

DDI '06  
Brooks/Garen  
Moor

## Answers To: Economic Collapse Good (DeDev)

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### Economic Growth Leads to General Well-Being

Indur M. Goklany, an independent scholar and author, August 22, 2002, Policy Analysis No, 447, <http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa447.pdf>

More direct measures of human well-being than per capita income include freedom from hunger, mortality rates, child labor, education, access to safe water, and life expectancy. Those indicators generally advance with wealth, because wealth helps create and provide the means to improve them. In turn, those improvements can stimulate economic growth by creating conditions conducive to technological change and increasing productivity. Thus, wealth, technological change, and well-being reinforce each other in a virtuous cycle of progress.

### Growth Decreases Economic Inequality

Indur M. Goklany, an independent scholar and author, August 22, 2002, Policy Analysis No, 447, <http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa447.pdf>

During the last half century, as wealth and technological change advanced worldwide, so did the well-being of the vast majority of the world's population. Today's average person lives longer and is healthier, more educated, less hungry, and less likely to have children in the work-force. Moreover, gaps in these critical measures of well-being between the rich countries and the middle- or low-income groups have generally shrunk dramatically since the mid-1900s irrespective of trends in income inequality. However, where those gaps have shrunk the least or even expanded recently, the problem is not too much globalization but too little. The rich are not better off because they have taken something away from the poor; rather, the poor are better off because they benefit from the technologies developed by the rich, and their situation would have improved further had they been better able to capture the benefits of globalization. A certain level of global inequality may even benefit the poor as rich countries develop and invest in more expensive medicines and technologies that then become affordable to the poor.

### Growth Improves Quality of Life

Indur M. Goklany, an independent scholar and author, August 22, 2002, Policy Analysis No, 447, <http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa447.pdf>

Figure 1, based on cross-country data, shows that various indicators of human wellbeing improve as countries become wealthier, with improvements coming most rapidly at the lowest levels of wealth. There are several possible explanations for this association. First, economic development indeed improves these indicators. Greater wealth translates into greater resources for researching and developing new technologies that directly or indirectly advance human well-being.<sup>19</sup> It also means increased resources for advancing literacy and education, which, too, are generally conducive to greater technological innovation and diffusion.<sup>20</sup> Equally important, wealthier societies are better able to afford new as well as existing, but underused, technologies.<sup>21</sup> For instance, with respect to health—captured in Figure 1 by both infant mortality and life expectancy—these include “old” technologies such as water treatment to produce safe water, sanitation, basic hygiene, vaccinations, antibiotics, insect and vector control, and pasteurization,<sup>22</sup> as well as newer science-based technologies such as AIDS and oral rehydration therapies, organ transplants, mammograms, and other diagnostic tests. They also include agricultural technologies that increase crop yields, thereby increasing available food supplies and reducing hunger and malnourishment, which then reduces the toll of infectious and parasitic diseases.<sup>23</sup>

DDI '06  
AZ: DeDer  
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AZ: Growth  $\rightarrow$  Resource Shortages

1/1

### **Growth Leads to Innovation, Solving Resource Shortages**

Julian Simon, professor of business administration at the University of Maryland, 1996, *The Ultimate Resource II*, [http://www.juliansimon.com/writings/Ulimate\\_Resource/TCHAR03A.txt](http://www.juliansimon.com/writings/Ulimate_Resource/TCHAR03A.txt)

Now I'll restate this line of thought into a theory that will appear again and again in the book: More people, and increased income, cause resources to become more scarce in the short run. Heightened scarcity causes prices to rise. The higher prices present opportunity, and prompt inventors and entrepreneurs to search for solutions. Many fail in the search, at cost to themselves. But in a free society, solutions are eventually found. And in the long run the new developments leave us better off than if the problems had not arisen. That is, prices eventually become lower than before the increased scarcity occurred. It is all-important to recognize that discoveries of improved methods and of substitute products are not just luck. They happen in response to an increase in scarcity - a rise in cost. Even after a discovery is made, there is a good chance that it will not be put into operation until there is need for it due to rising cost. This point is important: Scarcity and technological advance are not two unrelated competitors in a Malthusian race; rather, each influences the other.

