri express for our flawed but decent democratic capitalist institutions—the best political and economic arrangements man has yet devised and the outcome of centuries of difficult trial and error—is dangerous, especially since it's so common in the university and media. It seems to support Islamist revolutionary hopes, the increasingly violent anti–globalization movement, and kindred political lunacies.

Empire anarchist rhetoric which praises terrorism and totalitarianism.
Wolfe, 01 (Alan, director of the Boisi Center for Religion and American Public Life at Boston College, "The Snake", The New Republic Online, October 4th, http://www.powells.com/review/2001_10_04)

The anarchist flavor of Empire is conveyed most strikingly by its romanticization of violence. Although by now everyone knows that there are terrorists in this world, there are no terrorists in Hardt and Negri's book. There are only people who are called terrorists, "a crude conception and terminological reduction that is rooted in a police mentality." Terms such as "ethnic terrorists" and "drug mafias" appear within quotation marks, as if no serious revolutionary could believe that there were such things. "Totalitarianism" is another pure construct, simply an invention of cold war ideology, that has been used to "denounce the destruction of the democratic sphere...." Certainly the term has little to do with actual life in the Soviet Union, which Hardt and Negri describe as "a society criss-crossed by extremely strong instances of creativity and freedom."

AT HARDT/NEGRI: ALTERNATIVE JUSTIFIES HOLOCAUST

Hardt and Negri argue that the state as always bad and resistance movements are always good – this ignores a critical distinction between democracy and totalitarianism that downplays the Holocaust.

Wolfe, 01 (Alan, director of the Boisi Center for Religion and American Public Life at Boston College, "The Snake", The New Republic Online, October 4th, http://www.powells.com/review/2001_10_04)

Negri, when not in prison, has been a political philosopher, and he is the author of numerous books, manifestos, and theses on subjects ranging from Spinoza's metaphysics to the nature of insurgency under contemporary capitalism. In nearly all this work, as in Empire, he invariably associates violence with states in the exercise of their power, never with opposition groups and their tactics. For the latter, any action, no matter how insurrectionary, is justified. For the former, any action, no matter how peaceful, is terrorism in disguise. From this warped perspective, all states are equally bad and all movements of opposition are equally good. Only the working of such a myopia can help the reader to understand why the authors of Empire are incapable of mustering any rigorous historical or moral consciousness of Nazism and its policy of Jewish extermination. In their view Nazism is capitalism, and that is the end of the story. Nazi Germany, Hardt and Negri write, far from a unique excursion into human evil, "is the ideal type of the transformation of modern sovereignty into national sovereignty and of its articulation into capitalist form...." Since Nazism is merely normal capitalism — this point of view was once associated with the Frankfurt School, and it survives almost nowhere outside the pages of this book — there is no reason to single out the Nazis or their sympathizers for crimes against humanity. Astonishingly, Hardt and Negri are worse than neutral in their discussion of the Nazi period: they actually heap praise on the ordinary Germans who supported the regime. The obedience of these citizens is called "exemplary" in this book. The authors also celebrate "their military and civil valor in the service of the nation," before moving on to identify the victims whom they valorously helped to send to Buchenwald as "communists, homosexuals, Gypsies, and others," the latter, presumably, being the Jews (whom Hardt and Negri reserve for Auschwitz). I am not making this up. Lest anyone consider these apologetics for Nazism a misreading of my own — how can good leftists, after all, engage in a downplaying of the Holocaust? — Hardt and Negri twice acknowledge that they are completely fed up with the whole question of totalitarianism.

AT HARDT/NEGRI: GLOBALIZATION GOOD

Globalization increases world prosperity and freedom – Hardt and Negri provide no evidence to the contrary.
Balakrishnan, 2000 (Political Science Professor at University of Chicago and member of the editorial board of New Left Review, Gopal, "Hardt and Negri's Empire", New Left Review, September-October, http://newleftreview.org/A2275)

Inseparable from the failure to think politically, Hardt and Negri, like the rioters endlessly disrupting World Trade Organization meetings, offer no evidence to support their basic charge that economic globalization is causing wide–scale planetary misery. Predictably, this past summer, as the G–8 meeting got underway in Genoa, Italy, the New York Times chose these two "joyful" Communists to write a lengthy op–ed extolling the virtues of anti–globalization rioters. The truth about globalization is exactly the reverse of what Hardt and Negri assert. Globalization is dramatically increasing world prosperity and freedom. As the Economist's John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge point out, in the half century since the foundation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the world economy has expanded six–fold, in part because trade has increased 1,600 percent; nations open to trade grow nearly twice as fast as those that aren't; and World Bank data show that during the past decade of accelerated economic globalization, approximately 800 million people escaped poverty.]

Globalization allows for justice, solidarity, and democracy.
Gills –02 [Barry K, Chair of the World Historical Systems theory group of the International Studies Association and a faculty affiliate of the Globalization Research Center of the University of Hawaii, "Democratizing Globalization and Globalizing Democracy, May, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, May]

If there is global capitalism, then the system gives rise to and in fact requires fundamental counterparts, including global justice, global solidarity, global democracy, and global citizenship, the last of these perhaps being especially significant. We need a credible political theory of global democracy based on the new concept of global citizenship rather than merely a pragmatic problem-solving approach. If democracy is a process of building countervailing powers, then the democratic theory we have at present, which is based on countries and their domestic political order, must be transposed to the global level. To do so, we must also elevate or transpose the classic enlightenment democratic ideals of equality, justice, solidarity (fraternity), and liberty to the global level.

Globalization is inevitable and key to spreading democracy and community empowerment.
Gills –02 [Barry K, Chair of the World Historical Systems theory group of the International Studies Association and a faculty affiliate of the Globalization Research Center of the University of Hawaii, "Democratizing Globalization and Globalizing Democracy, May, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, May]

Thus, there is likewise a historical dialectic between globalization and democratization, a process that is unavoidable. I firmly believe, on both historical and moral grounds, that this historical dialectic leads strongly, even inexorably, toward the practices and theory of global democracy, that is, to the globalization of democracy and the democratization of globalization. Insofar as neoliberal economic globalization has succeeded, it creates the conditions for further critical social responses that lead to renewed struggles for democratic freedoms and participation by the ordinary people affected by these changes. In these processes of renewed democratic struggles, we may expect to see continued efforts at self-government by many peoples and also expanded representation. Globalization allows the transcending of old established and fixed territorial units and borders of political representation, thus allowing a more territorially diffuse pattern of political community to emerge, and to do so globally. This process deepens democracy by extending it to the global arena but moreover by also devolving power to self-constituting communities seeking self-government and representation in the political order, whether this be on a local, national, regional, or global level.

AT HARDT/NEGRI: CAPITALISM GOOD

Capitalism is not perfect but is better than Hardt and Negri's alternative—which would devolve into totalitarianism.
Balakrishnan, 2000 (Political Science Professor at University of Chicago and member of the editorial board of New Left Review, Gopal, "Hardt and Negri's Empire", New Left Review, September-October, http://newleftreview.org/A2275)

Needless to say, economic globalization isn't without its downside. As I've argued in these pages (see "Capitalism and the Suicide of Culture," February 2000), it can—there's no necessity at work—amplify and disseminate some of the less attractive aspects of today's libertine culture. But on balance, as neoconservative sociologist Peter L. Berger has suggested, the empirical evidence proves it far preferable to any alternative economic order we know of. It has profoundly diminished human suffering. If Hardt and Negri's depiction of global capitalism is mendacious, their hazy alternative to it—absolute democracy, open borders, equal compensation—is apolitical utopian nonsense. How would such schemes actually work? Hardt and Negri never say. Do they truly think that "annulling" private property and eliminating nations, if it were somehow possible, would be liberating? Wouldn't it lead to a totalitarian increase in political power, as in the old Soviet Union? But then Hardt and Negri seem to look back fondly on Lenin and Stalin's dark regime. "Cold war ideology called that society totalitarian," they complain, "but in fact it was a society criss–crossed by extremely strong instances of creativity and freedom, just as strong as the rhythms of economic development and cultural modernization." To which one can only respond: Have they never read a page of Solzhenitsyn? Moreover, as filled with admiration as Hardt and Negri are toward the Soviet Union, they are contemptuous toward the decencies and the humbleoften not so humble—freedoms of democratic capitalist societies.

AT HARDT/NEGRI: AT HISTORICAL ARGUMENT

Hardt and Negri's historical examples are highly selective and poorly developed.
Petras, 01 (James, Professor of Sociology at Binghamton University, "Empire With Imperialism", Rebellion: Petras Essays in English, October 29, http://www.rebelion.org/petras/english/negri010102.htm)

The authors argue early on that the intellectual origins the U.S. revolution can be traced to Spinoza and Machiavelli. Rousseau and Locke are given short shrift, despite their greater immediate relevance. Extended and tendencious discussions of sovereignty are interspersed with reductionist assertions which collapse or omit numerous variations. For example, in their discussion of totalitarianism and the nation-state they argue "If Nazi Germany is ideal type of the transformation of modern sovereignty into national sovereignty and of the articulation in its capitalist form, Stalinist Russia is the ideal type of the transmission of popular interest and the cruel logics that follow from it into a project of national modernization, mobilizing for its own purposes the productive forces that yearn for liberation from capitalism" (p.110). I have quoted extensively in order to illustrate the confused, illogical, unhistorical nature of the author's broad and vacuous generalizations. What empirical or historical basis is there for claiming Nazi Germany is the "ideal type"? National sovereignty pre-existed the Nazis and continues after its demise in non-totalitarian settings. If Stalin's Russian embodied "popular interest" why should anyone seek to be liberated from it? "Cruel logic" of "popular interests" is stuff from the ancien regime - hardly the basis for orienting the "multitudes" which the writers describe to be the new agencies for democratizing the world. The authors engage in what George Saboul once referred to as the "vacuum cleaner" approach to history: a little of ancient history, a smattering of exegesis of elementary political theory, a plus and minus evaluation of post-modernism, a celebration of U.S. constitutionalism, a brief synopsis of colonialism and post-colonialism. These discursive forays provide an intellectual gloss for the core argument dealing with the contemporary world: the disappearance of imperialism; the obsolescence of imperial states, nation states (and boundaries) and the ascendancy of an ill-defined Empire, globalization, and supra-national governing bodies, apparently resembling the United Nations.

AT HARDT/NEGRI: NO QUALIFIED DATA

Hardt and Negri's have no supporting data.
Wolfe, 01 (Alan, director of the Boisi Center for Religion and American Public Life at Boston College, "The Snake", The New Republic Online, October 4th, http://www.powells.com/review/2001_10_04)

Most of Empire is an exercise in nominalism, in the attempt to name, rather than to describe, to analyze, or even to condemn, the new order that its authors see emerging. Although it is presumably devoted to outlining the contours of a new mode of production, the book contains no data, offers no effort to demonstrate who owns what or holds power over whom, and provides no indicators of any of the deplorable conditions that it discusses. As if once again to distinguish itself from Marx, Empire, like the left Hegelians whom Marx once attacked, moves entirely at the level of ideas. Unlike the left Hegelians, however, Hardt and Negri handle ideas incompetently.

AT HARDT/NEGRI: MULTITUDE FAILS

The multitude will never be unified—"workers" stand for different objectives and never coordinate.
Wolfe, 01 (Alan, director of the Boisi Center for Religion and American Public Life at Boston College, "The Snake", The New Republic Online, October 4th, http://www.powells.com/review/2001_10_04)

Never saying so explicitly, the authors of this book, in identifying their hopes with such disparate movements of protest whatever their targets or their political coloration, are throwing over the most central proposition of Marxism: class consciousness. Workers no longer need to be aware of themselves as workers in order to bring down capitalism. They need not develop a revolutionary strategy, for under contemporary conditions "it may no longer be useful to insist on the old distinction between strategy and tactics." They do not even need to be workers. All that is required is that they set themselves up against power, whatever and wherever power happens to be. Never mind that movements that do so can stand for wildly different objectives — an open society here, a closed society there; or that they are also, as Hardt and Negri point out, often unable or unwilling to communicate with each other. Indeed, as Hardt and Negri do not point out, they might, if they had the chance, prefer to kill one another.

Hardt and Negri admit they have no idea how the multitude will rise up and over throw Empire.
Wolfe, 01 (Alan, director of the Boisi Center for Religion and American Public Life at Boston College, "The Snake", The New Republic Online, October 4th, http://www.powells.com/review/2001_10_04)

And redemption will come from the multitude, who despite their oppression under empire — or Empire — remain pure in heart. In them, one can see the emergence of the new city that will put us at one with the world. Unlike Augustine's, of course, their city cannot be the divine one, since "the multitude today...resides on the imperial surfaces where there is no God the Father and no transcendence." Instead, they will create "the earthly city of the multitude," which the authors esoterically define as "the absolute constitution of labor and cooperation." About the practical question of how this can be done, Hardt and Negri have nothing significant to say. "The only response that we can give to these questions is that the action of the multitude becomes political primarily when it begins to confront directly and with an adequate consciousness the central repressive operations of Empire." This, too, is a Christian conception of revolution. We cannot know how we will be saved; we must recognize that if only we have faith, a way will be found.

AT HARDT/NEGRI: NATION-STATE STRONG

The nation state is not dying away—their economic analysis is superficial.

Petras, 01 (James, Professor of Sociology at Binghamton University, "Empire With Imperialism", Rebelion: Petras Essays in English, October 29, http://www.rebelion.org/petras/english/negri010102.htm)

Assumption 2: The old nation-state governments have been superseded by a new world government, made up of the heads of the IFI, the WTO, and the heads of the MNCs (p. 326). This is an argument that is based on a superficial discussion of epiphenomena, rather than a deeper analytical view of the structure of power. While it is true that the IFIs make many important decisions in a great many geographical locations affecting significant economic and social sectors, these decisions and the decision-makers are closely linked to the imperial states and the MNCs which influence them. All top IFI officials are appointed by their national/imperial governments. All their crucial policy guide lines that dictate their loans and conditions for lending are set by the finance, treasury and economy ministers of the imperial states. The vast majority of funds for the IFIs come from the imperial states. Representation on the executive board of the IFI is based on the proportion of funding by the imperial states. The IMF and the WB have always been led by individuals from the U.S. or E.U. Hardt and Negri's vision of IFI power is based on a discussion of derived power not its imperial states source. In this sense, international power is based in the imperial states not on supra-national entities. The latter concept grossly overestimates the autonomy of the IFIs and underestimates their subordination to the imperial states. The real significance of the IFIs is how they magnify, extend and deepen the power of the imperial states and how they become terrain for competition between rival imperial states. Far from superseding the old states, the IFIs have strengthened their positions. Assumption 3: One of the common arguments of globalist theorists like Hardt and Negri is that an information revolution has taken place that has eliminated state borders, transformed capitalism and created a new epoch (p.145) by providing a new impetus to the development of the productive forces**.** The claims that information technologies have revolutionized economies and thus created a new global economy in which nation states and national economies have become superfluous is extremely dubious. A comparison of productivity growth in the U.S. over the past half century fails to support the globalist argument. Between 1953-72, before the so-called information revolution in the U.S. productivity grew an average 2.5%; with the introduction of computers, productivity growth between 1973-95 was less than half. Even in the so-called boom period of 1995-99, productivity growth was 2.5% about the same as the pre-computer period. Japan which makes the most extensive use of computers and robots has witnessed a decade of stagnation and crises. During the year 2000-01, the information sector went into a deep crises, tens of thousands were fired, hundreds of firms went bankrupt, stocks dropped in value some 80%. The speculative bubble, that defined the so-called information economy, burst. Moreover, the major source of growth of productivity claimed by the globalists was in the computerization of the area of computer manufacture. Studies have shown that computer use in offices is directed more toward personal use than to exchanging ideas. Estimates run up to 60% of computer time is spent in activity unrelated to the enterprise. Computer manufacturers account for 1.2% of the U.S. economy and less than 5% of capital stock. Moreover, the U.S. population census provides another explanation for the higher productivity figures - the 5 million illegal immigrants who have flooded the U.S. labor market in the 1990s. Since productivity is measured by the output per estimated worker, the 5 million uncounted workers inflate the productivity data. If the 5 million are included the productivity figures would deflate. With the decline of the information economy and its stock valuations it becomes clear that the "information revolution" is not the transcendent force defining the economies of the major imperial states, let alone defining a new world order. The fact that most people have computers and browse, that some firms have better control over their inventories does not mean that power has shifted beyond the nation-state. The publicists' claims about the "information revolution" ring hollow, as the investors in the world stock markets move funds toward the real economy and away from the high tech firms which show no profits and increasing losses.

AT HARDT/NEGRI: NATION-STATE STRONG

Hardt and Negri's examples of globalization all ignore the crucial role of the nation-state in creating those trends—the nation is not dying away.

