

Zizekian Kritik of Capitalist Lies

1NC Link	2
1NC Impact (IP)	3
1NC Turns Case	6
Aid Links	7
Gendered Law Links	8
Human Rights / ID Politics Link	9
Human Rights / ID Politics Link	10
Civil War/Instability Link	11
Health/Medicine Link	12
Family Planning/Gag Rule Link	13
Development Link	15
Ethics Impacts	16
Capitalism Bad Generic Impact.....	17
A2: Link Turn/ Perm	18
Withdraw Alternative Solvency	19
Withdraw Alternative Solvency	20
Self-Orientation First.....	21
Radical Negation Alternative Solvency	22
Authentic Act Alternative Solvency.....	23
A2: Fiat/Framework	24
AT: R & T	25
AT: R & T	26
AT: R & T	27
AT: R & T	28
AT: R & T	29
AT: R & T	30
AT: R & T	31
AT: Feminine Violence	32
AT: Feminine Violence	33
AT: Feminine Violence	34
AT: We Solve War Etc.....	35
AT: We Solve War Etc.....	36
AT: Alternative Fails.....	37
AT: Fissures Permutation	38
AT: Poverty	39
AT: Poverty	40
AT: Poverty	41
AT: Environment.....	42
AT: Cap Solves War.....	43
Framework.....	44
A2: Fiat/Framework	45

1NC Link

() The affirmatives focus on the “root causes” of humanitarian issues fails to realize the true nature and origin- the universal enemy is capital. Despite the best or seemingly good intentions, the market ideology can co-opt the plan for its own exploitative purposes. *****

Zizek 2006 (Slavoj, University of Ljubljana, “Nobody has to be vile”, April 6)

Liberal communists are pragmatic; they hate a doctrinaire approach. There is no exploited working class today, only concrete problems to be solved: starvation in Africa, the plight of Muslim women, religious fundamentalist violence. When there is a humanitarian crisis in Africa (liberal communists love a humanitarian crisis; it brings out the best in them), instead of engaging in anti-imperialist rhetoric, we should get together and work out the best way of solving the problem, engage people, governments and business in a common enterprise, start moving things instead of relying on centralised state help, approach the crisis in a creative and unconventional way. Liberal communists like to point out that the decision of some large international corporations to ignore apartheid rules within their companies was as important as the direct political struggle against apartheid in South Africa. Abolishing segregation within the company, paying blacks and whites the same salary for the same job etc: this was a perfect instance of the overlap between the struggle for political freedom and business interests, since the same companies can now thrive in post-apartheid South Africa. Liberal communists love May 1968. What an explosion of youthful energy and creativity! How it shattered the bureaucratic order! What an impetus it gave to economic and social life after the political illusions dropped away! Those who were old enough were themselves protesting and fighting on the streets: now they have changed in order to change the world, to revolutionise our lives for real. Didn't Marx say that all political upheavals were unimportant compared to the invention of the steam engine? And would Marx not have said today: what are all the protests against global capitalism in comparison with the internet? Above all, liberal communists are true citizens of the world - good people who worry. They worry about populist fundamentalism and irresponsible greedy capitalist corporations. They see the 'deeper causes' of today's problems: mass poverty and hopelessness breed fundamentalist terror. Their goal is not to earn money, but to change the world (and, as a by-product, make even more money). Bill Gates is already the single greatest benefactor in the history of humanity, displaying his love for his neighbours by giving hundreds of millions of dollars for education, the fight against hunger and malaria etc. The catch is that before you can give all this away you have to take it (or, as the liberal communists would put it, create it). In order to help people, the justification goes, you must have the means to do so, and experience - that is, recognition of the dismal failure of all centralised statist and collectivist approaches - teaches us that private enterprise is by far the most effective way. By regulating their business, taxing them excessively, the state is undermining the official goal of its own activity (to make life better for the majority, to help those in need).

CR

1NC Impact (IP)

() A continuation of current capitalist ethics allows extermination through future nuclear wars, genocides, starvation, and environmental destruction—put away your transition wars arguments because they are going on now and murder by capitalism is much worse

International Perspectives 2000 www.geocities.com/wageslavex/capandgen.html

Mass death, and genocide, the deliberate and systematic extermination of whole groups of human beings, have become an integral part of the social landscape of capitalism in its phase of decadence. Auschwitz, Kolyma, and Hiroshima are not merely the names of discrete sites where human beings have been subjected to forms of industrialized mass death, but synecdoches for the death-world that is a

component of the capitalist mode of production in this epoch. In that sense, I want to argue that the Holocaust, for example, was not a Jewish catastrophe, nor an atavistic reversion to the barbarism of a past epoch, but rather an event produced by the unfolding of the logic of capitalism itself. Moreover, Auschwitz, Kolyma, and Hiroshima are not "past", but rather futural events, objective-real possibilities on the Front of history, to use concepts first articulated by the Marxist philosopher Ernst Bloch. The ethnic cleansing which has been unleashed in Bosnia and Kosovo, the genocide of the Tutsis in Rwanda, the mass death to which Chechnya has been subjected, the prospect for a nuclear war on the Indian sub-continent, are so many examples of the future which awaits the human species as the capitalist mode of production enters a new millenium.

Indeed, it is just such a death-world that constitutes the meaning of one pole of the historic alternative which Rosa Luxemburg first posed in the midst of the slaughter inflicted on masses of conscripts during World War I: socialism or barbarism! Yet, confronted by the horror of Auschwitz, Kolyma, and Hiroshima, Marxist theory has been silent or uncomprehending. While I am convinced that there can be no adequate theory of mass death and genocide which does not link these phenomena to the unfolding of the logic of capital, revolutionary Marxists have so far failed to offer one. Worse, the few efforts of revolutionary Marxists to grapple with the Holocaust, for example, as I will briefly explain, have either degenerated into a crude economism, which is one of the hallmarks of so-called orthodox Marxism, or led to a fatal embrace of Holocaust denial; the former being an expression of theoretical bankruptcy, and the latter a quite literal crossing of the class line into the camp of capital itself. Economism, which is based on a crude base-superstructure model (or travesty) of Marxist theory, in which politics, for example, can only be conceived as a direct and immediate reflection of the economic base, in which events can only be conceived as a manifestation of the direct economic needs of a social class, and in the case of the capitalist class, the immediate need to extract a profit, shaped Amadeo Bordiga's attempt to "explain" the Holocaust. Thus, in his "Auschwitz ou le Grand Alibi" Bordiga explained the extermination of the Jews at the hands of the Nazis, as the reaction of one part of the petty bourgeoisie to its historical demise at the hands of capital by "sacrificing" its other -- Jewish -- part so as to save the rest, an undertaking welcomed by big capital, which could thereby liquidate a part of the petty bourgeoisie with the support of the rest of that same class. Quite apart from an economism which simply ignores the dialectic between the economy on the one hand, and the political and ideological on the other (about which more later), such an "explanation" asks us to conceive of genocide not as the complex outcome of the unfolding of the operation of the law of value in the diverse spheres of social life, but as the direct outcome of the utilitarian calculation of segments of the petty bourgeoisie and big capital. Auschwitz, the veritable hallmark of the fundamental irrationality of late capital, is transformed by Bordiga into a rational calculation of its direct profit interests on the part of the capitalists. However, an undertaking which fatally diverted the scarce resources (material and financial) of Nazi Germany from the battlefields of the imperialist world war, simply cannot, in my view, be comprehended on the basis of a purely economic calculus of profit and loss on the part of "big capital." While Bordiga's reaction to Auschwitz fails to provide even the minimal bases for its adequate theorization, the reaction of the militants of La Vieille Taupe, such as Pierre Guillaume, constitutes a political betrayal of the struggle for communist revolution by its incorporation into the politics of Holocaust denial. For Guillaume, Auschwitz can only be a myth, a fabrication of the allies, that is, of one of the imperialist blocs in the inter-imperialist world war, because it so clearly serves their interests in mobilizing the working class to die in the service of democracy; on the alter of anti-fascism. Hence, La Vieille Taupe's "fervor to contest the evidence of its [the Holocaust's] reality by every means possible, including the most fraudulent. For the evidence of genocide is just so many deceptions, so many traps laid for anticapitalist radicality, designed to force it into dishonest compromise and eventual loss of resolve."

It is quite true that capital has utilized antifascism to assure its ideological hegemony over the working class, and that the Holocaust has been routinely wielded for more than a generation by the organs of mass manipulation in the service of the myth of "democracy" in the West (and by the state of Israel on behalf of its own imperialist aims in the Middle-East). And just as surely the ideology of antifascism and its functionality for capital must be exposed by revolutionaries. Nonetheless, this does not justify the claims of Holocaust denial, which not only cannot be dissociated from anti-Semitism, but which constitutes a denial of the most lethal tendencies inherent in the capitalist mode of production, of the very barbarism of capitalism, and thereby serves as a screen behind which the death-world wrought by capital can be safely hidden from its potential victims. This latter, in its own small way, is the despicable contribution of La Vieille Taupe, and the basis for my conviction that it must be politically located in the camp of capital. Marxism is in need of a theory of mass death and genocide as immanent tendencies of capital, a way of comprehending the link (still obscure) between the death-world symbolized by the smokestacks of Auschwitz or the mushroom cloud over Hiroshima and the unfolding of the logic of a mode of production based on the capitalist law of value. I want to argue that we can best grasp the link between capitalism and genocide by focusing on two dialectically inter-related strands in the social fabric of late capitalism: first, are a series of phenomena linked to the actual unfolding of the law of value, and more specifically to the completion of the transition from the formal to the real domination of capital; second, are a series of phenomena linked to the political and ideological (this latter understood in a non-reductionist sense, as having a material existence) moments of the rule of capital, specifically to the forms of capitalist hegemony. It is through an analysis of the coalescence of vital elements of these two strands in the development of capital, that I hope to expose the bases for the death-world and genocide as integral features of capitalism in the present epoch.

The real domination of capital is characterized by the penetration of the law of value into every segment of social existence. As Georg Lukács put it in his History and Class Consciousness, this means that the commodity ceases to be "one form among many regulating the metabolism of human society," to become its "universal structuring principle." From its original locus at the point of production, in the capitalist factory, which is the hallmark of the formal domination of capital, the law of value has systematically spread its tentacles to incorporate not just the production of commodities, but their circulation and consumption. Moreover, the law of value also penetrates and then comes to preside over the spheres of the political and ideological, including science and technology themselves. This latter occurs not just through the transformation of the fruits of technology and science into commodities, not just through the transformation of technological and scientific research itself (and the institutions in which it takes place) into commodities, but also, and especially, through what Lukács designates as the infiltration of thought itself by the purely technical, the very quantification of rationality, the instrumentalization of reason; and, I would argue, the reduction of all beings (including human beings) to mere objects of manipulation and control. As Lukács could clearly see even in the age of Taylorism, "this rational mechanisation extends right into the worker's 'soul'." In short, it affects not only his outward behavior, but her very internal, psychological, makeup. The phenomenon of reification, inherent in the commodity-form, and its tendential penetration into the whole of social existence, which Lukács was one of the first to analyze, is a hallmark of the real domination of capital: "Its basis is that a relation between people takes on the character of a thing and thus acquires a 'phantom objectivity', an autonomy that seems so strictly rational and all-embracing as to conceal every trace of its fundamental nature: the relation between people." Reification, the seeming transformation of social relations into relations between things, has as one of its outcomes what the German-Jewish thinker H.G. Adler designated as "the administered man" [Der verwaltete Mensch]. For Adler, when human beings are administered, they are treated as things, thereby clearing

the way for their removal or elimination by genocide. The outcome of such a process can be seen in the bureaucratic administration of the Final Solution, in which the organization of genocide was the responsibility of desk killers like Adolf Eichmann who could zealously administer a system of mass murder while displaying no particular hatred for his victims, no great ideological passion for his project, and no sense that those who went to the gas chambers were human beings and not things. The features of the desk killer, in the person of Eichmann, have been clearly delineated by Hannah Arendt. He is the high-level functionary in a vast bureaucratic organization who does his killing from behind a desk, from which he rationally plans and organizes mass murder; treating it as simply a technical task, no different than the problem of transporting scrap metal. The desk killer is the quintessential bureaucrat functioning according to the imperatives of the death-world. As a human type, the desk killer, that embodiment of the triumph of instrumental reason, has become a vital part of the state apparatus of late capitalism. Here, the Lukácsian concept of reification, the Adlerian concept of the administered man, and the Arendtian portrait of the desk

killer, can be joined to Martin Heidegger's concept of *das Gestell*, enframing, in which everything real, all beings, including humans, are treated as so much *Bestand*, standing-reserve or raw material, to be manipulated at will. This reduction of humans to a raw material is the antechamber to a world in which they can become so many waste products to be discarded or turned into ashes in the gas chambers of Auschwitz or at ground

zero at Hiroshima. While the reification which attains its culminating point in the real domination of capital may contain within itself the possibility of mass murder and its death-world, it does not in and of itself explain the actual unleashing of the genocidal potential which, because of it, is now firmly ensconced within the interstices of the capitalist mode of production. To confront that issue, I want to elucidate two concepts which, while not directly linked by their authors to the unfolding of the capitalist law of value, can be refunctioned to forge such a link, and have already been effectively wielded in the effort to explain genocide: the concept of the obsolescence of man [Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen], articulated by the German-Jewish philosopher Günther Anders, and the concept of bio-politics, articulated by Michel Foucault. For Anders, the first industrial revolution introduced the machine with its own source of power as a means of production, while the second industrial revolution saw the extension of commodity production to the whole of society, and the subordination of man to the machine. According to Anders, the third industrial revolution, in the epoch of which humanity now lives, has made humans obsolete, preparing the way for their replacement by machines, and the end of history (Endzeit). For Anders, the Holocaust marked the first attempt at the systematic extermination of a whole

group of people by industrial means, opening the way for the extension of the process of extermination to virtually the whole of the human species; a stage which he designates as "post-civilized cannibalism" [postzivilisatorischen Kannibalismus], in which the world is "overmanned", and in which Hiroshima marks the point at which "humanity as a whole is eliminatable" [tötbar]. Anders's philosophy of technology is unabashedly pessimistic, leaving virtually no room for Marxist hope (communist revolution). Nonetheless, his vision of a totally reified world, and technology as the subject of history, culminating in an Endzeit, corresponds to one side of the dialectic of socialism or barbarism which presides over the present epoch. Moreover, Anders's concept of an overmanned world can be fruitfully linked to the immanent tendency of the law of value to generate an ever higher organic composition of capital, culminating in the present stage of automation, robotics, computers, and information technology, on the bases of which ever larger masses of living labor are ejected from the process of production, and, indeed, from the cycle of accumulation as a whole, ceasing to be -- even potentially -- a productive force, a source of exchange-value, in order to become an insuperable burden for capital, a dead weight, which, so long as it lives and breathes, threatens its profitability. This "obsolescence of man" can at the level of total capital thereby create the necessity for mass murder; inserting the industrial extermination of whole groups of people into the very logic of capital: genocide as the apotheosis of instrumental reason! Reason transmogrified into the nihilistic engine of destruction which shapes the late capitalist world. Michel Foucault's concept of bio-power can also be refunctioned to explicitly link it to the basic tendencies of the development of capitalism, in which case it provides a point of intersection between the triumph of the real domination of capital economically, and the political and ideological transformation of capitalist rule, while at the same time making it possible to grasp those features of capital which propel it in the direction of genocide. The extension of the law of value into every sphere of human existence, the culminating point of the real domination of capital, is marked by the subordination of the biological realm itself to the logic of capital. This stage corresponds to what Foucault designates as bio-politics, which encapsulates both the "statification of the biological", and the "birth of state racism". Bio-politics entails the positive power to administer, manage, and regulate the intimate details of the life -- and death -- of whole populations in the form of technologies of domination: "In concrete terms ... this power over life evolved in two basic forms ... they constituted ... two poles of development linked together by a whole intermediary cluster of relations. One of these poles ... centered on the body as a machine: its disciplining, the optimization of its capabilities, the extortion of its forces, the parallel increase of its usefulness and its docility, its integration into systems of efficient and economic controls, all this was ensured by the procedures of power that characterized the disciplines: an anatomo-politics of the human body. The second ... focused on the species body, the body imbued with the mechanics of life and serving as the basis of the biological processes: propagation, births and mortality, the level of health, life expectancy and longevity, with all the conditions that can cause these to vary. Their supervision was effected through an entire series of interventions and regulatory controls: a bio-politics of the population." Such a bio-politics represents the subjugation of biological life in its diverse human forms to the imperatives of the law of value. It allows capital to mobilize all the human resources of the nation in the service of its expansion and aggrandizement, economic and military.