### **With Innovation, Resources are Virtually Infinite**

Julian Simon, professor of business administration at the University of Maryland, 1996, *The Ultimate Resource II*, [http://www.juliansimon.com/writings/Ulimate\\_Resource/TCHAR03A.txt](http://www.juliansimon.com/writings/Ulimate_Resource/TCHAR03A.txt)

Improvement in the efficiency of using copper not only reduces resource use in the present, but effectively increases the entire stock of unused resources. For example, an advance in knowledge that leads to a one percent decrease in the amount of copper that we need to make electrical outlets is much the same as an increase in the total stock of copper that has not yet been mined. And if we were to make such a one percent increase in efficiency for all uses every year, a one percent increase in demand for copper in every future year could be accommodated without any increase in the price of copper, even without any other helpful developments.

2

10.4.06  
12: De Dev  
Brooks/Goren

# AZ: Growth entrenches poverty

1/1

## Growth Solves Poverty

**USAID** (U.S. Agency for International Development), 2002, "Foreign Aid in the National Interest," <http://www.usaid.gov/fani/Full%20Report-%20Foreign%20Aid%20in%20the%20National%20Interest.pdf>

New data eliminate any doubt that rapid economic growth reduces poverty.<sup>5</sup> In all but a few countries economic growth has increased per capita incomes for the poorest 20 or 40 percent of the population. Yet despite rapid global growth since World War II, the world still has a large—and in some regions, growing—number of poor people. Are these people forever trapped in low growth environments? Are there circumstances where economic growth does not reach the poor? Fortunately, it is possible to understand the relationship between reductions in poverty and changes in the distribution of income, and to strengthen the link between economic growth and poverty alleviation.

Income distribution matters because it reflects and affects how growth changes the lives of poor people. The sectors in which growth originates and the initial distribution of income help shape how well poor people connect to economic growth (box 2.1). In countries where the gap between the incomes of the poorest 20 percent and the richest 20 percent is less than twice the average per capita income—that is, where the income gap is relatively small—growth in both agricultural and nonagricultural productivity improves the distribution of income. Growth in agricultural productivity is slightly but consistently more effective in generating incomes for all people.<sup>7</sup> Rising agricultural incomes spur growth in nonagricultural rural production as well. In the long run, the agriculture sector will absorb a smaller share of productive resources, and nonagricultural job opportunities will be more important for poor people.

3

10/1 '06  
Az: DeDev  
Brooks/Garen

AZ: Growth → overpopulation

1/1

### **Growth Decreases Fertility Rates**

**USAID** (U.S. Agency for International Development), 2002, "Foreign Aid in the National Interest," <http://www.usaid.gov/fani/Full%20Report-%20Foreign%20Aid%20in%20the%20National%20Interest.pdf>

Second, economic growth is a key factor in causing fertility to decline because it generally leads women to believe they are better off with fewer children. Without economic growth, an important rationale for having large families does not change.<sup>15</sup> Rather, changes in fertility are driven by parents weighing economic and personal choices in the face of falling infant mortality.

### **Population Won't Explode--Global Population Decreasing**

Ben J. **Wattenberg**, a senior fellow at American Enterprise Institute, March 13, 2003, The American Enterprise, [http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.16549/pub\\_detail.asp](http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.16549/pub_detail.asp)

The United Nations divides the 194 nations of the world into two groups: Less Developed Countries and More Developed Countries. The most surprising news comes from the LDCs. An image races across our mind's eye: A population explosion and its victims. We see a row of small children trailing a weary mother in a rotten, sprawling, unmanageable city.

In the 1960s the LDC rate was six children per woman. Today it is under three. Some major nations have declined from seven to two! Huge declines have occurred in Brazil, China, Iran, India, Egypt, Turkey, Indonesia, and--attention Pat Buchanan!--Mexico.

Fortuitously, this scenario gives the LDCs a "demographic dividend." For several decades they will have relatively few old or young people to support. The bulk of their population will be working-age and ready to produce, hopefully lessening inequality in the world.

