

Heidegger Kritik—ELS SDI '03

<u>Shell</u>	1-2	<u>Alternative</u>	
<u>Links</u>		Alt. Solves Enviro.	34-38
Standing Reserve	3-4	Alt. Solves—"The Turning"	39
Management	5-6	Intellectual Endorsement	40
Problem-Solution	7	<u>AT: Aff Args</u>	
Reformism	8	AT: Permutation	41-45
Environ. Crises	9	AT: Nazi!	46
Science= Rigged Game	10-12	AT: No Alt/Pragmatism	47
Intrinsic Value/Rt. to life	13	AT: No Alt/Policy Paralysis	48
Non-Human Rt. to life (Whaling aff.)	14-19	AT: Performative Contradiction	49
Non-Human Rt. to life-- AT: Permutation	20	AT: Perf. Cont/Wrong Forum— Debate = Technology	50
Biocentrism bad	21-22	AT: Heidegger/Stewardship= Anthropocentrism	51
<u>Impacts/Implications</u>		AT: Levinas/Ethics Precedes Ontology	52
Extinction (also AT: Nazi!)	23-24		
Tech. = Nuke disaster, kills enviro., Being	25		
Tech. Kills enviro., Being	26-27		
Tech. Kills Being	28		
! o/w Nuke war	29		
Error Replication	30-31		
Ontology 1 st	32-33		

INC SHEU

A. The affirmative embraces technological thought—Approaches to ecological crises which rely on a managerial approach to the environment close off the possibility of other modes of thought, refusing to acknowledge that human attempts to control the environment are part of the problem.

McWhorter '92 (Ladelle, Professor of Philosophy @ Northeast Missouri State U,
Heidegger and the Earth, ed. Ladelle McWhorter, p. ____ GAL)

Therefore, when we react to problems like ecological crises by retreating into the familiar discomfort of our Western sense of guilt, we are not placing ourselves in opposition to technological thinking and its ugly consequences. On the contrary, we are simply reasserting our technological dream of perfect managerial control. How so? Our guilt professes our enduring faith in the managerial dream by insisting that problems – problems like oil spills, acid rain, groundwater pollution, the extinction of whales, the destruction of the ozone, the rain forests, the wetlands – lie simply in mismanagement or in a failure to manage (to manage ourselves in this case) and by reaffirming to ourselves that if we had used our power to manage our behavior better in the first place we could have avoided this mess. In other words, when we respond to Heidegger's call by indulging in feelings of guilt about how we have been treating the object earth, we are really just telling ourselves how truly powerful we, as agents, are. We are telling ourselves that we really could have done differently; we had the power to make things work, if only we had stuck closer to the principles of good management. And in so saying we are in yet a new and more stubborn way refusing to hear the real message, the message that human beings are not, never have been, and never can be in complete control, that the dream of that sort of managerial omnipotence is itself the very danger of which Heidegger warns.

Thus guilt – as affirmation of human agential power over against passive matter – is just another way of covering over the mystery. Thus guilt is just another way of refusing to face the fact that we human beings are finite and that we must begin to live *with* the earth instead of trying to maintain total control. Guilt is part and parcel of a managerial approach to the world.

Thinking along Heidegger's paths means resisting the power of guilt, resisting the desire to close ourselves off from the possibility of being with our own finitude. It means finding "the courage to make the truth of our own presuppositions and the realm of our own goals into the things that most deserve to be called in question." It means holding ourselves resolutely open for the shattering power of the event of thinking, even if what is shattered eventually is ourselves. 9-10

1

Inc SHEL

B. Technological solutions inevitably cause ecological devastation—we must resist the urge to endorse “quick fixes” to our environmental problems in order to break free of this cycle.

McWhorter '92 (Ladelle, Professor of Philosophy @ Northeast Missouri State U,
Heidegger and the Earth, ed. Ladelle McWhorter, p. GAL)

PROPHESIES
OF
ENVIRONMENTAL
DOOM
SPUR
US TO
TECHNOLOGICAL
MANAGEMENT
“QUICK
FIXES”
THAT
NEW
ECOLOGICAL
DISASTERS
DOING IS
PART OF
THE PROBLEM

Thinking today must concern itself with the earth. Wherever we turn – on newsstands, on the airwaves, and in even the most casual of conversations everywhere – we are inundated by predictions of ecological catastrophe and omnicidal doom. And many of these predictions bear themselves out in our own experience. We now live with the ugly, painful, and impoverishing consequences of decades of technological innovation and expansion without restraint, of at least a century of (disastrous) (natural) resource (management) policies, and of more than two centuries of virtually unchecked industrial pollution – consequences that include the fact that millions of us on any given day are suffering, many of us dying of diseases and malnutrition that are the results of humanly produced (ecological) devastation; the fact that thousands of species now in existence will no longer exist on this planet by the turn of the century; the fact that our planet's climate has been altered, probably irreversibly, by the carbon dioxide and chloro-fluorocarbons we have heedlessly poured into our atmosphere; and the mind-boggling fact that it may now be within humanity's power to destroy all life on this globe.

2-3

Our usual response to such prophecies of doom is to ignore them or, when we cannot do that, to scramble to find some way to manage our problems, some (quick solution) some technological fix. But over and over again new resource management techniques, new solutions, new technologies disrupt delicate systems even further, doing (still) more damage to a planet already dangerously out of ecological balance. Our ceaseless interventions seem only to make things worse, to perpetuate a cycle of human activity followed by (ecological disaster) followed by human intervention followed by a (new disaster) of another kind. In fact, it would appear that our trying to (do things) change things (fix things) cannot be the solution, because it is part of the problem itself. But, if we cannot act to solve our problems, what should we do?

STANDING RESERVE (C)

_. The affirmative view of the earth as a stockpile of resources for our efficient exploitation chains us to a singular view of the world, which inevitably turns to destruction. Only by abandoning their utilitarian calculus can we escape technological thinking.

Thiele '95, (Leslie Paul, Dept. of Polit. Sci. @ U of Florida,
Environmental Ethics, Summer, GAL)

Heidegger identifies the culmination of freedom understood as sovereign control with modern technology. In contrast to releasement, which lets things be disclosed in manifold ways according to their various natures, technology reveals things in a singular manner, as that which awaits efficient use and using up by human minds and hands, as "standing reserve" (*Bestand*). The mode of revealing that discloses everything as standing reserve receives the name "enframing" (*Gestell*). To the extent that we exist and operate within the mode of enframing, our relation to the world, to others, and to ourselves becomes invariant and one-dimensional. We come "to know" the Earth in one and only one way, as a storehouse of resources awaiting efficient exploitation. For Heidegger, however, the Earth remains a source of inexhaustible mystery. Heidegger often cited the Heraclitean fragment, "Nature loves to hide." Nature hides in that it resists becoming an open book of our calculations. However one may come to witness the natural world, something else remains hidden: relationships of interdependence, evolutionary legacies, and biological and aesthetic properties. Heidegger advocates that the mystery and diversity of nature be preserved by way of the manifold modes of disclosure to which humans are heir on account of their capacity for freedom. Enframing attitudes

and behavior, however, rob nature of its ability to hide by disclosing it in a singular manner. "The unbridled, basically enlightenment directive to nail life and everything living onto a board, like things, orderly and flat, so that everything becomes overseeable, controllable, definable, connectable, and explicable," Heidegger writes, "underlies all the many quasi-memories of life, which are being attempted today in every sphere of experience."⁴¹ Such attempts to "penetrate" the Earth with "calculating importunity," inevitably turn to destruction, which, Heidegger observes,

may herald itself under the appearance of mastery and of progress in the form of the technical-scientific objectification of nature, but this mastery nevertheless remains an impotence of will. The Earth appears openly cleared as itself only when it is perceived and preserved as that which is by nature undisclosable, that which shrinks from every disclosure and constantly keeps itself closed up.⁴²

Only when we preserve the mysterious unity of beings in Being, restraining our drive to enframe everything under a utilitarian calculus do we gain the freedom to perceive the Earth as Earth, in its inexhaustible mystery and diversity. Heidegger's concern, therefore, is not simply to reroute the destructiveness of our technological natures to ecologically beneficial purposes. He is prompting us to take on a more fundamental task: to challenge the historical presupposition that we are primarily and foremost technological beings, and to reconceive our freedom as a capacity to bear witness to what is rather than as the opportunity or prerogative to master and possess it, physically or conceptually. 184-5

(3)

STANDING RESERVE (C)

___. Technological thought reveals the earth as standing reserve—all of nature, even people, become resources awaiting human use and abuse. This mode of thought extinguishes all other types of thinking.

McWhorter '92 (Ladelle, Professor of Philosophy @ Northeast Missouri State U,
Heidegger and the Earth, ed. Ladelle McWhorter, p. GAL)

What is now especially dangerous about this sense of our own managerial power, born of forgetfulness, is that it results in our viewing the world as mere resources to be stored or consumed. Managerial or technological thinkers, Heidegger says, view the earth, the world, all things as mere Bestand, standing-reserve.

All is here simply for human use. No plant, no animal, no ecosystem has a life of its own, has any significance, apart from human desire and need. Nothing, we say, other than human beings, has any intrinsic value. All things are instruments for the working out of human will. Whether we believe that God gave Man dominion or simply that human might (sometimes called intelligence or rationality) in the face of ecological fragility makes us always right, we managerial, technological thinkers tend to believe that the earth is only a (stockpile) or a (set of commodities) to be managed, bought, and sold. The forest is timber; the river, a power source. Even (people) have become resources, (human resources), personnel to be managed, or populations to be controlled.

This managerial, technological mode of revealing, Heidegger says, is embedded in and constitutive of Western culture and has been gathering strength for centuries. Now it is well on its way to (extinguishing) all other modes of revealing, all other ways of being human and being earth. It will take tremendous effort to think through this danger, to think past it and beyond, tremendous courage and resolve to allow thought of the mystery to come forth; thought of the inevitability, along with revealing, of concealment, of loss, of ignorance; thought of the occurring of things and their passage as events not ultimately under human control. And of course even the call to allow this thinking – couched as it so often must be in a grammatical imperative appealing to an agent – is itself a paradox, the first that must be faced and allowed to speak to us and to shatter us as it scatters thinking in new directions, directions of which we have not yet dreamed, directions of which we may never dream.

STANDING
RESERVE
X
INTRINSIC
VALUE
EARTH,
AND
EVEN
HUMAN
RESOURCES
BECOME
RESOURCES
AWAITING
OUR
USE AND
ABUSE
AT:
FEAR
CONTRADICTORY
6-7

MANAGEMENT (L)

CONFRONTING SOCIETAL ISS WITHIN THE TECHNOLOGICAL MODE OF THINKING
MERELY GIVES WAY TO GUILT FOR NOT HAVING "MANAGED" OUR ACTIONS
CORRECTLY, PREVENTING TRUE CHANGE. ONLY TRUE REFLECTION OUTSIDE
A MANAGERIAL FRAMEWORK OFFERS ESCAPE.

McWhorter '92 (Ladelle, Professor of Philosophy @ Northeast Missouri State U,
Heidegger and the Earth, ed. Ladelle McWhorter, p. GAL)

And shattered we may be, for our self-understanding is at stake; in fact, our very selves – selves engineered by the technologies of power that shaped, that are, modernity – are at stake. Any thinking that threatens the notion of human being as modernity has posited it – as rationally self-interested individual, as self-possessed bearer of rights and obligations, as active mental and moral agent – is thinking that threatens our very being, the configurations of subjective existence in our age.

PROTECT.
MECHANISM
FOR
STATUS
Q10

PROTECT.
MECHANISM
FOR
STATUS
Q10


PROTECT.
MECHANISM
FOR
STATUS
Q10

Those configurations of forces will resist this thinking. Their resistance will occur in many forms. However, one of the most common ways that modern calculative selfhood will attempt to reinstate itself in the face of Heidegger's paradoxical call to think the earth is by employing a strategy that has worked so well so many times before: it will feel guilty.

Those of us who are white know this strategy very well. Confronted with our racism, we respond not by working to dismantle the structures that perpetuate racism but rather by feeling guilty. Our energy goes into self-rebuke, and the problems pointed out to us become so painful for us to contemplate that we keep our distance from them. Through guilt we paralyze ourselves. Thus guilt is a marvelous strategy for maintaining the white racist self.

Those of us who are women have sometimes watched this strategy employed by the caring, liberal-minded men in our lives. When we have exposed sexism, pressed our criticisms and our claims, we have seen such men – the 'good' men, by far the most responsive men – deflate, apologize, and ask us to forgive. But seldom have we seen honest attempts at change. Instead we have seen guilt deployed as a cry for mercy or pity on the status quo, and when pity is not forthcoming we have seen guilt turn to rage, and we have heard men ask, "Why are you punishing us?" The primary issue then becomes the need to attend to the feelings of those criticized rather than to their oppressive institutions and behaviors. Guilt thus protects the guilty. Guilt is a facet of power; it is not a reordering of power or a signal of oppression's end. Guilt is one of the modern managerial self's maneuvers of self-defense.

(LINE)
GUILT -
PROTECT
MECH. FOR
MODERN MANAGE.
SELF. IN POWER
WE CAN MANAGE
OURSELVES
BETTER...



CONTINUES...

