NIETZSCHE

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We call our argument The Narcissistic Malaise

The Affirmative's pursuit of a world free of suffering requires the construction of an ideal world to which our current world must aspire. In order to achieve this fantasy, the 1AC's assistance identifies the imperfections of existence and justifies a process of ordering to correct them

Paul **Saurette**, professor of political theory at Johns Hopkins, in 19**96**
["I Mistrust all Systematizers and Avoid Them: Nietzsche, Arendt, and the Crisis of the Will to Order in International Relations Theory, *Journal of International Studies*, 25.1, pp. 1-28]

According to Nietzsche, the philosophical foundation of a society is the set of ideas which give meaning to the phenomenon of human existence within a given cultural framework. As one manifestation of the Will to Power, this will to meaning fundamentally influences the social and political organisation of a particular community.[5] Anything less than a profound historical interrogation of the most basic philosophical foundations of our civilization, then, misconceives the origins of values which we take to be intrinsic and natural. Nietzsche suggests, therefore, that to understand the development of our modern conception of society and politics, we must reconsider the crucial influence of the Platonic formulation of Socratic thought. Nietzsche claims that pre-Socratic Greece based its philosophical justification of life on heroic myths which honoured tragedy and competition. Life was understood as a contest in which both the joyful and ordered (Apollonian) and chaotic and suffering (Dionysian) aspects of life were accepted and affirmed as inescapable aspects of human existence.[6] However, this incarnation of the will to power as tragedy weakened, and became unable to sustain meaning in Greek life. Greek myths no longer instilled the self-respect and self-control that had upheld the pre-Socratic social order. 'Everywhere the instincts were in anarchy; everywhere people were but five steps from excess: the *monstrum-in-animo* was a universal danger'.[7] No longer willing to accept the tragic hardness and self-mastery of pre-Socratic myth, Greek thought yielded to *decadence*, a search for a new social foundation which would soften the tragedy of life, while still giving meaning to existence. In this context, Socrates' thought became paramount. In the words of Nietzsche, Socrates

saw *behind* his aristocratic Athenians; he grasped that his case, the idiosyncrasy of his case, was no longer exceptional. The same kind of degeneration was everywhere silently preparing itself: the old Athens was

coming to an end—And Socrates understood that the world had need of him —his expedient, his cure and his personal art of self-preservation.[8]

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Socrates realised that his search for an ultimate and eternal intellectual standard paralleled the widespread yearning for assurance and stability within society. His expedient, his cure? An alternative will to power. An alternate foundation that promised mastery and control, not through acceptance of the tragic life, but through the disavowal of the instinctual, the contingent, and the problematic. In response to the failing power of its foundational myths, Greece tried to renounce the very experience that had given rise to tragedy by retreating/escaping into the Apollonian world promised by Socratic reason. In Nietzsche's words, '[r]ationality was divined as a *saviour*...it was their last expedient. The fanaticism with which the whole of Greek thought throws itself at rationality betrays a state of emergency: one was in peril, one had only one choice: either to perish, or be *absurdly rational*....'[9] Thus, Socrates codified the wider fear of instability into an intellectual framework.

The Socratic Will to Truth is characterised by the attempt to understand and order life rationally by renouncing the Dionysian elements of existence and privileging an idealised Apollonian order. As life is inescapably comprised of both order and disorder, however, the promise of control through Socratic reason is only possible by creating a 'Real World' of eternal and meaningful forms, in opposition to an 'Apparent World' of transitory physical existence. Suffering and contingency is contained within the Apparent World, disparaged, devalued, and ignored in relation to the ideal order of the Real World. Essential to the Socratic Will to Truth, then, is the fundamental contradiction between the experience of Dionysian suffering in the Apparent World and the idealised order of the Real World. According to Nietzsche, this dichotomised model led to the emergence of a uniquely 'modern'[10] understanding of life which could only view suffering as the result of the imperfection of the Apparent World. This outlook created a modern notion of responsibility in which the Dionysian elements of life could be understood only as a phenomenon for which someone, or something, is to blame. Nietzsche terms this philosophically-induced condition *ressentiment*, and argues that it signalled a potential crisis of the Will to Truth by exposing the central contradiction of the Socratic resolution.

This contradiction, however, was resolved historically through the aggressive universalisation of the Socratic ideal by Christianity. According to Nietzsche, ascetic Christianity exacerbated the Socratic dichotomisation by employing the

Apparent World as the responsible agent against which the *ressentiment* of life could be turned. Blame for suffering fell on individuals within the Apparent World, *precisely* because they did not live up to God, the Truth, and the Real World. As Nietzsche wrote,

'I suffer: someone must be to blame for it' thinks every sickly sheep. But his shepherd, the ascetic priest tells him: 'Quite so my sheep! someone must be to blame for it: but you yourself are this someone, you alone are to blame for yourself,—*you alone are to blame for yourself*'—This is brazen and false enough: but one thing is achieved by it, the direction of *ressentiment* is altered.[11]

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Faced with the collapse of the Socratic resolution and the prospect of meaninglessness, once again, 'one was in peril, one had only one choice: either to perish, or be *absurdly rational....*'[12] The genius of the ascetic ideal was that it preserved the meaning of the Socratic Will to Power as Will to Truth by extrapolating *ad absurdium* the Socratic division through the redirection of *ressentiment* against the Apparent World! Through this redirection, the Real World was transformed from a transcendental world of philosophical escape into a model towards which the Apparent World actively aspired, always blaming its contradictory experiences on its own imperfect knowledge and action.

This subtle transformation of the relationship between the dichotomised worlds creates the Will to Order as the defining characteristic of the modern Will to Truth. Unable to accept the Dionysian suffering inherent in the Apparent World, the ascetic *ressentiment* desperately searches for 'the hypnotic sense of nothingness, the repose of deepest sleep, in short *absence of suffering*'.[13] According to the ascetic model, however, this escape is possible only when the Apparent World perfectly duplicates the Real World. The Will to Order, then, is the aggressive need increasingly to order the Apparent World in line with the precepts of the moral Truth of the Real World. The *ressentiment* of the Will to Order, therefore, generates two interrelated reactions. First, *ressentiment* engenders a need actively to mould the Apparent World in accordance with the dictates of the ideal, Apollonian Real World. In order to achieve this, however, the ascetic ideal also asserts that a 'truer', more complete knowledge of the Real World must be established, creating an ever-increasing Will to Truth. This self-perpetuating movement creates an interpretative structure within which everything must be understood and ordered in relation to the ascetic Truth of the Real World. As Nietzsche suggests,

[t]he ascetic ideal has a *goal*—this goal is so universal that all other interests of human existence seem, when compared with it, petty and narrow; it

> interprets epochs, nations, and men inexorably with a view to this one goal;
> it permits no other interpretation, no other goal; it rejects, denies, affirms
> and sanctions solely from the point of view of its interpretation.[14]

The very structure of the Will to Truth ensures that theoretical investigation must be increasingly ordered, comprehensive, more True, and closer to the perfection of the ideal. At the same time, this understanding of intellectual theory ensures that it creates practices which attempt to impose increasing order in the Apparent World. With this critical transformation, the Will to Order becomes the fundamental philosophical principle of modernity.

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Out of this desire for a harmonious world arises feelings of envy and resentment at those who live their lives according to a different worldview. The pity and compassion the Affirmative feels for those in Africa is not benevolent, but is instead a strategy of containment. By identifying the suffering of others, pity restores a sense of utopian wholeness by reducing the other to an object "dependent" on our betterment.

Michael **Ure**, Monash University, **in** 20**06**
["The Irony of Pity: Nietzsche Contra Schopenhauer and Rousseau," *The Journal of Nietzsche Studies* 32, p. 78-80]

Schopenhauer reveals here that the pitying person's disposition is not a product of a direct participation in the other's condition and does not therefore require any metaphysical explanation. Rather, **our pity for others emerges from the easing of our envy over their happiness**. **This kind of pity**, therefore, **demands no understanding of the other's suffering at all**, let alone the merging of identities that Schopenhauer presupposes in his metaphysical explanation of pity. On Schopenhauer's own analysis, **pity is not a mysterious merging of identities but, rather, a psychological metamorphosis anchored in the dissolution of the pain of envy or,** to state this point in positive terms, **the return of a feeling of self-plenitude in the acknowledgment of the other's lack**. **We do not grow "tenderer" toward the other because we feel his suffering in** *him*, as Schopenhauer puts it, **but because in his state of deprivation he no longer causes** *us* **suffering.** In Schopenhauer's example, **as pitiers our relationship to the other undergoes a change when we no longer see or imagine the other as enviable, not because we miraculously enter into and are motivated by the other's suffering.**

Chastising the psychological naïveté of Schopenhauer's metaphysical account of pity, Nietzsche confirms this point in his claim that the *Leid* that we attend to in the act of pity is not the other's *Leid* but, in fact, our own feeling of self-lack. Paradoxically, therefore, for Nietzsche, Schopenhauerian *Mitleid* is not *Mit-Leid* or "suffering-*with*": "That pity [*Mitleiden*], on the other hand, is the *same kind of thing* as the suffering [*mit demLeiden*] at the sight of which it arises, or that it possesses an especially subtle, penetrating understanding of suffering, are propositions contradicted by experience, and he who glorifies pity precisely on account of these two qualities *lacks* adequate *experience* in this very realm of the moral" (*D* 133). Nietzsche argues that because Schopenhauer fails to understand how his notion of pity is anchored in the desire to restore one's self-affection, he also fails to see that it subverts the very regard for others, or "the realm of the moral," that he unwisely attempts to base on the structure of the emotion as he understands it.

Of course, the corollary of Schopenhauer's position is that **although the visible signs of envy may disappear with the misfortune of others, the paranoid-schizoid position that fuels envy remains even more firmly entrenched**. **For rather than curing envy, this kind of pity merely serves to satisfy the envious need for others to be diminished so that one can feel whole and complete**. **Though by this means pitiers pleasurably assuage their narcissistic wound, it is**, as Nietzsche underscores, **a damaging** and enervating **means of doing so because it creates an addiction to finding pleasure in themselves through enviously spoiling the other**. According to Nietzsche, **the tonic effect of envy is outweighed by its harmful effects on not only the envied but the envier**. **The psychological consequence of this addiction to envy is** *melancholia*: **that** is to say, **not only do we attack and spoil the other's joy, but inevitably this spoiling constructs a world in which we feel that our own joy may similarly become the object of attack.**[38] If Schopenhauer's analysis of the moral psychology of pity is correct, then the others' return to joy must make them strangers to our hearts and excite our envy, and with this envy must also come the return of the menace of Schadenfreude. Nietzsche makes just this point regarding the disjointed rejoicing of pity: "*The compassionate Christian.*—**The reverse side of** Christian **compassion for the suffering of one's neighbour is a profound suspicion of all the joy of one's neighbour, of his joy in all that he wants to do and can**" (*D* 80). In other words, **within the framework** of Schopenhauer's ethics **of pity we can regard others as of equal worth only so long as they suffer equally**. **Suffering thus bridges the gulf among egos—but** *not*, as we have seen, because as pitiers we mysteriously enter into or participate in the condition of others but, rather, because their demise brings them down to our level and thus appeases the envy we feel at the sight of their self-sufficient happiness (see *D* 138). **The sight of others' suffering**, in short, **makes their independence more palatable to us because in this debased state they no longer arouse in us painful feelings of deprivation or** the **anxiety that we may be abandoned**. To recall Rousseau on this latter point, the *suffering* of others is a pledge of their affection for us. As Schopenhauer's analysis implies, taking pleasure in the other's suffering is a tonic for restoring damaged narcissistic self-affection. It is for this reason, Nietzsche believes, that when persistent feelings of

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envy threaten to attenuate our self-affection we pursue social or intersubjective means for reviving the pleasant feeling of Schadenfreude.

In other words, **when we enviously spoil others we** surreptitiously **restore to ourselves our narcissistic self-affection. Our envy does so by enabling us to construct ourselves as those who, by comparison with the spoiled object, are exempt from suffering, need, and loss. Through envy we aim to make the other** abject or **pitiable so that we no longer feel or experience our own abjection**. **The damage we inflict through envy reduces the other to the needy, insufficient, pitiable condition that we ourselves experience**. **It thereby soothes our painful feeling that in the face of a fantasized self-sufficient other we are superfluous or unloved. The imaginative work of envy reaches a successful resolution when it enables us to achieve a reversal of roles and our formerly abject self can feel itself as whole and complete in comparison with the now diminished other**: "Sometimes we love the rich man in the midst of misfortunes; *but so long as he prospers he has no real friend*, except the man who is not deceived by appearances, who pities rather than envies him in spite of his prosperity."[39] In Rousseau's framework, pity is the use to which envy puts the imagination. To clarify, it is the means through which Rousseau believes that wounded narcissists can reverse the positions of lack/plenitude: **by pitying others we transform ourselves into those who**, like the Epicurean gods, **are divinely free of anxiety and exempt from suffering and pain**. In this respect the conception of the moral subject that lies at the heart of his ethics of pity exemplifies the paranoid-schizoid defenses of pathological narcissism. It is apparent, to begin with, that Rousseau's moral subjects have not relinquished or tempered their fantasy of narcissistic plenitude insofar as they harbor the *regret* that they do not occupy the privileged position of the needless Epicurean gods. Indeed, it is partly because they bitterly measure their own loss against this fantasy of divine tranquility that they brim with painful envy at the sight of others' joy. (In accusing the other "of seeking happiness for himself alone" they repeat what Klein describes as the basic complaint of infantile envy: the accusation that its first object "has an unlimited flow of milk" that "it keeps for its own gratification." For Klein this image of a wholly self-gratifying object is the ego's projection of its own most desired state.)[40]

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This pity and compassion ultimately produces limitless violence—when the recipients of our pity assert independence from our assistance, they are ignored or destroyed to maintain the fantasy of our perfect world

Michael **Ure**, Monash University, **in** 20**06**
["The Irony of Pity: Nietzsche Contra Schopenhauer and Rousseau," *The Journal of Nietzsche Studies* 32, p. 68-70]

Turning to **Klein** first, she **identifies the paranoid-schizoid position as the incipient ego's primitive response to the anxiety that its rage over the loss of its perfection** (or the demise of primary narcissism) **might also lead it to destroy the good object on which it depends for its material and psychic survival**. **Indeed, this rage**, or persecutory anxiety as Klein calls it, **seems so potent and threatening that the good object must be rendered sublime and perfect in order to protect it from its own rage**. **In order to crystallize these intrapsychic processes**, Klein formulates the concept of the paranoid-schizoid position: the idea that **the ego splits its object world into idealized and debased objects (schizoid splitting) and projects them into the other (paranoia)**. According to Klein, **the presence of envy is symptomatic of an abnormally strong paranoid-schizoid tendency**. **Envy arises**, she asserts, **because we harbor a fantasy of a condition of inexhaustible plenitude or self-sufficiency. This fantasy is disturbed by the painful discovery of our dependence on others and the limits this places on our narcissistic dream of perfection and omnipotence**. Following Freud's lead, she holds that **we attempt to maintain and nurture this fantasy and** that **the ego**, at least in part, **is constituted and develops as a mechanism for** warding off the anxiety generated by this loss and **restoring the fantasy of plenitude**.34 In this context, **Klein conceives idealization as a projective mechanism that protects this divine image of the self by putting it into the other**. **She believes that the paranoid-schizoid position serves the ego as a necessary initial stage in fending off and dispersing anxiety. However, individuals who remain fixed in this position**, she asserts, **establish all the intrapsychic conditions for badly damaged object relations characterized by**, among other things, **envious spoiling and the consequent inability to accept the other as a separate and independent agent**. Although her account of pathological object relations is too elaborate to unpack in detail here, it is possible to discern in Klein's analysis the following account of the relationship among narcissism, idealization, and envy. **In order to protect the fantasy of our ideal condition,** she argues, **we project into our objects the plenitude or omnipotence that we desire for ourselves**. In other words, **through the mechanism of idealization the object is endowed with all the qualities of self-sufficiency or plenitude that the ego wants for itself but cannot attain**. This idealization, however, can only be a transitional solution to the demise of our primary narcissism. For **the discovery of the idealized object's independence engenders in the primitive ego the fear of being abandoned by it and shame over its own needy dependence**. According to Klein, **this** early emotional matrix **generates either a compulsive attempt to control the object or, when it can no longer be controlled, to spoil and destroy it**. However, if in its narcissistic rage over the independence of the other and shame over its dependence on it, the ego enviously spoils and destroys the other, it also thereby prevents itself from assimilating or reintrojecting the good that it has put into the other.