The other side of bio-politics, of this power over life, for Foucault, is what he terms "thanatopolitics," entailing an awesome power to inflict mass death, both on the population of one's enemy, and on one's own population: "the power to expose a whole population to death is the underside of the power to guarantee an individual's continued existence. If genocide is indeed the dream of modern powers ... it is because power is situated at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population." Nuclear, chemical, and biological, weapons make it possible to wield this power to condemn whole populations to death. Bio-politics, for Foucault, also necessarily entails racism, by which he means making a cut in the biological continuum of human life, designating the very existence of a determinate group as a danger to the population, to its health and well-being, and even to its very life. Such a group, I would argue, then, becomes a biological (in the case of Nazism) or class enemy (in the case of Stalinism, though the latter also claimed that biological and hereditary characteristics were linked to one's class origins). And the danger represented by such an enemy race can necessitate its elimination through physical removal (ethnic cleansing) or extermination (genocide). The Foucauldian concept of bio-politics allows us to see how, on the basis of technologies of domination, it is possible to subject biological life itself to a formidable degree of control, and to be able to inflict mass death on populations or races designated as a biological threat. Moreover, by linking this concept to the real domination of capital, we are able to see how the value-form invades even the biological realm in the phase of the real domination of capital. However, while bio-power entails the horrific possibility of genocide, it is Foucault's ruminations on the binary division of a population into a "pure community" and its Other, which allows us to better grasp its necessity. Such a perspective, however, intersects with the transformations at the level of the political and ideological moment of capital, and it is to these, and what I see as vital contributions to their theorization by Antonio Gramsci and Ernst Bloch, that I now want to turn in an effort to better elucidate the factors that propel capital in the direction of mass death and genocide. What is at issue here is not Gramsci's politics, his political practice, his interventions in the debates on strategy and tactics within the Italian Communist Party, where he followed the counter-revolutionary line of the Stalinist Comintern, but rather his theorization of the political and ideological moment of capital, and in particular his concept of the "integral state", his understanding of the state as incorporating both political and civil society, his concept of hegemony, and his understanding of ideology as inscribed in practices and materialized in institutions, which exploded the crude base-superstructure model of orthodox Marxism and its vision of ideology as simply false consciousness, all of which have enriched Marxist theory, and which revolutionaries ignore at their peril. In contrast to orthodox Marxism which has equated the state with coercion, Gramsci's insistence that the state incorporates both political and civil society, and that class rule is instantiated both by domination (coercion) and hegemony (leadership) allows us to better grasp the complex and crisscrossing strands that coalesce in capitalist class rule, especially in the phase of the real domination of capital and the epoch of state capitalism. For Gramsci, hegemony is the way in which a dominant class installs its rule over society through the intermediary of ideology, establishing its intellectual and cultural leadership over other classes, and thereby reducing its dependence on coercion. Ideology, for Gramsci, is not mere false consciousness, but rather is the form in which humans acquire consciousness, become subjects and act, constituting what he terms a "collective will". Moreover, for him, ideology is no mere superstructure, but has a material existence, is materialized in praxis. The state which rests on a combination of coercion and hegemony is what Gramsci designates as an integral state. It seems to me, that one major weakness of the Gramscian concept of hegemony is that he does not seem to apply it to the control exercised over an antagonistic class. Thus, Gramsci asserts that one dominates, coerces, antagonistic classes, but leads only allied classes. Gramsci's seeming exclusion of antagonistic classes from the ideological hegemony of the dominant class seems to me to be misplaced, especially in the epoch of state capitalism, when the capitalist class, the functionaries of capital, acquire hegemony, cultural and intellectual leadership and control, not just of allied classes and strata (e.g. the middle classes, petty bourgeoisie, etc.), but also over broad strata of the antagonistic class, the working class itself. Indeed, such hegemony, though never total, and always subject to reversal (revolution), is the veritable key to capitalist class rule in this epoch. One way in which this ideological hegemony of capital is established over broad strata of the population, including sectors of the working class, is by channeling the dissatisfaction and discontent of the mass of the population with the monstrous impact of capitalism upon their lives (subjection to the machine, reduction to the status of a "thing", at the point of production, insecurity and poverty as features of daily life, the overall social process of atomization and massification, etc.), away from any struggle to establish a human Gemeinwesen, communism. Capitalist hegemony entails the ability to divert that very dissatisfaction into the quest for a "pure community", based on hatred and rage directed not at capital, but at the Other, at alterity itself, at those marginal social groups which are designated a danger to the life of the nation, and its population. One of the most dramatic effects of the inexorable penetration of the law of value into every pore of social life, and geographically across the face of the whole planet, has been the destruction of all primitive, organic, and pre-capitalist communities. Capitalism, as Marx and Engels pointed out in the Communist Manifesto, shatters the bonds of immemorial custom and tradition, replacing them with its exchange mechanism and contract. While Marx and Engels stressed the positive features of this development in the Manifesto, we cannot ignore its negative side, particularly in light of the fact that the path to a human Gemeinwesen has so far been successfully blocked by capital, with disastrous consequences for the human species. The negative side of that development includes the relentless process of atomization, leaving in its wake an ever growing mass of rootless individuals, for whom the only human contact is by way of the cash nexus. Those who have been uprooted geographically, economically, politically, and culturally, are frequently left with a powerful longing for their lost communities (even where those communities were hierarchically organized and based on inequality), for the certainties and "truths" of the past, which are idealized the more frustrating, unsatisfying, and insecure, the world of capital becomes. Such longings are most powerfully felt within what Ernst Bloch has termed non-synchronous strata and classes. These are strata and classes whose material or mental conditions of life are linked to a past mode of production, who exist economically or culturally in the past, even as they chronologically dwell in the present. In contrast to the two historic classes in the capitalist mode of production, the bourgeoisie and proletariat, which are synchronous, the products of the

capitalist present, these non-synchronous strata include the peasantry, the petty bourgeoisie, and -- by virtue of their mental or cultural state -- youth and white-collar workers. In my view, Bloch's understanding of non-synchronicity needs to be extended to segments of the working class, in particular those strata of the blue-collar proletariat which are no longer materially synchronous with the high-tech production process upon which late capitalism rests, and the mass of workers ejected from the production process by the rising organic composition of capital and its concomitant down-sizing. In addition, the even greater mass of peasants streaming into the shanty towns around the great commercial and industrial metropolitan centers of the world, are also characterized by their non-synchronicity, their inability to be incorporated into the hyper-modern cycle of capital accumulation. Moreover, all of these strata too are subject to a growing nostalgia for the past, a longing for community, including the blue-collar communities and their institutional networks which were one of the features of the social landscape of capitalism earlier in the twentieth century. However, no matter how powerful this nostalgia for past community becomes, it cannot be satisfied. The organic communities of the past cannot be recreated; their destruction by capital is irreversible. At the same time, the path to a future Gemeinwesen, to which the cultural material and longings embodied in the non-synchronous classes and strata can make a signal contribution, according to Bloch, remains obstructed by the power of capital. So long as this is the case, the genuine longing for community of masses of people, and especially the nostalgia for past communities especially felt by the non-synchronous strata and classes, including the newly non-synchronous elements which I have just argued must be added to them, leaves them exposed to the lure of a "pure community" ideologically constructed by capital itself. In place of real organic and communal bonds, in such an ideologically constructed pure community, a racial, ethnic, or religious identification is merely superimposed on the existing condition of atomization in which the mass of the population finds itself. In addition to providing some gratification for the longing for community animating broad strata of the population, such a pure community can also provide an ideological bond which ties the bulk of the population to the capitalist state on the basis of a race, ethnicity, or religion which it shares with the ruling class. This latter is extremely important to capital, because the atomization which it has brought about not only leaves the mass of humanity bereft, but also leaves the ruling class itself vulnerable because it lacks any basis upon which it can mobilize the population, physically or ideologically. The basis upon which such a pure community is constituted, race, nationality, religion, even a categorization by "class" in the Stalinist world, necessarily means the exclusion of those categories of the population which do not conform to the criteria for inclusion, the embodiments of alterity, even while they inhabit the same geographical space as the members of the pure community. Those excluded, the "races" on the other side of the biological continuum, to use Foucauldian terminology, the Other, become alien elements within an otherwise homogeneous world of the pure community. As a threat to its very existence, the role of this Other is to become the scapegoat for the inability of the pure community to provide authentic communal bonds between people, for its abject failure to overcome the alienation that is a hallmark of a reified world. The Jew in Nazi Germany, the Kulak in Stalinist Russia, the Tutsi in Rwanda, Muslims in Bosnia, blacks in the US, the Albanian or the Serb in Kosovo, the Arab in France, the Turk in contemporary Germany, the Bahai in Iran, for example, become the embodiment of alterity, and the target against which the hatred of the members of the pure community is directed. The more crisis ridden a society becomes, the greater the need to find an appropriate scapegoat; the more urgent the need for mass mobilization behind the integral state, the more imperious the need to focus rage against the Other. In an extreme situation of social crisis and political turmoil, the demonization and victimization of the Other can lead to his (mass) murder. In the absence of a working class conscious of its historic task and possibilities, this hatred of alterity which permits capital to mobilize the population in defense of the pure community, can become its own impetus to genocide. . In that sense, the death-world, and the prospect of an Endzeit cannot be separated from the continued existence of humanity's subordination to the law of value. Reification, the overmanned world, each of them features of the economic and ideological topography of the real domination of capital. The immanent tendencies of the capitalist mode of production which propel it towards a catastrophic economic crisis, also drive it towards mass murder and genocidebio-politics, state racism, the constitution of a pure community directed against alterity, create the possibility and the need for genocide. We should have no doubt that the survival of capitalism into this new millenium will entail more and more frequent recourse to mass murder.

1NC Turns Case

() This turns case- the true objective of humanitarianism is to fuel the market, feeding and failing to solve the “problems”

Epprecht No Date Given (Marc, University of Alberta, “The World Bank, Health, & Africa”, International Report, Zmag)

The cruder agenda of imperial biomedicine no longer tarnishes the image of Western humanitarianism and, indeed, over the past three decades some impressive strides have been made against specific diseases. Nonetheless, as the title Investing in Health implies, **improved health in the Third World is still regarded by the West's leading development agency primarily as a means to the end of improved profits.** This highly acclaimed report thus remains very much a part of the ongoing imperial project, or "structural adjustment" as it is called in donor-speak. Imperialism in this sense means the aggressive promotion or enforcement by the West of conditions favorable to profit-making by (mainly Western) multi-national corporations. Structural adjustment includes the privatization of parastatal corporations, cutbacks in public sector spending and employment, opening domestic markets to foreign trade, and easy repatriation of profits from foreign investment. As critics of earlier World Health Organization (WHO) health strategies have pointed out, **catchy phrases such as "health for all" may also insidiously promote this corporate agenda by generating new sources of profits from the Third World, especially from prescription drugs and medical technology.**

Aid Links

International aid is a tool or pauperization – it makes sub-Saharan Africa dependent on economic rationality

Santosh Saha. (Phd history) "First World, Third World"

Journal of Third World Studies. Americus: Fall 1998. Vol.15, Iss. 2; pg. 224, 3 pgs

PAGE JSTOR Accessed: 6/23/07 AK

Visualize a philanthropic movement, the "international aid," that has damaged the environment in Third World countries, lowered the standard of living of the millions in poorer south, and left a trail of desperate indebtedness in its wake; an international system of financing development projects in Latin America, Africa and Asia, where corruption and inefficiency impoverished those poor people which the rich western donors purported to help. That, in essence, is the system of aid that emerges from William Ryrie's timely vigorous presentation about the evils of aid to the "Third World."

The author, who has served IFC and other international bodies, argues that aid organizations and professionals are not aware that "whole societies can be corrupted or pauperized" by a mentality of dependency arising out of foreign aid (p. 114). He testifies that aid would work well through redistribution rather than growth. "Aid... should take the form of investment designed to promote economic growth, not subsidy" (p. 114). There is nothing new in these assertions. What is novel in this presentation is the force of arguments, based on substantial information and comparative analysis

The US uses Aid to advance a strategy of violence onto Africa

Soren Ambrose, Njoki Njoroge Njehu. 05 (Solidarity Africa: Network in Action)" Multinational Monitor.

Washington: Jul/Aug 2005 JSTOR Accessed: 6/23/07 AK

NAIROBI - Multinational Monitor was born just as sub-Saharan Africa entered a distinct historical phase. The 20 or so years after most of its countries gained their independence constituted, in hindsight, a relative "honeymoon" phase, if such a term can be applied to an era that saw the rise of Mobutu in Zaire, an exceptionally brutal civil war in Nigeria, the consolidation of the apartheid regime in South Africa and other horrors. The earlier period at least offered a steady rise in living standards in most countries; the next 25 years would be marked by spiraling poverty across the region and the virtual loss of governments' sovereignty to determine their own policies. Fumbling steps from dictatorship to democracy, stubborn corruption, the influence of multinationals looking to extract mineral wealth, eruptions of brutal violence, the spread of HIV/AIDS and persistence of other preventable diseases, foreign domination and imposed economic devastation: these are among the themes that have dominated sub-Saharan Africa during Multinational Monitor's lifespan. Most of these problems have a long provenance in Africa - they were deliberate characteristics of the colonial project in Africa (though interest in democracy was not indulged until the colonial endgame). At the 1885 Berlin Conference, the major European powers divided up the continent, with scant attention to geographic or cultural boundaries - a jigsaw puzzle of incoherent states that continues to haunt the continent. The formal end of colonialism (for most countries in the period between 1956 and 1964) inspired a burst of energy and confidence, but as it dwindled, it became clear that the post-colonial period was also a neo-colonial period, with systems set up to facilitate the transfer of wealth out of Africa just as efficiently as before. The Cold War completed the analogy, with the United States and the USSR engaged in a new scramble for Africa, each seducing and claiming allies around the continent, with little concern about the corruption they created or the welfare of populations they put at risk.

