Representations Toolkit

AFF FW

Reps Don't Determine Policy

Policies come before representations. To change the way representations are utilized and perceived requires a shift in policy methodology. Practice can reframe the language of engagements and allow for new perspectives.

Arthur **Kleinman**, , Professor of Medical Anthropology and Professor of Anthropology at Harvard, The appeal of experience; the dismay of images: cultural appropriations of suffering in our times," DAEDALUS Winter 19**96**, p. http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3671/is_199601/ai_n8747499/print

> **Humanizing the level at which interventions are organized means focusing** planning and evaluation **on the interpersonal space of suffering**, the local, ethnographic context of action. **This requires** not only **engagement with what is at stake for participants** in those local worlds, but bringing those local participants (not merely national experts) into the process of developing and assessing programs. **Such policy-making from the ground up can only succeed**, however, **if these local worlds are more effectively projected into national and international discourses on human problems**. (This may represent the necessary complement to the globalization of local images. Perhaps it should be called the global representation of local contexts.) **To do so requires a reformulation of the indexes and instruments of policy**. Those analytic tools need to authorize deeper depictions of the local (including how the global--e.g., displacement, markets, technology--enters into the local). And **those methodologies of policy must engage the** existential side of **social life**. How **to reframe the language** of policies and programs so that large-scale social forces are made to relate to biography and local history **will require** interdisciplinary **engagements that bring alternative perspectives** from the humanities, the social sciences, and the health sciences to bear on human problems. **The goal is to reconstruct the** object of inquiry and the **purposes of practice**.

Representations and views of the world are always shaped by institutional actions. If we can prove that we change institutions at the policy level, we gain a better internal link to the solvency question.

Claire **Colebrook**, Professor of English Lit University of Edinburgh, Questioning Representation, SubStance Vol. 29 No. 2 Issue 92, 20**00**, p47-67 JStor

Perhaps the strongest version of this form of representationalism is the challenge to the very project of philosophy and theory, a challenge undertaken not only by Rorty's pragmatism but also in the work of sociologists of philosophy such as Pierre Bourdieu. According to Bourdieu, the project of philosophy depends upon certain procedures of justification and the institutionalization of forms of argument (Bourdieu 991, 89). **Any appeal to a general truth claim**, for example, **has to rest upon a particular cultural form**. In the case of Heidegger, for example, Bourdieu argues that **Heidegger 's emphasis on the primacy of the metaphysical question depends upon, and is conditioned by, social and political interests, a cultural capital granted to philosophical discourse, the metaphorization of certain practices, and the elevation of intellectuals as a distinct social power** (73). What Bourdieu's phrase "political ontology" suggests, of course, is that **there is no validity to ontology in general, and that whatever is said to be or exist depends upon the symbolic relations of any given culture.**

Responsibility to Take Action

As intellectuals we have a responsibility to respond to suffering

Ketels 96 (Violet, associate professor of English at Temple University, The Annals of The American Academy of Political and Social Science, Nov, 548 Annals 45)

Intellectuals are not customarily thought of as men and women of action. Our circumstances are ambiguous, our credibility precarious. While our sense of past and future is "radically linguistic," [49] we scarcely have a common human language anymore, and **our fashionable linguistic skepticism elevates the denying of verities to an article of faith, out of which we build academic careers of nay-saying.**

We use the written word as the primary political medium for gaining attention. **We are "writing people," who traffic in words and thus carry an unavoidable accountability for what we say with them.** [50] Havel defines intellectuals as people who devote their lives "to thinking in general terms about the affairs of this world and the broader context of things . . . professionally," [51] for their occupation.

If we aspire to be distinguished from mere scribblers, history demands that we choose between being "the apologist for rulers [and] an advisor to the people; the tragedy of the twentieth century is that these two functions have ceased to exist independently of one another, and intellectuals like Sartre who thought they were fulfilling one role were inevitably drawn to play both." [52]

Alternatively, **we can choose** with Richard Rorty, echoing Max Weber, **to stay out of politics,** "where passionate commitment and sterile excitation are out of place," keeping "politics in the hands of charismatic leaders and trained officials." We can choose to pursue "[our] own private perfection." [53]

That particular stance, however expedient, did not work well in Germany. In Czechoslovakia, it produced wartime Nazi collaborator Gustave Husak, the "President of Forgetting," who sought to perfect totalitarianism by systematically purging "the Party and state, the arts, the universities, and the media of everyone who dared to speak critically, independently, or even intelligently about what the regime defined as politics." [54] It produced Tudjman and Milosevic in Yugoslavia.

Intellectuals can choose their roles, but cannot not choose, nor can we evade the full weight of the consequences attendant on our choices. "It is always the intellectuals, however [*57] we may shrink from the chilling sound of that word . . . **who must bear the full weight of moral responsibility**." [55]

Humanist intellectuals can aspire to be judged by more specifically exacting criteria: as those whose work is worthwhile because it has human uses; survives the test of reality; corresponds to history; represses rationalizing in favor of fact; challenges the veracity of rulers; refuses the safety of abstraction; recognizes words as forms of action, as likely to be lethal as to be liberating; scruples to heal the rupture between words and things, between things and ideas; remains incorruptibly opposed to the service of ideological ends pursued by unnecessary violence or inhumane means; and, finally, takes risks for the sake of true witness to events, to the truth even of unpopular ideas or to the lies in popular ones. Above all, **intellectuals can resist the dreary relativism that neutralizes good and evil as if in defense of the theoretical pseudo-notion that distinguishing between them is not possible. The hour is too late, the situation too grave for such pettifoggery.**

THE CONSEQUENCES OF LINGUISTIC ABUSE AND CYNICISM

Bearing witness is not enough, but it is something. At the dedication of the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington, D.C., Elie Wiesel spoke. "We must bear witness," he said. "What have we learned? . . . We are all responsible. We must do something to stop the bloodshed in Yugoslavia." He told a story of a woman from the Carpathian Mountains who asked of the Warsaw Uprising, "Why don't they just wait quietly until after the war?" In one year she was packed into a cattle car with her whole family on the way to Auschwitz. "That woman was my mother," Wiesel said.

Vaclav Havel, the humanist intellectual from Bohemia, spoke too: of the Holocaust as a memory of democratic appeasement, live memory of indifference to the danger of Hitler's coming to power, of indifference to the Munich betrayal of Prague. "Our Jews went to concentration camps. . . . Later we lost our freedom." We have lost our metaphysical certainties, our sense of responsibility for what comes in the future. **For we are all responsible, humanly responsible for what happens in the world.** Do we have the right to interfere in internal conflict? Not just the right but the duty. Remember the Holocaust. To avoid war, we watched--silently and, so, complicitly, unleashing darker, deadlier demons. What should we have done about Yugoslavia? Something. Much earlier.

We must vigilantly listen for the early warning signs of threats to freedoms and lives everywhere. We must keep the clamorous opposition to oppression and violence around the world incessant and loud. Cry out! Cry havoc! **Call murderers murderers. Do not avoid violence when avoidance begets more violence. There are some things worth dying for. Do not legitimize the bloodletting** [*58] in Bosnia or anywhere by negotiating with the criminals who plotted the carnage. **Do not join the temporizers. Take stands publicly: in words; in universities** and boardrooms; in other corridors of power; and at local polling places. Take stands preferably in written **words**, which have a longer shelf life, are likelier to **stimulate debate, and may have a lasting effect on the consciousnesses of some among us.**

Reps Good

Reps Mobilize/ Alt Paralyzes

Representations identify human needs and craft responses to those needs. The alternative paralyzes social action.

Arthur **Kleinman**, , Professor of Medical Anthropology and Professor of Anthropology at Harvard, The appeal of experience; the dismay of images: cultural appropriations of suffering in our times," DAEDALUS Winter 19**96**, p. http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3671/is_199601/ai_n8747499/print

Our **critique of appropriations of suffering** that do harm **does not mean that no appropriations are valid. To conclude that would be to undermine any attempt to respond to human misery. It would be much more destructive than the problem we have identified; it would paralyze social action**. **We must draw upon the images of human suffering in order to identify human needs and to craft humane responses.** Yet, to do so, to develop valid appropriations, we must first make sure that the biases of commercial emphasis on profit-making, the partisan agendas of political ideologies, and the narrow technical interests that serve primarily professional groups are understood and their influence controlled. **The first action**, then, **is** critical self-**reflection on the purposes of policies and the effects of programs**. We take that to be a core component of programs of ethics in the professions. Perhaps a more difficult action is to lift the veil on the taken-for-granted cultural processes within which those policies and programs, no matter how well intended, are inevitably, and usually unintentionally, taken up and exploited. The idea that the first impulse of social and health-policy experts should be to historicize the issue before them and to critique the cultural mechanisms of action at hand goes against the grain of current practice. Nonetheless, that is a chief implication of our analysis. **The starting point of policymakers and program builders needs to be the understanding that they can** (and often unwillingly do**) do harm.** Because that potential for harm lies latent in the institutional structures that have been authorized to respond to human problems, that work behind even the best intentioned professionals, **"experts" must be held responsible to define how those latent institutional effects can be controlled.**

Perm

Perm - Reps + Institutional Analysis Key to Solve

Our use of representations internal link turns the criticism. Witnessing and mobilization work best in the context of an analysis of institutions. We are not just asking you to feel bad, rather we are endorsing a policy in the context of local institutions.