Post, 02 (Charlie, member of Solidarity's National Committee, "Review: Empire and Revolution", International Viewpoint Magazine, http://www.internationalviewpoint.org/article.php3?id_article=435)

The result of the internationalisation of lean production over the past two decades has not been a 'smooth' or 'decentred global network' or 'empire' that Hardt and Negri claim. Quite the opposite, the centres of accumulation and social power remain in the centres of advanced capitalism in Western Europe, the US and Japan. Global uneven and combined development - the growing gap in incomes, production and the like - between this global 'north' and the global 'south' has only grown wider. Some regions of the former 'third world' have become centres of labour-intensive assembly and parts production (the 'Newly Industrialized Countries' of Mexico, Brazil, South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan), becoming extensions of capitalist accumulation cantered in the 'north.' However, vast expanses of the globe (sub-Saharan Africa) remain at best sites of raw material extraction, or at worst huge labour reserves, marked by extreme poverty and capitalist-created famine and natural disasters. Hardt and Negri's claims that the nation-state and inter-imperialist rivalry have declined in importance with the rise of 'empire' and various institutions of 'global governance' (World Bank, IMF, WTO, G7, EU, NATO, etc) lack theoretical and even empirical plausibility. The 'declining effectiveness' of the nation-state can be traced clearly through the evolution of a whole series of global juridico-economic bodies, such as GATT, the World Trade Organization, the World Bank, and the IMF. The globalisation of production and circulation, supported by this supranational juridical scaffolding, supersedes the effectiveness of national juridical structures (p 337). Clearly, this 'supranational juridical scaffolding' has been crucial in changing the political environment for capitalist accumulation over the past two decades. Clearly, 'neo-liberalism' - the dismantling of the rules that restrict corporations at home and abroad - would be impossible without these 'global juridico-economic bodies.' However, the growing importance of these trans-national organizations does not mean that, in the words of Hardt and Negri 'state functions and constitutional elements have effectively been displaced to other levels and domains' (p. 307). On the contrary, the ability of these global political bodies to operate effectively requires, in many ways, the strengthening of the national-capitalist state. [Kim Moody presents a compelling alternative analysis. The trans-national corporations (TNCs) have neither the desire nor ability to create a world state. They have opted instead for a system of multilateral agreements and institutions that they hope will provide coherence and order the world market. Through their 'home' governments, the TNCs have attempted to negotiate forms of regulation through the GATT, the new WTO, and the various regional and multilateral trade agreements. They have also transformed some of the old Bretton Woods institutions, notably the World Bank and IMF. [9] To ensure the unhindered operations of the trans-nationals and protect private business property, these global political institutions require national capitalist states capable of denationalising industries, abolishing social welfare programs and labour regulations, generally deregulating their capital, labour and commodities markets, and containing challenges from below. Put simply, rather than representing a simple shift of political powers 'upward' from the nation-state to the 'global juridico-economic bodies', the development of the WTO, EU, and the like actually enhance the role of the nation-state.

AT HARDT/NEGRI: AT BIOPOWER IMPACT

Powerless people depend upon biopolitics to keep them alive—for example, those suffering from HIV/AIDS would be squeezed out of Hardt and Negri's society because they would be non-productive workers.

Bull, 01 (Malcolm, head of art history and theory at Oxford University, "You Can't Build a New Society with a Stanley Knife", London Review of Books, Vol. 23, No. 19, http://www.lrb.co.uk/v23/n19/bull01_.html)

It would, I think, be difficult for Hardt and Negri to turn their argument around in this way. Although they recognise the function of society in the production of individual subjectivities they barely acknowledge its role in the production of power. Using Foucault's model of biopower, they argue that power constitutes society, not the other way round: 'Power, as it produces, organises; as it organises, it speaks and expresses itself as authority.' In reply to Machiavelli's observation that the project of constructing a new society needs arms and money, they cite Spinoza and ask: 'Don't we already possess them? Don't the necessary weapons reside precisely within the creative and prophetic power of the multitude?' No one is powerless; even the old, the sick and the unemployed are engaged in the 'immaterial labour' that produces 'total social capital'. Sounding a bit like Ali G, they conclude: 'The poor itself is power. There is World Poverty, but there is above all World Possibility, and only the poor is capable of this.' It is difficult to see how this analysis comprehends the reality of powerlessness. You may be able to threaten the world with a Stanley knife, but you cannot build a new society with one. Insofar as the problems of the powerless have been addressed in recent years it is often through a dynamic that works in the opposite direction to the one Hardt and Negri suggest. Their response to globalisation is to maintain that since we have not contracted into global society, we still have all the power we need to change it. The alternative is to argue that a geographically boundless society must also be a totally inclusive society. The latter is an extension of what used to be called the politics of recognition. Globalisation may have replaced multiculturalism as the focus of contemporary political debate, but there is an underlying continuity: the concern of anti-globalisation protesters with remote regions of the world, with the lives of people unlike themselves, and with species of animals and plants that most have seen only on TV is predicated on an unparalleled imaginative identification with the Other. This totalisation of the politics of recognition from the local to the global is what has given momentum to campaigns such as the one for African Aids victims; here, it is a question of sympathy rather than sovereignty, of justice rather than power. In many cases, unless the powerful recognised some kinship with them, the powerless would just die. Capitalism has no need for the 'immaterial labour' of millions now living. For powerless human beings, as for other species, autonomy leads to extinction.

AT HARDT/NEGRI: ALT FAILS

The alternative fails: there are far too many fragmented cultures to form an effective multitude and social organization is needed to combat oppression.

Angus, 04 ("Empire, Borders, Place: A Critique of Hardt and Negri's Concept of Empire." Theory & Event 7:3 Ian Angus, Project Muse, 2004)

The "aspirations" of the multitude established as the constitutive force of the future are reduced to very little: freedom, particularly to emigrate, and the right to a socially guaranteed income. In the undoubted care not to venture outside what is permitted by American liberalism, the project deliberately ignores everything that could be qualified as the heritage of the workers' and socialist movement, in particular the equality rejected by the political culture of the United States. It is difficult to believe in the transformative power of an emerging global (and European) citizenship while the policies implemented fundamentally deprive citizenship of its effectiveness. The construction of a real alternative to the contemporary system of globalized liberal capitalism involves other requirements, in particular the recognition of the gigantic variety of needs and aspirations of the popular classes throughout the world. In fact, Hardt and Negri experience much difficulty in imagining the societies of the periphery (85 percent of the human population). The debates concerning the tactics and strategy of building a democratic and progressive alternative that would be effective in the concrete and specific conditions of the different countries and regions of the world never appear to have interested them. Would the "democracy" promoted by the intervention of the United States permit going beyond an electoral farce like the one in the Ukraine, for example? Can one reduce the rights of the "poor" who people the planet to the right to "emigrate" to the opulent West? A socially guaranteed income may be a justifiable demand. But can one have the naiveté to believe that its adoption would abolish the capitalist relation, which allows capital to employ labor (and, consequently, to exploit and oppress it), to the advantage of the worker who would from that point on be in a position to use capital freely and so be able to affirm the potential of his or her creativity? The reduction of the subject of history to the "individual" and the uniting of such individuals into a "multitude" dispose of the true questions concerning the reconstruction of subjects of history equal to the challenges of our era. One could point to many other important contributions to oppose to the silence of Hardt and Negri on this subject. Undoubtedly, historic socialisms and communisms had a tendency to reduce the major subject of modern history to the "working class." Moreover, this is a reproach that could be leveled at the Negri of workerism. In counterpoint, I have proposed an analysis of the subject of history as formed from particular social blocs capable, in successive phases of popular struggle, of effectively transforming the social relations of force to the advantage of the dominated classes and peoples. At the present time, to take up the challenge implies that one is moving forward in the formation of democratic, popular, and national hegemonic blocs capable of overcoming the powers exercised by both the hegemonic imperialist blocs and the hegemonic comprador blocs. The formation of such blocs takes place in concrete conditions that are very different from one country to another so that no general model (whether in the style of the "multitude" or some other) makes sense. In this perspective, the combination of democratic advances and social progress will be part of the long transition to world socialism, just as the affirmation of the autonomy of peoples, nations, and states will make it possible to substitute a negotiated globalization for the unilateral globalization imposed by dominant capital (which Empire praises!) and thus gradually deconstruct the current imperialist system.

AT HARDT/NEGRI: NO MULTITUDE

The dramatic centralization of state power that has come after 9/11 disproves Hardt and Negri's theory that the economic base is more important than the state

Steinmetz, (Sociology Professor, Michigan) 03 (George, *Public Culture* 15.2 (2003) 323-345,
The State of Emergency and the Revival of American Imperialism: Toward an Authoritarian Post-Fordism).

The manifest regulatory changes over the past year have focused primarily on the structure and role of the (U.S.) state. The current "state of emergency," the threat of terrorism, is constructed as a specifically political crisis, a shaken sense of political sovereignty. This massive campaign to recentralize power began, somewhat ironically, just at the moment when globalization theorists (including Hardt and Negri) were reaching a consensus that the state was being overshadowed by transnational, regional, and local organizations. The refocusing of political power on the level of the American national state has been most evident in the area of U.S. geopolitical strategy (unilateralism and preemptive military strikes), but much of the new regulatory activity has focused on the state apparatus itself and the "domestic" level of politics, with the creation of a huge new government agency (the Department of Homeland Security), transformations of the legal system (e.g., secret trials and arrests, indefinite detentions), and intensified domestic surveillance: first with the 2001 USA Patriot Act, which dramatically relaxed restrictions on search and seizure; then with the Total Information Awareness Program, which collects and analyzes vast amounts of data on private communications and commercial transactions; and most recently with the proposed Domestic Security Enhancement Act of 2003.

Hardt and Negri are wrong, the state is still the central locus of power

Steinmetz, (Sociology Professor, Michigan) 03 (George, *Public Culture* 15.2 (2003) 323-345,
The State of Emergency and the Revival of American Imperialism: Toward an Authoritarian Post-Fordism).

The argument for the obsolescence of the strong state becomes less convincing when the U.S. government is busy spying on and arresting its subjects, denying them public trials and lawyers, and threatening to conduct an ever-expanding global war against terrorism defined in ever more open-ended terms. If the essence of politics is defining the enemy, as Carl Schmitt argued, the state apparatuses of the United States seem to have dominated this field domestically since September 11, with the news media playing the role of a supine, supporting chorus. Even questioning the state's decisions has been qualified as treasonous

Hardt and Negri mis-describe the era. Information and cross border flows of people have both become MORE difficult, not less so.

Steinmetz, (Sociology Professor, Michigan) 03 (George, *Public Culture* 15.2 (2003) 323-345,
The State of Emergency and the Revival of American Imperialism: Toward an Authoritarian Post-Fordism).

Within Empire, according to Hardt and Negri, "increasingly less will passports or legal documents be able to regulate our movements across borders" (397); John Ashcroft has insisted, by contrast, that America's national borders will never again be open and fluid. The government's secret drumhead trials are the opposite of the transparently open model envisioned by the authors of *Empire*. The attorney general's seeming disdain for civil liberties (except the Second Amendment), the chilling effect of current policies on immigration, international students and scholars, and Muslims in the United States—all of this seems diametrically opposed to the deterritorializing tendencies of Empire. Developments that seem to run directly counter to the notion of a "democratic network structure" of information (Hardt and Negri 2000: 299) include the provisions in the USA Patriot Act that allow the FBI to search records of books and Internet sites used; the Total Information Awareness program; and the brief but significant career of the "Office of Strategic Influence," whose purpose was to distribute both true and false news items (see Dao and Schmitt 2002). 19 Clearly we are moving into a new political space.

AT HARDT/NEGRI: NO EMPIRE

Hardt and Negri are wrong about recent history so their alternative is doomed to failure: the Empire that they describe has dissipated.

Steinmetz, (Sociology Professor, Michigan) 03 (George, *Public Culture* 15.2 (2003) 323-345,
The State of Emergency and the Revival of American Imperialism: Toward an Authoritarian Post-Fordism).

I will argue here, however, that *Empire* should be understood as a historical reflection on the post-Fordist formation that crystallized in the 1990s and that is now coming to an end rather than a consideration of the present and the future. Hardt and Negri's arresting portrait of Empire is undercut by an explanatory framework that suffers from many of the epistemological shortcomings of traditional Marxism. The authors' residual reductionism and their adherence to a Marxian end-of-history story line prevent them from grasping the transitory nature of the relatively decentered political formation that they call "Empire." In addition to the political shock of September 11 and the ensuing war on terrorism, the 1990s also differed in other ways from the current period. As Slavoj Zizek points out, this was a period in which there was no dominant "schematization" of the "figure of the Enemy" around a single "central image." Capitalist profit rates were so satisfying as to make this lack unproblematic. Nor was there anything like September 11 during this decade: no direct and radical attack on the American node in the network of global capitalism. The ideological, political, and economic conditions for the decentered, multivalent system of Empire described by Hardt and Negri thus seem to have disappeared in the past year and a half.

AT HARDT/NEGRI: HURTS MOVEMENTS

Empire theory is theoretically indefensible and disabling to resistance movements because they could misdirect their efforts. Instead of a moment of transformation, we are faced with a dramatic consolidation of state power and capitalist hegemony.

Steinmetz, (Sociology Professor, Michigan) 03 (George, *Public Culture* 15.2 (2003) 323-345,
The State of Emergency and the Revival of American Imperialism: Toward an Authoritarian Post-Fordism).

Contra such theorists as Hardt and Negri, there is little support for arguments that capitalist history has entered its final phase, that with the coming of Empire the multitudes have reached a stage in which "pushing through to come out the other side" becomes a realistic possibility. These authors link the rise of Fordism to the "great economic crisis of 1929" (Hardt and Negri 2000: 241) and acknowledge the role of the economic crisis of the 1970s in creating the conditions for the transition to post-Fordism. Yet they do not entertain the possibility that Empire itself could enter into a political crisis, like the one we are currently witnessing, and give rise to a new imperialism. Nor do they consider the possibility that a more systemic economic crisis might give rise to a mode of regulation that is neither imperial nor imperialist, but protectionist and neocolonial. Each period of core hegemony has nurtured the illusion among enthusiasts of capitalism that it has reached its apotheosis and the parallel fantasy among leftists that capitalism is on its last legs. Hugo Grotius ([1625] 1901), writing during the golden age of Dutch hegemony, believed that his own world was the ultimate one. (Not surprisingly, Grotius's name is often heard in current discussions of U.S. foreign policy.) The events leading up to the 1848 revolutions in Europe, during the era of British hegemony, famously led Marx and Engels in the Communist Manifesto to predict "an immediately following proletarian revolution." To take a more recent example, Ernest Mandel (1975: 125) believed that *late capitalism*—the title of his book, published in 1972 at the beginning of the death throes of Fordism but written at the end of the first era of postwar American hegemony—had entered a terminal period of "overall social crisis." The final sentence of *Late Capitalism* announced that "the final abolition of capitalism. . . is now approaching." Insisting that there is something ultimate about Empire is not only theoretically indefensible but could actually be disabling for movements of resistance, for such arguments may desensitize readers to the possibility of further mutations of capitalism and modes of social regulation. Without pushing for a cyclical view of history, which Hardt and Negri rightly reject, one need not fall back on its inverse, a teleological or truncated narrative.

AT BAUDRILLARD: CEDE THE POLITICAL

Baudrillard is just a fashionable source of cynicism—not a political strategy.
Rojek 93 (Chris, Deputy Director, Theory, Culture & Society Centre , Professor of Sociology and Culture at Nottingham Trent University, Forget Buadrillard? Edited by Chris Rojek, pgs 109)

His lacerating nihilism, his readiness to prick any cause, his devotion to experience for experience s sake, are all recurring tropes of at least one type of modernism. To be sure, modernism is a multi-faceted concept. Rather than speak of *the* project of modernism it is perhaps more accurate to speak o *projects* of modernism. These projects work around a central dichotomy: reflecting the order of things and exposing the fundamental disorder of things. In the political realm the keynote projects designed to reflect the order of things have been (a) providing a theory of liberal democracy which legitimates the operation of he market; (b) the socialist critiques of capitalism and the plan for the reconstruction of society; and (c) the feminist transformation of the male order of things. These are all *constructive* projects. They either aim to give shape to people's lives or they seek to replace the easing set of politico-economic conditions with a state of affairs that is judged to be superior on rational or moral grounds. Baudrillard it might be said, traces the dispersal of these projects He relishes being the imp of the perverse, the ruthless exponent of the disorder of things His work exposes the posturing and circularities of constructive arguments. But in doing this Baudrillard is not acting as the harbinger of a new postmodern state of affairs. Rather he is treading the well worn paths of one type of modernist sceptism and excess – a path which has no other destiny than repletion. His message of 'no future' does not transcend the political dilemma of modernism, it exemplifies it.

Baudrillard's alternative fails to confront real world politics.