Gendered Law Links

Legal gains do nothing to suppression the domination of patriarchy because they are still based on the master/slave dichotomy which perpetuates authoritarian patriarchal violence

Zizek in 1995

(Slavoj, Law and the Postmodern Mind: Superego by Default, Cardozo Law Review, page lexis gjm)

As a consequence of the bourgeois egalitarian ideology's rise to power, the public domain loses its direct patriarchal character and the relationship between the public law and its obscene superego underside undergoes a radical change. In the traditional patriarchal society, the inherent transgression of the law assumes the form of a carnivalesque reversal of authority: the king becomes a beggar, madness poses as wisdom, etc. A custom practiced in the villages of northern Greece until the middle of our century exemplifies this reversal. n5 One day a year was set aside for women to take over. Men had to stay at home and look after children while women gathered in the local inn, drank to excess, and organized mock trials of men. What breaks out in this carnivalesque suspension of the ruling patriarchal law is the fantasy of feminine power. Lacan draws attention to the fact that, in everyday French, one of the designations for the wife is la bourgeoise n6 - the one who, beneath the semblance of male domination, actually pulls the strings. This, however, can in no way be reduced to a version of the standard male chauvinist wisecrack that patriarchal domination is not so bad for women after all since, at least in the close circle of the family, they run the show. The problem runs deeper; one of the consequences of the fact that the master is always an impostor is the duplication of the master - the agency of the master is always perceived as a semblance concealing another, "true" master. Suffice it to recall the well-known anecdote quoted by Theodore Adorno in Minima Moralia, n7 about a wife who apparently subordinates to her husband and, when they are about to leave the party, [*928] obediently holds his coat, all the while exchanging behind his back ironic patronizing glances with the fellow guests to communicate the message, "poor weakling, let him think he is the master!"

In this opposition of semblance and actual power men are impostors, condemned to performing empty symbolic gestures while the actual responsibility falls to women. However, the point not to be missed here is that this specter of woman's power structurally depends on the male domination: it remains its shadowy double, its retroactive effect, and as such its inherent moment. For that reason, bringing the woman's shadowy power to light and acknowledging it publicly enables law to cast off its direct patriarchal dress and present itself as neutral egalitarian. The character of its obscene double also undergoes a radical shift: what now erupts in the carnivalesque suspension of the "egalitarian" public law is precisely the authoritarian-patriarchal logic that continues to determine our attitudes, although its direct public expression is no longer permitted. "Carnival" thus becomes the outlet for the repressed dark side of social jouissance: Jew-baiting riots, gang rapes, lynchings, etc.

Human Rights / ID Politics Link

In the era of Post-politics multiculturalists negotiate identity in order to foreclose an authentic act of politics, the 1AC's attempts at the possible of identity politics returns to the Real in the form of racism – we must instead embrace politics as the art of the impossible and oppose globalization and universalization

Zizek, Senior Researcher at the Institute for Social Studies, Ljubljana, Slovenia, **1999**
(Slavoj, The Ticklish Subject, page 198-201, gjm)

Today however, we are dealing with another form of the denegation of the political, postmodern *post-politics*, which no longer merely 'represses' the political, trying to contain it and pacify the 'returns of the repressed', but much more effectively 'forecloses' it, so that the postmodern forms of ethnic violence, with their 'irrational' excessive character, are no longer simple 'returns of the repressed' but, rather, represent a case of the foreclosed (from the Symbolic) which, as we know from Lacan, returns in the Real. In post-politics, the conflict of global ideological visions embodied in different parties which compete for power is replaced by the collaboration of enlightened technocrats (economists, public opinion specialists. . .) and liberal multiculturalists; via the process of negotiation of interests, a compromise is reached in the guise of a more or less universal consensus. Post-politics thus emphasizes the need to leave old ideological divisions behind and confront new issues armed with the necessary expert knowledge and free deliberation that takes people's concrete needs and demands into account

The best formula that expresses the paradox of post-politics is perhaps Tony Blair's characterization of New Labour as the 'Radical Centre': in the old days of 'ideological' political division, the qualification 'radical' was reserved either for the extreme Left or for the extreme Right. The Centre was, by definition, moderate: measured by the old standards, the term 'Radical Centre' is the same nonsense as 'radical moderation'. What makes New Labour (or Bill Clinton's politics in the USA) 'radical' is its radical abandonment of the 'old ideological divides', usually formulated in the guise of a paraphrase of Deng Xiaoping's motto from the 1960s: 'It doesn't matter if a cat is red or white; what matters is that it actually catches mice': in the same vein, advocates of New Labour like to emphasize that one should take good ideas without any prejudice and apply them, whatever their (ideological) origins. And what are these 'good ideas'? The answer is, of course, ideas that work. It is here that we encounter the gap that separates a political act proper from the 'administration of social matters' which remains within the framework of existing sociopolitical relations: the political act (intervention) proper is not simply something that works well within the framework of the existing relations, but something that *changes the very framework that determines how things work*. To say that good ideas are 'ideas that work' means that one accepts in advance the (global capitalist) constellation that determines what works (if, for example, one spends too much money on education or healthcare, that 'doesn't work', since it infringes too much on the conditions of capitalist profitability). One can also put it in terms of the well-known definition of politics as the 'art of the possible': authentic politics is, rather, the exact opposite, that is, the art of the *impossible* - it changes the very parameters of what is considered 'possible' in the existing constellation.²⁹

When this dimension of the impossible is effectively precluded, the political (the space of litigation in which the excluded can protest the wrong/injustice done to them) foreclosed from the symbolic returns in the Real, in the guise of new forms of *racism*; this 'postmodern racism' emerges as the ultimate consequence of the post-political suspension of the political, the reduction of the State to a mere police-agent servicing the (consensually established) needs of market forces and multiculturalist tolerant humanitarianism: the 'foreigner' whose status is never properly 'regulated' is the *indivisible remainder* of the transformation of the democratic political struggle into the post-political procedure of negotiation and multiculturalist policing. Instead of the political subject 'working class' demanding its universal rights, we get, on the one hand, the multiplicity of particular social strata or groups, each with its problems (the dwindling need for manual workers, etc.) and, on the other, the immigrant, ever more prevented from politicizing his predicament of exclusion.³⁰

Human Rights / ID Politics Link

The obvious counter-argument here is that today it is the (political) Right that is accomplishing the acts, boldly changing the very rules of what is considered acceptable-admissible in the sphere of public discourse: from the way Reaganism and Thatcherism legitimized the debate about curtailing workers' rights and social benefits, up to the gradual legitimization of the 'open debate' about Nazism in revisionist historiography a la Nolte (was it really so bad? Was not Communism worse, that is, cannot Nazism be understood as a reaction to Leninism-Stalinism?). Here, however, it is crucial to introduce a further distinction: for Lacan, a true act does not only retroactively change the rules of the symbolic space; it also disturbs the underlying fantasy - and here, concerning *this* crucial dimension, Fascism emphatically does *not* pass the criterion of the act. Fascist 'Revolution' is, on the contrary, the paradigmatic case of a pseudo-Event, of a spectacular turmoil destined to conceal the fact that, on the most fundamental level (that of the relations of production), *nothing really changes*. The Fascist Revolution is thus the answer to the question: what do we have to change so that, ultimately, nothing will really change? Or to put it in terms of the libidinal economy of the ideological space - far from disturbing/'traversing' the fantasy that underlies and sustains the capitalist social edifice, Fascist ideological revolution merely brings to the light the phantasmic 'inherent transgression' of the 'normal' bourgeois ideological situation (the set of implicit racist, sexist, etc., 'prejudices' that effectively determine the activity of individuals in it, although they are not publicly recognized).

One of today's common wisdoms is that we are entering a new medieval society in the guise of the New World Order - the grain of truth in this comparison is that the New World Order, as in medieval times, is global, but not universal, since it strives for a new global order with each part in its allocated place. A typical advocate of liberalism today throws together workers' protests against reducing their rights and right-wing insistence on fidelity to the Western cultural heritage: he perceives both as pitiful remainders of the 'age of ideology' which have no relevance in today's post-ideological universe. However, the two resistances to globalization follow totally incompatible logics: the Right insists on a particular communal identity (ethnos or habitat) threatened by the onslaught of globalization; while for the Left, the dimension under threat is that of politicization, of articulating: 'impossible' universal demands ('impossible' from within the existing space of World Order).

Here one should oppose globalization and universalization (not only in the sense of global capitalism, the establishment of a global world market, but also in the sense of the assertion of 'humanity' as the global point of reference for human rights, legitimizing the violation of State sovereignty, from trade restrictions to direct military interventions, in parts of the world where global human rights are violated) is precisely the name for the emerging post-political logic which progressively precludes the dimension of universality that appears in politicization proper. The paradox is that there is no Universal proper without the process of political litigation of the 'part of no part' of an out-of-joint entity presenting/manifesting itself as the stand-in for the Universal.

Civil War/Instability Link

() Constant attempts to end promote stability and reform current policy fail to reflect the root causes of crisis and leave capitalist exploitation intact

Epprecht No Date Given (Marc, University of Alberta, "The World Bank, Health, & Africa", International Report, Zmag)

The unifying feature of all of these documents is to portray Africa's economic crisis as internally-generated and so to minimize the historical (and continuing) role of violence in the project of stabilizing capitalism in Africa. The major Western donors thus emphasize the corruption and increasingly "inefficient" bureaucracies of African states, lack of democracy, poor planning, lack of incentives for production or discipline, and even cultural constraints peculiar to Africans. Because these constraints are purportedly internal, more "efficient" (that is, better targeted, more conditional) aid could fix them without any need to challenge the larger status quo, above all the flow of wealth out of Africa in the form of debt service, unimpeded returns on investment and cheap commodities. In this view, possible "imperfections" in the "free market" are simply accepted as given and natural (although, in some cases, "imperfections" may be rued in passing. The tendencies of multi-national corporations to fix prices, for example, or of private enterprise to extract short-term profits with long-term environmental and social costs, or of developed countries to intervene massively in the "free market" with tariffs, sanctions, invasions, and so on to ensure favorable terms of trade if and whenever the "invisible hand" does not do so on its own, may be mentioned provided such mention does not challenge the monetarist paradigm).

Health/Medicine Link

() Use of medicine and western technologies secure capitals control on both a domestic and foreign level

Epprecht No Date Given (Marc, University of Alberta, "The World Bank, Health, & Africa", International Report, Zmag)

Africans may be forgiven, therefore, for treating with caution both the World Bank's latest assertions of leadership and its guarded optimism about renewed growth. The fact is that the most violent and exploitative regimes in the colonial era were commonly cloaked with similar claims of Western leadership and benevolence, or that Cold War rhetoric about the "free world" often concealed investment in and military aid to sundry pro-Western torture states. Moreover, Africans have long been aware that even so-called humanitarian aid has often transparently advanced a self-serving Western agenda. Biomedicine, for instance, which many Westerners assume to be one of the few unambiguously clear examples of progress or triumph in Africa stemming from Western initiative, is now increasingly understood by historians to have been an important instrument for empire building and maintenance. In the colonial era the admitted goals of investment in health included rendering areas suitable for European settlement; ameliorating the otherwise catastrophic health effects of destruction of communities and eco-systems following colonial conquest; stabilizing the reproduction of a cheap labor force; saving on environmental or public hygiene costs through cheap, often fraudulent vaccines; providing pseudo-scientific grounds for the creation or reification of ethnic differences; justifying large population movements and racial segregation; and providing a humanitarian or progressive gloss which helped to make the oppressive mechanics of empire palatable to populations both at home and among many Africans. CR

Family Planning/Gag Rule Link

() **Lifting the gag rule and promoting family planning efforts clouds it's rhetoric in feminist liberation- it allows the west to cast blame towards developing countries and continue it's cycle of consumption.**

Hartman 1999 (Betsy, director of the Population and Development Program at Hampshire College and a co-founder of the Committee on Women, Population and the Environment, "Cross Dressing Malthus", Sept 23)

While many of the campaign's messages include the need for women's empowerment, the main theme reaching the press is that population growth is a major drain on social, economic and environmental resources. Left out of the picture are the real culprits: capitalist exploitation of both people and nature, obscene income and consumption disparities, inappropriate technologies and hyper-militarization. The belief is you can have your cake and eat it too: you can support women's rights, while scapegoating their fertility for the planet's ills. You can cross-dress Malthus and parade him around as a feminist. Five years after the 1994 UN population conference in Cairo, the population establishment is experiencing a sort of ideological schizophrenia. On the one hand are positive calls to make women's empowerment and broader reproductive health services the centerpiece of population policies and the rightful condemnation of the use of coercion and demographic targeting in family planning programs. In some countries there have been serious attempts to reform population programs, and within institutions like the UNFPA, there are progressive individuals struggling to change policy. On the other hand, many population and environment groups, especially in the US, continue to blame poverty, environmental degradation, political violence and even the spread of diseases like AIDS on rapid population growth in the Third World. Zero Population Growth, for example, links 'Y6B' to 'Y2K', claiming that world population passing the six billion mark is a more threatening problem than the potential computer glitch. Lester Brown of the Worldwatch Institute has taken an even more cynical approach, arguing that African countries which have experienced rapid population growth are suffering from "demographic fatigue", accounting for their inability to take adequate measures to halt the spread of the AIDS epidemic. These messages actually undermine the Cairo reforms by reinforcing demographic targeting and spreading fear and loathing of the faceless, nameless masses 'over there.' Despite the Cairo reforms, population control programs remain in place in many regions. Sterilization abuse of poor women is still common in a number of countries, including Peru, Mexico, India and China. In many national and international family planning programs, long-acting, provider-dependent contraceptives like Norplant are targeted at poor women since these methods are considered more effective in preventing pregnancy even if they present greater risks to health and do nothing to block the transmission of sexually transmitted diseases like HIV/AIDS. The main rationale for US foreign assistance in the reproductive health field is still reducing population growth; according to the Center for Reproductive Law and Policy, USAID continues to give less funding for maternal services than it does for family planning. Why is neo-Malthusianism so powerful in the US, much more powerful than it is, for example, in European development and environment circles? There are a number of different but related reasons. For one, we have a strong anti-abortion movement which makes the population establishment seem reasonable by comparison -- at least it supports family planning, though often of the wrong kind. We also have a well-funded population lobby that has influence at the highest echelons of government. Money talks in Washington, DC. In addition, we happen to live in one of the most parochial countries on the planet, where knowledge about development issues in the Third World is slim indeed. Just look at the social studies and biology textbooks kids read in school and you'll find that population is typically blamed for poverty and environmental degradation. This is very unlike curricular materials in the UK, where competing theories on population are taught in a sophisticated and complex way, and geography involves more than learning the location of the fifty states. Then there is the wilderness ethic, the belief in a pure nature, unsullied by human beings. (Of course we created our wilderness through the genocide of its Native American inhabitants.) There is little appreciation

that human communities can and do live in more sustainable relationships with their environments in other countries. Poor peasants, we are taught, overmine the soil and cut down the rain forests -- there is little knowledge about how peasant agriculture actually contributes to biodiversity and land conservation in many areas, or about the business interests responsible for most forest destruction. But the roots of the neo-Malthusian success go deeper than this. Neo-Malthusianism is a useful ideological glue which binds liberals, and even some leftists, to conservative causes. It is a tricky little belief system, constantly mutating to fit the political moment. Just last year, right-wing anti-immigration activists tried to change the Sierra Club's neutral policy on immigration by arguing that immigrants, by contributing to US population growth, were the main despoilers of our environment. And just watch the debates over climate change. The spin doctors are trying to divert attention from the US refusal to take serious measures to cut carbon emissions by playing up the threat of China and India's populations as future energy consumers. Better the one child family over there than a one car policy here, or raising taxes, god forbid, to finance public transport and energy conservation. But probably the single most important reason neo-Malthusianism is so powerful in the US is because it resonates so well with domestic racism and sexism. Images of overbreeding single women of color on welfare and bare-breasted, always pregnant Third World woman are two sides of the same nasty coin. And both groups, it is believed, are excellent candidates for social engineering. Insert Norplant, tie their tubes, put them to work in fast food chains or sweat shops, and give them a little micro-credit and education if you're feeling generous... And meanwhile call their young male counterparts barbarians, whether they live in the US inner city or Robert Kaplan's African anarchy. Lock the boys and men in prison.