Meanwhile modern nations proceeded from low fertility to incredibly low fertility. In the 1960s European TFRs were at 2.6 children per woman. Today, the rate is 1.3, as is the Japanese. The low fertility nations face massive pension problems. In a pay-as-you-go system, who will pay the senior bees when there are so few worker bees? In Europe and Japan workers typically retire before their sixtieth birthday and do not like to hear that they might have to work until they are older. Workers have marched while politicians hide under their desks.

### **Birth Rates are Rapidly Decreasing**

Ben J. **Wattenberg**, a senior fellow at American Enterprise Institute, March 13, 2003, The American Enterprise, [http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.16549/pub\\_detail.asp](http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.16549/pub_detail.asp)

But no longer useful. For the last five years UN expert meetings have examined a trend that has been ever-more apparent for several decades: Never have birth rates fallen so far, so fast, so low, so surprisingly, for so long, in so many places. Now the United Nations has made it official, breaking demographic crockery everywhere. Its 2002 World Population Prospects uses 1.85 children per woman as the point to which human population is tending in this century.

DOI '06  
AZ: De Dev  
Brooks/Garen

# AZ: Growth hurts Environment

1/2

## **Turn : Growth Helps the Environment**

Bjorn Lomborg, director of Denmark's national Environmental Assessment Institute and associate professor of statistics in the Department of Political Science at the University of Aarhus, 2001, *The Skeptical Environmentalist*, p. 32-33.

In general we need to confront our myth of the economy undercutting the environment. We have grown to believe that we are faced with an inescapable choice between higher economic welfare and a greener environment. But surprisingly and as will be documented throughout this book, environmental development often stems from economic development - only when we get sufficiently rich can we afford the relative luxury of caring about the environment. On its most general level, this conclusion is evident in Figure 9, where higher income in general is correlated with higher environmental sustainability.

## Growth is More Environmentally Beneficial

Gene Grossman, Prof of International Economics at Princeton, and Alan Krueger, prof of Economics and Public Affairs at Princeton, May 1995, *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*.

Contrary to the alarmist cries of some environmental groups, we find no evidence that economic growth does unavoidable harm to the natural habitat. Instead we find that while increases in GDP may be associated with worsening environmental conditions in very poor countries, air and water quality appear to benefit from economic growth once some critical level of income has been reached. The turning points in these inverted U-shaped relationships vary for the different pollutants, but in almost every case they occur at an income of less than \$8000 (1985 dollars). For a country with an income of \$10,000, the hypothesis that further growth will be associated with deterioration of environmental conditions can be rejected at the 5 percent level of significance for many of our pollution measures.

Our findings are broadly consistent with those reported in other studies. For example, the World Bank Development Report [1992] also reports an inverted U-shaped relationship between per capita income and concentrations of sulfur dioxide and suspended particulates in city air, with turning points even lower than those suggested here. Moreover, they find that both the percentage of the population without access to safe water and the percentage of urban population without adequate sanitation decline steadily at all levels of income. Shafik and Bandyopadhyay [1992] find an inverted U-shaped relationship between total and annual deforestation and national income, while Selden and Song [1992] find similarly for estimated per capita national emissions of sulfur dioxide, particulates, oxides of nitrogen, and carbon monoxide (albeit, with somewhat higher turning points).<sup>12</sup> Only in the cases of municipal waste per capita (studied by the World Bank) and carbon dioxide emissions (studied by both the World Bank and Holtz-Eakin and Selden [1992]) do environmental conditions appear to still be worsening with growth at the income levels of even the most prosperous economies.

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AZ: De Dev  
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## AZ: Growth Hurts Environment

4/2

Turn: Growth Only Hurts Environment In Early stages - i.e., post-collapse.

Gene Grossman, Prof of International Economics at Princeton, and Alan Krueger, prof of Economics and Public Affairs at Princeton, May 1995, The Quarterly Journal of Economics.

To summarize, we find little evidence that environmental quality deteriorates steadily with economic growth. Rather, we find for most indicators that economic growth brings an initial phase of deterioration followed by a subsequent phase of improvement. We suspect that the eventual improvement reflects, in part, an increased demand for (and supply of) environmental protection at higher levels of national income. The turning points for the different pollutants vary, but in most cases they occur before a country reaches a per capita income of \$8000. For seven of the fourteen indicators we find a statistically significant positive relationship between environmental quality and income for a middle-income country with a per capita GDP of \$10,000. Only in one case (total coliform) do we find a significant adverse relationship at this income level.