Best & Kellner, 98 Department of Philosophy at University of Texas-El Paso, 1998 [Steven & Douglas, http://www2.cddc.vt.edu/illuminations/kell28.htm, "Postmodern Politics and the Battle for the Future"]

In the aftermath of the 1960s, novel and conflicting conceptions of postmodern politics emerged. Postmodern politics thus take a variety of forms and would include the anti-politics of Baudrillard and his followers, who exhibit a cynical, despairing rejection of the belief in emancipatory social transformation, as well as a variety of efforts to create a new or reconstructed politics. On the extreme and apolitical position of a Baudrillard, we are stranded at the end of history, paralyzed and frozen, as the masses collapse into inertia and indifference, and simulacra and technology triumph over agency. Thus, from Baudrillard's perspective, all we can do is "accommodate ourselves to the time left to us." [3]

AT BAUDRILLARD: SIMULATION

We do, in fact, know the difference between simulation and reality—the media plays a healthy role in the public sphere.

March, 95 James Marsh, Professor of Philosophy, Fordham University, 95, Critique, Action, and Liberation, pp. 292-293

Such an account, however, is as one-sided or perhaps even more one-sided than that of naive modernism. We note a residual idealism that does not take into account socioeconomic realities already pointed out such as the corporate nature of media, their role in achieving and legitimating profit, and their function of manufacturing consent. In such a postmodernist account is a reduction of everything to image or symbol that misses the relationship of these to realities such as corporations seeking profit, impoverished workers in these corporations, or peasants in Third-World countries trying to conduct elections. Postmodernism does not adequately distinguish here between a reduction of reality to image and a mediation of reality by image. A media idealism exists rooted in the influence of structuralism and poststructuralism and doing insufficient justice to concrete human experience, judgment, and free interaction in the world.4 It is also paradoxical or contradictory to say it really is true that nothing is really true, that everything is illusory or imaginary. Postmodemism makes judgments that implicitly deny the reduction of reality to image. For example, Poster and Baudrillard do want to say that we really are in a new age that is informational and postindustrial. Again, to say that everything is imploded into media images is akin logically to the Cartesian claim that everything is or might be a dream. What happens is that dream or image is absolutized or generalized to the point that its original meaning lying in its contrast to natural, human, and social reality is lost. We can discuss Disneyland as reprehensible because we know the difference between Disneyland and the larger, enveloping reality of Southern California and the United States.5 We can note also that postmodernism misses the reality of the accumulation-legitimation tension in late capitalism in general and in communicative media in particular. This tension takes different forms in different times. In the United States in the 1960s and 1970s, for example, social, economic, and political reality occasionally manifested itself in the media in such a way that the electorate responded critically to corporate and political policies. Coverage of the Vietnam war, for example, did help turn people against the war. In the 1980s, by contrast, the emphasis shifted more toward accumulation in the decade dominated by the "great communicator." Even here, however, the majority remained opposed to Reagan's policies while voting for Reagan. Human and social reality, while being influenced by and represented by the media, transcended them and remained resistant to them.6 To the extent that postmodernists are critical of the role media play, we can ask the question about the normative adequacy of such a critique. Why, in the absence of normative conceptions of rationality and freedom, should media dominance be taken as bad rather than good? Also, the most relevant contrasting, normatively structured alternative to the media is that of the "public sphere," in which the imperatives of free, democratic, nonmanipulable communicative action are institutionalized. Such a public sphere has been present in western democracies since the nineteenth century but has suffered erosion in the twentieth century as capitalism has more and more taken over the media and commercialized them. Even now the public sphere remains normatively binding and really operative through institutionalizing the ideals of free, full, public expression and discussion; ideal, legal requirements taking such forms as public service programs, public broadcasting, and provision for alternative media; and social movements acting and discoursing in and outside of universities in print, in demonstrations and forms of resistance, and on media such as movies, television, and radio.7

AT BAUDRILLARD: SIMULATION

Relegating human suffering to the realm of simulation is just nihilism, crushing politics.
Kellner, 89 Phil. Chair @ UCLA, 1989, Jean Baudrillard, p. 107-8, Douglas

Yet does the sort of symbolic exchange which Baudrillard advocates really provide a solution to the question of death? Baudrillard's notion of symbolic exchange between life and death and his ultimate embrace of nihilism (see 4.4) is probably his most un-Nietzschean moment, the instant in which his thought radically devalues life and focuses with a fascinated gaze on that which is most terrible — death. In a popular French reading of Nietzsche, his 'transvaluation of values' demanded negation of all repressive and life- negating values in favor of affirmation of life, joy and happiness. This 'philosophy of value' valorized life over death and derived its values from phenomena which enhanced, refined and nurtured human life. In Baudrillard, by contrast, life does not exist as an autonomous source of value, and the body exists only as 'the caarnality of signs,' as a mode of display of signification. His sign fetishism erases all materialjty from the body and social life, and makes possible a fascinated aestheticized fetishism of signs as the primary ontological reality. This way of seeing erases suffering, disease, pain and the horror of death from the body and social life and replaces it with the play of signs — Baudrillard's alternative. Politics too is reduced to a play of signs, and the ways in which different politics alleviate or intensify human suffering disappears from the Baudrillardian universe. Consequently Baudrillard's theory spirals into a fascination with signs which leads him to embrace certain privileged forms of sign culture and to reject others (that is, the theoretical signs of modernity such as meaning, truth, the social, power and so on) and to pay less and less attention to materiality (that is, to needs, desire, suffering and so on) a trajectory will ultimately lead him to embrace nihilism (see 4.4).

AT CRITIQUES OF SCIENCE

Science is the opposite of domination – scientific knowledge liberates and improves lives.
Bronner 04 Stephen Eric Bronner, Professor of Political Science at Rutgers University, 2004, Reclaiming the Enlightenment: Toward a Politics of Radical Engagement, p. 21-23

Something will always be missing: freedom will never become fully manifest in reality. The relation between them is asymptotic. Therefore, most philosophes understood progress as a regulative ideal, or as a postulate,13 rather than as an absolute or the expression of some divine plane or the foundation for a system.'4 Even in scientific terms, progress retained a critical dimension insofar as it implied the need to question established certainties. In this vein, it is misleading simply to equate scientific reason with the domination of man and nature.15 All the great figures of the scientific revolution —Bacon, Boyle, Newton—were concerned with liberating humanity from what seemed the power of seemingly intractable forces. Swamps were everywhere; roads were few; forests remained to be cleared; illness was rampant; food was scarce; most people would never leave their village. What it implied not to understand the existence of bacteria or the nature of electricity, just to use very simple examples, is today simply inconceivable. Enlightenment figures like Benjamin Franklin, "the complete philosophe,"'6 became famous for a reason: they not only freed people from some of their fears but through inventions like the stove and the lightning rod they also raised new possibilities for making people's lives more livable. Critical theorists and postmodernists miss the point when they view Enlightenment intellectuals in general and scientists in particular as simple apostles of reification. They actually constituted its most consistent enemy. The philosophes may not have grasped the commodity form, but they empowered people by challenging superstitions and dogmas that left them mute and helpless against the whims of nature and the injunctions of tradition. Enlightenment thinkers were justified in understanding knowledge as inherently improving humanity. Infused with a sense of furthering the public good, liberating the individual from the clutches of the invisible and inexplicable, the Enlightenment idea of progress required what the young Marx later termed "the ruthless critique of everything existing." This regulative notion of progress was never inimical to subjectivity. Quite the contrary: progress became meaningful only with reference to real living individuals.

AT SAID: NO ALTERNATIVE

Post-colonialism essentializes oppression and makes resistance impossible.

Ong 99 Aihwa Ong, Professor of Anthropology at UC Berkeley, Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logic of Transnationality, 1999, p. 33-34

More broadly, postcolonial theorists focus on recovering the voices of subjects silenced by patriarchy and colonial rule (The Empire Writes Back is the title of one popular collection); they assume that all contemporary racial, ethnic, and cultural oppressions can all be attributed to Western colonialisms. American appropriations of postcolonial theory have created a unitary discourse of the postcolonial that refers to highly variable situations and conditions throughout the world; thus, Gayatri Spivak is able to talk about "the paradigmatic subaltern woman," as well as "New World Asians (the old migrants) and New Immigrant Asians (often 'model minorities') being disciplinarized together?" Other postcolonial feminists also have been eager to seek structural similarities, continuities, conjunctures, and alliances between the postcolonial oppressions experienced by peoples on the bases of race, ethnicity, and gender both in formerly colonized populations in the third world and among immigrant populations in the United States, Australia, and England.16 Seldom is there any attempt to link these assertions of unitary postcolonial situations among diasporan subjects in the West to the historical structures of colonization, decolonization, and contemporary developments in particular non-Western countries. Indeed, the term postcolonial has been used to indiscriminately describe different regimes of economic, political, and cultural domination in the Americas, India, Africa, and other third-world countries where the actual historical experiences of colonialism have been very varied in terms of local culture, conquest, settlement, racial exploitation, administrative regime, political resistance, and articulation with global capitalism. In careless hands, postcolonial theory can represent a kind of theoretical imperialism whereby scholars based in the West, without seriously engaging the scholarship of faraway places, can project or "speak for" postcolonial situations elsewhere. Stuart Hall has warned against approaches that universalize racial, ethnic, and gender oppressions without locating the "actual integument of power…in concrete institutions." A more fruitful strand of postcolonial studies is represented by subaltern scholars such as Partha Chatterjee, who has criticized the Indian national projects, which are based on Western models of modernity and bypass "many possibilities of authentic, creative, and plural development of social identities," including the marginalized communities in Indian society. He suggests that an alternative imagination that draws on "narratives of community" would be a formidable challenge to narratives of capital. This brilliant work, however, is based on the assumption that both modernity and capitalism are universal forms, against which non-Western societies such as India can only mobilize "pre-existing cultural solidarities such as locality, caste, tribe, religious community, or ethnic identity." This analytical opposition between a universal modernity and non-Western culture is rather old-fashioned it is as if Chatterjee believes the West is not present in Indian elites who champion narratives of the indigenous community. Furthermore, the concept of a universal modernity must be rethought when, as Arif Dirlik observes, "the narrative of capitalism is no longer the narrative of the history of Europe; non-European capitalist societies now make their own claims on the history of capitalism."20 The loose use of the term "the postcolonial," then, has had the bizarre effect of contributing to a Western tradition of othering the Rest; it suggests a postwar scheme whereby "the third world" was followed by "the developing countries," which are now being succeeded by "the postcolonial." This continuum seems to suggest that the further we move in time, the more beholden non-Western countries are to the forms and practices of their colonial past. By and large, anthropologists have been careful to discuss how formerly colonized societies have developed differently in relation to global economic and political dominations and have repositioned themselves differently vis-a-vis capitalism and late modernity. By specifying differences in history, politics, and culture, anthropologists are able to say how the postcolonial formation of Indonesia is quite different from that of India, Nicaragua, or Zaire.

AT BUTLER: PERM

Perm solves best – even Butler agrees strategically using gender categories is politically effective

Baldwin, 97 Margaret A. Baldwin, Assoc. Prof Law @ FSU, Spring 1997, "Public Women and the Feminist State," 20 Harv. Women's L.J. 47, p ln

However salutary the postmodern goal of de-essentializing women, postmodern theory ultimately effaces the specific situation of public women, and forfeits altogether any account of gender along the way. This difficulty, and its implications for political strategy, is often spoken of but rarely addressed seriously within postmodern feminism. Denise Riley offers the diktat that at such junctures women can know amongst themselves "that 'women' don't exist -- while maintaining a politics of [*160] 'as if they existed' -- since the world behaves as if they unambiguously did." 434 Judith Butler makes the same tactical concession when she affirms the continued necessity of asserting "a generally shared conception of 'women'" 435 as a political strategy: Within feminism, it seems as if there is some political necessity to speak as and for women, and I would not contest that necessity. Surely, that is the way in which representational politics operates, and . . . lobbying efforts are virtually impossible without recourse to identity politics. So we agree that demonstrations and legislative efforts and radical movements need to make claims in the name of women. 436

IDENTITY POLITICS: CEDE THE POLITICAL

Identity politics only fracture the left—a universal goal of using reform to fight oppression will be more effective.

Wilson, 2000 – Editor and Publisher of Illinois Academe – 2000 (John K. Wilson, "How the Left can Win Arguments and Influence People" p. 124- 126)

Many philosophers of the left propose solving all the problems posed to progressives by uniting the left behind some single universal principle of class, abandoning its diverse obsessions with race, gender, sexual orientation, environmentalism, and all the other "isms" of the left. A left that works for the working class is not incompatible, however, with a left that campaigns for equality on the basis of race, gender, sexual orientation, disability, age, and so on. If progressives ignore the fact that African Americans or women or gays and lesbians face inequality and discrimination, no one will take them seriously when they argue that the poor are treated unjustly. A theory of oppression that challenges the American presumption of equality must encompass all these oppressions, not just the ones that seem most politically palatable. Conservative forces developed the term special-interest groups to attack progressive causes. For Republicans, it became the way to attack the best-organized leftist parts of the Democratic Party. For Democrats, denouncing "special interests" has been the favorite tactic of centrist candidates who want to eliminate progressive forces with their own party. The special-interest groups are not nearly as special as the corporate interests. The "special interests" have relatively little power, even within the Democratic Party, and they represent a far larger part of America than do the corporations that often oppose them. Progressives are tagged with the label of being the servants of "special interests"-blacks, Latinos, women, gays and lesbians, labor unions, the poor, the disabled, and so forth. Of Course, if you add up all the "special interests" supposedly beholden to the left, they represent more than 90 percent of the population. Obviously, it's the right and the neoliberals who serve the truly "special" interests: rich straight white men and the corporations they run. There is no inherent conflict between the so-called special interests on the left and the ideal of common progressive ideals. The goal of liberty and equality requires addressing the injustices affecting these so-called special interests. No progressive movement can be true to its name unless it speaks out against racial discrimination, gender inequality, homophobia, and any other forms of oppression. Progressives must demand that class be added to these issues, but class analysis alone cannot adequately address all inequalities. Class alone does not explain why the wealthy African American driving a BMW gets pulled over by the police. Class alone does not explain why women face a glass ceiling (or, even more often, a glass door). Exclusively class-based solutions may help some poor white males who legitimately need assistance, but class ignores too many other important factors. It's the unequal treatment of women and minorities that helps create many of these class inequalities, and the politics of racism and sexism that prevents the public from looking at the inequities created by class. Both the Republican and Democratic Parties are notorious for using race to distract poor whites from the poverty they face and to prevent them from organizing to achieve greater equality. The answer to this problem is not to abandon the cause of racial equality in hopes of building a larger progressive movement based on appealing to racists. The left can succeed only if it has principles. What the left needs to do is communicate the fact that these principles promote an ideal of equality that includes advancing the cause of poor people of all races. Race and gender analysis does not distract us from understanding an overarching principle of class. On the contrary, no one can understand how class inequalities exist in America without comprehending how racial bias and gender discrimination create many of these class inequities. Class is not a magic word capable of bringing the masses to progressive causes, any more than race or gender has brought success to the left. Progressives need to cast a wide net of interlinked causes that can be pursued separately while still contributing to the ultimate goal of justice and equality. The left needs intellectuals and activists, academics and anarchists, special-interest groups and broad coalitions, Marxist ideologies and crazed hippies, atheists and religious freaks, reformers and revolutionaries, and everybody else. This is the left. It cannot be controlled, but it can be nudged. The diverse left cannot be led down a single path, but perhaps it can be guided in a general direction. Or at the very least, perhaps the left can be persuaded to give up its internal bickering and recognize its common foes.

AT CAPITALISM K: CEDE THE POLITICAL

Capitalism is utterly inevitable—the left only looks crazy when they focus on Marxism over practical reforms.

