

Heidegger's Kritik of Technology

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This is a good start. I suggest cutting the entirety of the McWhorter book if you plan on running the argument. The journal Environmental Ethics is your friend.



KRITIK OF TECHNOLOGY: INC

A: QUICK-FIX MANAGEMENT SOLUTIONS ONLY CREATE NEW PROBLEMS, FEEDING A CYCLE THAT LEADS TO FURTHER ENVIRONMENTAL DISRUPTIONS

MCWHORTER (Asst. Prof., Philosophy, Northeast Missouri State) '92

[Ladelle, Heidegger and the Earth, ed. Ladelle McWhorter, p. 2-3]

Thinking today must concern itself with the earth. Wherever we turn-on newsstands, on the airwaves, and even the most causal of conversations everywhere-we are inundated by predictions of ecological catastrophe and omnicidal doom. And many of these predictions bear themselves out in our own experience. We now live with the ugly, painful, and impoverishing consequences of decades of technological innovation and expansion without restraint, of at least a century of disastrous "natural resource management" policies, and of more than two centuries of virtually unchecked industrial pollution- consequences that include the fact that millions of us on any given day are suffering, many of us dying of diseases and malnutrition that are the results of humanly produced ecological devastation; the fact that thousands of species now in existence will no longer exist on this planet by the turn of the century; the fact that our planet's climate has been altered, probably irreversibly, by the carbon dioxide and chlorofluorocarbons we have heedlessly poured into our atmosphere; and the mind-boggling fact that it may now be within humanity's power to destroy all life on this globe.

Our usual response to such prophecies of doom is to ignore them or, when we cannot do that, to scramble to find some way to manage our problems, some quick solution, some technological fix. But over and over again new resource management techniques, new solutions, new technologies disrupt delicate systems even further, doing still more damage to a planet already dangerously out of ecological balance. Our ceaseless interventions seem only to make things worse, to perpetuate a cycle of human activity followed by ecological disaster of another kind. In fact, it would appear that our trying to do things, change things, fix things cannot be the solution, because it is part of the problem itself. But, if we cannot act to solve our problems, what should we do?

Heidegger's work is a call to reflect, to think in some way other than calculatively, technologically, pragmatically. Once we begin to move with and into Heidegger's call and begin to see our trying to seize control and solve problems as itself a problematic approach, if we still believe that thinking's only real purpose is to function as a prelude to action, we who attempt to think will twist within the agonizing grip of paradox, feeling nothing but frustration, unable to conceive of ourselves as anything but paralyzed. However, as so many peoples before us have known, paradox is not only a trap: it is also a scattering point and passageway. Paradox invites examination of its own constitution (hence of the patterns of thinking within which it occurs) and thereby breaks a way of thinking open, revealing the configurations of power that propel it and hold it on track. And thus it makes possible the dissipation of that power and the deflection of thinking into new paths and new possibilities.

Heidegger frustrates us. At a time when the stakes are so very high and decisive action is so loudly and urgently called for, Heidegger apparently calls us to do nothing. If we get beyond the revulsion and anger that such a call initially inspires and actually examine the feasibility of response, we begin to understand the frustration attendant upon paradox: how is it possible, we ask, to choose, to will, to do nothing? The call itself places in question the bimodal logic of activity and passivity: it points up the paradoxical nature of our passion for action, of our passion for maintaining control. The call itself suggests that our drive for acting decisively and forcefully is part of what must be thought through, that the narrow option of will versus surrender is one of the power configurations of current thinking that must be allowed to dissipate.





KRITIK OF TECHNOLOGY: INC

(B): MANAGERIAL MINDSETS REDUCE THE WORLD TO "STANDING RESERVE," LEAVING ONLY USE VALUE AND ERODING BEING

MCWHORTER (Asst. Prof., Philosophy, Northeast Missouri State) '92

[Ladelle, Heidegger and the Earth, ed. Ladelle McWhorter, p. 6]

What is now especially dangerous about this sense of our own managerial power, born of forgetfulness, is that it results in our viewing the world as mere resources to be stored or consumed. Managerial or technological thinkers, Heidegger says, view the earth, the world, all things as mere Bestand, standing-reserve.

All is here simply for human use. No plant, no animal, no ecosystem has a life of its own, has any significance, apart from human desire and need. Nothing, we say, other than human beings, has any intrinsic value. All things are instruments for the working out of human will. Whether we believe that God gave Man dominion or simply that human might (sometimes called intelligence or rationality) in the face of ecological fragility makes us always right, we managerial, technological thinkers tend to believe that the earth is only a stockpile or a set of commodities to be managed, bought, and sold. The forest is timber, the river, a power source. Even people have become resources, human resources, personnel to be managed, or populations to be controlled.



KRITIK OF TECHNOLOGY : INC

(C)

TECHNOLOGICAL MINDSET THREATENS US WITH NUCLEAR ANNIHILATION AND THE DESTRUCTION OF THE EARTH - MUST DELIBERATE INSTEAD OF ACT

BECKMAN (Emeritus Prof., Philosophy, Harvey Mudd College) 2K

[Tad A., "Martin Heidegger and Environmental Ethics,"

<http://thuban.ac.hmc.edu/~tbeckman/personal/Heidart.html> wfi]

The threat of (nuclear annihilation) is, currently, the most (dramatic) and (ironic) sign of technology's "success" and of its overwhelming power; mass itself has been grasped as a standing-reserve of enormous energy. On the one hand we consider ourselves, rightfully, the most advanced humans that have peopled the earth but, on the other hand, we can see, when we care to, that our way of life has also become the (most) profound threat to life that the earth has yet witnessed. Medical science and technology have even begun to suggest that we may learn enough about disease and the processes of aging in the human body that we might extend individual human lives indefinitely. In this respect, we have not only usurped the gods' rights of creation and destruction of species, but we may even usurp the most sacred and terrifying of the gods' rights, the determination of mortality or immortality. The gods, it is true, have been set aside in our time; they are merely antiquated conceptions.

The "withdrawal of the gods" is a sign of our pervasive power and our progressive "ego-centrism." The human ego stands at the center of everything and, indeed, sees no other thing or object with which it must reckon on an equal footing. We have become alone in the universe in the most profound sense. Looking outward, we see only ourselves in so far as we see only objects standing-in-reserve for our dispositions. It is no wonder that we have "ethical problems" with our environment because the whole concept of the environment has been profoundly transformed. A major portion of the environment in which modern Westerners live, today, is the product of human fabrication and this makes it ever more difficult for us to discover a correct relationship with that portion of the environment that is still given to us. It is all there to be taken, to be manipulated, to be used and consumed, it seems. But what in that conception limits us or hinders us from using it in any way that we wish? There is nothing that we can see today that really hinders us from doing anything with the environment, including if we wish destroying it completely and for all time. This, I take it is the challenge of environmental ethics, the challenge of finding a way to convince ourselves that there are limits of acceptable human action where the environment is involved. But where can we look for the concepts that we need to fabricate convincing arguments?



