

Heidegger Affirmative

2AC Frontline

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ZAC F/L

1. Reject the critique – Heidegger was a Nazi – his adherence to national socialism wasn't a simple personal error – he viewed it as the *least* technological form of society – he wasn't a Nazi in spite of his philosophy, he was a Nazi **BECAUSE OF HIS PHILOSOPHY**

Zizek in 99 (Slavoj, Senior Researcher @ Univ. of Ljubljana, The Ticklish Subject, pp. 13-14)

As Heidegger himself put it, those who came closest to the ontological Truth are condemned to err at the ontic level . . . err about what? Precisely about the line of separation between ontic and ontological. The paradox not to be underestimated is that the very philosopher who focused his interest on the enigma of ontological difference – who warned again and again against the metaphysical mistake of conferring ontological dignity on some ontic content (God as the highest Entity, for example) – fell into the trap of conferring on Nazism the ontological dignity of suiting the essence of modern man. The standard defence of Heidegger against the reproach of his Nazi past consists of two points: not only was his Nazi engagement a simple personal error (a 'stupidity' [Dummheit], as Heidegger himself put it) in no way inherently related to his philosophical project; the main counter-argument is that it is Heidegger's own philosophy that enables us to discern the true epochal roots of modern totalitarianism. (However, what remains unthought here is the hidden complicity between the ontological indifference towards concrete social systems (capitalism, Fascism, Communism), in so far as they all belong to the same horizon of modern technology, and the secret privileging of a concrete sociopolitical model (Nazism with Heidegger, Communism with some 'Heideggerian Marxists') as closer to the ontological truth of our epoch.


Here one should avoid the trap that caught Heidegger's defenders, who dismissed Heidegger's Nazi engagement as a simple anomaly, a fall into the ontic level, in blatant contradiction to his thought, which teaches us not to confuse (ontological) horizon with (ontic) choices (as we have already seen, Heidegger is at his strongest when he demonstrates how, on a deeper structural level, ecological, conservative, and so on, oppositions to the modern universe of technology are already embedded in the horizon of what they purport to reject: the ecological critique of the technological exploitation of nature ultimately leads to a more 'environmentally sound' technology, etc.). Heidegger did not engage in the Nazi political project 'in spite of' his ontological philosophical approach, but because of it; this engagement was not 'beneath' his philosophical level – on the contrary, if one is to understand Heidegger, the key point is to grasp the complicity (in Heidegger's: 'speculative identity') between the elevation above ontic concerns and the passionate 'ontic' Nazi political engagement.

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2. TURN – the alternative of rethinking makes questions of social and economic justice homeless – the very nature of the question that they ask destroys the ability for any practical reconstruction

Yar in 2000 (Majid, Lancaster University, Cultural Values, January 2000)

Similarly, we must consider the consequences that this ontological substitution' for the essence of the political has for politics, in terms of what is practically excluded by this rethinking. If the presently available menu of political engagements and projects (be they market or social liberalism, social democracy, communitarianism, Marxism, etc.) are only so many moments of the techno-social completion of an underlying metaphysics, then the fear of 'metaphysical contamination' inhibits any return to recognisable political practices and sincere engagement with the political exigencies of the day. This is what Nancy Fraser has called the problem of 'dirty hands', the suspension of engagement with the existing content of political agendas because of their identification as being in thrall to the violence of metaphysics. Unable to engage in politics as it is, one either [a] sublimates the desire for politics by retreating to an interrogation of the political with respect to its essence (Fraser, 1984, p. 144), or [b] on this basis, seeks 'to breach the inscription of a wholly other politics'. The former suspends politics indefinitely, while the latter implies a new politics, which, on the basis of its reconceived understanding of the political, apparently excludes much of what recognizably belongs to politics today. This latter difficulty is well known from Arendt's case, whose barring of issues of social and economic justice and welfare from the political domain are well known.