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The alternative is to refuse the pity and compassion of the 1AC—This act of complete nihilism affirms the world as it is and disregards the desire for a better one. Only this act can resist the denigration of life in the world of the Affirmative

Alan **White**, professor of philosophy at Williams College, in 19**90**
("Within Nietzsche's Labyrinth: Transformations of Nihilism,"
http://www.williams.edu/philosophy/faculty/awhite/WNL%20web/Transformations%20of%20Nihilism.htm).

All of this suggests that radical nihilism remains "something to be overcome." The questions arise: by whom, and how? A passage already introduced provides a hint concerning the first: what I have been calling radical nihilism results when "all one has left are the values that pass judgment." This suggests that one for whom those values have "devalued themselves" must be left with nothing at all. Etymologically, it would certainly make sense to call such a person a "nihilist." In addition, Nietzsche suggests that one who is left with nothing in this manner has gained rather than lost: **in denying that the world requires "purpose," "unity," or "truth"** of the sort posited by religious nihilists and despaired of by radical nihilists, **one may regain the world of becoming in its original innocence**:

one cannot judge, measure, compare, or even deny the whole! Why not? -- For five reasons, all accessible even to modest intellects; for example, **because there is nothing besides the whole** [*weil es nichts gibt ausser dem Ganzen*]. [...] And, once again, **this is a tremendous restorative, for herein lies the innocence of all existence**. (*N*:15[30] / *WP*:765; cf. *TI*VI:8)

        The Nietzschean term that suggests itself for the resulting position is "complete [*vollendeter*] **nihilism**," but this term must be used with care. I take it from Nietzsche's description of himself as "Europe's first complete nihilist, who, however, has himself already lived nihilism through to its end, within himself -- who has it behind him, beneath him, outside of him" (*N*:11[411] / *WP*:P). The wording of this passage indicates that Nietzsche, although Europe's first complete nihilist, is no longer a nihilist. I will nevertheless characterize this position as "complete nihilism" in the sense of completed nihilism, **nihilism that has been lived through entirely, "the logic of our great values and ideals, thought through to its end"** (*N*:11[411] / *WP*:P).
        My use of the term receives some justification from Nietzsche's claim of having brought nihilism to its end, albeit only within himself; its advent within the world at large, he tells us, is to dominate "the history of the next two centuries." Following those two centuries, "in some future or other," there will be a countermovement, a transvaluation, that will "absolve [*ablö sen*] this complete nihilism" (*N*:11[411] / *WP*:P). If Nietzsche cannot accomplish this transvaluation, he can at least foresee it, and thereby, within himself, bring nihilism to its end; but, again, he can be aware of doing so, can be aware that the end is end, only if he is beyond the end, only if he sees that what follows the end is no longer nihilism. **One is a complete nihilist only when one has completed nihilism, thereby ceasing to be a nihilist**. And indeed, in the continuation of the passage defining nihilism as the condition of one who has left only "the values that pass judgment -- nothing else," **Nietzsche describes the "problem of strength and weakness" in terms that clearly place the strongest beyond the so-defined nihilism**:
(1) **the weak collapse**
(2) **the stronger destroy what does not collapse**;
(3) **the strongest overcome the values that pass judgment**. (*N*:9[107] / *WP*:37)

        The religious nihilist, unlike the radical nihilist, denies being a nihilist; what about **the complete nihilist**? Certainly, the latter **acknowledges that our world does not correspond to the traditional "highest values," and that we "have no right" to any other world**; **but this acknowledgment is paired with the denial that any other world "ought to be,"** and that our "world of becoming" ought not to be. **For the complete nihilist, denigrating the world for its lack of purpose is as senseless as denigrating a philosophical treatise for its lack of plot, a symphony for its lack of text**, or a painting for representing, rather than containing, motion or depth. In non-Nietzschean terms: the complete nihilist considers nihilism itself to be the result of a category mistake. The complete nihilist thus returns to a position abandoned with the step to religious nihilism: **the complete nihilist "deifies becoming and the apparent world as the only world, and calls them good**" (*N*:9[60] / *WP*:585).

Link: Pity/Suffering

The emotions of pity and compassion, or *Mitleid* in German, stem from the loss of narcissistic wholeness. Envious at others' departure from our ideal of a perfect world, pity requires that the other suffer so that we may intervene and return everything to normal.

Michael **Ure**, Monash University, **in** 20**06**
["The Irony of Pity: Nietzsche Contra Schopenhauer and Rousseau," *The Journal of Nietzsche Studies* 32, p. 68-70]

Nietzsche is intent on stripping away pity's golden luster. He builds his case against pitié/Mitleid largely on the basis of his suspicions about the psychological dynamics that, so he claims, we can use to lay bare Schopenhauer's and Rousseau's gilded rationalizations of this pathos. **According to Nietzsche**, the type of **pitié**/**Mitleid** they expound **is symptomatic of what we might call**, drawing on psychoanalytic terms, **the narcissistic malaise**.4 **Boldly stated, he argues that as a psychological transaction Mitleid satisfies the ego's desire to assuage its loss of narcissistic plenitude**. In making this case, Nietzsche dramatically [End Page 68] reverses their perspective, arguing that **Mitleid should not be understood as an affective bond with the other, not as a sign of living for others, but, rather, as a veiled means of restoring self-affection at the other's expense**. To show this he analyzes the moral psychology that underpins the precepts of the ethics of pity. If Nietzsche's psychological analysis is correct, then **Mitleid is not antithetical to revenge against others but, in fact, closely linked to** one of its subtle shadings and masks, which he calls **envy**. "In the gilded sheath of pity," as he puts it with signature pithiness, "there is sometimes stuck the dagger of envy" (AOM 377).
Whereas Rousseau and Schopenhauer claim that Mitleid is the only source of ethical concern for others, Nietzsche argues that their psychology of **Mitleid uncritically accepts a paranoid-schizoid splitting of the object world**, to borrow Melanie Klein's terminology, into the enviable and the pitiable.5 He claims that **because these forms of pity are generated by a paranoid-schizoid psychological constellation, they are better characterized as what we might call "hateship" rather than friendship**. In this respect, **Nietzsche sees in the psychology of the pitier an immature or infantile attempt to resolve the narcissistic malaise**. Nietzsche pursues this critique of Rousseau and Schopenhauer as part of a broader concern that informs his middle period: his concern with theorizing a mature transformation of narcissism that does not entail such damaging splitting and projection.
We can reconstruct and elaborate three steps in Nietzsche's critical analysis of the psychological configuration that engenders the type of pity that Rousseau and Schopenhauer advocate: his claim that **pity is deeply complicit in envy and its projective identifications**; that **it ultimately tends toward a diminution of others**; and, finally, that **the twinning of pity and envy in the construction of the object world blocks our ability to live well with others**. In other words, Nietzsche builds a strong case for reversing Schopenhauer and Rousseau's central, unexamined presumption: he shows that **far from overcoming our "colossal egoism**," as Schopenhauer calls it, **pity is a species of pathological narcissism that damages the individual's capacity for composing or "restoring" balanced** (gleichgewicht) **relations with others** (HAH 376). Nietzsche especially underscores the point that **a morality built on these psychological foundations prevents individuals from developing a subtle, penetrating, and therapeutically efficacious understanding of another's intrapsychic world and experiences**. **In criticizing the ethics of pity**, then, **Nietzsche specifically targets the conceptualization of this pathos or affect that lies at the heart of** both Rousseau's and Schopenhauer's **ethical philosophy**. In prosecuting his case against their ethics he brings to bear his method of "psychological dissection," claiming that it can help explore and fathom pity's intrapsychic significance in a way that sheds new light on both Rousseau's moral pedagogy of pitié and Schopenhauer's metaphysically based ethics of Mitleid (HAH 35, 37). His core thesis is that **pitié/Mitleid**, as they conceive it, **merely crystallizes the structure of** affects and **defenses characteristic of a psyche ensnared by a primitive means of soothing the narcissistic wound**.6 Contextualized this way, Nietzsche argues, **Mitleid should be treated first and foremost as a pathological stratagem through which the psyche seeks narcissistic gratification.** His analysis might stand as an illustration of his broader claim that **moral philosophy should not be based on or give credence to belief in conceptual oppositions** (HAH 1). For he turns common sense inside out and claims that **pitié/Mitleid**, which Schopenhauer identifies as action devoid of "all egoistic motivations," has its roots in envy.7 It is his psychological dissections that place Nietzsche several steps ahead of not only Rousseau and Schopenhauer but also those critics who invoke this tradition of pity against Nietzsche without carefully examining, as he does, its theoretical and psychological presuppositions.8 We can orient ourselves to Nietzsche's critique of this type of pity by briefly examining Rousseau's and Schopenhauer's very similar treatments of the origins and worth of pity.9

Link: Pity/Suffering

The assistance of the Affirmative is a form of pity that is not genuine but uses the suffering of others to disguise feelings of contempt and envy. To restore the sense of a perfect, ordered world, we bestow on others a sense of suffering that we should correct.

Michael **Ure**, Monash University, **in** 20**06**
["The Irony of Pity: Nietzsche Contra Schopenhauer and Rousseau," *The Journal of Nietzsche Studies* 32, p. 80-1]

Rousseau then begins not with a subject who seeks mutual recognition but with one who suffers deeply from the loss of narcissistic self-sufficiency. The only way he conceives of this subject becoming sociable is to give full rein to its primordial envy to spoil others so that it does not suffer from its own sense of self-lack or narcissistic wound. Envy's conjuring trick is to restore self-affection through diminishing others. This is how Rousseau arrives at the perverse position of affirming a moral psychology in which we experience the other's joy as a source of *bitterness* and the other's suffering as a source of *sweet pleasure. Pity is a disjointed rejoicing.*[41] **The other's suffering is sweet because it restores to us our narcissistic self-affection: ''Pity is sweet, because, when we put ourselves in the place of the one who suffers,** *we are aware, nevertheless of the pleasure of not suffering like him*. *Envy is bitter*, because the sight of a happy man, far from putting the envious in his place, inspires him with regret that he is not there. *The one seems to exempt us from the pain he suffers, the other seems to deprive us of the good things he enjoys*."[42]
It is for this reason that Nietzsche claims that overcoming the feeling of self-lack and restoring the vanity of self-affection are the motivating forces of the kind of pity Rousseau and Schopenhauer identify as the source of all our moral actions. Couched in psychoanalytic terms, our feelings of self-lack are a reignition of infantile rage over our asymmetrical dependence on an idealized, self-sufficient other. Pity serves to soothe this envious rage by overturning the asymmetry that the needy, dependent child fears may lead to its abandonment. These psychoanalytic insights are implicit in Nietzsche's treatment of Rousseau and Schopenhauer. It is because Nietzsche sees how their notion of pity is shaped by this psychological matrix that he argues that it is both self-serving *and* damaging to the other. On the plane of fantasy, he suggests, **as pitiers we imagine the others on whom we depend as self-sufficient and we play the game of pity in order to redress this asymmetry. We do so by attempting to make ourselves appear as enviable and self-sufficient individuals on whose beneficence others must depend**. In the psychological transaction of pity, as Nietzsche sees it, **we aim to spoil others by making their suffering the occasion for undermining their independence and asserting our own**. As Nietzsche explains in the following aphorism: **[End Page 80]**
If we love, honour, admire someone and then afterwards discover that he is *suffering* . . . our feeling of love, reverence and admiration changes in an essential respect: it grows *tenderer*; that is to say, the gulf between us and him seems to be bridged, an approximation to identity seems to occur. Only now do we conceive it possible that we might give back to him, while *he previously dwelt in our imagination as being elevated above our gratitude*. This capacity to give back produces in us great joy and exaltation. . . . [W]e have the *enjoyment of active gratitude*—which, in short, is *benevolent revenge. If he wants and takes nothing whatever from us, we go away chilled and saddened, almost offended*. . . . From all of this it follows that, even in the most favorable cases, there is something degrading in suffering and something elevating and productive of superiority in pitying—which separates these two sensations from one another to all eternity.
(*D* 138)
As Nietzsche analyzes it here, **as pitiers our giving is motivated by the desire to usurp the position of imagined omnipotence, rather than by the other's desire for our pity.** (It is this insight that informs Zarathustra's caution that pity should always be a conjecture—"May your pity be a conjecture: that you may first know if your friend wants pity" [*Z*:1 "Of the Friend"].) For Nietzsche the fact that as pitiers we are driven by our desire to restore our self-affection is disclosed by our feeling of offence if the other does not appreciate our "gift" of *Mitleid*: "*Refusing gratitude*.—One may well refuse a request, but one may never refuse gratitude (or what comes to the same thing, receive it coldly or conventionally). To do so is very wounding—and why?" (*D* 235). **Through gift giving inspired by such pity,** Nietzsche implies, **we try to exact from the other the kind of acknowledgment that can aid us in our attempt to restore our fantasy of plenitude**. **As a sign of their subordination to us, the gratitude of others can serve to bolster our fragile illusion of omnipotence**. In this context, therefore, **if others refuse our gift of pitying concern, they are, as it were, refusing to grant us the right to feel or imagine ourselves as elevated above them. In this regard, the gift of Mitleid is really a gift we attempt to** *bestow on ourselves at the other's expense*.

Link: Pity/Suffering

The use of suffering to create a sense of pity among people externalizes suffering, creating a sense of superiority, resentment, and fear

Roland **Bleiker**, University of Queensland **and** Amy **Kay**, UNDP, Cairo, **2007**
["Representing HIV/AIDS in Africa: Pluralist Photography and Local Empowerment," *International Studies Quarterly* 51.1, pp. 139-163]

In a compelling application of Arendt's typology, Luc Boltanski (1999:4) stresses how **a politics of pity views the unfortunate collectively, even though it relies on singling out particular misfortunes to inspire pity in the first place**. It is evident that the ensuing dynamics entail a fundamental dilemma, one that perhaps cannot be solved. **A generalized portrayal of HIV/AIDS as a political problem is unlikely to inspire pity. Statistical data, for instance, cannot do this**, no matter how much evidence it provides of the devastating impact of the disease. To arouse pity, Boltanski (1999:11) stresses, "**suffering and wretched bodies must be conveyed in such a way as to affect the sensibility of those more fortunate**." That is the function of the Hooper photograph. **But problems arise as soon as this image is used to establish and defend a more generic political stance**. **This is the case**, for instance, **when the** Hooper **photograph is being used to draw public awareness in the West about the general problem of HIV/AIDS in Africa. The image of suffering then inevitably becomes detached from both the sufferer and local circumstances.**

Manifestations of pity often mask unequal power relations. **It was precisely in the seemingly selfless Christian practices of pity that Nietzsche detected a will to power**, a thirst for triumph, **a desire to subjugate**. **Pity then becomes linked to several features that fundamentally contradict the original humanist desire for social change**. **Images of suffering in Africa subconsciously contain a range of moral judgments and sentiments, including resentment and fear** (see Sontag 2003:75). They may also remind western audiences of what they are free from. Paradoxically, **the very disturbing nature** of the Hooper photograph thus **provides a certain feeling of safety and security to some of those viewing it. Death in a distant and dangerous elsewhere can then become a way of affirming life in the safe here and now, giving people a sense of belonging to a particular group that is distinct from others** (Biehl 2001:139; Radley 2002:2; see also Nussbaum 2001:297–454 for a more general discussion of pity and its distinctiveness from compassion, sympathy, and empathy).

