

Heidegger Kritik

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Strategy Guide

If you are worried that there are not enough links in this file you should consider two things-

(A) It's a Heidegger K- if you're losing on the no-link you probably shouldn't be reading this arg

(B) Much of the link work from the eco-management kritik can be used in this file as well- you should be careful with the cards you select, but there shouldn't be terrible consistency problems, and re-tagging the cards should remedy most of those that exist

If you are worried that there are not enough answers in this file then you should consider that the eco-management file contains all the impact turn arguments you should need- this file contains the defenses of pragmatism, answers to the Heidegger alt, perm solvency cards, answers to aesthetics, and answers to ontology args that should be most important in specifically answering this file

If you are worried about the eco-management alt than you can probably read the Heidegger alt in this file, although it would be best to re-tag the card and remove the ontology 1st argument if you're just going to read the other file

Also, you should keep in mind that most of the arguments about how liberalism is good, Heidegger is a nazi, and politics and ontology shouldn't be mixed can be answered with the A2: Politics 1st arguments in the neg section of the file

1NC Shell

(A) THE AFF'S REDUCTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT'S ESSENCE TO A RESOURCE MAKES IT SOMETHING TO BE EXPLOITED- THIS ENSURES OUR SEPARATION FROM THE EARTH AND ATTEMPTS ABSOLUTE CONCEPTUAL MASTERY OF NATURE

MCWHORTER '92, (Ladelle, Prof. of Philosophy @ Richmond, Heidegger and the Earth, pg. 4)

What is most illustrative is often also what is most common. Today, on all sides of ecological debate we hear, with greater and greater frequency, the word *management*. On the one hand, business people want to manage natural resources so as to keep up profits. On the other hand, conservationists want to manage natural resources so that there will be plenty of coal and oil and recreational facilities for future generations. These groups and factions within them debate vociferously over which management policies are the best, that is, the most efficient and manageable. Radical environmentalists damn both groups and claim it is human population growth and rising expectations that are in need of management. But wherever we look, wherever we listen, we see and hear the term *management*.

We are living in a veritable age of management. Before a middle class child graduates from high school she or he is already preliminarily trained in the arts of weight management, stress management, and time management, to name just a few. As we approach middle age we continue to practice these essential arts, refining and adapting our regulatory regimes as the pressures of life increase and the body begins to break down. We have become a society of managers – of our homes, careers, portfolios, estates, even of our own bodies – so is it surprising that we set ourselves up as the managers of the earth itself? And yet, as thoughtful earth-dwellers we must ask what does this signify?

INC Shell

(B) (1) THIS MANAGERIAL MODE OF THINKING CULMINATES IN NIHILISM- JUST AS REDUCING THE ENVIRONMENT TO PURE OBJECT EFFACES THE INTRINSIC BEAUTY OF THE EARTH, USING MANAGERIAL THOUGHT TO OVERCOME ALL OBSTACLES TO HUMAN MASTERY OF BEING REDUCES EXISTENCE TO A COLD, STERILIZED PROCESS DEVOID OF ALL THAT MAKES THAT LIVING A VIVID EXPERIENCE

MCWHORTER '92, (Ladelle, Prof. of Philosophy @ Richmond, Heidegger and the Earth, pgs. 6-7)

The danger of a managerial approach to the world lies not, then, in what it knows – not in its penetration into the secrets of galactic emergence or nuclear fission – but in what it forgets, what it itself conceals. It forgets that any other truths are possible, and it forgets that the belonging together of revealing with concealing is forever beyond the power of human management. We can never have, or know, it all; we can never manage everything.

What is now especially dangerous about this sense of our own managerial power, born of forgetfulness, is that it results in our viewing the world as mere resources to be stored or consumed. Managerial or technological thinkers, Heidegger says, view the earth, the world, all things as mere Bestand, standing-reserve.

All is here simply for human use. No plant, no animal, no ecosystem has a life of its own, has any significance, apart from human desire and need. Nothing, we say, other than human beings, has any intrinsic value. All things are instruments for the working out of human will. Whether we believe that God gave Man dominion or simply that human might (sometimes called intelligence or rationality) in the face of ecological fragility makes us always right, we managerial, technological thinkers tend to believe that the earth is only a stockpile or a set of commodities to be managed, bought, and sold. The forest is timber; the river, a power source. Even people have become resources, human resources, personnel to be managed, or populations to be controlled.

This managerial, technological mode of revealing, Heidegger says, is embedded in and constitutive of Western culture and has been gathering strength for centuries. Now it is well on its way to extinguishing all other modes of revealing, all other ways of being human and being earth. It will take tremendous effort to think through this danger, to think past it and beyond, tremendous courage and resolve to allow thought of the mystery to come forth; thought of the inevitability, along with reyealing, of concealment, of loss, of ignorance; thought of the occurring of things and their passage as events not ultimately under human control. And of course even the call to allow this thinking – couched as it so often must be in a grammatical imperative appealing to an agent – is itself a paradox, the first that must be faced and allowed to speak to us and to shatter us as it scatters thinking in new directions, directions of which we have not yet dreamed, directions of which we may never dream.

1NC Shell

McWhorter continues in '92

And shattered we may be, for our self-understanding is at stake; in fact, our very selves – selves engineered by the technologies of power that shaped, that are, modernity – are at stake. Any thinking that threatens the notion of human being as modernity has posited it – as rationally self-interested individual, as self-possessed bearer of rights and obligations, as active mental and moral agent – is thinking that threatens our very being, the configurations of subjective existence in our age.

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(2) AND, EVEN IF WE LOSE OUR ETHICS ARGUMENTS, THE NEED FOR QUICK SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS IS MOTIVATED BY GUILT FOR THE SQUO- THIS TRAPS US IN A CYCLE OF CONSUMPTION, GUILT, AND THEN MANAGEMENT, ENSURING THE HARMS ARE REPLICATED AND TURNING THE CASE

MCWHORTER '92, (Ladelle, Prof. of Philosophy @ Richmond, Heidegger and the Earth, pg. 2-3)

Thinking today must concern itself with the earth. Wherever we turn – on newsstands, on the airwaves, and in even the most casual of conversations everywhere – we are inundated by predictions of ecological catastrophe and omnicidal doom. And many of these predictions bear themselves out in our own experience. We now live with the ugly, painful, and impoverishing consequences of decades of technological innovation and expansion without restraint, of at least a century of disastrous “natural resource management” policies, and of more than two centuries of virtually unchecked industrial pollution – consequences that include the fact that millions of us on any given day are suffering, many of us dying of diseases and malnutrition that are the results of humanly produced ecological devastation; the fact that thousands of species now in existence will no longer exist on this planet by the turn of the century; the fact that our planet’s climate has been altered, probably irreversibly, by the carbon dioxide and chlorofluorocarbons we have heedlessly poured into our atmosphere; and the mind-boggling fact that it may now be within humanity’s power to destroy all life on this globe.

Our usual response to such prophecies of doom is to ignore them or, when we cannot do that, to scramble to find some way to manage our problems, some quick solution, some technological fix. But over and over again new resource management techniques, new solutions, new technologies disrupt delicate systems even further, doing still more damage to a planet already dangerously out of ecological balance. Our ceaseless interventions seem only to make things worse, to perpetuate a cycle of human activity followed by ecological disaster followed by human intervention followed by a new disaster of another kind. In fact, it would appear that our trying to do things, change things, fix things cannot be the solution, because it is part of the problem itself. But, if we cannot act to solve our problems, what should we do?

1NC Shell

(C) ALT TEXT: IN THE FACE OF THE 1AC'S PROPHECIES OF DOOM, THE JUDGE SHOULD VOTE NEGATIVE TO DO NOTHING

THE CALL TO ACTION MERELY INVITES FUTURE DISASTERS- DO NOTHING IN RESPONSE TO THE AFF'S ADVANTAGES INVITES A DISRUPTIVE ACCEPTANCE OF A MORE VIVID AND AESTHETIC RELATIONSHIP WITH THE ENVIRONMENT- INSTEAD OF TREATING IT AS A RESOURCE TO SOME HIGHER GOAL WHICH ABSOLUTE TRUTH HAS SET OUT FOR US TO ACHIEVE, WE APPROACH THE EARTH AS SOMETHING WHICH IS BOTH CONSTANTLY REVEALING ITSELF TO US, AND YET PERPETUALLY ALWAYS CONCEALS MORE FROM US- THIS MEDITATIVE MODE OF THINKING AVOIDS REDUCING THINGS TO STANDING RESERVE AND OPENS THE WAY FOR AN ETHICAL MODE OF EXISTENCE

MCWHORTER '92, (Ladelle, Prof. of Philosophy @ Richmond, Heidegger and the Earth, pgs. 3-4)

Heidegger's work is a call to reflect, to think in some way other than calculatively, technologically, pragmatically. Once we begin to move with and into Heidegger's call and begin to see our trying to seize control and solve problems as itself a problematic approach, if we still believe that thinking's only real purpose is to function as a prelude to action, we who attempt to think will twist within the agonizing grip of paradox, feeling nothing but frustration, unable to conceive of ourselves as anything but paralyzed. However, as so many peoples before us have known, paradox is not only a trap; it is also a scattering point and passageway. Paradox invites examination of its own constitution (hence of the patterns of thinking within which it occurs) and thereby breaks a way of thinking open, revealing the configurations of power that propel it and hold it on track. And thus it makes possible the dissipation of that power and the deflection of thinking into new paths and new possibilities.

Heidegger frustrates us. At a time when the stakes are so very high and decisive action is so loudly and urgently called for, Heidegger apparently calls us to do – nothing. If we get beyond the revulsion and anger that such a call initially inspires and actually examine the feasibility of response, we begin to undergo the frustration attendant upon paradox; how is it possible, we ask, to choose, to will, to do nothing? The call itself places in question the bimodal logic of activity and passivity; it points up the paradoxical nature of our passion for action, of our passion for maintaining control. The call itself suggests that our drive for acting decisively and forcefully is part of what must be thought through, that the narrow option of will versus surrender is one of the power configurations of current thinking that must be allowed to dissipate.¹⁻²⁻³

But of course, those drives and those conceptual dichotomies are part of the very structure of our self-understanding both as individuals and as a tradition and a civilization. Hence, Heidegger's call is a threatening one, requiring great courage, "the courage to make the truth of our own presuppositions and the realm of our own goals into the things that most

1NC Shell

McWhorter continues in '92

deserve to be called in question.”³ Heidegger’s work pushes thinking to think through the assumptions that underlie both our ecological vandalism and our love of scientific solutions, assumptions that also ground the most basic patterns of our current ways of being human.

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(D) THE QUESTION OF WHAT IS IS A PRIOR POLITICAL QUESTION- THE WAY THAT WE ORGANIZE AND STRUCTURE THE WORLD IS NOT NEUTRAL OR INEVITABLE- ONLY ALLOWING ONTOLOGY TO BECOME A RADICALLY OPEN QUESTION CAN ALLOW US TO REALIZE ETHICS AND JUSTICE

DILLON '99, (Michael, Prof. of IR @ U of Lancaster, *Another Justice*, Political Theory Vol. 27, No. 2, April 1999, 155-175)

I take the defining feature of contemporary continental thought to be the return of the ontological. The return of the ontological has been developed in terms of a critical genealogy of political problematisations consequent upon a fundamental reappraisal of the basic categories of philosophical modernity. Specifically, the modern understanding of narrative, order and justice, value, identity, and continuity, together with an aspiration to a rigorously methodological access to truth and totality, secured always from the perspective of the *cogito* (without asking about the sum), were all disrupted by the ontological turn. It was precisely because the ontological turn did devastatingly target the sum that the putatively secure ground of the cogito was radically unsecured. Because you cannot say anything about anything, that is, without always already having made assumptions about the is as such, however, the return of the ontological has even wider ramifications than that of genealogy. For any thought, including, therefore, that of Justice, always already carries some interpretation of what it means to be, and of how one is as a being in being. To call these fundaments into question is to gain profound critical purchase upon the thought that underpins the thought and practices of distributive justice itself. We are at the level of those fundamental desires and fears which confine the imagination and breed the cruelties upon which it relies in order to deflect whatever appears to threaten or disturb its various drives for metaphysical security.¹² Politics and philosophy have always been wedded since their first inception in the polis. The return of the ontological was therefore prompted by the twin political and philosophical crises that assailed European civilisation at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries. Hence the crisis of (inter)national politics (to which E. H. Carr, for example, responded) was as much a crisis of thought as the crisis of thought, as expressed in debates about Empiricism, Scientism, Positivism, and Historicism at that time, was a crisis of politics. For what was at issue was a thinking way of life—complexly diverse and radically plural in its composition—that had hit the buffers in terms of the elevated universal expectations of reason and justice which its thought and politics had promised. Historicism's failure to meet the challenges of Empiricism, Positivism, and Scientism nonetheless served to expose the crisis of political modernity itself: bureaucratisation, rationalisation, global industrialisation, technologisation, the advent of mass society, world war and genocide.¹³ On the one hand, a return to "basics" was prompted by the ways in which the slaughter of the Great War, the holocaust of the Second World War, and the subsequent advent of the terminal dangers of the nuclear age undermined the confidence of a European civilisation gone global. This "failure of nerve" was enhanced by the impact of its racial and economic imperialism, together with the subsequent experience of postcolonialism. On the other hand, the return of the ontological was indebted philosophically, amongst other influences to Nietzsche's overturning of the metaphysical deceptions of ontology, and to Heidegger's early attempt to formulate a fundamental ontology. In neither instance am I claiming that the outcome of the ontological turn has resulted in some new orthodoxy or canon.¹⁴ Levinas, for example, through moves too complicated to retrace in this exercise, championed the metaphysical over against the 'ontological'.

Quite the contrary. The question of ontology has, instead, been split wide open, and the formulations, desires, institutions, and practices of our established ways of being—justice and Justice included—are shown to be suspended in that very opening. Irrespective of this return to basics, the preoccupation of both thought and politics nonetheless also became the future. Just as the self-annihilationist capacities of European civilisation gone global posed the question of a habitable global future, so, in thought too, the crossover from the nineteenth to the twentieth centuries became preoccupied with "an affirmation of the future or of an opening onto the future."¹⁵ Think of the problem of messianicity in Benjamin, the question of the future in Nietzsche, the privilege of the futural ecstasy in Heidegger. . . . These thinkers are all thinkers of the future.¹⁶

In each instance, also, the thought of and for the future is associated with destruction. The experiencing of an abyss resonates somehow with the thinking of the abyss and there—"where the mouth gapes".¹⁷ Both politics and philosophy think, and seek to affirm, the future. The return of the ontological was, then, a plural one radically disturbing the fundaments of all regional thought such as that of politics and justice as well as the more well-known and elaborated, though intimately related, subject of reason. This movement of thought was positive in that, while providing a critical reappraisal of ontology (cf.