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To offer two examples: [1] in her commentary on the U.S. civil rights movement in the 1950s, she argued that the politically salient factor which needed challenging was only racial legislation and the formal exclusion of African-Americans from the political sphere, not discrimination, social deprivation and disadvantage, etc. (Arendt, 1959, pp. 45-56); [2] Arendt's pronouncement at a conference in 1972 (put under question by Albrecht Wellmer regarding her distinction of the 'political' and the 'social'), that housing and homelessness were not political issues, that they were external to the political as the sphere of the actualisation of freedom as disclosure; the political is about human self-disclosure in speech and deed, not about the distribution of goods, which belongs to the social realm as an extension of the *oikos*.²⁰ The point here is not that Arendt and others are in any sense unconcerned or indifferent about such sufferings, deprivations and inequalities. Rather, it is that such disputes and agendas are identified as belonging to the socio-technical sphere of administration, calculation, instrumentality, the logic of means and ends, subject-object manipulation by a will which turns the world to its purposes, the conceptual rendering of beings in terms of abstract and levelling categories and classes, and so on; they are thereby part and parcel of the metaphysical-technological understanding of Being, which effaces the unique and singular appearance and disclosure of beings, and thereby illegitimate candidates for consideration under the renewed, ontological-existential formulation of the political. To reconceive the political in terms of a departure from its former incarnation as metaphysical politics, means that the revised terms of a properly political discourse cannot accommodate the prosaic yet urgent questions we might typically identify under the rubric of 'policy'. Questions of social and economic justice are made homeless, exiled from the political sphere of disputation and demand in which they were formerly voiced. Indeed, it might be observed that the postmetaphysical formulation of the political is devoid of any content other than the freedom which defines it; it is freedom to appear, to disclose, but not the freedom to do something in particular, in that utilising freedom for achieving some end or other implies a collapse back into will, instrumentality, teleocracy, *poeisis*, etc. By defining freedom *qua* disclosedness as the essence of freedom and the sole end of the political, this position skirts dangerously close to advocating *politique pour la politique*, divesting politics of any other practical and normative ends in the process.²¹

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3. Permutation – do the aff and the negative alternative

- a. Heideggerian rethinking doesn't require movement away from technology or science

Kovacs (Department of Philosophy @ Florida International University) 94
George, Heidegger Studies, v10, p. 198

! This attempt to rethink and even ground an interdisciplinary ecology with Heidegger's ideas, however, may not be regarded as immune from some difficulties. The grounding of ecology in the historical unfolding of being should (not) become a pretense for dispensing with, or for adopting a reductionist attitude toward, science, technology, and ethics. It should be remembered that without science we may not be able to know the earth's beings (science allows us, as Heidegger's (positive) view of science claims, to get close to what is essential to all things, to beings),⁶ and that without ethics we may not be ready to let earth and beings be. The phenomenological understanding of world and earth goes further than perspectival science, but this "going further" may become empty (may remain a mere formality) without arriving at the ethics (ethos) of dwelling in deeds, attitudes, and language. Ontological leap (leap for being) may not be isolated, though ought to be distinguished, from ethical daring and courage. } 178


ZAC F/L

b. ONLY THE PERM SOLVES – the uncompromising nature of their critique and rethinking makes it unable to differentiate between good and bad rationalities and technical alternatives – we must combine to solve

Yar in 2000 (Majid, Lancaster Univ., Cultural Values, Jan 2000)

In summary, on the basis of the criticisms I've outlined, I think that the postmetaphysical rethinking of the political must address itself to a number of difficulties; [1] It must open itself to the investigations of socio-historical sciences in formulating its characterisations of the political in late modernity, rather than relying upon a 'mapping' of philosophical understandings onto society, culture and polity as a whole; [2] It must reconsider its assumptions about the importance or potency of philosophy, using those aforementioned social, historical and politological investigations to reassess the heretofore unchallenged assumption that politics, society and culture are in some sense lived and practised as actualisations of philosophical figurations. This in turn will at least set in question the assumption that a post-philosophically led turn to an 'other thinking' of Being is the most appropriate response to a pathologisation of the political, a pathologisation which the philosophical tradition itself is presumed to have instigated; [3] on the basis of such explorations and reassessments, it must break with synoptic, over-generalising and undifferentiated assessments of the present political, enabling an identification of those aspects of political thinking and practice most in need of challenge; and [4] it must find a way to admit those social and economic problematics which stand under suspicion because of their contamination with metaphysical assumptions (instrumentality, rational calculability, planning, control,

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will-ful manipulation, etc.), but which nonetheless constitute the large part of the most urgent political concerns, for most people, in most of the world today. This last challenge appears the most difficult, striking as it does at the heart of the distinctions upon which the postmetaphysical critique relies. These distinctions are both its strength and its weakness. Strengths because they permit a critique of political modernity at a depth its rivals find hard to match, in the course of which it uncovers underlying continuities and compromises that prevalent discourses on emancipation share with the ideologies and practices they endeavour to supplant. But weaknesses in that the 'extremity' or uncompromising character of its distinctions prevent it from doing what its rivals can do - that is, differentiate between 'legitimate' and 'illegitimate' uses of rationality in its different forms, distinguish between technological alternatives according to their sensitivity to human and environmental needs, and so on. The only way forward, I would suggest, would be to open up to both the explorations of those disciplines in the human and social sciences it has thus far shunned, and equally to engage in a heterodox dialogue with other accounts which 'work' the same socio-political terrain (I'm thinking here especially of critical theory and the possibility of a philosophically informed social theory and analysis).²² I think that such an engagement can only be to the benefit of all parties concerned.

p 32-33

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4. The alternative fails – technology is impossible to reject – proves their project is utopian

Steiner, 2003

(Gary, Professor at Bucknell University, "The perils of a total critique of reason," *Philosophy Today*, Vol. 47, Iss. 1, Proquest)

But the question arises as to where a genuine principle of limitation on technological endeavor would come from. It is scarcely conceivable that Western humanity-and by now most of humanity, because of their pleasures and interests and their own passions and desires and motives-would halt the technological project. Even if, by some change of heart, Western humanity could adopt an altered relation to reality and human beings, how could it be enforced and allowed to yield its effects? The technological project can be stopped only by some global catastrophe that it had helped to cause or was powerless to avoid. Heidegger's teasing invocation of the idea that a saving remedy grows with the worst danger is useless. In any case, no one would want the technological project halted, if the only way was a global catastrophe. Perhaps even the survivors would not want to block its reemergence.