5

MANAGEMENT

↓ ↓ ↓

Of course guilt does not *feel* that way. It feels like something unchosen, something we undergo. It feels much more like self-abuse than self-defense. But we are shaped, informed, produced in our very selves by the same forces of history that have created calculative, technological revealing. Inevitably, whenever we are confronted with the unacceptability of what is foundational for our lives, those foundations exert force to protect themselves. The exertion, which occurs as and in the midst of very real pain, is not a conscious choice; but that does not lessen – in fact it strengthens – its power as a strategy of self-defense. Calculative, technological thinking struggles to defend and maintain itself through us and as us.

Some men feel guilty about sexism; many white people feel guilty about racism; most of us feel guilty about all sorts of habits and idiosyncracies that we tell ourselves we firmly believe should be changed. For many of us guilt is a constant constraint upon our lives, a seemingly permanent

state. As a result, guilt is familiar, and, though somewhat uncomfortable at times, it comes to feel almost safe. It is no surprise, then, that whenever caring people think hard about how to live with/in/on the earth, we find ourselves growing anxious and, usually, feeling guilty about the way we conduct ourselves in relation to the natural world. Guilt is a standard defense against the call for change as it takes root within us. But, if we are to think with Heidegger, if we are to heed his call to reflect, we must not respond to it simply by deploring our decadent life-styles and indulging ourselves in a fit of remorse. Heidegger's call is not a moral condemnation, nor is it a call to take up some politically correct position or some privileged ethical stance.

When we respond to Heidegger's call as if it were a moral condemnation, we reinstate a discourse in which active agency and its projects and responsibilities take precedence over any other way of being with the earth. In other words, we insist on remaining within the discourses, the power configurations, of the modern managerial self. Guilt is a concept whose heritage and meaning occur within the ethical tradition of the Western world. But the history of ethical theory in the West (and it could be argued that ethical theory only occurs in the West) is one with the history of technological thought. The revelation of things as to-be-managed and the imperative to be in control work themselves out in the history of ethics just as surely as they work themselves out in the history of the natural and human sciences.

It is probably quite true that in many different cultures, times, and places human beings have asked the question: How shall I best live my life? But in the West, and in relatively modern times, we have reformulated that question so as to ask: How shall I conduct myself? How shall I behave? How shall I manage my actions, my relationships, my desires? And how shall I make sure my neighbors do the same? Alongside technologies of the earth have grown up (technologies of the soul) theories of human behavioral control of which current ethical theories are a significant subset. Ethics in the modern world at least very frequently functions as just another field of scientific study yielding just another set of engineering goals.



PROBLEM-SOLUTION (C)

_. Evaluating our situation as a "problem" to be "solved" by appropriate action is predicated on the technological worldview that places humanity at its center—our crisis is not a problem to be solved by some action – it's a metaphysical condition that requires new understanding.

DREYFUS '95 (Hubert, prof. philosophy. UC Berkeley. The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger, ed. Guignon, p. 304)

Nevertheless, although Heidegger does not deny that technology presents us with serious problems, as his thinking develops he comes to the surprising and provocative conclusion that focusing on loss and destruction is still technological. ("All attempts to reckon existing reality ... in terms of decline and loss, in terms of lack, crisis, and destruction are merely technological behavior" (CCT 48; TK 45-46). Seeing our situation as posing a problem that must be solved by appropriate scientific technological tools. "The instrumental conception of technology conditions every attempt to bring man into the right relation to technology. ... The will to mastery becomes all the more urgent the more technology threatens to slip from human control" (CCT 5; VA 14-15). Heidegger is clear this approach will not work. "No single man, no group of men," he tells us, "no commission of prominent statesmen, scientists, and technicians, no conference of leaders of commerce and industry, can brake or direct the progress of history in the atomic age" (DT 53; G 22). Heidegger's view is both darker and more hopeful. He thinks there

is a more dangerous situation facing modern man than the technological destruction of nature and civilization, yet this is a situation about which something can be done – at least indirectly. Heidegger's concern is the human distress caused by the technological understanding of being, rather than the destruction caused by specific technologies. Consequently, he distinguishes the current problems caused by technology – ecological destruction, nuclear danger, consumerism, and so on – from the devastation that would result should technology solve all our problems:

What threatens man in his very nature is ... that man, by the peaceful release, transformation, storage, and channeling of the energies of physical nature, could render the human condition tolerable for everybody and happy in all respects. (PLT 116; GA 194)

The "greatest danger" is that

the approaching tide of technological revolution in the atomic age could so captivate, bewitch, dazzle, and beguile man that calculative thinking may someday come to be accepted and practiced as the only way of thinking. (DT 56; G 27)

The danger, then, is not the destruction of nature or culture but certain totalizing kinds of practices – a leveling of our understanding of being. This threat is not a problem for which we must find a solution but an ontological condition that requires a transformation of our understanding of being.

REFORM (L) / AT: ETHICS PRECEDES ONTOLOGY

— REFORMS WITHIN THE SYSTEM ONLY REINFORCE THE TECHNOLOGICAL OBSESSION WITH CONTROL — ABANDONING HUMANIST ONTOLOGY / PRECEDES ETHICS.

ZIMMERMAN '94 (MICHAEL E., DEPT. OF PHILOSOPHY @ NEWCOMB OF TULANE U.,
CONTESTING EARTH'S FUTURE: RADICAL ECOLOGY AND POSTHUMANITY p.106)

1. For Heidegger, for something "to be" means for it to be manifest or to be present. Only because entities can manifest themselves and can thus be encountered as manifest, can they subsequently be interpreted as objects in various domains: for example, in science, in-

dustry, and everyday life. Unlike animals, humans can encounter entities as manifest because humans can apprehend the "ontological difference" between being and entities. "Being" does not name a superentity, a metaphysical ground, a primal source, or a divine creator. Radically other than any entity, being names the event of presencing (*Anwesen*) by which an entity presents, reveals, or shows itself. Human existence constitutes the temporal, historical, linguistic clearing, or absencing (*Abwesen*) in which the being (presencing, self-manifesting) of entities can occur. Without human existence, things could not be manifest and in this sense could not "be" at all. Early Heidegger sometimes spoke as if this clearing, this capacity for understanding that entities are, were a human capacity, but later, seeking to purge his thinking of anthropological residues, he argued that human existence occurs only within a larger clearing that transcends merely human concerns.

Because modern humanity's openness for being has become so constricted that things can only show themselves one-dimensionally as flexible raw material, modern humanity has become oblivious to its highest possibility, namely, to let things be by holding open the clearing in which they can reveal themselves. Like a deep ecologist, Heidegger argued that (re)forming existing institutions would only reinforce the destructive urges of the control-obsessed subject. Claiming that anthropocentric humanism underestimates humanity, he favored a "higher humanism" that lets things be, instead of disclosing them as instruments serving the power-interests of the human subject.²⁸ Like many deep ecologists, he said that the ethics needed to improve our treatment of nature cannot arise from the metaphysical framework of humanism, but only from a new ethos, a new way of understanding what humans and nonhumans are. In this sense, ontology proceeds ethics.

ENVIR. CRISES (4)

— . ATTEMPTING TO REPRESENT THE STATUS QUO IN TERMS OF IMPACTS AND LOSS IS TECHNOLOGICAL.

HEIDEGGER 77 (MARTIN, THE QUESTION CONCERNING TECHNOLOGY TRANSL. WILLIAM LOVITT, p. 48)

< Only when insight brings itself disclosingly to pass, only when the coming to presence of technology lights up as Enframing, do we discern how, in the ordering of the standing-reserve, the truth of Being remains denied as world. Only then do we notice that all mere willing and doing in the mode of ordering steadfastly persists in injurious neglect. In this same way all mere organizing of the world conceived and represented historiographically in terms of universality remains truthless and without foundation. All mere chasing after the future so as to work out a picture of it through calculation in order to extend what is present and half-thought into what, now veiled, is yet to come, itself still moves within the prevailing attitude, belonging to technological, calculating representation. All attempts to reckon existing reality morphologically, psychologically, in terms of decline and loss, in terms of fate, catastrophe, and destruction, are merely technological behavior. That behavior operates through the device of the enumerating of symptoms whose standing-reserve can be increased to infinity and always varied anew. Such analyses of the "situation" do not notice that they are working only according to the meaning and manner of technological dissecting, and that they thus furnish to the technological consciousness the historiographical-technological presentation of happening commensurate with that consciousness. But no historiographical representation of history as happening ever brings us into the proper relation to destining, let alone into the essential origin of destining in the disclosing coming-to-pass of the truth of Being that brings everything into its own.

All that is merely technological never arrives at the essence of technology. It cannot even once recognize its outer precincts.

Therefore, as we seek to give utterance to insight into that which is, we do not describe the situation of our time. It is the constellation of Being that is uttering itself to us. >

SCIENCE = RIGGED GAME

Science is a rigged game—Technological thought closes off other paths of thinking, forgetting that other truths are possible.

McWhorter '92 (Ladelle, Professor of Philosophy @ Northeast Missouri State U,
Heidegger and the Earth, ed. Ladelle McWhorter, p. GAL)

Science
tries
to know
manage
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paths
of
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truths
are
possible
S-6

The noted physicist Stephen Hawking, in his popular book *A Brief History of Time*, writes, "The eventual goal of science is to provide a single theory that describes the whole universe."⁵ Such a theory, many people would assert, would be a systematic arrangement of all knowledge both already acquired and theoretically possible. It would be a theory to end all theories, outside of which no information, no revelation could, or would need to, occur. And the advent of such a theory would be as the shining of a light into every corner of being. Nothing would remain concealed.

This dream of Hawking's is a dream of power; in fact, it is a dream of absolute power/absolute control. It is a dream of the ultimate managerial utopia. This, Heidegger would contend, is the dream of technological thought in the modern age. We dream of knowing, grasping everything, for then we can control, then we can manage, everything.

But it is only a dream, itself predicated, ironically enough, upon concealment, the self-concealing of the mystery. We can never control the mystery, the belonging together of revealing and concealing. In order to approach the world in a manner (exclusively) technological, calculative, mathematical, scientific, we must (already have given up) (or lost, or been expelled by, or perhaps ways of being such as we are even impossible within)

other approaches or modes of revealing that would unfold into knowledges of other sorts. Those other approaches or paths of thinking must already have been obliterated; those other knowledges must already have concealed themselves in order for technological or scientific revelation to occur.

The danger of a managerial approach to the world lies not, then, in what it knows – not in its penetration into the secrets of galactic emergence or nuclear fission – but in what it forgets, what it itself conceals. It forgets that any other truths are possible, and it forgets that the belonging together of revealing with concealing is forever beyond the power of human management. We can never have, or know, it all; we can never manage everything. i

SCIENCE = RIGGED GAME

- THEIR VIEW OF NATURE IS ONLY ONE POSSIBLE WAY OF REVEALING THE WORLD - TECHNOLOGICAL WORLDVIEWS ONLY OFFER INSIGHT INTO THAT WHICH THEY'VE CONSTRUCTED BEFOREHAND.

Foltz, Department of Philosophy at University of Dallas, 1984
(Bruce V., Environmental Ethics, Winter 1984, p. 117)

"To the extent that nature becomes interpreted as what is present at hand, our "originary" involvement with it is obscured. This interpretation, however, was already established in Greek and medieval philosophy (for example, in the Platonic idea as what is always present to be "seen" in the apprehension of changeable entities), and it is progressively elaborated in the thought of Descartes and Kant. Thus, it is precisely this determination of nature as constant presence that leads Descartes to define it as *res extensa* (since extension is what is always necessarily present in "corporeal" entities), as well as to choose mathematics as the manner in which that presence can be secured.²⁷ Yet, with the advent of modern philosophy, the being of nature is no longer grasped simply in terms of presence as sheer givenness. Rather, it is set forth as the objectivity of an aggregate of given objects which is secured beforehand by the self-securing of subjectivity; on the basis of the self-grounding of the *ego cogito* (Descartes) or of transcendental apperception (Kant), nature is posited as constantly present to subjectivity in its measurability and calculability.

Such a comprehension of nature, however, is no longer the pure gaze of *theoria* upon the presence of what is present at hand, but a setting up and establishing of that presence; entities become objects, or literally "what is set before" (*ob-jectum*) a subject. It is also, in addition, an articulation of the basic posture of modern science. As stated by Kant, "they [i.e., Galileo, etc.] learned that reason has insight only into that which it produces after a plan of its own . . . constraining nature to give answers to questions of reason's own determining."²⁸ That is, modern science not only sets up in advance the conceptual framework wherein an event of nature can become visible as such an event, but it sets up the conditions under which nature can be forced to show itself within that framework; it is, in a word, experimental science.²⁹

It is possible, even from this somewhat brief account of Heidegger's exposition, to catch sight of the manner in which modern science serves as a threshold to modern technology. Science does not prepare the way for technology merely because it provides the models, explanations, and data which technology goes on to utilize; it is rather because modern science is not simply a pure contemplating of what is present in nature, but is already a positing (projecting) or setting up of nature which secures it (beforehand) in the way it can be present. If science makes ready for the challenging forth and setting-in-order of technology, it is because it already "sets upon" nature, demanding that it exhibit itself in its (objectness) and calculability. Neither Heidegger's "history of being," his philosophy of science,



CONTINUES...

