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## Heidegger INC

The problem-solution mindset of the Affirmative locks us into a world of technological doom. As we search for solutions we simply cause more problems.

LaDelle McWhorter, Professor of Philosophy at Northeast Missouri State, 1992, *Heidegger and the Earth*, ed: McWhorter.

What is most illustrative is often also what is most common. Today, on all sides of ecological debate we hear, with greater and greater frequency, the word management. On the one hand, business people want to manage natural resources so as to keep up profits. On the other hand, conservationists want to manage natural resources so that there will be plenty of coal and oil and recreational facilities for future generations. These groups and factions within them debate vociferously over which management policies are the best, that is, the most efficient and manageable. Radical environmentalists damn both groups and claim it is human population growth and rising expectations that are in need of management. But wherever we look, wherever we listen, we see and hear the term management. We are living in a veritable age of management. Before a middle class child graduates from high school she or he is already preliminarily trained in the arts of weight management, stress management, and time management, to name just a few. As we approach middle age we continue to practice these essential arts, refining and adapting our regulatory regimes as the pressures of life increase and the body begins to break down. We have become a society of managers - of our homes, careers, portfolios, estates, even of our own bodies - so is it surprising that we set ourselves up as the managers of the earth itself? And yet, as thoughtful earth-dwellers we must ask, what does this signify? In numerous essays - in particular the beautiful 1953 essay, "The Question Concerning Technology" - Heidegger speaks of what he sees as the danger of dangers in this, our age. This danger is a kind of forgetfulness - a forgetfulness that Heidegger thought could result not only in nuclear disaster or environmental catastrophe, but in the loss of what makes us the kind of beings we are, beings who can think and who can stand in thoughtful relationship to things. This forgetfulness is not a forgetting of facts and their relationships; it is a forgetfulness of something far more important and far more fundamental than that. He called it forgetfulness of 'the mystery.' It would be easy to imagine that by 'the mystery' Heidegger means some sort of entity, some thing, temporarily hidden or permanently ineffable. But 'the mystery' is not the name of some thing; it is the event of the occurring together of revealing and concealing. Every academic discipline, whether it be biology or history, anthropology or mathematics, is interested in discovery, in the 'revelation of new truths' Knowledge, at least as it is institutionalized in the modern world is concerned, then, with what Heidegger would call revealing, the bringing to light, or the coming to presence of things. However, in order for any of this revealing to occur, Heidegger says, concealing must also occur. Revealing and concealing belong together. Now, what does this mean? We know that in order to pay attention to one thing, we must stop paying close attention to something else. In order to read philosophy we must stop reading cereal boxes. In order to attend to the needs of students we must sacrifice some of our research time. Allowing for one thing to reveal itself means allowing for the concealing of something else. All revealing comes at the price of concomitant concealment. But this is more than just a kind of Kantian acknowledgment of human limitation. Heidegger is not simply dressing up the obvious, that is, the fact that no individual can undergo two different experiences simultaneously His is not a point about human subjectivity at all. Rather, it is a point about revealing itself. When revealing reveals itself as temporally linear and causally ordered, for example, it cannot simultaneously reveal itself as ordered by song and unfolding dream. Furthermore, in revealing, revealing itself is concealed in order for what is revealed to come forth. Thus, when revealing occurs concealing occurs as well. The two events are one and cannot be separated. Too often we forget. The radiance of revelation blinds us both to its own event and to the shadows that it casts, so that revealing conceals itself and its self-concealing conceals itself, and we fall prey to that strange power of vision to consign to oblivion whatever cannot be seen. Even our forgetting is forgotten, and all races of absence absent themselves from our world. The noted physicist Stephen Hawking, in his popular book A Brief History of Time, writes, "The eventual goal of science is to provide a single theory that describes the whole universe."<sup>5</sup> Such a theory, many people would assert, would be a systematic arrangement of all knowledge both already acquired and theoretically possible. It would be a theory to end all theories, outside of which no information, no revelation could, or would need to, occur. And the advent of such a theory would be as the shining of a light into every corner of being. Nothing would remain concealed.



# Heidegger INC



This dream of Hawking's is a dream of power; in fact, it is a dream of absolute power, absolute control. It is a dream of the ultimate managerial utopia. This, Heidegger would contend, is the dream of technological thought in the modern age. We dream of knowing, grasping everything, for then we can control, then we can manage, everything. But it is only a dream, itself predicated, ironically enough, upon concealment, the self-concealing of the mystery. We can never control-the mystery the belonging together of revealing and concealing. In order to approach the world in a manner exclusively technological, calculative, mathematical, scientific, we must already have given up (or lost, or been expelled by, or perhaps ways of being such as we are even impossible within) other approaches or modes of revealing that would unfold into knowledges of other sorts. Those other approaches or paths of thinking must already have been obliterated; those other knowledges must already have concealed themselves in order for technological or scientific revelation to occur. The danger of a managerial approach to the world lies not then in what it knows nor in its planetary on into the secrets of galactic emergence or nuclear fission – but in what it forgets, what it itself conceals. It forgets that any other truths are possible, and it forgets that the belonging together of revealing with concealing is forever beyond the power of human management. We can never have, or know, it all; we can never manage everything.

(2)

# Heidegger INC

The affirmative's interventionist mindset is the root cause of environmental catastrophe. The need for ceaseless interventions is motivated by guilt for the status quo and merely recreates environmental problems

LaDelle McWhorter, Professor of Philosophy at Northeast Missouri State, 1992, Heidegger and the Earth, ed: McWhorter.

Thinking today must concern itself with the earth. Wherever we turn on newsstands, on the airwaves, and in even the most casual of conversations everywhere - we are inundated by predictions of ecological catastrophe and omnicidal doom. And many of these predictions bear themselves out in our own experience. We now live with the ugly, painful, and impoverishing consequences of decades of technological innovation and expansion without restraint of at least a century of disastrous "natural resource management" policies, and of more than two centuries of virtually unchecked industrial pollution - consequences that include the fact that millions of us on any given day are suffering, many of us dying of diseases and malnutrition that are the results of humanly produced ecological devastation; the fact that thousands of species now in existence will no longer exist on this planet by the turn of the century; the fact that our planet's climate has been altered, probably irreversibly, by the carbon dioxide and chlorofluorocarbons we have heedlessly poured into our atmosphere; and the mind-boggling fact that it may now be within humanity's Power to destroy all life on this globe. Our usual response to such prophecies of doom is to ignore them or, when we cannot do that, to scramble to find some way to manage our problems, some quick solution, some technological fix. But over and over again new resource management techniques, new solutions, new technologies disrupt delicate systems even further, doing still more damage to a planet already dangerously out of ecological balance. Our ceaseless interventions seem only to make things worse, to perpetuate a cycle of human activity followed by ecological disaster followed by human intervention followed by a new disaster of another kind. In fact, it would appear that our trying to do things, change things, fix things cannot be the solution, because it is part of the problem itself. But, if we cannot act to solve our problems, what should we do?

# Heidegger INC.

To change ~~the~~ the state of technological domination  
we must undergo self-transformation, when  
we reject our managerial desire for purity we  
can stop labeling and controlling.

LaDelle McWhorter, Professor of Philosophy at Northeast Missouri State, 1992, "Asceticism/askēsis : Foucault's thinking historical subjectivity" in *Ethics and Danger: Essays on Heidegger and Continental Thought*.


The ascetic self, then, undergoes changes as the process intensifies, becoming more powerful perhaps and ever more rigidly defined. The ascetic self is subjected and subjectified by the processes of purification that posit its ever more carefully delineated identity core. The ascetic self en-selves itself by enforcing the continued stability of the identity it seeks to be. Asceticism is a powerfully paradoxical drive for constant self-transformation toward a perfect stasis in a pure unity of self-identical repose. Foucault's *askesis* bears great resemblance to the movement of self-transformative ascetic drives. The ascetic self's drive to know itself is certainly apparent in Foucault. And there is a sense in which in Foucault we encounter a kind of truth, a truth that the self is not self-identical but rather that it is an amalgamation of disparate forms. The ascetic self, upon encountering that "truth," upon acceding to the plausibility of genealogical accounts, begins, predictably enough, to discipline itself to that self-knowledge, to bring itself into intellectual conformity with that truth. But when the drive to purify confronts the "truth" of its own impurity, when it runs headlong into the contradictory project of attempting to pare itself down to its fundamental multiplicity, ascetic selfhood begins to undergo the self-transforming power of Foucault's discourse, and the valences that held themselves in tension to produce the notion of a perfect unity, of some enduring Same, must necessarily shift. The thought of self in the center of Foucault's discourse is the thought of transgression, a reversal of forces, a gradual or perhaps violent turning outward of the valences before turned in, like fingers pulling loose from a stone they have gripped too hard for too long. It will be necessary to find a different way to speak: When there occurs the undergoing of the genealogical stripping away of the argumentative and commonsense forces sustaining belief in the unitary self, when there occurs the undergoing of the exposure of the fearful and nonrational drives that put those beliefs in place, there may occur a kind of death of the ahistorical self, just as, in Nietzsche's discourse, when there occurs the undergoing of the exposure of the ungodliness that supported gods, there occurs a kind of death of the ahistorical God. As the thought of God loses its power to shape a world, the thought of a unitary self-identity begins to lose its power to shape a life. And what then? Will human being simply fly apart? Will we all go stark raving mad? Will might equal right and society degenerate into a war of all against all? Perhaps. But why should it come that? Selfishness would be a strange thing in a discourse that did not insist upon the unity of self-identical selves. Perhaps, as Nietzsche says, morality and evil are Siamese twins. Foucault's discourse, then, like ascetic discourses, is a self-transformative exercise. It is an *askesis* that allows the powers of ascetic selfhood to bring themselves to bear in characteristic ways. But because Foucault's discourse draws asceticism to focus its self-transformative power on the drive for purification itself, ascetic selfhood finds itself in question. Not only does self-transformation occur here, but there is within the discourse an awareness of this transformative power and an allowance of it as opposed to a denial or an attempt at masterful control. Thus, like ascetic discourses, Foucault's is a discourse that transforms itself; but it transforms itself from an active production of an agent-subject to a process of self-overcoming that opens possibilities for movements of differing rather than the continued movement of purification that is an insistence upon the identity of the same. Yes, Foucault's discourse begins as and in some ways may be read as remaining an ascetic discourse. It draws its energy from its ascetic lineage and past. But within Foucault's discourse ascetic selfhood cannot maintain control of the direction of its own forceful drives. Thus, as Foucault's discourse operates upon the forces at its own discursive center, something other to asceticism may begin to emerge, something we ascetic selves are not able to name, something that will resist the ascetic drive to label and identify, but something the undergoing of which may be either beautiful or terrible or both but which will definitely be—to use a Nietzschean word—interesting.

## 2 NC LINK

The affirmative subscribes to the idea that the entire world is able to be managed by humanity – not only is this assumption flawed, it limits out crucial sources of knowledge that are key to solvency. Only rethinking our place in the world can solve.

LaDelle McWhorter, Professor of Philosophy at Northeast Missouri State, 1992, *Heidegger and the Earth*, ed: McWhorter.

What is most illustrative is often also what is most common. Today, on all sides of ecological debate we hear, with greater and greater frequency, the word management. On the one hand, business people want to manage natural resources so as to keep up profits. On the other hand, conservationists want to manage natural resources so that there will be plenty of coal and oil and recreational facilities for future generations. These groups and factions within them debate vociferously over which management policies are the best, that is, the most efficient and manageable. Radical environmentalists damn both groups and claim it is human population growth and rising expectations that are in need of management. But wherever we look, wherever we listen, we see and hear the term management. We are living in a veritable age of management. Before a middle class child graduates from high school she or he is already preliminarily trained in the arts of weight management, stress management, and time management, to name just a few. As we approach middle age we continue to practice these essential arts, refining and adapting our regulatory regimes as the pressures of life increase and the body begins to break down. We have become a society of managers - of our homes, careers, portfolios, estates, even of our own bodies - so is it surprising that we set ourselves up as the managers of the earth itself? And yet, as thoughtful earth-dwellers we must ask, what does this signify? In numerous essays - in particular the beautiful 1953 essay, "The Question Concerning Technology" - Heidegger speaks of what he sees as the danger of dangers in this, our age. This danger is a kind of forgetfulness – a forgetfulness that Heidegger thought could result not only in nuclear disaster or environmental catastrophe, but in the loss of what makes us the kind of beings we are, beings who can think and who can stand in thoughtful relationship to things. This forgetfulness is not a forgetting of facts and their relationships; it is a forgetfulness of something far more important and far more fundamental than that. He called it forgetfulness of 'the mystery.' It would be easy to imagine that by 'the mystery' Heidegger means some sort of entity, some thing, temporarily hidden or permanently ineffable. But the mystery is not the name of some thing; it is the event of the occurring together of revealing and concealing. Every academic discipline, whether it be biology or history, anthropology or mathematics, is interested in discovery, in the 'revelation of new truths' Knowledge, at least as it is institutionalized in the modern world is concerned, then, with what Heidegger would call



# 2NC LINK



[Continues, no break]

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## ZNC ALT

The affirmative's interventionist mindset is the root cause of environmental degradation – only stepping back and rethinking solves.

LaDelle McWhorter, Professor of Philosophy at Northeast Missouri State, 1992, *Heidegger and the Earth*, ed: McWhorter.

Thinking today must concern itself with the earth. Wherever we turn on newsstands, on the airwaves, and in even the most casual of conversations everywhere - we are inundated by predictions of ecological catastrophe and omnicidal doom. And many of these predictions bear themselves out in our own experience. We now live with the ugly, painful, and impoverishing consequences of decades of technological innovation and expansion without restraint of at least a century of disastrous "natural resource management" policies, and of more than two centuries of virtually unchecked industrial pollution - consequences that include the fact that millions of us on any given day are suffering, many of us dying of diseases and malnutrition that are the results of humanly produced ecological devastation; the fact that thousands of species now in existence will no longer exist on this planet by the turn of the century; the fact that our planet's climate has been altered, probably irreversibly, by the carbon dioxide and chlorofluorocarbons we have heedlessly poured into our atmosphere; and the mind-boggling fact that it may now be within humanity's Power to destroy all life on this globe. Our usual response to such prophecies of doom is to ignore them or, when we cannot do that, to scramble to find some way to manage our problems, some quick solution, some technological fix. But over and over again new resource management techniques, new solutions, new technologies disrupt delicate systems even further, doing still more damage to a planet already dangerously out of ecological balance. Our ceaseless interventions seem only to make things worse, to perpetuate a cycle of human activity followed by ecological disaster followed by human intervention followed by a new disaster of another kind. In fact, it would appear that our trying to do things, change things, fix things cannot be the solution, because it is part of the problem itself. But, if we cannot act to solve our problems, what should we do?

