

Heidegger 2AC

Block

logan

Heidegger 2AC Block

*be sure to use other kritik blocks for fiat good, case outweighs, etc.

1. Heidegger's project fails on an ontic level – his ontological pursuit creates the conditions for ideology, and we become so blind in our pursuit of ideology that Nazism and fascism become an inevitable end – this card is redonk.

Slavoj Zizek, Senior Researcher and General Badass at the Inst. for Social Studies, University of Lubljana, 1999, *The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Center of Political Ontology* [loganberry]

| As Heidegger himself put it, those who came closest to the ontological Truth are condemned to err at the ontic level . . . err about what? Precisely about the line of separation between ontic and ontological. The paradox not to be underestimated is that the very philosopher who focused his interest on the enigma of ontological difference – who warned again and again against the metaphysical mistake of conferring ontological dignity on some ontic content (God as the highest Entity, for example) – fell into the trap of conferring on Nazism the ontological dignity of suiting the essence of modern man. The standard defence of Heidegger against the

reproach of his Nazi past consists of two points: not only was his Nazi engagement a simple personal error (a 'stupidity [Dummheit]', as Heidegger himself put it) in no way inherently related to his philosophical project; the main counter-argument is that it is Heidegger's own philosophy that enables us to discern the true epochal roots of modern totalitarianism. However, what remains unthought here is the hidden complicity between the ontological indifference towards concrete social systems (capitalism, Fascism, Communism), in so far as they all belong to the same horizon of modern technology, and the secret privileging of a concrete sociopolitical model (Nazism with Heidegger, Communism with some 'Heideggerian Marxists') as closer to the ontological truth of our epoch.

Here one should avoid the trap that caught Heidegger's defenders, who dismissed Heidegger's Nazi engagement as a simple anomaly, a fall into the ontic level, in blatant contradiction to his thought, which teaches us not to confuse ontological horizon with ontic choices (as we have already seen, Heidegger is at his strongest when he demonstrates how, on a deeper structural level, ecological, conservative, and so on, oppositions to the modern universe of technology are already embedded in the horizon of what they purport to reject: the ecological critique of the technological exploitation of nature ultimately leads to a more 'environmentally sound' technology, etc.). Heidegger did not engage in the Nazi political project 'in spite of' his ontological philosophical approach, but because of it; this engagement was not 'beneath' his philosophical level – on the contrary, if one is to understand Heidegger, the key point is to grasp the complicity (in Hegelese: 'speculative identity') between the elevation above ontic concerns and the passionate 'ontic' Nazi political engagement.

One can now see the ideological trap that caught Heidegger: when he criticizes Nazi racism on behalf of the true 'inner greatness' of the Nazi movement, he repeats the elementary ideological gesture of maintaining an inner distance towards the ideological text – of claiming that there is

Heid. → Failure
on ontic level
ontological
pursuit →
positive for
ontology
ideology
we became
blind in our
pursuit of
ontological
greatness

Nazi
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fault
Aest.
ethics
ALT
ways

ideological
pursuit
is sweet

technological thought is sweet!

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something more beneath it, a non-ideological kernel: ideology exerts its hold over us by means of this very insistence that the Cause we adhere to is not 'merely' ideological. So where is the trap? When the disappointed Heidegger turns away from active engagement in the Nazi movement, he does so because the Nazi movement did not maintain the level of its 'inner greatness', but legitimized itself with inadequate (racial) ideology. In other words, what he expected from it was that it should legitimize itself through direct awareness of its 'inner greatness'. And the problem lies in this very expectation that a political movement that will directly refer to its historico-ontological foundation is possible. This expectation, however, is in itself profoundly metaphysical, in so far as it fails to recognize that the gap separating the direct ideological legitimization of a movement from its 'inner greatness' (its historico-ontological essence) is constitutive, a positive condition of its 'functioning'. To use the terms of the later Heidegger, ontological insight necessarily entails ontic blindness and error, and vice versa – that is to say, in order to be 'effective' at the ontic level, one must disregard the ontological horizon of one's activity. (In this sense, Heidegger emphasizes that 'science doesn't think' and that, far from being its limitation, this inability is the very motor of scientific progress.) In other words, what Heidegger seems unable to endorse is a concrete political engagement that would accept its necessary, constitutive blindness – as if the moment we acknowledge the gap separating the awareness of the ontological horizon from ontic engagement, any ontic engagement is depreciated, loses its authentic dignity. 163-15

2. Heidegger concedes technological thought is everywhere – the negative displays it in their structured arguments, their flowing, even the way they dress – means two things –
 - a. The negative links to their own kritik – this takes out their alternative and proves a performative contradiction that's a voter because it destroys our ability to articulate a consistent strategy.
 - b. It's inevitable – there is no method endorsable in this round to break down technological thought processes, even on an individual level.