11

SCIENCE = RIGGED GAME



nor his interpretation of the relation between science and technology can be taken up in detail here. Yet two interrelated points must be noted before proceeding. First, the manner in which nature presents itself to modern science is not, according to Heidegger, somehow false or illusory: "scientific research is a kind of attack upon nature, but one which nevertheless allows nature to be heard."¹⁰ To be sure, nature can be made to manifest itself in its objectivity; this is (how) ever only one way in which nature can be disclosed. Second, if this is the case then there is an aspect of nature which cannot be encompassed by modern science—or by modern technology. It is just this "essential fullness of nature" which can never be "gotten around" by natural science that was originally evoked in the word *physis*.¹¹

If modern science is unable to encompass nature in its fullness, this is because before it can be set up as an object, or set in order as a standing reserve, nature is always already emerging on its own. This self-emergence, according to Heidegger, is what the early Greeks meant by *physis*. *Physis* did not originally designate the merely "physical," or even one realm of entities as opposed to another—falling within the subsequent dualities of nature and spirit, nature and history, nature and art, etc.—but an aspect of being as such. It is that sense in which the being of an entity unfolds and emerges from itself, while continually returning to itself; both the blossoming of a tree and the beauty of an artwork.¹² Moreover, in its primary reference to being as such, and not merely to being as grounding the presence of entities, the concept of *physis* signifies being not only as presence, but to the same degree, as self-withholding. Thus, "while the 'plant' sprouts, emerges, and extends itself into the open, it simultaneously goes back into its roots in that it fixes them in the closed and so takes its stand. The [process of] self-unfolding is inherently a going-back-into-itself."¹³ Self-emerging as such simultaneously inclines toward self-concealing; yet, the latter is "not a mere self-closing but a sheltering in which the essential possibility of emerging is preserved. . . ."¹⁴ (It is just this element of self-reserve that is violated by technology. By demanding its unrestrained presence in the form of standing reserve, technology "drives the earth beyond the natural (*gewachsenen*) sphere of its possibility" into a kind of exhaustion which Heidegger calls "devastation.")¹⁵ . 372 - 4

RT TO LIFE / INTRINSIC VALUE (L)

— Attempts to Attach A "Value" To The Environment Reinforces Technological Thinking And Environmental Destruction By Assuming Nature Is An Object For Human Estimation.

GARE '95

[Arran E., Senior Lecturer of Philosophy and Cultural Inquiry @ Swinburne U., Australia. Postmodernism and the Environmental Crisis, p. 89]

Correlative to the reduction of the world to objects, instruments at hand, and to truth conceived of as certainty, modern philosophy posits a realm of values to deal with the issue of what is the ultimate point of controlling the world. If there are any challenges to the ways in which things are being done, to the goals being pursued, then this is seen as an issue of values. For instance, environmentalists decrying not only the destruction of the environment for its effect on humans but because nature is seen to have a significance independent of human purposes call for a recognition of the intrinsic value of nature.⁷¹ But the notion of value is rooted in Cartesian dualism. It is simply to call upon the subjective side of the subjective/objective divide to compensate for the 'devaluation' of the objective world by science. But then this subjectivizes all significance of the world. Consequently Heidegger argues that to ascribe value to anything is to debase it:

human's [T]hrough the characterization of something as 'a value' what is so valued is robbed of its worth. That is to say, by the assessment of something as a value what is valued is admitted only as an object for human's value estimation. . . . Every valuing, even where it values positively, is a subjectivizing. It does not let beings be.⁷²

With unparalleled perspicacity, Heidegger has not only shown what it is about Western civilization which has driven people to be so environmentally destructive, but has shown why efforts to confront this crisis (by calling for the attribution of a higher value to nature) simply reinforce the forms of thinking responsible for environmental destruction. By revealing the problem we are at least provided with some direction for thinking about alternatives.

Non-Human R. To Life (L)

_. Extending rights to non-humans is merely an attempt to make them “more human”—it is tantamount to conceptual capture and control of nature, hypocritically reinforcing anthropocentrism.

Thiele '95, (Leslie Paul, Dept. of Polit. Sci. @ U of Florida,
Environmental Ethics, Summer, GAL)

The sociocentric response to the deep ecologists' argument from intuition is to suggest that their intuitions remain misguided and, ironically, perversely anthropocentric. To confer rights on animals (and plants), intuitively, mythically, or otherwise, is to (anthropomorphize) them. In subjecting them to ethical, political, or religious categories, humans take animals out of their own habitat, figuratively if not literally, and thrust them into a human one. This amounts to the (conceptual capture) and (control) of nature, a systematization of nature according to human cognitive and emotional dispositions and needs. fr: been eco! C to wilds AM.

Certainly *different* need not mean “higher.” Human uniqueness need not imply the prerogative to dominate other species, as Elizabeth Dodson Gray rightly observes.²⁶ But appreciating difference certainly also means not foisting upon animals ethical (political) or (spiritual) identities that they have never requested, upheld, or, so far as we can tell, understood. Conversing with the bear's “spirit” before or after killing it may make the hunter feel good about his or her membership in an ecological community, but we may presume that the conversation remains largely unappreciated by the bear. Such panpsychism, Bookchin acerbically remarks, remains atavistic and puerile. It is a hypocritical attempt to escape the charge of anthropocentrism while exhibiting its most perverse effects. Bookchin asks rhetorically: “Is this not the crudest form of ‘anthropocentrism’ (to use a world for the projection of the human into the natural that evokes so much disdain in ecology movements) to introduce deified forms created by the human imagination into the natural world in the name of ecological ‘spirituality’?”²⁷ This accusation is not an easy one to parry for deep ecologists. Even were it parried, however, the biocentric unwillingness to recognize different ranks of life would still (resurface) to haunt us. A handful of soil might contain 50,000 algae, twenty times as many fungi, and two hundred thousand times as many bacteria. Must we hold an ongoing dialogue with their spirits as we tread upon them, or breathe in their atmospheric counterparts? Likewise, while porpoises may be fondly embraced as friendly spirits whose increasing numbers have a legitimate right to share the Earth with us, are we to feel the same way about the AIDS virus? *

NON-HUMAN RT. TO LIFE (C)

— THE ATTEMPT TO EXTEND "EQUAL RIGHTS" TO ANIMALS SUBSUMES THEM INTO A HUMAN PROJECT - WE MUST CELEBRATE NATURE FOR ITS OTHERNESS, NOT FOR BEING THE SAME AS US.

Thiele '95, (Leslie Paul, Dept. of Polit. Sci. @ U of Florida,
Environmental Ethics, Summer, GAL)

In sum, Heidegger's understanding of the unique ontological status of human being and human freedom separates his perspective from any radically biocentric view. As Warwick Fox, an Australian philosopher, observes, the central intuition of deep ecology "is the idea that we can make no firm ontological divide in the field of existence: That there is no bifurcation in reality between the human and the nonhuman realms. . . . to the extent that we perceive boundaries, we fall short of deep ecological consciousness."⁴³ Yet, for Heidegger, it is precisely our capacity for ontological shepherding that distinguishes human beings from other life forms. In this respect, Heidegger would find nonsensical any attempt to speak, as some have in his name, of the *Dasein* of animals,⁴⁴ for what identifies *Dasein* is precisely its unique ontological capacity to question its own existence, its Being. Bookchin criticizes as

"mind-negating" that biocentrism which implicitly denies the unique human capacity that allows us to make the conceptual distinction between biocentrism and anthropocentrism in the first place.⁴⁵ My point here is that biocentrists also often negate human beings' ontological capacities in an effort to ascribe equality—of rights and ethical domain—to all life. As Zimmerman observes: ". . . only insofar as we remain open for the strangeness and otherness of the nonhuman can we avoid subsuming everything under some human project. Only by letting things be within their own limits can we blossom within our limits."⁴⁶

This caveat pertains to ethical and political "projects" no less than technological ones. Turning grizzly bears into rights bearers is simply not letting grizzly bears be grizzly bears. Thus, while we may acknowledge Gary Snyder's ecological sensitivity when he states that "Plants and animals are also people,"⁴⁷ we should still deplore his lack of appreciation of nature's distinct otherness. Likewise, Morris Berman insists that wherever we look at the universe we see ourselves; right down to the smallest particles we "discover our own minds in them, or behind them." Berman suggests that this modern form of "animism" is no longer "naive" because it seeks to supplant archaic anthropomorphism with an aesthetic approach.⁴⁸ But, like many other deep ecological perspectives, it fails sufficiently to acknowledge that our efforts to move beyond narrow anthropocentrism must resist turning everything into (a part of) us. We need to recognize and celebrate difference as only human beings can, that is to say, ontologically. The false assumption made by many deep ecologists is that without "rights" nonhuman life becomes merely instrumental and subject to wanton exploitation and destruction. Historically, it is true, humans have far too seldom respected that which was not their equal. But the challenge we face today is to celebrate nature not for being the same as us, but for being different. Animals, plants, and ecosystems require our protection (and in many cases that means our noninterference) precisely because they do not hold rights, because they are beyond rights. Nature must be allowed to hide from our conceptual, political, and ethical intrusions no less than from our technological ones.

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Non-HUMAN Rt. To Life ④

—. Arguing for the animals “right to life” invariably creates a ranking of rights, begging the question—We end up protecting life that is most useful or most like us, recreating anthropocentric biases.

Thiele '95, (Leslie Paul, Dept. of Polit. Sci. @ U of Florida,
Environmental Ethics, Summer, GAL)

Despite important differences, categorically distinct concepts give way to a continuum of sensibilities when we look at the biocentrists and sociocentrists themselves. Most sociocentric environmentalists, for example, harbor deep ecological sentiments in varying degrees. They have, minimally, a reverence for nature which, though not completely usurping humanistic concerns, significantly bears upon their political and ethical deliberations. Indeed, their position is at its strongest when their claims reach beyond the need for sustainable economic use of natural resources to include the aesthetic and spiritual benefits to humankind of a healthy ecosystem. Because utility can be indefinitely expanded to include these other dimensions of human well-being, sociocentric environmentalists can always argue from interest, albeit long-term human interest broadly defined. Biocentric environmentalists, as well, often display humanist leanings. More specifically, they often find themselves relying on utilitarian standards in their efforts to persuade others (and perhaps themselves). Both Aldo Leopold and John Muir, for example, found it necessary to camouflage or subsume their deep ecological orientations within a utilitarian rhetoric when attempting to win over particular audiences.⁹ Arne Naess, similarly, writes that “human fulfillment seems to *demand* and *need* free nature. . . . Human nature may be such that with increased maturity a *human* need increases to protect the richness and diversity of life for *its own sake*. Consequently, what is useless in a narrow way may be useful in a wider sense, namely satisfying a human need.”¹⁰ The problem, however, is that deep ecologists generally consider theirs a “radical” perspective precisely because the ethic of biospherical equality is uncompromised by utilitarian concerns. While they may engage humanist rhetoric from time to time, such efforts appear as tactical expedients largely inconsistent with their principles.

This inconsistency has not been lost on sociocentrists, who often accuse deep ecologists of being unable to make biocentric theory coherent with its practice. In the battle for the hearts and minds of the ecologically attuned but conceptually uncommitted, such deep ecologists as Dave Foreman, cofounder of Earth First!, often gain ground with such claims as the “grizzly bear in Yellowstone Park has as much right to her life as any one of us has to our life.”¹¹



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Non-Human R. To Life (L)

_. Extending rights to non-humans fails—the root of anthropocentrism is a misunderstanding of human dignity, not a lack of equal rights.

Thiele '95, (Leslie Paul, Dept. of Polit. Sci. @ U of Florida,
Environmental Ethics, Summer, GAL)

Religious and moral discourse has been around for millennia. Rights discourse is of a later generation, but has had more than a few hundred years to mature. Yet the degradation and destruction of human life continues largely unabated, and some might argue that it has actually increased. If the point of the biocentric argument is to save nature from human destruction, then historically we have no indication that extending moral, political, or religious

consideration to it will achieve this goal.³⁰ In light of this and earlier difficulties with the biocentric perspective, I argue that the problem lies not so much in an insufficient extension of rights to nonhuman life as with an inadequate understanding of the nature of human dignity and freedom that such rights aim to protect.

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NON-HUMAN RT. TO LIFE (L) - AT: PENNY

— THE PENNY MISAPPROPRIATES OUR ALTERNATIVE, CAUSING THE CONCEPTUAL CONTROL OF NATURE. THE ALTERNATIVE ALONE SOLVES BEST FOR THE ENVIRONMENT.

Thiele '95, (Leslie Paul, Dept. of Polit. Sci. @ U of Florida,
Environmental Ethics, Summer, GAL)

Naess writes that "in Protagoras' statement about *homo mensura* nothing is said about what is measured. Man may be the measure of all things in the sense that only a human being has a measuring rod, but what he measures he may find to be greater than himself and his survival."⁶¹ Here Naess rightly acknowledges the necessarily anthropocentric nature of any conceivable deliberations we might entertain about nature. But the point should not be that nature is greater than man, but simply, and yet profoundly, that it is different. On the other side of things, Petrarch once upbraided himself for falling in love with nature. "I was stunned," he wrote, "angry with myself that I still admired earthly things. I ought to have learned, long ago, even from pagan philosophers, that nothing is admirable besides the mind: compared to its greatness nothing is great."⁶² Contrariwise, Heidegger teaches us that what is great about the human mind, or rather about human being, is precisely that it can sustain itself in wonder and admiration about all that is *not* mind, not itself. The wonder at nature as something radically other is a necessary antidote to all strictly utilitarian, anthropocentric approaches which unduly circumscribe human being within its own needs, personal or social. Yet, this wonder is misappropriated when couched in biocentric arguments for the equal rights of nature based on an expansive sense of self, for herein our conceptual subjugation of nature reasserts itself. In short, the preservation of nature for its own sake is at the same time the only way to preserve the greatness and uniqueness of human being. Human being fundamentally discovers its freedom and dignity in the witnessing of difference.