Development Link

() Development can only exist in opposition to the undeveloped- the plan serves to construct dehumanization

Zizek 2006 (Slavoj, University of Ljubljana, “Nobody has to be vile”, April 6)

According to liberal communist ethics, the ruthless pursuit of profit is counteracted by charity: charity is part of the game, a humanitarian mask hiding the underlying economic exploitation. Developed countries are constantly 'helping' undeveloped ones (with aid, credits etc), and so avoiding the key issue: their complicity in and responsibility for the miserable situation of the Third World. As for the opposition between 'smart' and 'non-smart', outsourcing is the key notion. You export the (necessary) dark side of production - disciplined, hierarchical labour, ecological pollution - to 'non-smart' Third World locations (or invisible ones in the First World). The ultimate liberal communist dream is to export the entire working class to invisible Third World sweat shops. CR

() Development objectives fuel US capitalism

Epprecht No Date Given (Marc, University of Alberta, “The World Bank, Health, & Africa”, International Report, Zmag)

Foreign aid is generally predicated upon the assumption that the West, having developed itself, can help other nations and peoples to make a similar transition. While conceding that much foreign aid is actually spent in the donor country and that it commonly fosters lucrative opportunities for Western businesses in the Third World, aid donors usually prefer to emphasize the humanitarian or enlightened elements of their self-interest. This is particularly true of the World Bank which, because it is a multilateral institution and has a mandate to underwrite long-term development projects, is less prone to the type of short-termism and scandals which periodically disgrace government-to-government deals (Britain's Pergau dam project in Malaysia, for a recent example, in exchange for the latter's purchase of British weaponry). CR

Ethics Impacts

Challenging global capitalism is the ultimate ethical responsibility – the current order guarantees social exclusion on a global scale

Zizek and Daly 2k4 (Slavoj and Glyn, Conversations with Zizek page 14-16)

For Zizek it is imperative that we cut through this Gordian knot of postmodern protocol and recognize that our ethico-political responsibility is to confront the constitutive violence of today's global capitalism and its obscene naturalization / anonymization of the millions who are subjugated by it throughout the world. Against the standardized positions of postmodern culture – with all its pieties concerning 'multiculturalist' etiquette – Zizek is arguing for a politics that might be called 'radically incorrect' in the sense that it break with these types of positions 7 and focuses instead on the very organizing principles of today's social reality: the principles of global liberal capitalism. This requires some care and subtlety. For far too long, Marxism has been bedeviled by an almost fetishistic economism that has tended towards political morbidity. With the likes of Hilferding and Gramsci, and more recently Laclau and Mouffee, crucial theoretical advances have been made that enable the transcendence of all forms of economism. In this new context, however, Zizek argues that the problem that now presents itself is almost that of the opposite fetish. That is to say, the prohibitive anxieties surrounding the taboo of economism can function as a way of not engaging with economic reality and as a way of implicitly accepting the latter as a basic horizon of existence. In an ironic Freudian-Lacanian twist, the fear of economism can end up reinforcing a de facto economic necessity in respect of contemporary capitalism (i.e. the initial prohibition conjures up the very thing it fears).

This is not to endorse any kind of retrograde return to economism. Zizek's point is rather that in rejecting economism we should not lose sight of the systemic power of capital in shaping the lives and destinies of humanity and our very sense of the possible. In particular we should not overlook Marx's central insight that in order to create a universal global system the forces of capitalism seek to conceal the politico-discursive violence of its construction through a kind of gentrification of that system.

What is persistently denied by neo-liberals such as Rorty (1989) and Fukuyama (1992) is that the gentrification of global liberal capitalism is one whose 'universalism' fundamentally reproduces and depends upon a disavowed violence that excludes vast sectors of the world's populations. In this way, neo-liberal ideology attempts to naturalize capitalism by presenting its outcomes of winning and losing as if they were simply a matter of chance and sound judgment in a neutral market place.

Capitalism does indeed create a space for a certain diversity, at least for the central capitalist regions, but it is neither neutral nor ideal and its price in terms of social exclusion is exorbitant. That is to say, the human cost in terms of inherent global poverty and degraded 'life-chances' cannot be calculated within the existing economic rationale and, in consequence, social exclusion remains mystified and nameless (viz. the patronizing reference to the 'developing world'). And Zizek's point is that this mystification is magnified through capitalism's profound capacity to ingest its own excesses and negativity: to redirect (or misdirect) social antagonisms and to absorb them within a culture of differential affirmation. Instead of Bolshevism, the tendency today is towards a kind of political boutiqueism that is readily sustained by postmodern forms of consumerism and lifestyle.

Against this Zizek argues for a new universalism whose primary ethical directive is to confront the fact that our forms of social existence are founded on exclusion on a global scale. While it is perfectly true that universalism can never become Universal (it will always require a hegemonic-particular embodiment in order to have any meaning), what is novel about Zizek's universalism is that it would not attempt to conceal this fact or reduce the status of the abject Other to that of a 'glitch' in an otherwise sound matrix.

Capitalism Bad Generic Impact

Global capitalism threatens survival – its is not a question of just the state corporations manipulate and control the market and our ecological well-being

Zizek, Senior Researcher at the Institute for Social Studies, Ljubljana, Slovenia, **1999**
(Slavoj, The Ticklish Subject, page 350-351, gjm)

This already brings us to the second aspect of our critical distance towards risk society theory: the way it approaches the reality of capitalism. Is it not that, on closer examination, its notion of 'risk' indicates a narrow and precisely defined domain in which risks are generated: the domain of the uncontrolled use of science and technology in the conditions of capitalism? The paradigmatic case of 'risk', which is not simply one among many out risk 'as such', is that of a new scientific-technological invention put to use by a private corporation without proper public democratic debate and control, then generating the spectre of unforeseen catastrophic long-term consequences. However, is not this kind of risk rooted in the fact that the logic of market and profitability is driving privately owned corporations to pursue their course and use scientific and technological innovations (or simply expand their production) without actually taking account of the long-term effects of such activity on the environment, as well as the health of humankind itself?

Thus - despite all the talk about a 'second modernity' which compels us to leave the old ideological dilemmas of Left and Right, of capitalism versus socialism, and so on, behind - is not the conclusion to be drawn that in the present global situation, in which private corporations outside public political control are making decisions which can affect us all, even up to our chances of survival, the only solution lies in a kind of direct socialization of the productive process - in moving towards a society in which global decisions about the fundamental orientation of how to develop and use productive capacities at the disposal of society would somehow be made by the entire collective of the people affected by such decisions? Theorists of the risk society often evoke the need to counteract reign of the 'depoliticized' global market with a move towards radical repoliticization, which will take crucial decisions away from state planners and experts and put them into the hands of the individuals and groups concerned themselves (through the revitalization of active citizenship, broad public debate, and so on) - however, they stop short of putting in question the very basics of the anonymous logic of market relations and global capitalism, which imposes itself today more and more as the 'neutral' Real accepted by all parties and, as such, more and more depoliticized. 34

A2: Link Turn/ Perm

() **The plan get's co-opted- their attempt at change fuels the currently endless cycle- one act within the system can't break down the rest**

Zizek 2006 (Slavoj, University of Ljubljana, "Nobody has to be vile", April 6)

This isn't an entirely new phenomenon. Remember Andrew Carnegie, who employed a private army to suppress organised labour in his steelworks and then distributed large parts of his wealth for educational, cultural and humanitarian causes, proving that, although a man of steel, he had a heart of gold? In the same way, today's liberal communists give away with one hand what they grabbed with the other. **There is a chocolate-flavoured laxative available on the shelves of US stores which is publicised with the paradoxical injunction: Do you have constipation? Eat more of this chocolate! - i.e. eat more of something that itself causes constipation.** The structure of the chocolate laxative can be discerned throughout today's ideological landscape; it is what makes a figure like Soros so objectionable. He stands for ruthless financial exploitation combined with its counter-agent, humanitarian worry about the catastrophic social consequences of the unbridled market economy. Soros's daily routine is a lie embodied: half of his working time is devoted to financial speculation, the other half to 'humanitarian' activities (financing cultural and democratic activities in post-Communist countries, writing essays and books) which work against the effects of his own speculations. The two faces of Bill Gates are exactly like the two faces of Soros: on the one hand, a cruel businessman, destroying or buying out competitors, aiming at a virtual monopoly; on the other, the great philanthropist who makes a point of saying: 'What does it serve to have computers if people do not have enough to eat?' CR

() **Like Bill Gates in a business suit, they fail to realize the current state of reality and the true source of inequality**

Zizek 2006 (Slavoj, University of Ljubljana, "Nobody has to be vile", April 6)

Some of them, at least, moved to Davos. The tone of the Davos meetings is now predominantly set by the group of entrepreneurs who ironically refer to themselves as 'liberal communists' and who no longer accept the opposition between Davos and Porto Alegre: their claim is that we can have the global capitalist cake (thrive as entrepreneurs) and eat it (endorse the anti-capitalist causes of social responsibility, ecological concern etc). There is no need for Porto Alegre: instead, Davos can become Porto Davos. So who are these liberal communists? The usual suspects: Bill Gates and George Soros, the CEOs of Google, IBM, Intel, eBay, as well as court-philosophers like Thomas Friedman. The true conservatives today, they argue, are not only the old right, with its ridiculous belief in authority, order and parochial patriotism, but also the old left, with its war against capitalism: both fight their shadow-theatre battles in disregard of the new realities. The signifier of this new reality in the liberal communist Newspeak is 'smart'. Being smart means being dynamic and nomadic, and against centralised bureaucracy; believing in dialogue and co-operation as against central authority; in flexibility as against routine; culture and knowledge as against industrial production; in spontaneous interaction and autopoiesis as against fixed hierarchy. Bill Gates is the icon of what he has called 'frictionless capitalism', the post-industrial society and the 'end of labour'. Software is winning over hardware and the young nerd over the old manager in his black suit. In the new company headquarters, there is little external discipline; former hackers dominate the scene, working long hours, enjoying free drinks in green surroundings. The underlying notion here is that Gates is a subversive marginal hooligan, an ex-hacker, who has taken over and dressed himself up as a respectable chairman. CR

Withdraw Alternative Solvency

Our alternative is to completely withdraw from the ideology of capital – this is essential to destroy the fetish that allows capital to survive

Johnston, interdisciplinary research fellow in psychoanalysis at Emory University, **2004**
(Adrian, Psychoanalysis, Culture & Society, December v9 i3 p259 page infotrac gjm)

Perhaps the absence of a detailed political roadmap in Zizek's recent writings isn't a major shortcoming. Maybe, at least for the time being, the most important task is simply the negativity of the critical struggle, the effort to cure an intellectual constipation resulting from capitalist ideology and thereby to truly open up the space for imagining authentic alternatives to the prevailing state of the situation. Another definition of materialism offered by Zizek is that it amounts to accepting the internal inherence of what fantasmatically appears as an external deadlock or hindrance (Zizek, 2001d, pp 22-23) (with fantasy itself being defined as the false externalization of something within the subject, namely, the illusory projection of an inner obstacle, Zizek, 2000a, p 16). From this perspective, seeing through ideological fantasies by learning how to think again outside the confines of current restrictions has, in and of itself, the potential to operate as a form of real revolutionary practice (rather than remaining merely an instance of negative/critical intellectual reflection). Why is this the case? Recalling the analysis of commodity fetishism, the social efficacy of money as the universal medium of exchange (and the entire political economy grounded upon it) ultimately relies upon nothing more than a kind of "magic," that is, the belief in money's social efficacy by those using it in the processes of exchange. Since the value of currency is, at bottom, reducible to the belief that it has the value attributed to it (and that everyone believes that everyone else believes this as well), derailing capitalism by destroying its essential financial substance is, in a certain respect, as easy as dissolving the mere belief in this substance's powers. The "external" obstacle of the capitalist system exists exclusively on the condition that subjects, whether consciously or unconsciously, "internally" believe in it-- capitalism's life-blood, money, is simply a fetishistic crystallization of a belief in others' belief in the socio-performative force emanating from this same material. And yet, this point of capitalism's frail vulnerability is simultaneously the source of its enormous strength: its vampiric symbiosis with individual human desire, and the fact that the late-capitalist cynic's fetishism enables the disavowal of his/her de facto belief in capitalism, makes it highly unlikely that people can simply be persuaded to stop believing and start thinking (especially since, as Zizek claims, many of these people are convinced that they already have ceased believing). Or, the more disquieting possibility to entertain is that some people today, even if one succeeds in exposing them to the underlying logic of their position, might respond in a manner resembling that of the Judas-like character Cypher in the film The Matrix (Cypher opts to embrace enslavement by illusion rather than cope with the discomfort of dwelling in the "desert of the real"): faced with the choice between living the capitalist lie or wrestling with certain unpleasant truths, many individuals might very well deliberately decide to accept what they know full well to be a false pseudo-reality, a deceptively comforting fiction ("Capitalist commodity fetishism or the truth? I choose fetishism").

Withdraw Alternative Solvency

Our alternative is an absolute withdrawal from the plan – this negative gesture wipes the slate of the real clean which is a precursor to any positive gesture – this acknowledgement is key to opening the absolute contraction of subjectivity

Zizek, Senior Researcher at the Institute for Social Studies, Ljubljana, Slovenia, **1999**
(Slavoj, The Ticklish Subject, page 153-154, gjm)

It would therefore be tempting to risk a 'Badiouian-Pauline reading of the end of psychoanalysis, determining it as a New Beginning, a symbolic 'rebirth' - the radical restructuring of the analysand's subjectivity in such a way that the vicious cycle of the superego is suspended, left behind. Does not Lacan himself provide a number of hints that the end of analysis opens up the domain of Love beyond Law, using the very Pauline terms to which Badiou refers? Nevertheless, Lacan's way is not that of St Paul or Badiou: psychoanalysis is not 'psychosynthesis'; it does not already posit a 'new harmony', a new Truth-Event; it - as it were - merely wipes the slate clean for one. However, this 'merely' should be put in quotation marks, because it is Lacan's contention that, in this negative gesture of 'wiping the slate clean', something (a void) is confronted which is already 'sutured' with the arrival of a new Truth-Event. For Lacan negativity, a negative gesture of withdrawal precedes any positive gesture of enthusiastic identification with a Cause: negativity functions as the condition of (im)possibility of the enthusiastic identification - that is to say, it lays the ground, opens up space for it but is simultaneously obfuscated by it and undermines it. For this reason, Lacan implicitly changes the balance between Death and Resurrection in favour of Death: what 'Death' stands for at its most radical is not merely the passing of earthly life, but the 'night of the world', the self-withdrawal, the absolute contraction of subjectivity, the severing of its links with 'reality' - this is the 'wiping the slate clean' that opens up the domain of the symbolic New Beginning, of the emergence of the 'New Harmony' sustained by a newly emerged Master-Signifier.