## Growth Cleans the Environment

Gene Grossman, Prof of International Economics at Princeton, and Alan Krueger, prof of Economics and Public Affairs at Princeton, May 1995, The Quarterly Journal of Economics.

We discuss first the indicators of urban air quality. Sulfur dioxide and smoke display an inverted U-shaped relationship with GDP. Pollution appears to rise with GDP at low levels of income, but eventually to reach a peak, and then to fall with GDP at higher levels of income. In the case of  $\text{SO}_2$ , the estimated relationship turns up again at very high levels of income, but the relatively small number of observations for sites with incomes above \$16,000 means that we cannot have much confidence in the shape of the curve in this range.<sup>9</sup> We find a monotonically decreasing relationship between heavy particles and per capita GDP at all levels of income in the sample range. In all three of these cases, the income variables are jointly significant at the 1 percent level. Although the income variables are highly correlated, the lagged GDP terms tend to have the lower  $p$ -values, perhaps indicating that past income has been a major determinant of current pollution standards.

## Development Promotes New Resource-Preserving Technologies

Gene Grossman, Prof of International Economics at Princeton, and Alan Krueger, prof of Economics and Public Affairs at Princeton, May 1995, The Quarterly Journal of Economics.

Exhaustible and renewable natural resources serve as inputs into the production of many goods and services. If the composition of output and the methods of production were immutable, then damage to the environment would be inextricably linked to the scale of global economic activity. But substantial evidence suggests that development gives rise to a structural transformation in what an economy produces (see Syrquin [1989]). And societies have shown remarkable ingenuity in harnessing new technologies to conserve scarce resources. In principle, the forces leading to change in the composition and techniques of production may be sufficiently strong to more than offset the adverse effects of increased economic activity on the environment. In this paper we address this empirical issue using panel data on ambient pollution levels in many countries.

DOI '06  
FZ: De Dev  
Brooks/Garen  
1/2  
AZ: Growth is Unsustainable

## Recent Unsustainable Growth Has Ceased

Joel **Havemann**, Staff Writer, 7/20/06, Los Angeles Times, lexis.

Bernanke acknowledged that inflation had outpaced his previous semiannual forecast, presented in February, his first month on the job after replacing Alan Greenspan. He pointed out that the inflation measure favored by the Fed, personal consumption expenditures, had risen at an annual rate of 4.3% during the first five months of this year.

But much of this increase in prices occurred while the economy was growing at an unsustainable 5.6% rate in the first three months of the year.

Since that time, Bernanke said, economic **growth** had eased to a pace that would not generate inflation. Consumer spending had slowed, he said, and the housing market had cooled.

GDP Growth Has Stabilized—Growth Sustainable.

States News Service, 7/28/06, lexis.

Joint Economic Committee Vice Chairman Bob Bennett (R-Utah) today said that the latest economic report indicating 2.5 percent **growth** of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the second quarter is on target with historic trends and reflects very positive and **sustainable growth**.

The average of the last three quarters of GDP **growth** show a continued, positive course for the U.S. economy. We are on target to sustain the tremendous **growth** we have experienced for 19 consecutive quarters, said Bennett. The pro-**growth** policies supported by the president and Congress are working, and we must be vigilant in looking for opportunities to continue to boost consumer confidence and business investment.

Below are additional highlights of the Bureau of Economic Analysis report:

GDP **growth** in the second quarter was estimated to have been an annualized 2.5 percent rate, an expected moderation following the rapid 5.6 percent rate of **growth** in the first quarter.

The deceleration in GDP primarily reflected reduced **growth** in personal consumption spending, business equipment and software spending, exports, federal government spending, and residential investment.

Economic Outlook is Positive—No Growth Surges.