ZNC OVERVIEW

NEXT, ON THE HEIDEGGER ARGUMENT...

DESPITE THE DENSITY OF OUR EU, OUR ARGUMENT IS STRAIGHTFORWARD...

- FIRST, THE INITIAL PIECE OF MCWHORTER '92 EVIDENCE CLAIMS THAT THE AFF'S EFFORTS TO 'SOLVE' ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS THRU THE MANAGEMENT OF HUMYN BEHAVIOR ONLY LEADS TO ADDITIONAL, UNPREDICTABLE ECO-PROBLEMS, FOSTERING A CYCLE OF HUMYN INTERVENTION THAT FAILS TO ADDRESS THE ROOT CAUSE OF THE CASE HARMS, NAMELY THE PRIVILEGING OF PEOPLE OVER THE REST OF THE BIOSPHERE. THIS TURNS CASE SOLVENCY
- SECOND, THE MIDDLE MCWHORTER '92 EU ~~EXPLAINS~~ HOW THE AFF'S JUSTIFICATIONS FOR INTERVENTION ~~REDUCE~~ THE WORLD TO A STANDING RESERVE, RESOURCES THAT ARE VALUABLE ONLY BECAUSE OF THEIR HUMYN USE VALUE. BOTH MCWHORTER CARDS SHOW THAT THE AFF'S CALL TO ACTION UNDERMINES THE VALUE OF EXISTENCE (BEING)
- THIRD, THE BECKMAN ZK C-SUB IMPACTS THIS LOSS OF BEING, EXPLAINING HOW THE AFF'S LOGIC ENSURES NUCLEAR ANNIHILATION AND THE DESTRUCTION OF THE BIOSPHERE, ONLY REJECTING THE CALL TO MANAGE THE WORLD AS A RESOURCE CAN PREVENT THIS.



TECHNOLOGICAL MINDSET LINKS: ZNC

BLIND USE OF TECHNOLOGY IGNORES ITS ESSENCE AND ROLE IN OUR BEING—RENDS IT UN-UNDERSTANDABLE AND UN-USEFUL

BECKMAN (Emeritus Prof., Philosophy, Harvey Mudd College) 2K

[Tad A., "Martin Heidegger and Environmental Ethics,"

<http://thuban.ac.hmc.edu/~beckman/personal/Heidart.html> wfi]

The major difficulty with the present discussion of technology is the fact that we focus attention on what we call technology in its everyday sense and we ignore technology in its essence. In this situation, it matters little whether we embrace technology or condemn it, for we are all equally enslaved by our misunderstanding of what technology actually is. According to Heidegger, "technology [in its everyday sense] is not equivalent to the essence of technology." ([7], p. 4) To be free of misunderstandings, to relate to technology intelligently, we must find its central meaning and that can be done only by discovering its essence.

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In our present point of view, we see technology as a complex of contrivances and technical skills, put forth by human activity and developed as means to our ends. Technology, in this view, is an object, or a complex of objects and techniques, that seems passive itself; indeed, we conceive of it as activated by us only. According to Heidegger, however, we are fundamentally mistaken in this; "we are delivered over to it in the worst possible way when we regard it as something neutral." ([7], p. 4) On the contrary, the essence of technology reveals it as something far from neutral or merely an instrument of human control; it is an autonomous organizing activity within which humans themselves are organized. Viewing technology as a means to an end, "everything depends on our manipulating technology in the proper manner... We will, as we say, 'get' technology 'spiritually in hand.'... But suppose now that technology were no mere means, how would it stand with the will to master it?" ([7], p. 5) How, indeed, can we cope with it if it encompasses us in its organizational activity?

In summary, the problem with our critique of technology lies at two levels. First, while we argue and take sides on the issue of technology, none of us is really free to deal with it constructively because none of us really understands it in its essence, i.e., in its entirety and in its central sense. Second, our limited understanding of technology is so misguided that little of value can be salvaged from it. This is because all discussions are prefaced on the view that technology is an object which we manipulate as a means to our own ends. In fact, the essence of technology reveals it as a vast system of organization which encompasses us rather than standing objectively and passively ready for our direction and control.

5



TECHNOLOGY MINDSET LINKS: 2NC

TECHNOLOGICAL SOLUTIONS CREATE NATURE AS SOMETHING TO BE USED, CAUSING VIOLENCE AND EXPLOITATION

BECKMAN (Emeritus Prof., Philosophy, Harvey Mudd College) 2K

[Tad A., "Martin Heidegger and Environmental Ethics,"

<http://thuban.ac.hmc.edu/~tbeckman/personal/Heidart.html> wfi]

We have arrived at the opening of the essence of modern technology. Technology is a mode of the fundamental way in which things happen in the universe and we, as tech@ agents, are involved in this happening within the cooperative elements of causation. But technology has evolved through the intervening three millennia; what was previously called 'techne' and was a form of the general process of bringing-forth has separated into different modes of revealing. What we understand as modern technology can scarcely be recognized as having a common origin with the fine arts or crafts; indeed, modern technology is distinguished in having made its "alliance" with modern physical science rather than with the arts and crafts. Therefore, to understand technology as it is today and in its complete essence, we must understand the course of that separate and unique evolution.

Perhaps it is not difficult to understand the separate paths of the fine arts, craftsmanship, and modern technology. Each seems to have followed different human intentions and to have addressed different human skills. However, while the fine arts and craftsmanship remained relatively consistent with techne in the ancient sense, modern technology withdrew in a radically different direction. As Heidegger saw it, "the revealing that rules in modern technology is a challenging [Herausfordern], which puts to nature the unreasonable demand that it supply energy that can be extracted and stored as such." ([7], p. 14) Modern technology sets-upon nature and challenges-forth its energies, in contrast to techne which was always a bringing-forth in harmony with nature. The activity of modern technology lies at a different and more advanced level wherein the natural is not merely decisively redirected; nature is actually "set-upon." The rhetoric in which the discussion is couched conveys an atmosphere of (violence) and (exploitation).

To uncover the essence of modern technology is to discover why technology stands today as the danger. To accomplish this insight, we must understand why modern technology must be viewed as a "challenging-forth," what affect this has on our relationship with nature, and how this relationship affects us. Is there really a difference? Has technology really left the domain of techne in a significant way? In modern technology, has human agency withdrawn in some way beyond involvement and, instead, acquired an attitude of violence with respect to the other causal factors?