Arthur **Kleinman**, , Professor of Medical Anthropology and Professor of Anthropology at Harvard, The appeal of experience; the dismay of images: cultural appropriations of suffering in our times," DAEDALUS Winter 19**96**, p. http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3671/is_199601/ai_n8747499/print

This may seem too thoroughgoing a critique. Clearly, **witnessing and mobilization can do good**, but **they work best when they take seriously the complexity of local situations and work through local institutions. Moral witnessing also must involve a sensitivity to other, unspoken moral and political assumptions**. **Watching and reading about suffering**, especially suffering that exists somewhere else, has, as we have already noted**, become a form of entertainment. Images of trauma are part of our political economy**. Papers are sold, television programs gain audience share, careers are advanced, jobs are created, and prizes are awarded through the appropriation of images of suffering. Kevin Carter won the Pulitzer Prize, but his victory, substantial as it was, was won because of the misery (and probable death) of a nameless little girl. **That more dubious side of the appropriation of human misery in the globalization of cultural processes is what must be addressed.**

Perm - Reps Can Be Reappropriated

Language can be reappropriated and used to give us new understandings of the world and reveal alternate ways to engage the world

Ruffin 99 (Sandra, Postmodernism, Spirit Healing, and Proposed Amendments to the Indian Child Welfare Act, McGeorge Law Review, Ass. Prof. of Law at St Thomas Univ of Law, Harvard Law School, lexis)

The constructive and destructive power of language 18 **requires that I make a few prefatory remarks about linguistic and stylistic choices.** Like Toni Morrison, I want to awaken and engage the "midwifery" 19 properties of language so that **in the midst of the relational experience of text and interpreter, new possibilities of understanding are born.** In that regard, I **use old words in new ways, or at least, in different ways, and request** your **participation in the nuanced effects of the words in interaction to allow the alternative view to emerge. Convention in thought is precisely that which I wish to lay aside in exchange for the opportunity to invent.** This is especially true in Parts II and III where the critical lens through which the Act is viewed is explained and where the vision of reality which drives the rationality of the Article is revealed. **This is not to suggest that anything presented here is new, original, or true in any pure sense, but only that it is intended to resonate at a deeper, more submerged level of consciousness than a more conventional approach generally intends.**

AFF Link Level

Universals Exist

Even if things are socially constructed, it doesn't mean that it doesn't have real effects.
MacKinnon 2000 (Catharine, Symposium On Unfinished Feminist Business: Points Against Postmodernism, Chicago-Kent Law Review, Prof of Law at Univ of Mich and Prof of Law at Univ of Chicago, lexis)

Nice neutral word, difference, and it has all that French credibility. Never mind that differences can simply be fragmented universals. It doesn't improve one's ability to analyze hierarchy as socially constructed to add more pieces called differences if the differences are seen as biologically determined to begin with. You can have a biological theory of race just like you can have a biological theory of gender, and you've gotten equally nowhere in terms of dismantling social hierarchy. Put another way, **if women don't exist, because there are only particular women, maybe Black people don't exist either**, because they are divided by sex. Probably lesbians can't exist either, because they are divided by race and class; if women don't exist, woman-identified women surely don't exist, except in their heads. **We are reduced to individuals, which, of all coincidences, is where liberalism places us.** With its affirmation of women's commonalities in all their diversity, it is feminism that rejects the view that "woman" is a pre-social, i.e., biologically determined, category and the notion that all women are the same. Feminism and essentialism cannot occupy the same space.
The postmodern attack on universality also proves a bit too much. Inconveniently, the fact of death is a universal--approaching 100%. Whatever it means, however it is related-to culturally and spiritually, whatever happens after it, it happens. Much to the embarrassment of the anti-essentialists, who prefer flights of fancy to gritty realities, **life and death is even basically a binary distinction**--and not a very nuanced one either, especially from the dead side of the line, at least when seen from the standpoint of the living, i.e., as far as we know. **And it is even biological at some point. So the idea that there is nothing essential, in the sense that there are no human universals, is dogma. Ask most anyone who is going to be shot at [*699] dawn.**

*****Impact Answers******

AT: Reps Violent

Our representations are not violent nor do they create violence. Violence is an inevitable aspect of identity, contingent on random choices. Only after it occurs does it become tied to a representation.

Elana **Gomel**, Ph.D in Humanities from Tel-Aviv University, Written in Blood: Serial Killing and Narratives of Identity, The University of Detroit Mercy: Post Identity, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 24-70, Winter 19**99**

I do not imply, however, that violence in general or serial murder in particular are totally free from the constraints of discourse or that the identity of the serial killer is not constructed using the building blocks of cultural narratives (though the narratives in question are more variegated than Seltzer suggests). Rather, I would claim that the serial "form of **violence" is conditioned not so much by the monolithic coherence of representation as by its breakdown.** The **violent behavior** of a serial killer **is not a direct outcome of any social construction but a random, causeless choice which is retrospectively incorporated into a generic narrative of identity.** The repeated ritualistic violence, then, becomes a means of reinforcing this identity but achieves precisely the opposite, its complete disintegration.**Rather than being generated by representation, corporeal violence offers a resistance to it.**

Alt Answers

Turn – Alt Complicit with Totalitarianism

As intellectuals we have a duty to attend to and act against atrocities – the alt's commitment to vacuous linguistic games is complicit with suffering and totalitarianism
Ketels 96 (Violet, associate professor of English at Temple University, The Annals of The American Academy of Political and Social Science, Nov, 548 Annals 45)

[*46] **THE political bestiality of our age is abetted by our willingness to tolerate the deconstructing of humanist values. The process begins with the cynical manipulation of language. It often ends in stupefying murderousness before which the world stands silent, frozen in impotent "attentism"--a wait-and-see stance as unsuited to the human plight as a pacifier is to stopping up the hunger of a starving child**.

We have let lapse our pledge to the 6 million Jewish victims of the Holocaust that their deaths might somehow be transfiguring for humankind. We allow "slaughterhouse men" tactical status at U.N. tables and "cast down our eyes when the depraved roar past." 1 Peacemakers, delegated by us and circumscribed by our fears, temporize with thugs who have revived lebensraum claims more boldly than Hitler did.

In the Germany of the 1930s, a demonic idea was born in a demented brain; the word went forth; orders were given, repeated, widely broadcast; and men, women, and children were herded into death camps. Their offshore signals, cries for help, did not summon us to rescue. **We had become inured to the reality of human suffering. We could no longer hear what the words meant or did not credit them or not enough of us joined the chorus. Shrieking victims perished in the cold blankness of inhumane silence.**

We were deaf to the apocalyptic urgency in Solzhenitsyn's declaration from the Gulag that we must check the disastrous course of history. We were heedless of the lesson of his experience
 that only the unbending strength of the human spirit, fully taking its stand on the shifting frontier of encroaching violence and declaring "not one step further," though death may be the end of it--only this unwavering firmness offers any genuine defense of peace for the individual, of genuine peace for mankind at large. 2

In past human crises, writers and thinkers strained language to the breaking point to keep alive the memory of the unimaginable, to keep the human conscience from forgetting. In the current context, however, **intellectuals seem more devoted to abstract assaults on values than to thoughtful probing of the moral dimensions of human experience.**

"Heirs of the ancient possessions of higher knowledge and literacy skills," 3 we seem to have lost our nerve, and not only because of Holocaust history and its tragic aftermath. We feel insecure before the empirical absolutes of hard science. **We are intimidated by** the "high modernist rage against mimesis and content," 4 monstrous progeny of **the union between Nietzsche and philosophical formalism, the grim proposal we have bought into that there is no truth, no objectivity, and no disinterested knowledge. 5**

Less certain about the power of language, that "oldest flame of the [*47] humanist soul," 6 to frame a credo to live by or criteria to judge by, we are vulnerable even to the discredited Paul de Man's indecent hint that "wars and revolutions are not empirical events . . . but 'texts' masquerading as facts." 7 **Truth and reality seem more elusive than they ever were in the past; values are pronounced to be mere fictions of ruling elites to retain power. We are embarrassed by virtue.**

Words collide and crack under these new skeptical strains, dissolving into banalities the colossal enormity of what must be expressed lest we forget. Remembering for the future has become doubly dispiriting by our having to remember for the present, too, our having to register and confront what is wrong here and now.

The reality to be fixed in memory shifts as we seek words for it; the memory we set down is flawed by our subjectivities. It is selective, deceptive, partial, unreliable, and amoral. It plays tricks and can be invented. It stops up its ears to shut out what it does not dare to face. 8

Lodged in our brains, such axioms, certified by science and statistics, tempt us to concede the final irrelevance of words and memory. We have to get on with our lives. Besides, memories reconstructed in words, even when they are documented by evidence, have not often changed the world or fended off the powerful seductions to silence, forgetting, or denying.

Especially denying, which, in the case of the Holocaust, has become an obscene industry competing in the open market of ideas for control of our sense of the past. It is said that the Holocaust never happened. Revisionist history with a vengeance is purveyed in words; something in words must be set against it. Yet what? How do we nerve to the task when we are increasingly disposed to cast both words and memory in a condition of cryogenic dubiety?

