

KO Space Neg

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China Frontline-1 NC

1. No Solvency

A. 1 AC author concedes plan isn't enough to stop China.

Griffin and Lin, 8 - Research Assistant, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University
(Christopher Griffin and Joseph Lin, Armed Forces Journal, "China's Space Ambitions" April 8, 2008, http://www.aei.org/publications/filter.all.pubID.27772/pub_detail.asp)

Further, recognizing the potential for long-term competition with China over the future control of space, the U.S. must take steps to mitigate its potential losses and guarantee that it retains escalation superiority in any future conflict. Investing in a hardened, robust satellite system is the obvious first step in any such effort. Developing redundancy through additional layers or C4ISR capabilities is another necessary step in this regard. Rapid improvements in unmanned aerial vehicles promise to facilitate such an effort, and would push the Sino-American competition to a cutting-edge field in which the U.S. retains a clear technological lead.

B. 1 AC evidence doesn't say US aerospace domination deters China-just that its important.

2. No Impact.

A. Their impact card is telling a fictional story about a supposed US attack-Forden's not predicting this will happen.

B. China doesn't have the infrastructure to attack us-either they're deterred by our space superiority or our satellites can see their preparation.

Forden, 8—An M.I.T. research associate and a former UN weapons inspector and strategic weapons analyst Congressional Budget Office
(Geoffrey, PhD, "How China Loses the Coming Space War", 1-10-08, <http://blog.wired.com/defense/2008/01/inside-the-chin.html#more>)

But China could not launch the massive attack required to have anything like a significant effect on US ability to utilize space without months of careful planning and pre-positioning of special, ASAT carrying missiles around the country. It would also have to utilize its satellite launch facilities to attack any US assets in deep space: the GPS navigation satellites and communications satellites in geostationary orbit. Most importantly, it would have to time the attack so as to hit as many US satellites as simultaneously as possible. And, despite all that movement, Beijing would somehow have to keep the whole thing secret. Failure to do so would undoubtedly result in the US attacking the large, fixed facilities China needs to wage this kind of war before the full blow had been struck. Even if the United States failed to do so, China would undoubtedly plan for that contingency. Based on the orbits of US military satellites determined by the worldwide network of amateur observers, there appears to be a large number of low Earth orbit military satellites over China several times each week. To hit them, China would have to preposition its ASAT-tipped missiles and their mobile launchers in remote areas of China, one position for each satellite. (If reports of low reliabilities for these missiles are correct, two or more missiles might be assigned to each satellite.) Furthermore, these positions are really only suitable for a particular day. If China's political and military planners have any uncertainty at all about which day to launch their space war, they would need to pre-position additional launchers around the country. Thus, attacking nine low Earth orbit satellites could require as many as 36 mobile launchers—enough for two interceptors fired at each satellite with a contingency day if plans change—moved to remote areas of China; areas determined more by the satellite orbits than China's network of road. (As will be discussed below, nine is about the maximum they could reasonably expect to hit on the first day of the space war.) At the same time that China would be trying to covertly move its mobile missile launchers around the country, it would also have to assemble a fleet of large rockets -- ones normally used for launching satellites. The more large rockets China uses for this task, the more deep-space satellites it can destroy. At present, however, China only has the facilities for assembling and launching a total for four such rockets nearly simultaneously. Two would have to be assembled out in the open where they could be observed by US spy satellites and two could be assembled inside a vertical assembly building during the 18 days it takes to stack and fuel the Long March rocket's stages while preparing to launch. [See right.] Even the two assembled indoors would need to arrive by train and eventually would have to be moved, one after the other, to the launch pad. Each of these rockets, usually reserved for launching satellites into geostationary orbits, could carry three to four interceptors and their special orbital maneuver motors to attack either US navigation satellites, at about 12,000 miles altitude, or communications satellites at about 22,000 miles.

China Frontline-1 NC

C. We'd kick China's ass-we can shoot down their space missiles before they launch them.

Forden, 8—An M.I.T. research associate and a former UN weapons inspector and strategic weapons analyst Congressional Budget Office (<http://blog.wired.com/defense/2008/01/inside-the-chin.html#more>)

If China was to attack the strategically important deep-space satellites it would give the United States at least an indication of the impending attack two or more weeks prior to launch as it assembled its Long March rockets on their launch pads. There could be few other reasons for China to assemble so many rockets at its satellite launch centers for near-simultaneous launches. The US could, if it wished to initiate hostilities, destroy the rockets before they were launched using either stealth bombers or cruise missiles. Alternatively, it could wait and use its National Missile Defense interceptors—which have an inherent ASAT capability—to shoot down the first group of deep space ASATs as they wait for D-day in their parking orbit.

3. No risk of war.

A. Economic interdependence.

Aaron **Friedberg**, Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, **'5**
(The Future of U.S.-china relations: is conflict inevitable?, International Security, Vo. 30, No. 2, Fall)

Liberal optimists believe that bilateral economic exchange creates shared interests in good relations between states. The greater the volume of trade and investment flowing between two countries, the more groups on both sides will have a strong interest in avoiding conflict and preserving peace. Liberal optimists note that economic exchange between the United States and China has increased dramatically since the onset of market reforms in China in the late 1970s. From the start of reform in 1978 to the end of the twentieth century, the value of the trade moving between the two countries grew by more than two orders of magnitude, from \$1 billion to almost \$120 billion annually. ¹¹ By 2004 that figure had doubled to a reported total of \$245 billion. ¹² Capital flows have also risen, with U.S. investors pouring significant resources each year into China. ¹³ As China enters the World Trade Organization (WTO) and opens its markets even wider to foreign goods and capital, the density of commercial linkages between the United States and the PRC will increase. ¹⁴ Economic interdependence has already helped to create a strong mutual interest in peace between the two Pacific powers. Barring some major disruption, economic forces will probably continue to draw them together, constraining and damping any tendencies toward conflict.

B. International Institutions.

Aaron **Friedberg**, Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, **'5**
(The Future of U.S.-china relations: is conflict inevitable?, International Security, Vo. 30, No. 2, Fall)

In addition to their faith in trade as an instrument of peace, liberal optimists place great store in the role of international institutions of various kinds. These can help to improve communication between states, reducing uncertainty about intentions and increasing the capacity of governments to make credible, binding commitments to one another. By so doing, they can help to ease or counteract some of the pernicious effects of international anarchy, clearing the way for higher levels of cooperation and trust than would otherwise be attainable. ¹⁶ As regards U.S.-China relations, liberal optimists note that since the end of the Cold War there has been a proliferation of regional institutions in East Asia. Included among these are APEC (the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum); the ARF (the ASEAN [Association of Southeast Asian Nations] Regional Forum); ASEAN + 3; the East Asia Summit; an expanding network of bilateral military-to-military talks; and an even wider array of quasi-official track-2 security dialogues involving scholars, analysts, and bureaucrats from countries in the region. Over the course of the last decade, China has also sought entry into several important global institutions, including the WTO (which it entered in 2001) and the nuclear nonproliferation regime (which it joined in 1996). In addition, it has begun to play a more active and prominent role in the United Nations. By one count, the PRC's membership in formal, international governmental organizations more than doubled between 1977 and 1997 (from 21 to 52), while its membership in international nongovernmental organizations soared during the same period from 71 to 1,163. ¹⁷ The growth of international institutions in Asia and the expansion of both U.S. and Chinese participation in them are drawing the United States and the PRC into a thickening web of ties that liberal optimists believe will promote contact, communication and, over time, greater mutual understanding and even trust, or at the very least, a reduced likelihood of gross misperception. Aside from whatever direct effects it may have on bilateral relations with the United States, China's increasing participation in international institutions should also give it a growing, albeit more diffuse, stake in the stability and continuity of the existing global order. The desire of China's leaders to continue to enjoy the benefits of membership in that order should make them less likely to take steps that would threaten the status quo. This, in turn, should reduce the probability that the PRC will act in ways that could bring it into conflict with the United States, which is, after all, the principal architect, defender, and beneficiary of the contemporary international system.

China Frontline-1 NC

C. Chinese Democracy

Aaron **Friedberg**, Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, '5
(The Future of U.S.-china relations: is conflict inevitable?, International Security, Vo. 30, No. 2, Fall)

Above all else, liberal optimists believe that democracy is a force for peace. Regimes that rely for their power and legitimacy on the consent of the governed are less likely to enter lightly into military adventures or to engage in wars whose true purpose is to line the pockets, and satisfy the vainglory, of their leaders. Although democracies may at times behave belligerently toward nondemocracies, they have rarely, if ever, gone to war with one another. As the number of democracies in the world increases (as it has quite dramatically, albeit at an uneven pace, over the course of the last two centuries), the likelihood of international conflict should diminish.¹⁹ Liberal optimists believe that, although it is still far from finished, the process of democratization is already well under way in China.²⁰ This process is being driven largely by economic development, which, in turn, is being accelerated by China's increasing openness to trade. Rising per capita incomes are creating a growing Chinese middle class. In Europe and North America, and more recently in Asia, those whose rising incomes allow them to do more than attend to the struggle for daily existence have been the prime movers behind progress toward democracy, and there is every reason to hope that they will play a similar role in China.²¹ Liberals also believe that, in addition to stirring the desire for political rights, economic development creates an objective, functional need for political liberalization. Without courts, contracts, and a reliable rule of law, economic progress will surely falter. Moreover, in an era in which sustained growth depends increasingly on free flows of information, regimes that seek to restrict speech and control communications will be at a fatal disadvantage. Over time, if it wishes even to approach the levels of well-being already attained by its advanced industrial counterparts (all of which are democracies), China too must become democratic.²² As it does, the liberal optimists expect that its relations with the United States will stabilize and that, ultimately, it will enter into the democratic "zone of peace." Although the process may take time fully to unfold, before too long open conflict between the United States and a democratic China will be as improbable as war among the members of the European Union appears to be today. Since the mid-1990s the presumed links between trade, growth, democracy, and peace have been staple features of official U.S. rhetoric regarding relations with China. President Bill Clinton began to make these arguments after abandoning his initial irritation with the idea of linking China's access to the U.S. market to its performance on human rights issues.²³ Despite his harsh criticisms of some aspects of the Clinton administration's policy of "engagement," candidate and later President George W. Bush embraced the basic logic of the idea that trade promotes democracy, and, ultimately, peace. Thus in a 1999 campaign speech, Bush declared, "Economic freedom creates habits of liberty. And habits of liberty create expectations of democracy. . . . Trade freely with China, and time is on our side."

D. Deterrence.

Aaron **Friedberg**, Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, '5
(The Future of U.S.-china relations: is conflict inevitable?, International Security, Vo. 30, No. 2, Fall)

As during the Cold War, the mutual possession of nuclear weapons by the two polar powers should serve as an additional source of constraint on their behavior. This factor is stressed, for example, by Avery Goldstein who argues that it provides "the strongest reasons to expect that the dangers associated with China's arrival as a full-fledged great power will be limited." Goldstein suggests that, as participants in what Robert Jervis has called the "nuclear revolution," the United States and China have already entered into an "easily established [relationship] of mutual deterrence that provide[s] not only a robust buffer against general war, but also a strong constraint on both limited war and crisis behavior."