TECHNOLOGY MINDSET LINKS: ZNC

TECHNOLOGY IS A MODE OF DOMINATION THAT RENDERS THE WORLD AS A STANDING RESERVE, ELIMINATING INTRINSIC WORTH

BECKMAN (Emeritus Prof., Philosophy, Harvey Mudd College) 2K

[Tad A., "Martin Heidegger and Environmental Ethics,"

<http://thuban.ac.hmc.edu/~tbeckman/personal/Heidart.html> wfi]

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✓ The essence of technology originally was a revealing of life and nature in which human intervention deflected the natural course while still regarding nature as the teacher and, for that matter, the keeper. The essence of modern technology is a revealing of phenomena, often far removed from anything that resembles "life and nature," in which human intrusion not only diverts nature but fundamentally changes it. As a mode of revealing, technology today is a challenging-forth of nature so that the technologically altered nature of things is always a situation in which nature and objects wait, standing in reserve for our use. We pump crude oil from the ground and we ship it to refineries where it is fractionally distilled into volatile substances and we ship these to gas stations around the world where they reside in huge underground tanks, standing ready to power our automobiles or airplanes. Technology has intruded upon nature in a far more active mode that represents a consistent direction of domination. Everything is viewed as "standing-reserve" and, in that, loses its natural objective identity. The river, for instance, is not seen as a river; it is seen as a source of hydro-electric power, as a water supply, or as an avenue of navigation through which to contact inland markets. In the era of techne humans were relationally involved with other objects in the coming to presence; in the era of modern technology, humans challenge-forth the subjectively valued elements of the universe so that, within this new form of revealing, objects lose their significance to anything but their subjective status of standing-ready for human design. 1

TECHNOLOGICAL MINDSET ERODES HUMYN BEING—ENFRAMES THE WORLD IN WAYS THAT PRECLUDE US FROM UNDERSTANDING OUR PLACE WITHIN IT

BECKMAN (Emeritus Prof., Philosophy, Harvey Mudd College) 2K

[Tad A., "Martin Heidegger and Environmental Ethics,"

<http://thuban.ac.hmc.edu/~tbeckman/personal/Heidart.html> wfi]

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✓ At this point, we have almost completed the analysis of modern technology in its essence. Only one final aspect of this analysis remains; it is an understanding of the overarching context in which technology came to proceed along this path. Heidegger named this context by the German word 'Ge-stell,' which has been translated to the English word, 'enframing.' In Heidegger's words,

"enframing [Ge-stell] means the gathering together of that setting-upon which sets upon man, i.e., challenges him forth, to reveal the real, the mode of ordering, as standing-reserve." {7}, p. 20 But, "where Enframing reigns, there is danger in the highest sense." {7}, p. 28

To understand the essence of modern technology as enframing, Heidegger claims is to understand the problem of technology in its fullest sense; for in enframing we will understand the deeper context in which humans journeyed from involvement with nature into an intrusion upon it. We must move, then, to understand what Heidegger meant by enframing.





TECHNOLOGY MINDSET LINKS: ZNC



We are to understand technology through enframing in two very important ways. First, technology is a process, or coming-to-presence, which is underway in the world and which has truly gigantic proportions. The two concepts that Heidegger used as analogies in arriving at the word 'Ge-stell' were 'Gebirg' and 'Gemuet.' Both of these are processes of cosmic scope. The former is the gradual building, emergence, folding, and eroding of a mountain range. The latter is the welling up and building of emotional feelings that originate in the depths of our beings, as differentiated from the simple emotions that arise quickly and spontaneously in normal contexts. Second, technology viewed as enframing is a process that is shaping human destiny today and that has been shaping human destiny in relation to the universe for almost as long as we conceive of our history. What we call technology and think to be a neutral instrument standing ready for our control is actually a specific manifestation of this whole process. ([7], p. 19) The concept of enframing suggests that human life in the context of the natural world is gathered wholly and cosmically within the essence of technology. Just as the technology that we now see ongoing in the world shows the characteristic of challenging-forth the objects around us, the whole process within which human life is developing challenges-us-forth to this mode of revealing the real or of ordering nature into standing reserve. Our control over technology is an illusion; it and we alike are being shaped, like an evolving mountain range, in the process that Heidegger called enframing. The possession of what we commonly call technology is only a fragmentary, though characteristic, aspect of that whole development; language thought, religion, art, and all other aspects of human life are coordinated into this development as a part of enframing.

To see the essence of technology in this way delivers us into the final phase of Heidegger's analysis, the great danger to humanity that technology represents. Just as enframing organizes our lives progressively into a disposition of challenging and ordering the things around us into standing reserve, its progress as a development of human destiny challenges and orders us into standing reserve for its own ends.

"The destining of revealing is in itself not just any danger, but danger as such. Yet when destining reigns in the mode of Enframing, it is the supreme danger. This danger attests itself to us in two ways. As soon as what is unconcealed no longer concerns man even as object, but does so, rather, exclusively as standing-reserve, and man in the midst of objectlessness is nothing but the orderer of standing-reserve, then he comes to the very brink of a precipitous fall; that is, he comes to the point where he himself will have to be taken as standing-reserve. Meanwhile, man, precisely as the one so threatened, exalts himself to the posture of lord of the earth. In this way the impression comes to prevail that everything man encounters exists only insofar as it is his construct. This illusion gives rise in turn to one final delusion: It seems as though man everywhere and always encounters only himself." ([7], pp. 26-7; emphasis added)

Just as humans have progressively limited the being of the natural objects around them, Heidegger observed, they too have acquired a progressively limited character or being. While we have come to think that we encounter only ourselves in the world, "in truth, however, precisely nowhere does man today any longer encounter himself, i.e., in his essence." ([7], p. 27) While all epochs of human evolution contain danger, the epoch of modern technology possesses the gravest danger because it is the epoch whose characteristic is to conduct humanity out of its own essence. Modern technology, in Heidegger's view, is the highest stage of misrepresentation of the essence of being human. In order to understand this danger completely and, certainly, in order to come to accept it as a correct analysis, will require a more extensive review of Heidegger's theory of human nature and its essence. But this will be easier and also more appropriate in the final section of this essay, after we have reviewed Heidegger's understanding of art. For art, in its essence and not as we presently conceive of it, from the disposition of enframing, is a wholly separate path of human development.



ENERGY LINKS: ZNC

ENERGY PRESERVATION/CONSERVATION REDUCES THE WORLD TO ITS USE VALUE

PADRUTT (Daseinanalytisches Institut, Zurich) '92

[Hanspeter, Heidegger and the Earth, ed. Ladelle McWhorter, p. 27]

A few years after the Americans landed on the moon, the Club of Rome published those famous computer predictions, entitled "The Limits of Growth," which showed that, if things continue the way they have gone on "spaceship earth," soon it could not go on. Better founded and more oppressing still was the study commissioned by President Jimmy Carter, which appeared in 1980 with the title *Global 2000 Study*. Both studies are honest appraisals and cautious predictions, which can shake up humankind. However, since they take for granted the basis of "world-models" or "spaceship earth," they can also solidify the opinion that the world is a machine. Spaceship earth and the world model correspond to a worldview of objectifying subjectivism and are snares along the way of descent from the throne of master and owner of nature. Actually the question emerges whether the objectifying reductionism of natural science - which can be detected in many notions of the ecological movement - should not also become questionable for this movement. As sensible and correct as the demand to save energy is, still the concept of energy remains reductionist and ambiguous, because it reduces the light and warmth of the sun, the waterfall in the mountain stream, the roaring of the wind, the burning of wood, and the power of the horse, reduces this whole world to kilowatt hours. Is it not noteworthy that the concept of energy comes from the way language got used in the eighteenth century and, in the historical unfolding of being in this language, is connected with Aristotelian *energeia*, the work-character of beings? Just as problematic as natural science's reduction of all beings in the concept of energy is, so too is the economic reduction of all beings to a monetary value problematic. Certainly the proposals for economic decentralization and for the development of a softer technology made by the British economist E. F. Schumacher (author of *Small is Beautiful*) are as relevant today as ever. Certainly the provocative theses of an Ivan Illich are in many ways very pertinent. And probably an ecological economy will develop presumably in the direction of James Robertson's "alternatives worth living." But one cannot overlook the fact that an ecological accounting still reduces things to a monetary value and that many concepts of these authors are characterized by the economy of objectifying subjectivism, by a worldview of the retailers - as, for example, the concept of a "qualitative growth.";