Not only before but also since 1945, the criminality of governments, paraded as politics and fattening on linguistic manipulation and deliberately reimplanted memory of past real or imagined grievance, has spread calamity across the planet. "The cancer that has eaten at the entrails of Yugoslavia since Tito's death [has] Kosovo for its locus," but not merely as a piece of land. The country's rogue adventurers use the word "Kosovo" to reinvoke as sacred the land where Serbs were defeated by Turks in 1389! 9 Memory of bloody massacres in 1389, sloganized and distorted in 1989, demands the bloody revenge of new massacres and returns civilization not to its past glory but to its gory tribal wars. As Matija Beckovic, the bard of Serb nationalism, writes, "It is as if the Serbian people waged only one battle--by widening the Kosovo charnel-house, by adding wailing upon wailing, by counting new martyrs to the martyrs of Kosovo. . . . Kosovo is the Serbianized [*48] history of the Flood--the Serbian New Testament." 10

A cover of Suddeutsche Zeitung in 1994 was printed with blood donated by refugee women from Bosnia in an eerily perverse afterbirth of violence revisited. 11 **We stand benumbed before multiplying horrors**. As Vaclav Havel warned more than a decade ago, regimes that generate them "are the avant garde of a global crisis in civilization." **The depersonalization of power in "system, ideology and apparat," pathological suspicions about human motives and meanings, the loosening of individual responsibility, the swiftness by which disastrous events follow one upon another "have deprived us of our conscience, of our common sense and natural speech and thereby, of our actual humanity."** 12 Nothing less than the transformation of human consciousness is likely to rescue us.

THE INTELLECTUALS' DILEMMA

Books, essays, speeches by eyewitnesses to totalitarian experience plead for a reaffirmation of basic human rights. They are exhortations to plunder history for usable analogy.

But **well-schooled intellectuals know that contingency rules human history**. The flow of events does not stop, does not seem to hold fast long enough, for us to use the lessons historians exact from the past. **Language seems pitifully unequal** to history's

caprice of presenting new configurations. In midthought, examples we adduce become obsolete as news of new horrors flash onto the screens of our moral imaginations.

Preachments about basic human rights, however elegantly urged, do not summon us to virtue or insulate us from the predators who have turned civilized cities into killing fields. What, then, are they worth? Are they merely the fictions they are labeled by intellectuals of skeptical chic who choose disdainful withdrawal from the chaos of history? 13 Fear of mockery tempts even the humanists among us to retreat into a stance of nonassessment. **The risk of being accused of vapid moralizing ties our tongues and retards reaction**.

Such failures of nerve seem justified by the history we are enjoined to plunder. They precipitate descent into a fatalistic nihilism that relieves us from responsibility. Words do not matter; they rarely mean what they say. What does it matter, then, how intellectuals use their verbal virtuosity? Values are relative and truth elusive.

We stand precisely where many gifted French intellectuals stood during World War II, in spite of the myth of resistance promulgated by the most brilliant among them. **They remained glacially unmoved, engrossed** [*49] **in vacuous verbal games, when the desperation of the situation should have aroused their** moral **conscience**, their humane consciousness, and their civic spirit. **They rushed to embrace the position "that language is not referential and the writing of history impossible,"** 14 **because it let them off the hook.**

History has survived them and provides a regenerative, other view against nihilism and detachment. It testifies that our terror of being found guilty of phrases too smooth or judgment too simple is not in itself a value. Some longing for transcendence persists in the human spirit, some tenacious faith that truth and goodness exist and can prevail.

What happened in the death camps, the invasion of Prague by Russian tanks, the rape of Muslim women, the dismembering of Bosnian men, the degrading of a sophisticated society to subsistence and barbarous banditry: these things do not become fictions simply because we cannot speak of them adequately or because composing abstractions is safer than responding to the heinous reality of criminal acts.

No response to the Holocaust and its murderous wake or to the carnage in the former Yugoslavia **could possibly be adequate to the atrocities** alphabetized in file folders **of perpetrators or to the unspeakable experiences burned into brains and bodies of survivors. But no response at all breeds new catastrophe.** Saul Bellow warned about the "humanistic civilized moral imagination" that, seized with despair, "declines into lethargy and sleep." 15 Imagine the plight of human creatures if it were to be silenced altogether, extinguished or forgotten. "Humanism did not produce the Holocaust, and the Holocaust, knowing its enemies, was bent on the extermination of humanism. It is an odd consequence of an all-or-nothing mentality to repudiate humanist values because they are inadequate as an antidote to evil." 16

Basic human rights asserted in words cannot be restored in reality unless they are matched to practices in all the spheres of influence we occupy. We feel revulsion at the repudiation of humanist values so visible in the savagery of the battlefield and the councils of war. Yet we seem inoculated against seeing the brutalities of daily human interactions, the devaluing of values in our own intellectual spheres, the moral and ethical debunking formally incorporated into scholarly exegesis in literature, philosophy, the social sciences, and linguistics, the very disciplines that cradled humanist values. Remembering for the future by rehearsing the record, then, is not enough, as the most eloquent witnesses to Holocaust history have sorrowfully attested. We must also respond to the record with strategies that challenge humanist reductionism in places where we tend to overlook it or think it harmless. **Our moral outrage should be intensified, not subdued,** [*50] **by what we know. We must search out alternatives to the anomie that seizes us when the linguistic distance between words and reality seems unbridgeably vast,** and reflections upon historical events ill matched to the dark complexities of the human experience we would illumine.

To be fair, it is not just a desire to evade responsibility or to forget that makes our responses so feeble. At times we simply have no words. At times we are not unlike the German "executor executioners" who were interviewed for the film Shoah, "physically incapable of finding the true words and attaching them to the deeds, as a paralyzed man cannot tie his tie or lift a pen." We need fresh air in our "separate national and linguistic rooms." 17

The executioners have not earned forgiveness. We have not earned the right to "turn away from the dilemmas posed by the writers who bore witness to the ugly European past." 18

A LESSON FOR INTELLECTUALS

Even though, as Americans, we have not experienced "by fire, hunger and the sword" 19 the terrible disasters in war overtaking other human beings on their home ground, **we know the consequences of human hospitality to evil.** We know about human perfidy: the chasm that separates proclaiming virtue from acting decently. **Even those of us trained to linguistic skepticism and the relativity of moral judgment can grasp the verity in the stark warning, "If something exists in one place, it will exist everywhere."** 20 **That the dreadful something warned against continues to exist anywhere should fill us with an inextinguishable yearning to do something. Our impotence to action against the brutality of mass slaughter shames us.**

We have the historical record to ransack for precedent and corollaries--letters, documents, testaments, books--written words that would even "preserve their validity in the eyes of a man threatened with instant death." 21 The truths gleanable from the record of totalitarian barbarism cited in them may be common knowledge; they are by no means commonly acknowledged. 22 They appear in print upon many a page; they have not yet--still not yet--sufficiently penetrated human consciousness.

Herein lies the supreme lesson for intellectuals, those who have the projective power to grasp what is not yet evident to the general human consciousness: it is possible to bring down totalitarian regimes either by violence or by a gradual transformation of human consciousness; it is not possible to bring them down "if we ignore them, make excuses for them, yield to them or accept their way of playing the game" 23 **in order to avoid violence.**

Baudrillard Alt Depoliticizes

Baudrillard's representational analysis depoliticizes social knowledge and collapses into nihlism. The 1AC politicizes theory and identity necessary to overcome

Robert **Antonio**, University of Kansas Department of Sociology, 20**00**, American Journal Sociology, "After Postmodernism", JStor

A second or "depoliticized" version of the strong program suggests a more radical relativism and profound disintegration of modern theory's cultural bases. At the height of the postwar era, Henri **Lefebvre held-** explaining his break from Marxist historicism and progressivism-**that** new forms of media and **information production reduce "social reality" to a "system of signs and significations"** and that **it "loses all its solidity, its substantiality and its frames of reference; it begins to crumble**-or rather, to evaporate." Hence arises, he warned, a "world of boredom" and "nostalgia," ruled by the "aleatory" or complete chance ([I9621 1995, pp. 204, 222-23). Radicalizing this view in the 1970s and 1980s, Jean **Baudrillard held that all-pervasive "simulation" melts all that is solid into a flat, fluid cultural surface of incommensurable, fragmented, transitory, "floating signifiers." Arguing that all distance from the text is lost and that cultural representations are self-referential, he precludes social knowledge** and favors purely aesthetic responses (e.g., Baudrillard 1983a, 1983b). In his view, modern theory's core epistemological and normative distinctions (e.g., ideal-real, true-false, good-bad, base-superstructure, culture-society) have evaporated. Thus, "progressive" facets of history are not distinguishable from their opposites. **All dissolves into pure contingency, ending communication, meaning, and sociality and foreclosing the basic democratic presupposition that people are capable of absorbing information, digesting it critically, and employing it reasonably** in citizenship, popular sovereignty, and social cooperation. In this version of the strong program, the "end of politics" goes hand in hand with the "end of history." Radicalizing the idea of cultural exhaustion and the total critique of modernity, it opens the way for postliberal critiques and "solutions." As I will explain below, **reactionary** tribalist **theorists converge with and appropriate from the politicized strong program, posing an extreme version of identity politics and standpoint theory in order to overcome the depoliticized strong program's nihilism, which they hold suffuses cultural life under neoliberal rule.**

Turn - Silence Worse

Rejecting the use of representations is worse than imagery. Silence allows the construction of a totalitarian state where all narratives are silenced and forgotten. We must choose to remember as an act of resistance against totalitarianism.