Wilson, 2000 – Author of many books including 'The Myth of Political Correctness' – 2000 (John K. Wilson, "How the Left can Win Arguments and Influence People" p. 7- 10)

Socialism is dead. Kaput. Stick a fork in Lenin's corpse. Take the Fidel posters off the wall. Welcome to the twenty-first century. Wake up and smell the capitalism. I have no particular hostility to socialism. But nothing can kill a good idea in America so quickly as sticking the "socialist" label on it. The reality in America is that socialism is about as successful as Marxist footwear (and have you ever seen a sickle and hammer on anybody's shoes?). Allow your position to be defined as socialist even if it isn't (remember Clinton's capitalist health care plan?), and the idea is doomed. Instead of fighting to repair the tattered remnants of socialism as a marketing slogan, the left needs to address the core issues of social justice. You can form the word socialist from the letters in social justice, but it sounds better if you don't. At least 90 percent of America opposes socialism, and 90 percent of America thinks "social justice" might be a good idea. Why alienate so many people with a word? Even the true believers hawking copies of the Revolutionary Socialist Worker must realize by now that the word socialist doesn't have a lot of drawing power. In the movie Bulworth, Warren Beatty declares: "Let me hear that dirty word: socialism!" Socialism isn't really a dirty word, however; if it were, socialism might have a little underground appeal as a forbidden topic. Instead, socialism is a forgotten word, part of an archaic vocabulary and a dead language that is no longer spoken in America. Even Michael Harrington, the founder of the Democratic Socialists of America (DSA), didn't use the word socialism in his influential book on poverty, The Other America. The best reason for the left to abandon socialism is not PR but honesty. Most of the self-described "socialists" remaining in America don't qualify as real socialists in any technical sense. If you look at the DSA (whose prominent members include Harvard professor Cornel West and former Time columnist Barbara Ehrenreich), most of the policies they urge-a living wage, universal health care, environmental protection, reduced spending on the Pentagon, and an end to corporate welfare-have nothing to do with socialism in the specific sense of government ownership of the means of production. Rather, the DSA program is really nothing more than what a liberal political party ought to push for, if we had one in America. Europeans, to whom the hysteria over socialism must seem rather strange, would never consider abandoning socialism as a legitimate political ideology. But in America, socialism simply isn't taken seriously by the mainstream. Therefore, if socialists want to be taken seriously, they need to pursue socialist goals using nonsocialist rhetoric. Whenever someone tries to attack an idea as "socialist" (or, better yet, "communist"), there's an easy answer: Some people think everything done by a government, from Social Security to Medicare to public schools to public libraries, is socialism. The rest of us just think it's a good idea. (Whenever possible, throw public libraries into an argument, whether it's about good government programs or NEA funding. Nobody with any sense is opposed to public libraries. They are by far the most popular government institutions.) If an argument turns into a debate over socialism, simply define socialism as the total government ownership of all factories and natural resources--which, since we don't have it and no one is really arguing for this to happen, makes socialism a rather pointless debate. Of course, socialists will always argue among themselves about socialism and continue their internal debates. But when it comes to influencing public policy, abstract discussions about socialism are worse than useless, for they alienate the progressive potential of the American people. It's only by pursuing specific progressive policies on nonsocialist terms that socialists have any hope in the long term of convincing the public that socialism isn't (or shouldn't be) a long-dead ideology.

Apocalyptic predictions about the ills of capitalism will not motivate activism—practical reforms are the only hope for the left.

Wilson, 2000 – Editor and Publisher of Illinois Academe – 2000 (John K. Wilson, "How the Left can Win Arguments and Influence People" p. 14- 15)

Leftists also need to abandon their tendency to make apocalyptic predictions. It's always tempting to predict that environmental destruction is imminent or the stock market is ready to crash in the coming second Great Depression. Arguments that the U.S. economy is in terrible shape fly in the face of reality. It's hard to claim that a middle-class American family with two cars, a big-screen TV, and a computer is oppressed. While the poor in America fell behind during the Reagan/Gingrich/Clinton era and the middle class did not receive its share of the wealth produced during this time, the economy itself is in excellent shape. Instead, the problem is the redistribution of wealth to the very rich under the resurgence of "free market" capitalism. Instead of warning that the economy will collapse without progressive policies, the left should emphasize that the progressive aspects of American capitalism have created the current success of the American economy after decades of heavy government investment in human capital. But the cutbacks in investment for education and the growing disparity between the haves and the have-notes are threatening the economy's future success.

AT CAPITALISM K: CEDE THE POLITICAL

Capitalism is inevitable—reforms, not revolution, are the only option.

Wilson, 2000 – Editor and Publisher of Illinois Academe – 2000 (John K. Wilson, "How the Left can Win Arguments and Influence People" p. 15- 16)

Capitalism is far too ingrained in American life to eliminate. If you go into the most impoverished areas of America, you will find that the people who live there are not seeking government control over factories or even more social welfare programs; they're hoping, usually in vain, for a fair chance to share in the capitalist wealth. The poor do not pray for socialism-they strive to be a part of the capitalist system. They want jobs, they want to start businesses, and they want to make money and be successful. What's wrong with America is not capitalism as a system but capitalism as a religion. We worship the accumulation of wealth and treat the horrible inequality between rich and poor as if it were an act of God. Worst of all, we allow the government to exacerbate the financial divide by favoring the wealthy: go anywhere in America, and compare a rich suburb with a poor town-the city services, schools, parks, and practically everything else will be better financed in the place populated by rich people. The aim is not to overthrow capitalism but to overhaul it. Give it a social-justice tune-up, make it more efficient, get the economic engine to hit on all cylinders for everybody, and stop putting out so many environmentally hazardous substances. To some people, this goal means selling out leftist ideals for the sake of capitalism. But the right thrives on having an ineffective opposition. The Revolutionary Communist Party helps stabilize the "free market" capitalist system by making it seem as if the only alternative to free-market capitalism is a return to Stalinism. Prospective activists for change are instead channeled into pointless discussions about the revolutionary potential of the proletariat. Instead of working to persuade people to accept progressive ideas, the far left talks to itself (which may be a blessing, given the way it communicates) and tries to sell copies of the Socialist Worker to an uninterested public.

Overthrowing capitalism is a political non-starter—reforms are the only way that the left will be effective.

Wilson, 2000 Editor and Publisher of Illinois Academe of many books including 'The Myth of Political Correctness' – 2000 (John K. Wilson, "How the Left can Win Arguments and Influence People" p. 123)

The left often finds itself stuck in a debate between revolution and reform. To self-described revolutionaries, any attempt to reform the system is a liberal compromise that only delays the creation of a socialist utopia. The vision of workers casting off their chains and embracing the overthrow of capitalism is pure fantasy. No one actually knows what it means to overthrow capitalism, and it clearly isn't going to happen, anyway. Reforming American capitalism is not a halfhearted effort at modest change; it is a fundamental attack on the reigning ideology of "free market" capitalism. Progressive reforms, taken seriously, are revolutionary in every important sense. Reforms such as the New Deal were truly revolutionary for their time, and American capitalism has been saved from its own flaws by these progressive reforms. The problem is that these progressive reforms have not been carried far enough, in part because the revolutionary left has too often failed to support the progressives' reformist agenda. The only leftist revolution in America will come from an accumulation of progressive policies, and so the question of revolution versus reform is irrelevant.

AT CAPITALISM K: PEACE

Capitalism promotes democratic peace.

Fukuyama 95 – Senior Social Scientist, Rand Corporation – 1995 (Francis, TRUST, p. 360-1)

The role that a capitalist economy plays in channeling recognition struggles in a peaceful direction, and its consequent importance to democratic stability, is evident in post-communist Eastern Europe. The totalitarian project envisioned the destruction of an independent civil society and the creation of a new socialist community centered exclusively around the state. When the latter, highly artificial community, there were virtually no alternative forms of community beyond those of family and ethnic group, or else in the delinquent communities constituted by criminal gangs. In the absence of a layer of voluntary associations, individuals clung to their ascriptive identities all the more fiercely. Ethnicity provided an easy form of community by which they could avoid feeling atomized, weak, and victimized by the larger historical forces swirling around them. In developed capitalist societies with strong civil societies, by contrast, the economy itself is the locus of a substantial part of social life. When one works for Motorola, Siemens, Toyota, or even a small family dry-cleaning business, one is part of a moral network that absorbs a large part of one's energies and ambitions. The Eastern European countries that appear to have the greatest chances for success as democracies are Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic, which retained nascent civil societies throughout the communist period and were able to generate capitalist private sectors in relatively short order. There is no lack of divisive ethnic conflicts in these places, whether over competing Polish and Lithuanian claims to Vilnius or Hungarian irredenta vis-à-vis neighbors. But they have not flared up into violent conflicts yet because the economy has been sufficiently vigorous to provide an alternative source of social identity and belonging. The mutual dependence of economy and polity is not limited to democratizing states in the former communist world. In a way, the loss of social capital in the United States has more immediate consequences for American democracy than for the American economy. Democratic political institutions no less than businesses depend on trust for effective operation, and the reduction of trust in a society will require a more intrusive, rule-making government to regulate social relations.

AT CAPITALISM K: CAN BE LIBERATORY

Capitalism is inevitable and can be turned into a force for liberation as long as progressives focus on practical reforms.

Wilson, 2000 – Editor and Publisher of Illinois Academe – 2000 (John K. Wilson, "How the Left can Win Arguments and Influence People" p. 12- 14)

Progressive capitalism is not a contradiction in terms, for progressives support capitalism in many ways. Even nonprofit organizations and cooperatives are not antithetical to capitalism and the market; these groups simply use capitalism for aims different from the single-minded pursuit of profits. But the rules of supply and demand, the expenses and revenues, the idea of entrepreneurship and innovation, and the need to adapt to the market are essential. Any progressive magazine or institution that tries to defy the rules of capitalism won't be around for very long and certainly won't have the resources to mount a serious advocacy of progressive ideas. One of the most effective tactics of the environmental movement was encouraging consumers to consider environmental values when making capitalist choices about what products to buy. Today, a manufacturer who ignores environmental issues puts its profits at risk because so many people are looking for environmentally friendly products and packaging. Crusades against Coca-Cola for its massive output of non-recycled plastic bottles in America or against companies supporting foreign dictatorships are part of the continuing battle to force companies to pay attention to consumer demands. Of course, consumer protests and boycotts are only one part of making "capitalism for everyone." Many progressive groups are now buying stock in companies precisely to raise these issues at stockholder meetings and pressure the companies to adopt environmentally and socially responsible policies. Unfortunately, the legal system is structured against progressive ideas. In 2000, Ben and Jerry's Ice Cream was forced to sell out to a big corporation that might ignore its commitment to many progressive causes. The company didn't want to sell, but the law demanded that the company's duty to stockholders was to consider only the money involved. Imagine what would happen if our capitalist laws were designed to promote progressive ideas instead of impeding them. Instead of allowing a shareholder lawsuit against any company acting in a morally, socially, and environmentally conscious way, American laws should encourage these goals. The claim by some leftists that capitalism is inherently irresponsible or evil doesn't make sense. Capitalism is simply a system of markets. What makes capitalism so destructive isn't the basic foundation but the institutions that have been created in the worship of the "free market." Unfortunately, progressives spend most of their time attacking capitalism rather than taking credit for all the reforms that led to America's economic growth. If Americans were convinced that social programs and investment in people (rather than corporate welfare and investment in weaponry) helped create the current economic growth, they would be far more willing to pursue additional progressive policies. Instead, the left allows conservatives to dismiss these social investments as "too costly" or "big government."

AT CAPITALISM K: NO SPECIFC ALT = FAILURE

The massive but failed WTO protests prove that protesting against capitalism without a specific alternative is doomed to failure.

Wilson, 2000 – Editor and Publisher of Illinois Academe – 2000 (John K. Wilson, "How the Left can Win Arguments and Influence People" p. 110- 113)

Victory isn't easy for the left, even when it wins. One example in which progressives did almost everything right (but nevertheless was widely attacked) was the 1999 World Trade Organization (WTO) hearings in Seattle. Thanks to the hard work of leftists around the country (and the world), Seattle was overrun by more than 50,000 protesters who were determined to bring public attention to a powerful, secretive trade group. A huge rally organized by labor groups brought tens of thousands marching through Seattle, complete with union workers and environmentalists in sea turtle costumes. Thousands of protesters linked arms and prevented the opening session of the WTO from meeting. Most of the media coverage blamed the protesters for property damage that was planned and caused by anarchists and not stopped by the police. But the protesters did have a powerful effect on the scene, where the bias of the American media was less important to the delegates, many of whom sympathized with some of the protests. President Clinton, the world's leading trend detector, expressed his support for listening to the peaceful protesters, showing that he was more alert to the persuasive power of the anti-WTO forces than most of the media. Seattle and Washington left the left with many lessons. The first was never to let the media choose what the issue would be. Unfortunately, journalists (and their editors) are trained to overlook an important point for the sake of a flashy image and to portray a dramatic confrontation rather than a moral cause. This doesn't excuse the inaccurate reporting, biased attacks, and unquestioning defense of the authorities that filled most of the front pages and TV news about the WTO and IMF demonstrations. The progressives failed to spin the issue beyond their simple anti-WTO message. The reasons for opposing the WTO got some mention, but the idea of an alternative international organization built on genuine "free trade" and the protection of basic human rights never was aired. The left has become so accustomed to being ignored that progressives have wisely refined the attention-grabbing techniques of theatrical protest that can convey a simple message. Unfortunately, the left hasn't developed the difficult techniques of bringing more complex arguments into the public debate, and the result is that progressive views seem shallow and emotional compared with the more extensive coverage of the ideas of the right and the center in the mainstream media. Still, Seattle was both a success and an opportunity lost. The left brought attention to an organization without many redeeming values, but it never was able to launch a serious debate about what the alternative global values should be. Ignoring the massive evidence of police misconduct and brutality, the media served a well-defined role as gatekeepers of the truth. When the media criticized Seattle officials, it was for "permitting" the peaceful protestors to exercise their right to protest instead of shutting down the city, as happened for the rest of the WTO meetings. Still, the inability of the left to unify their ideas as easily as they unified behind the physical protest made it possible for many of the media errors to go unchallenged. Imagine if all the groups united behind the WTO protests had planned to meet after the initial melee and formulated a united response. Imagine if they had declared,

We denounce all violence, whether it is the violence of smashing windows; the violence of shooting tear gas, concussion grenades, pepper spray, and rubber bullets at peaceful protestors; or the violence of regimes anywhere in the world where political, human, or labor rights are violated and the environment is harmed.

We regret that the police chose to ignore the vandalism on the streets of downtown Seattle and instead attacked nonviolent protestors with tear gas and rubber bullets. As we informed police before the protests began, a group of violent anarchists had announced their intention to try to disrupt our nonviolent protests and discredit our cause. although many peaceful demonstrators defended Seattle's stores—some of which we had previously protested in front of—against property damage and looting, we could no persuade these well-organized anarchists to stop, and we could not persuade the policy shooting tear gas at us to stop the violence.

We remain united in our belief that the policies of the World Trade Organization are harmful to the people of the world and are designed instead to increase the profits of corporations and the politicians who serve them. We will return to downtown Seattle to exercise our constitutional rights to assemble peacefully and express our ideas about the WTO.

Saying that the WTO should be abolished is a simply and perhaps desirable goal. But failing to present a comprehensive alternative to international trade left the protesters open to accusations of being naïve or protectionist. The problem for the left was that their efforts were so disorganized that no clear alternative emerged. There was no comprehensive solution offered for the problems posed by the WTO, the World Band, and the IMF. No alternative institutions were proposed to take over the work of helping the world rather than harming it. Progressives need an international approach to free trade that doesn't seem like protectionism. "America First" is not a progressive perspective, and it fails to help the rest of the world. Without a progressive vision of globalism, the protests against free trade begin to merge with narrow-minded Buchananesque conspiracy theories about the UN or the WTO taking over the world.

AT GLOBAL/LOCAL: PERM

Local resistance must be combined with larger struggles to effectively resist.

Gills – 02 [Barry K, Chair of the World Historical Systems theory group of the International Studies Association and a faculty affiliate of the Globalization Research Center of the University of Hawaii, "Democratizing Globalization and Globalizing Democracy, May, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, May]

In this sense, we may conclude that we are living through the (gradual or sudden?) demise of the old world order and the (slow or sudden?) birth of a new one. Economically, this new order is based on an increased level of global economic integration and unison. Politically, however, it is premised on the need to translate grassroots participatory political action into increasingly popular democratic forms of governance at local, national, regional, and global levels (Gills 2000c; 2001). Moreover, it is also based on a real need to combine the peoples and social forces of North and South in new ways, bringing together new coalitions drawn from movements around the world. The governments and the corporations of the world must now listen to and accommodate the demands of the peoples of the whole world, who represent the voice of the governed. This new reality, which in my view is an objective one and not mere idealism, therefore requires a new [*169] paradigm. This new paradigm of world order must be based profoundly on multicivilizational dialogue and universal inclusion. Rather than a political order based on one nation, we are moving toward the need for a political order based on one humanity, and only democratic norms can accommodate such a form of governance.

AT GLOBAL/LOCAL: GLOBAL RESISTANCE KEY

Local struggles are not enough—global impacts require coordinated, large scale responses too.

Best and Kellner, 01 - Assoc. Prof Phil. and Human. U Texas and Phil. Of Ed. Chair – 2001 (Steven and Douglas, "Postmodern Politics and the Battle for the Future," Illuminations, http://www.uta.edu/huma/illuminations/kell28.htm)

The emphasis on local struggles and micropower, cultural politics which redefine the political, and attempts to develop political forms relevant to the problems and developments of the contemporary age is extremely valuable, but there are also certain limitations to the dominant forms of postmodern politics. While an emphasis on micropolitics and local struggles can be a healthy substitute for excessively utopian and ambitious political projects, one should not lose sight that key sources of political power and oppression are precisely the big targets aimed at by modern theory, including capital, the state, imperialism, and patriarchy. Taking on such major targets involves coalitions and multi-front struggle, often requiring a politics of alliance and solidarity that cuts across group identifications to mobilize sufficient power to struggle against, say, the evils of capitalism or the state. Thus, while today we need the expansion of localized cultural practices, they attain their real significance only within the struggle for the transformation of society as a whole. Without this systemic emphasis, cultural and identity politics remain confined to the margins of society and are in danger of degenerating into narcissism, hedonism, aestheticism, or personal therapy, where they pose no danger and are immediately coopted by the culture industries.