Extension 3: Trade Prevents War

China and the US are completely reliant on each other-no risk of war.

Mike **Moore**, Contributing Editor of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, '6
(SAIS Review 26.1, p. 175-188, Project Muse) [Bozman]

The Chinese government may be corrupt and repressive, but it is not collectively stupid. China learned a vital lesson from the collapse of the Soviet Union: In a direct arms competition with the United States, the United States wins. The Soviet Union sought to create an alternate universe, a socialist paradise with Muscovite characteristics. It failed. China has chosen, albeit cautiously, to join the global community, and it expects the payoff will be a modest degree of national prosperity. Does China actively seek to initiate a cold war-style competition with the United States? Several factors would suggest it does not. Manufacturing consumer goods for export to the West drives China's boom and provides employment for tens of millions in a nation in which unemployment is still dangerously high. A cold war-style confrontation would sap China's economic vitality by diverting huge amounts of capital away from the making of consumer goods (mainly for export) into China's arms industries, thus threatening China's main business: the Wal-Marting of America. That Red China and capitalist America are now joined at the hip in the economic sphere is a fact that few politicians care to acknowledge fully. The overriding fact is that China needs U.S. consumers, the biggest single market for its made-in-China products,

Regan**Serrano/Strange**

and American consumers seem comfortable with that. "The China price," which denotes the lowest possible price for manufactured goods, is now part of the American lexicon. The downward competition among American manufacturers to meet the China price means that American consumers buy manufactured goods far more cheaply at discount stores than they could have bought comparable American-made goods. A quid pro quo relationship has developed between Washington and Beijing. Washington generally accepts that China will continue to supply inexpensive products to U.S. consumers; in turn, China continues to help finance the growing U.S. national debt by buying hundreds of billions of dollars of low-interest Treasury bonds that private investors in the United States and elsewhere no longer covet.⁹

Extension 2: We'll Kick China's Ass

China barely has the capacity to take down 4 of our satellites-we'd roll them.

Forden, 8—An M.I.T. research associate and a former UN weapons inspector and strategic weapons analyst Congressional Budget Office

(Geoffrey, PhD, "How China Loses the Coming Space War", 1-10-08, <http://blog.wired.com/defense/2008/01/inside-the-chin.html#more>)

You need a launch pad to attack a target in deep space, like an American GPS satellite. China has just three of these pads. This really restricts China's offensive capabilities in space. Assuming that China devotes all its deep-space ASATs on GPS satellites, it could destroy at most 16 satellites. At the current time, with 32 functioning navigation satellites, that would still leave 16 satellites still working. Over a period of years, the debris from those collisions would represent a significant threat to more than those satellites immediately attacked. They would pass, time and time again, through the belts of debris that resulted from the interceptions. However, it would probably take longer than the military conflict China initiated with these attacks before additional satellites were destroyed by subsequent collisions. Usually, there are about nine GPS satellites over China at any given time. If China somehow managed to destroy all of these, it could eliminate America's use of precision-guided munitions—for a few hours, until the orbits of other GPS satellites take them over the Taiwan Straits. Quite quickly, the constellation's other 23 satellites would fill in the gap due to their normal orbital movement. Even if it destroyed 16 satellites, China could still only interrupt GPS over the Straits for about eight hours. During the other 16 hours there would be the four or more satellites present over the target area for bombing runs, unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) flights, and ship tracking. This pattern of eight hours off followed by 16 hours when GPS could be used would be repeated every day until new satellites are launched. This outage would certainly cause difficulties; GPS not only guides American precision bombs – it helps pilot UAV spy planes, and monitor ships. US casualties might increase, with air crews forced to fly missions during daylight hours – and conduct some of the "dull, dirty, and dangerous" missions now flown by robotic planes. It's a situation no American commander would want to face. But it would not be a catastrophic one. And it would not eliminate precision weaponry, UAVs, or any other American activity that depends on GPS. Keep in mind, this is the worst of the worst-case scenarios. It is highly unlikely that China could remove all the satellites over the conflict area at the same time. After all, attacking 16 satellites, all in different orbits with ASATs launched on just four different rockets involves some fairly complex orbital maneuvers. A much more likely scenario is that, at best, China could destroy four GPS satellites in the initial wave followed roughly seven hours later by four more, a third wave at roughly 45 minutes after that, and the final wave two hours later. Thus, the GPS attack is spread over ten hours and never eliminates all the satellites visible over the area of conflict at the same time. This Chinese attack on US navigation satellites would not eliminate or even significantly degrade the US's ability use precision-guided munitions.

China can't beat us in space.

William **Martel**, Professor of National Security Affairs @ the Naval War College & Toshi Yoshihara, PhD Candidate in IR @ Tufts, **'3** (The Washington Quarterly 26.4, 19-35, p. Muse) [Bozman]

During the next decade or so, the PRC will not likely be able to compete in every area of space technology with the United States at any level that even remotely resembles the intensity of the superpower rivalry during the Cold War. In addition, with the Bush administration's defense transformation plans, U.S. investments in the next generation of leap-ahead technologies are likely to leave China even further behind. Over the next 5-10 years, however, Beijing may be able to pursue selective technological capabilities that can challenge U.S. interests in space.

Innovation Frontline-1 NC

*****Hege wont collapse even if every worst case scenario comes true.**

Stephen G. **Brooks**, Asst. Prof. of Government @ Dartmouth and William C. Wohlforth, Ass. Prof. of Government @ Dartmouth, '88 (World Out of Balance, p. 2) [Quals Added]

What accounts for this sudden shift in assessments of American power? For most observers, it was not new information about material capabilities. As Robert Jervis [Profesor of IR @ Columbia] observes, "Measured in any conceivable way, the United States has a greater share of world power than any other country in history."¹¹⁴ That statement was as accurate when it was written in 2006 as it would have been at any time after 1.991, and the primacy it describes will long persist, even if the most pessimistic prognostications about U.S. economic, military, and technological competitiveness come true. For most scholars of international relations, what really changed after 2003 were estimates of the political utility of America's primacy. Suddenly, scholars were impressed by the fact that material preponderance does not always translate into desired outcomes. For many, theories of international relations (IR) that explain constraints on the use of power were vindicated by American setbacks in Iraq and elsewhere.

Nano Frontline-1 NC

1. Nanotech is science fiction, not science – manipulating atoms violates the laws of physics.

Colin Milburn, graduate student at Harvard University in History of Science, 2003. "Nanotechnology in the Age of Posthuman Engineering: Science Fiction as Science," <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/configurations/v010/10.2milburn.html#top>

Due to the tendency of nanowriting to speculate on the far future and to prognosticate its role in the radical metamorphosis of human life (coupled with the fact that nanotech research has yet to produce material counterparts to its adventurous mathematical models and computer simulations), many critics have claimed that nanotechnology is less a science and more a science fiction. For instance, David E. H. Jones, chemist at the University of Newcastle upon Tyne, insinuates that nanotech is not a "realistic" science, and that, because its aspirations seem to violate certain natural limits of physics, "nanotechnology need not be taken seriously. It will remain just another exhibit in the freak-show that is the boundless-optimism school of technical forecasting." 16 Gary Stix, staff writer for Scientific American and a persistent critic of nanotech, has compared Drexler's writings to the scientific romances of Jules Verne and H. G. Wells, suggesting that "real nanotechnology" is not to be found in these science fiction stories. 17 Furthermore, Stix maintains that nanowriting, a "subgenre of science fiction," damages the legitimacy of nanoscience in the public eye, and that "[d]istinguishing between what's real and what's not" is essential for nanotech's prosperity. 18 Similarly, Stanford University biophysicist Steven M. Block has said that many nanoscientists, particularly Drexler and those involved with the Foresight Institute, have been too influenced by laughable "science fiction" expectations and have gotten ahead of themselves; he proposes that for "real science to proceed, nanotechnologists ought to distance themselves from the giggle factor." 19 Several critics have stated that direct manipulation and engineering of atoms is not physically possible for thermodynamic or quantum mechanical reasons; others have suggested that, without experimental [End Page 265] verification for its outrageous notions and miraculous devices, nanotechnology is not scientifically valid; many more have dismissed the long-range predictions made by nanowriting on the grounds that such speculation obscures the reality of present-day research and the appreciable accomplishments within the field. These attacks have in common a strategic use of the term "real science" as opposed to "science fiction," and, whether rejecting the entire field as mere fantasy or attempting to extricate the scientific facts of nanotech from their science-fictional entanglements, charges of science-fictionality have repeatedly called the epistemological status of nanotechnology into question. 20

2. Nanobots won't be able to reproduce quickly – 1 gram would take 19 million years

RICHARD E. SMALLEY, Nobel Prizewinner in Chemistry for the discovery of fullerenes, 9/01. "Nanofallacies: Of Chemistry, Love and Nanobots," Scientific American.

<http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/viewarticle?data=dGJyMPPp44rp2%2fdV0%2bnjisfk5Ie42t%2bK8tnthKzj34HspPF759frfeb18Yy%2bra1LraiuSLaWslKxrrhMs5bOZaTq8Hns6d978t%2fthufau0m3rLJMsaueSrCc6nns3bt97Jziervp51Ck6t9%2fu7fMPt%2fku0myqq5Rt6y0PuTl8IXf6ru14tzEjeri0n326gAA&hid=114>

WHEN A BOY AND A GIRL fall in love, it is often said that the chemistry between them is good. This common use of the word "chemistry" in human relations comes close to the subtlety of what actually happens in the more mundane coupling of molecules. In a chemical reaction between two "consenting" molecules, bonds form between some of the atoms in what is usually a complex dance involving motion in multiple dimensions. Not just any two molecules will react. They have to be right for each other. And if the chemistry is really, really good, the molecules that do react will all produce the exact product desired. Near the center of the typical chemical reaction, the particular atoms that are going to form the new bonds are not the only ones that jiggle around: so do all the atoms they are connected to and the ones connected to these in turn. All these atoms must move in a precise way to ensure that the result of the reaction is the one intended. In an ordinary chemical reaction five to 15 atoms near the reaction site engage in an intricate three-dimensional waltz that is carried out in a cramped region of space measuring no more than a nanometer on each side. In recent years, it has become popular to imagine tiny robots (sometimes called assemblers) that can manipulate and build things atom by atom. Imagine a single assembler: working furiously, this hypothetical nanorobot would make many new bonds as it went about its assigned task, placing perhaps up to a billion new atoms in the desired structure every second. But as fast as it is, that rate would be virtually useless in running a nanofactory: generating even a tiny amount of a product would take a solitary nanobot millions of years. (Making a mole of something—say, 30 grams, or about one ounce—would require at least 6×10^{23} bonds, one for each atom. At the frenzied rate of 109 per second it would take this nanobot 6×10^{14} seconds—that is, 1013 minutes, which is 6.9×10^9 days, or 19 million years.)

