

SDI 2003  
ELS Lab

Heidegger Aff

- 1      Alt => Quietism/Totalitarianism
- 2      Alt. Fails/Doesn't Solve
- 3      Nazi!
- 4-5    Ontology Answers

Aut.  $\Rightarrow$  Quietism / Totalitarianism

— THE ALTERNATIVE OF "LETTING BE" CRUSHES ACTION TO STOP TOTALITARIAN ABUSES - HEIDEGGER'S NAZISM PROVES.

Bookchin, Murray, 1995, RE-ENCHANTING HUMANITY, Institute for Social Ecology, p. 169-170

Technology, as Heidegger construes it, is 'no mere means. Technology is a way of revealing. If we give heed to this, then another whole realm for the essence of technology will open itself up to us. It is the realm of revealing, i.e., of truth.'<sup>30</sup> After which Heidegger rolls out technology's transformations, indeed mutations, which give rise to a mood of anxiety and finally hubris, anthropocentricity, and the mechanical coercion of things into mere objects for human use and exploitation.

Heidegger's views on technology are part of a larger weltanschauung which is too multicolored to discuss here, and demands a degree of interpretive effort we must forgo for the present in the context of a criticism of technophobia. Suffice it to say that there is a good deal of primitivist animism in Heidegger's treatment of the 'revealing' that occurs when *techné* is a 'clearing' for the 'expression' of a crafted material - not unlike the Eskimo sculptor who believes (quite wrongly, I may add) that he is 'bringing out' a hidden form that lies in the walrus ivory he is carving. But this issue must be seen more as a matter of metaphysics than of a spiritually charged technique. Thus, when Heidegger praises a windmill, in contrast to the 'challenge' to a tract of land from which the 'hauling out of coal and ore' is subjected, he is *not* being 'ecological'. Heidegger is concerned with a windmill, not as an ecological technology, but more metaphysically with the notion that 'its sails do indeed turn in the wind; they are left entirely to the wind's blowing'. The windmill 'does not unlock energy from the air currents in order to store it'.<sup>31</sup> Like man in relation to Being, it is a medium for the 'realization' of wind, not an artifact for acquiring power.

Basically, this interpretation of a technological interrelationship reflects a regression - socially and psychologically as well as metaphysically - into quietism. Heidegger advances a message of passivity or passivity conceived as a human activity, an endeavor to let things be and 'disclose' themselves. 'Letting things be' would be little more than a trite Taoist and Buddhist precept were it not that Heidegger as a National Socialist became all too ideologically engaged, rather than 'letting things be'.

when he was busily undoing 'intellectualism,' democracy, and technological intervention into the 'world'.

Art ⑤

— The Alternative Fails - Rejection of Technology is Futile —

Bookchin, Murray, 1995, RE-ENCHANTING HUMANITY, Institute for Social Ecology, p. 156-7

First, technophobia sets up a misleading enemy for committed environmentalists and culture critics, redirecting their attention away from patently social concerns. Well-meaning people are urged to focus on a problem that cannot be seriously fought — specifically, technology — assuming they agree it is a problem in the first place.

Second, technophobes leave unanswered the strategic question of how a truly democratic society could be possible, if its members lacked the means of life and the free time to exercise their freedoms. Claims that a 'primitive' way of life would allow for 'banker's hours', to use Jerry Mander's expression, are simply fallacious.<sup>2</sup> Mander's sources, nourished on the 1960s and 1970s craze for the virtues of aboriginal ways of life, are now very questionable, if not completely specious, as we saw in Chapter 5. Unless people are prepared to give up literacy, books, modern music, physical comfort, and the great wealth of philosophical, scientific, and cultural ideas associated with civilization, the basic decision they face is how to use their vast fund of technological knowledge and devices, not whether to use them.

\_\_\_ The Alternative fails to achieve it's goals—technology can not be overcome

Kateb '97 (George, Social Research, Fall)

But the question arises as to where a genuine principle of limitation on technological endeavor would come from. It is scarcely conceivable that Western humanity—and by now most of humanity, because of their pleasures and interests and their own passions and desires and motives—would halt the technological project. Even if, by some change of heart, Western humanity could adopt an altered relation to reality and human beings, how could it be enforced and allowed to yield its effects? The technological project can be stopped only by some global catastrophe that it had helped to cause or was powerless to avoid. Heidegger's teasing invocation of the idea that a saving remedy grows with the worst danger is useless. In any case, no one would want the technological project halted, if the only way was a global catastrophe. Perhaps even the survivors would not want to block its reemergence.

