NIETZSCHE

1

STRATEGY NOTES

THERE ARE TWO SHELLS: A "SECURITY" SHELL AGAINST POLICY AFFS, AND A "SUFFERING" SHELL FOR KRITIK-Y CASES.

FOR ADDITIONAL LINKS…

-- THERE IS A GENERIC "PLAN" LINK BY SAURETTE

-- MOST AFFS WILL ALSO LINK TO PITY

-- AGAINST FAMILY PLANNING, YOU CAN READ THE "SOCIAL JUSTICE" LINK BY BROWN, AS WELL AS THE "WELFARE" LINK BY QUAIN AND THE "FAMILY PLANNING" LINK BY STRINGER

-- AGAINST BIG, YOU CAN RUN THE "BIGGIE GOT SHOT" LINK BY OWEN AND RILEY, THE WELFARE LINK BY QUAIN, AND SOME EQUALITY LINKS

-- AGAINST MARRIAGE PROMOTION, YOU CAN READ THE "SOCIAL JUSTICE" LINK BY BROWN AND THE "IDENTITY-POLITICS OF INJURY" LINK BY BROWN

-- AGAINST PRIVATIZATION, YOU CAN RUN WORKFARE LINK BY ARNOLD AND THE HUMANITY LINK BY ODYSSEOS

-- AGAINST RECOUNT, YOU CAN RUN THE "WELFARE" LINK BY QUAIN AND SOCIAL JUSTICE LINK BY BROWN AND THE EQUALITY LINKS

ALSO, YOU SHOULD BE MISSING PAGES THAT WENT INTO THE SUPPLEMENT. THEY ARE…

27, 32, 37-40, 62, 65, 73, 75-76, 80, 83-85, 96, 101, 102-103, 105-106, 108-110, 114, 115-117, 123-126, 139, 140-3, 153, 162-163, 164, 175-177

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SUFFERING 1NC

A) Life is pain. Anyone who tells you otherwise is selling something. The affirmative's fixation with ending suffering negates life. Instead of deluding ourselves with dreams of escaping the inevitability of suffering followed by a meaningless death, we should embrace this suffering as a testing and show of strength.
Kain, professor of philosophy at Santa Clara, 20**07**
[Philip J., "Nietzsche, Eternal Recurrence, and the Horror of Existence," *Journal of Nietzsche Studies 33 (2007),* 49-63]
At the center of Nietzsche's vision lies his concept of the "terror and horror of existence" (BT 3). As he puts it in The Birth of Tragedy:

There is an ancient story that King Midas hunted in the forest a long time for the wise Silenus, the companion of Dionysus. . . . When Silenus at last fell into his hands, the king asked what was the best and most desirable of all things for man. Fixed and immovable, the demigod said not a word, till at last, urged by the king, he gave a shrill laugh and broke out into these words: "Oh, wretched ephemeral race, children of chance and misery, why do you compel me to tell you what it would be most expedient for you not to hear? What is best of all is utterly beyond your reach: not to be born, not to be, to be nothing. But the second best for you is—to die soon."

(BT 3)1

Why is it best never to have been born? Because all we can expect as human beings is to suffer. Yet, still, this is not precisely the problem. As Nietzsche tells us in On the Genealogy of Morals, human beings can live with suffering. What they cannot live with is **meaningless suffering**—suffering for no reason at all (GM III:28). In Nietzsche's view we are "surrounded by a fearful void . . ." (GM III:28; cf. WP 55). We live in an empty, meaningless cosmos. We cannot look into reality without being overcome. Indeed, in Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche even suggests that "it might be a basic characteristic of existence that those who would know it completely would perish . . ." (BGE 39; cf. WP 822).

And it was not just intellectual reflection that led Nietzsche to a belief in the horror of existence. He lived it himself.2 In a letter of April 10, 1888, he writes: "Around 1876 my health grew worse. . . . There were extremely painful and obstinate headaches which exhausted all my strength. They increased over long years, to reach a climax at which pain was habitual, so that any given year contained for me two hundred days of pain. . . . My specialty was to endure the extremity of pain . . . with complete lucidity for two or three days in succession, with continuous vomiting of mucus."3 In Nietzsche contra Wagner, he tells us how significant this suffering was for him:

I have often asked myself whether I am not much more deeply indebted to the hardest years of my life than to any others. . . . And as to my prolonged illness, [End Page 49] do I not owe much more to it than I owe to my health? To it I owe a higher kind of health, a sort of health which grows stronger under everything that does not actually kill it!—To it, I owe even my philosophy. . . . Only great suffering is the ultimate emancipator of the spirit. . . . Only great suffering; that great suffering, under which we seem to be over a fire of greenwood, the suffering that takes its time—forces us philosophers to descend into our nethermost depths. . . .

(NCW "Epilogue")

Nietzsche's belief in the horror of existence is largely, if not completely, overlooked by most scholars.4 I hope to show that it had a profound effect on his thought, indeed, that he cannot be adequately understood without seeing the centrality of this concept. To begin to understand its importance, let us consider three different visions of the human condition.

The first holds that we live in a benign cosmos. It is as if it were purposively planned for us and we for it. We fit, we belong, we are at home in this cosmos. We are confirmed and reinforced by it. Our natural response is a desire to know it and thus to appreciate our fit into it. Let us call this the designed cosmos. Roughly speaking, this is the traditional view held by most philosophers from Plato and Aristotle through the medievals. And for the most part it has disappeared in the modern world—few really believe in it anymore.

The second vision backs off from the assumptions required by the first. This view started with Francis Bacon, if not before, and it is the view of most moderns. Here the cosmos is neither alien nor designed for us. It is neither terrifying nor benign. The cosmos is neutral and, most importantly, malleable. Human beings must come to understand the cosmos through science and control it through technology. We must make it fit us. It does not fit us by design. We must work on it, transform it, and mold it into a place where we can be at home. We must create our own place. For these modern thinkers, we end up with more than the ancients and medievals had. We end up with a fit like they had, but we get the added satisfaction of bringing it about ourselves, accomplishing it through our own endeavor, individuality, and freedom. Let us call this the perfectible cosmos.

The third vision takes the cosmos to be alien. It was not designed for human beings at all; nor were they designed for it. We just do not fit. We do not belong. And we never will. The cosmos is horrible, terrifying, and we will never surmount this fact. It is a place where human beings suffer for no reason at all. It is best never to have been born. Let us call this the horrific cosmos. This is Nietzsche's view.

Nietzsche simply dismisses the designed cosmos, which few believe in anymore anyway (WP 12a). On the other hand, Nietzsche takes the perfectible cosmos very seriously. He resists it with every fiber of his being.5 For Nietzsche, we must stop wasting time and energy hoping to change things, improve them, make progress (see, e.g., WP 40, 90, 684)—the outlook of liberals, socialists, and even Christians, all of whom Nietzsche tends to lump together and excoriate. For [End Page 50] Nietzsche, we cannot reduce suffering, and to keep hoping that we can will simply weaken us. Instead, we must conceal an alien and terrifying cosmos if we hope to live in it. And we must develop the strength to do so. We must toughen ourselves. We need more suffering, not less. It has "created all enhancements of man so far . . ." (BGE 225, 44; WP 957; GM II:7).

If we look deeply into the essence of things, into the horror of existence, Nietzsche thinks we will be overwhelmed—paralyzed. Like Hamlet we will not be able to act, because we will see that action cannot change the eternal nature of things (BT 7). We must see, Nietzsche says, that "a profound illusion . . . first saw the light of the world in the person of Socrates: the unshakeable faith that thought . . . can penetrate the deepest abysses of being, and that thought is capable not only of knowing being but even of correcting it. This sublime metaphysical illusion accompanies science as an instinct . . ." (BT 15). In Nietzsche's view, we cannot change things. Instead, with Hamlet we should "feel it to be ridiculous or humiliating that [we] should be asked to set right a world that is out of joint" (BT 7; cf. TI "Anti-Nature," 6).

Knowledge of the horror of existence kills action—which requires distance and illusion. The horror and meaninglessness of existence must be veiled if we are to live and act. What we must do, Nietzsche thinks, is construct a meaning for suffering. Suffering we can handle. Meaningless suffering, suffering for no reason at all, we cannot handle. So we give suffering a meaning. **We invent a meaning**. We create an illusion. The Greeks constructed gods for whom wars and other forms of suffering were festival plays and thus an occasion to be celebrated by the poets. Christians imagine a God for whom suffering is punishment for sin (GM II:7; cf. D 78).

One might find all this unacceptable. After all, isn't it just obvious that we can change things, reduce suffering, improve existence, and make progress? Isn't it just obvious that modern science and technology have done so? Isn't it just absurd for Nietzsche to reject the possibility of significant change? Hasn't such change already occurred?

Well, perhaps not. Even modern environmentalists might resist all this obviousness. They might respond in a rather Nietzschean vein that technology may have caused as many problems as it has solved. The advocate of the perfectible cosmos, on the other hand, would no doubt counter such Nietzschean pessimism by arguing that even if technology does cause some problems, the solution to those problems can only come from better technology. Honesty requires us to admit, however, that this is merely a hope, not something for which we already have evidence, not something that it is absurd to doubt—not at all something obvious. Further technology may or may not improve things. The widespread use of antibiotics seems to have done a miraculous job of improving our health and reducing suffering, but we are also discovering that such antibiotics give rise to even more powerful bacteria that are immune to those [End Page 51] antibiotics. We have largely eliminated diseases like cholera, smallpox, malaria, and tuberculosis, but we have produced cancer and heart disease. We can cure syphilis and gonorrhea, but we now have AIDS.

Even if we could show that it will be possible to continuously reduce suffering, it is very unlikely that we will ever eliminate it. If that is so, then it remains a real question whether it is not better to face suffering, use it as a discipline, perhaps even increase it, so as to toughen ourselves, rather than let it weaken us, allow it to dominate us, by continually hoping to overcome it.

But whatever we think about the possibility of reducing suffering, the question may well become moot. Nietzsche tells a story: "**Once upon a time, in some out of the way corner of that universe which is dispersed into numberless twinkling solar systems, there was a star upon which clever beasts invented knowing. That was the most arrogant and mendacious minute of 'world history,' but nevertheless, it was only a minute. After nature had drawn a few breaths, the star cooled and congealed, and the clever beasts had to die**" (TL 1, 79). Whatever progress we might think we are making in reducing suffering, whatever change we think we are bringing about, it may all amount to nothing more than a brief and accidental moment in biological time, whose imminent disappearance will finally confirm the horror and meaninglessness of existence.

The disagreement here is not so much about the quantity of suffering that we can expect to find in the world but, rather, its nature. For proponents of the designed cosmos, suffering is basically accidental. It is not fundamental or central

to life. It is not a necessary part of the nature of things. It does not make up the essence of existence. We must develop virtue, and then we can basically expect to fit and be at home in the cosmos. For the proponents of a perfectible cosmos, suffering is neither essential nor unessential. The cosmos is neutral. We must work on it to reduce suffering. We must bring about our own fit. For Nietzsche, ==even if we can change this or== that, even if we can reduce suffering here and there, ==what cannot be changed for human beings is that suffering is fundamental== and central to life. The very nature of things, the very essence of existence, means suffering. Moreover, it means meaningless suffering—suffering for no reason at all. That cannot be changed—it can only be concealed.

Nietzsche does not reject all forms of change. What he rejects is the sort of change necessary for a perfectible cosmos. He rejects the notion that science and technology can transform the essence of things—he rejects the notion that human effort can significantly reduce physical suffering. Instead, he only thinks it possible to build up the power necessary to construct meaning in a meaningless world and thus to conceal the horror of existence, which cannot be eliminated.

We cannot prove the opposite view, and I do not think we can dismiss Nietzsche's view simply because it goes counter to the assumptions of [End Page 52] Christianity, science, liberalism, socialism, and so forth. And we certainly cannot dismiss this view if we hope to understand Nietzsche. At any rate, for Nietzsche, we cannot eliminate suffering; we can only seek to mask it.

[INSERT SPECIFIC LINKS]

SUFFERING 1NC

Impact: The affirmative's guilty hand-wringing over the problem of poverty reflects a nihilistic self-hatred that will culminate in mass destruction
Bruckner, French writer and philosopher, 19**86**
[Pascal, *..The Tears of the White Man: Compassion as Contempt*, p.63-70]

    What is our wealth, in short? "A sort of economic Nazism created by a master race of the wealthy, who reign over a mass of undernourished people."39 After this, how can we fail to see ourselves as monsters devastated by shame?4°
    These are fallacious comparisons, of course, because they always fail to mention the different levels of industrialization that by themselves explain the huge differences in consumption between countries. When socioeconomic conditions are radically different, precise figures lose all validity and serve no purpose other than for slogans and reproaches. But there is no value in pointing out the uselessness of this quantitative overkill. Excess is the enemy of precision, and overstatement is deceptive. **Overabundance of numbers becomes the rule, and indignant speeches answer with millions of starving people and contemptuous citations of the record books, where the number of hungry people is listed alongside the largest number of sausages, the longest kiss, the highest hairdo, and so on. These statistics pretend to be encyclopedias of suffering, packages of agony,41 and the officious indicators of one sole message: We are all parasites and cannibals**. 42
Suffering humanity is placed on a scale and, on balance, the West is portrayed as worthless. Our way of life is put in numerical terms in order to ridicule it. The reasoning behind our scolding Third World-lovers is that, the less we suffer, the more we must feel responsible. An elaborate, ramshackle, logical system that tries to establish a causal link, no matter how far-fetched, is set up between myself and this suffering. Highly technical explanations are worked out to demonstrate that, in the final analysis, it is still Europe that pulls the strings .41 It is like the world of a detective story, the infallible deduction that unravels the problems of hunger like Sherlock Holmes:

> Who is guilty of these massacres that fill the morgues of the Third World every day? Is it mere fate? Are these men, women, and children the victims of uncontrollable and recurring natural disasters? No. For every victim, there is a murderer.

    Thenceforth, all of us, young and old, are at fault for what goes wrong on our unhappy planet.45 We are participating in the destruction of the world 46-from agricultural breakthroughs to woodcutting technology" to female circumcision.
    The West is the great and only guilty party to all the evils of the world. In sum, we are inhuman and criminal because we do not want others to exist,49 and the causes of famine lie before us on the dinner table.5° It makes no difference that this accusation cannot be proven. Guilt is an easy way of bridging distinctions and doing away with intermediaries, because it draws a pitiless red line between their poverty and our sated appetites. Remorse comes *before* wrongdoing, because our error is not in sinning but in existing. The mania of suspicion makes us guilty before the fact for the disintegration of Ghanaian society, for empty stores in Angola, for the rising prices in Central America, for clouds of locusts in black Africa, for hurricanes in the Caribbean, tribal warfare in New Guinea, and so on. Every study, every book on the Third World, whatever its subject, says the same thing. The guilt of the accused is confirmed, and more evidence is accumulated against him. They are like a storekeeper's books, where the long list of the evils of the Old World is neatly spelled out, while the merits of the Southern hemisphere stand out from the details of an implicit frame of reference that is never questioned. They are an exercise in malediction, which is supposed to make our horror grow as it convinces us all-salaried workers, professors, lawyers, laborers, truckdrivers-of our fundamental thievery. The reader himself is a convenient scoundrel…
    Obsessive repetition takes the place of a concern for precision, because we have to make our own breast-beating offering for the suffering of the world. **Duty, that nameless and insatiable goddess, conducts a Kafkaesque trial against Europeans. This is the bad faith of bad consciences-unable to give solace for one scourge or another in any real way, we accuse ourselves of being the cause. The old relationship between colonizer and colonized is endlessly atoned for, and we search for aftereffects of imperialism everywhere. We can thus mortify our flesh with delight because we know how rotten we are.**
    The conclusion is that our very existence is an insult to the human race. We have only one duty-to wipe ourselves off the face of the earth.51 The future of the West is self-destruction.

SUFFERING 1NC

Alternative:
Affirm the status quo. Embracing the inevitability of suffering allows us to overcome the nihilism of the aff's ascetic ideal. This confrontation with the inevitability of suffering strengthens us and makes us capable of non-resentful modes of relating to others.

Thiele '90 [Leslie, Professor of Political Science at the University of Florida, "Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of the Soul: A Study of Heroic Individualism", pg 198-201]

Nietzsche's atheism did not spell the end of his attachment to the idea of love of fate. With God out of the way, man comes into his own. What cannot be controlled can be interpreted creatively. **The sign of a higher morality is a full affirmation of life as it unfolds.** Citing Emerson, Nietzsche was wont to say that for the higher man each day is holy, that is, each day is made holy by the full exercise of his creative powers.2 Already as a philology student at Leipzig Nietzsche had expounded this view in a letter: "Indeed it remains within our power to use each event, small and large accidents for our improvement and fitness, and as it were to exhaust it . . . . It rests upon our disposition: the worth we attribute to an event has that value for us. Thoughtless and immoral people do not know of such an intentionality of fate" *(NB 20.2.67)*. **Fate is no longer a providential distribution of meaning and justice; it is simply what befalls us. However, one must be of the disposition and have the power literally to make the best of it.** One must be like those "masters of musical improvisation" who are capable of "breathing a beautiful meaning and a soul into an accident" (CS *243)*. One then ceases to have "wishes," Nietzsche wrote, because one learns to harvest the best fruits of knowledge from whatever land one passes through *(NB 18,10.75)*. **Indeed, man is the "soil" upon which the "seedcorn" fate is scattered: it is the quality of the soil that determines if anything of beauty or use will grow** *(HH 293)*.

Amor fati is **not fatalism. The fatalist believes himself to be as a leaf in the wind: the forces of nature, of history, of chance, are simply too great to be affected or combatted.** Resignation yields rest and comfort. *Amor fati* **induces struggle with these forces. Fate is not merely what happens** *to* **one, but what happens as a result of one's active involvement with life. The love of fate is the love of this involvement and of its outcome.** One cherishes the opportunity to do battle with *fortuna*.

The fatalist actually resents fate. He has not learned how he might joyfully partake as the "iron hands of necessity shake the dice box of chance" (D 81). **The lover of fate,** on the other hand, **makes everything that comes his way a cause for celebration. Temporary defeats are welcomed as preparations for greater victories. Pain and privation are seen as tools in the workshop of wisdom.** One is having constantly to hone these tools against *fortu no's* stone, the better to achieve tomorrow what has eluded one today. Those practiced• in this trade are rewarded for their efforts.3 They ride the waves of destiny to win their prize: **the opportunity to create from their haphazard voyage something of meaning and beauty.** Fate becomes a sort of providence for those capable of breathing soul into accident. **To love one's fate means fully to affirm one's life, not resentfully to oppose it.** The paradox, however, is that it is the most difficult of struggles to love fate. **Only constant self-overcoming develops the power necessary to embrace destiny.** Only a changing self can accept what is. Once again, it is only through the eyes of deficiency that ideals are seen. The hero negates and affirms himself, endlessly struggling to be at rest, waging inner war that he may truly love himself. Love of fate is won, temporarily, in this ongoing battle for peace. For man it is a fleeting mood.

In *The Gay Science* Nietzsche first introduced the term *amor fati as* something yet unachieved: "1 want to learn more and more to see as beautiful what is necessary in things; then I shall be one of those who make things beautiful. *Ainor fall:* Let that be my love henceforth! . . . some day I wish to be only a Yes-sayer" (GS *223)*. To wish is not to be. Indeed, one must *be* a no-sayer, a destroyer and struggler, if one is to become something different, namely, a yes-sayer. **The ideal that drives one to grow and change must, if one is to embrace fate, eventually sublimate into the love of what is.**

The extent to which one demonstrates this love reveals one's affinity with the overman: "**My formula for greatness in a human being is** *aniorfati:* **that one wants nothing to be different, not forward, not backward, not in all eternity. Not merely bear what is necessary, still less conceal it-all idealism is mendaciousness in the face of what is necessary-but love it"** *(EH 258)*. *Amor fati is* the "highest state" attainable to man, constituting a "Dionysian relationship to existence" *(WP 536)*. An abundance of strength and joy allows one to affirm all-past, present, and future. The affirmation of the present and future may be facilitated through hope. One may joyfully greet one's trials believing 'that their hardships will yield greater strength, that the toil will prove worth the trouble. But what of the past? To want nothing to be different in the past is the true measure of *amorfati*. Here acceptance is not enough. It cannot be mixed with hope to **yield a higher** grade of satisfaction. One must indeed love one's fate to desire that it be as it was without the slightest modification. Otherwise the will, impotent regarding the past, will be wrathful and full of vengeance. "To redeem the past and to transform every 'it was' into an 'I wanted it thus!'-that alone do I call redemption!" Zarathustra proclaims *(Z 161-62)*. **True love of fate demands that one no longer need hope in order to live joyfully.,**

Fate is loved when one is consumed by living it. Life must not serve as a means to some other end, even if that end is growth. The experiences of life, past and present, are not to be seen as stepping-stones to preferred states in the present or future: "Becoming must be explained without recourse to final intentions; becoming must appear justified at every moment ... the present must absolutely not be justified by reference to a future, nor the past by reference to the present" (WP 377). **Living, like loving, must be its own reward.**

SECURITY 1NC

LIFE IS RISKY, AND ONLY AN IDIOT THINKS THEY WILL LIVE FOREVER. THEIR NUCLEAR WAR IMPACT REFLECT THE SAD RESENTMENT INHERENT TO "SECURITY"—A FALSE BELIEF THAT THEY CAN ABOLISH THE RISKS THAT THREATEN OUR EXISTENCE. SECURITY'S PROMISE OF SAFETY RESULTS ONLY IN MASSIVE STATE VIOLENCE

DER DERRIAN 98

[JAMES, WATSON INSTITUTE RESEARCH PROFESSOR OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES AT BROWN UNIVERSITY, "THE VALUES OF SECURITY: HOBBES, MARX, NIETZSCHE, AND BAUDRILLARD", JSTOR]

Nietzsche transvalues both Hobbes's and Marx's interpretations of security through a genealogy of modes of being. His method is not to uncover some deep meaning or value for security, but to destabilize the intolerable fictional identities of the past which have been created out of fear, and to affirm the creative differences which might yield new values for the future. 33 Originating in the paradoxical relationship of a contingent life and a certain death, the history of security reads for Nietzsche as an abnegation, a resentment and,

finally, a transcendence of this paradox. In brief, the history is one of individuals seeking an impossible security from the most radical "other" of life, the terror of death which, once generalized and nationalized, triggers a futile cycle of collective identities seeking security from alien others--who are seeking similarly impossible guarantees. It is a story of differences taking on the otherness of death, and identities calcifying into a fearful sameness. Since Nietzsche has suffered the greatest neglect in international theory, his reinterpretation of security will receive a more extensive treatment here.

One must begin with Nietzsche's idea of the will to power, which he clearly believed to be prior to and generative of all considerations of security. In Beyond Good and Evil , he emphatically establishes the primacy of the will to power: "Physiologists should think before putting down the instinct of self-preservation as the cardinal instinct of an organic being. A living thing seeks above all to discharge its strength--life itself is will to power; self-preservation is only one of the most frequent results." 34

The will to power, then, should not be confused with a Hobbesian perpetual desire for power. It can, in its negative form, produce a reactive and resentful longing for only power, leading, in Nietzsche's view, to a triumph of nihilism. But Nietzsche refers to a positive will to power, an active and affective force of becoming, from which values and meanings--including self-preservation--are produced which affirm life. Conventions of security act to suppress rather than confront the fears endemic

to life, for ". . . life itself is essentially appropriation, injury, overpowering of what is alien and weaker; suppression, hardness, imposition of one's own forms, incorporation and at least, at its mildest, exploitation--but why should one always use those words in which slanderous intent has been imprinted for ages." 35 Elsewhere Nietzsche establishes the pervasiveness of agonism in life: "life is a consequence of war, society itself a means to war." 36 But the denial

of this permanent condition, the effort to disguise it with a consensual rationality or to hide from it with a fictional sovereignty, are all effects of this suppression of fear.

The desire for security is manifested as a collective resentment of difference--that which is not us, not **certain**, not predictable. **Complicit with a negative will to power is the fear-driven desire for protection from the unknown.** Unlike the positive will to power, which produces an aesthetic affirmation of difference, **the search for truth produces a truncated life which conforms to the rationally knowable, to the causally sustainable.** In The Gay Science , Nietzsche asks of the reader: "Look, isn't our need for knowledge precisely this need for the familiar, the will to uncover everything strange, unusual, and questionable, something that no longer disturbs us? Is it not the instinct of fear that bids us to know? And is the jubilation of those who obtain knowledge not the jubilation over the restoration of a sense of security?" 37

The fear of the unknown and the desire for certainty combine to produce a domesticated life, in which causality and rationality become the highest sign of a sovereign self, the surest protection against contingent forces. **The fear of fate assures a belief that everything reasonable is true, and everything true, reasonable.** In short, the security imperative produces, and is sustained by, the strategies of knowledge which seek to explain it. Nietzsche elucidates the nature of this generative relationship in The Twilight of the Idols

The causal instinct is thus conditional upon, and excited by, the feeling of fear. The "why?" shall, if at all possible, not give the cause for its own sake so much as for a particular kind of cause --a cause that is comforting, liberating and relieving. . . . That which is new and strange and has not been experienced before, is excluded as a cause. Thus one not only searches for some kind of explanation, to serve as a cause, but for a particularly selected and preferred kind of explanation--that which most quickly and frequently abolished the feeling of the strange, new and hitherto unexperienced: the most habitual explanations. 38

A safe life requires safe truths. The strange and the alien remain unexamined, **the unknown becomes identified as evil,** and evil provokes hostility--**recycling the desire for security**. **The "influence of timidity," as Nietzsche puts it, creates a people who are willing to subordinate affirmative values to the "necessities" of security**: "they fear change, transitoriness: this expresses a straitened soul, full of mistrust and evil experiences." 39

The unknowable which cannot be contained by force or explained by reason is relegated to the off-world. "Trust," the "good," and other common values come to rely upon an "artificial strength": "the feeling of security such as the Christian possesses; he feels strong in being able to trust, to be patient and composed: he owes this artificial strength to the illusion of being protected by a god." 40 For Nietzsche, of course, only a false sense of security can come from false gods: "Morality and religion belong altogether to the psychology of error : in every single case, cause and effect are confused; or truth is confused with the effects of believing something to be true; or a state of consciousness is confused with its causes." 41

Nietzsche's interpretation of the origins of religion can shed some light on this paradoxical origin and transvaluation of security. In The Genealogy of Morals , Nietzsche sees religion arising from a sense of fear and indebtedness to one's ancestors:The conviction **reigns that it is only through the sacrifices and accomplishments of the ancestors that the tribe exists --and that one has to pay them back with sacrifices and accomplishments:** one thus recognizes a debt that constantly grows greater, since these forebears never cease, in their continued existence as powerful spirits, to accord the tribe new advantages and new strength.

SECURITY 1NC

The affirmative prevents nuclear war, and blinks. The greatest danger is not death or suffering, but the suicidal nihilism fostered by the all-too-careful utilitarianism of the Last Man.
Owen and Ridley, 2K
[David, assistant director of the Centre for Post-Analytic Philosophy at the University of Southampton, Aaron, senior lecture and associate director of the Centre for Post-Analytic Philosophy at the University of Southampton, "Dramatis Personae," in *Why Nietzsche Still?* ed. Alan Schrift, pp. 149-151]

The modern condition offers both a threat and a promise. Nietzsche argues that the self-destruction of the ascetic ideal threatens to undermine our capacities for "self-discipline," "self-surveillance," and "self-overcoming" and our disposition to truthfulness precisely because we now lack an overarching goal in the service of which these capacities and this disposition are cultivated. But this undermining does not entail any diminution of our dissatisfaction with our this-worldly existence: the suffering endemic to life itself remains; all that has gone is the (ascetic) mode of valuing that rendered such suffering meaningful, and hence bearable. Thus Nietzsche discerns the outlines of a creature whose best capacities have atrophied and whose relationship to its own existence is one of perpetual dissatisfaction. The threat here is obvious:

What is to be feared, what has a more calamitous effect than any other calamity, is that man should inspire not profound fear but profound *nausea;* also not great fear but great pity. Suppose these two were one day to unite, they would inevitably beget one of the uncanniest monsters: the "last will" of man, his will to nothingness, nihilism. And a great deal points to this union. (GM III:14)

So **suicidal nihilism beckons**. The one response to the situation that is absolutely ruled out is the one that has so far proved most successful at addressing problems of this sort, namely, adoption of the ascetic ideal, because the present crisis is caused by the self-destruction of that ideal. But Nietzsche argues that two plausible responses to the crisis are nonetheless possible for modern man. Both of these involve the construction of immanent ideals or goals: one response is represented by the type the Last Man, the other by the type the *Ubermensch*.

The first response recognizes the reality of suffering and our (postascetic) inability to accord transcendental significance to it and concludes that the latter provides an overwhelming reason for abolishing the former to whatever extent is possible. This has the effect of elevating the abolition of suffering into a quasitranscendental goal and brings with it a new table of virtues, on which prudence figures largest. In other words, this response takes the form of *a rapport a soi* characterized by a style of calculative rationality directed toward the avoidance of suffering at any cost, for example, of utilitarianism and any other account of human subjectivity that accords preeminence to maximizing preference satisfaction. In Thus *Spoke* Zarathustra Nietzsche portrays this type as follows:
"What is love? What is creation? "What is longing? What is a star?" thus asks the Last Man and blinks.
The earth has become small, and upon it hops the Last Man, who makes everything small. His race is as inexterminable as the flea; the Last Man lives longest.
"We have discovered happiness," say the Last Men and blink.

They have left the places where living was hard: for one needs warmth.

One still loves one's neighbor and rubs oneself against him: for one needs warmth.

Sickness and mistrust count as sins with them: one should go about warily He is a fool who still stumbles over stones or over men!

A little poison now and then: that produces pleasant dreams. And a lot of poison at last, for a pleasant death.

They still work, for work is entertainment. But they take care the entertainment does not exhaust them.

Nobody grows rich or poor any more: both are too much of a burden.

Who still wants to rule? Who obey? Both are too much of a burden.

No herdsman and one herd. Everyone wants the same thing, everyone is the same: whoever thinks otherwise goes voluntarily into the madhouse

"Formerly all the world was mad," say the most acute of them and blink.

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They are clever and know everything that has ever happened: so there is no end to their mockery. They still quarrel, but they soon make up- otherwise indigestion would result.

They have their little pleasure for the day and their little pleasure for the night: but they respect health.

"We have discovered happiness," say the Least Men and blink. (*Z: 1* "Prologue" 5)

Nietzsche's hostility to this first form of response is evident. His general objection to the Last Man is that the Last Man's ideal, like the ascetic ideal, **is committed to the denial of chance and necessity as integral features of human existence**. 'Whereas the ascetic ideal denies chance and necessity per se so that, while suffering remains real, what is objectionable about it is abolished, the Last Man's ideal is expressed as the practical imperative to abolish suffering, and hence, a fortiori, what is objectionable about it that is, our exposure to chance and necessity. This general objection has two specific dimensions. The first is that the Last Man's ideal is unrealizable, insofar as human existence involves ineliminable sources of suffering not least our consciousness that we come into being by chance and cease to be by necessity. Thus the Last Man's ideal is predicated on a neglect of truthfulness. The second dimension of Nietzsche's objection is that pursuit of the Last Man's ideal impoverishes and arbitrarily restricts our understanding of what we can be and, in doing so, forecloses our future possibilities of becoming otherwise than we are. Thus the Last Man's ideal entails an atrophying of the capacities (for selfovercoming, etc.) bequeathed by the ascetic ideal. Nietzsche brings *these two* dimensions together in *Beyond Good and Evil:*

"*You want, if possible and there is no more insane 'if possible'to abolish suffering* .... Well being as you understand it that is no goal, that seems to us an *end*, a state that soon makes man ridiculous and contemptiblethat makes his destruction *desirable*" (*BGE* 225).

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SECURITY 1NC

Life is pain. Anyone who tells you otherwise is selling something. Instead of deluding ourselves with dreams of escaping the inevitability of suffering followed by a meaningless death, we should embrace this suffering as a testing and a show of strength.

Kain, professor of philosophy at Santa Clara, 20**07**
[Philip J., "Nietzsche, Eternal Recurrence, and the Horror of Existence," *Journal of Nietzsche Studies 33 (2007),* 49-63]
At the center of Nietzsche's vision lies his concept of the "terror and horror of existence" (BT 3). As he puts it in The Birth of Tragedy:

> There is an ancient story that King Midas hunted in the forest a long time for the wise Silenus, the companion of Dionysus. . . . When Silenus at last fell into his hands, the king asked what was the best and most desirable of all things for man. Fixed and immovable, the demigod said not a word, till at last, urged by the king, he gave a shrill laugh and broke out into these words: "Oh, wretched ephemeral race, children of chance and misery, why do you compel me to tell you what it would be most expedient for you not to hear? What is best of all is utterly beyond your reach: not to be born, not to be, to be nothing. But the second best for you is—to die soon."

   (BT 3)1

Why is it best never to have been born? Because all we can expect as human beings is to suffer. Yet, still, this is not precisely the problem. As Nietzsche tells us in On the Genealogy of Morals, human beings can live with suffering. What they cannot live with is **meaningless suffering**—suffering for no reason at all (GM III:28). In Nietzsche's view we are "surrounded by a fearful void . . ." (GM III:28; cf. WP 55). We live in an empty, meaningless cosmos. We cannot look into reality without being overcome. Indeed, in Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche even suggests that "it might be a basic characteristic of existence that those who would know it completely would perish . . ." (BGE 39; cf. WP 822).

   And it was not just intellectual reflection that led Nietzsche to a belief in the horror of existence. He lived it himself.2 In a letter of April 10, 1888, he writes: "Around 1876 my health grew worse. . . . There were extremely painful and obstinate headaches which exhausted all my strength. They increased over long years, to reach a climax at which pain was habitual, so that any given year contained for me two hundred days of pain. . . . My specialty was to endure the extremity of pain . . . with complete lucidity for two or three days in succession, with continuous vomiting of mucus."3 In Nietzsche contra Wagner, he tells us how significant this suffering was for him:

> I have often asked myself whether I am not much more deeply indebted to the hardest years of my life than to any others. . . . And as to my prolonged illness, [End Page 49] do I not owe much more to it than I owe to my health? To it I owe a higher kind of health, a sort of health which grows stronger under everything that does not actually kill it!—To it, I owe even my philosophy. . . . Only great suffering is the ultimate emancipator of the spirit. . . . Only great suffering; that great suffering, under which we seem to be over a fire of greenwood, the suffering that takes its time—forces us philosophers to descend into our nethermost depths. . . .

   (NCW "Epilogue")

Nietzsche's belief in the horror of existence is largely, if not completely, overlooked by most scholars.4 I hope to show that it had a profound effect on his thought, indeed, that he cannot be adequately understood without seeing the centrality of this concept. To begin to understand its importance, let us consider three different visions of the human condition.

   The first holds that we live in a benign cosmos. It is as if it were purposively planned for us and we for it. We fit, we belong, we are at home in this cosmos. We are confirmed and reinforced by it. Our natural response is a desire to know it and thus to appreciate our fit into it. Let us call this the designed cosmos. Roughly speaking, this is the traditional view held by most philosophers from Plato and Aristotle through the medievals. And for the most part it has disappeared in the modern world—few really believe in it anymore.

The second vision backs off from the assumptions required by the first. This view started with Francis Bacon, if not before, and it is the view of most moderns. Here the cosmos is neither alien nor designed for us. It is neither terrifying nor benign. The cosmos is neutral and, most importantly, malleable. Human beings must come to understand the cosmos through science and control it through technology. We must make it fit us. It does not fit us by design. We must work on it, transform it, and mold it into a place where we can be at home. We must create our own place. For these modern thinkers, we end up with more than the ancients and medievals had. We end up with a fit like they had, but we get the

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added satisfaction of bringing it about ourselves, accomplishing it through our own endeavor, individuality, and freedom. Let us call this the perfectible cosmos.

The third vision takes the cosmos to be alien. It was not designed for human beings at all; nor were they designed for it. We just do not fit. We do not belong. And we never will. The cosmos is horrible, terrifying, and we will never surmount this fact. It is a place where human beings suffer for no reason at all. It is best never to have been born. Let us call this the horrific cosmos. This is Nietzsche's view.

Nietzsche simply dismisses the designed cosmos, which few believe in anymore anyway (WP 12a). On the other hand, Nietzsche takes the perfectible cosmos very seriously. He resists it with every fiber of his being.5 For Nietzsche, we must stop wasting time and energy hoping to change things, improve them, make progress (see, e.g., WP 40, 90, 684)—the outlook of liberals, socialists, and even Christians, all of whom Nietzsche tends to lump together and excoriate. For [End Page 50] Nietzsche, we cannot reduce suffering, and to keep hoping that we can will simply weaken us. Instead, we must conceal an alien and terrifying cosmos if we hope to live in it. And we must develop the strength to do so. We must toughen ourselves. We need more suffering, not less. It has "created all enhancements of man so far . . ." (BGE 225, 44; WP 957; GM II:7).

If we look deeply into the essence of things, into the horror of existence, Nietzsche thinks we will be overwhelmed—paralyzed. Like Hamlet we will not be able to act, because we will see that action cannot change the eternal nature of things (BT 7). We must see, Nietzsche says, that "a profound illusion . . . first saw the light of the world in the person of Socrates: the unshakeable faith that thought . . . can penetrate the deepest abysses of being, and that thought is capable not only of knowing being but even of correcting it. This sublime metaphysical illusion accompanies science as an instinct . . ." (BT 15). In Nietzsche's view, we cannot change things. Instead, with Hamlet we should "feel it to be ridiculous or humiliating that [we] should be asked to set right a world that is out of joint" (BT 7; cf. TI "Anti-Nature," 6).

Knowledge of the horror of existence kills action—which requires distance and illusion. The horror and meaninglessness of existence must be veiled if we are to live and act. What we must do, Nietzsche thinks, is construct a meaning for suffering. Suffering we can handle. Meaningless suffering, suffering for no reason at all, we cannot handle. So we give suffering a meaning. **We invent a meaning**. We create an illusion. The Greeks constructed gods for whom wars and other forms of suffering were festival plays and thus an occasion to be celebrated by the poets. Christians imagine a God for whom suffering is punishment for sin (GM II:7; cf. D 78).

One might find all this unacceptable. After all, isn't it just obvious that we can change things, reduce suffering, improve existence, and make progress? Isn't it just obvious that modern science and technology have done so? Isn't it just absurd for Nietzsche to reject the possibility of significant change? Hasn't such change already occurred?

Well, perhaps not. Even modern environmentalists might resist all this obviousness. They might respond in a rather Nietzschean vein that technology may have caused as many problems as it has solved. The advocate of the perfectible cosmos, on the other hand, would no doubt counter such Nietzschean pessimism by arguing that even if technology does cause some problems, the solution to those problems can only come from better technology. Honesty requires us to admit, however, that this is merely a hope, not something for which we already have evidence, not something that it is absurd to doubt—not at all something obvious. Further technology may or may not improve things. The widespread use of antibiotics seems to have done a miraculous job of improving our health and reducing suffering, but we are also discovering that such antibiotics give rise to even more powerful bacteria that are immune to those [End Page 51] antibiotics. We have largely eliminated diseases like cholera, smallpox, malaria, and tuberculosis, but we have produced cancer and heart disease. We can cure syphilis and gonorrhea, but we now have AIDS.

Even if we could show that it will be possible to continuously reduce suffering, it is very unlikely that we will ever eliminate it. If that is so, then it remains a real question whether it is not better to face suffering, use it as a discipline, perhaps even increase it, so as to toughen ourselves, rather than let it weaken us, allow it to dominate us, by continually hoping to overcome it.

But whatever we think about the possibility of reducing suffering, the question may well become moot. Nietzsche tells a story: "**Once upon a time, in some out of the way corner of that universe which is dispersed into numberless twinkling solar systems, there was a star upon which clever beasts invented knowing. That was the most arrogant and mendacious minute of 'world history,' but nevertheless, it was only a minute. After nature had drawn a few breaths, the star cooled and congealed, and the clever beasts had to die**" (TL 1, 79). Whatever progress we might think we are making in reducing suffering, whatever change we think we are bringing about, it may all amount to nothing more than a brief and accidental moment in biological time, whose imminent disappearance will finally confirm the horror and meaninglessness of existence.

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The disagreement here is not so much about the quantity of suffering that we can expect to find in the world but, rather, its nature. For proponents of the designed cosmos, suffering is basically accidental. It is not fundamental or central to life. It is not a necessary part of the nature of things. It does not make up the essence of existence. We must develop virtue, and then we can basically expect to fit and be at home in the cosmos. For the proponents of a perfectible cosmos, suffering is neither essential nor unessential. The cosmos is neutral. We must work on it to reduce suffering. We must bring about our own fit. For Nietzsche, even if we can change this or that, even if we can reduce suffering here and there, what cannot be changed for human beings is that suffering is fundamental and central to life. The very nature of things, the very essence of existence, means suffering. Moreover, it means meaningless suffering—suffering for no reason at all. That cannot be changed—it can only be concealed.

Nietzsche does not reject all forms of change. What he rejects is the sort of change necessary for a perfectible cosmos. He rejects the notion that science and technology can transform the essence of things—he rejects the notion that human effort can significantly reduce physical suffering. Instead, he only thinks it possible to build up the power necessary to construct meaning in a meaningless world and thus to conceal the horror of existence, which cannot be eliminated.

We cannot prove the opposite view, and I do not think we can dismiss Nietzsche's view simply because it goes counter to the assumptions of [End Page 52] Christianity, science, liberalism, socialism, and so forth. And we certainly cannot dismiss this view if we hope to understand Nietzsche. At any rate, for Nietzsche, we cannot eliminate suffering; we can only seek to mask it.

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SECURITY 1NC

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Embrace the status quo. Acceptance of the necessity of the existing world is also acceptance of the inevitability of chaos and chance. We must submit ourselves to the one dice-roll of the status quo, rather than resentfully trying to control the dice through claims to predictions and causality.

Deleuze 1986 (Gilles, French philosopher, "Nietzsche and Philosophy," Columbia UP, p. 25-7) vp

The game has two moments which are those of a dicethrow — the dice that is thrown and the dice that falls back. Nietzsche presents the dicethrow as taking place on two distinct tables, the earth and the sky. The earth where the dice are thrown and the sky where the dice fall back: "if ever I have played dice with the gods at their table, the earth, so that the earth trembled and broke open and streams of fire snorted forth; for the earth is a table of the gods, and trembling with creative new words and the dice throws of the gods" (Z III "The Seven Seals" 3 p. 245). "0 sky above me, you pure and lofty sky! This is now your purity to me, that there is no eternal reason-spider and spider's web in you; that you are to me a dance floor for divine chances, that you are to me a god's table for divine dice and dicers" (Z III "Before Sunrise" p. 186). But these two tables are not two worlds. They are the two hours of a single world, the two moments of a single world, midnight and midday3 the hour when the dice are thrown, the hour when the dice fall back. Nietzsche insists on the two tables of life which are also the two moments of the player or the artist; "We temporarily abandon life, in order to then temporarily fix our gaze upon it." The dicethrow affirms becoming and it affirms the being of becoming. It is not a matter of several dicethrows which, because of their number, finally reproduce the same combination. On the contrary, it is a matter of a single dicethrow which, due to the number of the combination produced, comes to reproduce itself as such. It is not that a large number of throws produce the repetition of a combination but rather the number of the combination which produces the repetition of the dicethrow. **The dice which are thrown once are the affirmation of chance, the combination which they form on falling is the affirmation of necessity.** Necessity is affirmed of chance in that being is affirmed of becoming and unity is affirmed of multiplicity. It will be replied, in vain, that thrown to chance, the dice do not necessarily produce the winning combination, the double six which brings back the dicethrow. This is true, but only insofar as the player did not know how to affirm chance from the outset. For, just as unity does not suppress or deny multiplicity, necessity does not suppress or abolish chance. **Nietzsche identifies chance with multiplicity, with fragments, with parts, with chaos:** the chaos of the dice that are shaken and then thrown. **Nietzsche turns chance into an affirmation**. The sky itself is called "chance-sky", "innocence-sky" (Z III "Before Sunrise"); the reign of Zarathustra is called "great chance" (Z IV "The Honey Offering" and III "Of Old and New Law Tables"; Zarathustra calls himself the "redeemer of chance"). "By chance, he is the world's oldest nobility, which I have given back to all things; I have released them from their servitude under purpose . . . I have found this happy certainty in all things: that they prefer to dance on the feet of chance" (Z III "Before Sunrise" p. 186); "My doctrine is 'Let chance come to me: it is as innocent as a little child!' "(Z III "On the Mount of Olives" p. 194). What Nietzsche calls necessity (destiny) is thus **never the abolition but rather the combination of chance itself. Necessity is affirmed of chance in as much as chance itself affirmed.** For there is only a single combination of chance as such, a single way of combining all the parts of chance, a way which is like the unity of multiplicity, that is to say number or necessity. There are many numbers with increasing or decreasing probabilities, but only one number of chance as such, one fatal number which reunites all the fragments of chance, like midday gathers together the scattered parts of midnight. This is why it is sufficient for the player to affirm chance once in order to produce the number which brings back the dice- throw.22 To know how to affirm chance is to know how to play. But we do not know how to play, "Timid, ashamed, awkward, like a tiger whose leap has failed. But what of that you dicethrowers! You have not learned to play and mock as a man ought to play and mock!" (Z IV "Of the Higher Man" 14 p. 303). The bad player counts on several throws of the dice, on a great number of throws. In this way he makes use of causality and probability to produce a combination that he sees as desirable. He posits this combination itself as an end to be obtained, hidden behind causality. This is what

Nietzsche means when he speaks of the eternal spider, of the spider's web of reason, "A kind of spider of imperative and formality hidden behind the great web, the great net of causality — we could say, with Charles the Bold when he opposed Louis XI, "I fight the universal spider" (GM III 9). To abolish chance by holding it in the grip of causality and finality, to count on the repetition of throws rather than affirming chance, to anticipate a result instead of affirming necessity — these are all the operations of a bad player. They have their root in reason, but what is the root of reason? The spirit of revenge, nothing but the spirit of revenge, the spider (Z II "Of the Tarantulas"). Ressentiment in the repetition of throws, bad conscience in the belief in a purpose But, in this way, all that will ever be obtained are more or less probable relative numbers. That the universe has no purpose, that it has no end to hope for any more than it has causes to be known — this is the certainty necessary to play well (VP Ill 465). The dicethrow fails because chance has not been affirmed enough in one throw. It has not been affirmed enough in order to produce the fatal number which necessarily reunites all the fragments and brings back the dicethrow. We must therefore attach the greatest importance to the following conclusion: for the couple causality-finality, probability-finality, for the opposition and the synthesis of these terms, for the web of these terms, Nietzsche substitutes the Dionysian correlation of chance-necessity, the **Dionysian couple chance-destiny. Not a probability distributed over several throws but all chance at one, not a final, willed combination, but the fatal combination, fatal and loved**, **amor fati; not the return of a combination by the number of throws, but the repetition of a dicethrow by the nature of the fatally obtained number.**

LINK – THE PLAN

THE AFFIRMATIVE'S NEED TO SOLVE THE WORLD'S PROBLEMS IS EMBLEMATIC OF THE SOCRATIC DRIVE TO RESOLVE LIFE'S INEVITABLE CHAOS. THROUGH THE PLAN THEY CAN "CORRECT EXISTENCE," MOLDING THE APPARENT WORLD OF CHAOS INTO THE PERFECT IMAGE PRODUCED BY THEIR RESENTMENT.