ENERGY LINKS: ZNC

NOTIONS AND EXPLOITATION OF ENERGY SEPARATES US FROM THE WORLD, FEEDING THE TECHNOLOGICAL MINDSET

BECKMAN (Emeritus Prof., Philosophy, Harvey Mudd College) 2K

[Tad A., "Martin Heidegger and Environmental Ethics,"

<http://thuban.ac.hmc.edu/~tbeckman/personal/Heidart.html> wfi]

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Heidegger clearly saw the development of "energy resources" as symbolic of this evolutionary path; while the transformation into modern technology undoubtedly began early, the first definitive signs of its new character began with the harnessing of energy resources, as we would say. As a representative of the old technology, the windmill took energy from the wind but converted it immediately into other manifestations such as the grinding of grain; the windmill did not unlock energy from the wind in order to store it for later arbitrary distribution. Modern wind-generators, on the other hand, convert the energy of wind into electrical power which can be stored in batteries or otherwise. The significance of storage is that it places the energy at our disposal; and because of this storage the powers of nature can be turned back upon itself. The storing of energy is, in this sense, the symbol of our over-coming of nature as a potent object. "...a tract of land is challenged into the putting out of coal and ore. The earth now reveals itself as a coal mining district, the soil as a mineral deposit." {[7], p. 14} This and other examples that Heidegger used throughout this essay illustrate the difference between a technology that diverts the natural course cooperatively and modern technology that achieves the unnatural by force. Not only is this achieved by force but it is achieved by placing nature in our subjective context, setting aside natural processes entirely, and conceiving of all revealing as being relevant only to human subjective needs.



CONSERVATION / PRESERVATION LINK: ZNC

AFF'S PRESERVATION OF ECOSYSTEMS/RESOURCES ARISES FROM GUILT—DOES NOT CHALLENGE UNDERLYING MANAGERIAL MINDSET

MCWHORTER (Asst. Prof., Philosophy, Northeast Missouri State) '92

[Ladelle, Heidegger and the Earth, ed. Ladelle McWhorter, p. 8-9]

It is probably quite true that in many different cultures, times, and places human beings have asked the question: How shall I best live my life? But in the West, and in relatively modern times, we have reformulated that question so as to ask: How shall I conduct myself? How shall I behave? How shall I manage my actions, my relationships, my desires? And how shall I make sure my neighbors do the same? Alongside technologies of the earth have grown up technologies of the soul, theories of human behavioral control of which current ethical theories are a significant subset. Ethics in the modern world at least very frequently functions as just another field of scientific study yielding just another set of engineering goals.

Therefore, when we react to problems like ecological crises by retreating into the familiar discomfort of our Western sense of guilt, we are not placing ourselves in opposition to technological thinking and its ugly consequences. On the contrary, we are simply reasserting our technological dream of perfect managerial control. How so? Our guilt professes our enduring faith in the managerial dream by insisting that problems – problems like oil spills, acid rain, groundwater pollution, the extinction of whales, the destruction of the ozone, the rain forests, the wetlands – lie simply in mismanagement or in a failure to manage (to manage ourselves in this case) and by reaffirming to ourselves that if we had used our power to manage our behavior better in the first place we could have avoided this mess. In other words, when we respond to Heidegger's call by indulging in feelings of guilt about how we have been treating the object earth, we are really just telling ourselves how truly powerful we, as agents, are. We are telling ourselves that we really could have done differently; we had the power to make things work, if only we had stuck closer to the principles of good management. And in so saying we are in yet a new and more stubborn way refusing to hear the real message, the message that human beings are not, never have been, and never can be in complete control, that the dream of that sort of managerial omnipotence is itself the very danger of which Heidegger warns.

Thus guilt – as affirmation of human agential power over against passive matter – is just another way of covering over the mystery. Thus guilt is just another way of refusing to face the fact that we human beings are finite and that we must begin to live with the earth instead of trying to maintain total control. Guilt is part and parcel of a managerial approach to the world.



A2 "WE KRITIK (CRITICIZE Modern Tech":ZNC

VIEWING TECHNOLOGY AS "MODERN" RENDERS IT UNKNOWABLE

BECKMAN (Emeritus Prof., Philosophy, Harvey Mudd College) **2K**

[Tad A., "Martin Heidegger and Environmental Ethics,"
<http://thuban.ac.hmc.edu/~tbeckman/personal/Heidart.html> wfi]

*tech
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The contemporary critique of technology has taken the form of attacking these and other sensitive issues. Both the creative and destructive powers of technology have begun to frighten us because we can begin to see our real limitations as knowledgeable managers and organizers of the world. And the concept of a human fabricated immortality staggers us because it places us, now, in the position of having to make the fundamental decision of whether we humans are better off as mortals or as immortals. These are matters that nature once dictated and that demanded no human consideration. We have to ask whether human intelligence is really capable of addressing them? Can we trust our judgment in matters of this scope?

What Heidegger pointed out in "The Question Concerning Technology" is, first of all, that this critique is fundamentally misplaced. It is misplaced in time and it is misplaced in scope. It is misplaced in time because we assume that technology has been problematic for us only in the last two centuries; it is misplaced in scope because we assume that technology is merely a neutral instrument in our hands and with which we can do as we will. Both of these erroneous assumptions tend to render us less effective in working out our problems with technology and with ourselves. By limiting the era of technology to the last two centuries, we create the hidden assumption that the historical path of Western development is essentially independent of technology. Thus, we assume that Western civilization is founded firmly on various roots that can be called forth to deal with technology. Seeing technology as a relative newcomer, we assume that we are anchored in something else that can take "spiritual" command of technology and turn it into a more constructive agency of design.



A2 "PERMUTATION": ZNC

CALCULATIVE THINKING DENIES DELIBERATION

PADRUTT (Daseinanalytisches Institut, Zurich) '92

[Hanspeter, Heidegger and the Earth, ed. Ladelle McWhorter, p. 26-27]

I hardly need to mention that a possible turning in the way being gets handed over, a turning in the forgetting of being, and thus a handing over that "leaves *Gestell* behind"⁴⁸ would be most important for ecology and the efforts towards a softer technology. Nevertheless, the following questions arise: Are there any signs of such an important turning? Is it coming, or not? Or has it already come? And if it has already come - or is about to - is it still in time, before the massive explosion that could transform the meadow - all meadows - into a battlefield, perhaps interrupting forever the activity of the praying mantises? Does the turning come soon enough to put an end to the poisoning of the meadowland with cadmium and radioactive cesium? Is the turning quicker than the breeder reactor in Creys-Malville? Is Gorbachev's new thinking a good sign?

