



CDE: REALLY BIG THEORY BLOCK BOOK

Fourth Edition

William H. Bennett

Table of Contents

Agent of Action Counterplans	8
Agent Specification 1NC	9
Agent Specification 2NC	10
ASPEC - AT: Topic only Requires Federal Government	11
ASPEC - AT: Infinite Regress	12
ASPEC - AT: Cross-Examination Checks	13
ASPEC - AT: Agent Counterplans Bad	14-15
ASPEC - AT: Normal Means	16
ASPEC - AT: Pick One and we'll Defend it	17
ASPEC - AT: Agent Counterplans Good	18
Extra Topicality Bad	19
Extra Topicality Bad - AT: Severance	20
Extra Topicality Bad - AT: Increase NEG Ground	21
Extra Topicality Bad - AT: Counterplans Check	22
Pecs Good	23-24
Agent Counterplans Good	25-26
Answer to No Neg Fiat	27
International Fiat Good	28
Defense	29
Dispostionality Good	30-31
Conditionally Good	32-33
Extra Topicality Good	34
Agent Specification Bad	35-36
International Fiat Bad	37
Agent Cps Bad	38
PICs Bad	39
Conditionally Bad	40
Dispostinality Bad	41
Consultation Counterplans	42
Consult Good	42
Consult Bad 43	
Consult CPs - A2: not infinitely regressive	44
Consult CPs - A2: Don't Steal Entirety	44
Consult CPs - A2: Must Defend Immediacy	44
Consult CPs - A2: Aff Side Bias	45
Consult CPs - A2: Lit Checks	45
Consult CPs - A2: Best Policy Option	45
Counterplan Attacks By The Affirmative	46-47
Counterplans Must Be Non-Topical	48
Counterplans Must Be Competitive	49
Policy Paradigm Means No Conditional/Multiple CP'S	50
Textual Competition Bad	51
Counterplans Are Limited To Political Feasibility	52
Severance Permutations Are Bad	53
2NC Counterplans Are Illegitimate	54
Counterplans Must Be Non-Topical	55
Topical Counterplans Illegitimate	56
Agent Counterplans Bad	57
Delay CP's Bad	58
Counterplan Defense Advocacy	59
Redundancy Equals Competition	60
Textual Competition Good	61
Counterplans Don't Have To Be Competitive	62
International Actor Fiat Good	63
Counterplans In 2NC Our Friend	64
Topical Counterplans Legitimate	65
Extensions on 2 - Increase Educations	66
Extensions on 3 - Equal Ground	66
Extensions on 4 - Debate Equality	66-67
Extension - Aff. Says Theorists Say CP Must Be Untopical	67
50 State Fiat Good (States Counterplan Advocacy)	68
Operationally Defined Counterplans is Legitimate	69
Political Feasibility Does Not Limit Counterplans	70
Conditional And or Utopian Counterplans Are Nifty	71
Political Feasibility Bad Test for Utopian Counterplans	72
Delay CP's Good	73
Counterplans Do/Don't Limit Negative Arguments	74
Counterplans Should Prohibit Case Attacks	75
Negative Abandons System	
Negative Cannot Give Counterplan and Attack Affirmative Case at the Same Time	76