Self-Orientation First

Our question of self-orientation precedes political action

Johnston, interdisciplinary research fellow in psychoanalysis at Emory University, **2004**
(Adrian, Psychoanalysis, Culture & Society, December v9 i3 p259 page infotrac gjm)

The height of Zizek's philosophical traditionalism, his fidelity to certain lasting truths too precious to cast away in a postmodern frenzy, is his conviction that no worthwhile praxis can emerge prior to the careful and deliberate formulation of a correct conceptual framework. His references to the Lacanian notion of the Act (qua agent-less occurrence not brought about by a subject) are especially strange in light of the fact that he seemingly endorses the view that theory must precede practice, namely, that deliberative reflection is, in a way, primary. For Zizek, the foremost "practical" task to be accomplished today isn't some kind of rebellious acting out, which would, in the end, amount to nothing more than a series of impotent, incoherent outbursts. Instead, given the contemporary exhaustion of the socio-political imagination under the hegemony of liberal-democratic capitalism, he sees the liberation of thinking itself from its present constraints as the first crucial step that must be taken if anything is to be changed for the better. In a lecture given in Vienna in 2001, Zizek suggests that Marx's call to break out of the sterile closure of abstract intellectual ruminations through direct, concrete action (thesis eleven on Feuerbach--"The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it") must be inverted given the new prevailing conditions of late-capitalism. Nowadays, one must resist succumbing to the temptation to short-circuit thinking in favor of acting, since all such rushes to action are doomed; they either fail to disrupt capitalism or are ideologically co-opted by it.

Radical Negation Alternative Solvency

Radical negation of the particular is the only mechanism to establishing a concrete universal

Zizek, Senior Researcher at the Institute for Social Studies, Ljubljana, Slovenia, **1999**
(Slavoj, The Ticklish Subject, page 91-92, gjm)

However, are things really so simple? In order not to misread the properly Hegelian flavour of the opposition between abstract and concrete universality, one should 'crossbreed' it with another opposition, that between positive Universality as a mere impassive/neutral medium of the coexistence of its particular content (the 'mute universality' of 'a species defined by what all members of the species have in common), and Universality in its actual existence, which, is individuality, the assertion of the subject as unique and irreducible to the particular concrete totality into which he is inserted. In Kierkegaardese, this difference is the one between the positive Being of the Universal and universality-in-becoming: the obverse of the Universal as the pacifying neutral medium/container of its particular content is the Universal as the power of negativity that undermines the fixity of every particular constellation, and this power comes into existence in the guise of the individual's absolute egotist self-contraction, his negation of all determinate content. The dimension of Universality becomes 'actual' (or, in Hegelese, 'for itself') only by 'entering into existence' as universal, that is, by opposing itself to all its particular content, by entering into a negative relationship with its particular content.

With regard to the opposition between abstract and concrete Universality, this means that the only way towards a truly 'concrete' universality leads through the full assertion of the radical negativity by means of which the universal negates its entire particular content: despite misleading appearances, it is the 'mute universality' of the neutral container of the particular content which is the predominant form of abstract universality. In other words, the only way for a Universality to become 'concrete' is to stop being a neutral-abstract medium of its particular content, and to include itself among its particular subspecies. What this means is that, paradoxically, the first step towards 'concrete universality' is the radical negation of the entire particular content: only through such a negation does the Universal gain existence, become visible 'as such'. Here let us recall Hegel's analysis of phrenology, which closes the chapter on 'Observing Reason' in his Phenomenology: Hegel resorts to an explicit phallic metaphor in order to explain the opposition of the two possible readings of the proposition 'the Spirit is a bone' (the vulgar-materialist 'reductionist' reading - the shape of our skull actually and directly determines the features of our mind - and the speculative reading - the spirit is strong enough to assert its identity with the most utterly inert stuff, and to 'sublate' it - that is to say, even the most utterly inert stuff cannot escape the Spirit's power of mediation). The vulgar-materialist reading is like the approach which sees in the phallus only the organ of urination, while the speculative reading is also able to discern in it the much higher function of insemination (i.e. precisely 'conception' as the biological anticipation of concept).

Authentic Act Alternative Solvency

Must engage in an authentic act which disrupts the fantasy –acceptance of the fundamental alienation in the symbolic order is a precondition for authenticity

Zizek, Senior Researcher at the Institute for Social Studies, Ljubljana, Slovenia, **1999**
(Slavoj, The Ticklish Subject, page 374-375, gjm)

This antinomy can also be formulated as the antinomy between the simulacrum (of the masks I wear, of the roles I play in the game of intersubjective relationships) and the Real (of traumatic bodily violence and cuts), The key point here is again to assert the Hegelian 'speculative identity' between these two opposites: the price of the global reign of simulacra is extreme violence to the bodily Real (Long ago, Lacan provided the formula for this paradoxical coincidence of opposites: when symbolic efficiency is suspended, the Imaginary falls into the Real) So how are we to break out of this vicious cycle? Any attempt to return to Oedipal symbolic authority is clearly self-defeating, and can lead only to ridiculous spectacles like those of the Promise-Keepers, What is needed is the assertion of a Real which, instead of being caught in the vicious cycle with its imaginary counterpart, (re)introduces the dimension of the impossibility that shatters the Imaginary; in short, what is needed is an act as opposed to mere activity - the authentic act that involves disturbing ('traversing') the fantasy.

Whenever a subject is 'active' (especially when he is driven into frequent hyperactivity), the question to be asked is: what is the underlying fantasy sustaining this activity? The act - as opposed to activity - occurs only when this phantasmic background itself is disturbed. In this precise sense, act for Lacan is on the side of the object qua real as opposed to signifier (to 'speech act'): we can perform speech acts only in so far as we have accepted the fundamental alienation in the symbolic order and the phantasmic support necessary for the functioning of this order, while the act as real is an event which occurs *ex nihilo*, without any phantasmic support. As such, the act as object is also to be opposed to the subject, at least in the standard Lacanian sense of the 'alienated' divided subject: the correlate to the act is a divided subject, but not in the sense that, because of this division, the act is always failed, displaced, and so on - on the contrary, the act in its tuche is that which divides the subject who can never subjectivize it, assume it as 'his own', it himself as its author-agent - the authentic act that I accomplish is always by definition a foreign body an intruder which simultaneously attracts/fascinates and repels me, so that if and when I come too close to it, this leads to my aphanisis, self-erasure. If there is a subject to the act, it is not the subject of subjectivization, of integrating the act into the universe of symbolic integration and recognition, of assuming the act as 'my own', but, rather an uncanny 'acephalous' subject through which the act takes place as that which is 'in him more than himself'. The act thus designates the level at which the fundamental divisions and displacements usually associated with the 'Lacanian subject' (the split between the subject of the enunciation and the subject of the enunciated/statement; the subject's 'decentrement' with regard to the symbolic big Other; etc.) are momentarily suspended – in the act, the subject, as Lacan puts it, posits himself as his own cause, and is no longer determined by the decentred object-cause.

For that reason, Kant's description of how a direct insight into the Thing in itself (the noumenal God) would deprive us of our freedom and turn us into lifeless puppets if we subtract from it the scenic imagery (fascination with the Divine Majesty) and reduce it to the essential (an entity performing what it does 'automatically', without any inner turmoil and struggle), paradoxically fits the description of the (ethical) act perfectly – this act is precisely something which unexpectedly 'just occurs' it is an occurrence which also (and even most) surprises its agent itself (after an authentic act, my reaction is always 'Even I don't know how I was able to do that, it just happened!'). The paradox is thus that, in an authentic act, the highest freedom coincides with the utmost passivity, with a reduction to a lifeless automaton who blindly performs its gestures. The problematic of the act thus compels us to accept that radical shift of perspective involved in the modern notion of finitude: what is so difficult to accept is not the fact that the true act is which noumenal and phenomenal dimensions coincide is forever out of our reach; the true trauma lies in the opposite awareness that *there are acts*, that they *do occur*, and that we have to come to terms with them.

A2: Fiat/Framework

() Turn: Depoliticization- The is the link- attempting to exclude our criticism reinforces neoliberal ideology and stifles any break or vision away from the status quo

Sears No date given (Alan, author and frequent contributor, “The New Socialist: The End of the 20th Century Socialism?”)

Neo-liberalism and lean production have rolled back many of the social rights associated with winning fuller citizenship. However, we have not yet seen a repoliticization of society. Indeed, it is a central goal of neo-liberalism to depoliticize society, making it seem that the market determines everything and that politics is irrelevant. Of course, underlying this apparent market domination is a brutal use of state power in immigration controls, policing and imprisonment to eliminate alternatives to wage labour (such as squeegeeing car windshields), **stifle dissent and reinforce the vulnerabilities of the disadvantaged.** At the present time, there is a remarkable political consensus about the inevitability of neo-liberalism and lean production that ranges from the Tories to the NDP. Globally, New Labour in Britain has been a pioneer in the re-engineering of social democracy to fit with neo-liberalism, though apparently more radical formations like the ANC in South Africa and the PT in Brazil also fell in line. This depoliticization of society and weakening of the infrastructure of dissent produces a dumbing down of political discussion and debate. With few issues of substance in play, the media tend to reduce politics to silly coverage of personalities and empty sound-bytes. This does not begin with the media, but with the shrinking of the sphere of politics and the weakening of collective means of communication, analysis and mobilization. CR

AT: R & T

1) Robinson engages a tainted epistemology –

- a) Their theory relies on a conflation of the political and the contingent nature of politics --
Lacan's focus on ontology does not preclude the use of lack in an analysis of politics

Thomassen, Department of Government, University of Essex, 2004

(Lasse, The British Journal of Politics & International Relations Volume 6 Issue 4 Page 558 - November

<http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/full/10.1111/j.1467-856X.2004.00157.x?cookieSet=1>)

Robinson believes that, since Lacan did not provide a specific theory of politics, but only a more abstract ontology, all the political appropriations of Lacan can do is to subsume politics to pregiven Lacanian categories (p. 261). This is obviously a potential danger, and one that must be avoided. One must insist that analytical categories are always rearticulated when applied; as Wittgenstein has shown, there is no application that leaves intact the rule being applied. But this does not preclude the theorisation of politics through categories that were not originally thought to apply (directly or indirectly) to politics. This would assume a regional conception of politics: politics as determined as a particular region with particular (essential) limits and requiring a theory only applicable to this region. This, in turn, would require a theory transcending all regions and thus capable of delimiting the specifically political region—again not a feasible alternative from a post-structuralist viewpoint. It is the merit of, among others, the theorists considered by Robinson, that they have introduced a distinction between, on the one hand, *politics* as the region of practices usually referred to as politics and, on the other hand, *the political* as the moment of the contingent institution of politics and the social. *The political* cannot be reduced to a specific region, but instead refers to a logic permeating society in its entirety, even if in some places more than others. Since *the political* understood as contingency permeates *politics*, we can use *the political* as a principle of analysing *politics*. This is one of the contributions of post-structuralist (including Lacanian) political theory.

AT: R & T

- b) **Robinson misreads the role of violence in Žižek's theory – even if its part of the revolution it is not a defining feature of a transcendent society**

Thomassen, Department of Government, University of Essex, **2004**

(Lasse, The British Journal of Politics & International Relations Volume 6 Issue 4 Page 558 - November
<http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/full/10.1111/j.1467-856X.2004.00157.x?cookieSet=1>)

(3) According to Robinson, Lacanian political theory is inherently conservative. 'Lacanian', Robinson writes, 'urge that one reconcile oneself to the inevitability of lack. Lacanian politics is therefore about coming to terms with violence, exclusion and antagonism, not about resolving or removing these' (p. 260). And, about Mouffe, he writes that, 'as a Lacanian, Mouffe cannot reject exclusion; it is, on a certain level, necessary according to such a theory' (p. 263). Such assertions are only possible if we believe in the possibility of opposing exclusion to a situation of non-exclusion, which is exactly what post-structuralists have challenged. Moreover, the post-structuralist (and Lacanian) view does not necessarily preclude the removal of any concrete exclusion. On the contrary, the acknowledgement of the constitutivity of exclusion shifts the focus from exclusion versus non-exclusion to the question of which exclusions we can and want to live with. Nothing in the post-structuralist (and Lacanian) view thus precludes a progressive politics. Of course, this is not to say that a progressive politics is guaranteed—if one wants guarantees, post-structuralist political theory is not the place to look.

There are similar problems with Robinson's characterisation of Žižek's 'nihilistic variety of Lacanianism': 'the basic structure of existence is unchangeable ... [Žižek's] Lacanian revolutionism must stop short of the claim that a better world can be constructed' (p. 267). This, according to Robinson, 'reflects an underlying conservatism apparent in even the most radical-seeming versions of Lacanianism' (p. 268). Again, the constitutivity of exclusion and violence does not necessarily mean that 'the new world cannot be better than the old' (p. 268). The alternative to guaranteed progress is not necessarily conservatism or nihilism, and the impossibility of a perfect society does not exclude attempts at improvement—with the proviso that what counts as improvement cannot be established according to some transcendental yardstick.

AT: R & T

- c) **Robinson groups six contradictory lack authors into one – this makes it difficult to trust any conclusion they come to**

Thomassen, Department of Government, University of Essex, **2004**

(Lasse, The British Journal of Politics & International Relations Volume 6 Issue 4 Page 558 - November
<http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/full/10.1111/j.1467-856X.2004.00157.x?cookieSet=1>)

In the May 2004 issue of this *Journal*, Andrew Robinson (2004) reviewed recent books by Alain Badiou, Judith Butler, Ernesto Laclau, Slavoj Žižek, Chantal Mouffe and Yannis Stavrakakis under the heading 'The politics of lack'. Robinson argues that a post-structuralist conception of politics oriented by a notion of constitutive lack and inspired by Lacanian psychoanalysis is fundamentally misguided. This approach to politics and political theory is guided by the idea that identity is constituted around a fundamental lack at the heart of the subject, and that identity is constituted through the identification with external objects, thus temporarily filling the lack. There are three basic problems with this approach to politics, according to Robinson. First, as it relies on an abstract ontology, it is unable to properly engage with concrete politics, and the study of politics is reduced to the subsumption of empirical cases to pre-given ontological categories, which the former merely exemplify. Second, the kind of radical democratic theory emerging from the lack/Lacanian approach is only radical in name, but in fact uncritical of existing liberal democracy. Finally, this approach is conservative and nihilistic, according to Robinson, because it refuses the possibility of progress.

While Robinson makes some succinct points about some of the texts under consideration, I would like to address some of the general points Robinson makes as well as the assumptions about political theorising behind his critique of these authors. I shall address three points: (1) the use of the labels 'Lacanian' and 'theorist of lack'; (2) the relationship between ontology and politics; and (3) the alleged conservatism of the Lacanian political theory.