1NC Shell

Dillon continues in '99

Heidegger), a certain 'ontological' sensibility has also emerged from it. It is based upon a profound, if variously interpreted, appreciation of the ontological difference—the difference between beings, as existing entities, and being as such. It offers for all other thought the alternative and radically dualistic starting point of the mutually disclosive belonging together of being and beings.¹⁸ The return of the ontological thus became the driving force behind what William Connolly calls ontopolitical interpretation. Connolly reminds us that all political acts and every interpretation of political events, no matter how deeply they are sunk in specific historical contexts, "or how high the pile of data," upon which they sit, contain an "ontopolitical dimension."¹⁹ What that means, simply, is that all political acts and all political utterances, express—enact—a view of how things are. They establish fundamental presumptions, "fix possibilities, distribute explanatory elements, generate parameters."²⁰ In short, they establish a fundamental framework of necessity and desire. That is why the ontological turn has a direct bearing upon the question of Justice as well as upon the allied questions of freedom and belonging. It therefore challenges the language of politics as much as it challenges the politics of Language, and thus re-poses the very question of the political itself.²¹

Cybernetics Link

CYBERNETIC ENVIRONMENTALISM STILL REDUCES EXPERIENCE TO CALCULATION EPITOMIZED IN ITS “NETWORK SYSTEM” STRUCTURE- IT REMAINS ESSENTIALLY THE SAME AS THE STATUS QUO

PADRUTT '92, (Hanspeter, Member of the Daseinsanalytisches Institut in Zurich, *Heidegger and Ecology in Heidegger and the Earth* ed. Ladelle McWhorter, pg. 30)

I could refer to other leading notions of the ecological movement, but I must limit myself here to the ones mentioned. There is only one more that needs to be especially stressed, because it belongs to that basic science that philosophy has let loose and now runs rampant in all the sciences: cybernetics. It is the guiding idea of the “networked system” that Frederic Vester brought into circulation. Just as with the already mentioned concept of information, so too the notion of the system of cybernetics and its formulas of control ring, homeostasis, and networking in linear and nonlinear connections, with positive and negative feedback, can be laid on the same Procrustean bed. Even if this has the appearance of “holistic” thinking – and even if Frederic Vester has done a great service for the ecological movement – still the networked system hides within it the inherent objectifying subjectivism and is a whole chasm away from the “reference-connections” that unfold in language. That is why I am also skeptical of the hope of Gregory Bateson that in cybernetics a new, more human, and more ecological era is already being rung in. The “cybernetic pantheism” that Bateson’s *Ecology of Mind* proclaims is chained to the spirit of control technology. Something similar is also true of the hopes that have been placed in *modern theoretical physics*, e.g., by Fritjof Capra and Ilya Prigogine. When modern physics contradicts, for example, the classical conception of a three-dimensional space and a time separate from space or undermines the concept of a fixed object – or even when it works toward a unified theory of all powers of nature, and thus toward a “holistic worldview” – this does not change the fact that measuring, calculating, and observing are still going on and that the world is being reduced to a world-formula. Herbert Pietschmann announced a “new era,” and Fritjof Capra, a “turning point.” But with this does the ecological movement get around to entering the thinking of the turning and thus also to the enigmas in the epochs of the history of being? |

Green Politics Link

GREEN POLITICS REMAIN TRAPPED IN MECHANICAL UNDERSTANDINGS OF THE ENVIRONMENT ELEVATING CONCEPTS LIKE ENERGY THAT ASSUME THE ENVIRONMENT FUNCTIONS LIKE A HUMAN MACHINE- THIS CONTINUES THE TENDENCY TO REDUCE THE EARTH TO USE-VALUE AND MAKES THE CASE IMPACTS INEVITABLE

PADRUTT '92, (Hanspeter, Member of the Daseinsanalytisches Institut in Zurich, *Heidegger and Ecology in Heidegger and the Earth* ed. Ladelle McWhorter, pgs. 27-29)

A few years after the Americans landed on the moon, the Club of Rome published those famous computer predictions, entitled “The Limits of Growth,” which showed that, if things continue the way they have gone on “spaceship earth,” soon it could not go on. Better founded and more oppressing still was the study commissioned by President Jimmy Carter, which appeared in 1980 with the title *Global 2000 Study*. Both studies are honest appraisals and cautious predictions, which can shake up humankind. However, since they take for granted the basis of “world-models” or “spaceship earth,” they can also solidify the opinion that the world is a machine. Spaceship earth and the world model correspond to a worldview of objectifying subjectivism and are snares along the way of descent from the throne of master and owner of nature. Actually the question emerges whether the objectifying reductionism of natural science – which can be detected in many notions of the ecological movement – should not also become questionable for this movement. As sensible and correct as the demand to save energy is, still the *concept* of energy remains reductionist and ambiguous, because it reduces the light and warmth of the sun, the waterfall in the mountain stream, the roaring of the wind, the burning of wood, and the power of the horse, reduces this whole world to kilowatt hours. Is it not noteworthy that the concept of energy comes from the way language got used in the eighteenth century and, in the historical unfolding of being in this language, is connected with Aristotelian *energeia*, the work-character of beings? Just as problematic as natural science’s reduction of all beings in the concept of energy is, so too is the economic reduction of all beings to a monetary value problematic. Certainly the proposals for economic decentralization and for the development of a softer technology made by the British economist E. F. Schumacher (author of *Small is Beautiful*) are as relevant today as ever. Certainly the provocative theses of an Ivan Illich are in many ways very pertinent. And probably an ecological economy will develop presumably in the direction of James Robertson’s “alternatives worth living.” But one cannot overlook the fact that an ecological accounting still reduces things to a monetary value and that many concepts of these authors are characterized by the economy of objectifying subjectivism, by a worldview of the retailers – as, for example, the concept of a “qualitative growth.”

The worldview of biology, too, has shaped many concepts and thought patterns of the ecological movement and based them in the objectifying

Green Politics Link

Padrutt continues in '92

subjectivism. The word *environment* (*Umwelt*) in "environmental protection" is such a concept. The only thing that this concept has in common with what is called in *Being in Time* the most close-at-hand, domestic, surrounding world of humans is the name. The environment meant by biology is the surroundings in whose mi-lieu, in whose middle-place, the organism resides. The opposition of organism and its environment as well as the concept of organism itself correspond to a characteristic amalgamation of machine and subject. The organism and its environment, e.g., the praying mantis and the meadow, are thereby given a mechanical explanation – and along with that the organism is seen from the human vantage point, anthropomorphically, as subject. But natural science's reduction and anthropomorphic interpreting of life are a basic assumption for the theory of evolution. Thanks to natural science's reduction of living creatures, e.g., to apparatuses programmed in terms of nucleic acids, it can be "proven" that humans and apes are closely related, while apes and baobab trees are more distantly related. And thanks to the anthropomorphic interpretation of all subjects in the theory of evolution, everywhere in nature there can be something like a struggle for existence or survival of the fittest. In addition to that, the worldview of evolutionary biology thinks it has an overview with the grandiose perspective of billions of years – similar to the overview that the astronomers and astronauts have of the earth and the universe. Recently the theory of evolution has merged with geology and the physical theory of the origin of the universe and becomes a unified, scientific theory of origins that reaches from the original big bang into today – and it talks like Doutreval, who acts as if he had been present when dragonflies first came into being.

All ecological thought patterns that proceed from the evolution of living creatures remind us of the shortsighted *hybris* (ὕβρις) and the objectifying subjectivism of the astronaut perspective of evolutionary biology. Here I am thinking of the publication *A Planet Is Being Plundered* by Herbert Gruhl and *The Eight Deadly Sins of Civilized Humanity* by Konrad Lorenz – and then of the enthusiastic representatives of the so-called evolutionary theory of knowledge, which traces our present ecological mistakes back to the condition of our evolution and expects the rescue from danger to come from this biological self-enlightenment of humans. Heidegger's putting the biological worldview into question has also to do with the appeal to "life," which enjoys some popularity today with the ecological movement, whose precursor was Albert Schweitzer with his "respect for life." At least one should ask what "life" really means. Similarly worthy of questioning are other ecological concepts that assume the determination of the human as *animal rationale*, rational animal. The rational animal has needs that it is proper to satisfy. Thus those concepts that proceed in any way from the need-satisfaction of the subject – whether they are deduced from Friedrich Nietzsche, Sigmund Freud, or Karl Marx – belong here. Is it really just

Green Politics Link

Padrutt continues in '92

satisfying a need when I quench my thirst with water? Do I really simply cover a deficit of H₂O in me? Or is this situation of thirst, as pressing as it can be, an event of language that opens up a world, which objectifying subjectivism merely reduces to a disturbance in the metabolism of a rational animal? Whoever has ever been thirsty on a hike knows how often they were “spoken to” by the absent spring. No less fundamental are the questions that those thought patterns raise which ecology connects with human progress and the emancipation of humans into a larger autonomy. The eco-socialist is just as exposed to the question of the modern, autonomic subject that believes in steady progress as the green-conservative is to the question of the worldview of biology. The autonomic, anthropomorphic standpoint of the subject leaves its traces, e.g., in the publications of Erich Fromm, who calls for a *radical humanism*. For it is no accident that Fromm also understood the word *being* exclusively in the sense of the being of humans. As impressive as the contrasting investigation of human behavior in terms of “having and being” may be, the differentiation must still be made between it and the question of the meaning of being.J

Pragmatism Link

THE NEED FOR CEASELESS INTERVENTIONS INTERPRETS HUMANITY AS AN ACTIVE BEING THAT MUST TRANSFORM AND ACT UPON THE PASSIVE CANVAS OF NATURE- THIS SEPARATES US FROM NATURE, FORCING US TO DWELL WITHIN THE EARTH INSTEAD OF WITH THE EARTH

MCWHORTER '92, (Ladelle, Prof. of Philosophy @ Richmond, Heidegger and the Earth, pgs. vii-viii)

When we attempt to think ecologically and within Heidegger's discourse (or perhaps better: when we attempt to think Heideggerly within ecological concerns), the paradoxical unfolds at the site of the question of human action. Thinking ecologically – that is, thinking the earth in our time – means thinking death; it means thinking catastrophe; it means thinking the possibility of utter annihilation not just for human being but for all that lives on this planet and for the living planet itself. Thinking the earth in our time means thinking what presents itself as that which must not be allowed to go on, as that which must be controlled, as that which must be stopped. Such thinking seems to call for immediate action. There is no time to lose. We must work for change, seek solutions, curb appetites, reduce expectations, find cures now, before the problems become greater than anyone's ability to solve them – if they have not already done so. However, in the midst of this urgency, thinking ecologically, thinking Heideggerly, means rethinking the very notion of human action. It means placing in question our typical Western managerial approach to problems, our propensity for technological intervention, our belief in human cognitive power, our commitment to a metaphysics that places active human being over against passive nature. For it is the thoughtless deployment of these approaches and notions that has brought us to the point of ecological catastrophe in the first place. Thinking with Heidegger, thinking Heideggerly and ecologically, means, paradoxically, acting to place in question the acting subject, willing a displacing of our will to action; it means calling ourselves as selves to rethink our very selves, insofar as selfhood in the West is constituted as agent, as actor, as controlling ego, as knowing consciousness. Heidegger's work calls us not to rush in with quick solutions, not to act decisively to put an end to deliberation, but rather to think, to tarry with thinking unfolding itself, to release ourselves to thinking without provision or predetermined aim.

Guilt Link

ARGUMENTS THAT WE HAVE A RESPONSIBILITY TO SAVE THE ENVIRONMENT OR THAT WE ARE COMPLICIT WITH DESTRUCTION ACT OUT OF GUILT FOR PAST CONSUMPTIVE ATTITUDES- THIS ONLY FIXES A GLITCH IN THE SYSTEM OF MANAGERIALISM, INSTEAD OF QUESTIONING MANAGERIAL THOUGHT ITSELF

MCWHORTER '92, (Ladelle, Prof. of Philosophy @ Richmond, Heidegger and the Earth, pg. viii)

The first essay, "Guilt as Management Technology: A Call to Heideggerian Reflection," gives an overview of Heidegger's thinking on technology and discusses Heidegger's call for reflection as opposed to instrumental or calculative thinking about the earth. It carefully distinguishes reflection, in Heidegger's sense, from moral stock-taking or ethical judgment. In fact, it suggests that moral discourse and practice are themselves forms of technology, sets of techniques for maintaining control over self and other. As such, morality shows itself as a danger, as part of the technological, calculative, managerial thinking that currently endangers the earth itself. The essay closes with a kind of warning. If it is the case that morality is part of technological discourse and practice rather than a separable discourse whose purpose is critique, then moral condemnation and moral guilt are reinstatiations of the calculative. Thus, our tendency to feel guilty about our treatment of the earth is not a change of heart but is rather a perpetuation of human domination.

Metaphysics Link

THE ATTEMPT TO POSIT HUMANITY AS INTELLECTUAL MASTER OF THE WORLD FORGETS THE MYSTERY OF KNOWLEDGE WHICH IS THAT AS WE LEARN ONE WAY OF DOING SOMETHING WE FORGET ANOTHER, THAT EVERY PROCESS OF REVEALING IS ALSO A CONCEALING- THE AFF'S WIELDING OF THEIR SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE OF NATURE AS UNIVERSAL ALLOWS US TO SEPARATE OURSELVES FROM OTHER FORMS OF KNOWING AND TO CREATE AN ABSOLUTE LAYER OF MEDIATION BETWEEN SELF AND NATURE

MCWHORTER '92, (Ladelle, Prof. of Philosophy @ Richmond, Heidegger and the Earth, pgs. 4-6)

In numerous essays – in particular the beautiful 1953 essay, “The Question Concerning Technology” – Heidegger speaks of what he sees as the danger of dangers in this, our, age. This danger is a kind of forgetfulness – a forgetfulness that Heidegger thought could result not only in nuclear disaster or environmental catastrophe, but in the loss of what makes us the kind of beings we are, beings who can think and who can stand in thoughtful relationship to things. This forgetfulness is not a forgetting of facts and their relationships; it is a forgetfulness of something far more important and far more fundamental than that. He called it forgetfulness of ‘the mystery’.

It would be easy to imagine that by ‘the mystery’ Heidegger means some sort of entity, some *thing*, temporarily hidden or permanently ineffable. But ‘the mystery’ is not the name of some thing; it is the event of the occurring together of revealing and concealing.

Every academic discipline, whether it be biology or history, anthropology or mathematics, is interested in discovery, in the revelation of new truths. Knowledge, at least as it is institutionalized in the modern world, is concerned, then, with what Heidegger would call revealing, the bringing

to light, or the coming to presence of things. However, in order for any of this revealing to occur, Heidegger says, concealing must also occur. Revealing and concealing belong together.

Now, what does this mean? We know that in order to pay attention to one thing, we must stop paying close attention to something else. In order to read philosophy we must stop reading cereal boxes. In order to attend to the needs of students we must sacrifice some of our research time. Allowing for one thing to reveal itself means allowing for the concealing of something else. All revealing comes at the price of concomitant concealment. But this is more than just a kind of Kantian acknowledgment of human limitation. Heidegger is not simply dressing up the obvious, that is, the fact that no individual can undergo two different experiences simultaneously. His is not a point about human subjectivity at all. Rather, it is a point about revealing itself. When revealing reveals itself as temporally linear and causally ordered, for example, it cannot simultaneously reveal itself as ordered by song and unfolding in dream. Furthermore, in revealing, revealing itself is concealed in order for what is revealed to come forth. Thus, when revealing occurs concealing occurs as well. The two events are one and cannot be separated.⁴

Metaphysics Link

McWhorter continues in '92

Too often we forget. The radiance of revelation blinds us both to its own event and to the shadows that it casts, so that revealing conceals itself and its self-concealing conceals itself, and we fall prey to that strange power of vision to consign to oblivion whatever cannot be seen. Even our forgetting is forgotten, and all traces of absence absent themselves from our world.

The noted physicist Stephen Hawking, in his popular book *A Brief History of Time*, writes, "The eventual goal of science is to provide a single theory that describes the whole universe."⁵ Such a theory, many people would assert, would be a systematic arrangement of all knowledge both already acquired and theoretically possible. It would be a theory to end all theories, outside of which no information, no revelation could, or would need to, occur. And the advent of such a theory would be as the shining of a light into every corner of being. Nothing would remain concealed.

This dream of Hawking's is a dream of power; in fact, it is a dream of absolute power, absolute control. It is a dream of the ultimate managerial utopia. This, Heidegger would contend, is the dream of technological thought in the modern age. We dream of knowing, grasping everything, for then we can control, then we can manage, everything.

But it is only a dream, itself predicated, ironically enough, upon concealment, the self-concealing of the mystery. We can never control the mystery, the belonging together of revealing and concealing. In order to approach the world in a manner exclusively technological, calculative, mathematical, scientific, we must already have given up (or lost, or been expelled by, or perhaps ways of being such as we are even impossible within) other approaches or modes of revealing that would unfold into knowledges of other sorts. Those other approaches or paths of thinking must already have been obliterated; those other knowledges must already have concealed themselves in order for technological or scientific revelation to occur.

2NC- Anthropocentrism DA

THE AFF'S MODE OF THINKING RENDERS THE ENVIRONMENT A STATIC OBJECT TO BE ORDERED BY DYNAMIC HUMAN SUBJECTS WHO ARE ITS INTELLECTUAL MASTERS- THIS CREATES KNOWLEDGE OF THE EARTH THAT IS ROOTED IN ANTHROPOCENTRISM- VIEW THEIR ADVANTAGE CLAIMS WITH SUSPICION

PADRUTT '92, (Hanspeter, Member of the Daseinsanalytisches Institut in Zurich, *Heidegger and Ecology in Heidegger and the Earth* ed. Ladelle McWhorter, pgs. 19-22)

The place of consciousness is the place of the objectifying Cartesian subject. This subject, the “thinking substance” of the “I think therefore I am,” tyrannically brings objects before itself. It stands in the *center*, surveys, and examines on all sides – sees in perspective – from its own point of view. It is no accident that construction from a *central perspective* was discovered by two architects in the early Renaissance and soon took its place victoriously in painting. This perspectival relationship of the primary (human) subject to the perspectively observed world (a relationship that emerged in the Renaissance) – this perspectival “worldview” – is inextricably linked with the emergence of the method of natural science grounded in mathematics. The self-certain domination of the subject and the objectifying method that yields certainty belong together; together they form what I would call ‘objectifying subjectivism’. The objectifying method – wanting to measure and calculate everything, for the sake of certainty – has to reduce everything that is to measurable and calculable quantities. Weight, distance, and duration were most easily available to exact measurement; but then the objectifying method reduced nature, too, to a coherence of motions of a whole series of points in a three-dimensional, geometric space, coursing in a one-dimensional time, thought as a ‘time-axis’, and reduced things to geometric substances with defined extension. Since this reduction robbed events of their singularity, a repeatable reeling off of the same event became thinkable; repeatable experimenting and engineering set forth on its triumphal procession, and along with it the interpretation of nature and the whole world as a machine. In objectifying subjectivism human beings see themselves as “master and owner of nature” and the world as a large machine. Finally, the objectifying turns back to the subject and, with the supremacy of the machine, itself gets interpreted more and more exclusively as a functional, psychosomatic apparatus.²²

2NC- Anthropocentrism DA

Padrutt continues in '92

In order to get closer to the “meaning of being,” the meaning of the little word *is* – which gets said in manifold ways (Aristotle) and which also oscillates unsaid in everything that is and in all that happens – Heidegger in *Being and Time* in a certain sense begins where Descartes left off. I think, therefore I am; but what does ‘I am’ mean? In order to get closer to the meaning of ‘is’, Heidegger undertook an analysis of the ‘am’, an analysis of everyday Dasein, which in any case has in its being a relation to its being (and to being in general). Dasein is in the world, not as an item of clothing is in the closet, but rather – thrown into the world – it has the task of being its being as its own being.