Heidegger would probably have warned against such impatient questions. "Perhaps," he said in that lecture in Bremen,

perhaps we are already standing in the shadow cast in advance of the arrival of this turning. When and how it takes place in the unfolding of being, no one knows. It is also unnecessary to know that Knowing like that would actually be very destructive for humans. . . .⁴⁹

If turning takes place in the unfolding of being, that is not possible without humans. It needs us, our reflection and our participation. But on principle we cannot know whether, when, and how a turning happens. To know such would not only be very destructive for humans; it would also be the end of all pain and all joy - quite similar to our knowing what one day will be in death. To know such would put an end to our dwelling on the earth, since awaiting and not knowing belong to this dwelling. It is for us, here and now, in meditative thinking and in spirited action, to await the turning - without calculating it.





A2 "PERMUTATION": ZNC

TECHNOLOGICAL SOLUTIONS PRECLUDES LETTING BEINGS BE

ZIMMERMAN (Philosopher, Tulane Univ.) '93

[Michael E., Environmental Ethics, Fall, p. 203]

Pragmatists would probably say that the issue of intrinsic worth is not only undecidable, but in this case makes no practical difference anyway, since—despite their disagreement about the ontological status of entities or their intrinsic worth—Heidegger and deep ecologists both call on humanity to "let beings be." For Heidegger, this phrase has at least three meanings. First, it means to open up the ontological clearing in which things can disclose themselves and thus "be." Second, it means to allow things to show themselves without undue human interference. Third, it means to interact with things in respectful ways to bring forth not only the goods needed for human life, but also new creations, including works of art. "Letting things be," then, is not to be understood merely passively, as a disinterested "bearing witness" to things, but also actively, as working with things to bring forth new possibilities. Such authentic producing is to be distinguished from technological producing at the end of the history of productionist metaphysics. Technological production forces entities to reveal themselves inappropriately, e.g., animals as mere machines. While deep ecologists emphasize the second of these three meanings of "letting things be," they also acknowledge the importance of creative activity for human self-realization. Nevertheless, their concern about the ecological consequences of modernity's "productionist" mentality leads them to support that kind of creativity which does not unduly interfere with the self-realization of nonhuman beings. ↗ vs

ATTEMPTS TO SOLVE PROBLEMS DENY THE WORLD FOR WHAT IT IS

MCWHORTER (Asst. Prof., Philosophy, Northeast Missouri State) '92

[Ladelle, Heidegger and the Earth, ed. Ladelle McWhorter, p. 2]

Some might find this unnecessarily harsh. We academics may wish to contest the accusation. Surely, in the universities of all places, thinking is going on. But Heidegger had no respect for that or any other kind of complacency. The thinking he saw as essential is no more likely, perhaps unfortunately, to be found in universities or among philosophers than anywhere else. For the thinking he saw as essential is not the simple amassing and digesting of facts or even the mastering of complex relationships or the producing of ever more powerful and inclusive theories. The thinking Heidegger saw as essential, the thinking his works call us to, is not a thinking that seeks to master anything, nor a thinking that results from a drive to grasp and know and shape the world; it is a thinking that disciplines itself to allow the world—the earth, things—to show themselves on their own terms. Heidegger called this kind of thinking 'reflection'. In 1936 he wrote, "Reflection is the courage to make the truth of our own presuppositions and the realm of our own goals into the things that most deserve to be called in question."² Reflection is thinking that never rests complacently in the conclusions reached yesterday; it is thinking that continues to think, that never stops with a satisfied smile and announces: We can cease; we have the right answer now. On the contrary, it is thinking that loves its own life, its own occurring, that does not quickly put a stop to itself, as thinking intent on a quick solution always tries to do. ↗



AZ "PERMUTATION": ZNC

ATTEMPTS TO "DO" ARE TIED TO TECHNOLOGICAL METAPHYSICS—SHOULD ONLY DELIBERATE

STAMBAUGH (Hunter College, CUNY) '87

[Joan, Heidegger and Asian Thought, ed. Graham Parkes, p. 89]

For starters, the title of the essay, "Overcoming Metaphysics," is somewhat misleading. It sounds as if we, we human beings, were able, if we wanted to and decided to, to set about getting rid of metaphysics by surmounting or transcending it to a "higher" point of view or position. Heidegger often used the far less common word for overcoming, *Verwindung*, to indicate that we cannot simply do away with metaphysics by our own efforts; rather, we can learn to live with it by not paying excessive heed to it or getting obsessed with surmounting it. Basically, Heidegger is saying that metaphysics is where we are right now, the reality oppressing us in the form of the will to will, of framing, of the essence of technology. To think that we can change this by some kind of *zao* is a sheer pipedream. All attempts at overcoming anything, not just metaphysics, are inextricably caught in the fatal net of this will to will, of the *Ge-stell* (framing). Metaphysics is with us, and there is no way that we can assert with any degree of certainty that it won't stay with us. The wish for this degree of certainty is itself already a consequence of the modern gestalt of metaphysics, the Cartesian desire for clarity and certainty, for an unshakable foundation (*fundamentum inconcussum*).

Basically, there is nothing whatever we can "do"; the doing is part of the problem, if not its source. All "doing" is itself metaphysical; it is a kind of production that finds the epitome of its expression in Karl Marx. "If one believes that thinking is capable of changing the place of man, this still represents thinking in accordance with the model of production." No wonder when asked in the *Spiegel* interview what philosophy could do to save us in our present situation, Heidegger answered quite simply: nothing. His much-touted statement that only a god can save us is only another way of saying the same thing. ↗



IMPACT EXTENSION: ZNC

- (1) THE LOSS OF BEING ENSURES NUCLEAR ANNIHILATION AND THE COLLAPSE OF THE BIOSPHERE — THAT'S OUR BECKMAN C-SUB
- (2) LOSS OF BEING IS AS BAD AS NUCLEAR ANNIHILATION

ZIMMERMAN (phenomenologist) '94

(Michael, Contesting Earth's Future: Radical Ecology and Postmodernity, p. 117)

Heidegger asserted that human self-assertion, combined with the eclipse of being, threatens the relation between being and human Dasein.²³ Loss of this relation would be even more dangerous than a nuclear war that might bring about the complete annihilation of humanity and the destruction of the earth.²⁴ This controversial claim is comparable to the Christian teaching that it is better to forfeit the world than to lose one's soul by losing one's relation to God. Heidegger apparently thought along these lines: it is possible that after a nuclear war, life might once again emerge, but it is far less likely

that there will ever again occur an ontological clearing through which such life could manifest itself. Further, since modernity's one-dimensional disclosure of entities virtually denies them any "being" at all, the loss of humanity's openness for being is already occurring.²⁵ Modernity's background mood is horror in the face of nihilism, which is consistent with the aim of providing material "happiness" for everyone by reducing nature to pure energy.²⁶ The unleashing of vast quantities of energy in nuclear war would be equivalent to modernity's slow-motion destruction of nature: unbounded destruction would equal limitless consumption. If humanity avoided nuclear war only to survive as contented clever animals, Heidegger believed, we would exist in a state of ontological damnation: hell on earth, masquerading as material paradise.²⁷