Nanotech Frontline-1 NC

3. Nanobots can't self-replicate – unable to adequately control the atoms

RICHARD E. **SMALLEY**, Nobel Prizewinner in Chemistry for the discovery of fullerenes, 9/01. “Nanofallacies: Of Chemistry, Love and Nanobots,” Scientific American.
<http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/viewarticle?data=dGJyMPPp44rp2%2fdV0%2bnjisfk5Ie42t%2bK8tnthKzj34HspPF759frfebl8Yy%2bra1LraiuSLaWs1KxrrhMs5bOZaTq8Hns6d978t%2fthufau0m3rLJMsaueSrCc6nns3bt97Jziervp5ICk6t9%2fu7fMPt%2fku0myqq5Rt6y0PuTl8IXf6ruI4tzEjeri0n326gAA&hid=114>

But how realistic is this notion of a self-replicating nanobot? Let's think about it. Atoms are tiny and move in a defined and circumscribed way—a chemist would say that they move so as to minimize the free energy of their local surroundings. The electronic “glue” that sticks them to one another is not local to each bond but rather is sensitive to the exact position and identity of all the atoms in the near vicinity. So when the nanomanipulator arm of our nanobot picks up an atom and goes to insert it in the desired place, it has a fundamental problem. It also has to somehow control not only this new atom but all the existing atoms in the region. No problem, you say: our nanobot will have an additional manipulator arm for each one of these atoms. Then it would have complete control of all the goings-on that occur at the reaction site. But remember, this region where the chemistry is to be controlled by the nanobot is very, very small—about one nanometer on a side. That constraint leads to at least two basic difficulties. I call one the fat fingers problem and the other the sticky fingers problem. Because the fingers of a manipulator arm must themselves be made out of atoms, they have a certain irreducible size. There just isn't enough room in the nanometer-size reaction region to accommodate all the fingers of all the manipulators necessary to have complete control of the chemistry. In a famous 1959 talk that has inspired nanotechnologists everywhere, Nobel physicist Richard Feynman memorably noted, “There's plenty of room at the bottom.” But there's not that much room. Manipulator fingers on the hypothetical self-replicating nanobot are not only too fat; they are also too sticky: the atoms of the manipulator hands will adhere to the atom that is being moved. So it will often be impossible to release this minuscule building block in precisely the right spot. Both these problems are fundamental, and neither can be avoided. Self-replicating, mechanical nanobots are simply not possible in our world. To put every atom in its place—the vision articulated by some nanotechnologists—would require magic fingers. Such a nanobot will never become more than a futurist's daydream.

Extension 3: Grey Goo Impossible

Grey goo is impossible – self-replicating robots can't be made and we can defend ourselves.

Ronald **Bailey**, Science Correspondent for *Reason* and former FERC analyst, 12-1-2004. "The smaller the better: the limitless promise of nanotechnology--and the growing peril of a moratorium." http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi_0199-3334354/The-smaller-the-better-the.html

The second nanotechnology risk that worries ETC Group activists is runaway self-replication. Mooney points to a scenario suggested by Eric Drexler himself in The Engines of Creation: **Self-replicating nanobots get out of control and spread** exponentially across the landscape, **destroying everything** in their path by converting it into copies of themselves. In this scenario, **the biosphere is transformed** by rampaging nanobots **into "gray goo."** But according to Nobelist Richard Smalley, "**Self-replicating nanorobots** like those envisioned by Eric Drexler **are simply impossible to make.**" Mihail Roco likewise dismisses such nanobots as "sci fi," insisting **there is "common agreement among scientists that they cannot exist."** Drexler replies, reasonably enough, that we know nanoassembly is possible because that's what living things do. Cells, using little machines such as ribosomes, mitochondria, and enzymes, precisely position molecules, store and access assembly instructions, and produce energy. Some have quipped that biology is nanotechnology that works. As that analogy suggests, there is a close affinity between nanotechnology and biotechnology. "The separation between nanotechnology and biotechnology is almost nonexistent," said Mino Dastoor, a senior adviser in the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's Office of Aerospace Technology, at the National Nanotechnology Initiative's conference in April. For future missions, NASA needs machines that are resilient, evolvable, self-sufficient, ultra-efficient, and autonomous. "Biology seems to be able to do all these things very elegantly and efficiently," noted Dastoor. "The wet world of biology and the dry world of nanotechnology will have to live side by side and merge." The fact is that no one has yet definitively shown that Drexler's vision of molecular manufacturing using nanoassemblers is impossible. So let's suppose Smalley and Roco are wrong, and such nanobots are possible. How dangerous would self-replicating nanobots be? One of the ironies of the debate over regulation of nanotechnology is that it was nanotech boosters like Drexler who first worried about such risks. To address potential dangers such as the uncontrolled self-replication envisioned in his gray goo scenario, Drexler and others founded the Foresight Institute in 1989. Over the years, Foresight devised a set of guidelines aimed at preventing mishaps like a gray goo breakout. Among other things, the Foresight guidelines propose that nanotech replicators "must not be capable of replication in a natural, uncontrolled environment." This could be accomplished, the guidelines suggest, by designing devices so that they have an "absolute dependence on a single artificial fuel source or artificial 'vitamins' that don't exist in any natural environment." So if some replicators should get away, they would simply run down when they ran out of fuel.

Another proposal is that self-replicating nanotech devices be "dependent on broadcast transmissions for replication or in some cases operation." That would put human operators in complete control of the circumstances under which nanotech devices could replicate. One other sensible proposal is that devices be programmed with termination dates. Like senescent cells in the human body, such devices would stop working and self-destruct when their time was up. "The moratorium is not a new proposal," says Foresight Institute President Christine Peterson. "Eric Drexler considered that idea a long time ago in *The Engines of Creation* and dismissed it as not a safe option. With a moratorium, we, the good guys, are going to be sitting on our hands. It's very risky to let the bad [people] guys be the ones developing the technology. To do arms control on nanotechnology, you'd better have better nanotechnology than the bad guys." Software entrepreneur Ray Kurzweil is confident that nanotech defenses against uncontrolled replication will be stronger than the abilities to replicate. Citing our current ability to reduce computer viruses to nuisances, Kurzweil argues that we will be even more vigilant against a technology that could kill if uncontrolled. Smalley suggests we can learn how to control nanotech by looking at biology. The natural world is filled with self-replicating systems. In a sense, living things are "green goo." We already successfully defend ourselves against all kinds of self-replicating organisms that try to kill us, such as cholera, malaria, and typhoid. "What do we do about biological systems right now?" says Smalley. "I don't see that it's any different from biotechnology. We can make bacteria and viruses that have never existed before, and we'll handle [nanobots] the same way." Nanotech theorist Robert Freitas has written a study, "Some Limits to Global Ecophagy by Biovorons Nanoreplicators With Public Policy Recommendations" which concludes that all "scenarios examined appear to permit early detection by vigilant monitoring, thus enabling rapid deployment of effective defensive instrumentalities." Freitas persuasively argues that dangerous self-replicating nanobots could not emerge from laboratory accidents but would have to be made on purpose using very sophisticated technologies that would take years to develop.

Extension 4: No Arms Races

Status quo democratization, globalization, deterrence and international arms control will solve nanotech arms races and wars

Bryan **Burns**, Ph.D. from Cornell and nanotech scholar, February 13, **2005**

<http://nanodot.org/comments.pl?sid=01/02/14/0132244&cid=1>

In terms of achieving safety in peaceful uses of nanotechnology, the prospects seem good. The safety section of my paper on Open Sourcing Nanotechnology reviews some of those issues and how openness could help. The bigger problem, as analyzed in Mark Gubrud's paper on Nanotechnology and International Security cited above, concerns avoiding arms races and warfare using nanoweapons. An international arms control regime, as Mark recommends, may well be part of the solution, but it may be useful to put such a strategy into the context of a broader set of conditions and actions which can help avoid arms races and nanowar: Democracy, and more broadly building a "high-trust civil society" as mentioned in the Foresight Guidelines on MNT, as in the argument that "democracies don't make wars on each other." Interdependence, increasing interlinkages, economic and otherwise, weaving peoples together to the point where their common interests far outweigh the gains from violent conflict. Thomas Friedman's phrasing on capitalist globalization is that "countries with McDonalds don't make war on each other." International arms control regimes, which might play a role, especially in setting norms enforced by reputation in international civil society, but which face formidable practical and ethical questions in terms of the level of surveillance and other control which would be needed for thorough enforcement. Deterrence, based on credible threats of retaliation. This includes not just the extremes of mutual assured destruction (MAD) institutionalized terrorism, but also the stability that might be promoted by modest levels of deterrence.

Disease→Extinction

Unchecked disease spread causes extinction.

South China Morning Post '96

(Kavita Daswani, "Leading the way to a cure for AIDS", 1-4, L/N)

Despite the importance of the discovery of the "facilitating" cell, it is not what Dr Ben-Abraham wants to talk about. There is a much more pressing medical crisis at hand - one he believes the world must be alerted to: the possibility of a virus deadlier than HIV.

If this makes Dr Ben-Abraham sound like a prophet of doom, then he makes no apology for it. AIDS, the Ebola outbreak which killed more than 100 people in Africa last year, the flu epidemic that has now affected 200,000 in the former Soviet Union - they are all, according to Dr Ben-Abraham, the "tip of the iceberg".

Two decades of intensive study and research in the field of virology have convinced him of one thing: in place of natural and man-made disasters or nuclear warfare, humanity could face extinction because of a single virus, deadlier than HIV.

"An airborne virus is a lively, complex and dangerous organism," he said. "It can come from a rare animal or from anywhere and can mutate constantly. If there is no cure, it affects one person and then there is a chain reaction and it is unstoppable. It is a tragedy waiting to happen."

That may sound like a far-fetched plot for a Hollywood film, but Dr Ben-Abraham said history has already proven his theory. Fifteen years ago, few could have predicted the impact of AIDS on the world. Ebola has had sporadic outbreaks over the past 20 years and the only way the deadly virus - which turns internal organs into liquid - could be contained was because it was killed before it had a chance to spread. Imagine, he says, if it was closer to home: an outbreak of that scale in London, New York or Hong Kong. It could happen anytime in the next 20 years - theoretically, it could happen tomorrow.

The shock of the AIDS epidemic has prompted virus experts to admit "that something new is indeed happening and that the threat of a deadly viral outbreak is imminent", said Joshua Lederberg of the Rockefeller University in New York, at a recent conference. He added that the problem was "very serious and is getting worse".

Dr Ben-Abraham said: "Nature isn't benign. The survival of the human species is not a preordained evolutionary programme. Abundant sources of genetic variation exist for viruses to learn how to mutate and evade the immune system."

He cites the 1968 Hong Kong flu outbreak as an example of how viruses have outsmarted human intelligence. And as new "mega-cities" are being developed in the Third World and rainforests are destroyed, disease-carrying animals and insects are forced into areas of human habitation. "This raises the very real possibility that lethal, mysterious viruses would, for the first time, infect humanity at a large scale and imperil the survival of the human race," he said.