Dasein is “my own” “thrown projection” in connection with what encounters it: care (*Sorge*). But Dasein is not a substance that is merely at hand, not a thinking substance, and not a psychosomatic apparatus. And, respectively, Dasein is also not merely a specimen of a living organism or of the species *animal rationale*, rational animal. In Dasein there takes place a disclosure or opening of being – in the disclosure of self in singular manner as well as of the world.

But this disclosure is through and through ‘ec-static’, outside itself, not closed up in itself, but ‘outside’ – out there, as the Freiburg Cathedral earlier. This being-out-there refers not only to the present, but also and equally to the world horizon of the future and of the past. What Heidegger in *Being and Time* called the horizontal-existential disclosure of being in Dasein – in the disclosure of self and of the world – later, after the so-called “turning” in his thinking, he spoke of more and more as the indwelling opening-out of the clearing of being, as indwelling in the temporal, threefold open and the opening-out of this indwelling through the whole of Dasein. *Ex-sistenz* then meant indwelling opening-out of the open expanse of the Da.

↙ The shifting from the objectifying subject to the open expanse of the Da leads us away from the standpoint of the subject which stands in the center of the world, to the mystery of the world itself, to the *Ereignis* of being and of time, which we do not have at our disposal, but into which we are let. This shift is a re-thinking and a re-tuning all in one, a leap into the open expanse of the Da. The re-tuning is nothing else but the

2NC- Anthropocentrism DA

Padrutt continues in '92

re-tuning already mentioned, from the dreadful, shortsighted ὕβρις into the pain-filled, buoyant, spirited, released coming-forth holding-in-reserve. And the re-thinking leads away from objectifying calculating and measuring to phenomenological, meditative thinking, from natural science's reduction of phenomena to the upholding of their fullness, from the perspectival worldview to a regard for the inseparable interconnectedness of thinking, world, human, death, sky, earth, and language: to mindfulness of *Ereignis* of being and time, of *Ereignis* of the world-fourfold: Rethinking leads away from progress to "overture." }

This shift has many further consequences that have varied significance for various disciplines. For ecology the following consequences seem to me to be of fundamental importance:

The *world* now is no longer the universe, 'all of the world', the sum of everything, but rather the play of world²³ in which we are inseparably connected co-players.

What we call space and time also belong in this play of the world. However, *space* is now no longer the three-dimensional, calculable, geometric space, but rather the play of places, the playing together of the places of a region.²⁴ And *time* is no longer a one-dimensional time-axis, but the play of time, which grants presence and absence in the three dimensions of future, past, and present.²⁵

Language is no longer expression, means of communication, and the giving of signs by the subject, but rather the house of being in which we dwell, the coming forth of world and thing, an oscillation of the *Ereignis* of being of time. The word is no longer an information-cipher, no longer a label-appendage separable from the things, but rather in a certain sense 'the flowering of clearing', 'the blossom of *Ereignis*'.²⁶

If the human being is not a rational animal, but rather the indwelling opening-out of the Da, then perhaps the definition of *animal* as animal *lacking reason* is also false. As a rule we either take the animal as organism and thus as a machine, or we interpret it anthropomorphically, from the human standpoint. From the human point of view the animal can perhaps be called "world-poor" (as not having a world). Heidegger spoke in this way in the lecture course of the winter of 1929-30.²⁷ However, some years later he no longer said this. Rather: Because we cannot speak with the animals, "our human interpreting" finds "hardly any way" of understanding "as soon as it shuns the mechanical explication of the animal, which can always be done, as well as the anthropomorphic explanation."²⁸ But then Doutreval's description of the meadow as a battlefield is also questionable, because it is filled with mechanical explication and anthropomorphic explanation. Does the praying mantis's mate really experience a "ghastly drama" in copulation?

2NC- Anthropocentrism DA

Padrutt continues in '92

Finally, with the shifting from the objectifying subject, the root unfolding of the *thing* has to be thought anew. Now we are always already closer to things than a “theory of knowledge” that proceeds from sense-perception postulates. We hear the automobile (that drives by outside) *itself*, and not simply an acoustic sensation.²⁹ A theory of knowledge that has to bridge the gulf between subject and object becomes superfluous. The thing is also no longer an object of representing that can be broken down into form and matter or substance and accidents or defined more precisely. Rather the thing is in a certain sense an event of gathering: the thing things; it lets the world “linger.”³⁰

It is obvious that the shift from the objectifying subject to the Da has various consequences for ecology. At issue for ecology, too, is the descent of humans from their anthropocentric throne and the surrender of their autocratic, tyrannical position which makes everything around into their object. Of course there are snares on this descent that can be more easily detected if we pay heed to this shift in the way that Heidegger thinks it. (I will come back to this later.)

2NC- Alt Extension

WE'LL DRAW A DISTINCTION HERE BETWEEN THE AFF'S FORM OF ECOLOGY AND OURS- THEY UNDERSTAND THE ENVIRONMENT AS A SERIES OF BIOLOGICAL CAUSE-EFFECT RELATIONSHIPS AND REDUCE ITS ESSENCE TO A WELL-OILED MACHINE- THE ALT RECONCEPTUALIZES ECOLOGY AS A DWELLING WITH THE EARTH THAT APPRECIATES ITS INTRINSIC BEAUTY

PADRUTT '92, (Hanspeter, Member of the Daseinsanalytisches Institut in Zurich, *Heidegger and Ecology in Heidegger and the Earth* ed. Ladelle McWhorter, pg. 13-14) "In a lecture...all-embracing sense."

IN A LECTURE delivered in 1951 Heidegger discussed a late poem by Hölderlin in which these lines appear:

Humans dwell on this earth
Full of merit, but also poetically.¹

At the end of the lecture, in which Heidegger had shown in what sense our dwelling is fundamentally poetic, he called our present dwelling "completely unpoetic." It is unpoetic "because of a peculiar excess of raging measuring and calculating."² The diagnosis refers to our "genuine need for dwelling,"³ the need for our dwelling on the earth. Heidegger had this dwelling in mind already in the second chapter of the first section of *Being and Time*, when he distinguishes the 'being-in' of our 'being-in-the-world' from a thing's being simply present within a container – and ascertained our being-in, from the original meaning of the German word *bin*, as a dwelling; "ich bin" says: I stay with, am intimate with, dwell.⁴ Dwelling in the world is equally originally a dwelling in language. That is why in his "Letter on Humanism" (1946) Heidegger could designate language, this "house of being," as the "housing" in which humans "dwell."⁵

Heidegger indicated just how a poetic dwelling might look in the lecture "Building Dwelling Thinking" (also 1951): Mortals dwell "insofar as they rescue the earth." This "rescuing" is not to be understood only as a rescuing of something from danger, but also (in the old sense of the word) as "freeing something into its own root unfolding." To rescue the earth is quite other than to use it up or to exploit it. Rescuing the earth does not subdue the earth. Mortals further dwell "insofar as they welcome the sky as sky," "insofar as they await the godly ones as godly," and insofar as they "escort" themselves and fellow human beings. Thus mortals, in dwelling near/with things, spare, protect, and preserve (*schonen*) the "fourfold" of earth, sky, gods, and humans.⁶

I will return to these initially strange-sounding references by Heidegger to "preserving the fourfold." For now these references and quotations are

2NC- Alt Extension

Padrutt continues in '92

meant only to show that in all-embracing sense Heidegger's thinking can be seen as a tidings about dwelling, a saying about human dwelling. In Greek 'dwell' is *oikēō* and *oīkoς* means 'home' or 'household', while 'say' means in Greek *λέγειν* and *λόγος* means 'saying'. *Dwelling-saying* is *eco-log*y. (*Wohn-sage ist Oeko-logie.*)

The science of ecology got its name in 1866 from the zoologist Ernst Haeckel. As concept it meant 'the science of the household of nature'. As a natural science, ecology is a part of biology, according to Haeckel, the "science of the relationships of the organism to its surrounding environment." But since the manifold of organisms is almost immeasurable and since their "surrounding environments" are thoroughly interwoven in one another, this science *from its inception* had to transcend the regions of the specialists and somehow see the world as a whole. Thus it could easily happen – when the emerging debate over the environment in the early 1970s brought scientific ecology out of its shadow existence into the glaring light of public view – that in general usage the concept of ecology moved beyond its narrow, biological meaning and was more and more used in connection with thought on protecting the environment and a so-called "holistic way of seeing." When an association of ecology-minded doctors was recently established in Germany, this was not meant primarily as a society for the advancement of the science of ecology, but rather a coming together of medical doctors who were sensitive to issues of ecology in this now general and all-embracing sense of the word. In this all-embracing sense ecology refers totally to our dwelling on the earth; the Greek word, which allows both meanings of 'household-science' and 'dwelling-saying',⁷ fits the narrow, biological sense and the all-embracing sense.

2NC- Alt Extension

THIS VIEW OF THE EARTH'S ESSENCE AS EARTH INSTEAD OF AS MACHINE ALLOWS US TO APPROACH THE EARTH AS WHAT IT IS, INSTEAD OF ATTEMPTING TO TRANSLATE IT INTO ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, OR SOCIAL TERMS- THIS CREATES A POLITICS THAT IS SKEPTICAL OF THE QUICK SOLUTIONS OUR MCWHORTER EVIDENCE INDICATES ARE PART OF A GUILTY CYCLE OF ENVIRONMENTAL DESTRUCTION AND INSTEAD SEEKS TO PROBLEMATIZE THE VERY PROCESSES OF CONSUMPTION THAT CREATED THE NEED FOR THE GREEN MOVEMENT

A2: Case Outweighs

- 1.) UNIQUENESS- EXTEND OUR ALT PIECE OF MCWHORTER EV- THE PROBLEMS OF THE STATUS QUO ARE THE RESULT OF MANAGERIAL INTERVENTIONS LIKE THE AFF- DON'T ALLOW THEM TO PAINT THEMSELVES AS THE ONLY ONES THAT "DO ANYTHING" IN THE DEBATE, THEIR UNWILLINGNESS TO PART WITH MANAGERIAL THINKING MEANS THEY ARE NO DIFFERENT FROM THE SQUO
- 2.) ALT SOLVES THE CASE- EXTEND OUR ALT PIECE OF MCWHORTER EV- THE ALT'S ACT OF DOING NOTHING OPENS US TO DWELL WITH THE EARTH- RATHER THAN SUBMITTING IT TO MANAGERIAL CONTROL WE FREE OURSELVES TO ENGAGE IT ON ITS OWN TERMS

THIELE '95, (Leslie Paul, Prof. of Poli. Sci. @ U of Florida, Timely Meditations, p.185)

The ontology of dwelling engages the meaning of human being in a way that buttresses practical environmental concerns. Heidegger writes, "Mortals dwell in that they save the earth.... To save really means to set something free into its own presencing. To save the earth is more than to exploit it or even wear it out. Saving the earth does not master the earth and does not subjugate it, which is merely one step from spoliation" (PLT 150). The identification of human being as an ontologically care-full, worldly dweller facilitates an actual (ontic) earthly caretaking. Identifying oneself, and one's dignity, by the exercise of disclosive freedom precludes wholesale efforts at control and subjugation. To be free, we remember, is to set free, is to let be. The exercise of freedom coalesces our who and our how, our sense of self and our way of being in the world. To understand human freedom as a disclosure that preserves is to be well on the way to an ecological practice.

- 3.) NIHILISM- EXTEND OUR SECOND PIECE OF MCWHORTER EV- THE REDUCTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT'S ESSENCE TO A SET OF PRODUCTS FOR USE BEGS THE QUESTION OF WHAT THINGS ARE TO BE USED FOR- THE AFF'S EMBRACE OF THE BRUTE FACT OF SURVIVAL REMOVES THEIR ABILITY TO APPRECIATE THE BEAUTY OF EXISTENCE AND ROBS IT OF ANY MEANING- RE-ORIENTING OURSELVES IS A PRE-REQUISITE TO THEIR IMPACT CLAIMS
- 4.) TURNS CASE- EXTEND OUR THIRD PIECE OF MCWHORTER EV- MANAGEMENT OF THE ENVIRONMENT IS MOTIVATED BY GUILT AND IS MERELY A BAND-AID THAT ALLOWS THE CONSUMPTIVE MINDSET TO CONTINUE- THIS APPROACH ONLY PAVES THE WAY FOR FUTURE GREATER ENVIRONMENTAL CATASTROPHES BECAUSE IT FAILS TO CHALLENGE THE WORLD-VIEW THAT UNDERLIES CONSUMPTION

A2: Permutation

- (1) SOLVENCY DEFICIT- THE PERMUTATION CANNOT SIMULTANEOUSLY DO SOMETHING AND DO NOTHING- THE AFF'S INABILITY TO PART WITH THE 1AC PROVES THAT EVEN AS THEY ATTEMPT TO UNDERSTAND THE MYSTERY OF KNOWLEDGE, THAT THINGS ARE SIMULTANEOUSLY REVEALED AND CONCEALED, THEY BELIEVE THEY HAVE ALREADY ABSOLUTELY REVEALED WHAT IS VALUE IN THE FORM OF THE 1AC- MEANS THEY SOLVE NONE OF THE ALT
- (2) AESTHETICS DA- AT BEST THE PERMUTATION WOULD BE A COMBINATION OF AN AESTHETIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL WAY OF APPROACHING THE WORLD- THIS CULMINATES IN AN AESTHETIC WHICH SEES BEAUTY IN THE REDUCTION OF THINGS TO PURE OBJECT AND IN SUBORDINATING ALL THAT IS MYSTERIOUS TO PURE KNOWLEDGE, ENDING IN DESTRUCTION

GEROULANOS '4, (Stefanos, Grad Student @ Johns Hopkins University, Review of The Cult of Art in Nazi Germany, MLN 119.5 (2004) 1115-1120, muse)

Michaud argues that at stake in Nazism's obsessive theorization of aesthetics was art's effect: to awaken the myth (of the awakening of Germany); to represent and reproduce the purity, uniqueness, and superiority of Aryan/German artistic genius; to present this transformation of time—from fallen history into accelerated eschatology (186-91)—to "ensure control over the imaginary representations of the people" (111) in such a way as to facilitate this national and racial 'cleansing.' This is an art of unification as much as one of battle (115, 94)—a battle played out in eugenics, and, later, in genocide. A crucial chapter of The Cult of Art on the "reproduction of the Aryan genius" is echoed by much of the recent research on the practice and legitimization of eugenics across Europe and the U.S. during the 1920s and 1930s (124-26), and presents the various ways in which Nazi Germany invested art with "a very real eugenic power" (126), aiming at a purer self-reproduction of the race itself. The section entitled "Engendering through images" (134-40) provides a fascinating intellectual history of the claim that a work of art carries the force to affect and define the unborn of a pregnant spectator. For Michaud, this claim not only turned art into a foundation for certain theories of race—Schultze-Naumburg's attempt to forge a German 'visual judgment' and his trust that art was what defined racial particularity (127-29), Darré's 'types' for selective breeding (140-43), Gottfried Benn's endogenous images (169, et al.), the attack on monster-producing degenerate art, etc.—but also complemented, in a visible and very public manner, the attempt to produce ideals that racial science 'needed.' In the register of the industrial production of life and death (156), the 'art of eternity' thus acquired its most tremendous purity, constructing the Nazi New Man (and his sexual object [157-62]) in their eternal present. The long concluding chapter centers on mass mobilization and the role of propaganda in revealing and embodying the essence of "life according to the image . . . life within the image" (186). Mass mobilization in labor and war served to end the uncertainties of the future and conclude the anticipation of a "world to come," marked now by the liberation, or accession, of the [End Page 1117] individual (worker, soldier, artist) to a new existence. "National Socialism conferred the dignity of the artist upon all the combatants of the Volksgemeinschaft whether they fought on the military front; the labor front, the art front, or the birth front" (209). Seeking a unification and self-purification of society, propaganda for the "beauty of labor" utilized the whole arsenal described thus far so as to retheorize work (198-99) in such a way as to break down social divisions, purify the worker of his conscience and liberal mentality, and turn him into a total man of limitless, indeed divine capacity. Effecting this radical conversion of the past into a people of the pure present was, for Hitler, his "finished work" (210) and "promised the power of complete happiness, provided the strength to destroy without culpability" (219).