SAURETTE 1996

[PAUL, "I MISTRUST ALL SYSTEMIZERS AND AVOID THEM: NIETZSCHE ARENDT AND THE CRISIS OF THE WILL TO ORDER IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY, JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES VOL. 25 NO. 1]

According to Nietzsche, the philosophical foundation of a society is the set of ideas which give it meaning to the phenomenon of human existence within a given cultural framework. As one manifestation of the Will to Power, this will to meaning fundamentally influences the social and political organization of a particular community. Anything less than a profound historical interrogation of the most basic philosophical foundations of our civilization, then, misconceives the origins of values which we take to be intrinsic an d natural. Nietzsche suggests, therefore, to understand the development of our modern conception society and politics, we must reconsider the crucial influence of the platonic formulation of Socratic thought. Nietzsche claims that pre-Socratic Greece based its philosophical justifications of life on heroic myths which honored tragedy and competition. Life was understood as a contest in which both the joyful and ordered (Apollonian) and chaotic and suffering (Dionysian) Aspects of life were accepted and affirmed as inescapable aspects of human existence. However this incarnation of the will to power as a tragedy weakened, and became unable to sustain meaning in Greek life. Greek myths no longer instilled the self-respect and self-control that had upheld the pre-Socratic social order. 'Everywhere the instincts were in anarchy; everywhere people but five steps from excess: the monstrum in animo was a universal danger. No longer willing to accept the tragic hardness and self-mastery of pre-Socratic myth, Greek thought yielded to decadence a search for a new social foundation which would soften the tragedy of life. While still giving meaning to existence. In this context, Socrates' thought became paramount. In the words of Nietzsche, Socrates Saw behind his aristocratic Athenians; he grasped that his case, the idiosyncrasy of his case, was no longer exceptional. The same kind of denigration was everywhere silently preparing itself: the old Athens was coming to an end. And Socrates understood that the world had no need of him – his expedient, his cure and his personal art of self-preservation. Socrates realized that his search for an ultimate and eternal intellectual standard paralleled the widespread yearnings for assurance and stability within society. His expedient, his cure? An Alternative will to power. An Alternate Foundation that promised mastery and control, not through acceptance of the tragic life, but through the disavowal of the instinctual, the contingent and the problematic. In response to the failing power of its foundational myths, greece tried to renounce the very experience that had given rise to tragedy by retreating /escaping into the Apollonian world promised by Socratic reason. In Nietzsche's words, '[r]ationality was divined as a savior... it was their last expedient. The fanaticism with which the whole of Greek thought throws itself at rationality betrays a state of emergency : one was peril, one had only one choice: either to perish or be absurdly rational..." Thus Socrates codified the wider fear of instability into an intellectual framework. The Socratic Will to Truth is characterized by the attempt to understand and order life rationally by renouncing the Dionysian elements of existence and privileging an idealized Apollonian order. As life is inescapably comprised of both order and disorder, however, the promise of control through Socratic reason is only possibly by creating a 'Real World' of eternal and meaningful forms, in opposition to an 'Apparent World' of transitory physical existence. Suffering and Contingency is contained within the apparent world, disparaged, devalued and ignored in relation to the ideal order of the real world. Essential to the Socratic will to truth, then, is

the fundamental contradiction between the experience of Dionysian suffering in the apparent world and the idealized order of the Real World. According to Nietzsche, this dichotomized model lead to the emergence of a uniquely 'modern' understanding of life in which one could only view suffering as the result of an imperfection of the apparent world. This outlook created a modern notion of responsibility in which the Dionysian elements of life could be understood only as a phenomenon for which someone or something is to

blame. Nietzsche terms this philosophically induced condition ressentiment. And argues that it signaled a potential crisis of the Will to Truth by exposing the central contradiction of the Socratic resolution.   This contradiction however, was resolved historically through the aggressive universalisation of the Socratic ideal by Christianity. According to Nietzsche, acetic Christianity exacerbated the Socratic dichotomization by employing the Apparent World as the responsible agent against which the ressentiment of life could be turned. Blame for suffering fell on individuals within the apparent world, precisely because they did not live up to god, the Truth and the Real World. As Nietzsche wrote, 'I suffer: someone must be to blame for it' thinks every sickly sheep. But his shepherd, the ascetic priest tells him: 'quite easy so my sheep! Someone must be to blame for it but you yourself are this someone, you are alone are to blame for yourself.   You are alone are to blame for yourself – this is brazen and false enough: but one thing is achieved by it, the direction of ressentiment is altered. Faced with the collapse of the Socratic resolution and the prospects of meaninglessness, once again, 'one was in peril, one had only one choice: either to perish or be absurdly rational...'" the genius of the ascetic ideal was that it preserved the meaning of the Socratic will to power as the Will to Truth by extrapolating ad absurdium the Socratic division through this reduction.   The real world was transformed from a transcendental world of philosophical escapes into a model towards which the apparent world actively aspired always blaming its contradictory experiences on its own imperfect knowledge and action.   This subtle transformation of the relationship between the dichotomized worlds creates the Will to Order as the defining characteristic of the modern Will to truth. Unable to accept the Dionysian suffering inherent in the Apparent World, the ascetic ressentiment desperately searches for the 'hypnotic sense of nothingness, the repose of deepest sleep, in short absence of suffering'.   According to the ascetic model, however, this escape is possibly only when the apparent world perfectly duplicates the Real World. The will to Order then is the aggressive need increasingly to order the Apparent world in line with the precepts of the moral Truth of the Real World.   The ressentiment of the will to order therefore generates two interrelated reactions. First, the ressentiment engenders a need actively to mould the Apparent World in accordance with the dictates of the ideal, Apollonian Real World. In order to achieve this, however, the acetic ideal also asserts that a truer more complete knowledge of the Real World must be established, creating an ever-increasing will to truth. This self-perpetuating movement creates an interpretive structure within which everything must be understood and ordered in relation to the ascetic truth of the real world as Nietzsche suggests.

LINK – SOLVING OPPRESSION

EXPLOITATION AND OPPRESSION ARE INEVITABLE — THEIR ATTEMPT TO LIMIT THEM REFLECTS THEIR HATRED OF LIFE

FREIDRICH NIETZSCHE, ÜBERMENSCH, **1886** [TR. JUDITH NORMAN, ED. ROLF-PETER HORTSMANN, *BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL*, RE-PUBLISHED BY CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS IN 2002, PP 152-153]

Corruption, as an expression of the fact that anarchy threatens inside the instincts and that the foundation of the affects, which we call "life," has been shaken: corruption means fundamentally different things, depending on the life-form in which it manifests itself. When, for instance, an aristocracy like that in France at the beginning of the Revolution throws away its privileges with a sublime disgust and sacrifices itself to an excess of its moral feeling, then this is corruption. It was really just the final act of that centuries-long corruption in which the aristocracy gradually relinquished its dominant authority and was reduced to a mere function of the kingdom (and, in the end, to its trinket and showpiece). But the essential feature of a good, healthy aristocracy is that it does not feel that it is a function (whether of the kingdom or of the community) but instead feels itself to be the meaning and **highest justification** (of the kingdom or community), — and, consequently, that it accepts in good conscience the sacrifice of countless people who have to be pushed down and shrunk into incomplete human beings, into slaves, into tools, all for the sake of the aristocracy. Its fundamental belief must always be that society cannot exist for the sake of society, but only as the substructure and framework for raising an exceptional type of being up to its higher duty and to a higher state of being. In the same way, the sun-seeking, Javanese climbing plant called the sipo matador will wrap its arms around an oak tree so often and for such a long time that finally, high above the oak, although still supported by it, the plant will be able to unfold its highest crown of foliage and show its happiness in the full, clear light. 259

Mutually refraining from injury, violence, and exploitation, placing your will on par with the other's: in a certain, crude sense, these practices can become good manners between individuals when the right conditions are present (namely, that the individuals have genuinely similar quantities of force and measures of value, and belong together within a single body). But as soon as this principle is taken any further, **and maybe even held to be the fundamental principle of society,** immediately shows itself for what it is: **the will to negate life**, the principle of disintegration and decay. Here we must think things through thoroughly, and ward off any sentimental weakness: life itself is essentially a process of it appropriating, injuring, overpowering the alien and the weaker, oppressing, being harsh, imposing your own form, incorporating, and at least, the very least, exploiting, - but what is the point of always using words that have been stamped with slanderous intentions from time immemorial? Even a body within which (as we presupposed earlier) particular individuals treat each other as equal (which happens in every healthy aristocracy): if this body is living and not dying, it will have to treat other bodies in just those ways that the individuals it contains refrain from treating each other. It will have to be the embodiment of will to power, it will want to grow, spread, grab, win dominance, - not out of any morality or immorality, but because it is alive, and because life is precisely will to power. But there is no issue on which the base European consciousness is less willing to be instructed than this; these days, people everywhere are lost in rapturous enthusiasms, even in scientific disguise, about a future state of society where "the exploitative character" will fall away: — to my ears, that sounds as if someone is promising to invent a life that dispenses with all organic functions. "Exploitation" does not belong to a corrupted or imperfect, primitive society: it belongs to the essence of being alive as a fundamental organic function; it is a result of genuine will to power, which is just the will of life. — Although this is an innovation at the level of theory, — at the level of reality, it is the primal fact of all history. Let us be honest with ourselves to this extent at least! –

LINK – SOLVING OPPRESSION – DENIES LIFE

Life takes it's form and value from all it's manifestations-selectively singling out suffering as a derogatory aspect that must be eliminated prevents the affirmation of life as a totality
Kathleen Marie **Higgins**, Professor at U.T., **2007** [Hicks, Steven V., and Alan Rosenberg. Reading Nietzsche at the Margins. New York: Purdue UP. Print. 61-63 "Although Nierzsche later… high-strung mind"]

Although Nietzsche later finds fault with his first book, he did not abandon the general form of theodicy employed in The Birth of Tragedy, **redemption of suffering by interpreting it as integral to the flux of life as a whole**. This **is the type of theodicy provided by his later "doctrine" of eternal recurrence,** which interprets time as cyclical and repeating.
Nietzsche's first published formulation of his idea of eternal recurrence, in The Gay Science, makes explicit his concern with the suffering involved in life.What if some day or night a demon were to steal after you into your lone- liest loneliness and say to you: "This life as you now live it and have lived it, you will have to live once more and innumerable times more; and there will be nothing new in it, but every painand every joy and every thought and sigh and everything unutterably small or great in your life will have to return to you, all in the same succession and sequence .. ....Would you not throw yourself down and gnash your teeth and curse the demon who spoke thus? Or have you once experienced a tremendous moment when you would have answered him, "You are a god and never
have I heard anything more divine.' If this thought gained possession of you, it would change you as you are or perhaps crush you. The question in each and everything, "Do you desire this once more and innumerable times more?" would lie upon your actions as the greatest weight Or how well disposed would you have to become to yourself and to life to crave nothing more fervently than this ultimate confirmation and seal? (GS, 341
Significantly, Nietzsche does not imply here that accepting suffering is easy. Rhetorically, he indicates his expectation that most people's initial reaction to the recurrence of life would be horror, presumably because the repetition of one's suffering would be entailed. But he goes on to suggest **the possibility of an attitude that valued life's joys so thoroughly that suffering would be accepted along with it. From this perspective suffering is no longer the focus, but instead, the delight of being alive, which by the way necessarily includes suffering**.
Nietzsche claims that the idea of eternal recurrence is "the fundamental conception" of Thus Spoke Zarathustra (EH III: Z, § 1). His protagonist, Zarathustra describes the implications of this vision for an understanding of suffering in "The Drunken Song," the book's penultimate section.
Have you ever said Yes to a single joy? 0 my friends, then you said Yes too to all woe. **All things are entangled, ensnared, enamored; if ever you wanted one thing twice, if ever you said, "You please me, happiness! Abide, moment!" then you wanted all back. All anew, all eternally, all entangled, ensnared, enamored-oh, then you loved the world.** Eternal ones, love it eternally and evermore; and to woe too, you say: go, but return! For all joy wants-eternity. (Z IV, § 19) Even in the final creative year of his life, 1888, Nietzsche continues to assert the importance of eternal recurrence (TI XI, § 4). In Ecce Homo, his autobiography, he explicitly links eternal recurrence to his understanding of the Dionysian. The psychological problem of Zarathustra, according to Nietzsche, is how he that has the hardest, most terrible insight into reality, that has thought "the most abysmal idea," nevertheless does not consider it an objection to existence, not even to its eternal recurrence-but rather one reason more for being himself the eternal Yes to all things, "the tremendous, unbounded saying Yes and Amen."... But **this is the concept of Dionysus once again**. (EH III: Z, S 4) Similarly, Nietzsche reaffirms the connection of eternal recurrence with the Greek tragic vision in Twilight of the Idols, another work of 1888. After referring to the Dionysian mysteries, Nietzsche asks, What was it that the Hellene guaranteed himself by means of these mysteries? Eternal life, the eternal return of life,
This symbol, Nietzsche continues, addresses the problem of suffering and transfigures it.
In the doctrine of the mysteries, **pain is pronounced holy: the pangs of the woman giving birth hallow all pain; all becoming and growing-all that guarantees a future-involves pain. That there may be the eternal joy of creating, that the will to life may eternally affirm itself**, the agony of the woman giving birth must also be there eternally. (TI XI, § 4)
Nietzsche explicitly connects eternal recurrence and the transfiguration so frequently that suffering must surely be among his primary concerns. One reason this is seldom acknowledged may be that he focuses mainly on individual, personal suffering, not that of humanity more generally. Except when he is discussing the Greeks, and then of necessity speaking of something outside his immediate experience, Nietzsche's published formulations of eternal recurrence are rather introverted. As the parable of the demon indicates, his idea of

eternal recurrence raises a personal question (though one relevant to any particular reader): "**Do you love your life enough to will its eternal recurrence**?"

Psychological suffering appears to be paradigmatic for Nietzsche. In fact,

he even suggests that "**real**" **suffering is an antidote to the fantasized mental misery so common in his time**. Perhaps there is nothing that separates men or ages more profoundly than a difference in their knowledge of misery: misery of the soul as well as the body. Regarding the latter we moderns may well be, all of us, in spite of our frailties and infirmities, tyros who rely on fantasies, for lack of any ample firsthand experience-compared to the age of fear, the longest of all ages, in which individuals had to protect themselves. In those days, **one received ample training in bodily torments and deprivations and one understood even a certain cruelty against oneself and a voluntary habituation to pain as a necessary means of self-preservation** ....

There is a recipe against pessimistic philosophers and the excessive sensitivity that seems to me the real "misery of the present age"-but this recipe may sound too cruel and might itself be counted among the signs that lead people to judge that "existence is something evil." Well, the recipe against this "misery" is: misery. (GS, § 48) **Real afflictions of the body strike Nietzsche as a welcome alternative to agitations of the high-strung mind.**

LINK – SOLVING OPPRESSION – SUFFERING INEV.

Immorality and cruelty are inevitable—Their attempt to address suffering is life denying.

Nehamas, 1998 [Alexander, Professor of Philosophy @ Princeton U, *Nietzsche and Politics*, Edited by Jacqueline Scott, "Nietzsche and 'Hitler'", pgs. 9 – 10]

I am in deep sympathy with Nietzsche's immoralism, his idea that good and evil qualities are closely interconnected. Sometimes he seems to believe that whoever has a great virtue will also have to have a great vice. More often, he claims that the very same psychological quality that constitutes a vice in one context constitutes a virtue in another. Every belligerent urge that is essential to establishing a new state , for example, becomes dangerous once that state is in place; it is renamed, reconceived as a vice, and repressed (BGE 201). Honesty is an intellectual, sublimated expression of the same drive that in other contexts manifests itself as cruelty (BGE 230)—and so indeed, Nietzsche argues consistently, is high culture in general (BGE 229, HH 43).

If Nietzsche is right that good and evil qualities are connected in that way, the right way to treat the drives that produce immorality is not to try to eliminate or repress them but to sublimate and spiritualize them, to use them for producing admirable goals. Nietzsche is clear: "The spiritualization of sensuality is called love ... the spiritualization of hostility ... consists in a profound appreciation of the value of having enemies [including internal ones: 'the price of fruitfulness is to be rich in internal oppositions'] ... in the political realm, too, [he writes naively] hostility has become more spiritual" (TI "Morality" 3). To try instead to destroy "the passions and cravings, merely as a preventive measure against their stupidity and the unpleasant consequences of this stupidity—today this itself strikes us as merely another acute form of stupidity" (TI "Morality" 1). Yet that is just what he claims "the church," which he identifies with morality, does:

The church fights passion with excision in every sense: its practice, its "cure," is castratism. It never asks: "How can one spiritualize, beautify, deify a craving?" It has always laid the stress of discipline on extirpation (of sensuality, of pride, of the lust to rule, of avarice, of vengefulness). But an attack on the roots of passion means an attack on the roots of life: the practice of the church is hostile to life. (TI "Morality" 1)

Nietzsche sometimes writes, in an almost moralistic vein, that to "deny" or to be "hostile" to life is simply wrong (WP 351). More often, he argues that it is self-defeating, because, with his uncanny psychological sense, he sees that the effort to extirpate the passions requires the very same passions that are being extirpated. The effort to eliminate a passion requires its exercise: if cruelty, for example, is a natural passion, we can suppress it only by treating ourselves cruelly. Nietzsche, in contrast to morality as he understands it, does not mind: such behavior is cruelty made sublime. But he also accepts the consequence of his view: sublimated cruelty, in particular situations, may well erupt in its crudest, most horrifying forms. In a related context, he writes:

One may be quite justified in continuing to fear the blond beast at the core of all noble races and in being on one's guard against it: but who would not a hundred times sooner fear where one can also admire than not fear but be permanently condemned to the repellent sight of the ill-constituted, dwarfed, atrophied, and poisoned? (GM 1:11; cf. 1:12)

LINK – PITY

Pity is based on envy, and attempt to make up for lack in the self by projecting weakness onto the "pitiful"

Ure, post-doctoral fellow at CHED, former lecturer at Monash University, 20**06**

[Michael, "The Irony of Pity: Nietzsche contra Schopenhauer and Rousseau," *Journal of Nietzsche Studies* 32(2006), project Muse]

This is precisely the psychological constellation Nietzsche illuminates in Rousseau's and Schopenhauer's accounts of the moral subject. Both Rousseau's and Schopenhauer's moral psychology remains fixed in the paranoid-schizoid position and its damaging object relations. That is to say, their psychology uncritically accepts the primitive mechanism of assuaging narcissistic loss through enviously destroying or spoiling the joy of others, on the one side, and taking pleasure in their suffering, on the other.35 Unlike Nietzsche, then, neither Rousseau nor Schopenhauer attempts to theorize the psychological transformations and modulations of narcissism.

Nietzsche argues that rather than seeking to overcome envy, Rousseau and Schopenhauer's ethics of pity constructs social relations oriented around the need to assuage the feeling of self-lack. He claims that the envious subject soothes itself through Schadenfreude. It follows, therefore, that if pity also assuages envy, then it must be closely related to Schadenfreude. According to Nietzsche, Schadenfreude results from the projection of an envy-fuelled wish for the other's downfall beyond the social realm into the realm of chance: *Schadenfreude* originates in the fact that in certain respects of which he is well aware, everyone feels unwell, is oppressed by care or envy or sorrow: the harm that befalls another makes him our *equal*, it appeases our envy. . . . *The disposition bent on equality thus extends its demands to the domain of happiness and chance as well*: *Schadenfreude* is the commonest expression of the victory and restoration of equality within the higher world order too. (*WS*27, emphasis added) Nietzsche comically draws the links between pitying others and taking delight in their sorrow in the following aphorism: "*What is 'elevating'in our neighbour's misfortune.*—He has experienced a misfortune, and now the 'compassionate' [*Mitleidigen*] come along and depict his misfortune for him in detail—at length

they go away content and elevated: they have gloated over the unfortunate man's distress and over their own and passed a pleasant afternoon" (*D* 224). Nietzsche here comically deflates one of the human, all-too-human vices he discovers writ large in Schopenhauer and Rousseau's ethics: the thrilling pleasures of the pitier's voyeurism, which Rousseau unwittingly discloses in his obsessive emphasis on the visual aspects of suffering; for Rousseau, human suffering is an "object," "sight," "scene," impression," "picture," or "spectacle" that leaves us feeling pleasantly satisfied.36

Strangely, as if in clairvoyant agreement with Nietzsche's criticism, in defending pity Schopenhauer himself links it to the gloating of Schadenfreude. As we have seen, on the metaphysical plane, Schopenhauer claims that our concern for others springs from a mysterious, direct participation in their feelings. Yet his psychological analysis in fact shows that the emergence of pity turns on the devaluation or diminution of others. Schopenhauer might baulk at the notion that those who take pity on others enjoy their suffering, but even as he attempts to shuffle aside this affect, he nevertheless maintains that without the malicious wishes of Schadenfreude coming to pass, pity is impossible. Pity flows, according to Schopenhauer, only when one's envy is appeased by the sight of the lucky person's fall from grace. Bluntly stated, Schopenhauer's own point is that love of others (*Menschliebe*) pivots on their misery. We can see this in his thesis that the appeasement of our envy at the other's joy is the primary condition of pity:

A man will not obtain demonstrations of genuine philanthropy from others as long as he is well   off in every respect. . . . For the lucky man as such we feel no sympathy; on the contrary, as such   he remains a stranger to our hearts. . . . Indeed, if he has many advantages over others he may   easily excite envy, which if he should once fall from the heights of fortune, threatens to turn into malicious joy. . . . *For as soon as the lucky man falls, there occurs a great transformation in the hearts of others*, which for our consideration is instructive. . . . Envy is reconciled and has   disappeared with its own cause; compassion takes its place and

gives birth to loving-kindness. Those who were envious of and hostile to the man of fortune have often become, after his downfall, his considerate, consoling, and helpful friends. . . . *For misfortune is the condition of compassion, and this is the source of philanthropy*.

Schopenhauer reveals here that the pitying person's disposition is not a product of a direct participation in the other's condition and does not therefore require any metaphysical explanation. Rather, our pity for others emerges from the easing of our envy over their happiness. This kind of pity, therefore, demands no understanding of the other's suffering at all, let alone the merging of identities that Schopenhauer presupposes in his metaphysical explanation of pity. On Schopenhauer's own analysis, pity is not a mysterious merging of identities but, rather, a psychological metamorphosis anchored in the dissolution of the pain of envy or, to state this point in positive terms, the return of a feeling of selfplenitude in the acknowledgment of the other's lack. We do not grow "tenderer" toward the other because we feel *his* suffering in *him,* as Schopenhauer puts it, but because in his state of deprivation he no longer causes *us* suffering. In Schopenhauer's example, as pitiers our relationship to the other undergoes a change when we no longer see or imagine the other as enviable, not because we miraculously enter into and are motivated by the other's suffering.

Chastising the psychological naïveté of Schopenhauer's metaphysical account of pity, Nietzsche confirms this point in his claim that the *Leid* that we attend to in the act of pity is not the other's *Leid* but, in fact, our own feeling of self-lack. Paradoxically, therefore, for Nietzsche, Schopenhauerian *Mitleid* is not *Mit-Leid* or "suffering-*with*": "That pity [*Mitleiden*], on the other hand, is the *same kind of thing* as the suffering [*mit dem Leiden*] at the sight of which it arises, or that it possesses an especially subtle, penetrating understanding of suffering, are propositions contradicted by experience, and he who glorifies pity precisely on account of these two qualities *lacks* adequate *experience* in this very realm of the moral" (*D* 133). Nietzsche argues that because Schopenhauer fails to understand how his notion of pity is anchored in the desire to restore one's self-affection, he also fails to see that it subverts the very regard for others, or "the realm of the moral," that he unwisely attempts to base on the structure of the emotion as he understands it.

Of course, the corollary of Schopenhauer's position is that although the visible signs of envy may disappear with the misfortune of others, the paranoid-schizoid position that fuels envy remains even more firmly entrenched. For rather than curing envy, this kind of pity merely serves to satisfy the envious need for others to be diminished so that one can feel whole and complete. Though by this means pitiers pleasurably assuage their narcissistic wound, it is, as Nietzsche underscores, a damaging and enervating means of doing so because it creates an addiction to finding pleasure in themselves through enviously spoiling the other.

According to Nietzsche, the tonic effect of envy is outweighed by its harmful effects on not only the envied but the envier. The psychological consequence of this addiction to envy is *melancholia*: that is to say, not only do we attack and spoil the other's joy, but inevitably this spoiling constructs a world in which we feel that our own joy may similarly become the object of attack.38 If Schopenhauer's analysis of the moral psychology of pity is correct, then the others' return to joy must make them strangers to our hearts and excite our envy, and with this envy must also come the return of the menace of Schadenfreude. Nietzsche makes just this point regarding the disjointed rejoicing of pity: "*The compassionate Christian.*—The reverse side of Christian compassion for the suffering of one's neighbour is a profound suspicion of all the joy of one's neighbour, of his joy in all that he wants to do and can" (*D* 80). In other words, within the framework of Schopenhauer's ethics of pity we can regard others as of equal worth only so long as they suffer equally. Suffering thus bridges the gulf among egos—but *not*, as we have seen, because as pitiers we mysteriously enter into or participate in the condition of others but, rather, because their demise brings them down to our level and thus appeases the envy we feel at the sight of their self-sufficient happiness (see *D* 138). The sight of others' suffering, in short, makes their independence more palatable to us because in this debased state they no longer arouse in us painful feelings of deprivation or the anxiety that we may be abandoned. To recall Rousseau on this latter point, the *suffering* of others is a pledge of their affection for us. As Schopenhauer's analysis implies, taking pleasure in the other's suffering is a tonic for restoring damaged narcissistic self-affection. It is for this reason, Nietzsche believes, that when persistent feelings of envy threaten to attenuate our self-affection we pursue social or intersubjective means for reviving the pleasant feeling of Schadenfreude. In other words, when we enviously spoil others we surreptitiously restore to ourselves our

narcissistic self-affection. Our envy does so by enabling us to construct ourselves as those who, by comparison with the spoiled object, are exempt from suffering, need, and loss. Through envy we aim to make the other abject or pitiable so that we no longer feel or experience our own abjection. The damage we inflict through envy reduces the other to the needy, insufficient, pitiable condition that we ourselves experience. It thereby soothes our painful feeling that in the face of a fantasized self-sufficient other we are superfluous or unloved. The imaginative work of envy reaches a successful resolution when it enables us to achieve a reversal of roles and our formerly abject self can feel itself as whole and complete in comparison with the now diminished other: "Sometimes we love the rich man in the midst of misfortunes; *but so long as he prospers he has no real friend*, except the man who is not deceived by appearances, who pities rather than envies him in spite of his prosperity." In Rousseau's framework, pity is the use to which envy puts the imagination. To clarify, it is the means through which Rousseau believes that wounded narcissists can reverse the positions of lack/plenitude: by pitying others we transform ourselves into those who, like the Epicurean gods, are divinely free of anxiety and exempt from suffering and pain. In this respect the conception of the moral subject that lies at the heart of his ethics of pity exemplifies the paranoid-schizoid defenses of pathological narcissism. It is apparent, to begin with, that Rousseau's moral subjects have not relinquished or tempered their fantasy of narcissistic plenitude insofar as they harbor the *regret* that they do not occupy the privileged position of the needless Epicurean gods. Indeed, it is partly because they bitterly measure their own loss against this fantasy of divine tranquility that they brim with painful envy at the sight of others' joy. (In accusing the other "of seeking happiness for himself alone" they repeat what Klein describes as the basic complaint of infantile envy: the accusation that its first object "has an unlimited flow of milk" that "it keeps for its own gratification." For Klein this image of a wholly self-gratifying object is the ego's projection of its own most desired state.)

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LINK – PITY

The affirmative's pity for the disenfranchised breeds only vengefulness and cruelty- they assuage their ego while losing the ability to effectively related to the world
Ure, post-doctoral fellow at CHED, former lecturer at Monash University, 20**06**
[Michael, "The Irony of Pity: Nietzsche contra Schopenhauer and Rousseau," *Journal of Nietzsche Studies* 32(2006), project Muse]
Rather than dismissing or denouncing the "pitiless" Nietzsche, this essay carefully examines his subtle psychological analysis of *pitié*/*Mitleid*. It does so by training a spotlight on his principal object of criticism: Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Arthur Schopenhauer's ethics of pity. I shall argue that Nietzsche's psychological analysis presents a compelling case for interpreting Rousseauian and Schopenhauerian pity not as a sign of living *for* others or as a form of mutuality and recognition, as its defenders routinely assume, but as a veiled means of assuaging narcissistic loss at the other's expense. In this respect, I claim that Nietzsche joins hands with and strengthens Stoic arguments and anxieties to the effect that pity breeds vengefulness and cruelty and that he does so by drawing on his psychoanalytic insights into our subterranean intrapsychic and intersubjective stratagems for restoring to ourselves the illusion of majestic plenitude.3 The Gilded Sheath of Pity: Rousseau and Schopenhauer *Pity*.—In the gilded sheath of pity there is sometimes stuck the dagger of envy. —*AOM* 377 Nietzsche is intent on stripping away pity's golden luster. He builds his case against *pitié*/*Mitleid* largely on the basis of his suspicions about the psychological dynamics that, so he claims, we can use to lay bare Schopenhauer's and Rousseau's gilded rationalizations of this pathos. According to Nietzsche, the type of *pitié*/*Mitleid* they expound is symptomatic of what we might call, drawing on psychoanalytic terms, the narcissistic malaise.4 Boldly stated, he argues that as a psychological transaction *Mitleid* satisfies the ego's desire to assuage its loss of narcissistic plenitude. In making this case, Nietzsche dramatically reverses their perspective, arguing that *Mitleid* should not be understood as an affective bond with the other, not as a sign of living *for* others, but, rather, as a veiled means of restoring self-affection at the other's expense. To show this he analyzes the *moral psychology* that underpins the precepts of the ethics of pity.
If Nietzsche's psychological analysis is correct, then *Mitleid* is not antithetical to revenge against others but, in fact, closely linked to one of its subtle shadings and masks, which he calls envy. "In the gilded sheath of pity," as he puts it with signature pithiness, "there is sometimes stuck the dagger of envy" (*AOM* 377). Whereas Rousseau and Schopenhauer claim that *Mitleid* is the *only* source of ethical concern for others, Nietzsche argues that their psychology of *Mitleid* uncritically accepts a paranoid-schizoid splitting of the object world, to borrow Melanie Klein's terminology, into the enviable and the pitiable.5 He claims that because these forms of pity are generated by a paranoid-schizoid psychological constellation, they are better characterized as what we might call "hateship" rather than friendship. In this respect, Nietzsche sees in the psychology of the pitier an immature or infantile attempt to resolve the narcissistic malaise.
Nietzsche pursues this critique of Rousseau and Schopenhauer as part of a broader concern that informs his middle period: his concern with theorizing a mature transformation of narcissism that does not entail such damaging splitting and projection.
We can reconstruct and elaborate three steps in Nietzsche's critical analysis of the psychological configuration that engenders the type of pity that Rousseau and Schopenhauer advocate: his claim that pity is deeply complicit in envy and its projective identifications; that it ultimately tends toward a diminution of others; and, finally, that the twinning of pity and envy in the construction of the object world blocks our ability to live well with others. In other words, Nietzsche builds a strong case for reversing Schopenhauer and Rousseau's central, unexamined presumption: he shows that far from overcoming our "colossal egoism," as Schopenhauer calls it, pity is a species of pathological narcissism that damages the individual's capacity for composing or "restoring" balanced (*gleichgewicht*) relations with others (*HAH*376). Nietzsche especially underscores the point that a morality built on these psychological foundations prevents individuals from developing a subtle, penetrating, and therapeutically efficacious understanding of another's intrapsychic world and experiences.

LINK – PITY

The aff's seemingly benign gesture is bound up with a logic of pity that *necessarily* victimizes the Other. The plan is a coping mechanism that locks in status quo power disparities and breeds resentment in both the giver and recipient of aid.

Zarowsky, 2000 [Christina, M.D. and Medical Anthropologist Specialized in Public Health, *Global Health Policy, Local Realities: The Fallacy of the Level Playing Field*, Edited by Linda Whiteford and Lenore Manderson, "Poverty, Pity, and the Erasure of Power: Somali Refugee Dependency," pgs. 184 – 185]

Lemarchand (1968) and Foster (1967) stress that clientage is not primarily an interpersonal relationship, or in Lemarchand's terms a "lopsided friendship." Rather, it represents the enactments of recognized structural differences and culturally defined obligations by individuals from groups with differential access to resources. The models of charity in Late Antiquity and Medieval periods emphasized almsgiving as obedience to the law of God and did not imply criticism of the poor, and this view of charity as a right of the poor and duty of the rich remains the formal position of Muslim scholars today, even if the practice of charity in Islamic societies is experienced more ambivalently and more hierarchically (Kozlowski 1998). By the late nineteenth century in England, this charitable form of patronage was not seen as a structural obligation on the part of the wealthy, but rather as a gesture of generosity and kindness on the part of the donor. This vision of charity remains prevalent today.

An important component of the modem practice of charity is the emotion of pity and the mutual recognition of inequality that this emotion marks. The discourse of pity and charity invokes dyadic emotional ties, erasing the visibility of the structural inequality that makes these discourses possible. However, the practice of pity is not a private, interpersonal transaction. The long tradition of "Christian charity," of which humanitarianism is an important modern version, developed in a stratified society. Pity does not erase power differences, but reinforces them, by providing emotional and moral valuation of patron-client relationships. In Ethiopia, open appeals to pity were almost never made by even the poorest Somali refugees or returnees with whom I interacted, but were frequently made and almost always accompanied by physical gestures of subordination, such as bowing the head and making whimpering noises, by destitute Amharic returnees and beggars. Amharic society is much more stratified and hierarchical than Somali society (Levine 1974; Lewis 1961). The evocation of pity by Amharic beggars and refugees was an attempt to obtain assistance precisely through offering recognition, and reinforcement, of the stratification of Amharic society. The appeals to pity and expressions of pity by Western donors, individual and corporate, do the same thing on a global scale, but without the acknowledgment that this global society is structurally, and not simply accidentally and temporarily, stratified.

LINK – PITY – LABELLING LINK

The affs labeling of those they try to help as 'poor' and 'weak' is a distancing tactic that enables them to 'provide help' while leaving their fundamental relationship to the Other unscathed.

von Tevenar, Birkbeck College, London, 20**05**
[Gudrun, "Nietzsche's Objections to Pity and Compassion," paper presented in Professor Gemes' Nietzsche seminar, October 18th, http://www.bbk.ac.uk/phil/staff/academics/gemes-work/GurdrenvonTevenar18Oct05]
Let us focus again on the difference between pity and compassion with the help of Nietzsche's own words. Zarathustra declares [part II: Of the Pitiers]:

> But I am a giver: gladly give I as a friend to friends. But strangers and the poor may
> help themselves to the fruit of my trees: it shames less that way. [my translation]

Let us leave aside the question of shame and concentrate solely on the attitude of the speaker who describes himself as a giver. He gladly gives to friends – presumably out of friendship – and also gives to strangers and the poor – presumably out of Mitleid. So Zarathustra gives to both, but note the difference in his attitude towards them! With the first group Zarathustra identifies because of the bond of friendship, he is attentive to them as someone like himself – as a friend to friends. But the second group, the strangers and poor, he keeps at a distance, a distance defined by their condition of strangeness and poverty. This is precisely the distance we have earlier defined as characteristic of the attitude of pity. It separates the needy by defining them – as with a label – by their condition of strangeness and poverty thus failing to attend to them as persons, as someone like oneself. One consequence of keeping strangers and the poor in this way separate and at a distance is that, after opening the gates to one's orchard, nothing stops one now from happily continuing one's own pursuits such as, perhaps, feasting with one's friends while the needy are away in the orchard.

LINK – PITY – REPS OF SUFFERING

The 1AC is not an act of alterity – it is an act of pity, which distances us further from those they depict. The Aff call for compassion is a self-serving act, which enables the State to wage violence from a moral high-ground.
Campbell, Professor of Cultural and Political Geography @ Durham, 19**99**
[David, "Violence, Justice, and Identity in the Bosnian Conflict," Sovereignty and Subjectivity, ed. Edkins and Pin-fat, p21-22]
This is the strange morality of pity that Friedrich Nietzsche warned against. In questioning morality so as establish the possibility for a revaluation of values, Nietzsche paid particular attention to "unegoistic" instincts such as pity. Nietzsche regarded the morality of pity as a danger to all right-thinking persons, for it represented a constraint upon the sovereignty of the individual through the transmission of pain from the victim to the observer. But Nietzsche argued the danger was greater than that, for he saw that some "good" persons sought objects of pity as a means to increase their own position and control.6 The objects of pity would remain victims regardless of the amount of attention directed their way, whereas the pitiers would markedly increase their feeling of superiority.
In few places has this productive complex of pity been more evident than the Bosnian conflict. The international community has focused on the abnormality of the conflict through an oft-repeated parade of pathetic images while finding it difficult to confront the normality of life lived in the context of violence. As Slavoj Zizek argues, what disturbs us most is not the sense that there is something perversely unique about Bosnia in general and Sarajevo in particular, though most assessments attempt to make that case:

> The unbearable is not the difference. The unbearable is the fact that in a sense there is no difference: there are no bloodthirsty "Balkanians" in Sarajevo, just normal citizens like us. The moment we take full note of this fact, the frontier that separates "us" from "them" is exposed in all its arbitrariness, and we are forced to renounce the safe distance of external observers.

To maintain the distance, therefore, we emphasize compassion for the victim. Zizek, like Baudrillard, believes something global has emerged: "Sarajevo is but the special case of what is perhaps the key feature of the ideological constellation that characterises our epoch of world-wide triumph of liberal democracy: the universalisation of the notion of victim." To say as much is not to degrade the evident suffering or downplay the abundant horrors of the violence that has consumed the Bosnian capital (among other areas) since early 1992. To the contrary, in order to come to terms with the violence, it is necessary to highlight the function of compassion and what it conceals if we are to respond more effectively. In this context it might be said, as Zizek argues, that "our compassion, precisely in so far as it is 'sincere,' presupposes that in it, we perceive ourselves in the form that we find likeable: the victim is presented so that we like to see ourselves in the position from which we stare at her."9 In our empathy toward Bosnian victims, we have, especially through the emphasis upon humanitarian aid and intervention, thought of ourselves in a manner that we find congenial—the humanitarians giving charity to the helpless.
This desirable sense of our self more often than not **does little for the other**. Moreover, the victims, who are neither so weak nor easily indulged as we think, can plainly see this. Indeed, the "justifiable contempt" held by many Sarajevans toward both their enemy and those Europeans who, with their "hypocritical contrition . . . bronze their good conscience in the sun of solidarity," pierces the phantasm of the pitiful victim and exposes the political deficit of compassion. For what our surfeit of concern conceals is the "immobilising power of fascination . . . [which] thwarts our ability to act" and prevents a political analysis of the conflict in Bosnia. The "ethics of compassion with the victim legitimises the avoidance, the endless post¬ponement, of the act. All 'humanitarian' activity of aiding victims, all food, clothes and medicine for Bosnians, are there to obfuscate the urgency of the act."11 This is certainly the view of Rony Brauman, a former president of Mdecins sans Frontières, who has charged the international community with hiding behind compassion in the face of genocide.12 At the same time, we might offer this cautionary note from Jacques Derrida:

> However insufficient, confused, or equivocal such signs may still be, we should salute what is heralded today in the reflection on the right of inter¬ference or intervention in the name of what is obscurely and sometimes hypocritically called the humanitarian, thereby limiting the sovereignty of the state in certain conditions. Let us salute such signs even as one remains vigilantly on guard against the manipulation or appropriations to which these novelties can be subjected.13

LINK – PITY – PITY➔LASHOUTS

The 1AC's universal image of the victim is life negating AND results in lash outs against those who don't fit the image.
Bruckner, French writer and philosopher, 19**86**
[Pascal, *..The Tears of the White Man: Compassion as Contempt*, p.115-116]

In 1964 the American anthropologist Colin Turnbull went to Northern Uganda to study the Iks, a tribe that used to be huntergatherers, but that had been forced to leave their territory and settle in villages because of the creation of a national park. Turnbull went to the Iks with a single conviction-that there was a natural goodness to African man, particularly when he was a nomad, uncorrupted by Western civilization. Turnbull expected to find "gentleness, generosity, consideration, affection, honesty, hospitality, and compassion." But he was quickly disenchanted. The resettlement of the Iks had been like a Biblical "fall" and had totally corrupted them. The Christian virtues praised by Turnbull in his earlier studies' of hunting tribes had disappeared. In less than three generations, these once-happy and prosperous people had degenerated into villagers whose only concern was their individual existence. They had given up all social relations, and lost all notions of hope, love, and respect. The Iks grab food from the mouths of their parents, drive their children out of the family compound so that they will not have to feed them, and let old, sick, and disabled people die with total indifference. Their Garden of Eden had turned into a "hideous world" [op. cit., p. 224], a "band of carnivores" [op. cit., p. 64], always ready to kill one another in order to eat. They excel in "what might be called bestiality if that were not so insulting to animals" [op. cit., p. 270].

Turnbull could not forgive these Africans for having destroyed his Robinson Crusoe fantasy. The end of his book is absolutely astounding. In the degeneration of the Iks, he sees a kind of reverse evolution, and the future of the rich peoples, who are devoted to the vagaries of progress and the cult of technological tricks. His tone then changes to invective. He recommends that the Ugandan government deport and disperse the Iks so that theii bad example cannot contaminate nearby populations. Since the government did not do this, he limits himself to hoping that the 2,000 surviving Iks will soon disappear from the face of the earth.

An ethnologist praying for the extermination of the people he studies is certainly a new phenomenon! It is typical, though, of Third-Woridists. The same tendency to shift from praise to condemnation to pass from adoration to hatred when our investments of goodness and gentleness do not pan out is always there. 4 The desire to *control though compliments*, in which the Third World is a neutral and controllable object, changes to impotent rage when the guerrilla, the native, or the primitive is seen as richer than was thought. If the facts do not fit the fantasies, it is because the tropical skies look down on a hell even more abominable than our own. The playground of the angels is really nothing but a cauldron seething with three billion monsters. We have come full circle, and the proof is clear-self-punishment is the highway to hatred of the human race.

LINK – PITY – A2:PITY=NEUTRAL

Pity is never neutral—The plan creates a gift economy with the Other that inevitable produces resentment in the giver.