In concluding his own account of the need to foster not an identification with nature but a wonder, awe, and respect for nature's otherness, Peter Reed made a candid admission. He writes:

So far (as often happens in environmental ethics) I have said something like, "If all of us had this feeling about ecological problems, we could solve them." This may be true, but it is not much help. There are steps missing. What about those who do not (basically) have the feeling? In the face of power struggles and inert political institutions, how do we implement an ethic based on awe for nature?⁶³

I have suggested that reformulating our relation to nature in terms of a disclosive freedom goes a long way toward answering these important questions. Our deep and enduring attachment to freedom, far from pitting us against nature as it has for millennia, could become the greatest impetus to ecological care.] 189-90

Biocentrism BAD

- TOTAL COMMITMENT TO BIOCENTRISM IS INCOHERENT - IT WOULD REQUIRE UNCONTROLLED PROLIFERATION OF DISEASE CAUSING PATHOGENS, AND PROMOTES MISANTHROPY DUE GUILT OVER HUMANITY'S INEVITABLE CONSUMPTION OF LIFE.


Thiele '95, (Leslie Paul, Dept. of Polit. Sci. @ U of Florida,
Environmental Ethics, Summer, GAL)

[With this in mind, many biocentrists, such as Arne Naess, refuse to rank different forms of life according to schemes of "relative intrinsic value." Richness of experience, the presence of an eternal soul, the capacity for reason, self-consciousness, and "higher" evolutionary development are not considered admissible as evidence.¹³ David Ehrenfeld also argues that no credence should be given to such anthropocentric distinctions. "For those who reject the humanistic basis of modern life," Ehrenfeld writes, "there is simply no way to tell whether one arbitrarily chosen part of Nature has more 'value' than another part, so like Noah we do not bother to make the effort."¹⁴ Adopting this "Noah Principle" means we simply "do not bother" to distinguish between grizzly bears, sardines, and mosquitoes. All have an equal right to life; all deserve preservation. This principle theoretically extends to every life form, including plants and amoebas. Thus, Ehrenfeld argues for the preservation of such deadly pathogens as the smallpox virus.¹⁵ Social ecologists, such as Bookchin, find

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this position scandalous. Moreover, when taken to its logical conclusion this biocentric principle appears to dictate more than the controlled preservation of specimens of all species in Noah-like fashion. As simple "citizens" of the biosphere, we have no claim to the prerogatives of global zookeepers. Our noninterference with the uncontrolled proliferation of all species—including the uncontrolled proliferation of pathogenic species—appears to be a duty.

Indeed, the biocentric acknowledgment of equal rights for all life may entail not only noninterference with other species, but, quite ironically, humanitarian aid for them. Arne Naess observes that "if a rat is discovered in an inaccessible ventilator, it is clearly cause to warn the SPCA to come and end its suffering—by putting it out of its misery."¹⁶ To be consistent on this score, however, should we not also send SPCA squads into the sewers to save rats from early demise, or at least ensure their painless deaths, after severe storms? By deep ecological standards, sewer rats merit consideration just like the whales recently trapped under Arctic ice did (notwithstanding the financial and environmental costs incurred by having numerous ships, aircraft, and personnel from more than one nation involved in their rescue). But what of those fish and microorganisms, in this latter case, that were robbed of a bountiful feast of whale meat as a result of our "humanitarian" intervention. Must we not also compensate them for their loss of dinner? Furthermore, could we accomplish this duty without taking yet other life in the process? The practical and theoretical conundrums mount.



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(21)

Biocentrism B4D



Albert Schweitzer, an iconic figure for most deep ecologists, insisted that the ethical person “tears no leaf from its tree, breaks off no flower, and is careful not to crush any insect as he walks.” Hence, Schweitzer removed insects struggling on a pool of rainwater to safe ground, explaining that “when I help an insect out of his troubles all that I do is to attempt to remove some of the guilt contracted through [humanity’s] crimes against animals.”¹⁷ True biocentrists, such as the Jainists, may find it necessary to sweep the path before them lest they tread on some unsuspecting creature and wear gauze over their mouths lest they inadvertently inhale and thereby put an end to some minuscule life? Even here, were we consistently to extend the biocentric ethic to include all life forms, precluding the accusation of “zoocentrism,” plant life would also merit equal protection. Must we then, as inevitable consumers of life, remain irredeemably guilty? And is this collective guilt, “biological ‘original sin,’” as Bookchin puts it, likely to result in a truly misanthropic orientation?¹⁸ With this in mind, many environmentally oriented thinkers, such as Al Gore and Michael Zimmerman, worry about the inherent misanthropy of certain deep ecological perspectives. Has something gone terribly wrong, we are asked, when biocentrism separates us from fellow human beings with a veil of guilt, implicit in Dave Foreman’s characterization of our species as “the human pox” and “a cancer on nature”?¹⁹ Moreover, is it not “natural” for us to be anthropocentric, given that wolves typically conduct themselves in a lupocentric manner, eagles generally behave aquicentrically, and bees are fervent apicentrists?

EXTINCTION! / At: NAZI!

— Their Reliance ON RATIONALITY AND TECHNOLOGICAL THOUGHT BRINGS US CLOSER
TO EXTINCTION - THE HOLOCAUST WAS A PRODUCT OF THIS MODE OF THOUGHT.

Campbell and Dillon '93 (The political subject of violence, David and Michael, ed. Campbell and Dillon, p.)

This interpretation of violence as constitutive of identity might, paradoxically, offer the only hope of some amelioration of the worst excesses of violence exhibited by the formation of (political) identity. The orthodox rendering of such violence as pre-modern abdicates its responsibility to a predetermined historical fatalism. For if these ethnic and nationalist conflicts are understood as no more than settled history rearing its ugly head, then there is nothing that can be done in the present to resolve the tension except to repress them again. In this view, the historical drama has to be enacted according to its script, with human agency in suspension while nature violently plays itself out. The only alternative is for nature to be overcome as the result of an idealistic transformation at the hands of reason. Either way, this fatalistic interpretation of the relationship between violence and the political is rooted in a hypostatized conception of man/nature as determinative of the social/

political: the latter is made possible only once the former runs its course, or if it is overturned.

It might have once been the case that the prospect of a transformation of nature by reason seemed both likely and hopeful; indeed, many of the most venerable of the debates in the political theory of international relations revolved around this very point.⁸ But, having reached what Foucault has called society's 'threshold of modernity', 'we' now face a prospect that radically re-figures the parameters of politics: the real prospect of extinction. As Foucault argues, we have reached this threshold because

the life of the species is wagered on its own political strategies. For millennia, man remained what he was for Aristotle: a living animal with the additional capacity of a political existence; modern man is an animal whose politics place his existence as a living being in question.⁹

How the prospect of extinction might materialise itself is an open question. That increasingly it can be materialised, militarily, ecologically and politically, is not.

The double bind of this prospect is that modernity's alternative of transformation through reason is not only untenable, it is deeply complicit in the form of (inter)national life that has been responsible for bringing about the real prospect of extinction in the first place. The capacity of violence to eradicate being was engendered by reason's success; not merely, or perhaps even most importantly, by furnishing the technological means, but more insidiously in setting the parameters of the political (*le politique*, to use the useful terms of debate in which Simon Critchley engages) while fuelling the violent practices of politics (*la politique*). The reliance on reason as that which could contain violence and reduce the real prospect of extinction may prove nothing less than a fatal misapprehension. In support of this proposition, consider the interpretive bases of the Holocaust.

For all that politics in the last fifty years has sought to exceptionalise the Nazis' genocide as an aberrant moment induced by evil personalities, there is no escaping the recognition that modern political life lies heavily implicated in the instigation and conduct of this horror. In so far as modernity can be characterised as the promotion of rationality and efficiency to the exclusion of alternative criteria for action, the Holocaust is one outcome of the 'civilising process'. With its plan rationally to order Europe through the elimination of an internal other, its bureaucratised administration of death, and its employment of the technology of a modern state, the Holocaust 'was not an irrational outflow of the not-yet-fully-eradicated residue of pre-modern barbarity. It was a legitimate resident in the house of modernity; indeed, one who would not be at home in any other house'.¹⁰

The paradoxical nature of modernity is suggested by the emergence of a Holocaust from within its bosom. And there can be no better indication - in

contradistinction to those 'modernists' who would like to brand so-called postmodernists' with the responsibility for all and future Holocausts - that a reliance on established traditions of reason for ethical succour and the progressive amelioration of the global human condition may be seriously misplaced. The comfort we have derived from the etiological myth of modern politics has occluded the way in which the 'civilising process' of which that myth speaks has disengaged ethics from politics. As Bauman concludes: (16) 5

1: EXTINCTION

— TECHNOLOGY CAN'T SAVE US: ONLY OPENNESS TO A NEW RELATION WITH
BEING CAN AVOID EXTINCTION.

Zimmerman '83, (Michael E., Dept. of Philosophy @ Newcomb of Tulane U,
Environmental Ethics, Summer, GAL)

1
128
EXTINCTION
Some people think that a calamity might usher in the new age, but World War II changed nothing—industrialization and the arms race are worse than ever (WCT, 66/65). Yet many people are now experiencing anxiety in the face of the potential extinction of our species through (nuclear war). According to Heidegger, when we let ourselves experience anxiety about our own personal deaths, we become open for hidden possibilities and we can resolve to act in light of them. It may be that by letting ourselves experience anxiety about the death of our species, we can rediscover our primary obligation (and highest possibility) of letting beings be—and resolve to live up to that obligation, something we cannot do if our species annihilates itself and the Earth.⁷² Though many people continue to cling to the animating Western conviction that technical rationality can save the day, many others proclaim the rebirth of a long dormant strand of Western tradition that defines reason as the wisdom needed to keep us within our proper limits.⁷³ Heidegger provides a basis for radical environmentalism insofar as he calls on us to remain open for the creative renewal of the Western wisdom tradition that offers a more appropriate understanding of Being—a new *ethos* in which to dwell. In the end, he may be a voice unheard in the wilderness of the Will to Power. Whether we heed his call and the call of others like him to be open for a new move in the “destiny of Being,” and whether such a move is already occurring, all this remains to be seen. We can be sure only of this: that each of us is always being put to the test. Today, perhaps more than ever, each of us is obligated to be open for the possible. Lack of such openness invites destruction of our species and of the living Earth, the great being that may rightfully be called our “mother.” Even while resolving to act in accordance with the possible and necessary, we must practice patience, humility, and acceptance—so we will be prepared for the unexpected that comes from the familiar.]

! : TECH/MANAGERIAL THOUGHT \Rightarrow ENVIR, NUCLEAR WAR, ~~X~~ Being

— THE TECHNOLOGICAL/MANAGERIAL MODE OF THOUGHT EMBLACED BY THE AFFIRMATIVE CAUSES ENVIRONMENTAL DESTRUCTION, NUCLEAR DISASTER, AND LOSS OF HUMAN'S RELATIONSHIP WITH BEING.

McWhorter '92 (Ladelle, Professor of Philosophy @ Northeast Missouri State U, Heidegger and the Earth, ed. Ladelle McWhorter, p. GAL)

[What is most illustrative is often also what is most common. Today, on all sides of ecological debate we hear, with greater and greater frequency, the word management. On the one hand, business people want to manage natural resources so as to keep up profits. On the other hand, conservationists want to manage natural resources so that there will be plenty of coal and oil and recreational facilities for future generations. These groups and factions within them debate vociferously over which management policies are the best, that is, the most efficient and manageable. Radical environmentalists damn both groups and claim it is human population growth and rising expectations that are in need of management. But wherever we look, wherever we listen, we see and hear the term management.

MANAGE
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OF BEING

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We are living in a veritable age of management. Before a middle class child graduates from high school she or he is already preliminarily trained in the arts of weight management, stress management, and time management, to name just a few. As we approach middle age we continue to practice these essential arts, refining and adapting our regulatory regimes as the pressures of life increase and the body begins to break down. We have become a society of managers – of our homes, careers, portfolios, estates, even of our own bodies – so is it surprising that we set ourselves up as the managers of the earth itself? And yet, as thoughtful earth-dwellers we must ask, what does this signify?