AT LACAN/ZIZEK: "THE ACT" FAILS

Zizek's Act fails to accomplish fundamental change—it is merely therapeutic for individuals.

Robinson 04 (Andrew, PhD, political theory, University of Nottingham, "Introduction: The Basic Zizekian Model," Theory Blog, http://andyrobinsontheoryblog.blogspot.com/2004/11/zizek-notes-and-work-in-progress_15.html)

Why does Zizek support the Act? Although he connects the Act to 'radicalism', he does not state anywhere that the Act accomplishes any fundamental change in the deep structure of existence; at best, it can temporarily suspend (for instance) exclusion. This is not an attempt to achieve a better world (still less a perfect one!) but a purely structural attempt to restore something which Zizek thinks is missing. In this sense, even in its 'radicalism', the Act is conservative. Zizek is concerned that the matrix of sublimation - the possibility of producing 'sublime' objects which seem to encapsulate the absolute - is under threat (FA 26; elsewhere, Zizek attacks postmodernists and other 'new sophists' for this). The Act in whatever form reproduces the possibility of sublimity; in this sense, it reproduces old certainties in new forms, undermining all the gains made by theories of historicity and contingency. The purpose of the Act, which Zizek has transplanted from psychoanalytic practice (directed at individual psyches) to socio-political practice (directed at entire social systems) without considering whether this is possible or appropriate, is primarily therapeutic. The role of the Act is to solve the antinomy of the present by asserting a Real against the combined Imaginary and Real of simulacra, thereby reintroducing the impossibility that shatters the Imaginary, enabling us to traverse the fantasy (TS 374; the fantasy is the extimate kernel of libidinal investment which Zizek sees lurking almost everywhere). Zizek seems to be restoring to psychoanalysis a naive conception of psychological health: via the ex nihilo act, one can escape the logic of the symptom (DSST 178).

Zizek's Act is radically nihilistic and accomplishes nothing political.

Robinson 04 (Andrew, PhD, political theory, University of Nottingham, "Introduction: The Basic Zizekian Model," Theory Blog, http://andyrobinsontheoryblog.blogspot.com/2004/11/zizek-notes-and-work-in-progress_15.html)

It is important to realise that the Act is not revolutionary in the sense of creating something new on the basis of an ideal, or an imaginary, or the restoration of an authentic pre-alienated state, or any other process which would allow one to create something on the basis of a project and praxis. The Act is radically nihilistic (see below). For Zizek, the subject can change nothing - all it can do is add itself to reality by an act of claiming responsibility for the given (SOI 221). Zizek is a little inconsistent on the relationship between the Act and the existing system, but on the whole, he seems to see Acts as occurring for the system, against imaginaries and especially the extimate kernel of fantasy. Christianity did not so much suspend the law, says Zizek, as suspend its obscene supplement (FA 130) (i.e. extimate kernel). Zizek thinks fantasy is fundamentally inconsistent, so it is an "ethical duty" to put this on display, in order to disrupt fantasy (PF 74; see CONSERVATISM on Zizek's tendency to conflate 'displaying' with 'doing', so that the boundary between being a sexist or a fascist and displaying sexism or fascism to disrupt it is unclear). Zizek is inconsistent, however, since there are also occasions when he seems to want to encourage fantasies (TS 51). Crucially, the Act is also a form of decisiveness. Zizek wants to pin down vacillating signifiers without using a Master-Signifier or quilting-point, he says on one occasion (FA 139-40). Elsewhere (eg. on Chavez and Lenin), he seems to rather like the Master or "One" whose Act 'quilts' the field. Either way, the Act seems to give a certain focus to discourse, acting as a centre. As his discussions of the vanishing mediator show, he sees the Act establishing a new set of symbolic and imaginary discourses which restore the role of the master-signifier, by directly adopting the position of the extimate kernel. Zizek also sees the Act as a resolution of a dilemma. According to Zizek, Good assumes (and therefore produces) Evil, and the Act escapes the resulting dilemma by breaking with Good (TS 382; this is also what distinguishes the Act as diabolical Evil from everyday evil - crime, the Holocaust and so on). For Zizek, denial of the possibility of the Act is the root of evil (TS 376). What seems completely missing here is any case for the Act that in any way justifies ethically the terrible nature of the Act, both for its perpetrator and for others; one can only really accept Zizek's Act if one places at the core of one's belief-system the importance of resolving dilemmas in some supposed deep structure of existence, so what matters is not human or social consequences or any specific beliefs, but merely the adoption of a structural position which solves contradictions in and thereby overcomes the problems of a structure. Despite Zizek's repeated use of the term "ethics", therefore, this is in many ways not an ethical system at all, but a kind of model of structural problem-solving - a "therapy" for society, passed off as ethics.

AT LACAN/ZIZEK: "THE ACT" FAILS

Zizek's alternative "act" conceptualizes culture as having so much power over individuals that liberation is impossible.
Robinson 04 (Andrew, PhD, political theory, University of Nottingham, "Introduction: The Basic Zizekian Model," Theory Blog, http://andyrobinsontheoryblog.blogspot.com/2004/11/zizek-notes-and-work-in-progress_15.html)

The Act is a fundamentally negative occurrence in which one strips oneself of all human dignity and 'recognises' that one is nothing but excrement, that there is no 'little treasure' inside and that the subject is nothing but a void. (It is therefore utterly incompatible with approaches which involve action - eg. praxis - as a humanising phenomenon). "By traversing the fantasy, the subject accepts the void of his nonexistence" (TS 281). Traversing the fantasy leads to subjective destitution: abandoning the notion of something 'in me more than myself' and recognising that the big Other is nothing but a semblance. This involves a change in one's worldview: the "analyst's desire" makes possible a community minus its phantasmic support, without any need for a 'subject supposed to...' (know, enjoy or believe) (TS 296). (In this passage Zizek portrays the Act as leading to a fundamental shift in character-structure, although this is not a claim he repeats consistently). An Act is defined by the characteristic that it "surprises/transforms the agent itself" (CHU 124; a choice in the usual sense cannot therefore be an Act). It involves subjective destitution, a (supposedly) liberating moment, "the anti-ideological gesture par excellence by means of which I renounce the treasure within myself and fully admit my dependence on the externality of symbolic apparatuses - that is to say, fully assume the fact that my very self-experience of a subject who was already there prior to the external process of interpellation is a retrospective misrecognition brought about by the process of interpellation" (CHU 134; NB how this means endorsing control by the system, not opposing it; cf. MATERIALISM). The Act therefore involves an utter prostration before symbolic apparatuses: NOT the liberation of the human from the system, but the total victory of the system over humans (cf. Zizek's support for Big Brother-type surveillance; see MARX).

The Act is indeterminate nonsense—there is no way to know if a political intervention meets the criteria.

Robinson 04 (Andrew, PhD, political theory, University of Nottingham, "Introduction: The Basic Zizekian Model," Theory Blog, http://andyrobinsontheoryblog.blogspot.com/2004/11/zizek-notes-and-work-in-progress_15.html)

Not surprisingly given that he sees the Act as shattering meaning, Zizek wants a commitment which is "dogmatic", "cannot be refuted by any 'argumentation' " and "does not ask for good reasons", and which is "indifferent" to the truth-status of the Event it refers to (TS ****; find reference). A Decision (Act) is circular, a shibboleth, and a creative act which nevertheless reveals a constitutive void which is invisible (TS 138; NB the slippage between epistemology and ontology here: how do we know the Act is revealing rather than creating the void?). Law is legitimated by transference: it is only convincing to those who already believe (SOI 38). The Act subverts a given field as such and achieves the apparently 'impossible' by retroactively creating the conditions of its possibility by changing its conditions (CHU 121). It has its own inherent normativity, lacking any simple external standards (TS 388) As well as being problematic in itself, this kind of open advocation of irrationalism and dogmatism would seem to rule out the possibility of empirically or rationally assessing the validity of a particular Act: by definition an Act is not open to such assessment, so one cannot judge between a false (eg. Nazi) and a true Act, since this would involve precisely such a rational and empirical process of assessment ("good reasons" and truth-status). This raises problems for Zizek's attempts to distance himself from Nazism (see below, on false acts). Also, Zizek is being inconsistent in trying to defend such an attack on communication by communicative means (can one make a rational case against rationality?).

AT LACAN/ZIZEK: "THE ACT" FAILS

The Zizekian "Act" requires an abandonment of ethics and accepting an obliteration of the self.

Robinson 04 (Andrew, PhD, political theory, University of Nottingham, "Introduction: The Basic Zizekian Model," Theory Blog, http://andyrobinsontheoryblog.blogspot.com/2004/11/zizek-notes-and-work-in-progress_15.html)

Zizek's theory of the Act presupposes a belief that we are all basically worthless. "The ultimate level of the ethical experience" is found in the utterly broken victim of the Nazi or Stalinist camps (DSST 86), which means one "will be surprised to learn how even the darkest Stalinism harbours a redemptive dimension" (DSST 88). Humanity per se is reducible to the most broken concentration camp inmates (i.e. the ones who have gone beyond trying o reconstruct meaning through petty resistances; referred to in the camps as "Muslims" or "Musselmen" because of their resemblance to famine victims); these people were not dehumanised by the Nazis, but rather, express an inhuman kernel of humanity (DSST 76-7). This kind of person is the " 'zero-level' of humanity" which makes human symbolic engagement possible by wiping the slate of animal instincts (DSST 77; NB the strong binary operative here, which is totally flawed: dogs show similar modes of action when exposed to similar situations, such as Seligman's dogs in the 'learned helplessness' experiments). Zizek thinks we all have had to go through this experience (DSST 77-8). This experience also negates the concept of authenticity (though not enough to stop Zizek using it elsewhere): one can't say such victims are involved in an authentic existential project, but it would be cynical to say they are living an inauthentic existence since it is others, not themselves, who degrade them (DSST 78-9; I don't actually see why an external basis for subordination would affect the concept of authenticity in the slightest; perhaps it would affect the strongest versions which assume pure freedom, but it would not undermine, for instance, the later Sartre, since in this case the authenticity of the project has been defeated by the practico-inert, leading to a state of existence he terms "exis": a degraded existence without project). I think a Deleuzian analysis would be more appropriate here: the dehumanisation of these victims results from the (temporary) total victory of the Oedipal/authoritarian cage: flows and breaks are cut off or utterly contained within an order of power/knowledge, with the political conclusion being that freedom exists in a struggle with domination and that the struggle for freedom is necessary to prevent us being reduced to this level. But this would be partly a causal account, whereas Zizek seems to want a pure ethics. Where Zizek's account leads politically is far more sinister; Zizek cannot in all seriousness criticise the inhumanity of the concentration camps if they simply reveal our essence, and it is hard to see how one could oppose the Nazis if they did not dehumanise their victims or treat them inhumanely. Indeed, such an excremental reduction is something Zizek elsewhere praises, and his attempts to distance himself from Nazism have nothing to do with the inhumanity of the camps; rather, they revolve around nit-picking over whether the Nazis really traversed the fantasy or stopped short at a false act (see below). The Act is a submission: revolutionaries should become "followers" of the truth-event and its call (TS 227; this reproduces with a reversed sign Vaneigem's concept of the Cause as a form of alienation. cf. Donald Rooum's cartoon Wildcat: "I don't just want freedom from the capitalists, I also want freedom from people fit to take over"). Love is "nothing but" an act of self-erasure which breaks the chain of justice (DSST 49-50). Zizek demands submission to radically exterior, meaningless injunctions, "experienced as a radically traumatic intrusion", which "a renewed Left should aim at fully endorsing"; "something violently imposed on me from the Outside through a traumatic encounter that shatters the very foundations of my being" (TS 212). It also involves the negation of dignity: Zizek refers to "heroically renouncing the last vestiges of narcissistic dignity and accomplishing the act for which one is grotesquely inadequate" (TS 352). The heroism of the act is to openly endorse a transition "from Bad to Worse", and for this reason, a true act, which redefines the 'rules of the game', is "inherently 'terroristic' " (TS 377). Thus, instead of the "liberal trap" of respecting some rights and rejecting obligatory Party lines, one should seek the "good terror", i.e. choosing what one has to do (TS 378). Any qualms are dismissed by Zizek as "humanist hysterical shirking the act" (TS 380; NB this misuse of clinical categories in socio-ideological analysis quickly leads Zizek into problems: the Lacanian categories obsessional/hysterical/psychotic/perverse are strictly incompatible, whereas it is quite clear that a theorist who 'hysterically' rejects terror may easily also 'psychotically' believe in literality and 'perversely' believe in decoded flows). The Act involves accepting utter self-obliteration, and rejecting all compassion (TS 378).

AT LACAN/ZIZEK: "THE ACT" FAILS

Zizek's "act" erases all compassion for others.

Robinson 04 (Andrew, PhD, political theory, University of Nottingham, "Introduction: The Basic Zizekian Model," Theory Blog, http://andyrobinsontheoryblog.blogspot.com/2004/11/zizek-notes-and-work-in-progress_15.html)

Assuming an Act means rejecting all concern for others and making oneself, to all intents and purposes, a rock. In the Act, one "assumes... the full burden of freedom impervious to any call of the Other" (DSST 175). Whereas in Derrida and other postmodernists, argues Zizek, ethics is a response to the call of the Other, either abyssal or actual, in Zizek's Lacan the ethical act proper suspends both of these along with the rest of the 'big Other' (DSST 161). Zizek loathes 'soft-heartedness' because it "blurs the subject's pure ethical stance". In this passage, he is referring to Stalinist views; but his criticism of them is not of this loathing; rather, he thinks "that they were not 'pure' enough" because they got caught in an emotional sense of duty (DSST 111). This according to Zizek is the difference between Lenin and Stalin: Zizek's Lenin did not become emotionally attached to his Act (DSST 113). Zizek's ethical anti-humanism goes so far that he advocates hating the beloved out of love (FA 126), because what one should love is not their human person. Zizek also endorses Kant's attempt to purge ethics of historical contents, including compassion and concern for others (PF 232-3).

Zizek's alternative fails to transform the existing order—it is a shot in the dark.

Robinson 04 (Andrew, PhD, political theory, University of Nottingham, "Introduction: The Basic Zizekian Model," Theory Blog, http://andyrobinsontheoryblog.blogspot.com/2004/11/zizek-notes-and-work-in-progress_15.html)

How one locates the Act in relation to revolution depends just how fundamentally the change involved in a revolution is conceived. The Act according to Zizek disrupts/overthrows the existing order of Imaginary and Symbolic alignments (though this does not of course make it revolutionary in practice); however, his account seems to involve the restoration of the basic structure of the social system subsequently, so there is no possibility of meaningful change in terms of overcoming social oppression and exclusion or the irrationalities of ideology. (This also leaves the question of why an Act would lead to anything better; indeed, Zizek denies that it would. So why opt for an Act?). In a sense, the Act is conservative. Traversing the fantasy involves the act of 'accepting' there is no way one can ever be satisfied: a direct relation to the objet petit a (i.e. desired object) minus the screen of fantasy, involving "a full acceptance of the pain... as inherent to the excess of pleasure which is jouissance" (PF 30). This means accepting "radical ontological closure" - i.e. 'accepting' that there is no radical difference - and also that "we renounce every opening, every belief in the messianic Otherness", including, for instance, Derridean and Levinasian concepts of being 'out-of-joint' (PF 31), especially the idea of jouissance being amassed elsewhere. This leads one into the realm of drive; one becomes "eternal-'undead' " (PF 31). (Zizek is here replacing an irrational belief that jouissance is amassed elsewhere with an irrational belief that it isn't; the existence or non-existence of difference and Otherness is an empirical question, and Zizek's refusal to accept that radical Otherness could exist renders his theory potentially extremely normalist and ethnocentric). Crucially, the Act does not involve overcoming Law and the system. It involves suspending them, so they can be resurrected or resuscitated on a new basis. Although the Act is a 'shot in the dark' (preventing voluntary reconstruction/transformation of society), nevertheless it always involves a necessary betrayal (see TS) which reproduces the Oedipal/authoritarian structure of the world; the vanishing mediator always vanishes so as to restore the system. It is interesting to note Zizek's insistence on using the word "suspension" (St Paul's suspension of the law, the leftist suspension of the ethics, and so on). The suspension of the Law, as shown in Zizek's quote from St Paul (TS 150-1), is clearly in fact something more: it is in a sense psychotic, breaking with both Law and desire. But it is a suspension because it resurrects Law in the more total form of the Cause. It is interesting that Zizek chooses the word "suspension". If Zizek has in mind a destruction or fundamental transformation of the Law or ethics, there are so many better terms he could have chosen: abolition, destruction, smashing, overcoming, transcending, sublating, surpassing and so on. That he (more-or-less consistently) uses the term "suspension" is therefore probably significant. This term implies a temporary absence of the phenomenon in question, as opposed to its permanent destruction, replacement, or even transformation. In other words: what is suspended (Law, ethics, etc.) nevertheless returns in the same basic form as before (which presumably means its structural nature is basically the same).

AT LACAN/ZIZEK: "THE ACT" FAILS

Zizek's Act relies on extreme individualism—it results in no social change.