Link: Security

The desire for security smothers life with a constant search for, and fear of, forms of difference that threaten insecurity. The pursuit of total security justifies violence against difference and comes at the cost of everything that makes life worthwhile.

James **Der Derian**, professor of international studies at Brown, 19**98**
["The Value of Security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche, Baudrillard," <u>On Security</u>, ed. Ronnie Lipschutz, online, http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/index.html]

Nietzsche transvalues both **Hobbes's** and Marx's **interpretations of security through a genealogy of modes of being. His method is not to uncover some deep meaning or value for security, but to destabilize the intolerable fictional identities of the past which have been created out of fear, and to affirm the creative differences which might yield new values for the future**. 33 **Originating in the paradoxical relationship of a contingent life and a certain death, the history of security reads for Nietzsche as an abnegation, a resentment and, finally, a transcendence of this paradox**. In brief, the **history is one of individuals seeking an impossible security from the most radical "other" of life, the terror of death which, once generalized and nationalized, triggers a futile cycle of collective identities seeking security from alien others--who are seeking similarly impossible guarantees**. **It is a story of differences taking on the otherness of death, and identities calcifying into a fearful sameness**. Since Nietzsche has suffered the greatest neglect in international theory, his reinterpretation of security will receive a more extensive treatment here.

One must begin with Nietzsche's idea of the will to power, which he clearly believed to be prior to and generative of all considerations of security. In Beyond Good and Evil , he emphatically establishes the primacy of the will to power: "Physiologists should think before putting down the instinct of self-preservation as the cardinal instinct of an organic being. A living thing seeks above all to discharge its strength--life itself is will to power; self-preservation is only one of the most frequent results." 34 **The will to power**, then, **should not be confused with a Hobbesian perpetual desire for power**. It can, in its negative form, produce a reactive and resentful longing for only power, leading, in Nietzsche's view, to a triumph of nihilism. But **Nietzsche refers to a positive will to power, an active and affective force of becoming, from which values and meanings--including self-preservation--are produced which affirm life. Conventions of security act to suppress rather than confront the fears endemic to life**, for ". . . life itself is essentially appropriation, injury, overpowering of what is alien and weaker; suppression, hardness, imposition of one's own forms, incorporation and at least, at its mildest, exploitation--but why should one always use those words in which slanderous intent has been imprinted for ages." 35 Elsewhere Nietzsche establishes the pervasiveness of agonism in life: "**life is a consequence of war, society itself a means to war**." 36 But **the denial of this permanent condition, the effort to disguise it with a consensual rationality or to hide from it with a fictional sovereignty, are all effects of this suppression of fear**. **The desire for security is manifested as a collective resentment of difference**--**that which is not us, not certain, not predictable. Complicit with a negative will to power is the fear-driven desire for protection from the unknown. Unlike the positive will to power, which produces an** aesthetic **affirmation of difference, the search for truth produces a truncated life which conforms to the rationally knowable, to the causally sustainable**. In The Gay Science , Nietzsche asks of the reader: "Look, isn't our need for knowledge precisely this need for the familiar, the will to uncover everything strange, unusual, and questionable, something that no longer disturbs us? Is it not the instinct of fear that bids us to know? And is the jubilation of those who obtain knowledge not the jubilation over the restoration of a sense of security?" 37

The fear of the unknown and the desire for certainty combine to produce a domesticated life, in which causality and rationality become the highest sign of a sovereign self, the surest protection against contingent forces. The fear of fate assures a belief that everything reasonable is true, and everything true, reasonable. In short, the security imperative produces, and is sustained by, the strategies of knowledge which seek to explain it. Nietzsche elucidates the nature of this generative relationship in The Twilight of the Idols :

The causal instinct is thus conditional upon, and excited by, the feeling of fear. The "why?" shall, if at all possible, not give the cause for its own sake so much as for a particular kind of cause --a cause that is comforting, liberating and relieving. . . . That which is new and strange and has not been experienced before, is excluded as a cause. Thus one not only searches for some kind of explanation, to serve as a cause, but for a

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Link: Security

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particularly selected and preferred kind of explanation--that which most quickly and frequently abolished the feeling of the strange, new and hitherto unexperienced: the most habitual explanations. 38
A safe life requires safe truths. The strange and the alien remain unexamined, the unknown becomes identified as evil, and evil provokes hostility--recycling the desire for security. The "influence of timidity," as Nietzsche puts it, creates a people who are willing to subordinate affirmative values to the "necessities" of security: "they fear change, transitoriness: this expresses a straitened soul, full of mistrust and evil experiences." 39
The unknowable which cannot be contained by force or explained by reason is relegated to the off-world. "Trust," **the "good," and other common values come to rely upon an "artificial strength": "the feeling of security** such as the Christian possesses; he feels strong in being able to trust, to be patient and composed: he owes this artificial strength to the illusion of being protected by a god." 40 For Nietzsche, of course, only a false sense of security can come from false gods: "Morality and religion belong altogether to the psychology of error : in every single case, cause and effect are confused; or truth is confused with the effects of believing something to be true; or a state of consciousness is confused with its causes." 41
Nietzsche's interpretation of the origins of religion can shed some light on this paradoxical origin and transvaluation of security. In The Genealogy of Morals , Nietzsche sees religion arising from a sense of fear and indebtedness to one's ancestors:
The conviction reigns that it is only through the sacrifices and accomplishments of the ancestors that the tribe exists --and that one has to pay them back with sacrifices and accomplishments: one thus recognizes a debt that constantly grows greater, since these forebears never cease, in their continued existence as powerful spirits, to accord the tribe new advantages and new strength. 42

Link: Poverty Reduction

The banner of poverty reduction creates a feeling of superiority and self-righteousness that unites people through emotional identification.

Andrea **Cornwall**, Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, October **2005**
["What do Buzzwords do for Development Policy? A critical look at 'participation', 'empowerment' and 'poverty reduction'," *Third World Quarterly* 26.7, pp. 1043-1060]

We argue in this paper that **participation and empowerment, words that speak of the laudable aim of enabling poor people to have voice and choice, have now come to symbolise the legitimacy to pursue today's generation of development blueprints, under the rubric of poverty reduction**. In the texts of mainstream development agencies, **this triad of 'good things' is used to purvey a storyline that situates them as guardians of rightness and champions of progress**. **This storyline** is more than utopian, in Sorel's sense: more than an exercise in intellectual construction. It **comes imbued with powerful myths about the desirability of donor co-ordination, policy coherence and a series of embedded assumptions about the doing of development that place entrenched ideas and practices undergirding the development industry entirely beyond question**. Sorel contends: **myths are not descriptions of things, but expressions of a determination to act. A myth cannot be refuted since it is, at bottom, identical with the convictions of a group**. Myths safeguard utopias, Sorel argues. The statements of intent that constitute the policies of **international development agencies gain the qualities of myth precisely because they are born of convictions**. **They seek to call us to action, name what we can do, and make us into agents of the possible**. Like all successful ideologies, **they work because they do more than convey a good argument; they compel people to listen because they themselves are the main protagonists of the story. Development myths work through emotional identification**, not through rationality; they build and sustain the feeling of conviction that people need in order to be able to act. **Good argument has its place here, but is secondary to something that is of quite a different order: a feeling of rightness, backed by the creation of normative instruments,** like the MDGs, **which serve an almost ceremonial function in bolstering a feeling of togetherness and purposefulness, of a visionary goal towards which to strive**. But buzzwords are more than pep-words. Their use in development discourse is not just to promote a we-can-do-it boost. The utopias that are shored up by development myths and bolstered by buzzwords are profoundly ideological constructions. International development organisations may appear to have appropriated concepts once used by radical alternative movements, but they have not necessarily swallowed them whole. Efforts to promote particular concepts within these institutions have produced partial victories. Actor networks linked to broader, overlapping networks of advocates and activists in civil society organisations have sought to gain room for manoeuvre within their own institutions, large parts of which may remain entirely unresponsive to new ideas. To talk of terms being co-opted is to assume that buzzwords have singular meanings. But buzzwords are useful in policy statements because they are fuzz-words. Their propensity to shelter multiple meanings makes them politically expedient, shielding those who use them from attack by lending the possibility of common meaning to extremely disparate actors.

Impact: No value to life

Pity destroys all value to life and leads to self-extinction. The constant identification and response to suffering multiples it and smothers life with contempt

Friedrich **Nietzsche**, the anti-christ, **1895**
[The Anti-Christ, http://www.fns.org.uk/ac.htm]

Christianity is called the religion of *pity*.-- **Pity stands in opposition to all the tonic passions that augment the energy of the feeling of aliveness: it is a depressant**. A man loses power when he pities. **Through pity that drain upon strength which suffering works is multiplied a thousandfold**. **Suffering is made contagious by pity; under certain circumstances it may lead to a total sacrifice of life and living energy--a loss out of all proportion to the magnitude of the cause** (--the case of the death of the Nazarene). This is the first view of it; there is, however, a still more important one. If one measures the effects of pity by the gravity of the reactions it sets up, its character as a menace to life appears in a much clearer light. **Pity** thwarts the whole law of evolution, which is the law of natural selection. It preserves whatever is ripe for destruction; it **fights on the side of those disinherited and condemned by life**; by maintaining life in so many of the botched of all kinds, **it gives life itself a gloomy and dubious aspect**. Mankind has ventured to call **pity** a virtue (--in every *superior* moral system it appears as a weakness--); going still further, it **has been called the virtue, the source and foundation of all other virtues-- but let us always bear in mind that this was from the standpoint of a philosophy that was nihilistic, and upon whose shield the denial of life was inscribed**. Schopenhauer was right in this: that **by means of pity life is denied, and made worthy of denial--pity is the technic of nihilism**. Let me repeat: **this depressing and contagious instinct stands against all those instincts which work for the preservation and enhancement of life**: in the role of *protector* of the miserable, it is a prime agent in the promotion of *decadence--**pity** persuades to extinction*....Of course, **one doesn't say "extinction"**: **one says "the other world**," or "God," **or "the *true* life**," or Nirvana, salvation, blessedness.... **This innocent rhetoric**, from the realm of religious-ethical balderdash, **appears a *good deal less innocent* when one reflects upon the tendency that it conceals beneath sublime words: the tendency to *destroy life***. Schopenhauer was hostile to life: that is why pity appeared to him as a virtue. . . . Aristotle, as every one knows, saw in pity a sickly and dangerous state of mind, the remedy for which was an occasional purgative: he regarded tragedy as that purgative. **The instinct of life should prompt us to seek some means of puncturing any** such **pathological and dangerous accumulation of pity** as that appearing in Schopenhauer's case (and also, alack, in that of our whole literary *decadence,* from St. Petersburg to Paris, from Tolstoi to Wagner), that it may burst and be discharged. . . **Nothing is more unhealthy**, amid all our unhealthy modernism, **than** Christian **pity**. To be the doctors *here,* to be unmerciful *here,* to wield the knife here--all this is *our* business, all this is *our* sort of humanity, by this sign we are philosophers, we Hyperboreans !--

Impact: Turns the case

The charity of the Affirmative entrenches existing power relations and disguises the structural causes of oppression

Christina **Zarowsky**, Lecturer Psychiatry- McGill University, **2000**
[Global Health Policy, Local Realities: the fallacy of the level playing field, eds. L. Whiteford & L. Manderson, p. 185

An important component of the modern practice of charity is the emotion of pity, and the mutual recognition of inequality that this emotion marks. The discourse of pity and charity invokes dyadic emotional ties, erasing the visibility of the structural inequality that makes these discourses possible. However, the practice of pity is not a private, interpersonal transaction. The long tradition of "Christian charity," of which humanitarianism is an important modern version, developed in a stratified society. **Pity does not erase power differences, but reinforces them, by providing emotional and moral valuation of patron-client relationships**. In Ethiopia, open appeals to pity were almost never made by even the poorest Somali refugees or returnees with whom I interacted, but were frequently made and almost accompanied by physical gestures of subordination, such as bowing the head and making whimpering noises, by destitute Amharic returnees and beggars. Amharic society is much more stratified and hierarchical than Somali society. The evolution of pity by Amharic beggars and refugees was an attempt to obtain assistance precisely through offering recognition, and reinforcement, of the stratification of Amharic society. **The appeals to pity and expression of pity by Western donors, individual and corporate, do the same thing on a global scale, but without the acknowledgement that this global society is structurally**, and not simply accidentally and temporarily, **stratified**.

Turns the case--Discourses of assistance disguise reinforce the structural links between poverty and the rest of society

Christina **Zarowsky**, Lecturer Psychiatry- McGill University, **2000**
[Global Health Policy, Local Realities: the fallacy of the level playing field, eds. L. Whiteford & L. Manderson, p. 198]

Refugees, refugee discourse, and "dependency" play a particular role in this process. In addition to being an uncomfortable marker of nation- and statehood, refugees also represent the most visible part – literally, the homeless – of the global underclass. It is not surprising that with the internationalization of welfare, we should also see an internationalization of attempts to erase, through discursive, legal, or fiscal strategies, the structural links between the underclass – welfare bums, bag ladies, youth gangs, or refugees – **and the rest of society. A pity-based discourse that zeros in on standardized individuals – both on the donor and on the recipient side of the relationship – who are stripped of social, political, or economic networks (let alone power) make these structural links more difficult to see, while maintaining inequality between donors and beneficiaries**.

Impact: Compassion→War

The humanitarianism of pity and compassion produces endless interventions and war and reinforces global inequalities

Christina **Zarowsky**, Lecturer Psychiatry- McGill University, **2000**
[Global Health Policy, Local Realities: the fallacy of the level playing field, eds. L. Whiteford & L. Manderson, p. 177-8]

This moral dimension of globalization is not limited to institutions that explicitly espouse moral agendas, such as the protection of human rights and provision of **humanitarian aid**. **The justification offered for military intervention in recent wars** – Kuwait, Somalia, Kosovo—**was moral**: the imperative to prevent genocide, protect human rights, prevent starvation. Although **each of these interventions** also **had** important, and often overriding, economic or geopolitical implications for key actors, **a moral rhetoric** was **essential to the mobilization of economic and political resources**. In the case of refugee relief, the moral imperative is central to the existence of large institutions and global programs affecting millions of people around the world. The potential and real conflicts between institutional interests and moral objectives are recognized within the humanitarian field. This chapter argues further that **moral models based on pity contribute to inequality, both in** particular **instances of humanitarian aid and globally**. Humanitarian aid is based in historically contingent models and practices of charity, and it continues to manifest the conflicts and ambiguities present in the practice of charity over the last two to three centuries. **The increasing use by humanitarian agencies of** mental **health language** about trauma or dependency syndrome, **in place of a moral language of pity** and charity, **does not overcome the** ambivalences and **inequalities integral to older models of charity**. **Rather, it masks them**. **This ambivalence toward charity and especially its recipients, and its implications for** refugee **well-being** and the possibilities of "leveling the playing field," **are** often **eclipsed by the urgency of humanitarian crises and by the real transfer of resources and relief of suffering that occur through humanitarian aid**. The ambivalence toward beneficiaries and the role of pity in maintaining, rather than erasing, inequality are more clearly visible in the widespread concern and rhetoric over "refugee dependency."