In numerous essays – in particular the beautiful 1953 essay, "The Question Concerning Technology" – Heidegger speaks of what he sees as the danger of dangers in this, our, age. This danger is a kind of forgetfulness – a forgetfulness that Heidegger thought could result not only in nuclear disaster or environmental catastrophe, but in the loss of what makes us the kind of beings we are, beings who can think and who can stand in thoughtful relationship to things. This forgetfulness is not a forgetting of facts and their relationships; it is a forgetfulness of something far more important and far more fundamental than that. He called it forgetfulness of 'the mystery'. }

25

1: TECH THOUGHT ⇒ ~~ENVIR.~~, ~~Being~~

— OUR TECHNOLOGICAL DISCLOSURE OF NATURE VIEWS EVERYTHING AS
STANDING RESERVE - THIS RESULTS IN ENVIRONMENTAL DESTRUCTION, AND LOSS OF Being

Zimmerman '83, (Michael E., Dept. of Philosophy @ Newcomb of Tulane U,
Environmental Ethics, Summer, GAL)

As we shall see, Heidegger was not always clear in his attempt to reconcile the notion that beings manifest *themselves* and the notion that this manifesting (Being) occurs within the linguistic-historical world opened up through human existence in the service of the "history of Being." At times, he suggests that the history of Being is a kind of "play" in which one mode of self-manifesting or Being follows the next, without any one mode being a more adequate revelation of beings than any other. This view would correspond to the one proposed by Foucault and Derrida, for whom the appearance of beings is largely at the mercy of the prevailing language-game, no one of which is privileged. At other times, however, Heidegger suggests that the current technological disclosure of the Being of beings is particularly restrictive, for it lets beings show themselves only as objects for human use. Although no human experience of beings can occur outside the context and limits of language, language does not *add* Being to beings; instead, language and tradition provide the clearing in which beings can present themselves, although sometimes in restricted ways. Such is the case today, when humanity elevates itself to the status of world ruler who uses language as an instrument to exploit everything that is. Ignorant of our obligation to let beings show themselves as they are, we overstep our own proper limits and attempt the impossible: the technological domination of nature.⁹ According to Heidegger, only humans can be so hubristic:

The unnoticeable law of the earth preserves the earth in the sufficiency of the emerging and perishing of all things in the allotted sphere of the possible which everything follows, and yet nothing knows. The birch tree never oversteps its possibility. The colony of bees dwells in its possibility. It is first the will which arranges itself everywhere in technology that devours the earth in the exhaustion and consumption and change of what is artificial. Technology drives the earth beyond the developed sphere of its possibility into such things which are no longer a possibility and are thus the impossible. (EP, 190/90)

In his early work, Heidegger defined *inauthenticity* as the denial of one's own limits and *authenticity* as acting in accordance with one's limits.¹⁰ Later, he decided that inauthenticity results not from lack of personal resoluteness, but is instead a cultural phenomenon resulting from the "destiny of Being" (*Seinsgeschick*)¹¹ Because beings are now destined to present themselves only as objects for use, we cannot avoid treating them as commodities. We are drawn to force things, including the environment that sustains us, beyond their limits. Yet by stepping over our proper limits, we do evil:

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CONTINUES . . .

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1: Tech Thought \Rightarrow ~~X~~ ENVIR., ~~X~~ Being

↓ ↓ ↓

Destructiveness comes from unbridled license, which consumes itself in its own revolt and is thus active evil. Evil is always the evil of ghostly spirit. . . . Evil is ghostly in that it is the revolt of a terror blazing away in blind delusion, which casts all things into unholy fragmentation and threatens to turn the calm, collected blossoming of gentleness into ashes. (OWL, 179/60)

At the same time that he claims we are in self-willed "insurrection" against nature, Heidegger also suggests that we are destined to overstep our limits:

"The earth can show itself only as an object for assault. . . . Nature appears everywhere as the object of technology" (QT, 100/236). It appears that, like Oedipus, we are acting disastrously out of an ignorance imposed by fate. Indeed, Heidegger once said that "since man is the percipient who perceives what is, we can think of him as the *persona*, the [tragic] mask of Being" (WIT, 62/28). The tragedy, however, is not so much that an arrogant species might be committing suicide by destroying its environment, but that if beings become revealed in ever more limited ways, eventually they will scarcely "be" at all. Even if we somehow manage to avoid total environmental collapse, if we become frozen into a one-dimensional apprehension of beings, we will cease being human—for what is essential to our humanity is openness for novel and creative ways of apprehending what is. The prospects for avoiding the calamity in our tragic script seem bleak. Heidegger once said that

No one can foresee the radical changes to come. But the technological advance will move faster and faster and can never be stopped. In all areas of his existence, man will be encircled ever more tightly by the forces of technology. These forces . . . , since man has not made them, have moved long since beyond his will and have outgrown his capacity for decision. (DT, 51/19)

103-105

(27)

TECHNOLOGY & Being

— EXCLUSIVE USE OF TECHNOLOGICAL THOUGHT ROBS HUMANITY OF ITS VERY ESSENCE, A GREATER DANGER THAN WORLD WAR III.

Martin Heidegger, professor of philosophy, Discourse on Thinking, 1966, p. 55-6

But for the time being — we do not know why for how long — ~~man~~ finds himself in a perilous situation. Why? Just because a third world war might break out unexpectedly and bring about the complete annihilation of humanity and the

destruction of the earth? No. In this dawning atomic age a far greater danger threatens — precisely when the danger of a third world war has been removed. A strange assertion! Strange indeed, but only as long as we do not meditate.

In what sense is the statement just made valid? This assertion is valid in the sense that the approaching tide of technological revolution in the atomic age could so captivate, bewitch, dazzle, and beguile ~~man~~ that calculative thinking may someday come to be accepted and practiced as the only way of thinking.

What great danger then might move upon us? Then there might go hand in hand with the greatest ingenuity in calculative planning and inventing indifference toward meditative thinking, total thoughtlessness. And then? Then ~~man~~ would have denied and thrown away ~~his~~ own special nature — that ~~he~~ is a meditative being. Therefore, the issue is the saving of ~~man~~'s essential nature. Therefore, the issue is keeping meditative thinking alive.

Yet releasement toward things and openness to the mystery never happen of themselves. They do not befall us accidentally. Both flourish only through persistent, courageous thinking.

___. Vote negative to avoid loss of our relation with Being: Technology's slow motion destruction of nature outweighs complete nuclear annihilation.

Zimmerman '94 (Michael E., Dept. of Philosophy @ Newcomb of Tulane U.,
Contesting Earth's Future: Radical Ecology and Postmodernity, p. 119)

Heidegger asserted that human self-assertion, combined with the eclipse of being threatens the relation between being and human Dasein. Loss of this relation would be even more dangerous than a nuclear war that might "bring about the complete annihilation of humanity and the destruction of the earth." This controversial claim is comparable to the Christian teaching that it is better to forfeit the world than to lose one's soul by losing one's relation to God. Heidegger apparently thought along these lines; it is possible that after a nuclear war, life might once again emerge, but it is far less likely that there will ever again occur an ontological clearing through which such life could manifest itself. Further, since modernity's one-dimensional disclosure of entities virtually denies them any "being" at all, the loss of humanity's openness for being is already occurring. Modernity's background mood is horror in the face of nihilism, which is consistent with the aim of providing material "happiness" for everyone by reducing nature to pure energy. The unleashing of vast quantities of energy in nuclear war would be equivalent to modernity's slow-motion destruction of nature: unbounded destruction would equal limitless consumption. If humanity avoided nuclear war only to survive as contented clever animals, Heidegger believed we would exist in a state of ontological damnation; hell on earth masquerading as material paradise.

! : ERROR REPLICATION

~~First~~, The unspoken assumptions of their policy analysis mean they are doomed to error replication by predetermining how the "problem" is viewed.

Shapiro '88 (The Politics of Representation, Michael J., Professor of Political Science at University of Hawaii, p.)

With this analysis as background, how can we arrive at a more linguistically self-conscious model of writing for the social sciences in general and political analysis in particular? The common wisdom has it that social scientists should avoid ethically charged language in the descriptive or explanatory part of their presentation. This is sometimes construed, as it is by James Q. Wilson, as a matter of presenting the "evidence" (evidence that has emerged from social scientific investigations) in relatively nontechnical language, and then evaluating the alternative policy options in light of that evidence. But descriptions of evidence contain evaluations. Figures of speech and rhetorical and grammatical structures of discourse are not simply extra means of expression used to represent thoughts. What is thought is produced by the figuration of the text. For example, the employment of an individualistic discourse allocates responsibility for crime to persons whose conduct has been criminalized. Such a discourse is part of what Foucault calls the "mechanisms of domination," for it speaks in the

language of the administration of penalties. Policy analysts who speak in the ordinary way, which is familiar to policy makers and the public at large, are letting the prevailing power structure play ventriloquist. When they let the existing structure of domination speak through their mouths, the alternative policy responses proffered for meeting "the situation" are predetermined by the interests that constitute "the situation" to begin with.

Policy analysis, then, is necessarily a polemical practice. Once we recognize that its value, the resources it lends, and the kinds of persons it presumes and creates come about through its grammatical, narrative, and rhetorical strategies, we are in a position to rethink the relationship it has with its clientele. In one respect, vocation of critical analysis is the same within this productive approach to discourse as it is in the representational approach: it is supposed to provide analysis. But the kind of analysis is different. Rather than accepting and reifying the subjects, objects, and surface relationships deployed by the languages of public policy and of

everyday life, it makes available the practices that have produced the referents of that language. 178

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1: Error Replication

— OUR ONE DIMENSIONAL TECHNOLOGICAL THINKING CAUSE ENDLESS ERROR REPLICATION —
HUMANIST ACTIVISM IS OFTEN A "CURE" WORSE THAN THE DISEASE.

Zimmerman '83, (Michael E., Dept. of Philosophy @ Newcomb of Tulane U,
Environmental Ethics, Summer, GAL)

Although Rorty's critique is accurate in some ways, it is misguided in others. He implies, for example, that Heidegger's apparent lack of concern about the relation between beings and beings would lead to starvation for children whose only hope lies in the spread of technology, i.e., in the expansion of the human quest to dominate nature. As I have already noted, however, Heidegger did say that we must support the prevailing morality as long as anything better is lacking. Moreover, he understood that humanistic activism often leads to greater problems than the ones it "solves." The drive to control malaria in certain countries, for example, was well-intentioned and largely successful at first. But the elimination of malaria led to such overpopulation that in some countries more people are starving than ever before. Moreover, malaria is making a comeback as the malaria mosquito grows resistant to insecticides. The humanistic Western tradition is leading us to a situation with which the prevailing norms may not be able to cope. One critic of humanism contends that, given the rate at which we are destroying the biosphere, the best alternative facing us is a rapid collapse of industrial civilization without nuclear war.⁶⁰ Humanism, of course, can hardly call for an end to industrialization that forms the basis of human "progress." So the system carries on, guided by its own internal "logic."

Since Heidegger was a keen student of the self-destructive logic of Western thought, we can be sure that when he calls for a renewal of "thought" he does not mean academic philosophy, but a paradigm shift in our understanding of Being. Such a shift, in Heidegger's view, will have to come from some reappropriation of our own tradition. Recently, Rorty seems to have recognized the validity of this view when he says that the moral concern of philosophy "should be with continuing the conversation with the West. . . ."⁶¹ The subjectivistic Cartesian "turn," he tells us, was "the triumph of the quest for certainty over the quest for wisdom. . . . Science, rather than living, became philosophy's object, and epistemology its center."⁶² By trying to provide a "correct" picture of reality, philosophy has neglected to ask crucial questions about life. Philosophy's task must be to remain open for new language-games, 124-5 for alternative descriptions of humankind and nature. Philosophy must become "edifying" if we are to avoid the freezing-over of culture that would lead to dehumanization.⁶³ Heidegger was such an edifying thinker whose task it was to de-construct the Western tradition so that it could speak again in new ways. Today, we are victims of "one-track thinking" that parades itself as the only possible or reasonable one (WIT, 26/55). Oblivious to the possibility of alternative ways of understanding Being, we are on the verge of losing our "humanity," i.e., our openness for the mystery of Being. Such openness could be lost even if we somehow manage to avoid nuclear war or ecological catastrophe—though these latter possibilities seem increasingly likely to be realized.⁶⁴

(31)

ONTOLOGY 1st

— QUESTIONS OF ONTOLOGY COME FIRST - THEY AFFECT THE ENTIRE FOUNDATION OF ALL THEIR CLAIMS.

Dillon '99 (*Moral Spaces: Rethinking Ethics and World Politics*, ed. David Campbell and Michael J. Shapiro, Professor of Politics @ University of Lancaster, Michael, p.)

[As Heidegger — himself an especially revealing figure of the deep and mutual implication of the philosophical and the political — never tired of pointing out, the relevance of ontology to all other kinds of thinking is fundamental and inescapable. For one cannot say anything about any thing that is without always already having made assumptions about the is as such. Any mode of thought, in short, always already carries an ontology sequestered within it. What this ontological turn does to other — regional — modes of thought is to challenge the ontology within which they operate. The implications of that review reverberate throughout the entire mode of thought, demanding a reappraisal as fundamental as the reappraisal ontology has demanded of philosophy.

With ontology at issue, the entire foundations or underpinnings of any mode of thought are rendered problematic. This applies as much to any modern discipline of thought as it does to the question of modernity as such, with the exception, it seems, of science, which, having long ago given up the ontological questioning of when it called itself natural philosophy, appears now, in its industrialized and corporatized form,

to be invulnerable to ontological perturbation. With its foundations at issue, the very authority of a mode of thought and the ways in which it characterizes the critical issues of freedom and judgment (of what kind of universe human beings inhabit, how they inhabit it, and what counts as reliable knowledge for them in it) is also put in question. The very ways in which Nietzsche, Heidegger, and other continental philosophers challenged Western ontology, simultaneously, therefore reposed the fundamental and inescapable difficulty, or *aporia*, for human being of decision and judgment.

In other words, whatever ontology you subscribe to, (knowingly or unknowingly) as a human being you still have to act. Whether or not you know or acknowledge it, the ontology you subscribe to will construe the problem of action for you in one way rather than another. You may think ontology is some arcane question of philosophy, but Nietzsche and Heidegger showed that it intimately shapes not only a way of thinking, but a way of being, a form of life. Decision, a fortiori political decision, in short, is no mere technique. It is instead a way of being that bears an understanding of Being, and of the fundamentals of the human way of being within it. This applies, indeed applies (most) to those (mock-innocent) political slaves who claim only to be technocrats of decision making. 1978

ONTOLOGY 15

— DEVELOPMENT OF A NEW METAPHYSICS THAT ABANDONS ~~THE~~ TECHNOLOGICAL
THOUGHT IS THE MOST IMPORTANT TASK FOR PHILOSOPHY — IT'S KEY TO
SOLVING ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS.