TECHNOLOGY & BEING: ZNC

RELIANCE UPON TECHNOLOGY TO ADDRESS OUR PROBLEMS RESULTS IN A LEVELING OF BEING

DREYFUS (Prof., Politics, UC-Berkeley) '93

[Hubert L., The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger, ed. Charles Gulgon, p. 304-5]

Nevertheless, although Heidegger does not deny that technology presents us with serious problems, as his thinking develops he comes to the surprising and provocative conclusion that focusing on loss and destruction is still technological: "All attempts to reckon existing reality . . . in terms of decline and loss, in terms of fate, catastrophe, and destruction, are merely technological behavior" (QCT 48; TK 45-46). Seeing our situation as posing a problem that must be solved by appropriate action is technological too: "The instrumental conception of technology conditions every attempt to bring man into the right relation to technology. . . . The will to mastery becomes all the more urgent the more technology threatens to slip from human control" (QCT 5; VA 14-15). Heidegger is clear this approach will not work. "No single man, no group of men," he tells us, "no commission of prominent statesmen, scientists, and technicians, no conference of leaders of commerce and industry, can brake or direct the progress of history in the atomic age" (DT 52; G 22).

Heidegger's view is both darker and more hopeful. He thinks there is a more dangerous situation facing modern man than the technological destruction of nature and civilization, yet this is a situation about which something can be done – at least indirectly. Heidegger's concern is the human distress caused by the technological understanding of being, rather than the destruction caused by specific technologies. Consequently, he distinguishes the current problems caused by technology – ecological destruction, nuclear danger, consumerism, and so on – from the devastation that would result should technology solve all our problems:

What threatens man in his very nature is . . . that man, by the peaceful release, transformation, storage, and channeling of the energies of physical nature, could render the human condition . . . tolerable for everybody and happy in all respects. (PLT 116; GA 294)

The "greatest danger" is that

the approaching tide of technological revolution in the atomic age could so captivate, bewitch, dazzle, and beguile man that calculative thinking may someday come to be accepted and practiced as the only way of thinking. (DT 56; G 27)

The danger then, is not the destruction of nature or culture but certain totalizing kinds of practices – a leveling of our understanding of being. This threat is not a problem for which we must find a solution, but an ontological condition that requires a transformation of our understanding of being.



TECHNOLOGY & BEING: ZNC

TECHNOLOGICAL THINKING RENDERS HUMYNS AS STANDING RESERVE, ELIMINATING THEIR INTRINSIC VALUE

BECKMAN (Emeritus Prof., Philosophy, Harvey Mudd College) 2K

[Tad A., "Martin Heidegger and Environmental Ethics,"

<http://thuban.ac.hmc.edu/~tbeckman/personal/Heidart.html> wfi]

Let us return to the essay "The Question Concerning Technology" because it was there that Heidegger set us underway against "the greatest danger" and in possession of the idea that it may be through art that we can come to a saving power. He was correct in his understanding of technology as enframing, it poses a great danger to human life; this danger is that the epoch of enframing locks human activity into its own form of the destining-of-revealing and, hence, tends to limit human freedom by concealing the possibility of other forms of revealing and, within that, the possibility of human involvement in other forms of revealing.

"The threat to man does not come in the first instance from the potentially lethal machines and apparatus of technology. The actual threat has already affected man in his essence. The rule of Enframing threatens man with the possibility that it could be denied to him to enter into a more original revealing and hence to experience the call of a more primal truth." [7], p. 28

As human beings become progressively more involved as the orderers of a reality conceived as standing-reserve, they too become standing-reserve at a higher level of organization. In other words, as human beings come to see other beings in the world only for their potential applications to human dispositions, humans themselves come to mirror this shallowness of "being" and to see themselves merely in terms of potential resources to the dispositions of others. Enframing challenges us forth in the decisive role as organizer and challenger of all that is in such a way that human life withdraws from its essential nature. Within this role the essence of our humanity falls into concealment; we can no longer grasp the real nature of life. We withdraw into a conception of reality that is subjective and isolated; but Heidegger asserts that the human essence is not a being in isolation.

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E KRITIK TURNS SOLVENCY: ZNC

QUICK SOLUTIONS FAIL BECAUSE THEY DO NOT ALTER THE MANAGERIAL MINDSET—DELIBERATION SUPERIOR

MCWHORTER (Asst. Prof., Philosophy, Northeast Missouri State) '92

[Ladelle, Heidegger and the Earth, ed. Ladelle McWhorter, p. vii-viii]

When we attempt to think ecologically and within Heidegger's discourse (or perhaps better: when we attempt to think Heideggerly within ecological concerns), the paradoxical unfolds at the site of the question of human action. Thinking ecologically – that is, thinking the earth in our time – means thinking death; it means thinking catastrophe; it means thinking the possibility of utter annihilation not just for human being but for all that lives on this planet and for the living planet itself. Thinking the earth in our time means thinking what presents itself as that which must not be allowed to go on, as that which must be controlled, as that which must be stopped. Such thinking seems to call for immediate action. There is no time to lose. We must work for change, seek solutions, curb appetites, reduce expectations, find cures now, before the problems become greater than anyone's ability to solve them – if they have not already done so. However, in the midst of this urgency, thinking ecologically, thinking Heideggerly, means rethinking the very notion of human action. It means placing in question our typical Western managerial approach to problems, our propensity for technological intervention, our belief in human cognitive power, our commitment to a metaphysics that places active human being over against passive nature. For it is the thoughtless deployment of these approaches and notions that has brought us to the point of ecological catastrophe in the first place. Thinking with Heidegger, thinking Heideggerly and ecologically, means, paradoxically, acting to place in question the acting subject, willing a displacing of our will to action; it means calling ourselves as selves to rethink our very selves, insofar as selfhood in the West is constituted as agent, as actor, as controlling ego, as knowing consciousness. Heidegger's work calls us not to rush in with quick solutions, not to act decisively to put an end to deliberation, but rather to think, to tarry with thinking unfolding itself, to release ourselves to thinking without provision or predetermined aim.