## 2 NC IMPACT

**Technological thinking is inevitable; human's life enslaved to technology is far worse than the threat of the bomb**

Martin Heidegger 1959, 20<sup>th</sup> century philosopher, *Discourse on Thinking*, trans. From *Gelassenheit* by John M. Anderson and E. Hans Freund, 1966 [pp. 49-51] [Emphasis Added]

If the taming of atomic energy is successful, and it will be successful, then a totally new era-of technical development will begin. What we know now as the technology of film and television, of transportation and especially air transportation, of news reporting, and as medical and nutritional technology, is presumably only a crude start. No one can foresee the radical changes to come. But technological advance will move faster and faster and can never be stopped. In all areas of his existence, man will be en- circled ever more tightly by the forces of technology. These forces, which everywhere and every minute claim, enchain, drag along, press and impose upon man under the form of some technical contrivance or other-these forces, since man has not made them, have moved long since beyond his will and have outgrown his capacity for decision. But this too is characteristic of the new world of technology, that its accomplishments come most speedily to be known and publicly admired. Thus today everyone will be able to read what this talk says about technology in any competently managed picture magazine or hear it on the radio. But-it is one thing to have heard and read some- thing, that is, merely to take notice; it is another thing to understand what we have heard and read, that is, to ponder. The international meeting of Nobel Prize winners took place again in the summer of this year of 1955 in Lindau. There the American chemist, Stanley, had this to say: "The hour is near when life will be placed in the hands of the chemist who will be able to synthesize, split and change living substance at will." We take notice of such a statement. We even marvel at the daring of scientific re- search, without thinking about it. We do not stop to consider that an attack with technological means is being pre- pared upon the life and nature of man compared with which the explosion of the hydrogen bomb means little. For precisely if the hydrogen bombs do not explode and human life on earth is preserved, an uncanny change in the world moves upon us. Yet it is not that the world is becoming entirely technical which is really uncanny. Far more uncanny is our being unprepared for this transformation, our inability to con- front meditatively what is really dawning in this age. No single, man, no group of men, no commission of prominent statesmen, scientists, and technicians, no conference of leaders of commerce and industry, can brake or direct the progress of history in the atomic age. No merely human organization is capable of gaining dominion over it.

## 2NC—Must Rethink Relationship to us and earth

The rhetoric of the ecological movement is saturated with disaster imagery and calls for immediate action in the face of extinction. However, this managerial approach is emblematic of the very technological worldview that placed the earth in its current position. In order to temper our insatiable will to action, we must embark a journey of thought in order to rethink our relationship our selves and the earth.

LaDelle McWhorter, Professor of Philosophy at Northeast Missouri State, 1992, *Heidegger and the Earth*, ed: McWhorter.

When we attempt to think ecologically and within Heidegger's discourse (or perhaps better: when we attempt to think Heideggerly within ecological concerns), the paradoxical unfolds at the site of the question of human action. Thinking ecologically - that is, thinking the earth in our time - means thinking death; it means thinking catastrophe; it means thinking the possibility of utter annihilation not just for human being but for all that lives on this planet and for the living planet itself. Thinking the earth in our time means thinking what presents itself as that which must not be allowed to go on, as that which must be controlled, as that which must be stopped. Such thinking seems to call for immediate action. There is no time to lose. We must work for change, seek solutions, curb appetites, reduce expectations, find cures now, before the problems become greater than anyone's ability to solve them - if they have not already done so. However, in the midst of this urgency, thinking ecologically, thinking Heideggerly, means rethinking the very notion of human action. It means placing in question our typical Western managerial approach to problems, our propensity for technological intervention, our belief in human cognitive power, our commitment to a metaphysics that places active human being over against passive nature. For it is the thoughtless deployment of these approaches and notions that has brought us to the point of ecological catastrophe in the first place. Thinking with Heidegger, thinking Heideggerly and ecologically, means, paradoxically, acting to place in question the acting subject, willing a displacing of our will to action; it means calling ourselves as selves to rethink our very selves, insofar as selfhood in the West is constituted as agent, as actor, as controlling ego, as knowing consciousness. Heidegger's work calls us not to rush in with quick solutions, not to act decisively to put an end to deliberation, but rather to think, to tarry with thinking unfolding itself to release ourselves to thinking without provision or predetermined aim.

## Tech → Calculation

The affirmative's endorsement of technology endorses a calculative worldview

Michael E. Zimmerman, Professor of Philosophy at Tulane University, 1990, *Heidegger's Confrontation with Modernity*, NetLibrary [BB]

For modern commercial-technological humanity, nothing is "sacred." Everything has its price; everything can be calculated and evaluated according to the economic interests of someone or other. In the pre-technological era, when humanity still felt itself to be a part of the world instead of its master, people had to adapt themselves to the natural order as best they could. Even medieval humanity, to be sure, projected a certain order onto the world, but at least that "order" was believed to have been created and sustained by God—not by humans. The old-fashioned view that people must adapt themselves to the pre-existing order of things may be discerned in the objection which many people made in regard to the first airplanes: "If God had intended us to fly, He would have given us wings!" In the technological age, however, instead of conforming to the natural order, people force nature to conform to their needs and expectations. Whenever nature proves unsatisfactory for human purposes, people reframe it as they see fit. For Heidegger, such technological "reframing" compels entities to be revealed in inappropriate ways. The "factory farm," for example, treats corn and cattle as if they were merely complex machines, not living things. Such reframing, however, is a necessary consequence of the economic imperatives of the food industry.

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## Calculative Thinking Bad

Calculative thinking is an endless cycle calculation that neglects meaning in order to fashion specific results

Martin Heidegger 1959, 20<sup>th</sup> century philosopher, *Discourse on Thinking*, trans. From *Gelassenheit* by John M. Anderson and E. Hans Freund, 1966 [pp. 45, 46] [Emphasis Added]

The growing thoughtlessness must, therefore, spring from some process that gnaws at the very marrow of man today: man today is in flight from thinking. This flight- from-thought is the ground of thoughtlessness. But part of this flight is that man will neither see nor admit it. Man today will even flatly deny this flight from thinking. He will assert the opposite. He will say-and quite rightly- that there were at no time such far-reaching plans, so many inquiries in so many areas, research carried on as passionately as today. Of course. And this display of ingenuity deliberation has its own great usefulness. Such thought remains indispensable. But-it also remains true that it is thinking of a special kind.

Its peculiarity consists in the fact that whenever we plan, research, and organize, we always reckon with conditions that are given. We take them into account with the calculated intention of their serving specific purposes. Thus we can count on definite results. This calculation is the mark of all thinking that plans and investigates. Such thinking remains calculation even if it neither works with numbers nor uses an adding machine or computer. Calculative thinking computes. It computes ever new, ever more promising and at the same time more economical possibilities. Calculative thinking races from one prospect to the next. Calculative thinking never stops, never collects itself. Calculative thinking is not meditative thinking, not thinking which contemplates the meaning which reigns in everything that is.

## Relationship to Technology → Standing Reserve

To see the earth as a vector to procure alternative energy makes human's relationship to earth ruled by the prospect of furthering modern technology and industry

Martin Heidegger 1959, 20<sup>th</sup> century philosopher, *Discourse on Thinking*, trans. From *Gelassenheit* by John M. Anderson and E. Hans Freund, 1966 [pp. 49-51] [Emphasis Added]

The age that is now beginning has been called of late atomic age. Its most conspicuous symbol is the atom bomb. But this symbolizes only the obvious; for it was recognized at once that atomic energy can be used also for peaceful purposes. Nuclear physicists everywhere are busy with vast plans to implement the peaceful uses of atomic energy. The great industrial corporations of the leading countries, first of all England, have figured out already that atomic energy can develop into a gigantic business. Through this atomic business a new era of happiness is envisioned. Nuclear science, too, does not stand idly by. It publicly proclaims this era of happiness. Thus in July of this year at Lake Constance, eighteen Nobel Prize winners stated in a proclamation: "Science [and that is modern natural science] is a road to a happier human life." What is the sense of this statement? Does it spring from reflection? Does it ever ponder on the meaning of the atomic age? No For if we rest content with this statement of science, we remain as far as possible from a reflective insight into our age. Why? Because we forget to ponder. Because we forget to ask: 'What is the ground that enabled modern technology to discover and set free new energies in nature?' This is due to a revolution in leading concepts which has been going on for the past several centuries, and by which man is placed in a different world. This radical revolution in outlook has come about in modern philosophy. From this arises a completely new relation of man to the world and his place in it. The world now appears as an object open to the attacks of calculative thought, attacks that nothing is believed able any longer to resist. Nature be- comes a gigantic gasoline station, an energy source for modern technology and industry. This relation of man, to the world as such, in principle a technical one, developed in the seventeenth century first and only in Europe. It long remained unknown in other continents, and it was al- together alien to former ages and histories. The power concealed in modern technology determines the relation of man to that which exists. It rules the whole earth. Indeed, already man is beginning to advance beyond the earth into outer space. In not quite twenty years, such gigantic sources of power have become known through the discovery of atomic energy that in the foreseeable future the world's demands for energy of any kind will be ensured forever. Soon the procurement of the new energies will no longer be tied to certain countries and continents, as is the occurrence of coal, oil, and timber. In the foreseeable future it will be possible to build atomic power stations anywhere on earth. Thus the decisive question of science and technology to-day is no longer: 'Where do we find sufficient quantities of fuel? The decisive question now runs: In what way can we tame and direct the unimaginably vast amounts of atomic energies, and so secure mankind against the danger that these gigantic energies suddenly-even without military actions-break out somewhere, "run away" and destroy everything?

# IN-ROUND CHANGE KEY

Traditional debate is inadequate, simply accepting current circumstances as fixed shuts out the possibility of change, imagining a "new world" in this round is crucial and becomes the focal point of change

Graeber, professor in the anthropology department at Goldsmiths College, University of London, in *Fragments of an Anarchist Anthropology*, 2004, ~~introduces~~

So in this case, the question becomes: What sort of social theory would actually be of interest to those who are trying to help bring about a world in which people are free to govern their own affairs? This is what this pamphlet is mainly about. For starters, I would say any such theory would have to begin with some initial assumptions. Not many. Probably just two. First, it would have to proceed from the assumption that, as the Brazilian folk song puts it, "another world is possible." That institutions like the state, capitalism, racism and male dominance are not inevitable; that it would be possible to have a world in which these things would not exist, and that we'd all be better off as a result. To commit oneself to such a principle is almost an act of faith, since how can one have certain knowledge of such matters? It might possibly turn out that such a world is *not* possible. But one could also make the argument that it's this very unavailability of absolute knowledge which makes a commitment to optimism a moral imperative: Since one cannot know a radically better world is not possible, are we not betraying everyone by insisting on continuing to justify, and reproduce, the mess we have today? And anyway, even if we're wrong, we might well get a lot closer. manifesto): Here of course one has to deal with the inevitable objection: that utopianism has lead to unmitigated horror, as Stalinists, Maoists, and other idealists tried to carve society into impossible shapes, killing millions in the process. This argument belies a fundamental misconception: that imagining better worlds was itself the problem. Stalinists and their ilk did not kill because they dreamed great dreams—actually, Stalinists were famous for being rather short on imagination—but because they mistook their dreams for scientific certainties. This led them to feel they had a right to impose their visions through a machinery of violence. Anarchists are proposing nothing of the sort, on either count. They presume no inevitable course of history and one can never further the course of freedom by creating new forms of coercion. In fact all forms of systemic violence are (among other things) assaults on the role of the imagination as a political principle, and the only way to begin to think about eliminating systematic violence is by recognizing this. And of course one could write very long books about the atrocities throughout history carried out by cynics and other pessimists... So that's the first proposition.

## IN-ROUND CHANGE KEY

Our job as intellectuals in the setting of debate is not to prescribe action but rather to contribute to debate with ideas as to what alternative action to solve may be

~~expecting our ideas to be followed while hoping for change~~ David Graeber Fragments of an Anarchist Anthropology, 2004, ~~once more shows us the alternative~~

"any anarchist social theory would have to reject self-consciously any trace of vanguardism. The role of intellectuals is most definitively not to form an elite that can arrive at the correct strategic analyses and then lead the masses to follow[....]One obvious role for a radical intellectual is to do precisely that: to look at those who are creating viable alternatives, try to figure out what might be the larger implications of what they are (already) doing, and then offer those ideas back, not as prescriptions, but as contributions, possibilities—as gifts."

This year's resolution calls for an alternative energy policy. The aff highlights the energy policy while ignoring the call for alternatives, largely missing the point. It is time to reject the mantle of the traditional intellectual and assume that of the activist. We must seek for true alternatives. True alternatives, those which challenge the traditional agenda be they ecological

or institutional and reject coercive actions are the true paths.

# IN-ROUND CHANGE KEY

Restructuring of society starts in places like this debate round. If we continue to challenge the authority of the state and corporate apex, we can construct a society of balanced communities between humanity and nature.

Murray Bookchin, political and social philosopher, and Dave Foreman, environmentalist and co-founder of Earth First!, Introduction by Steve Chase, editor, Forward by David Levine, 1991, *Defending the Earth: A Dialogue Between Murray Bookchin and Dave Foreman*, pg. 100-1

Over the last few decades, demands for local community control have yielded a multitude of block associations, tenants' groups, alternative institutions, neighborhood alliances and multiracial citizen action groups. The town meeting, or citizens assembly, initially a New England institution, is becoming a byword in regions of the United States that have no shared tradition with the Northeast. Community action groups have also begun to enter into local politics, a terrain that was once the exclusive preserve of elite party machines. They are doing this on a scale that is beginning to affect municipal policymaking. Grassroots politics, specifically popular municipal politics, is becoming an integral part of U.S. politics as a whole. While it has yet to find a coherent voice and a clear sense of direction, I hope it is here to stay and will work its way, however confusedly, into the real world of the political landscape. Put bluntly, a latent dual power must emerge in which the local base of society begins to challenge the authority of its seemingly invulnerable state and corporate apex. I think we can develop such a tendency in North America today. I think it possible – if a highly conscious, well-organized, and programmatically coherent libertarian municipalist movement develops in the next decade – for the people to reconstruct society along lines that could foster a balanced, well-rounded, and harmonious community of interests among each other and between humanity and nature. Such an approach is not a utopian dream; it is an urgently needed strategy for our own time. Bewuse of automation, the flight of capital and the emerging global division of labor, a number of U.S. cities and towns have been transformed in the eyes of corporate and government elites from sites for maintaining essential "human resources" into a dumping ground for superfluous "human waste" To varying degrees, cities like New York, Detroit, and St. Louis have been set adrift by the corporations and the state. They have been abandoned to their squalor and to a leprous process of decay. Not surprisingly, given our country's racist history, people of color comprise residential majorities in many of these cities. Owing to the decline of municipal services in these largely abandoned cities, a vacuum is developing between the traditional institutions that managed the city and the urban population itself. Understaffed and underfunded municipal agencies can no longer pretend to adequately meet such basic needs as sanitation, education, health, and public safety. An eerie municipal "no man's land" is emerging between the traditional, decaying institutional apparatus of these cities and the people it professes to serve.