# NAZISM TRANS

At: HEIDEGGER'S PHILOSOPHY (3) NAZISM

— HEIDEGGER'S NAZISM WAS NOT ACCIDENTAL - IT WAS A DIRECT RESULT OF HIS PHILOSOPHY

Rockmore 2002 (Tom, The Review of Metaphysics, Dec., Vol. 56, Iss. 2; pg. 419)

This excellent study of the theme of polemos shows a detailed grasp of the entire range of Heidegger's writings and relevant parts of the huge and rapidly growing secondary literature. This work is based on recent efforts to understand the link between Heidegger's philosophical theories and his politics. In Fried's opinion, efforts by Heidegger or his more uncritical fans to deny his Nazi proclivities are not only fallacious but also obscure his theories. Fried is concerned to grasp Heidegger's theories within his times and as they relate to our times without reducing one to the other. In following polemos throughout Heidegger's writings, he casts genuine light on the position as a whole. Fried focuses mainly on the middle period, when Heidegger is explicitly concerned with polemos. He shows that this concept links together Heidegger's writings, early and late.

Fried's reading of Heidegger's concept of polemos is explicitly political in at least two senses: as concerns Heidegger's turn toward Nazism and with respect to an incipient, undeveloped, but disturbing political view. Fried believes that Heidegger's thinking led him toward fascism in a way which was hardly accidental but his theories cannot simply be reduced to his life. He starts from the idea that "official" Heideggerian efforts to explain away or belittle Heidegger's Nazism as a simple, naive error are simply fallacious. He goes to considerable lengths to show the basic continuity between the theories advanced in Being and Time, the subsequent political turning, and the ostensible political quietism later featured in Contributions to Philosophy. In this way, he undermines the effort to discern basic changes in Heidegger's thinking in order to save, if not the thinker, at least the thought. Yet he also holds that Heidegger's philosophical concerns remain timely despite the difficulties in which he himself became involved.

— Attempts to separate Heidegger's thought from his politics fails - his deconstruction of politics without a reconstructive alternative leads to anti-democratic and antiliberal consequences.

Rockmore 2002 (Tom, The Review of Metaphysics, Dec., Vol. 56, Iss. 2; pg. 419)

Fried does best in showing with skill, patience, and considerable insight what Heidegger thinks. His good grasp of German (and Greek) helps him to provide sensitive, insightful readings of Heidegger's writings. He never directly considers reasons which might justify polemos as a central concept. Yet he indirectly (and very effectively) criticizes it in pointing to its potentially destructive political consequences. He usefully calls attention to the weakness of various postmodern efforts to grasp either Heidegger's politics or the consequences of his thinking for politics. Fried suggests convincingly that Derrida's suggestion that Heidegger was somehow untrue to his own position in turning to National Socialism misrepresents Heidegger's theories. He also points to disturbing antiliberal and antidemocratic consequences in the effort shared by Heidegger and his postmodern enthusiasts to deconstruct politics without reconstructing something in its place. Fried seems to be saying that confrontation with other conceptual perspectives cannot be isolated from a simply destructive confrontation with such main elements of the modern world as liberal democracy.

**Ethics Precedes Ontology- Heidegger's Totalizing Focus on Ontology Forecloses Any Ethical Relationship With The Other By Mediating Our Relations Through The Third Party of the Truth Of Being- The Inevitable Result is Discrimination and Genocide Diacritics, '96 (Committee on Public Safety, Summer)**