Jack **Guynn**, President and Chief Executive Officer, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, 6/11/04, Speech Delivered to the Databank Real Estate Symposium

In many ways I think it's appropriate to reflect, without gloating, on our economy's positive recent developments. We have worked our way through the 2001 recession with a relatively short and shallow falloff in output; we have returned to what looks like broad-based output **growth**; we are now getting decent employment **growth**; and we have inflation within the range most of us would define as acceptable. The trick now is to do what we can to stay on that path to **sustainable growth** and long-term price stability.



DOI 106  
AZ: De Dev  
Brooks/Garen

AZ: Growth is UNSustainable

2/2

Growth is Sustainable—Fed's Actions Prove

Joel **Havemann**, Staff Writer, 7/20/06, Los Angeles Times, lexis.

Federal Reserve Chairman Ben S. Bernanke on Wednesday presented a benign forecast for the U.S. economy, and markets welcomed his testimony as evidence that the Fed would soon halt its campaign of raising short-term interest rates.

In his semiannual economic assessment to Congress, Bernanke predicted a happy combination of slower but **sustainable** expansion and gradually moderating inflation.

**Growth** "should moderate ... both this year and next," Bernanke told the Senate Banking Committee. "Should that moderation occur as anticipated, it should also help to limit inflation pressures over time."

2006 Was An Ideal Economic Year—Means More to Come

Patricia **Sabatini**, staff writer, 4/7/06, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette

The economy has been humming a happy tune for more than four years now, but there are still plenty of bars left to the song, a local economist said yesterday.

With the nation close to full employment, inflation in check and consumers continuing to spend, "2006 represents basically the perfect constellation of circumstances for the economy," said Richard DeKaser, chief economist at National City Corp. in Cleveland, during an economic Webcast.

Although Mr. DeKaser expects a slight "slowing trend" over the next two years, overall his outlook is for "**sustainable growth**," even beyond the next two years.

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DDI '06  
AZ: DeDer  
Brooks/Garen

# AZ: Oil Collapses Econ.

1/1

## Oil Price Increases Don't affect Economy

Stephen **Brown**, Director of Energy Economics and Microeconomic Policy Analysis at the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, November/December '06 Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas

But, as noted previously, rising oil and natural gas prices do not seem to be hurting U.S. economic growth as much as the conventional wisdom might suggest. The principal reason is that the current rise in oil and natural gas prices is more the result of strong world economic activity than a shock to world oil supplies. Consequently, rising energy prices would have less effect on economic activity—restraining only slightly what would otherwise be extremely strong growth. For example, Americans are paying higher prices for gasoline to get to work, but they have jobs to go to and greater income to buy the gasoline.

## Price Increases Do Not Indicate Decreasing Supply

Stephen **Brown**, Director of Energy Economics and Microeconomic Policy Analysis at the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, November/December '06 Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas

But the oil price increases occurring in 2000 owe more to growing world demand fostered by a robust world economy than to a supply shock. Consequently, U.S. economic activity has been and should remain much less responsive to rising oil prices than the conventional wisdom might have us expect. The unconventional wisdom suggests that rising energy prices are more evidence of a robust economy than a threat to it. That bodes well for the sustainability of the current economic expansion in the United States and the Southwest, as well as for the continued recovery of the oil and gas industry.

DDI '06  
AZ: De Der  
Brooks/Galen

Growth Key to Hege

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### Growth key to U.S. Hegemony

Zalmay Khalilzad, US Special Envoy to the Iraqi Opposition, *The Washington Quarterly*, 1995 Spring, Vol. 18, No. 2; Pg. 84

The United States is unlikely to preserve its military and technological dominance if the U.S. economy declines seriously. In such an environment, the domestic economic and political base for global leadership would diminish and the United States would probably incrementally withdraw from the world, become inward-looking, and abandon more and more of its external interests. As the United States weakened, others would try to fill the Vacuum.

To sustain and improve its economic strength, the United States must maintain its technological lead in the economic realm. Its success will depend on the choices it makes. In the past, developments such as the agricultural and industrial revolutions produced fundamental changes positively affecting the relative position of those who were able to take advantage of them and negatively affecting those who did not. Some argue that the world may be at the beginning of another such transformation, which will shift the sources of wealth and the relative position of classes and nations. If the United States fails to recognize the change and adapt its institutions, its relative position will necessarily worsen.