Zimmerman '83, (Michael E., Dept. of Philosophy @ Newcomb of Tulane U,
Environmental Ethics, Summer, GAL)

For a long time, philosophers aligned with the Anglo-American analytic tradition have been in conflict with philosophers aligned with the Continental phenomenological tradition. The environmental crisis now facing all of us, however, is helping to initiate a dialogue between thinkers in these two camps. This essay is a contribution to that dialogue. Some people have described the environmental crisis in limited terms, such as the ecological destruction caused by industrial pollution. Others have argued that the environmental crisis goes much deeper, that it is a symptom of an underlying cultural crisis. According to this argument, Westerners exploit the natural world because they regard themselves as the source of all value and meaning. Humanism, the term that describes this anthropocentric position, proclaims the "rights of man" and reduces everything else to the status of a commodity. John Passmore once wrote that the environmental crisis can be solved without turning to "mysticism" or a new metaphysics—in short, without abandoning the philosophical principles supporting humanism. Not long afterward, however, he was moved to say that

"New
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Crisis
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we do need a 'new metaphysics' which is genuinely not anthropocentric, and which takes change and complexity with the seriousness they deserve. . . . The working out of such a metaphysics is, in my judgement, the most important task which lies ahead of philosophy.¹

Act (S) ENVIR.

_. We advocate an alternative of human stewardship of Being—all this means is letting nature be, abandoning the urge to control and manage it. This “letting be” is the best means of protecting the environment.

Thiele '95, (Leslie Paul, Dept. of Polit. Sci. @ U of Florida,
Environmental Ethics, Summer, GAL)

Heidegger has frequently been invoked in ecological debate. Many characterizations of his work in this regard have been misleading, however, for he is not to be identified as a deep ecologist, *pace* Charles Taylor and the early Michael Zimmerman.³¹ My purpose here, however, is not critically to assess these readings. Rather, I focus on an aspect of Heidegger's thought seldom engaged within or without environmental circles, and argue that it holds the key to his ecological thinking. Heidegger, though few recognize it, places freedom at the center of his philosophic inquiry. “The question of the essence of human freedom,” he writes, “is the fundamental question of philosophy, and even the question of Being entwined in it.”³² But freedom, for Heidegger, emerges most fundamentally not in our acting upon objects or others (positive liberty) nor in our escaping being illegitimately acted upon (negative liberty), but in our witnessing of Being. “Freedom,” he writes, “is the condition of possibility of the disclosure of the Being of beings, of the understanding of Being.”³³ Heidegger identifies human being, *Dasein*, as a uniquely self-interpreting being. Because human being is by nature a Being-in-the-world,

however, its capacity and concern to disclose itself is at the same time a capacity and concern to disclose its world. That is to say, freedom arises whenever human beings approach things in the world—rocks, trees, people, animals, plants, language—with a questioning wonder at the sheer *isness*, the Being, which unites disparate entities.

Heidegger employs the term *Gelassenheit*, or releasement, to describe the human disposition that facilitates our disclosive freedom. Releasement indicates a letting be, subjecting things neither to domination and control nor to an objectifying possession. Releasement is an opening of oneself up to things so that they may be appreciated and understood for themselves. Since Being is only accessible through beings, releasement toward beings allows for the disclosure of Being. No longer restricted to the exhibition of beings solely as objects of possession or mastery, we learn fully to dwell in the world owing to our exercise of disclosive freedom. Heidegger writes:

Freedom reveals itself as the “letting-be” of what-is. . . . The phrase we are now using, namely the “letting-be” of what-is, does not, however, refer to indifference and neglect, but to the very opposite of them. To let something be is in fact to have something to do with it. . . . Freedom is not what common sense is content to let pass under that name: the random ability to do as we please, to go this way or that in our choice. Freedom is not license in what we do or do not do. Nor, on the other hand, is freedom a mere readiness to do something requisite and necessary and thus in a sense “actual.” Over and above all this (“negative” and “positive” freedom) freedom is a participation in the revealment of what-is-as-such.³⁴



CONTINUES...

(34)

ALT B ENVIR.



To be free, in Heidegger's sense of the term, means to free that which is other, to disclose the world in a way that preserves and safeguards its difference.

Mortals dwell in the world by saving the earth. Heidegger writes: "To save really means to set something free into its own presencing. To save the earth is more than to exploit it or even wear it out. Saving the earth does not master the earth and does not subjugate it, which is merely one step from spoliation."³⁵

Thus, Heidegger's understanding of freedom distances itself from a narrow anthropocentric objectification of the world as a resource for exploitation. The Being of nature solicits disclosure and appreciation apart from its utility. But unlike certain deep ecologists, Heidegger is unwilling to equate humans, ontologically or ethically, with all other organisms. The human capacity to experience freedom through participation in the disclosure of Being is unique and most worthy of preservation. Heidegger writes: "Compared with the duration of cosmic galaxies, human existence and its history is certainly quite fleeting, only a 'moment.' But this transiency is nevertheless the highest mode

of Being when it becomes an existing out of and toward freedom."³⁶ While Heidegger supports what would today be called the nonanthropocentric approach to the Earth and world, he rejects its replacement with a strictly biocentric approach. However, Heidegger's unwillingness to proclaim undifferentiated organic life as the highest good (does not) jeopardize his status as an ecological theorist. Arguably it makes his case stronger. Celebrating the unique capacities of human being to disclose in a way that preserves promotes humanity's benign (ontological) stewardship of the Earth and the world. I am suggesting that the fostering of human freedom, understood as a disclosive letting be rather than a sovereign control of objects or a sovereign maintenance of a private domain is precisely that measure which best safeguards the Earth's ecological diversity and health. 181-3

Art
disclosure
- anthropocentric
- biocentric
- ecocentric
- stewardship
- letting be
- best for
- ecological diversity
- 181-3

Alt (S) ENVIR.

— ONTOLOGICAL QUESTIONING OF OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH NATURE SOLVES
PRACTICAL ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS.

HAAK '93 (MICHEL, THE SONG OF THE EARTH: HEIDEGGER AND THE GROUNDS
OF THE HISTORY OF BEING p. 170)

To define human being as care, while not stipulating any particular ethical or environmental attitude or comportment, indicates that human being is not to be defined by its possessive mastery of the world. "It is one thing just to use the earth," Heidegger writes, "another to receive the blessing of the earth and to become at home in the law of this reception in order to shepherd the mystery of Being and watch over the inviolability of the possible" (EP 109). Relations with others and nature would develop in a less technologically exploitative and more preservative, ecological direction, Heidegger suggests, once the understanding of human being as care displaces the subjectivism that grounds our metaphysical self-understandings. In writing that "man is not the lord of beings. Man is the shepherd of Being," Heidegger gestures at the changes to our concrete, worldly relationships that might ensue from changes in our ontological relationships (BW 221; cf. N 248). The ontology of dwelling engages the meaning of human being in a way that buttresses practical environmental concerns. Heidegger writes, "Mortals dwell in that they save the earth. . . . To save really means to set something free into its own presencing. To save the earth is more than to exploit it or even wear it out. Saving the earth does not master the earth and does not subjugate it, which is merely one step from spoliation" (PLT 150). The identification of human being as an ontologically care-full, worldly dweller facilitates an actual (ontic) earthly caretaking. Identifying oneself, and one's dignity, by the exercise of disclosive freedom precludes wholesale efforts at control and subjugation. To be free, we remember, is to set free, is to let be. The exercise of freedom coalesces our who and our how, our sense of self and our way of being in the world. To understand human freedom as a disclosure that preserves is to be well on the way to an ecological practice.

— ONTOLOGICAL QUESTIONING OF TECHNOLOGY SOLVES THE CASE: IT WOULD LEAD TO
CHANGE IN ATTITUDES, ACTION, AND INSTITUTIONS TO SOLVE ENVIRONMENTAL EXPLOITATION.

ZIMMERMAN '93 (MICHAEL, ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS, SPRING p. 196)

Like Heidegger, deep ecologists criticize the metaphysical presuppositions allegedly responsible for ecological destruction, and also contend that a transformed awareness of what humanity and nature "are" would lead spontaneously to a transformation of society. The solution to the environmental crisis, then, would involve an ontological shift: from an anthropocentric, dualistic, and utilitarian understanding of nature to an understanding which "lets things be," i.e., which discloses things other than merely as raw material for human ends. A nonanthropocentric humanity, having undergone what amounts to a spiritual transformation, would presumably develop attitudes, practices, and institutions that would exhibit respect and care for all beings. 196 FO

(36)

Act. ⑤ ENVIRONMENT

— ONLY BY ABANDONING TECHNOLOGICAL APPROACHES CAN THE ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS BE RESOLVED - CONCEPTUAL CONTROL OF NATURE DESTROYS IT.


Thiele '95, (Leslie Paul, Dept. of Polit. Sci. @ U of Florida,
Environmental Ethics, Summer, GAL)

Henry David Thoreau writes that "Life consists with wildness. The most alive is the wildest. Not yet subdued to man, its presence refreshes him."⁵⁴ Why, we ask, does wildness refresh? The answer is precisely because it has not been subdued by humankind, because, escaping physical and conceptual capture, it remains radically other. In short, Thoreau discovered that nature loves to hide, and he deeply loved its hiddenness. As Thoreau observed, "The highest that we can attain to is . . . a discovery that there are more things in heaven and earth than are dreamed of in our philosophy."⁵⁵ In the same vein, Walt Whitman, Thoreau's romantic contemporary, writes "what is better than to tell the best, / It is always to leave the best untold." This judgment follows because the "best of the earth cannot be told anyhow."⁵⁶ As evidence of this insight, John Muir's environmental awakening occurred upon a chance encounter with wild orchids in a Canadian swamp. They literally brought Muir to tears because he knew that these orchids had grown and bloomed without relevance or relation to human beings. They were beyond us. Finally, Albert Schweitzer chose the word reverence (*Ehrfurcht*) to limn his own experience with the mysterious, wondrous, and completely sufficient *isness* and *otherness* of nature experienced in the heart of Africa. I believe that such sentiments, if mustered less by guilt at human arrogance and more by disclosive freedom, augur a resolution of the environmental crisis.

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In his welcomingly honest if perhaps overly fatalistic account of our ecological predicament, Bill McKibben wonders if the time for its resolution is already past.⁵⁷ Nature, McKibben worries, has been irreversibly integrated into humankind's utilitarian calculus, permanently brought out of hiding. McKibben asks:

How can there be a mystique of the rain now that every [acidic] drop—even the drops that fall as snow on the Arctic—bears the permanent stamp of man? Having lost its separateness, it loses its special power. Instead of being a category like God—something beyond our control—it is now a category like the defense budget or the minimum wage, a problem we must work out. . . . What will it mean to come across a rabbit in the woods once genetically engineered "rabbits" are widespread? Why would we have any more reverence or affection for such a rabbit than we would for a Coke bottle? . . . Someday, man may figure out a method of conquering the stars, but at least for now when we look into the night sky, it is as Burroughs said: "We do not see ourselves reflected there—we are swept away from ourselves, and impressed with our own insignificance. . . ." The ancients, surrounded by wild and even hostile nature, took comfort in seeing the familiar above them—spoons and swords and nets. But we will need to train ourselves not to see those patterns. The comfort we need is inhuman.⁵⁸



37

CONTINUES . . .



In his attempt to stave off the “end of nature,” McKibben advocates not an environmental utopia, but “something else—an ‘atopia,’ perhaps—where our desires are not the engine.”⁵⁹ While McKibben’s etymology is faulty, his insight is genuine. A decentering of sorts is necessary, a move beyond “narrow” anthropocentrism and its premium of utility in the fulfillment of human desires and needs. Heidegger poses a similar question for us regarding our worldly enframing. He writes:

One settles for beings and forgoes Being so decidedly, that one does not acknowledge this abnegation as an abnegation, but presents it as a gain, as the advantage of never more becoming disturbed by ‘the abstract’ while meddling with beings. From where does this strange parsimoniousness originate? Perhaps this self-sufficiency in his experiencing and ordering of beings comes from this, that man in the midst of beings only thinks of what he needs.⁶⁰

To preserve their unique capacity for wonder and ontological disclosure, human beings must orient themselves to that which lies beyond their needs, including their need for conceptual capture and ethical standardization.] 188-9

Alt 5 - "THE TURNING"

- ONCE WE REALIZE THAT OUR ~~THE~~ TECHNOLOGICAL DISCLOSURE OF BEING IS ONLY ONE POSSIBLE WAY OF REVEALING THE WORLD, WE CAN "STEP OUTSIDE THE BOX" — THIS TURNING ADOPTS AN UNDERSTANDING DIVORCED OF MANAGERIAL ENFRAMING.

Dreyfus, Professor of Philosophy @ UC Berkeley, '93 (Hubert L., The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger, ed. Charles Guignon, 1993, p. 307-8)

"For us to be able to make a similar dissociation, Heidegger holds, we must rethink the history of being in the West. Then we will see that although a technological understanding of being is our destiny, it is not our fate. That is, although our understanding of things and ourselves as resources to be ordered, enhanced, and used efficiently has been building up since Plato, we are not stuck with that understanding. Although the technological understanding of being governs the way things have to show up for us, we can be open to a transformation of our current cultural clearing."