Impact: Error Replication

The rush to secure the world produces bureaucratic bungling that creates error replication—The solutions we prescribe make the problems worse

James **Der Derian 2005** (Watson Institute research professor of international studies; director of the Watson Institute's Global Security Program; Harvard International Review; "National Security: An Accident waiting to Happen;" Fall 2005; http://hir.harvard.edu/articles/1430/)

It often takes a catastrophe to reveal the illusory beliefs we continue to harbor in national and homeland security. **To keep us safe, we place our faith in national borders** and guards, **bureaucracies and experts**, technologies and armies. **These and other instruments of national security are empowered and legitimated by the assumption that it falls upon the sovereign country to protect us from the turbulent state of nature and anarchy that permanently lies in wait offshore and over the horizon** for the unprepared and inadequately defended. But this parochial fear, posing as a realistic worldview, has recently taken some very hard knocks. Prior to September 11, 2001, national borders were thought to be necessary and sufficient to keep our enemies at bay; upon entry to Baghdad, a virtuous triumphalism and a revolution in military affairs were touted as the best means to bring peace and democracy to the Middle East; and before Hurricane Katrina, emergency preparedness and an intricate system of levees were supposed to keep New Orleans safe and dry. The intractability of disaster, especially its unexpected, unplanned, unprecedented nature, erodes not only the very distinction of the local, national, and global, but, assisted and amplified by an unblinking global media, reveals the contingent and highly interconnected character of life in general. Yet **when it comes to dealing with natural and unnatural disasters, we continue to expect** (and, in the absence of a credible alternative, understandably so) if not **certainty and total safety** at least a high level of probability and competence from our national and homeland security experts **However,** between the mixed metaphors and behind the metaphysical concepts given voice by US Homeland Security Director Michael Chertoff early into the Katrina crisis, there lurks an uneasy recognition that this administration—and perhaps **no national government—is up to the task of managing incidents that so rapidly cascade into global events**. Indeed, they suggest that **our national plans and preparations for the "big one"**—a force-five hurricane, terrorist attack, pandemic disease—**have become part of the problem, not the solution**. His use of hyberbolic terms like "ultra-catastrophe" and "fall-out" is telling: such events exceed not only local and national capabilities, but the capacity of conventional language itself. An easy deflection would be to lay the blame on the neoconservative faithful of the first term of US President George W. Bush, who, viewing through an inverted Wilsonian prism the world as they would wish it to be, have now been forced by natural and unnatural disasters to face the world as it really is—and not even the most sophisticated public affairs machine of dissimulations, distortions, and lies can close this gap. However, **the discourse of the second Bush term has increasingly returned to the dominant worldview of national security, realism. And if language is, as Nietzsche claimed, a prisonhouse, realism is its supermax penitentiary**. Based on linear notions of causality, a correspondence theory of truth, and the materiality of power, **how can realism possibly account—let alone prepare or provide remedies—for complex catastrophes, like the toppling of the World Trade Center** and attack on the Pentagon by a handful of jihadists armed with box-cutters and a few months of flight-training? A force-five hurricane that might well have begun with the flapping of a butterfly's wings? A northeast electrical blackout that started with a falling tree limb in Ohio? **A possible pandemic triggered by the mutation of an avian virus**? How, for instance, are we to measure the immaterial power of the CNN-effect on the first Gulf War, the Al-Jazeera-effect on the Iraq War, or the Nokia-effect on the London terrorist bombings? For events of such complex, non-linear origins and with such tightly-coupled, quantum effects, the national security discourse of realism is simply not up to the task. Worse, what if the "failure of imagination" identified by the 9/11 Commission is built into our national and homeland security systems? **What if the reliance on planning for the catastrophe** that never came **reduced our capability to flexibly respond and improvise for the "ultra-catastrophe" that did**? **What if worse-case scenarios**, simulation training, and disaster exercises—as well as border guards, concrete barriers and earthen levees—**not only prove inadequate but might well act as force-multipliers**—what organizational theorists identify as "negative synergy" and "cascading effects" —**that produce the automated bungling** (think Federal Emergency Management Agency) **that transform isolated events and singular attacks into global disasters**? Just as "normal accidents" are built into new technologies—from the Titanic sinking to the Chernobyl meltdown to the Challenger explosion—**we must ask whether "ultra-catastrophes" are no longer the exception but now part and parcel of densely networked systems that defy national management; in other words, "planned disasters."**

Impact: Violence

The barriers to our idealized image the world are eradicated in the name of security and safety.

James **Der Derian 2005** (Watson Institute research professor of international studies; director of the Watson Institute's Global Security Program; Harvard International Review; "National Security: An Accident waiting to Happen;" Fall 2005; http://hir.harvard.edu/articles/1430/)

What, then, is to be done? A first step is to move beyond the wheel-spinning debates that perennially keep security discourse always one step behind the global event. It might well be uni-, bi-, or multi-polar, but it is time to recognize that the power configuration of the states-system is rapidly being subsumed by a heteropolar matrix, in which a wide range of different actors and technological drivers are producing profound global effects through interconnectivity. Varying in identity, interests, and strength, these new actors and drivers gain advantage through the broad bandwidth of information technology, for networked communication systems provide the means to traverse political, economic, religious, and cultural boundaries, changing not only how we interpret events, but making it ever more difficult to maintain the very distinction of intended from accidental events. According to the legal philosopher of Nazi Germany, Carl Schmitt, **when the state is unable to deliver on its traditional promissory notes of safety, security, and well-being through legal, democratic means, it will necessarily exercise the sovereign "exception:" declaring a state of emergency, defining friend from foe, and**, if necessary, **eradicating the threat to the state. But what if the state, facing the global event, cannot discern the accidental from the intentional?** An external attack from an internal auto-immune response? The natural as opposed to the "planned disaster"? The enemy within from the enemy without? **We can**, as the United States has done since September 11, **continue to treat catastrophic threats as issues of national rather than global security, and go it alone**. However, **once declared, bureaucratically installed**, and repetitively gamed, **national states of emergency grow recalcitrant and become prone to even worse disasters**. As Paul Virilio, master theorist of the war machine and the integral accident once told me**: "The full-scale accident is now the prolongation of total war by other means."**

Alt: Complete Nihilism

Complete nihilism is a revaluation of values that leaves the nihilism of pity behind and restores joy to life

Ashley **Woodward**, professor at Monash University, **2002**
["NIHILISM AND THE POSTMODERN IN VATTIMO'S NIETZSCHE," *Minerva - An Internet Journal of Philosophy* Vol. 6, http://www.ul.ie/~philos/vol6/nihilism.html

Active nihilism leads to accomplished or "complete nihilism," that which is attained when no values whatever remain. **Complete nihilism is the completed destruction of all values, but is paradoxically also the *overcoming* of nihilism. From the position of complete nihilism, it is possible to leave nihilism behind and *actively* create new categories of valuation that will be wholly affirmative and free from nihilism**. **The absence of all traditional, transcendent values allows a *new era* in which new values may be posited, values that are immanent and apply only to this world**. These new valuations rest on the secure foundation of our disillusioned creative abilities, and apply to *actual* reality. In the historical sense, **this constitutes a new era of valuation and human flourishing after nihilism has been overcome.** According to Nietzsche, modernity is characterised by the advent of radical nihilism. The history of the next two hundred years will be the history of an increasingly radicalised active nihilism. **The crucial point** of what I am calling the modernist interpretation of Nietzsche **is the possibility of overcoming nihilism, the conviction that there shall come a time in history when nihilism shall be left behind**. [3] After modernity?a time Nietzsche predicts to arise a hundred years from now?nihilism will be overcome and human culture will be reinvigorated by new categories of valuation, a "revaluation of all values."

Alt: Amor Fati

The alternative is akin to Nietzsche's *amor fati*. We must affirm the world in its entirety and not attempt to subtract the things we do not like.

Alan **White**, professor of philosophy at Williams College, in 19**90**
("Within Nietzsche's Labyrinth: Veil Frames,"
http://www.williams.edu/philosophy/faculty/awhite/WNL%20web/Veil%20frames.htm).

The present, condemned by Socrates, is deified by the Apollinian. This is perplexing, however, in that **the deification of the present is characteristic**, according to the later Nietzsche, not of the Apollinian but **of the Dionysian**, and thus of the perspective he himself attempts to take. Consider:

> **An experimental philosophy** [Experimental-Philosophie] such as I live anticipates experimentally [versuchsweise] even the possibilities of fundamental [grundsätzlichen] nihilism; but this **is not to say that it must halt at a no, a negation, a will to the no**. **It wants rather to continue on to the reverse of this** [bis zum Umgekehrten hindurch] -- **to a Dionysian affirmation of the world as it is, without subtraction, exception, or selection** -- **it wants the eternal circulation** [Kreislauf], -- **the same things, the same logic** and illogic of entanglements [Knoten]. **The highest state a philosopher can attain: to stand in a Dionysian relationship to existence -- my formula for this is *amor fati***.
>
> **This requires conceiving the previously denied aspects of existence not only as necessary, but as desirable** [wünschenswert]: **and not only as desirable in relation to the previously affirmed aspects** (perhaps as their complements or preconditions), **but for themselves** [um ihrer selber willen], **as the more powerful, more fruitful, truer aspects of existence**, within which its will speaks out more distinctly. (VIII:16[32]; WP:1041)

> **My formula for what is great in humanity is *amor fati***: **that one wants nothing otherwise, not forward, not backward, not in all eternity. Not merely to bear what is necessary, still less to conceal it** -- all idealism is mendacity in the face of what is necessary -- **but rather to love it.** (EHII:10)

A2: No Alternative

The alternative does not condemn ethical regard for others—instead it makes ethical decisions all the more important.

Alan **White**, professor of philosophy at Williams College, in 19**90**
("Within Nietzsche's Labyrinth: Completing Frames,"
http://www.williams.edu/philosophy/faculty/awhite/WNL%20web/Completing%20frames.htm).

Differently stated, is it not the case that, in the words of Ivan Karamazov, "If God is dead, then all is permitted," or, in Nietzsche's own words, "Everything is false! Everything is permitted!" (N:VII:25[505] / WP:602; cf. N:VII:25[304], N:26[25], N:31[51], N:32[8(34)]). My answer -- introduced in the chapter devoted to Zarathustra, and developed in those that come thereafter -- is that **everything is indeed permitted, but that universal permissibility does not make ethical reflection impossible or trivial; on the contrary, it makes such reflection the more pressing. Simply put: to say that everything is permitted is to say, at least, that there is no one** -- better, no One -- **around to forbid or prohibit anything**. **It is not to say that we cannot make distinctions, that all acts are equally admirable, or honorable, or desirable**. If we take our ethical bearings by what is permitted and what is forbidden, we may pay little attention to what is noble. Likewise, **even if everything is permitted, that does not mean that all answers to the question, "What should I do," are equally good. Instead, it makes the question more pressing, more difficult, and more interesting**.

As I attempt to decide what I am to do, how I am to live my life, it makes little difference whether "everything is permitted" or not. **If some ways of living were prohibited, I would still have to decide which of the remaining ways to adopt as my own; if no ways are prohibited, the question becomes the more pressing -- even if all ways are somehow open, I must still decide which I am to follow**.

Differently stated: **just as acceptance of a universal moral code** -- denial that "everything is permitted" -- **does not entail decent or admirable behavior, neither does the denial of such codes entail indecent of despicable behavior.** We have all, I suspect, encountered moral absolutists who, while adhering strictly to their accepted laws, allow themselves extraordinary latitude with respect to acts not specifically covered by the codes. Appropriately, **Nietzsche insists explicitly that just as the identification of prohibitions does not guarantee moral behavior, the denial of prohibitions does not preclude it**:

I deny morality as I deny alchemy, that is, I deny their premises: but I do not deny that there have been alchemists who believed in these premises and acted in accordance with them. -- I also deny immorality: not that countless people feel themselves to be immoral, but that there is any true reason so to feel. **It goes without saying that I do not deny -- unless I am a fool -- that many actions called immoral ought to be avoided and resisted, or that many called moral ought to be done and encouraged -- but I think the one should be encouraged and the other avoided for other reasons than hitherto.** (D:103)

A2: No Alternative

The alternative is an ethical decision that should be made individually rather than prescribed politically.

Alan **White**, professor of philosophy at Williams College, in 19**90**
("Within Nietzsche's Labyrinth: Life Without Kitsch,"
http://www.williams.edu/philosophy/faculty/awhite/WNL%20web/life_without_kitsch.htm)

<u>**The Nietzsche I present in this book is less exciting**</u>, perhaps, **than the more notorious Nietzsche who champions blond beasts and master races.** As I read him, **Nietzsche champions neither, but neither does he develop a powerful political alternative. On the contrary,** my **Nietzsche has little to say that is of political importance. I have argued that he presents us with reasons for respecting others and encouraging diversity, but he does not**, in my judgment, <u>**illuminate our political action**</u>.
        The most provocative teachings I find **in Nietzsche are not political, but rather ethical; Nietzsche does not attempt to tell us how to save the world, but rather how to save ourselves -- how to save ourselves from living lives that we will come to view with regret rather than with pride. And he teaches that we can do that without becoming supermen who blithely crush their supposed inferiors beneath their feet**.

A2: Perm

The permutation remains committed to a strategy of mastery that privileges the sovereign in the pursuit of harmony.

William E. **Connolly**, prof. of political science at Johns Hopkins, in 19**91**
[Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox, pp. 29-31]

With respect to the idea of freedom these three positions can be located in the same frame. A matrix, in which the categories across the horizontal axis are mastery and attunement and those on the vertical axis are the individual and the collectivity, creates space for four theories of freedom.[6] The permutations can then expand indefinitely as compromises are forged by theorists of mastery who create a little room for attunement, theorists of individuality who give more credibility to the state as a site of collective freedom, theorists of community who concede a little more to the dictates of mastery, and so on. But these contending theories share certain affinities.

First, across the horizontal axis, the doctrines linking freedom to mastery and attunement share a pattern of insistence: each demands, through a set of presuppositions about self and nature providing the measure against which all other assumptions and standards are to be assessed, that the order of things be susceptible in principle either to human mastery or to a harmonization that approaches the highest human essence. The world, at least in the final instance, must be *for us* in one way or the other. It—including external nature and the human material from which unified selves are constructed—must be either formed for us or plastic enough to be mastered by us.

Ontological narcissism—as we might label views that demand dispensations from within the world to replace the loss of a personal, willful, and powerful God located above it—allows each of the contending parties to domesticate the protean idea of contingency: each of these orientations invokes ontological assumptions that domesticate contingency as the unexpected, the dangerous event, the obdurate condition that resists effective intervention, the inevitable outcome accidental only in its timing, the resistance to detailed design lodged in the human animal and nature. And perhaps each masks the conversion of a world of microcontingencies into a world of global contingency by its insistence that the world itself must be predisposed to us in one way or the other.

Second, along the vertical axis, each position tends to deploy its idealism within the terms of the problematic of sovereignty. Either the state is the highest embodiment of freedom and democracy, or it is the site of constitutional protections that guard space for individual freedom. None of the positions within this frame strives to rethink the problematic of sovereignty itself, probably because each thinks that any effort to do so would take away the essential precondition for democracy in the territorial state.

↓   ↓

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It is not easy to think outside the frame of these debates, and I do not claim to be ready to do so in any finished or refined way. But it may be important today to try to push against these boundaries. For within the terms of these debates the appreciation of incorrigible or necessary contingency is stifled in thinking about freedom. Freedom becomes restricted to the confines of the sovereign state because only there can the institutionalization of democracy be established. Freedom becomes bound up with mastery or attunement because the world is treated (at least implicitly) as if it must be susceptible to one aspiration or the other: *it* owes that much to *us*, for god's sake. When these bonds of insistence between the contending parties are discerned, we may also be in a position to locate the impulse to serenity inside the phenomenology of life and death summarized earlier. Perhaps a secret plea for secular consolation binds together the contestants in these debates. If God (with a capital letter) is dead (or at least severely wounded), then the World

itself must be for us in one way or the other: it *must* be susceptible either to our mastery or to our quest to become attuned to a harmonious direction installed in being. And perhaps that plea, inscribed pervasively in the twin projects of mastery and realiza-tion, simultaneously exacerbates dangers and disciplines residing in late modernity and screens out interpretations that might dramatize them more cogently. 29 -31

A2: Perm

The permutation still links because it seeks to add to or subtract from existence. We must accept the world as it is

Alan **White**, professor of philosophy at Williams College, in 19**90**
("Within Nietzsche's Labyrinth: Agreements with Being,"
http://www.williams.edu/philosophy/faculty/awhite/WNL%20web/agreements_with_being.htm).