To remain the preponderant world power, U.S. economic strength must be enhanced by further improvements in productivity, thus increasing real per capita income; by strengthening education and training; and by generating and using superior science and technology. In the long run the economic future of the United States will also be affected by two other factors. One is the imbalance between government revenues and government expenditure. As a society the United States has to decide what part of the GNP it wishes the government to control and adjust expenditures and taxation accordingly. The second, which is even more important to U.S. economic well-being over the long run, may be the overall rate of investment. Although their government cannot endow Americans with a Japanese-style propensity to save, it can use tax policy to raise the savings rate.

Economic Depression Destroys U.S. Hege

Raimo Vayrynen, prof @ University of Helsinki, 1983, *International Studies Quarterly*, "Economic Cycles, Power Transitions, Political Management and Wars between Major Powers".

For our analysis, the relationship between long waves of economic development and the competitive or hegemonic cycles within the core is of central importance. To date very few convincing analyses of this relationship have been provided. However, Nicole Bousquet (1980: 48-50) has suggested a starting point by showing that the transition to unicentricity has, as a rule, occurred during systemic economic upswings, while the system has tended to return to multicentricity during economic downturns. Such a coincidence of the decline of hegemonic power and systemic economic stagnation induces secondary core states to resort to protectionist measures. This tends to reduce economic interaction between core states, to increase rivalries and instabilities in their mutual relations in general, and to tighten the control structures between center and periphery where competition for spheres of influence becomes more intense (Hopkins *et al.*, 1982: 63-64). This explanation of the alternations between hegemony and rivalry in intra-core relations argues that during a period of accelerated economic growth a would-be hegemonic power is able to monopolize a disproportionate share of the surplus, while in the conditions of stagnation redistribution takes place between the hegemonic power, unable to defend its position, and the catch-up powers.

10

DAI '06  
A2, De Dev

Growth Wars = After Econ. Downturn

1/3

Brooks/Garen

Growth Wars occur in Growth Post-Recession - WWI proves

Raimo Vayrynen, prof @ University of Helsinki, 1983, International Studies Quarterly, "Economic Cycles, Power Transitions, Political Management and Wars between Major Powers".

Germany's industrial development is of particular importance in this context. Trebilcock (1981: 48-50) argues that German economic growth from the middle of the 19th century to World War I consisted of 'two, technologically distinct, surges of expansion, separated by a phase of short-lived recession'. The upswing of the long wave to the early 1870s witnessed the surge of railroads and the iron industry—which expanded in Great Britain as well, of course—while the upswing phase of the next long wave from 1892 to 1913 was based on steel, electrical and chemical industries, in all of

which Germans were particularly innovative. The German economy suffered less from the downturn between these two periods of accelerated growth than the economies of other major powers, with the exception of the United States.

Hegemony Prevents Growth Wars

Raimo Vayrynen, prof @ University of Helsinki, 1983, International Studies Quarterly, "Economic Cycles, Power Transitions, Political Management and Wars between Major Powers".

The next step in our analysis is the specification of a hypothesized relationship between power transitions and phases of long economic waves, on the one hand, and their combined impact on the probability of warfare among major powers, on the other. We have already observed that wars tend to occur during the upswing phase of the economic cycle. According to the conception of economic predominance as a producer of peace, the probability of major-power war is lowest in the period of hegemonic maturity and somewhat more probable during hegemonic decline, when the leading power may have to react against the military challenge of catch-up states. The probability of a war among major powers is obviously highest in the period of ascending hegemony, when the rivalry for power and market shares is the most intense. It is somewhat less probable during hegemonic victory, which is assumed, however, to be more conflict-ridden than the period of declining hegemony.

Turn: Economic Crisis Causes Power Wars - WWII proves

Raimo Vayrynen, prof @ University of Helsinki, 1983, International Studies Quarterly, "Economic Cycles, Power Transitions, Political Management and Wars between Major Powers".