Arthur **Kleinman**, , Professor of Medical Anthropology and Professor of Anthropology at Harvard, The appeal of experience; the dismay of images: cultural appropriations of suffering in our times," DAEDALUS Winter 19**96**, p. http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3671/is_199601/ai_n8747499/print

The official report is thorough and detailed. It is classified neibu, restricted use only. To distribute it is to reveal state secrets. Presented publicly it would have been, especially if it had been published in the 1960s, a fundamental critique of the Great Leap, and a moral and political delegitimation of the Chinese Communist Party's claim to have improved the life of poor peasants. Even today the authorities regard it as dangerous. **The official silence is another form of appropriation. It prevents public witnessing. It forges a secret history, an act of political resistance through keeping alive the memory of things denied**.34 **The totalitarian state rules by collective forgetting, by denying the collective experience of suffering, and thus creates a culture of terror**. **The absent image is also a form of political appropriation; public silence is perhaps more terrifying than being overwhelmed by public images of atrocity.** Taken together the two modes of appropriation delimit the extremes in this cultural process.

Turn - Alt Justifies Oppression

Postmodernist denials of social reality make them complicity with the worst atrocities in human history. A pragmatic understanding of social reality and consequences is the only way to resist oppression.

MacKinnon 2000 (Catharine, Symposium On Unfinished Feminist Business: Points Against Postmodernism, Chicago-Kent Law Review, Prof of Law at Univ of Mich and Prof of Law at Univ of Chicago, lexis)

It is the denial of their social reality that is complicated and raises difficult philosophical questions. Understand that the denial of the reality of such events has been a philosophical position about reality itself. Unless and until effectively challenged, only what power wants to see as real is granted reality status. Reality is a social status. Power's reality does not have to establish itself as real in order to exist, because it has the status as real that power gives it; only the reality of the powerless has to establish itself as real. Power can also establish unreality--like the harmlessness of pornography or smoking--as reality. That doesn't make it harmless. **But until power is effectively challenged on these lies, and they are lies, only those harmed** (and those harming them, who have every incentive to conceal) **have access to knowing that that is what they are.** So it has taken us all this time, and a movement that has challenged male power, to figure out that women's reality is also a philosophical position: that women's reality exists, including women's denied violation, therefore social reality exists separate from its constitution by male power or its validation by male knowledge.

This analysis raises some questions about postmodernism that [*706] are not simply a report on my current mental state. They are: **Can postmodernism stop the rape of children when everyone has their story, and everyone is presumably exercising sexual agency all the time? Can postmodernism identify fascism if power only exists in microcenters and never in systematic, fixed, and determinate hierarchical arrangements? How can you oppose something that is always only in play? How do you organize against something that isn't even really there except when you are thinking about it? Can postmodernism hold the perpetrators of genocide accountable?** If the subject is dead, and we are dealing with deeds without doers, 47 how do we hold perpetrators accountable for what they perpetrate? Can the Serbian cultural defense for the extermination of Croats, Bosnian Muslims, and Kosovar Albanians be far behind? If we can have a multicultural defense for the current genocide, because that's how the Serbs see it, why not a German cultural defense for the earlier one? Anti-Semitism was part of German culture. Finally, for another old question, if you only exist in opposition, if you are only full in opposition to the modern, 48 it has determined you. Don't you need an account of how you are not merely reiterating your determinations? From postmodernists, one is not yet forthcoming. **The postmodernist reality corrosion, thus, not only makes it incoherent and useless--the pragmatists' valid criticism** 49 **--but also regressive, disempowering, and collaborationist.**

Turn – Alt Denies Autonomy

Attempts to escape representations denies human agency

Claire **Colebrook**, Professor of English Lit University of Edinburgh, Questioning Representation, SubStance Vol. 29 No. 2 Issue 92, 20**00**, p47-67 JStor

The idea of autonomous representation is, perhaps, **an oxymoron. To represent oneself is to submit to a trans-individual system of language, signification or representation. But any such representational scheme can never be fully disowned**, rendered anonymous, collective, inhuman **or fully dispersed beyond all subjectivity.** Rather, **the act of representation institutes autonomy or places a self in a point of view, Autonomy ought not to be defined in terms of a being that is then expressed**. Rather, **the procedure of autonomy is a recognition that there is no foundational being other than its continual institution through a representation** that dislocates itself from a prior presence. **If we do not recognize that representation effects an autonomy** that it can then be seen to belie, **if we try to overcome this scar of representation, then we do so at the expense of forgetting** what it is to think. In short, **we attack** the error of anthropologism-**the idea of a general human subject** who represents us all-with the error of anthropomorphism: **the idea of a world that is fully and adequately given, without representation, separation or the contribution of thought.**

Turn – Alt Denies Agency

Postmodernism is an attempt to escape reality and pretend that everything occurs in your head. This removes agency necessary to deal with the REAL effects of oppression and suffering in the world.

MacKinnon 2000 (Catharine, Symposium On Unfinished Feminist Business: Points Against Postmodernism, Chicago-Kent Law Review, Prof of Law at Univ of Mich and Prof of Law at Univ of Chicago, lexis)

Postmodernism as practiced often comes across as style--petulant, joyriding, more posture than position. But it **has a method, making metaphysics far from dead. Its approach and its position, its** [*701] **posture toward the world and its view of what is real, is that it's all mental. Postmodernism imagines that society happens in your head**. Back in the modern period, this position was called idealism. In its continuity with this method, to offer a few examples, postmodernism has made the penis into "the phallus" and it is mostly observed to signify. 32 Women have become "an ongoing discursive practice," 33 or, ubiquitously, "the female body," 34 which is written on and signified but seldom, if ever, raped, beaten, or otherwise violated. Racism and homophobia are elided "differences" in disguise.

Abuse has become "agency"--or rather challenges to sexual abuse have been replaced by invocations of "agency," women's violation become the sneering wound of a "victim" pinned in arch quotation marks. 35 Instead of facing what was done to women when we were violated, we are told how much freedom we had at the time. (For this we need feminism?) **Agency in the postmodern lexicon is a stand-in for the powerless exercising power; sometimes it means freedom, sometimes self-action, sometimes resistance, sometimes desire. We are not told which of these is meant, precisely, or how any or all of these things are possible under the circumstances. It would be good to know. Oddly missing in this usage is what an agent legally is: someone who acts for someone else, the principal, who is pulling [*702] their strings. Domination, postmodernists know exists, but they don't tell us how or where or why. It is something that no one does or has done to them but somehow winds up in "gendered lopsidedness." 36 What we used to call "what happened to her," has become, at its most credible, "narrative." But real harm has ceased to exist.**

So whole chapters of books with "pornography" in their titles can be written without ever once talking about what the pornography industry concretely does, who they are, or what is done to whom in and with the materials. 37 There is no discussion of how pornography exploits and mass-produces sexual abuse. There is not even an extension of the early work on the scopic drive by Foucault, Lacan, and Irigaray (who are even French)--an analysis that is readily extendable to describe the aggressive appropriation and trafficking of women in pornography. 38 Nor have I noticed the multiculturalists out there opposing the spread of pornography from Scandinavia, Germany, and the United States on grounds of cultural imperialism, and it's taking over the world. **The point of postmodernism is to get as far away from anything real as possible.**

Turn - Alt = Alienation

The belief that representations create everything would destroy human condition and would collapse upon itself. Postmodern representationalism actually alienates us instead of liberating.

Claire **Colebrook**, Professor of English Lit University of Edinburgh, Questioning Representation, SubStance Vol. 29 No. 2 Issue 92, 20**00**, p47-67 JStor

The second way in which postmodernity is characterized by the problem of representation is in both the post-structuralist and conservative critiques of the first position.' Representation is targeted in many post-structuralist theories as the very problem of overcoming a history of Western thought that has subordinated itself.2 The idea that there is a logic—an ultimate ground or foundation of the given—ties thought to some outside or some "proper image" of itself. Ideas of being, truth, presence logic, or the real have defined thought as re-presentation: the faithful image, copy or doubling of the present.3 Western thought, it is argued, has always posited some unquestioned "transcendence" or being that is there to be represented. **To liberate thought from representation would be to render thought ungrounded. No longer an act of mimesis or recognition, thought would have to be responsible for its own event. The postmodern idea that all we have are representations of the world with no possibility of an ultimate presence is still too foundationalist**—**for representation then comes to stand in for some grounding logic or condition.** Thus, both Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault attack the very notion of the "signifier," the idea that there is a representation, sign or token that is other than some presence or sense (Derrida 1978, 281; Foucault 1972: 229). From this critique of representation as signification there are two possibilities. The post-structuralist endeavor, undertaken by Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze and Irigaray, is to question the very project of a grounding logic, a project that they see as exemplified in the modern motif of representation. This strand of poststructuralism is deeply critical of the structuralist appeal to sign systems, semiotics and representational conditions, conditions that attenuate the final moment in a Western tradition of perpetual self-grounding (Deleuze 1994 xix; Derrida 1978, 155; Foucault 1970, 208; Irigaray 1985, 133). How can the representational domain be posited as the limit point of our questioning? Surely **one cannot remain within some representational totality**—such as a culture, discourse, or epoch, **for any recognition of such a totality implies the possibility of questioning either its legitimacy or its limit**. The post-structuralist critique of **postmodern representationalism often issues in an apocalyptic or utopian projection of a point beyond representation, a radical homelessness in which thought no longer locates itself within a totality**, logic or scheme. And this **freedom from grounding or totality would also overcome a sense of the world as being or presence, in favor of a continual becoming**, effect, or non-presence. Against the location of thought within the point of view of a representing subject, this **anti-representationalism strives to think beyond all subjectivism.**