<u>**Zarathustra affirms being**</u>. Immediately before describing his restoration to divinity of "Lord Chance," he announces:

> **<u>I have become one who blesses and one who affirms</u>**: this is why I wrestled long and was a wrestler, so that once my hand would be freed for blessing.

And this is my blessing: to stand over every thing whatsoever as its own sky or heaven, as its rounded roof, its azure bell and eternal security: and blessed is he who thus blesses!

For all things are baptized in the well of eternity and beyond good and evil. (III:4; 209.3-10)

<u>**Nietzsche, too, affirms being**</u>. **<u>His "experimental philosophy" presses on to "the reverse" of "a will to the No," on to "a Dionysian affirmation of the world as it is, without subtraction, exception, or selection</u>**" (16[32] / WP:1041). **<u>His amor fati requires "that one want nothing otherwise, not forward, not backward, not in all eternity. Not merely to bear what is necessary, still less to conceal it</u>** [...] **<u>but rather to love it</u>**" (EHII:10).

A2: Framework

Much like the desire for a better world when ones does not exist, the Affirmative's framework arguments are fictitious rules that suppress debate in the name of playing the "correct" way

Ian **Johnston**, Malaspina College, May 19**99**
["There's Nothing Nietzsche Couldn't Teach Ya About the Raising of the Wrist,"
http://www.mala.bc.ca/~johnstoi/introser/nietzs.htm]

When Nietzsche looks at Europe historically what he sees is that different **games have been going on like this for centuries.** He further sees that **many of the participants in any one game have been aggressively convinced that their game is the "true" game**, that it corresponds with the essence of games or is a close match to the wider game they imagine going on in the natural world, in the wilderness beyond the playing fields. **So they have spent a lot of time producing their rule books** and coaches' manuals and making claims about how the principles of their game copy or reveal or approximate the laws of nature. **This has promoted and still promotes a good deal of bad feeling and fierce arguments**. **Hence, in addition to any one game itself, within the group pursuing it there have always been all sorts of sub-games debating the nature of the activity, refining the rules, arguing over the correct version of the rule book** or about how to educate the referees and coaches, and so on.
Nietzsche's first goal is to attack this dogmatic claim about the truth of the rules of any particular game. He does this, in part, by appealing to the tradition of historical scholarship which shows that these **games are not eternally true, but have a history**. **Rugby began when a soccer player broke the rules and picked up the ball and ran with it.** American football developed out of rugby and has changed and is still changing. Basketball had a precise origin which can be historically located.
Rule books are written in languages which have a history by people with a deep psychological point to prove: the games are an unconscious expression of the particular desires of inventive games people at a very particular historical moment; these rule writers are called Plato, Augustine, Socrates, Kant, Schopenhauer, Descartes, Galileo, and so on. For various reasons **they believe**, or claim to believe, **that the rules they come up with** reveal something about the world beyond the playing field and **are** therefore **"true" in a way that other rule books are not; they have, as it were, privileged access to reality** and thus record, to use a favorite metaphor of Nietzsche's, the text of the wilderness.
In attacking such claims, Nietzsche points out, **the wilderness bears no relationship at all to any human invention like a rule book** (he points out that nature is "wasteful beyond measure, without purposes and consideration, without mercy and justice, fertile and desolate and uncertain at the same time; imagine indifference itself as a power--how could you live according to this indifference. Living--is that not precisely wanting to be other than this nature" (Epigram 9). Because there is no connection with what nature truly is, **such rule books are mere** "foreground" pictures, **fictions dreamed up, reinforced**, altered, and discarded for contingent historical reasons. Moreover, the rule books often bear a suspicious resemblance to the rules of grammar of a culture (thus, for example, the notion of an ego as a thinking subject, Nietzsche points out, is closely tied to the rules of European languages which insist on a subject and verb construction as an essential part of any statement).
So how do we know what we have is the truth? And why do we want the truth, anyway? **People seem to need to believe that their games are true**. **But why? Might they not be better if they accepted that their games were false, were fictions, having nothing to do with** the **reality** of nature beyond the recreational complex? If they understood the fact that everything they believe in has a history and that, as he says in the Genealogy of Morals, "only that which has no history can be defined," they would understand that all this proud history of searching for the truth is something quite different from what philosophers who have written rule books proclaim.
Furthermore these historical changes and developments occur accidentally, for contingent reasons, and have nothing to do with the games, or any one game, shaping itself in accordance with any ultimate game or any given rule book of games given by the wilderness, which is indifferent to what is going on. And there is no basis for the belief that, if we look at the history of the development of these games, we discover some progressive evolution of games towards some higher type. We may be able, like Darwin, to trace historical genealogies, to construct a narrative, but that narrative does not reveal any clear direction or any final goal or any progressive development. The genealogy of games indicates that history is a record of contingent change. The assertion that there is such a thing as progress is simply one more game, one more rule added by inventive minds (who need to believe in progress); it bears no relationship to nature beyond the sports complex. Ditto for science.
So long as one is playing on a team, one follows the rules and thus has a sense of what constitutes right and wrong or good and evil conduct in the game, and this awareness is shared by all those carrying out the same endeavour. **To pick up the ball in soccer is evil** (unless you are the goalie); **and to punt the ball while running in American football is permissible but stupid; in Australian football both actions are essential and right. In other words, different cultural communities have different standards of right and wrong conduct. These are determined by the artificial inventions called rule books, one for each game. These rule books have developed the rules historically**; thus, **they have no permanent status and no claim to privileged access**.

A2: Util

Utilitarianism is slave morality—it subordinates joy to the constant search for pain and suffering to alleviate

Jonny **Anomaly**, Tulane University, in **2005**
["Nietzsche's Critique of Utilitarianism," The Journal of Nietzsche Studies 29 (2005) pp.1-15]
In interpreting Nietzsche's attacks on utilitarianism, it is crucial to understand the (often tenuous) connection Nietzsche makes between utilitarianism and Christianity. Because Nietzsche considers utilitarianism a secular offspring of Christian morality, many of his global **attacks on utilitarianism resemble** his **more familiar critique of Christian "slave morality"**— the morality of the herd. In particular, Nietzsche contends that **utilitarianism inherited Christianity's commitment to the equal worth of each person, and perpetuated its erroneous assumption that a timeless, universal criterion for morality is tenable.**
Nietzsche's preliminary account of the difference between master morality and slave morality in *Beyond Good and Evil* culminates with the conclusion that **"[s]lave morality is essentially a morality of utility"** (260). Although Nietzsche develops the notorious distinction between master and slave morality most fully in the *Genealogy*, he articulates the sense in which he considers utilitarianism a form of slave morality in a revealing passage in *Beyond Good and Evil*. Here he speculates that the noble, aristocratic man first identifies himself and those like him (powerful, proud, distinguished men) as good, and then contrasts himself with those he contemptuously regards as "the cowardly, the timid, the petty" and, above all, "those who think only of narrow utility" (*BGE* 260). The noble's power consists not only in his ability to exploit others with his superior acumen or physical strength but also in exercising "power over himself," by refraining from acting on the inclination of pity that characterizes those whom he despises. The slave, conversely, identifies himself negatively; he is part of the group that resents those who unabashedly exercise their power. **Nietzsche scorns slave morality because its proponents meekly resign themselves to whatever master morality is not, and yet consider their own moral principles universally binding** rather than acknowledging them as narrowly useful for members of their own group. In the Christian tradition, "**pity, the kind and helping hand**, the warm heart, patience, industriousness, humility, friendliness **come into honor—for these are the most useful qualities [for the slave]**" (*BGE* 260). Although Nietzsche thinks utilitarians share these values, he does not consider their values coextensive with Christian morality, since hedonistic utilitarianism is concerned with maximizing the very sensation that Christian morality aims to suppress: pleasure (*WP* 35).[5] The partial coincidence between Christian and utilitarian values results in part, Nietzsche thinks, from the fact that utilitarians construe "utility" in exceedingly familiar terms. The pleasure they seek is not that of the voluptuary or conqueror, but that of the "herd animal"— the "boring" and "mediocre" enjoyment of people who have yet to awaken from the "soporific" spell of slave morality (*BGE* 228).[6]
What does it mean to espouse the values of a herd animal? **We have already encountered some of the values Nietzsche associates with slave morality**—humility, industriousness, **pity**, but in what sense are they "herd" values? If the fundamental goal of an animal within a herd is its own preservation, and if its own preservation depends upon the health of the herd of which it is a member, then, Nietzsche supposes, the moral principles of that group will tend to reflect the kind of egalitarianism embodied in Bentham's dictum, "Everybody counts for one, and nobody for more than one."[7] Nietzsche considers this the essence of herd mentality: "[I]t is the instinct of the herd that finds its formula in this rule—one is equal, one takes oneself for equal" (*WP* 925). According to Nietzsche, this egalitarian formula originates from the benefit that comes from reciprocal cooperation among equals in a group, but has been extended by Christian morality to apply to all people—including *un*equals. Nietzsche thus construes the golden rule as a precept of "prudence" or mutual advantage, observing that "John Stuart Mill believes in it"as the basis of morality, but that he fails to grasp its prudential origin (*WP* 925).[8]
Nietzsche also portrays egalitarian values as myopic, dangerous, and potentially self-subverting. This is because, **Nietzsche thinks, the opposite of these values—pain, suffering, inequality; in short, "evil"—is equally indispensable for the survival and happiness of the very herd that seeks to eradicate it**. Accordingly, Nietzsche sharply criticizes Bentham's hedonic calculus (which correlates happiness maximization with pain minimization) as inconsistent with utilitarian goals. In its place, **Nietzsche stresses the necessity of physical suffering and intellectual struggle for the self-improvement of each and, by extension, the vitality and happiness of the group. He accordingly rebukes the proponent of any morality that makes the reduction of suffering its fundamental goal**: "[I]f you experience suffering and displeasure as evil, worthy of annihilation and as a defect of existence, then it is clear that besides your religion of pity you also harbor another religion in your heart that is perhaps the mother of the religion of pity: the *religion of comfortableness*" (*GS* 338). This religion—or, more specifically, *morality*—of comfort thwarts its own goals by attempting to eliminate *all* suffering (*BGE* 44).[9] In a passage that anticipates what we now call the "hedonic paradox," according to which pleasure is diminished when we pursue it directly, Nietzsche ridicules those who, like Bentham, seek to maximize individual or collective happiness by minimizing pain: "[H]ow little you know of human happiness, you comfortable and benevolent people, for happiness and unhappiness are sisters and even twins that either grow up together or, as in your case, *remain small* together" (*GS* 338).[10] He goes on to underline the idiosyncratic nature of suffering and the simplemindedness of those who heedlessly strive to relieve the suffering of others. "It never occurs to them," Nietzsche adds, "that ... the path to one's own heaven always leads through the voluptuousness of one's own hell" (*GS* 338).

A2: Suffering Bad

Suffering is an inevitable part of life—Accepting and overcoming suffering is key to an affirmation of life.

Gudrun **von Tevenar**, Birkbeck College, London, Autumn **2005**
["Nietzsche's Objections to Pity and Compassion," *The Gemes/Leiter Nietzsche Seminar*, http://www.bbk.ac.uk/phil/staff/academics/gemes-work/GurdrenvonTevenar18Oct05]

Against *Mitleid* and against the negative significance of suffering **Nietzsche** puts forward his own proposals. He **argues** in On the Genealogy of Morals [III:14] **that suffering and particularly the suffering of others**, i.e. the suffering of the sick, weak, and misshapen multitude of the herd, **must not be allowed to obstruct the life of the strong** - those lucky, talented, healthy few who must be promoted because needed as blueprint for future men. He warns us therefore against what he calls 'the conspiracy of the sufferers against the well-formed and victorious' and makes his famous claim that the weak pose the greatest danger to the strong, and that the strong and healthy have to be shielded from polluting contact with the sick with their secret resentment and veiled pleas for *Mitleid*. On a more positive note, **Nietzsche urges us to accept our suffering as an integral part of a worthwhile life, to actively and purposefully master it and not just passively 'suffer' it. Active acceptance and mastering are not just better ways of coping with suffering, they function at the same time also as an affirmation of life. Hence Nietzsche despised the feeble resignation and impotent resentment with which members of the herd fail to accept their suffering, thus fail to cope, thus fail to affirm**.

Nietzsche does not ignore suffering—he encourages people to overcome their suffering rather than living life in resentment

Gudrun **von Tevenar**, Birkbeck College, London, Autumn **2005**
["Nietzsche's Objections to Pity and Compassion," *The Gemes/Leiter Nietzsche Seminar*, http://www.bbk.ac.uk/phil/staff/academics/gemes-work/GurdrenvonTevenar18Oct05]

These are powerful and thought provoking objections. However, I suggest that they somewhat miss their point because **Nietzsche** was not interested in virtue, did not address himself to the multitude, and did not, therefore, envisage the possibility of members of the herd growing into stoic heroes. Moreover, there is ample evidence throughout his writings as well as in his letters that he **was not insensitive to the fact that deprivation** – mental and physical – **stunts growth and that severe pain and misery not only hurts but also harms people**. Yet **Nietzsche nonetheless**, and here lies the highly controversial nature of his thought, **refused to grant suffering, even severe suffering, the kind of significance assigned to it through the influence of Christianity** and Schopenhauer, **which leads**, almost inevitably, to *Mitleid* and hence, Nietzsche feared, **to erosion of the will to power** of those precious, privileged few by undermining their confidence in themselves and in their lives. **The truly objectionable feature of suffering,** Nietzsche holds, **is not the well-acknowledged fact that it hurts and harms people, but the non-acknowledged and deeply deplorable fact that so many sufferers simply fail to respond appropriately to their suffering and thus allow themselves to become feeble, impaired, wretched** – in other words, **they allow themselves to 'suffer' hurt and harm**. We can conclude, then, that **Nietzsche was not insensitive to the misery and contingency of suffering but simply refused to accept its alleged wider significance**.

A2: Nietzsche=Nazi

Nietzsche despised socialism for multiple reasons

Taylor 96 (Alan, professor at UT in Arlington, Evans Experimentalism, A Polemic on Nietzsche's Implicit Indictment of National Socialism, 1996, http://evans-experientialism.freewebspace.com/taylor_alan_%20nietzsche.htm)

Nietzsche hated Socialism perhaps more than anything else. Some critics have even suggested that much of Nietzsche's work responds directly to the socialist doctrines or Karl Marx who was a contemporary or Nietzsche's and whose work was much more popularly received. **Of the socialists Nietzsche says: How ludicrous I find the socialists, with their nonsensical optimism concerning the "good man", who is waiting to appear from behind the scenes if only one would abolish the old "order" and set all the "natural drives" free**. WP 755 Also: I am opposed to Socialism because it dreams quite naively of "the good, true, and beautiful" and of "equal rights." WP 753 Politically, Nietzsche could be best described as an "aristocratic radical," one who believes in the value of a rigidly stratified social order where the "higher type" rules.
Socialism is anathema to an aristocratic society because it seeks to make everyone equal, whereas Nietzsche argues that social stratification is not only inevitable, but positively beneficial and necessary for the advancement of the species.
The socialists want to realize a utopia that Nietzsche says is both unachievable and undesirable. A world in which everyone is peaceful and equal, he says, would produce nothing of value.