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3. Heidegger's project presents a forced choice that ruptures their alternative solvency.

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For this reason, Heidegger's 'decision', in the precise sense of anticipatory resoluteness [*Ent-Schlossenheit*], has the status of a forced choice: the Heideggerian decision *qua* repetition is not a 'free choice' in the usual sense of the term. (Such a notion of freely choosing between alternative possibilities is utterly foreign to Heidegger; he dismisses it as belonging to superficial Americanized liberal individualism.) Rather, it is fundamentally the choice of 'freely assuming' one's imposed destiny. This paradox, necessary if one is to avoid the vulgar liberal notion of freedom of choice, indicates the theological problematic of *predestination* and *Grace*: a true decision/choice (not a choice between a series of objects leaving my subjective position intact, but the fundamental choice by means of which I 'choose myself') presupposes that I assume a passive attitude of 'letting myself be chosen' – in short, free choice and Grace are strictly equivalent; or, as Deleuze put it, we really choose only when we are chosen: 'Ne choisit bien, ne choisit effectivement que celui qui est choisi.'¹²

4. Alternative destroys all technological thought, even that which can be productive, i.e. sciences to cure viral/bacterial infections or debate/argument that can be used to reach solutions and resolve questions.
5. Alternative can't escape the kritik – Heidegger proposes ideas to rethink thinking through traditional methods of thinking – this logic is circular and offers no end point.

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6. Heidegger's project fails because we was too metaphysical – his project encountered the endless chain of subjectivism and thus he gave up – our authors predict his mistake.

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If the published *Being and Time* were to cover the entire Part I of the original project, one could still somehow justify this perception of wholeness. (We did get the entire 'systematic' part; what is missing is merely the 'historic' part, the interpretation of the three key moments in the history of Western metaphysics – Aristotle, Descartes, Kant – whose radicalized 'repetition' is Heidegger's own analytic of *Dasein*.) Obviously, the inherent impediment, the barrier preventing the completion of the project, already affects the last section of Part I. If we leave aside the problem of non-publication of the texts (lecture notes) covering the remaining two sections of Part II (does it have something to do with the enigmatic status of imagination in Aristotle, as demonstrated by Castoriadis, the status that explodes the ontological edifice? or with the same implicit anti-ontological thrust of the Cartesian *cogito* as the first announcement of the 'night of the world'?), the enigma is: why was Heidegger unable to accomplish his very systematic exploration of time as the horizon of Being? The standard, 'official' answer is well known: because it became clear to him that the approach of *Being and Time* was still too metaphysical/transcendental, 'methodological', in proceeding from *Dasein* to the question of Being, instead of directly approaching the temporal Disclosure of Being as that which sustains the unique status of *Dasein* among all entities. But what if there was another deadlock, another kind of abyss, that Heidegger encountered – and withdrew from – at this point? We therefore want to argue against the 'official' version of this impediment (that Heidegger became aware of how the project of *Being and Time* was still caught in the transcendental-subjectivist procedure of first establishing the 'conditions of possibility' of the sense of Being via the analysis of *Dasein*): what Heidegger actually encountered in his pursuit of *Being and Time* was the abyss of radical subjectivity announced in Kantian transcendental imagination, and he recoiled from this abyss into his thought of the historicity of Being.

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7. Heidegger's conception of technology mandates ruthless fascist ideology – it is a necessary byproduct of his ideological platform – this card's amazing.

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Here, however, complications arise: on closer inspection, it soon becomes clear that Heidegger's argumentative strategy is twofold. On the one hand, he rejects every concern for democracy and human rights as a purely ontic affair unworthy of proper philosophical ontological questioning – democracy, Fascism, Communism, they all amount to the same with regard to the epochal Destiny of the West; on the other hand, his insistence that he is not convinced that democracy is the political form which best suits the essence of technology^b none the less suggests that there is another political form which suits this ontological essence better – for some time, Heidegger thought he had found it in the Fascist 'total mobilization' (but, significantly, never in Communism, which always remains for him epochally the same as Americanism...). Heidegger, of course, emphasizes again and again how the ontological dimension of Nazism is not to be equated with Nazism as an ontic ideologico-political order; in the well-known passage from *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, for example, he repudiates the Nazi biologist race ideology as something that totally misses the 'inner greatness' of the Nazi movement, which lies in the encounter between modern man and technology.⁷ None the less, the fact remains that Heidegger never speaks of the 'inner greatness' of, say, liberal democracy – as if liberal democracy is just that, a superficial world-view with no underlying dimension of assuming one's epochal Destiny...⁸