(1) Robinson tells us that, although there are differences among the books under review, '[t]here are, however, sufficient similarities between the books under review here to suggest that they belong to a single approach, sufficiently similar to each other and sufficiently different from other varieties of post-structuralism to qualify as a distinct paradigm' (p. 259). The 'approach' or 'paradigm' is referred to as 'an ontology of lack', (p. 269), '[a]n approach to politics drawn from Lacanian psychoanalysis' (p. 259), 'Lacanian politics' (p. 260) and 'Lacanianism' (p. 267), and the theorists are referred to as 'Lacnians' (p. 260) and 'Lacanian theorists' (p. 268).

Although the use of labels like these can be useful, one must be careful. First of all, although I would contend that Mouffe could be classified as a theorist of lack, she is hardly a Lacanian. In the book reviewed by Robinson, she makes only a general reference to Lacan (Mouffe 2000, 34). In addition, she makes reference to the developments of an ethics of psychoanalysis inspired by the work of Lacan in the works of Slavoj Žižek, Yannis Stavrakakis and John Rajchman (Mouffe 2000, 137–139). These developments, she argues, dovetail with her own approach, but neither she nor anyone else has ever claimed that she is 'a Lacanian' (Robinson 2004, 263). It thus seems to be possible to be a 'theorist of lack' without being a 'Lacanian', and one should not confuse the two. Indeed, it seems that we are dealing here with an instance of what Robinson is criticising, namely the subsumption of a concrete instance (Mouffe) to an *a priori* category ('Lacanian') with no regard to the specificity of the former.

Moreover, there are important differences between the theorists reviewed by Robinson. Stavrakakis, for instance, has criticised the work of Badiou and Žižek (Stavrakakis 2003), and Žižek has criticised Laclau for not being radical enough (Butler, Laclau and Žižek 2000). More examples could be given, but the important point here is that when one talks about 'approaches' and 'paradigms', one must be careful to specify exactly what it is that unites the theorists within the approach or paradigm. Robinson also recognises this: 'The differences between the texts under review mainly arise around the issue of how to articulate Lacanian themes into a concrete political discourse' (p. 261). That is, we can talk about a Lacanian approach or an approach inspired by an ontology of lack even though there are differences in the extent to which the theorists interpret Lacanian themes or the ontology of lack respectively. The identification of an approach can, for instance, serve as the focal point for a discussion of the relative merits of different post-structuralist approaches (see Tønder and Thomassen (forthcoming)). Indeed, Robinson seems to aim at precisely this; that is, Robinson's aim is to rescue post-structuralist political theory from Lacanian political theory (pp. 259, 268ff.). However, his critique of Lacanian political theory (as I shall call it) seems to rest on a conception of political theory hardly reconcilable with what can broadly be referred to as post-structuralism. What is at stake here is what kind of political theory is possible from a post-structuralist perspective.

AT: R & T

2) Contingency fails –

a) Contingency doesn't overcome the discourse of the master

Newman, postdoctoral fellow and lecturer at the University of Western Australia, **2004**
(Saul, Psychoanalysis, Culture & Society, December v9 i3 p298 page infotrac gjm)

Moreover, as Lacan shows, political movements and discourses that seek to transform society, to overthrow the dominant discourse of the master, are still trapped within this discourse and inevitably perpetuate it. The discourse of the master encompasses even those revolutionary theories that seek to overthrow it:

What I mean by this is that it embraces everything, even what thinks of itself as revolutionary, or more exactly what is romantically called Revolution with a capital R. The discourse of the master accomplishes its own revolution in the other sense of doing a complete circle. (Grigg, Seminar XVII, Ch 6, p 2)

In other words, what a political revolution succeeds in doing is merely to re-instantiate itself within the structure of the master's discourse. It merely completes the circle, once again ending up in the master's discourse--the very position of authority that it tried to negate. It is here that Lacan seems to reflect the anarchist argument about the "place of power" or the structural imperative of authority to perpetuate itself, even in revolutionary situations. In other words, both the anarchists and Lacan would see power and authority in terms of a specific structural logic of self-perpetuation, pointing to the dangers of revolutionary endeavors that do not deal directly with this question. This would apply particularly to Marxism, which ends up in a 'changing of the guard'. As anarchists showed, Marxism falls into the trap of the place of power because it thinks it can transform society without transforming the structure of authority; because it seeks merely to put another agent in the position of authority--the worker in place of the bourgeois. "And this is why," as Lacan says "all he has done is change masters" (Grigg, Seminar XVII, Ch 2, p 6).

b) Only psycho-analysis holds individuals responsible for their interactions with the real – contingencies do not solve

Daly, Lecturer of International Studies @ University College of Northampton, 2004 (Glyn, "Slavoj Zizek: Risking the Impossible," Lacan.com, <http://www.lacan.com/zizek-primer.htm>, Kel)

Zizek's thought is concerned crucially to reactivate the dimension of the miraculous in political endeavour. For Zizek the miracle is that which coincides with trauma in the sense that it involves a fundamental moment of symbolic disintegration (2001b: 86). This is the mark of the act: a basic rupture in the weave of reality that opens up new possibilities and creates the space for a reconfiguration of reality itself. Like the miracle, the act is ultimately unsustainable - it cannot be reduced to, or incorporated directly within, the symbolic order. Yet it is through the act that we touch (and are touched by) the Real in such a way that the bonds of our symbolic universe are broken and that an alternative construction is enabled; reality is transformed in a Real sense.

The Real is not simply a force of negation against which we are helpless. In contrast to standard criticisms, what psychoanalysis demonstrates is that we are *not* victims of either unconscious motives or an infrastructural logic of the Real. If reality is a constitutive distortion then the ultimate lesson of psychoanalysis is that we are responsible for its reproduction. Miracles can and do happen. We are capable of Real acts that give reality a new texture and direction; acts that reflect this gap in the order of Being, this abyss of freedom. If Freud - in his theory of the unconscious - affirms an essential autonomization of the signifier, then what Zizek emphasises is an essential autonomization of the act: a basic capacity to break out of existing structures/cycles of signification. Far from being constrained by the notion of impossibility, Zizek's perspective is sustained and energised by the ontological potential for achieving the "impossible" through Real intervention. In this sense, Zizek's conception of the Real may be said to constitute both an inherent limit and an inherent opening/beginning: the radically negative dimension that is the condition of *creatio ex nihilo* and the political itself.

AT: R & T

3) Our Method is sound

a) We cannot take rationality for granted – our method forces criticism of these given terms

Daly, Lecturer of International Studies @ University College of Northampton, 2004 (Glyn, “Slavoj Zizek: Risking the Impossible,” Lacan.com, <http://www.lacan.com/zizek-primer.htm>, Kel)

Zizek is concerned to confront this alibi head on and to oppose it with an ethics of the Real (see also Zupancic, 2000). This is an ethics in which we assume responsibility for our own actions and our inscription within the broader life-world up to and including the construction of socio-economic reality. This is not to embrace any kind of carte blanche approach to reality. The point is rather that we should address the full implications of the way in which our reality is reproduced in human terms and not as a cosmic order. We cannot hide behind terms like "globalisation", "pragmatism", "economic reality", "rationality" and so on, as if they described a neutral ontological order. On the contrary, we are obliged to confront the way in which such terms attempt to ideologically disguise the artificial nature of reality (this grimace of the Real) and, on that very basis, to make real (Real) ethical decisions: i.e. decisions that begin from the position that genuine transformation is always possible and always involves this traumatic dimension of the Real; this dimension of rupture with existing symbolic structures.

An ethics of the Real is not one of accepting impossibility in the sense of an indefinite ideal, but is rather one that entreats us to risk the impossible: to break out of the bonds of existing possibility. This opens the way to what Zizek refers to as the act and to overcome the symbolic mortification associated with the ideological-cynical attitude that revolves around, a fetishized notion of absolute reality. The Third Wayist perspective, for example, is largely stupefied by its master signifier "globalisation" and is consequently unable to mount any real challenge to the basic power structures. Global (capitalist) reality is in place, so it is chiefly a question of adjustment and of adopting a mature-pragmatic attitude. Politics is reduced to a repetitive logic of deliberation rather than active resistance; a politics of conformism towards a determinate order of reality rather than a reconfiguration of that reality. Like Hamlet, Third Wayism remains transfixed by the spectre of impossibility (the global Thing) and this renders it incapable of risking the impossible; of passing to the act.

AT: R & T

- b) **Robinson's ideology partakes in a tautology of its own – their demand for rational morality succumbs to systems of domination they do not criticize**

Dean, Associate Professor of Political Theory, Hobart-William Smith Colleges, 2005 (Jodi, "Enjoyment as a Category of Political Theory," Paper at the Annual Meeting of American Political Science Association, Sept, http://jdeanicate.typepad.com/i_cite/files/apsa_05_enjoyment.doc, Kel)

Drawing from Louis Althusser's theory of ideological interpellation, Žižek asks how the effect of belief in a cause arises, how, in other words, a subject comes to recognize as hailed by an ideological institution (such as the state in the form of the policeman saying, "hey, you!" or God's call as made manifest through the practices, texts, and institutions of the church). The subject may go about specific activities related to a cause, but why does the subject recognize this particular cause as his own? Why does he respond to the hail? Why is it he who is hailed, addressed, called? Žižek's surprising answer is not that the subject has a preexisting good reason for responding, not that the cause in some way corresponds to the subject's deep or true interests. Rather, the subject responds to a certain irrational injunction, that is, to the very fact of the groundless command. We might think here of the word of God, binding because it is God's word or of the fundamental authority of law as grounded in the fact that it is law. In each case, if we point to something beyond God or law as the grounds for their authority, we are positing something higher, something by which to judge God or law, say reason or morality. And, if we then say that reason or morality is the ultimate authority, we get stuck in the same tautology: reason authorizes because it is reasonable; morality authorizes because it is moral. Žižek conceives of this tautology as an object, a sticking point, a residue of irrationality that serves as the very condition for the subject's submission to the ideological hail (objet petit a). Hence, he offers the following wordplay: jouis-sense, enjoyment-in-sense (enjoy-meant) to capture the conjunction of the meaning offered by ideology with its ultimate core of meaninglessness or, irrational enjoyment.¹⁷ Thus, unlike Foucault, Žižek emphasizes the subjectivization of the practices constitutive of belief: belief in an ideological cause results from an excessive, traumatic kernel that resists symbolization or incorporation into a signifying economy. The excess of the subject with respect to its practices, then, is not the result of a multiplicity of competing hails (although this is not excluded). Instead, it is more fundamental: the subject is the very failure of interpellation/symbolization, an absence that is marked (embodied/positivized) by the irrational injunction.¹⁸

AT: R & T

4) External offense

a) Our method is key to understanding current social movements

Dean, Associate Professor of Political Theory, Hobart-William Smith Colleges, 2005 (Jodi, "Enjoyment as a Category of Political Theory," Paper at the Annual Meeting of American Political Science Association, Sept, http://jdeanicate.typepad.com/i_cite/files/apsa_05_enjoyment.doc, Kel)

The category isn't a magic bullet or golden ticket. It's not a pill we can take or practice we can adopt that will revolutionize current political action and thought. Nonetheless, it contributes to thinking about our attachment to and investment in violent, destructive, and authoritarian modes of being. The notion of jouissance, in other words, helps clarify how the accomplishments of new social movements associated with feminism, queer activism, and anti-racism, their successes in challenging the patriarchal family and the disciplined society, have not ushered in a new world of freely self-creating identities, but rather interconnect with expansions and intensifications of global corporate capital to generate new forms of guilt, anxiety, and dependency.² For political theorists, then, the concept is indispensable to understanding the deep libidinal attraction of domination, that is, the passion of our attachments to the objects constitutive of our subjectivities however contingent these objects may be, and hence to the challenge of freedom under communicative capitalism.³

b) Lack politics are essential to understand social relationships and the flow of domination

Newman, postdoctoral fellow and lecturer at the University of Western Australia, **2004**
(Saul, Psychoanalysis, Culture & Society, December v9 i3 p298 page infotrac gjm)

But what does this mean for anarchism and emancipative politics generally? Simply, that it must abandon the fantasy of utopian fullness and recognize that the other is lacking, that there is no natural or essential commonality that holds society together. In other words, what radical politics must acknowledge and, indeed, affirm is that there is no dialectical process or underlying social logic that determines the political--that the political is always radically ungrounded, indeterminate and contingent. Stavrakakis here talks about the crisis of the utopian project, suggesting that instead "the politics of today is the politics of aporia." (Stavrakakis, 1999, p 99) Utopian political projects, including anarchism, were based on the fantasy of a society without dislocation and antagonism, and were attempts to conceal or "patch up" the very lack in the social itself--the lack that was irreducible and indeed, constitutive of the political itself. Traversing the fantasy in the political sense, then, would mean recognizing this irreducible void in the social--the void that jeopardizes and dislocates any political symbolization. It would mean acknowledging the contingency and undecidability of politics, and that transformative and emancipative political projects can never hope to transform the whole of society--there will always be something that eludes them. Society, in other words, is an impossible object that can never be grasped in this way. Indeed, as Stavrakakis argues, Lacanian political theory is based around a fundamental impossibility or lack: "Lacanian political theory aims at bringing to the fore, again and again, the lack in the Other, the same lack that utopian fantasy attempts to mask ..." (Stavrakakis, 1999, p 166). This would mean, moreover, that any kind of radical political critique of institutions and social practices could not be from the perspective of some sort of essentialist subjectivity or social order that institutions are seen to impose themselves upon, but rather would operate within the discursive limits of the institution itself--according to the Lacanian realization that all social practices, even revolutionary ones, are part of, and indeed dependent upon, institutional and discursive structures themselves (Copjec, 1990, p 51).

AT: Feminine Violence

Their criticism fails to interrogate our essential claim that we collapse the political and ethical – this moment of impossibility opens a space for radical politics

Dean, Associate Professor of Political Theory at Hobart-William Smith Colleges, **2004**

(Jodi, Zizek on Law, Law and Critique,

<http://www.springerlink.com/media/f016ykmgr5v7a768x2m/contributions/t/5/7/6/t576781u81nj6m4h.pdf>
[gjm])

This approach has its drawbacks. The sacrifice of "what is in one more than oneself" seems to involve the sacrifice of another. These others may well be those closest to or most like one's self; they fill in as substitutes for that which one sacrifices in oneself, giving it material form, embodying it. In Zizek's examples, moreover, the bodies are feminine and infantile, sacrifices, in a way, of the maternal as well as of the future.