In order to rid the world of systems of domination one must embrace that a better world is possible  
David Graeber, professor in the anthropology department at Goldsmiths College, University of London, Fragments of an Anarchist Anthropology, 2004

So in this case, the question becomes: What sort of social theory would actually be of interest to those who are trying to help bring about a world in which people are free to govern their own affairs? This is what this pamphlet is mainly about. For starters, I would say any such theory would have to begin with some initial assumptions. Not many. Probably just two. First, it would have to proceed from the assumption that, as the Brazilian folk song puts it, "another world is possible." That institutions like the state, capitalism, racism and male dominance are not inevitable; that it would be possible to have a world in which these things would not exist, and that we'd all be better off as a result. To commit oneself to such a principle is almost an act of faith, since how can one have certain knowledge of such matters? It might possibly turn out that such a world is *not* possible. But one could also make the argument that it's this very unavailability of absolute knowledge which makes a commitment to optimism a moral imperative: Since one cannot know a radically better world is not possible, are we not betraying everyone by insisting on continuing to justify, and reproduce, the mess we have today? And anyway, even if we're wrong, we might well get a lot closer. manifesto): Here of course one has to deal with the inevitable objection: that utopianism has lead to unmitigated horror, as Stalinists, Maoists, and other idealists tried to carve society into impossible shapes, killing millions in the process. This argument belies a fundamental misconception: that imagining better worlds was itself the problem. Stalinists and their ilk did not kill because they dreamed great dreams—actually, Stalinists were famous for being rather short on imagination—but because they mistook their dreams for scientific certainties. This led them to feel they had a right to impose their visions through a machinery of violence. Anarchists are proposing nothing of the sort, on either count. They presume no inevitable course of history and one can never further the course of freedom by creating new forms of coercion. In fact all forms of systemic violence are (among other things) assaults on the role of the imagination as a political principle, and the only way to begin to think about eliminating systematic violence is by recognizing this. And of course one could write very long books about the atrocities throughout history carried out by cynics and other pessimists... So that's the first proposition. The second, I'd say, is that any anarchist social theory would have to reject self-consciously any trace of vanguardism. The role of intellectuals is most definitively not to form an elite that can arrive at the correct strategic analyses and then lead the masses to follow. But if not that, what? This is one reason I'm calling this essay "Fragments of an Anarchist Anthropology"—because this is one area where I think anthropology is particularly well positioned to help. And not only because most actually-existing self-governing communities, and actually-existing non-Davidet economies in the world have been investigated by anthropologists rather than sociologists or historians. It is also because the practice of ethnography provides at least something of a model, if a very rough, incipient model, of how nonvanguardist revolutionary intellectual practice might work. When one carries out an ethnography, one observes what people do, and then tries to tease out the hidden symbolic, moral, or pragmatic logics that underlie their actions; one tries to get at the way people's habits and actions makes sense in ways that they are not themselves completely aware of. One obvious role for a radical intellectual is to do precisely that: to look at those who are creating viable alternatives, try to figure out what might be the larger implications of what they are (already) doing, and then offer those ideas back, not as prescriptions, but as contributions, possibilities—as gifts. This is more or less what I was trying to do a few paragraphs ago when I suggested that social theory could refashion itself in the manner of direct democratic process. And as that example makes clear, such a project would actually have to have two aspects, or moments if you like: one ethnographic, one utopian, suspended in a constant dialogue.

Criticism through intellectual debate is an alternative to the dominating power structures that exist today.

Immanuel Wallerstein, U.S. Sociologist, A Movement of Movements: Is Another World Really Possible? Page 271 Edited by Tom Mertes, 2004

If, as I have argued elsewhere, the modern world-system is in structural crisis, and we have entered an 'age of transition'—a period of bifurcation and chaos—then it is clear that the issues confronting antisystemic movements pose themselves in a very different fashion than those of the nineteenth and most of the twentieth centuries. The two-step, state-oriented strategy has become irrelevant, which explains the discomfort of most existing descendants of erstwhile antisystemic organizations in putting forward either long-term or immediate sets of political objectives. Those few who try meet with scepticism from their hoped-for followers; or, worse, with indifference. Such a period of transition has two characteristics that dominate the very idea of an antisystemic strategy. The first is that those in power will no longer be trying to preserve the existing system (doomed as it is to self-destruction); rather, they will try to ensure that the transition leads to the construction of a new system that will replicate the worst features of the existing one—its hierarchy, privilege and inequalities. They may not yet be using language that reflects the demise of existing structures, but they are implementing a strategy based on such assumptions. Of course, their camp is not united, as is demonstrated by the conflict between the so-called centre-right 'traditionalists' and the ultra-right, militarist hawks. But they are working hard to build backing for changes that will not be changes, a new system as bad as—or worse than—the present one. The second fundamental characteristic is that a period of systemic transition is one of deep uncertainty, in which it is impossible to know what the outcome will be. History is on no one's side- Each of us can affect the future, but we do not and cannot know how others will act to affect it, too. The basic framework of the WSF reflects this dilemma, and underlines it. A strategy for the period of transition ought therefore to include four components—all of them easier said than done. The first is a process of constant, open debate about the transition and the outcome we hope for, This has never been easy, and the historic antisystemic movements were never very good at it. But the atmosphere is more favourable today than it has ever been, and the task remains urgent and indispensable—underlining the role of intellectuals in this conjuncture. The structure of the WSF has lent itself to encouraging this debate; we shall see if it is able to maintain this openness.

We must carry out defensive political actions (i.e. rejection of the plan) while engaging in debate over the alternative to today's hierachal systems of power.

Immanuel Wallerstein, U.S. Sociologist, A Movement of Movements: Is Another World Really Possible? Page 272 Edited by Tom Mertes, 2004

The second component should be self-evident: an antisystemic movement cannot neglect short-term defensive action, including electoral action. The world's populations live in the present, and their immediate needs have to be addressed. Any movement that neglects them is bound to lose the widespread passive support that is essential for its long-term success. But the motive and justification for defensive action should not be that of remedying a failing system but rather of preventing its negative effects from getting worse in the short run. This is quite different psychologically and politically. The third component has to be the establishment of interim, middle- range goals that seem to move in the right direction. It would suggest that one of the most useful—substantively, politically, psychologically—is the attempt to move towards selective, but ever-widening, decommmodification. We are subject today to a barrage of neoliberal attempts to commodify what was previously seldom or never appropriated for private sale—the human body, water, hospitals. We must not only oppose this but move in the other direction. Industries, especially failing industries, should be decommodified. This does not mean they should be 'nationalized—for the most part, simply another version of commodification. It means we should create structures, operating in the market, whose objective is performance and survival rather than profit. This can be done, as we know, from the history of universities or hospitals—not all, but the best. Why is such a logic impossible for steel factories threatened with delocalization? Finally, we need to develop the substantive meaning of our long- term emphases, which I take to be a world that is relatively democratic and relatively egalitarian. I say 'relatively' because that is realistic. There will always be gaps—but there is no reason why they should be wide, encrusted or hereditary. Is this what used to be called socialism, or even communism? Perhaps, but perhaps not. That brings us back to the issue of debate. We need to stop assuming what the better (not the perfectt society will be like. We need to discuss it, outline it, experiment with alternative structures to realize it; and we need to do this at the same time as we carry out the first three parts of our programme for a chaotic world in systemic transition. And if this programme is insufficient, and it probably is, then this very inaufficiency ought to be part of the debate which is Point One of the programme.

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The process of askesis allows us to move beyond traditional norms and assumptions as part of an individual transformation. Our only way of discovering anything more than the managerialism of the affirmative's advocacy is to throw ourselves into the ascetic process.

LaDelle **McWhorter**, Professor of Philosophy at Northeast Missouri State, **1992**, "Asceticism/askēsis : Foucault's thinking historical subjectivity" in *Ethics and Danger: Essays on Heidegger and Continental Thought*.

In order to read Foucault's discourse as nothing but a perverse perpetuation of the ascetic ideal we must engage in a bit of ascetic refusal ourselves; we must insist that a discourse is the product of an author, a subject who acts. We must reject the possibility that Foucault's *discourse itself* might move us beyond the control of the ascetic self who produced or reads it. In other words, we must insist that there exist logically separable subjects and objects that stand in relation to each other as external causes and effects and maintain their identities regardless of change. But, if we pay careful attention to the transformative processes of askesis JavaScript:doPopup('Popup','Page\_247\_Popup\_1.html','width=224,height=150,resizable=yes,scrollbars=yes')JavaScript:doPop up('Popup','Page\_247\_Popup\_2.html','width=224,height=150,resizable=yes,scrollbars=yes')\*, we realize that that insistence is optional, and we can begin to undergo the possibility that there are other powers in this discourse of Foucault's, other voices besides the active, other grammars besides our Latinate substantive. The only way to find out is to engage the askesis JavaScript:doPopup('Popup','Page\_247\_Popup\_4.html','width=224,height=150,resizable=yes,scrollbars=yes')JavaScript:doPop up('Popup','Page\_247\_Popup\_5.html','width=224,height=150,resizable=yes,scrollbars=yes')\* and allow ourselves to undergo. We cannot reproduce Foucault's askesis JavaScript:doPopup('Popup','Page\_247\_Popup\_7.html','width=224,height=150,resizable=yes,scrollbars=yes')JavaScript:doPop up('Popup','Page\_247\_Popup\_8.html','width=224,height=150,resizable=yes,scrollbars=yes')\* here. However, some remarks may help us get a feel for some of the directions such an exercise might begin to take.

The self is a historical entity that is constantly shifting – our alternative can change not only our assumptions but ourselves as well.

LaDelle **McWhorter**, Professor of Philosophy at Northeast Missouri State, **1992**, "Asceticism/askēsis : Foucault's thinking historical subjectivity" in *Ethics and Danger: Essays on Heidegger and Continental Thought*.

Self, then, as part of the eventful world, is itself eventful. It is to be thought as a nexus of repeating force events remaining more or less steady through time. Selves take many different shapes, as it were, as force events shift, are unable to repeat, or occur at a reduced level of energy vis-à-vis one another. Nevertheless, the shifts are usually minor; selves remain identifiable most of the time. This is to be expected, unless there is some relatively cataclysmic change in the sustaining patterns of force events. But what if there is? Well, then, selves may be dramatically altered. Some may die. New forms may be born. Postcataclysmic arrangements are not predictable; for, in an eventful world, there are no underlying, hidden laws or structures that govern change. However, the emergings of arrangements are often traceable in retrospect. Certain sorts of force networks might come to show themselves as essential to the maintenance of a given equilibrium. One might interrogate such a network with regard to its structure and emergence and so begin to think the history of its becoming the essence of a particular arrangement or current equilibic form. Selves, then, have histories, of course, but they also are historical. They are not subsisting entities to which things happen, around which events occur; not enduring substances whose manifestations are sometimes deformed or incomplete; selves occur at every instant, and at every instant their occurring interacts with or conflicts with, reinforces or disrupts all sorts of other occurrences "in" the matrices of world-event. Analyses will accordingly be multiple and complex. Hence genealogy as opposed to a quest for truth.

Our alternative is to embrace a process of askesis in order to rethink our relationship to the world and more importantly ourselves. Askesis is an individual process of self-transformation which breaks down our ascetic drives for purity and control. The role of the ballot is for the judge to affirm our criticism as a way of questioning themselves.

LaDelle McWhorter, Professor of Philosophy at Northeast Missouri State, 1992, "Asceticism/askēsis : Foucault's thinking historical subjectivity" in *Ethics and Danger: Essays on Heidegger and Continental Thought*.

The ascetic self, then, undergoes changes as the process intensifies, becoming more powerful perhaps and ever more rigidly defined. The ascetic self is subjected and subjectified by the processes of purification that posit its ever more carefully delineated identity core. The ascetic self en-selves itself by enforcing the continued stability of the identity it seeks to be. Asceticism is a powerfully paradoxical drive for constant self-transformation toward a perfect stasis in a pure unity of self-identical repose. Foucault's *askesis* bears great resemblance to the movement of self-transformative ascetic drives. The ascetic self's drive to *know* itself is certainly apparent in Foucault. And there is a sense in which in Foucault we encounter a kind of truth, a truth that the self is not self-identical but rather that it is an amalgamation of disparate forms. The ascetic self, upon encountering that "truth," upon acceding to the plausibility of genealogical accounts, begins, predictably enough, to discipline itself to that self-knowledge, to bring itself into intellectual conformity with that truth. But when the drive to purify confronts the "truth" of its own impurity, when it runs headlong into the contradictory project of attempting to pare itself down to its fundamental multiplicity, ascetic selfhood begins to undergo the self-transforming power of Foucault's discourse, and the valences that held themselves in tension to produce the notion of a perfect unity, of some enduring Same, must necessarily shift. The thought of self in the center of Foucault's discourse is the thought of transgression, a reversal of forces, a gradual or perhaps violent turning outward of the valences before turned in, like fingers pulling loose from a stone they have gripped too hard for too long. It will be necessary to find a different way to speak: When there occurs the undergoing of the genealogical stripping away of the argumentative and commonsense forces sustaining belief in the unitary self, when there occurs the undergoing of the exposure of the fearful and nonrational drives that put those beliefs in place, there may occur a kind of death of the ahistorical self, just as, in Nietzsche's discourse, when there occurs the undergoing of the exposure of the ungodliness that supported gods, there occurs a kind of death of the ahistorical God. As the thought of God loses its power to shape a world, the thought of a unitary self-identity begins to lose its power to shape a life. And what then? Will human being simply fly apart? Will we all go stark raving mad? Will might equal right and society degenerate into a war of all against all? Perhaps. But why should it come that? Selfishness would be a strange thing in a discourse that did not insist upon the unity of self-identical selves. Perhaps, as Nietzsche says, morality and evil are Siamese twins. Foucault's discourse, then, like ascetic discourses, is a self-transformative exercise. It is an *askesis* that allows the powers of ascetic selfhood to bring themselves to bear in characteristic ways. But because Foucault's discourse draws asceticism to focus its self-transformative power on the drive for purification itself, ascetic selfhood finds itself in question. Not only does self-transformation occur here, but there is within the discourse an awareness of this transformative power and an allowance of it as opposed to a denial or an attempt at masterful control. Thus, like ascetic discourses, Foucault's is a discourse that transforms itself; but it transforms itself from an active production of an agent-subject to a process of self-overcoming that opens possibilities for movements of differing rather than the continued movement of purification that is an insistence upon the identity of the same. Yes, Foucault's discourse begins as and in some ways may be read as remaining an ascetic discourse. It draws its energy from its ascetic lineage and past. But within Foucault's discourse ascetic selfhood cannot maintain control of the direction of its own forceful drives. Thus, as Foucault's discourse operates upon the forces at its own discursive center, something other to asceticism may begin to emerge, something we ascetic selves are not able to name, something that will resist the ascetic drive to label and identify, but something the undergoing of which may be either beautiful or terrible or both but which will definitely be—to use a Nietzschean word—interesting.