Counterplanning Does Limit Other Arguments	77
Counterplanning Does Not Limit The Neg To Just The Counterplan	78
Other Attacks Not Preempted: Neg. May Argue Stock Issues As Well As Counterplan	79
Counterplan Dispositionality or Conditionality	80
Dispositionality	80
Dispositionality Good	80
Dispositionality Bad	81
Conditional Arguments Are Horrible	82
Conditional Arguments Are Wonderful	83
Dispositionality Good	84
Conditionality Bad	85
Conditionality Good - Offense	86
Conditionality Good	87
Dispo Good	89
Conterplan Presumption	90
Counterwarrants	92
Decision Rules	94
Disadvantages (Includes Intrinsicness)	96
Neg-Preempts For Disadvantages	97
A Disadvantage Must Be Intrinsic To The Resolution	98
Intrinsicness Bad	99
Intrinsicness Good	100
Intrinsicness Good - AT Makes Plan Not T	100
Intrinsicness Good - AT Moving Target	100
Intrinsicness Good - AT Infinite Regression	101
Intrinsicness Good - AT No Risk/Irresponsible	101
Intrinsicness Perms Good	102
Intrinsicness Perms Bad	103
Evidence	104
Extratopicality	105-07
Fiat	108-109
Neg Has Fiat Power	110
Non-U.S. Fiat is Legitimate	11-112
Negative Doesn't Have Fiat	113
Neg Fiat Bad	114
Non-U.S. (Foreign and NGO) Fiat is Not Legitimate	115
Negative Fiat Defined	116
Theory: The Affirmative Team Abuses Fiat	117
Generic Attacks Good	118
Hasty Generalization	119
Incrementalism	120
Incrementalism is a Structural Change	121
Incrementalism is not a voter	122
Incrementalism is Disadvantageous	123
Incremeantlism Shell	124
Incrementalism is Great Voting Issue	125
Incrementalism Not a Structural Change	126
Incrementalism Avoids Disadvantages	127
Inherency	128
Justification Affirmative	129
Affirmative Attack: Justification is not a voting issue	129-130
Justification is not a voter-extensions	130
Justification burden is illogical	131
Justification Negative	132
Justification Attack #__: The U.S. Government	133
Justification Attack #__: The U.S. Government	134
Negative Extension Block: Justification: Affirmative says resolution is not the focus	135
Negative Extension Block: Justification: Affirmative says resolution is not the focus	136
Negative Extension Block: Affirmative say Justification causes decrease in research	137
Negative Extension Block: Affirmative says they need only to be superior to the Status Quo	138
Kritiks Are Good/Desirable	139
Critiques Enhance Education	140
Answers to 'Critiques Are Infinitely Regressive'	141
Critiques Good - Check Oppression	142
Discourse Shapes Reality	143
Marketplace of Ideas is Good-Finds Truth	144
The Marketplace of Ideas is Superior-We Should Allow Ideas	145
Answers to 'Critiques are Infinitely Regressive'	146
Should Reject Deontological Criteria	147

Should Reject Consequentialism	148
Critiquing Assumptions Allows Change	149-150
Answers to 'Political Correctness is Bad'	151
Critiques Good-Check Oppression	152
Critiques Enhance Education	153-154
Critiques Good-Practical Policymaking Requires them	155
Critiques good-Ethical Policymaking Requires Them	156
Critiques Are Legitimate	157
Critiquing Assumptions Allows For Change	158-159
Critique Good - Long Shell (1/3)	160-163
Critique Good - Short Shell	164
Epistemology First	165-166
Critique solves "Root Cause"	167
Performativity Shell (½)	168-169
Link-Traditional Politics	170
Link- Ideal Speech	171
Performance key to Political Participation	172
Performance key to Political Participation	173-174
Performance key to Education	175
Performance key to Change	176
Performance key to Policymaking	177
Performance key to Inclusion	178-179
Epistemology First	180-181
Kritiks are Bad/Flawed	182
Critiques Must have Alternatives	183
Critiques Bad-Infinately Regressive	184
Critiques Bad-Speech Restrictions are Counterproductive	185
Critiques Illegitimate	186
Kritiks Alternatives Need a Text	187
Sample Critique Permutation Block	188
Discourse Does Not Shape Reality-Sapir Whorf Theory is Wrong	189
Discourse Does Not Shape Reality-Sapir Whorf Theory is Wrong	190-191
Critiques Bad-Infinately Regressive-They Lack Alternatives	192
Critiques Must Have Alternatives	193-194
Critiques Bad-Speech Restrictions are Counterproductive	195-196
Critique Illegitimate	197-198
Kritik Answers	199-200
Deconstruction Bad-Theoretically Flawed	201
Deconstruction Bad-Counterproductive	202
Critical Discourse Bad-Excludes Minority Views	203
Poststructuralist Bad-Counterproductive	204
Action should Precede Critical Analysis	205
Censorship of Speech is Counterproductive	206
Affirmative Shell: Plan and Policy Should Be Focus - Long (¼)	207-210
Affirmative Shell: Plan and Policy Should Be Focus - Short	211
Definitions	212
Definitions-USFG is the Agent of the Resolution	212
Definitions-Resolved Related to the Resolution, Not Debaters	212
Definition-Should Implies Expectation	212
Rules Are the key to Ethics	213
Rules key to Education	214
Rules key to Deliberation	215
Rules key to Deliberation	216-217
Rules key to Deliberation	218
Deliberation Impact-Agency	219
Deliberation Impact-Peace	220-221
Deliberation Impact-Democracy/Discrimination	222
Rules key to Community	223
Community Impact- Humanity	224
Community Impact- Humanity	225
Answers to: Rules = Violence	226
A/T: Rules = Exclusion	227
A/T: "Kritiks are too cool for rules"	228
Fiat Good	229
Plan Focus key to Deliberation	230
Plan Focus key to change	231-232
Plan Focus key to change	233
Policymaking key to Deliberation Agency	234
Policymaking key to Deliberation Agency	235
Policymaking key to Education	236-238
Policymaking key to change	239-240
Policymaking key to Ethics	241
Policymaking key to Moral Decision Making	242
Political Vacuum DA	243-244