China Threat Con K-1 NC

A. Their depiction of China as a threat is a discursive construct that doesn't reflect objective reality. The thesis of a threatening Chinese rise is a falsehood designed to ratify Western power.

Chengxin **Pan**, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Faculty of Arts, at Deakin University, August 2004, Discourses Of 'China' In International Relations: A Study in Western Theory as (IR) Practice, p. 141-142

These are some of the questions in the minds of Western/American strategic analysts, who are wondering how to maintain U.S. preponderance in a world of anarchy and uncertainty. The conservative realist Samuel Huntington asks: "If being an American means being committed to the principles of liberty, democracy, individualism, and private property, and if there is no evil empire out there threatening those principles, what indeed does it mean to be an American, and what becomes of American national interests?" Obsessed with this self-imagery, many scholars and policy planners have been keen to reinvolve the timeless, structural certainty of geopolitical rivalry, and to embrace the 'back to the future' scenario, maintaining that despite the dawn of the post-Cold War period little has changed—the world remains a dangerous, volatile place. With such searching eyes for an enemy, it would be surprising if China failed to come into view. Indeed, China makes a perfect candidate, in that "China remains the major source of uncertainty in the Asia-Pacific." That is, not only do the implications of its economic transformation and military ambition remain unclear, but the resilience of the Communist government even after its roundly condemned Tiananmen suppression seems also to fly in the face of the 'End of History' triumphalism. Consequently, (and before September 11), the only major certainty coming out of the post-Cold War era seems to be an unpredictable and dangerous China. From the beginning, this 'China threat,' I suggest, is not a result of its actual challenge to the West or the United States per se, but primarily a discursive dimension of the neorealist construction of the American self in terms of global supremacy and indispensable leadership. As Huntington makes it clear, "Chinese hegemony will reduce American and Western influence [in Asia] and compel the United States to accept what it has historically attempted to prevent: domination of a key region of the world by another power." In the absence of such self-fashioning, most of China's neighbours, which might arguably be more vulnerable to a China threat if there is one, have traditionally adopted a much less alarmist view on the 'Middle Kingdom.' Thus, China's real challenge for America, as Yu Bin notes, "is perhaps more psychological and conceptual—that is, how to deal with a major power whose rise is not necessarily guided by Washington, unlike the post-World War II rise of Japan and Germany." Also, it can be argued that the existence of an 'enemy' is indispensable to the continued imagination of the 'indispensable nation.' In Charles Frazier's novel Cold Mountain, Inman, a soldier returning home from battle during the American Civil War, pondered the question: "What is the cost of not having an enemy?" Such a cost, then, seems very high indeed, for at stake here is what is seen as the 'fundamental' modern Western/American self-identity as a (global) rational being and indispensable leader. Heroic leadership would not be so needed if there was little left to fight for. Clearly mindful of this, Georgi Arbatov, Director of Moscow's Institute for the Study of the USA and Canada, told a U.S. audience the year before the collapse of the Berlin Wall: "We are going to do something terrible to you—we are going to deprive you of an enemy." While he correctly noted that for the U.S. to live without an identity-defining enemy is terrible indeed, Arbatov was only half right, for the 'enemy' itself often has no control over its status as an enemy. Rather, as noted before, it is primarily a ready-made discursive category built into the American self-imagination. With this discursive category as the analytical framework for understanding other actors on the world stage, Western and particularly American scholars did not simply 'discover' a China threat out there; it was cognitively constructed beforehand.

B. These representations make war inevitable.

Chengxin **Pan**, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Faculty of Arts, at Deakin University, August 2004, Discourses Of 'China' In International Relations: A Study in Western Theory as (IR) Practice, p. 43-44

Like the liberal construction of Other touched on above, this largely realist framing of Other carries with it some profound implications in practice. That is, when the Other is depicted as a fixed geopolitical threat, waging a war (or at least preparing for war) to destroy it often becomes the only rational option to fulfilling the universal self. In this regard, Robert Young notes that "war constitutes the [Western] philosophical concept of being itself. For being is always defined as the appropriation of either difference into identity, or of identities into a greater order.... War, then, is another form of the appropriation of the other...." In this context, not surprisingly, war has figured prominently in U.S. foreign relations: War is always violent, bloody, and destructive. But American wars are fought for great and good ends, and they result in good for America. The Revolution created freedom, independence, and democracy. The Civil War resulted in the expansion of freedom, the destruction of slavery, the growth of industrial might and wealth, and the formation of a unified, powerful nation. Insofar as both liberal and realist framings of Other are derived from the same particular American self-construction, their different approaches to understanding global politics in general and China in particular are basically mutually complementary, rather than mutually exclusive. Recently, this relationship of mutual complement is particularly striking in the emergence of a 'two worlds' theory, and its various incarnations such as the new imperialism, liberal imperialism, the New Wilsonianism, and neo-conservatism. As neoconservative commentators William Kristol and Robert Kagan put it, both 'moral clarity' and 'military strength' are essential if Americans are to continue to be proud of their leading role in world affairs.

China Threat Con K-1 NC

C) The Alternative: Vote negative, use the ballot to criticize their representations of China and abandon attempts to render China knowable and controllable.

Chengxin **Pan**, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Faculty of Arts, at Deakin University, August 2004, Discourses Of 'China' In International Relations: A Study in Western Theory as (IR) Practice, p. 259-260

This is not to endorse an 'anything goes' attitude on studying China's foreign relations. Quite the opposite. For the range of social meanings which can be attached to a certain thing is not limitless, and under certain circumstances, it is obvious that some interpretations appear truer than others. Ultimately, it is the different practical consequences associated with different interpretations that matter. Thus, my point here is that while different meaning-giving strategies could all have certain 'real-world' implications, some implications are more dangerous than others. Therefore, when we assign some particular meaning to China, we need to remind ourselves of its potential practical effect, and incessantly bear in mind that such effect, if dangerous, may in some degree be undone if a different, more constructive meaning is given. In short, however tempting it might be, we cannot here return to the kind of 'Hobson's choice' between either a new fixed, definite solution or no alternative at all to the continued reign of the conventional meaning-giving regime. Rather, the choice lies in constantly recognising, on the one hand, the impossibility of having a detached, God's-eye view of some fundamental truth, and on the other hand, the possibility of formulating nuanced, self-reflective, and responsible ways of seeing an inherently changing world. Such choice, as I have demonstrated in this thesis, is not only clearly possible but also imperative in the study of a complex China amid the volatility, danger, as well as vast potential of contemporary global politics. A 'choice' which might indeed hold the key to world peace in the decades to come.

2 NC Space Link-Must Read

Their discourse of Chinese challenges to US space dominance are constructed threat rhetoric-the Chinese don't want a space arms race-their neoconservative air force generals choose to overlook peaceful Chinese behavior-the most likely scenario for a space war is one in which the US weaponizes space.

Mike Moore, Contributing Editor of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, '6
(SAIS Review 26.1, p. 175-188, Project Muse) [Bozman]

But even if a military and economic rivalry develops, would that necessarily lead to one of the many Pearl Harbor scenarios spun out by space warriors?12 The answer is almost surely no. Any substantive antisatellite threat to U.S. space assets would have to be preceded by extensive testing, including tests in space. The United States would quickly detect any such tests. The kindest thing that can be said about space Pearl Harbor scenarios is that they are classic scare tactics, the latest installment in a string of scenarios trotted out by hardliners throughout the Cold War.13 Pearl Harbor allusions trigger potent images for Americans, visions of a sleepy Sunday morning that turn into a nightmare of roaring aircraft and staccato gunfire, of exploding bombs and torpedoes, of roiling smoke and foundering ships, of death in a fire-flooded bay. They also bring to mind a nation that was woefully unprepared for global war despite the Roosevelt administration's desperate attempts to get the country into some sort of fighting trim. Yet on closer inspection Pearl Harbor analogies seem to be little more than dramatic devices chosen for their emotional impact rather than for their correspondence to actual probability. The Pearl Harbor attack was a wager by an arrogant and highly militarized government. Japan assumed the United States, once its Pacific fleet was crippled, would work out a negotiated settlement that would fall far short of all-out war with a powerful seafaring nation 5,000 miles distant. Tokyo bet that the United States, which had no close Asian ties and had for two years refrained from fighting on behalf of its close British allies, would not expend blood and treasure to shield Asians from Japanese control. Japan's leaders were ignorant of American history and the American character. They lost their bet, bringing destruction upon their homeland. Would any national leader make that kind of irrational bet today—or tomorrow? The United States was militarily weak in 1941, although its latent power was enormous. Today, the United States is universally recognized as the world's hyperpower; even the Defense Department acknowledges that the United States has no "peer competitor." The United States has the means and the will to fight effectively with new generations of conventional weapons, as well as with an assortment of nuclear weapons, should it come to that. [End Page 183] What 21st-century leader would risk his nation's survival on a risky surprise attack? Any nation that wanted to launch a Pearl Harbor-style attack on U.S. space assets would first have to conduct many tests in space. U.S. observation satellites and ground stations would detect those tests. Does anyone really believe that United States, even if an Adlai Stevenson-style president were in the White House, would fail to respond vigorously to such a provocation? The United States does not lack for enemies. But just as tigers do not attack a healthy bull elephant, it is difficult to imagine that any nation would directly challenge the United States in space. Could a hostile country secretly mount a covert program capable of taking out a few U.S. military and surveillance satellites? Possibly. Could such an enemy secretly develop the capability to eliminate enough U.S. satellites to tip the balance of power radically in a surprise attack? Not likely. The question proposes a suicidal scenario as unreal as anything the bolt-from-the-blue crowd dreamed up during the Cold War. "Purposeful interference with U.S. space systems," says a 1999 Department of Defense directive, "will be viewed as an infringement on our sovereign rights. The US may take all appropriate self-defense measures, including, if directed by the National Command Authorities, the use of force, to respond to such an infringement on our rights."14 Clearly, this directive is ambiguous. The nature and extent of the "appropriate self-defense measures" are not clear. But again, what national leader is likely to bet his life and the life of his state against the world's "hyperpower"? Who would want to challenge a country whose precision conventional weapons can reliably strike targets as small as a house from 20,000 feet and 12 miles downrange, and which has thousands of nuclear weapons ready for use? Nevertheless, space warriors continue to wring their hands about the potential military-space capabilities of China. The penultimate paragraph of an article published in the Winter 2005 issue of High Frontier, a quarterly produced by Air Force Space Command, distilled the conventional wisdom regarding the Middle Kingdom: "China possesses both the intent and a growing capability to threaten U.S. space systems in the event of a future clash between the two countries."15 Yet this analysis overstates the threat posed by China and misses the real threat. Consider a few ironies. China persists in underwriting America's instant-gratification lifestyle by exporting cheap consumer goods to the United States while financing a substantial part of the U.S. national debt by buying hundreds of billions of dollars of U.S. Treasury notes. On the other hand, China is regularly portrayed by U.S. hardliners as the next great threat. In its continuing enthusiasm for buying Treasury notes, China underwrites the further development of America's new high-tech way of war. This is distinctly odd behavior for a nation that is presumed to be preparing for a High Noon confrontation with the United States. China is intent on integrating itself into the global economic system—strange behavior indeed for a nation that is regularly depicted as a military threat to the United States and, by extension, the West. [End Page 184] A final irony is that China has long been the lead player in the global effort to negotiate a ban on all space-oriented weapons. This inconvenient fact is seldom mentioned in the United States by Air Force Space Command, by the Pentagon, by the White House, by hard-line think tanks, by cable-news pundits, by America-first newspaper editorialists, or by the assortment of triumphalists and neoconservatives determined to eliminate evil empires everywhere. The most credible threat America is likely to face in the first half of this century is not a state-sponsored attack on its space assets, but rather intermittent terrorism generated by states or sub-state actors.