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The alternative is not a call to inaction – we are actively doing work on ourselves in order to confront our assumptions and engaging ourselves in the ascetic process – think of it as an exercise.

LaDelle McWhorter, Professor of Philosophy at Northeast Missouri State, 1992, "Asceticism/askēsis : Foucault's thinking historical subjectivity" in *Ethics and Danger: Essays on Heidegger and Continental Thought*.

In the Introduction to The Use of Pleasure Foucault calls his work an askesis\*, "an exercise of oneself in the activity of thought." The "living substance of philosophy," Foucault writes, is the essay, "which should be understood as the assay or test by which, in the game of truth, one undergoes changes, and not as the simplistic appropriation of others for the purpose of communication."<sup>1</sup> Foucault's work, then, does not simply report to us his conclusions or theories. Foucault is not primarily interested in imparting information. What he offers instead is a kind of exercise book. Hence, if we are to think through Foucault's work, we need first to think the meaning of the word exercise. An exercise, of course, is a kind of practice, a practice designed to change the one who undergoes it. We undertake various programs of exercise in order to alter ourselves in some way. We engage in physical exercises to change the contours of our bodies or magnify their strength, to clear our minds of anger or depression, or to stimulate ourselves for intellectual work. We engage in mathematical or logic exercises in order to train ourselves in the patterns of mathematical or logical thought, as we engage in grammatical exercises in order to discipline our writing and speech. Exercises are transforming practices, practices "by which ... one undergoes changes." An exercise book, then, requires an approach quite different from most works of professional scholarship. If a typical work of scholarship is to be understood as simply a report of its author's conclusions, suggestions, and perhaps still-embryonic ideas, then it may be taken as a product, the result of an agent's or a subject's having acted to produce it As such it is an object to be perceived and judged and thought about, an object external to and separable from us subjects who read and judge it. But an exercise book demands to be treated as a very different kind of thing. If it is the case that exercise, askesis \*, is a transformative practice, then Foucault's exercise books cannot be adequately comprehended by the notion 'object'. They cannot be perceived and read and judged by a subject whose being is wholly external to them. As we have noted, an exercise is a practice whose very nature it is to alter the practitioner. And that means that the practitioner (the writer, the reader) and the practice are not external to one another. As the askesis\* plays out, the boundaries necessary for maintaining subjective and objective identities shift and may even erode. Exercises are often empowering and enlightening.

Askesis breaks with the modes of modern subjectivity – we confront the self-identical self through a form of asceticism that looks inward to strip away our false constructions of who we are.

LaDelle McWhorter, Professor of Philosophy at Northeast Missouri State, 1992, “Asceticism/askēsis : Foucault's thinking historical subjectivity” in *Ethics and Danger: Essays on Heidegger and Continental Thought*.

Heid askesis

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pup('Popup','Page\_246\_Popup\_2.html','width=224,height=150,resizable=yes,scrollbars=yes')\* purports to be other than  
an insistence upon ascetic submission to rigid identity structures. It purports to be the very opposite, in fact—  
an attempt to think subjectivity in the absence of transhistorical structure, the pure kernel of the ascetic  
dream. However, if this claim to otherness is true, Foucault is engaged in an apparent paradox. He—a subject, a self, a  
person with a particular identity, that man Michel Foucault—is trying to exercise himself in the thinking of his own  
contingency, his own optionality. He is attempting to put himself through an exercise that would constitute  
the undergoing of his own dispersal. What are we to make of even the thought of that? Cynicism snaps: This call of  
his for inwardness, selfhood, and subjectivity to think its historical emergence out of disparate forces and  
shameful heterogeneous unions could not possibly emerge from within the ascetic complex that is modern  
subjectivity, unless—unless—it is some new ploy, some new strategy for purification. Perhaps in Foucault's  
discourse the ascetic will is attempting to subject itself to a rigid identity in yet a new way; perhaps it is  
attempting to think dissension as—its truth. Foucault has been read that way, as Nietzsche has. Foucault's  
askesis JavaScript:doPopup('Popup','Page\_246\_Popup\_4.html','width=224,height=150,resizable=yes,scrollbars=yes')JavaScript:  
pt:doPopup('Popup','Page\_246\_Popup\_5.html','width=224,height=150,resizable=yes,scrollbars=yes')\* can be read as a  
kind of vengeful attempt to humiliate the ascetically produced self-identical self by bringing it up against its  
real genealogical past. If we were to read Foucault this way we would understand him to be perpetuating and perhaps  
developing asceticism in at least two ways. First, he would be maintaining the notion of a pure, self-identical truth  
of the self. In other words, he would still be positing a constant core, but in this case the core would be  
something like the Freudian id, a petty, infantile, frightened little thing. Second, in addition to positing this  
pure center of being, Foucault's discourse would be a perpetuation of asceticism in the sense that he would  
be forcing himself, and us, to turn around and face this puny, ugly little truth that is ourselves; he would be  
forcing us to strip away our delusions of grandeur and our pride in order to be that which we really are; he  
would be imposing, once again, and in yet a new and more repulsive way, the rigid standard of absolute  
identity. He would be calling us to an ever more honest ownership of ourselves.

### Alt Solvency

The alternative solves case – Our insistence of a rejection of action seems in the face of ecological crisis, but it is essential to embrace paradox in order to forge new paths of thought and innovation.

LaDelle McWhorter, Professor of Philosophy at Northeast Missouri State, 1992, *Heidegger and the Earth*, ed: McWhorter.

Heidegger's work is a call to reflect, to think in some way other than calculatively, technologically, pragmatically. Once we begin to move with and into Heidegger's call and begin to see our trying to seize control and solve problems as itself a problematic approach, if we still believe that thinking's only real purpose is to function as a prelude to action, we who attempt to think will twist within the agonizing grip of paradox, feeling nothing but frustration, unable to conceive of ourselves is anything but paralyzed. However, as so many peoples before us have known, paradox is not only a trap; it is also a scattering point and passageway. Paradox invites examination of its own constitution (hence of the patterns of thinking within which it occurs) and thereby breaks a way of thinking open, revealing the configurations of power that propel it and hold it on track. And thus it makes possible the dissipation of that power and the deflection of thinking into new paths and new possibilities.

Heidegger's insistence on rethinking calls into question the dichotomies that the affirmative relies upon such as activity and passivity. The alternative solves the will to action.

LaDelle McWhorter, Professor of Philosophy at Northeast Missouri State, 1992, *Heidegger and the Earth*, ed: McWhorter.

Heidegger frustrates us. At a time when the stakes are so very high and decisive action is so loudly and urgently called for, Heidegger apparently calls us to do - nothing. If we get beyond the revulsion and anger that such a call initially inspires and actually examine the feasibility of response, we begin to undergo the frustration attendant upon paradox; how is it possible, we ask, to choose, to will, to do nothing? The call itself places in question the bimodal logic of activity and passivity; it points up the paradoxical nature of our passion for action, of our passion for maintaining control. The call itself suggests that our drive for acting decisively and forcefully is part of what must be thought through, that the narrow option of will versus surrender is one of the power configurations of current thinking that must be allowed to dissipate. But, of course, those drives and those conceptual dichotomies are part of the very structure of our self-understanding both as individuals and as a tradition and a civilization. Hence, Heidegger's call is a threatening one, requiring great courage, "the courage to make the truth of our own presuppositions and the realm of our own goals into the things that most deserve to be called in question." Heidegger's work pushes thinking to think through the assumptions that underlie both our ecological vandalism and our love of scientific solutions, assumptions that also ground the most basic patterns of our current ways of being human.

## Technological Thinking → Genoide

The affirmative views the natural world as a standing reserve that can be controlled and tapped to fulfill human desires. The endpoint of this logic is biopolitical genocide as humans become part of this standing reserve as well in support of the greater good.

LaDelle McWhorter, Professor of Philosophy at Northeast Missouri State, 1992, Heidegger and the Earth, ed: McWhorter.

What is now especially dangerous about this sense of our own managerial power, born of forgetfulness, is that it results in our viewing the world as mere resources to be stored or consumed. Managerial or technological thinkers, Heidegger says, view the earth, the world, all things as mere Bestand, standing-reserve. All is here simply for human use. No plant, no animal, no ecosystem has a life of its own, has any significance apart from human desire and need. Nothing, we say, other than human beings, has any intrinsic value. All things are instruments for the working out of human will. Whether we believe that God gave Man dominion or simply that human might (sometimes called intelligence or rationality) in the face of ecological fragility makes right, we managerial, technological thinkers tend to believe that the earth is only a stockpile or a set of commodities to be managed, bought, and sold. The forest is timber; the river, a power source. Even people have become resources, human resources, personnel to be managed, or populations to be controlled. This managerial, technological mode of revealing Heidegger says is embedded in and constitutive of Western culture and has been gathering strength for centuries. Now it is well on its way to extinguishing all other modes of revealing, all other ways of being human and being earth. It will take tremendous effort to think through danger, to think past it and beyond, tremendous courage and resolve to allow thought of the mystery to come forth; thought of the inevitability along with revealing, of concealment, of loss, of ignorance; thought of the occurring of things and their passage as events not ultimately under human control. And of course even the call to allow this thinking - couched as it so often must be in a grammatical imperative appealing to an agent - is itself a paradox, the first that must be faced and allowed to speak to us and to shatter us as it scatters thinking in new directions, directions of which we have not yet dreamed, directions of which we may never dream.

## ECOLOGY LINK

The affirmative's notion of an obligation towards the earth is a reflection of the Western development of guilt. However, the idea that the individual owes something to the world is an instance of technological thought that must be rejected to gain an authentic relationship with the environment.

LaDelle McWhorter, Professor of Philosophy at Northeast Missouri State, 1992, *Heidegger and the Earth*, ed: McWhorter.

And shattered we may be, for our self-understanding is at stake; in fact, our very selves – selves engineered by the technologies of power that shaped, that are, modernity – are at stake. Any thinking that threatens the state. As a result, guilt is familiar, and, though somewhat uncomfortable at times, it comes to feel almost safe. It is no surprise, then, that whenever caring people think hard about how to live with/in/on the earth, we find ourselves growing anxious and, usually, feeling guilty about the way we conduct ourselves in relation to the natural world. Guilt is a standard defense against the call for change as it takes root within us. But, if we are to think with Heidegger, if we are to heed his call to reflect, we must not respond to it simply by deplored our decadent lifestyles and indulging ourselves in a fit of remorse. Heidegger's call is not a moral condemnation, nor is it a call to take up some politically correct position or some privileged ethical stance. When we respond to Heidegger's call as if it were a moral condemnation, we reinstate a discourse in which active agency and its projects and responsibilities take precedence over any other way of being with the earth. In other words, we insist on remaining within the discourses, the power configurations, of the modern managerial self. Guilt is a concept – whose heritage and meaning occur within the ethical tradition of the western world. But the history of ethical theory in the west (and it could be argued that ethical theory only occurs in the West is one with the history-of technological thought. The revelation of things as to-be-managed and the imperative to be in control work themselves out in the history of ethics just as surely as they work themselves out in the history of the natural and human sciences.

## FRAMEWORK/POLICY BAD

In response to our kritik, the Affirmative feels challenged and resorted to a framework to exclude our argument. This is analogous to policemen who utilize violent beaurocracy.

David Graeber, Reader in Social Anthropology at the University of London, 2007, Possibilities, p. 404

It might be helpful here to reflect on the nature of the violence—"force", if you like—that police represent. A former LAPD officer writing about the Rodney King case pointed out that in most of the occasions in which a citizen is severely beaten by police, it turns out that the victim was actually innocent of any crime. "Cops don't beat up burglars", he observed. If you want to cause a policeman to be violent, the surest way is to challenge their right to define the situation. This is not something a burglar is likely to do.<sup>36</sup> This of course makes perfect sense if we remember that police are, essentially, bureaucrats with guns. Bureaucratic procedures are all about questions of definition. Or, to be more precise, they are about the imposition of a pre-established schema to a social reality that is, usually, infinitely more complex: a crowd can be either orderly or disorderly; a citizen can be white, black, Hispanic, or an Asian/Pacific Islander; a petitioner is or is not in possession of a valid photo ID. Such simplistic rubrics can only be maintained in the absence of dialogue; hence, the quintessential form of bureaucratic violence is the wielding of the truncheon when somebody "talks back".

I began by saying that this was to be an essay of interpretation. In fact, it has been just as much an essay about frustrated interpretation; about the limits of interpretation. Ultimately, I think this frustration can be traced back to the very nature of violence—bureaucratic or otherwise. Violence is in fact unique among forms of human action in that it holds out the possibility of affecting the actions of others about whom one understands nothing. If one wants to affect another's actions in any other way, one must at least have some idea who they think they are, what they want, what they think is going on. Interpretation is required, and that requires a certain degree of imaginative identification. Hit someone over the head hard enough, all this becomes irrelevant. Obviously, two parties locked in an equal contest of violence would usually do well to get inside each other's heads, but when access to violence becomes extremely unequal, the need vanishes. This is typically the case in situations of structural violence: of systemic inequality that is ultimately backed up by the threat of force. Structural violence always seems to create extremely lopsided structures of imagination. Gender is actually a telling example here.

### The notion of “policy” assumes a system of domination

David Graeber, professor in the anthropology department at Goldsmiths College, University of London, Fragments of an Anarchist Anthropology, 2004

Even more than High Theory, what anarchism needs is what might be called Low Theory: a way of grappling with those real, immediate questions that emerge from a transformative project. Mainstream social science actually isn't much help here, because normally in mainstream social science this sort of thing is generally classified as "policy issues," and no self-respecting anarchist would have anything to do with these. against policy (a tiny manifesto): The notion of "policy" presumes a state or governing apparatus which imposes its will on others. "Policy" is the negation of politics; policy is by definition something concocted by some form of elite, which presumes it knows better than others how their affairs are to be conducted. By participating in policy debates the very best one can achieve is to limit the damage, since the very premise is inimical to the idea of people managing their own affairs.