Robinson 04 (Andrew, PhD, political theory, University of Nottingham, "Introduction: The Basic Zizekian Model," Theory Blog, http://andyrobinsontheoryblog.blogspot.com/2004/11/zizek-notes-and-work-in-progress_15.html)

The category of the Act involves extreme methodological individualism. The assumption that an individual Act can alter society as a whole, whatever its earth-shattering psychological consequences for a particular individual, is deeply flawed. This problem is related to Zizek's inappropriate expansion of what are at root clinical/therapeutic concepts into socio-political analysis. Individual Acts do not have direct social effects. The Mary Kay Letourneau case, for instance, has not substantially changed popular perceptions of non-abusive relations between legal- and illegal-age people; it certainly has not shattered the social structure. Rather, Letourneau has been anathematised and victimised by the state. On a social level, the Act is impotent and politically irrelevant; it has no transformative role and makes sense only in a closed analytical system. Even when Acts of Zizek's type do have social effects, there is no reason to believe that these effects shatter or reformulate entire social structures. Zizek's account here rests on psychologising social structures, imagining that these structures rest on the same basis as a Lacanian account of the psyche. Actually, a single act on the superficial level is unlikely to alter the social structure any more than a tiny amount. For instance: suppose Letourneau's Act worked; suppose the law was changed to make love a defence for consensual sex across the age-of-consent boundary. Would this have any deep-rooted social effects? Surely not. Such changes have not, for instance, taken us very far towards gay liberation; the situation is better than it was, but the social position of gay men has not been reshaped dramatically. Acts are impotent against deep prejudices. Since Acts do not have meaningful social effects, they cannot really help the worst-off group (social symptom). If the "cathartic moment" of a break with the dominant ideology only occurs in a single individual, the social system would not be harmed. To be effective, it would have to produce a new conception of the world which is expansive and convinces wide strata of the population. Zizek is missing the significance of revolutions such as in Russia when he sees them as pure Acts by leaders; this is an intentionalist delusion. As Gramsci rightly puts it, each revolution involves an "intense critical labour" whereby a new conception of the world is formulated, spread and used to create a collective will. The collective will does not simply spring miraculously from a leader's whim.

The "act" is so radically negative that it is unable to formulate new politics.

Robinson 04 (Andrew, PhD, political theory, University of Nottingham, "Introduction: The Basic Zizekian Model," Theory Blog, http://andyrobinsontheoryblog.blogspot.com/2004/11/zizek-notes-and-work-in-progress_15.html)

Because of his extreme methodological individualism, Zizek ends up with a highly intentionalist, leader-fixated model of politics which is authoritarian and also exaggerates the role of leaders both in practice and potentially. Stalinism, for instance, was not a result of an Act by Stalin and Lenin; it was a social-structural phenomenon involving the actions of many individuals, with a "history of everyday life" and structural dynamics such as intrabureaucratic competition, resulting from the mode (or modes) of thought and action it involved. The extension of clinical categories into society requires the reduction of concepts which are usually diverse to singularity: one unconscious, symptom, fundamental fantasy, etc. for entire societies or even the whole of humanity. This is in contradiction with psychoanalytic practice and also is implausible. Zizek's politics are "a prescription for political quietism and sterility" (Laclau, CHU 293). I disagree with Laclau's reasons for claiming this, but the conclusion is valid: the Act has little practical political relevance, and Zizek's sectarianism (see RESISTANCE) leaves him aloof from actual political struggles. Zizek seems to have no real sense of what is important in politics. For Zizek, the main issue is reviving the category of the Act, to fill a supposed structural void. But there are many concrete issues which are many times more important: closing down the WTO, fighting back against the wave of police repression, stopping the wholesale commodification of society, stopping environmental destruction, stopping Bush's racist war, smashing capitalism, etc. 'Restoring the properly ethical dimension of the act' only matters to someone who is so trapped in his own theory that he thinks the whole world revolves around it. (What did Wittgenstein say about philosophy and masturbation?). Zizek should let the fly out the jar! The abstract and essentialist pursuit of the "act proper" is a distraction from contingent political struggles. Zizek lacks, and is presumably unable on principle to formulate, a positive conception of what should replace the present system. His suggestions are either vague and naive (socialising cyberspace, for instance), reproduce capitalism (the necessity of betrayal), or set up something worse (terror). Zizek's endorsement of "absolute negativity" is a barrier to his developing actual alternatives.

AT LACAN/ZIZEK: "THE ACT" FAILS

The alternative fails: Lacan under-develops the connection between individual psyches and universal understandings. They will not be able to explain how one person thinking about the mysterious Act will change society.

Robinson (PhD Political Theory, University of Nottingham) 05 (Theory and Event, Andrew, 8:1, The Political Theory of Constitutive Lack: A Critique).

Lacanian analysis consists mainly of an exercise in projection. As a result, Lacanian "explanations" often look more propagandistic or pedagogical than explanatory. A particular case is dealt with only in order to, and to the extent that it can, confirm the already-formulated structural theory. Judith Butler criticizes Žižek's method on the grounds that 'theory is applied to its examples', as if 'already true, prior to its exemplification'. 'The theory is articulated on its self-sufficiency, and then shifts register only for the pedagogical purpose of illustrating an already accomplished truth'. It is therefore 'a theoretical fetish that disavows the conditions of its own emergence'52. She alleges that Lacanian psychoanalysis 'becomes a theological project' and also 'a way to avoid the rather messy psychic and social entanglement' involved in studying specific cases53. Similarly, Dominick LaCapra objects to the idea of constitutive lack because specific 'losses cannot be adequately addressed when they are enveloped in an overly generalised discourse of absence... Conversely, absence at a "foundational" level cannot simply be derived from particular historical losses'54. Attacking 'the long story of conflating absence with loss that becomes constitutive instead of historical'55, he accuses several theorists of eliding the difference between absence and loss, with 'confusing and dubious results', including a 'tendency to avoid addressing historical problems, including losses, in sufficiently specific terms', and a tendency to 'enshroud, perhaps even to etherealise, them in a generalised discourse of absence'56. Daniel Bensaïd draws out the political consequences of the projection of absolutes into politics. 'The fetishism of the absolute event involves... a suppression of historical intelligibility, necessary to its depoliticization'. The space from which politics is evacuated 'becomes... a suitable place for abstractions, delusions and hypostases'. Instead of actual social forces, there are 'shadows and spectres'. The operation of the logic of projection is predictable. According to Lacanians, there is a basic structure (sometimes called a 'ground' or 'matrix') from which all social phenomena arise, and this structure, which remains unchanged in all eventualities, is the reference-point from which particular cases are viewed. The "fit" between theory and evidence is constructed monologically by the reduction of the latter to the former, or by selectivity in inclusion and reading of examples. At its simplest, the Lacanian myth functions by a short-circuit between a particular instance and statements containing words such as "all", "always", "never", "necessity" and so on. A contingent example or a generic reference to "experience" is used, misleadingly, to found a claim with supposed universal validity. For instance, Stavrakakis uses the fact that existing belief-systems are based on exclusions as a basis to claim that all belief-systems are necessarily based on exclusions58, and claims that particular traumas express an 'ultimate impossibility'59. Similarly, Laclau and Mouffe use the fact that a particular antagonism can disrupt a particular fixed identity to claim that the social as such is penetrated and constituted by antagonism as such60. Phenomena are often analysed as outgrowths of something exterior to the situation in question. For instance, Žižek's concept of the "social symptom" depends on a reduction of the acts of one particular series of people (the "socially excluded", "fundamentalists", Serbian paramilitaries, etc.) to a psychological function in the psyche of a different group (westerners). The "real" is a supposedly self-identical principle which is used to reduce any and all qualitative differences between situations to a relation of formal equivalence. This shows how mythical characteristics can be projected from the outside, although it also raises different problems: the under-conceptualization of the relationship between individual psyches and collective phenomena in Lacanian theory, and a related tendency for psychological concepts to acquire an ersatz agency similar to that of a Marxian fetish. "The Real" or "antagonism" occurs in phrases which have it doing or causing something. As Barthes shows, myth offers the psychological benefits of empiricism without the epistemological costs.

AT LACAN/ZIZEK: "THE ACT" FAILS

Zizek's alternative is authoritarian—his concept of human nature requires political domination.

Robinson 04 (Andrew, PhD, political theory, University of Nottingham, "Introduction: The Basic Zizekian Model," Theory Blog, http://andyrobinsontheoryblog.blogspot.com/2004/11/zizek-notes-and-work-in-progress_15.html)

The Act also seems to be authoritarian in the sense that it involves an unfounded imposition of will which reshapes the symbolic edifice. Perhaps even worse is Zizek's conception of human nature. Zizek thinks people are basically too chaotic to live without rulers, repeating the claims of the likes of Hobbes. He sees 'unruliness' and going to the end beyond every human measure as a primordial drive and part of human nature - a drive ethics tries to contain - a drive involving "clinging to wild egotistical freedom unbound by any constraints" which "has to be broken and 'gentrified' by the pressure of education" (PF 236-7). Humanity is as such unnaturally prone to excess, and has to be gentrified through institutions (PF 135). There is a basic drive to dis-attach from the world which fantasy is a protection against (TS 289). The role of paternal Law is to expose people to the harsh demands of social reality, demands which lead to entry into desire (FA 76; Zizek is presumably some kind of expectationist). He even seems to endorse Kant's view that people need a Master and (hierarchic) discipline to tame their 'unruly' insistence on their own will and force them to submit to being placed in subjection to "the laws of mankind and brought to feel their constraint" (TS 36 - clearly a substitutionist term). So Zizek endorses Kant's work on education, where he claims the role of schools is not for children to learn but to accustom them "to sitting still and doing exactly what they are told", to "counteract man's natural unruliness" (TS 36)! (Zizek also conflates social control with the unrelated issue of "venturing wildly and rashly into danger" in this discussion of Kant). Once accustomed to freedom, one will do anything for it, so this urge must be "smoothed down" (TS 36). Zizek calls this text of Kant's a "marvellous text" (TS 36). He also makes the (apparently contradictory with all the above, but equally conservative) claim that "a human being is... in need of firm roots" and that this basic need is the root of the symbolic order (CHU 250). On the whole Zizek seems to be endorsing a conservative or even reactionary view of human nature; though this is not entirely clear.

AT LACAN/ZIZEK "THE ACT" FAILS

Zizek's political stance is violent and feeds into power. The notion of the "Act" has so few limits that there is nothing to prevent elites from deploying it to violently maintain power.

Robinson (PhD Political Theory, University of Nottingham) 05 (Theory and Event, Andrew, 8:1, The Political Theory of Constitutive Lack: A Critique).

On a political level, this kind of stance leads to an acceptance of social exclusion which negates compassion for its victims. The resultant inhumanity finds its most extreme expression in Žižek's work, where 'today's "mad dance", the dynamic proliferation of multiple shifting identities... awaits its resolution in a new form of Terror'. It is also present, however, in the toned-down exclusionism of authors such as Mouffe. Hence, democracy depends on 'the possibility of drawing a frontier between "us" and "them"', and 'always entails relations of inclusion-exclusion'28. 'No state or political order... can exist without some form of exclusion' experienced by its victims as coercion and violence29, and, since Mouffe assumes a state to be necessary, this means that one must endorse exclusion and violence. (The supposed necessity of the state is derived from the supposed need for a master-signifier or nodal point to stabilize identity and avoid psychosis, either for individuals or for societies). What is at stake in the division between these two trends in Lacanian political theory is akin to the distinction Vaneigem draws between "active" and "passive" nihilism30. The Laclauian trend involves an implied ironic distance from any specific project, which maintains awareness of its contingency; overall, however, it reinforces conformity by insisting on an institutional mediation which overcodes all the "articulations". The Žižekian version is committed to a more violent and passionate affirmation of negativity, but one which ultimately changes very little. The function of the Žižekian "Act" is to dissolve the self, producing a historical event. "After the revolution", however, everything stays much the same. For all its radical pretensions, Žižek's politics can be summed up in his attitude to neo-liberalism: 'If it works, why not try a dose of it?'31. The phenomena which are denounced in Lacanian theory are invariably readmitted in its "small print", and this leads to a theory which renounces both effectiveness and political radicalism. It is in this pragmatism that the ambiguity of Lacanian political theory resides, for, while on a theoretical level it is based on an almost sectarian "radicalism", denouncing everything that exists for its complicity in illusions and guilt for the present, its "alternative" is little different from what it condemns (the assumption apparently being that the "symbolic" change in the psychological coordinates of attachments in reality is directly effective, a claim assumed – wrongly – to follow from the claim that social reality is constructed discursively). Just like in the process of psychoanalytic cure, nothing actually changes on the level of specific characteristics. The only change is in how one relates to the characteristics, a process Žižek terms *'dotting the "i"s'*" in reality, recognizing and thereby installing necessity32. All that changes, in other words, is the interpretation: as long as they are reconceived as expressions of constitutive lack, the old politics are acceptable. Thus, Žižek claims that de Gaulle's "Act" succeeded by allowing him 'effectively to realize the necessary pragmatic measures' which others pursued unsuccessfully33. More recent examples of Žižek's pragmatism include that his alternative to the U.S. war in Afghanistan is only that 'the punishment of those responsible' should be done in a spirit of 'sad duty', not 'exhilarating retaliation'34, and his "solution" to the Palestine-Israel crisis, which is NATO control of the occupied territories35. If this is the case for Žižek, the ultra-"radical" "Marxist-Leninist" Lacanian, it is so much the more so for his more moderate adversaries. Jason Glynos, for instance, offers an uncompromizing critique of the construction of guilt and innocence in anti-"crime" rhetoric, demanding that demonization of deviants be abandoned, only to insist as an afterthought that, 'of course, this... does not mean that their offences should go unpunished'36**.**
Lacanian theory tends, therefore, to produce an "anything goes" attitude to state action: because everything else is contingent, nothing is to limit the practical consideration of tactics by dominant elites.

AT LACAN/ZIZEK: REVOLUTION FAILS

Zizek offers no clear alternative—capitalism is inevitable.

Robinson 04 (Andrew, PhD, political theory, University of Nottingham, "Introduction: The Basic Zizekian Model," Theory Blog, http://andyrobinsontheoryblog.blogspot.com/2004/11/zizek-notes-and-work-in-progress_15.html)

It is by no means clear that Zizek thinks alternatives to capitalism are possible, or that he wants them. He seems to want to destroy capitalism, on his definition of it (see CAPITALISM, CONSERVATISM), which sets up a rather conservative target (liberalism, permissiveness, decadence, 'flabbiness', etc.). It is less clear that he wants to destroy it by any other criterion: he endorses work ethics and authoritarianism, and he has posited so much of the deep structure of society as unchangeable as to render the space for change highly limited. Laclau attacks Zizek on this subject. Despite "r-r-revolutionary zeal", Zizek is no more proposing a thoroughly different economic and political regime than Laclau. Zizek lets us know nothing about his alternative, Laclau says (actually, this is not strictly true, though he does tell us very little); he only tells us that it isn't liberal democracy or capitalism. Laclau is concerned it could mean Stalinism, despite Zizek's earlier resistance against this (NB Zizek dislikes late, post-Stalin Stalinism with a human face, but distinguishes this from the earlier Stalinism - what he resisted was the former); Laclau suspects Zizek simply doesn't know what his alternative is (CHU 289). How does Zizek respond to this? He uses it to pathologise Laclau, claiming he cannot imagine an alternative and so thinks there isn't one (which Laclau actually never states).

AT LACAN/ZIZEK: REVOLUTION FAILS

Zizek's alternative fails—he claims that capitalism must be over thrown but has no means of accomplishing this goal.

Boynton, 98 (Director of NYU's Graduate Magazine Journalism Program, Robert, "Enjoy Your Žižek!" *Lingua Franca*, October, http://www.robertboynton.com/articleDisplay.php?article_id=43)

"Authentic politics is the art of the impossible," he writes. "It changes the very parameters of what is considered "possible' in the existing constellation." This is a noble vision, but when Zizek turns to history, he finds only fleeting examples of genuine politics in action: in ancient Athens; in the proclamations of the Third Estate during the French Revolution; in the Polish Solidarity movement; and in the last, heady days of the East German Republic before the Wall came down and the crowds stopped chanting "Wir sind das Volk" ("We are the people!") and began chanting "Wir sind ein Volk" ("We are a/one people!"). The shift from definite to indefinite article, writes Zizek, marked "the closure of the momentary authentic political opening, the reappropriation of the democratic impetus by the thrust towards reunification of Germany, which meant rejoining Western Germany's liberal-capitalist police/political order." In articulating his political credo, Zizek attempts to synthesize three unlikely–perhaps incompatible–sources: Lacan's notion of the subject as a "pure void" that is "radically out of joint" with the world, Marx's political economy, and St. Paul's conviction that universal truth is the only force capable of recognizing the needs of the particular. Zizek is fond of calling himself a "Pauline materialist," and he admires St. Paul's muscular vision. He believes that the post-political deadlock can be broken only by a gesture that undermines "capitalist globalization from the standpoint of universal truth in the same way that Pauline Christianity did to the Roman global empire." He adds: "My dream is to combine an extremely dark, pessimistic belief that life is basically horrible and contingent, with a revolutionary social attitude. AS PHILOSOPHY, Zizek's argument is breathtaking, but as social prescription, "dream" may be an apt word. The only way to combat the dominance of global capitalism, he argues, is through a "direct socialization of the productive process"–an agenda that is unlikely to play well in Slovenia, which is now enjoying many of the fruits of Western consumer capitalism. When pressed to specify what controlling the productive process might look like, Zizek admits he doesn't know, although he feels certain that an alternative to capitalism will emerge and that the public debate must be opened up to include subjects like control over genetic engineering. Like many who call for a return to the primacy of economics, Zizek has only the most tenuous grasp of the subject.