Turn - Alt = Totalizing Discourse

The idea that nothing is real and that everything is socially constructed recreates the same totalizing discourse that post-modernism attempts to escape. A partial objective standpoint allows us to effect social change without creating a totalizing narrative.
MacKinnon 2000 (Catharine, Symposium On Unfinished Feminist Business: Points Against Postmodernism, Chicago-Kent Law Review, Prof of Law at Univ of Mich and Prof of Law at Univ of Chicago, lexis)

It is my view that it is the *relation* of theory to reality that feminism changed, and it is in part a reversion to a prefeminist relation of theory to reality that postmodernism is reimposing. This **is not about truth. Truth is a generality, an abstraction of a certain shape and quality. Social realities are something else again. Postmodernism has decided that because truth died with God, there are no social facts. The fact that reality is a social construction does not mean that it is not there; it means that it is there, in society, where we live.**
According to postmodernism, there are no facts; everything is a reading, so there can be no lies. Apparently it cannot be known whether the Holocaust is a hoax, whether women love to be raped, whether Black people are genetically intellectually inferior to white people, whether homosexuals are child molesters. To postmodernists, these factish things are indeterminate, contingent, in play, all a matter of interpretation. Similarly, whether or not acts of incest happened or are traumatic to children become fogged over in "epistemological quandaries" as beyond thinking, beyond narrative, beyond intelligibility, as "this event that is no event"--as if survivors have not often reported, in intelligible narratives, that such events did happen and did harm them. [41] That violation often damages speech and memory does not mean that, if one has speech and memory, one was not violated. Recall when Bill Clinton, asked about his sexual relationship with a young woman intern, said that it all depended on what "is" means. The country jeered his epistemic dodge as a transparent and slimy subterfuge to evade accountability: get real. The postmodernists were strangely silent. But you can't commit perjury if there are no facts. Where are these people when you need them?
What postmodernists want, I have come to think, **apart from to live in their heads instead of in the world** (that old dodge**), is to vault themselves out of power methodologically. They want to beat** [*704] **dominance at its own game, which is usually called dominating. They want to win every argument in advance. Also, if everything is interpretation, you can never be wrong.** Feminism has faced that you don't know what is real by getting outside your determinants (which you can't do anyway) but by getting deep inside them with a lot of other people with the same foot (even feet) on their necks. Abdicating this, feminism's source of power, postmodernism has swallowed the objective standpoint while claiming to be off on a whole new methodological departure. Then **they sigh and admit they might have to concede partiality,** 42 **meaning admitting only knowing part. What, again, was the alternative? Totality? What's wrong with partiality--except from the objective standpoint, which thinks it means you can't be right? Who said there is either the whole or a part? Postmodernism keeps becoming what it claims to supersede.** 43

Alt Can't Solve - AT: Floating PIC

The postmodern relativism of the alternative cannot form the basis of concrete political action

Robert **Antonio**, University of Kansas Department of Sociology, 20**00**, American Journal Sociology, "After Postmodernism", JStor

> The total **critique by** the politicized version of strong-program **postmodernism executes** a sharp, albeit, **incomplete break with modern theory, leaving its self-proclaimed hope for cultural transformation hanging without sociological bases.** Putting aside Schmitt's normative affirmation of friend-enemy thinking, his theory offers insights into left tribalism**.** Suffusing its combative particularism, friend-enemy distinctions contradict its espoused ideals, foster political correctness, and undermine its hoped for alliance politics. Although formally embracing multiculturalism, essentialized identity politics and standpoint philosophy break with the communication model upon which such cultural pluralism relies. **Abandoning the historicist emphasis on the "factual" or consequential side of normative discourses,** strong-program **textualism lacks the constraint provided by systematic "sociological" inquiry about obdurate "realities." The resulting radical relativist position points limply to the social location of favored points of view, but it lacks pragmatic bases to justify their ranking over competing perspectives.** Although advocating multisided plural discourses**," this strategy merely asserts normative standpoints and, thus, tends toward monologue**. **Its implicit reliance on authority paves the way for more extreme antiuniversalism, perspectivism, and culturalism**. The radical conservative total critique overturns much more radically and consistently the sociological presuppositions of modern theory and of sociopolitical orders based on demos.

Post-Modernism's denial of human rights and oppression leaves it unable to resist them. Pomo cannot change the social order - only acknowledging that social reality exists will allow us to make the world a better place.

MacKinnon 2000 (Catharine, Symposium On Unfinished Feminist Business: Points Against Postmodernism, Chicago-Kent Law Review, Prof of Law at Univ of Mich and Prof of Law at Univ of Chicago, lexis)

> **Postmodernism's analysis of the social construction of reality is stolen from feminism and the left but gutted of substantive content-**-producing Marxism without the working class, feminism without women. **It's an abstract critique of abstract subjects. The hall of mirrors** (that's plural) **that much of postmodernism substitutes for any attempt to grasp a real social world is an ultimate collapse into liberalism's relativism regresses.** As mildly put by Alan Sokal and Jean Bricmont, "**relativism is an extremely weak foundation on which to build a criticism of the existing social order."** 59 Once postmodernism's various acts of theft and sell-out are exposed, what is left is a pose, an empty gesture of theatrical anarchism (to which Marx's critique applies), a Hegelian negation of the status quo (and just as determined by it), liberalism's terrible child (many liberals look plenty grounded and engaged by comparison), a precious politics of abdication and passivism.
> I do know this: **we cannot have this postmodernism and still have a meaningful practice of** women's **human rights**, far less a women's movement. Ironically, and how postmodernism loves an irony, just as women have begun to become human, **even as we have begun to transform the human so it is something more worth having and might apply to us, we are told by high theory that the human is inherently**
> [*711] **authoritarian, not worth having, untransformable, and may not even exis**t--and how hopelessly nineteenth-century of us to want it. 60 (That few of the feminist postmodernists, had it not been for the theory of humanity they criticize, would have been permitted to learn to read and write--this is perhaps a small point.)
> **The reason postmodernism undermines a practice of human rights is not because it corrodes universality. Human rights in the real world are proving far less attached to their Enlightenment baggage than are the intellectuals who guard its theory. The reason is, the reality of violation is the only ground the violated have to stand on to end it. Power and its pretenders think they can dispense with ground because they are in no danger of losing theirs or the power that goes with it. Postmodernism vitiates human rights to the extent it erects itself on its lack of relation to the realities of the subordinated because it is only in social reality that human violation takes place, can be known, and can be stopped.**

Neg FW

Reps Shape Policy

Debate is fundamentally an activity of various representations and images—the affirmative chose to present the 1AC in the way that they did, and those choices must be scrutinized. Their representations are not ethical and you should vote negative to hold the affirmative accountable for their choices. Evaluate the round through representations.

Roxanne Lynn **Doty**, assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at Arizona State University, Imperial Encounters, **1997**, p. 169-171

The cases examined in this study attest to the importance of representational practices and the power that inheres in them. The infinity of traces that leave no inventory continue to play a significant part in contemporary constructions of "reality." This is not to suggest that representations have been static. Static implies the possibility of fixedness, when what I mean to suggest is an inherent fragility and instability to the meanings and identities that have been constructed in the various discourses I examined. For example, to characterize the South as "uncivilized" or "unfit for self—government~~ is no longer an acceptable representation. This is not, however, because the meanings of these terms were at one time fixed and stable. As I illustrated, what these signifiers signified was always deferred. Partial fixation was the result of their being anchored by some exemplary mode of being that was itself constructed at the power! knowledge nexus: the white male at the turn of the century, the United States after World War II. Bhabha stresses "the wide range of the stereotype, from the loyal servant to Satan, from the loved to the hated; a shifting of subject positions in the circulation of colonial power" (1983: 31). The shifting subject positions—from uncivilized native to quasi state to traditional "man" and society, for example are all partial fixations that have enabled the exercise of various and multiple forms of power. Nor do previous oppositions entirely disappear. What remains is an infinity of traces from prior repre sentations that themselves have been founded not on pure presences but on differance. "The present becomes the sign of the sign, the trace of the trace," Derrida writes (1982: 24). Differance makes possible the chain of differing and deferring (the continuity) as well as the endless substitution (the discontinuity) of names that are inscribed and reinscribed as pure presence, the center of the structure that itself escapes structurality. North-South relations have been constituted as a structure of deferral. The center of the structure (alternatively white man, modern man, the United States, the West, real states) has never been absolutely present outside a system of differences. It has itself been constituted as trace—the simulacrum of a presence that dislocates itself, displaces itself, refers itself (ibid.). **Because the center is not a fixed locus but a function in which an infinite number of sign substitutions come into play, the domain and play of signification is extended indefinitely** (Derrida 1978: z8o). **This** both opens up and limits possibilities, **generates alternative sites of meanings and political resistances that give rise to practices of reinscription that seek to reaffirm identities and relationships**. The inherently incomplete and open nature of discourse makes this reaffirmation an ongoing and never finally completed project. In this study I have sought, **through an engagement with various discourses in which claims to truth have been staked, to challenge the validity of the structures of meaning and to make visible their complicity with practices of power and domination**. By examining the ways in which structures of meaning have been associated with imperial practices, I have suggested that **the construction of meaning and the construction of social, political, and economic power are inextricably linked. This suggests an ethical dimension to making meaning and an ethical imperative that is incumbent upon those who toil in the construction of structures of meaning.** This is especially urgent in North-South relations today: **one does not have to search very far to find a continuing complicity with colonial representations that ranges from a politics of silence and neglect to constructions of terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism, international drug trafficking, and Southern immigration to the North as new threats to global stability and peace.** The political stakes raised by this analysis revolve around the question of being able to "get beyond" the representations or speak outside of the discourses that historically have constructed the North and the South. I do not believe that there are any pure alternatives by which we can escape the infinity of traces to which Gramsci refers. Nor do I wish to suggest that we are always hopelessly imprisoned in a dominant and all-pervasive discourse. Before this question can be answered—indeed, before we can even proceed to attempt an answer—attention must be given to the politics of representation. **The price that international relations scholarship pays for its inattention to the issue of representation is perpetuation of the dominant modes of making meaning and deferral of its responsibility and complicity in dominant representations**.