ZAC F/L

5. No impact and turn – their philosophy is powerless to solve fascism or tyranny – don't be fooled by post-modernists' unflinchable obsession with Heidegger – his account of civilization's decline locks him into fascism

Cooke, 1998

(Bill, *Heidegger, Nazism, and postmodernism*, Free Inquiry, Fall 1998, Vol. 18, Issue 4, p. 63-64, lecturer in the School of Art and Design, Manukau Institute of Technology in New Zealand)

What is it about this singularly unpleasant man that appeals to postmodernists? Gianni Vattimo best illustrates the thought-process involved. The most imposing trait of postmodernism, Vattimo declares, is its effort to "free itself from the logic of overcoming, development, and innovation." **Heidegger's** importance lies in his "attempt to prepare a post-metaphysical kind of thought" ("The Structure of Artistic Revolutions" in Thomas Docherty, ed., *Postmodernism: A Reader*, Helmer Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993, p. 117).

Many postmodernists are attracted to **Heidegger's** attempt to fend off modernity by conjuring up an antirational re-enchantment, using the tools of the poet and artist. This is not to say that postmodernism is tantamount to fascism. The problem is not that postmodernism courts fascism, but that it does not care that **Heidegger** did. And even if the postmodernists did care, their having spurned reason and metanarratives renders them unable to make any judgment call that isn't an arbitrary mark in the sand.

Heidegger found this out when the Nazis cast him aside. His philosophy was powerless to explain, let alone combat, the peril he had helped to unleash. Safranski's claim that **Heidegger's** philosophy helped release him from National Socialism ignores the obvious point that it was **Heidegger's** philosophy that also led him into it. And whether Young is correct or not in arguing that **Heidegger** can, with careful re-reading, be put to use in the cause of liberalism and democracy, I for one would prefer to use the thoughts of people such as John Dewey and Bertrand Russell, whose words were matched by deeds and whose philosophy opposed National Socialism before, during, and after that period.

READ THEORY INDICTS!!! IT'S CONDITIONAL!!!!!!

Nazi!

() Heidegger was one of the first Holocaust deniers – his equivocation of mechanization with gas chambers is morally indefensible

Redner in 2002 (Harry, Monash University, Modern Judaism, 22:2, 2002, project muse)

The anti-Semitism of the four modern malign masters, Heidegger, Wittgenstein, Lukacs and Gentile, is not all of a kind, nor is each equally serious or culpable.⁵ In fact, they stand for four distinct varieties of anti-Semitism and are, therefore, indicative of the varied forms, mild or virulent, that this disease of the European mind can take. That there is something wrong with each one of them in this respect, and that all have moral shortcomings on this score, is clearly shown by their response, or mostly lack of response, to the Holocaust. Heidegger's attitude is the most blameworthy, for in his supposed "silence" on this he was, in fact, one of the earliest of the Holocaust deniers, as I shall show. Wittgenstein also maintained a studious silence about it, which was not so much a denial as a willed indifference and unconcern; the murder of the Jews seemed to matter little to him, despite his own family's narrow escape. Lukacs had no such doubts concerning the Holocaust, but he did express a strong inclination to blame the victims for their fate. Gentile, who died just before the full horror was exposed—but who must have known something of what was happening to the deported Jews whom the Germans were rounding up all around him in Italy as elsewhere—never allowed such relative trifles of circumstance to trouble his conscience or disturb his renewed allegiance to Fascism, then in closest alliance with a murderous Nazism.

Heidegger's acknowledgment of the reality of the Holocaust was equivocal right from the very start. This is already revealed in 1948 in his letter to Marcuse which contains the following passage:

I can only add that instead of the word "Jews" [in your letter] there should be the word "East Germans" and then exactly the same [terror] holds true of one of the Allies, with the difference that everything that has happened since 1945 is public knowledge world-wide, whereas the bloody terror of the Nazis was in fact kept a secret from the German people.⁶