The ultimate goal of a criticism is to reveal injustices, not to enact solutions that extend beyond the scope of what it represents.

**Subcomandante Marcos**, Revolutionary/Leader in the EZLN Movement, A Movement of Movements: Is Another World Really Possible? Page 7-8 Edited by Tom Mertes, 2004

Homosexuals, for example, were suspect as potential traitors, elements harmful to the socialist movement and state. While the indigenous peoples were viewed as a backward sector preventing the forces of production -- blah, blah, blah. So what was required was to clean out these elements, imprisoning or re-educating some, and assimilating others into the process of production, to transform them into skilled labor—proletarians, to put it in those terms. Guerrillas normally speak in the name of majorities. it seems surprising that you speak in the sense of minorities, when you could do so in the name of the poor or exploited of Mexico as a whole. Why do you do this? Every vanguard imagines itself to be representative of the majority. We not only think that is false in our case, but that even in the best of cases it is little more than wishful thinking, and in the worst cases an outright usurpation. The moment social forces come into play, it becomes clear that the vanguard is not such a vanguard and that those it represents do not recognize themselves in it. The EZLN, in renouncing any claim to be a vanguard, is recognizing its real horizon. To believe that we can speak on behalf of those beyond ourselves is political masturbation. In some cases it is not even that, because there is no pleasure in this onanism—at most, that of pamphlets read only by those who produce them. We are trying to be honest with ourselves and some might say that this is a matter of human decency. No. We could even be cynical and say that the honest admission that we only represent the indigenous Zapatista communities of one region of the Mexican South-East has paid off. But our discourse has reached the ears of many more people than those we represent. This is the point we have reached. That's all. In the speeches we made in the course of our march to the capital, we told people—and ourselves—that we could not and should not try to lead the struggles we encountered on our journey, or fly the flag for them. We had imagined that those below would not be slow to show themselves, with so many injustices, so many complaints, so many wounds. . In our minds we had formed the image that our march would be a kind of plough, turning the soil so that all this could rise from the ground. We had to be honest and tell people that we had not come to lead anything of what might emerge. We came to release a demand, that could unleash others. But that's another story. Were the speeches you gave along the route improvised from town to town until the address in Mexico City, or did you design them from the outset as a sequence, such that the last was not necessarily the strongest? Look, there is an official version and a real version. The official story is that we saw at each stop what we had to do. The real story is that we wove this discourse together over the course of the last seven years. A moment arrived when the Zapatismo of the EZLN was overtaken by many developments. Today we are not expressing what we were before 1994, or in the first days of 1994 when we were fighting; we are acting on a series of moral commitments we made in the last seven years. In the end we didn't manage to plough the land, as we had hoped. But the mere act of our waiting on it was enough to bring all these buried feelings to the surface. In every town square, we told people: 'We have not come to lead you, we have not come to tell you what to do, but to ask for your help.' Even so, we received during our march dockets of complaints going back to the time before the Mexican Revolution, given to us in the hope that finally someone might resolve the problem. If we could sum up the die. course of the Zapatista march to date, it would be: 'No one is going to do it for us.' The forms of organization, and the tasks of politics, need to be changed for that transformation to be possible. When we say 'no' to leaders, we are also saying 'no' to ourselves

The role of the ballot is an endorsement of critique. Our critique is not a thing, it is a process in which we, absent the ever oppressing state, engage in resistance and invent new modes of intervention. The Debate Community is uniquely posed to perform these actions.

Brian Holmes, cultural theories, art critic, founder of Universete Tangente, wrote many works. 2007, *Constituent Imagination: Militant Investigations, Collective Theorization*. Published by AK Press, pg. 42-43

As supranational regions engulf ever-larger populations and the movement across shifting borders becomes an ever-more common activity, geopoetics, is increasingly experienced in the flesh and in the imaginary, it is traced on the collective skin. This is when geopoetics becomes a vital activity, promise of liberation. How to interpret artworks and artistic-activist interventions so as to highlight the forms taken by the geopoetic imaginary? Through analytic work on the dynamics of form and the efficacy of symbolic ruptures, one can try to approach the diagrammatic level where the cartography of sensatio is reconfigured through experimentation. This level comes constantly into play whenever it is a matter of translating analysis back into intervention. Because of the transverse nature of global flows, it is possible to draw off the experiences of far away acts of resistance in the midst of one's own confrontations with power, both in its brute objective forms, and in its subtle interiorizations. The relation between the Argentine pot-banging cacerola; and the almost continuous urban mobilizations in Spain, from February 15, 2003, all the way up to the ouster of the mendacious and power-hungry Aznar government in March of 2004, is a large-scale example of this process of transfiguration. And this is the generative side of the continental drift. To sense the dynamics of resistance and creation across the interlinked world space is to start taking part in the solidarities and modes of cooperation that have been emerging across the planet since the late 1990s. Just Doing It If you want to accomplish anything like this kind of research, don't expect much help from the existing institutions. Most are still busy adapting to the dictates of neoliberal management; and the best we could do for the first big round of meshworked critique was to hijack a few of their people and divert a few of their resources. What's more, the open windows that do exist are likely to close down with the neoconservative turn. Self-organized groups will have to generate a collective learning process about the effects of social atomization and economic subjugation-essentially, a new understanding of the forms of contemporary alienation-and they will have to explore the reactions to these trends, whether intensely negative (the fascist and racist closure of formerly democratic societies) or positive and forward-looking (activist interventions, the invention of new modes of social self-management, cultural reorientations, ecologically viable forms of development). Another goal of the critique is to raise the level of debate and engagement in the cultural and artistic sectors-the vital media of social expression-where a narcissistic blindness to the violence of current conditions is still the norm. But the most important aim is to help relaunch the activist mobilizations that became so promising around the turn of the millennium. "Help" is the right word here, because there is no intellectual privilege in the activist domain. Activist-researchers can contribute to a short, middle, and long-term analysis of the crisis, by examining and inventing new modes of intervention at the micro-political scales where even the largest social

010Vem1t5 begin.

Who can play this great game? Whoever is able to join or form a meshwork of independent researchers. What are the pieces, the terrains, the wagers and rules? Whichever ones your group finds most productive and interesting. How does the game continue, when the ball goes out of your field? Through shared meetings in a meshwork of meshworks, through collective actions, images, projects, and publications. And most importantly, who wins? Whoever can provoke some effective resistance to the downward spiral of human coexistence at the outset of the 21st century.

### Role Of Ballot

The judge is armed with the ballot and thus has the ability to create real change.

David Graeber, Reader in Social Anthropology at the University of London and small- a anarchist, 2007, Possibilities, p. 342

For most of human history, it has been extremely unusual to have both at the same time. Where egalitarian societies exist, it is also usually considered wrong to impose systematic coercion. Where a machinery of coercion did exist, it did not even occur to those wielding it that they were enforcing any sort of popular will.

It is of obvious relevance that Ancient Greece was one of the most competitive societies known to history. It was a society that tended to make everything into a public contest, from athletics to philosophy or tragic drama just about anything else. So it might not seem entirely surprising they made political decision-making into a public contest as well. Even more crucial, though, was the fact that decisions were made by a populace in arms. Aristotle, in his *Politic*, reDavids that the constitution of a Greek city-state will normally depend on the chief arm of its infantry: if this is cavalry, it will be an aristocracy, since horses are expensive. If hoplite infantry, it will be oligarchic, as all could not afford the armor and training. If its power was based in the navy or light infantry, one can expect a democracy as anyone can row, or use a sling. In other words, if a man is armed, then one pretty much has to take his opinions into account. One can see how this worked at its starker in Xenophon's Anabam, which tells the story of an army of Greek mercenaries who suddenly find themselves leaderless and lost in the middle of Persia. They elect new officers, and then hold a collective vote to decide what to do next. In a case like this, even if the vote was 60/40, everyone could see the balance of forces and what would happen if things actually came to blows. Every vote was, in a real sense, a conquest.

## Small Issues First

We must critique and fight for individual rights at home in order to engage the larger enemy of neoliberalism

Jose Bov, Revolutionary/Leader of SECC, A Movement of Movements: Is Another World Really Possible? Page 138  
Edited by Tom Mertes, 2004

There were two strands. One was the libertarian thinking of the time— anarcho-syndicalist ideas, in particular: Bakunin, Kropotkin, Proudhon, the anarchists of the Spanish Civil War. There were still a lot of Civil War veterans living in Bordeaux, and we used to have discussions with them. The other was the example of people involved in non-violent action strategies: Luther King and the civil rights movement in the States; César Chavez, the Mexican-American farm-worker who organized the Latino grape-pickers in California. There was a strong Gandhian influence, too: the idea that you can't change the World without making changes in your own life; the attempt to integrate powerful symbolic actions into forms of mass struggle. In much of Europe and the United States, there was a clear rupture between the struggles of the sixties and seventies and those of today, with big defeats— Reagan, Thatcher—lying in between. In the States, in particular there seems to be a new generation involved now in the anti-globalization protests. In France, there has perhaps been less sense of a clear-cut shift at, but less generational renewal, too? The seventies were years of powerful militancy in France, coinciding with a political situation in which there was a possibility of the left parties taking office for the first time. There was a lot of hope in 1981, when Mitterrand was elected. The ebb came in the eighties. Some people argued, ‘We mustn’t do anything that would damage the Socialists’. Others were disillusioned and quit politics, saying: ‘We thought this would change things, but nothing has changed’. They were the years of commercialization, of individual solutions, when cash was all-important. We weren’t affected by that so much in the peasants’ movement On the Larzac plateau, after our victory against the army in ‘81, we started organizing for self-management of the land, bringing in young people to farm, taking up the question of Roquefort and intensive farming, fighting for the rights of small producers, building up the trade-union networks that eventually came together in the Confederation Paysanne. So for us, the eighties were very rich years. There was no feeling of a downturn. As for the young generation: it’s true that many of the campaigns of the nineties were a bit drab. They made their point, but they did not thaw many people in. It was the emergence of another set of issues—the housing struggles of the homeless, the campaigns of the sans-papiers—that began to create new forms of political activity, crystallizing in the anti-globalization movement of the last few years. At the trial over dismantling the McDonald’s in Millau in June 2000, we had over 100,000 supporters, lots of them young people. Since then, in Nice, Prague, Genoa, there has been a real sense of a different sort of consciousness. It comes from a more global way of thinking about the world, where the old forms of struggle—in the work-place or against the state—no longer carry the same weight. With the movement against a monolithic world-economic system, people can once again see the enemy more clearly. That had been a problem in the West. It's been difficult for people to grasp concretely what the new forms of alienation involve, in an economy that has become completely autonomous from the political sphere. But at the same time—and this may be more specific to France—the anti-globalization movement here has never cut itself off from other social forces. We've always seen the struggle for the rights of immigrants and the excluded, the sans-papiers, the unemployed, the homeless, as part of the struggle against neoliberalism. We couldn't conceive of an anti-globalization movement that didn't fight for these rights at home.

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The current discourse of alternative energy fails to solve environmental crisis and only replicates the problems in a worse form

John Byrne and Noah Toly 06 (Transforming Powe: Energy, Environment, and Society In Conflict, "Energy as a social Project" p. 1, Noah Toly is Director of Urban Studies and Assistant Professor of Politics and International Relations. Prior to joining the faculty at Wheaton, he served as Policy Fellow at the Center for Energy and Environmental Policy in the University of Delaware's School of Urban Affairs and Public Policy.)

From climate change to acid rain, contaminated landscapes, mercury pollution, and biodiversity loss, the origins of many of our least tractable environmental problems can be traced to the operations of the modern energy system. A scan of nightfall across the planet reveals a social dilemma that also accompanies this system's operations: invented over a century ago, electric light remains an experience only for the socially privileged. Two billion human beings—almost one-third of the planet's population—experience evening light by candle, oil lamp, or open fire, reminding us that energy modernization has left intact—and sometimes exacerbated—social inequalities that its architects promised would be banished (Smil, 2003: 370 - 373). And there is the disturbing link between modern energy and war.<sup>3</sup> Whether as a mineral whose control is fought over by the powerful (for a recent history of conflict over oil, see Klare, 2002b, 2004, 2006), or as the enablement of an atomic war of extinction, modern energy makes modern life possible and threatens its future. With environmental crisis, social inequality, and military conflict among the significant problems of contemporary energy-society relations, the importance of a social analysis of the modern energy system appears easy to establish. One might, therefore, expect a lively and fulsome debate of the sector's performance, including critical inquiries into the politics, sociology, and political economy of modern energy. Yet, contemporary discourse on the subject is disappointing: instead of a social analysis of energy regimes, the field seems to be a captive of euphoric technological visions and associated studies of "energy futures" that imagine the pleasing consequences of new energy sources and devices.<p.1.>

Empirics is on our side – nuclear weaponry proves the failure in this discourse

John Byrne and Noah Toly 06 (Transforming Powe: Energy, Environment, and Society In Conflict, "Energy as a social Project" p. 1, Noah Toly is Director of Urban Studies and Assistant Professor of Politics and International Relations. Prior to joining the faculty at Wheaton, he served as Policy Fellow at the Center for Energy and Environmental Policy in the University of Delaware's School of Urban Affairs and Public Policy.)

The euphoria of contemporary energy studies is noteworthy for its historical consistency with a nearly unbroken social narrative of wonderment extending from the advent of steam power through the spread of electricity (Nye, 1999). The modern energy regime that now powers nuclear weaponry and risks disruption of the planet's climate is a product of promises pursued without sustained public examination of the political, social, economic, and ecological record of the regime's operations. As early as 1934, Lewis Mumford (see also his two-volume *Myth of the Machine*, 1966; 1970) critiqued the industrial energy system for being a key source of social and ecological alienation (1934: 196): The changes that were manifested in every department of Technics rested for the most part on one central fact: the increase of energy. Size, speed, quantity, the multiplication of machines, were all reflections of the new means of utilizing fuel and the enlargement of the available stock of fuel itself. Power was dissociated from its natural human and geographic limitations: from the caprices of the weather, from the irregularities that definitely restrict the output of men and animals.<P.2-3>

Faith in the large-scale centralized energy system and its discourse will make catastrophe inevitable

John Byrne and Noah Toly 06 (Transforming Powe: Energy, Environment, and Society In Conflict, "Energy as a social Project" p. 1, Noah Toly is Director of Urban Studies and Assistant Professor of Politics and International Relations. Prior to joining the faculty at Wheaton, he served as Policy Fellow at the Center for Energy and Environmental Policy in the University of Delaware's School of Urban Affairs and Public Policy.)