A2: Permutation

(3) PERM STILL LINKS OR ITS SEVERANCE- THE AFF DOES ALL OF THE 1AC WHICH IS WHAT ALL OF OUR ORIGINAL LINKS ARE TO- SINCE THEY CAN'T DO NOTHING, THEN WE'LL STILL WIN A LINK TO THE KRITIK THAT THE PERM DOESN'T SOLVE- OTHERWISE THEY'RE SEVERING, THAT'S BAD BECAUSE IT DOESN'T GIVE US STABLE NEG GROUND AND KILLS CLASH-VOTER FOR COMPETITIVE EQUITY AND EDUCATION

(4) GUILT DA- THE PERMUTATION IS A RECOGNITION OF THE FALLACIES OF TECHNOLOGICAL THINKING AND A SIMULTANEOUS UNWILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT ANXIETY- THIS NOSTALGIA FOR ACTION AND THE NEED TO MANAGE THE WORLD IS A SIGN OF GUILT THAT KEEPS US ADDICTED TO THE FAILINGS OF THE STATUS QUO AND MAKES CHANGE IMPOSSIBLE

MCWHORTER '92, (Ladelle, Prof. of Philosophy @ Richmond, Heidegger and the Earth, pgs. 7-8)

Those configurations of forces will resist this thinking. Their resistance will occur in many forms. However, one of the most common ways that modern calculative selfhood will attempt to reinstate itself in the face of Heidegger's paradoxical call to think the earth is by employing a strategy that has worked so well so many times before: it will feel guilty.

Those of us who are white know this strategy very well. Confronted with our racism, we respond not by working to dismantle the structures that perpetuate racism but rather by feeling guilty. Our energy goes into self-rebuke, and the problems pointed out to us become so painful for us to contemplate that we keep our distance from them. Through guilt we paralyze ourselves. Thus guilt is a marvelous strategy for maintaining the white racist self.

Those of us who are women have sometimes watched this strategy employed by the caring, liberal-minded men in our lives. When we have exposed sexism, pressed our criticisms and our claims, we have seen such men – the 'good' men, by far the most responsive men – deflate, apologize, and ask us to forgive. But seldom have we seen honest attempts at change. Instead we have seen guilt deployed as a cry for mercy or pity on the status quo; and when pity is not forthcoming we have seen guilt turn to rage, and we have heard men ask, "Why are you punishing us?" The primary issue then becomes the need to attend to the feelings of those criticized rather than to their oppressive institutions and behaviors. Guilt thus protects the guilty. Guilt is a facet of power; it is not a reordering of power or a signal of oppression's end. Guilt is one of the modern managerial self's maneuvers of self-defense.

A2: Permutation

McWhorter continues in '92

Of course guilt does not *feel* that way. It feels like something unchosen, something we undergo. It feels much more like self-abuse than self-defense. But we are shaped, informed, produced in our very selves by the same forces of history that have created calculative, technological revealing. Inevitably, whenever we are confronted with the unacceptability of what is foundational for our lives, those foundations exert force to protect themselves. The exertion, which occurs as and in the midst of very real pain, is not a conscious choice; but that does not lessen – in fact it strengthens – its power as a strategy of self-defense. Calculative, technological thinking struggles to defend and maintain itself *through us and as us.* 6

Some men feel guilty about sexism; many white people feel guilty about racism; most of us feel guilty about all sorts of habits and idiosyncracies that we tell ourselves we firmly believe should be changed. For many of us guilt is a constant constraint upon our lives, a seemingly permanent state. As a result, guilt is familiar, and, though somewhat uncomfortable at times, it comes to feel almost safe. It is no surprise, then, that whenever caring people think hard about how to live with/in/on the earth, we find ourselves growing anxious and, usually, feeling guilty about the way we conduct ourselves in relation to the natural world. Guilt is a standard defense against the call for change as it takes root within us. But, if we are to think with Heidegger, if we are to heed his call to reflect, we must not respond to it simply by deplored our decadent life-styles and indulging ourselves in a fit of remorse. Heidegger's call is not a moral condemnation, nor is it a call to take up some politically correct position or some privileged ethical stance.

A2: Permutation- All Other Instances

- (1) PERMUTATION IS TEXTUALLY INTRINSIC- THE ALT ONLY DOES NOTHING IN THE FACE OF THE 1AC, THE AFF'S ACTION IN OTHER INSTANCES IS NOT IN THE ALT OR THE PLAN- INTRINSICNESS IS BAD BECAUSE IT MAKES THE AFF CONDITIONAL AND MAKES GENERATING UNIQUE LINKS AND INTERNAL LINKS IMPOSSIBLE, VOTER FOR FAIRNESS AND EDUCATION
- (2) SOLVENCY DEFICIT- THE PERM MISUNDERSTANDS THE ALT- OUR ALT IS NOT A STRUCTURAL CHANGE TO THE WORLD LIKE LEGISLATION OR REVOLUTION, RATHER IT IS A CHANGE IN HOW WE APPROACH THE WORLD ITSELF- TO DO THE ALT IN ALL OTHER INSTANCES IS MERELY TO CHANGE THE METHOD OF MANAGING SO THAT WE MANAGE INSTANCES OF ACTION, NOT TO QUESTION THE METHODOLOGY OF ENFRAMING ITSELF
- (3) THE PERM BANS ACTION IN ALL INSTANCES EXCEPT THE PLAN, MEANING THAT IT FUNCTIONALLY COUNTERPLANS IN UNIQUENESS FOR THE KRITIK- THIS MAKES A KRITIK A UNIQUE DA TO THE CASE AND MEANS THEY SOLVE NONE OF OUR OFFENSE

A2: Pomo Bad

MODERNISM HAS CREATED SOME OF THE WORST ATROCITIES IN HISTORY AND HAS NOT ACHIEVED ITS OWN GOALS OF PROGRESS AND LIBERATION- POST-MODERNISM ALLOWS FOR THE BEST FORMS OF KNOWLEDGE

ROSENAU '92, (Pauline, Prof of Poli Sci @ U of Quebec-Montreal, Post-Modernism and the Social Sciences: Insights, Inroads, and Intrusions, pgs. 5-6, questia)

Modernity entered history as a progressive force promising to liberate humankind from ignorance and irrationality,⁴ but one can readily wonder whether that promise has been sustained.⁵ As we in the West approach the end of the twentieth century, the “modern” record—world wars, the rise of Nazism, concentration camps (in both East and West), genocide, worldwide depression, Hiroshima, Vietnam, Cambodia, the Persian Gulf, and a widening gap between rich and poor (Kamper and Wulf 1989)—makes any belief in the idea of progress or faith in the future seem questionable. Post-modernists criticize all that modernity has engendered: the accumulated experience of Western civilization, industrialization, urbanization, advanced technology, the nation state, life in the “fast lane.” They challenge modern priorities: career, office, individual responsibility, bureaucracy, liberal democracy, tolerance, humanism, egalitarianism, detached experiment, evaluative criteria, neutral procedures, impersonal rules, and rationality (Jacquard 1978; Vattimo 1988). The post-modernists conclude there is reason to distrust modernity's moral claims, traditional institutions, and “deep interpretations” (Ashley 1987: 411). They argue that modernity is no longer a force for liberation; it is rather a source of subjugation, oppression, and repression (Touraine 1990). Post-modernism challenges global, all-encompassing world views, be they political, religious, or social. It reduces Marxism, Christianity, Fascism, Stalinism, capitalism, liberal democracy, secular humanism, feminism, Islam, and modern science to the same order and dismisses them all as logocentric, transcendental totalizing meta-narratives that anticipate all questions and provide predetermined answers.⁶ All such systems of thought rest on assumptions no more or no less certain than those of witchcraft, astrology, or primitive cults (Shweder 1986: 11). The postmodern goal is not to formulate an alternative set of assumptions but to register the impossibility of establishing any such underpinning for knowledge (Ashley and Walker 1990a: 264; Culler 1982: 155; Norris 1982: 3133), to “delegitimate all mastercodes” (Hassan 1987: 169). The most extreme post-modernists urge us to be comfortable in the absence of certainty, learn to live without explanation, accept the new philosophical relativism (Bauman 1987: 3-4). Post-modernists question the superiority of the present over the past, the modern over the pre-modern (Vattimo 1988). They reject any preference for the complex, urban life-style of the intellectual over the rural routine of the peasantry in the countryside (Karnouh 1986). Therefore, they attribute renewed relevance to the traditional, the sacred, the particular, and the irrational (Touraine 1990). All that modernity has set aside, including emotions, feelings, intuition, reflection, speculation, personal experience, custom, violence, metaphysics, tradition, cosmology, magic, myth, religious sentiment, and mystical experience (Graff 1979: 32–33) takes on renewed importance. Some post-modernists look with nostalgia on the past and particularly on the “self-managing, self-reproducing” popular culture of pre-modern times (Bauman 1987: 67); a few even romanticize the period when people lived in caves (Gebauer 1989). The postmodern “remembers, recollects” and asserts that there is no special value for the new (Vattimo 1988: 101).

A2: Pragmatism

(1) [INSERT PRAGMATISM LINK HERE]

(2) ONTOLOGICAL EXAMINATION IS NOT PASSIVE- AVOIDS IMMEDIATE CALCULATIVE REDUCTION AND TAKES RESPONSIBILITY FOR ITS DECISIONS- THE AFF MODES OF POLITICS WILL INEVITABLY FALL SHORT

DILLON '99, (Michael, Prof. of IR @ U of Lancaster, Another Justice, Political Theory Vol. 27, No. 2, April 1999, 155-175)

An alternative composure need not entail that proactive decisiveness so prized by champions of distributive regimes. Rather, something like what Heidegger sought to recall from Eckerhardt's letting be (*Gelassenheit*) is called for. It appears passive only because it is attuned to the call of that other Justice in response to which their own juridical responses are often most violently at a loss. This is why the recall of their debt to that which they exclude, of the dangerous and uncertain adventure of hospitality to which another Justice calls us, is not only strange but also somehow deeply threatening to the defendants of distributive adjudication. 29

(3) TURN- THE RUSH TO QUICK SOLUTIONS IS AN ATTEMPT TO BRING AN END TO THE DIFFICULT PROCESS OF MEDITATIVE THINKING, MAKING IT ULTIMATELY PASSIVE- ONLY THE ALT IS ABLE TO USHER IN AN HOSPITABLE MODE OF BEING

MCWHORTER '92, (Ladelle, Prof. of Philosophy @ Richmond, Heidegger and the Earth, pg. 2)

Some might find this unnecessarily harsh. We academics may wish to contest the accusation. Surely, in the universities of all places, thinking is going on. But Heidegger had no respect for that or any other kind of complacency. The thinking he saw as essential is no more likely, perhaps unfortunately, to be found in universities or among philosophers than anywhere else. For the thinking he saw as essential is not the simple amassing and digesting of facts or even the mastering of complex relationships or the producing of ever more powerful and inclusive theories. The thinking Heidegger saw as essential, the thinking his works call us to, is not a thinking that seeks to master anything, not a thinking that results from a drive to grasp and know and shape the world; it is a thinking that disciplines itself to allow the world – the earth, *things* – to show themselves on their own terms. Heidegger called this kind of thinking ‘reflection’. In 1936 he wrote, “Reflection is the courage to make the truth of our own presuppositions and the realm of our own goals into the things that most deserve to be called in question.”² Reflection is thinking that never rests complacently in the conclusions reached yesterday; it is thinking that continues to think, that never stops with a satisfied smile and announces: We can cease; we have the right answer now. On the contrary, it is thinking that loves its own life, its own occurring, that does not quickly put a stop to itself, as thinking intent on a quick solution always tries to do.]

A2: Politics 1st

(1) NO SOLVENCY- SEPARATIONS OF POLITICS AND ONTOLOGY HAVE ALWAYS-ALREADY DECIDED UPON AN INTERPRETATION OF BEING MAKING THEIR GOALS IMPOSSIBLE

PADRUTT '92, (Hanspeter, Member of the Daseinsanalytisches Institut in Zurich, Heidegger and Ecology in Heidegger and the Earth ed. Ladelle McWhorter, pg. 31)

Once in a while the conceptual interplay of theory and praxis is put against this attempt. From the philosophical point of view the so-called practical or political dimension of the attempt is rejected, whereas from the ecological point of view the so-called theoretical, philosophical dimension is rejected. But deeper reflection and decisive action do not need to contradict each other. Those who shield themselves from the political consequences might one day be confronted with the fact that no decision is still a decision that can have consequences. And those who believe that they need not bother about thinking fail to recognize that no philosophy is also a philosophy – e.g., a cybernetic worldview – that also has consequences.

(2) UNIVERSALITY DA- ATTEMPTS TO ELEVATE POLITICS ABOVE ONTOLOGY IGNORE THAT THERE IS NO NEUTRAL, DEFAULT UNDERSTANDING OF HOW BEING AND BEINGS MANIFEST THEMSELVES- THEIR ATTEMPT TO PLACE POLITICS IN A VACUUM ASSUMES WESTERN CALCULATIVE THINKING TO BE UNIVERSAL- THIS RESULTS IN OTHERIZATION AND ENABLES DESTRUCTION

DILLON '99, (Michael, Prof. of IR @ U of Lancaster, Another Justice, Political Theory Vol. 27, No. 2, April 1999, 155-175)

Politics, Aristotle taught, is a particular way of life. It is not merely rule, governance, or management, but an ethos, or way of being, associated with the polis. Hence the term politeia. The polis and its politeia have, of course, gone. Consistent with this loss, and the thinking upon which I draw, I would want to push Connolly's observation a stage further. While justice is always intimately related to an allied regime of politics—the frame within which it is staged, legislated, and executed—it follows that another Justice must always be intimately related, also, to another politics. By that I mean not only that the thinking of another Justice entails the thinking of another politics, but also that this other politics must be defined as the response to the advent of another Justice. Therefore challenged to articulate a 'politeia' of our own—or, rather, challenged to articulate a 'politeia' which brings another 'we' to presence—I would say now that politics is that practice, or way of life (ethos), which is continuously attuned to the advent of another Justice. It is precisely that attunement which articulates the 'we' of what Jean-Luc Nancy calls being-in-common or being-in-relation; and stands up for it.²² Ontopolitical interpretation indicates that the return of the ontological whips the ground out from under the feet of the normal model of justice. It targets that ground as one comprising deep-rooted insistences that are deeply inimical to human flourishing, especially in an age of threatening globe interdependencies. Leviathan's justice tends to imprison dissidents and expel recalcitrants for the same reasons that the rational controlling ego attempts to banish unwanted impulses from itself. Insistence by the subject of justice on the self-same induces the expulsion or denial of anxiety-inducing Otherness. Hermeneutical denial leads to hermeneutical tyranny.²³ Allied with the impulse of ontopolitical interpretation, the advent of another Justice calls us instead to a political life which makes way for the being-in-common of human being to be rediscovered in circumstances like this which are continuously closing it off and closing it down.

A2: Politics 1st

(3) MOVEMENTS DA- SEPARATION OF ONTOLOGY AND POLITICS GUARANTEES CO-OPTION OF MOVEMENTS AND ENSURES THEY FAIL TO SEE THE INTERCONNECTED NATURE OF MODES OF DOMINATION

MARZEC '1, (Robert, Teaches Postcolonial Studies @ State U of New York @ Fredonia, An Anatomy of Empire, *symploke* 9.1-2 (2001) 165-168, muse)

Retrieving crucial foundational shifts in history that determine the order of existence in our present marks the first aspect of this archival study of empire, or, to use Spanos's term, "anatomy." The second involves the interrogation of not only accepted discourses, but cutting-edge movements of critical thought as well, an aspect of scholarship that good cautious

scholars take as a principal charge. In the work of Edward Said, for instance, Spanos traces a movement of thought that inadvertently leads to a major oversight in the field of postcolonial criticism empowered by Said's insights.

Fleshing out the influence of colonization along the full continuum of being, Spanos throws into relief the repercussions of Said's emphasis on geopolitical imperialism and subsequent

failure to give full weight to the ontological origins of occidental imperialism. This gesture enables Spanos to reveal the extent to which the relay of imperial ideologies is enabled by a centuries-long colonization of the notion of "truth" itself, a colonization governed by a logic of mastery

that stems from Imperial Rome and that "derives from thinking being meta-ta-physica [*"above," "beyond," or "outside"* things in contextual, temporal flux]." Similarly, Spanos finds it highly disabling that critics have come to take Foucault's emphasis on the period of the Enlightenment as evidence for concluding this moment in history to be a "mutation" in thinking resulting in Western Imperialism proper." Consequently, postcolonial theory in general heedlessly contributes to a failure to consider the full jurisdiction of imperialism.