Susan S. **Stocker**, Department of Philosophy and Religion, Goucher College, **2k2** ("Facing disability with resources from Aristotle and Nietzsche" pg. 8)

If my experience is any indication, you can't count on who will come through with an empathic gener ative response. This can be because some people have already given you and everyone else too much of them selves. When someone is either not inclined or else already overtaxed, **the other's needs look and feel like a demand, an enforced requirement of morality, rather than an enlargement of our own sphere, the way empathy is.** This matters because, as Amélie Rorty observes, "ethics without psychology is science fiction."28 Psychologist Judith Jordan points out that s**elf-boundaries must be intact, neither too rigid nor too diffuse, to be able to experience empathy. If too rigid, the other person's experience remains rather remote. But if self-boundaries are too diffuse, there can be an "uncontained merging" or the other is used as "a narcissistic extension of self."**29 Upon hearing that one is facing illness, these people are fearful that they will be "drawn in." This is because they rightly feel that their own resources are already taxed to the limit. Others, whose boundaries are intact, can respond with a healthy empathic engagement. **I innocently asked one friend**, whom I now know was evidencing the classic symptoms of co dependence (only feeling comfortable when giving, anticipates your every need) **to pick up something for me from a location I knew she was going to. When she brought it by, I asked what I could do for her. With some heat, she replied, "you can take care of yourself, so that I don't have to."** I was stung by her words. I imagined saying things like, I've always been so supportive of you, why can't you help me when I really need it? Initially I was angry and disappointed. But our illnesses or conditions do not create these situ ations; they simply reveal them for what they are. It is futile to seek for help here. In fact, it is a mark of mental health not even to try, to accept the limits of the situation and be grateful for having seen these constraints, not to resent them. Thank you, Nietzsche. It took me awhile but I finally figured out that on those occasions when I saw this person, when asked how I was doing, I could say, "not so good, but there is nothing you can do about it." This freed us both to have what we could have together. In fact, **there is no one on whom you can always count**. So there's a skill needed here, to discern on whom one may rely at any given time. **To accept the situation for what it is, is expressive of a Nietzschean sensibility, which frames the situation from a realistically protective stance.**

LINK – PITY – A2: PITY → ACTION

Representations of suffering cause complacence not social change. The pity economy of the 1AC distances us from material suffering, making the Other manageable.

Bleiker and Kay 2007.

[(Roland, University of Queensland), (Amy, United Nations development program) "Representing HIV/AIDS in Africa: Pluralist Photography and Local Empowerment" pg. 150-151]

Several consequences emerge from the decontextualized nature of humanist photography. The basic idea behind this approach, as already stressed, is to generate compassion in viewers, which, in turn, ought to engender social change. But the universal nature of humanist photography is unlikely to generate compassion, at least if we define compassion as Hanna Arendt (1990) does: as sentiments that are directed toward particular individuals. Humanist photography is more likely to inspire what Arendt calls pity, a more abstract and generalized form of politics. In a compelling application of Arendt's typology, Luc Boltanski (1999:4) stresses how a politics of pity views the unfortunate collectively, even though it relies on singling out particular misfortunes to inspire pity in the first place. It is evident that the ensuing dynamics entail a fundamental dilemma, one that perhaps cannot be solved. A generalized portrayal of HIV/AIDS as a political problem is unlikely to inspire pity. Statistical data, for instance, cannot do this, no matter how much evidence it provides of the devastating impact of the disease. To arouse pity, Boltanski (1999:11) stresses, ''suffering and wretched bodies must be conveyed in such a way as to affect the sensibility of those more fortunate.'' That is the function of the Hooper photograph. But problems arise as soon as this image is used to establish and defend a more generic political stance. This is the case, for instance, when the Hooper photograph is being used to draw public awareness in the West about the general problem of HIV/AIDS in Africa. The image of suffering then inevitably becomes detached from both the sufferer and local circumstances. Manifestations of pity often mask unequal power relations. It was precisely in the seemingly selfless Christian practices of pity that Nietzsche (1991:947) detected a will to power, a thirst for triumph, a desire to subjugate. Pity then becomes linked to several features that fundamentally contradict the original humanist desire for social change. Images of suffering in Africa subconsciously contain a range of moral judgments and sentiments, including resentment and fear (see Sontag 2003:75). They may also remind western audiences of what they are free from. Paradoxically, the very disturbing nature of the Hooper photograph thus provides a certain feeling of safety and security to some of those viewing it. Death in a distant and dangerous elsewhere can then become a way of affirming life in the safe here and now, giving people a sense of belonging to a particular group that is distinct from others (Biehl 2001:139; Radley 2002:2; see also Nussbaum 2001:297–454 for a more general discussion of pity and its distinctiveness from compassion, sympathy, and empathy).

LINK – MORAL OBLIGATIONS

Moral imperatives are tools of resentment that create a false necessity for action, simultaneously reducing life-as-multiplicity to a herd led by false idols.

Nietzsche, a dead God, **1910**

[Friedrich [German philosopher and classical philologist 1910 *The Will to Power*]
The Herd *274*

(Spring-Fall 1887) Whose will to power is morality?- The common factor in the history of Europe since Socrates is the attempt to make moral values dominate over all other values: so that they should be the guide and judge not only of life but also of (I) knowledge, (2) the arts, (3) political and social endeavors. "Improvement" the sale duty, everything else a means to it (or a disturbance, hin- drance, danger: consequently to be combatted to the point of anni- hilation-). A similar movement in China. A similar movement in India. What is the meaning of this will to power on the part of moral values which has developed so tremendously on earth? *Answer:-* three powers are hidden behind it: (I) the in- stinct of the herd against the strong and independent; (2) the instinct of the suffering and underprivileged against the fortunate; (3) the instinct of the mediocre against the exceptional.- Enor- mous advantage possessed by this movement, however much cruelty, falseness, and narrow-mindedness have assisted it (for the history of the struggle of morality with the basic instincts of life is itself the greatest piece of immorality that has yet existed on earth-). 275 (1883-1888) Very few manage to see a problem in that which makes our daily life, that to which we have long since grown accustomed- our eyes are not adjusted to it: this seems to me to be the case especially in regard to our morality. The problem "every man as an object for others" is the occasion of the highest honors: for himself-no! The problem "thou shalt": an inclination that cannot ex- plain itself, similar to the sexual drive, shall not fall under the general condemnation of the drives; on the contrary, it shall be their evaluation and judge! The problem of "equality," while we all thirst after dis- tinction: here, on the contrary, we are supposed to make exactly the same demands on ourselves as we make on others. This is so insipid, so obviously crazy: but-it is felt to be holy, of a higher rank, the conflict with reason is hardly noticed. Sacrifice and selflessness as distinguishing, unconditional obe- dience to morality, and the faith that one is everyone's equal before it. The neglect and surrender of well-being and life as distin- guishing, the complete renunciation of making one's own evalua- tions, and the firm desire to see everyone else renounce them too. "The value of an action is determined: everyone is subject to this valuation. " We see: an authority speaks-who speaks?- One may forgive human pride if it sought to make this authority as high as possible in order to feel as little humiliated as possible under it. Therefore-God speaks! One needed God as an unconditional sanction, with no court of appeal, as a "categorical imperative"-: or, if one believed in the authority of reason, one needed a metaphysic of unity, by virtue of which this was logical. Now suppose that belief in God has vanished: the question presents itse1f anew: "who speaks?"-My answer, taken not from metaphysics but from animal physiology: *the herd instinct speaks*. It wants to be master: hence its "thou shalt!"- it will allow value to the individual only from the point of view of the whole, for the sake of the whole, it hates those who detach themselves-- it turns the hatred of all individuals against them. 276 (1886-1887) The whole of European morality is based upon what is use- ful to the herd: the affliction of all higher, rarer men lies in this, that everything that distinguishes them enters their consciousness accompanied by a feeling of diminution and discredit. The *strong points* of contemporary men are the causes of their pessimistic gloom: the mediocre are, like the herd, little troubled with questions and conscience--cheerful. (On the gloominess of the strong: Pascal, Schopenhauer.) *The more dangerous a quality seems to the herd, the more thoroughly* is *it proscribed*. 277 (1883-1888) Morality of truthfulness in the herd. "You shall be knowable, express your inner nature by clear and constant signs-otherwise you are dangerous: and if you are evil, your ability to dissimulate is the worst thing for the herd. We despise the secret and un- recognizable.- Consequently you must consider yourself know- able, you may not be concealed from yourself, you may not believe that you change." Thus: the demand for truthfulness presupposes the know ability and stability of the person. In fact, it is the object of education to create in the herd member a definite faith concern- ing the nature of man: it first invents this faith and then demands "truthfulness. " 278 (1885) Within a herd, within any community, that is to say *inter pares*," the overestimation of truthfulness makes good sense. Not to be deceived-and consequently, as a personal point of morality, not to deceive! a mutual obligation between equals! In dealing with what lies outside, danger and caution demand that one should be on one's guard against deception: as a psychological preconditioning for this, also in dealing with what lies within. Mistrust as the source of truthfulness. 279 (1883-1888) *Toward a critique of the herd virtues.-* Inertia operates (l) in trustfulness, since mistrust makes tension, observation, reflection necessary;- (2) in veneration, where the deterrence in power is great and submission necessary: so as not to fear, an attempt is made to love, esteem, and to interpret the disparity in power as disparity in value: so that the relationship no longer makes one rebellious;- (3) in the sense of truth. What is true? Where an explanation is given which causes us the minimum of spiritual effort (moreover, lying is very exhausting);- (4) in sympathy. It is a relief to count oneself the same as others, to try to feel as they do, to *adopt* a current feeling: it is something passive com- pared with the activity that maintains and constantly practices the individual's right to value judgments (the latter allows of no rest);- (5) in impartiality and coolness of judgment: one shuns the exertion of affects and prefers to stay detached, "objective";- (6) in integrity: one would rather obey an existing law than create a law oneself, than command oneself and others: the fear of commanding-: better to submit than to react;- (7) in toleration: the fear of exercising rights, of judging. 280 *(Spring-Fall 1887)* The instinct of the herd considers the middle and the mean as the highest and most valuable: the place where the majority finds itself; the mode and manner in which it finds itself. It is therefore an opponent of all orders of rank, it sees an ascent from beneath to above as a descent from the majority to the minority. The herd feels the exception, whether it be below or above it, as something opposed and harmful to it. Its artifice with reference to the ex- ceptions above it, the stronger, more powerful, wiser, and more fruitful, is to persuade them to assume the role of guardians, herdsmen, watchmen-to become its *first servants:*'" it has there- with transformed a danger into something useful. Fear ceases in the middle: here one is never alone; here there is little room for misunderstanding; here there is equality; here one's own form of being is not felt as a reproach but as the right form of being; here contentment rules. Mistrust is felt toward the exceptions; to be an exception is experienced as guilt. 281 *(March-June 1888)* When, following the instinct of the community, we make prescriptions and forbid ourselves certain actions, we quite reason- ably do not forbid a mode of "being," a "disposition," but only a certain direction and application of this "being," this "disposition." But then the ideologist of virtue, the moralist, comes along and says: "God sees into the heart! What does it matter if you refrain from certain actions: you are no better for that!" Answer: My dear Sir Long-Ears-and-Virtuous, we have no desire whatever to be better, we are very contented with ourselves, all we desire is not to harm one another-and therefore we forbid certain actions when they are directed in a certain way, namely against us, while we cannot sufficiently honor these same actions provided they are directed against enemies of the community-against you~ for instance. We educate our children in them; we cultivate them- If we shared that "God-pleasing" radicalism that your holy madness recommends, if we were fools enough to condemn together with those actions the source of them, the "heart," the

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"disposition," that would mean condemning our own existence and with it its supreme prerequisite-a disposition, a heart, a passion we honor with the highest honors. By our decrees, we prevent this dispo- sition from hreaking out and expressing itself in an inexpedient way -we are prudent when we make such law for ourselves, we are also moral-Have you no suspicion, however faint, what sacrifice it is costing us, how much taming, self-overcoming, severity toward ourselves it requires? We are vehement in our desires, there are times when we would like to devour each other- But the "sense of community" masters us: please note that this is almost a definition of morality. 282 *(Fall 1888)* The weakness of the herd animal produces a morality very similar to that produced by the weakness of the decadent: they understand one another, they form an alliance (-the great decadence religions always count on the support of the herd). In itself, there is nothing sick about the herd animal, it is even in- valuable; but, incapable of leading itself, it needs a "shepherd"- the priests understand that-The state is not intimate, not clan-destine enough; "directing the conscience" eludes it. And that is how the herd animal has been made sick by the priest?- 283 (1883-1888) Hatred for the privileged in body and soul: revolt of the ugly, ill-constituted souls against the beautiful, proud, joyous. Their means: inculpation of beauty, pride, joy: "there is no merit," "the danger is tremendous: one *should* tremble and feel ill," "natural- ness is evil; it is right to oppose nature." Also "reason." (The anti- uatural as the higher). Again it is the priests who exploit this condition and win the "people" over. "The sinner" in whom God has more joy than in the just man." *This* is the struggle against "paganism" (the pang of conscience as the means of destroying harmony of soul). The hatred of the average for the exceptional, of the herd for the independent. (Custom as true "morality.""") Turning *against* egoism": only the "for another" has value. "We are all equal";- against lust for dominion, against "dominion" in general;- against privilege;- against sectarians, free spirits, skeptics;- against philosophy (as opposing the tool-and-corner instinct); with philosophers themselves "the categorical impera- tive," the essence of morality "universal and general." *284 (Spring-Fall 1887)* The conditions and desires that are *praised:- peaceable, fair, moderate, modest, reverent, considerate, brave, chaste, honest, faithful, devout, straight, trusting, devoted, sympathetic, helpful, conscientious, simple, mild, just, generous, indulgent, obedient, disinterested, unenvious, gracious, industrious-* To distinguish: to what extent such qualities are conditioned as *means* to a definite aim and end (often an "evil" end); or as natural *consequences* of a dominating affect (e.g., spirituality) or expression of a state of distress, which is to say: as condition of existence (e.g., citizen, slave, woman, etc.). *Summa:* they are none of them felt to he "good" for their own sake, but from the first according to the standards of "society," "the herd," as means to the ends of society and the herd, as necessary to their preservation and advancement, at the same time as the consequence of an actual herd instinct in the individual: thus in the service of an instinct which is fundamentally different from these conditions of virtue. For the herd is, in relation to the out- side world, hostile, selfish, unmerciful, full of lust for dominion, mistrust, etc. In the "shepherd" this antagonism becomes patent: he must possess opposite qualities to the herd. Mortal enmity of the herd toward orders of rank: its instinct favors the leveller (Christ). Toward strong individuals *(Ies souve- rains)* it is hostile, unfair, immoderate, immodest, impudent, in- considerate, cowardly, mendacious, false, unmerciful, underhand, envious, revengeful. 285 (1884) I teach: the herd seeks to preserve one type and defends itself on both sides, against those who have degenerated from it (crim- inals, etc.) and those who tower above it. The tendency of the herd is directed toward standstill and preservation, there is nothing creative in it. The pleasant feelings with which the good, benevolent, just man inspires us (in contrast to the tension, fear which the great, new man arouses) are our own feelings of personal security and equality: the herd animal thus glorifies the herd nature and then it feels comfortable. This judgment of comfort masks itself with fair words-thus "morality" arises.- But observe the hatred of the herd for the truthful.- 286 (1883-1888) Let one not be deceived about oneself! If one hears within oneself the moral imperative as it is understood by altruism, one belongs to the herd. If one has the opposite feeling, if One feels one's danger and abberration lies in disinterested and selfless actions, One does not belong to the herd. 287 (1883-1888) My philosophy aims at an ordering of rank: not at an in- dividualistic morality."O The ideas of the herd should rule in the herd-but not reach out beyond it: the leaders of the herd require a fundamentally different valuation for their own actions, as do the independent, or the "beasts of prey," etc.

LINK – MORAL OBLIGATIONS

Morality rests upon a myth of external ideals that devalues present existence and collapses into resentment towards the unrepentant and excluded

Kathleen Marie **Higgins**, Professor at U.T., 20**07** [Hicks, Steven V., and Alan Rosenberg. Reading Nietzsche at the Margins. New York: Purdue UP. Print. 64-65 nietzsche claims… person'e suffering]

Nietzsche claims here that Christianity, and **any** similarly **unconditional morality, must inevitably fail to provide atheodicy justifying the entire texture of life.** Such moralities inevitably find fault with life because suffering does not bear any direct relationships to desert. **The theodicy offered by Christianity appeals to an afterlife as a deus ex machina-the afterlife is brought in to resolve a problem left unsolved without such an intervention. This, according to Nietzsche, is to abandon the quest to find meaning in life in the face of suffering, since meaning is deferred to existence outside this world.**

In On the Genealogy of Morals Nietzsche analyzes Christian **morality as characterized by ressentiment, a desire on the part of those who are suffering to blame and to inflict suffering in recompense.** Christian morality attempts to rationalize suffering **by seeking someone to blame-evildoers, who deserve damnation, which they will receive if unrepentant, in contrast to the innocent, who will be rewarded in a future life**. More insidiously, Christianity encourages its followers to find the evildoer in themselves, thus inducing them to wallow in guilt and fear of retribution unless they throw themselves on the mercy of God (or more accurately, the clergy).

Christianity's approach to suffering is barbaric, according to Nietzsche. It inspires terrifying emotions in its adherents, which they will act desperately to expiate. Moreover, God himself is the inventor of hell, a site of eternal torture, which is interpreted as the ultimate destination of those who remain insubor- dinate to him. Worst of all, the Christian doctrine that the crucifixion occurred as atonement for sin suggests that **God enjoys cruel spectacle, so much that he accepts the broken, bleeding body and life of Jesus as repayment for humanity's faults.** God is a ruthless accountant, adamantly insisting on what is owed him and willing to accept a payment of blood.

Nietzsche's opposition to Christian morality again shows him to be concerned with suffering, in this case to resist the suffering he claims Christianity brings into the world, again primarily inward suffering. On the Genealogy of Morals analyzes the mechanisms that Christian **morality** exploits, all of which **increase** suffering: **its exploitation of its adherents' self-doubts and its encouragement of harsh judgments against others as a means to self-esteem; its incitement of bad conscience in those who are already suffering; and its "explanation" of personal suffering in terms of guilt, and the ascetic practices it encourages. Nietzsche also stresses the sufferer's interpretive perspective on his or her own life, a perspective that Christianity manipulates so as to heighten the person's suffering.**

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Link- moral Oblig. to (S) Poverty

The 1AC's 'moral imperative' to stop poverty creates a guilt economy that *requires* people to remain poor in order to have something to protest about.

Bruckner, French writer and philosopher, 19**86**

[Pascal, *..The Tears of the White Man: Compassion as Contempt*, p.81-82]

Tragedy and poverty have thus become exotic, so that when a European region is poor, it is mentally classified as part of the Third World. Naples, Andalusia, and Sicily have slipped into this category. This is necessary, for on the chaos of the Third World floats the life raft upon which we are rebuilding our identity. **We establish ourselves by setting ourselves against their misfortune. Of course, it is criminal to let children in Africa and Asia die of hunger, because their lives are sacred; but their lives are sacred only because they are dying of hunger**. They are victims of atonement who restore the harmony of our communities. The abuses that we denounce must be maintained so we can contrive to denounce them. And **the more we attack Western democracies, the more they are secretly valued, because the verbal rejection of our wealth rests on the assumption that somewhere else there are impoverished cultures whose frugal lives will redeem our wastefulness, crowds in tatters who will make up for our sins.**90 Thus, our white priests slumming amid the poor believe they are shaming us by bringing us heartrending stories, but they give us cause for secretly rejoicing. Rather than making us ashamed of our serenity, the camera that travels amid the disasters of India and West Africa makes us need to reconfirm it. **No matter what the dizzying dimensions of the world around us, the depth of our ignorance, the dangers of future catastrophes, and our individual weaknesses, we are certain that the West is a little island surrounded by oceans of indigence, and is all the more precious because of that**. Faced with the lacerations of Africa, the crises of the Near East, and the calamities of Asia, we thank the good Lord that we are French. **The horror of the Third World, which is confirmed as bestial in nature to us, becomes the shadowy foil we need to feel good about ourselves. Free men need martyrs like this. The movement that designates them as poor is precisely the same one that prevents us from seeing them as human. They are no longer like slaves of Ancient Rome, or Little Black Sambos, or Viets from French Indochina; they are the dregs of the Third World, and they are all the same. We lament their fate in order to detach ourselves from it a little, and the depths are described in order to make us feel more comfortable in our cozy lives.** Blaming ourselves serves two ends; it makes life more pleasant and, in the end, does not touch us.

We dress in our finery and berate ourselves in the welter of guilt, enjoying our peace while we contemplate those poor souls ground down in the heat and the filth. The shame they inspire makes the boredom of everyday life attractive again. **The total disorder of the Southern hemisphere makes the Northern look like heaven on earth, which we must keep safe at all costs. The terrifying accounts of deterioration make the West look a lot better. Our happiness would not be so great if it were not for four billion nonwhite peasants beaten down by poverty**, just beyond our borders, who make our own successes look both precarious and miraculous.

LINK – SOCIAL JUSTICE (BROWN)

Pursuing social justice through the law is an act of resentment that freezes the identities of oppressor and oppressed, casting the state as a neutral arbiter purified of its violence.
Brown, Professor of Women's Studies @ UC Santa Cruz, 19**95**
[Wendy, *States of Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity* pg. 26-27]

There is a second and related reason for taking up with Nietzsche in the ensuing reflections on contemporary forms of political life. His thought is useful in understanding the source and consequences of a contemporary tendency to moralize in the place of political argument, and to understand **the codification of injury and powerlessness --the marked turn away from freedom's pursuit-- that this kind of moralizing politics entails.** Examples of this tendency abound, but it is perhaps nowhere more evident than in the contemporary proliferation of efforts to pursue legal redress for injuries related to social subordination by marked attributes or behaviors: race, sexuality, and so forth.' This effort, which strives to establish racism, sexism, and homophobia as morally heinous in the law, and to prosecute its individual perpetrators there, has many of the attributes of what Nietzsche named **the politics of ressentiment**: Developing a righteous critique of power from the perspective of the injured, **it delimits a specific site of blame for suffering by constituting sovereign subjects and events as responsible for the "injury"** of social subordination. It fixes the identities of the injured and the injuring as social positions, and codifies as well the meanings of their actions against all possibilities of indeterminacy, ambiguity, and struggle for resignification or repositioning. **This effort** also **casts the law** in particular **and the state** more generally as neutral arbiters of injury rather than as themselves invested with the power to injure. Thus, the effort to "outlaw" social injury powerfully legitimizes law and the state as appropriate protectors against injury and casts injured individuals as needing such protection by such protectors. Finally, in its economy of perpetrator and victim, this project seeks not power or emancipation for the injured or the subordinated, but the revenge of punishment, making the perpetrator hurt as the sufferer does.

It is important to be clear here. I am not impugning antidiscrimination law concerned with eliminating barriers to equal access to education, employment, and so forth. Nor am I suggesting that what currently travels under the sign of "harassment" is not hurtful, that "hate speech" is not hateful, or that harassment and hate speech are inappropriate for political contestation. Rather, precisely because they are hurtful, hateful, and political, because these phenomena are complex sites of political and historical deposits of discursive power, attempts to address them litigiously are worrisome. When social "hurt" is conveyed to the law for resolution, political ground is ceded to moral and juridical ground. Social injury such as that conveyed through derogatory speech becomes that which is "unacceptable" and "individually culpable" rather than that which symptomizes deep political distress in a culture; injury is thereby rendered intentional and individual, politics is reduced to punishment, and justice is equated with such punishment on the one hand and with protection by the courts on the other. It is in this vein that, throughout the ensuing chapters, I question the political meaning and implications of the turn toward law and other elements of the state for resolution of antidemocratic injury. In the course of such questioning, I worry about the transformation of the instrumental function of law into a political end, and about bartering political freedom for legal protection. I worry, too, about the recuperation of an anachronistic discourse of universal and particular that this turn seems to entail: if the range of political possibility today traffics between proliferating highly specified (identitybased) rights and entitlements and protecting general or universal rights, it is little wonder that tiresome debates about censorship, and about "identity politics" versus "universal justice," so preoccupy North American progressives in the late twentieth century.

When contemporary anxieties about the difficult imperatives of freedom are installed in the regulatory forces of the state in the form of increasingly specified codes of injury and protection, do we unwittingly increase the power of the state and its various regulatory discourses at the expense of political freedom'? Are we fabricating something like a plastic cage that reproduces and further regulates the injured subjects it would protect? Unlike the "iron cage" of Weber's ascetics under capitalism, this cage would be quite transparent to the ordinary eye.47 Yet it would be distressingly durable on the face of the earth: law and other state institutions are not known for their capacity to historicize themselves nor for their adaptation to cultural particulars. Nor is this cage fabricated only by those invested in social justice: Foucault's characterization of contemporary state power as a "tricky combination in the same political structures of individualization techniques, and of totalization procedures" suggests that progressive efforts to pursue justice along lines of legal recognition of identity corroborate and abet rather than contest the "political shape" of domination in our time.48

The danger here is that in the name of equality or justice for those historically excluded even from liberal forms of these goods, we may be erecting intricate ensembles of definitions and procedures that cast in the antihistorical rhetoric of the law and the positivist rhetoric of bureaucratic discourse highly specified identities and the injuries contingently

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constitutive of them. In this effort, notwithstanding its good intentions, will we not, as Foucault puts the matter, further "tie the individual to itself"? Is it not precisely this form of power that "applies itself to immediate everyday life [to] categorize the individual, mark him by his own individuality, attach him to his own identity, impose a law of truth on him which he must recognize and which others have to recognize in him"?49 Even as we seek to redress the path and humiliation consequent to historical deprivation of freedom in a putatively "free" political order, might we thus sustain the psychic residues of these histories as the animus of political institutions constitutive of our future? It is against this grave possibility, and for alternatives, that these essays are written.

LINK – SOCIAL JUSTICE (BROWN)

Demanding social justice for historical injury codifies ressentiment and locks subordinated groups in their subordination.

Brown, Professor of Women's Studies @ UC Santa Cruz, 19**95**

[Wendy, *States of Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity* pg. 66-70]

Liberalism contains from its inception a generalized incitement to what Nietzsche terms *ressentiment*, the moralizing revenge of the powerless,"the triumph of the weak as weak. "22 This incitement to ressentitnent inheres in two related constitutive paradoxes of liberalism: that between individual liberty and social egalitarianism, a paradox which produces failure turned to recrimination by the subordinated, and guilt turned to resentment by the "successful"; and that between the individualism that legitimates liberalism and the cultural homogeneity required by its commitment to political universality, a paradox which stimulates the articulation of politically significant differences on the one hand, and the suppression of them on the other, and which offers a form of articulation that presses against the limits of universalist discourse even while that which is being articulated seeks to be harbored withinincluded inthe terms of that universalism.

   Premising itself on the natural equality of human beings, liberalism makes a political promise of universal individual freedom in order to arrive at social equality, or achieve a civilized retrieval of the equality postulated in the state of nature. It is the tension between the promises of individualistic liberty and the requisites of equality that yields ressentiment in one of two directions, depending on the way in which the paradox is brokered. A strong commitment to freedom vitiates the fulfillment of the equality promise and breeds ressentiment **as welfare state liberalism** --- attenuations of the unmitigated license of the rich and powerful on behalf of the "disadvantaged." Conversely, a strong commitment to equality, requiring heavy state interventionism and economic redistribution, attenuates the commitment to freedom and breeds ressentiment expressed as neoconservative antistatism, racism, charges of reverse racism, and so forth.

   However, it is not only the tension between freedom and equality but the prior presumption of the self-reliant and self-made capacities of liberal subjects, conjoined with their unavowed dependence on and construction by a variety of social relations and forces, that makes all liberal subjects, and not only markedly disenfranchised ones, vulnerable to ressentiment: it is their situatedness within power, their production by power, and liberal discourse's denial of this situatedness and production that cast the liberal subject into failure, the failure to make itself in the context of a discourse in which its selfmaking is assumed, indeed, is its assumed nature. This failure, which Nietzsche calls suffering, must either find a reason within itself (which redoubles the failure) or a site of external blame upon which to avenge its hurt and redistribute its pain. Here is Nietzsche's account of this moment in the production of ressentiment:

For every sufferer instinctively seeks a cause for his suffering, more exactly, an agent; still more specifically, a guilty agent who is susceptible to suffering in short, some living thing upon which he can, on some pretext or other, vent his affects, actually or in effigy . . . . This ... constitutes the actual physiological cause of ressentiment, vengefulness, and the like: a desire to deaden pain by means of affects, . . . to deaden, by means of a more violent emotion of any kind, a tormenting, secret pain that is becoming unendurable, and to drive it out of consciousness at least for the moment: for that one requires an affect, as savage an affect as possible, and, in order to excite that, any pretext at all.

   Ressentiment in this context is a triple achievement: it produces an affect (rage, righteousness) that overwhelms the hurt; it produces a culprit responsible for the hurt; and it produces a site of revenge to displace the hurt (a place to inflict hurt as the sufferer has been hurt). Together these operations both ameliorate (in Nietzsche's term, "anaesthetize") and externalize what is otherwise "unendurable."

   In a culture already streaked with the pathos of ressentiment for the reasons just discussed, there are several distinctive characteristics of late modern postindustrial societies that accelerate and expand the conditions of its production. My listing will necessarily be highly schematic: First, the phenomenon William Connolly names "increased global contingency", combines with the expanding pervasiveness and complexity of domination by capital and bureaucratic state and social networks to create an unparalleled individual powerlessness over the fate and direction of one's own life, intensifying the experiences of impotence, dependence, and gratitude inherent in liberal capitalist orders and constitutive of ressentiment.24 Second, the steady desacralization of all regions of life -- what Weber called disenchantment, what Nietzsche called the death of god would seem to add yet another reversal to Nietzsche's genealogy of ressenti;nent as perpetually available to "alternation of direction." In Nietzsche's account, the ascetic priest deployed notions of "guilt, sin, sinfulness, depravity, damnation" to "direct the ressentiment of the less severely afflicted sternly back upon themselves . . . and in this way exploit[ed] the bad instincts of all sufferers for the purpose of selfdiscipline, selfsurveillance, and selfovercoming. "25 However, the desacralizing tendencies of late modernity undermine the efficacy of this deployment

and turn suffering's need for exculpation back toward a site of external agency.26 Third, the increased fragmentation, if not disintegration, of all forms of association not organized until recently by the commodities marketcommunities, churches, familiesand the ubiquitousness of the classificatory, individuating schemes of disciplinary society, combine to produce an utterly unrelieved individual, one without insulation from the inevitable failure entailed in liberalism's individualistic construction27 In short, the characteristics of late modern secular society, in which individuals are buffeted and controlled by global configurations of disciplinary and capitalist power of extraordinary proportions, and are at the same time nakedly individuated, stripped of reprieve from relentless exposure and accountability for themselves, together add up to an incitement to ressentiment that might have stunned even the finest philosopher of its occasions and logics Starkly accountable yet dramatically impotent, the late modern liberal subject quite literally seethes with ressentiment.

   Enter politicized identity, now conceivable in part as both product of and reaction to this condition, where "reaction" acquires the meaning Nietzsche ascribed to it: namely, an effect of domination that reiterates impotence, a substitute for action, for power, for selfaffirmation that reinscribes incapacity, powerlessness, and rejection. For Nietzsche, ressentiment itself is rooted in reaction -- the substitution of reasons, norms, and ethics for deeds -- and he suggests that not only moral systems but identities themselves take their bearings in this reaction. As Tracy Strong reads this element of Nietzsche's thought:

Identity ... does not consist of an active component, but is reaction to something outside; action in itself; with its inevitable self-assertive qualities, must then become something evil, since it is identified with that against which one is reacting. The will to power of slave morality must constantly reassert that which gives definition to the slave: the pain he suffers by being in the world. Hence any attempt to escape that pain will merely result in the reaffirmation of painful structures.

   If the "cause" of ressentitnent is suffering, its "creative deed" is the reworking of this pain into a negative form of action, the "imaginary revenge" of what Nietzsche terms "natures denied the true reaction, that of deeds."29 This revenge is achieved through the imposition of suffering "on whatever does not feel wrath and displeasure as he does"30 (accomplished especially through the production of guilt), through the establishment of suffering as the measure of social virtue, and through casting strength and good fortune ("privilege," as we say today) as self-recriminating, as its own indictment in a culture of suffering: "it is disgraceful to be fortunate, there is too much misery."31

   But in its attempt to displace its suffering, identity structured by ressentiment at the same time becomes invested in its own subjection. This investment lies not only in its discovery of a site of blame for its hurt will, not only in its acquisition of recognition through its history of subjection (a recognition predicated on injury, now righteously revalued), but also in the satisfactions of revenge, which ceaselessly reenact even as they redistribute the injuries of marginalization and subordination in a liberal discursive order that alternately denies the very possibility of these things and blames those who experience them for their own condition. Identity politics structured by ressentiment reverse without subverting this blaming structure: they do not subject to critique the sovereign subject of accountability that liberal individualism presupposes, nor the economy of inclusion and exclusion that liberal universalism establishes. Thus, politicized identity that presents itself as a selfaffirmation now appears as the opposite, as predicated on and requiring its sustained rejection by a "hostile external world."32

LINK – IDENTITY – POLITICS OF INJURY

Grounding demands for inclusion based on politicized identities codifies the subject as injured and while transform suffering into resentment and revenge.
Brown, Professor of Women's Studies @ UC Santa Cruz, 19**95**
[Wendy, *States of Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity* pg. 72-74]

Revenge as a "reaction," a substitute for the capacity to act, produces identity as both bound to the history that produced it and as a reproach to the present which embodies that history. The will that "took to hurting" in its own impotence against its past becomes (in the form of an identity whose very existence is due to heightened consciousness of the immovability of its "it was," its history of subordination) a will that makes not only a psychological but a political practice of revenge, a practice that reiterates the existence of an identity whose present past is one of insistently unredeemable injury. This past cannot be redeemed *unless* the identity ceases to be invested in it, and it cannot cease to be invested in it without giving up its identity as such, thus giving up its economy of avenging and at the same time perpetuating its hurt "when he then stills the pain of the wound *he at the same time infects the wound.* "40

In its emergence as a protest against marginalization or subordination, politicized identity thus becomes attached to its own exclusion both because it is premised on this exclusion for its very existence as identity and because the formation of identity at the site of exclusion, as exclusion, augments or "alters the direction of the suffering" entailed in subordination or marginalization by finding a site of blame for it. But in so doing, it installs its pain over its unredeemed history in the very foundation of its political claim, in its demand for recognition as identity. In locating a site of blame for its powerlessness over its past, a past of injury, a past as a hurt will and locating a "reason" for the "unendurable pain" of social powerlessness in the present, it converts this reasoning into an ethicizing politics, a politics of recrimination that seeks to avenge the hurt even while it reaffirms it, discursively codifies it. Politicized identity thus enunciates itself, makes claims for itself, only by entrenching, restating, dramatizing, and inscribing its pain in politics; it can hold out no future for itself or others that triumphs over this pain. The loss of historical direction, and with it the loss of futurity characteristic of the late modern age, is thus homologically refigured in the structure of desire of the dominant political expression of the age: identity politics. In the same way, the generalized political impotence produced by the ubiquitous yet discontinuous networks of late modern political and economic power is reiterated in the investments of late modern democracy's primary oppositional political formations.

LINK – IDENTITY– STANDPOINT

Their romanticization of the "standpoint of the oppressed" belies a resentment with their own subject positions. The 1AC's universalization of a narrative of pity proliferates slave morality.

Conway, 1997 [Daniel W. Ph.D, Professor and Department Head of Philosophy, Nietzsche & the Political, Routledge, 135-6]

The political agenda of postmodern feminism thus assigns to (some) subjugated standpoints a political preference or priority. Haraway, for example, believes that some subjugated standpoints may be more immediately revealing, especially since they have been discounted and excluded for so long. They may prove especially useful in coming to understand the political and psychological mechanisms whereby the patriarchy discounts the radically situated knowledges of others while claiming for its own (situated) knowledge an illicit epistemic privilege: The standpoints of the subjugated . . . are savvy to modes of denial through repression, forgetting, and disappearing actsways of being nowhere while claiming to see comprehensively. The subjugated have a decent chance to be on to the god-trick and all its dazzling-and, therefore, blinding-illuminations. But these subjugated standpoints do not afford feminist theorists an epistemically privileged view of the world, independent of the political agendas they have established. Reprising elements of Nietzsche's psychological profile of the "slave" type, Haraway warns against the serious danger of romanticizing and/or appropriating the vision of the less powerful while claiming to see from their positions. To see from below is neither easily learned nor unproblematic, even if "we" "naturally" inhabit the great underground terrain of subjugated knowledges. The positionings of the subjugated are not exempt from critical re-examination, decoding, deconstruction, and interpretation; that is, from both semiological and hermeneutic modes of critical enquiry. The standpoints of the subjugated are not "innocent" positions. A subjugated standpoint may shed new light on the ways of an oppressor, but it in no way renders superfluous or redundant the standpoint of the oppressor. Because neither standpoint fully comprises the other, the aggregation of the two would move both parties (or a third party) closer to a more objective understanding of the world. If some feminists have political reasons for disavowing this project of aggregation, or for adopting it selectively, then they must pursue their political agenda at the expense of the greater objectivity that they might otherwise have gained. Continuing this Nietzschean line of investigation, Bat-Ami Bar On exposes the dangers involved in conceiving of "mastery" as emanating from a single, static center.36 Attempting to translate the guiding insights of Nietzsche's "perspectivism" into distinctly political terms, Bar On points out that in the complex societies of advanced industrial capitalism, virtually all agents simultaneously stand in relations of "mastery" to some and "enslavement" to others. As an alternative to the "single-center" theory of power preferred by traditional epistemologists, Bar On proposes a "theorized dispersion of power among multiple centers."37 In a Similarly Nietzschean vein, bell hooks warns that the romanticization of "marginality" may actually dispossess oppressed agents of a fruitful "place of resistance."" Here hooks follows Nietzsche in reminding feminist •theorists not to discount prematurely the potentially restorative powers that conditions of oppression can, under certain circumstances, engender.

LINK - WELFARE

Welfare is nihilism: it subordinates the strong to a regime of pity that reduces life to the mere avoidance of suffering

Quain 20**09** (Tony, Bachelor of Arts in Economics from Georgetown University, http://www.tonyquain.com/philo/200611NW.shtml)

What does Nietzsche have to contribute to our understanding of the charity and benevolence of a political society? Specifically, would Nietzsche favor or oppose a generous, redistributive welfare state? I shall argue that in his writing Nietzsche makes it quite clear that he would oppose state redistribution of wealth, both from the point of view of those from whom wealth is taken and those to whom it is given.[2] While he does not in *The Gay Science* directly confront or discuss the merits of welfare politics, his views on pity, benevolence, dignity, morality, equality, pain, and happiness all contribute to a mosaic quite contemptuous of charity and its motives and consequences. Nietzsche would reject the welfare state as being, at the same time, both weak submission to self-negating morality and a projection of power of the strong over the weak.

Nietzsche's approach is individualistic. While he often speaks of the origins, development, and ails of society in general, his writing is nowhere intended to sway the designs or designers of the collective; he directs his attention always to the individual as an individual. Following this style, the evidence of his rejection of the welfare state shall be presented as the admonitions he dispenses to three kinds of people[3]: the Benefactor, who gives what he has to assist those in need; the Moralist, who demands that others do the same; and the Recipient, who accepts the charity of others or the manna of a compassionate state. The argument will conclude with a possible alternative Nietzsche offers to the welfare state.

The Benefactor is held up for contempt mainly because his acts originate from a contemptible feeling of pity. Throughout *The Gay Science*, Nietzsche makes clear that pity is an enervating emotion of the weak-willed. "What is needful is not pity for [the evil and unhappy]. We must learn to abandon this arrogant fancy."[4] Further, he admires the absence of pity: "At times, our strengths propel us so far forward that we can no longer endure our weaknesses and perish from them … Thus we become hard against everything in us that desires consideration, and our greatness is also our lack of compassion."[5] Pity is also tied directly to a notion of charity, as when he says, "Indeed, those who now preach the morality of pity even take the view that precisely this and only this is moral—to lose one's *own way* in order to come to the assistance of a neighbor."[6] Those who give of themselves out of pity simply do not deserve our respect.

While Nietzsche often singles out pity as a deplorable affection, virtues of self-negation in general are held in low regard. "I do not like negative virtues—virtues whose very essence is to negate and deny oneself something."[7] Also: "'Selflessness' has no value either in heaven or on earth."[8] Benevolence is thoroughly linked in Nietzsche's mind to self-negation, as when he cries "*No altruism!*" and then describes people who desire to be a "function" of someone else and thus fail to live for themselves.[9]

Yet even as he pours derision on self-negation and pity, Nietzsche does not deny that these feelings have personal utility, even if they are misplaced. Pity moves us to take possession of the pitiful, to exert power over them. "When we see somebody suffer, we like to exploit this opportunity to take possession of him; those who become his benefactors and pity him … do this … and the pleasure they feel is comparable to that aroused by the prospect of a new conquest."[10] This makes it less clear that selfless virtues such as pity do not hold some positive value for the individual.

When Nietzsche says, "Benefiting and hurting others are ways of exercising one's power upon others; that is all one desires in such cases,"[11] he extends power as a motivation not just for those who are charitable, but also for those who would redistribute wealth from benefactors (willing or unwilling) to recipients. Hurting unwilling benefactors through taxation and benefiting poor recipients through public welfare spending ultimately serves the power instincts of those who may be neither. Here we are speaking of the Moralist.

For Nietzsche, there is no special place for humans in nature and no minimum acceptable human condition. He claims that we should "remove humanity, humaneness, and 'human dignity.'"[12] Indeed, he sees the Moralist as too involved, too caring of others, too unconcerned for the self. "I do not want to wage war against what is ugly … *Looking away* shall be my only negation."[13] Ultimately Nietzsche wants the Moralist to reserve judgment for others and instead look to oneself. In his criticism of the Kantian categorical imperative and 'universal laws,' he counters, "We, however, *want to become those we are*—human beings who are new, unique, incomparable, who give themselves laws, who create themselves."[14] He seeks a moral anarchy, which by extension appears to imply political anarchy. Indeed, he proclaims that the message of "'equal rights,' 'a free society,' 'no more masters and no servants'" has no allure. "We simply do not consider it desirable that a realm of justice and concord should be established on earth," since this would be the "realm of

the deepest leveling."[15] While this does not conclusively determine that Nietzsche believed in total anarchy, it does show that with specific regard to notions of equality he is strongly disposed to anarchy and opposed to all order and leveling.