Reps Shape Policy

We need to critically examine the justifications for policies or we risk reproducing the very harms that well-meaning political decisions are meant to alleviate. Reject the aff's discursive constructions

Doty 96(Assistant Professor Of Political Science at ASU, 1996 [Roxanne Lynn, Imperial Encounters: The Politics of Representation in North-South Relations, p. 170-171]

North-South relations have been constituted as a structure of deferral. The center of the structure (alternatively white man, modern man**, the U**nited **S**tates, the West, real states**) has never been absolutely present outside a system of differences.** It has itself been constituted as trace—the simulacrum of a presence that dislocates itself, displaces itself, refers itself (ibid**.). Because the center is not a fixed locus but a function in which an infinite number of sign substitutions come into play the domain and play of signification is extended indefinitely** (Derrida 1978: 280). **This** both opens up and limits possibilities, **generates alternative sites of meanings and political resistances that give rise to practices of reinscription that seek to reaffirm identities and relationships. The inherently incomplete and open nature of discourse makes this reaffirmation an ongoing and never finally completed project**. In this study I have sought**, through an engagement with various discourses in which claims to truth have been staked, to challenge the validity of the structures of meaning and to make visible their complicity with practices of power and domination. By examining the ways in which structures of meaning have been associated with imperial practices**, I have suggested that **the construction of meaning and the construction of** social, political, and economic **power are inextricably linked. This suggests an ethical dimension to making meaning and an ethical imperative that is incumbent upon those who toil in the construction of structures of meaning.** This is especially urgent in North-South relations today**: one does not have to search very far to find a continuing complicity with colonial representations that ranges from a politics of silence and neglect to constructions of terrorism**, Islamic fundamentalism, and international drug trafficking, and Southern immigration to the North as new threats to global stability and peace. The political stakes raised by this analysis revolve around the question of being able to "get beyond" the representations or speak outside of the discourses that historically have constructed the North and the South.

Reps Shapes Reality

How the world is presented to us determines our perceptions and responses to events.
The Framework Institute 01 (Communicating Global Interdependence, A Frameworks Message Memo, 2001)

In summarizing their detailed analysis of more than 10,000 TV news stories over a six week period (1), the Center for Media and Public Affairs concluded:
"Little of the material we found on local or national television news could reasonably be expected to increase either the comprehension ordinary citizens have of global issues, or their representation in the public debate of America's role in the wider world. The sheer volume of global news has gradually declined on the networks and remains minuscule on most local newscasts. The coverage that does exist is largely episodic in format, prosaic in presentation, and shallow in context. **Television news typically emphasizes the 'otherness' of the world outside our borders, portraying the international arena as a subsidiary sphere of little concern to most Americans except as a place where bad things happen, and the United States occasionally needs to intervene to set them right."**
It is little wonder in this context that, as Ethel Klein notes (C), "**foreign aid...is now seen as charity." Indeed, the very definition of intervention becomes relief from mayhem.**
Of particular concern to the analysts was the fact that "the global news agenda was skewed heavily...toward topics such as war, natural disasters, industrial accidents, crimes, and demonstrations." Moreover, the news was "overwhelmingly episodic, focusing on discrete events and short-term crises." As the work of Shanto Iyengar demonstrates, "**exposure to episodic news makes viewers less likely to hold public officials accountable for the existence of some problem and also less likely to hold them responsible for alleviating it** (Is Anyone Responsible?, University of Chicago Press, 1991:2). Finally, and perhaps most important in terms of our research:
"Global news rarely conveyed the impression that Americans had a stake in global issues, beyond a humanitarian interest in assisting disaster victims**. Only a small proportion of stories dealt with the causes of international problems, and those that did focused mainly on the obvious, such as natural disasters and accidents attributed to human error, rather than more complicated historical, ethnic, religious, or socio-political processes. Attention was directed mainly to what was about to happen, not why a particular event was happening and how it fit into broader patterns of similar events. As a corollary, there was even less attention to political solutions for the problems that were reported. The United States was rarely seen as the cause of international problems, and even more rarely was it seen as part of the solution, on either local or network newscasts.** Even the WTO protests generated little discussion of ways to resolve the problems that the protesters thrust into the news agenda."
It is little wonder from this coverage that, as Grady and Aubrun concluded (5), "**In their day to day lives, Americans are scarcely aware of other countries, their governments and their actions."**

Reps Shape Reality

Signification through representation is always performative and constructs specific bodies and reality.

Veronica **Vasterlin**g, Associate Professor in Philosophy at U of Nijimegen, Butler's Sophisticated Constructivism: A Critical Assessment, Hypatia 14.3, 19**99**, pg. 17-38

How does the problem of linguistic monism arise? One of the aims of Butler's *Bodies That Matter* (1993) is to deconstruct the notion of the body as a natural, prelinguistic given. This is how Butler puts it: "The body posited as to the sign, is always *posited* or *signified* as *prior*. This signification produces as an *effect* of its own procedure the very body that it nevertheless and simultaneously claims to discover as that which *precedes* its own action**. If the body signified as prior to signification is an effect of signification, then the mimetic or representational status of language, which claims that signs follow bodies as their necessary mirrors, is not mimetic at all. On the contrary, it is productive, constitutive, one might even argue performative**, inasmuch as this signifying act delimits and contours the body that it claims to find prior to any and all signification" (1993, 30).

Butler's deconstruction of the body as a natural given results in the claim that the body is always already linguistically constructed. Obviously, this claim evokes the charge of linguistic monism: doesn't the claim entail a sort of linguistic metaphysics of the body? [2] What needs to be examined, however, is the exact import of this claim: is it an ontological or an epistemological claim? Does the claim entail that the body is ontologically coextensive with its linguistic constructions, in other words, that the body *is* nothing but a collection of linguistic constructions? Or does it imply that the body is only epistemologically accessible as a linguistically constructed body? Only the former, not the latter, would justify the charge of linguistic monism.

I examine two lines of argument that in **Butler's opinion** undercut the charge of linguistic monism. The first one, concerning the notion of referentiability, **can be construed as a general epistemological argument about language and its relation to reality.** The second argument is more complex, beginning from the claim that **language is the condition of the appearance of materiality.** The import of this claim is ambiguous; it can be construed as either ontological or epistemological. Though I conclude that Butler succeeds in refuting the charge of linguistic monism, the way in which she solves this problem raises new questions. On the one hand, she ends up defending an epistemological position that is not only too restrictive but also, in my opinion, has negative consequences for a feminist and queer theory of the body. On the other hand, certain passages suggest another, more phenomenological approach that, though hardly elaborated, opens an interesting and more fruitful perspective on such a theory.

Reps Come First

Rhetorical analysis is a necessary precursor to policy making- representations always come first

Dauber 01(Cori Elizabeth, Associate professor of communications at the university of North Caroline Chapel Hill, "the shot seen round the world: the impact of the images of Mogadishu on american military operations"; http://muse.uq.edu.au.ts.isil.westga.edu/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v004/4.4dauber.html)

The impact the Mogadishu images have had on American foreign policy is clear. But their impact is not inescapable or inevitable. It is based on the incorrect assumption that people can only read images unidirectionally. No matter how similar, no matter how powerfully one text evokes another, every image is unique. Each comes from a different historical situation, is placed within a different story, and offers an ambiguous text that can be exploited by astute commentators. **Images matter profoundly, but so do their contexts and the words that accompany them.** The implications of this shift in interpretation are potentially profound. Mogadishu, or the mention of a potential parallel with Mogadishu, need not be a straightjacket or a deterrent to the use of American power**. Rhetoric, whether discursive or visual, has real power in the way events play out.** What this article makes clear is that **rhetoric (and therefore rhetorical analysis)** also **has power in the way policy is shaped and defined. In a recent book on the conflict in Kosovo,** the authors **note that when the president spoke to the nation on the night the air war began, he immediately ruled out the use of ground forces. This was done**, they argue**, due to fears that leaving open the possibility of ground force** participation **would sacrifice** domestic public and congressional (and allied) **support** for the air war. But "publicly ruling out their use only helped to reduce Milosevic's uncertainty regarding the likely scope of NATO's military actions," 109 and possibly to lengthen the air war as a result. Yet, they report, National Security Advisor Sandy **Berger**, "who authored the critical passage in the president's speech, **maintains that 'we would not have won the war without this sentence.'**" **110 It would be difficult to find more direct evidence for the profound impact and influence public rhetoric and debate have**--and are understood to have**--on policy, policymaking, and policymakers at the highest level.** That means **that rhetorical analysis can have a role to play and a voice at the table before policies are determined.** Academic **rhetoricians**, through their choice of projects and the formats in which they publish, **can stake a claim to having an important voice at the table--and they should do so.**

Reps Come First

Change has to come from the way we view representations first. Representations, structures, and the way we experience are all interconnected but the key to is change the connection between our own subjectivity and other's experience.