2 NC Space Link-Must Read

Fighting terrorism requires imagination, well-coordinated governmental agencies, extraordinarily good intelligence resources, unflagging military tenacity, a willingness by the American people to accept a degree of discomfort, inconvenience, and uncertainty, and a high degree of cooperation among national leaders everywhere, including China. Fighting terrorism also requires having sophisticated national-security assets in space, including surveillance, communications, and geo-positioning satellites.¹⁶ But it does not require that the United States develop and deploy a space-control capability or place weapons in space—unless one believes that the bin Ladens of the world have advanced anti-satellite programs hidden in their caves and spider holes. The Security Dilemma More than a decade after the end of the Cold War, the world remains unpredictably dangerous. The United States must have well-trained and well-equipped military forces to help ensure its security. But at what point does overwhelming military superiority inspire so much fear and loathing among other nations as to provoke countervailing reactions? Political realists talk endlessly of the "security dilemma," a zero-sum conundrum in which a state that becomes extraordinarily powerful is seen by other states as diminishing their own security, thus prompting countervailing reactions. Realists have a point. It follows that an attempt to develop and deploy a fully realized space-control capability could become a case of overreach that might, in the end, jeopardize American security by triggering a new kind of arms race, and a new cold war. The desire to enjoy freedom of action in world affairs is not a uniquely American aspiration. It is a universal goal for governments, although it is seldom achieved. Governments, whether democratic, authoritarian, totalitarian, monarchical, or theocratic, attempt to maximize their own freedom of action vis-à-vis other states. In April 2002, Timothy Garton Ash, an Oxford scholar, a senior fellow at the conservative Hoover Institution at Stanford University and a man who loves and admires the United States, extolled America's many virtues in a *New York Times* op-ed. "I love the energy, the openness, the everyday cheerfulness of people in shops and on the street, the sense of freedom you get driving for hours down a California highway under those king-size **[End Page 185]** skies, and the feeling that all people—whoever they are, wherever they come from—have a chance to shape their own lives." And yet, Ash was worried. "The fundamental problem is that America today has too much power for anyone's good." It would be dangerous even for an archangel to wield so much power. The writers of the American Constitution wisely determined that no single locus of power, however benign, should predominate; for even the best could be led into temptation. Every power should therefore be checked by at least one other. That also applies to world politics.¹⁷ We Americans love our Statue of Liberty, our Washington and Lincoln memorials, our Grand Canyon and our Golden Gate, our Constitution, our rule of law, our democratic ways. We never tire of telling the world about these marvels and many more. But for good or ill, how we Americans actually employ our high-tech, space-based military power is the thing by which the United States increasingly will be judged by the rest of the world. In a world of sovereign nations, a unilateral U.S. space-control capability would raise profoundly troubling questions about the meaning of sovereignty in the 21st century. An attempt to deploy a space-control capability and insert weapons into orbit surely would be regarded by many states as an intolerable violation of global norms and of their sovereignty. Today's threats do not require the United States to pursue high-tech, space-based weaponization. To do so would threaten relations with the rest of the world and possibly set off a damaging arms race in space.

Framework-2 NC

1. Our Framework. The role of the judge is that of an intellectual first, and policymaker second. This means the aff must defend both the plan and the fundamental assumptions that make the plan intelligible.

2. Our Framework is a pre-requisite to any effective policy discussion about China. The world does not pre-exist our attempts to name and describe it, and neither does China. Traditional realist theories of international relations rely on a positivist, empiricist understanding of the world and the way we gather knowledge about it – this itself is a form of violence done to the world that cannot capture the complexity of U.S.-China relations.

Chengxin **Pan**, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Faculty of Arts, at Deakin University, August 2004. Discourses Of 'China' In International Relations: A Study in Western Theory as (IR) Practice, p. 7-9

I will pursue some of these themes later in the chapter. For now, it is worth reiterating that this thesis is underpinned by the belief that **the process by which we give meaning to the world is always intrinsically connected to the way we act within it**, and therefore always practically constitutive of it in one form or another. In this sense, the thesis is located consciously within a critical social theory tradition in general, and critical IR scholarship in particular. In the social sciences, this tradition has been variably labelled as 'critical theory,' 'postpositivism,' '**discourse analysis**,' or 'poststructuralism.' It **is** a diverse tradition but one **united by its dissenting voice "against the intellectual imperialism of the modern, post-Cartesian 'scientific' approach to knowledge and society and its foremost expression in positivist/empiricist discourse."**¹⁸ Inspired by (primarily) continental philosophical and intellectual endeavour, there has emerged in the past two decades or so a body of critical IR literature which has sought to question and challenge the positivist foundation of mainstream IR, especially in terms of its "cognitive validity, empirical objectivity, and universalist and rationalist claims." Central to this critical challenge is the notion of discourse. **Discourses**, according to Michel Foucault, are "practices that systematically **form the objects of which they speak**. Of course, discourses are composed of signs; but what they do is more than use these signs to designate things. It is this more that renders them irreducible to the language (langue) and to speech. It is this 'more' that we must reveal and describe." This 'more,' as Foucault explains, means primarily the inherent function of discourse as practice: **We must not imagine that the world turns toward us a legible face which we would have only to decipher**; the world is not the accomplice of our knowledge; there is no prediscursive providence which disposes the world in our favor. **We must conceive discourse as a violence which we do to things**, or in any case as a practice which we impose on them. Thus understood, this discourse approach suggests that **knowledge and power and theory and practice are always intrinsically connected. A discourse "is not a way of learning 'about' something out there in the 'real world'; it is rather, a way of producing that something as real, as identifiable, classifiable, knowable, and therefore, meaningful."** Cynthia Weber proposes that it is not possible to talk about something as an ontological 'thing' without at the same time engaging in the political practice of constituting that thing. **This does not dismiss the existence of reality; rather, it underlines reality's dependence on the social construction of a discursive strategy.** In the words of Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann: **the objectivity of the institutional world**, however massive it may appear to the individual, **is a humanly produced**, constructed objectivity.... In other words, despite the objectivity that marks the social world in human experience, it does not thereby acquire an ontological status apart from the human activity that produced it. In short, the theme of discourse, knowledge/power, and theory/practice, central to critical IR scholarship, motivates this present study of Chinese foreign relations. Drawing upon these critical insights, the thesis argues that **the conventional interpretation of China is best seen as a particular body of discourse among many possible ways of interpreting 'China' in the global context.** I am not alone in arguing this case. There are now a small number of scholars around the world who do likewise. For example, in a critical investigation of Cold War U.S. China studies, Tani E. Barlow focuses on the question of how the pretence of modern social science in the writings of Marion J. Levy, Lucian W. Pye, and John K. Fairbank has enabled the displacement of the colonial question from their scholarly inquiry. By casting these scholars' studies in terms of discourse or narrative, Barlow demonstrates how postwar **China studies in the U.S., assuming that China is representable in natural and social scientific terms, were developed in close tandem with U.S. national defence interests and served as a legitimating instrument for the latter's geopolitical, colonial dominance throughout the Cold War era.**

Framework-2 NC

- 3. Plan Focus Moots the 1AC.** Plan focus allows the aff to ignore the discourses that were 7/8th of the 1AC.
- 4. Reciprocal.** Our framework allows the aff to kritik neg assumptions and representations.
- 5. No One-Word PICS.** Our framework limits out trivial objections without evidence justifying rejection.
- 6. It's What We Do, Not What We Justify.** You can't evaluate this as competing interpretations because there's no resolution to ground them.
- 7. Strict Fiat is Bad.** They should get to "weigh" their impacts, but not in terms of implementing the plan. Pan says it's pointless to compare worldviews by comparing plans, because the plan only makes sense if the worldview makes sense.
- 8. Strategic Responsibility.** They pick what goes in the 1AC, they should be forced to defend it, especially when it's their reason to vote aff.
- 9. Time Skew Inevitable.** We could have read more disads or T violations, both of which create more "worlds."
- 10. Reject arg not team.**

Link-2 NC

Viewing China as a rising threat is not a neutral depiction of an objective world – its epistemological assumptions cast the U.S. and China into orientalist binaries. Their appeals to the ‘cold, hard truth’ of their arguments is proof of ours.

Chengxin **Pan**, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Faculty of Arts, at Deakin University, **2004**, Alternatives 29, p. 308-10