Although Nietzsche has been shown to offer much disdain for benefactors and moralists, it is the Recipient who he believes is harmed most by charitable intentions. This arises out of a fundamental misunderstanding of human happiness. Discomfort and displeasure are necessary for us to experience and appreciate true pleasure and true happiness:

"To this day you have the choice: either *as little displeasure as possible*, painlessness in brief—and in the last analysis socialists and politicians of all parties have no right to promise their people more than that—or *as much displeasure as possible* as the price for the growth and abundance of subtle pleasures and joys that have rarely been relished yet. If you decide for the former and desire to diminish and lower the level of human pain, you also have to diminish and lower the level of their *capacity for joy*."[16]

LINK - WORKFARE

TANF enforces a moralized vision of work that promotes individual ascetic ideals (the majority of this article is uncut) Kathleen **Arnold**, Asceticism in Contemporary Political Theory: Marx, Weber, Nietzsche and Beyond, 8:2 | © 2005 http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v008/8.2arnold.html

Ascetic ideas as they are applied by neo-liberals and "new Democrats" in the United States to welfare/workfare policies and low wage policies affecting poor workers7 include the Personal Responsibility and Work Reconciliation Act, resultant workfare policies, and the demand for worker flexibility in low tier employment. **Ascetic ideas are increasingly emphasized in order to justify deregulation, the expectation of worker flexibility, and the dismantling of the welfare state.** In this framework, ascetic practices ostensibly make the individual independent from state aid (welfare recipients) or state intervention (in the case of poor workers). Demanding ascetic practices of workfare recipients or poor workers is not hypocritical or unreasonable, the argument would go, because we all refer to and practice this belief system. For this reason, we are outraged by the high salaries of Chief Executive Officers just as much as we are irritated by the idea of poor single mothers on welfare. **The implementation of increasingly moral policies for both the working poor and welfare recipients is thus justified because they are the same values to which we all adhere.** However, there is a difference in viewpoint depending on the group; it is assumed that some individuals have achieved self-mastery and others need to be guided. **The aim of asceticism in liberal capitalism is for the individual to be morally responsible, economically independent, and hard working, and in this way, ascetic ideas suggest the absence of the state and state power.**

The connection between capitalism and asceticism is, of course, not new and can be traced to the ascetic morals that Max Weber described in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. As he demonstrates, the Protestant Ethic took hold in Western nations to varying degrees, influencing our behavior and contributing to the notion of a hard working, self-disciplined individual of moral integrity as the paradigm of capitalist behavior and success. To Weber, these values are internalized and not forced upon us by the state; even his idea of an "iron cage" which ensures that we all labor endlessly in employment we haven't necessarily chosen is more the result of an "invisible hand" than state legislation.8 In this way, he conceptually distinguished between the rationalization of every day life, including bureaucracy and ascetic ethics, and his analysis of the modern, sovereign state, which has a monopoly on the means of legitimate violence. In a certain sense, one precluded the other (as I will discuss below). Contemporary arguments about welfare and the poor also make this distinction: welfare and warfare are viewed as absolutely separate, welfare occupying a moral, democratic, and therefore, non-coercive sphere (in this case, welfare does not mean cash payments but moral requirements and rules imposed on welfare/workfare recipients9). **An ascetic ethos is also framed both as a personal choice and morally important to society; an individual who does not have a work ethic -- such as the homeless, welfare mothers, unauthorized immigrants -- is thought to negatively affect others, usurping resources, occupying public space, and serving as a negative role model. It is up to this individual to change his or her behavior and become a productive part of society.**

In this way, **the two sets of policy issues affecting the poor -- the welfare to workfare programs and low wage strategies and other policies concerning poor workers -- are depoliticized**. Thus, the promotion of family values in welfare programs is not viewed as politically coercive because these principles are thought to concern individual behavior. Alternatively, **the exhortation to accept low wage policies as fiscally responsible shifts the burden from the state to the individual.** In this context, not only does the state appear absent, but ascetic values seem to be alternately humane, a form of tough love, or collective austerity. Nevertheless, I will argue that **ascetic principles based on the Protestant ethic** (discussed below) **are not only inextricably linked to the state and prerogative power but also are applied coercively and disingenuously to the poor. This both produces and reflects a double standard, which is reflected in the state's treatment of the poor.**

LINK – B.I.G.GIE GOT SHOT

The affirmative abolishes the necessity of work, and blinks. The requirement to work is too much of a burden for the Last Man, so in the name of blissful sleep and good health the affirmative gives welfare to all. This fantasy represents the culmination of suicidal nihilism, a longing for existence free of struggle and therefore free of living Owen and Ridley, 2K

[David, assistant director of the Centre for Post-Analytic Philosophy at the University of Southampton, Aaron, senior lecture and associate director of the Centre for Post-Analytic Philosophy at the University of Southampton, "Dramatis Personae," in *Why Nietzsche Still?* ed. Alan Schrift, pp. 149-151]

The modern condition offers both a threat and a promise. Nietzsche argues that the self-destruction of the ascetic ideal threatens to undermine our capacities for "self-discipline," "self-surveillance," and "self-overcoming" and our disposition to truthfulness precisely because we now lack an overarching goal in the service of which these capacities and this disposition are cultivated. But this undermining does not entail any diminution of our dissatisfaction with our this-worldly existence: the suffering endemic to life itself remains; all that has gone is the (ascetic) mode of valuing that rendered such suffering meaningful, and hence bearable. Thus Nietzsche discerns the outlines of a creature whose best capacities have atrophied and whose relationship to its own existence is one of perpetual dissatisfaction. The threat here is obvious:

What is to be feared, what has a more calamitous effect than any other calamity, is that man should inspire not profound fear but profound *nausea;* also not great fear but great pity. Suppose these two were one day to unite, they would inevitably beget one of the uncanniest monsters: the "last will" of man, his will to nothingness, nihilism. And a great deal points to this union. (GM III:14)

So **suicidal nihilism beckons**. The one response to the situation that is absolutely ruled out is the one that has so far proved most successful at addressing problems of this sort, namely, adoption of the ascetic ideal, because the present crisis is caused by the self-destruction of that ideal. But Nietzsche argues that two plausible responses to the crisis are nonetheless possible for modern man. Both of these involve the construction of immanent ideals or goals: one response is represented by the type the Last Man, the other by the type the *Ubermensch.*

The first response recognizes the reality of suffering and our (postascetic) inability to accord transcendental significance to it and concludes that the latter provides an overwhelming reason for abolishing the former to whatever extent is possible. This has the effect of elevating the abolition of suffering into a quasitranscendental goal and brings with it a new table of virtues, on which prudence figures largest. In other words, this response takes the form of *a rapport a soi* characterized by a style of calculative rationality directed toward the avoidance of suffering at any cost, for example, of utilitarianism and any other account of human subjectivity that accords preeminence to maximizing preference satisfaction. In Thus *Spoke* Zarathustra Nietzsche portrays this type as follows:

"What is love? What is creation? "What is longing? What is a star?" thus asks the Last Man and blinks.
The earth has become small, and upon it hops the Last Man, who makes everything small. His race is as inexterminable as the flea; the Last Man lives longest.
"We have discovered happiness," say the Last Men and blink.
They have left the places where living was hard: for one needs warmth.
One still loves one's neighbor and rubs oneself against him: for one needs warmth.
Sickness and mistrust count as sins with them: one should go about warily He is a fool who still stumbles over stones or over men!
A little poison now and then: that produces pleasant dreams. And a lot of poison at last, for a pleasant death.
They still work, for work is entertainment. But they take care the entertainment does not exhaust them.
Nobody grows rich or poor any more: both are too much of a burden.
Who still wants to rule? Who obey? Both are too much of a burden.
No herdsman and one herd. Everyone wants the same thing, everyone is the same: whoever thinks otherwise goes voluntarily into the madhouse
"Formerly all the world was mad," say the most acute of them and blink.
They are clever and know everything that has ever happened: so there is no end to their mockery. They still quarrel, but they soon make up- otherwise indigestion would result.
They have their little pleasure for the day and their little pleasure for the night: but they respect health.
"We have discovered happiness," say the Least Men and blink. (Z: 1 "Prologue" 5)
Nietzsche's hostility to this first form of response is evident. His general objection to the Last Man is that the Last Man's ideal, like the ascetic ideal, **is committed to the denial of chance and necessity as integral**

features of human existence. 'Whereas the ascetic ideal denies chance and necessity per se so that, while suffering remains real, what is objectionable about it is abolished, the Last Man's ideal is <u>expressed as the practical imperative to abolish suffering</u>, and hence, a fortiori, what is objectionable about it that is, our exposure to chance and necessity. This general objection has two specific dimensions. The first is that the Last Man's ideal is unrealizable, insofar as human existence involves ineliminable sources of suffering not least our consciousness that we come into being by chance and cease to be by necessity. Thus <u>the</u> Last Man's <u>ideal is predicated on a neglect of truthfulness</u>. The second dimension of Nietzsche's objection is that <u>pursuit of the Last Man's ideal impoverishes and arbitrarily restricts our understanding of what we can be and, in doing so, forecloses our future possibilities of becoming otherwise than we are</u>. Thus <u>the</u> Last Man's <u>ideal entails an atrophying of the capacities (for selfovercoming, etc.) bequeathed by the ascetic ideal</u>. Nietzsche brings *these two* dimensions together in *Beyond Good and Evil:*

"*You want, if possible and there is no more insane 'if possible'to abolish suffering* .... <u>Well being as you understand it that is no goal,</u> that seems to us an *end,* a state that soon makes man ridiculous and contemptiblethat makes <u>his destruction *desirable*</u>" *(BGE* 225

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LINK – FAMILY PLANNING/FEMINISM

If patriarchy did not exist, feminism would have to invent it. Their idea of gender liberation is resentfully invested in the subordination they claim to challenge.
Stringer, PhD in Political Science @ Australian National University, **2K**
[Rebecca, "A Nietzchean Breed," *Why Nietzsche Still?* ed. Alan Schrift, pp263-265]

We are reminded by Deleuze that Nietzsche's concept of *ressentiment is* at once "biological, sociological, historical, and political." It is primarily on the plane of the political that theorists of feminist *ressentiment* use the concept, arguing as they do that <u>certain feminist theories, practices, and political ruses are implicated in a "politics of *ressentiment*</u>." 38

The concept presents the political theorist with a set of psychopolitical characteristics and epistemological moves that, where relevant, can be grafted onto the political attitude in question in order to "diagnose" it. A review of the etymology and meaning of the word *resentment* will help to reveal the two primary points made in the case against feminist po*litical* <u>*ressentiment*</u>. first, that it <u>is nontransformative</u>; second, that <u>it in fact resuscitates and appropriates the relations of power it also ostensibly opposes</u>. As we have seen, these points also appear in the discourse on feminist victimology, although there they are differently expressed, defended, and exemplified.

The French word *ressentiment,* from which the English *resentment* was derived, commonly denotes a state of vengeful rancor produced as an effect of an injurious encounter. The word *resent* conjugates the prefix *re,* which designates both repetition and backward motion, with *sent,* which comes from the Latin verb *sentire,* "to feel." Thus *ressentiment pertains to reactive feelings repeatedly felt and designates a psychological state that is always and only relational: resentment is always the product of "interaction" between injured forces and injuring forces (from the harmful actions of a tyrannical person to the more general condition of human suffering), and it always produces in turn a reactive desire on the part of the injured to exact retribution from the injuring (their assailant, "life"). As Anna Yeatman notes, ressentiment* "makes sense to a subject who is systematically brutalized and exploited by more powerful forces." 39 <u>*Ressentiment is* an *economy* of negative affect rather than an affect in itself: it is a configuration of emotions wherein pain is constantly remembered and revisited, and in which hatred and the desire for revenge are constantly renewed</u>. What is most important for our purposes is the point at which *ressentiment* becomes "creative": that is, the point at which it becomes a "condition of possibility" and ceases to be simply a "condition."

<u>*Ressentiment* gives birth to morals at the same time that it comes to serve as a means of identity formation</u>, and <u>on the plane of the political the concept can be used to discern the process through which negative and nontransformative political identities are achieved. The feeling of powerlessness and the experience of suffering are always at the root of *ressentiment*--whether incurred as a result of a loss of power (the noble forced to slavery) or a perpetual state of powerlessness (the "original" slave). In the case of feminism, the "danger" of *ressentiment* presents itself with the desire to counter the forces that have caused women's oppression historically.</u> *Ressentiment* <u>feminism can be understood, to use Yeatman's term, as a "reactive project of survival.</u> 1140 As such, <u>this feminism forms its political identity in accordance with the tactic of inversion, and its opposition to the sociocultural configurations that have proved injurious to women is motivated by the will to reverse these configurations</u>. This reversal occurs, at an imagined or discursive level which is not to say that it does not have "real" effects at the birth of feminist morals or, more specifically, when this feminism comes to equate women's powerlessness with women's goodness. As Yeatman describes, echoing the concerns of the popular press feminists dealt with above, "Such a feminism is committed to discovering what is good in women's distinctive ways of relating and doing things [and] ends up celebrating as virtues all those aspects of the identity of the oppressed which are associated with strategic selfpreservation in a condition of weakness. 1141 Similarly, Brown comments that this feminism maneuvers toward attaining "singular purchase on 'the good.", 42

<u>For this feminism, patriarchy assumes the appearance of a system that enjoys the privilege of unhindered activity</u>: patriarchy is a "force which does not separate itself from its effect or its manifestations." 41 This feminism will attempt to forge such a separation by casting the activity of patriarchy as the blameworthy cause of injury, as a force that must be separated from its manifestations (the doer posited beyond the deed) and be made accountable for its effects. <u>With the introduction of accountability through accusation, this feminism casts itself and its constituency as the deserving creditors</u>. However, **the less obvious companion of this credit claim is an investment in, or indebtedness to, the power relationship from which it is elaborated.** Nietzsche notes that <u>the creature of *ressentiment* **"requires a hostile world in order to exist":**</u> here this means that **the evils of patriarchy *buttress* this feminism's moral identity and serve as a necessary resource for its "survival"** (GM I:io). In this sense, <u>this feminism is indebted to the configuration of power against which it is situated, an indebtedness that has two effects</u>: for Yeatman, **it "preserv[es] the identity of the oppressed subject"**; for Brown, **it "inadvertently redraw[s] the very configurations and effects of power that [it] seek[s] to vanquish**."44 As with the previous set of writers I discussed, Brown, Yeatman, and Tapper share the concern that <u>the politics of *ressentiment* leads feminists to position themselves "politically" in a morally superior realm outside of power. In this realm</u> -- the margins, the bottom of the hierarchy-- <u>participating in power is admonished as an unfeminist act that is equated with "undemocratic domination.</u> 1145 One of the primary points found in each of their critiques is that <u>this realm is no less implicated in a will to power and no less prone to the desire to dominate than is the center, the top of the hierarchy</u>.

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LINK – SELF PRESERVATION

The desire to preserve the human species reflects herd morality
Quain 2009 (Tony, Bachelor of Arts in Economics from Georgetown University,
http://www.tonyquain.com/philo/200611NW.shtml)
"Whether I contemplate men with benevolence or with an evil eye, I always find them concerned with a single task …: to do what is good for the preservation of the human race. Not from any feeling of love for the race, but merely because nothing in them is older, stronger, more inexorable and unconquerable than this instinct—because this instinct constitutes the essence of our species, our herd."[1]

    With this grand assertion, the 19th century German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche opens Book I of *The Gay Science*, a work encompassing most of his influential ideas on morality, religion, and man and society. But does the preservation of the species imply the need to ensure the preservation of every individual? Even if it did, does Nietzsche believe that this primal instinct has served man well? Is there a basic human dignity that demands that our herd take care of *all* of its members?

    What does Nietzsche have to contribute to our understanding of the charity and benevolence of a political society? Specifically, would Nietzsche favor or oppose a generous, redistributive welfare state? I shall argue that in his writing Nietzsche makes it quite clear that he would oppose state redistribution of wealth, both from the point of view of those from whom wealth is taken and those to whom it is given.[2] While he does not in *The Gay Science* directly confront or discuss the merits of welfare politics, his views on pity, benevolence, dignity, morality, equality, pain, and happiness all contribute to a mosaic quite contemptuous of charity and its motives and consequences. Nietzsche would reject the welfare state as being, at the same time, both weak submission to self-negating morality and a projection of power of the strong over the weak.

    Nietzsche's approach is individualistic. While he often speaks of the origins, development, and ails of society in general, his writing is nowhere intended to sway the designs or designers of the collective; he directs his attention always to the individual as an individual. Following this style, the evidence of his rejection of the welfare state shall be presented as the admonitions he dispenses to three kinds of people[3]: the Benefactor, who gives what he has to assist those in need; the Moralist, who demands that others do the same; and the Recipient, who accepts the charity of others or the manna of a compassionate state. The argument will conclude with a possible alternative Nietzsche offers to the welfare state.

LINK – UTILITARIANISM

Utilitarianism is slave morality. It seeks the greatest good for the herd

Anomaly, Lecturer at the Program in Political Philosophy, Policy, and Law at the University of Virginia, 2005
[Jonny, "Nietzsche's Critique of Utilitarianism," *Journal of Nietzsche Studies*, Issue 29, muse]
Nietzsche's preliminary account of the difference between master morality and slave morality in *Beyond Good and Evil* culminates with the conclusion that "[s]lave morality is essentially a morality of utility" (260). Although Nietzsche develops the notorious distinction between master and slave morality most fully in the *Genealogy*, he articulates the sense in which he considers utilitarianism a form of slave morality in a revealing passage in *Beyond Good and Evil*. Here he speculates that the noble, aristocratic man first identifies himself and those like him (powerful, proud, distinguished men) as good, and then contrasts himself with those he contemptuously regards as "the cowardly, the timid, the petty" and, above all, "those who think only of narrow utility" (*BGE* 260). The noble's
power consists not only in his ability to exploit others with his superior acumen or physical strength but also in exercising "power over himself," by refraining from acting on the inclination of pity that characterizes those whom he despises.
The slave, conversely, identifies himself negatively; he is part of the group that resents those who unabashedly exercise their power. Nietzsche scorns slave morality because its proponents meekly resign themselves to whatever master morality is not, and yet consider their own moral principles universally binding rather than acknowledging them as narrowly useful for members of their own group. In the Christian tradition, "pity, the kind and helping hand, the warm heart, patience, industriousness, humility, friendliness come into honor—for these are the most *useful* qualities [for the slave]" (*BGE* 260).
Although Nietzsche thinks utilitarians share these values, he does not consider their values coextensive with Christian morality, since hedonistic utilitarianism is concerned with maximizing the very sensation that Christian morality aims to suppress: pleasure (*WP* 35).5
The partial coincidence between Christian and utilitarian values results in part, Nietzsche thinks, from the fact that utilitarians construe "utility" in exceedingly familiar terms. The pleasure they seek is not that of the voluptuary or conqueror, but that of the "herd animal"—the "boring" and "mediocre" enjoyment of people who have yet to awaken from the "soporific" spell of slave morality (*BGE* 228).6
What does it mean to espouse the values of a herd animal? We have already encountered some of the values Nietzsche associates with slave morality—humility, industriousness, pity, but in what sense are they "herd" values?
If the fundamental goal of an animal within a herd is its own preservation, and if its own preservation depends upon the health of the herd of which it is a member, then, Nietzsche supposes, the moral principles of that group will tend to reflect the kind of egalitarianism embodied in Bentham's dictum, "Everybody counts for one, and nobody for more than one."7 Nietzsche considers this the essence of herd mentality: "[I]t is the instinct of the herd that finds its formula in this rule—one is equal, one takes oneself for equal" (*WP* 925). According to Nietzsche, this egalitarian formula originates from the benefit that comes from reciprocal cooperation among equals in a group, but has been extended by Christian morality to apply to all people—including *un*equals. Nietzsche thus construes the golden rule as a precept of "prudence" or mutual advantage, observing that "John Stuart Mill believes in it" as the basis of morality, but that he fails to grasp its prudential origin (*WP* 925).8

LINK – UTILITARIANISM

THEIR UTILITARIAN IDEAL IS JUST PITY IN THE NAME OF THE GENERAL WELFARE. THIS DEMONIZATION OF SUFFERING DEVALUES LIFE TO THE LOWEST COMMON DENOMINATOR.

FREIDRICH **NIETZSCHE**, ÜBERMENSCH, <u>1886</u> [TR. JUDITH NORMAN, ED. ROLF-PETER HORTSMANN, *BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL*, RE-PUBLISHED BY CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS IN 2002, PP 116-120]

<u>Hedonism, pessimism, utilitarianism, eudamonianism: these are all ways of thinking that measure the value of things according to pleasure and pain</u>, which is to say according to incidental states and trivialities. They are all foreground ways of thinking and naivetes, and nobody who is conscious of both formative powers and an artist's conscience will fail to regard them with scorn as well as pity. <u>Pity for you! That is certainly not pity as you understand it: it is not pity for social "distress," for "society" with its sick and injured, for people depraved and destroyed from the beginning as they lie around us on the ground; even less is it pity for the grumbling, dejected, rebellious slave strata who strive for dominance - they call it "freedom."</u> **Our pity is a higher, more far-sighted pity: - we see how humanity is becoming smaller, how you are making it smaller!** - <u>and there are moments when we look on your pity with indescribable alarm, when we fight this pity</u> —, when we find your seriousness more dangerous than any sort of thoughtlessness. <u>You want</u>, if possible (and no "if possible" is crazier<u>) to abolish suffering. And us? —</u> it looks as though we would prefer it to be **heightened and made even worse than it has ever been!** Well-being as you understand it — that is no goal; it looks to us like an end! — a condition that immediately renders people ridiculous and despicable — that makes their decline into something desirable<u>! The discipline of suffering, of great suffering —</u> don't you know that this discipline has **been the sole cause of every enhancement in humanity so far?** <u>The tension that breeds strength into the unhappy soul</u>, its shudder at the sight of great destruction, its inventiveness and courage in enduring, surviving, interpreting, and exploiting unhappiness, and whatever depth, secrecy, whatever masks, spirit, cunning, greatness it has been given: - <u>weren't these the gifts of suffering</u>, of the disciple of great suffering? In human beings, creature and creator are combined: in humans there is material, fragments, abundance, clay, dirt, nonsense, chaos; but in humans there is also creator, maker, hammer-hardness, spectator-divinity and seventh day: - do you understand this contrast? <u>And that your pity is aimed at the "creature in humans," at what needs to be molded, broken, forged, torn, burnt, seared and purified, - at what necessarily needs to suffer and should suffer?</u> And our pity - <u>don't you realize who our inverted pity is aimed at when it fights against your pity as the worst of all pampering and weaknesses? -</u> **Pity against pity, then!** - But to say it again: <u>there are problems that are higher than any problems of pleasure, pain, or pity; and any philosophy that stops with these is a piece of naivete. –</u>226

We immoralists! — This world as it concerns us, in which we need to love and be afraid, this almost invisible, inaudible world of subtle command, subtle obedience, a world of the "almost" in every respect, twisted, tricky, barbed, and loving: yes, it is well defended against clumsy spectators and friendly curiosity! We have been woven into a strong net and shirt of duties, and cannot get out of it —, in this sense we are "people of duty," — even us! It is true that we sometimes dance quite well in our "chains" and between our "swords"; it is no less true that more often we grind our teeth and feel impatient at all the secret harshness of our fate. But we can do as we please: fools and appearances will speak up against us, claiming "those are people without duties" - fools and appearances are always against us! 227

Genuine honesty, assuming that this is our virtue and we cannot get rid of it, we free spirits - well then, we will want to work on it with all the love and malice at our disposal, and not get tired of "perfecting" ourselves in our virtue, the only one we have left: may its glory come to rest like a gilded, blue evening glow of mockery over this aging culture and its dull and dismal seriousness! And if our genuine honesty nevertheless gets tired one day and sighs and stretches its limbs and finds us too harsh and would rather things were better, easier, gentler, like an agreeable vice: we will stay harsh, we, who are the last of the Stoics! And we will help it out with whatever devilishness we have - our disgust at clumsiness and approximation, our "nitimur in vetitum^ our adventurer's courage, our sly and discriminating curiosity, our subtlest, most hidden, most spiritual will to power and world-overcoming which greedily rambles and raves over every realm of the future, - we will bring all of our "devils" to help out our "god"! People will probably misjudge us and misconstrue us on account of this: so what! People will say: "this 'genuine honesty' — this is devilishness and absolutely nothing else!" So what! And even if they were right! Haven't all gods so far been devils like this, who have became holy and been re-baptized? And, ultimately, what do we know about ourselves? And what the spirit that leads us wants to be called'? (It is a question of names.)

And how many spirits we are hiding? Our genuine honesty, we free spirits, — let us make sure that it does not become our vanity, our pomp and finery, our limitation, our stupidity! Every virtue tends towards stupidity, every stupidity towards virtue; "stupid to the point of holiness" they say in Russia, — let us make sure we do not end up becoming saints or tedious bores out of genuine honesty! Isn't life a hundred times too short to be bored? You would have to believe in eternal life in order to …228

You will have to forgive me for having discovered that all moral philosophy so far has been boring and should be classified as a soporific — and that nothing has done more to spoil "virtue" for my ears than this tediousness of its advocates; although I would not want to underestimate their general utility. It is quite important that as few people as possible think about morality - consequently, it is really quite important for morality not to somehow turn interesting one of these days! But there is no need to worry! Things today are the same as they have always been: I don't see anyone in Europe who has (or conveys) any idea that moral deliberation could be dangerous, insidious, seductive - that it could be disastrous*. Just look at the indefatigable, unavoidable English utilitarians, for example, how awkwardly and honorably they walk in Bentham's footsteps, wandering to, wandering fro (a Homeric simile says it better), just as he himself had walked in the footsteps of the honorable Helvetius (no, this was not a dangerous man, this Helvetius!). No new thoughts, no sign of any subtle change or fold in an old thought, not even a real history of the earlier thought: an impossible literature on the whole, unless you know how to sour it with some malice. That old English vice called **cant**, which is a piece of moral tartufferie, has insinuated itself into these moralists too (who have to be read with ulterior motives, if they have to be read at all -), hidden this time under a new form: science. And there is no lack of secret defenses against all the bites of conscience that will afflict a race of former Puritans whenever they deal with morality on a scientific level. (Isn't a moralist the opposite of a Puritan? A thinker, that is, who treats morality as something questionable, question-mark-able, in short, as a problem? Shouldn't moralists be - immoral?) Ultimately, they all want English morality to be given its dues: since it is best for humanity, for the "general utility" or "the happiness of the majority" - no! **the happiness of England**. They want, with all the strength they can muster, to prove to themselves that striving for English happiness, I mean for comfort and fashion (and, at the highest level, for a seat in Parliament), is the proper path to virtue as well, and, in fact, that whatever virtue has existed in the world so far has involved just this sort of striving. Not one of these clumsy, conscience-stricken herd animals (who set out to treat egoism as a matter of general welfare -) wants to know or smell anything of the fact that "**general welfare" is no ideal, no goal,** not a concept that can somehow be grasped, but only an emetic; - that what is right for someone absolutely cannot be right for someone else; that the requirement that there be a single morality for everyone is harmful precisely to the higher men; in short, that there is an order of rank between people, and between moralities as well. They are a modest and thoroughly mediocre type of person, these utilitarian Englishmen, but, as I have said: to the extent that they are boring, we cannot think highly enough of their utility. They should even be encouraged: as the following rhymes try, in part, to do. Good barrow pushers, we salute you, "More is best" will always suit you, Always stiff in head and knee, Lacking spirit, humor too, Mediocre through and through, Sans genie et sans esprit.

LINK – UTILITARIANISM

Utilitarianism turns over on itself: their attempt to eliminate suffering denies the intrinsic relationship between suffering and 'happiness,' ends possibility of happiness.

Anomaly, Lecturer at the Program in Political Philosophy, Policy, and Law at the University of Virginia, 20**05**
[Jonny, "Nietzsche's Critique of Utilitarianism," *Journal of Nietzsche Studies*, Issue 29, muse]

Nietzsche also portrays egalitarian values as myopic, dangerous, and potentially self-subverting. This is because, Nietzsche thinks, the opposite of these values—pain, suffering, inequality; in short, "evil"—is equally indispensable for the survival and happiness of the very herd that seeks to eradicate it. Accordingly, Nietzsche sharply criticizes Bentham's hedonic calculus (which correlates happiness maximization with pain minimization) as inconsistent with utilitarian goals. In its place, Nietzsche stresses the necessity of physical suffering and intellectual struggle for the self-improvement of each and, by extension, the vitality and happiness of the group. He accordingly rebukes the proponent of any morality that makes the reduction of suffering its fundamental goal: "[I]f you experience suffering and displeasure as evil, worthy of annihilation and as a defect of existence, then it is clear that besides your religion of pity you also harbor another religion in your heart that is perhaps the mother of the religion of pity: the religion of comfortableness" (GS 338). This religion— or, more specifically, morality— of comfort thwarts its own goals by attempting to eliminate all suffering (BGE 44).9 In a passage that anticipates what we now call the "hedonic paradox," according to which pleasure is diminished when we pursue it directly, Nietzsche ridicules those who, like Bentham, seek to maximize individual or collective happiness by minimizing pain: "[H]ow little you know of human happiness, you comfortable and benevolent people, for happiness and unhappiness are sisters and even twins that either grow up together or, as in your case, remain small together" (GS 338).10 He goes on to underline the idiosyncratic nature of suffering and the simplemindedness of those who heedlessly strive to relieve the suffering of others. "It never occurs to them," Nietzsche adds, "that . . . the path to one's own heaven always leads through the voluptuousness of one's own hell" (GS 338).

LINK – UTILITARIANISM

Utilitarianism reflects the false morality of the "good" and "evil," a denial of life incompatible with higher values

Campbell, 2003 [David, Professor of Cultural and Political Geography @ Durham U, "Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Meaning," The Journal of Nietzsche Studies, 26, pg. 26]

<The meaning of the terms "good" and "bad" is determined "not for a time only . . . but permanently" by the ruler's "decree." In this way there comes about a common currency of values and social cohesion. This decree is not arbitrary, but a "quick jetting forth" from his character. The source of "supreme" value judgments is, then, the agent, somewhat as water under pressure jets out a fountain. To find the origin of moral terms we need to look back, so to speak, to character, not ahead to consequences or "utility." Nietzsche dismisses the "lukewarmness which every scheming prudence, every utilitarian calculus presupposes." He further highlights impassioned agency by castigating its opposite, the "slave ethics" of the "low-minded," as merely passive and reactive rather than active and creative. "Slave ethics requires . . . an outside stimulus in order to act at all; all its action is reaction" (I, §X). Nietzsche speaks of the ruler's "triumphant self-affirmation" (I, §X), suggesting that his will would be ascendant in its own terms only, if the circumstance of a "pathos of distance" between a natural ruler and "plebeians" did not dictate his ascendancy over them.

The feelings one interprets have a bodily basis, in what Nietzsche calls one's "physiology": in other words, perhaps, one's physical type. His discussion of "priests" is further evidence that he operates a theory of self-interpretation. Their "morbidity and neurasthenia" explain their turning away from "action," their self-disgust and consequent asceticism, and hence the moral terms they typically deploy such as "pure" and "impure," and their idea of God as "nothingness." Their self-understanding as priests depends on their interpreting morbid feelings, and these on physical debility: [End Page 26]>

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LINK – PREDICTION

Their use of calculation overdetermines the future – makes their impacts a necessity.

Lawrence J. **Hatab**, 20**05,** Nietzsche's Life Sentence – Coming to Terms with Eternal Recurrence [Professor of Philosophy and Chair of the department as Old Dominion University, 127-130]

Nietzsche rejects both the notion of a free will and an unfree will *(BGE 21)*. Yet he also champions an idea that seems clearly at odds with freedom, namely necessity. It is important to begin with an analysis of this idea in order to address critical assessments of eternal recurrence and to fathom how freedom can function in Nietzsche's thought. As we have seen, Nietzsche specifically associates eternal recurrence with necessity, and the repetition scheme seems to imply a rigid determinism, because any event that happens, has happened, or will happen cannot admit of any alternatives. Whatever I do next has happened an infinite number of times in the same way, and so there is only one possible future. Surely this sounds like determinism and a denial of freely chosen acts in any sense, since choice implies real alternative possibilities.' My argument is as follows: Nietzschean necessity does rule out classic conceptions of free will, but it does not fit classic conceptions of determinism either. Nietzsche advances an unusual sense of necessity that echoes the ancient Greek understanding of fate, most especially the force of tragic fate.

For Nietzsche, the necessity of an event does rule, out alternatives, but simply from the standpoint of the "self-evidence" of the immediate event as such, with nothing *other* or outside it, whether that be a causal chain or a selforiginating "will" or "substance." This is why Nietzsche says that "occurrence *(Geschehen)* and necessary occurrence is a tautology" (WP 639). Necessity is counterposed not only to free alternatives but to any sense of mechanism,

causality, or law: "Let us beware of saying that there are laws in nature. There are only necessities" (GS 109).2 We have previously seen that one connotation of necessity follows from the absence of global purposes, an absence that makes the idea of an "accident" senseless *(GS* 109). But necessity is also different from logical or causal necessity; Nietzsche dismisses any radical sense of causality or law. The reason he denies both a free and an unfree will is that each is a false attribution of causality: freedom as self-causation and unfreedom as external causation *(EGE 21)*. Necessity does not follow from the force of law but from the *absence of* law *(BGE 22);* it cannot mean some fixed relation between successive states (which violates the primacy *of* radical becoming) but simply that a state is what it is rather than something else (WP *552, 631)*. *Necessity indicates that an occurrence "cannot be otherwise" simply by force of its immediate emergence, independent of any sense of causality-whether the self-causality of freedom, the final causality of teleology; or the efficient causality of determinism-since causality always looks away* from an occurrence as such and in one way or another relies on the possibility of alternatives. Teleology looks "ahead" for intelligibility, mechanism looks "before" and "after" for causal regulation, and freedom looks "within" for a spontaneous agent. Alternativeness, of course, is essential to freedom, but it operates in teleology too ("straying" from telic movement-an accidenthelps define proper movement), and in scientific causality as well (current causal findings depend on positing future repetitions and alternative results under different causal conditions).

 Nietzsche does not deny the possibility of causal thinking, only its primal posture as "explanation?' Causality is an *interpretation of* experience that is useful for "designation and communication" *(BGE 21-22)*. Necessity names the primal immediacy *of* events-in-becoming *as such,* for which in each case an "alternative" would not be "another event" but *no event* (see WP *567)*. It is important to note that the "immediacy" of occurrence should not be taken as an isolated state or a pure "present:' because all occurrences are temporally structured. An occurrence is an extended span of movement that can be acknowledged in Nietzsche's conception of necessity.

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LINK – UTILITARIANISM A2: UTIL = NATURAL

Self-destructive NOT self-preservation constitutes the cardinal drive of organic beings.

Freidrich <u>Nietzsche</u>, übermensch, <u>1886</u> [tr. Judith Norman, ed. Rolf-Peter Hortsmann, *Beyond Good and Evil*, re-published by Cambridge University Press in 2002, pp 15

<u>Physiologists should think twice before positioning the drive for self-preservation as the cardinal drive of an organic being. Above all, a living thing wants to discharge its strength — life itself is will to power —: self-preservation is only one of the indirect and most frequent consequences of this</u>. — In short, here as elsewhere, <u>watch out for superfluous ideological principles! — such as the drive for preservation</u> (which we owe to Spinoza's inconsistency —). This is demanded by method, which must essentially be the economy of principles.

LINK – UTILITARIANISM

Utilitarianism reflects the false morality of the "good" and "evil," a denial of life incompatible with higher values

Campbell, 2003 [David, Professor of Cultural and Political Geography @ Durham U, "Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Meaning," The Journal of Nietzsche Studies, 26, pg. 26]

<The meaning of the terms "good" and "bad" is determined "not for a time only . . . but permanently" by the ruler's "decree." In this way there comes about a common currency of values and social cohesion. This decree is not arbitrary, but a "quick jetting forth" from his character. The source of "supreme" value judgments is, then, the agent, somewhat as water under pressure jets out a fountain. To find the origin of moral terms we need to look back, so to speak, to character, not ahead to consequences or "utility." Nietzsche dismisses the "lukewarmness which every scheming prudence, every utilitarian calculus presupposes." He further highlights impassioned agency by castigating its opposite, the "slave ethics" of the "low-minded," as merely passive and reactive rather than active and creative. "Slave ethics requires . . . an outside stimulus in order to act at all; all its action is reaction" (I, §X). Nietzsche speaks of the ruler's "triumphant self-affirmation" (I, §X), suggesting that his will would be ascendant in its own terms only, if the circumstance of a "pathos of distance" between a natural ruler and "plebeians" did not dictate his ascendancy over them.

The feelings one interprets have a bodily basis, in what Nietzsche calls one's "physiology": in other words, perhaps, one's physical type. His discussion of "priests" is further evidence that he operates a theory of self-interpretation. Their "morbidity and neurasthenia" explain their turning away from "action," their self-disgust and consequent asceticism, and hence the moral terms they typically deploy such as "pure" and "impure," and their idea of God as "nothingness." Their self-understanding as priests depends on their interpreting morbid feelings, and these on physical debility: [End Page 26]>

LINK – UTILITARIANISM

Utilitarianism turns over on itself: their attempt to eliminate suffering denies the intrinsic relationship between suffering and 'happiness,' ends possibility of happiness.

Anomaly, Lecturer at the Program in Political Philosophy, Policy, and Law at the University of Virginia, 20**05**
[Jonny, "Nietzsche's Critique of Utilitarianism," *Journal of Nietzsche Studies*, Issue 29, muse]

Nietzsche also portrays egalitarian values as myopic, dangerous, and potentially self-subverting. This is because, Nietzsche thinks, the opposite of these values—pain, suffering, inequality; in short, "evil"—is equally indispensable for the survival and happiness of the very herd that seeks to eradicate it. Accordingly, Nietzsche sharply criticizes Bentham's hedonic calculus (which correlates happiness maximization with pain minimization) as inconsistent with utilitarian goals. In its place, Nietzsche stresses the necessity of physical suffering and intellectual struggle for the self-improvement of each and, by extension, the vitality and happiness of the group. He accordingly rebukes the proponent of any morality that makes the reduction of suffering its fundamental goal: "[I]f you experience suffering and displeasure as evil, worthy of annihilation and as a defect of existence, then it is clear that besides your religion of pity you also harbor another religion in your heart that is perhaps the mother of the religion of pity: the religion of comfortableness" (GS 338). This religion— or, more specifically, morality— of comfort thwarts its own goals by attempting to eliminate all suffering (BGE 44).9 In a passage that anticipates what we now call the "hedonic paradox," according to which pleasure is diminished when we pursue it directly, Nietzsche ridicules those who, like Bentham, seek to maximize individual or collective happiness by minimizing pain: "[H]ow little you know of human happiness, you comfortable and benevolent people, for happiness and unhappiness are sisters and even twins that either grow up together or, as in your case, remain small together" (GS 338).10 He goes on to underline the idiosyncratic nature of suffering and the simplemindedness of those who heedlessly strive to relieve the suffering of others. "It never occurs to them," Nietzsche adds, "that . . . the path to one's own heaven always leads through the voluptuousness of one's own hell" (GS 338).

LINK – UTILITARIANISM

THE DRIVE TO EVALUATE EVERYTHING "OBJECTIVELY" AND WITHOUT CONCERN FOR HOW INDIVIDUALS EXPRESS THEMSELVES TURNS US INTO TOOLS WITHOUT SPIRIT OR VALUES.

FREIDRICH NIETZSCHE, ÜBERMENSCH, 1886 [TR. JUDITH NORMAN, ED. ROLF-PETER HORTSMANN, *BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL*, RE-PUBLISHED BY CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS IN 2002, PP 97-99]

However gratefully we might approach the objective spirit - and who hasn't been sick to death at least once of everything subjective, with its damned ipsissimosityl4 - nevertheless, in the end we even have to be cautious of our gratitude, and put an end to the exaggerated terms in which people have recently been celebrating the desubjectivization and depersonification of spirit, as if this were some sort of goal in itself, some sort of redemption or transfiguration. This kind of thing tends to happen within the pessimist school, which has reasons of its own for regarding "disinterested knowing" with the greatest respect. The objective man who no longer swears or complains like the pessimist does, the ideal scholar who expresses the scientific instinct as it finally blossoms and blooms all the way (after things have gone partly or wholly wrong a thousand times over) - he is certainly one of the most expensive tools there is**: but he belongs in the hands of someone more powerful. He is only a tool, we will say: he is a mirror, — he is not an "end in himself**." The objective man is really a mirror: he is used to subordinating himself in front of anything that wants to be known, without any other pleasure than that of knowing, of "mirroring forth." He waits until something comes along and then spreads himself gently towards it, so that even light footsteps and the passing by of a ghostly being are not lost on his surface and skin. He has so thoroughly become a passageway and reflection of strange shapes and events, that whatever is left in him of a "person" strikes him as accidental, often arbitrary, and still more often as disruptive. It takes an effort for him to think back on "himself," and he is not infrequently mistaken when he does. He easily confuses himself with others, he is wrong about his own basic needs, and this is the only respect in which he is crude and careless. Maybe his health is making him suffer, or the pettiness and provincial airs of a wife or a friend, or the lack of companions and company, - all right then, he makes himself think about his sufferings: but to no avail! His thoughts have already wandered off, towards more general issues, and by the next day he does not know how to help himself any more than he knew the day before. He has lost any serious engagement with the issue as well as the time to spend on it: he is cheerful, not for lack of needs but for lack of hands to grasp his neediness. The obliging manner in which he typically approaches things and experiences, the sunny and natural hospitality with which he accepts everything that comes at him, his type of thoughtless goodwill, of dangerous lack of concern for Yeses and Noes: oh, there are plenty of times when he has to pay for these virtues of his! — and being human, he all too easily becomes the caputmortuunfi of these virtues. If you want him to love or hate (I mean love and hate as a god, woman, or animal would understand the terms —) he will do what he can and give what he can. But do not be surprised if it is not much, — if this is where he comes across as fake, fragile, questionable, and brittle. His love is forced, his hatred artificial and more like un tour deforce, a little piece of vanity and exaggeration. He is sincere only to the extent that he is allowed to be objective: he is "nature" and "natural" only in his cheerful totality. His mirror-like soul is forever smoothing itself out; it does not know how to affirm or negate any more. He does not command; and neither does he destroy. "Je ne meprise presque new," he says with Leibniz: that presque should not be overlooked or underestimated! He is no paragon of humanity; he does not go in front of anyone or behind. In general, he puts himself at too great a distance to have any basis for choosing between good or evil. If people have mistaken him for a philosopher for so long, for a Caesar-like man who cultivates and breeds, for the brutal man of culture — then they have paid him much too high an honor and overlooked what is most essential about him, — he is a tool, a piece of slave (although, without a doubt, the most sublime type of slave) but nothing in himself, — presque rien. The objective person is a tool, an expensive measuring instrument and piece of mirror art that is easily injured and spoiled and should be honored and protected; but he is not a goal, not a departure or a fresh start, he is not the sort of complementary person in which the rest of existence justifies itself. He is not a conclusion — and still less a beginning, begetter or first cause; there is nothing tough, powerful or self-supporting that wants to dominate. Rather, he is only a gentle, brushed-off, refined, agile pot of forms, who first has to wait for some sort of content or substance in order "to shape" himself accordingly, - he is generally a man without substance or content, a "selfless" man. And consequently, in parenthesi, nothing for women. —

Link – humanism/liberalism/universalism
The notion of "humanity" as a universal goal necessitates an assimilationist ethic whereby the periphery is incorporated through correction and valuation- just wars are waged and exclusion of the "inhuman" from the polis becomes necessary.
Rasch 2003 (William, Prof. Germanic Studies @ Indiana U, "Human Rights as Geopolitics: Carl Schmitt and the Legal Form of American Supremacy," *Cultural Critique* 54, p. 120-147) vp

In his The Conquest of America, Tzvetan Todorov approaches <u>our relationship to the "other" by way of</u> three <u>interlocking distinctions</u>, namely, self/other, same/different, and equal/unequal. A simple superposition of all three distinctions <u>makes of the other someone who is different and therefore unequal. The problem</u> we have been discussing, however, <u>comes to light when we make of the other someone who is equal because he is essentially the same. This form of the universalist ideology is assimilationist. It denies the other by embracing him.</u> Of the famous sixteenth-century defender of the Indians, Bartolomé de Las Casas, Todorov writes,
 [his] declaration of the equality of men is made in the name of a specific religion, Christianity.... Hence, there is a potential danger of seeing not only the Indians' human nature asserted but also their Christian "nature." "The natural laws and rules and rights of men," Las Casas said; but who decides what is natural with regard to laws and rights? Is it not speciWcally the Christian religion? Since Christianity is universalist, it implies an essential non-difference on the part of all men. We see the danger of the identiWcation in this text of Saint John Chrysostrom, quoted and defended at Valladolid: "Just as there is no natural difference in the creation of man, so there is no difference in the call to salvation of all men, barbarous or wise, since God's grace can correct the minds of barbarians, so that they have a reasonable understanding."12
Once again we see that <u>the term "human" is not descriptive, but evaluative. To be truly human, one needs to be corrected.</u> Regarding the relationship of difference and equality, Todorov concludes, "<u>If it is</u> [End Page 139] <u>incontestable that the prejudice of superiority is an obstacle in the road to knowledge, we must also admit that the prejudice of equality is a still greater one, for it consists in identifying the other purely and simply with one's own 'ego ideal'</u> (or with oneself)" (1984, 165). <u>Such identification is</u> not only the essence of Christianity, but also of <u>the doctrine of human rights</u> preached by enthusiasts like Habermas and Rawls. <u>And</u> such identification <u>means that the other is stripped of his otherness and made to conform to the universal ideal of what it means to be human.</u>
And <u>yet, despite</u>—indeed, because of—<u>the all-encompassing embrace, the detested other is never allowed to leave the stage altogether.</u> Even as we seem on the verge of actualizing Kant's dream, as Habermas puts it, of "a cosmopolitan order" that unites all peoples and abolishes war under the auspices of "the states of the First World" who "can afford to harmonize their national interests to a certain extent with the norms that define the halfhearted cosmopolitan aspirations of the UN" (1998, 165, 184), it is still fascinating to see how the barbarians make their functionally necessary presence felt. John <u>Rawls</u>, in his The Law of Peoples (1999), conveniently <u>divides the world into well-ordered peoples and those who are not well ordered. Among the former are the "reasonable liberal peoples" and the "decent hierarchical peoples"</u> (4). <u>Opposed to them are the "outlaw states" and other "burdened" peoples who are not worthy of respect. Liberal peoples, who</u>, by virtue of their history, <u>possess superior institutions, culture, and moral character</u> (23-25), <u>have not only the right to deny non-well-ordered peoples respect, but the duty to extend</u> what Vitoria called "<u>brotherly correction</u>" and Habermas "gentle compulsion" (Habermas 1997, 133). 13 That is, Rawls believes that the "refusal to tolerate" those states deemed to be outlaw states "is a consequence of liberalism and decency." Why? <u>Because outlaw states violate human rights.</u> What are human rights? "What I call human rights," Rawls states, "are ... a proper subset of the rights possessed by citizens in a liberal constitutional democratic regime, or of the rights of the members of a decent hierarchical society" (Rawls 1999, 81<u>). Because of their violation of these liberal rights, nonliberal, nondecent societies do not even have the right "to protest their condemnation by the world society"</u> (38), <u>and decent peoples have the right, if necessary, to wage just wars against them. Thus,</u> [End Page 140] <u>liberal societies are not merely contingently established and historically conditioned forms of organization; they become the universal standard against which other societies are judged. Those found wanting are banished,</u> as outlaws, <u>from the civilized world. Ironically, one of the signs of their outlaw status is their insistence on autonomy,</u> on sovereignty.

<u>controlled, localized, and limited but never eliminated. Order is localizable and therefore so is the state of exception</u> (Ausnahmezustand) <u>on which it is grounded.</u> Agamben, on the other hand, implicitly believes in the possibility of a political order that would not be based on an exclusion. The insistence on localizing a putatively logically necessary exception is, in Agamben's view, what drives modernity. Indeed, it is what has driven us all straight to hell, because for Agamben the telos, or logical consequence of such localization, is, quite simply if melodramatically, Auschwitz. "When our age," he writes, "tried to grant the unlocalizable a permanent and visible localization, the result was the concentration camp" (1998, 20). Thus, rather than merely "limiting" or "civilizing" the violence associated with a fatalistically necessary state of exception, Agamben wishes to eliminate it. Accordingly, his vision of the political is alternately nihilistic and utopian—that is—hopeless except for the one grand hope."Until a completely new politics ... is at hand," he writes, "every new theory and every praxis will remain imprisoned and immobile, and the 'beautiful day' of life will be given citizenship only either through blood and death or in the perfect senselessness to which the society of the spectacle condemns it" (11). [End Page 129]

LINK - COSMOPOLITANISM

Cosmopolitanism is a false universalism deployed to exert domination over others..