George Leaman notes that there are "two politically charged deceptions contained in this sentence: the first lies in the attempt to equate the forced resettlement of ethnic Germans in Eastern Europe after the war with the mass murder of Jews during the war; the second deception in this passage is contained in Heidegger's assertion that the German people had no knowledge of the 'bloody terror of the Nazis' as it was happening." Leaman examines other notorious passages from Heidegger's speeches and writings where he diminishes, underplays, and relativizes the full extent and horror of the Holocaust by far-fetched analogies, [End Page 118] such as the following from a lecture of December 1, 1949: "agriculture is now a motorized food-industry, in essence the same as the manufacture of corpses in gas chambers and extermination camps, the same as the blockading and starving of nations, the same as the manufacture of hydrogen bombs." If not himself an outright denier of the Holocaust—he was too cunning to ever place himself publicly in such an exposed position—Heidegger was, nevertheless, one of the sources behind the unabashed deniers, the so-called historical revisionists, such as his French pupil Beaufret and his notorious acolyte Faurisson. The historian Hugo Ott hints strongly to this effect:

As has been known for some time now, Jean Beaufret has identified himself with Faurisson's 'studies' and has in effect authorized them. Was Faurisson right, then, in claiming Heidegger, as well as Beaufret, as his predecessor? Did the exchange between them also touch on this question, or did it go unmentioned? Didn't the dimension of silence risk dissolving into nothingness?⁷

() Heidegger's anti-semitism bleeds into his philosophy – there is no place for blacks, jews or other so-called "inferior" races in his conception of Being

Redner in 2002 (Harry, Monash University, Modern Judaism, 22:2, 2002, project muse)

Compared to the complexities and subtleties of Lukacs' case, the anti-Semitism of Heidegger is quite straightforward and has already been dealt with by a number of authors, among them, most notably, Victor Farias. He shows that Heidegger was an anti-Semite of sorts almost from the start till the end of his active life. He was an anti-Semite before he became a Nazi and continued being one after Nazism was defeated:


That Heidegger's radical anti-Semitism was apparent several years before his militant Nazism has been demonstrated by Ulrich Sieg's discovery of a 1929 letter in which Heidegger asserts that the task of fighting the growing "Judaisation of the German spirit" is an historic mission of thought and politics of the German universities.²⁰

Concerning these supposed corrupting dangers of the Jewish Spirit or so-called Judaization nothing much had changed for Heidegger after the war. George Leaman notes that "in a conversation with Rainer Marten in the late 1950s, Heidegger expressed concern about the renewal of 'Jewish' influence in German philosophy. Marten recalls that Heidegger 'counted on his fingers the number of Chairs in philosophy that had already been reoccupied by Jews.'" ²¹ These remarks are not up to the level of his Nazi inspired anti-Semitism of the 1930s, as when in a letter to Jaspers of May 1933 he states that "there is a dangerous international network of Jews," ²² but they do indicate the persistence and constancy of his paranoia concerning Jewry despite his apparent personal friendship with so many Jews and affairs with Jewish women.

His Jewish disciples, above all Hannah Arendt and Jacques Derrida, have tried to defend Heidegger against the well-founded charge of blatant anti-Semitism by arguing that he did not have a biologically based racial "philosophy" like that of the Nazis. It is true that his philosophy of Being was ontological not ontic, hence he did not directly resort to a biological racial basis which would be in need of supposedly "scientific" evidence. He preferred to dwell in the more rarified air of language, "the House of Being," in order to assert the superiority of the Aryan. Race he regarded as less "essential," but there is no indication that he ever believed it to be not valid or "racial science" to be false. He was personally friendly with leading Nazi racial geneticists. He never criticised Hitler's or anyone else's racial theories. He expressed himself in racist terms where it suited his purpose to do so, as Rainer Marten reports:

Blacks, as he determines in his lectures of the summer semester of 1934 (edited into the notes), have in common with minerals that neither think. Because they are incapable of thinking, it is impossible that they could be worthy of [End Page 124] Being. This is no intellectual naivete. It is intellectual racism, a philosophical scandal that cannot be called anything the least bit paler or less precise. ²³

There is no reason to suppose that the Jews are any more "worthy of Being" according to Heidegger. In his Nazi years he frequently speaks of the forces emanating from blood and soil (Blut und Boden) which alone constitute a people, and of which the Jews are bereft.




Spartan Debate Institute 2003

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How this persistent anti-Semitism escaped the notice of his numerous Jewish friends and disciples for so long **defies any simple explanation. Partly it is due to the wishful thinking of intellectuals who are loath to believe that such an "intellect" as the "great" philosopher Heidegger could possibly fall prey to such nonsense. Partly it is also due to Heidegger's own cunning dissimulation, for he was careful** **how he expressed his basic anti-Semitic convictions since so often in his career** he had to depend on Jews for success. After he had failed to get the chair of Catholic philosophy at Freiburg in 1916, due to Church machinations as he believed, his further prospects depended on the assimilated Jew Husserl and his neo-Kantian allies in Marburg, who were mostly also Jews. At Marburg and Freiburg he built up a clientele of mainly Jewish disciples, such as Marcuse, Arendt, Anders, Strauss, to name only the most prominent, to whom he owed his reputation as a brilliant mind and teacher even before he published his primary masterwork. At the same time he had an ongoing alliance with Jaspers, who though not himself a Jew, had strong Jewish sympathies and connections. To a convinced anti-Semite such a dependence on Jews must have been terribly galling. He continually made derogatory remarks against Husserl behind his back. Little wonder that once he had gained success he should have joined the Nazis and expunged with this one blow anything that he might have owed to the now despised Jews.