AZ" BUT WE SOLVE": ZNC

AFF'S CLAIMS TO SOLVE ARE FICTIONAL—ATTEMPTS TO TIGHTEN OUR GRIP ON THE WORLD ONLY EXACERBATES THE PROBLEM

DREYFUS (Prof., Politics, UC-Berkeley) '93

[Hubert L., The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger, ed. Charles Gulgon, p. 304]

Nevertheless, although Heidegger does not deny that technology presents us with serious problems, as his thinking develops he comes to the surprising and provocative conclusion that focusing on loss and destruction is still technological: "All attempts to reckon existing reality . . . in terms of decline and loss, in terms of fate, catastrophe, and destruction, are merely technological behavior" (QCT 48; TK 45–46). Seeing our situation as posing a problem that must be solved by appropriate action is technological too: "The instrumental conception of technology conditions every attempt to bring man into the right relation to technology. . . . The will to mastery becomes all the more urgent the more technology threatens to slip from human control" (QCT 5; VA 14–15). Heidegger is clear this approach will not work. "No single man, no group of men," he tells us, "no commission of prominent statesmen, scientists, and technicians, no conference of leaders of commerce and industry, can brake or direct the progress of history in the atomic age" (DT 52; G 22).¹²



ALTERNATIVE EXTENSION: ZNC

STEPPING OUTSIDE USE/RESOURCE MINDSET CRITICAL TO NEW CONSCIOUSNESS

DREYFUS (Prof., Politics, UC-Berkeley) '93

[Hubert L., *The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger*, ed. Charles Guignon, p. 306]

For us to be able to make a similar dissociation, Heidegger holds, we must rethink the history of being in the West. Then we will see that although a technological understanding of being is our destiny, it is not our fate. That is, although our understanding of things and ourselves as resources to be ordered, enhanced, and used efficiently has been building up since Plato, we are not stuck with that understanding. Although the technological understanding of being governs the way things have to show up for us, we can be open to a transformation of our current cultural clearing.

Only those who think of Heidegger as opposing technology will be surprised at his next point. Once we see that technology is our latest understanding of being, we will be grateful for it. Our technological clearing is the cause of our distress, yet if it were not given to us to encounter things and ourselves as resources, nothing would show up as anything at all, and no possibilities for action would make sense. And once we realize – in our practices, of course, not just as a matter of reflection – that we receive our technological understanding of being, we have stepped out of the technological understanding of being, for we then see that what is most important in our lives is not subject to efficient enhancement – indeed, the drive to control everything is precisely what we do not control. This transformation in our sense of reality – this overcoming of thinking in terms of values and calculation – is precisely what Heideggerian thinking seeks to bring about. Heidegger seeks to make us see that our practices are needed

as the place where an understanding of being can establish itself, so we can overcome our restricted modern clearing by acknowledging our essential receptivity to understandings of being:

Modern man must first and above all find his way back into the full breadth of the space proper to his essence. That essential space of man's essential being receives the dimension that unites it to something beyond itself... that is: the way in which the safekeeping of being itself is given to belong to the essence of man as the one who is needed and used by being. (QCT 39; TK 39)

This transformation in our understanding of being, unlike the slow process of cleaning up the environment, which is, of course, also necessary, would take place in a sudden gestalt switch: "The turning or the danger comes to pass suddenly. In this turning, the clearing belonging to the essence of being suddenly clears itself and lights up" (QCT 44; TK 43). The danger – namely that we have a levered and concealed understanding of being – when grasped as the danger, becomes that which saves us. "The selfsame danger is, when it is as the danger, the saving power" (QCT 39; TK 39).



ALTERNATIVE EXTENSION: ZNC

REJECTION OF TECHNOLOGY CALLS FORTH NEW HUMYN CONSCIOUSNESS

BECKMAN (Emeritus Prof., Philosophy, Harvey Mudd College) 2K

[Tad A., "Martin Heidegger and Environmental Ethics,"

<http://thuban.ac.hmc.edu/~tbeckman/personal/Heidart.html> wfi]

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Our mistaken assessment of the lifeti e of technology is really caused by our failure to understand its essence. Technology must be understood in its essence and not merely as industrial machinery, space-age refrigerators, and computer-directed guidance systems. If we understand technology in its essence, Heidegger claimed, we will see that all of the West's historical development has been built out of it; technology is the central theme of our civilization. To move out of the dangers that technology presents, then, requires more than retrenching ourselves in "traditional values;" it requires a transformation of values, a process of placing Western civilization on a whole new course. This is clearly similar to what Nietzsche recognized and called the "transvaluation of all values," though Heidegger asserted that Nietzsche himself was never able to make the transformation or to recognize the whole extent to which it is necessary.

The problem of technology is not merely its obvious physical dangers to us nor is it merely these confusions of time and scope. Technology is more than just a name for Western thinking, Western dispositions, and Western inventiveness. Technology is also a mode of self-consciousness, a mode of seeing ourselves and, hence, of letting ourselves enter into the world. Heidegger's analysis demands a new calling-forth of human consciousness. It demands that humans come to presence in the world in a new way more fitting to their essential nature. It is the object of this final section to interpret this last portion of the argument and its relevance to environmental ethics.]

ALTERNATIVE—VIEWING HUMYN EXPERIENCE, KNOWLEDGE, AND ACTION THROUGH DASEIN

BECKMAN (Emeritus Prof., Philosophy, Harvey Mudd College) 2K

[Tad A., "Martin Heidegger and Environmental Ethics,"

<http://thuban.ac.hmc.edu/~tbeckman/personal/Heidart.html> wfi]

When we explore beings, things that exist, we discover that most beings are simply in existence with no relationship to one another, no consciousness. Human beings are unique, so far as we can tell, because human beings do observe. Humans are aware of other beings; they witness them. This is why Heidegger referred to the human being with the German word 'Dasein' or

"being-there." The human is the only being we know for which the "there" and the "when" make sense because the human's awareness defines a "there" and a "when" among all other beings. For non-aware beings, beings that are merely "ready-to-hand," there is no sense of taking a place within a historical time. It is in this respect, then, that our central concern regarding the human essence must be to consider who we are as beings among beings and, in particular, as beings who witness other beings. All profound thinking about human life must be founded on the question of





ALTERNATIVE EXTENSION: ZNC



who we are as aware beings among other beings. The essence of human life is, indeed, founded in the facticity, or objectivity, of *dasein*; not only do we humans come into relationship with other beings through our characteristic consciousness but they come into their own beings as objects through us. They are witnessed by us. This is why Heidegger insisted that, from the position of our own essence, "we can never encounter only [ourselves]." ([1], p. 27) Any conception of our environment that perceives only ourselves and our dispositions is necessarily flawed from the point of view of essential human nature.

The human presence is crucial to other beings coming-to-presence, to truth happening. This concept should sound familiar now now; what it claims is that the human essence is fundamentally involved in all revealing, in all objects coming into unconcealment. Technology, as a mode of revealing, is one path within many possible paths that open up within the essential nature of that human role; each of these paths develops a specific aspect of our relations to beings. That relationship is always reciprocated in the sense that, in so far as being-there is our essential nature, the way that we are there, the way that we relate, is the way that we ourselves come into being during that period. This is the key to Heidegger's insight that the way we treat other things is the determinant of the way we ourselves will be treated. The danger of technology is that it treats other beings in an aggressive, utilitarian way so that, ultimately, we ourselves are carried away within the overarching themes of aggression and utility. In the epoch of technology, we come to see ourselves exclusively within the limited sense of agency within this unfolding structure of being. What is this revealing in which we participate? The process is understood as something coming out of "concealedness" into "unconcealedness." To understand what Heidegger meant requires us to reflect as deeply as possible upon the nature of human experience as it happens to us (within what we are) and not merely life as the West has traditionally interpreted it. Heidegger conceived of this through the concept of the "Open."