Consequentialism key to Deliberation/Accountability	245
Consequentialism key to Ethics	246
Consequentialism key- Nuclear War	247
Consequentialism key -States (½)	248-249
Critique Prevents Change (½)	250-252
Calculability Good	253
Policy before discourse	254-255
Representations Good- Nuclear	256
Offensive Language	257-258
Academic Discourse Good (½)	259-260
Permutation-Coalitions	261-262
Permutation-Interpretations	263-264
Minor Repair Theory-Minor Repair legitimate	265
Paradigms	266
Games Player is a Bad Paradigm	266
Hypothesis Testing Paradigm Bad	267
Policy Paradigm Best	268
Stock Issues is a Bad Paradigm	269
Tabula Rasa is A Bad Paradigm	270
Games Player Paradigm Best	271
Hypothesis Testing Paradigm Good	272
Extension To () Hypo is Good	273
Policy is a Bad Paradigm	274
Stock Issues Paradigm Best	275
Tabula Rasa Paradigm Best	276
Permutations	277
Permutations are Good	277
Permutations are Legitimate	278
Severance Permutations Good	279
Permutations are Illegitimate	280-281
Permutations Illegitimate-Extensions	282
Intrinsicness Perms Bad	283
Severance Permutations Bad	284
Severance Perms Good	285
Intrinsic Perms Good	286
Multiple Perms Good	287
Multiple Perms Bad	288
Severance Perms Bad	288
Intrinsic Perms Bad	288
PIC counterplan	289
Prima Facie Theory	291
Re-Planning	292
Significance is not a Voting Issue	294
Solvency	295
Solvency not a Voter	295
Solvency/PMNS A Voting Issue	296
Spread Disadvantage: Destroys the sacred values of debate	297-298
Theory	299
Theory Articles are not evidence	299
Theory Brief: Theory is the Foundation of Debate	300
Topicality-Affirmative Rights or Aff. Presumption?	301
Affirmative is not Presumptively Topical	302
Negative Fails to meet topicality burdens	303
No Affirmative Right to Define Terms	304
Affirmative Has Presumption on Topicality	305
Affirmative has Presumption on Definitions	306-307
Topicality By Effects	308
Effects Topicality Illegitimate	308-309
Effects Topicality	310
Extensions To: Effects Topicality	310-311
Effects Topicality is legitimate	312
Topicality Standards	313
Best Definition is Best	313
Best Definition Standard Advocacy	314-315
Broad Definitions Are good	316
Broad Topicality is Desirable	317
Context is Best Standard	318
Debatability is a Good Standard	319
Dictionary Definitions Are Groovy	320