Arthur **Kleinman**, , Professor of Medical Anthropology and Professor of Anthropology at Harvard, The appeal of experience; the dismay of images: cultural appropriations of suffering in our times," DAEDALUS Winter 19**96**, p. http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3671/is_199601/ai_n8747499/print

Ultimately, **we will have to engage** the more ominous aspects of globalization, such as the commercialization of suffering, **the commodification of experiences** of atrocity and abuse, and the pornographic uses of degradation.(36) Violence in the media, and its relation to violence in the streets and in homes, is already a subject that has attracted serious attention from communities and from scholars.(37) Regarding the even more fundamental cultural question of how social experience is being transformed in untoward ways, **the first issue would** seem **to be to develop historical, ethnographic, and narrative studies that provide a more powerful understanding of the cultural processes through which the global regime** of disordered capitalism **alters the connections between collective experience and subjectivity**, so that moral sensibility, for example, diminishes or becomes something frighteningly different: promiscuous, gratuitous, unhinged from responsibility and action.(38) **There is a terrible legacy here that needs to be contemplated. The transformation of epochs is as much about changes in social experience as shifts in social structures and cultural representations**; indeed**, the three sites of social transformation are inseparable. Out of their triangulation, subjectivity too transmutes**. The current transformation is no different; yet perhaps we see more clearly the hazards of the historical turn that we are now undertaking. Perhaps all along we have been wrong to consider existential conditions as an ultimate constraint limiting the moral dangers of civilizational change.

AT: Perm – Sever Reps

Reps Tied to Speaker and Policy

Representations reflect the way the subject is implicated with the object of representation through moral and political assumptions. Images always conjure an ideology.

Arthur **Kleinman**, , Professor of Medical Anthropology and Professor of Anthropology at Harvard, The appeal of experience; the dismay of images: cultural appropriations of suffering in our times," DAEDALUS Winter 19**96**, p. http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3671/is_199601/ai_n8747499/print

Having learned about Carter's suicide, the prize-winning image, an anonymously public icon of suffering at a distance, becomes part of close experience. Kevin **Carter is transformed from a name on the side of the photograph to a narrative**, a story that is emplotted with a classic example of Joseph Conrad's depiction of Africa as the heart of darkness, **the site of social horror. Carter becomes a subject in the cultural story his photograph helped write** by being transformed, infected more than affected, by what he had to bear. But what of the horrors experienced by the little Sudanese girl, who is given neither a name nor a local moral world? The tension of uncertainty is unrelieved. Only now, with the story of Carter's suicide, **the suffering of the representer and the represented interfuses**. Professional **representation as well as popular interpretations would have us separate the two**: one a powerless local victim, the other a powerful foreign professional.(15) Yet, the account of Carter's suicide creates a more complex reality. **The disintegration of the subject/object dichotomy implicates us all**. The theories of a variety of academic professions may help explain how **Carter got us into this situation of bringing the global into the local**, but they fail to explain how we will get ourselves out of the moral complexities **he has intensified for us by projecting the local into the global**.(16) **We are left only with the unsentimentalized limits of the human condition--a silence seemingly without meaning**, possibly without solace. And still the world calls for images: the mixture of moral failures and global commerce is here to stay.(l7)

Without disputing **the photograph's immense achievement, it is useful to explore its moral and political assumptions.**(18) There is, **for example**, the unstated idea that **this group of unnamed Africans** (are they Nuer or Dinka?) cannot protect their own. They **must be protected, as well as represented, by others. The image of the subaltern conjures up an almost neocolonial ideology of failure, inadequacy, passivity, fatalism, and inevitability**.(19) **Something must be done, and it must be done soon**, but from outside the local setting. **The authorization of action** through an appeal for foreign aid, even foreign intervention, **begins with an evocation of indigenous absence, an erasure of local voices and acts.**

Reps Tied to Policy

Language affects the way we understand and act in moments of encounters. Language sustains our perception of the world and this semantic construction ties things we do not understand to representations we can understand. If we can win that the understanding of the AFF is bunk, their plan is suspect.

Veronica **Vasterlin**g, Associate Professor in Philosophy at U of Nijimegen, Butler's Sophisticated Constructivism: A Critical Assessment, Hypatia 14.3, 19**99**, pg. 17-38

Whereas everything that is intelligible to us is also accessible to us, the reverse is not true. Phenomena that are intelligible to us are phenomena we do understand in some way or other. At the most basic level, to understand something means to be able to name or refer to it. **As understanding involves the capacity to name, to refer**, or to articulate that which is understood, **it is always mediated by language.** To equate intelligibility and accessibility would mean that we cannot have access to phenomena we do not understand, that is, phenomena we cannot articulate. That does not seem plausible. By following the hermeneutic model of understanding, I try to show that we can have access to phenomena we do not understand, that is, cannot articulate, though this access is not completely independent of linguistically mediated understanding. In daily life, **our behavior and actions are guided by a mostly implicit understanding of the world we inhabit, an understanding that is based upon the ways in which this world is semantically constructed.** Even so**, our daily routines are** on occasion slightly, and sometimes profoundly, **disrupted because we are confronted with people, situations, actions, images, texts, things, bodily sensations etcetera that defy our understanding. The context of habitual understanding enables these confrontations or encounters.** [5] **To become aware of something we do not understand, we need a context of what we do understand.** [6] **By giving us access to what we do not understand, the context of habitual understanding does, as it were, indicate its own limits.** We register these limits not simply as a lack of understanding but, more precisely, as a lack of our capacity to articulate. The nagging feeling or awareness of something we cannot put in words is nothing unusual. This fact of everyday life implies that the range of accessibility is wider than, though not independent of, the range of intelligibility. Whereas the latter more or less coincides with our linguistic capacities, the former indicates that these capacities do not (fully) determine our awareness of and contact with reality.

Reps Tied to Policy

Representations exclude certain characteristics and privilege others – this shapes what we call reality. This repression and normalization has direct political consequences and prevents positive change.

Veronica **Vasterlin**g, Associate Professor in Philosophy at U of Nijimegen, Butler's Sophisticated Constructivism: A Critical Assessment, Hypatia 14.3, 19**99**, pg. 17-38

Though inspired by Butler's characterization of the body as a demand in and for language, this interpretation of the unintelligible body is incompatible with the epistemological position Butler defends, in general. If language determines the limits of accessibility, then access is restricted to what we can name, articulate, and in a basic sense, understand. This epistemological position precludes the possibility of (pre)conscious experience of the unintelligible body. The psychoanalytical interpretational scheme which dominates *Bodies That Matter* (Butler 1993) confirms this conclusion. According to this scheme, the **normative standards of sex, gender, and sexuality that regulate the intelligibility of the body initiate the psychic operation of repudiating and abjecting** the unintelligible body, thereby **excluding it from the realm of (pre)conscious experience.** Though this psychoanalytical interpretation makes sense in specific cases, Butler applies it as a generalized interpretational scheme to Western culture as a whole. Applied as such, it is both empirically implausible and politically self-defeating. [7] The force of normative standards is not always and everywhere the same nor are the circumstances and backgrounds of individuals the same. Depending on these two variable factors, **psychic reaction with respect to the unintelligible body may vary from repudiation and abjection to acceptance and even celebration. The political consequences of the generalized scheme are more serious.** Though Butler stresses the subversive potential of the abjected, unintelligible body, this kind of subversion is not likely to change anything for the better. **What is excluded from consciousness does not disappear, on the contrary, it haunts conscious experience and it does**, indeed, **exert a subversive pressure on intelligible reality**. But to what good? **Unless we can take control of it, its very subversiveness will lead to either defensive reactions, hence it will consolidate the normative standards that regulate the intelligible body**, or mental and/or emotional breakdown, **hence to suffering instead of change for the better.** Only if the unintelligible body is accessible to (pre)conscious experience and conscious efforts of articulation, its subversive potential may turn into the positive potential of critical force and creative resource.

Reps Tied to Policy

Representations create the basis for which policies are evaluated. These evaluations are ideologically biased and perpetuate a certain type of politics. If we can win the method of evaluating their plan is bunk, you cannot advocate the plan.