Nietzsche condemned nationalism. He would not have supported Nazism.

Taylor 96 (Alan, professor at UT in Arlington, Evans Experimentalism, A Polemic on Nietzsche's Implicit Indictment of National Socialism, 1996, http://evans-experientialism.freewebspace.com/taylor_alan_%20nietzsche.htm)

In *Beyond Good and Evil* **he describes nationalism as "a plop and release into old loves and narrowness**" 241. Speaking for "the good Europeans" in *The Gay Science* **Nietzsche describes the link between nationalism and Germany while he also Expresses his desire to rise above such petty interests**. Although he was born in Germany, Nietzsche claimed to be descended from Polish aristocracy. **His loathing for the Germany of his age is unparalleled. Nationalism, he says, is "desolating the German spirit by making it vain and that is, moreover, petty politics". Nazi Germany embodied the nationalism and race hatred that Nietzsche warned against time and again. Nationalism, for Nietzsche, is a sickness that must be overcome.**

A2: Nietzsche Bad

There are multiple readings of Nietzsche and not all readings end up justifying violence. Labeling Nietzsche violent is a tactic of ressentiment and is only done to disguise the failings of the plan

<u>**Connolly**</u>, William E. Professor of Political Science at John Hopkins University **1991** [Identity/ Difference: democratic negotiations of political paradox]

I will advance some ingredients in a post-Nietzschean political theory by working on the second and third points. Let me say something, though, about the first one, the reading of Nietzsche as the consummate philosopher of world mastery. While such a reading is possible, it is not *the* single or necessary reading to be drawn from a thinker as protean as Nietzsche. It tends to be given by those who endorse strong transcendental or teleological perspectives. They presume that any ethic of care and self-limitation must flow from a teleotranscendental perspective, and that since Nietzsche noisily repudiates such a perspective, the coiner of the phrase "will to power" must endorse a ruthless philosophy in which a few exercise mastery over other humans and nature. Many may find *this* Nietzsche reassuring as a negative counterpoint to their own thinking, implying that since this is where all followers of Nietzsche must end up, anyone of "good will" should buy into their perspective to avoid this result. Nietzsche thus becomes a foil used to cover a weak affirmative argument through negation of the opposing one. There is irony in this strategy, since it is the strategy Nietzsche exposes as a favorite tactic of *ressentiment*.

These theorists have failed to explore the possibility that Nietzsche combines a tragic conception of life with nontheistic reverence, and that together these provide a human basis for agonistic care and self-limitation.

If Nietzsche is to play the negative role for which he has been nominated, it must be shown not only that the mastery reading *can* be constructed out of Nietzsche's texts but also that no other possibilities more disturbing to the aura of necessity attaching to the teleotranscendental alternative can be distilled from them. And this task, in my view, has not been accomplished. 195-6

AFF: Perm

Use of the state is critical to Nietzsche's exercise of the will to power—Self-cultivation is an agonistic process that democracy can enhance

Hatab 20**02** (professor at Old Dominion University, The Journal of Nietzsche Studies 24 (2002) 132-147, Prospects For A Democratic Agon: Why We Can Still Be Nietzscheans, Project Muse)

How can we begin to apply the notion of agonistics to politics in general and democracy in particular? First of all, contestation and competition can be seen as fundamental to self-development and as an intrinsically social phenomenon. Agonistics helps us articulate the social and political ramifications of Nietzsche's concept of will to power. As Nietzsche put it in an 1887 note, "**will to power can manifest itself only against resistances**; **it seeks that which resists it**" (KSA 12, p.424). **Power, therefore, is not simply an individual possession or a goal of action; it is more a global, interactive conception. For Nietzsche, every advance in life is an overcoming of some obstacle or counterforce, so that conflict is a mutual co-constitution of contending forces**. [End Page 134] **Opposition generates development**. The human self is not formed in some internal sphere and then secondarily exposed to external relations and conflicts. The self is constituted in and through what it opposes and what opposes it; in other words, **the self is formed through agonistic relations**. Therefore**, any annulment of one's Other would be an annulment of one's self in this sense. Competition can be understood as a shared activity for the sake of fostering high achievement and self-development, and therefore as an intrinsically social activity.** 10

In the light of Nietzsche's appropriation of the two forms of Eris, it is necessary to distinguish between agonistic conflict and sheer violence. **A radical agonistics rules out violence, because violence is actually an impulse to eliminate conflict by annihilating or incapacitating an opponent, bringing the agon to an end**. 11 In a later work **Nietzsche discusses the "spiritualization of hostility** (Feindschaft)**," wherein one must affirm both the presence and the power of one's opponents as implicated in one's own posture** (TI "Morality as Antinature," 3). And in this passage **Nietzsche specifically applies such a notion to the political realm. What this implies is that the category of the social need not be confined to something like peace or harmony. Agonistic relations, therefore, do not connote a deterioration of a social disposition and can thus be extended to political relations**.

How can democracy in general terms be understood as an agonistic activity? Allow me to quote from my previous work. **Political judgments are not preordained or dictated; outcomes depend upon a contest of speeches where one view wins and other views lose in a tabulation of votes; since the results are binding and backed by the coercive power of the government, democratic elections and procedures establish temporary control and subordination—which, however, can always be altered or reversed because of the succession of periodic political contests. . . . Democratic elections allow for, and depend upon, peaceful exchanges and transitions of power**. . . . [**L**]**anguage is the weapon in democratic contests. The binding results, however, produce tangible effects of gain and loss that make political exchanges more than just talk or a game. . . . The urgency of such political contests is that losers must yield to, and live under, the policies of the winner; we notice, therefore, specific configurations of power, of domination and submission in democratic politics**. 12

AFF: Institutions Good

Nietzsche rejected the repudiation of institutions. He saw the state as a place to realize his alternative.

Hatab 20**02** (professor at Old Dominion University, The Journal of Nietzsche Studies 24 (2002) 132-147, Prospects For A Democratic Agon: Why We Can Still Be Nietzscheans, Project Muse)

Those who take Nietzsche to be diagnosing social institutions as descendants of slave morality should take note of GM II,11, where **Nietzsche offers some interesting reflections on justice and law. He indicates that the global economy of nature is surely not a function of justice; yet workable conceptions of justice and injustice are established by the historical force of human law.** Nietzsche does not indict such forces as slavish infirmities. **Legal arrangements are "exceptional conditions" that modulate natural forces of power in** [End Page 136] **social directions, and that are not an elimination of conflict but an instrument in channeling the continuing conflict of different power complexes**. Surprisingly, **Nietzsche attributes the historical emergence of law not to reactive resentment but to active, worldly forces that check and redirect the "senseless raging of revenge," and that are able to reconfigure offenses as more "impersonal" violations of legal provisions rather than sheer personal injuries**. Here **Nietzsche analyzes the law in a way analogous to his account of the Greek agon and its healthy sublimation of natural impulses for destruction**. **A legal system is a life-promoting cultural force that refashions natural energies in less savage and more productive directions.**

Finally, **those who read Nietzsche as an anti-institutional transgressor and creator should heed TI ("Skirmishes of an Untimely Man," 39), where Nietzsche clearly diagnoses a repudiation of institutions as a form of decadence**. **Because of our modern faith in a foundational individual freedom, we no longer have the instincts for forming and sustaining the traditions and modes of authority that healthy institutions require**.

The whole of the West no longer possesses the instincts out of which institutions grow, out of which a future grows: perhaps nothing antagonizes its "modern spirit" so much. **One lives for the day, one lives very fast, one lives very irresponsibly: precisely this is called "freedom." That which makes an institution an institution is despised, hated, repudiated: one fears the danger of a new slavery the moment the word "authority" is even spoken out loud**. **That is how far decadence has advanced in the value-instincts of our politicians, of our political parties: instinctively they prefer what disintegrates, what hastens the end.**
In the light of these remarks**, a Nietzschean emphasis on power and agonistics offers significant advantages for political philosophy. In some respects we are freed from the modern project of "justifying" the force of social institutions because of a stipulated freedom from constraint in the "state of nature." With a primal conception of power(s), we can retrieve an Aristotelian take on social institutions as fitting and productive of human existence. Forces of law need** not **be seen as** alien to the self, but as **modulations of a ubiquitous array of forces within which human beings can locate relative spheres of freedom**. And an agonistic conception of political activity need not be taken as a corruption or degradation of an idealized order of political principles or social virtues. **Our own tradition of the separation of powers and an adversarial legal system can be taken as a baseline conception of the nature**, **function, and proper operation of government offices and judicial practice**. The founders of the Constitution inherited from Montesquieu the idea that a division of powers is the best check on tyranny. In other words, **tyranny is avoided not by some project of harmony, but by multiplying the number of power sites in a government and affirming their competition through mutual self-assertion** [End Page 137] **and mistrust**. 16 **Our common law tradition is agonistic in both conception and practice**. **Most procedural rules are built around the idea of coequal competition in open court before a jury who will decide the outcome, where the judge in most respects plays the role of an impartial referee. And the presumption of innocence is fundamentally meant to contest the government's power to prosecute and punish**. 17 **I think that both notions of separation of powers and legal adversarialism are compatible with Nietzsche's analysis of the law noted previously—that a legal order is not a means of preventing struggle, but "a means in the struggle between power-complexes" (GM II,11).**

AFF: Institutions Good

Agonistic practices would limit out the possibility of authoritarian violence. The overall practice teaches individuals to rid themselves of the traditional notion of democracy and instead, recognize different ideas and notions as equally important.

Hatab 20**02** (professor at Old Dominion University, The Journal of Nietzsche Studies 24 (2002) 132-147, Prospects For A Democratic Agon: Why We Can Still Be Nietzscheans, Project Muse)

Assuming that politics should not be restricted and reserved for an elite, but open to the participation of all citizens, can we retain a sense of respect and political rights in appropriating Nietzsche for democracy? I think so. In fact, Nietzschean **conceptions of agonistics and nonfoundational openness can go a long way toward articulating and defending democratic practices without the problems attaching to traditional principles of equality**. If political respect implies inclusiveness and an open regard for the rightful participation of others, **an agonistic model of politics can underwrite respect without the need for substantive conceptions of equality or even something like "equal regard."** I have already mentioned that agonistics can be seen as a fundamentally social phenomenon. **Since the self is formed in and through tensional relations with others, then any annulment of my Other would be an annulment of myself. Radical agonistics, then, discounts the idea of sheer autonomy and self-constitution. Such a tensional sociality can much more readily affirm the place of the Other in social relations than can modern models of subject-based freedom.** Moreover, **the structure of an agon conceived as a contest can readily underwrite political principles of fairness. Not only do I need an Other to prompt my own achievement, but the significance of any "victory" I might achieve demands an able opponent**. **As in athletics, defeating an incapable or incapacitated competitor winds up being meaningless**. So I should not only will the presence of **others in an agon**, I should also want that they be able adversaries, that they **have opportunities and capacities to succeed in the contest. And I should be able to honor the winner of a fair contest. Such is the logic of competition that contains a host of normative features, which might even include active provisions for helping people in political contests become more able participants**. 25 In addition, agonistic respect need not be associated with something like positive regard or equal worth, a dissociation that can go further in facing up to actual political conditions and problematic connotations that can attach to liberal dispositions. Again allow me to quote my previous work. **Democratic respect forbids exclusion, it demands inclusion; but respect for the Other as other can avoid a vapid sense of "tolerance," a sloppy "relativism," or a misplaced spirit of "neutrality." Agonistic respect allows us to simultaneously affirm our beliefs and affirm our opponents as worthy competitors** [End Page 142] **in public discourse**. **Here we can speak of respect without ignoring the fact that politics involves perpetual disagreement**, and we have an adequate answer to the question "Why should I respect a view that I do not agree with?" In this way beliefs **about what is best (aristos) can be coordinated with an openness to other beliefs and a willingness to accept the outcome of an open competition among the full citizenry (demos)**. **Democratic respect, therefore, is a dialogical mixture of affirmation and negation, a political bearing that entails giving all beliefs a hearing, refusing any belief an ultimate warrant, and perceiving one's own viewpoint as agonistically implicated with opposing viewpoints. In sum, we can combine 1) the historical tendency of democratic movements to promote free expression, pluralism, and liberation from traditional constraints, and 2) a Nietzschean perspectivism and agonistic respect, to arrive at a postmodern model of democracy that provides both a nonfoundational openness and an atmosphere of civil political discourse.** 26

AFF: Nietzsche→Violence

Nietzschean views allow genocide to happen.

Kelly **Ross 2003**. ("Friedrich Nietzsche", July 5, 2007, http://www.friesian.com/NIETZSCH.HTM)

One could hardly say that either Nietzsche or Hitler "love" the Jews the way that an eagle loves a small mammalian meal. Some have wondered, however, how much of Hitler's hatred was heartfelt and how much merely cynical. Albert Speer said that Hitler never talked about the Jews in private conversation. Was he really obsessed with them, or were they merely a device in his larger schemes of predation, in which whole nations could be thoughtlessly consumed and expended in the interest of Germany and himself? So much the better would this be, for Nietzsche. One thing must always be kept in view here: **Nietzsche provides a feel-good philosophy for predators. There is going to be no fault to find with Hitler if he merely destroys, uses, tortures, kills, etc. Nietzsche himself seems more at fault if the only real sin is impotent resentment and inactive rancor.** Nietzsche did not live to see the Nazis, but he knew of another power that had to deal with the Jews as an alien, hostile, and disruptive force: Rome viewed Israel as a **monstrosity**; the Romans regarded the Jews as *convicted* of hatred against the whole of mankind -- and rightly so if one is justified in associating the welfare of the human species with absolute supremacy of aristocratic values.... The Romans were the strongest and most noble people who ever lived. [p.185-186, boldface added] The Romans, of course, killed many Jews, and expelled them from Jerusalem and their Temple, but they did not actually try to exterminate them. **Perhaps genocide would have been too much for Nietzsche. But exactly how would he object to it? He could not say that mass murder was intrinsically *unjust*, since that is absurd. The most he could do would be to say, "You're letting them get to you too much**." But, Hitler might object, **after 2000** (or 3000, who knows?) **years of damage done by these people, why not just get rid of them? Couldn't Nietzsche just say, "Why not?" Is it really something to worry about so much? No. And, as Nietzsche says, the "welfare of the human species" may be at stake**.

Nietzsche's ideas of good and evil justify all atrocities, and the people who commit murder and genocide, in Nietzsche's views, can't be blamed for their actions.

Kelly **Ross 2003**. ("Friedrich Nietzsche", July 5, 2007, http://www.friesian.com/NIETZSCH.HTM)

At the end of the passage above, before the ones about Rome and Napoleon, **what more we get is the idea that *strength cannot but manifest itself as strength*, i.e. there was no *choice* about the noble terror inflicted by Hitler, or any other predator. "A quantum of strength is equivalent to a quantum of urge, will, activity, and it is only the snare of language** (of the arch-fallacies of reason petrified in language), **presenting all activity as conditioned by an agent -- the "subject" -- that blinds us to this fact**. ....so does popular morality divorce strength from its manifestation, as though there were behind the strong a neutral agent, free to manifest its strength or contain it. But no such agent exists; there is no "being" behind the doing, acting, becoming; the "doer" has simply been added to the deed by the imagination -- the doing is everything. [pp.178-179]**So there is no self, no "neutral agent," of the predator, that is free to choose good or evil. The "doing" is all that there is. So not only cannot Hitler be blamed for being "evil," since that term is only used by the miserable, impotent, and mean, but he cannot even be said to have had a choice in the matter, since the idea of choice itself is an "arch-fallacy" perpetrated by the miserable, impotent, and mean just so that they *can blame* the strong for acting in their instinctively strong way**.

AFF: Nietzsche→Violence

Nietzsche's view of life and the human race is violent, justifying and praising oppression and violence.