After the war, to overcome the censure he received from the Allied de-Nazification authorities, he once more turned to Jews, who unthinkingly helped him rehabilitate himself and rebuild his reputation. He assiduously wooed prominent Jewish thinkers and artists such as Martin Buber and Paul Celan. He resumed contact with his exiled Jewish disciples whom he had abandoned in the intervening years. They unhesitatingly responded and came flocking to his call as if nothing had happened. They were the first to bring out his works in other languages and among the first to write sympathetic commentaries on them. Much has already been revealed concerning the role of Hannah Arendt in all this effort of rehabilitation and the forging of his international reputation as the leading twentieth-century philosopher. But she was only one among many others who all blindly supported him. Once again Heidegger's response was predictable. After he attained international fame, he cultivated more and more right wing disciples, such as the historian Nolte and the outright Holocaust revisionists, Beaufret and Faurisson. [End Page 125] That is surely a clear indication of his real attitude to Jews in general.

The influence of Heidegger's anti-Semitism is all too evident in his philosophy. At its crudest it amounts to an exclusion of Jewish thinkers from the history of Western philosophy. There is hardly a mention of Spinoza in Heidegger's whole opus, despite the enormous influence that this Jewish thinker exercised on German philosophy from Leibniz onwards. Husserl is referred to early in his career, when he depended on him, but after that almost completely neglected. The neo-Kantians are mentioned only to be denounced. **But even beyond that, at a much deeper level there takes place in Heidegger's account of the history of philosophy a kind of Aryanization of Being. As he repeatedly asserts, Being is only expressed in Greek and German, and no other languages figure between the eschatological extremes of the Origin in the one and the End in the other. Only the Greek and German languages are worthy of the truth of Being, all others are mere translations or really corruptions of it. The pre-Socratic poet-thinkers at the origin of the eschatology of Being and the post-Nietzschean poet-thinker at its end are the only ones who are worthy of the Aryan dignity of Being.**

As with other German ideologues from Schopenhauer onwards, the denigration of Jews and the so-called Jewish Spirit also stands in for an attack on Christianity, the "Jewish religion." When he became a Nazi Heidegger had scores to settle with his native Catholic Church which had earlier failed to recognize his genius. This displaced anti-Semitism also had a profound influence on his philosophy. For to counter the Judaism of Christianity, he sought to build up a kind of neo-pagan counter-theology, or really a mythology, that supposedly owed nothing to Jewish sources. But ironically, as I have shown in *Malign Masters*, much of this is crude eschatological thinking of a debased Jewish-Christian spirit. Despite himself, Heidegger remained the "Christian theologian" he had acknowledged himself to be at the start of his career before he became so famous. But **this new "theology," or really philosophical mythology, very easily merged with the anti-Semitism of Nazi ideology, which he never explicitly abjured.**

Heidegger and Nazism are inseparable. Steiner, 2003

(Gary, Professor at Bucknell University, "The perils of a total critique of reason," *Philosophy Today*, Vol. 47, Iss. 1, Proquest)

One of the most tormenting realities of contemporary social thought is the fact that many thinkers devoted to the cause of emancipation unwittingly embrace philosophical positions with totalitarian consequences. Another tormenting reality is that thinkers sometimes embrace such positions deliberately. A case in point is Martin Heidegger, whose advocacy of the conceptions of "Volk," "labor," and "historicity" in the early 1930s led to widespread-though far from universal-condemnation of his philosophy as inherently pernicious. Those who find the terms of Heidegger's philosophy to be inseparable from his support of National Socialism see in that support an expression of a metaphysical commitment; thus, for example, Rüdiger Safranski, the most recent in a line of Heidegger biographers, observes that "to Heidegger the National Socialist seizure of power was a revolution. It was far more than politics; it was a new act in the history of Being, the beginning of a new epoch."¹ To anyone familiar with Heidegger's conception of "two beginnings"-one the achievement of the early Greeks in the establishment of the polis and the other an as-yet unrealized "advent" that promises to overcome the specter of nihilism-these words ring ominous. For they confer on the National Socialist revolution a metaphysical significance, and they make it impossible not to ponder the implications of Heidegger's unyielding insistence that the Germans possess pride of place in the unfolding of world history and in the endeavor to overcome nihilism.²

Heidegger's philosophy lead him to join the Nazis.