Brennan, prof. of cultural studies, comparative literature, and English @ Minnesota, 20**02**
[Timothy, "Cosmo-Theory," *The South Atlantic Quarterly* 100.3, pg.]

What <u>cosmopolitanism popularly evokes</u>—among other things, the thirst for another knowledge, unprejudiced striving, world travel, supple open-mindedness, <u>broad international norms of civic equality, a politics of treaty and understanding rather than conquest</u>—can hardly be devalued, especially today. As various urban "suss" laws are upheld by the higher courts, and as an entire people abroad is bombarded by U.S. planes for the collective sin of belonging to a race of "serial ethnic cleansers," one is tempted to stick to the basic decency of cosmopolitanism (á la Martha Nussbaum) rather than try to be too subtle. 1

On the other hand, cosmopolitanism has prompted some of these very symptoms. It is a fundamentally ambivalent phenomenon. An ethical argument for cosmopolitanism or for its nominal opposite (patriotism) cannot be based on a formal adherence to a list of positive qualities. One's judgment of cosmopolitanism's value or desirability, in other words, is affected by whose cosmopolitanism or patriotism one is talking about—whose definitions of prejudice, knowledge, or open-mindedness one is referring [End Page 659] to. **Cosmopolitanism is local while denying its local character. This denial is an intrinsic feature of cosmopolitanism and inherent to its appeal**.

Our confusion over these preliminary observations derives from a fact about cosmopolitanism that seems, at first, to be quite extraneous to it. In general, the term has been disorienting within cultural theory because of the theorist's unwillingness to analyze the marketplace in a sustained or careful way. My apparently unjustified leap into new territory might be defended by recalling the opening question of the chapter "The Fair, the Pig, and Authorship" from Peter <u>Stallybrass and Allon White's</u> widely read book, The Politics and Poetics of Transgression. They ask, "How does one 'think' a marketplace?" Their provisional answer, which I take to be the type of point I make in this essay, is that "the commonplace is what is most radically unthinkable":

   At once a bounded enclosure and site of open commerce, it is both the imagined centre of an urban community and its structural interconnection with the network of goods. . . . A marketplace is the epitome of local identity (often indeed it is what defined a place as more significant than surrounding communities) and the unsettling of that identity by the trade and traffic of goods from elsewhere. . . . In the marketplace pure and simple categories of thought find themselves perplexed and one-sided. 2

Their <u>image of opening up the center's one-sided logic to the clashing values of the outer boroughs is</u> reminiscent of the hybridity so <u>widely extolled in theories of cosmopolitanism</u>. <u>But</u> <u>they take us into more troubling territory with their image of a local reality translated into global terms by way of market flow</u>—a reality, as the authors describe it, <u>that transforms hybridity itself into a coercive lesson imposed on outlying populations</u>. Pursuing this logic, which is uniquely accessible in a cultural analysis that attempts to "think a marketplace," Stallybrass and White find themselves questioning Mikhail Bakhtin's famous observations on the carnivalesque. They observe that "the fair, far from being the privileged site of popular symbolic opposition to hierarchies, was in fact a kind of educative spectacle, a relay for the diffusion of the cosmopolitan values of the 'centre' (particularly the capital and the new urban centres of production) throughout the provinces and the lower orders." 3

If they treat the concept only in passing and superficially, nevertheless [End Page 660] the authors are right about cosmopolitanism functioning as a relay for the center's values, sublimating differences on grounds of understanding by way of a motive to export ideological products made to the measure of the world of saleable things. But I would add a point they leave only implicit: namely, that **cosmopolitanism makes sense only in the context of a specific national-cultural mood**. As Stallybrass and White imply, <u>centers tend to be where the concept has historically found its greatest acclaim</u>. But what they do not quite express is the process by which one—benevolently, of course—expands his or her sensitivities toward the world while exporting a self-confident locality for consumption as the world. The problem exposed here consists of the ways in which <u>an ideo-economic substructure is elaborately developed for the export of "idea-products" in a necessarily self-concealing act, where what is promoted has value only insofar as it proclaims that it promotes its opposite</u>. This is a subject for theory that has too rarely been taken up, since it points toward the threatening topic of the economic function of intellectuals.

LINK - JUSTICE

Justice is nothing but another word for revenge-people use judicial systems as a mechanism to normalize punishment

Kathleen Marie **Higgins**, Professor at U.T., **2007** [Hicks, Steven V., and Alan Rosenberg. Reading Nietzsche at the Margins. New York: Purdue UP. Print. 66-67 Fundamental to "justice"…person observed]

Fundamental to "justice," in Nietzsche's view, is the motivation of revenge. Revenge, as Nietzsche sees it, is **a symptom of spiritual poisoning, as well as an incitement to further decay.** His focus is concern to eliminate the grip of revenge as a motive. Its vindictive motivation is a central reason for Nietzsche's attack on "justice" and those who promote it, and an important ground for his opposition to traditional morality. In a passage titled "The Revenge against the Spirit and Other Ulterior Motives of Morality" he remarks,

There is a human being who has turned out badly, who does not have enough spirit to be able to enjoy it but just enough education to realize this .... Such a person who is fundamentally ashamed of his existence... eventually ends up in a state of habitual revenge, will to revenge.

What do you suppose he finds necessary, absolutely necessary, to give himself in his own eyes the appearance of superiority over more spiritual people and to attain the pleasure of an accomplished revenge at least in his imagination? Always **morality**; you can bet on that. Always big moral words. Always the rub-a-dub of **justice**, wisdom, **holiness, virtue** .... (GS, 5 359)

Nietzsche considers morality to be a mode of imaginary revenge. **The moralist gets revenge on someone who might otherwise be envied by calling that person's gratifying actions "sins" and that person "immoral."** These characterizations are imposed by imagination. **Pronouncement of moral judgment, even without external sanction, is a gratifying act of revenge**.

Significantly, "**justice" and morality accomplish revenge by means of a decision regarding how one views another.** The decision, in both cases, is motivated by a desire to avenge oneself, and the vision of the other is, accordingly, uglified, denigrated. "**Justice," so motivated, is inherently unjust, for it adopts an interpretive mode that is always at the expense of the person observed**. By contrast, Zarathustra's "justice that is love with open eyes" interprets differently.

LINK – EGALITARIANISM

Equality reflects a nihilist leveling that destroys all values by subordinating excellence and strength

Hatab 1995 [*A Nietzschean Defense of Democracy*]

I do not wish to be mixed up and confused with these preachers of equality. For, to me justice speaks thus: "Men are not equal." Nor shall they become equal! **Nietzsche's primary political target is egalitarianism, which, like slave morality, gives the appearance of something positive but is in fact a reactive negation. The promotion of political equality is unmasked as the weak majority grabbing power to incapacitate the strong few.'** Democracy is different from slave morality in one very important respect: Democracy repairs the lack of agency that constituted the slave mentality, because slave values have now been redirected from the more internal realms of religious imagination and moral ideals to the external public realm of political power and cultural institutions. **In democratic politics, the herd instinct actually rules and legislates against hierarchical domination.** For Nietzsche, **the unfortunate consequence is the hegemony and promulgation of mediocrity and a vapid conformism, which obviates creativity and excellence and portends the aimless contentment, the happy nihilism, of the "last man," who makes everything comfortable, small, and trivial** (Z P,5). On behalf of excellence and high aspirations, Nietzsche challenges democracy by promoting rank, distance, and domination. **The doctrine of human equality is diagnosed as weakness and decadence, a poison that destroys the natural justice of differentiation.** promoting rank, distance, and domination." **Equality," as a certain factual increase in similarity, which merely finds expression in the theory of "equal rights,' is an essential feature of decline**. The cleavage between man and man, status and status, the plurality of types, the will to oneself, to stand out-what *I* call the *pathos of distance*, that is characteristic of every strong age. The strength to withstand tension, the width of the tensions between extremes, becomes ever smaller today; finally the extremes themselves become blurred to the point of similarity. The doctrine of equality! There is no more poisonous poison anywhere for it seems to be preached by justice itself, whereas it really is the termination of justice. "**Equal to the equal, unequal to the unequal"- *that* would be the true slogan of justice; and also its corollary: "Never make equal what is unequal." Nietzsche sees equality as a blending that washes out differences**, something that offends his constant affirmation of *distinctions,* which requires a demarcational hold against an Other.

LINK – EGALITARIANISM

Universal ethics are an expression of resentment that deny chaos and reduce all life to base cogs.
Conway, 1997

[Daniel W. Ph.D, Professor and Department Head of Philosophy, Nietzsche & the Political, Routledge, 29-30]

Especially when viewed from the broadly historical perspective that Nietzsche favors, however, the enterprise of morality encompasses far more than the universal prescriptions and metaphysical fictions that he *so famously debunks. In fact, he regularly reminds his readers that the type of morality he opposes is only one among several possible moralities:Morality in Europe today is herd animal* morality-in other words, as we understand it, merely *one* type of human morality beside which, before which, and after which many other types,. above all *higher* moralities, are or ought to be, possible. But this morality resists such a "possibility," such an "ought" with all its power: it says stubbornly and inexorably, "I am morality itself, and nothing besides is morality." (BGE **202**)Continuing this critique of moral monism in his next book, *On the Genealogy of Morals,* he declares that contemporary morality, despite its claims to universality, is in fact descended from a "slave" morality, which in turn emerged only in response to the hegemony of a logically and historically prior "noble" morality. The history of morality, encrypted in the "long hieroglyphic record" that Nietzsche aims to decipher (GM P:7), thus contradicts the claim of *any* morality, including the ubiquitous "herd animal morality," to a privileged, monistic prerogative as the arbiter of ethical life. In his "review" of the *Genealogy,* he explicitly identifies the "slave revolt in morality" with "the birth of Christianity out of the spirit of *ressentiment*" (EH XI).A universally binding morality would necessarily erect a monolithic moral ideal, thereby reducing a plurality of human types and kinds to a lowest common denominator. Ethical laws should (and do) bind collectively, but only across a limited number of individuals, such as constitute a people, race, tribe, or community. As Zarathustra puts it, "I am a law only for my kind [die Meinen], I am no law for all" (Z IV:12). The dream of an ethical community comprising all human beings, or all sentient beings, thus spells political nightmare. The laws of an omni-inclusive ethical community would express only the commonalities and banalities of the individuals involved, rather than their unique strengths and virtues. Morality should always serve the enhancement of the ethical life of a particular people, and not the other way around:

to culture any history or evolution; the education determined by the law of the land was intended to bind all generations and keep them at *one level .... So culture developed in spite of the polis. (HH)*

Nietzsche's negative view of <mark>institutions</mark> generally, like that of his twentieth century student, Foucault, pertains to his conviction that they <u>contain and <mark>constrain life, dominating through excessive control and devitalization of their subjects.</mark></u> <u>Institutions also endure over time, and in this too are contrary to a cultural ethos of creativity and struggle</u>.

LINK – THE STATE

Their use of the State justifies a violent apparatus that requires individuals to suborn their freedom and individual drive for the sake of an unnatural order
Newman 2000 (Saul, Prof. Sociology @ Macquarie U, "Anarchism and the Politics of Ressentiment," *Theory and Event*, 4:3, Johns Hopkins UP) vp

This conception of the State ironically strikes a familiar note with Nietzsche. Nietzsche, like the anarchists, sees modern man as 'tamed', fettered and made impotent by the State.[15] He also sees the State as an abstract machine of domination, which precedes capitalism, and looms above class and economic concerns. The State is a mode of domination that imposes a regulated 'interiorization' upon the populace. According to Nietzsche the State emerged as a "terrible tyranny, as a repressive and ruthless machinery," which subjugated, made compliant, and shaped the population.[16] Moreover the origins of this State are violent. It is imposed forcefully from without and has nothing to with 'contracts'.[17] Nietzsche demolishes the "fantasy" of the social contract -- the theory that the State was formed by people voluntarily relinquishing their power in return for the safety and security that would be provided by the State. This idea of the social contract has been central to conservative and liberal political theory, from Hobbes to Locke. Anarchists also reject this theory of the social contract. They too argue that the origins of the State are violent, and that it is absurd to argue that people voluntarily gave up their power. It is a dangerous myth that legitimizes and perpetuates State domination.
The Social Contract
Anarchism is based on an essentially optimistic conception of human nature: if individuals have a natural tendency to get on well together then there is no need for the existence of a State to arbitrate between them. On the contrary, the State actually has a pernicious effect on these natural social relations. Anarchists therefore reject political theories based on the idea of social contract. Social contract theory relies on a singularly negative picture of human nature. According to Hobbes individuals are naturally selfish, aggressively competitive and egotistic, and in a state of nature they are engaged in a war of "every man, against every man" in which their individual drives necessarily bring them into conflict with one another.[18] According to this theory, then, society in a state of nature is characterized by a radical dislocation: there is no common bond between individuals; there is in fact a constant state of war between them, a constant struggle for resources.[19] In order to put a stop to this state of permanent war, individuals come together to form a social contract upon which some kind of authority can be established. They agree to sacrifice part of their freedom in return for some kind of order, so that they can pursue their own individual ends more peacefully and profitably. They agree on the creation of a State with a mandate over society, which shall arbitrate between conflicting wills and enforce law and order.
The extent of the State's authority may vary from the liberal State whose power is supposedly tempered by the rule of law, to the absolute State power -- the Leviathan -- dreamt up by Hobbes. While the models may vary, however, anarchists argue that the result of this social contract theory is the same: a justification of State domination, whether it be through the rule of law or through the arbitrary imposition of force. For anarchists any form of State power is an imposition of force. The social contract theory is a sleight of hand that legitimates political domination -- Bakunin calls it an "unworthy hoax!"[20] He exposes the central paradox in the theory of the social contract: if, in a state of nature, individuals subsist in a state of primitive savagery, then how can they suddenly have the foresight to come together and create a social contract?[21] If there is no common bond in society, no essence within humans which brings them together, then upon what basis can a social contract be formed? Like Nietzsche, anarchists argue that there is no such agreement that the State was imposed from above, not from below. The social contract tries to mystify the brutal origins of the State: war, conquest and self-enslavement, rather than rational agreement. For Kropotkin the State is a violent disruption of, and an imposition upon, a harmoniously functioning, organic society.[22] Society has no need for a 'social contract'. It has its own contract with nature, governed by natural laws.[23]

LINK – SECURITY

Security is an idol

Der Derrian, 19**95**, The Value of Security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche, and Baudrillard [Watson Institute research professor of international studies and professor of political science at Brown University]

The rapidity of change in the international system, as well as the inability of international theory to make sense of that change, raises this question: Of what value is security? More specifically, just how secure is this preeminent concept of international relations? This evaluation of security invokes interpretive strategies to ask epistemological, ontological, and political questions--questions that all too often are ignored, subordinated, or displaced by the technically biased, narrowly framed question of *what* it takes to achieve security. The goal, then, of this inquiry is to make philosophically problematic that which has been practically axiomatic in international relations. The first step is to ask whether the paramount value of security lies in its abnegation of the insecurity of all values.

No other concept in international relations packs the metaphysical punch, nor commands the disciplinary power of "security." In its name, peoples have alienated their fears, rights and powers to gods, emperors, and most recently, sovereign states, all to protect themselves from the vicissitudes of nature--as well as from other gods, emperors, and sovereign states. In its name, weapons of mass destruction have been developed which have transfigured national interest into a security dilemma based on a suicide pact. And, less often noted in international relations, in its name billions have been made and millions killed while scientific knowledge has been furthered and intellectual dissent muted.

We have inherited an *ontotheology* of security, that is, an *a priori* argument that proves the existence and necessity of only one form of security because there currently happens to be a widespread, metaphysical belief in it. Indeed, within the concept of security lurks the entire history of western metaphysics, which was best described by Derrida "as a series of substitutions of center for center" in a perpetual search for the "transcendental signified."[1] From God to Rational Man, from Empire to Republic, from King to the People--and on occasion in the reverse direction as well, for history is never so linear, never so neat as we would write it--the security of the center has been the shifting site from which the forces of authority, order, and identity philosophically defined and physically kept at bay anarchy, chaos, and difference.

Yet the center, as modern poets and postmodern critics tell us, no longer holds. The demise of a bipolar system, the diffusion of power into new political, national, and economic constellations, the decline of civil society and the rise of the shopping mall, the acceleration of *everything* --transportation, capital and information flows, change itself--have induced a new anxiety. As George Bush repeatedly said--that is, until the 1992 Presidential election went into full swing--"The enemy is unpredictability. The enemy is instability."[2]

LINK – HEGEMONY

Hegemony is predicated upon a violent will to order that seeks to elevate security to a transcendental ideal. This moral justification for violence not only results in the genocidal elimination of difference but is constitutive of a hatred of life and the world as it is.
Der Derian 2003 (James, Prof. of IR @ Brown U, "Decoding The National Security Strategy of the United States of America," boundary 2 30.3, Duke UP, p. 19-27) vp

From President Bush's opening lines of The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (NSS), the gap between rhetoric and reality takes on Browningesque proportions: "'Our Nation's cause has [End Page 19] always been **larger than our Nation's defense**. We fight, as we always fight, for a just peace—a peace that favors liberty. We will defend the peace against the threats from terrorists and tyrants. We will preserve the peace by building good relations among the great powers. And we will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent'" (1). Regardless of authorial (or good) intentions, the NSS reads more like late—very late—nineteenth-century poetry than a strategic doctrine for the twenty-first century. The rhetoric of the White House favors and clearly intends to mobilize the moral clarity, nostalgic sentimentality, and uncontested dominance reminiscent of the last great empires against the ambiguities, complexities, and messiness of the current world disorder. However, the gulf between the nation's stated cause ("to help make the world not just safer but better" [1]) and defensive needs (to fight "a war against terrorists of global reach" [5]) is so vast that one detects what Nietzsche referred to as the "breath of empty space," that void **between the world as it is and as we would wish it to be**, which produces all kinds of metaphysical concoctions.
In short shrift (thirty pages), the White House articulation of U.S. global objectives to the Congress elevates strategic discourse from a traditional, temporal calculation of means and ends, to the theological realm of monotheistic faith and monolithic truth. Relying more on aspiration than analysis, revelation than reason, the NSS is not grand but grandiose strategy. In pursuit of an impossible state of national security against terrorist evil, soldiers will need to be sacrificed, civil liberties curtailed, civilians collaterally damaged, regimes destroyed. But a nation's imperial overreach should exceed its fiduciary grasp: what's a full-spectrum dominance of the battle space for? Were this not an official White House doctrine, the contradictions of the NSS could be interpreted only as poetic irony. How else to comprehend the opening paragraph, which begins with "The United States possesses unprecedented—and unequaled—strength and influence in the world" and ends with "The great strength of this nation must be used to promote a balance of power that favors freedom" (1)? Perhaps the cabalistic Straussians that make up the defense intellectual brain trust of the Bush administration (among them, Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle, and William Kristol) have come up with a nuanced, indeed, anti-Machiavellian reading of Machiavelli that escapes the uninitiated. But so fixed is the NSS on the creation of a world in America's image that concepts such as balance of power and imminent threat, once rooted in historical, juridical, as well as reciprocal traditions, [End Page 20] become free-floating signifiers. Few Europeans, "old" or "new," would recognize the balance of power principle deployed by the NSS to justify preemptive, unilateral, military action against not actual but "emerging" imminent threats (15). Defined by the eighteenth-century jurist Emerich de Vattel as a state of affairs in which no one preponderant power can lay down the law to others, the classical sense of balance of power is effectively inverted in principle by the NSS document and in practice by the go-it-alone statecraft of the United States. Balance of power is global suzerainty, and war is peace.

Link - hegemony

The impact turns case- the unilateral nihilism of preventive warfare exceed the capacity of United States national security strategy- the imperial goal of steady-state hegemony culminates in a true balance of power, the rise of countless new and unpredictable threats to security.
Der Derian 2003 (James, Prof. of IR @ Brown U, "Decoding The National Security Strategy of the United States of America," boundary 2 30.3, Duke UP, p. 19-27) vp

The NSS calls for nothing less, nothing more, than a transformation of the "major institutions of American national security," in which the military and the intelligence community are to lead the way (29). The various tenets of the "RMA"—the revolution in military affairs—were fully evident in the Iraqi war, not only in the unfolding of the war plan, OPLAN 1003 VICTOR, but in the high values placed on flexibility, speed, and information. The opening decapitation strike, the info-war of "shock and awe," the reliance on light ground forces and precision munitions for a "rolling start" all reflect Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld's efforts to implement a radical transformation in how the United States fights and defends itself. Ultimately, however, real-world transformations exceed the grasp of the NSS. The war in Iraq put on full display just how effective the military could be in attaining its planned goals. But what falls outside the engineering and imaginary of the plan, what Edmund Burke called the "empire of circumstance," is in the driver's seat and beyond the cybernetic machinations of the NSS, as we see in the "peace" that followed. Many scholars saw the end of the Cold War as an occasion to debate the merits of a unipolar future as well as to wax nostalgic over the stability of a bipolar past. These debates continued to be state-centric as well as materialist in their interpretation of how power works. By such criteria, there was little doubt that the United States would emerge as the dominant military, economic, and, indeed, civilizational power. Even in Paul Wolfowitz's worst-case nightmares, it was difficult to identify a potential "peer competitor" on the horizon. [End Page 26] But then came 9/11, and blueprints for a steady-state hegemony were shredded. Asymmetrical power and fundamentalist resentment, force-multiplied by the mass media, prompted a permanent state of emergency. After the first responders came a semiotic fix with a kick, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. But from the tragedy of 9/11 to the farce of war in Iraq, after the multilateral hopes for a "safer and better world" were subverted by the unilateral nihilism of preventive war, the syntax of order and the code of the simulacrum began to break down. We caught a glimpse of a heteropolar matrix, in which actors radically different in identity and interests (states versus super-empowered individuals), using technologies in revolutionary ways (civilian airliners to create kamikaze weapons of mass destruction, the Internet to mobilize the largest antiwar demonstrations ever), were suddenly comparable in their capability to produce improbable global effects. It might be small solace, but out of this deeply nihilistic moment might yet come a real balance of power and truth, in which the Straussian reach of The National Security Strategy is foreshortened by a Nietzschean grasp of reality.

LINK – WAR ON TERROR GOOD

The War on Terror represents the ascetic ideal *PAR EXCELLENCE* - Appalled with the world as it is, the WoT constitutes a resentful quest for purity-- the result of this orientation is endless cycles of war through permanent conflict.
Der Derian 2003 (James, Prof. of IR @ Brown U, "Decoding The National Security Strategy of the United States of America," boundary 2 30.3, Duke UP, p. 19-27) vp
A war to rid the world of evil, and ending it on the hour, even one so chosen by the most powerful nation in the world, is yet another tall order set by the NSS. The war is to be fought simultaneously on multiple fronts, aiming, when possible, "to disrupt the financing of terrorism" and "to enlist the support of the international community," and, when necessary, to "not hesitate to act alone . . . to exercise our right of self-defense by acting preemptively" (6). The strategy for defense might start, but it does not stop, at our border. States that support terrorism will be compelled "to accept their sovereign responsibilities"; "terrorism will be viewed in the same light as slavery, piracy, or genocide"; and public diplomacy will be used "to promote the free flow of information and ideas" (6). And should the ghost of Vince Lombardi prove insufficient ("While we recognize that our best defense is a good offense . . .) , then the war must be waged at home as well (". . . we are also strengthening America's homeland security to protect against and deter attack" [6]). In most of the sections that follow, after all the early fist waving at terrorism and its supporters, the hand of the United States is opened to the international community that must be constituted by a conflict in which **"freedom and fear are at war," and "there will be no quick or easy end"** (7). In these sections, the NSS seeks to "Work with Others to Defuse Regional Conflicts" (section IV); "Ignite a New Era of Global Economic Growth through Free Markets and Free Trade" (section VI); "Expand the Circle of Development by Opening Societies and Building the Infrastructure of Democracy" (Section VII); and "Develop Agendas for Cooperative Action with the Other Main Centers of Global Power" (Section VIII). But the document [End Page 23] seems schizoid: after a prologue in which lines are drawn and ultimatums issued, the call for international dialogue rings hollow. The NSS might aim for peace, but it amounts to a blueprint for a permanent war. Gone is any trace of the humility that presidential candidate Bush invoked in his foreign policy addresses. In its place, hubris of an epic size obviates any historical or self-consciousness about the costs of empire. What ends not predestined by America's righteousness are to be preempted by the sanctity of holy war. The NSS leaves the world with **two options: peace on U.S. terms, or the perpetual peace of the grave.** The evangelical seeps through the prose of global realpolitik and mitigates its harshest pronouncements with the solace of a better life to come. We all shall be—as played by the band as the Titanic sank—"Nearer My God to Thee" (coincidently, written by Sarah Flower Adams, sister of the nineteenth-century poet Elizabeth Barrett, who secretly married . . .)
From the perspective of the NSS, even before the shock of 9/11, the end of the Cold War augured not global peace but a new world disorder. "New deadly challenges have emerged from rogue states and terrorists" (13); and while they might not possess the might of the Soviet Union, they have the asymmetrical advantages garnered by weapons of mass destruction and the will to use them. Positing that traditional deterrence no longer works, the NSS presents axiomatically the right to preemptively strike against these new enemies: "The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction—and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack" (15). This is not a grand strategy; this is a blank check, to take whatever actions, whenever deemed necessary, against whoever fits the terrorist profile.

LINK - TERRORISM

Terrorism discourse divides the world into "good" and "evil," manifesting the nihilism of reactive morality

Gary Shapiro, Richmond Philosophy Professor, 2007 [Hicks, Steven V., and Alan Rosenberg. Reading Nietzsche at the Margins. New York: Purdue UP, 2007. Print. 200-201 Nietzsche however… total obliteration.]

Nietzsche, however, is the better analyst of the language of good and evil that drives the current war effort by both contemporary Assassins and Crusaders. The rhetoric of evil is reactive. September 11 is the sign of our victimization by the evil ones; we, in contrast, must be good. It is the mirror image of Al Qaeda's calendar of good and evil in which it is dates like those of the Crusades them- selves, the Spanish expulsion of the Moors, or the Balfour Declaration that mark corresponding events. On the Genealogy of Morals proposes a contrast between a sovereign language of "good and bad" and the reactive moral discourse of "good

and evil." The struggle against evil necessarily tends toward a metaphysical and theological hypostatization of evil and a similar faith in the transcendent purity of those who reactively designate themselves as the good. So Nietzsche would understand why the explicit appeal to theology by bin Laden and his kind is increasingly matched by parallel presidential invocations of "the Almighty" and by Christian apocalyptic fantasies centered on the Middle East. Even in Nietzsche's "Decree," which goes far in the direction of mimicking that which it opposes, Christianity is referred to as "depravity [Laster]" rather than as evil, and there is no suggestion of its total obliteration.

LINK - ECOLOGY

The affirmative resents the inevitability of exploitation that is part of nature itself—we must celebrate the Earth's violent generative power rather than its limits

Michael Zimmerman, Professor at Tulane University, 2007 [Hicks, Steven V., and Alan Rosenberg. Reading Nietzsche at the Margins. New York: Purdue UP. Print. 176-177 "Nietzsche personally… are crumbling"]

Nietzsche personally was not pleased by the prospect of human domination of the planet. For him, dominating oneself (and at times even other humans) for the sake of self-overcoming was one thing; brutal dominion over animals, for example, was another. (On mistreatment of animals, see for example HAH I, § 36, 53.) Nevertheless, if my argument is correct, he saw no way around some form of human dominion over life on earth, especially in the coming centuries. Hence, he criticized as disingenuous sentimental attitudes toward nature because they ignore that people have always exploited the natural world (D, § 286; BGE, § 259). Nietzsche knew that humans could not have become intelligent, moral animals without relying on the work, food, and products provided by our animal cousins. Injury, appropriation, overpowering of what is alien and weaker, all these are essential to life, not its corruptions or imperfections. People should be honest about this, he tells us (BGE, § 259). Some poets claim to sense something "greater" lurking behind natural phenomena, but Nietzsche asserts that such sense is merely a residue of early human fear that something really was lurking behind trees and rocks: saber-toothed tigers, wolves, and other predators! (D, § 142). For Nietzsche, nature is relentless, pitiless, and indifferent to the concerns of any species; indeed, nature is another word for the infinite and constantly shifting perspectives of the Will to Power. Nature is no model for art, Nietzsche insists, because it has too many gaps, distortions, and infelicities. To see what "is" is inartistic! The artist and the poet, rather, improve and expand upon what is given (TI, "What Germans Lack," 7). Even sober scientists remain "artists in love," "burdened with those estimates of things that have their origin in the passion and loves of former centuries." Consider that mountain or that cloud: "What is 'real' in that? Subtract from it the phantasm and very human contribution, my sober friends! If you can!" (GS, § 57).

We project upon nature not only beauty and rationality, but also moral value. But, Nietzsche warns against projecting moral significance onto the back of amoral nature! (D, § 3). Surely he would criticize many of today's Greens, who not only promote utilitarian ideals (such as sustainability of exploitation), which he scorned, but who also adhere to Malthusian and ascetic notions about nature's scarcity, insufficiency, and limits. In contrast to such ascetic ideals, Nietzsche held that nature is given to lavishness, squandering, overabundance, violence, and exploitation, all in the service not merely of survival but of generating -lucky hits-new types, new species-that keep the evolutionary game moving forward. He would also conclude, I believe, that environmentalists are in many cases ascetics who fail to posit an adequate goal for future humanity. He would ask: So what if we manage to preserve the biosphere so life can go on. Why should it "go on"? Of course, only the human animal can ask such a question, but Nietzsche is persuaded that the current answers to which we cling are crumbling.

LINK – THE HUMAN

Their valorization of the "human" hypostatizes it – negates the dynamic and evolving nature of the human.

Conway, 1997 [Daniel W. Ph.D, Professor and Department Head of Philosophy, Nietzsche & the Political, Routledge, 9-10]

A significant disadvantage of the term "perfectionism" is its misleading connotation of a *final* perfection or completion of the species. While it is true that great human beings continually exceed the achievements of their predecessors, these transflgurative exploits are both chaotic and unpredicted; they expand the horizon of human perfectibility along any number of unanticipated planes and vectors. The enactment of previously unknown human perfections is furthermore not immediately visible in its full relief; centuries, even millennia, may pass before humankind as a whole acknowledges the unparalleled achievements of its highest exemplars. Any attempt to identify in advance the final perfection of the human soul thus amounts to nothing more than an exercise in idealism, which Nietzsche comes to view in his post-Zarathustran writings as the philosophical antipode to his own "realism" (EH 11:10).

Based on his careful observations of human "nature" and history, Nietzsche assumes that the species as a whole is both dynamic and evolving. As far as he knows, humankind neither progresses inexorably toward some preordained omega point, nor fulfills a cosmic destiny that consigns the weak and infirm to a premature extinction. Through the signal exploits of its highest representatives, humankind reaches ever   beyond itself, but it reaches for no pre-established goal or telos. Each successive transfiguration further limns the unknown depths and reaches of the human soul. Indeed, Nietzsche's perfectionism is at all intelligible only in the event that the human soul is in fact predicated of sufficient plasticity to accommodate the completion and perfection he envisions.

LINK – COLONIAL GUILT

Their attempt to make you feel guilty for the entire history of colonialism is the ultimate expression of the ascetic ideal. This hatred makes genuine liberation or engagement with the 'oppressed' impossible.
Bruckner, French writer and philosopher, 19**86**
[Pascal, ..*The Tears of the White Man: Compassion as Contempt*, p.146-147]

The foregoing teaches us this: **that hatred of the West is really a hatred of all cultures concentrated on a single one. In the beginning, one finds nothing loveable in oneself, but in the end, one loses the ability to love others**. If the value attached to other cultures is in proportion to the disdain for our own, it is certain that this fascination will decline as one is reconciled with one's own society, or at best will linger in a kind of esthetic eclecticism. **A doctrine that preaches the liberation of the human race cannot possibly be based on the hatred of an entire civilization. Man does not work to diminish but to increase himself, and there is every reason to mistrust a form of humanism that begins by leaving out a quarter of the surface of the globe and calling for the consignment of a whole society to hatred and oblivion**. The great religions, philosophies, and belief systems are so linked to one another that to reject one is to reject all.

It is futile to hope that the systematic cultivation of shame will miraculously open us up to far-off societies, and wipe away misunderstandings. Some may say this sense of guilt is our last chance to retain some modicum of respect for the oppressed. But this is pure cynicism, because it means admitting that, aside from a vague feeling of unease, there is nothing that ties us to them. The proclaimed abandonment of Eurocentrism is still an involuntary act, and the first precondition of the acceptance of others is a consensus about our respect for our own culture. **Let us become our own friends first, so that we can become friends of others again**. **If we are tired of our own existence, others are of little use. To love the Third World, for it to have a future, does not require a repudiation of Europe, and the future of industrialized countries does not require that they forget the nations of the Southern hemisphere. Every self-destructive wish carries with it a generalized negativity that envisions the end of the world.**

LINK – COLONIAL GUILT

Making you responsibility for the history of colonialism negates life and results in totalitarian violence in the name of guilt purging.

Bruckner, French writer and philosopher, 19**86**
[Pascal, ..*The Tears of the White Man: Compassion as Contempt*, p.126-127]

When the West is blamed for the evils of the world, three main types of accusations are presented:

> *Guilt by history:* You are responsible for the frightful genocide of colonialism that was carried on against Indians and blacks from the Renaissance to the twentieth century by your ancestors.

> *Guilt by contagion:* You are guilty of being the happy descendants of these unscrupulous freebooters, and you must not forget that your prosperity is built on the corpses of millions of natives.

> *Guilt by confirmation:* You demonstrate that you are no better than your conquering forefathers because you do not react when hunger kills children and new nations are pushed into underdevelopment by your selfishness.

In short, the present is the consequence of the past, and the future will repeat it. The question is not open to discussion-day by day and year by year the list of sins grows longer, sins imputed to a community of people on whom weighs the ancestral suspicion of having fouled the wellsprings of life. Evil is a sort of anthropological curse that attaches to people in countries of the temperate zones. The West is supposed to be cruel and toxic-like cat hairs are to an asthmatic. No matter what we may do, our error remains and we cannot expiate our sins. By a device like that used n anti-Semitism or racism, collective characteristics are cited, and a whole group of people in all their variety are treated as a single person whose criminal nature is ascribed. There are no more human beings, simply entities— the French, the Germans, the Americans—in the same way as one talks of the Jews and the Arabs. The amalgamation of a certain group of people, regime, or government guilty of certain actions with the people they belong to transforms political guilt into metaphysical guilt.
        If the West is genocidal by definition (the way ice is cold), if the responsibility is collective and goes back to the dawn of time, what is the point of denouncing its inherent criminality here or there in El Salvador, Brazil, or South Africa, and seeking to pro-tect its victims? What is past is past, irrevocably; why should we be eternally responsible for it? How long will the peoples of Europe continue to be blamed for the atrocities committed by their ancestors? When will it end, this genealogical blackmail that, in the name of reparations and collective interests, would make us the indirect accomplices of slave trading, massacres, and pillage? There is nothing so dangerous as this idea of collective responsibility, which is transmitted• indefinitely from generation to generation, and which evokes memories of the worst sort of totalitarian coercion. In the context of French history, our army applied the concept of collective responsibility in Algeria, when, in response to a guerrilla attack, it razed villages, massacred citizens, and tortured suspects. A respect for the past cannot be allowed to lead to confusion of debts and charges. Penance for the wrongs of the past cannot be irretrievably committed to a seamless and endless history. To suppose that Europeans and Americans are naturally or culturally evil is as intellectually lazy and moralistic as to say the opposite. It avoids thinking seriously about contemporary conditions of violence and oppression. It is wrong to declare that the West is guilty simply because it exists, as if it were an insult to creation, a cosmic catastrophe, a monstrosity to **be wiped off the face of the earth**. The question of Israel is fundamental in this regard. Through non-recognition of the Jewish state, the entire Western World is held to be illegitimate.

LINK – ANTI-COLONIALISM

Demonization of the west reductively divides the globe, creating guilt and resentment towards all things 'Western'
Bruckner, French writer and philosopher, 19**86**
[Pascal, ..*The Tears of the White Man: Compassion as Contempt*, p.20-23]

In commitment to the Third World, what must be takes over from reality. The revolt against the Old World takes on a strange fatalism. What good is there in defending unstable democracies, when the march of history demands their disappearance? In short, the answer has been found. **We know more than our fathers, and they are doubly contemptible because they are not just colonial-ists, but out of date. We are the end of history. Our way of looking at blacks, Indians, arid Asians no longer is burdened by the ignorance, prejudice, and fears that characterized the white man from Cortez to Kipling. Inexorable destiny now commands us to vanish. This leads to a piercing irony, the analysis of even the most moderate moralizers: At the end of our day, it is too late to save our values, and the only thing left for us to do is to collaborate in our own downfall.** 24 Now that the former colonial victim has been freed from his chains, he has a wisdom that approaches the mystical. With great seriousness, a whole generation of European and American intellectuals, fortified by Sartre's authority, subscribes to the prophecy of Frantz Fanon, who said that "the Third World now faces Europe like a colossus whose task must be to try to resolve the problems for which Europe has not been able to find solutions" (op. cit., p. 241).

Imperialism has transformed the planet into a gigantic world market, in which each part complements the other. The battle, therefore, must be waged everywhere. Others are fighting for us at the other end of the earth; here we must fight for them. There is a strict clockwork that governs all these struggles, and whatever helps the liberation of mankind in Vientiane, Peking, or Bamako reinforces liberty in Paris.25 **Every time the white man is kicked out, driven away, or eliminated, humanity regains a little of its independence." Wherever the native is oppressed, our dignity is reduced and wherever he raises his head, we regain a reason for living.27 Even in his smallest gestures, everyone must demonstrate in favor of the side he has chosen.** Refusal to take sides is still the choice of the stronger, and is tantamount to complicity with evil.

This political viewpoint makes all morality temporary and even irrelevant in the face of the Promethean confrontation that is tearing the earth into two factions. Being non-European is enough to put one on the side of right. Being European or being supported by a European power is enough to make one suspect. I The bloody messes in banana republics, and butchery of political opposition and the dictatorial lunacy by their petty chieftains are all brushed aside. Such trifles will not restrain the progress of these peoples toward socialism. What seems criminal in Cuba, Angola, and Guinea has the real purpose of washing away the far greater crime of colonialism.

Against every kind of moral reservation, then, there is a guilty conscience that can paralyze any thought of criticism. For this generation, which saw colonialism in its worst moments and for which it has a deep disgust, guilt lives on long after the circumstances that gave rise to it. And the severity of the judge is in inverse proportion to the distance of the country in question. The farther away the country is from European shores, the greater is its claim to total freedom from condemnation.

The slightest scuffle with the police in the streets of Paris, Berlin, or Milan proves the monstrous nature of the capitalist system. Every year, some magazine or pundit predicts the return of fascism in France, Germany, or Italy. In contrast, hangings by the dozen in some Near Eastern country, the almost systematic use of torture beyond the Mediterranean, and "reeducation camps" in socialist countries are looked upon either as negligible or as ideologically justified. South of the Equator, assassination is a humanitarian act and repression a historical necessity. The remorseless and self-righteous critic who endlessly denounces the deceptions of parliamentary democracy is suddenly rapt with admiration before the atrocities committed in the name of the Koran, the Vedas, the Great Helmsman, or negritude. Because perfect democracy does not exist anywhere, the imperfect democracies of the West can be damned and the worst forms of political power legitimated.

What was a partisan feeling in the Northern hemisphere became conformity to tyrannies elsewhere. There was no need to subscribe to the disciplines or dogmas of these regimes. The fact that they were far away gave them a seal of authority that would have been suspect in Paris. This led many non-Marxist intellectuals, even many Christian activists, to fawn on these states and the scholasticism they spout as doctrine. Because of the unforgettable mistakes committed by the West, they placed their greatest hopes on those who hated us and spat in our faces. Many could have echoed the phrase of the poet Louis Aragon, who wrote in 1925, "We are the defeatists of Europe….We are the ones who always hold out our hands to the enemy…"

Third Worldism validates this black-and-white vision, which would have the sinfulness of one side stand forever as witness to the grace and virtue of the other. The spiritual bankruptcy of certain liberation movements and the crudest slogans of their leaders are exhibited as so many words form the Savior. At the same time, intellectual rigor, logic, and education, which are exclusive property of wealthy countries, are rejected as diabolical imperialist ploys. Puny insurrections and the slightest of uprisings are given enormous attention, far out of proportion to their real importance. The ignorance and sectarianism of tropical gangsters are treated with reverence. Glory is given to the parade of splendid Asians who have been called upon to destroy European civilization. The most outrageous lunacies are praised to the skies by enlightened intellectuals, who are only too happy to submit to a primitive authority to abase themselves "before the splendor of a healthy barbarism"[28] By this axiom, **anyone who uplifts, praises, or celebrates the West is suspected of the worst sort of evil. Modesty, humility, self-destructiveness, and whatever else might lead Europeans to efface**

themselves and give up leadership are honored and saluted as wonderfully progressive. The golden rule of this masochism is simple: Whatever comes from us is bad; whatever comes from them is perfect. Formerly colonized peoples are prized as perfect through and through.

Love your enemies. Our atheistic times never followed this Christian exhortation more faithfully than in the 1970s. Of course, there was little difference—*we do not hallow the enemy in hopes of a future reconciliation but rather seek in him our own destruction.* **Since the Westerner was not a man except at the expense of the rest of the human race, mankind will not become human again except at the expense of the West.** This is why the outlaw has been a figure of frenzied adoration in the West for the last 30 years.[29]

How many of us, in our heart of hearts, have regretted that he was not born a worker, a woman, a Chinese, Indian, or Ghanaian, since these are the categories of people endowed with innocence in the European imagination? This is the typical mistake of Third World-lovers, as soon as they become convinced that solidarity with underdeveloped countries requires that they admire, rather than correct, the sufferings. In 1839, Lord Macaulay, Minister in Charge of Indian Affairs for His Majesty the King of England, declared, "Our native subjects have more to learn from us than we do from them" (cited in *Imperialism,* Phil Centin, NY; Walker & Co., 1971). His great-great grandsons, only too happy to make up for past mistakes, say exactly the opposite, again and again. The passionate belief in fantasies of the world dreamed by the formerly oppressed is the price for redeeming Europe's classic claim to define itself as the only measure of what was human. **The white man, strangely enough, tries to describe himself in the same oversimplified and malicious terms once used by the colonizer to describe the colonized.30 Carefully selected accounts end up showing only those episodes of Western history that demonstrate that he is loathsome. A sort of generalized and sweeping reductionism is practiced-one that cannot see subtleties.** The more simplistic an explanation is, the more chic it is. The "headhunter complex"-the ability to reduce a society to a few salient features in order to dismiss it-is at work here, just as the Jivaro headhunter shrinks the head of his enemy to the size of an apple

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LINK - SOCIALISM

Socialism reshapes individual beings into a cog subordinated by the needs of the collective. In the name of economic freedom and justice despotism is required as a mechanism for control.

Nietzsche, Dead, **1878** [Human, all too Human, http://nietzsche.holtof.com/Nietzsche_human_all_too_human/index.htm]

Socialism in respect to its means. **Socialism is the visionary younger brother of an almost decrepit despotism, whose heir it wants to be. Thus its efforts are reactionary in the deepest sense. For it desires a wealth of executive power, as only despotism had it; indeed, it outdoes everything in the past by striving for the downright destruction of the individual, which it sees as an unjustified luxury of nature, and which it intends to improve into an expedient organ of the community**. Socialism crops up in the vicinity of all excessive displays of power because of its relation to it, like the typical old socialist Plato, at the court of the Sicilian tyrant;11 it desires (and in certain circumstances, furthers) the Caesarean power state of this century, because, as we said, it would like to be its heir. But even this inheritance would not suffice for its purposes; **it needs the most submissive subjugation of all citizens to the absolute state, the like of which has never existed**. And since it cannot even count any longer on the old religious piety towards the state, having rather always to work automatically to eliminate piety (because it works on the elimination of all existing states), **it can only hope to exist here and there for short periods of time by means of the most extreme terrorism.** Therefore, it secretly prepares for reigns of terror, **and** drives the word "justice" like a nail into the heads of the semieducated masses, to rob them completely of their reason (after this reason has already suffered a great deal from its semieducation), and to **give them a good conscience for the evil game that they are supposed to play.** Socialism can serve as a rather brutal and forceful way to teach the danger of all accumulations of state power, and to that extent instill one with distrust of the state itself. When its rough voice chimes in with the battle cry "As much state as possible," it will at first make the cry noisier than ever; but soon the opposite cry will be heard with strength the greater: "As little state as possible."