Such solutions also attempt to mediate the increasing risk that accompanies techno-fixes of the conventional energy regime. The current phase of industrialization is replete with efforts to harmonize market and technological logics in a way that leaves the large-scale centralized energy system intact despite its tendencies to breed significant potential social and environmental crises (Byrne et al, 2002: 287; see also Beck, 1992). Progress [has] necessitated commitments to advancing knowledge and its application, along with the distinctive threats that only modernity could augur. Societies are obliged to place their faith in experts, technocratic systems, and management institutions, in the expectation that these offer social and environmental protection. At the same time, catastrophe-scale mistakes are inevitable. Those least equipped to 'model' their problems become the 'lab mice' as human intelligence works out management schemes. Conventional techno-fixes to increase energy supplies cannot remove risks, nor can market economics, but together they seek to convince society that abandonment of the modern energy project is nonetheless unwarranted. <p. 11>

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## A/T Tech is inevitable (1/2)

Technological thinking is inevitable, but releasement towards things and openness to the mystery will allow humans to view things in an undomineering, untechnical way: avoiding a catastrophic loss of being

Martin Heidegger 1959, 20<sup>th</sup> century philosopher, *Discourse on Thinking*, trans. From *Gelassenheit* by John M. Anderson and E. Hans Freund, 1966 [pp. 52-57] [Emphasis Added]

Is man, then, a defenseless and perplexed victim at the mercy of the irresistible superior power of technology? He would be if man today abandons any intention to pit meditative thinking decisively against merely calculative thinking. But once meditative thinking awakens, it must be at work unceasingly and on every last occasion—hence, also, here and now at this commemoration. For here we are considering what is threatened especially in the atomic age: the autochthony of the works of man. Thus we ask now: even if the old rootedness is being lost in this age, may not a new ground and foundation be granted again to man, a foundation and ground out of which man's nature and all his works can flourish in a new way even in the atomic age? What could the ground and foundation be for the new autochthony? Perhaps the answer we are looking for lies at hand; so near that we all too easily overlook it. For the way to what is near is always the longest and thus the hardest for us humans. This way is the way of meditative thinking. Meditative thinking demands of us not to cling one-sidedly to a single idea, nor to run down a one-track course of ideas. Meditative thinking demands of us that we engage ourselves with what at first sight does not go together at all. Let us give a trial. For all of us, the arrangements, devices, and machinery of technology are to a greater or lesser extent indispensable. It would be foolish to attack technology blindly. It would be shortsighted to condemn it as the work of the devil. We depend on technical deices; they even challenge us to ever greater advances. But suddenly and unaware we find ourselves so firmly shackled to these technical devices that we fall into bondage to them. Still we can act otherwise. We can use technical devices, and yet with proper use also keep ourselves so free of them, that we may let go of them any time. We can use technical devices as they ought to be used, and also let them alone as something which does not affect our inner and real core. We can affirm the unavoidable use of technical devices, and also deny them the right to dominate us, and so to warp, confuse, and lay waste our nature. But will not saying both yes and no this way to technical devices make our relation to technology ambivalent and insecure? On the contrary! Our relation to technology will become wonderfully simple and relaxed. We let technical devices enter our daily life, and at the same time leave them outside, that is, let them alone, as things which are nothing absolute but remain dependent upon something higher. I would call this comportment toward technology which expresses "yes" and at the same time "no," by an old word, releasement towards things. Having this comportment we no longer view things only in a technical way. It gives us clear vision and we notice that while the production and use of machines demands of us another relation to things, it is not a meaningless relation. Farming and agriculture, for example, now have turned into a motorized food industry. Thus here, evidently, as elsewhere, a profound change is taking place in man's relation to nature and to the world. But the meaning that reigns in this change remains obscure. There is then in all technical processes a meaning, not invented or made by us, which lays claim to what man does and leaves undone. We do not know the significance of the uncanny increasing dominance of atomic technology. The meaning pervading technology hides itself. But if we explicitly and continuously heed the fact that such hidden meaning touches us everywhere in the world of technology, we stand at once within the realm of that which hides itself from us, and hides itself just in approaching us. That which shows itself and at the same time withdraws is the essential trait of what we call the mystery. I call the comportment which enables us to keep open to the meaning hidden in technology, openness to the mystery. Releasement towards things and openness to the mystery belong together. They grant us the possibility of dwelling in the world in a totally different way. They promise us a new ground and foundation upon which we can stand and endure in the world of technology without being imperiled by it. Releasement towards things and openness to the mystery give us a vision of a new autochthony which someday even might be fit to recapture the old and now rapidly disappearing autochthony in a changed form. But for the time being—we do not know how long—man finds himself in a perilous situation. Why? Just because a third world war might break out unexpectedly and bring about complete annihilation of humanity and the destruction of the earth? No. In this dawning atomic age a far greater danger threatens—precisely when the danger of a third world war has been removed. A strange assertion! Strange indeed, but only as long as we do not meditate. In what sense is the statement just made valid? This assertion is valid in the sense that the approaching tide of technological revolution in the atomic age could so captivate, bewitch, dazzle, and beguile man that calculative thinking may

[Continued, no break]

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## A/T Tech is inevitable (2/2)

[Continued, no break]

someday come to be accepted and practiced as the only way of thinking. What real danger then might move upon us? Then there might go hand in hand with the greatest ingenuity in calculative planning and inventing indifference toward meditative thinking, total thoughtlessness. And then? Then man would have denied and thrown away his own special nature—that he is a meditative being. Therefore, the issue is the saving of man's essential nature. Therefore, the issue is keeping meditative thinking alive. Yet releasement toward things and openness to the mystery never happen of themselves. They do not befall us accidentally. Both flourish only through persistent, courageous thinking. Perhaps today's memorial celebration will prompt us toward this. If we respond to the prompting, we think of Conradin Kreutzer by thinking of the origin of his work the lie-giving powers of his Hewberg homeland. And it is we who think if we know ourselves here and now as the men who must find and prepare the way into the atomic age, through it and out of it. If releasement toward things and openness to the mystery awaken within us, then we should arrive at a path that will lead to a new ground and foundation. In that ground the creativity which produces lasting works could strike new roots.

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## A2: Technology is neutral

The affirmative's conception of technology as a neutral force destroys meaningful understanding of the essence of technology

Martin Heidegger, German philosopher, 1949, *The Question Concerning Technology*,  
<http://www.wright.edu/cola/Dept/PHL/Class/P.Internet/PITexts/QCT.html> [BGB]

In what follows we shall be questioning concerning technology. Questioning builds a way. We would be advised, therefore, above all to pay heed to the way, and not to fix our attention on isolated sentences and topics. The way is one of thinking. All ways of thinking, more or less perceptibly, lead through language in a manner that is extraordinary. We shall be questioning concerning technology, and in so doing we should like to prepare a free relationship to it. The relationship will be free if it opens our human existence to the essence of technology. When we can respond to this essence, we shall be able to experience the technological within its own bounds. Technology is not equivalent to the essence of technology. When we are seeking the essence of "tree," we have to become aware that what pervades every tree, as tree, is not itself a tree that can be encountered among all the other trees. Likewise, the essence of technology is by no means anything technological. Thus we shall never experience our relationship to the essence of technology so long as we merely represent and pursue the technological, put up with it, or evade it. Everywhere we remain unfree and chained to technology, whether we passionately affirm or deny it. But we are delivered over to it in the worst possible way when we regard it as something neutral; for this Conception of it, to which today we particularly like to pay homage, makes us utterly blind to the essence of technology. According to ancient doctrine, the essence of a thing is considered to be what the thing is. We ask the question concerning technology when we ask what it is. Everyone knows the two statements that answer our question. One says: Technology is a means to an end. The other says: Technology is a human activity. The two definitions of technology belong together. For to posit ends and procure and utilize the means to them is a human activity. The manufacture and utilization of equipment, tools, and machines, the manufactured and used things themselves, and the needs and ends that they serve, all belong to what technology is. The whole complex of these contrivances is technology. Technology itself is a contrivance—in Latin, an instrumentum.

## A2 Crisis Politics

The aff views technology as a means to an end – the crisis politics advocated by the IAC represents a desperate attempt to re-control technology, ensuring future failure

Martin Heidegger, German philosopher, 1949, *The Question Concerning Technology*,  
<http://www.wright.edu/cola/Dept/PHL/Class/P.Internet/PITexts/QCT.html> [BGB]

The current conception of technology, according to which it is a means and a human activity, can therefore be called the instrumental and anthropological definition of technology. Who would ever deny that it is correct? It is in obvious conformity with what we are envisaging when we talk about technology. The instrumental definition of technology is indeed so uncannily correct that it even holds for modern technology, of which, in other respects, we maintain with some justification that it is, in contrast to the older handicraft technology, something completely different and therefore new. Even the power plant with its turbines and generators is a man-made means to an end established by man. Even the jet aircraft and the high--frequency apparatus are means to ends. A radar station is of course less simple than a weather vane. To be sure, the construction of a high-frequency apparatus requires the interlocking of various processes of technical-industrial production. And certainly a sawmill in a secluded valley of the Black Forest is a primitive means compared with the hydroelectric plant on the Rhine River. But this much remains correct: Modern technology too is a means to an end. This is why the instrumental conception of technology conditions every attempt to bring man into the right relation to technology. Everything depends on our manipulating technology in the proper manner as a means. We will, as we say, "get" technology "intelligently in hand." We will master it. The will to mastery becomes all the more urgent the more technology threatens to slip from human control.

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## Standing Reserve (1/2)

The affirmative's challenging of the earth to create energy creates a system of standing reserve

Martin Heidegger, German philosopher, 1949, *The Question Concerning Technology*,  
<http://www.wright.edu/cola/Dept/PHL/Class/P.Internet/PITexts/QCT.html> [BGB]

Technology is a mode of revealing. Technology comes to presence in the realm where revealing and unconcealment take place, where aletheia, truth, happens. In opposition to this definition of the essential domain of technology, one can object that it indeed holds for Greek thought and that at best it might apply to the techniques of the handicraftsman, but that it simply does not fit modern machine-powered technology. And it is precisely the latter and it alone that is the disturbing thing, that moves us to ask the question concerning technology per se. It is said that modern technology is something incomparably different from all earlier technologies because it is based on modern physics as an exact science.

Meanwhile, we have come to understand more clearly that the reverse holds true as well: modern physics, as experimental, is dependent upon technical apparatus and upon progress in the building of apparatus. The establishing of this mutual relationship between technology and physics is correct. But it remains a merely historiographical establishing of facts and says nothing about that in which this mutual relationship is grounded. The decisive question still remains: Of what essence is modern technology that it thinks of putting exact science to use? What is modern technology? It too is a revealing. Only when we allow our attention to rest on this fundamental characteristic does that which is new in modern technology show itself to us. And yet, the revealing that holds sway throughout modern technology does not unfold into a bringing-forth in the sense of poiesis. The revealing that rules in modern technology is a challenging [Herausfordern], which puts to nature the unreasonable demand that it supply energy which can be extracted and stored as such. But does this not hold true for the old windmill as well? No. Its sails do indeed turn in the wind; they are left entirely to the wind's blowing. But the windmill does not unlock energy from the air currents in order to store it. In contrast, a tract of land is challenged in the hauling out of coal and ore. The earth now reveals itself as a coal mining district, the soil as a mineral deposit. The field that the peasant formerly cultivated and set in order appears differently than it did when to set in order still meant to take care of and maintain. The work of the peasant does not challenge the soil of the field. In sowing grain it places seed in the keeping of the forces of growth and watches over its increase. But meanwhile even the cultivation of the field has come under the grip of another kind of setting-in-order, which sets upon nature. It sets upon it in the sense of challenging it. Agriculture is now the mechanized food industry. Air is now set upon to yield nitrogen, the earth to yield ore, ore to yield uranium, for example; uranium is set Up to yield atomic energy, which can be unleashed either for destructive or for peaceful purposes. This setting-upon that challenges the energies of nature is an expediting, and in two ways. It expedites in that it unlocks and exposes. Yet that expediting is always itself directed from the beginning toward furthering something else, i.e., toward driving on to the maximum yield at the minimum expense. The coal that has been hauled out in some mining district has not been produced in order that it may simply be at hand somewhere or other. It is being stored; that is, it is on call, ready to deliver the sun's warmth that is stored in it. The sun's warmth is challenged forth for heat, which in turn is ordered to deliver steam whose pressure turns the wheels that keep a factory running.

The hydroelectric plant is set into the current of the Rhine. It sets the Rhine to supplying its hydraulic pressure, which then sets the turbines turning. This turning sets those machines in motion whose thrust sets going the electric current for which the longdistance power station and its network of cables are set up to dispatch electricity. In the context of the interlocking processes pertaining to the orderly disposition of electrical energy, even the Rhine itself appears to be something at our command. The hydroelectric plant is not built into the Rhine River as was the old wooden bridge that joined bank with bank for hundreds of years. Rather, the river is dammed up into the power plant. What the river is now, namely, a water-power supplier, derives from the essence of the power station. In order that we may even remotely consider the monstrousness that reigns here, let us ponder for a moment the contrast that is spoken by the two titles: "The Rhine," as dammed up into the power works, and "The Rhine," as uttered by the artwork, in Holderlin's hymn by that name. But, it will be replied, the Rhine is still a river in the landscape, is it not? Perhaps. But how? In no other way than as an object on call for inspection by a tour group ordered there by the vacation industry. The revealing that rules throughout modern technology has the character of a setting-upon, in the sense of a challenging--forth. Such challenging happens in that the energy concealed in nature is unlocked, what is unlocked is transformed, what is transformed is stored up, what is stored up is in turn distributed, and what is distributed is switched about ever anew. Unlocking, transforming, storing, distributing, and switching about are ways of revealing. But the revealing never simply comes to an end. Neither does it run off into the indeterminate. The revealing reveals to itself its own manifoldly interlocking paths, through regulating their course. This regulating itself is, for its part, everywhere secured. Regulating and securing even become the chief characteristics of the revealing that challenges. What kind of unconcealment is it, then, that is peculiar to that which results from this setting-upon that challenges? Everywhere everything is ordered to stand by, to be immediately on hand, indeed to stand there just so that it may be on call for a further

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## Standing Reserve (2/2)

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ordering. Whatever is ordered about in this way has its own standing. We call it the standing-reserve [Bestand]. The word expresses here something more, and something more essential, than mere "stock." The word "standing-reserve" assumes the rank of an inclusive rubric. It designates nothing less than the way in which everything presences that is wrought upon by the revealing that challenges. Whatever stands by in the sense of standing-reserve no longer stands over against us as object. Yet an airliner that stands on the runway is surely an object. Certainly. We can represent the machine so. But then it conceals itself as to what and how it is. Revealed, it stands on the taxi strip only as standing-reserve, inasmuch as it is ordered to insure the possibility of transportation. For this it must be in its whole structure and in every one of its constituent parts itself on call for duty, i.e., ready for takeoff. (Here it would be appropriate to discuss Hegel's definition of the machine as an autonomous tool. When applied to the tools of the craftsman, his characterization is correct. Characterized in this way, however, the machine is not thought at all from the essence of technology within which it belongs. Seen in terms of the standing-reserve, the machine is completely nonautonomous, for it has its standing only on the basis of the ordering of the orderable.) The fact that now, wherever we try to point to modern technology as the revealing that challenges, the words "setting--upon," "ordering," "standing-reserve," obtrude and accumulate in a dry, monotonous, and therefore oppressive way — this fact has its basis in what is now coming to utterance. Who accomplishes the challenging setting-upon through which what we call the actual is revealed as standing-reserve? Obviously, man. To what extent is man capable of such a revealing? Man can indeed conceive, fashion, and carry through this or that in one way or another. But man does not have control over unconcealment itself, in which at any given time the actual shows itself or withdraws. The fact that it has been showing itself in the light of Ideas ever since the time of Plato, Plato did not bring about. The thinker only responded to what addressed itself to him. Only to the extent that man for his part is already challenged to exploit the energies of nature can this revealing that orders happen. If man is challenged, ordered, to do this, then does not man himself belong even more originally than nature within the standing-reserve? The current talk about human resources, about the supply of patients for a clinic, gives evidence of this. The forester who measures the felled timber in the woods and who to all appearances walks the forest path in the same way his grandfather did is today ordered by the industry that produces commercial woods, whether he knows it or not. He is made subordinate to the orderability of cellulose, which for its part is challenged forth by the need for paper, which is then delivered to newspapers and illustrated magazines. The latter, in their turn, set public opinion to swallowing what is printed, so that a set configuration of opinion becomes available on demand. Yet precisely because man is challenged more originally than are the energies of nature, i.e., into the process of ordering, he never is transformed into mere standing-reserve. Since man drives technology forward, he takes part in ordering as a way of revealing. But the unconcealment itself, within which ordering unfolds, is never a human handiwork, any more than is the realm man traverses every time he as a subject relates to an object.