Nevertheless, these acts provide a momentary suspension of meaning that opens up another space of possibility. (Beloved notes that infanticide came to be rearticulated not in terms of the savagery of slaves but of the very institution of slavery.⁶⁵) What radical acts like Sethe's and (to lesser extent) Keyser Soeze's accomplish is a collapsing of the space between the ethical and the political. Rather than holding onto some ethical moment as the limit or ground or exception to the political, through the act one suspends the limit/exception in a political gesture par excellence. Indeed, this is a point where Zizek diverges significantly from Derrida: he rejects Derridean messianic Otherness for its passivity. The Derridean account of the act relies on a split between the political and the ethical; Zizek, as I've shown, understands an act as that which collapse the distinction between the two. Emphasizing the call of the Other, Derrida can only conceive of action in terms of response, a response forever inadequate, forever limited by the Other. Not only does this risk a certain sentimentalism of the Other in imaginary as well as symbolic terms, but it also fails to account for the radical dimension of the act: "It is not so much that, in the act, I 'sublate'/'integrate' the Other; it is rather that, in the act, I directly 'am' the impossible Other-Thing."⁶⁶

AT: Feminine Violence

Their alternative is trapped in the discourse of the Master – it makes their impacts inevitable

Newman, postdoctoral fellow and lecturer at the University of Western Australia, **2004**
(Saul, Psychoanalysis, Culture & Society, December v9 i3 p298 page infotrac gjm)

Moreover, as Lacan shows, political movements and discourses that seek to transform society, to overthrow the dominant discourse of the master, are still trapped within this discourse and inevitably perpetuate it. The discourse of the master encompasses even those revolutionary theories that seek to overthrow it:

What I mean by this is that it embraces everything, even what thinks of itself as revolutionary, or more exactly what is romantically called Revolution with a capital R. The discourse of the master accomplishes its own revolution in the other sense of doing a complete circle. (Grigg, Seminar XVII, Ch 6, p 2)

In other words, what a political revolution succeeds in doing is merely to re-instantiate itself within the structure of the master's discourse. It merely completes the circle, once again ending up in the master's discourse--the very position of authority that it tried to negate. It is here that Lacan seems to reflect the anarchist argument about the "place of power" or the structural imperative of authority to perpetuate itself, even in revolutionary situations. In other words, both the anarchists and Lacan would see power and authority in terms of a specific structural logic of self-perpetuation, pointing to the dangers of revolutionary endeavors that do not deal directly with this question. This would apply particularly to Marxism, which ends up in a 'changing of the guard'. As anarchists showed, Marxism falls into the trap of the place of power because it thinks it can transform society without transforming the structure of authority; because it seeks merely to put another agent in the position of authority--the worker in place of the bourgeois. "And this is why," as Lacan says "all he has done is change masters" (Grigg, Seminar XVII, Ch 2, p 6).

Their alternative remains apolitical – only moving away from identity politics can achieve a universal authentic act

Zizek, Senior Researcher at the Institute for Social Studies, Ljubljana, Slovenia, **1999**
(Slavoj, The Ticklish Subject, page 208-209, gjm)

This is politics proper: the moment in which a particular demand is not simply part of the negotiation of interests but aims at some thing more, and starts to function as the metaphoric condensation of the global restructuring of the entire social space. There is a clear contrast between this subjectivization and today's proliferation of postmodern 'identity politics' whose goal is the exact opposite, that is, precisely the assertion of one's particular identity, of one's proper place within the social structure. The postmodern identity politics of particular (ethnic, sexual, etc.) lifestyles perfectly fits the depoliticized notion of society, in which ever particular group is 'accounted for', has its specific status (of victim) acknowledged through affirmative action or other measures destined to guarantee social justice. The fact that this kind of justice meted out to victimized minorities requires an intricate police apparatus (for identifying the group in question, for punishing offenders against its rights – how legally to define sexual harassment or racial inquiry?, and so on – for providing the preferential treatment which should compensate for the wrong this group has suffered) is deeply significant: what is usually praised as 'postmodern politics' (the pursuit of particular issues whose resolution must be negotiated within the 'rational' global order allocating its particular component its proper place) is thus effectively the end of politics proper.

AT: Feminine Violence

Their alternative is not radical enough – it attempts to eliminate the Other which guarantees failure – we must instead interrogate the mechanisms the Big Other uses to dictate the very notion of identity

Zizek, Senior Researcher at the Institute for Social Studies, Ljubljana, Slovenia, **1999**
(Slavoj, The Ticklish Subject, page 71-72, gjm)

In States of Injury,⁴ Wendy Brown refers to the same logic of the dialectical process when she emphasizes how the first reaction of the oppressed to their oppression is that they imagine a world simply deprived of the Other that exerts oppression on them – women imagine a world *without men*; African-Americans a world without whites; workers a world without capitalists... The mistake of such an attitude is not that it is 'too radical', that it wants to annihilate the Other instead of merely changing it, but, on the contrary, that it is not radical enough: it fails to examine the way the identity of its own position (that of a worker, a woman, an African-American ...) is mediated by the Other (there is no worker without a capitalist organizing the production process, etc.), so that if one is to get rid of the oppressive Other, one has substantially to transform the content of one's own position. That is also the fatal flaw of precipitate historicization: those who want 'free sexuality delivered of the Oedipal burden of guilt and anxiety' proceed in the same way as the worker who wants to survive *as a worker* without a capitalist; they also fail to take into account the way their own position is 'mediated' by the Other. The well-known Mead-Malinowski myth of the free, non-inhibited sexuality reigning in the South Pacific provides an exemplary case of such an 'abstract negation': it merely projects into the spatio-historical Other of 'primitive societies' the fantasy of a 'free sexuality' rooted in our own historical context. In this way, it is not 'historical' enough: it remains caught in the co-ordinates of one's own historical horizon precisely in its attempt to imagine a 'radical' Otherness – in short, anti-Oedipus is the ultimate Oedipal myth....

Only our criticism can solve their impact – universal demands are the only mechanism of solving for gender oppression

Zizek, Senior Researcher at the Institute for Social Studies, Ljubljana, Slovenia, **1989**
(Slavoj, The Sublime Object of Ideology, page 3-4 gjm)

It is upon the unity of these two features that the Marxist notion of the revolution, of the revolutionary situation, is founded: a situation of metaphorical condensation in which it finally becomes clear to the everyday consciousness that it is not possible to solve any particular question without **solving them all** - that is, without solving the fundamental question which embodies the antagonistic character of the social totality. In a 'normal', pre-revolutionary state of things, everybody is fighting his own particular battles (workers are striking for better wages, feminists are fighting for the rights of women, democrats for political and social freedoms, ecologists against the exploitation of nature, participants in the peace movements against the danger of war, and so on). Marxists are using all their skill and adroitness of argument to convince the participants in these particular struggles that the only real solution to their problem is to be found in the global revolution: as long as social relations are dominated by Capital, there will always be sexism in relations between the sexes, there will always be a threat of global war, there will always be a danger that political and social freedoms will be suspended, nature itself will always remain an object of ruthless exploitation. . . . The global revolution will then abolish the basic social antagonism, enabling the formation of a transparent, rationally governed society.

AT: We Solve War Etc

The Real produces structural causality and constructs the reality of subjects

Zizek, Senior Researcher at the Institute for Social Studies, Ljubljana, Slovenia, **1989**
(Slavoj, The Sublime Object of Ideology, page 162-163 gjm)

The paradox of the Lacanian Real, then, is that it is an entity which although it does not exist (in the sense of 'really existing', taking place in reality), has a series of properties - it exercises a certain structural causality. it can produce a series of effects in the symbolic reality of subjects. That is why it can be illustrated by a multitude of well-known jokes based on the same matrix: 'Is this the place where the Duke of Wellington spoke his famous words?' - 'Yes, this is the place, but he never spoke those words' - these never-spoken words are a Lacanian Real. One can quote examples *ad infinitum*: 'Smith not only doesn't believe in ghosts, he isn't even afraid of them!' . . . up to God himself who, according to Lacan, belongs to the Real: 'God has all perfections except one - he doesn't exist!' In this sense, the Lacanian *objet suppose savoir* (the subject presumed to know) is also such a real entity: it does not exist, but it produces a decisive shift in the development of the psychoanalytic cure.

The spectacle of the negative argument is a very particular strategy – it establishes a scenario to fear in order to sustain the current order

Hardt & Negri, 2000 (Michael & Antonio, Empire, P 323, Kel)

The society of the spectacle rules by wielding an age-old weapon. Hobbes recognized long ago that for effective domination “the Passion to be reckoned upon, is Fear.” For Hobbes, fear is what binds and ensures social order, and still today fear is the primary mechanism of control that fills the society of the spectacle. Although the spectacle seems to function through desire and pleasure (desire for commodities and pleasure of consumption), it really works through the communication of fear—or rather, spectacle creates forms of desire and pleasure that are intimately wedded to fear. In the vernacular of early modern European philosophy, the communication of fear was called superstition. And indeed the politics of fear has always been spread through a kind of superstition. What has changed are the forms and mechanisms of the superstitions that communicate fear.

The spectacle of fear that holds together the postmodern, hybrid constitution and the media manipulation of the public and politics certainly takes the ground away from a struggle over the imperial constitution. It seems as if there is no place left to stand, no weight to any possible resistance, but only an implacable machine of power.

AT: We Solve War Etc

The threat of nuclear war is a tool of global capitalism – it insists on fear knowing that it will diffuse conflict

Hardt & Negri, 2000 (Michael & Antonio, Empire, P 344-6, Kel)

Imperial control operates through three global and absolute means: the bomb, money, and ether. The panoply of thermonuclear weapons, effectively gathered at the pinnacle of Empire, represents the continuous possibility of the destruction of life itself. This is an operation of absolute violence, a new metaphysical horizon, which completely changes the conception whereby the sovereign state had a monopoly of legitimate physical force. At one time, in modernity, this monopoly was legitimated either as the expropriation of weapons from the violent and anarchic mob, the disordered mass of individuals who tend to slaughter one another, or as the instrument of defense against the enemy, that is, against other peoples organized in states. Both these means of legitimation were oriented finally toward the survival of the population. Today they are no longer effective. The expropriation of the means of violence from a supposedly self-destructive population tends to become merely administrative and police operations aimed at maintaining the segmentations of productive territories. The second justification becomes less effective too as nuclear war between state powers becomes increasingly unthinkable. The development of nuclear technologies and their imperial concentration have limited the sovereignty of most of the countries of the world insofar as it has taken away from them the power to make decisions over war and peace, which is a primary element of the traditional definition of sovereignty. Furthermore, the ultimate threat of the imperial bomb has reduced every war to a limited conflict, a civil war, a dirty war, and so forth. It has made every war the exclusive domain of administrative and police power. From no other standpoint is the passage from modernity to postmodernity and from modern sovereignty to Empire more evident than it is from the standpoint of the bomb. Empire is defined here in the final instance as the "non-place" of life, or, in other words, as the absolute capacity for destruction. Empire is the ultimate form of biopower insofar as it is the absolute inversion of the power of life.

AT: Alternative Fails

The argument that we cannot overcome capitalism saps the critical energy from revolution – the system is only strong because we think it is

Zizek in 1995

(Slavoj, Ideology Between Fiction and Fantasy, Cardozo Law Review, page lexis gjm)

The problematic of "multiculturalism" that imposes itself today is therefore the form of appearance of its opposite, of the massive presence of Capitalism as universal world system: it bears witness to the unprecedented homogenization of today's world. It is effectively as if, since the horizon of social imagination no longer allows us to entertain the idea of an eventual demise of Capitalism - since, as we might put it, everybody seems to accept that Capitalism is here to stay - the critical energy found a substitute outlet in fighting for cultural differences which leave the basic homogeneity of the capitalist world-system intact. So we are fighting our PC battles for the right of ethnic minorities, of gays and lesbians, of different "life-styles," etc., while Capitalism pursues its triumphant march - and today's critical theory, in the guise of "cultural studies," is doing the ultimate service to the unrestrained development of Capitalism by actively contributing in the ideological effort to render its massive presence invisible: in a typical postmodern "cultural critique," the very mention of Capitalism as world system tends to give rise to the accusation of "essentialism," "fundamentalism," etc.

AT: Fissures Permutation

One should renounce strategies of synthesis – instead radical criticism must assert that contradictions are irreducible – we should celebrate the gap between thesis and anti-thesis not try to fill it with constructed synthesis

Zizek in 2006

(Slavoj, The Parallax View, The Symptom Volume 7, spring, <http://www.lacan.com/zizparallax.htm> [gjm])

□
In his formidable *Transcritique*, 7 Kojin Karatani endeavors to assert the critical potential of such a "parallax view": when confronted with an antinomic stance in the precise Kantian sense of the term, one should renounce all attempts to reduce one aspect to the other (or, even more, to enact a kind of "dialectical synthesis" of the opposites); one should, on the contrary, assert antinomy as irreducible, and conceive the point of radical critique not a certain determinate position as opposed to another position, but the irreducible gap between the positions itself, the purely structural interstice between them. Kant's stance is thus "to see things neither from his own viewpoint, nor from the viewpoint of others, but to face the reality that is exposed through difference (parallax)." 8 (Is this not Karatani's way to assert the Lacanian Real as a pure antagonism, as an impossible difference which precedes its terms?) This is how Karatani reads the Kantian notion of the *Ding an sich* (the Thing-in-itself, beyond phenomena): this Thing is not simply a transcendental entity beyond our grasp, but something discernible only via the irreducibly antinomic character of our experience of reality. 9 □ □ Let us take Kant's confrontation with the epistemological antinomy which characterized his epoch: empiricism versus rationalism. Kant's solution is neither to chose one of the terms, nor to enact a kind of higher "synthesis" which would "sublate" the two as unilateral, as partial moments of a global truth (and, of course, nor does he withdraw to pure scepticism); the stake of his "transcendental turn" is precisely to avoid the need to formulate one's own "positive" solution. What Kant does is to change the very terms of the debate; his solution - the transcendental turn - is unique in that it, first, rejects the ontological closure: it recognizes a certain fundamental and irreducible limitation ("finitude") of the human condition, which is why the two poles, rational and sensual, active and passive, cannot ever be fully mediated-reconciled - the "synthesis" of the two dimensions (i.e., the fact that our Reason seems to fit the structure of external reality that affects us) always relies on a certain salto mortale or "leap of faith." Far from designating a "synthesis" of the two dimensions, the Kantian "transcendental" rather stands for their irreducible gap "as such": the "transcendental" points at something in this gap, a new dimension which cannot be reduced to any of the two positive terms between which the gap is gaping. And Kant does the same with regard to the antinomy between the Cartesian *cogito* as *res cogitans*, the "thinking substance," a self-identical positive entity, and Hume's dissolution of the subject in the multitude of fleeting impressions: against both positions, he asserts the subject of transcendental apperception which, while displaying a self-reflective unity irreducible to the empirical multitude, nonetheless lacks any substantial positive being, i.e., it is in no way a *res cogitans*. Here, however, one should be more precise than Karatani who directly identifies the transcendental subject with transcendental illusion:

AT: Poverty

Extend the Zizek and Daly evidence – capitalism is responsible for social subjugation on a global scale – this subjugation is responsible for an ethic which makes unequal distribution of resources possible – material yardsticks should not be used to measure ethics because it assures the continuation of the logic of capital

Their argument is all hype – the promise of globalization has been empty for the nations who are not heralded by capital

Shah, editor of Global Issues, **2005**

(Anup, Criticisms of Current Forms of Free Trade, originally created 09/07/1998, updated 6/20/2005
<http://www.globalissues.org/TradeRelated/FreeTrade/Criticisms.asp> gjm)

In reporting on the March 2002 UN Conference on Financing for Development in Monterrey, Mexico, the *New York Times* described feelings of some leaders on the effects of globalization:

Globalization, or the fast-paced growth of trade and cross-border investment, has done far less to raise the incomes of the world's poorest people than the leaders had hoped, many officials here say. The vast majority of people living in Africa, Latin America, Central Asia and the Middle East are no better off today than they were in 1989, when the fall of the Berlin Wall allowed capitalism to spread worldwide at a rapid rate.