Each Word Should Have Meaning	321
Field Context is Best Standard	322
Field Context is Best	323
Grammar is Best Standard	324-325
Invariant is the Best Standard	326
Legal Sources Great	327
Extensions to legal Definitions Good	328-329
Most Limiting Definitions are Best	330
Operational Definitions are Good	331
Precise Definitions are Unnecessary	332
Questionable Grammar is not Harmful	333
Reasonability Standard is Best	334-335
Words Have many Meanings	336
Each word need not have meaning	337
Topicality Standards Attacked	338
Best Standard is Undesirable	338
Best Definition is a Bad Standard	339
Common or Lay Definitions Bad	340
Correct usage is Bad Standard	341-342
Dictionary Definitions are Too Restrictive	343
Debatability is a Bad Standard	344
Dictionaries are Bad	345
Dictionary Definitions are Illegitimate	346
Essential Properties-Bad Standard	347
Field Context is Bad Standard	348
Field Context-Specialized/Subject-Dictionaries are bad	349
Grammar is a Bad Standard	350
Correct Grammar is Unnecessary	351
Legal Sources Bad	352-353
Legal Definitions not Precise	354
Legal Definitions Hurt Debate	355
Operational Definitions are Unacceptable	356
Reasonability is Bad	357
Extensions to Reasonability is Bad	358
Eliminates True/False Test (#5)	358
Redundancy is a Bad Counterplan Standard	359
Resolutory Context is a Bad Standard	360
Topicality is/is not a Voting Issue	361
Affirmative Should Not Get Leeway on Topicality	361
Fair Warning Does Not Eliminate Topicality	362
Decision Rule: Misuse of Language is disastrous	363
Judges Must Vote Within their Jurisdiction	364
Liberal Topic Interpretations are Intolerable	365
Precise Definition(s) Critical	366
Extensions For Precise Definition(s)	366
Reverse Topicality is not a Voter	367
Topicality is a Voting Issue	368
Extensions to T is a Voting Issue	369-370
Topicality Argumentation is Harmful	371
Topicality is not a Voting Issue	372-373
Paradigms Support Non-Voting Issue	374
Topical Counterplan Advocacy or Defense	375
Affirmative Shell-Long	375-378
Affirmative Shell-Short	379
Negative Shell-Long (¼)	380
Negative Shell-Long (2/4)	380-381
Negative Shell-Long (¾)	382
Negative Shell-Long (4/4)	383
Negative Shell-Short	384
Definitions	385
Definition-USFG is the Agent of Resolution	385
Definition-USFG is in D.C. (Not 'the People')	385
Definition-Resolved Relates to the Resolution, Not Debaters	385
Definition-Should implies Expectation	385
Rules Good	386
Critical Framework Fail-Environment	387-388
Rules key to Ethics	388
Rules key to Policymaking	389
Rules key to competition	390
Rules key to Educations	391-392
Rules key to Deliberation	393
Rules key to Deliberation	394-395
Rules key to Deliberation	396
Deliberation Impact-Partisanship	397