Zizek's alternative is political nihilism – he supplies no method for over throwing capitalism.

Laclau 04 Ernesto Laclau, Professor of Political Theory at the University of Essex and Visiting Professor of Comparative Literature at SUNY-Buffalo, 2004, Umbr(a): War, p. 33-34

Here we reach the crux of the difficulties to be found in Zizek. On the one hand, he is committed to a theory of the full revolutionary act that would operate in its own name, without being invested in any object outside itself. On the other hand, the capitalist system, as the dominating, underlying mechanism, is the reality with which the emancipatory act has to break. The conclusion from both premises is that there is no valid emancipatory struggle except one that is fully and directly anti-capitalist. In his words: "I believe in the central structuring role of the anti-capitalist struggle." The problem, however, is this: he gives no indication of what an anti-capitalist struggle might be. Zizek quickly dismisses multicultural, anti-sexist, and anti-racist struggles as not being directly anti-capitalist. Nor does he sanction the traditional aims of the Left, linked more directly to the economy: the demands for higher wages, for industrial democracy, for control of the labor process, for a progressive distribution of income, are not proposed as anti-capitalist either. Does he imagine that the Luddites' proposal to destroy all the machines would bring an end to capitalism? Not a single line in Zizek's work gives an example of what he considers an anti-capitalist struggle. One is left wondering whether he is anticipating an invasion of beings from another planet, or as he once suggested, some kind of ecological catastrophe that would not transform the world but cause it to fall apart. So where has the whole argument gone wrong? In its very premises. Since Zizek refuses to apply the hegemonic logic to strategico-political thought, he is stranded in a blind alley. He has to dismiss all "partial" struggles as internal to the "system" (whatever that means), and the "Thing" being unachievable, he is left without any concrete historical actor for his anti-capitalist struggle. Conclusion: Zizek cannot provide any theory of the emancipatory subject. At the same time, since his systemic totality, being a ground, is regulated exclusively by its own internal laws, the only option is to wait for these laws to produce the totality of its effects. Ergo: political nihilism.

AT LACAN/ZIZEK: DOES NOT APPLY TO AFF

It does not make sense to have a fixed understanding of the political that gets applied to all situations. They will have persuasive descriptions of Lacanian theory but nothing that applies it to our aff.

Robinson (PhD Political Theory, University of Nottingham) 05 (Theory and Event, Andrew, 8:1, The Political Theory of Constitutive Lack: A Critique).

One of the functions of myth is to cut out what Trevor Pateman terms the "middle level" of analytical concepts, establishing a short-circuit between high-level generalizations and ultra-specific (pseudo-) concrete instances. In Barthes's classic case of an image of a black soldier saluting the French flag, this individual action is implicitly connected to highly abstract concepts such as nationalism, without the mediation of the particularities of his situation. (These particularities, if revealed, could undermine the myth. Perhaps he enlisted for financial reasons, or due to threats of violence). Thus, while myths provide an analysis of sorts, their basic operation is anti-analytical: the analytical schema is fixed in advance, and the relationship between this schema and the instances it organizes is hierarchically ordered to the exclusive advantage of the former. This is precisely what happens in Lacanian analyses of specific political and cultural phenomena. Žižek specifically advocates 'sweeping generalizations' and short-cuts between specific instances and high-level abstractions, evading the "middle level". 'The correct dialectical procedure... can be best described as a direct jump from the singular to the universal, bypassing the mid-level of particularity'. He wants a 'direct jump from the singular to the universal', without reference to particular contexts.

Prefer our specific solvency evidence over their generic theory. Saying that something that cannot be defined will come back to haunt us is the ultimate hidden DA. We will defend against any specific case turn but cannot defend against a turn that they say is beyond our grasp.

Robinson (PhD Political Theory, University of Nottingham) 05 (Theory and Event, Andrew, 8:1, The Political Theory of Constitutive Lack: A Critique).

The technical term operates in much the same way as in positivistic theories, where the use of a noun turns a set of observed "facts" into a "law". Lack (in the sense of the verb "to lack") is explained by means of a nominalized lack (for instance, the failure of society by the fact of antagonism), and the various versions of nominalized lack are arranged in sentences involving the verb "to be". It is not simply a relation of dislocation but a theoretical entity in its own right. For instance, '"class struggle" is that on account of which every direct reference to universality... is... "biased", dislocated with regard to its literal meaning. "Class struggle" is the Marxist name for this basic "operator of dislocation"'90. One might compare this formula to the statement, "I don't know what causes dislocation". Žižek also refers to history 'as a series of ultimately failed attempts to deal with the same "unhistorical", traumatic kernel'. Dallmayr similarly writes of Laclau and Mouffe's concept of antagonism that 'negativity designates not simply a lack but a "nihilating" potency', 'a nihilating ferment with real effects'92, and Newman writes of a 'creative and constitutive absence'. Butler notes that 'the "real" that is a "rock" or a "kernel" or sometimes a "substance" is also, and sometimes within the same sentence, "a loss", a "negativity"'94. Constitutive lack is a positivity - an "operator of dislocation", a "nihilating" element - in the Lacanian vocabulary. It is this process of mythical construction which allows lack to be defined precisely, and which therefore meets (for instance) Newman's criterion that it be less 'radically underdefined' than Derrida's concept of lack95. One can only avoid an "I-don't-know" being underdefined if one misrepresents it mythically.

AT LACAN/ZIZEK: NON-FALSIFIABLE

Lacan's explanation of the Real requires a leap of faith similar to religion. You are asked to believe in it because it 'resists symbolization' or it is beyond our understanding. Yet, it is credited with determining all social conflicts.

Robinson (PhD Political Theory, University of Nottingham) 05 (Theory and Event, Andrew, 8:1, The Political Theory of Constitutive Lack: A Critique).

This passage could almost have been written with the "Lacanian Real" in mind. The characteristic of the Real is precisely that one can invoke it without defining it (since it is "beyond symbolization"), and that the accidental failure of language, or indeed a contingent failure in social praxis, is identified with an ontological resistance to symbolization projected into Being itself. For instance, Žižek's classification of the Nation as a Thing rests on the claim that 'the only way we can determine it is by... empty tautology', and that it is a 'semantic void'63. Similarly, he claims that 'the tautological gesture of the Master-Signifier', an empty performative which retroactively turns presuppositions into conclusions, is necessary, and also that tautology is the only way historical change can occur64. He even declares constitutive lack (in this case, termed the "death drive") to be a tautology. Lacanian references to "the Real" or "antagonism" as the cause of a contingent failure are reminiscent of Robert Teflon's definition of God: 'an explanation which means "I have no explanation"'. An "ethics of the Real" is a minor ethical salvation which says very little in positive terms, but which can pose in macho terms as a "hard" acceptance of terrifying realities. It authorizes truth-claims - in Laclau's language, a 'reality' which is 'before our eyes67', or in Newman's, a 'harsh reality' hidden beneath a protective veil68 - without the attendant risks. Some Lacanian theorists also show indications of a commitment based on the particular kind of "euphoric" enjoyment Barthes associates with myths. Laclau in particular emphasizes his belief in the 'exhilarating' significance of the present69, hinting that he is committed to euphoric investments generated through the repetition of the same.

AT LACAN/ZIZEK: NON-FALSIFIABLE

Their vision of politics is a non-falsifiable myth: The root of the Lacanian subject is structured around the "lack." The problem is that there is nothing to support this idea of a missing reality. The other team may be able to explain Lacan's ideas but not **why they are true**.

Robinson (PhD Political Theory, University of Nottingham) 05 (Theory and Event, Andrew, 8:1, The Political Theory of Constitutive Lack: A Critique).

More precisely, I would maintain that "constitutive lack" is an instance of a Barthesian myth. It is, after all, the function of myth to do exactly what this concept does: to assert the empty facticity of a particular ideological schema while rejecting any need to argue for its assumptions. 'Myth does not deny things; on the contrary, its function is to talk about them; simply, it purifies them, it makes them innocent, it gives them a natural and eternal justification, it is a clarity which is not that of an explanation but that of a statement of fact'. This is precisely the status of "constitutive lack": a supposed fact which is supposed to operate above and beyond explanation, on an ontological level instantly accessible to those with the courage to accept it. Myths operate to construct euphoric enjoyment for those who use them, but their operation is in conflict with the social context with which they interact. This is because their operation is connotative: they are "received" rather than "read" and open only to a "readerly" and not a "writerly" interpretation. A myth is a second-order signification attached to an already-constructed denotative sign, and the ideological message projected into this sign is constructed outside the context of the signified. A myth is therefore, in Alfred Korzybski's sense, intensional: its meaning derives from a prior linguistic schema, not from interaction with the world in its complexity. Furthermore, myths have a repressive social function, carrying in Barthes's words an 'order not to think'. They are necessarily projected onto or imposed on actual people and events, under the cover of this order. The "triumph of literature" in the Dominici trial consists precisely in this projection of an externally-constructed mythical schema as a way of avoiding engagement with something one does not understand. Lacanian theory, like Barthesian myths, involves a prior idea of a structural matrix which is not open to change in the light of the instances to which it is applied. Žižek's writes of a 'pre-ontological dimension which precedes and eludes the construction of reality'42, while Laclau suggests there is a formal structure of any chain of equivalences which necessitates the logic of hegemony43. Specific analyses are referred back to this underlying structure as its necessary expressions, without apparently being able to alter it; for instance, 'those who triggered the process of democratization in eastern Europe... are not those who today enjoy its fruits, not because of a simple usurpation... but because of a deeper structural logic'44. In most instances, the mythical operation of the idea of "constitutive lack" is implicit, revealed only by a rhetoric of denunciation. For instance, Mouffe accuses liberalism of an 'incapacity... to grasp... the irreducible character of antagonism'45, while Žižek claims that a 'dimension' is 'lost' in Butler's work because of her failure to conceive of "trouble" as constitutive of "gender"46. This language of "denial" which is invoked to silence critics is a clear example of Barthes's "order not to think": one is not to think about the idea of "constitutive lack", one is simply to "accept" it, under pain of invalidation. If someone else disagrees, s/he can simply be told that there is something crucial missing from her/his theory. Indeed, critics are as likely to be accused of being "dangerous" as to be accused of being wrong.

AT LACAN/ZIZEK: CONSERVATIVE POLITICS

Turn: Lacanian criticism is analytically radical but breaks down into very conservative politics.

Robinson (PhD Political Theory, University of Nottingham) 05 (Theory and Event, Andrew, 8:1, The Political Theory of Constitutive Lack: A Critique).

There is more than an accidental relationship between the mythical operation of the concept of "constitutive lack" and Lacanians' conservative and pragmatist politics. Myth is a way of reducing thought to the present: the isolated signs which are included in the mythical gesture are thereby attached to extra-historical abstractions. On an analytical level, Lacanian theory can be very "radical", unscrupulously exposing the underlying relations and assumptions concealed beneath officially-sanctioned discourse. This radicalism, however, never translates into political conclusions: as shown above, a radical rejection of anti-"crime" rhetoric turns into an endorsement of punishment, and a radical critique of neo-liberalism turns into a pragmatist endorsement of structural adjustment. It is as if there is a magical barrier between theory and politics which insulates the latter from the former. One should recall a remark once made by Wilhelm Reich: 'You plead for happiness in life, but security means more to you'133. Lacanians have a "radical" theory oriented towards happiness, but politically, their primary concern is security. As long as they are engaged in politically ineffectual critique, Lacanians will denounce and criticize the social system, but once it comes to practical problems, the "order not to think" becomes operative. This "magic" barrier is the alibi function of myth. The short-circuit between specific instances and high-level abstractions is politically consequential.

The deep negativity toward politics makes Lacanian analysis collapse into reactionary politics.

Robinson (PhD Political Theory, University of Nottingham) 05 (Theory and Event, Andrew, 8:1, The Political Theory of Constitutive Lack: A Critique).

The political function of Lacanian theory is to preclude critique by encoding the present as myth. There is a danger of a stultifying conservatism arising from within Lacanian political theory, echoing the 'terrifying conservatism' Deleuze suggests is active in any reduction of history to negativity136. The addition of an "always" to contemporary evils amounts to a "pessimism of the will", or a "repressive reduction of thought to the present". Stavrakakis, for instance, claims that attempts to find causes and thereby to solve problems are always fantasmatic137, while Žižek states that an object which is perceived as blocking something does nothing but materialize the already-operative constitutive lack138. While this does not strictly entail the necessity of a conservative attitude to the possibility of any specific reform, it creates a danger of discursive slippage and hostility to "utopianism" which could have conservative consequences. Even if Lacanians believe in surplus/contingent as well as constitutive lack, there are no standards for distinguishing the two. If one cannot tell which social blockages result from constitutive lack and which are contingent, how can one know they are not all of the latter type? And even if constitutive lack exists, Lacanian theory runs a risk of "misdiagnoses" which have a neophobe or even reactionary effect. To take an imagined example, a Lacanian living in France in 1788 would probably conclude that democracy is a utopian fantasmatic ideal and would settle for a pragmatic reinterpretation of the ancién regime. Laclau and Mouffe's hostility to workers' councils and Žižek's insistence on the need for a state and a Party139 exemplify this neophobe tendency. The pervasive negativity and cynicism of Lacanian theory offers little basis for constructive activity. Instead of radical transformation, one is left with a pragmatics of "containment" which involves a conservative de-problematization of the worst aspects of the status quo. The inactivity it counsels would make its claims a self-fulfilling prophecy by acting as a barrier to transformative activity.

AT LACAN/ZIZEK: CONSERVATIVE POLITICS

The alternative encourages oppressive social relations—the idea we are driven by *joussiance* is essentially a justification for sadomasochism—including the attacking oneself or accepting totalitarianism as an authentic political act.

Robinson (PhD Political Theory, University of Nottingham) 05 (Theory and Event, Andrew, 8:1, The Political Theory of Constitutive Lack: A Critique).

The "death instinct" is connected to an idea of primordial masochism which, in the form of "aphanisis" or "subjective destitution", recurs throughout Lacanian political theory. Žižek in particular advocates masochism, in the guise of "shooting at" or "beating" oneself, as a radical gesture which reveals the essence of the self and breaks the constraints of an oppressive reality, although the masochistic gesture is present in all Lacanian theorists. The death instinct is typified by Žižek as a pathological (in the Kantian sense), contingent attitude which finds satisfaction in the process of self-blockage109. It is identical with the Lacanian concept of jouissance or enjoyment. For him, 'enjoyment (jouissance) is not to be equated with pleasure: enjoyment is precisely "pleasure in unpleasure"; it designates the paradoxical satisfaction procured by a painful encounter with a Thing that perturbs the equilibrium of the pleasure principle. In other words, enjoyment is located "beyond the pleasure principle"'110. It is also the core of the self, since enjoyment is 'the only "substance" acknowledged by psychoanalysis', and 'the subject fully "exists" only through enjoyment'111. Primordial masochism is therefore central to the Lacanian concept of the Real, which depends on there being a universal moment at which active desire - sometimes given the slightly misleading name of the "pleasure principle" - is suspended, not for a greater or delayed pleasure, but out of a direct desire for unpleasure (i.e. a primary reactive desire). Furthermore, this reactive desire is supposed to be ontologically prior to active desire. Dominick LaCapra offers a similar but distinct critique to my own, claiming that Lacanian and similar theories induce a post-traumatic compulsion repetition or an 'endless, quasi-transcendental grieving that may be indistinguishable from interminable melancholy'. Reich has already provided a rebuttal of "primordial masochism", which, paradoxically given Žižek's claims to radicalism, was denounced by orthodox Freudians as communist propaganda. In Reich's view, masochism operates as a relief at a lesser pain which operates as armouring against anxiety about an underlying trauma113. Regardless of what one thinks of Reich's specific account of the origins of masochism, what is crucial is his critique of the idea of a death drive. 'Such hypotheses as are criticised here are often only a sign of therapeutic failure. For if one explains masochism by a death instinct, one confirms to the patient his [sic] alleged will to suffer'. Thus, Lacanian metaphysics conceal Lacanians' encouragement of a variety of neurosis complicit with oppressive social realities. Politically, the thesis of primordial masochism provides a mystifying cover for the social forces which cause and benefit from the contingent emergence of masochistic attachments (i.e. sadistic power apparatuses). One could compare this remark to Butler's claim that Žižek 'defends the trauma of the real... over and against a different kind of threat'115

AT LACAN/ZIZEK: CONSERVATIVE POLITICS

Zizek's alternative is pessimistic and authoritarian – his theory precludes a democratic politics.