ALTERNATIVES

ALT – AFFIRM THE INEVITABILITY OF SUFFERING

We must affirm chance and the inevitability of suffering—it allows us to overcome the nihilism of the aff's ascetic ideal

Owen and Ridley, 2K

[David, assistant director of the Centre for Post-Analytic Philosophy at the University of Southampton, Aaron, senior lecture and associate director of the Centre for Post-Analytic Philosophy at the University of Southampton, "Dramatis Personae," in *Why Nietzsche Still?* ed. Alan Schrift, pp. 151-153]

The second response to the nihilistic threat posed by the self-destruction of the ascetic ideal is definitive of the *Ubermensch* type. This response recognizes both the reality and the ineliminability of suffering and concludes that an affirmation of chance and necessity must therefore be built into the very conception of what it is for something to function as a (postascetic) ideal. So this response, insofar as it cultivates an affirmation of chance and *necessity (i*.e., *amor* fati), overcomes the (ascetic) hatred of or (modern) dissatisfaction with thisworldly existence. Yet the success of this overcoming is conditional on the exercise and development of the very capacities and disposition that are the bequest of the ascetic ideal. The disposition to truthfulness is a condition of recognizing the ineliminability of chance and necessity. But actually to recognize, let alone affirm, this awful fact about human existence requires the exercise of the capacities for selfsurveillance (so that one can monitor oneself for the symptoms of selfdeception in the face of this fact), selfdiscipline (so that one can resist the understandable temptation to deceive oneself about this fact), and selfovercoming (so that one can develop, in the face of this temptation, one's capacities for selfsurveillance and selfdiscipline). Thus the ascetic ideal provides the tools required to overcome the crisis precipitated by its own selfdestruction. In other words, the *Ubermensch's* ideal simply is the exercise and cultivation of the capacities and the disposition required to affirm the fact that chance and necessity are ineliminable. And because chance and necessity are ineliminable, and therefore require perpetually to be affirmed anew, such exercise and cultivation must itself be perpetual, a process without the slightest prospect of an end. The contrast with the Last Man's ideal is stark. Whereas the latter offers a feeling of power to its devotees by positing as realizable the unrealizable ideal of no more suffering that is, of a fixed, final, *completed* state of being, the *Ubermensch's* ideal offers a feeling of power predicated only on the continual overcoming of the desire for any such state. 'What the Last Man longs for, in other words, the *Ubermensch* distinguishes himself by unendingly and truthfully refusing to want.

It is of the first importance that the *Ubermensch's* ideal should represent a *process* as inherently valuable, rather than a product (such as the Last Man's completed state of life without suffering). There are two reasons for thinking this important. The first is the one mentioned above: given that chance and necessity are ineliminable features of living a life, a life oriented to the affirmation of this fact must recognize the ineliminably processual character of such an affirmation, and hence the ineliminably processual character of an ideal that serves rather than denies "the most fundamental prerequisites of life" (GM III:z8). The other reason is that this ideal exhibits the form of practical reasoning that Nietzsche's genealogy itself deploys. By contrast with, say, Kant's conception of practical reasoning, which centers on an opposition between the real and the ideal (between the heteronomous and the autonomous), and so denies "the most fundamental prerequisites of life," Nietzsche's conception involves a continual process of movement from the attained to the attainable; and it is precisely this that the *rapport* a soi constitutive of the *Ubermensch* exhibits. Thus, while Kant offers a juridical conception of practical reasoning structured in terms of the idea of law, Nietzsche offers a medical or therapeutic conception articulated through the idea of the type or exemplar. 'Which is to say, Nietzsche's genealogical investigation (at its best, i.e., its most selfconsistent) exemplifies precisely that commitment to the affirmation of life which it recommends, that is, to an *Ubermenschlich rapport* a soi. Process, not product; Dionysus, not Apollo.

The aim of this chapter has been to question the standard interpretation of Nietzsche's use of the idea of human types, according to which he holds that there are, as a matter of scientific fact, certain naturally occurring subspecies of humanity, and to propose an alternative understanding. If our account of the way in which human types typically figure in Nietzsche's thought is right that is, if we are right to treat human types as exemplars of various *rap ports* a soi it is clear that any biologically based conception of human types must be simply incapable of making sense of Nietzsche's self-understanding as a cultural physician, his account of practical reasoning, his genealogical technique, his genealogy of morality, his critique of the ascetic ideal and of the Last Man, or, indeed, his recommendation of the *Ubermensch* as an exemplar. Moreover, apart from making more sense of Nietzsche's philosophical activity, the account presented here also makes him a much more interesting philosopher, not least as an articulate proponent of the classical understanding of philosophy as medicine for the soul. For Nietzsche, as for Epicurus, "empty is the word of that philosopher by whom no affliction of men is cured. For as there is no benefit in medicine if it does not treat the diseases of the body, so with philosophy, if it does not drive out the *affliction of* the soul." 7

ALT – REJECT SUFFERING/CARE OF SELF

In opposition to the 1AC's politics of pity, which inevitably homogenize and distance self from other, the alternative's call for self-overcoming and confrontation with suffering produces a strong individual capable of actual engagement with the material other
Ure, post-doctoral fellow at CHED, former lecturer at Monash University, 20**06**
[Michael, "The Irony of Pity: Nietzsche contra Schopenhauer and Rousseau," *Journal of Nietzsche Studies* 32(2006), project Muse]
Nietzsche maintains that by seeking to secure ourselves from the travails of self-cultivation we also create for ourselves strict limits on how we can engage with others. In this regard, his critique of modern communitarianism and its "fear of everything individual" is not a rejection of engaging with others but, rather, of the kind of turning to others and the treatment of their suffering that is integral to a culture in which individuals flee from the intrapsychic realm of "reflections, brooding and dreaming." Because this culture treats our personal engagement with ourselves as a troublesome obstacle that should be overcome, or so he claims, "helping" others can only take the form of ensuring that they too learn to police themselves with instrumental labor and find their happiness in the blessings of self-oblivion. In this context, helping others, to use Nietzsche's metaphors, must mean helping them transform themselves into "small, soft, round, unending" granules of "sand" or, translating these metaphors, into interchangeable, undifferentiated atoms that can be smoothly adapted to meet the imperatives of a commercially driven collectivity. Nietzsche argues that in a commercial culture that deifies security, the practices of "pity," "help," or "sympathy" can only ever be either "superficial" or "tyrannical" (*D*174). These practices must become superficial to the extent that commercial culture compels individuals to flee from the "labyrinth" of the soul and "tyrannical" to the extent that its market imperatives ultimately exclude nonutilitarian self-cultivation and unprofitable, unassimilable forms of alterity (*D* 174, 169). Nietzsche claims, then, that it is a flight from the labyrinth of a complex, differentiated self that underpins modern commercial culture and its transformation of the relations between self and other. In opposition to the desert of undifferentiated atoms this culture creates, Nietzsche conjures up the image of an oasis. It is not, however, an image depicting either the lost glories of Homeric agonism or the splendid isolation of the great individual. The question itself remains unanswered whether one is of *more use* to another by immediately leaping to his side and helping him—which can only be superficial where it does not become a tyrannical seizing and transforming—or by *creating* something out of oneself that the other can behold with pleasure: a beautiful, restful, self-enclosed garden perhaps, with high walls against the storms and the dust of the roadway but also a hospitable gate. (*D* 174) Nietzsche's image of the "self-enclosed garden" is one that draws on the long history of Western iconography and ideas of paradise as a topos rather than "an abstract state imagined in terms of . . . metaphysical ecstasy." Etymologically, the notion of paradise originally derives from the Persian word *paradeiza* for "walled garden" or a circular walled enclosure that came to be applied to royal parks. As a recurrent dream in Western literature and iconography, this figure of the enclosed paradise garden has become, as Robert Hughes observes, "saturated in nostalgia: this is the innocence our ancestors lost for us, at the close of a period over whose vanishing we had no control." From the accent he places on its beauty and restfulness, Nietzsche seems especially drawn to the classical conception of the paradise garden as an "epigram of order," albeit, as the abode of Venus, an orderly topos of pleasure.
Nietzsche's taste for the classical idea of paradise also becomes apparent in his subtle inversion of Christianity's allegorical interpretation of the garden, which added to the image of the *hortus conclusus* the *porta clausa*, or locked gate. In his metaphor of the self as a garden of paradise Nietzsche replaces this locked gate with the hospitable gate. Nietzsche's alternative to the desert of pity is thus the cultivation of oneself as a paradise garden that is open to the other. To cultivate oneself, as he understands it, is to create oneself as a paradise garden for the other. By contrast, Nietzsche implies, by exercising the kind of pity that precludes us from taking pleasure in the other's joy and which "helps" by transforming the other into an undifferentiated nonentity, we create a *porta clausa*. Ironically, then, **it is through the exercise of pity that we lock ourselves and others out of paradise**.

ALT – REJECT SUFFERING/CARE OF SELF

The alternative is to reject the affirmative for its invocation of memory in the call for action and instead affirm eternal return as an understanding of life as endlessly recurring and suffering as an inevitable and constitutive aspect of existence. Instead of formulating identity and values in opposition to a demonized subject, eternal return offers the opportunity to affirm a will to power, overcoming creative impotence and affirming freedom and thus life itself.
Newman 2000 (Saul, Prof. Sociology @ Macquarie U, "Anarchism and the Politics of Ressentiment," *Theory and Event*, 4:3, Johns Hopkins UP) vp

Rather than having an external enemy -- like the State -- in opposition to which one's political identity is formed, we must work on ourselves. As political subjects we must overcome ressentiment by transforming our relationship with power. One can only do this, according to Nietzsche, through eternal return. To affirm eternal return is to acknowledge and indeed **positively affirm the continual 'return' of same life with its harsh realities.** Because it is an active willing of nihilism, it is at the same time a transcendence of nihilism. Perhaps in the same way, eternal return refers to power. We must acknowledge and affirm the 'return' of power, the fact that it will always be with us. To overcome ressentiment we must, in other words, will power. We must **affirm a will to power -- in the form of creative, life-affirming values,** according to Nietzsche.[56] This is to accept the notion of 'self-overcoming'.[57] To 'overcome' oneself in this sense, would mean an overcoming of the essentialist identities and categories that limit us. As Foucault has shown, we are constructed as essential political subjects in ways that that dominate us -- this is what he calls subjectification.[58] We hide behind essentialist identities that deny power, and produce through this denial, a Manichean politics of absolute opposition that only reflects and reaffirms the very domination it claims to oppose. This we have seen in the case of anarchism. In order to avoid this Manichean logic, anarchism must no longer rely on essentialist identities and concepts, and instead positively affirm the eternal return of power. This is not a grim realization but rather a 'happy positivism'. It is **characterized by political strategies aimed at minimizing the possibilities of domination, and increasing the possibilities for freedom.** If one rejects essentialist identities, what is one left with? Can one have a notion of radical politics and resistance without an essential subject? One might, however, ask the opposite question: how can radical politics continue without 'overcoming' essentialist identities, without, in Nietzsche's terms, 'overcoming' man? Nietzsche says: "The most cautious people ask today: 'How may man still be preserved?' Zarathustra, however, asks as the sole and first one to do so: 'How shall man be overcome?'"[59] I would argue that anarchism would be greatly enhanced as a political and ethical philosophy if it eschewed essentialist categories, leaving itself open to different and contingent identities -- a post-anarchism. To affirm difference and contingency would be to become a philosophy of the strong, rather than the weak. Nietzsche exhorts us to 'live dangerously', to do away with certainties, to break with essences and structures, and to embrace uncertainty. "Build your cities on the slopes of Vesuvius! Send your ships into unchartered seas!" he says.[60] The politics of resistance against domination must take place in a world without guarantees. To remain open to difference and contingency, to affirm the eternal return of power, would be to become what Nietzsche calls the superman or Overman. The overman is man 'overcome' -- the overcoming of man: "God has died: now we desire -- that the Superman shall live."[61] For Nietzsche the Superman replaces God and Man -- it comes to redeem a humanity crippled by nihilism, joyously affirming power and eternal return. However I would like to propose a somewhat gentler, more ironic version of the Superman for radical politics. Ernesto Laclau speaks of "a hero of a new type who still has not been created by our culture, but one whose creation is absolutely necessary if our time is going to live up to its most radical and exhilarating possibilities."[62]

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ANSWERS TO:

A2: PERM – MUST AFFIRM ALL LIFE

The perm fails – Eternal recurrence requires each moment of life be affirmed. Even small inclusions radical change the movement of the alternative.

Thiele '90 [Leslie, Professor of Political Science at the University of Florida, "Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of the Soul: A Study of Heroic Individualism" , pg 203]

Nietzsche held that all existence was inextricably meshed**. To alter the slightest detail affects the whole. The constitution of an individual is not selective: it entails all of its pleasure and pain, knowledge and ignorance, limitations and experience.** The constitution of history is no different. Circumstance begets identity. It follows that were *anything* different in history, one would not have come to be as one is. To have arrived at the moment of experiencing the Dionysian rapture, then, is **to embrace everything that led to this moment:**

The first question is by no means whether we are content with ourselves, but whether we are content with anything at all. **If we affirm one single moment, we thus affirm not only ourselves but all existence. For nothing is self-sufficient, neither in us ourselves nor in things; and if our soul has trembled with happiness and sounded like a harp string just once, all eternity was needed to produce this one event-and in this single moment of affirmation all eternity was called good, redeemed, justified, and affirmed.** (WP 532-33)

A2: PERM – MUST AFFIRM ALL LIFE

Can't perm. Voting negative requires accepting all of existence

Lawrence J. **Hatab**, 20**05,** Nietzsche's Life Sentence – Coming to Terms with Eternal Recurrence [Professor of Philosophy and Chair of the department as Old Dominion University, pg. 138]

   The charge of moral repugnance is to my mind the most authentic critical *response to* eternal recurrence, and the one most entitled to repudiate Nietzsche because it squarely engages the core existential significance of cyclic repetition.2° Moreover, the force of moral repugnance is inevitable for any authentic encounter with eternal recurrence because here we identify its genuine "ethical" significance: not that recurrence can serve as a measure for moral action, but that it crystallizes the existential problem of meaning and value. Repetition dictates that everything I value must include everything that limits, opposes, or negates my values; and this surely can cause me to recoil at the prospect of eternally certifying everything that for me diminishes life. Zarathustra's nausea over the return of the small man is precisely this kind of moral repugnance. We can say, then, that eternal recurrence is meant to be and should be repellent to one's value estimations. **If it is not experienced in this way, its full material significance is surely missed or evaded.** And the only way such significance can be truly gauged is to confront what is most offensive to one's values and sense of meaning.21 Thus it is entirely appropriate to raise *examples such* as the Holocaust in discussions of eternal recurrence.

   It seems to me that finding eternal recurrence morally repellent need not be a sign of life-denial in the manner of overt projects of transcendence, perfection, or annihilation prosecuted by Nietzsche. If moral repugnance were the same as life-denial, there would be nothing to distinguish Zarathustra's resistance from slavish resentment.22 Can I not affirm life in some kind of Nietzschean way without willing a return of the Holocaust? Would such an omission necessarily indicate a fugitive disposition? Can I not accept and even affirm the existence of an evil without my nose being rubbed in it by endless repetition?

   Even though it is possible to chart "grades" of life affirmation by the degree to which one can measure up to the test of eternal recurrence-I presume Schopenhauer would receive (and not contest) an F, but could I maybe get a B?-nevertheless Nietzsche takes a hard line (pass-fail) by insisting that true affirmation demands amorfati and saying Yes to the recurrence of the same (recall the default argument). **Accordingly he speaks against any moralistic dismissal of one's** *alter-value*. *But* apart from the charge against moral repugnance of latent nihilism-which seems excessive and even inert against a heartfelt decision to repudiate eternal recurrence-is there any way in which Nietzsche can respond to this critical problem in a positive manner analogous to previous discussions of freedom and creativity?

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A2: PERM – DICE ROLL ALT SPECIFIC

The permutation doesn't seek chance in the dice, but order- the appeal to probable or preferable outcomes to the permutation reflect the inability to affirm the whole of chance at one time, to reunite the fragment of being to recognize the necessity of confronting destiny.
Deleuze 1986 (Gilles, French philosopher, "Nietzsche and Philosophy," Columbia UP, p. 27-8) vp

Whereas the thrown dice affirm chance once and for all, the dice: which fall back necessarily affirm the number or the destiny which brings the dice back. It is in this sense that the second moment of the game is also the two moments together or the player who equals the whole. The eternal return is the second moment, the result of the dicethrow, the affirmation of necessity, the number which brings together all the parts of chance. But it is also the return of the first moment, the repetition of the dicethrow, the reproduction and reaffirmation of chance itself. Destiny in the eternal return is also the "welcoming" of chance, "I cook every chance in my pot. And only when it is quite cooked do I welcome it as my food. And truly, many a chance came imperiously to me; but my will spoke [0 it even more imperiously, then it went down imploringly on its knees - imploring shelter and love with me, urging in wheedling tones; 'Just see, 0 Zarathustra, how a friend comes to a friend!' "(Z III "Of the Virtue (hat makes small" 3 p. 191). This means that there are fragments of chance which claim to be valid in themselves, they appeal to their probability, each solicits several throws of the dice from the player; divided among several throws, having become simple probabilities, the fragments of chance are slaves who want to speak as masters. 24 But Zarathustra knows that one must not play or let oneself be played, on the contrary, **it is necessary to affirm the whole of chance at once** (therefore boil and cook it like the player who wants the dice in his hands), in order to reunite all its fragments and to affirm the number which is not probable but fatal and necessary. Only then is chance a friend who visits his friend, a friend who will be asked back, a friend of destiny whose destiny itself **assures the eternal return as such.**

A2: PERM + L/TURN THAT READS NIETZSCHE ETHICALLY

Our link comes before their perm/link turn. The attempt to read Nietzsche ethically ignores the complicity of ethics in our subjection.

Butler, Maxine Elliot Professor in the Departments of Rhetoric and Comparative Literature, **2K**
[Judith, "Circuits of Bad Conscience," in *Why Nietzsche Still?* Ed. Alan Schrift, p. 121-122]

My inquiry concerns a persistent problem that emerges when we try to think the possibility of a will that takes itself as its own object and, through the formation of that kind of reflexivity, binds itself to itself, acquires its own identity through reflexivity. To what extent is this apparent self-bondage fully or exclusively self-imposed? Is this strange posture of the will in the service of a social regulation that requires the production of the subject a consequence or an expression of bad conscience? I suppose that those who seek to redeem Nietzsche by claiming that he can be invoked in the service of the ethical might think that the only alternative worse than bad conscience is its obliteration. But remember that Nietzsche not only distinguishes between the ethical and morality, but asks about the value of morality, thus instating a value by which morality might be assessed, but suggesting as well that this assessment, this valuation, may not be reducible to morality.
I take it that the juxtaposition of Nietzsche with the question of ethics is, indeed, a question because Nietzsche and various figures within the Continental tradition have been found guilty by association with irresponsible acts and events. What will be the response to these charges?
To take the side of the ethical, to relate each and every thinker to the ethical? Or will this be an occasion to think the problem a bit more carefully, to continue to pose the ethical as a question, one which cannot be *freed of* its complicity with what it most strongly opposes? Will this, paradoxically, become a time in which we reflect upon the more pervasive dimensions of complicity and what might be derived from such a vexed relation to power?
    I understand the desire to resituate Nietzsche within the ethical domain as an effort to counter the caricature, within contemporary criticism, of Nietzsche as one who only destroys the domain of values (where that destruction is not itself a source of value, or a value in itself). I want instead to suggest that Nietzsche offers us a political insight into the formation of the psyche and the problem of subjection, understood paradoxically not merely as the subordination of a subject to a norm but as the constitution of a subject through *precisely such* a subordination. Indeed, to the *extent that* bad conscience involves a turning against oneself, a body in recoil upon itself, how does this figure *serve the* social regulation of the subject, and how might we understand this more fundamental subjection, without which no proper subject *emerges?* I want to suggest that, although *there is* no final undoing of the reflexive bind, that posture of the self bent against itself, a passionate deregulation of the subject may perhaps *precipitate a* tenuous unraveling of that constitutive knot. What *emerges is* not the unshackled will or a "beyond" to power, but another direction for what is most formative in passion, a formative power which is at once the condition of its violence against itself, its status as a necessary fiction, and the site of its enabling possibilities. This recasting of the "will" is not, properly speaking, the will of a subject, nor is it an effect fully cultivated by and through social norms; it is, I would suggest, the site at which the social implicates the psychic in its very formationor, to be more precise, as its very formation and formativity.

A2: IMPACTS OUTWEIGH

Total calculation is impossible. All calculations are products of larger systems of values. Must engage the universe as chaos and struggle.

Lawrence J. **Hatab**, 20**05,** Nietzsche's Life Sentence – Coming to Terms with Eternal Recurrence [Professor of Philosophy and Chair of the department as Old Dominion University, pg. 148]

Although Nietzsche speaks against fugitive perspectives in favor of life affirming perspectives, he also concedes that, because all such outlooks stem from perspectival interests, any *overall* evaluation of life cannot be given veridical status: **"The total value of the world cannot be evaluated"** (WP 708). Evaluations of life, then, are local estimations that serve particular interests but that cannot stand as a global measure to rule out other estimations. And Nietzsche's texts are not inconsistent with this delimitation. Although he strenuously fights against "weak" forms of life, he nevertheless affirms the necessity and authenticity of these perspectives.38 Life-denying perspectives serve the interests of certain types of life, who have thus been able to cultivate their own forms of power that have had an enormous effect on history. The coherence of Nietzsche's position can be noticed by reiterating my distinction between life enhancement and life affirmation. Even life-denying perspectives are life-enhancing because they further the needs of weaker forms of life. The "strength" of life affirmation denotes the capacity to embrace the full agonistic field of all life forces-as an unresolvable, tragic limit on all forms of meaning.

I think that the complex question of Nietzsche's perspectivism can be sorted out On the one hand, in my reading Nietzsche *does* advance a global philosophical position, summed up as an *agonistic, existential perspectivisin, which has the following basic features: (1) existential meaning, and not a disinterested objectivity, is the first-order description and origin of any belief system; (2) the life-world is a field of differing meaning-perspectives that emerge by way of a reciprocal process of tensional relations; (3) the overall process-field is radically agonistic and therefore incapable of coalescing around, or reducing to, any particular meaning-perspective. Nietzsche is, ready and willing to declare this philosophical position and contend with all comers-not with a view toward refutation and justification, but rather capacious performance in an ongoing competition.*

On the other hand, within this global perspectivism, Nietzsche advances his own perspective in the field of play: namely the *affirmation* of the perspectival whole, of all the finite forces of life without exception-and thus the necessity of all life conditions dramatically portrayed in eternal recurrence. Here Nietzsche opposes other perspectives that cannot affirm the agonistic whole, that seek conditions of being as a resolution of tragic becoming. From the standpoint of his global perspectivism, however, Nietzsche allows that these fugitive perspectives are at least affirming their own interests (life enhancement). What they cannot affirm is the agonistic whole-and this is Nietzsche's particular battle to wage in the perspectival field. What is distinctive about Nietzsche's posture becomes clear: he grants that both his global perspectivism and his affirmation project are themselves perspectives, that neither can claim any warrant beyond their presentation as a philosophical contender offered by Friedrich Nietzsche.

A2: FRAMEWORK (RETAG)

Framework is a will to order is an expression of resentment with creativity and criticism immanent to political becoming. Attempting to make debate stable results in the activity becoming an authoritarian mockery of the ideals it espouses.

Ian **Johnston**, professor of liberal arts @ Malaspina University-College Nanaimo, 19**99** [lecture in Liberal Studies 401, November, http://records.viu.ca/~johnstoi/introser/nietzs.htm]

Even more devastating is Nietzsche's extension of the historical critique to language itself. Since philosophical systems deliver themselves to us in language, they are shaped by that language and by the history of that language. Our Western preoccupation with the inner self which perceives, judges, wills, and so forth, Nietzsche can assess as, in large part, the product of grammar, the result of a language that builds its statements around a subject and a predicate. Without that historical accident, Nietzsche affirms, we would not have erred into mistaking for the truth something that is a by-product of our particular culturally determined language system. He makes the point, for example, that our faith in consciousness is just an accident. If instead of saying "I think," we were to say "Thinking is going on in my body," then we would not be temped to give to the "I" some independent existence (e.g., in the mind) and make large claims about the ego or the inner self. The reason we do search for such an entity stems from the accidental construction of our language, which encourages us to use a subject (the personal pronoun) and a verb. The same false confidence in language also makes it all to easy for us to think that we know clearly what key things like "thinking" and "willing" are; whereas, if we were to engage in even a little reflection, we would quickly realize that the inner processes neatly summed up by these apparently clear terms are anything but clear. His emphasis on the importance of psychology as queen of the sciences underscores his sense of how we need to understand more fully just how complex these activities are, particularly their emotional affects, before we talk about them so simplistically, the philosophers up to now done. The analogy I want to put on the table is the comparison of human culture to a huge recreational complex in which a large number of different games are going on. Outside people are playing soccer on one field, rugby on another, American football on another, and Australian football on another, and so on. In the club house different groups of people are playing chess, dominoes, poker, and so on. There are coaches, spectators, trainers, and managers involved in each game. Surrounding the recreation complex is wilderness. These games we might use to characterize different cultural groups: French Catholics, German Protestants, scientists, Enlightenment rationalists, European socialists, liberal humanitarians, American democrats, free thinkers, or what have you. The variety represents the rich diversity of intellectual, ethnic, political, and other activities. The situation is not static of course. Some games have far fewer players and fans, and the popularity is shrinking; some are gaining popularity rapidly and increasingly taking over parts of the territory available. Thus, the traditional sport of Aboriginal lacrosse is but a small remnant of what it was before contact. However, the Democratic capitalist game of baseball is growing exponentially, as is the materialistic science game of archery. And they may well combine their efforts to create a new game or merge their leagues. When Nietzsche looks at Europe historically what he sees is that different games have been going on like this for centuries. He further sees that many of the participants in any one game have been aggressively convinced that their game is the "true" game, that it corresponds with the essence of games or is a close match to the wider game they imagine going on in the natural world, in the wilderness beyond the playing fields. So they have spent a lot of time producing their rule books and coaches' manuals and making claims about how the principles of their game copy or reveal or approximate the laws of nature. This has promoted and still promotes a good deal of bad feeling and fierce arguments. Hence, in addition any one game itself, within the group pursuing it there have always been all sorts of sub-games debating the nature of the activity, refining the rules, arguing over the correct version of the rule book or about how to educate the referees and coaches, and so on. Nietzsche's first goal is to attack this dogmatic claim about the truth of the rules of any particular game. He does this, in part, by appealing to the tradition of historical scholarship which shows that these games are not eternally true, but have a history. Rugby began when a soccer player broke the rules and picked up the ball and ran with it. American football developed out of rugby and has changed and is still changing. Basketball had a precise origin which can be historically located. Rule books are written in languages which have a history by people with a deep psychological point to prove: the games are an unconscious expression of the particular desires of inventive games people at a very particular historical moment; these rule writers are called Plato, Augustine, Socrates, Kant, Schopenhauer, Descartes, Galileo, and so on. For various reasons they believe, or claim to believe, that the rules they come up with reveal something about the world beyond the playing field and are therefore "true" in a way that other rule books are not; they have, as it were, privileged access to reality and thus record, to use a

favorite metaphor of Nietzsche's, the text of the wilderness. In attacking such claims, Nietzsche points out, <u>the wilderness bears no relationship at all to any human invention like a rule book</u> (he points out <u>that nature is "wasteful beyond measure, without purposes and consideration, without mercy and justice, fertile and desolate and uncertain at the same time; imagine indifference itself as a power--how could you live according to this indifference.</u> Living--is that not precisely wanting to be other than this nature" (Epigram 9). Because there is no connection with what nature truly is, such rule books are mere "foreground" pictures, fictions dreamed up, reinforced, altered, and discarded for contingent historical reasons. Moreover, the <u>rule books often bear a suspicious resemblance to the rules of grammar of a culture</u> (thus, for example, the notion of an ego as a thinking subject, Nietzsche points out, is closely tied to the rules of European languages which insist on a subject and verb construction as an essential part of any statement). So how do we know what we have is the truth? And why do we want the truth, anyway? People seem to need to believe that their games are true. But why? Might they not be better if they accepted that their games were false, were fictions, having nothing to do with the reality of nature beyond the recreational complex? If they understood the fact that everything they believe in has a history and that, as he says in the Genealogy of Morals, "only that which has no history can be defined," they would understand that all this proud history of searching for the truth is something quite different from what philosophers who have written rule books proclaim. Furthermore these historical changes and developments occur accidentally, for contingent reasons, and have nothing to do with the games, or any one game, shaping itself in accordance with any ultimate game or any given rule book of games given by the wilderness, which is indifferent to what is going on. And there is no basis for the belief that, if we look at the history of the development of these games, we discover some progressive evolution of games towards some higher type. We may be able, like Darwin, to trace historical genealogies, to construct a narrative, but that narrative does not reveal any clear direction or any final goal or any progressive development. The genealogy of games indicates that history is a record of contingent change. The assertion that there is such a thing as progress is simply one more game, one more rule added by inventive minds (who need to believe in progress); it bears no relationship to nature beyond the sports complex. Ditto for science. <u>So long as one is playing on a team, one follows the rules and thus has a sense of what constitutes right and wrong or good and evil conduct</u> in the game, and this awareness is shared by all those carrying out the same endeavour. To pick up the ball in soccer is evil (unless you are the goalie); and to punt the ball while running in American football is permissible but stupid; in Australian football both actions are essential and right. In other words, different cultural communities have different standards of right and wrong conduct. These are determined by the artificial inventions called rule books, one for each game. Now, this last point, like the others, has profound implications for how we think of ourselves, for our conception of the human self. Because <u>human individuals, like human cultures, also have a history.</u> Each of us has a personal history, and thus <u>we</u> ourselves <u>cannot be defined; we</u>, too, <u>are in a constant process of becoming, of transcending the person we have been into something new. We may like to think of ourselves as defined by some essential rational quality, but in fact we are not.</u> In stressing this, of course, Nietzsche links himself with certain strains of Romanticism, especially (from the point of view of our curriculum) with William Blake and, for those who took the American Adam seminar, with Emerson and Thoreau.

A2: NIETZSCHE = NAZI – NA UH!

Nietzsche was neither an Anti-Semitic or a Nazi.

Millen '97 [Rochelle, Professor of Religion at Wittenburg University, _Nietzsche, God, and The Jews: His Critique of Judeo-Christianity in Relation to the Nazi Myth_ (Review), http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/modern_judaism/v017/17.1br_santaniello.html]

At the same time, however, the original Israel represents strength and power. **The Jews of Nietzsche's day remain a heroic people, using their inner strengths and resources in a straightforward and valuable way.** Santaniello makes the interesting point that perhaps **Nietzsche admires the Jews of his time because their endurance demonstrates an active spiritual power, something he finds lacking in the German nation.**

As we have seen, Nietzsche was not wholly uncritical of historical Judaism. He found particularly abhorrent the concept of election, which, he believed, originated with Judaism and was transformed in German-Christian culture. Its German form became the idealization of the_Volk_, which then came to express itself in racial ideology. Its Christian manifestation was **anti-Semitism in all its permutations.** Nietzsche's understanding of election--later echoed in the essays of Simone Weil--is based on the notion of superiority rather than responsibility (see Amos 2:2), a difference with significant ramifications. **Nietzsche sees in chosenness a justification for hatred of the Other, thus connecting the election of the followers of Christ with an intrinsic anti-Semitism. The disdain in which Nietzsche held anti-Semitism may thus be seen from two perspectives: genuine empathy toward the victims of social and racial persecution and the insight that anti-Semitism represented an inherent weakness in a stagnant and increasingly meaningless Christianity**, one whose alleged spiritual strength was based on theologically justified denigration of the Jews.

From 1891 onward, **Elisabeth, Nietzsche's sister**, compiled (and then published) what she claimed were the previously unpublished notes of her famous brother. In fact, until her death in 1935, **Elisabeth was responsible for feeding to the leading ideologues of what became National Socialism--including Houston Stewart Chamberlain, Dietrich Eckhart, Joseph Goebbels, Alfred Rosenberg, and Hitler himself--presumed** [End Page 107] **statements of Nietzsche's professed love of Christianity, allegiance to Aryan racial supremacy, and** (after 1923) **loyalty to the Nazi Party. These are clearly antithetical to Nietzsche's critiques of Christianity, anti-Semitism, and Wagnerism.** Under Elisabeth's control, the Nietzsche Archive in Weimar became a propaganda tool for fascist politics and National Socialism. As Santaniello confirms, Nietzsche never wrote a book entitled_The Will to Power_; it was, rather, a compilation of distorted statements of Nietzsche's put together by Elisabeth herself in 1901, a year after Nietzsche's death. **One might speculate that Elisabeth needed to justify her own powerful anti-Semitic leanings, and in true Freudian style, could not do it in a better fashion than by deliberately twisting her brother's thought.** Thus she could cover up Nietzsche's violent break with her mentor, Richard Wagner, in 1876 and with herself in 1884; she could appropriate his genius for her purposes, camouflaging her own shallowness, complacency, and racism. In truth, **Elisabeth's false representations of Nietzsche's philosophy represent the very aspects of Christianity and German culture that Nietzsche so deeply despised.** This is especially evident in her skewed two-volume biography of her brother,_The Life of Nietzsche_ (much of which was written between 1895-1904) and its later popular adaptations,_The Young Nietzsche_ and_The Lonely Nietzsche_ (1912-1915). By the time of Elisabeth's death in 1925, Nietzsche's appropriation by the Nazis was complete, and he was continually depicted as a well known anti-Semite of long standing.

In the light of her meticulous biographical and psychological analysis in Part 1 and textual analyses in Part 2, Santaniello is concerned to emphasize the "crucial fact that **Nietzsche was a staunch opponent of antisemitism and that his extremely rare position during his time did not win for him many popularity contests"** (p. 150). This is significant in that Santaniello unequivocally demonstrates that the **Nazis'** deliberate manipulations of the Nietzsche corpus were based not on their misunderstanding but rather on their astute comprehension of his work. They understood **only too well that Nietzsche defended the Jews and defied many of the precursors of National Socialism:** the Wagners, Ernest Renan, Chamberlain, Gobineau, Stöcker, and the Forsters, his own sister and brother-in-law. By adapting and distorting Nietzsche's works, the Nazis effectively silenced his voice. They converted him into an ideological partner, with the safeguard that he would be blamed if their endeavor failed. In fact, this latter has come to be. Untangling the web woven

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NIETZSCHE K

KIRK/RALPH GRIPE

by those with a vested interest in Nietzsche's "anti-Semitism" is a central focus of Santaniello's excellent volume. Santaniello clearly indicates that fear of Nietzsche's thought, lack of clarity as to his position on Jews and Judaism, and reluctance to confront the implications of his actual ideas led to the continued "scapegoating" (p. 151) of Nietzsche. Santaniello sees her task as uncovering this cultural deception, thus **[End Page 108]** bringing us face to face with Nietzsche as the modern, pre-Holocaust paradigm of the two-thousand-year-old crisis between Judaism and Christianity. Nietzsche understood the relevance of this crisis for European culture, the emptiness at which it had arrived, and the lack of individual and collective morality it represented. He cried out--with anguish and despair--warning, exhorting, chastising; his words, however, were camouflaged by powers stronger than he.

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A2: NIETZSCHE IS ANTI-DEMOCRATIC

Nietzsche critiques egalitarianism NOT democracy. Democracy is possible without equality.

Franklin, 1998 [A. Todd, Associate Professor of Philosophy @ Hamilton U, *Nietzsche and Politics*, Edited by Jacqueline Scott, "The Political Implications of Nietzsche's Aristocratic Radicalism", pgs. 147 – 149]

Hatab's view emerges as a product of two different lines of development. The first concerns the nature of democracy, and the second concerns its ability to acknowledge various forms of superiority and merit. Detaching democracy from its egalitarian roots, Hatab argues that, in practice, democracy is essentially an ongoing contest between different competing perspectives, or rather, different competing interests and views. More precisely, he characterizes democracy as, an oscillation of order and disorder, a dialectical contest that generates order out of conflict through rituals of assertion, challenge, response, and decision—a contest, however, that is not to be resolved into any consummation of sheer order, harmony, synthesis, or consensus. Although democratic dialogue can and does produce agreements in the course of debate, and although democracy requires the agreement that political decisions will be binding, nevertheless, disagreement and differences are the sine qua non of democratic politics. (Hatab, 86)

Given Hatab's rhetoric of contest, it seems natural to expect that his account of democracy's ability to distinguish and acknowledge various forms of superiority and merit will be decidedly Nietzschean. Indeed, as Hatab himself sees it, his revised account should be able to show that "democracy can be more amenable to [Nietzsche's] way of thinking than he [himself] imagined" (Hatab, 54).

Rejecting all popular forms of liberalism that decry the inequities of endowed talents and inherited advantages, Hatab claims that in order for our politics to be truly worldly,

we must accept and affirm the natural inequalities of fortune, be ever on guard against a tendency to resent such disparities, and simply proceed to think about political possibilities informed by this naturalized departure from traditional presumptions and habits. (Hatab, 105)

In keeping with this naturalized stance, Hatab goes on to develop a postmodern conception of justice that allows for both cultural and political discriminations. Taking his queue from Aristotle, Hatab devises a formula for what he calls contextual apportionment. According to this formula,

"a and b can be treated equally (or unequally) when they are equal (or unequal) in c relevant to d," where a and b are persons, c is a particular condition or ability, and d is a particular context for which c is appropriate. (Hatab, 112)

Given this formula, differential treatment and regard are justified insofar as they are contextualized in terms of specific talents, achievements, or performances, and based on relevant factors.

Although Hatab relishes the fact that this formula gives rise to a form of meritocratic stratification that is perfectly compatible with democracy, he qualifies the practice of "recognizing our betters" by adding that such meritocratic recognition should ... be thoroughly contextual and never reductive to the point of designating better or worse persons who are essentially superior to other persons, who might therefore be seen to deserve vested or entrenched privileges. (Hatab, 117)

Focusing on this refusal to make essentialist judgments concerning persons, Clark eventually claims that Hatab's view betrays an unconscious "prejudice in favor of equality" (Clark, 137). However, leaving aside all questions of motivating prejudice, I believe that the postmodern character of Hatab's view goes a long way toward bridging the gap between Nietzsche's aristocraticism and democracy.

Detailing the evaluative principles of his postmodern notion of democracy, Hatab writes,

From a postmodern perspective, achievements, even great achievements, would not translate into any notion of a superior "person" or someone who is closer to the "truth" or the "good." With a decentered self, we can talk of performances rather than "natures." There is no unified essence in the light of which we might be tempted or prompted to sum people up, close the book on them, or presume to measure them in any fundamental way. Consequently the "person" in postmodern discourse can be a functional, but nevertheless nominal, signification; it makes no reference to strict "identity," substantive or otherwise. (Hatab, 118)

Now although Hatab's postmodern rejection of strict "identity" prevents him from accepting essentialist notions of superiority, a commitment to a postmodern notion of personhood in no way precludes the possibility of discriminating between persons on the basis of relevant factors or characteristics.

Consider three following example: people who have exceptional eyesight can rightly be judged superior in this regard. However, such judgments can only be made on the basis of clear and relevant evidence of exceptional eyesight. In addition, these judgments are good only insofar as the person's eyesight remains exceptional, for once her eyesight weakens, the judgment is no longer valid. Analogously, it seems that judgments concerning the superior character of a person only make sense when they are founded on pertinent tangible evidence. In addition, such judgments are likewise only good insofar as the person continues to exhibit exemplary character. Once he exhibits poor character, the judgment of superiority is no longer valid. However, this is not to say that his character is now fixed and determined as poor. On the contrary, the point is simply that the status of one's character is never fixed. Moreover, the point is that judgments of superiority and inferiority are always contingent upon tangible evidence of the relevant qualities or characteristics.

A2: NIETZSCHE SUPPORTS SLAVERY

Their argument is based on a myth of "Equality for all"—domination and exclusion are inevitably parts of politics Conway, 19**97**

[Daniel W. Ph.D, Professor and Department Head of Philosophy, Nietzsche & the Political, Routledge, 36-7]

Nietzsche thus *presents slavery* as a necessary, indispensable practice in those hierarchically organized *societies that* contribute to the permanent enhancement of humankind (BGE 44), a practice he associates with spiritual husbandry: "Slavery is, as it seems, both in the cruder and in the more subtle sense, the indispensable means of spiritual discipline and cultivation, too" (BGE 188). Although it turns out that he is more interested in the sort of "slavery" that one imposes on oneself in the cultivation of one's soul, his peculiar, metaphorical use of the term "slavery" is itself a concession to the besetting decadence of his epoch. If *real* slavery were possible in late modernity-that is, if the establishment of an aristocratic political regime were a viable option in the twilight of the idols-then he would surely, and unabashedly, endorse it as a precondition of the perfectionism he advocates. And although he might prefer the practice of slavery in its "more subtle sense," allowing the "slaves," for example, an (illusory) feeling of their freedom and self-determination, he also justifies the institution of slavery by appealing to the "moral imperative of Nature," which is directed, he insists, at humankind itself (BGE 188). Nietzsche thus views the practice of exclusion as an inescapable element-a "necessary evil," as it were-of political legislation in any regime. In order for a society to produce a few whole human beings, it must legislate and enforce the fragmentation of countless others. Only by virtue of this exclusion is culture-an artificial subsystem sheltered within the indifferent economy of Nature-possible at all. He thus insists that "the greatest of all tasks, the attempt to raise humanity higher, includ{esj the relentless destruction of everything that [is] degenerating and parasitical" (EH 1V:4). It is simply the nature of politics, he believes, that all regimes must practice exclusion, whether or not they do so knowingly and resolutely. Despite their visceral aversion to Manu's grisly decrees, modern lawgivers are no more at liberty to dispense with political exclusion than to reprise his specific practice of it. The morality of taming too practices a form of exclusion, insofar as it forces all higher, singular types to lie in a Procrustean bed of its own mediocre design (TI IX:43); it too justifies its exclusionary practices by appealing to a sustaining myth, that of "equal rights for all" (CW 7)

A2: NIETZSCHE SUPPORTS SLAVERY

Nietzsche doesn't necessarily justify elite domination or slavery

Clark, 1998 [Maudemarie, Professor of Philosophy @ UC Riverside, *Nietzsche and Politics*, Edited by Jacqueline Scott, "Nietzsche's Antidemocratic Rhetoric", pgs. 124 – 126]

But having conceded this much to the usual reading of Beyond Good and Evil, I am left with a major question: namely, does Nietzsche believe that enhancing the human type depends on the existence of an aristocratically organized political system, a system conceived, as one commentator puts it, "along the lines of a pyramid in which each social group is assigned privileges and duties appropriate to its social role" (Ansell-Pearson, 41)? And if by "legislating values," philosophers will thereby be part of "new caste to rule Europe," need we conceive their "rule" as involving force and violence, as a matter of imposing their will on a resisting populace?

I begin with the point that although Nietzsche claims that enhancements of the human type are always the work of an aristocratic society, he does not say that this requires aristocratic political institutions. He in fact says nothing at all in Beyond Good and Evil about the kind of political organization or institutions (of the larger society) that are required for the enhancements with which he is concerned. He does claim that the democratic movement is "a form of the decay of political organization" (BGE 203). I suspect that readers often take it for granted that Nietzsche regards this decay as something bad because he mentions it in the same breath, with another form of decay that he clearly does regard as something bad, the "decay, namely, the diminution, of the human being," which he says "make[s] him mediocre and lower[s] his value" (BGE 203). In fact, Nietzsche does not say that the "decay of political organization" is a bad thing. Although he undoubtedly thinks its decay reduces the value of political organization for some purposes, what he actually says is perfectly compatible with believing that this decay makes possible things of even higher value, e.g., the development of individuality. I suggest that Nietzsche believes that the enhancement of the human type with which he is concerned depends upon the development of individuality and that he recognizes that such development is made possible by a weakening of political organization (see, e.g., GS 23 and G-S 356). The claim that democracy represents the decay of political organization therefore gives me no reason to concede that Nietzsche is against democratic political institutions or in favor of aristocratic ones. In fact, the claim is perfectly compatible with believing (as I think Nietzsche does, although I cannot argue that here) that the "decay" of the political order brought about by the development of democratic institutions has made possible the very aristocratic society that Nietzsche wants to encourage, that of his "new philosophers."

Although Nietzsche clearly claims that enhancements of the human type will always be the work of an "aristocratic society," he does not characterize such a society in political terms or say that its existence depends on aristocratic political institutions. Instead, he characterizes it in terms of its underlying value orientation, as "a society that believes in the long ladder of an order of rank and differences in value between man and man, and needs slavery in some sense or other." A group of philosophers should therefore be able to form an aristocratic society in Nietzsche's sense by sharing such a value orientation, one that posits their own form of existence as the telos or highest good achieved by society, even if the larger society in which they live is governed by democratic political institutions. To be sure, Nietzsche claims that "slavery" will be needed by the aristocratic society he regards as a precondition for any enhancement of the human type. But he says "slavery in some sense or other," which makes clear that he has refrained from specifying the sense of "slavery" involved. In fact, scholars and scientists form the only group Nietzsche picks out as deserving the status of "slaves" in relation to philosophers. Surely, Nietzsche's point is not that scholars should be "slaves" of philosophers in the literal (i.e., social and political) sense. In Gay Science 18, Nietzsche tells us that the ancient philosophers thought of all nonphilosophers as slaves, but makes more explicit (though still not fully so) that he is using the term "metaphorically," to characterize one who lacks true independence or freedom. I suggest that he uses "slave" in the same sense in Beyond Good and Evil, the difference being that the later text leaves it more up to the reader to figure out for herself that he is using the term in a metaphorical sense.6 In the same way, I suggest, this book leaves it to the reader to determine for herself whether Nietzsche considers aristocratic political institutions necessary for the enhancement of the human type. How is she to do that? My suggestion is that she should begin by seeking to determine Nietzsche's reasons for claiming that an aristocratic society is necessary if the human type is to be enhanced and whether, given these reasons, it makes sense for him to think that such enhancement depends upon the existence of an aristocratic political system.