Only those who think of Heidegger as opposing technology will be surprised at his next point. Once we see that technology is our latest understanding of being, we will be grateful for it. Our technological clearing is the cause of our distress, yet if it were not given to us to encounter things and ourselves as resources, nothing would show up as anything at all, and no possibilities for action would make sense. And once we realize — in our practices, of course, not just as a matter of reflection — that we receive our technological understanding of being, we have stepped out of the technological understanding of being, for we then see that what is most important in our lives is not subject to efficient enhancement — indeed, the drive to control everything is precisely what we do not control. This transformation in our sense of reality — this overcoming of thinking in terms of values and calculation — is precisely what Heideggerian thinking seeks to bring about. Heidegger seeks to make us see that our practices are needed as the place where an understanding of being can establish itself; we can overcome our restricted modern clearing by acknowledging our essential receptivity to understandings of being:

Modern man must first and above all find his way back into the full breadth of the space proper to his essence. That essential space of man's essential being receives the dimension that unites it to something beyond itself... that is, the way in which the safeguarding of being itself is given to belong to the essence of man as the one who is needed and used by being. (OCT 39; TK 39)

This transformation in our understanding of being, unlike the slow process of cleaning up the environment, which is, of course, also necessary, would take place in a sudden gestalt switch: The turning of the danger comes to pass suddenly. In this turning, the clearing belonging to the essence of being suddenly clears itself and lights up. (OCT 44; TK 43). The danger — namely that we have a leveled and concealed understanding of being — when grasped as the danger becomes that which saves us. "The seltsame danger is, when it is as the danger, the saving power" (OCT 39; TK 39).

INTELL. ENDORSEMENT (S)

— YOUR BAUST MATTERS - AFFIRMATIONS OF A PARADIGM SHIFT AWAY FROM TECHNOLOGY
TEACH "CRITICAL MASS", OPENING NEW ALTERNATIVES.

Zimmerman '83, (Michael E., Dept. of Philosophy @ Newcomb of Tulane U,
Environmental Ethics, Summer, GAL)

Though often accused of adopting a passive, even pessimistic attitude toward the future, Heidegger in fact urged us to do what is needed to sustain the present world while we also remain open for the paradigm shift needed to usher in a new world. He always held that possibility is more important than actuality (BT, 63/38). To heed the summons of the possible requires humility, which requires acceptance of one's finitude and limits. Released from the self-deprecation that lurks in all arrogance, the humble person acts decisively and freely to bring forth what is needed. The crucial "act," of course, is the paradigm shift that we cannot produce but only affirm. Only from within the new world or context opened up by such a shift will there appear alternatives to our present exploitative treatment of beings. For a new paradigm to emerge, as it may be doing at this historical juncture, an unspecifiable "critical mass" of the populace must heed the summons of the possible and declare the emergence of the new domain.⁷¹ Words bring forth the world, and yet the words arise from within a world. Hence, it seems, the change must arise from

127-8

within our own tradition, although today this tradition has been informed by other traditions as well.

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At: Perm

_. Turn: "Doing" is part of the problem—the affirmative call for action to solve the problem is part of the western metaphysics we critique. The perm is still thinking within the mode of technological production.

Joan Stambaugh. Professor of Hunter College, City University of New York. 1987
(Heidegger and Asian Thought, Ed. Graham Parkes, P. _____)

"For starters, the title of the essay, "Overcoming Metaphysics," is somewhat misleading. It sounds as if we, we human beings, were able, if we wanted to and decided to, to set about getting rid of metaphysics by surmounting or transcending it to a "higher" point of view or position. Heidegger often used the far less common word for overcoming, *Verwindung*, to indicate that we cannot simply do away with metaphysics by our own efforts; rather, we can learn to live with it by not paying excessive heed to it or getting obsessed with surmounting it. Basically, Heidegger is saying that metaphysics is where we are right now, the reality oppressing us in the form of the will to will, of framing, of the essence of technology. To think that we can change this by some kind of *dian* is a sheer pipedream. All attempts at overcoming anything, not just metaphysics, are inextricably caught in the fatal net of this will to will of the *Ge-stell* (framing). Metaphysics is with us, and there is no way that we can assert with any degree of certainty that it won't stay with us. The wish for this degree of certainty is itself already a consequence of the modern gestalt of metaphysics, the Cartesian desire for clarity and certainty, for an unshakable foundation (*fundamentum inconcussum*).

Basically, there is nothing whatever we can "do"; the doing is part of the problem if not its source. All "doing" is itself metaphysical; it is a kind of production that finds the epitome of its expression in Karl Marx. "If one believes that thinking is capable of changing the place of man, this still represents thinking in accordance with the model of production." No wonder when asked in the *Spiegel* interview what philosophy could do to save us in our present situation, Heidegger answered quite simply: nothing. His much-touted statement that only a god can save us is only another way of saying the same thing.

Turn: Attempting to combine a new sense of reality with a technologically rooted policy coopts the margin, mobilizing it for technological ordering.

Dreyfus, Professor of Philosophy @ UC Berkeley, '93 (Hubert L. The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger, ed. Charles Guignon, 1993, p. 310-11)

"What can we do to get what is still nontechnological in our practices in focus in a non-nihilistic paradigm? Once one sees the problem, one also sees that there is not much one can do about it. A new sense of reality is not something that can be made the goal of a crash program like the moon flight—another paradigm of modern technological power. A new paradigm would have to take up practices that are now on the margin of our culture and make them central, while deemphasizing practices now central to our cultural self-understanding. It would come as a surprise to the very people who participated in it, and if it worked it would become an exemplar of a new understanding of what matters and how to act. These would, of course, be powerful forces tending to take it over and mobilize it for our technological order and if it failed it would not really be measured by our current understanding and so look ridiculous."

(41)

At: Perry

_. The permutation is another link: Our alternative of reflection doesn't stop and say "we've got the answer now"—the plan still operates in the problem-solution mindset, attempting to "know" and "control" the earth.

McWhorter '92 (Ladelle, Professor of Philosophy @ Northeast Missouri State U,
Heidegger and the Earth, ed. Ladelle McWhorter, p. ____ GAL)

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Perry
1-2

Heidegger calls us to give thought to - or give ourselves over to thought of - the strangeness of our technological being within the world. His works resound with calls for human beings to grow more thoughtful, to take heed, to notice and reflect upon (where we are) and what we are doing, lest human possibility and the most beautiful of possibilities for thought be lost irretrievably in forces we do not understand and only pretend we can control.

Heidegger's admonitions are sometimes somewhat harsh. "Let us not fool ourselves," he wrote in 1955. "All of us, including those who think

professionally, as it were, are often enough thought-poor; we all are far too easily thought-less. Thoughtlessness is an uncanny visitor who comes and goes everywhere in today's world. For nowadays we take in everything in the quickest and cheapest way, only to forget it just as quickly, instantly."¹

Some might find this unnecessarily harsh. We academicians may wish to contest the accusation. Surely, in the universities of all places, thinking is going on. But Heidegger had no respect for that or any other kind of complacency. The thinking he saw as essential is no more likely, perhaps unfortunately, to be found in universities or among philosophers than anywhere else. For the thinking he saw as essential is (not) the simple amassing and digesting of facts or even the mastering of complex relationships or the producing of ever more powerful and inclusive theories. The thinking Heidegger saw as essential, the thinking his works call us to, is not a thinking that seeks to master anything, not a thinking that results from a drive to (grasp) and (know) and shape the world it is a thinking that disciplines itself to allow the world - the earth, things - to show themselves on their own terms. Heidegger called this kind of thinking 'reflection'. In 1936 he wrote, "Reflection is the courage to make the truth of our own presuppositions and the realm of our own goals into the things that most deserve to be called in question."² Reflection is thinking that never rests complacently in the conclusions reached yesterday; it is thinking that continues to think, that never stops with a satisfied smile and announces: We can cease; we have the right answer now. On the contrary, it is thinking that loves its own life, its own occurring, that does not quickly put a stop to itself, as thinking intent on a quick solution always tries to do.]

Ari Perry

___. Turn: Revealing and concealing of different modes of thought occur together—Thinking technologically forecloses other options.

McWhorter '92 (Ladelle, Professor of Philosophy @ Northeast Missouri State U,
Heidegger and the Earth, ed. Ladelle McWhorter, p. ____ GAL)

Ari Perry notes: revealing and concealing occur simultaneously. 4-3

It would be easy to imagine that by 'the mystery' Heidegger means some sort of entity, some *thing*, temporarily hidden or permanently ineffable. But 'the mystery' is not the name of some thing; it is the event of the occurring together of revealing and concealing. Every academic discipline, whether it be biology or history, anthropology or mathematics, is interested in discovery, in the revelation of new truths. Knowledge, at least as it is institutionalized in the modern world, is concerned, then, with what Heidegger would call revealing, the bringing to light, or the coming to presence of things. However, in order for any of this revealing to occur, Heidegger says, concealing must also occur. Revealing and concealing belong together.

Now, what does this mean? We know that in order to pay attention to one thing, we must stop paying close attention to something else. In order to read philosophy we must stop reading cereal boxes. In order to attend to the needs of students we must sacrifice some of our research time. Allowing for one thing to reveal itself means allowing for the concealing of something else. All revealing comes at the price of concomitant concealment. But this is more than just a kind of Kantian acknowledgment of human limitation. Heidegger is not simply dressing up the obvious, that is, the fact that no individual can undergo two different experiences simultaneously. His is not a point about human subjectivity at all. Rather, it is a point about revealing itself. When revealing reveals itself as temporally linear and causally ordered, for example, it cannot simultaneously reveal itself as ordered by song and unfolding in dream. Furthermore, in revealing, revealing itself is concealed in order for what is revealed to come forth. Thus, when revealing occurs concealing occurs as well. The two events are one and cannot be separated.

Too often we forget. The radiance of revelation blinds us both to its own event and to the shadows that it casts, so that revealing conceals itself and its self-concealing conceals itself, and we fall prey to that strange power of vision to consign to oblivion whatever cannot be seen. Even our forgetting is forgotten, and all traces of absence absent themselves from our world.)

At: Peay / STATE C

— POLITICAL ACTION IS METAPHYSICAL AND HUMANIST — THE PEAY
IS PART OF THE PROBLEM.

Zimmerman '83, (Michael E., Dept. of Philosophy @ Newcomb of Tulane U,
Environmental Ethics, Summer, GAL)

[Heidegger holds that appropriate ethical limits can only arise within a new ethos, a new paradigm for understanding what we and other beings are. The new paradigm will arise from a new appropriation of the Western tradition. We cannot will that such a change come about, though we can be receptive to it. When Heidegger proclaimed in 1966 that "only a god can save us now," his point was that despite the depth of our need, we can do nothing practical to bring about a new ethos (Sp, 277/209). Political activism cannot alleviate the problem originally (produced by such activism) itself an expression of confidence in human self-perfectibility. From Heidegger's viewpoint, all modern political systems—capitalist as well as socialist—are metaphysical and humanistic; hence, they are part of the problem.⁴³ By "de-constructing" meta-

physics, that is, by suggesting that there is no ultimate ground, basis, or *arche* for reality, he undermines the foundation for Western political thought. Does this mean, as Reiner Schürmann and others have argued, that the "political" direction of his thought is anarchistic?⁴⁴ Is he, like Theodore Roszak, calling for the "creative disintegration" of Western industrial society?⁴⁵ Does he, like his former student Herbert Marcuse, call for a new understanding of Being that will free us from the "logic of domination" and open the way for a free, spontaneous interplay between humankind and nature?⁴⁶ For Heidegger, as for Marcuse, play without limits is merely destructive. Proper limits for behavior cannot be established by current legal forms, which are merely functions of the prevailing will to power, but only by Being itself. Yet when Heidegger talks about Being as doing things—imposing limits, concealing itself, guiding the destiny of the West—he hypostasizes it and makes it sound like a divine agency. In so doing, he reveals his debt to the Judaeo-Christian eschatological tradition.⁴⁷ In other places, however, where talk of the history of Being is lacking, he indicates that Being always means the self-presencing of beings. Being here refers to the way in which a thing is, how it stands forth and presents itself. From this point of view, to say that only Being can impose appropriate limits on humankind means that we must learn to behave in accordance with who we really are, in accordance with our own Being. Yet again, if Being can only reveal itself through language, and if language bears tradition, there can be no access to who we are "in ourselves." Tradition then assumes the role of "ground" and we are plunged back into metaphysics. }

At:
PEAY

44

At: Penn

— THE PERMUTATION FAILS - THE TRACE OF HUMAN CONTROL TAINTS OUR
RELATIONSHIP WITH NATURE.

Thiele '95, (Leslie Paul, Dept. of Polit. Sci. @ U of Florida,
Environmental Ethics, Summer, GAL)

Use and predation in themselves are neither unwarranted nor illegitimate—as long as we understand the origin of human freedom and dignity to lie not in the mastery and possession of beings, but in the witnessing of their Being. Humans are inextricably integrated with the natural world. Since we cannot (and should not) isolate ourselves from nature, we must establish limits to our exploitation of it, and to our attempts at its "restoration."⁴⁰ Although there can be no categorical and timeless resolution to this problem of balance, we can initiate a strategy of restraint. I believe such restraint best follows from changes in our understanding of human freedom. If we equate our dignity with our freedom, and our freedom with our capacity to control the world and maintain our independence, then our relation to nature will bear the (increasingly fatal) marks of human sovereignty. If, on the other hand, we understand our freedom and dignity to rest with our capacity to let beings be, then our relation to nature may bear the fruits of a symbiotic integration. 1 24

At:
Penn
Trace
of
human
control
manages
to
fail
rel. to
nature
184

45

At: NAZI!

