

AT Nietzsche

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AT Nietzsche - 1/6

1. TURN- NIETZSCHE'S NEGATIVITY PRECLUDES HIS ABILITY TO SURPASS NIHILISM. HIS ETERNAL RECURRENCE CONTAINS RESIDUAL SUBJECTIVITY WHICH MEANS IT BECOMES AN ETERNAL WILLING OF THE OBJECT OF HIS CRITICISM I.E. THE ALTERNATIVE REPRODUCES THE LINKS.

Conway in 98

(Daniel, Prof. Philosophy @ PennState "Tumbling Dice", symplode 6.1, muse)

Nietzsche's experiments with nomadism are compromised in the end by his (involuntary) foundational commitment to negativity—lack, loss, sin or deficiency—as the originary metaphysical condition of human experience. Although Nietzsche understands this preoccupation with negativity as a prejudice fundamental to the crisis of European nihilism, shrewdly exposing it in its various neo-Hegelian incarnations, his experiments with originary sufficiency all eventually founder. In promulgating his dubious teaching of the Übermensch, for example, he cannot help but present this figure of originary sufficiency within the irrefrangible frame of negativity, as a "cure" his readers both lack and need in order to become whole (Nietzsche 1982, 124-137). Even Dionysus himself, the enduring symbol for the unquenchable sufficiency of Life, the diceplayer par excellence, eventually becomes conscripted as an agent of negativity.

2. NIETZSCHE'S ESCAPE OR POST-NIHILISM BECOMES A MAZE OF SUBJECTIVITY WHERE NOMADS WANDER AND ROTATE TO INFINITY WITHIN HIS CRITICISM AND RE-ENTRAPMENT WITHIN BINARIES.

Conway in 98

(Daniel, Prof. Philosophy @ PennState "Tumbling Dice", symplode 6.1, muse)

While it may be true that Nietzsche's nomadic adventures confounded all despotic attempts to codify the law, it is simply not the case that he, or anyone else, could sustain indefinitely the rhizomatic activities for which he is celebrated. While his "nomadic war machine" succeeded in deterritorializing the despotic codifications of philosophy, thereby creating the conditions for the possibility of investigating difference, it also contributed eventually to the inevitable reterritorialization of philosophy, through the despotic codification of new oppositional categories. Nietzsche's labyrinth, so inviting initially as an extra-dialectical retreat from the orthodoxy of binary opposition, eventually reveals itself as a gilded cage, wherein self-styled nomads satisfy their twisted desire to wave the despot's scepter.

AT Nietzsche - 2/6

3. NIETZSCHE'S PROJECT INEVITABLY FALLS WITHIN THE RETERRITORIALIZATION OF METAPHYSICS, BETRAYING HIS PROJECT AND REDUCING HIM TO A SYSTEM OF BINARIES BETRAYING THE CRITICISM.

Conway in 98

(Daniel, Prof. Philosophy @ PennState "Tumbling Dice", symplode 6.1, muse)

In order to put Nietzsche to work, one must not only embrace his familiar deterritorializing movement, which corresponds to the affirmation of chance; one must also embrace his inevitable reterritorialization, which corresponds to the affirmation of necessity. For all of his rhizomatic calisthenics, his dice too must return to earth, and the fatal combination they eventually deliver will necessarily betray the promise of his nomadic war machine. In order to affirm Nietzsche, one must forcibly inscribe his practice of critique into the context of his critique of modernity, thereby divesting him of any extra-machinic (either romantically human or fatuously divine) privilege. He must be reduced—as he reduces all others—to a collection of signs, which may be decoded unsentimentally and incorporated within the framework of one's own evolving difference engine.

4. NIETZSCHE'S PROJECT FALLS BACK INTO NIHILISM HAVING STARED INTO THE MOST ABSTRACT DARKNESS OF IT FROM OUTSIDE OF RATIONALITY.

Kroker in 2k3

(ndrew, editor CTheory.net, accessed @ <http://www.ctheory.net/will/future.html>)

Perhaps as a psychological counter-move to his fatal attraction to the stronger will of Nietzsche, Heidegger always insisted that while Nietzsche could brilliantly express the deepest logic of modernist metaphysics, he never succeeded in escaping the axiomatic of his time because of his abiding commitment to the language of value. For Heidegger, Nietzsche's primal concepts - the will to power and eternal recurrence - were themselves simultaneously uncoverings of the modernist episteme and its deepest continuation. Consequently for Heidegger, Nietzsche's story had about it the tragic sense of futility: a thinker who prematurely fell into silence because he had been overcome by the language of completed nihilism-- a writer whose thought penetrated the inner soul-ice chamber of nihilism because it had managed to escape the rational prison-house of thought. Beyond writing, beyond thinking, Heidegger's Nietzsche was simultaneously the anti-Christ of nihilism and the value-priest that seduces into a virulent life-form the modernist nomenclature.