"In the midst of beings as a whole an open place occurs. There is a clearing, a lighting... That which is can only be, as a being, if it stands within and stands out within what is lighted in this clearing. Only this clearing grants and guarantees to us humans a passage to those beings that we ourselves are not, and access to the being that we ourselves are. Thanks to this clearing, beings are unconcealed in certain changing degrees." ([6], p. 53)

But the "changing degrees" should be taken as a dialectic of conflict, of clearing and concealment. In this regard, Heidegger's concepts of *World* and *Earth* are the forms of clearing and concealment in the dialectical process.

"To the Open there belong a world and the earth... the world is the clearing of the paths of the essential guiding directions with which all decision complies... The earth is not simply the Closed but rather that which rises up as self-closing. World and earth are always intrinsically and essentially in conflict, belligerent by nature... Earth juts through the world and world grounds itself on the earth only so far as truth happens as the primal conflict between clearing and concealing." ([6], p. 55)

Life is more complex than simply living among an extensive inventory of things that we perceive and that stimulate our sense organs. What life is, for each of us and for all of us together, is always in flux. Our recognition of beings, of ourselves, and of all the relations between these, is our world. It is built on, or out of, the whole of beings and is a lighting or clearing within them. It is a continual process in which beings come to presence and beings fall back into concealment. Earth itself is a determinant that is never "seen" as such but is always reckoned with nevertheless; world is what is "seen."



A2 "Deep Ecology Turns" 2NC

NO DEEP ECOLOGY DOGMA—MANY INTERPRETATIONS COMPATIBLE WITH HEIDEGGER'S THOUGHT

NAESS (Center for Development & Environment, Univ. of Oslo) '97

[Arne, "Heidegger, Postmodern Theory and Deep Ecology," Trumpeter 14, 4
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The above title is from a chapter in the book *Contesting Earth's Future: Radical Ecology and Postmodernity* by Michael Zimmerman, University of California Press 1994. The last 28 pages of the chapter are headed "Heidegger, Naess, and Ontological Phenomenalism". My gestalt ontology is a sort of ontological realism in the sense that we have direct access to the contents of reality in our spontaneous experiences. These are not mere appearances or phenomena.

Zimmerman does not mention "the 8 points of the deep ecology movement", and that is all to the good because they are perhaps too often brought into the discussion. But it is of some importance to immediately observe that the questions the author painstakingly discusses all belong to "level 1 of the Apron Diagram". That is, they belong to the ultimate premises. At this level the supporters of the deep ecology movement recognize widely, in part incompatible views. The 8 points, constituting the second level, are proposed as expressions of what the supporters have in common on a fairly general and abstract plane. For instance that it is meaningful to do something for a living being's own sake, (cp. "inherent value"). One supporter may say he does not accept anything Heidegger seems to say on this level, or that he accepts everything. And Naess is only one of the 15 or 20 theorists of the movement. Deep ecology has never been, and will hopefully never be a philosophical sect.



A2 "Eco-Ethics" ZNC

INCORPORATION OF HEIDEGGER'S THOUGHT IMPROVES ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS

BECKMAN (Emeritus Prof., Philosophy, Harvey Mudd College) **2K**

[Tad A., "Martin Heidegger and Environmental Ethics,"

<http://thuban.ac.hmc.edu/~tbeckman/personal/Heidart.html> wfi]

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After World War II, Martin Heidegger directed much of his thinking to technology and to the impact of technology on our perceptions of human life. One of the essays developed along this path was "The Question Concerning Technology." It is unfortunate that the essay is not widely read because it carries the critique of technology out of its usual context and form and delivers it into a new light where there is, perhaps, some progress to be made. Furthermore, the essay has special significance to environmental issues and, I believe, lays a new groundwork for an ethical approach to our relations with the environment.



AFF ANSWERS

HEIDEGGERS INVOLVEMENT WITH NAZISM IS INSEPARABLE FROM HIS PHILOSOPHY

BERNSTEIN (Prof., Philosophy, MIT) '92

[Richard, J., The New Constellation]

<One cannot begin with the apriori (and unjustified) assumption that there is no relation between Heidegger's philosophy and his politics. One must "look and see," one must carefully examine Heidegger's texts before making any such judgment.

In contrast to Rorty's rigid and misleading demarcation, there are those who have argued that Heidegger's fundamental philosophic concerns are not only compatible with his political engagement, but were appropriated by Heidegger when he supported the "movement" of National Socialism. Karsten Harries, who develops a subtle argument along these lines, claims that "Authenticity as Heidegger himself understands it, rules out a separation of the political stance of the author and his philosophy."¹⁴ Harries argues that an analysis of such key Heideggerian concepts as "authenticity," "conscience," "guilt," and especially the treacherously ambiguous concept of "resolve" (*Entschlossenheit*) in *Sein und Zeit* reveal crucial links between Heidegger's philosophy and his Rectoral Address.¹⁵ According to Harries we cannot ignore Heidegger's changing political stances if we want to understand his philosophy. Heidegger's turn "towards National Socialism was genuine and cannot be erased from the development of his thought."¹⁶ Furthermore, the intimate relation between Heidegger's philosophy and politics is crucial for understanding his development. For Heidegger's "disastrously misplaced enthusiasm for National Socialism" and his "unfounded hope for a new beginning which would rescue Germany from disintegration and madness" is the key for understanding what Harries calls the "apolitical" turn of his subsequent rethinking of his own "philosophy and its relationship to the age."¹⁷ > ~5



AFF ANSWERS: ZAC

ACTION WITHOUT A SPECIFIC ALTERNATIVE IS USELESS

RORTY (Prof., Philosophy, Univ. of Virginia) '91

[Richard, Objectivity, Relativism and Truth, Philosophical Papers v. 1]

In particular, I think that a lot of the energy of leftist intellectuals in the contemporary American academy is being wasted, just insofar as they hope that work within such disciplines as philosophy and literary criticism can be geared in with political action in some direct way (as opposed to a long-term, atmospheric, indirect way). One symptom of this hope is the conviction that it is politically useful to "problematize" or "call into question" traditional concepts, distinctions, and institutions. My own view is that it is not much use pointing to the "internal contradictions" of a social practice, or "deconstructing" it, unless one can come up with an alternative practice — unless one can at least sketch a utopia in which the concept or distinction would be obsolete. After all, every social practice of any complexity, and every element of such a practice, contains internal tensions. Ever since Hegel we intellectuals have been busy winking them out. But there is little point in exhibiting such tensions unless you have some suggestions about resolving them. The Deweyan liberal left and the Marxist radical left of my youth both tried to work out utopian visions — to suggest practices which would minimize the tensions in question. My doubts about the contemporary Foucauldian left concern its failure to offer such visions and such suggestions.] 16 16 16