The widespread impulse to emphasize the period of the Enlightenment as if it were the cradle of true imperial practices is symptomatic of the very disciplinarity that Foucault calls into question. This reconfiguration of critical thought enables Spanos to "unconceal" the ontological force of American contemporary imperialism,

and to resituate the war in Vietnam as an event that reveals the violent metaphysical imperative of "mastering" informing the idea of America. In constructing his counter-memory archive, Spanos finds the origins of this impulse to master reality in the Roman transformation of Greek thinking. The early Greek thinking of being as temporal and groundless (notable in philosophers such as Parmenides and Anaxemander) undergoes a hardening process that results in the colonization of lived events for purposes of intellectual manipulation: the Greek logos as legein (words) is transformed into Logos as Ratio (the Word of Reason); the agonistic Greek [End Page 166] understanding of truth as a-letheia is annulled in favor of the Roman circumscription of truth as correctness (*veritas*). More than a challenge to accepted periodizations of imperialism, Spanos's compelling insight here shows how colonization begins at the site of thought itself, that it has been a way of thinking holding dominion for far longer than commonly considered.

Thinking, he reveals, has come to be governed by an impulse to reify being as a thoroughly controlled spatial image, "a 'field' or 'region' or 'domain' to be comprehended, mastered, and exploited" (191). This change naturalizes and universalizes an instrumentalism that transforms the "uncalculability of being" into a utility, into a "world picture" that can be grasped in a technological age that conceals the nothing at the heart of the social order for purposes of reducing being to a disposable commodity. Consequently, the instability and the antagonism offered by the heterogeneity disseminated by the movement of temporality is re-presented

as a problem to be surmounted and eventually "solved" with the imposition of "a final and determinate solution" (191). The power of this triumph of instrumentalist thinking lies in its ability to throw all foundational inquiry into oblivion. In its ubiquity,

this instrumentality affects the very people attempting to offer opposition to the dominant order, for within the problematic of contemporary criticism, one is either characterized as engaging in a form of "high theory" that uses a

language that fails to speak to the world at large, or one resists by taking "real political action." Thus, ontological analyses are doubly ostracized. This constitutes an incredible handicap to oppositional thinking in the post-Cold War era. Spanos writes:

If an opposition that limits resistance to the political, means a time of defeat. But for the oppositional thinker who is attuned to the ontological exile to which he/she has been condemned by the global triumph of technological thinking it also means the recognition that this exilic condition of silence constitutes an irresolvable contradiction in the "Truth" of instrumental thinking --the "shadow" that haunts its light-- that demands to be thought. In the interregnum, the primary task of the margin-alized intellectual is the re-thinking of thinking itself . . . [I]t is the event of the Vietnam War--and the dominant American culture's inordinate will

to forget it--that provides the directives for this most difficult of tasks not impossible. (193) This "silencing" of an ontological engagement--what Heidegger referred to as "the forgetting of beinga"--parallels the silence surrounding the event of Vietnam on the part of American media and the

intellectual deputies of the dominant Cold-War culture. If represented at all in the dominant American imaginary, the war appears as an embarrassment, a failure on the part of America to maintain its exceptionalist national self-image that has been part of the character

of American identity as far back [End Page 167] as the Puritan "errand in the wilderness."

This prevailing view of Vietnam--made manifest most explicitly when

President George Bush announced that the American people had "kicked the Vietnam syndrome" by "winning" the Gulf War--is part and parcel of the reigning philosophical view of the American order: the Hegelian-informed view that we have reached the "end of history" with the form of democracy known as "free-market" capitalism (an economy of ordering that not only governs Western nation-states, but seeks to rule "Third World" cultures as well). Having "reached the

A2: Politics 1st

Marzec continues in '1

"end" implies that one has solved and mastered the contradictions hindering the socio-political domain, that one "stands above" the fray and movement of difference. It is at this point that we come to see Spanos's most significant contribution to critical inquiry. His building of a counter-memory archive, through the refusal to separate the ontological from the sociopolitical, enables him to reveal the full reign and power of an American exceptionalism that presents itself as benign. The power of this current order of reality lies in its ability to separate the many "sites" that constitute the continuum of being. By presenting Vietnam, free-market democracy, Puritanism, the Hegelian "end of history," and the Roman transformation of Greek thinking as unrelated, the order disables the critical thinker from "unconcealing" the depth of its control. This disciplined split—the logic of the "interregnum"—continues to consume and disable the full potential of resistance. The split afflicts the most formidable thinkers, even Spanos's own intellectual master guides, Heidegger (who's emphasis on ontology overlooks the socio-political) and Foucault (who's primary focus on the socio-political register generates its own blindness to the power of ontological domination). Questioning this logic of the interregnum demands what one would hope scholarly research to always offer as a matter of course—a reconsideration of the ways in which we think in the present. This requires that the scholar who wishes to rub against the imperatives of the interregnum rethink the very movement of thought. In that rethinking we must confront without apology the increasing rapaciousness of not only the self-congratulatory nature of American rhetoric, but the growing, insidious neo-imperial movement of transnational corporations that have come to extend the logic of mastery beyond national borders. As such, living in the interregnum presents the critical scholar with a singular intellectual burden—one, according to Spanos, "most difficult but not impossible."

A2: Heidegger = Nazi

(1) DECRYING THEORIES AS FASCIST IS MERELY A TACTIC OF MAINTAINING THE STATUS QUO- IT HAS NO POSITIVE ANALYTICAL VALUE

ZIZEK '2, (Senior Researcher at the Institute for Social Studies in Ljubljana, Welcome to the Desert of the Real!, p. 76-77)

It is here that we should oppose the standard historicist genealogy (the search for origins, influences, etc.) to the strict Nietzschean genealogy. Apropos of Nazism, the standard genealogy is exemplified by the search for the 'proto-Fascist' elements or kernel out of which Nazism grew (when, in Wagner's Ring, Hagen chases the Rhine gold; when the German Romantics aestheticized politics . . .); while the Nietzschean genealogy fully takes into account the rupture constitutive of a new historical event:

none of the 'proto-Fascist' elements is Fascist per Se, the only thing that makes them 'Fascist' is their specific articulation — or, to put it in Stephen Jay Gould's terms, all these elements are 'ex-apted' by Fascism. In other words, there is no 'Fascism avant la lettre', because it is the letter itself (the nomination) which makes Fascism proper out of the bundle of elements. Along the same lines, we should radically reject the notion that discipline (from self-control to physical training) is a 'proto-Fascist' feature — the very predicate 'proto-Fascist' should be abandoned: it is the exemplary case of a pseudo-concept whose function is to block conceptual analysis: when we say that the organized spectacle of thousands of bodies (or, say, the admiration of sports which demand great effort and self-control like mountain climbing) is 'proto-Fascist', are we saying absolutely nothing, we are simply expressing a vague association which masks our ignorance.

So when, decades ago, kung fu films were popular (Bruce Lee, etc.), was it not obvious that we were dealing with a genuine working-class ideology of youngsters whose only path to success was the disciplinary training of their only possession, their bodies? Spontaneity and the 'let it go' attitude of indulging in excessive freedoms belong to those who have the means to afford it — those who have nothing have only their discipline. The 'bad' physical discipline, if there is one, is not collective training but, rather, jogging and body-building as part of the subjective economy of the realization of the Self's inner potentials — no wonder an obsession with one's body is an almost obligatory part of ex-Leftist radicals' passage into the 'maturity' of pragmatic politics: from Jane Fonda to Joschka Fischer, the 'latency period' between the two phases is marked by the focus on one's own body.

(2) ACCUSATIONS THAT HEIDEGGER IS A NAZI ARE INTELLECTUALLY DISHONEST AND HAVE NO IMPACT- THEY'RE BIOGRAPHICAL NOT POLITICALLY PREDICTIVE OF USE OF HIS WORK

SPANOS '93, Professor of English, SUNY-Binghamton, HEIDEGGER AND CRITICISM, p.2.

The publication of Victor Farias's Heidegger and Nazism in 1987 reopened the question concerning the relationship between Heidegger's thought and Nazi politics with the force of scandal. Farias's book contributes little that was not already known about Heidegger's personal affiliation with Nazism. And his analytical effort to implicate Heidegger's thought at large with Nazism is characterized by a superficiality so obvious that, as Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe has observed, it betrays a certain intellectual dishonesty, a dishonesty, I would add, endemic to the future anterior perspective of anthropological inquiry. It suggests that Farias's identification of Heidegger's philosophical writing at large with an anti-Semitic fascism is the tendentious result, not so much of reading Heidegger's texts, as of an inexorably fixed moralistic point of view grounded in the self-evidently damning "facts" of Heidegger's personal adherence to the Nazi Party.

A2: Heidegger = Nazi

(3) HEIDEGGER'S THOUGHT IS EMANCIPATORY AND THE ALTERNATIVES ARE WORSE

SPANOS '93, William, Professor of English, SUNY-Binghamton, HEIDEGGER AND CRITICISM, p. l3)

To put the project of this book positively, these essays are intended to demonstrate the continuing use value of a certain Heideggerian initiative of thinking - especially the project of

overcoming philosophy - for oppositional intellectuals. Despite the politically conservative bent of his antihumanist

discourse, Heidegger's destructive hermeneutics remains viable - indeed, has been rendered crucial by the historical

demise of classical Marxism - to the polyvalent task of emancipation in the face of the massive "reform"

movement that would relegitimate not simply the discourse of humanism and its cultural institutions, but also the discreetly repressive

sociopolitical order it has always served.

A2: Util Good

(1) TURN- THE LOGIC OF UTILITARIANISM DEFIES QUESTIONING THE MEANS OF TECHNICAL STRATEGY- MANAGEMENT BECOMES AN END IN ITSELF, PRODUCING A NARCISSISTIC UNDERSTANDING OF THE WORLD THAT PAVES THE WAY FOR MORE WARS

BURKE '5, (Anthony, Politics and IR—University of New South Wales, Iraq: Strategy's burnt offering', Global Change, Peace & Security, 17:2, 191 – 213]

Yet Hannah Arendt, in *The Human Condition*, had already sounded a warning - pointing to the emptiness of a utilitarianism that gets caught in an 'unending chain of means and ends' in which 'all ends are bound to be of short duration and to be transformed into means for some further ends'.¹¹⁶ This perfectly describes the rolling disaster of the United States' policy towards Iraq, from the time the Reagan administration decided to make of Saddam a 'strategic asset', then sought his removal through a decade of failed and ever more destructive policy, until only the invasion and occupation of the country could seemingly achieve US goals. It perfectly describes the geopolitical panic and ambition of the Bush neoconservatives, who have sought to build one illusory strategic 'victory' on another (Afghanistan, Iraq, then) without consideration of what counts as victory, its manifest failures and its unbearable human, economic and political costs. Strategy, seeking one proliferating end after another, becomes an end in itself and the ultimate, narcissistic source of meaning. To use Arendt's words, it 'defies questioning about its own use utility established as meaning generates meaninglessness'

A2: Util Good

(2) TURN- UTIL IS JUST ANOTHER ATTEMPT TO ESTABLISH TOTAL MANAGERIAL CONTROL THROUGH METAPHYSICS- THIS ANNIHILATES THE BEAUTY OF LIFE BY VIEWING THINGS ONLY IN TERMS OF THEIR UTILITY- ALTERNATIVE ETHICAL FRAMEWORKS ARE KEY

MCWHORTER '92, (Ladelle, Prof. of Philosophy @ Richmond, Heidegger and the Earth, pgs. 8-9)

When we respond to Heidegger's call as if it were a moral condemnation, we reinstate a discourse in which active agency and its projects and responsibilities take precedence over any other way of being with the earth. In other words, we *insist* on remaining within the discourses, the power configurations, of the modern managerial self. Guilt is a concept whose heritage and meaning occur within the ethical tradition of the Western world. But the history of ethical theory in the West (and it could be argued that ethical theory only occurs in the West) is one with the history of technological thought. The revelation of things as to-be-managed and the imperative to be in control work themselves out in the history of ethics just as surely as they work themselves out in the history of the natural and human sciences.

It is probably quite true that in many different cultures, times, and places human beings have asked the question: How shall I best live my life? But in the West, and in relatively modern times, we have reformulated that question so as to ask: How shall I conduct myself? How shall I behave? How shall I *manage* my actions, my relationships, my desires? And how shall I make sure my neighbors do the same? Alongside technologies of the earth have grown up technologies of the soul, theories of human behavioral control of which current ethical theories are a significant subset. Ethics in the modern world at least very frequently functions as just another field of scientific study yielding just another set of engineering goals.

Therefore, when we react to problems like ecological crises by retreating into the familiar discomfort of our Western sense of guilt, we are not placing ourselves in opposition to technological thinking and its ugly consequences. On the contrary, we are simply reasserting our technological dream of perfect managerial control. How so? Our guilt professes our enduring faith in the managerial dream by insisting that problems – problems like oil spills, acid rain, groundwater pollution, the extinction of whales, the destruction of the ozone, the rain forests, the wetlands – lie simply in mismanagement or in a failure to manage (to manage ourselves in this case) and by reaffirming to ourselves that if we had used our power to manage our behavior better in the first place we could have avoided this mess. In

A2: Util Good

McWhorter continues in '92

other words, when we respond to Heidegger's call by indulging in feelings of guilt about how we have been treating the object earth, we are really just telling ourselves how truly powerful we, as agents, are. We are telling ourselves that we really could have done differently; we had the power to make things work, if only we had stuck closer to the principles of good management. And in so saying we are in yet a new and more stubborn way refusing to hear the real message, the message that human beings are not, never have been, and never can be in complete control, that the dream of that sort of managerial omnipotence is itself the very danger of which Heidegger warns.

Thus guilt – as affirmation of human agential power over against passive matter – is just another way of covering over the mystery. Thus guilt is just another way of refusing to face the fact that we human beings are finite and that we must begin to live *with* the earth instead of trying to maintain total control. Guilt is part and parcel of a managerial approach to the world. 

Thinking along Heidegger's paths means resisting the power of guilt, resisting the desire to close ourselves off from the possibility of being with our own finitude. It means finding "the courage to make the truth of our own presuppositions and the realm of our own goals into the things that most deserve to be called in question." It means holding ourselves resolutely open for the shattering power of the event of thinking, even if what is shattered eventually is ourselves.

A2: Tech Good

(1) THEIR EVIDENCE MISUNDERSTANDS THE FUNCTION OF THE WORD TECHNOLOGY FOR HEIDEGGER- HE IS REFERING TO THE NEED TO TRANSFORM THE ESSENCE OF THE EARTH INTO TECHNOLOGY

MALY '92, (Kenneth, Prof. of Philosophy @ U of Wisconsin, La Crosse, *Heidegger and Ecology*, *Heidegger and the Earth*, ed. Ladelle McWhorter, pgs. 11-12)

(c) *Technik*: In ordinary German *Technik* means both ‘technology’ and ‘technique’ – even though the word *Technologie* fits in here also. The English words *technique* and *technology* carry a similar ambiguity. As used in this essay, *Technik* does not mean the machinery or instrument of technology (as in: “We do not have the right technology for that job”). Nor does it mean strategy (as in: “If I knew the right technique, I would do it”). Rather, for Heidegger the discussion of *Technik* and *das Wesen der Technik* has to do with a way of revealing, i.e., a way in which being shows itself in a particular epoch. In this essay I have chosen to render *Technik* in English as ‘technics’ – both as an “adequate translation” and as a way to jolt our thinking away from “techniques” and “technologies” and into the way of revealing, i.e., concealing, that belongs to how the epoch of *Technik* unfolds.

A2: Tech Good

(2) AND, REDUCTION OF THE EARTH'S ESSENCE TO A MACHINE ROBS IT OF BEAUTY AND ACCESSES OUR IMPACT- THE ALT ENSURES THE BEST METHOD OF APPROACHING TECHNOLOGY
MCWHORTER '92, (Ladelle, Prof. of Philosophy @ Richmond, Heidegger and the Earth, pg. 1)

¶ Heidegger often refers in his writings to the dramatic changes to which he was witness – the loss of rootedness to place that came with the invention of the automobile, then the airplane, and now our various vehicles for travel in interplanetary space; the conquering of distances that has accompanied the development of communications technologies such as radio, television, and film, and of course, the changes in our thinking of and with the natural world that have come as we have become seemingly more and more independent of the earth's forces, more and more capable of outwitting them and even of harnessing them and forcing them to conform to our wills. These changes – but more especially human beings' unreflective incorporation of these changes into our daily lives – struck Heidegger as strange and very dangerous. It may well be that there is nothing really wrong with using a tractor to plow one's land or with using a computer to write one's book, but there is something ominous, Heidegger believed, about our not giving any thought to what is happening to ourselves and to the world when we do those things, or our not noticing or at least not caring about the disruptions these changes bring about in the fabric of things.