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A2: NIETZSCHE = MISOGYNIST

Turn: Nietzche's challenge to modern values and perspectives is crucial to constructing a feminist politics

Conway, 1997 [Daniel W. Ph.D, Professor and Department Head of Philosophy, Nietzsche & the Political, Routledge, 132-3]

Nietzsche willingly accepts the self-referential implications of his endorsement of situated knowledges. He readily acknowledges that his own perspectivism too is situated, that it reflects the peculiar political interests of its author. "Perspectivism" is itself perspectival in nature, for it is the product of the partial perspective and embodied affect peculiar to Herr Nietzsche. Rather than stake an illicit claim to epistemic purity, he quite openly voices the hostility and resentment that inform his own political campaign against the ascetic practices of traditional epistemology. It is no coincidence that his most illuminating articulation of his perspectivism appears in the *Genealogy,* a book in which he both announces and displays his own vested political interests in compiling a genealogy of morals. Nietzsche's perspectivism thus provides a promising epistemological model for feminist theorists. But let us be clear about the political costs of embracing his perspectivism: if we accept this reconstituted notion of objectivity, and seek an aggregation of radically situated perspectives, then we must abandon the quest for a privileged, epistemically pure, God's*eye perspective on* the world. We need not disavow our cultural, *genealogical or* political preferences for certain perspectives, but we must be careful to situate *these preferences within* a discernible political agenda. The *privilege of* a particular perspective will derive entirely from its situation within the political agenda it *expresses, and* not from its internal coherence or privileged access to the real world. *Several feminist* theorists have recently acknowledged their debts to Nietzsche's "perspectivism," which they have borrowed in order to articulate the theory of knowledge that underlies their political projects and agendas. Declaring a provisional truce with a potentially vicious opponent, *these theorists* join Nietzsche in rejecting the traditional epistemological ideal of Objectivity. Feminist theorists have long maintained that the pursuit of Objectivity would require agents to accede to a disembodied, trans-perspectival, patriarchal standpoint-a chimerical gambit that Donna Haraway calls "the God trick. "27 As Susan Bordo argues, this "view from nowhere" acquires the privilege and cachet of a "view from everywhere," and it effectively devaluates the experiences of those agents whose knowledges of the world are most obviously and ineluctably situated .21 These theorists thus conclude that the ideal of disinterested, detached Objectivity is pursued at the expense and exclusion of the situated knowledges of women, especially women of color. Traditional (patriarchal) epistemology consequently delivers only a simulacrum of objectivity, for its emphasis on disinterested detachment precisely discounts the partiality that defines a radically situated perspective. At the same time, however, some feminist theorists are understandably reluctant to abandon the *notion* of objectively valid knowledge as the goal of philosophical inquiry. According to Sandra Harding, some such critical standard is crucial to the very project of feminist epistemology: What would be the point of a theory of knowledge that did not make prescriptions for how to go about getting knowledge or of a prescription for getting knowledge that did not arise from a theory about how knowledge can be and has been produced? A reconstituted notion of objectivity would provide a standard whereby theorists might claim, for example, that one scientific theory is better or more complete or more promising than another. In this light, we might think of one goal of feminist epistemology as the reconstitution of the notion of objectivity, such that feminist theorists might continue the critical enterprise of science without subscribing to its most pernicious concepts.

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A2: NIETZSCHE ISN'T TALKING ABOUT ABJECT SUFFERING (NUSSBAUM)

TURN: Our critique is specific to abject suffering -- Their argument that the poor are too down-trodden for self over-coming is precisely the logic that creates welfare systems meant to sustain dependency instead of rise above it.
von Tevenar, Birkbeck College, London, 20**05**
[Gudrun, "Nietzsche's Objections to Pity and Compassion," paper presented in Professor Gemes' Nietzsche seminar, October 18th, http://www.bbk.ac.uk/phil/staff/academics/gemes-work/GurdrenvonTevenar18Oct05]
With the above in mind, let us now turn to the second of our two questions and Nussbaum's claim [see bibliography] that Nietzsche lacked 'inner understanding' of the misery and contingency of suffering. Nussbaum accuses Nietzsche of insensitivity for the way suffering can be erosive of human well-being. She argues that Nietzsche had no grasp of the simple truth that one functions badly when one is hungry and that stoic self-command is just not possible when suffering from what she terms 'basic vulnerability'. Nussbaum contrasts 'basic vulnerability', which comprises deprivations of resources utterly central to human mental, physical, and intellectual functioning, from 'bourgeois vulnerability' with its relatively comfortable pains of loneliness, ill health, bad reputation, and so on. These latter pains, Nussbaum argues, are indeed painful enough but not such as to impair human functioning altogether. She insists that Nietzsche simply ignored 'basic vulnerability' since he apparently believed that even a beggar could be a stoic hero so long as socialism and Mitleid did not keep him weak. Thus Nussbaum concludes that despite all his famous unhappiness Nietzsche was without 'inner understanding of the ways contingency matters for virtue'.
These are powerful and thought provoking objections. However, I suggest that they somewhat miss their point because Nietzsche was not interested in virtue, did not address himself to the multitude, and did not, therefore, envisage the possibility of members of the herd growing into stoic heroes. Moreover, there is ample evidence throughout his writings as well as in his letters that he was not insensitive to the fact that deprivation – mental and physical – stunts growth and that severe pain and misery not only hurts but also harms people. Yet Nietzsche nonetheless, and here lies the highly controversial nature of his thought, **refused to grant** suffering, e**ven severe suffering**, the kind of significance assigned to it through the influence of Christianity and Schopenhauer, which leads, almost inevitably, to Mitleid and hence, Nietzsche feared, to erosion of the will to power of those precious, privileged few by undermining their confidence in themselves and in their lives. The truly objectionable feature of suffering, Nietzsche holds, is not the well-acknowledged fact that it hurts and harms people, but the non-acknowledged and deeply deplorable fact that so many sufferers simply fail to respond appropriately to their suffering and thus allow themselves to become feeble, impaired, wretched – in other words, they allow themselves to 'suffer' hurt and harm. We can conclude, then, that Nietzsche was not insensitive to the misery and contingency of suffering but simply refused to accept its alleged wider significance.

UNCERTAINTIES

NIETZSCHE DISLIKED DEMOCRATIC IDEOLOGY

Nietzsche disliked democratic "ideology" because it debases what is considered to be "excellent" – it degrades values.

Clark, 1998 [Maudemarie, Professor of Philosophy @ UC Riverside, *Nietzsche and Politics*, Edited by Jacqueline Scott, "Nietzsche's Antidemocratic Rhetoric", pgs. 131 – 132]

In my attempt to get at the answer Nietzsche suggests to this question, I am indebted to Lawrence Hatab's recent critique of Nietzsche's aristocraticism, with which I have considerable sympathy and to which I shall return. What I find helpful at this point is something I think Hatab gets dead wrong. According to Hatab, Nietzsche's "assault on egalitarianism" follows from the belief that "most people [in a democratic society] are not capable of honoring excellence and success" (Hatab, 114). Hatab proceeds to argue against Nietzsche's aristocraticism on the grounds that "democratic societies have never collapsed into egalitarian mush—consider how readily we affirm many unequal power relations in milieus such as the military, the professions, and education, and how prone we are to idolize talent in various arenas." In other words, Hatab thinks that Nietzsche's complaint against democracy is that it produces equality, and he therefore takes the obvious fact that our democratic society has not produced equality as evidence that Nietzsche's worry is unfounded. In fact, however, Nietzsche denies that democracy produces equality. Hatab himself quotes Nietzsche's claim in Gay Science 18—"we are accustomed to the doctrine of equality, though not to equality itself"—to show that Nietzsche exaggerates the deleterious effect of egalitarianism. I would be astonished, however, if Nietzsche could really be consoled or reassured about democracy by considering our idolization of athletes, movie stars, and other entertainment specialists, or our appreciation of almost all of the qualities that give one a chance of having one's name added to the list of the rich and famous. Nietzsche's problem with democracy is not that it destroys the appreciation of or desire for success or excellence, I suggest, but that it debases our standards for what constitutes success and excellence, making them crude, plebeian, and even barbaric.

In a democracy, I take Nietzsche to be claiming, standards for success become common or democratic, as those of American society certainly are now: Just about everyone can have some of what constitutes success. In alphabetical order: fame, money, pleasure, power, sex. The successful just have more of it. And we have little shared idea of excellence beyond such success. This point was brought home to me once by an interview I saw with someone who had succeeded in amassing a large fortune at a very early age. When asked what had motivated him to work so hard to make money, he replied, in what struck me as all sincerity and innocence, that he had always been driven by a passionate desire to achieve excellence. It seemed that it had simply never occurred to him that there could be any measure of excellence or success other than money.

This is anecdotal, of course, and there are certainly various forms of achievement and success recognized in our democratic society. It is becoming increasingly difficult for anything to be regarded as an achievement, however, unless it brings the achiever more of what we can all have: e.g., money or the "feeling" that television commentators are always asking various winners to share with us. So even though most of us will never win an important sporting event, for instance, every attempt will be made to allow us to share in "how it feels" to win each of them, which, of course, will turn out to sound not very different from what we have felt on various occasions, usually even pretty ordinary. This is not at all to say that democracy thereby discourages the desire to win—or that it makes us really want to be equal. It obviously doesn't, and I see no evidence that Nietzsche thinks it does. The desire to achieve, to be a winner, is very strong; it is just that the measure of winning, of achieving excellence, is common, is reduced to increments of the lowest common denominator, of what everyone can relate to without having to change any fundamental aspect of their character. What is missing is any room for the idea that there are higher states of soul, virtues or excellences of character, ones that are not mere increments of that to which everyone can already relate. It was not always this way. Under the influence of religion, human

beings have traditionally believed in "higher human beings," in human beings who have achieved a level of spirituality or virtue of which most people are not capable. In the discourse of our now more democratic culture, on the other hand, virtue has only a minor presence. And there is certainly nothing in this discourse to challenge and stir the soul, to induce a craving for higher virtues or degrees of virtue. This is, I think Nietzsche would say, because the only virtues about which we talk are the old, tired virtues, virtues interpreted under the auspices of the old ideal, hence ones of which we assume everyone is already capable. But "what can be common," says Nietzsche, "always has little value" (BGE 43) – which is to say that what we perceive as ordinary cannot inspire us to extraordinary passion or effort. And without such passion and effort, Nietzsche very plausibly claims, no enhancement of the human type, no new level of spiritual achievement, will be possible.

AFF

PERMS AND THINGS

PERM – NET BENEFIT: K TO CRITIQUE

Only the perm prevents the critique from turns over on itself – absolutist rejection of morality is itself a new morality

Nehamas, 1998 [Alexander, Professor of Philosophy @ Princeton U, *Nietzsche and Politics*, Edited by Jacqueline Scott, "Nietzsche and 'Hitler'", pgs. 13 – 15]

To believe that our peers are a fixed single group is to think that we have a special status that gives our actions a special value, whatever our actions might be. The ancien regime may have thought so. Nietzsche's "healthy" aristocrats, whether social or spiritual, may have agreed. But this attitude—that is my central claim in this essay—is inconsistent with his view that the "subject" does not precede, determine, or cause its actions, but is actually constituted by them: "the popular mind in fact doubles the doing; when it sees the lightning flash, it is the doing of a doing: it posits the same event first as cause and then a second time as its effect" (GM 1:13, WP 531). Actions confer status, and not, as Nietzsche sometimes thinks when he is concerned with nobility, the other way around: that is exactly what makes his account of nobility so unsatisfying. The Homeric heroes of the Genealogy may well have believed that they were capable of deeds to which they, and only they, had a right. But if Achilles had remained hiding in women's clothes to avoid the war in Troy, he would have proved that he was not a hero and that he had no right to the deeds he actually performed (and which, of course, had he stayed at home, he would not have performed). We can think that we are different from people whose circumstances differ from ours because of the sheerest accident only if we separate our own selves from our actions, thinking that who we are is something over and above what we do and can determine independently the character and value of our deeds. Who "we" are, who our "peers" can be, is also, as Nietzsche failed to see, a matter of perspective and can change as our circumstances themselves change. "The order of rank" is compatible with many circles of duties, and there may be duties that we owe, in some extreme circumstances, to absolutely everyone. Such duties may govern a small part of our interactions with others: what is considered moral action, I believe, is a limited element in human ethical life and has little to do with our "rational essence." It governs those situations in which there is no reason to think that we are different from the rest of the world. But such differences are contextual, and the situations to which they give rise don't exhaust the range of our interactions as, under the influence of Kantian reflection, we are tempted to believe.

Nietzsche considered morality dangerous because it attempts to impose the same code of behavior on everyone, making it difficult for his immoralist heroes to function, and claimed that as "a fundamental principle of society ... it immediately proves to be what it really is—a will to the denial of life, a principle of disintegration and decay" (BGE 259). I believe, with him, that moral principles do not, cannot, and should not govern all our relationships with one another, and that they are not generally a sound basis for the practice of politics. But I also believe, against him, that Kant's insight into our sense of solidarity with other members of our species needs to keep a place within the economy of our lives, even if not for Kant's own reasons.

Objectivity, Nietzsche famously said, is not "contemplation without interest" but the ability to see each thing from many points of view, the ability "to employ a variety of perspectives and affective interpretations in the service of knowledge" (GM 111:12, TI "Germans" 6). He applied his idea to his own examination of Christian morality, to which he said both Yes— for the many who need it—and No—for the few who do not. He did not go far enough, and he never saw that there may be particular, specific, perhaps even extraordinary situations in which moral considerations might be appropriate even for the few who manage to live beyond good and evil. He did not see that the error of morality, which takes good and evil for realities that contradict one another (not as complementary value concepts, which would be the truth), ... advises taking the side of the good, ... desires that the good should renounce and oppose the evil down to its ultimate roots [and] therewith denies life which has in all its instincts both Yes and No (WP 351), is an error he may have made himself when he insisted that there are absolutely no situations in which moral principles could ever constrain his own heroes. He did not see that by restricting the area of life to which

morality is relevant, he could see it from yet another perspective, increase his objectivity toward it, become able to say another Yes and No to it.

Both "Yes" and "No" are essential to Nietzsche's thought about values: "Every naturalism in morality," he writes, "—that is, every healthy morality—is dominated by an instinct of life; some commandment of life is fulfilled by a determinate canon of 'shalt' and 'shalt not'" (TI "Morality" 4). In GS 344, he famously denies the unconditional value of truth on the grounds that in life "both truth and untruth constantly prove to be useful." His absolute rejection of moral considerations on behalf of his noble heroes may not fit so well with his general approach. And if I am right that Nietzsche depends, and must depend, on a separation of the doer from the deed when he completely rejects moral considerations, the deliciously ironic point emerges that in order to deny morality unconditionally (which is, on his own grounds, the manner of the moralist), he needs to appeal exactly to the distinction he believes to be the great invention of morality itself! For it is only by distinguishing between the doer and the deed, he argues, that morality could demand, absurdly, that strength express itself as weakness and reinterpret weakness as the product of choice:

The weakness of the weak —that is to say, their essence, their effects, their ineluctable, irremovable reality—[came to be seen as] a voluntary achievement, willed, chosen, a deed, a meritorious act. This type of man needs to believe in a neutral independent "subject" ... The subject (or, to use a more popular expression, the soul) has perhaps been believed in hitherto more firmly than anything else on earth because it makes possible to the majority of mortals, the weak and oppressed of every kind, the sublime self-deception that interprets weakness a freedom, and their being thus-and-thus as a merit. (GM 1:13)

PERM – COMPASSION + K OF PITY

Perm solves best – being compassionate in order to overcome the faults of pity allows for a higher morality – Zarathustra's journey proves.

Michael L. **Frazer,** Dept. of Government at Harvard, **2006** ["The Compassion of Zarathustra: Nietzsche on Sympathy and Strength," *The Review of Politics* 68]

<This conventional interpretation of the close of Nietzsche's epic, however, is surely incorrect. A close examination of the passage in question reveals that **Zarathustra never "overcomes" his compassion in the sense of ridding himself of it once and for all**. There is no indication that our hero will fail to experience compassion upon further encounters with suffering, or even that he has ceased to feel compassion for the higher men. Achieving "mastery" over a virtue or sentiment, remember, necessarily implies **retaining it in one's psyche, not abandoning it**. Rather than ridding himself of all sympathetic sentiments once and for all, Zarathustra affirms his feelings for the higher men as having had their "time" as an essential component of his destiny. **Compassion may cause him real misery, but, when properly harnessed, it helps rather than hinders Zarathustra's creativity**. Indeed, as tightly bound as sympathetic feelings are with the possession of knowledge and the faculty of imagination, they are **necessarily present in any creative psyche.** Remembering, then, that the telos of human striving is not happiness but creation (more specifically value-creation), the experience of compassion is nothing to be regretted. >

PERM SOLVES – ETERNAL RETURN NOT MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE

Perm solves—Accepting the eternal return does not require a passive acceptance of all that exists

Lawrence J. **Hatab**, 2005, Nietzsche's Life Sentence – Coming to Terms with Eternal Recurrence [Professor of Philosophy and Chair of the department as Old Dominion University, pg. 139-140]
How can a belief in *eternal recurrence* respond to the question of moral repugnance? An answer is implied in Zarathustra's own passage *through* such repulsion as a necessary stage in the path of life affirmation, which for Nietzsche must be understood in agonistic terms. If Zarathustra affirms the recurrence of the small man, this does not mean that he now abandons his opposition to mediocrity and life denial. Affirmation can be understood as a twofold response that characterizes Nietzsche's agonistic pluralism: first, that creativity is not for everyone, that herd values are appropriate for certain types; second, that will to power must include resistance and opposition, so that any value *requires* countervalues to become what it is-an overcoming. **The crucial point is that affirmation does not mean *approving* of everything, but rather affirming the necessity of otherness for the emergence of one's values**, which means that affirmation retains *opposition* to countervalues, retains the space of one's Yes and No. Confirmation of this idea can be found in Zarathustra's objection to indiscriminate approval, which he calls "omnisatisfaction" *(Allgenugsamkeit):*Verily, I also do not like those who consider everything good and this world the best. Such men I call the omnisatisfied. Omnisatisfaction, which knows how to taste everything, that is not the best taste. I honor the recalcitrant choosy tongues and stomachs, which have learned to say "I" and "yes' and "no?' (Z 111, 11, 2)
Eternal recurrence, therefore, cannot entail the approval of everything that returns. If I will the return of something I find heinous, I also will the return of my opposition to it. *Amorfati* cannot mean the indiscriminate love of all things but rather the love of the agonistic necessity that intertwines everything I value with otherness. This does not necessarily dilute or neutralize the moral repulsion that eternal recurrence can generate, but at least there is a way to disarm a charge such as Magnus's that recurrence calls on us to love the extermination camps unconditionally."
Nietzsche's philosophy is all about moral evaluations, in that will to power implies judgments and preferences for living one way over and against other ways. Indeed, "all experiences are moral experiences, even in the realm of sense perception" (GS 114). Nietzsche's fight against the slavish binary of good and evil is itself an evaluation; and he clearly states that "beyond good and evil" does not mean beyond "good and bad" (GM I, 17). The former is an eliminative project while the latter is an agonistic overcoming that requires the existence and persistence of that which is overcome. So Nietzsche's "immoralism" is a rhetorical move against a particular (and dominant) conception of morality in the Western tradition, not an amoral or antimoral posture in strict terms.
Moreover, Nietzsche's perspectivism does not recommend anything like radical skepticism or a facile relativism (see *BGE* 207-208), but rather the task of finding one's own meaning and living it out *at odds with* differing meanings.24 Although perspectivism disallows one's own morality being binding on all, to conclude from a plurality of values that no morality is binding or worthy of commitment *(Unverbindlichkeit aller Moral)* would be childish (GS 345). In the midst of different moral possibilities, what matters is "a brave and rigorous attempt *(Versuche)* to *live* in this or that morality" (D 195). Living in such a way requires that one contend with other perspectives, that one believe one's own perspective to be the *better* option. This is why something like equanimity would be inappropriate, indeed ruinous, for Nietzsche's agonistic perspectivism, and why eternal recurrence must include one's stance against other perspectives.
Nietzsche believes in the necessity of having "enemies," which distinguishes his unique form of affirmation from traditional projects of the good that are betrayed by their eliminative tyranny.

PERM SOLVES – NIETZSCHE AS DEMOCRAT

Perm: Nietzsche Compatible with Communities, Democratic Politics, and Morality

Conway, 1997

[Daniel W. Ph.D, Professor and Department Head of Philosophy, Nietzsche & the Political, Routledge, 123-4]
 Another critic of liberalism, Alasdair MacIntyre, actually proposes <u>Nietzsche's political thinking as representative of the signature errors and failures of liberalism</u>. Although Nietzsche may appear to be a critic of the Enlightenment project, his "criticisms" in fact reflect the natural, selfreferential development of liberal individualism. Hence, MacIntyre insists, the irreducible irrationality of Nietzsche's political thinking: <u>The rational and rationally justified autonomous moral subject of the eighteenth century is a fiction, an illusion; so, Nietzsche resolves, let will replace reason and let us make ourselves into autonomous moral subjects by some gigantic and heroic act of the will. . . MacIntyre thus cites Nietzsche's irrational excesses as evidence of the shipwreck of liberal political theory: The Nietzschean stance turns out not to be a mode of escape from or an alternative to the conceptual scheme of liberal individualist modernity, but rather one more representative moment in its internal unfolding.</u> Interpreting the doctrine of will to power as the logical outcome of the project of Enlightenment<u>, MacIntyre presents Nietzsche as a negative exemplar of modernity, whose misguided quest to produce the *Ubermensch* exemplifies the bankruptcy of liberal individualis.</u> Eithe*r* one must follow through the aspirations and the collapse of the different versions of the Enlightenment project until there remains only the Nietzschean diagnosis and the Nietzschean problematic or one must hold that the Enlightenment project was not only mistaken, but should never have been commenced in the first place. MacIntyre thus exploits the supposedly dead ends and blind alleys of Nietzsche's political thinking to call for a reconsideration of the Aristotelian moral tradition, whose premature rejection, he believes, constitutes the signal error of modernity<u>: The defensibility of the Nietzschean position turns *in the end*on the answer to the question: was it right in the first place to reject Aristotle? For if Aristotle's position in ethics and politics or something very like it-could be sustained, the whole Nietzschean enterprise would be pointless.</u> Despite his manifest allegiances to Aristotle, MacIntyre nevertheless subscribes to a surprisingly Nietzschean account of the political resources and options available to late modernity. The discontinuities and incommensurabilities that characterize moral discourse in late modernity are largely antithetical to a retrieval or recuperation of the Aristotelian moral tradition. Considerable time is needed to heal the wounds inflicted by the runaway excesses of liberal individualism, and MacIntyre bids us to begin Despite his manifest allegiances to Aristotle, MacIntyre nevertheless subscribes to a surprisingly Nietzschean account of the political resources and options available to late modernity. The discontinuities and incommensurabilities that characterize moral discourse in late modernity are largely antithetical to a retrieval or recuperation of the Aristotelian moral tradition. <u>Considerable time is needed to heal the wounds inflicted by the runaway excesses of liberal individualism, and MacIntyre bids us to begin These micro-communities will not succeed in restoring the moribund Aristotelian tradition, but they may ensure that "both morality and civility might survive the coming ages of barbarism and darkness."</u>" Invoking a remarkably Nietzschean image of the plight of moral agents in late modernity, MacIntyre expresses guarded optimism that ethical life may yet withstand the advance of decadence: 'What matters at this stage is the construction of local forms of community within which civility and the intellectual and moral life can be sustained through the new dark ages which are already upon us. And if the tradition of the virtues was able to survive the horrors of the last dark ages, we are not entirely without grounds for hope ... We are waiting not for a Godot, but for another-doubtless very different-St. Benedict.

ANSWERING THE LINKS

AFF – A2: SOLVING SUFFERING FAILS/IS BAD

"Suffering inevitable" is NOT a reason to vote negative -- The universality of suffering enables a compassionate engagement with others that a. is capable of alleviating some pain and b. does not fall into pity.   The alt. is deterministic and passive.
Van Hooft, Associate Professor of International and Political Studies @ Deakin University, 19**98**
[Stan, "The Meanings of Suffering," The Hastings Center Report, Vol. 28, No. 5 (Sep. - Oct., 1998), pg.17-18]
The only question remaining about this way of thinking would be whether it could give rise to compas- sion for the suffering of others. That is, <u>even if we reject</u> the ancient and <u>Christian attempts to accept suffering, we should try to incorporate some</u> part of Levinas's <u>humanistic insight</u>. And this seems possible. <u>Insofar as suffering is borne, it opens us to the suffering of others</u>. Indeed, **attempts to make suffering good blind us to the reality of our and of others' suffering by allowing us to view it as something that ought to happen or that ought to be accepted**. Cruelty and insensitivity lie down this path. <u>The tragic bearing of suffering</u>, on the other hand<u>, awakens us to its reality</u>. <u>If neither the gods</u>, the cosmos, providence, <u>nor a faith in</u> human <u>progress rob suffering of its tragedy, then we are left just with the brute fact that we and others suffer. And in this there is community</u>. <u>Our own suffering</u> awakens us to what the other is going through and thus <u>creates</u> in us the <u>compassion through which relieving actions can be moti- vated</u>. In this community of suffering, a meaning might yet be found for our own suffering. Perhaps all the meaning that suffering can have is that it teaches us to care for others.

AFF – A2: PITY LINK – GENEROSITY GOOD

Turn - Nietzsche does not reject all acts of compassion - the 1AC represents a shift from a slave morality, which considers suffering existential, towards a politics of becoming, which explores how identity and suffering are contingent products of institutional arrangements that must be critiqued.

Connolly, Krieger-Eisenhower professor of Political Science @ Johns Hopkins, 19**96**

[William E. "Suffering, Justice, and the Politics of Becoming," *CSST Work Paper #113*, October]

That being said, it must be emphasized that (my) Nietzsche is not against pity or compassion per se, despite what Caputo and several other commentators suggest. He resists compassion for selective modes of suffering to express it actively for others. As he puts the point: it is "compassion, in other words, against compassion" one type of compassion against another. l4 Nietzsche pits compassion for that suffocated by the normalizing politics of "good and evil" against compassion for existential suffering.

The latter compassion must be redirected, and the demand to which it responds must be overcome, if an ethic of generosity in relations of identity\difference is to be cultivated. Nietzsche might have striven to develop more respectful distance from the mode of suffering he finds most offensive and dangerous. But he, like everyone else in this respect, is compelled to be selective with respect to suffering. His open selectivity challenges concealed principles of selection in other moral perspectives. Is it because his selectivity pits him against powerful currents flowing through sacred and secular moralities in western societies that representatives of these traditions so often read him to be against compassion and benevolence per se?

The aff represents an act of sublime expenditure without expectation of return -- Generosity is not reducible to an economic exchange – it is the giving away of the self that is essential to creating social justice.

Diprose, 20**02** [Rosalyn, Associate Professor in Philosophy @ U of New South Wales, Corporeal Generosity: On Giving with Nietzsche, Merleau-Ponty, and Levinas, pgs. 4 – 6]

The idea of generosity offered in this book challenges the individualism apparent in Machan's account as well as the economy of contract and exchange that he insists is not only the basis of social relations but is characteristic of generosity itself. Generosity; on the contrary; is not reducible to an economy of exchange between sovereign individuals. Rather, it is an openness to others that not only precedes and establishes communal relations but constitutes the self as open to otherness. Primordially, generosity is not the expenditure of one's possessions but the dispossession of oneself, the being given to others that undercuts any self contained ego, that undercuts self possession. Moreover, generosity, so understood, happens at a prereflective level, at the level of corporeality and sensibility, and so eschews the calculation characteristic of an economy of exchange. Generosity is being given to others without deliberation in a field of intercorporeality, a being given that constitutes the self as affective and being affected, that constitutes social relations and that which is given in relation. On the model developed in this book, generosity is not one virtue among others but the primordial condition of personal, interpersonal, and communal existence. And while understanding generosity as a prereflective corporeal openness to otherness may not guarantee social justice, it is a necessary move in that direction.

This idea of generosity, underlying and developed in the analyses here, has a history informed by my reading of Jacques Derrida on identity, difference, and the gift. While Marcel Mauss' The Gjft (1967) is credited for initiating the idea that giving, rather than commodity transactions, establishes communal relations and the social identities of the parties concerned, it is, as Alan Schrift suggests, Derrida's discussions of the impossibility of the gift that have prompted much of the current interest in the topic (Schrift 1997, 1).2 The paradox I pointed to in Machan's discussion of generosity, that the conditions he assumes are necessary for generosity to be possible are the conditions that may make it impossible, is not peculiar to his account. This paradox, according to Derrida, is the aporia of the gift.

Derrida, in a way I discuss in more detail elsewhere, criticizes Mauss' idea that giving establishes reciprocal relations of obligation (Diprose 1994, ch. 4). Mauss (1967) finds that beneath the artifice of free and equal contracts between self present sovereign individuals lies a social economy based on the gift. Insofar as a gift is of the order of a "potlatch" (to

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nourish or consume), <u>its circulation determines the social rank and identity of a society's members. It bestows prestige on the one who receives it and, more important, a moral obligation toward the giver,</u> which cannot be repaid in ways other than by maintaining a social bond (Mauss 1967, 6). <u>The power of such gifts to constitute a social bond lies in theft spiritual status: transfer of a possession can only establish a social relationship between persons if that possession carries the significance of being part of the personhood of the giver</u> (10). While social contract theorists also assume that part of one's personal property is exchanged through contract (with the state in exchange for protection or with another in exchange for financial reward), according to Mauss, if the gift has the power to establish a social relation it is because it remains part of the personhood of the giver, so that its circulation is one that seeks a return to the place of its birth (19). So, <u>contrary to Machan's model of social economy, a social relation is not constituted by the exchange of commodities deemed separate from the self but through the gift of part of oneself to another. The identity of the giver and the recipient is not given in isolation prior to the giving of the gift</u>. As what is given is in essence part of the substance of the giver and, as the social identity and status of the recipient is enhanced by the gift, then, contrary to the logic of identity in Machan's model of social exchange, what is constituted through the gift is the social identity of each in relation to the other. Finally, contrary to the contract model of social exchange, where the giver pledges obedience to the state with this gift in exchange for its protection, the debtor in this relation is not the giver but the recipient. The gift constitutes the social identity of the parties and an enduring social bond that obligates the recipient to the donor.

While departing to some extent from Macbath model of social relations that supports his idea of generosity, <u>Mauss does treat the gift as a commodity; separable from its donor through an act of will and returned through a bond of obligation.</u> Insofar as he does this, <u>Mauss,</u> according to Derrida, <u>remains caught within the logic of exchange and contract</u> (Derrida 1992, 24). <u>Within this logic, which is also Machan's logic, the gift and giving are impossible. Generosity is impossible because, under the logic of contract and exchange, the gift is recognized as a gift</u> (it functions as a commodity) <u>and, once recognized, the gift bestows a debt on the recipient and is annulled through obligation, gratitude, or some other form of return</u> (12 14). Contrary to Machan's thesis, that only in a polity of sovereign property owners is generosity possible, Derrida's analysis suggests that it is precisely this economy of contract and exchange between self present individuals that makes generosity impossible. <u>The gift is only possible if it goes unrecognized, if it is not commodified, if it is forgotten by the donor and donee so that presence</u> (the gift as (a) present and the presence of both the donor and the donee) <u>is deferred</u> (23 24).

AFF – A2: PITY LINK – GENEROSITY GOOD

The aff is not an act of pity that expects anything from the other, but instead a generous act of expenditure.

Kathleen Marie **Higgins**, Professor at U.T., 20**07**
[Hicks, Steven V., and Alan Rosenberg. Reading Nietzsche at the Margins. New York: Purdue UP. Print. 95-97 "At the end of Book I… beyond oneself"]
At the end of Book I, <u>**Zarathustra speaks to his "friends" and proclaims that the "gift-giving virtue" is the highest virtue**</u>. But contrary to views of genuine giving as "altruistic," Zarathustra considers this virtue to be grounded in "selfishness": not "sick" selfishness that gives economically under threat or out of a desire for a return but a powerful, uncalculating self-love that overflows with gifts. In the context of Book I, Zarathustra claims that healthy giving originates in "the lover's will" (Z I, "On the Gift-Giving Virtue"). He develops this idea of love in Book II. In giving, he says, <u>**one should be "too pure for the filth of the words: revenge, punishment, reward, retribution. You love your virtue as a mother her child; but when has a mother ever wished to be paid for her love**</u>?" (Z II, "The Virtuous"). <u>**A mother, Nietzsche seems to be arguing, may well feel that the boundary between herself and her child is a permeable one, complicating simple oppositions between selfishness and altruism. She gives to the child of herself and gives the child, as an act of creation, to itself and to the world-and so also to herself. On this model, to be virtuous is to love one's deed, to create and to give, both to others and to oneself, in love. Love thus blurs the boundaries between self and other: in love, there is no sacrifice or surrender of self-no matter how much one gives-precisely to the extent that one desires to give and finds oneself loved and empowered in the giving, hence realizes oneself even in "self-sacrifice."**</u> In such giving, one does not "sacrifice" for the sake of this love and power but out of love. Thus, as Alison Ainly suggests, even though Nietzsche invokes "selfishness" and might, for good reason, be accused of idealizing a self-absorbed selfishness, the image of pregnancy and child also invokes a self that is "already other and already strange" (Ainly, 1988, p. 124).
The discussion of love that links Books land II also anticipates Nietzsche's first extensive published account of will to power, Book II's "On Self-Overcoming." There, Zarathustra reveals the "secret" confided to him by life: "I am that which must always overcome itself... whatever I create and however much I love it-soon I must oppose it and my love; thus my will wills it." Where, exactly, does love stand in relation to this "will"? This discussion of will to power is anticipated earlier in Book II when Zarathustra links love and will to creativity: "Verily, through a hundred souls I have already passed on my way, and through a hundred cradles and birth pangs. Many a farewell I have taken; I know the heartrending last hours. But thus my creative will, my destiny wills ft. Or, to say it more honestly: this very destiny-my will wills" (Z II, "Upon the Blessed Isles"). The Nietzschean self, thus portrayed, finds itself enmeshed in relations of creativity and love that, however crucial and constitutive of the self, are relativized through a deeper connection with a process of power/creativity that Nietzsche calls "will to power." This "will" demands the abandonment of love, which amounts, each time, to an abandonment of self. One must give oneself in love, but one must also abandon that which is created and loved, that into which one has poured oneself and out of which one has created oneself. In short, will-to-power does not "belong" to one. It is a space of alterity within the self, compelling the self always to move beyond itself in acts of giving and creating. At the heart of this movement is a relation between the self-as individual self or ego-and the will to power as that which is not just the deepest heart of the self, but of "life"-it is both within and beyond the self.

Nietzsche here puts the lie to any interpretation of will to power that views it as self-aggrandizing power over others. This is particularly evident in the section following "On Self-Overcoming" where

Zarathustra counsels the necessity of overcoming one's "heroic will" and one's pride in self-denial. Such heroic pathos, he claims, is violent and jealous and so cannot discover the blessedness of joy. Overcoming this pathos, finding joy, says Zarathustra, is the way to learning "beauty," "laughter," and "kindness": "And there is nobody from whom I want beauty as much as from you who are powerful;Jet your kindness be your final self-conquest. Of all evil I deem you capable: therefore I want the good from you" (Z II, "On Self-Overcoming"). Nietzsche's power, on this reading, is not an explosion of dominating will. On the contrary, it involves an ecstatic state in which one "turns away" from oneself and is "will-less," transforming heroism into graceful giving.

Zarathustra's "gift-giving virtue" blurs the boundaries between erotic and agapic love: it is a love full of desire but not a possessive desire to gather riches or benefits for the self, only for the sake of the self, but a desire-both of and not of the self-to give to the other. Like agape, which is both of and not of the self insofar as it is God's love working through the self, Zarathustra's love, as expression of will-to-power, takes place when one opens oneself to the giving and creating of a force beyond oneself.

AFF – A2: PITY LINK – GENEROSITY GOOD – ZARATHUSTRA VOTES AFF

Our act of generousity mirrors the unconditional giving of Zarathustra.

Diprose, 2002 [Rosalyn, Senior Lecturer in Philosophy @ U of New South Wales, *Corporeal Generosity: On Giving with Nietzsche, Merleau-Ponty, and Levinas*, pgs. 33 – 34]

"Nietzsche insists that the "overman" is not guilty of this parsimony that misappropriates the other. Self overcoming, he claims, is not built upon the assumption of sameness or the negation of the other's difference but upon a mode of self affirmation that seeks the other after the event, that "seeks its opposite only so as to affirm itself more gratefully and triumphantly" (Nietzsche 1969, 37). Self overcoming and the overcoming of justice based on the expectation of the return of gifts belong to those communities and individuals who, as Schrift suggests, have the power to forgive transgressions of their laws and values, who have been delivered from revenge (1994, 34 35). Schrift also suggests that Nietzsche, through his ideas of the "overman" and the overcoming of justice based on the creditor-debtor relation, points to an economy based on generosity. "In this economy, gifts can be given without expectation of return, and debts can be forgiven without penalty or shame" (Schrift 1994, 35).Translating this suggestion into ontological terms of the production of identity and difference through will to power, if there is a difference between a generous and a parsimonious relation to the other, it is that creative self fabrication, rather than negating the other's difference by reducing the other to the self, constitutes a distance, as difference, between self and other. This ability to create distance, to bestow value and meaning, through abundance of power rather than revenge against difference, requires the "gift giving virtue;' or more correctly, it involves the self giving itself without expectation of return (Nietzsche 1978, 74 77).

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AFF – A2: PITY LINK – GENEROSITY GOOD – INHERENTLY CREATIVE

Our act of generosity is a creative act of becoming regardless of its end result.

Diprose, 2002 [Rosalyn, Senior Lecturer in Philosophy @ U of New South Wales, *Corporeal Generosity: On Giving with Nietzsche, Merleau-Ponty, and Levinas*, pgs. 187 – 188]

That the expressivity of the other person's whole sensible being and of mine makes a difference to the nonindifference to difference is not to return Levinas' ethics to the realm of existing knowledge, calculation, or the domain of the "ought?' To admit that the expressivity of social imaginaries makes a difference to the nonindifference to difference is to admit that politics makes a difference to any encounter with the other in terms of what is felt rather than known, and in terms of what my (indeterminate) response already is in disturbed sensibility rather than in terms of what my response ought to be. However, if we are serious about our responsibility for the refugees our social imaginaries continue to effect, then we ought to take heed of the contestations that haunt us. To grant that "ineradicable difference" disturbs the political from within and also that generosity of being given to the other it prompts is never unconditional is also to admit that "being led by the flow" of this disorientation is not a question of passivity prior to any particular act. This is not to deny the aporetic structure of generosity. Recognizing that subjectivity as sensibility animated by the other's alterity is inseparable from the act, from politics, and so from the danger of doing damage to difference is to suggest that an ethico politics of sexual and cultural difference is to be found not in the self serving collection of debts nor in an expectation of unconditional self sacrifice in the service of the other but in the indeterminacy of generous acts that lie somewhere in between. That generosity born of exposure to alterity is necessarily also a closure to the other is not an excuse for inaction or passivity, nor a license for justifying the most other denying acts. On the contrary, to paraphrase John Caputo, this aporia of generosity underscores a passionate politics and an impatience for justice embodied in acts that risk oneself now for a justice that is never here.' To stay open to other ways of being, to see red, black, and white as not finished, to remain troubled by the other takes work. While the possibility of being led by the flow of alterity is already there in perception and in every act and gesture, to make good this possibility would require a break with old habits, an unsettling of sedimentation, particularly by those who benefit from existing social imaginaries. The politics of generosity begins with all of us, it begins and remains in trouble, and it begins within the act.

AFF – A2: PITY LINK – AGENCY SOLVES

Plan solves the link: embracing our agency allows for genuine empathy

Decety and Lamm, 2006 [Jean & Claus, Department of Psychology and Center for Cognitive and Social Neuroscience @ U of Chicago, "Human Empathy Through the Lens of Social Neuroscience," TheScientificWorldJOURNAL (2006) 6, pg. 1153 – 1154]

Given commensurability between self and other action representations, whether these representations are activated through bottom-up processing (emotion sharing) or when adopting the subjective perspective of another individual, self-awareness and the sense of being an agent constitute key additional processes that are necessary for successful social interactions. The prerequisite for social communication, including the experience of empathy, is that the two agents can preserve their individuality. Social cognition relies both on similarities and differences between individuals. However, in the case of emotion sharing, a complete overlap between self and other representations would induce emotional distress (a self-oriented aversive emotional response), or empathic overarousal, which is not the goal of empathy[7]. In fact, in the experience of empathy, individuals must be able to disentangle their own feelings from the feelings shared with others to attribute mental states to the target. Self-awareness is a necessary condition for making inference about the mental states in others[47]. Therefore, "agency" is a crucial aspect for successfully navigating shared representations between self and other[48,49,50]. Further, agency plays a pivotal role in cognitive development, including the first stage of self-awareness (or pretheoretical experience of one's own mentality), which scaffolds theory of mind capacities[51]. Indeed, the ability to recognize oneself as the agent of a behavior is the way one builds as an entity independent from the external world[52]. In the case of empathy, affective sharing must be modulated and monitored by the sense of whose feelings belong to whom[36], and thus, agency is a crucial aspect that enables a selfless regard for the other rather than a selfish desire to escape aversive arousal.

AFF – A2: PITY LINK – EMPATHY = HUMAN

Nietzsche's assessment is inaccurate: Empathy and altruism are a part of being human.

Decety and Lamm, 2006 [Jean & Claus, Department of Psychology and Center for Cognitive and Social Neuroscience @ U of Chicago, "Human Empathy Through the Lens of Social Neuroscience," TheScientificWorldJOURNAL (2006) 6, pgs. 1147 – 1148]

Preston and de Waal[9] convincingly argued that empathy is not an all-or-nothing phenomenon, and many intermediate forms of empathy exist between the extremes of mere agitation at the distress of another and full understanding of their predicament. Other comparative psychologists view empathy as a kind of induction process by which emotions, both positive and negative, are shared, and by which the probabilities of similar behaviors are increased in the observers. While certain nonhuman primates may share feelings between individuals, humans are uniquely able to intentionally feel for and act on behalf of other people whose experiences may differ greatly from their own[3]. Such a capacity may help to explain why empathic concern is often associated with prosocial behaviors such as helping a kin, and has been considered crucial for altruism. Evolutionary biologists suggest that empathic helping behavior has evolved because of its contribution to genetic fitness (kin selection). In humans and other mammals, an impulse to care for offspring is almost certainly genetically hard wired. Less clear, however, is whether an impulse to care for siblings, more remote kin, and similar nonkin is genetically hard wired[10]. The emergence of altruism, of empathizing with and caring for those who are not kin, is not easily explained within the framework of neo-Darwinian theories of natural selection, and thus social learning explanations of kinship patterns in human helping behavior are highly plausible. Indeed, one of the most striking aspects of human empathy is that it can be felt for virtually any target, even targets of a different species.

AFF – A2: PITY LINK – PITY = INEVITABLE

You've got it wrong – empathy is inevitable – it's just a question of whether we use positive empathy to engage in acts of altruism.

Decety and Lamm, 2006 [Jean & Claus, Department of Psychology and Center for Cognitive and Social Neuroscience @ U of Chicago, "Human Empathy Through the Lens of Social Neuroscience," TheScientificWorldJOURNAL (2006) 6, pgs. 1159 – 1160]

The question "how do competitive vs. cooperative interpersonal relationships affect empathy?" has been investigated both at the behavioral, psychophysiological, and neural levels. The reasoning behind these studies is that affective dispositions, or attitudes, differ depending on whether the other is seen as a competitor or a cooperator, and in turn influence whether we react with a congruent or a noncongruent emotion to another's affect.

Lanzetta and coworkers[94,95] investigated the psychophysiological, behavioral, and psychological effects of attitudes on interpersonal interaction. Their main finding is that competitive relationships lead to asymmetric affective (counterempathic) responses, while cooperative settings result in symmetric vicarious emotions. For instance, psychophysiological measures indicated that participants reacted to a painful shock of competitors with little arousal and distress, but got distressed when seeing them in joy. The reverse pattern was obtained for cooperators. These findings reflect an important and often ignored aspect of empathy, namely that this ability can also be used in a malevolent way as when knowledge about the emotional or cognitive state of competitors is used to harm them (e.g., when enemy soldiers are attacked after exhausting them by continuous artillery barrage). A recent study revealed the neural correlates of such counterempathic responding. Singer and colleagues[91] engaged participants in a sequential Prisoner's dilemma game with confederate targets, who would either play the game in a fair or unfair way. Following this behavioral manipulation, fMRI measures were taken during the observation of fair and unfair players receiving painful stimulation. Observing fair players replicated earlier findings of increased activation in brain areas coding the affective aspect of pain, such as the anterior insula and medial/anterior cingulate cortex. Of particular interest, activation in these brain regions was significantly reduced when participants in the scanner observed unfair players in pain. This effect, however, was detected in male participants only, who also showed a concurrent increase of activation in reward-related areas (i.e., nucleus accumbens and ventral striatum). The specific reduction of activity in the neural network processing the affective dimension of pain is in contrast with the results from the neuroimaging studies that investigated the modulation of affective responses (vicarious or direct) to pain by means of emotion regulation (e.g., [39,82]). Indeed, these studies reported modulation of activity in brain regions that are not directly involved in representing the affective state, such as the orbitofrontal cortex (which, interestingly, was also activated in male participants in Singer's study) or the medial prefrontal cortex. This suggests that different mechanisms are at play when empathy is modulated due to inter- or intrapersonal factors. Liking/disliking somebody might determine whether an affective empathic response is generated at all, while responding to the distress of neutral others might require regulation of a readily evoked emotional response. Alternatively, differences in the paradigms used (display of dynamic emotional expressions vs. cues for painful stimulation) might explain these differences between studies.