Turn: By '38, HEIDEGGER SAW NAZISM AS THE MOST DANGEROUS FORM OF
TECHNOLOGICAL ORDERING - ENDORSING THE KAMIK IS CONSISTENT WITH REJECTION OF NAZISM.

Dreyfus, Professor of Philosophy @ UC Berkeley, '93 (Hubert L., The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger, ed. Charles Guignon, 1993, p. 312)

But by 1938, in "The Age of the World Picture," Heidegger sees technology as the problem of the West, and National Socialism, rather than the USSR and the United States, as the most dangerous form of what he calls, in Nazi terms, "total mobilization" (QCT 137; GA 5 97). Heidegger also criticized the belief in a Führer as the organizer of a total order as an example of faith in technological ordering.

Beings have entered the way of erring in which the vacuum expands which requires a single order and guarantee of beings. Herein the necessity of "leadership" that is the planning calculation... of the whole of beings, is required. (EP 105; VA 93)

After 1938, then, Heidegger thought of National Socialism not as the answer to technology and nihilism, but as its most extreme expression.

the lesson that should be drawn from Heidegger's Nazi affiliation is not that he should be dismissed, but that constant interrogation of the supposed distinction between philosophy and politics is needed - their argument only bolsters our criticism

Dillon '96 (Politics of Security, Michael, Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations @ University of Lancaster, p.)

Heidegger's thought and life occurred as European politics - plunged from 1914 onwards into unprecedented political violence, technological intensification and holocaustal extermination - itself re-opened the question of the relationship between the philosophy of the 'West' and its very understanding of politics; and precisely because the violence of both rather than merely being directed outwards at Europe's subject empires erupted at the epicentre of the 'West' and called the grounds of its entire enlightened subjective self-possession into question. Heidegger was a deeply thoughtful and active participant in the forceful renewal, and failure, of the *Auseinandersetzung* between philosophy and politics which has characterised European thought since the end of the nineteenth century. He not only addressed himself to its deepest levels and widest implications, but at one time he also sought, and was prepared to make, the most direct of personal political commitments to it. He consequently joined the Nazi Party. If there is an escape not only from Heidegger's 'politics', therefore, but also the Fascism to which he

was drawn, it can only come through pursuing the reopening of the question of the political itself as it is made possible through his philosophy. But this applies not only because his philosophy evidently contributed to his own fateful commitment. Despite his monstrous silence in respect of the Holocaust, his thinking also led Heidegger into an elaborate investigation of the Western nihilism which gave, and continues to give, rise to Fascism.⁴

It is not a matter here, therefore, of testing either Heidegger, or his thinking, for their political incorrectness. His thought offers a major resource, instead, for continuously interrogating the indissoluble relationship between philosophy and politics, the character of the political thought of the 'West', and the crisis of politics which the age of global technology inaugurated by the 'West' now poses. All three are critically important to the reconfiguration of the International Relations of political Modernity as site for rethinking the advent of the political.⁵

46

AT: NO ACT / PRAG.

_. This is another link—the demand for immediate pragmatic action is technological—we must think through the activity/passivity dichotomy—realizing that our passion for action is part of the problem opens new avenues for thinking.

McWhorter '92 (Ladelle, Professor of Philosophy @ Northeast Missouri State U,
Heidegger and the Earth, ed. Ladelle McWhorter, p. ____ GAL)

Heidegger's work is a call to reflect, to think in some way other than calculatively, technologically, pragmatically. Once we begin to move with and into Heidegger's call and begin to see our trying to seize control and solve problems as itself a problematic approach, if we still believe that thinking's only real purpose is to function as a prelude to action, we who attempt to think will twist within the agonizing grip of paradox, feeling nothing but frustration, unable to conceive of ourselves as anything but paralyzed. However, as so many peoples before us have known, paradox is not only a trap; it is also a scattering point and passageway. Paradox invites examination of its own constitution (hence of the patterns of thinking within which it occurs) and thereby breaks a way of thinking open, revealing the configurations of power that propel it and hold it on track. And thus it makes possible the dissipation of that power and the deflection of thinking into new paths and new possibilities.

Heidegger frustrates us. At a time when the stakes are so very high and decisive action is so loudly and urgently called for, Heidegger apparently calls us to do - nothing. If we get beyond the revulsion and anger that such a call initially inspires and actually examine the feasibility of response, we begin to undergo the frustration attendant upon paradox; how is it possible, we ask, to choose, to will, to do nothing? The call itself places in question the bimodal logic of activity and passivity; it points up the paradoxical nature of our passion for action, of our passion for maintaining control. The call itself suggests that our drive for acting decisively and forcefully is part of what must be thought through, that the narrow option of will versus surrender is one of the power configurations of current thinking that must be allowed to dissipate.

3

At: No Alt. / Policy Paralysis

THEIR CHARACTERIZATION OF THE ALTERNATIVE AS PASSIVE INACTION IS AN
OVERSIMPLIFICATION - HEIDEGGER ADVOCATES AN ACTIVE WAITING AND OPENNESS TO BEING.

Joan Stambaugh. Professor of Hunter College, City University of New York. 1987
(Heidegger and Asian Thought, Ed. Graham Parkes, P. 247-77)

We might briefly consider the relation of *Gelassenheit* to the will before going on to see its relation to thinking. In other words, seeing what it is that Heidegger wants us to let go of will bring us closer to the kind of thinking that may be able to lead us back to the direction of Being. For Heidegger, the will is perhaps the most insidious ingredient of metaphysics culminating in the will to will, or technology. The delicate question of what it is we are "doing" in *Gelassenheit* if we are not willing and are also not totally passively idle leads Heidegger to speak of *Gelassenheit* as

the release of oneself from transcendental re-presentation and so a relinquishing of the willing of a horizon. Such relinquishing no longer stems from a willing, except that the occasion for releasing oneself to belonging to that which regions requires a trace of willing. This trace, however, vanishes while releasing oneself and is completely extinguished in releasement.¹²

This is tricky business. But anyone familiar with any kind of meditation will recognize what Heidegger is trying to deal with here. We cannot will not to will, will to relax, calm down or be enlightened, and yet we won't get there by doing nothing at all. We can't simply drop into the lap of Being. Here Heidegger brings in another word to intimate the kind of "doing" he has in mind. The word is *Inständigkeit*, indwelling, and points to the same phenomenon designated by perdurance (*Austrag*). This phenomenon is related to the kind of thinking Heidegger calls *Andenken*. It is a kind of waiting, not a passive waiting, but a very attentive, intense one. Perhaps as not too apt examples we could cite the solo musician who is about to begin his recital, collecting and gathering himself in an intense concentration, a centering; or even a baseball player at bat as he waits for the pitch. One could adduce many such examples. Each one would fall short and fail in one way or another, but perhaps they could point us in the right direction. *Inständigkeit* or perdurance is a kind of intensely receptive sticking something through, sticking it out, perhaps something akin to what we do when we try to recall something we have forgotten. It reminds me of what the Buddhist thinker Dogen called "sustained exertion." A kind of non-willing (not unwilling) exertion distances *Inständigkeit* from all flabby passivity. To use the more familiar word, when we endure something, we are not willing it, but we are not passive either. What we endure could be either something greatly painful or greatly joyful. Even the way we read a great and important book could be characterized by *Gelassenheit* and *Inständigkeit*. If I read the book in an unfocused way, I will only get a diffuse picture of it. I must have something in mind I want to find, the way I read when I am going to teach or write something on the book; and yet I must be open and receptive to something of which I perhaps have no idea. 247-77

(48)

AT: PERFORMATIVE CONTRADICTION

It's another link-our arguments only appear paradoxical from within the logic of non-contradiction, which prevents us from taking that paradox seriously.

McWHORTER '92 (LADELLE, Prof. of Philosophy @ Northeast Missouri State U.,
HEIDEGGER AND THE EARTH, Ed. LADELLE McWHORTER, GAL)

PARADOX IS THE TITILLATING OTHER OF ALL LOGICS rooted in the law of non-contradiction. It is Other because it is unassimilable; it is titillating because it is transgressive. Most of us enjoy an occasional encounter with paradox the way we enjoy a good joke - but rarely do we take paradoxes seriously. Our enjoyment, in fact, depends upon our thinking's maintaining itself within the logic of non-contradiction and viewing the paradoxical from that perspective rather than our immersing ourselves in the paradoxical on its own terms. However, when we think with Heidegger, especially when that thinking concerns itself with what we might loosely refer to as ecology, we find ourselves called upon to think with and within the paradoxical - or, at least, what appears paradoxical from the perspective of the logic of non-contradiction.

A: PERF. CONT. / WRONG FORM - DB8 = TECHNOL.

- THE CONFRONTATION WITH TECHNOLOGY SHOULD TAKE PLACE IN A FORM THAT IS
PARTIALLY TECHNOLOGICAL, LIKE DEBATE.
HEIDEGGER # (MARTIN, THE QUESTION CONCERNING TECHNOLOGY, TRANS. WILLIAM LOVITT, p. 35)

[Whether art may be granted this highest possibility of its essence in the midst of the extreme danger, no one can tell. Yet we can be astounded. Before what? Before this other possibility: that the frenziedness of technology may entrench itself everywhere to such an extent that someday, throughout everything technological, the essence of technology may come to presence in the coming-to-pass of truth.]

Because the essence of technology is nothing technological, essential reflection upon technology and decisive confrontation with it must happen in a realm that is, on the one hand, akin to the essence of technology and, on the other, fundamentally different from it.

Anti-Stewardship/Heidegger = Anthro.

_. Stewardship is not rooted in attitudes of superiority—it's an appreciation of manifestations of Being, not exploitation.

Thiele '95, (Leslie Paul, Dept. of Polit. Sci. @ U of Florida,
Environmental Ethics, Summer, GAL)

Many with deep ecological leanings reject the prospect of human stewardship of nature. McKibben, for example, worries that our becoming the "caretakers" of a managed world, 'custodians' of all life" would cause the "pungent mystery" of the natural world to evaporate.³⁷ Likewise, Naess suggests that the "arrogance of stewardship consists in the idea of superiority which underlies the thought that we exist to watch over nature like a highly respected middleman between the Creator and the Creation."³⁸ Heidegger's understanding of stewardship, however, is not susceptible to these charges. He conceives our earthly stewardship not as a utilitarian prerogative but as an ontological gift. Ontological stewardship—the guardianship of Being—primarily lets things be what they are and therefore entails neither the knowledge requisite for utilitarian oversight and manipulation nor the ethical justification requisite for unbridled exploitation. Heidegger, we must remember, defines human being as the "shepherd of Being" not the shepherd of beings. Our primary orientation to the streams and the trees and the animals is not as resources for managed exploitation, but as diverse manifestations of Being.

HEIDEGGER'S PHILOSOPHY IS COMPATIBLE WITH ANTI-ANTHROPOCENTRISM

Zimmerman '83, (Michael E., Dept. of Philosophy @ Newcomb of Tulane U,
Environmental Ethics, Summer, GAL)

In the following essay, I consider the extent to which Martin Heidegger's philosophy manages to carry out the task posed by Passmore: to provide a nonanthropocentric way of thinking that will lead us out of the current crisis in culture and environment. My essay will help answer the question posed by a French thinker in 1973: "In the final accounting, will Heidegger have been the first theoretician in the ecological struggle?"² Because he insists that only a radical shift in our understanding of humanity and nature can end the current crisis, Heidegger's thought is largely compatible with the "radical environmentalism" or "deep ecology" that is the subject of debate among some philosophers. //

51

Art: LEVINAS / ETHICS PRECEDES ONTOLOGY

— LEVINAS DECENTERING FAILS — HE CAN'T RECONSTRUCT ETHICS WITHOUT ONTOLOGY —
HIS FOCUS ON THE VICTIM/OTHER MERELY CONSTRUCTS A JUDEO-CHRISTIAN ONTOLOGY OF SUFFERING.

LAROCHELE '99 (GILBERT, Philosophy Today, SUMMER P. PROQUEST)

While ~~Levinas~~ only made sporadic reference to the Holocaust in his work, his entire philosophy is admittedly impregnated with the lessons it teaches. However, my argument consists in demonstrating that he is not able to reconstruct metaphysics without ontology, justice without identity, responsibility without subjectivity. Instead of actually decentering all points of view, Levinas seems rather to displace the final legitimacy of history from the persecutor to the persecuted, by giving the victim the final right to ontology.

Three propositions can serve here to establish the framework for this reflection:

- a) reflexivity, as a form of identity, resurfaces in Levinas through the status of the victim in the Holocaust;
- b) his notion of responsibility is defined by the will to adopt the point of view of the victim and opens onto, in accordance with Judeo-Christian tradition, an ontology of suffering as a way to salvation;
- c) that conception of identity and responsibility ends up justifying the moral superiority of the Jew, victim par excellence, and of his universal model of justice. The paradox we wish to expose is that the weakness of the victim curiously becomes the instrument of a will of power in which the Jew takes on the form of the "last man" in history. To demonstrate these assertions, it seems pertinent first to try to understand, through a rereading of *Difficult Freedom*, Levinas' offensive against Western philosophy and paganism, then to see how Nazism became its worst manifestation. Finally, bringing light onto the victim will serve to unveil Levinasian ontology and the failure of his decentering effort.