Cooke, 1998

(Bill, *Heidegger, Nazism, and postmodernism*, Free Inquiry, Fall 1998, Vol. 18, Issue 4, p. 63-64, lecturer in the School of Art and Design, Manukau Institute of Technology in New Zealand)

After the war the de-Nazification commission banned **Heidegger** from lecturing until 1949 and holding any official university position. It was decided that his support of the Nazi regime had been significant because his international reputation as a philosopher had given the Nazis respectability that helped cement their control of the country in those early months. **Heidegger** remained bitter about his treatment, feeling that he had been singled out unfairly. But he never retracted any of the statements he made during his years as an active Nazi. He actually reaffirmed them as late as 1966.

The question that developed was: Is Nazism intrinsic to **Heidegger's** philosophy? Into this situation stepped two scholars: Julian Young, based in Auckland, New Zealand, and Rudiger Safranski, from Berlin. It was Young's intention in **Heidegger, Philosophy, Nazism** to undertake a "deNazification of **Heidegger**." Safranski's book, **Martin Heidegger: Between Good and Evil**, is an attempt at a comprehensive intellectual biography of **Heidegger**.

Young's job is perhaps the more difficult, as he is running against the current philosophical tide. He admits early on that **Heidegger's** involvement with Nazism was "much deeper and much less honourable than the official story makes out." **Heidegger** was, at least for two years "a real Nazi: his involvement was a matter of conviction rather than compromise, opportunism, or cowardice." Safranski agrees: "To **Heidegger** the National Socialist seizure of power was a revolution. It was far more than politics; it was a new act in the history of Being, the beginning of a new epoch. Hitler, to him, meant a new era."

() Heidegger's critique is nihilistic and was directly linked to his support of Hitler.

Steiner, 2003

(Gary, Professor at Bucknell University, "The perils of a total critique of reason," *Philosophy Today*, Vol. 47, Iss. 1, Proquest)

Like Arendt and the other students of Heidegger examined in Heidegger's *Children*, Lowith was a fully assimilated Jew who thought of himself as more German than Jew. Lowith studied with Heidegger in Marburg in the 1920s and wrote his habilitation study under Heidegger; after 1933 he lived in exile in Italy, Japan, and the United States, and it was during this time that he wrote several texts examining the relationship between philosophy and politics in Heidegger's writings.⁴⁶ Lowith was the first to diagnose the inherent nihilism of Heidegger's concept of resoluteness in *Being and Time*, and he was the first to trace out the link between the key categories of *Being and Time* and Heidegger's partisanship for Hitler in 1933. In "The Occasional Decisionism of Carl Schmitt," Lowith succinctly identified the decisionistic character of Schmitt's notion of the "total state," and he drew a direct link between Schmitt's decisionism and Heidegger's in *Being and Time*; when the essay on Schmitt is read against the background of Lowith's classic *Heidegger: Thinker in a Destitute Time*, the depth of Lowith's insight into Heidegger's philosophical failings as well as his political ones comes into marked relief.

() Heidegger's total critique fails—leads to totalitarianism.

Steiner, 2003

(Gary, Professor at Bucknell University, "The perils of a total critique of reason," *Philosophy Today*, Vol. 47, Iss. 1, Proquest)

The specific value-orientations that Wolin has in mind here are those of classical liberalism. The total critique of reason and Heidegger's emphasis on facticity bring with them "a fateful distrust of universal concepts" and, in Heidegger's case at least, despair over "the decrepitude of Western liberalism"; this led Heidegger more or less directly to "an unabashed celebration of volkish particularism" with "grave ethical and political deficits."¹² For Wolin, these deficits can and must be redressed through a retreat from total critique and an embrace of "immanent critique," which seeks to preserve "the universalistic ethical qualities of modernity."¹³ Thus it is no surprise that Heidegger's *Children* is dedicated to Jürgen Habermas "in admiration and gratitude"; for by anyone's account no thinker has done more in the current generation to preserve "the ethico-political program of the Enlightenment" than Habermas.¹⁴ Wolin rightly sees in the work of Habermas the best attempt to concretize "the idealizations of an ethos of 'justice' that have become part of a (counterfactual) universally shared, posttotalitarian moral ethos"; such idealizations will take the form of "universalizable-hence, non-particularistic--norms."¹⁵ As such they hold the promise of avoiding the totalitarian tendencies of a viewpoint like Heidegger's, which, by giving a Nietzschean primacy to art, effectively renders truth non-falsifiable. Any such conception of truth is fundamentally at odds with Habermas's talk of "criticizable validity claims" that ~~serve as the objects of debate and~~ modification in a social process of "cooperatively seeking the truth."¹⁶ Truth (or justice) in this sense is a regulative ideal, so that what we take the truth to be at any given time is always a provisional judgment subject to further intersubjective critique.¹⁷ This conception of truth fits the model of "immanent critique" by relinquishing traditional claims to absolute truth while maintaining faith in the sufficiency of reason to continue to work progressively toward the realization of "emancipation" or a just society. The truth arrived at through a total critique of reason, on the other hand, by valorizing the irreducibly particular, brings with it unavoidable elitist and decisionistic consequences, and hence the potential for totalitarian domination.¹⁸