An economic crisis does not always lead to political and military confrontations. If the crisis is deep enough, however, as it was between the two world wars, such confrontations cannot be avoided (Krippendorff, 1975: 137-139). In contradistinction to the period before World War I, the rivalry between continental and maritime expansion during the interwar years occurred in the conditions of a deep economic crisis that fostered protectionism, nationalism, and military programs. Major reorganizations took place in European and US political systems—in their party systems and in the modes of economic intervention by the state. Internal pressures generated by these reorganizations, especially in Germany, in combination with the fertile international basis for economic and political rivalries and with the lack of global political leadership allowed the second breakdown of the international order and its deterioration into a global war.

# Growth Wars = After Econ. collapse

2/3

## Nearly All Power Wars Occur in an Upswing, Post-Depression

Raimo Vayrynen, prof @ University of Helsinki, 1983, International Studies Quarterly, "Economic Cycles, Power Transitions, Political Management and Wars between Major Powers".

Seven of the nine wars among major powers were initiated during the upswing phase of the long wave. This is in agreement with previous findings (Imbert, 1959:223-225). Wars involving one or more major powers and other system members, by contrast, were less strongly affected by the phase of economic waves: eight of thirteen war relationships (eleven plus two world wars) occurred during the upswing. The same tendency is revealed by the wars waged by major powers in the colonial peripheries, suggesting that wars to control areas outside the major-power system occur with some frequency also during economic downturns. British wars in India in the 1830s and the 1840s serve as an example of such a possibility (Kiernan, 1982:37-50).

A more detailed analysis of the association between long waves and warfare among major powers reveals that, of the seven wars that occurred during the upswing, five were initiated during the prosperity phase and two were initiated during the recession. This observation is in agreement with the view that the sudden and rapid expansion of the economy is especially conducive to the outbreak of war. Even more interesting, is the finding that no major wars were started during depression, when the economy is most frozen. The two remaining wars, including World War II, were initiated during the recovery phase of the long wave, when the economy has already started to expand but has not yet reached an upswing phase. The expansion of the world economy, and particularly the expansion of its industrial capacity with all its economic and political ramifications, thus seems to be an important contextual factor that promotes extensive wars among major powers.

## Turn: Depressions Make Faster Growth Inevitable

Raimo Vayrynen, prof @ University of Helsinki, 1983, International Studies Quarterly, "Economic Cycles, Power Transitions, Political Management and Wars between Major Powers".

A major point of contention in the analysis of long waves of economic development is the question of whether the various causal factors are essentially endogenous or exogenous to the economic cycle.<sup>4</sup> *Exogenous explanations* for long waves focus on such explanatory phenomena as major wars, or discovery of new markets, or new sources of raw materials.<sup>5</sup> Alternatively, to stress *endogenous dynamics* implies that an economic upswing contains seeds of its own destruction, while the downturn gives rise, in and of itself, to remedial action that leads to a new upswing. Such a cycle is *reproductive* if the preconditions for rapid accumulation are restored without fundamental changes in the social structure of social institutions. In a *non-reproductive* cycle, fundamental changes are needed in the socio-political context to restore the accumulation process. It is also possible that the expansionist phase of the long wave is reproductive, while the stagnation phase is associated with a non-reproductive crisis. In the US economy such crises seem to have spanned the years 1890-1903, 1926-1937 and 1969 to the present (Gordon *et al.*, 1983:152-157).

DDI '06  
A2: Devel  
Brooks/Green

Growth Wars = After Econ. Collapse

3/3

## Economic Collapses Inevitably End - Lead to More Growth

Raimo Vayrynen, prof @ University of Helsinki, 1983, International Studies Quarterly, "Economic Cycles, Power Transitions, Political Management and Wars between Major Powers".

For Schumpeter, an economic crisis, reflected in the period of stagnation, is a process by which the economy adapts itself to new conditions. Old technological innovations and associated production structures lose their ability to generate new demand and marketing opportunities. One of the pioneering observations made by Schumpeter (1939) was that basic innovations and infrastructural investments made during the economic stagnation give rise to new leading industries. They tend to lead the economy out of the crisis and to dominate the subsequent long economic cycle. In order to overcome stagnation, new innovations, industries, and entrepreneurs are needed to renovate the production structure and to provide a context for a new upswing in the long economic wave.