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## A2 "Experts" Research

The affirmative's emphasis on expert information objectifies the earth as on object to be understood, converting nature to standing reserve

Martin Heidegger, German philosopher, 1949, *The Question Concerning Technology*,  
<http://www.wright.edu/cola/Dept/PHL/Class/P.Internet/PITexts/QCT.html> [BGB]

Where and how does this revealing happen if it is no mere handiwork of man? We need not look far. We need only apprehend in an unbiased way that which has already claimed man so decisively that he can only be man at any given time as the one so claimed. Wherever man opens his eyes and ears, unlocks his heart, and gives himself over to meditating and striving, shaping and working, entreating and thanking, he finds himself everywhere already brought into the unconcealed. The unconcealment of the unconcealed has already propriated whenever it calls man forth into the modes of revealing allotted to him. When man, in his way, from within unconcealment reveals that which presences, he merely responds to the call of unconcealment, even when he contradicts it. Thus when man, investigating, observing, pursues nature as an area of his own conceiving, he has already been claimed by a way of revealing that challenges him to approach nature as an object of research, until even the object disappears into the objectlessness of standing-reserve. Modern technology, as a revealing that orders, is thus no mere human doing. Therefore we must take the challenging that sets upon man to order the actual as standing-reserve in accordance with the way it shows itself. That challenging gathers man into ordering. This gathering concentrates man upon ordering the actual as standing-reserve.

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## A2 "You Want the Past"

The critique doesn't strive to recreate the past – merely to reject the demand that nature become ordered and calculable – the alternative breaks down the illusion

Martin Heidegger, German philosopher, 1949, *The Question Concerning Technology*,  
<http://www.wright.edu/cola/Dept/PHL/Class/P.Internet/PITexts/QCT.html> [BGB]

The modern physical theory of nature prepares the way not simply for technology but for the essence of modern technology. For such gathering-together, which challenges man to reveal by way of ordering, already holds sway in physics. But in it that gathering does not yet come expressly to the fore. Modern physics is the herald of enframing, a herald whose provenance is still unknown. The essence of modern technology has for a long time been concealed, even where power machinery has been invented, where electrical technology is in full swing, and where atomic technology is well under way. All coming to presence, not only modern technology, keeps itself everywhere concealed to the last. Nevertheless, it remains, with respect to its holding sway, that which precedes all: the earliest. The Greek thinkers already knew of this when they said: That which is earlier with regard to its rise into dominance becomes manifest to us men only later. That which is primally early shows itself only ultimately to men. Therefore, in the realm of thinking, a painstaking effort to think through still more primally what was primally thought is not the absurd wish to revive what is past, but rather the sober readiness to be astounded before the coming of the dawn. Chronologically speaking, modern physical science begins in the seventeenth century. In contrast, machine-power technology develops only in the second half of the eighteenth century. But modern technology, which for chronological reckoning is the later, is, from the point of view of the essence holding sway within it, historically earlier. If modern physics must resign itself ever increasingly to the fact that its realm of representation remains inscrutable and incapable of being visualized, this resignation is not dictated by any committee of researchers. It is challenged forth by the rule of enframing, which demands that nature be orderable as standing-reserve. Hence physics, in its retreat from the kind of representation that turns only to objects, which has been the sole standard until recently, will never be able to renounce this one thing: that nature report itself in some way or other that is identifiable through calculation and that it remain orderable as a system of information. This system is then determined by a causality that has changed once again. Causality now displays neither the character of the occasioning that brings forth nor the nature of the causa efficiens, let alone that of the causa formalis. It seems as though causality is shrinking into a reporting—a reporting challenged forth—of standing-reserves that must be guaranteed either simultaneously or in sequence. To this shrinking would correspond the process of growing resignation that Heisenberg's lecture depicts in so impressive a manner. 'Because the essence of modern technology lies in enframing, modern technology must employ exact physical science. Through its so doing the deceptive appearance arises that modern technology is applied physical science. This illusion can maintain itself precisely insofar as neither the essential provenance of modern science nor indeed the essence of modern technology is adequately sought in our questioning.

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## Relationship to Tech is key

Embracing the paradoxical nature of modern technology – that there is escape, but only insofar as we accept there is no escape – is key to creating a relationship with technology

Michael E. Zimmerman, Professor of Philosophy at Tulane University, 1990, *Heidegger's Confrontation with Modernity*, NetLibrary [BB]

Such "essential thinking" is neither rational nor irrational, but a meditative openness for the being of entities. Such openness precedes the distinction between the rational and irrational. But does the technological era not result from the complete self-concealment of being? How then can we become open to it, especially if its self-concealment has stamped us with the one-dimensional rationality of Gestell? And if being has in fact completely concealed itself from us, how is it that we nevertheless encounter entities as entities, even if merely as "standing- reserve"? These questions compose the koan for the West. Heidegger formulated the koan in the following terms: Being has already cast itself upon us and has cast itself away from us.... This appears to be a "contradiction." Only we do not want to snatch what is disclosed there [and put it into] a formal scheme of formal thinking. In this way, everything becomes merely weakened in its essence and becomes essence-less under the appearance of a "paradoxical" formulation. As opposed to this, we must attempt to experience [the fact] that we—placed between the two limits—are transferred into a unique abode from which there is no exit. Yet since we find ourselves transferred into this situation of no exit, we will notice that perhaps even this uttermost situation without exit might arise from being itself.... [GA, 51: 80-81] Instead of trying to "solve" the problem of modern technology by furious actions and schemes produced by the rational ego, then, Heidegger counseled that people learn that there is no exit from that "problem." We are cast into the technological world. Insight into the fact that there is no exit from it may, in and of itself, help to free us from the compulsion which characterizes all attempts to become "masters" of technology—for technology cannot be mastered. Instead, it is the destiny of the West. We can be "released" from its grip only to the extent that we recognize that we are in its grip: this is the paradox.

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## A2 Nazism (1/3)

Heidegger's philosophy cannot be understood separate from his engagement with Junger and Nazism

Michael E. Zimmerman, Professor of Philosophy at Tulane University, 1990, *Heidegger's Confrontation with Modernity*, NetLibrary [BB]

From the very beginning of his career, Heidegger was concerned about the relation between burning issues of "factual existence," on the one hand, and problems in the history of metaphysics, on the other. He saw an internal relationship between the decline of the West into nihilism and the decline of Western humanity's understanding of being. During the 1920s, however, his critique of modern technology tended to be overshadowed by the ontological analyses that were clearly in the purview of his role as an academic philosopher. His decision to begin focusing on the phenomenon of modern technology cannot be understood apart from two interrelated events: first, his practical engagement with National Socialism, and second, his confrontation with Ernst Jünger's striking predictions about the technological future.

Jünger's thesis, that the Gestalt of the worker was mobilizing the entire planet into a technological frenzy, was in many ways similar to what Spengler, Scheler, and others had already said. Nevertheless, Heidegger concluded that Jünger's writings gave the clearest expression to the metaphysical condition of the West at the end of the history of metaphysics.

Jünger, like other reactionary authors, argued that modernity and industrial technology could not be explained either in terms of Marxist economic theories or in terms of the liberal free-market ideology. The industrial transformation of the earth was merely the empirical manifestation of a hidden, world-transforming power. Jünger maintained that this power took the form of the Gestalt of the worker, the latest historical manifestation of Nietzsche's cosmic Will to Power. Heidegger transformed what Jünger regarded as the history of the Will to Power into what he was to call the "history of being." Moreover, influenced once more by Jünger, he also formulated his own highly controversial claim that Nietzsche's metaphysics calls for humanity to dominate the earth through technological means. Resolved to forestall Jünger's fearsome predictions, but equally attracted to his masculinist rhetoric of courage and hardness, Heidegger used his own philosophical vocabulary and personal magnetism to support the National Socialist "revolution," which promised to provide an authentic "third way" between the twin evils of capitalist and communist industrialism. In this chapter, I argue that Heidegger believed National Socialism would renew and discipline the German spirit, thereby saving Germany from technological nihilism. I shall also address the following question: If Heidegger believed that his own philosophy could provide spiritual direction for National Socialism, does this mean that his philosophy is essentially fascist? In the subsequent chapter, I explain Jünger's conception of modern technology. Then, I shall describe in detail Jünger's influence both on Heidegger's engagement with National Socialism and on his mature concept of technology.

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## A2 Nazism (2/3)

Heidegger's Nazism persisted throughout his life – his lack of questioning of the movement makes him complicit in the holocaust – and his philosophy is deeply connected to Nazi ideology

Michael E. Zimmerman, Professor of Philosophy at Tulane University, 1990, *Heidegger's Confrontation with Modernity*, NetLibrary [BB]

For years after 1934, Heidegger continued to play an active role as part of a group of academicians who wanted to "complete" the revolution by transforming the German university system.<sup>30</sup> Moreover, he blacklisted people he considered to be "un-German" for somehow consorting with Jews. Heidegger's reasons for refusing to fire two Jewish professors during his rectorate were tactical, not ethical: their dismissal would not look good on the international scene. The question of whether he was deeply, or only opportunistically, anti-Semitic is complex. None of his public statements can be read as anti-Semitic, but on the other hand he never publicly apologized for his original support for the regime that exterminated millions of Jews and other "subhumans." In the late 1940s, in an extremely rare reference to the Holocaust, he said: "Agriculture is now a motorized food industry, essentially the same thing as the fabrication of cadavers in the gas chambers of the extermination camps, the same thing as the blockades and the reduction of countries to famine, the same thing as the fabrication of hydrogen bombs."<sup>31</sup> In this astonishing statement, Heidegger glided over the fact that the Holocaust was a German phenomenon involving the slaughter of millions of Jews. Instead, he chose to view the Holocaust as a typical episode in the technological era afflicting the entire West. Nevertheless, in speaking of the Holocaust in the same breath with the hydrogen bomb, Heidegger was making an important point. Mass extermination in the Nazi camps was possible only because of developments within industrial technology. Moreover, the Nazis spoke of the Jews as if they were little more than industrial "waste" to be disposed of as efficiently as possible. Officials in charge of planning strategic use of nuclear weapons must be trained to conceive of the enemy populace in wholly abstract terms. Heidegger argued in several places that the hydrogen bomb—an instrument of mass extermination—was not the real problem facing us. Instead, the problem is the perversion and constriction of humanity's understanding of being itself in the technological era. Extermination camps and hydrogen bombs, from Heidegger's viewpoint, were both symptoms of humanity's conception of itself and everything else as resources to be produced and consumed, created and destroyed, at will. There is, however, something problematic but also typical of Heidegger's tendency to explain specific events and deeds in Germany as if they were typical of the entire Western world. Hence, during the 1940s he spoke of Hitler as if he were the inevitable manifestation of certain trends within the history of productionist metaphysics: One believes that the leaders had presumed everything of their own accord in the blind rage of a selfish egotism and arranged everything in accordance with their own will. In truth, however, they are the necessary consequence of the fact that entities have gone over into the way of erring in which the vacuum [resulting from the self-concealment of being] expands which requires a single order and guarantee of entities. Therein is demanded the necessity of "leading," i.e., the planning calculation of the securing of the whole of the entity. For this such men who serve the leading must be directed and armed. The "leaders" are the authoritative mobilization-workers [Rustungsarbeiter] who oversee all sectors of the securing of the consumption of the entity, because they see through the whole of the surrounding [sectors] and thus dominate erring in its calculability. [VA I: 85-86/105] Hitler's National Socialism, we are told, resulted not from peculiar historical conditions, such as widespread German anti-Semitism and hostility toward Enlightenment political values, but instead from a metaphysical process that determined events throughout the West. Surely such an analysis is open to question. The same kind of exculpatory metaphysical explanation can be discerned in Heidegger's account of Nietzsche's racism: "Nietzsche's racial thought has a metaphysical, not a biological sense." [N II: 309] Here, Heidegger sought both to protect Nietzsche from abuse at the hands of various Nazi ideologues, and to clarify that his own conception of the German Volk was a metaphysical, not a racist, one. But, as Derrida asks, "Is a metaphysics of race more serious or less serious than a naturalism or biologism of race?"<sup>32</sup> Nevertheless, Derrida also cautions that in thinking Nazism and anti-Semitism, we must not focus on Heidegger alone, for "Nazism could have developed only with the differentiated but decisive complicity of other countries, of 'democratic' states, and of university and religious institutions."<sup>33</sup> During the 1920s and 1930s, German universities—professors and students alike—were mostly either conservative or reactionary in outlook.<sup>34</sup> Hence, students and faculty helped both to make Hitler's accession to power possible and to consolidate that power. After the war, reflecting on his Rektor's address, Heidegger argued that it had been intended to defend the university against political co-optation. But colleagues who may have read his ambiguous words in this manner in 1933 were soon expressing outrage at his accumulation of university authority, at his allowing himself to be called Führer of the university, and above all at his eagerness (expressed in a telegram to Hitler!) to cooperate with the Gleichschaltung, i.e., with the "coordination" of the university into the totalitarian National Socialist state.<sup>35</sup> Shortly before resigning as Rektor, Heidegger spelled out his official goals: Since the beginning of my installation, the initial principle and the authentic aim [of my rectorate]... reside in the radical transformation of intellectual education into a function of the forces and demands of the National Socialist state.... One cannot presume [to know] what will remain of our