Arthur **Kleinman**, , Professor of Medical Anthropology and Professor of Anthropology at Harvard, The appeal of experience; the dismay of images: cultural appropriations of suffering in our times," DAEDALUS Winter 19**96**, p. http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3671/is_199601/ai_n8747499/print

One metric of suffering recently developed by the World Bank has gained wide attention and considerable support.(27) Image II describes what the World Bank's health economists mean by the term Disability Adjusted Life Years (DALYs). Table 1 shows the result of the application of DALYs to measure the cost of suffering from illnesses globally. It emphasizes the significant percentage of loss in DALYs due to mental health problems. This finding, one would suppose, should help make the case for giving mental health problems--suicide, mental illnesses, trauma due to violence, substance abuse--higher priority so that greater resources can be applied to them. In fact, the cost of mental health problems are placed by the World Bank in the discretionary category so that the state is not held responsible for that burden. This is a serious problem that requires fundamental change in the way suffering from mental health problems is prioritized by the World Bank. But here we ask a different question: **What kind of cultural representation** and professional appropriation **of suffering is this?**

This metric of suffering was constructed by assigning degrees of suffering to years of life and types of disability. **The assumption is that values will be universal.** They will not vary across worlds as greatly different as China, India, sub-Saharan Africa, and North America. **They will also be reducible to measures of economic cost. That expert panels rate blindness with a severity of 0.6, while female reproductive system disorders are evaluated at one third the severity is surely a cause for questioning whether gender bias is present**, but more **generally it should make one uneasy with the means by which evaluations of severity and its cost can be validly standardized** across different societies, social classes, age cohorts, genders, ethnicities, and occupational groups.

The effort to develop an objective indicator may be important for rational choice concerning allocation of scarce resources among **different policies and programs**. (It certainly should support the importance of funding mental health programs, even though as it is presently used in the World Bank's World Development Report it does not lead to this conclusion.) But **it is** equally **important to question what are the limits and the potential dangers of configuring social suffering as an economic indicator**. The moral and political issues we have raised in this essay cannot be made to fit into this econometric index. Likewise, **the index is unable to map cultural, ethnic, and gender differences**. Indeed, it assumes homogeneity in the evaluation and response to illness experiences, which belies an enormous amount of anthropological, historical, and clinical evidence of substantial differences in each of these domains.(28) Professional categories are privileged over lay categories, yet the experience of illness is expressed in lay terms. Furthermore, the index focuses on the individual sufferer, denying that suffering is a social experience. **This terribly thin representation of** a thickly **human condition** may in time also thin out the social experience of suffering. It can do this by becoming part of the apparatus of cultural representation that **creates societal norms, which in turn shapes the social role and social behavior of the ill, and what should be the practices of families and health-care providers.** The American cultural rhetoric, for example, is changing from the language of caring to the language of efficiency and cost; it is not surprising to hear patients themselves use this rhetoric to describe their problems. Thereby, the illness experience, for some, may be transformed from a consequential moral experience into a merely technical inexpediency.

Reps Bad

Takes out Solvency

Representations isolate specific ideological interpretations which don't examine institutions. Even if they lead to policies, the policies are ideologically arrogant and backfire.

Arthur **Kleinman**, , Professor of Medical Anthropology and Professor of Anthropology at Harvard, The appeal of experience; the dismay of images: cultural appropriations of suffering in our times," DAEDALUS Winter 19**96**, p. http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3671/is_199601/ai_n8747499/print

> **Suffering is presented as if it existed free of local people and local worlds**. The child is alone. **This**, of course**, is not the way that disasters, illnesses, and deaths are usually dealt with** in African or other non-Western societies, or, for that matter, in the West. Yet, the **image of famine is culturally represented in an ideologically Western mode: it becomes the experience of a lone individual**.(20) **The next step**, naturally**, is to assume that there are no local institutions or programs. That assumption** almost invariably **leads to the development of regional or national policies that are imposed on local worlds. When those localities end up resisting or not complying** with policies and programs that are meant to assist them, **such acts are then labeled irrational or self-destructive. The local world is deemed incompetent**, or worse.

Reps → Paralyze

Representations recreate the way individuals are perceived and the way they interact with political and financial institutions. Experience is translated in terms of cultural capital which designates possible actions in terms of the system which is merely after more cultural capital. This consumption is counterproductive to attention towards violence and misery we can change.

Arthur **Kleinman**, , Professor of Medical Anthropology and Professor of Anthropology at Harvard, The appeal of experience; the dismay of images: cultural appropriations of suffering in our times," DAEDALUS Winter 19**96**, p. http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3671/is_199601/ai_n8747499/print

When those whose suffering is appropriated by **the media** cross over to places of refuge and safety, they often must **submit to** yet **another type of arrogation**.(24) **Their memories** (their intimately interior images) of violation **are made over into trauma stories**. These **trauma stories** then **become the currency, the symbolic capital, with which they enter exchanges for physical resources and achieve the status of political refugee**. Increasingly, **those** complicated **stories**, based in real events, yet **reduced to a core cultural image of victimization** (a postmodern hallmark), **are used by** health **professionals to rewrite social experience** in medical terms. **The person who undergoes torture first becomes a victim, an image of innocence and passivity, someone who cannot represent himself, who must be represented. Then he becomes a patient**, specifically a patient with a quintessential fin de siecle disorder (i.e., posttraumatic stress disorder).(25) Indeed, **to receive even modest public assistance it may be necessary to undergo a sequential transformation from one who** experiences, who **suffers** political terror **to one who is a victim** of political violence **to one who is sick, who has a disease. Because of the practical political and financial importance of such transformations, the violated themselves may want**, and even seek out, **the re-imaging of their condition** so that they can obtain the moral as well as the financial benefits of being ill. We need to ask, however, **what kind of cultural process underpins the transformation of a victim of violence to someone with a pathology**? What does it mean to give those traumatized by political violence the social status of a patient? And **in what way does the imagery** of victimization as the pathology of an individual **alter the experience--collective as well as individual--so that its lived meaning as moral and political memory, perhaps even resistance, is lost and is replaced** by "guilt," "paranoia," and a "failure to cope"? There is an uncomfortable irony here. There is an uncanny and unnecessary correlation between the aesthetics of murder in Guatemala, Rwanda, and Bosnia and the way in which those deaths are reported in the news. We are shown close-ups of limbs blown off by mortars and landmines. In low intensity warfare directed at terrorizing populations, people are not just killed; they are hacked into pieces, blown up, torn apart, burned, and broken. And all the details are dramatically displayed for us. Thus, **the cultural capital of trauma victims**--their wounds, their scars, their tragedy--**is appropriated by the same popular codes through which** physical and **sexual violence are commodified**, sold in the cinema, marketed as pornography, and used by tabloids and novelists to attract readers. **Spectacular forms** of trauma from abroad **hold another significance** as well: **they consume our interest and deflect attention from routinized misery** at home.

Alt Good

Rejection Solves

Rejection of representations opens space for new languages and discourses which can challenge oppressive norms.

Veronica **Vasterlin**g, Associate Professor in Philosophy at U of Nijimegen, Butler's Sophisticated Constructivism: A Critical Assessment, Hypatia 14.3, 19**99**, pg. 17-38

It is important to distinguish between intelligibility and accessibility for two reasons. First, **we need this distinction to explain why aspects of the intelligible body may be experienced as not fitting and even oppressive**. Experiences of this kind presuppose the awareness of an alternative. If accessibility were restricted to the intelligible body, access to an alternative experience of the body would simply be impossible. The second reason has to do with motives and resources for criticizing and changing oppressive aspects of the intelligible body. Access to what exceeds the intelligible body might be a powerful motive and resource for criticism and change. In other words**, the unintelligible body may come to function as a creative resource and critical force. Manifesting itself as a demand in and for language, the unintelligible body may mobilize us to articulate new meanings and new discursive practices** with respect to the body. **The signals of the unintelligible body and their demand may, if we are responsive to them, initiate an effort of articulation that is not only creative but also critical insofar as it challenges oppressive norms** that regulate the intelligibility of the body.

Postmodernism Good – Political

Postmodernism critical to politics

Smith 97 (Steve, Department of International Politics, University of Wales, Journal Peace Research, August)
Osterud sees postmodernists as accepting a world-view which, because of the absence of 'careful argumentation', is revealed as 'ideology in the classical sense of naive pipe dream' (p. 388). Because they indulge in 'non-analysis', their politics remain undiscovered. I think no one could accuse Foucault or Derrida of avoiding making their political positions clear. **Osterud's comment also begs the question whether it is possible to have non-ideological analysis. Only positivists believe that such a position is possible, since positivism is based on an explicit distinction between 'facts' and 'values'. This is what postmodernist writers seek to challenge by showing how the power-knowledge relationship works. There is no more political position than one which claims to be 'neutral' or which simply allows the 'facts to speak for themselves'.**

Alt Not Nihilism

Relativism doe not collapse into Nihilism
George 94 (Jim, Lecturer in International Relations, Australian National University, Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical Reintroduction to International Relations, p. 23)

Once framed in this manner, of course, **any perspective that questions the existence of some permanent, ahistorical framework of truth, knowledge, or reality must by definition be engaged in some sort of subjectivism or relativism**. **On the other hand, once the dichotomized framing process underlying these charges is exposed, a whole matrix of otherwise hidden logic can be opened up for scrutiny, affording the analyst/policymaker the opportunity for a more comprehensive and insightful agenda by which questions might be answered and problems might be "solved."** The charge of subjectivism, for example, has a pejorative sting only if one has already framed the pursuit of knowledge in objectivist terms--in other words, if subjectivism, by definition, represents the negative side of the positivist subject/object dichotomy (e.g., as Realism versus idealism, scientific research versus abstract theorizing).