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5. COUNTER CRITICISM OF METAPHYSICS-

A.) NIETZSCHE FAILS TO ESCAPE THE METAPHYSICAL TRADITIONS BECAUSE HE FILLS THE SPACE WITH AN ETERNAL RECURRENCE OF IDENTITY AND BINARIES OPERATING WITHIN METAPHYSICS.

Conway in 98

(Daniel, Prof. Philosophy @ PennState "Tumbling Dice", symplode 6.1, muse)

Nietzsche's failure to escape the snares of originary deficiency is illuminated most clearly in his repeated miscarriage of the teaching of eternal recurrence. Although Deleuze recommends eternal recurrence as a promising engine of repetition, Nietzsche's best renditions of this teaching clearly fail to engage the production of difference. As Heidegger has argued in his own parlance, Nietzsche remains mired in the metaphysical tradition, attempting with his teaching of eternal recurrence to "eternalize the moment" within a single, heroic act of will. Heidegger thus detects in Nietzsche's teaching of eternal recurrence a residual subjectivism, which tinctures his subsequent experiments with difference and repetition (Heidegger 1977, 95-105). Despite his efforts to illuminate the difference that metaphysical thinking necessary occludes, he ultimately conflates the eternal recurrence of the same with the eternal recurrence of identity. While his teaching of eternal recurrence does in fact clear a conceptual space for the investigation of difference, he promptly fills this space with identity, confounding the traditional codes of philosophy only to replace them with binary oppositions of his own design.

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B.) METAPHYSICS MARGINALIZES THE OTHER, REDUCING THEM TO PIECES ON A GAMEBOARD. THIS CREATES AN ENDS JUSTIFIES THE MEANS MENTALITY AND REDUCES US ALL TO STANDING RESERVE IN THE IMPERIAL'S ATTEMPT TO COLONIZE THE ENTIRE GLOBE. THIS LEGITIMATES DISCIPLINARY POWER, ALREADY IMPACTED.

Spanos in 2k

(William V., Professor of Comparative Language at Binghamton University, "America's Shadow: An Anatomy of an Empire", pgs. 9-11)

Metaphysics, therefore, in its post-Greek, that is, Roman, form, is a way of thinking that perceives "beings" or "things-as-they-are" from a privileged vantage point "beyond" or "above" them, that is, from a distance — an "Archimedean point," to appropriate Hannah Arendt's apt phrase⁹ — that enables the finite perceiver to "overcome" the ontologically prescribed limits of immediate vision or, to put it positively, to comprehend them in their totality. But incorporated implicitly in Heidegger's translation of the Greek prefix *meta* as "from above" is the idea of "from the end." For another meaning of the word *meta* is "after." These two meanings, it should be underscored, activate our awareness that the naturalization of the word "metaphysics" has congealed two metaphorical systems that are, nevertheless, absolutely integral with and necessary to each other: that which emanates from sight and that which emanates from the object it sees. But to disclose the indissoluble relationship of these metaphorical systems will require separating them out.

Holding in temporary abeyance the resonant specificity of the visual metaphysics of the "first" meaning in favor of thinking the second, we can say that the metaphysical interpretation of being involves the perception of "beings" or "things-as-they-are" (*physis*) from the end, not only in the sense of termination but also in the sense of the purpose or goal of a directional and totalizing temporal process, a process in which this end is present from the beginning. If we attend to the word *meta* as a category of time, we can be more specific about what "beings" actually refer to: it compels us to understand "them" as the radical temporality of being or, more precisely, the differences that temporality always already disseminates. To think meta-physically is thus to think backward. This means retro-spectively or circularly, for the purpose of accommodating difference to a preconceived end or of reducing the differential force of time to a self-identical, objectified, timeless presence, while preserving the appearance of the temporality of time.

To put this reduction in the terms precipitated by the implicit distinction between two kinds of time (one that is derivative and one that is original), to think metaphysically is to transform the spectral nothingness of being (*das Nichts*) into a comforting and/or productive totalized

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[SPANOS CONTINUES...]

Metaphysics is thus a circular mode of inquiry that, in beginning from the end, has as its end the (finally futile) total reification and determination of the essential anxiety-activating indeterminacy of the nothing, of temporality, of the differences that temporality disseminates; of a phantasmic alterity, as it were. To use the rhetoric in Heidegger's discourse that points to the essential imperialism of metaphysical ontology, it is an end-oriented mode of inquiry intended to level or at-home or domesticate or pacify — that is, to "civilize" — the "threatening"

not-at-home (*die Unheimliche*) that being as such "is" for *Dasein*. The function of metaphysical thinking is not simply to annul the anxiety — the dislocating uncanniness (*die Unheimlichkeit*) — precipitated by being-in-the-not-at-home. By an easy extension inhering in Heidegger's ironic invocation of the metaphor of "grasping" — one of the essential and determining white metaphors of the truth discourse of the Occident, to which I will return when I take up the spatial metaphysics informing the word "metaphysics" — it can be said that the function of this "after" in the logical economy of metaphysics is also to transform the indeterminate realm of the uncanny to a condition that enables its management. The function of metaphysical thinking, in short, is "ideological." It serves to reduce the ineffable be-ing of being to what Heidegger will later call exploitable "standing reserve" (*Bestand*) and Foucault, "docile and useful body."