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## A2 Nazism (3/3)

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transitory works. The only certainty is that our fierce will, inclined toward the future, gives a meaning and brings support to our most simple effort. The individual by himself counts for nothing. It is the destiny of our nation incarnated by its state that matters.<sup>36</sup> [My emphasis] In light of Being and Time's emphasis on individuation as an essential ingredient in authentic existence, we may be amazed at the assertion that the individual "counts for nothing" in the Nazi state. We should recall, however, that in the late chapters of Being and Time Heidegger argued that authentic individuation could occur only within the context of an entire generation willing to submit to its common destiny. The explicitly political Heidegger of 1933-34 sought to achieve his own authentic individuation by surrendering himself to what he believed were the "powers of being" at work in National Socialism. Two provocative passages shed light on Heidegger's political engagement. In the first passage, from 1935, Heidegger spoke of the "violent one" who tries to overpower the overpowering being: "The more towering the summit of historical Dasein, the deeper will be the abyss for the sudden fall into the unhistorical, which merely thrashes around in issueless and placeless confusion." [GA, 40: 170/135] Apparently, Heidegger was aware of the risk he was taking by supporting National Socialism. In his own defense, he insisted that it was better for him to become engaged than to sit on the sidelines like so many others did. He did not escape unscathed by his decision. So disturbed was he by his de-Nazification hearings, and by related threats by French occupation authorities to deprive him of his home and his personal library, that he had a nervous breakdown in the spring of 1946 and spent three weeks under psychiatric care. In light of the global havoc and personal disaster which followed upon Heidegger's decision to lend his philosophy in support of Hitler, we may find particularly ironic Heidegger's remark from 1929-30: What can [today's philosopher] not report with the most modern slogans about the world situation, spirit, and the future of Europe, the coming age of the world and the new Middle Ages! How he can speak with unsurpassable earnestness about the situation of the university and its concerns, ask what man is, whether he is a transition to or [a matter of] boredom to the gods. Perhaps he is a comedian—who can know that?... If he is one who philosophizes, why does he relinquish his solitude and loiter about as a public professor in the market? But above all, what a dangerous beginning is this ambiguous behavior! [GA, 29/30: 18-19] While Heidegger's maverick version of National Socialism was incomparably more sophisticated than the primitive writings of many Nazi ideologues, nevertheless he shared with other Nazis a deep mistrust for the concept of individual civil, political, and economic liberties. Regarding such liberties as invitations to socially corrosive egoism, he proclaimed that only by surrendering to a higher power could Germans achieve genuine freedom. This conception of freedom was shared not only by Heidegger and Hitler, but by Jünger as well. Heidegger's relationship to National Socialism cannot be understood unless we see the extent to which Heidegger believed that it offered an alternative to the technological nihilism predicted by Jünger. Jünger called on Germans to submit to that nihilism, while Hitler—so Heidegger at first believed—called on Germans to submit to the dangerous venture leading beyond such nihilism. In the following chapter, we shall examine Jünger's conception of the nihilism of modern technology.

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## A2 Rorty

Without a theoretical foundation for decisions, Rorty's calculus is impossible. Further, Rorty's understanding of politics and theory is flawed – only his interpretation allows the holocaust

Michael E. Zimmerman, Professor of Philosophy at Tulane University, 1990, *Heidegger's Confrontation with Modernity*, NetLibrary [BB]

Richard Rorty, for example, another pragmatist influenced by Heidegger's deconstructive method, suggests that deconstruction has and ought to have no real political effect. It is one thing, he suggests, to speak as intellectuals about deconstructing Western metaphysics; it is quite another to take that deconstruction into the political domain. In other words, while we may abandon our search for the chimera of "absolute foundations" or "final truths" in epistemology, science, and political theory, we should not confuse such abandonment with relinquishing our social solidarity as expressed in the liberal humanism which defines the Western world.<sup>34</sup> Hence, while Rorty likes Heidegger's method, he accuses Heidegger's critique of modernity and industrial technology of being in some respects naive. There is really no alternative, so Rorty insists, to increasing our commitment to the industrial technology which has come out of the Enlightenment —unless we are willing to see millions of people starve to death around the world.<sup>35</sup> In a world bereft of foundations for making monumental decisions, however, we may well ask: On what basis are we to say that it is better to feed starving millions, for example, than to worry about the fate of the entire human species in the face of a population explosion which threatens the stability of the biosphere? Moreover, are there not empirical questions to be asked regarding the relationship between those starving millions, on the one hand, and the influence of colonial-imperial economic practices—including those sponsored by the rich industrial democracies praised by Rorty—which helped to create the conditions for "overpopulation"? Rorty justifies his attempt to separate the activity of deconstructing the Western fascination with "objectivity" and "foundations" from the commitment to democratic-liberal social solidarity by saying that theory has not played a significant role in the praxis involved in establishing and furthering American democratic principles.<sup>36</sup> Unfortunately, however, we may not so readily separate cultural criticism from its possible political consequences. Political theory, including the Enlightenment universalism of America's "founding fathers," played an important role in the history of American democracy. Rorty tends to downplay this particular case of a beneficial consequence of political-cultural theory, however, in order to highlight the dangers involved in attempting to force social reality to live up to the "objective" demands of a particular theory, whether it be as sophisticated as Marxism or as primitive as National Socialism. Rorty, then, believes that his resistance to foundational theoretical schemes is the best way of defending against totalizing schemes which purport to be grounded in an objective, universal understanding of human nature and the purpose of historical existence. Unfortunately, National Socialism swept into power in part because of its attack upon the Enlightenment principles of universalism, rationality, and objectivity. Deconstructing the theoretical foundations of Weimar parliamentarianism helped to create a power vacuum that was quickly filled by Hitler's violent reaction against everything decadent and "Western."

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## A2 Moral Obligation/Responsibility

The affirmative's conception of moral obligation and responsibility for environmental problems as a lapse, doom solvency – the harms will continue to be replicated

Martin Heidegger, German philosopher, 1949, *The Question Concerning Technology*,  
<http://www.wright.edu/cola/Dept/PHL/Class/P.Internet/PITexts/QCT.html> [BGB]

The three previously mentioned ways of being responsible owe thanks to the pondering of the silversmith for the "that" and the "how" of their coming into appearance and into play for the production of the sacrificial vessel. □ Thus four ways of owing hold sway in the sacrificial vessel that lies ready before us.

They differ from one another, yet they belong together.

What unites them from the beginning? In what does this playing in unison of the four ways of being responsible play?

What is the source of the unity of the four causes? What, after all, does this owing and being responsible mean, thought as the Greeks thought it? □ Today we are too easily inclined either to understand being responsible and being indebted moralistically as a lapse, or else to construe them in terms of effecting. In either case we bar from ourselves the way to the primal meaning of that which is later called causality. So long as this way is not opened up to us we shall also fail to see what instrumentality, which is based on causality, properly is.

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## A2 "We Don't Have to Do the Alt"

Failure to question the essence of technology allows man to become standing-reserve, justifies all atrocities

Martin Heidegger, German philosopher, 1949, *The Question Concerning Technology*,  
<http://www.wright.edu/cola/Dept/PHL/Class/P.Internet/PITexts/QCT.html> [BGB]

But when we consider the essence of technology we experience enframing as a destining of revealing. In this way we are already sojourning within the free space of destining, a destining that in no way confines us to a stultified compulsion to push on blindly with technology or, what comes to the same, to rebel helplessly against it and curse it as the work of the devil. Quite to the contrary, when we once open ourselves expressly to the essence of technology we find ourselves unexpectedly taken into a freeing claim. The essence of technology lies in enframing. Its holding sway belongs within destining. Since destining at any given time starts man on a way of revealing, man, thus under way, is continually approaching the brink of the possibility of pursuing and promulgating nothing but what is revealed in ordering, and of deriving all his standards on this basis. Through this the other possibility is blocked—that man might rather be admitted sooner and ever more primally to the essence of what is unconcealed and to its unconcealment, in order that he might experience as his essence the requisite belonging to revealing. Placed between these possibilities, man is endangered by destining. The destining of revealing is as such, in every one of its modes, and therefore necessarily, danger. In whatever way the destining of revealing may hold sway, the unconcealment in which everything that is shows itself at any given time harbors the danger that man may misconstrue the unconcealed and misinterpret it. Thus where everything that presences exhibits itself in the light of a cause-effect coherence, even God, for representational thinking, can lose all that is exalted and holy, the mysteriousness of his distance. In the light of causality, God can sink to the level of a cause, of causa efficient He then becomes even in theology the God of the philosophers, namely, of those who define the unconcealed and the concealed in terms of the causality of making, without ever considering the essential provenance of this causality. In a similar way the unconcealment in accordance with which nature presents itself as a calculable complex of the effects of forces can indeed permit correct determinations; but precisely through these successes the danger may remain that in the midst of all that is correct the true will withdraw. The destining of revealing is in itself not just any danger, but the danger. Yet when destining reigns in the mode of enframing, it is the supreme danger. This danger attests itself to us in two ways. As soon as what is unconcealed no longer concerns man even as object, but exclusively as standing-reserve, and man in the midst of objectlessness is nothing but the orderer of the standing-reserve, then he comes to the very brink of a precipitous fall; that is, he comes to the point where he himself will have to be taken as standing-reserve. Meanwhile, man, precisely as the one so threatened, exalts himself and postures as lord of the earth. In this way the illusion comes to prevail that everything man encounters exists only insofar as it is his construct. This illusion gives rise in turn to one final delusion: it seems as though man everywhere and always encounters only himself. Heisenberg has with complete correctness pointed out that the actual must present itself to contemporary man in this way. In truth, however, precisely nowhere does man today any longer encounter himself, i.e., his essence. Man stands so decisively in subservience to on the challenging-forth of enframing that he does not grasp enframing as a claim, that he fails to see himself as the one spoken to, and hence also fails in every way to hear in what respect he ek-sists, in terms of his essence, in a realm where he is addressed, so that he can never encounter only himself. But enframing does not simply endanger man in his relationship to himself and to everything that is. As a destining, it banishes man into the kind of revealing that is an ordering. Where this ordering holds sway, it drives out every other possibility of revealing. Above all, enframing conceals that revealing which, in the sense of poiesis, lets what presences come forth into appearance. As compared with that other revealing, the setting-upon that challenges forth thrusts man into a relation to whatever is that is at once antithetical and rigorously ordered. Where enframing holds sway, regulating and securing of the standing-reserve mark all revealing. They no longer even let their own fundamental characteristic appear, namely, this revealing as such.

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# A/T: Perm

**Looking at issues from all positions at once sends us on the wrong track. We must look at positions from different methods individually.**

Paul Feyerabend, professor of philosophy at UC-Berkeley, 1978, Science in a Free Society, pp. 119-121

Experiences such as these convinced me that intellectual procedures which approach a problem through concepts and abstract from everything else are on the wrong track and I became interested in the reasons for the tremendous power this error has now over minds. I started examining the rise of intellectualism in Ancient Greece and the causes that brought it about I wanted to know what it is that makes people who have a rich and complex culture fall for dry abstractions and mutilate their traditions, their thought, their language so that they can accommodate the abstractions. I wanted to know how intellectuals manage to get away with murder - for it is murder, murder of minds and cultures that is committed year in year out at schools, universities, educational missions in foreign countries. The trend must be reversed, I thought, we must start learning from those we have enslaved for they have much to offer and at any rate, they have the right to live as they see fit even if they are not as pushy about their rights and their views as their Western Conquerors have always been. In 1964-5 when these ideas first occurred to me I tried to find an intellectual solution to my misgivings that is, I took it for granted that it was up to me and the likes of me to devise educational policies for other people. I envisaged a new kind of education that would live from a rich reservoir of different points of view permitting the choice of traditions most advantageous to the individual. The teacher's task would consist of facilitating the choice, not in replacing it by some 'truth' a theatre of ideas as imagined by Piscator and Brecht and it would lead to

the development of a great variety of means of presentation. The 'objective' scientific account would be one way of presenting a case, a play another way (remember that for Aristotle tragedy is 'more philosophical' than history because it reveals the structure of the historical process and not only its accidental details) a novel still another way. Why should knowledge be shown in the garment of academic prose and reasoning? Had not Plato observed that written sentences in a book are but transitory stages of a complex process of growth that contains gestures, jokes, asides, emotions and had he not tried to catch this process by means of the dialogue? And were there not different forms of knowledge, some much more detailed and realistic than what arose as 'rationalism' in the 7th and 6th century in Greece? Then there was Dadaism. I had studied Dadaism after the Second World War. What attracted me to this movement was the style its inventors used when not engaged in Dadaistic activities. It was clear, luminous, simple without being banal, precise without being narrow; it was a style adapted to the expression of thought as well as of emotion. I connected this style with the Dadaistic exercises themselves. Assume you tear language apart, you live for days and weeks in a world of cacophonic sounds, jumbled words, nonsensical events. Then, after this preparation, you sit down and write: 'the cat is on the mat'. This simple sentence which we usually utter without thought, like talking machines (and much of our talk is indeed routine) now seems like the creation of an entire world: God said let there be light, and there was light. Nobody in modern times has understood the miracle of language and thought as well as the Dadaists for nobody has been able to imagine, let alone create a world in which they play no role. Having discovered the nature of a living order, of a reason that is not merely mechanical, the Dadaists soon noticed the deterioration of such an order into routine. They diagnosed the deterioration of language that preceded the First World War and created the mentality that made it possible. After the

diagnosis their exercises assumed another, more sinister meaning. They revealed the frightening similarity between the language of the foremost commercial travellers in 'importance', the language of philosophers, politicians, theologians, and brute inarticulation. The praise of honour, patriotism, truth, rationality, honesty that fills our schools, pulpits, political meetings imperceptibly merges into inarticulation no matter how much it has been wrapped into literary from a pack of grunting pigs. Is there a way to prevent such deterioration? I thought there was. I thought that regarding all achievements as transitory, restricted and personal and every truth as created by our love for it arid not as 'found' would prevent the deterioration of once promising fairy tales and I also thought that it was necessary to develop a new philosophy or a new religion to give substance to this unsystematic conjecture.