At another level, from a “democratic peace” standpoint, a China under the rule of an authoritarian regime is predisposed to behave irresponsibly. As Bernstein and Munro put it: If the history of the last two hundred years is any guide, the more democratic countries become, the less likely they are to fight wars against each other. The more dictatorial they are, the more war prone they become. Indeed, if the current Beijing regime continues to engage in military adventurism—as it did in the Taiwan Strait in 1996—there will be a real chance of at least limited naval or air clashes with the United States. Subscribing to the same logic, Denny Roy asserts that “the establishment of a liberal democracy in China is extremely unlikely in the foreseeable future. . . . Without democratization within, there is no basis for expecting more pacific behavior without.” However, for other observers, even if China does become democratized, the threat may still remain. Postulating what he calls the “democratic paradox” phenomenon, Samuel Huntington suggests that democratization is as likely to encourage international conflict as it is to promote peace. Indeed, many China watchers believe that an increase in market freedom has already led to an upsurge in Chinese nationalism, the only thing that allegedly provides the glue to hold contemporary China together. It is argued that such nationalist sentiment, coupled with memories of its past humiliation and thwarted grandeur; will make China an increasingly dissatisfied, revisionist power—hence, a threat to the international status quo. Furthermore, some point out that what is also troublesome is an entrenched realpolitik strategic culture in traditional Chinese thought. Harvard China expert Alastair Lain Johnston, for example, argues that Chinese strategic culture is dominated by the para bellum (prepare for war) paradigm. This paradigm believes that warfare is a relatively constant feature in international relations, that stakes in conflicts with the adversary are zero-sum in nature, and that the use of force is the most efficacious means of dealing with threat. From this, Warren Cohen concludes that if Johnston’s analysis of China’s strategic culture is correct—and I believe that it is—generational change will not guarantee a kinder, gentler China. Nor will the ultimate disappearance of communism in Beijing. The powerful China we have every reason to expect in the twenty-first century is likely to be as aggressive and expansionist as China has been whenever it has been the dominant power in Asia. Apart from these so-called “domestic” reasons for the “China threat,” some commentators arrive at a similar conclusion based on the historical experience of power realignment as a result of the rise and fall of great powers. China, from this perspective, is regarded as the most likely candidate to fill the power vacuum created by the end of U.S.-Soviet rivalry in East Asia. This, according to Kenneth Lieberthal at the University of Michigan (and formerly of the U.S. State Department), “will inevitably present major challenges to the United States and the rest of the international system since the perennial question has been how the international community can accommodate the ambitions of newly powerful states, which have always forced realignment of the international system and have more often than not led to war.” For this reason, the rise of China has often been likened to that of Nazi Germany and militarist Japan on the eve of the two world wars. For example, Richard K. Betts and Thomas J. Christensen argue: Like Germany a century ago, China is a late-blooming great power emerging into a world already ordered strategically by earlier arrivals; a continental power surrounded by other powers who are collectively stronger but individually weaker (with the exception of the United States and, perhaps, Japan); a bustling country with great expectations, dissatisfied with its place in the international pecking order, if only with regard to international prestige and respect. The quest for a rightful “place in the sun will, it is argued, inevitably foster growing friction with Japan, Russia, India or the United States. At this point, it seems there has been enough reason and empirical evidence for the United States to be vigilant about China’s future ambition. While there are debates over the extent to which the threat is imminent or to which approaches might best explain it, the “objective” quality of such a threat has been taken for granted. In the words of Walter McDougall, the Pulitzer Prizewinning historian and strategic thinker at the University of Pennsylvania, recognizing the “China threat” is “commonsense geopolitics.” For Huntington, the challenge of “Greater China” to the West is simply a rapidly growing cultural, economic, and political “reality.” Similarly, when they claim that “China can pose a grave problem,” Betts and Christensen are convinced that they are merely referring to “the truth.” In the following sections, I want to question this “truth,” and, more generally, question the objective, self-evidentiary attitudes that underpin it. In my view, the “China threat” literature is best understood as a particular kind of discursive practice that dichotomizes the West and China as self and other. In this sense, the “truism” that China presents a growing threat is not so much an objective reflection of contemporary global reality, per se, as it is a discursive construction of otherness that acts to bolster the hegemonic leadership of the United States in the post-Cold War world. Therefore, to have a better understanding of how the discursive construction of China as a “threat” takes place, it is now necessary to turn attention to a particularly dominant way of U.S. self-imagination.

Hege Link-2 NC

() American hegemony isn't an objectively necessary response to threats that exist 'out there' – the drive for dominance in relation to China is a socially constructed justification for massive military and space budgets. This instrumentalization of China to justify American militarism is the height of the Other's annihilation.

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In this context, the connection between the construction of Other and neoconservatives' vision of the American self merits particular attention. Neoconservatives, a term originally referring to a number of self-styled intellectuals and high-ranking Reagan administration members, are characterised primarily by their shared vision of America's international role in terms of "benevolent global hegemony" based on "a neo-Reaganite foreign policy of military supremacy and moral confidence." With such self-construction, it follows that "no rival superpower is allowed to emerge in Western Europe, Asia or the territories of the former Soviet Union," an objective which should be obtained by an aggressive, unilateral, and military approach if necessary. First outlined in the leaked classified document the "Defense Planning Guidance" drafted by the Pentagon (by Lewis Libby and Paul Wolfowitz) in early 1992, this 'strategic instinct' was further taken up by the 'Project for the New American Century' (PNAC), a Washington-based neoconservative organisation founded in 1997. In September 2000, its report, Rebuilding America's Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century unequivocally reaffirmed that the Defense Planning Guidance "provided a blueprint for maintaining U.S. preeminence, precluding the rise of a great power rival, and shaping the international security order in line with American principles and interests."116 Characteristic of this particular American self-imagination, I argue, is an intolerance of Otherness at its most extreme. This, for example, has allowed Robert Kagan and William Kristol to identify a "present danger" to America, which was "one of declining strength, flagging will and confusion about our role in the world." They went on: "It is a danger, to be sure, of our own devising. Yet, if neglected, it is likely to yield very real external dangers, nearly as threatening in their own way as the Soviet Union was a quarter century ago." This identification of an open-ended danger to the United States was shared by a high-ranking Pentagon official, who, in arguing for the continuation of U.S. Cold War alliances, tellingly asked, "If we pull out, who knows what nervousness will result?" While a flurry of attempts to redefine new threats to ('our') security emerged in the wake of the end of the Cold War, these newly identified 'threats' were either too vague to effectively galvanise the public imagination or too trivial to warrant the call for continued U.S. global hegemony. It is in this context that attention began turning to China. The China threat, as Bruce Cumings explains, is basically "a metaphor for an enormously expensive Pentagon that has lost its bearings and that requires a formidable 'renegade state' to define its mission (Islam is rather vague, and Iran lacks necessary weight)."

() Preserving American hegemony in Asia requires a hierarchical power relationship that treats China as intrinsically threatening and justifies massive military buildups that only increase tension

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For example, speaking to the Pacific Basin Economic Council on 20 May 1996, U.S. President Clinton envisioned the emergence of an Asia-Pacific Community, where "Superpower confrontation has given way to growing cooperation. Freedom and democracy are on the march. Modern telecommunications have collapsed the distances between us. The new global economy is transforming the way we work and live, bringing tremendous opportunities for all our peoples." With this cheery picture of growing consensus and opportunity for all, what Clinton really wanted to convey was a message of the necessity of American leadership, since this transformation was "one America helped to inspire," and the absence of "our" leadership "could spark a dangerous and destabilizing arms race that would profoundly alter the strategic landscape." According to Clinton, therefore, change in Asia hinged upon a continuity of U.S. hegemony. As he remarked, "I have spoken today about challenge and change, but I pledge to you as President of the United States that one thing remains unchanging, and that is America's commitment to lead with strength, steadiness, and good judgment [emphases added]." Here, the hierarchical relationship between the U.S. and Asia cannot be clearer: on the one hand, it is Asia that needs to make those changes conceived and developed by 'us.' On the other hand, 'our' hegemonic role in that region must remain unchanged or unchallenged. Throughout Clinton's speech, China was rated as at the forefront of Asia's historic transformation. It can thus be assumed that this hierarchical power relationship applies also to U.S.-China relations, in which China must look to the U.S. for leadership and 'good judgment.' Little wonder then, that for Clinton, Cold War geopolitical alliances in Asia, recently revamped under the new U.S.-Japan 'Defense Guidelines,' should remain the backbone of the new vision for the global integration of China. This position was perhaps most famously outlined in the Nye Report, named after the prominent neoliberal IR theorist Joseph Nye, Jr., then Assistant Secretary of Defence for International Security Affairs. Although China was not the specified target in this report, its recommended deployment of an expeditionary force of 100,000 troops in Japan and Korea for the next 20 years could hardly be justified were it not for a concern about China. Here, (neorealist) containment and (neoliberal) engagement have clearly converged in U.S. China policy.

Military Link-2 NC

Western estimations of Chinese military capabilities aren't based on objective fact – they fall prey to over-estimation because of their realist, positivist basis.

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For neorealists, the most important question concerns of course China's (military) capabilities. For example, for Gerald Segal, understanding China's international relations necessitates a focus on its power status (in relation to the Western self). His foundation question thus: "[Is] China a rising power, and if so, how fast and in what direction [is it headed]?" Led by Segal's widely shared concerns, most attention in the China debate has been drawn to China's military capabilities. As Thomas J. Christensen notes, "Although many have focused on intentions as well as capabilities, the most prevalent component of the [China threat] debate is the assessment of China's overall future military power compared with that of the United States and other East Asian regional powers."

Once the analytical gaze is fixed on military capabilities, a discursive practice of overestimation is likely to follow. For instance, **dissatisfied with the U.S. General Accounting Office's estimation that China's actual defence spending is two or three times the announced result, Bernstein and Munro offer their own remarkable calculation: the multiple is much higher.**... it is between ten and twenty times the official figure.... The International Institute of Strategic Studies in London in 1995 concluded that China's actual defense spending is at least four times greater than the official figure. If the People's Armed Police is added in, the IISS estimate would go up to a multiple of five. With a conservative calculation for purchasing power parity, we would double that again, arriving at a multiple of ten.⁵⁶ As John Fairbank argued, **"as we phrase questions, so we get answers."** Thus, **these China scholars' questions are already framed in a way that the 'fact' of a China threat, is almost a guaranteed or predetermined part of the answer.** Consider the following example. In June 2001, the National Intelligence Council (NIC), a group that reports directly to CIA chief George Tenet, fired RAND from a classified project ordered by Congress to assess China's future military capabilities. The reason was simply that RAND's findings depicted China as a growing military power, but as no match for the United States in the near future. This fell short of a China threat, the result the NIC had wanted. One analyst familiar with the project later complained that people at the NIC, themselves under the pressure from Republican Hawks in Congress, "want China to be 10 feet tall."⁵⁸ Thus, **the problem is less about the lack of transparency in Chinese official statistics, but more about the pre-constituted image of the China threat which dictates how China and its capabilities/intentions should be interpreted** in the first instance. And **at the root of this problem is in turn the positivist-cum-realist commitment to the search for an assumed single, essential reality which effectively rules out ambiguity, contingency and indeterminacy.** In this case, **neorealist observers rest on an either/or certainty: either China guarantees absolute peace, or it represents a threat**—there is no half-way house. **Since no such guarantee has been forthcoming from China** (and I doubt it can be found anywhere), **it must be seen as a threat.**

China Reps→War

Representations of China as threatening on-balance make war more likely – even if the intent of the plan is peace, their reps spiral out of their control, culminating in full-on war.