() Heidegger and poststructuralism justify genocide.**Kateb, 1997**

(George, Professor at Princeton University, "Technology and Philosophy," *Social Research*, Vol. 64, Iss. 3, Proquest)

⌈ The fact that poststructuralism commits a fatal error so akin to Heidegger's does much to focus the central irony examined in Heidegger's *Children*: that even those students of Heidegger who should have been in the best position to maintain critical distance from him, fell prey to the master's spell. Like Heidegger, who, when asked how a man as uneducated as Hitler could govern Germany, responded "It is not a question of education ... just look at his wonderful hands!" it would seem that Arendt, Lowith, Jonas, and Marcuse each succumbed to Heidegger's influence even while they each recognized the pernicious elements of his thought 27 In this respect the error of these students is

Wolin implies, comparable to the error of poststructuralist thinkers, in that in both cases thinkers who ought to know better-- who ought to have learned the lesson of "der Fall Heidegger"--end up advocating philosophical positions that themselves manifest totalitarian or elitist tendencies. In the preface to Heidegger's *Children*, Wolin characterizes the link between Heidegger and postmodernism as "a strange marriage of convenience brokered in Paris, where French intellectuals, frustrated by orthodox Marxist dogmatics, perceived in Heideggerianism a more ruthless and unforgiving critique of the modern West." 28 The aim of Heidegger's *Children* is to demonstrate that comparable anti-modern tendencies are, due to the anxiety of Heidegger's influence, to be found in the thought of Arendt, Lowith, Jonas, and Marcuse:]

Discourse can never be terminally defined in terms of its influence.

White, 2000

(Stephen K., *Sustaining Affirmation: The Strengths of Weak Ontology in Political Theory*, Professor, Ph.D., City University of New York, 1980, pp. 4-11)

⌈ When I speak of “existential realities,” I mean to claim that language, finitude, natality, and sources are in some brute sense universal constitutives of human being, but also that their meaning is irreparably underdetermined in any categorical sense. There is, for example, simply no demonstrable essence of language or true meaning of finitude. Weak ontologies offer figurations of these universals, whose persuasiveness can never be fully disentangled from an interpretation of present historical circumstances. Fundamental conceptualization here thus means acknowledging that gaining access to something universal about human being and world is always also a construction that cannot rid itself of a historical dimension. ⌋

Discourse doesn't control human behavior or society.

White, 2000

(Stephen K., *Sustaining Affirmation: The Strengths of Weak Ontology in Political Theory*, Professor, Ph.D., City University of New York, 1980, pp. 4-11)

⌈ For weak ontology, human being is the negotiation of these existential realities. But when this negotiation is imagined in the fashion of a Teflon self powering itself through the world, there has been an unacceptable impoverishment of figuration. Accepting such an image implies, for example, a figuration of language as, in essence, an instrument: in effect we always “have” language; it never “has” us. Of course, as I just emphasized, such a claim of impoverishment can never be disentangled from historical claims; in this case, claims regarding, say, the various “costs” that Western modernity has had to pay for such a tight embrace of the disengaged self. ⌋

Ontology can't determine ethics, therefore it can't determine actions.

White, 2000

(Stephen K., *Sustaining Affirmation: The Strengths of Weak Ontology in Political Theory*, Professor, Ph.D., City University of New York, 1980, pp. 4-11)

How precisely do weak ontologies constitute a "foundation" of ethical-political life? Since such ontologies can make no strong claim to reflect the pure truth of being, one cannot derive any clear and incontestable principles or values for ethics and politics. The fundamental conceptualizations such an ontology provides can, at most, prefigure practical insight or judgment, in the sense of providing broad cognitive and affective orientation. Practice draws sustenance from an ontology in the sense of both a reflective bearing upon possibilities for action and a mobilizing of motivational force. ¹

() Heidegger's critique hides from reality, rendering it unable to solve for individual change.

Kateb, 1997

(George, Professor at Princeton University, "Technology and Philosophy," *Social Research*, Vol. 64, Iss. 3, Proquest)

His primary concern was the crisis of Marxism that emerged around the beginning of the twentieth century. By that time several misgivings about orthodox Marxism had arisen. One was that, as Eduard Bernstein had recognized, the relative prosperity of working people under capitalism rendered them fundamentally less revolutionary; another was that the deterministic implications of scientific Marxism foreclosed the possibility of genuine political activism.⁸² Where the early Lukacs sought to develop Lenin's notion of revolutionary vanguardism as a means for overcoming the problem of reification, the young Marcuse saw in *Being and Time* an alternate set of categories for conceptualizing and overcoming the problem. He seized upon the category of inauthenticity as a novel way of understanding reification, and he saw in the notions of historicity and authenticity the potential to make a place for the concrete individual that orthodox Marxism could not. "Ideally, Heidegger's focus on the individual would be able to offset one of Marxism's major deficiencies: a neglect of the individual in favor of the standpoint of society or the 'laws of history.'"⁸³ But Marcuse also saw in *Being and Time* an "aristocratic radicalism" that remained ignorant of its origins in a capitalist economy that was precisely the source of the problem of reification. And he would later realize that the concreteness of individual human beings in concrete historical circumstances that he thought he had found in *Being and Time* was merely illusory:

I soon realized that Heidegger's concreteness was to a great extent a phony, a false concreteness, and that in fact his philosophy was just as abstract and just as removed from reality. even avoiding reality, as the philosophies which at that time had dominated German universities.⁸⁴

☐ Technology can be a good thing.

Kateb, 1997

(George, Professor at Princeton University, "Technology and Philosophy," *Social Research*, Vol. 64, Iss. 3, Proquest)

But, first, what is the unamazed common-sense attitude toward modern technology? I hope that I am not too reductionist when I attribute to common sense the view that modern technology is just extraordinarily successful problem-solving, a terrific display of resourceful ingenuity, a splendid and constant show of adaptability to circumstances. Of course, problem-solving, ingenuity, and adaptability are traits essential to the story of modern technology. But what originally called forth these traits? What has helped to call them forth repeatedly, once modern technology is launched? Why have they appeared more in the West than any place else? Why have they appeared in such profusion only in the period that begins with the Italian Renaissance and the German Reformation-the period that many scholars call modernity? Both modern science and modern technology begin in that period-not from scratch, of course, but in any case substantially. Whatever drove the beginnings of science and whatever drives it still, the career of modern technology is, however, not wholly subsumable under that of modern science. As Heidegger says, modern technology is not simply applied science, although it is that, too, of course (Heidegger, 1977, p. 116). The will to work technologically on nature and human beings is conceptually independent of the will to know for its own sake, which is characteristic of science.

The kritik turns itself: it is philosophers that are responsible for technology and the mindset that comes with it.

Kateb, 1997

(George, Professor at Princeton University, "Technology and Philosophy," *Social Research*, Vol. 64, Iss. 3, Proquest)

⌈ A second theme is that, just as modern technology was not a universal phenomenon, so there was nothing inevitable about it in the West. All three philosophers have a keen feeling for accident and contingency, for roads not taken, for opportunities either not accepted or forced into being. A third theme is that the passions, drives, and motives that helped to promote technology are, to a significant extent, instigated or inspired by ideas, religious or philosophical, that manage to be absorbed into the selfconception that many individuals in a cross-national cultural setting hold of themselves. Modern technology is not only applied science; even more profoundly, it is philosophy or theology enacted. Philosophers and theologians are the originators. Other people go along or are carried along, because of the original reasons, or because of their own varied reasons, half-reasons, and nonreasons.

() Alternative can't solve: capitalism is the root cause of technological thinking.

Kateb, 1997

(George, Professor at Princeton University, "Technology and Philosophy," *Social Research*, Vol. 64, Iss. 3, Proquest)

Capitalism is the example that occupies most of Weber's attention in *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. The role of capitalism in developing technology, and also the role of technology in developing capitalism, may not figure with much explicitness in Weber's analysis. He is primarily interested in the preindustrial origins of the spirit of capitalism, the period of the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries. What matters, however, is the affinity between capitalism and technology, not their causal connection. They partake of a similar attitude to reality. Both are manifestations of what Weber conceptualizes as rationalism, rational method in any given sphere of life. Hence what Weber says about the rise of capitalism, we may plausibly apply to modern technology.

Humans, in general, are departing from technological thought.

White, 2000

(Stephen K., *Sustaining Affirmation: The Strengths of Weak Ontology in Political Theory*, Professor, Ph.D., City University of New York, 1980, pp. 4-11)

□ One of the entities most thrown into question has been our conception of the human subject. At issue is the assertive, disengaged self who generates distance from its background (tradition, embodiment) and foreground (external nature, other subjects) in the name of an accelerating mastery of them. This Teflon subject has had a leading role on the modern stage. Such subjectivity has been affirmed primarily at the individual level in Western democracies, although within Marxism it had a career at the collective level as well. In both cases, the relevant entity is envisioned as powering itself through natural and social obstacles; it dreams ultimately of frictionless motion. This modern ontology of the Teflon subject has, of course, not usually been thematized in quite such stark terms. But the lack of explicit thematization has been at least partially a measure of modernity's self-confidence. It is precisely the waning of this self-confidence that engenders such a widespread recourse to ontological reflection. Accordingly, the current turn might now be seen as an attempt to think ourselves, and being in general, in ways that depart from the dominant—but now more problematic—ontological investments of modernity. 1