Breger, 01 Assistant Professor of Germanic Studies at Indiana, 2001 (Claudia, Diacritics 31.1 (2001) 73-90, "The Leader's Two Bodies: Slavoj Zizek's Postmodern Political Theology," project muse)

More than ten years later—after a decade of authoritarian rule, war, and genocide in former Yugoslavia—recent revolutionary events in Serbia once more allow one to hope for a thorough democratization of the region. In a newspaper article evaluating the uprising, however, Zizek warned that these hopes might be premature: while Milosevic could find his new role as "a Serbian Jesus Christ," taking upon him all the "sins" committed by his people, Kostunica and his "democratic" nationalism might represent "nothing but Milosevic in the 'normal' version, without the excess" [Zizek, "Gewalt"]. Zizek was not alone in warning that the new government in Yugoslavia might not bring an end to Serbian nationalist politics. The pessimistic scenario Zizek evoked on this occasion, however, was not simply the result of his evaluation of the current political constellation in Serbia. Rather, the fantasy of the necessary return of the leader is connected to his political theory—a theory that does not allow for more optimistic scenarios of democratization and the diminution of nationalism in society. My reading of Zizek's work thus argues for a reevaluation of his theory in terms of its implicit authoritarian politics. The need for such a reevaluation is also suggested by Laclau toward the end of his recent exchange with Judith Butler and Zizek when he admits that "the more our discussions progressed, the more I realized that my sympathy for Zizek's politics was largely the result of a mirage" [Laclau, "Constructing Universality" 292]. Laclau now criticizes Zizek's radical Marxist rhetoric by suggesting that he "wants to do away with liberal democratic regimes" without specifying a political alternative [289], and describes Zizek's discourse as "schizophrenically split between a highly sophisticated Lacanian analysis and an insufficiently deconstructed traditional Marxism" [205]. On [End Page 73] the other hand, he also problematizes Zizek's "psychoanalytic discourse" as "not truly political" [289]. My argument primarily starts from this latter point: the antidemocratic—and, as I will argue, both antifeminist and anti-Semitic—moment of Zizek's theory is to be located not only in the way he performs Marxism, but also in the way he performs Lacanian psychoanalysis. While, in other words, Zizek's skepticism vis-à-vis democracy is obviously informed by, and inseparable from, Marxist critiques of "liberal," "representative" democracy, his failure to elaborate alternative visions of political change towards egalitarian and/or plural scenarios of society cannot be explained solely by his Marxist perspective..

AT LACAN/ZIZEK: ESSENTIALISM TURN

The alternative links to the critique: the Lacanian notion of a "constitutive element" that is at the root of all political fantasy is just as essentialist as they claim the affirmative to be. In other words, Lacan repeats the error of trying to create what he critiques.

Robinson (PhD Political Theory, University of Nottingham) 05 (Theory and Event, Andrew, 8:1, The Political Theory of Constitutive Lack: A Critique).

Lacanians assume that the idea of a founding negativity is not essentialist, whereas any idea of an autonomous positive or affirmative force, even if constructed as active, undefinable, changing and/or incomplete, is essentialist. The reason Lacanians can claim to be "anti-essentialist" is that there is a radical rupture between the form and content of Lacanian theory. The "acceptance of contingency" constructed around the idea of "constitutive lack" is a closing, not an opening, gesture, and is itself "essentialist" and non-contingent. Many Lacanian claims are not at all contingent, but are posited as ahistorical absolutes. To take an instance from Mouffe's work, 'power and antagonism' are supposed to have an 'ineradicable character' so that 'any social objectivity is constituted through acts of power' and will show traces of exclusions. One could hardly find a clearer example anywhere of a claim about a fixed basic structure of Being. One could also note again the frequency of words such as "all" and "always" in the Lacanian vocabulary. Ludwig Wittgenstein argues that 'if someone wished to say: "There is something common to all these constructions - namely the disjunction of all their common properties" - I should reply: Now you are only playing with words'77. Lacanian theory seems, indeed, to be treating disjunction as a basis for similarity, thus simply "playing with words"."contingency" embraced in Lacanian theory is not an openness which exceeds specifiable positivities, but a positivity posing as negativity. The relationship between contingency and "constitutive lack" is like the relationship between Germans and "Germanness", or tables and "tableness", in the work of Barthes. One could speak, therefore, of a "lack-ness" or a "contingency-ness" or an "antagonism-ness" in Lacanian political theory, and of this theory as a claim to fullness with this reified "lack-ness" as one of the positive elements within the fullness. One sometimes finds direct instances of such mythical vocabulary, as for instance when Stavrakakis demands acknowledgement of 'event-ness and negativity'78. Indeed, it is an especially closed variety of fullness, with core ideas posited as unquestionable dogmas and the entire structure virtually immune to falsification.

AT LACAN/ZIZEK: ESSENTIALISM TURN

Their alternative links to the critique. Their claim is that the aff is a quest for a new-master signifier that will fail because of the inevitable re-emergence of the Real. However, that ontological statement about humanity is itself, a new master-signifier.

Robinson (PhD Political Theory, University of Nottingham) 05 (Theory and Event, Andrew, 8:1, The Political Theory of Constitutive Lack: A Critique).

The gap between the two kinds of contingency is also suggested by the Lacanian insistence on the "need" for a master-signifier (or "nodal point"), i.e. a particular signifier which fills the position of universality, a 'symbolic injunction which relies only on its own act of enunciation'116. It is through such a gesture that one establishes a logic of sameness, and such a logic seems to be desired by Lacanians. Butler remarks that Žižek's text is a 'project of mastery' and a discourse of the law in which 'the "contingency" of language is mastered in and by a textual practice which speaks as the law'. He demands a '"New Harmony", sustained by a newly emerged Master-Signifier'. This insistence on a master-signifier is an anti-contingent gesture, especially in its rejection of the multiordinality of language. It is, after all, this multiordinality (the possibility of making a statement about any other statement) which renders language an open rather than a closed system. The "need" for a master-signifier seems to be a "need" to restore an illusion of closure, the "need" for metacommunication to operate in a repressive rather than an open way. This "need" arises because the mythical concept of "constitutive lack" is located in an entire mythical narrative in which it relates to other abstractions. In the work of Laclau and Mouffe, this expresses itself in the demand for a "hegemonic" agent who contingently expresses the idea of social order "as such". One should recall that such an order is impossible, since antagonism is constitutive of social relations, and that the hegemonic gesture therefore requires an exclusion. Thus, the establishment of a hegemonic master-signifier is merely a useful illusion. The alternative to demanding a master-signifier - an illusion of order where there is none - would be to reject the pursuit of the ordering function itself, and to embrace a "rhizomatic" politics which goes beyond this pursuit. In Laclau and Mouffe's work, however, the "need" for a social order, and a state to embody it, is never questioned, and, even in Zizek's texts, the "Act" which smashes the social order is to be followed by a necessary restoration of order118. This necessity is derived ontologically: people are, says Žižek, 'in need of firm roots'119. The tautological gesture of establishing a master-signifier by restrospectively positing conditions of an object as its components, thereby 'blocking any further inquiry into the social meaning' of what it quilts (i.e. repressive metacommunication), is a structural necessity120. This is because 'discourse itself is in its fundamental structure "authoritarian"'. The role of the analyst is not to challenge the place of the master, but to occupy it in such a way as to expose its underlying contingency121. The master-signifier, also termed the One, demonstrates the centrality of a logic of place in Lacanian theory. Lacanians assume that constitutive lack necessitates the construction of a positive space which a particular agent can fill (albeit contingently), which embodies the emptiness/negativity as such. Therefore, the commitment to master-signifiers and the state involves a continuation of an essentialist image of positivity, with "lack" operating structurally as the master-signifier of Lacanian theory itself (not as a subversion of positivity, but as a particular positive element). The idea of "constitutive lack" is supposed to entail a rejection of neutral and universal standpoints, and it is this rejection which constructs it as an "anti-essentialist" position. In practice, however, Lacanians restore the idea of a universal framework through the backdoor. Beneath the idea that "there is no neutral universality" lurks a claim to know precisely such a "neutral universality" and to claim a privileged position on this basis. A consistent belief in contingency and "anti-essentialism" entails scepticism about the idea of constitutive lack. After all, how does one know that the appearance that 'experience' shows lack to be constitutive reflects an underlying universality, as opposed to the contingent or even simulated effects of a particular discourse or episteme? Alongside its opponents, shouldn't Lacanian theory also be haunted by its own fallibility and incompletion? There is a paradox in the idea of radical choice, for it is unclear whether Lacanians believe this should be applied reflexively. Is the choice of Lacanian theory itself an ungrounded Decision? If so, the theory loses the universalist status it implicitly claims. If not, it would seem to be the kind of structural theory it attacks. A complete structural theory would seem to assume an extra-contingent standpoint, even if the structure includes a reference to constitutive lack. Such a theory would seem to be a radical negation of the incompletion of "I don't know".

AT LACAN/ZIZEK: 9/11 ARGUMENTS BAD

Zizek's arguments about 9/11 fail to recognize that the shock of the attack was not in its simulated nature but in its impact on real people. We need to focus on the actual effects of violence and how to redress it.

Crosswhite, 01 (Associate Professor of English at University of Oregon, 2001 Jim, "A Response to Slavoj Zizek's "Welcome to the Desert of the Real!"," September 25, http://www.uoregon.edu/~jcross/response_to_zizek.htm)

But to say that what happened on September 11 is like the scene in the Matrix where Morpheus introduces the Keanu Reeves character to the "desert of the real" is to say something that belongs on a Fox Network talk show. For what Americans is it true that the events of September 11 broke into an "insulated artificial universe" that generated an image of a diabolical outsider? Let's not consider the 5,000 incinerated and dismembered men and women and children who suffered from disease and injury like all people, who cleaned toilets and coughed up phlegm and changed diapers and actually occupied with what was once their real bodies those towers which, for Zizek, stand for virtual capitalism. They can't be the ones whose delusions generated the fantasy of a diabolical outsider. None of them, none of their surviving children, none of their fellow citizens fantasized Bin Laden's ruling that it is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it, to kill the Americans, military and civilians. So for whom has the fantastic "outside" broken in and smashed, with "shattering impact," an immaterial world of delusion? For whom does Osama Bin Laden appear as a character from a James Bond film? For whom did the events of September 11 arrive with the painful awareness that we were living in an artificial insulated reality? For whom do the people and events in this massacre of innocents appear solely in the shapes of film and television? Perhaps, perhaps the Americans living in an insulated, artificial reality are the characters in American television shows and in increasingly intertextual American films. Perhaps these are the Americans Zizek is listening to, watching, imagining. But here is the true "shattering impact:" that 5,000 innocent people who lived real lives in real, vulnerable human bodies, who bore real children, suffered real disease and injury and pain, bled real blood; 5,000 real people who helped to sustain a cosmopolitan city of millions and millions of other real people of different ethnic groups and religions and languages, real citizens who had achieved a great measure of peace and hope, who had been slowly and successfully bringing down the New York City crime rate; that 5,000 of these people would have their real bodies and lives erased in a matter of minutes, and that only body parts, the vapors of the incinerated, and the grieving and the sorrowful and the orphans would remain. This is the shock. This is the disbelief. Not the shattering of an illusion but the shattering of those real people and their real bodies. Not the shattering of a virtual reality, but the erasing of what was real. This is why the people of New York wept in the streets, why the tears and grief will continue. And this is why, in their grief, the survivors will struggle to preserve a memory of what was real, and to keep this memory of what was real from evanescing into someone else's symbol, or fantasy, or tool. Were the real lives they led less real for any happiness or peace they achieved? Are the unfathomable sufferings of Rwanda and what happened in Sarajevo to be the measure of what is most real? And yet in Zizek's writing, what happened on September 11 is not real but symbolic, as it seems to have been for the murderers, too: "the actual effect of these bombings is much more symbolic than real." We are just "getting a taste of" what goes on around the world "on a daily basis." OK, perhaps we are insulated and ignorant. But where are 5,000 innocents being incinerated by murderers on a daily basis? If Zizek is saying that Americans should be more knowledgeable about the lives and sufferings of other peoples whose lives and sufferings are entangled with America's own history, then who would disagree? If Zizek is saying that American power and its direct involvement in international affairs create a special responsibility for our educational systems and our media to provide us with a knowledge of global matters that we have not yet achieved, then who would disagree? If he is saying that Americans should comprehend more deeply how people in other parts of the world comprehend us, once more, who would disagree? If he is saying that real understanding of geographically distant others is endangered and distorted by the fantasies of film and television, are there educated Americans who have not heard this? Is the struggle to educate a democratic citizenship adequate to our time and the realities of globalization unique to the United States? That would be hard to believe. However, it must be conceded by all that the U.S. faces one special difficulty and so a special but obligatory struggle here. Many of its citizens will never have a first hand experience of Europe or the Middle East or Africa or Asia or even South America. I can drive or fly 3,000 miles and never leave my country. At best, I can get to Mexico or Canada. This would take someone living in France through all of Europe and into central Asia, or into the center of Africa. The problems of truly comprehending these others whose languages are rarely spoken anywhere near you and into whose actual presence you will never come are not trivial. But Zizek seems to be saying something more than all of this. He seems to know more than most of us know. He knows that "the ultimate truth of the capitalist utilitarian de-spiritualized universe is the de-materialization of the 'real life' itself, its reversal into a spectral show." This is difficult to comprehend. Is this the "ultimate truth" about a real nation, about real people, about a real, existing economic system, about an ethical theory, about a fantasy of real people, or about movies or television or what? The problem may be that many of us cannot imagine that "capitalism" (is it one thing?), which is after all something historical, has an "ultimate truth." And it is difficult to understand what he is asking at the end: "Or will America finally risk stepping through the fantasmatic screen separating it from the Outside World, accepting its arrival into the Real world, making the long-overdue move from 'A thing like this should not happen HERE!' to 'A thing like this should not happen ANYWHERE!'." Of course, to abandon the "here" for the "anywhere" would be foolish. We are in real bodies in real places with real limitations and with real work to do. It is not simply a "fantasmatic screen" that deeply attaches people in a unique way to the sufferings of their neighbors and their fellow citizens. But the demand that Zizek makes is neither unfamiliar nor inappropriate. It is more than worth pursuing. What can we do to work to see that what the people of New York City suffered on September 11 does not happen anywhere, neither in the U.S. nor anywhere else? The reactions of the American government now threaten regions all over the world and seriously threaten liberty and privacy and tolerance in the United States. The American past carries humanitarian successes and catastrophic failures and genocide. Perhaps fantastic critique has a role to play. Certainly we must struggle to sustain serious social criticism through threatening times, but unless we are simply displaying critical virtuosity, we must achieve a kind of criticism that is reasonably concrete, less pretending to ultimate truths of history, more capable of acknowledging the real suffering of real people, criticism that is not too proud to descend to the practicable. What do we seek now? First, to avert a catastrophe. We must undo the terrorist networks and prevent American anger and power from leading us into the catastrophic roles that seem to have been scripted for us. Five thousand innocents are murdered in New York City. That is more than enough. Every dead innocent fuels more anger, either from the powerless or from the powerful. Averting an escalation of global violence is the immediate and pressing task. Undoing and weakening the terrorist networks, withdrawing support from them, arresting the guilty—everyone who is not already a monster must be persuaded to join in this.

AT LACAN/ZIZEK: NO CONNECTION ALT AND BALLOT

There is no connection between the ballot and the alterative—Zizek argues that the alternative cannot be consciously brought about—it can only be recognized in hindsight.

Tell, 04 Communication Arts and Sciences at The Pennsylvania State University, 2004
(David, “On Belief (Review),” *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 37.1 (2004) 96-99, Project MUSE)

Most scholars of rhetoric, however, will not be satisfied with Zizek's belief. For although this belief provides the necessary subjective conditions for public intervention, it is difficult to imagine it being publicly deployed. This belief is, after all, radically privatized; it is the internal repetition of a "primordial decision," or an "unconscious atemporal deed" (147). One must wonder about the public possibilities of such a private (and subconscious) experience. Moreover, most rhetoricians may well be troubled by Zizek's claim that all "acts proper"—acts of actual freedom—occur outside the symbolic order. Insofar as rhetoric can be considered symbolic action, then, its action can never provide for innovative intervention into the public sphere. Zizek admits as much in an endnote: "true acts of freedom are choices/decisions which we make while unaware of it—we never decide (in the present tense); all of a sudden, we just take note of how we have already decided " (156n46). It is precisely here that the rhetorician will not be satisfied: if Rorty marginalized the rhetorical purchase of [End Page 98] belief by banishing it to the private sphere, Zizek does so by marginalizing rhetoric itself.