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To sum up, in this chapter, I have argued that the (neo)realist 'China threat' literature is primarily a discursive construction of Otherness. A construction predicated on a particular narcissistic understanding of the American self, with a positivist-cum-realist obsession with absolute certainty, security, and power. Within this self/Other framework, it is imperative that China be treated as an absolute threat so that U.S. preponderance in the post-Cold War world in general and in Asia in particular can continue to be legitimated and maintained. Thus, not only does this reductionist representation come at the expense of nuanced understanding of China as a dynamic, multifaceted country, but it is also responsible for the creation of the policy of containment which, even in the guise of 'crisis management,' can have a highly dramatic impact on U.S.-China relations, as the 1995-1996 missile crisis and the 2001 spy plane incident have vividly attested. Like in the past, the 'threat/containment' theory as practice is not only confrontational in itself, but also tends to have a self-fulfilling effect in terms of hardening Chinese worldview and foreign behaviour (a theme I will take up in Chapter 7). For instance, should the U.S. press ahead with a missile defence shield to both contain China and 'guarantee' its own invulnerability, it would be almost certain to intensify China's sense of vulnerability and compel it to expand its current small nuclear arsenal to maintain the credibility of its limited deterrence. As a result, it is far from unthinkable that the two countries, and possibly the whole region, might be dragged into an escalating arms race that would ultimately make war more likely. In this respect, Chalmers Johnson is right when he suggests that "A policy of containment toward China implies the possibility of war, just as it did during the Cold War vis-à-vis the former Soviet Union. The balance of terror prevented war between the United States and the Soviet Union, but this may not work in the case of China." Apparently, neither the U.S. nor the PRC wants open war with the other. Neoconservative writers Robert Kagan and William Kristol maintain that "we do not seek war with China." But the point is that the 'China threat' theorists, for all their alleged desire for peace and stability, tend to make war preparedness the most 'realistic' option for both sides. In this instance, therefore, intention, while important, may not be enough, just as all the 'good, friendly' intention on the part of the U.S. had not been able to avoid the 'loss of China' half a century ago. On this point, and to conclude this chapter, I want to draw attention to an interesting comment made by Charlie Neuhauser, a leading CIA China specialist, on the Vietnam War. He says, "Nobody wants it. We don't want it, Ho Chi Minh doesn't want it; it's simply a question of annoying the other side." Yet, as we now know, goaded by the fear of a rather illusive Communist threat in Southeast Asia, this 'unwanted war' in the end not only materialised, but it also claimed the lives of some 58,000 young Americans, as well as the lives of 2 million Vietnamese men, women, and children, and achieved virtually nothing else. Three decades on, the lesson, it seems, remains to be fully learned by 'China threat' theorists. As noted throughout this thesis thus far, the (neo)realist discourse of China as a threat is just one of the two dominant perspectives in the study of Chinese foreign relations. The other perspective, a (neo)liberal discourse, looks at China primarily in terms of 'opportunity.' It is this literature that I now want to turn my attention to in the chapter to follow, and explore the questions of both how this knowledge, its more 'positive' representation notwithstanding, remains a discursive practice of constructing Otherness, and what its implications are for contemporary Sino-Western relations.

2 NC Alt Solvency

1. The Alternative is the only chance to solve case – even if they win that the “solve” the entirety of case b.c of the security discourse all there impacts are inevitable – that’s Pan – this means the alterative rejection of security means we open up space to stop the likeliness of you impacts
2. Are argument is the belief that the mere act of nuclear weapons (or insert impact) use is a possibility changes policy-making discourse to now make it a thinkable scenario – which means by rethinking this notion we no longer allows nuclear exchange (or insert impact) to be a possibility
3. The Alternative is the only way out – by rejection of the otherization inherent in securitization we no longer identify an “enemy” or “threat” which means the state will no longer dehumanize these people which we argue is the only true impact in this round.
4. Even though it might be true that nuclear exchange (or insert impact) could happen this is only the truth because of the way in which practices and language has been oriented around security discourse, and because the way in which international relations is currently oriented if you run out of ideas than something must go boom – mean if we change the nature of IR we prevent you impact from occurring.
5. Refashioning US-China representations breaks down securitization and avoids conflicts-that’s Pan.
6. U.S.-China relations are always open to being refashioned by changing the way we view and represent China – hostilities have been empirically broken down by changing the way China is represented.

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As noted already, for all its scientific claims and totalising ambition, conventional Western theory and practice has not been able to play a totalising, all-encompassing role in the construction of Chinese reality. Therefore, there is nothing fatalistic about the ‘intimate enemy’ relationship between China and the West and new openings always exist for the construction of a different relationship, however difficult. As Berger and Luckmann have argued, “Institutionalization is not... an irreversible process, despite the fact that institutions, once formed, have a tendency to persist.” Similarly, American poet Christopher Mulrooney suggests that “Things become real as they are perceived, and change their existence as perception of them changes...” In short, the Sino- Western relationship can always be reconstructed or at least modified to some degree, as was the case during the U.S.-China rapprochement in the 1970s. As I will illustrate in Chapter 4, Richard Nixon’s tacit acceptance of some U.S. blame for China’s xenophobia and antagonism made possible a shift in both American and Chinese attitudes and policies towards each other. If anything, this underscores the always crucial role of discourse in helping transform social reality. The reality of international relations in general and that of Sino-U.S. relations in particular are no exception. In particular, in the contemporary context, it is no longer plausible to continue to claim, for example, that the ‘China threat’ is something out there beyond human construction, as John Derbyshire does when he argues that “we simply have no leverage” over China’s “increasingly militant and assertive nationalism,” other than preparing for war. As some IR theorists have noted, it is precisely this kind of ‘realism’ that often proves unrealistic, as it ultimately fails to explain important historical change such as the abrupt end of the Cold War.

AT: Perm

1. Perm Severs – Voting Issue. The representations of danger and call for security are what make the plan meaningful. Severance makes the aff a moving target – it justifies severing out of impact turned advantages or making intrinsic perms, both of which destroy debate.

2. Perm Fails. Pan says the initial framing of the plan prevents effective incorporation of kritik. Effective critique requires forgetting the entirety of the 1AC – otherwise we'll be caught in the same knee-jerk reaction to danger that securitization requires.

3. Net Benefits Are Reasons To Vote Neg. Reasons to vote aff that aren't based on security are proof of the marginalizing effect of security. They only prioritize non-security issues when it's convenient. Only voting neg truly clears the space for these net benefits.

4. The perm can't solve. The inclusion of the plan means that they don't fundamentally question the epistemological and ontological foundations of Western knowledge about China – they merely shift around the way we know particular things in a larger field that remains unchallenged. Any critical reflection via the perm will be hollow and won't solve our alt if it results in the plan's rush to action.

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Thus understood, this study has sought to argue that to have a better understanding of Chinese foreign relations in general and Sino-Western relations in particular, it is no longer adequate to engage in the usual task of working more diligently within the discursive confines of the current field of Chinese foreign relations studies. Rather, it requires the more ambitious and more challenging endeavour of radically rethinking the field itself, especially in regard to the ontological and epistemological foundations upon which it has so far functioned. To this end, we need to come to grips with the themes of knowledge/power, and theory/practice that have been developed in critical IR scholarship and in the critical social theory tradition in general, themes which I have sought to engage throughout this thesis. Until now, the conventional ontological and epistemological foundation upon which a host of common, self-evidentiary assumptions of China have been based, has been rarely, if ever, questioned, and both (neo)realist- and (neo)liberal-minded scholars and politicians remain largely indifferent to these issues in the twenty-first century. If anything, they continue to strive for a kind of God's-eye view of Chinese beliefs and foreign behaviour in terms of 'pre-existing problems.' Hence we have Samuel Huntington, for example, still convinced that what he calls the threat of 'Greater China' to the West is a rapidly growing cultural, economic, and political reality, and Betts and Christensen who equate their 'China threat' analysis with 'the truth.' Similarly, there are many Western liberals who regard the prospect of China's convergence with the West as a kind of historical inevitability, dictated by an impersonal force such as the global free market and/or the universal appeal of ideals such as democracy and human rights. For example, for all the tensions and brutality of free-market capitalism, and in spite of (or perhaps because of) the resentment and resistance against it, Thomas Friedman reasons that global capitalism is now truly global in that, by his own account, even poor villagers in north-eastern China have the aspiration to sell their products abroad and to make more money. Consequently, he puts forward his version of the 'End of History' thesis: ...with the collapse of communism in Europe, in the Soviet Union and in China—and all the walls that protected these systems—those people who are unhappy with the Darwinian brutality of free-market capitalism don't have any ready ideological alternative now. When it comes to the question of which system today is the most effective at generating rising standards of living, the historical debate is over. The answer is freemarket capitalism.... One road. Different speeds. But one road [emphasis added]. Buoyed by such claims to historical certainty, a leading China scholar has declared that "we have accumulated, thanks to China specialists in America and around the world, a high level of understanding of China's basic institutions and of the broad political, social, and economic trends in China since 1949. This is no small achievement." But as I have indicated throughout this study, it is largely this kind of achievement that has acted as a profound impediment to the understanding of their 'object of study' in terms of a social construct in which they have played a vital part. As such, mainstream China scholars continue to be trapped in a cycle of self-fulfilling, dangerous, and paradoxical theory and practice, with their 'scientific realism' allowing no way out of its own logic. While having recognised the self-fulfilling consequences of the 'China threat' thesis, neoconservative commentator Robert Kagan, for example, continues to fall back on an 'objectivist' approach to China in terms of 'what it is.' Consumed by the question of "what if the prophecy has already been fulfilled?" Kagan advises Americans to take "the emerging confrontations" with China seriously.

AT: Reps Don't Affect Reality

The perm can't solve and we'll still win a link – even if reps aren't directly tied to policy, our link on-balance outweighs their takeouts. And, the perm can't solve because it's not enough to take particular actions within a larger discursive field of Western China studies – the entire field that organizes our knowledge of China has to be disrupted and interrogated. This is ONLY possible in a world of the alternative; the perm dooms reflection.

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It is of course **possible to overemphasise intellectuals' responsibility for the (re)formulation of** actual and specific **policy**. As Robert L. Suettinger has argued: it is important to recognize that think tanks and academic discussions have only a limited and indirect impact on the thinking and decisions of key policymakers. Scholars may or may not have direct access to foreign policy officials, their articles may or may not be read, contradictory views may or may not cancel each other out. Generally, however, policy decisions have their own dynamics. Information flows and time horizons often do not accommodate dispassionate, lengthy, well-reasoned academic analysis.¹¹⁶ **While recognising this point, we have to be very careful not to push it too far. Scholarly analysis is not the same thing as policy blueprint, but in general terms the two are intimately connected,** not least in the sense that **scholarly ideas can limit the horizons of political imagination and exclude certain action** which might otherwise be taken into consideration as possible, perhaps more sensible, options. In the end, as Foucault puts it simply, **"there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge,** nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations." Thus, how we as scholars think and how we think differently matter. The question of how we can think differently cannot be satisfactorily answered in this thesis. However tempting, the thesis will promise no quick-fix solution to the difficult issues of Chinese foreign relations, particularly with the U.S. Nor is there simple, ready-made alternative to problems of Western discourse which I explore here. For 'alternatives' are themselves always in constant flux, and "the search for a source of meaning and order already in place" is in contradiction to the spirit of critical IR studies. Nevertheless, for all its reservations, the thesis does seek to indicate the possibility as well as the necessity of knowing China and its international relations in distinction from the conventional mode of knowledge. Given that at the centre of this disciplinary problem is positivist knowledge, **tinkering around the edges of the China field is no longer enough.** According to William Connolly, **"It is not just this theory or that theory that needs disturbance and destabilization but the field of discourse upon which these theories contend with each other while naturalizing a network of common or complementary assumptions."** In this regard, Edward Said's critique of Orientalism is again of significance. Concerned with "questions as to how the production of knowledge best serves communal, as opposed to factional, ends, how knowledge that is non-dominative and non-coercive can be produced in a setting that is deeply inscribed with the politics, the considerations, the positions, and the strategies of power," Said argues that "Orientalism reconsidered in this wider and libertarian optic entails nothing less than the creation of new objects for a new kind of knowledge." Again, the question of how this new kind of knowledge could be created is beyond the scope of this thesis. In the very least, however, such **knowledge will have to go beyond the confines of positivist certainties of subject and object, self and Other, and avoid reducing contingency and difference to either universal sameness or ahistorical Otherness to be controlled** or transformed. Also, such knowledge will have to refrain from speaking for the 'object of study,' and allow the 'object' some kind of subjectivity and 'sovereign' voice of its own, though not to the point of reifying that voice as the truth. In short, such **knowledge will have to be markedly different from the dichotomised, essentialist knowledge of China as offered by (neo)realist and (neo)liberal perspectives.** Indeed, **only by exposing the inadequacy and danger associated with the dominant Western discourses of China** in international relations, **can we prise open spaces for 'alternative' ways of knowing China** in IR, **and construct some more nuanced, more self-reflective, and less dangerous ways of engaging with** the complex and important issues of **China's** relations with the contemporary world in this increasingly globalised era. In this context, as stated at the outset, we would do well to work more closely with critical social theory in general and critical IR scholarship in particular, and to give discourse analysis a more salient position in the study of Chinese foreign relations. This thesis represents a hesitant step in this direction. I want to begin this journey via a discussion of Western thinking on self and Other—a discourse primarily carried out in an American accent.