¶ Heidegger calls us to give thought to – or give ourselves over to thought of – the strangeness of our technological being within the world. His works resound with calls for human beings to grow more thoughtful, to take heed, to notice and reflect upon where we are and what we are doing, lest human possibility and the most beautiful of possibilities for thought be lost irretrievably in forces we do not understand and only pretend we can control. ¶

A2: Alt → No Resources

THE ALT DOES NOT PRECLUDE RESOURCE GATHERING- RATHER IT ENCOURAGES A MEDITATIVE MODE OF RESOURCE EXTRACTION

THIELE '95, (Leslie Paul, Prof. of Poli. Sci. @ U of Florida, Timely Meditations, p.184)

Despite such caveats, Heidegger's ecological credentials can be supported on a number of grounds. Our sense of self, always in part philosophically derived, impinges on our political, social, and cultural lives. The way we act in the world depends on who we think we are - that is, on how and what we think (of) ourselves. To define human being as care, while not stipulating any particular ethical or environmental attitude or comportment, indicates that human being is not to be defined by its possessive mastery of the world. "It is one thing just to use the earth," Heidegger writes, "another to receive the blessing of the earth and to become at home in the law of this reception in order to shepherd the mystery of Being and watch over the inviolability of the possible."

A2: Aesthetics Bad

(1) THEIR TURNS ONLY LINK TO THE PERMUTATION- AESTHETICS ONLY BECOMES VIOLENT WHEN IT IS COMBINED WITH METAPHYSICS- OUR PIECE OF GEROULANOS '4 EV FROM THE PERM DEBATE INDICATES THAT THEY SEE BEAUTY IN REDUCTION OF THINGS TO TECHNOLOGY, MAKING THINGS LIKE LANDFILLS AND STERILIZED CITIES APPEAR BEAUTIFUL BECAUSE THEY SHOW DOMINATION OF NATURE WHILE THE ALT WOULD FIND BEAUTY IN THE EXPERIENCE OF THE ENVIRONMENT AS IT IS INSTEAD OF HOW HUMANS WOULD WISH IT TO BE

(2) AESTHETICS DO NOT CULMINATE IN FASCISM- THEY OFFER POLITICAL ALTERNATIVES WITHOUT PRESCRIBING PARTICULAR IDEOLOGICAL PROGRAMS

BLEIKER '3, (Roland, Prof. of Poli Sci @ U of Queensland, Why Then Is It So Bright? Towards an Aesthetics of Peace in a Time of War, Review of International Studies (2003), 29, 387–400)

When using aesthetic insights to challenge political domination, Krippendorff displays a particular preference for art that refuses to impose closure on its object of inquiry. The power of Shakespeare, for instance, is located in the fact that he does not denounce, but poses important questions, thus leaving the viewers/readers with the responsibility of reaching their own judgements (p. 241). Likewise, Sophocles' Antigone is presented as a key form of critique because it offers political alternatives without committing itself to a programmatic agenda (p.33). Herein lies the power of art: in its refusal to be dragged into short-term political manoeuvrings, which would reduce art to merely one more set of propaganda tools. Art is thus political in the more basic sense of offering insight into the processes through which we represent (often in narrow and highly problematic ways) political facts and challenges.

A2: Aesthetics Bad

(3) AESTHETICS ARE GOOD- THEY ALLOW FOR ETHICAL RESPONSIBILITY, LEAVE OPEN POSSIBILITIES FOR THOUGHT, AND AVOID REDUCING THE WORLD TO PURE TECHNOLOGY WITHOUT COLLAPSING INTO FASCISM

KAULINGFREKS '7, (Ruud, Prof. @ U of Leicester School of Management, Philosophy and Organization, ed. By Campbell Jones and Rene ten Bos, pgs. 47-48)

As a longing or a desire it is not surprising that philosophy has an affinity with aesthetics. Much of philosophy appeals to sensibilities. It is driven by emotion. A desire, although it points to a lack, is an emotional engagement. It cares for the lack. As I said above, desire exists only as long as it is not realized, as long as it is conscious of the lack. Realization of desire is in this sense a destruction of the desire. Defining philosophy as a desire means it remains in postponement. Philosophy is living in postponement, endlessly not attaining goals, in a sense caring for failure. A journey without end and taking care of not attaining the end but putting the steps in between in brackets, doubting them constantly. Living in the postponement is living in the doubt: 'yes but . . .'. It is exactly in this aspect that lies the great fascination for philosophy.

It was Socrates who made popular the idea of postponing knowledge, in the idea of 'knowing that I don't know'. To never going beyond the essay is an erotic attitude, the attitude of provocation, flirting and fascination of leaving all possibilities open. As long as I don't know, everything is possible. Each knowing restricts the field of possibilities, pins us down in a certain direction. At the same time postponement is a respect for everything that is not-me. As long as my statements are tentative I have to be respectful towards the matter I am considering. It could all be a mistake. Philosophy forces us into cautiousness and therefore into a reflective attitude. Nietzsche always kept reminding us of this in his quest against *hubris*, and was always fulminating against the arrogance of knowing. Hubris is to believe in one's own statement. It is to challenge the gods and be disrespectful of the world and others by thinking one sees through them, understands them and dominates them. Philosophy is a good antidote against having too high an idea of ourselves and the belief that we can control the world.

By explicitly relating philosophy to aesthetics, I am placing aesthetics at the core of the philosophical activity. Aesthetics is the youngest philosophical discipline. It started

A2: Aesthetics Bad

Kaulingfreks continues in '7

was Kant who was the first to make aesthetic theory an integral part of his system (for a detailed discussion on aesthetics see Warren and Rehn, Chapter 10 in this volume). Here I just want to point out to the importance of aesthetics for contemporary philosophical inquiry. In his third critique Kant tries to link the realms of freedom and nature or between the theoretical and the practical reason that were the subjects of his previous two Critiques. The *Critique of the Power of Judgement* (1790) studies taste judgements and shows how taste links abstract principles to empirical experience, how it links general concepts to singular sensitive experiences. The judgement of taste is led by sensibility or imagination. This becomes a third faculty besides intelligence and reason.

Judgements of taste have four characteristics. First, disinterested satisfaction, the judgement has no other purpose than the enjoyment of beauty. Second, the judgements of taste are of a subjective universality; taste is subjective but we claim universality. Our taste is related to reason without being part of it. We say that something is beautiful while we know that it is our feeling for the thing. Third, the judgement of taste has purposiveness without purpose; everything in the object of beauty points to the beauty but the beauty itself has no other purpose than to please. The object is purposive in its form but has no function. Finally, the judgement has a necessity without concept. Beauty is known as an act of necessary beauty. Everyone should be moved in the same way we are moved, or the aesthetic object is exemplary. Beauty lies in a *sensus communis*. From here Kant shows that in aesthetic judgements imagination and reason are in a balance, our knowledge faculty is in a free play. Aesthetics then is related to Enlightenment but at the same time criticizes it as being one sided. It shows that reason needs something to balance it and searches for a free play of reason and sensibility. Aesthetics is not an advocacy of sheer sensorium but the balance of both.

It is precisely this critical perspective that has come to the fore in the twentieth century. From the moment our culture starts to realize intellectual reason is not the faculty that rules the world and that it has brought us to a position of planetary dominance of technique, as Heidegger calls it, then aesthetics emerge as a way to counterbalance the dominance without falling into anti-intellectualism and unreason. Presenting philosophy as an aesthetic activity emphasizes this critical role and forms an invitation for a detached diagnosis of our culture. It is no wonder then that especially contemporary French philosophy embraces aesthetics for critical analysis of our culture. This is a path delineated by Heidegger and his critique of intellectual rationality even if philosophers as Badiou, Nancy and Levinas to name a few explicitly turn against Heidegger. The same applies to Deleuze and Guattari, who state in *What is Philosophy?* (1994) that philosophy is the creation of concepts and not the articulation of a wonder. Although Deleuze and Guattari clearly distinguish philosophy from art, their approach to philosophy is comprehensible from an aesthetic perspective. Concepts are created by a play of imagination and reason. There are however no aesthetic objects; the creation of concepts is an aesthetic activity.

A2: Levinas/Ethics 1st

(1) LEVINAS' STANDING IN FOR THE OTHER IS VIOLENT BECAUSE IT LEAVES NO SPACE FOR THE OTHER TO DISCLOSE ITSELF- ONTOLOGICAL EXAMINATION IS BEST BECAUSE IT SOLVES LEVINAS' POLITICAL CONCERN WHILE ALSO AVOIDING METAPHYSICAL THINKING

DILLON '99, (Michael, Prof. of IR @ U of Lancaster, Another Justice, Political Theory Vol. 27, No. 2, April 1999, 155-175)

Allowing a space for other ways to be is, then, a political art which raises questions not only about the Cartesianism of modern politics but also about that substitution whose insatiable ethic is one of Levinas's contribution to this debate. Recall that the return of the ontological has been a plural and ambiguous move resulting in no new orthodoxy or canon. A difference that fissures it through and through is that which Levinas's passionately self-conscious Auseinandersetzung against Heidegger (and Hegel) produced between himself and the German thinker.³⁰ For Levinas, the self is conjured up as a response to the infinite ethical call of responsibility for the Other. He defines that response in terms, ultimately, of standing in for the Other. Politically and ethically, however, standing in for the other threatens to allow the Other no place for its Otherness to stand and flourish. Allowing it that place is what I take to be the political work which devolves upon a way of being that is continuously invoked into being by the advent of the call of another Justice which issues through its own mortal hybridity.³¹ Philosophy's task, for Levinas, is to avoid conflating ethics and politics. The opposition of politics and ethics opens his first major work, Totality and Infinity, and underscores its entire reading. This raises the difficult question of whether or not the political can be rethought against Levinas with Levinas. Nor is this simply a matter of asking whether or not politics can be ethical. It embraces the question of whether or not there can be such a thing as an ethic of the political. Herein, then, lies an important challenge to political thought. It arises as much for the ontopolitical interpretation as it does for the understanding of the source and character of political life that flows from the return of the ontological. For Levinas the ethical comes first and ethics is first philosophy. But that leaves the political unregenerated, as Levinas's own deferral to a Hobbesian politics, as well as his very limited political interventions, indicate.³² In this essay I understand the challenge instead to be the necessity of thinking the co-presence of the ethical and the political. Precisely not the subsumption of the ethical by the political as Levinas charges, then, but the belonging together of the two which poses, in addition, the question of the civil composure required of a political life.

A2: Levinas/Ethics 1st

EXISTENCE ITSELF IS AN ETHICAL PROBLEM WHICH PROCEDES ANY OF THE AFF ATTEMPTS TO APPLY ETHICAL LAWS- A HOSPITALITY TOWARDS THE INCOMPLETENESS OF OUR OWN BEING IS CRUCIAL TO TAKING RESPONSIBILITY FOR OUR DECISIONS AND TO AVOID A TYRANNICAL ORIENTATION TOWARDS THE WORLD

DILLON '99, (Michael, Prof. of IR @ U of Lancaster, *Another Justice*, Political Theory Vol. 27, No. 2, April 1999, 155-175)

From out of the ontological turn, therefore, existence does not have to be made ethical by justice; it makes its very appearance as an ethical problem. ²⁴ That is to say, given no justification, it is nonetheless continuously in the position of always having to offer one as it assumes its groundless freedom. Thus the "Law of the law" ²⁵ for human being is the circumstance of an ungrounded freedom. There, while necessarily having to decide how to take up its freedom, of how to determine what is just and what is unjust, what is a fair measure of existence, and therefore how to be and what to do, the human has also to find ways not simply of welcoming others but also of extending that welcome to the very Otherness or strangeness which inhabits itself. It must do so since its own individual existence is always already composed of that strangeness. This, then, is not simply a matter of being kind to strangers. Neither is it a simple matter of elevating others—such as the Refugee—to some canonical status. ²⁶ Such interpretations of the trajectory, and of the implications, of the thinking upon which I draw trivialise the matter because they fail to appreciate fully the profound disturbance which the ontological return wreaks throughout the metaphysical tradition. It is a matter instead, of cultivating an ethos that welcomes rather than denies the human plurality that is integral to its being. A plurality without which it could not be, and a plurality which manifests itself continuously as the call of another Justice. The resistance to hermeneutical tyranny begins with fundamental opposition to its source in hermeneutical denial. In ways too numerous and persistent to mention, hermeneutical denial always insists that the human is not an unanswerable question of itself to itself. Denying this simultaneously and necessarily always entails denying, also, the very character and centrality of Language to being human. Skilled opponents of the radical hermeneuticism of human being—including some early hermeneuticists—know that Language is the site to be captured and tamed and that failure to do so will be fatal to their disciplinary project. Hermeneutical denial must strive to suborn and subordinate Language. Conversely, another Justice is the rearticulation of the living question of human being. Its advent is integrally aligned with the irrepressible movement of Language itself. Inciting the liminal force of Language against the forces of hermeneutical denial, another Justice invokes the resources of Language in a tone more poetic than arithmetic. It finds its expression in the vernacular of hospitality and possibility, for example, rather than that of liability and accountability. Silence also contours Language. Another Justice therefore finds its expression as well in the attunement of hearing, listening, and attending without which there would not be that withdrawal necessary for other intimations, interpretations, and ways of being to find articulation. This receiving, greeting, and hosting—participating in a giving composed of no permanent presents and no secure returns—entails, in its turn, another constitution. ²⁷ Once enacted in terms of a welcoming composure toward that which appears most difficult to receive well, it also addresses that which seems, at least in our tradition of thought, to be most fearful; our very own corporeal strangeness.

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Perm Solvency- Green Politics

REJECTION OF GREEN POLITICS FOR HINTS OF MASTERY MISSES ITS USEFULNESS FOR DEVELOPING A CLOSER RELATIONSHIP WITH THE EARTH- EVEN THE AUTHOR CONCLUDES THAT A TEMPERED VERSION OF CONSERVATIONISM COULD BE TRANSFORMATIVE

PADRUTT '92, (Hanspeter, Member of the Daseinsanalytisches Institut in Zurich, *Heidegger and Ecology in Heidegger and the Earth* ed. Ladelle McWhorter, pgs. 30-31)

With that I want to end this stroll through the leading notions of the ecological movement. I could, of course, only touch upon the manifold of ecological literature here.⁵⁰ I would also like explicitly to point out that with this stroll it was in no way a question of a disparaging critique of the ecological literature. I count myself as a participant in the ecological

movement and agree with many of the analyses and suggestions expressed in all these books. I also detect in almost all of these publications something of a change of heart, toward the ecological attitude of modesty, respect, fitting into a larger connectedness, withdrawing from mastery by us. This stroll has dealt only with the snares and land mines that threaten the necessary rethinking.

At the end I want just to look at some objections that could be brought against the attempt to bring Heidegger's thinking and ecology together.

Perm Solvency- Prag Good

PERM- DO THE PLAN AND ALL NON-MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE PARTS OF THE ALTERNATIVE—THIS RECOGNIZES THE FLAWS OF THE POLICY WITHOUT SACRIFICING PRAGMATIC UTILITY

KIDNER '1, (David, Senior Lecturer in Psychology at Nottingham Trent, 2001
Nature and Psyche, p. 19)

Recognizing that the building blocks out of which we attempt to construct a defense of the natural world may have the character of ideological Trojan horses, directing our theories in directions that are ultimately ineffective, does not mean that we should, or can, avoid them altogether. Unless we are to remain silent, then we have to use whatever materials are available to us, even if these are ideologically tainted. But they need to be used in full recognition of their ideological implications so that we minimize the extent to which they covertly determine the form of our theorizing and the conclusions we arrive at – suggesting a provisional, tongue-in-cheek stance that is quick to sense divergence from our intuitions. In this book, I will – initially at least – use inverted commas to signal particularly problematic terms; but the reader will not doubt soon be able to imagine them around many others as well.

Perm Solvency- Meditative + Tech Thinking

ONLY A COMBINATION OF TECHNOLOGICAL AND MEDITATIVE THOUGHT CAN ALLOW US TO APPROACH THE ESSENCE OF MODERN TECHNOLOGY

KOCKELMANS '85, (Joseph, Penn State philosopher, HEIDEGGER AND SCIENCE, p. 254)

This ambivalent attitude in regard to modern science and technology, which says at the same time yes and no, corresponds to the two modes of thinking we have referred to earlier.

Calculative thinking will help us to use our resources effectively; meditative thinking will help us in making certain that technicity will not overpower us. Meditative thinking will thus make it possible for us to come to a freedom in regard to things that let beings be (*Gelassenheit*), by maintaining an openness to the mystery that is hidden in modern technicity.