Kelly **Ross 2003**. ("Friedrich Nietzsche," July 5, 2007, http://www.friesian.com/NIETZSCH.HTM)

But, **one might think, violence and oppression are *unjust*! How could any progressive person not see that expoitation and abuse are *wrong*! We have Nietzsche's answer:**
No act of violence, rape, exploitation, destruction, is intrinsically "unjust," since life itself is violent, rapacious, exploitative, and destructive and cannot be conceived otherwise. Even more disturbingly, we have to admit that from the **biological** [i.e. Darwinian] point of view legal conditions are necessarily exceptional conditions, since they limit the radical life-will bent on power and must finally subserve, as means, life's collective purpose, which is to create greater power constellations. To accept any legal system as sovereign and universal -- to accept it, not merely as an instrument in the struggle of power complexes, but as a *weapon against struggle* (in the sense of Dühring's communist cliché that every will must regard every other will as its equal) -- is an **anti-vital** principle which can only bring about man's utter demoralization and, indirectly, a reign of nothingness. [p.208, boldface added]
Nietzsche is certainly *life affirming*, but then violence, rape, exploitation, and destruction are intrinsic to his view of life. Attempts to protect the weak, see that justice is done, and mitigate suffering are "anti-vital" projects that, being adverse to life itself, actually tend towards "a reign of nothingness." Thus, if we actually care about others and are not just interested in asserting power over them and using them for our own pleasure, then we can look forward to extinction.
The delicacy -- even more, the *tartufferie* -- of domestic animals like ourselves shrinks from imagining clearly to what extent **cruelty** constituted the collective delight of older mankind, how much it was an ingredient of all their joys, or how naïvely they manifested their cruelty, how they considered disinterested malevolence (Spinoza's *sympathia malevolens*) a normal trait, something to which one's conscience could assent heartily**.... To behold suffering gives pleasure, but to cause another to suffer affords an even greater pleasure.** [pp.197-198, boldface added]
A great part of the pleasure that we get, according to Nietzsche, from injustice to others is simply the pleasure of inflicting suffering. In this it is worth recollecting the feminist shibboleth that rape is not about sex, it is about power. Nietzsche would heartily concur. So much the better! And what is more, the value of rape is not just power, it is the chance to cruelly inflict suffering. **The rapist who beats and mutilates, perhaps even kills, his victim, has done no evil, he is instead one of the heroes of true historic nobility.** And people think that the *droit de seigneur* represents some "abuse" of power! No! It is the truly noble man as heroic rapist! Nietzsche would turn around Susan Brownmiller, who said that all men are rapists. No, it is just the problem that they *are not*. **Nietzsche would regard most men as virtual castrati** (domestic oxen, geldings) **for *not* being rapists.**

AFF: Nietzsche➔Violence

Nietzsche encourages rape, domination, murder, political oppression and violence, saying they are all noble traits.
Kelly **Ross 2003**. (Friedrich Nietzsche, July 5, 2007, http://www.friesian.com/NIETZSCH.HTM)

The lack of rights for the dark underclasses brings us to the principal theme of *The Genealogy of Morals*: **The morality of "good and evil" has been invented out of hatred and resentment by the defeated and subjugated races,** especially the Jews**. People who love Nietzsche for his celebration of creativity** and his dismissal of the moralism of traditional religion, mainly meaning Christianity**, usually seem to think of going "beyond good and evil" as merely legitimizing homosexuality, drugs, abortion, prostitution, pornography, and the other desiderata of progressive thinking. They don't seem to understand that Nietzsche wasn't particularly interested in things like that, but, more to the point, legitimizing rape, murder, torture, pillage, domination, and political oppression by the strong.** The only honest Nietzschean graduate student I ever met frankly stated, "To be creative, you must be evil." We get something similar in the recent Sandra Bullock movie, *Murder by Numbers* [2002], where the young Nietzschean student simply says, "Freedom is crime." The story of the movie is more or less that of Leopold and Loeb, the Chicago teenagers who in 1924 murdered a young boy (Bobby Franks) to prove that they were "beyond good and evil." Leopold and Loeb understood their Nietzsche far better than most of his academic apologists.
And we are the first to admit that anyone who knew these "good" ones [nobility] only as enemies would find them evil enemies indeed. For these same men who, amongst themselves, are so strictly constrained by custom, worship, ritual, gratitude, and by mutual surveillance and jealousy, who are so resourceful in consideration, tenderness, loyality, pride and friendship, when once they step outside their circle become little better than uncaged beasts of prey**. Once abroad in the wilderness, they revel in the freedom from social constraint and compensate for their long confinement in the quietude of their own community. They revert to the innocence of wild animals: we can imagine them returning from an orgy of murder, arson, rape, and torture, jubilant and at peace with themselves** as though they had committed a fraternity prank -- convinced, moreover, that the poets for a long time to come will have something to sing about and to praise. **Deep within all the noble races there lurks the beast of prey, bent on spoil and conquest. This hidden urge has to be satisfied from time to time, the beast let loose in the wilderness.** This goes as well for the Roman, Arabian, German, Japanese nobility as for the Homeric heroes and the Sandinavian vikings. **The noble races have everywhere left in their wake the catchword "barbarian." .....their utter indifference to safety and comfort, their terrible pleasure in destruction, their taste for cruelty -- all these traits are embodied by their victims in the image of the "barbarian," and "evil enemy,"** the Goth or the Vandal. The profound and icy suspicion which the German arouses as soon as he assumes power (we see it happening again today [i.e. 1887]) harks back to the persistent horror with which Europe for many centuries witnessed the raging of the blond Teutonic beast (although all racial connection between the old Teutonic tribes and ourselves has been lost). [pp.174-175, boldface added**] The "noble races" are thus ennobled by no** *restraint* **or** *consideration* **shown for the persons or possessions, let alone feelings, of those helpless strangers who come within their power. "Spoil and conquest," rape and torture, are fun.** Kaiser Wilhelm got in the spirit of things by telling German troups to act like the "Huns of Attila" on their mission to Peking in 1900. No Nietzschean has any business, for example, damning Christopher Columbus for enslaving the Caribs. While Nietzsche actually seems to think that the "blond Teutonic beast" was gone from Germany, and Hitler, as noted, hardly fills the bill, there is actually no lack of blonds in the "Nordic" nations, and Nietzsche himself here seems to have a relatively expansive notion of racial superiority. While he apparently thought of the Roman nobility as themselves of Aryan extraction, he can hardly have thought the same of the Arabians or Japanese. This acknowledgment would have been of material advantage in World War II, when many Arabs preferred the Germans to the British (or to the Zionist Jews of Palestine) -- while the Japanese, even today, often think of themselves as a pure and superior race. As actual German Allies in World War II, the Japanese where in close competition with Germany for atrocities against civilians and prisoners-of-war (though the Germans were relatively considerate of American and British prisoners, while brutal to Russians and others, as the Japanese were to all).

Nietzsche→Violence

Nietzsche rationalized genocide as noble--the "strong" simply overcoming the "weak"

Christopher **Simpson**, author and professor of journalism, 19**95**
["The Splendid Blond Beast," http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Genocide/SplendidBlondeBeast.html

Friedrich **Nietzsche called the aristocratic predators who write society's laws "the splendid blond beast" precisely because they so often behave as though they are beyond the reach of elementary morality**. **As he saw things, these elites have cut a path toward a certain sort of excellence consisting mainly of the exercise of power at the expense of others**. When dealing with ordinary people, he said, they "revert to the innocence of wild animals.... We can imagine them returning from an orgy of murder, arson, rape and torture, jubilant and at peace with themselves as though they had committed a fraternity prank-convinced, moreover, that the poets for a long time to come will have something to sing about and to praise." **Their brutality was true courage, Nietzsche thought, and the foundation of social order.**

Today genocide-the deliberate destruction of a racial, cultural, or political group-is the paramount example of the institutionalized and sanctioned violence of which Nietzsche spoke. Genocide has been a basic mechanism of empire and the national state since their inception and remains widely practiced in "advanced" and "civilized" areas. Most genocides in this century have been perpetrated by nation-states upon ethnic minorities living within the state's own borders; most of the victims have been children. The people responsible for mass murder have by and large gotten away with what they have done. Most have succeeded in keeping wealth that they looted from their victims; most have never faced trial. **Genocide is still difficult to eradicate because it is usually tolerated, at least by those who benefit from it.**

Nietzsche's politics caused the Holocaust

Darrell J. **Fasching**, professor of religious studies at South Florida, in 19**93**
[The Ethical Challenge of Auschwitz and Hiroshima : Apocalypse or Utopia?, p. 25-6]

Scarcely more than half a century after Nietzsche's madman had unleashed his prophecy the Nazis came along to embrace his vision of a normless will to power. **Nietzsche had offered a vision of a new type of individual who would have to take charge of human history after the death of God**; namely, the Übermensch or self-transcending person. **Such individuals would have the courage to "transvalue all values" and remake the world in their own image**. Nietzsche, of course, had a somewhat aristocratic vision of these new individuals. But **his vision was easily usurped by the Nazis who imagined themselves, the pure Aryan race, as the natural embodiment of this superior human being who would recreate the world through a will to power. The Nazi program of attempted genocide of the Jews is a logical outcome of this new normless situation expressed in Nietzsche**'s parable of "the Death of God." **In a world where power is the final arbiter of values and might makes right, deicide is inexorably followed by genocide**.

AFF: Pity vs. Compassion

No Link and turn--Nietzsche's philosophy only rejects pity, not compassion. The plan is a compassionate response to suffering in Africa that breaks down hierarchical power relations.

Gudrun **von Tevenar**, Birkbeck College, London, Autumn 2005
["Nietzsche's Objections to Pity and Compassion," *The Gemes/Leiter Nietzsche Seminar*,
http://www.bbk.ac.uk/phil/staff/academics/gemes-work/GurdrenvonTevenar18Oct05]

When we examine these objections with the pity/compassion distinction as briefly outlined at the beginning in mind, then we find that **Nietzsche's objections are almost exclusively concerned with Mitleid understood as pity and not as compassion**. Notice that Mitleid is either contaminated from the beginning with contempt and shame as in the examples of the savages and Zarathustra, or Mitleid seems preoccupied mainly with the mental state of the agent and not with the sufferer. **Understanding Mitleid merely as pity seems to me the main reason why Nietzsche's objections, though very sophisticated and eminently plausible, somehow miss their target** as far as Schopenhauer is concerned. Because Schopenhauer, when elevating Mitleid as the highest virtue, speaks throughout of Mitleid as compassion. Thus Schopenhauer claims that **compassionate agents can act selflessly and solely for the weal of sufferers precisely because they see in sufferers someone like themselves**. In other words, **in the eyes of compassionate agents there is**, according to Schopenhauer, **no gap of distance and otherness between agents and sufferers and hence no associated negative feelings of alienation and shame**. Indeed, Schopenhauer takes great pains to distinguish his kind of Mitleid, i.e. compassion, from various deviations and aberrations such as those that Nietzsche concentrates on and grants them no moral value whatsoever. We can conclude therefore that Schopenhauer could, in a way, willingly agree with most of Nietzsche's objections and yet keep his own theory intact, since he elevates compassion while Nietzsche denigrates pity.

AFF: Compassion Good

Compassion is critical to stopping atrocities like the Holocaust—their denial of humanist intervention authorizes genocide.

Violet B. **Ketels**, associate professor of English at Temple University, in 19**96**
["The Holocaust: Remembering for the Future: 'Havel to the Castle!' The Power of the Word," *The Annals of The American Academy of Political and Social Science*, November, 1996]

In the Germany of the 1930s, a demonic idea was born in a demented brain; the word went forth; orders were given, repeated, widely broadcast; and men, women, and children were herded into death camps. **Their offshore signals, cries for help, did not summon us to rescue. We had become inured to the reality of human suffering. We could no longer hear what the words meant or did not credit them or not enough of us joined the chorus. Shrieking victims perished in the cold blankness of inhumane silence.**

We were deaf to the apocalyptic urgency in Solzhenitsyn's declaration from the Gulag that we must check the disastrous course of history. We were heedless of the lesson of his experience that **only the unbending strength of the human spirit, fully taking its stand on the shifting frontier of encroaching violence and declaring "not one step further," though death may be the end of it--only this unwavering firmness offers any genuine defense of peace for the individual, of genuine peace for mankind at large**. 2

In past human crises, writers and thinkers strained language to the breaking point to keep alive the memory of the unimaginable, to keep the human conscience from forgetting. In the current context, however, **intellectuals seem more devoted to abstract assaults on values than to thoughtful probing of the moral dimensions of human experience.**

"Heirs of the ancient possessions of higher knowledge and literacy skills," 3 we seem to have lost our nerve, and not only because of Holocaust history and its tragic aftermath. **We feel insecure before the empirical absolutes of hard science.** We are intimidated by the "high modernist rage against mimesis and content," 4 **monstrous progeny of the union between Nietzsche and philosophical formalism, the grim proposal we have bought into that there is no truth, no objectivity, and no disinterested knowledge**. 5

Less certain about the power of language, that "oldest flame of the [*47] humanist soul," 6 to frame a credo to live by or criteria to judge by, we are vulnerable even to the discredited Paul de Man's indecent hint that "wars and revolutions are not empirical events . . . but 'texts' masquerading as facts." 7 Truth and reality seem more elusive than they ever were in the past; values are pronounced to be mere fictions of ruling elites to retain power. We are embarrassed by virtue.

Words collide and crack under these new skeptical strains, dissolving into banalities the colossal enormity of what must be expressed lest we forget. Remembering for the future has become doubly dispiriting by our having to remember for the present, too, our having to register and confront what is wrong here and now.

The reality to be fixed in memory shifts as we seek words for it; the memory we set down is flawed by our subjectivities. It is selective, deceptive, partial, unreliable, and amoral. It plays tricks and can be invented. It stops up its ears to shut out what it does not dare to face. 8

Lodged in our brains, such axioms, certified by science and statistics, tempt us to concede the final irrelevance of words and memory. We have to get on with our lives. Besides, memories reconstructed in words, even when they are documented by evidence, have not often changed the world or fended off the powerful seductions to silence, forgetting, or denying.

Especially denying, which, in the case of the Holocaust, has become an obscene industry competing in the open market of ideas for control of our sense of the past. It is said that the Holocaust never happened. Revisionist history with a vengeance is purveyed in words; something in words must be set against it. Yet what? How do we nerve to the task when we are increasingly disposed to cast both words and memory in a condition of cryogenic dubiety?

Not only before but also since 1945, **the criminality of governments, paraded as politics** and fattening on linguistic manipulation and deliberately reimplanted memory of past real or imagined grievance, **has spread calamity across the planet**. "The cancer that has eaten at the entrails of Yugoslavia since Tito's death [has] Kosovo for its locus," but not merely as a piece of land. The country's rogue adventurers use the word "Kosovo" to reinvoke as sacred the land where Serbs were defeated by Turks in 1389! 9 Memory of bloody massacres in 1389, sloganized and distorted in 1989, demands the bloody revenge of new massacres and returns civilization not to its past glory but to its gory tribal wars. As Matija Beckovic, the bard of Serb nationalism, writes, "It is as if the Serbian people waged only one battle--by widening the Kosovo charnel-house, by adding wailing upon wailing, by counting new martyrs.
to the martyrs of Kosovo. . . . Kosovo is the Serbianized [*48] history of the Flood--the Serbian New Testament." 10

AFF: Compassion Good

(Ketels 2/2)

A cover of Suddeutsche Zeitung in 1994 was printed with blood donated by refugee women from Bosnia in an eerily perverse afterbirth of violence revisited. 11

We stand benumbed before multiplying horrors. As Vaclav Havel warned more than a decade ago, **regimes that generate them "are the avant garde of a global crisis in civilization." The depersonalization of power in "system, ideology and apparat," pathological suspicions about human motives and meanings, the loosening of individual responsibility, the swiftness by which disastrous events follow one upon another "have deprived us of our conscience, of our common sense and natural speech and thereby, of our actual humanity.**" 12 Nothing less than the transformation of human consciousness is likely to rescue us.