AT: China Threat Objectively True

They can win that it's objectively true that China will threaten the U.S. and that won't take out our arg – we only have to win that China will take threatening action now because of the way the U.S. has represented it. If we win the root cause debate, we win the rest.

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My critical analysis of Western IR literature on China in the previous two chapters might well be objected to for the reason that it ignores the 'hard facts' on the ground. For example, liberal scholars may point out that the 'opportunity for convergence' is clearly real, for the Chinese themselves are talking about opening up, global integration, and joining track with international norms. Similarly, realist observers may contend that because the Chinese are caught up with nationalist fervour and realpolitik ideas and busy with military build-up and sabre-rattling in the Taiwan Strait, the 'China threat' is more than just a discursive construct. To some extent, these observers are right. Both the 'China threat' and 'China as opportunity' theses have certain 'empirical' qualities, and they were so acknowledged in the previous two chapters. Having said that, however, I want to suggest that the existence of the 'threat' or 'opportunity' reality in China says more about the self-fulfilling consequences of Western discourse as social construction than about its objective truth status. In other words, these trends are not pregiven, but have much to do with the very ways in which China has been so constructed by Western discursive practice. More specifically, in the first half of this chapter, I want to illustrate how China's transformation into a more responsible member in the international community is largely a product of the Western liberal conception of it, which is in many ways self-fulfilling in practice. I argue, moreover, that this self-fulfilling prophecy also has its own limitations and paradoxical implications for China's foreign relations. Thus, in spite of, or perhaps because of, its shaping power on Chinese perceptions and foreign behaviour, this discourse is unlikely to remake a homogeneous China in the image of the West. In the second half, I will look at how the Western realist discourse on China proves to be also a self-fulfilling prophecy with even more dangerous practical implications. But first let me begin with the constitutive influence of the (neo)liberal discourse on China.

AT: China Securitized Too

China might also be ethnocentric, but on balance U.S. ethnocentrism is worse because of its tangibly violent manifestations and the way it's been implemented throughout the world.

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Needless to say, ethnocentric thinking is not unique to the United States. China had for centuries assumed it was the centre of the world. But what distinguishes U.S. from Chinese ethnocentric self-identities is that while the latter was based largely on the Confucian doctrine, the former is sanctioned by more powerful, more institutionalised regimes of truth, notably Christianity and modern science. For the early English Puritans, America was part of a divine plan and they were the Chosen People blessed by covenant with God.¹⁸ With the advent of the European Scientific Age, a secular, liberal, and 'scientific' lustre was added to the highly religious import of American exceptionalism. Charles Darwin once argued that "the wonderful progress of the United States, as well as the character of the people, are the results of natural selection." Ever since, the United States has been construed as the manifestation of the law of nature, with its ideas and institutions described not as historically particular, but as truly universal. That is, "The US is utopia achieved." It represents the "End of History."

AT: Realism

Realist frameworks that focus on the rational, sovereign, self-interested nature of states miss much of U.S.-China relations. Analyzing discursive interplay that forms concursive relationships in IR is a much more useful explanatory framework.

Timothy **Luke**, university distinguished professor of political science at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, **2003**, Language, Agency, and Politics in a Constructed World, p. 114-15

The April Fool's Day incident may have been an accident, but it is not accidental. Instead, it **expresses the qualities of system-saturated concursive activities**, as concurrences propound many coincidences and a few incidents. Big businesses in the United States have sunk a great deal of money into China over the past two decades. General Motors and Motorola have invested nearly \$25 billion in China, and Ford, Daimler Chrysler, UPS, Starbucks, and McDonald's also sell goods and services there. Once again, Ford CEO Jacques Nasser stressed the **concursive realities at play in the America-China relationship** when he observed that "there is calm on both sides and a positive attitude to resolving this" (Naughton 2001, 33). After all, Ford is building vans in China for the Chinese, and Nasser does not want this "progress" stopped. **By revealing what is nonanarchical, unsovereign, arational, and ultra-collaborative in the allegedly anarchic terrains of international relations, one finds anomalies where only sovereign rational states allegedly compete in the games nations play. For some, China and America are the titans of the twenty-first century who must naturally become rivals after the Cold War between communism and capitalism, even though this communist great power and the capitalist superpower are now tremendously tight as trading partners.** In fact, the year 2001 may have shown something else. In 2001, the People's Republic of **China** (the world's most populous nation) **and the United States of America** (the world's most powerful nation) **find themselves increasingly running together at the coincide—and not apart as inside and outside—in many global arenas.**

AT: Realism (Mearsheimer)

Even if Mearsheimer is right about the "China Threat" his theories do not justify to policy solutions he prescribes. Such nonsense only makes conflict more likely.

Chen 07

("Lost in the Taiwan Strait: What's Wrong with Offensive Realism (and Why it Matters)?" Ching-Chang Chen Ph.D. Candidate, Department of International Politics University of Wales, Aberystwyth Visiting Doctoral Researcher, Institute of International Relations National Chengchi University 6 February, 2007 This paper is prepared for presentation at the Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Chicago, USA, 28 February - 3 March, 2007. Accessed online at the ISA website)

A standard offensive realist reply to my criticisms would probably be arguing that today's friend may be tomorrow's enemy; one cannot know what will happen in 2020 if China transforms into a giant Hong Kong.³⁹ According to this speculation, is it 'counter-productive' for the United States not to balance the European Union, which has been stronger than China regarding material capabilities, because one day it may become a mighty and nuclear-armed European Federation? Of course, no one can predict that a policy of constructive engagement will render impossible any future clash between China and the United States; nevertheless, denying the open-endedness of history and pursuing a deterministic policy of containment is guaranteed to create an immediate enemy. Unfortunately, in Mearsheimer's recent case study that claims to assess 'whether China can rise peacefully', he provides no empirical evidence but familiar historical analogies to support his policy prescription: An increasingly powerful China is also likely to push US military forces out of Asia, much the way the USA pushed the European great powers out of the Western Hemisphere in the nineteenth century. China can be expected to come up with its own version of the Monroe Doctrine... It is clear from the historical record how US policy-makers will react if China attempts to dominate Asia'.⁴⁰

But historical analogies do not amount to causes or explanations. Those who rely on historical analogies to speculate about Beijing's intentions tend to commit one of two kinds of analytical fallacies: Either they are imprecise about how the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is socialised to accept the validity of some analogies (e.g., tribute system) over others. Or they are imprecise about why Chinese conditions at time t that are identical to analogical conditions in time t-n are not altered, constrained, or collapsed by new and different conditions. As Alastair Iain Johnston points out, why would any similarities between Wilhelmine Germany's militarism and the PRC's current strategic behaviour not be altered by the fact that Beijing is more dependent on foreign investment for economic growth and political legitimacy than was Wilhelmine Germany, or by the fact that in the early twenty-first century the acquisition of colonies by great powers is no longer a certificate of major power-hood, or by the fact that China's relative power vis-à-vis the United States is far less than Germany's was vis-à-vis the United Kingdom?⁴¹ In this regard, Mearsheimer's analogical arguments do not get us any further than those of 'non-theoretical' sensationalist texts, say, The Coming Conflict with China.⁴²

In short, even if a military conflict between China and the United States over Taiwan did occur, it would not validate the predictive power of offensive realism; as I have demonstrated, it is logically impermissible for Mearsheimer to make such a prediction in the first instance. This does not suggest that one can be overly optimistic about the prospects of Sino-US relations. On the contrary, I cannot agree with Mearsheimer more on how US policy-makers would react to a rising China if they perceive Beijing's behaviour as attempts to dominate Asia (that is to say, if they understand the world in zero-sum power-transition terms). The tragedy of great power politics, then, has little to do with the distribution of power in the international system per se, but has more to do with how the offensive realist mantra of 'rising powers are inherently destabilising' itself becomes a lens through which one side only looks for confirming evidence of the other's predisposition to threaten. If the construction and persistence of this alarmist trope is perhaps more a sociological phenomenon than anything scientific, and if all the theoretical schools of thought in IR are attempting to get their audience to 'buy in' to their arguments,⁴³ I wonder, apart from merely reminding 'caveat emptor' (let the buyer beware), should not we also demand the seller to be responsible for their own products?

AT: Realism (Meirsheimer)

Offensive realism hurts assessments of China and prevents the thought that could change the outcome of such events

Chen 07

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Abstract

The rise of China has become a popular topic among pundits and practitioners of East Asian security since the last decade or so. Although there is no short of alarmist voices in the marketplace of ideas warning of America's coming conflict with China, few of them are theoretically informed. It is in this regard that John Mearsheimer's argument deserves our especial attention. His offensive realism, itself a modification of Kenneth Waltz's structural realism, argues that states that are merely concerned with their own survival nevertheless have to seek power-maximisation at the expense of other states and, if the circumstances allow, to establish hegemony. Mearsheimer predicts that the distribution of material capabilities and the compelling logic of anarchy will drive the US-Japan alliance and a rising China into an inevitable security competition, which could end up in a shooting war in the Taiwan Strait. Hence the United States should seek to contain China much the way it did to the Soviet Union during the Cold War. If Taiwan wishes to defend its de facto independence, according to his view, it has no alternative other than being a US 'aircraft carrier' against China. Under careful scrutiny, this paper demonstrates that even if a Strait shooting war did happen, it would not validate the predictive power of offensive realism, because it is theoretically impermissible for its exponents to make such a prediction in the first place. Great powers go to war is not simply because 'there is nothing to prevent it'; rather, human deliberation is involved and the question of responsibility is unavoidable. Mearsheimer not only neglects the moral implications behind the disastrous series of events, but also prevents himself (as well as his audience inside and outside the walls of academia) from coming to consider what could have been done to change the collision course and thus learns nothing from the past. In this sense, tragedy and scholarship are intimately intertwined.