Heidegger's depiction of human being as fundamentally *in relation* makes of otherness a condition of *Dasein's* possibility. To master one's own relation to being means to master one's own relation to another: "*Dasein's* understanding of being already entails the understanding of others, because its being is being-with" [SZ 1.4.§26]. In this sense, then, *Miteinandersein*, being-with-one-other, is a being with oneself also. Levinas critiques this notion of *Miteinandersein* for depicting the self and the other as related side by side, mediated through a third common term-- the truth of being [TA 18-19]. In contrast, Levinas posits the relation of the face to face, that is, between two, and with no third term, no external authority. Once three are involved, we enter the universe of the one and the many and, hence, of "the totalizing discourse of ontology" [Kearney 57-58]. Only in the ethical relation of two can the self encounter the other immediately without recourse to an anonymous and faceless collectivity. Describing ethics as a "meontology" [Kearney 61], Levinas argues that its openness to the other is prior to ontology's closure upon itself. It is not that Heidegger's rupture with Western metaphysics through fundamental ontology went too far, but that it did not go far enough. It ushered in a philosophy of identity based on bonds and on consanguinity without fully confronting the advent of otherness in the epiphany of the human face. How, wonders Levinas, can fundamental ontology embrace the consanguineous body yet refuse the face? By repudiating idealism's abstract human nature, fundamental ontology gave vent to what rationalism, as the self-proclaimed universal mark of "humanity," had been repressing all along: "the hatred of a man who is other than myself," the very essence, that is, of anti-Semitism [DL 361]. For Levinas, the unthought of Heidegger's ontology comes to light in the death camps. They are related as being and be-ings themselves are related, within a hermeneutic circle where it is impossible to inquire about the one without understanding it in terms of the other. As Heidegger observed in the introduction to *Being and Time*, such concrete inquiry, if taken as a formal concept from the perspective of analytic logic, can only beg the question [SZ *Einleitung* 1.§2]. But just as he seeks to think the relation between being and be-ings in a manner more rigorous than the conceptual, so Levinas relates fundamental ontology and [End Page 6] anti-Semitism as each other's condition of possibility. From as early as the essay translated here, but repeated often, Levinas prophesied that the advent of fundamental ontology was of historic moment, and that philosophy after Heidegger could never be innocent again. Alongside the Jews, Enlightenment rationalism also perished in the Holocaust. With the Holocaust, the Jew (re)entered history; after two millennia of being represented as the great refusers of the present, as atavists of the Old Law, left behind by the New, the Jew now became contemporaneous. Their testament typologized away into the shadowy prefigurement of what is to come and has already come, the Jew became the fulfillment of the present, in a literalness beyond all metaphor [DL 170-77]. Thus it is that, through genocide, Levinas saw history and philosophy mediated. Not since dialectical materialism have we encountered such an audacious literalness, such theoreticization of historical concreteness.

**Heideggerian Ontology Must Be Rejected- It Is Violent and Assumes That People are Mere Objects Standing at the Opening of a Horizon to Being**  
**Kantor, '99 (Alan, American Imago, Philosophy Professor)**

Perhaps no one has better articulated the ideas of guilt, responsibility and their immanent reference to ethics than Heidegger. <sup>3</sup> Levinas, however, does not think so. In fact his whole thought is posited against the Heideggerian discourse. It is an imperative to debunk Heidegger and go otherwise than Being, because one could not forgive him first, because philosophy of Being is a violent philosophy, an unethical discourse of power where human beings, who are perceived at the opening of some horizon, are understood as things; <sup>4</sup> Heidegger runs "against the original significance of ethics" (Levinas 1987, 109). Secondly, there is the issue of Heidegger's sympathy toward National Socialism and his later silence about the death camps. Heidegger's "intellectual vigor and extreme analytical virtuosity displayed in *Sein und Zeit* " is not clean of "the diabolical." There is a doubt, then, whether "there was never any echo of Evil in it" (Levinas 1989b, 485-88). Therefore, pardoning Heidegger is almost impossible. "One can forgive many Germans, but there are some Germans it is difficult to forgive. It is difficult to forgive Heidegger" (Levinas 1990, 25). In fact, pardon, which is an integral part of the ethical phenomenon, stronger than forgetting, the "very work of time," <sup>2</sup> that is, ethics (Levinas 1969, 282-3), is what Heidegger [End Page 361] cannot have. There is a limit to ethics, then. What is infinite and does not have a limit, reaches its limit when it comes to Heidegger. "Pardon in its immediate sense is connected with moral phenomenon of fault . . . Active in a stronger sense than forgetting, which does not concern the reality of the event forgotten, pardon acts upon the past, somehow repeats the event, purifying it" (Levinas 1969, 282-3). This is precisely what Heidegger is not permitted to have. "If Hanina [a rabbinical doctor of the Talmud who was offended] could not forgive the just and human Rab [the offender] because he was also the brilliant Rab, it is even less possible to forgive Heidegger" (Levinas 1990, 25). On the other hand, we might ask whether Heidegger's silence is just what guilt as the origin of the ethical, demands. Put another way: Does not guilt, according to the formulation of its absolute enunciation depicted by the saying "Here I am," which Levinas stresses so much, call for silence?