It is not, however, simply the Other of metaphysics — the nothing, the temporal, the accidental, the contradictory, the differential, or, to evoke the connotation of the ontological Other I want to underscore, the spectral — that metaphysical objectification and naming would domesticate and pacify. As the metaphysics released by the solicitation of the sedimented and innocuous (indeed, benign) names referring to the domestication (at-homing) of being suggest, it is also — and in a determined way — the "unknown," the "primitive," the "wild" or "savage," the an-archic, the dis-orderly, in their ecological and human (subjective, sexual, racial, ethnic, and sociopolitical) manifestations. It is, in short, the entire relay of being that haunts or threatens the authority of the received (hegemonic) discourse of the dominant, that is, Western, order.

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PUBLIC HEALTH AND SCIENCE CAN BE A SELF OVERCOMING THAT ALLOWS US TO ESCAPE NIHILISM AND EMBRACE A WILL TO POWER.

Cox in 99

(Cristoph; Nietzsche: Naturalism and Interpretation; p. 26-7)

Yet this final conviction is not just one among many. Nietzsche takes it to be *the* conviction upon which all of Western thought is based. A questioning of this conviction, then, amounts to a questioning of Western thought itself. Nietzsche makes clear that this is just what the “death of God” entails and just what the “intellectual conscience” requires. Impelled by the “intellectual conscience,” science demands its own self-overcoming. Insofar as science represents the kernel and esoteric form of the ascetic ideal, this self-overcoming of science is, at the same time, a self-overcoming of the ascetic ideal:

This pair, science and the ascetic ideal, both rest on the same foundation—I have already indicated it: on the same overestimation of truth (more exactly: on the same belief that truth is *inestimable* and *cannot* be criticized). Therefore they are *necessarily* allies, so that if they are to be fought they can only be fought and called in question together. A depreciation of the ascetic ideal unavoidably involves a depreciation of science: one must keep one’s eyes and ears open to this fact! (GM III:25)

And this self-overcoming of the ascetic ideal points to the self-overcoming of the foundations of European thought:

Consider on this question both the earliest and most recent philosophers: they are all oblivious of how much the will to truth itself first requires justification; here there is a lacuna in every philosophy—how did this come about? Because the ascetic ideal has hitherto *dominated* all philosophy, because truth was posited as being, as God, as the highest court of appeal—because truth was not *permitted* to be a problem at all. [...]—From the moment faith in the God of the ascetic ideal is denied, *a new problem arises*: that of the *value* of truth. The will to truth requires a critique—let us thus define our own task,—the value of truth must for once be experimentally *called into question*. (GM III:24; cf. BGE 1; A 8)

[W]hat meaning would *our* whole being possess if it were not this, that in us the will to truth becomes conscious of itself as a *problem*? . . . As the will to truth thus gains self-consciousness, from now on—there can be no doubt about it—morality [read: the ascetic ideal and the otherworldly, generally] will go to *ruin*: this is the great spectacle in a hundred acts reserved for the next two centuries in Europe—the most terrible, most questionable, and perhaps the most hopeful of all spectacles. . . . (GM III:27)

With this, the trajectory of Western thought nears its end; or rather, it nears its midpoint, because, for Nietzsche, our modernity marks not the end of history but the inauguration of a new history, “a higher history than all history hitherto” (GS 125), not the “dusk” of infinite wisdom, but the innocence of “daybreak.” Even so, that dawn is as yet merely announced. At present, we remain at “midnight,” between the old day and the new. This dark night is characterized by “nihilism,” the general malaise brought upon European culture by its recognition that “the highest values [i.e., truth, God, being] devalue themselves” (WP 2). This nihilism, Nietzsche argues, still essentially belongs to the old day; it remains a “shadow of God” (GS 108). For, though the nihilist acknowledges that all absolute values have devaluated themselves, he or she still laments the loss, and what remains still appears valueless. The nihilist does not yet *affirm* the “death of God” and its consequences.

Nietzsche, however, urges us to push what is falling (see Z:3 “On Old and New Tablets”; A 2). Wishing to become “the first perfect nihilist of Europe who, however, has [...] lived through the whole of nihilism, to the end, leaving it behind, outside himself” (WP P:3), Nietzsche encourages an “active nihilism” (WP 22–23) that will bring the old epoch to a close. This is the momentous task toward which Nietzsche directs his energies; and the achievement of this task will bring us to the final phase of his genealogy of Western thought.

Thus far, we have seen that metaphysics and theology overcome themselves through science, and that science, too, ends in a self-overcoming. What follows this self-overcoming of science? To answer this question, and to move from science to its successor, we must first take up the task announced above, the initial phase of the revaluation of values: the re-evaluation of truth.