Deliberation Impact-Agency	398
Deliberation Impact-Peace	399-400
Deliberation Impact-Democracy/Discrimination	401
Deliberation Impact-Determinism	402-403
Determinism Impact-V2L	404
Rules key to Community	405
Community Impact-Humanity	406
Community Impact-Humanity	407
Role of the Ballot	408-409
Fairness outweighs Educations	410
A/T: Deliberation = Elitist	411
A/T: Rules = Biopower	412
A/T: Rules = Violence	413
A/T: Rules = Exclusion	414
A/T: "Kritiks are too cool for rules"	415
Topic Good	416
Conventions Key	417-418
Debate key	419
Standards Defenses	420
Predictable Ground Key to Education	421
Predictability key to Plan Focus	421-422
Limits key to politics	423-424
Limits key to Inclusion	424
Limits and Education key to Politics	425
Education Good	426
Roleplaying key to Education	427
Education key to Deliberation	428
Education key to Deliberation	429
Education Solves Totalitarianism	430
Education key to change	431
Cornerstone: Oasis Key to Education	432
Debate Must Be Nonpolitical to Effectively Test Ideas	432-433
A/T: Mitchell	434
A/T" Mitchell 435	
Plan Focus Good	436
Fiat Good	437-438
Plan Focus key to Deliberation	438
Plan Focus key to Fairness	439
Plan Focus key to Education	440
Plan Focus key to Change	441-442
Plan Focus key to change	443
Plan focus checks Judge Intervention	444-445
Plan Focus checks Judge Intervention	446
Plan Focus key to check Crazy Alts	447
Policymaking key to Deliberation/Agency	448
Policymaking key to Education	449
Policymaking key to Education	450-451
Policymaking key to Education	452-453
Policymaking key to Change	454-455
Policymaking key to Ethics	456
Policymaking solves Totalitarianism	457
Policymaking Education Best	458
Consequentialism key to Deliberation/Accountability	459
Consequentialism key to Ethics	460
Consequentialism key to Ethics	461
Consequentialism key to Ethics	462
Consequentialism key-Nuclear War	463
Consequentialism key-States (1/2)	464-465
Consequentialism key to Change	466
Critique Prevents Change (1/2)	467
Critique Prevents Change (2/2)	467-468
Calculability Good	469
Representations Good	470-471
Representations Good-Nuclear	472
Representations Good-Nuclear	473
Offensive Language	474-475
Offensive Language	476
Academic Discourse Good (1/2)	477-478
Academic Discourse Good (2/2)	478
Misc	479
Permutation-Coalitions	480
Permutation-Interpretations	481-482
Permutation Interpretations	483-484
Permutation Interpretations	484-485
Realism Good	486-487

AGENT OF ACTION COUNTERPLAN

Err Negative on Theory Questions

- A. Structural Side Bias – The Affirmative Speaks first, last and has infinite prep time***
- B. Imbalance - affirmatives won the majority of debates before the advent of liberal negative theory such as PICs and Conditionality***
- C. Literature -- literature advocating change is always more explicit and prominent when compared to defense of the status quo***

Agent Specification 1NC

A. Interpretation – the affirmative must specify the process by which the branches of the federal government establish the plan

B. Standards

Ground – the affirmative is an incomplete policy without an agent – specific case, DA, CP, and Critique ground is predicated on the agent and agent issues color the entire debate

Real World – no policy can be established with an agent, since the Federal Government isn't a single entity – this is a 100% solvency takeout – vote negative on presumption

Plan Text Key – the nature of textual competition, lack of precise and binding cross-ex, and the fact that the negative loses 1NC and pre round prep time are all reasons why the agent must be in the plan

C. Voting Issue for reasons of fairness and education

Agent Specification 2NC

Debating the agent of the plan is critical to education and fairness

Lack of specification denies core negative ground such as agent counterplans, politics/spending disadvantages, and the role of agent questions in solvency – agent ground is a core literature question

We have a right to this predictable and intrinsic ground given the word “federal” in the topic, their interpretation allows the affirmative to claim benefits of federal action, without defending its full meaning

Implementation means substance alone is insufficient – policies are always advocated within the context of particular agents, meaning agent issues are intrinsically topic specific education – agents affect the way links are generated, how the affirmative solves, and negative ground as a whole

ASPEC - AT: Topic Only Requires Federal Government

- 1. The resolution isn't the end-all determination of ground – it doesn't determine counterplan status nor that you shouldn't have vague plans***
- 2. The Federal Government doesn't exist as one entity – specific branches implement the plan and that affects ground and solvency questions***
- 3. The resolution doesn't specify so that they can choose – it's the same as other parts of the resolution***