In sum, there is strong behavioral evidence demonstrating that the experience of empathy can be modulated by a number of social-cognitive factors. In addition, a few recent neuroscience studies indicate that such a modulation leads to neurodynamic activity changes in the neural systems that process social information. Further studies are required to increase our knowledge about the various factors, processes, and (neural and behavioral) effects involved in and resulting from the modulation of empathic responses. This knowledge will inform us how empathy can be promoted to ultimately increase humankind's ability to act in more prosocial and altruistic ways.

AFF – A2: PITY LINK – NIETZSCHE DOESN'T TOTALIZE

Nietzsche's critique of compassion isn't all-encompassing – the virtue gift-giving is one of strength and master morality.

Michael L. **Frazer,** Dept. of Government at Harvard, **2006** ["The Compassion of Zarathustra: Nietzsche on Sympathy and Strength," *The Review of Politics* 68]

<Nietzsche is undoubtedly filled with rage at those who bring about the degeneration of humanity by obtaining the compassion of their natural superiors, rage seemingly justified from the perspective of life. Nonetheless, his precise feelings toward compassion take a rather surprising form. "Anyone . . . who approached this almost deliberate degeneration and atrophy of man represented by the Christian European . . . would surely have to cry out in wrath, in compassion [mit Mitleid], in horror: 'O you dolts, you presumptuous, compassionate [mitleidigen] dolts, what have you done!" (JGB III: 62, p. 265). Nietzsche, in other words, reacts to the sight of humanity diminishing itself through compassion with compassion, albeit a "higher and more farsighted compassion [Mitleiden]" than the Christian and quasi-post-Christian moralists' foolish hatred of sheer suffer- ing. "Thus," Nietzsche concludes, "it is compassion versus compassion [Mitleid also gegen Mitleid]" (JGB VII:225, pp. 343 – 44). Given all of Nietzsche's arguments outlined above, however, how can he possibly endorse compassion in any form? **Can there really be a compassion of strength?**

One might answer in the negative, while finding some appropriately noble disposition that could perform an analogous function in the case of the strong and pitiless. Such a sentiment would lead the naturally healthy aristocrat to the service of a degenerating humanity without dragging him into the great cesspool of human suffering. To the contrary, it would grow naturally from the very health and power which keeps the nobleman at such a distance from his miserable inferiors. If Nietzsche, at times, still speaks of this sentiment as a sort of compassion, he is using the word very loosely, and primarily for ironic effect. And the best candidate for such a noble replacement for compassion is the "**gift-giving virtue**" discussed throughout Thus Spoke Zarathustra. In the prologue of that epic work, our hero at first tells the saint that he has left his lofty seclusion out of a (compassionate?) love of lesser men. Quickly, however, Zarathustra corrects himself. "Did I speak of love? I bring men a gift" (Z Prologue:2, p. 123). Nor is the gift-giving virtue a mere quirk of Nietzsche's protagonist; on the contrary, it is integral to the author 's conception of health and strength. "Those poor in life, the weak, impoverish life," he writes. "Those rich in life, the strong, enrich it. The first are parasites of life; the second give presents to it" (WM 48, p. 30). If you are naturally, vitally noble you will inevitably "force all things to and into yourself that they may flow back out of your well as **the gifts of your love**" (Z I "On the Gift-Giving Virtue," 1, p. 187).

The gift-giving virtue, however, is by no means a form of compassion, let alone a compassion of strength. Instead, it is compassion's usurper and replacement. "The noble human being . . . helps the unfortunate, but not, or almost not, from compassion [nicht oder fast nicht aus Mitleid], but prompted more by an urge begotten by excess of power" (JGB IX:260, p. 395). Yet one should not overlook or underestimate that "fast."36 To suggest that Nietzsche is discussing the gift-giving virtue when he approves of compassion does violence to his insistence that his "higher" Mitleid still deserves that otherwise lowly appellation. **A genuinely compassionate form of compassion is, for Nietzsche, still actively present in the noble soul**. >

LINK TURNS FOR CRITICAL AFFS

AFF - A2: PITY – GENEROSITY/DECONSTRUCTION TURN

No link and TURN - Our act of generosity is part of an immanent critique of the State's construction of [insert identity group] - Though fragile, this act of resistance poses a radical challenge to the pity-politics of status quo welfare.

Connolly Krieger-Eisenhower professor of Political Science @ Johns Hopkins, 19**95.**
[William E., *The Ethos of Pluralization* pg. xv-xvi]

If you come to terms with the ambiguous relation between new movements and congealed standards of political judgment and between hegemonic identities and the intrasubjective and intersubjective differences in which they are inextricably implicated, you might strive to cultivate an ethos of critical responsiveness to political movements that challenge the self-confidence and congealed judgments of dominant constituencies. You might, that is, translate the pluralist appreciation of established diversity into active cultivation of generosity to contemporary movements of pluralization. **This cultivation of generosity is not a simple matter of applying the existing moral code** fairly and consistently. For the introduction of a new possibility of being out of old injuries and differences contains a paradoxical element: the drive to recognition precedes consolidation of the identity to be recognized, and the panic it often induces in the self-confidence of established identities tempts them to judge the vulnerable entry through disabling identifications already sedimented in the old code. Such a bind sets up the new entrant to be repudiated even before "it" becomes crystallized in the institutions of law, marriage, work, investment, the military, religion, and education. And this repudiation is often expressed in a language of fairness and normality grounded in misrecognition of the binds involved in the enactment of a new identity out of old injuries. "Why should They be treated any differently from Us?" If the risky, disruptive politics of enactment is, as I contend, indispensable to identification and redress of social injuries, one of its conditions of possibility is cultivation of an *ethos of critical responsiveness* to social movements seeking to redefine their relational identities. Another way of putting this is to say that the recurrent disjunction between the injuries suffered by particular constituencies and the barriers to their rectification posed by cultural *codes* of morality and normality requires mediation by an *ethos* of critical responsiveness **never entirely reducible to a code**. The key challenges to a pluralist culture are first to cultivate critical responsiveness to new movements of pluralization and then to negotiate modified relations of coexistence as new identities cross the magic threshold of enactment. For, again, at its most fragile point a new possibility of being both disrupts the stability of established identities and lacks a sufficiently stable definition through which to present itself. This is because to *become* something new is to *move* the self-recognition and relational standards of judgment endorsed by other constituencies to whom you are connected. Identities are always collective and relational:3 to be white, female, homosexual, Canadian, atheist, and a taxpayer is to participate in a diverse set of collective identifications and to be situated in relation to a series of alter identifications. Hegemonic identities depend on existing definitions of difference to be. To alter your recognition of difference, therefore, is to revise your own terms of self-recognition as well. Critical responsiveness thus moves on two registers: to redefine its relation to others a constituency must also modify the shape of its own identity.4 In that sense critical responsiveness is always political. It is a political response to the politics of identity\difference that already precedes its intervention.

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AFF – A2: PITY – CONTINGENCY/DECONSTRUCTION TURN

Turn - The K's blanket injunction to embrace all suffering mirrors the reductionism of the Samaritan call to fight all suffering: Both views depoliticize ethics. The 1AC is militant critique of the stultifying construction of [   ], which explodes rather than reaffirms our identity in relationship to the 'Other'
Connolly, Krieger-Eisenhower professor of Political Science @ Johns Hopkins, 19**96**
[William E. "Suffering, Justice, and the Politics of Becoming," *CSST Work Paper #113*, October]
Most significantly, Caputo's metaphysical minimalism impels him to treat devastated groups and helpless individuals as paradigm objects of obligation. Sick, homeless, helpless individuals. Peoples laid low by floods, conquest, famine, holocaust. Caputo issues a charity model of obligation, in which virtuous helpers are pulled by the helplessness of the needy: "the power of obligation varies directly with the powerlessness of the one who calls for help, which is the power of powerlessness.
Such situations often occur, and their moral importance is undeniable. But they may not pose the most difficult cases in ethics. Some of the most difficult cases arise when people suffer from injuries imposed by **institutionalized identities**, principles, and cultural understandings, when **those who suffer are not entirely helpless but are defined as threatening**, contagious or dangerous **to the self-assurance of these identities**, and when the sufferers honor sources of ethics inconsonant or disturbing to these constituencies. And this suffering, too, invades the flesh. It engenders fatigue; it makes people perish; it drives them over the edge. To simplify obligation in an era of political pessimism, **Caputo has** quietly **emptied ethics of its political dimension**.
The most difficult cases require not an ethics of help for the helpless but **a political ethos of critical engagement** between interdependent, contending constituencies implicated in asymmetrical structures of power. 'Indeed, some ways of acting upon obligations to the deserving poor or victims of natural disaster provide moral cover for the refusal to cultivate an ethics of engagement with constituencies in more ambiguous, disturbing, competitive, positions. The most complex ethical issues arise in those ambiguous contexts where suffering is intense and the injuries suffered by some contribute to the sense of self-confidence, wholeness, transcendence or cultural desert of others. That is, the most pressing, difficult cases of ethics are political in character. They often revolve around what I will call the politics of becoming.
The politics of becoming occurs when a culturally marked constituency, suffering under the its current social constitution, strives to reconfigure itself by moving the cultural constellation of identity\difference then in place. In such situations either the condition of the subjugated constituency or the response required to open up a new line of flight is not acknowledged by some of the parties involved. And
sometimes by none. Under these circumstances it takes **a militant, experimental and persistent political movement to open up a line of flight from culturally induced suffering**. Such a-movement, to succeed, must extend from those who initiate cultural experiments -to others who respond sensitively to those experiments even while they disturb their own sense of identity.

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AFF – A2: PITY – PLAN DISRUPTS GIFT ECONOMY

Turn - by disrupting the current production of stable identities, the 1AC destabilizes the current relationship between helper/sufferer, opens new avenues for relating to difference and movement.
Connolly, Krieger-Eisenhower professor of Political Science @ Johns Hopkins, 19**96**
[William E. "Suffering, Justice, and the Politics of Becoming," *CSST Work Paper #113*, October]
By the politics of becoming I mean that paradoxical politics by which new cultural identities are formed out of old energies, injuries, and differences. The politics of becoming emerges out of the energies, suffering and lines of flight available to culturally defined differences in a particular historical
constellation. To the extent it succeeds in placing a new identity on the cultural field the politics of becoming changes the shape and contour of established identities as well. The politics of becoming thus sows disturbance and distress in the souls of those disrupted by its movement. In a (modern?) world
where people are marked and known through their identities, difference and becoming are ubiquitous. If each positive identity is organized through the differences it demarcates, if difference circulates through it as well as around it, if movement by some of these differences compromises its quest to present itself as
natural, transcendent, complete or self-sufficient, then the politics of becoming imperils the stability of being through which dominant constituencies are coddled and comforted.The question of ethics emerges within this complex set of relations. If becoming is as fundamental to life as being, the question becomes: which sort of suffering is most worthy of responsiveness in which contexts, that which the politics of becoming imposes on the stability, of being or that which established identities impose upon the movement of differences to protect their stability? In contemporary American culture the operational
answer often precedes the question. Here, frozen codes of morality and normality weigh in heavily on the side of being, stasis, and stability without acknowledging how the moral scales are tipped. And this is probably true more generally as well. To attend to the politics of becoming is to shift the cultural
balance between being and becoming without attempting the impossible, self-defeating goal of dissolving solid formations altogether.
The politics of becoming is paradoxical. A new cultural identity emerges out of old injuries and differences. But because there is not an eternal model it copies as it moves toward new definition, and because it meets resistance from identities counting upon its neediness or marginality to secure themselves, the end result of the politics of becoming is seldom clear at its inception. Indeed, becoming proceeds from inchoate injuries and hopes that may not be crisply defined until a new identity has been forged through which to measure those injuries retrospectively.
If and as a stigmatized identity attains a more positive standing, it may exaggerate to say that it has arrived at what it truly is. at bottom or in essence. No positive identity can be judged final in a world where things are mobile at bottom. Of course, it is also hard not to pretend such a final state has been approximated. The presumptions of (at least) European languages press in this direction. So do persistent human interests in regularity of expectation and stability of judgment. But a successful movement of becoming stirs up this cultural field of identities, standards, and procedures; thereby alters to some degree measure & which its previous suffering the responsibility of others to & are culturally defined.
Moreover, the new movement, if it is not squashed, sets up new intrasubjective and intersubjective differences. It might thereby enable some new positive possibilities by engendering new modes
of intrasubjective and intersubjective suffering not yet crystallized as injuries. Perhaps it is wise to assume that admirable modes of being tend to crowd each other out in a world not predesigned to house all together. Perhaps, too, suffering of the flesh is somewhat less variable within and across cultures than the formation of positive identities. These two premonitions inform those who seek to come to terms ethically with the constitutive tension between the powers of being and the energies of becoming.

AFF – A2: PITY – GENEALOGY TURN

Turn - genealogy is a life-affirming act of generosity that multiplies difference by submitting the current boundaries of identity to constant critique.
Connolly, Krieger-Eisenhower professor of Political Science @ Johns Hopkins, 19**96**
[William E. "Suffering, Justice, and the Politics of Becoming," *CSST Work Paper #113*, October]
Fourth, Nietzsche and Zarathustra tap into this fugitive and cognitively indirect experience of the protean diversity of life, cultivating for the rich abundance of life. They cultivate gratitude toward the abundance of being that endows life with mobility, They cultivate gratitude both to life and to the excess that provides one of its conditions of possibility, Such a gratitude is religious without necessarily being
theistic. It finds more intense expression at some times than others. "What is astonishing about the religiosity of the ancient Greeks is the lavish abundance of gratitude that radiates from it. Only a very distinguished type of human being stands in that relation to nature and to life. Later, when the rabble came to rule in Greece, fear choked out religion and prepared the way for christianity .11
Gratitude for the abundance of life, then, carries acceptance of a contestable conception of being into ethics and politics. But this temperament is not located beyond the play of identities, understandings, and principles. Rather, it is inserted into these media, rendering them more responsive to that which exceeds them, more generous and refined in their engagements with difference. Without the infusion of such gratitude, high sounding principles will be applied in stingy, punitive ways. A theistic or secular perspective that exudes it can foster ethical generosity while trimming some cognitive fat from its theological or secular diet.
This contestable faith in the abundance of being, this impious, nontheistic reverence for life, can render a postsecular ethic both alert to the fragility of ethics and open to the play of difference in cultural life." These two dispositions support one another. Those inspired by an ethos of generosity participate in the politics of becoming without having to ground their ethic in something solid, fixed or frozen. Because we can act ethically without being commanded by a god or transcendental imperative to do so, we can also deploy genealogy, deconstruction, and political disturbance to cultivate responsiveness to movements of difference. Our commitment to these activities does not dissolve ethics: it only does so for those who cannot be ethical without solid foundations. We do not have to pretend that obligation just happens either. Acceptance of obligation grows out of a protean care for the world that precedes it..Indeed, the demand for purity in obligation strips it of implication inside those human identities and interests that might mobilize it as an active force. For to retreat to the view that "obligation happens is to retain the Christian form of obligation as obedience while stripping off the transcendental command that authorizes it.
A post-secular ethic thus situates itself within the discordant experience of the indispensabilitv constitutive fragility of ethics. It renounces the assurance of solid grounds to enable it to explore unnecessary and injurious limits to life supported by the very provision of such assurances. Those who
participate in such an ethos cultivate critical generosity to those differences upon which the specification of their own identities depend, in part by responding to those differences outside that are regulated in themselves to enable them to be what they are and in part by recalling that they inhabit a world where the admirable possibilities of being outstrip the time and corporeal capacity of any particular individual or culture to embody them all.

AFF – A2: PITY – MARRIAGE PROMO SPECIFIC TURN

Turn - Attacking the production of sexual identity challenges the asceticism of enforced heterosexuality, while simultaneously interrogating the fixity of our own identity.

Connolly, Krieger-Eisenhower professor of Political Science @ Johns Hopkins, 19**96**
[William E. "Suffering, Justice, and the Politics of Becoming," *CSST Work Paper #113*, October]
Critical responsiveness is anticipatorv, in that it responds to pressures to become even before they have condensed into a firm, definite identity. It also subjects the politics of becoming to,critical appraisal, alert to the possibility a new movement might congeal into a fundamentalism that forecloses the future becoming or might force certain constituencies into an abject position. Finally, and most crucially, critical respondents engage in practices of self-revision as they respond to the politics of becoming. For example, when heterosexuals endorse diverse sensualities they also acknowledge that heterosexuality is neither firmly grounded in the universality of nature nor the automatic outcome of normal sensual development.And for whites to challenge established assumptions of racial difference is to come to terms with how "whiteness" has been culturally constructed by aligning diverse skin shades and tones with a set of social privileges, a gender graded code of parenthood, and middle class expectation. Critical responsiveness to the claims of difference calls forth a partial and comparative denaturalization of the respondents themselves; it also opens up possible lines of mobility in what you already are.
These effects are possible because every effective movement of difference moves the identities through which it has been differentiated. It is thus not surprising that the time in which politics on behalf of the pluralization of identities intensifies is also the time in which counter drives to the fundamentalization of disturbed identities also becomes tempting. Consider, then, the ambiguous relation the practice of justice bears to the politics of becoming. The politics of becoming repositions selected modes of suffering so that they move from an obscure subsistence or marked identity below the register of justice to a visible, unmarked place on it. In a modern world of justice as fairness between persons. this means that modes of being consciously or unconsciously shuffled below normal personhood become modified and translated into the dense operational rubric of personhood itself. A mode of suffering is thereby moved from below the reach of justice to a place within its purview, and now the language of injury, discrimination, injustice, and oppression can apply more cleanly to it. It is after a movement crosses this critical threshold that a mode of suffering becomes unjust.
Thus, the coarse practice of justice regularly poses barriers to the politics of becoming before providing support for it. Failure by some liberal theorists to acknowledge the fundamental ambiguity in the center of justice disables them from registering the importance of an ethos of responsiveness to justice itself. This does not mean that the politics of being (justice, common standards, shared understandings, etc) is
irrelevant to ethico-political action. It does mean that the "we's" who act together are more pluralized than some traditions recognize and are susceptible to periodic movement through the politics of becoming.

AFF – IMPACT TURNS TO NIETZSCHE/THE ALT

AFF – ALT CAN'T SOLVE INSTITUTIONAL OPPRESSION (URBAN POOR SPECIFIC)

The neg's individualized call for self-overcoming disenfranchises those made victims of institutional oppression – the ghettoization of urban minorities requires collective action that attacks social and economic barriers to becoming.

Stark, 1995 [Barbara, Professor of Law @ Hofstra Law, "Urban Despair and Nietzsche's 'Eternal Return:' From the Municipal Rhetoric of Economic Justice to the International Law of Economic Rights," *Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law*, 28.2, pgs. 207 – 213]

What if Americans knew that the next thirty years would merely repeat the preceding cycle? What if we knew that the "empowerment zones" proposed in the 1990s would be no more effective than the "enterprise zones" of the 1980s or the "model cities" and the "war on poverty" of the 1960s?72 What if we knew that the stories of abuse and neglect, of broken promises and broken lives, would be repeated every generation?73 What if we knew that our children's lives, like our own, would be spent in violence and hardship?74 Who would not succumb to what Cornel West describes as the "nihilism that increasingly pervades black communities"?75 As Professor West explains:

Nihilism is to be understood here not as a philosophic doctrine that there are no rational grounds for legitimate standards for authority; it is, far more, the lived experience of coping with a life of horrifying meaninglessness, hopelessness, and (most important) lovelessness. **The frightening result is a numbing detachment from others and a self-destructive disposition toward the world.**76

In the nineteenth century, Friedrich Nietzsche77 challenged the notion of historical progress and the hopefulness embedded in that notion, as well as the idea of any "rational grounds for legitimate standards for authority." His doctrine of the eternal return posited time not as linear progression, but as a cycle:78

The shepherd ... bit with a good bite. Far away he spewed the head of the snake—and he jumped up. No longer shepherd, no longer human—one changed, radiant, laughing^2
Nihilism is overcome by affirming that the only meaning is the meaning that we create:
I taught them to work on the future and to redeem with their creation all that has been. To redeem what is past in man and to re-create all "it was" until the will says, "Thus I willed it!—Thus I shall will it!—this I called redemption and this alone I taught them to call redemption.83

Although Nietzsche scholars and other philosophers offer wide-ranging interpretations of the eternal return84 Richard Rorty's explication of self-overcoming is the key here:

The drama of an individual human life, of the history of humanity as a whole, is not one in which a pre-existing goal is triumphantly reached or tragically not reached ... Instead, to see one's life, or the life of one's community, as a dramatic narrative is to see it as a process of Nietzschean self-overcoming. The paradigm of such a narrative is the life of the genius who can say of the relevant portion of the past, Thus I willed it,' because she has found a way to describe that past which the past never knew, and thereby found a self to be that which her precursors never knew was possible.85

The idea of self-overcoming or self-invention—"finding a way to describe the past which the past never knew*86—is familiar to most Americans.87 It happens all the time in United States politics and law.88 Americans only notice it when it is done clumsily and the strings show, as they did, for example, when President Bush claimed, "We won the Cold War."

For the urban poor, however, self-overcoming is problematic. First, the African-American urban poor cannot opt out of what Professor West describes as "a system of race-conscious people and practices."90 Second, partly because of racism, self-overcoming is necessarily a collective activity for the urban poor. Professor Bell Hooks has observed: "[N]o level of individual self-actualization alone can sustain the marginalized and oppressed. We must be linked to collective struggle, to communities of resistance that move us outward, into the world."91

In the 1960s, the civil rights movement explicitly drew on the independence movements of the formerly colonial Third World states,92 a larger "community of resistance that [moved them] outward into the world." In the 1990s, the urban poor can reaffirm that link by claiming the international human rights already won for them by the larger "communities of resistance" of which they are—and have always been—a part. By doing so, they can find "a way to describe that past which the past never knew and [find themselves] to be [that] which [their] precursors never knew was possible."93

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ETERNAL RETURN SUCKS.

The eternal return is a ridiculous demand that reflects sadism rather than true overcoming

Douglas L. Berger, Nietzsche Contra Schopenhauer: The Construel of Eternal Recurrence, No Date, http://www.temple.edu/gradmag/summer99/berger.htm

But Nietzsche saw Schopenhauer as making resignation a categorical imperative (which was in no way the case, as I have mentioned), and, therefore, he believed he had to compel an affirmation which was equally as fatalistic and necessary as Schopenhauer's denial of the Will. But **it is perfectly easy to imagine persons who would in no way be able to will the recurrence of their lives eternally, victims of natural and social cruelty, oppression, poverty, disease; indeed it would be quite preposterous to "diagnose" human beings who endure much lesser degrees of suffering as "decadent" merely because they would be unwilling to eternally recur. In fact, asking that these people affirm these conditions eternally as their only hope of redemption might seem more the demand of a sadistic elitist than an Übermensch. It is thus apparent that the eternal recurrence fails as a redemptive formula for life, for all living beings**; it only works for those lucky few who can answer the daemon affirmatively in the first place, and thus pass the test.

AFF – A2: POWERLESSNESS ALT – CONSERVATIVE FILL-IN TURN

There is no outside of power - the Alt's embrace of powerlessness cedes the political to forces of colonial and neo-liberal domination.
Brennan, prof. of cultural studies, comparative literature, and English @ Minnesota, 20**02**
[Timothy, "Cosmo-Theory," *The South Atlantic Quarterly* 100.3, pg.]
The imperial liberalism lying behind well-intentioned, good-spirited writing by cultural theorists is not, for all that, a simple matter of complicity. Such a charge would fall flat, since complicity is, as it were, second nature to those trained in the ethics of theory. The "will to truth," the discursive regime as an arena in which party politics has been displaced by the microlevels of personal interaction, all direct us to the now overfamiliar poststructuralist processes of avoiding complicity with Enlightenment power by remaining vigilant against repressive claims of universality. In this theoretical climate—and it is one largely shared throughout cultural theory, even in the social sciences—one avoids complicity by decentering oneself. Such decentering has logically moved the theorist to a form of "biopolitics" and specifically to a politics of the body, which among other things is the ultimate expression of a domain of enclosure that cannot be guilty of trespass on another's. It was the body, in fact, that was cast methodically, and with explicit intention, by prewar theorists like Georges Bataille as a substitute for both party politics and dialectical negation. 29 The only way to escape complicity as such was to oppose all opposition, disagreement, or overcoming. 30 [End Page 675] The ultimate riposte to power, in other words, was to make oneself powerless—to let power have its way, provided one was innocent of using it (a dialectical negation of the Nietzschean positions that inspired the original project). Fleeing universals indirectly meant giving the universalizing Western state a free hand, continuing to speak under its protections and privileges as though one were absolved from its actions by inaction.
Apart from their internal contradictions, **such escapes are a ruse**, for **they conceal a homology among intellectual sectors that is visible only in institutional settings**. In fact, this invocation of "complicity" in theory is one of several ways in which theory's concepts outwit protest, stealing its energies and replacing it with anarchist values that can in practice only arise in public spaces that are neoliberal. The cultural theorist weirdly misrecognizes him- or herself in the crazy mirror of government policy, as recent U.S. scandals show, even as they archive stark examples of intellectual flow: the Christian Right uses sexual harassment strategies in order to impeach the "abortion President"; Deleuzo-Foucauldian attacks on governmentality reverberate against a chorus of Republican calls to get the "government off our backs"; the ecstatic attention to the "subject" coincides with reduced access to citizenship in Europe and North America; a politics of identity intersects with perfect congruency the demands of fashion's niche marketing; and, above all, the obsolescence of sovereignty achieves its "radical" eloquence at about the moment NATO discovers rogue ethnics in the Balkans insisting on a horrific, recidivist principle like that of the nation-state. The positions on either side of these paradoxical binarisms are not equivalent since formalisms never are. They are, however, related, and they strengthen one another in the public sphere—not as a result of conspiracy, and in the name of different gods. But above all, naively, as though intellectuals did not work for anyone, or had no home.

AFF – ALT → MASS VIOLENCE

The alt's rejection of all moral codes lead to all forms of exploitation.

Kelley L. Ross, Ph.D Department of Philosophy, Los Angeles Valley College, Van Nuys, California. *Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900)* 20**08**

But, one might think, violence and oppression are unjust! How could any progressive person not see that exploitation and abuse are wrong! We have Nietzsche's answer:

No act of violence, rape, exploitation, destruction, is intrinsically "unjust," since life itself is violent, rapacious, exploitative, and destructive and cannot be conceived otherwise. Even more disturbingly, we have to admit that from the biological [i.e. Darwinian] point of view legal conditions are necessarily exceptional conditions, since they limit the radical life-will bent on power and must finally subserve, as means, life's collective purpose, which is to create greater power constellations. To accept any legal system as sovereign and universal -- to accept it, not merely as an instrument in the struggle of power complexes, but as a weapon against struggle (in the sense of Dühring's communist cliché that every will must regard every other will as its equal) -- is an anti-vital principle which can only bring about man's utter demoralization and, indirectly, a reign of nothingness. [p.208, boldface added]

Nietzsche is certainly life affirming, but then violence, rape, exploitation, and destruction are intrinsic to his view of life. Attempts to protect the weak, see that justice is done, and mitigate suffering are "anti-vital" projects that, being adverse to life itself, actually tend towards "a reign of nothingness." Thus, if we actually care about others and are not just interested in asserting power over them and using them for our own pleasure, then we can look forward to extinction.

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AFF – ALT → RACISM

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Nietzsche demonstrated a racism that foreshadowed that of the Nazis.
Kelley L. Ross, Ph.D Department of Philosophy, Los Angeles Valley College, Van Nuys, California 2008
First of all, Nietzsche's racism is unmistakable. The best way to approach this is to let Nietzsche speak for himself. In the quotes that follow, I will simply offer examples from *The Genealogy of Morals* alone, as translated by Francis Golffing (in the footnotes I have been adding some passages from *Beyond Good and Evil* for comparison).

The Latin *malus* ["bad"] (beside which I place *melas* [Greek for "black"]) might designate the common man as dark, especially black-haired ("hic niger est"), as the pre-Aryan settler of the Italian soil, notably distiguished from the new blond conqueror race by his color. At any rate, the Gaelic presented me with an exactly analogous case: *fin*, as in the name Fingal, the characteristic term for nobility, eventually the good, noble, pure, originally the fair-haired as opposed to the dark, black-haired native population. The Celts, by the way, were definitely a fair-haired race; and it is a mistake to try to relate the area of dark-haired people found on ethnographic maps of Germany to Celtic bloodlines, as Virchow does. These are the last vestiges of the pre-Aryan population of Germany. (The **subject races** are seen to prevail once more, throughout almost all of Europe; in color, shortness of skull, perhaps also in **intellectual and social instincts**. Who knows whether modern democracy, the even more fashionable anarchism, and especially that preference for the *commune*, the most primitive of all social forms, which is now shared by all European socialists -- whether all these do not represent a throwback, and whether, even physiologically, the **Aryan [master] race** of conquerors is not doomed?) [*The Birth of Tragedy and The Genealogy of Morals*, Doubleday Anchor Books, 1956, p.164, boldface added; note the term "master" deleted in the Golffing translation; note]

Here we have an unmistakable racism: the good, noble, and blond Aryans, contrasted with the dark and primitive indigenes of Europe. While Nietzsche's thought is often defended as unrelated to the racism of the Nazis, there does not seem to be much difference from the evidence of this passage. One difference might be Nietzsche's characterization of the "commune" as "the most primitive of all social forms." Nazi ideology was totalitarian and "social," denigrating individualism. Nietzsche would not have gone for this -- and the small, dark Hitler is certainly no Aryan -- but then many defenders of Nietzsche these days also tend to prefer a communitarian democracy, which means they might have more in common with the Nazis, despite their usual anti-racism, than Nietzsche himself. This is characteristic of the confusion of contemporary politics, let alone Nietzsche apologetics. The passage above, at least, provides as much aid and comfort for the Nazis as for any other interpretation or appropriation of Nietzsche.

Nietzsche's racism might be excused as typical of its age, and criticism of it anachronistic. However, the racism of Thomas Jefferson, a century earlier, involved an explicit denial that physical or intellectual differences between the races (about which Jefferson expressed no certainty) compromised the *rights* of the inferior races. To Nietzsche, however, the "subject races" have no "rights"; and domination, not to mention all the forms of "oppression" excoriated by the trendy Left, are positive and desirable goods.

AFF – ALT → NAZISM

The alt image of the 'strong' individual values cruelty and callousness.

Nehamas, 1998 [Alexander, Professor of Philosophy @ Princeton U, *Nietzsche and Politics*, Edited by Jacqueline Scott, "Nietzsche and 'Hitler'", pg. 8]

Noble values, Nietzsche writes, depend on the principle — "most alien and embarrassing to the present taste" — that one has duties only to one's peers: that against beings of a lower rank, against everything alien, one may behave as one pleases or "as the heart" desires, and in any case "beyond good and evil." Although he goes on to write, as Walter Kaufmann delighted in pointing out, that "here pity and like feelings may find their place" (BGE 260), the fact remains that a "good and healthy aristocracy ... accepts with a good conscience the sacrifice of untold human beings who, for its sake, must be reduced and lowered to incomplete human beings, to slaves, to instruments" (BGE 258). This is not just a point about a social class: "Egoism belongs to the nature of a noble soul—I mean that unshakable faith that to a being such as 'we are' other beings must be subordinate by nature and have to sacrifice themselves" (BGE 265).

That faith in the dispensability and merely instrumental value of others is the feature of nobility that produces the problem that makes me so uneasy, the problem of the evil hero. Joachim Fest may well be right when he portrays Adolf Hitler as someone who, despite his occasional appeals to Nietzsche, did not satisfy his criteria of nobility[9] Keith Ansell-Pearson may be correct when he claims that resentment is totally incompatible with a noble soul and that "Hitler was a man whose whole being was pervaded by feelings of deepseated resentment and poisonous revenge, and he can hardly be held up as an example of Nietzsche's model of the noble individual."[10] Nevertheless, though Hitler may have had the wrong kind of soul—whatever exactly that is—"Hitler" might not. Nobility and cruelty are not just compatible: they seem to go hand-in-hand for Nietzsche, and that gives his views their most disturbing ethical and political consequences. Politics, Nietzsche seems to believe, should aim at producing noble individuals, and noble individuals are not only not to be criticized because of their cruelty; on the contrary, they are often to be praised and admired for it.

AFF – ALT → NAZISM

Allow me to introduce Nietzsche: philosopher king of Nazism.

Kelley L. Ross, Ph.D Department of Philosophy, Los Angeles Valley College, Van Nuys, California. *Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900)* 20**08**

So is Nietzsche himself touched by rancor? His situation does, after all, involve a certain kind of *impotence*, like his miserable but sublime priests. He was definitely someone "deprived of the direct outlet of action." The Nazis, on the other hand, to say the least, were not. Hitler believed in direct action more than was actually prudent. If he had not been so restless and impatient, he could have done better at key points in the War, like the bombing of England or the invasion of Russia. So I think we would have to say that Hitler may have been a better Nietzschean than Nietzsche. Indeed, what horrifies most people about Hitler, his manifest predation, his ruthlessness, his mercilessness, are things of nobility in Nietzsche.

There is nothing very odd about lambs disliking birds of prey, but this is no reason for holding it against large birds of prey that they carry off lambs. And when the lambs whisper among themselves, "These birds of prey are evil, and does not this give us a right to say that whatever is the opposite of a bird of prey must be good?" there is nothing intrinsically wrong with such an argument -- though the birds of prey will look somewhat quizzically and say, "*We* have nothing against these good lambs; in fact, we love them; nothing tastes better than a tender lamb." -- to expect that strength will not manifest itself as strength, as the desire to overcome, to appropriate, to have enemies, obstacles, and triumphs, is every bit as absurd as to expect that weakness will manifest itself as strength. [p.178]

One could hardly say that either Nietzsche or Hitler "love" the Jews the way that an eagle loves a small mammalian meal. Some have wondered, however, how much of Hitler's hatred was heartfelt and how much merely cynical. Albert Speer said that Hitler never talked about the Jews in private conversation. Was he really obsessed with them, or were they merely a device in his larger schemes of predation, in which whole nations could be thoughtlessly consumed and expended in the interest of Germany and himself? So much the better would this be, for Nietzsche. One thing must always be kept in view here: **Nietzsche provides a feel-good philosophy for predators.** There is going to be no fault to find with Hitler if he merely destroys, uses, tortures, kills, etc. Nietzsche himself seems more at fault if the only real sin is impotent resentment and inactive rancor.

AFF – ALT INCAPABLE OF ADDRESSING VIOLENCE

Nietzsche's perspectivalism is indifferent to genocide and the Holocaust

Nehamas, 1998 [Alexander, Professor of Philosophy @ Princeton U, *Nietzsche and Politics*, Edited by Jacqueline Scott, "Nietzsche and 'Hitler'", pgs. 10 – 12]

But that is just our problem. Can we admire a philosophy that does not put anything beyond the pale? Let us revert to Hitler (no quotation marks). Can we admire a philosophy that may imply that what was wrong with Hitler's methodical, cold-blooded extermination of six million people was the fact that it was motivated by resentment and on the absurd belief that they constituted a danger to his race? Isn't it horribly obvious that such an action would have been wrong whatever the motives and the beliefs on which it was based? We must be careful here. Nietzsche writes: "Restoration of 'nature': an action in itself is perfectly devoid of value: it all depends on who performs it. One and the same 'crime' can be in one case the greatest privilege, in another a stigma" (WP 292; cf. BGE 30). We might try to imagine that six million people were in fact a danger to us, that it was a question of either us or them, and that we engaged in a war against them that resulted in their extermination. Such an action might seem justifiable, and that might appear to argue in favor of Nietzsche's claim: the same action—the destruction of six million people—can be accepted in one case and condemned in another. But the situation is more complicated. The issue is how we are to describe an action once we abstract from the agent who performed it (and therefore from its original motives and ends). In the present case, I believe, if the alternative we are imagining is to be "the same action" as the Nazi attempt to exterminate the Jews, it must be at least as methodical and cold-blooded as theirs. That seems to me to exclude the case of war as we generally understand it. It also suggests that it is very unlikely that the people in question could be a danger to us in any real sense, since our ability to exterminate them in the manner in which the Jews were exterminated suggests precisely that we have immense power over them.

Must a Nietzschean refuse to condemn any manifestation of cruelty "in itself"? Can't I believe that some of its instances are such that they are categorically different from the rest, and that they cannot ever, in whatever context, be praiseworthy? Nietzsche seems to say I can't: "The concept 'reprehensible action' presents us with difficulties. Nothing that happened at all can be reprehensible in itself: for one should not want to eliminate it: for everything is so bound up with everything else, that to want to exclude something means to exclude everything. A reprehensible action means: a reprehended world" (WP 293).12

Perhaps changing the scale of the example may allow the point to emerge more clearly. Suppose I live under a brutally oppressive regime. An official has been assassinated. The police grab a completely innocent woman at random in the street. They torture her in the square and will eventually kill her in retaliation. I watch, with the mixture of fascination and horror that always attends such sights. I am tempted to try to save her. I know I can't, and that any effort will cause us both to die in the same way—perhaps provoke the murder of others as well. I hold back. What I do is reasonable—but not right. Perhaps I have no obligation to try to save that woman: it is not obvious that we have a duty to be moral saints. And yet I feel both guilty and ashamed.

Is it wrong to feel that way? I believe not. I believe that in such situations one can never be sure that it is right not to intervene, even if we can easily understand why almost no one ever does. I believe that utilitarian calculations about endangering greater numbers are beside the point, manifestations of bad faith. Why? Because, I think, it is a complete accident that the police chose that woman and not me for their purposes. Nothing relevant distinguishes me from the woman: they just happened to pick her, not me. I am not even sure that, had I been in her place, I would have thought that someone should try to save me. But I am sure I would have thought that they should feel guilty and ashamed if they didn't. Of course, there is here and in countless other situations in life an element of what Bernard Williams has called "moral luck": perhaps my life unfolds in such a way that one day, retrospectively, I may be able to justify my not having acted to save that unknown woman's life.13 But to the extent that I can't, I must regret and, in Nietzsche's sense, "reprehend" my having acted as I did.

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The same is true of the Jews. Their extermination had something essentially fortuitous about it. Since they were innocent, what happened to them could have happened to anyone: their being Jewish was not, in that context, a relevant consideration; in that context, we are all Jews – or Blacks or Kossovars. But the enormity of the Jews' extermination, by changing the scale, introduces a radically different factor into the situation: it is difficult to imagine what possible development in anyone's life could possibly allow one to justify a harm of such magnitude. And without such justification, the action becomes reprehensible "in itself" – an action that should never occur.

As actions we have a duty to stop must never occur and are reprehensible in themselves, so actions we have a duty to perform are admirable, however foolish and ineffectual they turn out to be and however seldom we can perform them. Now Nietzsche writes, as we have seen, that it is in "the nature of the noble soul" to have "that unshakable faith that to a being such as 'we are' other beings must be subordinate by nature and have to sacrifice themselves" (BGE 265), that "one has duties only to one's peers" (BGE 260). But when what separates us from others is totally fortuitous, as in the situations we have discussed, there are no grounds for thinking that "we" are different from those others, that they are not our peers. Who counts as our peer can vary with the context.

AFF – ALT = ANTI-DEMOCRATIC

Nietzchean ideals of struggle and over-coming threaten the stability of democracy.
Bourke, Political Science PhD student @ Duke, 20**08**
[James Ethan, "Problems of a Nietzschean Democracy," dissertation, G-Scholar]
Connolly's favored method of disturbing the domination of identity groups is to expose the elements of contingency that make up their claims to universality, necessity, and normalcy. "The way to loosen the boundaries of that circle [of identity\difference relations] is to render prevailing standards of identity more alert to incorrigible elements of difference, incompleteness, and contingency within them." 13 In order to execute this strategy, Connolly borrows from a Nietzschean critical attitude. Connolly recommends that agonistic argumentation be carried out through the Nietzschean methods of "skeptical contestation" and genealogy, the latter being precisely the effort to expose historical contingencies underlying concepts and categories regarded as necessary or universal. Thus Connolly's vision of agonistic democracy incorporates both a Nietzschean valorization of struggle and a Nietzschean critical method. But it also involves Connolly in a characteristically Nietzschean set of problems. For **a political ethos centered on struggle threatens to collapse into violence**, and **this** in turn **could destabilize the very liberal democracy** that **Connolly seeks to reform**. Connolly's agonism might easily slip into antagonism, and parties engaged in struggle with one another would seem to have obvious motives to break out of constrained forums of verbal contestation. As much as Connolly would seek to spiritualize the ideal of Nietzschean struggle, it would seem that his reliance on this ideal introduces the specter of violence and instability into his politics.

What is fundamentally at issue in my critique of Connolly is the fact that Connolly's celebration of agonism threatens to undo the already fragile liberal settlement that Connolly presupposes in order for his politics to get off the ground. He then tries to prop up what his politics gnaws away at with a Nietzschean ethics that ultimately leaves too much out. What we need, and what Connolly fails to provide us with, is an answer to the question of why agonistic confrontations should not escalate into antagonistic fights. Such an answer need not be "teleotranscendental," but it must reflect on the bases of civic respect. Connolly would, it seems to me, tend too much to rely on the habits and inertial patterns of liberal societies, which may not be sustainable under the pressure of the kinds of politics he wants to experiment with. These considerations should highlight why I think Connolly's use of Nietzsche does not plausibly succeed as an effort to curtail violence and instability. His use of Nietzsche's ethics of adversarial respect does not address the sources of equality that make such respect possible, and his generalization of Nietzschean ethical attitudes and practices of self-cultivation ignore the ways in which Nietzsche sets up barriers to such democratization. What of Connolly's post-secular faith, his "non-theistic reverence for being?" Here the criticism is somewhat inappropriate, in that Connolly does not offer non-theistic reverence as a general public morality, but as one source of ethicality among many that some (presumably other left Nietzscheans like himself) will find sustenance in. He nowhere (that I am aware) makes the claim that all citizens have to buy into such an ethical stance, but rather sees it as a way to encourage ethical attitudes in people who do not profess a faith in either a god or a transcendent ground of morality. By contrast, his ideals of agonistic respect and self-cultivation are things that he encourages as broad ethical stances appropriate to all within the version of agonistic democracy he espouses. The insufficiencies of Nietzschean sources to secure such a political ethic seem to me to force us to take a step or two away from Connolly's project and consider what alternative visions of democracy can compete with Connolly's in their promise of enriching contemporary democratic practices. Unfortunately I am not prepared to supply a full public morality here, and in that sense I do not have an alternative to offer. However, I do think I can point out what directions a new project for revitalizing liberal democracy could (and should) take. It seems to me that there are two paths to take here, and I will recommend a combination of them.

AFF – ALT = ANTI-DEMOCRATIC

Nietzsche was opposed to modern democracy and supported aristocracy – even at the cost of the lives of most of humanity.

Clark, 1998 [Maudemarie, Professor of Philosophy @ UC Riverside, *Nietzsche and Politics*, Edited by Jacqueline Scott, "Nietzsche's Antidemocratic Rhetoric", pgs. 120 – 121]

The first section of this paper sets out what I take to be the near-consensus or standard view of Nietzsche's later political philosophy, which I will construct largely from the passages of Beyond Good and Evil that support it. These passages suggest that Nietzsche sees nothing good about democracy, that he is disgusted by and completely contemptuous of the liberal-democratic order that has progressively taken over Europe under the influence of "modern ideas," in particular, the idea of human equality. Such ideas have given rise to a completely mediocre culture, because "they make men small, cowardly, and hedonistic" (TI "Skirmishes" 38). As a consequence, modern human beings are not a pleasant sight: They want above all else comfort and safety; they want to avoid above all else the discomfort and danger of being alone, of standing alone, especially in their value judgments. Nietzsche is therefore led, as Detwiler puts it, to "a thoroughgoing repudiation of the dominant social ideals of modernity" (Detwiler, 190). Because modern ideas (that is, liberal-democratic ideals) have led to a complete decay of both the political order and the human type (BGE 203), Nietzsche places his hopes for turning things around in a new aristocratic order. For all enhancements of the human type, he says, are the work of an aristocratic society, a society that recognizes a difference in rank between human beings, hence does not accept the "modern" idea of equality (BGE 257).

Despite the good work he claims they do, Nietzsche seems to be under no delusions about aristocrats. The ones he describes in the final part of Beyond Good and Evil (titled "What is Noble?") take over a society and rule it through compulsion and violence (BGE 257). Members of "a good and healthy aristocracy," he claims, necessarily "accept with good conscience the sacrifice of untold human beings, who, for its sake, must be reduced and lowered to incomplete human beings, to slaves, to instruments. Their fundamental faith has to be that society must not exist for society's sake but only as the foundation and scaffolding on which a choice type of being is able to raise itself to its higher tasks and higher state of being—comparable to those sun-seeking vines of Java ... that ... enclasp an oak tree with their tendrils until eventually, high, above but supported by it, they can unfold their crowns in the open light and display their happiness" (BGE 258).2