Fascism Net Benefit

AND, PRAGMATISM IS KEY TO PREVENT FASCISM- ONLY SPECIFICALLY TARGETED REFORMS CAN ALLOW THE LEFT TO HAVE POLITICAL INFLUENCE

RORTY '98 (Richard, University Of Virginia Philosopher,
"ACHIEVING OUR COUNTRY: LEFTIST THOUGHT IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA", 1998, p. 104-107)

For purposes of thinking about how to achieve our country, we do not need to worry about the correspondence theory of truth, the grounds of normativity, the impossibility of justice, or the infinite distance which separates us from the other. For those purposes, we can give both religion and philosophy a pass. We can just get on with trying to solve what Dewey called "the problems of men." To think about those problems means to refrain from thinking so much about otherness that we begin to acquiesce in what Todd Gitlin has called, in the title of a recent book, "the twilight of common dreams." It means deriving our moral identity at least in part, from our citizenship in a democratic nation-state, and from leftist attempts to fulfill the promise of that nation. The cultural Left often seems convinced that the nation state is obsolete, and that there is therefore no point in attempting to revive national politics. The trouble with this claim is that the government of our nation-state will be, for the foreseeable future, the only agent capable of making any real difference in the amount of selfishness and sadism inflicted on Americans. It is no comfort to those in danger of being immiserated by globalization to be told that, since national governments are now irrelevant, we must think up a replacement for such governments. The cosmopolitan super-rich do not think any replacements are needed, and they are likely to prevail. Bill Readings was right to say that "the nation-state [has ceased] to be the elemental unit of capitalism," but it remains the entity which makes decisions about social benefits, and thus about social justice. The current leftist habit of taking the long view and looking beyond nationhood to a global polity is as useless as was faith in Marx's philosophy of history, for which it has become a substitute. Both are equally irrelevant to the question of how to prevent the reemergence of hereditary castes, or of how to prevent right-wing populists from taking advantage of resentment at that reemergence. When we think about these latter questions, we begin to realize that one of the essential transformations which the cultural Left will have to undergo is the shedding of its semi-conscious anti-Americanism, which it carried over from the rage of the late Sixties. This Left will have to stop thinking up ever more abstract and abusive names for "the system" and start trying to construct inspiring images of the country. Only by doing so can it begin to form alliances with people outside the academy-and, specifically, with the labor unions. Outside the academy, Americans still want to feel patriotic. They still want to feel part of a nation which can take control of its destiny and make itself a better place. If the Left forms no such alliances, it will never have any effect on the laws of the United States. To form them will require the cultural Left to forget about Baudrillard's account of America as Disneyland-as a country of simulacra-and to start proposing changes in the laws of a real country, inhabited by real people who are enduring unnecessary suffering, much of which can be cured by governmental action. Nothing would do more to resurrect the American Left than agreement on a concrete political platform, a People's Charter, a list of specific reforms. The existence of such a list-endlessly reprinted and debated, equally familiar to professors and production workers, imprinted on the memory both of professional people and of those who clean the professionals' toilets-might revitalize leftist Politics.

Passivity DA

(A) DOING NOTHING IS NOT AN ACTIVE ENGAGEMENT WITH THE EARTH ON ITS OWN TERMS AND ENCOURAGES POLITICAL PASSIVITY

WOLIN '90, (Richard, Professor of Modern European Intellectual History, Rice, THE POLITICS OF BEING, p. 147)

As we suggested earlier, the essential thinking of the later Heidegger promotes an "eclipse of practical reason." For his post-Kehre reformulation of the relation between Being and Dasein rebels so fervently against the voluntarist dimension of his own earlier thinking that the very concept of "meaningful human action" is seemingly rendered null and void. If the early Heidegger attempted to rally Dasein to "decisiveness" (Entschlossenheit), the thought of the later Heidegger appears at times to be a summary justification of human passivity and inaction (Gelassenheit) - so prejudicially is the balance between Sein and Mensch struck in favor of the former term. Thus, in the later Heidegger, the campaign against practical reason develops along a two-fold front: not only is the concept of Being grossly inflated, but the powers of human reason and will are correspondingly devalued.

(B) COMBINING ACTION TO STOP EXTINCTION WITH A WILLINGNESS TO ADOPT PARADIGM SHIFTS IN OUR THINKING IS KEY- THE ALT NEEDLESSLY SANCTIONS ANNIHILATION

SANTONI '85, (Ronald E. Phil. Prof @ Denison, Nuclear War, ed. Fox and Groarke, p. 156-7)

To be sure, Fox sees the need for our undergoing "certain fundamental changes" in our "thinking, beliefs, attitudes, values" and Zimmerman calls for a "paradigm shift" in our thinking about ourselves, other, and the Earth. But it is not clear that what either offers as suggestions for what we can, must, or should do in the face of a runaway arms race are sufficient to "wind down" the arms race before it leads to omnicide. In spite of the importance of Fox's analysis and reminders it is not clear that "admitting our (nuclear) fear and anxiety" to ourselves and "identifying the mechanisms that dull or mask our emotional and other responses" represent much more than examples of basic, often stated principles of psychotherapy. Being aware of the psychological maneuvers that keep us numb to nuclear reality may well be the road to transcending them but it must only be a "first step" (as Fox acknowledges), during which we Simultaneously act to eliminate nuclear threats, break our complicity with the arms race, get rid of arsenals of genocidal weaponry, and create conditions for international goodwill, mutual trust, and creative interdependence. Similarly, in respect to Zimmerman: in spite of the challenging Heideggerian insights he brings out regarding what motivates the arms race, many questions may be raised about his prescribed "solutions." Given our need for a paradigm shift in our (distorted) understanding of ourselves and the rest of being, are we merely left "to prepare for a possible shift in our self-understanding? (italics mine)? Is this all we can do? Is it necessarily the case that such a shift "cannot come as a result of our own will?" – and work – but only from "a destiny outside our control?" Does this mean we leave to God the matter of bringing about a paradigm shift? Granted our fears and the importance of not being controlled by fears, as well as our "anthropocentric leanings," should we be as cautious as Zimmerman suggests about our disposition "to want to do something" or "to act decisively in the face of the current threat?" In spite of the importance of our taking on the anxiety of our finitude and our present limitation, does it follow that "we should be willing for the worst (i.e. an all-out nuclear war) to occur? Zimmerman wrongly, I contend, equates "resistance" with "denial" when he says that "as long as we resist and deny the possibility of nuclear war, that possibility will persist and grow stronger." He also wrongly perceives "resistance" as presupposing a clinging to the "order of things that now prevails." Resistance connotes opposing, and striving to defeat a prevailing state of affairs that would allow or encourage the "worst to occur." I submit, against Zimmerman, that we should not, in any sense, be willing for nuclear war or omnicide to occur. (This is not to suggest that we should be numb to the possibility of its occurrence.) Despite Zimmerman's elaborations and refinements his Heideggerian notion of "letting beings be" continues to be too permissive in this regard. In my judgment, an individual's decision not to act against and resist his or her government's preparations for nuclear holocaust is, as I have argued elsewhere, to be an early accomplice to the most horrendous crime against life imaginable – its annihilation. The Nuremberg tradition calls not only for a new way of thinking, a "new internationalism" in which we all become co-nurturers of the whole planet, but for resolute actions that will sever our complicity with nuclear criminality and the genocidal arms race, and work to achieve a future which we can no longer assume. We must not only "come face to face with the unthinkable in image and thought" (Fox) but must act now - with a "new consciousness" and conscience - to prevent the unthinkable, by cleansing the earth of nuclear weaponry. Only when that is achieved will ultimate violence be removed as the final arbiter of our planet's fate.

Ethics 1st/Ontology 1st Bad

(A) ONTOLOGICAL QUESTIONS ARE UNABLE TO ESCAPE THEMSELVES AND REFER TO THE OTHER, LEAVING THE NEG TRAPPED IN A VICIOUS, NARCISSISTIC CIRCULARITY- THEY DON'T SOLVE THE IMPACT

LEVINAS & NEMO '85, (Emmanuel, professor of philosophy, and Philippe, professor of new philosophy, Ethics and Infinity, pg. 6-7

Are we not in need of still more precautions? Must we not step back from this question to raise another, to recognize the obvious circularity of asking what is the "What is . . ." question? It seems to beg the question. Is our new suspicion, then, that Heidegger begs the question of metaphysics when he asks "What is poetry?" or "What is thinking?"? Yet his thought is insistently anti-metaphysical. Why, then, does he retain the metaphysical question par excellence? Aware of just such an objection, he proposes, against the vicious circle of the petitio principi, an alternative, productive circularity: hermeneutic questioning. To ask "What is . . ." does not partake of onto-theo-logy if one acknowledges (1) that the answer can never be fixed absolutely, but calls essentially, endlessly, for additional "What is . . ." questions. Dialectical refinement here replaces vicious circularity. Further, beyond the openmindedness called for by dialectical refinement, hermeneutic questioning (2) insists on avoiding subjective impositions, on avoiding reading into rather than harkening to things. One must harken to the things themselves, ultimately to being, in a careful attunement to what is. But do the refinement and care of the hermeneutic question — which succeed in avoiding ontotheo-logy succeed in avoiding all viciousness? Certainly they convert a simple fallacy into a productive inquiry, they open a path for thought. But is it not the case that however much refinement and care one brings to bear, to ask what something is leads to asking what something else is, and so on and so forth, ad infinitum? What is disturbing in this is not so much the infinity of interpretive depth, which has the virtue of escaping onto-theo-logy and remaining true to the way things are, to the phenomena, the coming to be and passing away of being. Rather, the problem lies in the influence the endlessly open horizon of such thinking exerts on the way of such thought. That is, the problem lies in what seems to be the very virtue of hermeneutic thought, namely, the doggedness of the "What is . . .?" question, in its inability to escape itself, to escape being and essence.

(B) AND, THIS EFFACING OF THE OTHER MAKES THE HOLOCAUST POSSIBLE AGAIN- ETHICAL RESPONSIBILITY MUST PRECEDE QUESTIONS OF BEING

DAVIDSON '89, (Arnold I. coeditor of Critical Inquiry, Assoc Prof of Philosophy, U of Chicago, Critical Inquiry, Winter . p.426)

I understand Levinas' work to suggest another path to the recovery of the human, one that leads through or toward other human beings: "The dimension of the divine opens forth from the human face... Hence metaphysics is enacted where the social relation is enacted—in our relations with men... The Other is not the incarnation of God, but precisely by his face, in which he is disincarnate, is the manifestation of the height in which God is revealed. It is our relations with men... that give to theological concepts the sole signification they admit of." Levinas places ethics before ontology by beginning with our experience of the human face: and, in a clear reference to Heidegger's idolatry of the village life of peasants, he associated himself with Socrates, who preferred the city where he encountered men to the country with its trees. In his discussion of skepticism and the problem of others, Cavell also aligns himself with this path of thought, with the recovery of the finite human self through the acknowledgement of others: "As long as God exists, I am not alone. And couldn't the other suffer the fate of God?... I wish to understand how the other now bears the weight of God, shows me that I am not alone in the universe. This requires understanding the philosophical problem of the other as the trace or scar of the departure of God [CR, p.470]." The suppression of the other, the human, in Heidegger's thought accounts, I believe, for the absence, in his writing after the war, of the experience of horror. Horror is always directed toward the human; every object of horror bears the imprint of the human will, so Levinas can see in Heidegger's silence about the gas chambers and death camps "a kind of consent to the horror." And Cavell can characterize Nazis as "those who have lost the capacity for being horrified by what they do." Where was Heidegger's horror? How could he have failed to know what he had consented to? Hannah Arendt associates Heidegger with Paul Valéry's aphorism, "Les evenements ne sont que l'écume des choses!" ('Events are but the foam of things')." I think one understands the source of her intuition. The mass extermination of human beings, however, does not produce foam, but dust and ashes; and it is here that questioning must stop.

Politics + Ontology Bad DA

ONTOLOGY AND POLITICS MUST BE SEPARATED- EXPECTATIONS THAT THE TRUTH OF BEING CAN BE DISCLOSED THROUGH POLITICS INVITE DOGMATISM AND ERASE DISSENT- THEIR FRAMEWORK COLLAPSES INTO TOTALITARIAN VIOLENCE

WOLIN '90, (Richard, Professor of Modern European Intellectual History, Rice, THE POLITICS OF BEING, p. 117)

Though we may readily accept and even welcome Heidegger's claim that works of art reveal the truth or essence of beings ("The work [of art] ... is not the reproduction of some particular entity that happens to be present at any given time," observes Heidegger; "it is, on the contrary, the reproduction of the thing's general essence"), we must question the attempt to transpose aestheticico-metaphysical criteria to the realm of political life proper. Is it in point of fact meaningful to speak of the "unveiling of truth" as the raison d'être of politics in the same way one can say this of a work of art or a philosophical work? Is not politics rather a nonmetaphysical sphere of human interaction, in which the content of collective human projects, institutions, and laws is articulated, discussed, and agreed upon? Is it not, moreover, in some sense dangerous to expect "metaphysical results" from politics? For is not politics instead a sphere of human plurality, difference, and multiplicity; hence, a realm in which the more exacting criteria of philosophical truth must play a subordinate role? And thus, would it not in fact be to place a type of totalitarian constraint on politics to expect it to deliver over truth in such pristine and unambiguous fashion.

Aesthetics Bad DA

THE ALT'S CONFLATION OF AESTHETICS AND POLITICS CULMINATES IN WAR AND FASCISM,
WHILE LEAVING MATERIAL CONDITIONS OF INEQUALITY INTACT

BENJAMIN '37, (Walter, Philosopher and Essayist, The Work of Art in the Mechanical Age of Reproduction,
<http://pages.emerson.edu/Courses/spring00/in123/workofart/benjamin.htm>)

The growing proletarianization of modern man and the increasing formation of masses are two aspects of the same process. Fascism attempts to organize the newly created proletarian masses without affecting the property structure which the masses strive to eliminate. Fascism sees its salvation in giving these masses not their right, but instead a chance to express themselves. <21> The masses have a right to change property relations; Fascism seeks to give them an expression while preserving property. The logical result of Fascism is the introduction of aesthetics into political life. The violation of the masses, whom

Fascism, with its "Führer" cult, forces to their knees, has its counterpart in the violation of an apparatus which is pressed into the production of ritual values. All efforts to render politics aesthetic culminate in one thing: war. War and war only can set a goal for mass movements on the largest scale while respecting the traditional property system. This is the political formula for the situation. The technological formula may be stated as follows: Only war makes it possible to mobilize all of today's technical resources while maintaining the property system. It goes without saying that the Fascist apotheosis of war does not employ such arguments. Still, Marinetti says in his

manifesto on the Ethiopian colonial war: "For twenty- seven years we Futurists have rebelled against the branding of war as antiaesthetic.... Accordingly we state: ... War is beautiful because it establishes man's dominion over the subjugated machinery by means of gas masks, terrifying megaphones, flame throwers, and small tanks. War is beautiful because it initiates the dreamt-of metalization of the human body. War is beautiful because it enriches a flowering meadow with the fiery orchids of machine guns. War is beautiful because it combines the gunfire, the cannonades, the cease-fire, the scents, and the stench of putrefaction into a symphony. War is beautiful because it creates new architecture, like that of the big tanks, the geometrical formation flights, the smoke spirals from burning villages, and many others.... Poets and artists of Futurism! ... remember these principles of an aesthetics of war so that your struggle for a new literature and a new graphic art . . . may be illumined by them!"

This manifesto has the virtue of clarity. Its formulations deserve to be accepted by dialecticians. To the latter, the aesthetics of today's war appears as follows: If the natural utilization of productive forces is impeded by the property system, the increase in technical devices, in speed, and in the sources of energy will press for an unnatural utilization, and this is found in war. The destructiveness of war furnishes proof that society has not been mature enough to incorporate technology as its organ, that technology has not been sufficiently developed to cope with the elemental forces of society. The horrible features of imperialistic warfare are attributable to the discrepancy between the tremendous means of production and their inadequate utilization in the process of production—in other words, to unemployment and the lack of markets. Imperialistic war is a rebellion of technology which collects, in the form of "human material," the claims to which society has denied its natural material. Instead of draining rivers, society directs a human stream into a bed of trenches; instead of dropping seeds from airplanes, it drops incendiary bombs over cities; and through gas warfare the aura is abolished in a new way. "*Fiat ars—pereat mundus*," says Fascism, and, as Marinetti admits, expects war to supply the artistic gratification of a sense perception that has been changed by technology. This is evidently the consummation of "*l'art pour l'art*." Mankind, which in Homer's time was an object of contemplation for the Olympian gods, now is one for itself. Its self-alienation has reached such a degree that it can experience its own destruction as an aesthetic pleasure of the first order. This is the situation of politics which Fascism is rendering aesthetic. Communism responds by politicizing art.