## Economic Depressions Cause Growth To Return, But Faster

Raimo Vayrynen, prof @ University of Helsinki, 1983, International Studies Quarterly, "Economic Cycles, Power Transitions, Political Management and Wars between Major Powers".

There is certainly not a simple congruity between innovation life cycles, infrastructural investments, the dynamics of new industrial branches and the long waves of economic development. On the basis of the observations summarized here, however, it may be concluded that they are associated with one another (see Gordon, 1980:26-31; Freeman, 1981:16-26; van Duijn, 1983:129-144). In particular, the downturns of long economic waves tend to give rise to new technological innovations and to new infrastructural investments. These reinforce each other and lead to a sustained growth which is further propped up by a changed social structure and by organizational innovations. Both infrastructural investments and technological innovations have a certain life cycle which is obviously associated with the rise and relative decline of leading sector complexes. Finally, these new branches of economic activity generate new employment, which is partially lost during the downswing because of the growing capital intensity of production.

## Wars occur IN the Upswing After Depression

Raimo Vayrynen, prof @ University of Helsinki, 1983, International Studies Quarterly, "Economic Cycles, Power Transitions, Political Management and Wars between Major Powers".

The idea that *long waves give rise to wars* can be traced to Kondratieff who thought that the upswing phase is characterized by increased tension, which leads governments to initiate aggressive actions. Alvin H. Hansen (1932:96-97) came to a similar conclusion when he wrote that 'nations do not fight wars after prolonged periods of depression... In periods of long-wave upswing war chests are accumulated, navies are built, and armies are equipped and trained... It is the long-wave upswing that produces favourable conditions for waging of wars.' The arguments by Kondratieff and Hansen are not empirically convincing, however. Much more credible is the finding by Thompson and Zuk (1982:622-624) that during the period 1816-1914 80 per cent of interstate wars started during the upswing. Almost all of the 14 bloodiest wars also occurred during the upswing phase of the long cycle.<sup>15</sup>

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# Growth Stops Extinction

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## Global Progress is Key to Humanity's Existence

Michael Zey, business professor at Montclair State University, 1994, Seizing the Future, p. 34.

Having reached its current lofty state of development, the species will not choose to regress. The fact that the species is forging its way en masse into the Macroindustrial Era proves that our need to grow is almost a genetically based predisposition. The species ultimately understands there can be no turning back on the road to progress.

However, no outside force guarantees the continued progress of the human species, nor does anything mandate that the human species must even continue to exist. In fact, history is littered with races and civilizations that have disappeared without a trace. So, too, could the human species. There is no guarantee that the human species will survive even if we posit, as many have, a special purpose to the species existence.

Therefore, the species innately comprehends that it must engage in purposive actions to maintain its level of growth and progress. Humanity's future is conditioned by what I call the Imperative of growth, a principle I will herewith describe alone with its several correlates.

The Imperative of Growth states that in order to survive, any nation, indeed, the human race, must grow, both materially and intellectually. The Macroindustrial Era represents growth in the areas of both technology and human development, a natural stage in the evolution of the species' continued extension of its control over itself and its environmental. Although 5 billion strong, our continued existence depends on our ability to continue the progress we have been making at higher and higher levels.

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DDI '06  
AZ:DeDeV  
Brooks/Garri

Econ. collapse → Lashout wars

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### **Economic Collapse Leads to Lashout Wars**

Chris H. Lewis in his book "The Coming Age of Scarcity" p. 56 1998

Most critics would argue, probably correctly, that instead of allowing underdeveloped countries to withdraw from the global economy and undermine the economies of the developed world, the United States, Europe, and Japan and others will fight neocolonial wars to force these countries to remain within this collapsing global economy. These neocolonial wars will result in mass death, suffering, and even regional nuclear wars. If first world countries choose military confrontation and political repression to maintain the global economy, then we may see mass death and genocide on a global scale that will make the deaths of World War II pale in comparison. However, these neocolonial wars, fought to maintain the developed nations' economic and political hegemony, will cause the final collapse of our global industrial civilization. These wars will so damage the complex economic and trading networks and squander material, biological and energy resources that they will undermine the global economy and its ability to support the earth's 6 to 8 billion people. This would be the worst case scenario for the collapse of global civilization

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