AFF: A2 'Not our Nietzsche'

Even if their evidence doesn't explicitly endorse violence, Nietzsche's condemnation of morality licenses all atrocities

Simon **May**, College Research Fellow in Philosophy, Birkbeck College, 19**99**
[Nietzsche's Ethic Versus 'Morality: The New Ideal, pp. 132-133]

An apologist for Nietzsche might suggest that his ethic is not alone in effectively legitimizing inhumanity. He might argue, for example, that some forms of utilitarianism could not prevent millions being sacrificed if greater numbers could thereby be saved; or that heinous maxims could be consistently universalized by Kant's Categorical Imperative-maxims against which Kant's injunction to treat all human beings as ends in themselves would afford no reliable protection, both because its conception of 'humanity' is vague and because it would be overridden by our duty, as rational agents, to respect just such universalized maxims. **To this apologist one would reply that with Nietzsche there is not even an attempt to produce a systematic safety net against cruelty**, especially if one judges oneself to be a 'higher' type of person with life-enhancing pursuits-and, to this extent, **his philosophy licenses the atrocities of a Hitler, even though, by his personal table of values, he exerciates anti-Semitism and virulent nationalism**. Indeed to the extent it is irrelevant whether or not Nietzsche himself advocates violence and bloodshed or whether he is the gentle person described by his contemporaries. **The reality is that the supreme value he places on individual life enhancement and self-legislation leaves room for, and in some causes explicitly justifies, unfettered brutality**. In sum: the point here is not to rebut Nietzsche's claim that "everything is evil, terrible, and tyrannical in man's serves his enhancement "as much as its opposite does" – for such a rebuttal would be a major ethical undertaking in its own right. It is rather to suggest that the necessary balance between danger and safety which Nietzsche himself regards as a condition for flourishing is not vouchsafed by his extreme individualism. Indeed, such individualism seems not only self-defeating, but also quite unnecessary: for safeguards against those who have pretensions to sovereignty but lack nobility could be accepted on Nietzsche's theory of value as lust another 'condition for the preservation' of 'higher' types. **Since the overriding aim of his attack on morality is to liberate people from the repressiveness of the 'herd' instinct, this unrelieved potential danger to the 'higher' individual must count decisively against the success**-and the possibility of the success-**of his project**.

AFF: Nietzsche➔Racism

Nietzsche's philosophy is racist and oppressive.

Kelly **Ross 2003**. (Friedrich Nietzsche, July 5, 2007, http://www.friesian.com/NIETZSCH.HTM)

First of all, **Nietzsche's racism is unmistakable. The best way to approach this is to let Nietzsche speak for himself**. In the quotes that follow, I will simply offer examples from The Genealogy of Morals alone, as translated by Francis Golffing (in the footnotes I have been adding some passages from Beyond Good and Evil for comparison). **The Latin malus ["bad"] (beside which I place melas [Greek for "black"]) might designate the common man as dark, especially black-haired** ("hic niger est"), **as the pre-Aryan settler of the Italian soil, notably distinguished from the new blond conqueror race by his color**. At any rate, the Gaelic presented me with an exactly analogous case: fin, as in the name Fingal, the characteristic term for nobility, eventually the good, noble, pure, originally the fair-haired as opposed to the dark, black-haired native population. The Celts, by the way, were definitely a fair-haired race; and it is a mistake to try to relate the area of dark-haired people found on ethnographic maps of Germany to Celtic bloodlines, as Virchow does. These are the last vestiges of the pre-Aryan population of Germany. (**The subject races are seen to prevail once more, throughout almost all of Europe; in color, shortness of skull, perhaps also in intellectual and social instincts.** Who knows whether modern democracy, the even more fashionable anarchism, and especially that preference for the commune, the most primitive of all social forms, which is now shared by all European socialists -- whether all these do not represent a throwback, and whether, even physiologically, the Aryan race of conquerors is not doomed?) [The Birth of Tragedy and The Genealogy of Morals, Doubleday Anchor Books, 1956, p.164, boldface added, note] **Here we have an unmistakable racism: the good, noble, and blond Aryans, contrasted with the dark and primitive indigenes of Europe**. While Nietzsche's thought is often defended as unrelated to the racism of the Nazis, there does not seem to be much difference from the evidence of this passage. One difference might be Nietzsche's characterization of the "commune" as "the most primitive of all social forms." Nazi ideology was totalitarian and "social," denigrating individualism. Nietzsche would not have gone for this -- and the small, dark Hitler is certainly no Aryan -- but then many defenders of Nietzsche these days also tend to prefer a communitarian democracy, which means they might have more in common with the Nazis, despite their usual anti-racism, than Nietzsche himself. This is characteristic of the confusion of contemporary politics, let alone Nietzsche apologetics. The passage above, at least, provides as much aid and comfort for the Nazis as for any other interpretation or appropriation of Nietzsche**. Nietzsche's racism might be excused as typical of its age, and criticism of it anachronistic. However, the racism of Thomas Jefferson, a century earlier, involved an explicit denial that physical or intellectual differences between the races** (about which Jefferson expressed no certainty) **compromised the rights of the inferior races. To Nietzsche, however, the "subject races" have no "rights"; and domination, not to mention all the forms of "oppression" excoriated by the trendy Left, are positive and desirable goods.** This anxiety or distemper may be due to a variety of causes. It may result from a crossing of races too dissimilar (or of classes too dissimilar. **Class distinctions are always indicative of genetic and racial differences**: the European Weltschmerz and the pessimism of the nineteenth century were both essentially the results of an abrupt and senseless mixing of classes)... [p.267, boldface added, note] In the litany of political sins identified by the Left, "racism, classism, and homophobia" are the holy trinity -- with "classism," of course, as a codeword for the hated capitalism. **Here we see that for Nietzsche racism and "classism" are identical: the "subject races" form the subject classes. This is good and noble. We also get another aspect of the matter, the "mixing" of races and classes is "senseless" and productive of the pessimism and social problems of modern society**. In these terms, Nietzsche can only have approved of the Nazis laws against marriage or even sex between Aryans and Untermenschen.

AFF: Nietzsche→Dualisms (A2: White)

Simply affirming life recreates the good/evil binary by condemning any attempt to better life.

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[Beyond Nihilism: Nietzsche Without Masks, p. 189-90

The main problem that appears to delimit Nietzsche's philosophical affirmation of life is his failure to value human life as much as life in its totality. **His advances over nihilism are rooted in the notion that there is no need to invent a more perfect form of life** (as in the notion of an afterlife) since life already has sufficient meaning and value. The Dionysian struggle against the Socratic approach to existence is based on the view that reason has exceeded its role when it purports to define the meaning of life in terms of reason itself. And yet, the same opportunity that Nietzsche would like to see given to life is denied to human life. **There is an irresistible tendency on Nietzsche's part to deny the value of human life as such and to accept it as valuable only if it is perfect, noble, or strong. The dualism between good and evil is maintained as a measure of human worth**. **The fact that the dualism remains**, however, **means that the broader project of the affirmation of life in its totality is blocked**. Zarathustra's position serves as an illustration of this dilemma. His love of life is stifled by the torture he experiences at the thought that "small" human beings will recur eternally. Human weakness and failure elicit in Zarathustra a sense of nausea for the whole of existence. His perception and appraisal of reality appear to be out of balance. Even though Zarathustra finally accepts the idea of the recurrence, he makes his choice at the cost of his separation from humanity. He drops all human contact and stays in the mountains, desiring intercourse with eternity atone. There is an important split between his desire to affirm life and his inability to affirm human life. **Human life still appears to be too small, too insignificant and wretched to Nietzsche. Thus he constantly seeks grandeur**. Nietzsche noted that human life has dwindled because human beings lack opportunities for integrated and creative activities. It is a mistake, however, to link creativity and international with the quality of greatness. **The demand for greatness involves a value judgment against anything that is not exceptionally powerful or distinguished**. **This involves a devaluation of the ordinary aspects of human life. If these aspects do not count toward making human life meaningful, however, then one is still exhibiting a nihilistic attitude toward human existence**. Nietzsche is right in claiming that nihilism must be overcome in order for human beings to lead creative and resourceful lives. On the other hand, when he associates the latter values with the creation of a strong and majestic culture. he delimits the meaning of creativity. The expectations he places upon it are nihilistic as long as creativity is made to it under a paradigm of domination.

AFF: No Alternative

Nietzsche's alternative is completely outdated and could never be achieved in modern society. We must apply Nietzsche politically for his philosophy to be effective

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[Identity/ Difference: democratic negotiations of political paradox]

'But the collapse of two types called "man" and "overman" also results from disappearance of the social space in which this figure of solitude was supposed to reside. The overman, remember, rises; above the reactive politics of society, both by cultivating certain dispositions while residing within society and by clearing a space on the edge of social life. In this marginal space projected by Nietzsche, one could not stifle the definitions others gave one, but one could avoid extensive implication in a dense web of relations that would render it necessary either to accept those identifications or to struggle against them politically. **The Nietzschean overman**, in its dominant presentation in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, **lives a life of relative solitude—one that escapes**, for instance, **the hold of the state**, that "superfluous new idol," that "coldest of cold monster" that "tells lies in all the tongues of good and evil: "Only where the state ends, there begins the human being who is not superfluous: there begins the song of necessity, the unique and inimitable tune. . . . Where the state ends—look there my brother! Do you not see it, the rainbow and the bridges of the overman?
But this picture of a marginal space the effective reach of the tentacles of the state no longer refers to any discernable place in late-modern time. **The avoidances it counsels are no longer available, if they ever were. The clean air it seeks is polluted at low altitudes and too thin to breathe at the highest**.
Exactly what late modern life renders inescapable is the intensive entanglement of everyone with everyone else. No one is left alone anymore, though too many are compelled to fend for themselves as they respond to the violent impositions of state and society. The social fabric of interdependencies and conflicts is now too tightly woven; the gaps between the lines of regulation and surveillance have tightened up. This tightening of the social fabric cannot be measured-by ascertaining whether more or fewer people now live on the wrong side of officially defined norms—a mistake critics of the theme of "disciplinary society" repeatedly make when they support the thesis they seek to refute by pointing to those who resist, evade, elude, and disrupt social practices of discipline and normalization. It can be measured by pointing to the enlarged network of intrusions and regulations the army, of misfits face as the standards of normality are extended and intensified; it can be discerned in the resistances they require in order to sustain themselves amid these demands, and in the extension of disciplinary techniques to overcome those resistances. **Those who want aggregate measures can count the number of people today whose primary job is to control, observe, confine, reform, discipline, treat, or correct other people** (think of the police, military personnel, welfare agents, therapists, state security agents, private security agents, advertising firms, prison officials, parole boards, nursing home attendants, licensing agents, tax officials, and so on) **and the various clients**, patients, delinquents, misfits, troubled souls, losers, subversives, and evaders **who provide the primary objects of these practices. And they can compare this index**—after sorting out the complex dimensions that make every aggregate comparison extremely coarse—**with its counterpart a hundred** (or even fifty) **years ago**.
Perhaps we can today listen to enunciations by Nietzsche hundred years ago with ears attuned to a century of social intensification: Do you have courage, O my brothers? Are you brave? Not courage before witnesses, but the courage of hermits and eagles, which is no longer watched even by a god."
Avoid all such unconditional people! They are a poor sick sort, a sort , of mob: they look, sourly at this life, they have the evil eye for this earth.
Avoid all such unconditional people! They have heavy feet and sultry hearts: they do not know how to dance. How should the earth be light for them?19
One dimension in Zarathustra's message can still be heard by those with ears, but the metaphors of wildness, hermits, eagles, snakes, caves, silence, deep wells, high mountains, solitude, mob, flight, and earth that populate Nietzsche's invocations of the overman no longer do double duty today. The "hermit" has become an anonymous member of a regulated multitude who are homeless; the "eagle" has become a protected species; the "mob" has become a criminal network entangled with official intelligence agencies; the "deep well" accumulates pollutants from road maintenance, toxic wastes, and fertilizer runoffs; urban "caves" have become nightly residences for homeless outcasts who restlessly haunt the streets by day; the "earth" has become a deposit of finite resources for late-modern production. **The Nietzschean metaphors now refer to a spiritual disposition disjoined from topographical space; they are drained of reference to identifiable sites between the lines of social organization**.. Even the metaphors have become infiltrated by the signification they would rise above.
These changes in the signifying power of Nietzsche's nineteenth-century metaphors point to the collapse of social space for the overman as an independent, solitary type. The distinction between types now gives way to struggle within and between selves. **The elevation to a fictive space above the muck of reactive politics must be translated into political engagement with institutionalized practices**. Put another way: **the overman must either become a beautiful soul or be dismantled as an apolitical type: either Nietzschean critique of ressentiment becomes an anachronism or it is refigured into a political philosophy.**

AFF: Extinction O/W

Nietzsche's philosophy ignores the character of modern politics--The possibility of extinction precludes his alternative

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[Identity/ Difference: democratic negotiations of political paradox, p. 186]

Zarathustra says: "The most concerned ask today, 'How is man to be preserved?' But Zarathustra is the first and only one to ask: `How is man to be overcome?"16 **The idea is to stop worrying about the preservation of man, to strive to create a few overmen. Leave to their own devices those who insist upon being consumed by resentment, so that a few can cultivate another type of humanity**. The new type to be cultivated consists of a few free spirits who fend off the resentment against the human condition that wells up in everyone, a few who rise above the insistence that there be symmetry between evil and responsibility, who live above the demand that some guilty agent worthy of punishment be located every time they themselves suffer, who recognize that *existential* suffering is a precondition of wisdom.

But this typological differentiation between man and overman no longer makes much sense, if it ever did. For the overman— constituted as an independent, detached type—refers simultaneously to a spiritual disposition and to the residence of free spirits in a social space relatively insulated from reactive politics. The problem is that the disappearance of the relevant social preconditions confounds any division of humanity into two spiritual types. **If there is anything in the type to be admired, the ideal must be dismantled as a distinct caste of solitary individuals and folded into the political fabric of late-modern society**. The "overman" now falls apart as a set of distinctive dispositions concentrated in a particular caste or type, and its spiritual qualities migrate to a set of dispositions that may compete for presence in any self. The type now becomes (as it already was to a significant degree) a voice in the self contending with other voices, including those of ressentiment.

This model is implicitly suggested by Foucault when he eschews the term "overman" (as well as "will to power") and shifts the center of gravity of Nietzschean discourse from heroes and classical tragic figures to everyday misfits such as AlexiAlexina and Pierre Riviere. These textual moves are, I think, part of a strategy to fold Nietzschean agonism into the fabric of ordinary life by attending to' the extraordinary character of the latter. I seek to pursue this same trail.

The Nietzschean conception of a few who overcome resentment above politics while the rest remain stuck in the muck of resentment in politics is not today viable on its own terms. Today circumstances require that many give the sign of the overman a presence in themselves and in the ethicopolitical orientations they project onto the life of the whole. But this break with the spirit of Nietzsche requires further elucidation.

The shift results partly from the late-modern possibility of self-extinction. In this new world the failure to "preserve man" could also extinguish the human basis for the struggle Nietzsche named "overman." Preservation and overcoming are now drawn closer together so that each becomes a term in the other: the latter cannot succeed unless it touches the former. But the entanglement of each with the other in sociopolitical relations means, when the logic of this entanglement is worked out, that the "overman"' as a type cannot eliminate from its life some of the modalities definitive of the "human." If the overman was ever projected as a distinct type—and this is not certain—it now becomes refigured into a struggle within the self between the inclination to existential resentment and an affirmation of life that rises above this tendency.