Aesthetics Bad DA

AESTHETIC PERSPECTIVES REMOVE HUMANITY FROM THEIR IMAGES OF REALITY, INSTEAD FETISHIZING SPATIAL GRIDS- THIS DEPICTION OF REALITY IS THE QUINTESSENTIAL EXAMPLE OF MILITARY THINKING AND GUARANTEES IMPERIAL DOMINATION

VANDERBILT '3, (Tom, Writer and Author, War as Architecture,

<http://www.firstpulseprojects.net/vanderbilt.html>)

Art has been intricately intertwined with war at least since the days of Leonardo da Vinci whose drawings of siege engines and other commissions for the Borgias rival anything in his corpus in terms of technique and mastery. Those drawings, which in some cases presented fantastic new visions of what war could be, are echoed in the simulation programs the military now uses, created by partnerships involving the film and computer programming industries. Art can even be used in the conduct of war — e.g., it was recently revealed by a Spanish historian that a group of anarchists in Spain during the Civil War had employed specially designed cells, outfitted with surrealist decor inspired by Dali and Bunuel, for what they called "psycho-technic" torture; as *El País* described, "The avant garde forms of the moment — surrealism and geometric abstraction — were thus used for the aim of committing psychological torture." So too can architecture become a weapon, as revealed in a fascinating presentation (part of a panel entitled "Architecture, Violence, and Social (In)Security") by Eyal Weizman, a Tel Aviv-based architect. Weizman, detailing the spread of Israeli settlements in the West Bank, noted their "panopticon" like arrangement over neighboring Palestinian villages (usually at a lower elevation) as well as their linkage, in certain cases, by infrastructural devices (roads, tunnels) that bypass intervening zones of Palestinian autonomy. Thus the Israeli superhighway soars over Palestinian farmland, creating, as Weizman put it, "sovereignty in three dimensions." The landscape as a whole, as he put it, is "in effect an artificial arrangement of a totally synthetic environment, as designed as any built environment, within which all 'natural' elements like streams and mountains, forest orchards, rocks and ruins function not as the things being fought for but as the very weapons of the conflict." Weizman surveyed the architectural history of West Bank settlement, from the frontier like "tower and stockade" outposts of the 1930s, in which walled compounds were connected visually by tower reconnaissance and Morse Code; to the energetic campaign to colonize the mountaintops (so often containing the historical sites where Zionists hoped to return) in 1967. As Weizman noted, as there was little experience of building in the mountains, the "battle for the hilltops" began with an intensive aerial photography project; the West Bank became "the most photographed terrain in the world," — to the topographic groundwork for occupation and cultivation. His photos of settlements were haunting, capturing such bizarre imagery as the trompe l'oeil paintings of an idealized rural scene on a looming wall dividing Israelis from Palestinians. His images of stucco-and-tiled houses surrounded by walls and deserts eerily replicated Las Vegas suburbia (the American gated community represents a similar, if less overtly political, securitization of space). For Weizman, the land-use patterns — characterized by vast walls, barricades, even the planting of pine trees to forestall the planting of olive groves (by Palestinians) — amount to a military action, and he says architects should be prosecuted for war crimes. Weizman did not disagree when an audience member compared the settlements (a "postmodern diaspora," he called it, ad hoc nation-building) to some new version of the shtetl, the Jewish ghetto so ruthlessly and architecturally demarcated by the Nazis. The "two-state solution," Weizman concluded, "is a design solution that doesn't work." During the weeks of war coverage, it became typical to see a military analyst or general standing before an aerial photograph of Baghdad, pointer in hand, cataloging the damage done to a ministry building while its neighbors, in most cases, appeared remarkably intact (Michael Sorkin recently referred to this as a "good building/bad building" dichotomy)—no indication of casualties, no "on the ground" perspective. And yet how often have we seen this same presentation by architects and planners, this Olympian perspective of spatial rearrangement in which humans are absent or simply a statistical "user mix"? Listening to a number of presentations, it soon occurred to me, as I grew lost in the fog of architectural discourse, that much of what passes for the language of architecture — icy, jargon-laden, bolstered by reliance on dehumanized, abstract "spatial production" and other clinical terms — bears a certain resemblance to the language of modern military planning, with its "battlespace," "kill boxes," "network-centric warfighting operations," and the deck of cards depicting high ranking Iraqis as characters. What both of these languages, and both of these practices — which both involve the physical manipulation of human relations — neglect is the human equation, the people who live and die in these theorized constructs. When Bratton discussed the suicide bomber as the proponent of a "counter-habitation" of space, the act of bombing a "suspension of the premise of habitation itself," or when he described the World Trade Center attack as a form of architectural criticism, he was, beyond offering an implicit condonement, resorting to the spatial, strategic primacy of military thinking itself (suicide bombing victims would thus be "collateral damage" to act of counter-habitation), wherein there are no crimes, no victims. Bratton's formulation was of a symbolic piece with that influential Naval War College thesis, which bore the infamous title "Shock and Awe," with the lesser known subtitle, "Achieving Rapid Dominance." That document, which seeks the immediate control of the "operational environment," articulates its mantra thus: The goal of Rapid Dominance will be to destroy or so confound the will to resist that an adversary will have no alternative except to accept our strategic aims and military objectives."

Liberalism DA

(A) THE KRITIK'S UNDERSTANDING OF FREEDOM AS ONTOLOGICAL ENSURES FASCISM AND COLLAPSES POLITICAL FREEDOM

WOLIN '90, (Richard, Professor of Modern European Intellectual History, Rice, THE POLITICS OF BEING, 1990, p. 153)

consequently, the major problem with Heidegger's later philosophy is that the doctrine of Being, in its oppressive omnipotence, causes the conceptual space in which freedom can be meaningfully thought to all but disappear. In light of this fact, Jaspers' verdict concerning Heidegger's inability to grasp the nature of human freedom—"Heidegger doesn't know what freedom is"—becomes readily intelligible. For according to the theory of the "destining of Being," all the worldly events we experience undergo a prior, other-worldly, metaontological determination.

(B) THAT COLLAPSES VALUE TO LIFE

WOLIN '90, (Richard, Professor of Modern European Intellectual History, Rice, THE POLITICS OF BEING, p. 154)

The project of human freedom, incessantly belittled by "essential thinking," receives its inspiration from the conviction that "it is more honest, courageous, self-clairvoyant, hence a higher mode of life, to choose in lucidity than it is to hide one's choices behind the supposed structure of things." In this respect, the concept of freedom, as it has been handed down to us on the basis of the Greek ideal of autonomic or self-rule, represents an indispensable touchstone of the Western tradition: it has become a sine qua non for the ideal of a meaningful human existence. And thus, in a far from trivial sense, we view a life led under conditions of "unfreedom" as a life deprived of an essential prerequisite for the fulfillment of human potential. It would be a life bereft of those autonomous capacities of decision and choice on the basis of which alone we are able to identify and define our projects as our projects. We are of course simultaneously defined by a preexisting network of values, institutions, and belief-systems, which have themselves been shaped and handed-down by the members of a given community or group. Yet, it is our capacity to "choose in lucidity" as to which among these would endow our projects with direction and significance that forms the indispensable basis of a meaningful human life.

Pragmatic Epistemology Good

**(A) EVEN IF THE ALT'S GOALS ARE NOBLE, THEORY WILL BE IGNORED IN A VACUUM-
PRAGMATIC UTILITY SHOULD BE USED AS AN A PRIORI STANDARD FOR EVALUATING
KNOWLEDGE BECAUSE ONLY IT IS CAPABLE OF ACHIEVING ITS GOALS**

ISAAC '2 (Rudy, Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life at Indiana University, Bloomington, A pragmatist's progress?, Jeffrey C., p. 166-7)

If I am correct, then there is a reading of Rorty that brings him close to my historicist thesis. He seems to be saying that pragmatist philosophy can no longer be a public intellectual phenomenon, that the world has changed, and that there is no point in pretending that it hasn't. This aspect of Rorty strikes me as quite powerful. It offers a bracing critique of the pretensions of much academic activity, including much academic commentary about pragmatism, by challenging practitioners to clarify exactly how they imagine their ^{alistic} understanding of the character of public discourse in "postindustrial," "postmodern capitalist" societies like our own, in which things proceed very much on the surface. in which depth analysis and discursive argumentation seem to play little role in public affairs, and in which images, symbols, and (melodramatic) stories rather than arguments are what move people to action and, more typically, to inaction. Rorty is correct to insist upon the essentially private character of even the most practically oriented political theory, if we define "essentially" as "functionally" or "effectively." As good pragmatists, if we attend not so much to the intentions but to the consequences of our theoretical activity, it is hard to avoid Rorty's conclusion that it is impractical, has little effect, and fails to do what it purports to do.

Pragmatic Epistemology Good

(B) AND, HEIDEGGER'S PHILOSOPHY FAILS THE PRAGMATIC TEST- ITS APPLICATION TO PUBLIC POLICY CAN ONLY RESULT IN FASCISM- IT SHOULD BE REJECTED AS A POLITICAL METHODOLOGY

RORTY '89, (Richard, Prof. @ U of Virginia, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, pgs. 118-121)

Having drawn this analogy, I can now explain what is wrong with it, why I think Heidegger failed where Proust succeeded. Proust succeeded because he had no public ambitions – no reason to believe that the sound of the name “Guermantes” would mean anything to anybody but his narrator. If that same name does in fact have resonance for lots of people nowadays, that is just because reading Proust’s novel happens to have become, for those people, the same sort of thing which the walk *à côté de Guermantes* happened to become for Marcel – an experience which they need to redescribe, and thus to mesh with other experiences, if they are to succeed in their projects of self-creation. But Heidegger thought he knew some words which had, or should have had, resonance for *everybody* in modern Europe, words which were relevant not just to the fate of people who happen to have read a lot of philosophy books but to the public fate of the West. He was unable to believe that the words which meant so much to him – words like “Aristotle,” *physis*, “Parmenides,” *noien*, “Descartes,” and *substantia* – were just his own private equivalents of “Guermantes,” “Combray,” and “Gilberte.”

But that is, in fact, all they were. Heidegger was the greatest theoretical imagination of his time (outside the natural sciences); he achieved the sublimity he attempted. But this does not prevent his being entirely useless to people who do not share his associations. For people like me, who do share them, he is an exemplary, gigantic, unforgettable figure. Reading Heidegger has become one of the experiences with which we have to come to terms, to redescribe and make mesh with the rest of our experiences, in order to succeed in our own projects of self-creation. But Heidegger has no general public utility. To people who have never read, or read and were merely amused by, the attempts of metaphysicians like Plato and Kant to affiliate themselves with an

ahistorical power, ironist theory seems an absurd overreaction to an empty threat. Such people will find Heidegger’s *andenkendes Denken* no more urgent a project than Uncle Toby’s attempt to construct a model of the fortifications of Namur.

Heidegger thought that he could, by virtue of his acquaintance with certain books, pick out certain words which stood to all contemporary Europeans as Marcel’s litany of recollections stood to him. He could not. There is no such list of elementary words, no universal litany. The elementariness of elementary words, in Heidegger’s sense of “elementary,” is a private and idiosyncratic matter. The list of books which Heidegger read is no more central to Europe and its destiny than a lot of other lists of a lot of other books, and the concept of “the destiny of Europe” is, in any case, one we can do without. For this sort of historicist dramaturgy is just a further attempt to fend off thoughts of mortality with thoughts of affiliation and incarnation.²¹

Pragmatic Epistemology Good

Rorty continues in '89

Heidegger was quite right in saying that poetry shows what language can be when it is not a means to an end, but quite wrong in thinking that there could be a universal poem – something which combined the best features of philosophy and poetry, something which lay beyond both metaphysics and ironism. Phonemes *do* matter, but no one phoneme matters to very many people for very long. Heidegger's definition of "man" as "Being's poem" was a magnificent, but hopeless, attempt to save theory by poetizing it. But neither man in general nor Europe in particular has a destiny, nor does either stand to any larger-than-human figure as a poem stands to its author. Nor is ironist theory more than one of the great literary traditions of modern Europe – comparable to the modern novel in the greatness of the achievements which exemplify it, though far less relevant to politics, social hope, or human solidarity.

put forward a view about modern society, or the destiny of Europe, or contemporary politics, he becomes at best vapid, and at worst sadistic. When we read Heidegger as a philosophy professor who managed to transcend his own condition by using the names and the words of the great dead metaphysicians as elements of a personal litany, he is an immensely sympathetic figure. But as a philosopher of our public life, as a commentator on twentieth-century technology and politics, he is resentful, petty, squint-eyed, obsessive – and, at his occasional worst (as in his praise of Hitler after the Jews had been kicked out of the universities), cruel.

This claim repeats a suggestion I made at the end of the preceding chapter: that irony is of little public use, and that ironist theory is, if not exactly a contradiction in terms, at least so different from metaphysical theory as to be incapable of being judged in the same terms. Metaphysics hoped to bring together our private and our public lives by showing us that self-discovery and political utility could be united. It hoped to provide a final vocabulary which would not break apart into a private and a public portion. It hoped to be both beautiful on a small private scale and sublime on a large public one. Ironist theory ran its course in the attempt to achieve this same synthesis through narrative rather than system. But the attempt was hopeless.

Pragmatic Epistemology Good

Rorty continues in '89

the attempt was hopeless.

Metaphysicians like Plato and Marx thought they could show that once philosophical theory had led us from appearance to reality we would be in a better position to be useful to our fellow human beings. They both hoped that the public-private split, the distinction between duty to self and duty to others, could be overcome. Marxism has been the envy of all later intellectual movements because it seemed, for a moment, to show how to synthesize self-creation and social responsibility, pagan heroism and Christian love, the detachment of the contemplative with the fervor of the revolutionary.

On my account of ironist culture, such opposites can be combined in a life but not synthesized in a theory. We should stop looking for a successor to Marxism, for a theory which fuses decency and sublimity. Ironists should reconcile themselves to a private-public split within their final vocabularies, to the fact that resolution of doubts about one's final vocabulary has nothing in particular to do with attempts to save other people from pain and humiliation. Colligation and redescription of the little things that are important to one – even if those little things are philosophy books – will not result in an understanding of anything larger than oneself, anything like “Europe” or “history.” We should stop trying to combine self-creation and politics, especially if we are liberals. The part of a liberal ironist’s final vocabulary which has to do with public action is never going to get subsumed under, or subsume, the rest of her final vocabulary. I shall claim in Chapter 8 that liberal political discourse would do well to remain as untheoretical and simpleminded as it looks (and as Orwell thought it), no matter how sophisticated the discourse of self-creation becomes.

Heidegger = Nazi

(A) HEIDEGGER'S THOUGHT IS DEEPLY AUTHORITARIAN AND CEMENTS FASCISM

KAUFTNANN '80, (Walter, Princeton philosopher, DISCOVERING THE MIND: NIETZSCHE, HEIDEGGER, AND BUBER, p. 189)

Heidegger's thinking is deeply authoritarian. His insistence that he was engaged in existential ontology or fundamental ontology as well as the proliferation of strange labels helped to immunize his discourse against the obvious charge that it was absurdly dogmatic and apodictic. Any appeal to evidence or rival observations and interpretations was discounted in advance. So was empirical research as a matter of principle. All this is as different from Nietzsche as can be and, of course, also from Goethe. Heidegger, like Kant, did not admit hypotheses into philosophy, demanded certainty, and purchased the semblance of it through extreme obscurity.

(B) IT WASN'T A PERSONAL FAILING- HEIDEGGER'S NAZISM IS INTRINSIC TO HIS THOUGHT

ZIMMERMAN '93, (Michael, Professor of Philosophy, Tulane, ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS, Fall 1993, p.203-4)

In assessing the suitability of calling Heidegger a fore runner of their movement, deep ecologists should recall that he used his own philosophy to support National Socialism, and in a manner that was more enduring and profound than his self-justifying postwar statements would suggest. Indeed, he continued to speak well of that movement more than twenty years after World War II. His affiliation with Nazism cannot be explained as a personal failure, for he believed that the movement's "inner truth and greatness" was consistent with his own critical view of modernity. He regarded democracy, capitalism, socialism, scientific rationalism, consumerism, and "progressive" views of history in general as the culmination of Europe's long decline from its glorious beginning in ancient Greece. For him, National Socialism was an effort to counter modern progress, which he viewed as a degenerate, nihilistic process that was devastating the Earth and darkening the world. To restore the rank, order, and distinctions obliterated by industrial modernity, a radical revolution was needed, a "second beginning" equal in power to the beginning initiated by the ancient Greeks. Jettisoning ethical standards consistent with the Jewish, Christian, socialist, and liberal democratic traditions, he had no moral basis for challenging the decisions made by those who portrayed themselves as the gods' forerunners. Unfortunately, those people later turned out to be mass murderers. By the late 1930s, he concluded that the historical form taken by National Socialism, including its crude naturalistic, biological, and racist views, was another expression of technological modernity, but he never abandoned his conviction that there was a great potential at the core of the movement.