Rather than an unstoppable force for development, globalization now seems more like an economic temptress, promising riches but often not delivering, in the view of many of the leaders at the United Nations conference.

Only the alternative solves for poverty

Shah, editor of Global Issues, **2005**

(Anup, Criticisms of Current Forms of Free Trade, originally created 09/07/1998, updated 6/20/2005
<http://www.globalissues.org/TradeRelated/FreeTrade/Criticisms.asp> gjm)

The impoverishment of the developing world is understandable once one learns how “plunder by trade” locks the world into violence and war.

Eliminating poverty is not philosophically complicated; Eliminate the monopolization of land, technology, and finance capital and equalize pay for equally productive work, both within internal economies and between trading nations. Once all nations and all people have access to technology and their labor is paid equally for equally productive work, the buying power of labor in different nations, and within nations, will equalize. Eliminating those monopolies will instantly distribute a share of the wealth to all members of society even as economic efficiency increases and produces more wealth. This is a more cooperative and democratic capitalism that will assure all rights for all people.

AT: Poverty

The excesses of capitalism make elimination of poverty impossible

Shah, editor of Global Issues, **2005**

(Anup, Criticisms of Current Forms of Free Trade, originally created 09/07/1998, updated 6/20/2005
<http://www.globalissues.org/TradeRelated/FreeTrade/Criticisms.asp> gjm)

So, one might naturally ask, if it is this “simple” why haven't the poor done this? There is in some respects, a simple answer but one that demands a lot of explanation! The simple answer to this can be found in in things like politics, greed, dominance-politics, etc. For example, international economic institutions like the World Bank and IMF, with the influence of economically and politically powerful nations, have been able to push through policies, which are known to be destructive (as even admitted by former Chief Economist of the World Bank and Nobel prize winner. (See this web site's section on Structural Adjustment Policies or SAPs, for more including links to article from Joseph Stiglitz (that former Chief Economist) and others on how SAPs creates poverty and destroys any real chance of developing one's own nation.) In fact, instead, things like SAPs open up poor countries economy for “Foreign Direct Investment”, for “constructive engagement” etc. But these are often “constructive” for the multinationals, not always for the host country, because there is “investment” to create sweatshops, “constructive engagement” to extract resources, and so on. There is little “constructive investment” in helping these countries build their own industries. So, such investments might look like they create jobs in the poor countries, but compared to the real potential of what the poor countries could achieve, this is very little, and much potential for poverty alleviation instead is lost. And while some mainstream commentators may not like to talk about it, the effects of colonialism etc are still felt -- the same countries are still poor; their resources are still plundered away (instead of through force it is now largely through unequal trade). (See also this site's section on corporations and human rights for more on this issue of constructive engagement.)

Accumulation of wealth still occurs almost exclusively in richer nations – higher living standards are not indicitive of the progress of capitalism

Shah, editor of Global Issues, **2005**

(Anup, Criticisms of Current Forms of Free Trade, originally created 09/07/1998, updated 6/20/2005
<http://www.globalissues.org/TradeRelated/FreeTrade/Criticisms.asp> gjm)

Of course, today it is a bit more complicated too. We have, for example, products being exported from the poorer countries (albeit some facing high barriers in the rich nations). However, with labor being paid less than their fair wages in the poorer nations, wealth is still accumulated by the richer nations. While it might appear that free trade is taking place, the wealth that is accumulated by the richer countries suggests this is still the age-old mercantilism processes being played over again; a system that Adam Smith criticized so much.

The geopolitical and economic ramifications are far-reaching. The processes of fighting over control and dominance of wealth and power have continued well into this century, even when we are used to believing the older ways are gone. As mentioned in the geopolitics section of this site, and on the previous page on neoliberalism, wars throughout history have typically had trade, commerce, resources at their core, and political systems have been geared towards power play. J.W. Smith highlights well how, for example, the US broke away from British colonial rule, recognizing the unfairness and harshness in Imperial Britain's policies. However, the U.S. has now taken on that role and is doing the same things that the British once did to others: Shortly after the War of 1812 was fought to defeat British mercantilist trade practices, U.S. statesman Henry Clay pointed to the necessity of the United States developing a defensive capability by quoting a British leader,

AT: Poverty

[N]ations knew, as well as [ourselves], what we meant by “free trade” was nothing more nor less than, by means of the great advantage we enjoyed, to get a monopoly of all their markets for our manufactures, and to prevent them, one and all, from ever becoming manufacturing nations.

This is one of the most important aspects of history, and is conveniently ignored.

— J.W. Smith, *The World's Wasted Wealth 2*, (Institute for Economic Democracy, 1994), p. 123.

And with today's more complex and sophisticated global system, it is perhaps harder to see these aspects at play, especially in those regions of the world that have benefitted from the current system. J.W. Smith also captures this aspect quite well:

Although in [the] early years the power brokers knew they were destroying others' tools of production (industrial capital) in the ongoing battle for economic territory, trade has now become so complex that few of today's powerful are aware of the waste and destruction created by the continuation of this neo-mercantalist struggle for markets. Instead, they feel that it is they who are responsible for the world's improving standards of living and that they are defending not only their rights but everybody's rights.

This illusion is possible because in the battle to monopolize society's productive tools and the wealth they produce, industrial capital has become so productive that — even as capital, resources, and labor are indiscriminately consumed — living standards in the over-capitalized nations have continued to improve. And societies are so accustomed to long struggles for improved living standards that to think it could be done much faster seems irrational.

— J.W. Smith, *The World's Wasted Wealth 2*, (Institute for Economic Democracy, 1994), p. 158.

Structural inequality is increasing now – political economies over-determine the distribution of poverty our criticism offers the only hope for the elimination of poverty

Shah, editor of Global Issues, **2006**

(Anup, Criticisms of Current Forms of Free Trade, January 28,

<http://www.globalissues.org/TradeRelated/Poverty.asp> gjm)

Inequality is increasing around the world while the world appears to globalize. Even the wealthiest nation has the largest gap between rich and poor compared to other developed nations. In many cases, international politics and various interests have led to a diversion of available resources from domestic needs to western markets. Historically, politics and power play by the elite leaders and rulers have increased poverty and dependency. These have often manifested themselves in wars, hot and cold, which have often been trade and resource-related. Mercantilist practices, while presented as free trade, still happen today. Poverty is therefore not just an economic issue, it is also an issue of political economics.

AT: Environment

Environmental promises are not remedied by capitalism

Shah, editor of Global Issues, **2005**

(Anup, Criticisms of Current Forms of Free Trade, originally created 09/07/1998, updated 6/20/2005
<http://www.globalissues.org/TradeRelated/FreeTrade/Criticisms.asp> gjm)

Environmental concerns are typically not taken into account of directly. It is argued that the environment will benefit indirectly because the same process of individual greed will create markets that address environmental problems. Yet, this creates unnecessary jobs (which also uses more resources) because sustainable development that would not have to adversely affect the environment in the first place would be a more efficient form of development. This site's section looking deeper behind consumerism and consumption highlights how economic interests do not match or deliver on environmental concerns or human needs and also leads to wasted labor.

Over competition prevents corporations from protecting the environment

Shah, editor of Global Issues, **2005**

(Anup, Criticisms of Current Forms of Free Trade,
<http://www.globalissues.org/TradeRelated/Corporations/Environment.asp> gjm)

In some respects, many corporations are also victims of the ideologies that are prevalent in current mainstream economics that treat the environment in certain regards. Some corporations might wish to be more environmentally friendly but are unable to do so due to fears that their competitors will get away with it (sort of seen in the fiasco of the politics behind global warming issues).

"Over" competition (or even the drive to reduce competition by larger players trying to head towards unaccountable monopolies and oligopolies) may be detrimental in this regards too, then. (See for example, the [Simultaneous Policy](#) that highlights this aspect of over competition well.) It is hard for an individual corporation or even group of corporations to effectively break out of this cycle due to fear of competitors being able to take the advantage. Hence this becomes a political as well as economic and environmental issues.

AT: Cap Solves War

Interdependence doesn't solve war – their argument is based on a truly fair economic system which is not how trade works

Shah, editor of Global Issues, **2005**

(Anup, Criticisms of Current Forms of Free Trade, originally created 09/07/1998, updated 6/20/2005
<http://www.globalissues.org/TradeRelated/FreeTrade/Criticisms.asp> gjm)

In fact, as pointed out by the Institute for Economic Democracy, many wars throughout history, hot or cold, have had trade, resources and related expansion at their core. History shows us that the more powerful nations have devised international economic agreements that promote more dependency upon those wealthier countries. In a twisted sense then, such an interdependency as implemented would be good for “stability” of the status quo. Real interdependency on the other hand, that deals with equity and cooperation as well, may have more likelihood of being good for all, but that would be less likely to happen because it would threaten to reduce the influence and power of the wealthier nations and multinational corporations.

Framework

Ethics disadvantage – extend the Zizek and Daly evidence from the 1NC – mediating ethics through a symbolic order guarantees an apolitical notion of ethics which can never be progressive – their framework is the worse option for ethical actors because it always displaces ethics onto external authority

Aff choice is arbitrary – if we ran a K aff against them you know they'd say framework -- our argument is that it is most predictable method to evaluate debates is the affirmative defending the plan and the negative getting to run a criticism that is germane to their plan – if we win a link argument then our argument is predictable – reasons to prefer this interpretation

- a) negative ground – aff choice makes going negative unpredictable – affirmatives defending a plan and the negative being able to criticize that plan is essential to negative predictability – the affirmative should get the resolution and we should get things that are outside of that action
- b) affirmative ground – our interpretation assures the affirmative can always have state good offense against the criticism – this ground checks any differential in the strategy or predictability arguments
- c) limits – our interpretation is not unlimited we establish a side constraint of links to the plan – this solves their infinite regress argument – and the nature of the negative means that even in their interpretation there are an unlimited number of potential counterplans that a negative could run – which makes this a question of which provides more predictable offense

Their interpretation doesn't solve our offense – you could run a CP that PICs out of one part of the 1AC and have a criticize of those representations – this would be net worse for the affirmative because they could not garner offense off of their plan which would destroy their ability to compete Even if they win their framework this is not a voting issue – this is a reason why you would evaluate their impact claims – and we would win in that world as well because we have a ethics DA to their plan and all of our link arguments are reasons why their plan would not be able to solve.

A2: Fiat/Framework

() Their focus on mega-spheres of action eclipses questions of what we would do if we were simply ourselves killing political activism, inculcating a spectator mentality, and preventing change

Kappeler 95 (Susanne, Associate Professor at Al-Akawayn University, The Will to Violence: The politics of personal behavior, Pg. 10-11)*****

Yet our insight that indeed we are not responsible for the decisions of a Serbian general or a Croatian president tends to mislead us into thinking that therefore we have no responsibility at all, not even for forming our own judgment, and thus into underrating the responsibility we do have within our own sphere of action. In particular, it seems to absolve us from having to try to see any relation between our own actions and those events, or to recognize the connections between those political decisions and our own personal decisions. It not only shows that we participate in what Beck calls 'organized irresponsibility', upholding the apparent lack of connection between bureaucratically, institutionally, nationally, and also individually organized separate competences. It also proves the phenomenal and unquestioned alliance of our personal thinking with the thinking of the major power mongers, For we tend to think that we cannot 'do' anything, say, about a war, because we deem ourselves to be in the wrong situation because we are not where the major decisions are made. Which is why many of those not yet entirely disillusioned with politics tend to engage in a form of mental deputy politics, in the style of 'what would I do if I were the general, the prime minister, the president, the foreign minister or the minister of defense?' Since we seem to regard their mega spheres of action as the only worthwhile and truly effective ones, and since our political analyses tend to dwell there first of all, any question of what I would do if I were indeed myself tends to peter out in the comparative insignificance of having what is perceived as 'virtually no possibilities': what I could do seems petty and futile. For my own action I obviously desire the range of action of a general, a prime minister, or a General Secretary of the UN - finding expression in ever more prevalent formulations like 'I want to stop this war', 'I want military intervention', 'I want to stop this backlash', or 'I want a moral revolution. 'We are this war', however, even if we do not command the troops or participate in co-called peace talks, namely as Drakulic says, in our non-comprehension': our willed refusal to feel responsible for our own thinking and for working out our own understanding, preferring innocently to drift along the ideological current of prefabricated arguments or less than innocently taking advantage of the advantages these offer. And we 'are' the war in our 'unconscious cruelty towards you', our tolerance of the 'fact that you have a yellow form for refugees and I don't'- our readiness, in other words, to build identities, one for ourselves and one for refugees, one of our own and one for the 'others.' We share in the responsibility for this war and its violence in the way we let them grow inside us, that is, in the way we shape our feelings, our relationships, our values' according: to the structures and the values of war and violence. CR

Their truth claims are trapped in a capitalist ontology which predetermines how knowledge is produced

Schiwy, PhD Candidate in Romance Studies at Duke, **&Ennis**, PhD Candidate in Lit at Duke, **2002**
(Freya and Michael, Nepantla: Views from the South 3.1 project muse gjm)

The essays gathered in this dossier respond to issues raised during the workshop “Knowledges and the Known: Capitalism and the Geopolitics of Knowledge,” held at Duke University in November 2000. They address concerns about the possibilities for critical knowledge production at a moment when national state structures are reconfiguring into global institutions and when technologies (like gene prospecting) and epistemic regimes (like property rights and human rights) are installing the particular as a new universal, following the legacy of Enlightenment philosophy and Western political theory. They ask how knowledge production is linked to location and subjectivity and what the importance of these critical perspectives can be when neoliberal capitalism increasingly instrumentalizes and commodifies knowledge, reinforcing the growing dependence of universities around the world on corporate money. It is precisely within this context that Oscar Guardiola-Rivera engages current critical theory from the perspective of coloniality. Although the essays by Catherine Walsh and Javier Sanjinés address contemporary indigenous uprisings in the Andes, these movements are not their object of study. Instead of being about knowledge production *in* the Andes, all three of these articles are efforts to think about epistemology *from* the Andes.¹

Their argument divides the world into those who are capable and incapable of producing knowledge – this predetermines the questions we ask and the answers we formulate

Schiwy, PhD Candidate in Romance Studies at Duke, **&Ennis**, PhD Candidate in Lit at Duke, **2002**
(Freya and Michael, Nepantla: Views from the South 3.1 project muse gjm)

From these basic concerns we identified three broader topics to guide our workshop discussion. The first concerned the relationship between knowledge and subjectivity. The legitimization of the known as knowledge is one aspect of the modern need to designate subjects and [End Page 2] objects of knowledge in geopolitical terms, inscribing them with social, racial, and gendered characteristics. The Cold War reconfiguration of the division between theory and objects in terms of area studies implied and extended the definition of subjectivities and places that could legitimately partake in knowledge production and the definition of the concerns and questions to be addressed by it. What are the legacies of the connections between these social inscriptions, on the one hand, and the geopolitical and institutional locations of subjects and objects of knowledge, on the other? How can we evaluate the impact of the subject's deconstruction when facing what seem like renewed affirmations of “identity politics” in the North and South? How do we evaluate the epistemic capital of recent theorists emerging from the “South,” women and men of color whose theories are marketed, elaborated, and appropriated within the centers of economic and academic power? Does this favorable market situation indicate a change in the relation between social inscription and knowledge production within modernity/coloniality or is it a continuation of hegemonic structures that no longer require “identities” or “positionings”?