ASPEC - AT: Infinite Regress

- 1. Non-Responsive – there are only 3 branches, unless of course, higher level math is too confusing for <insert team>***
- 2. Any specification the affirmative chooses will be within the three branches – even agencies are “executive” agencies and therefore link to all executive ground***
- 3. Agent-less plans are more infinitely regressive – they justify cases with no funding, enforcement, or mandates – they could just simply read the resolution***

ASPEC - AT: Cross-Examination Checks

- 1. Negative Time Skew – given the fact that agent issues affect the entirety of negative ground and the affirmative has case selection, it is only reasonable that the negative have the agent in the plan to ensure no loss of pre-round, 1AC, and cross-ex time***
- 2. CP Ground – plan text is key to securing competition for counterplans – cross apply agent CPs good***
- 3. Cross Ex is the Wrong Place – even if binding, cross-ex gives the affirmative the ability to be vague and ambiguous, create arbitrary distinctions, and spending cross-ex on agent questions detracts from in-depth topic analysis – a net turn to their topic specific education argument***
- 4. Concedes They Could Defend an Agent – the post facto nature of their response means they could have easily specified in the plan – no risk of offense for the negative***

ASPEC - AT: Agent Counterplans Bad

1. They can never win this argument – if agent counterplans are bad, then agent counterplans would always lose on theory; however, negative disad and case ground would still be preserved – essentially, we can permute this argument

2. Agent CPs are good

Education – agent debates are paramount policy questions because certain agents are better suited for particular policies and the process is often the central issue regarding effectiveness

Ground – agent ground is vital on a diverse and large topic with no predictable limit as well as the ability to offset literature biased impacts such as racism and sexism

Lobbying – knowing about substance only matters if you can create change – this vastly expands the impact of debate education

Limits – agent counterplans provide a natural limiting function on the topic size by weeding out insignificant cases

Not Hard to Debate – a predictable, balanced, and large debate exists over the process of agent questions

Not Generic – agent debates always center on solvency questions, very few other teams or argument styles are punished for being generic, and not defending their agent makes the affirmative infinitely more generic

Not Trivial – our net benefit proves substance, Congress versus the executive is far from trivial, and debate turns on small but important distinctions

ASPEC - AT: Normal Means

1. Normal Means Isn't Exclusive

No Standards – what determines normal means? Is it the number of times an agent has acted, the preponderance of cards, or the specificity of the evidence? The mandates of the plan should never be conditioned on evidence standards that are determined until the end of the debate

This is the essence of moving target – not until the end of the round, we will definitively know what the agent is

Gives the affirmative too much ground – case selection means they have a head start on winning the agent of their plan, allowing them to essentially bait the negative and change their agent depending on what the negative says

2. Creates an unfair burden requiring the negative to spend time just to get to ground zero

3. No offense – choosing the agent is no different than them choosing their case, the negative can simply prepare for the agent decisions

ASPEC - AT: Pick One and We'll Defend It

- 1. Strategic Skew – we don't get to pick until the negative block, wasting our entire prep time before that point – if this was a genuine position, they should have let us pick before the debate***
- 2. Magnifies Affirmative Research Advantage – if we pick the agent, then we lose ground to say its unconstitutional, unrealistic, or non-topical***
- 3. Counterplan Competition – even if we get to pick the agent, that doesn't provide textual competition***
- 4. Fine, Have it Your Way – if you win this standard is good for debate, then...***

Your agent is the paid intern for House of Representatives, 11th District, Georgia

Vote Negative – the powers of the intern are surprisingly limited and therefore none of your plan mandates will achieve anything AND we have a federal government crisis DA and job loss DA

ASPEC - Agent Counterplans Good

Policy making education is found at the agency and implementation level

Schuck 1999 [Peter H. Schuck, Professor, Yale Law School, and Visiting Professor, New York Law School, Spring (“Delegation and Democracy” – Cardozo Law Review)
http://www.constitution.org/ad_state/schuck.htm]

God and the devil are in the details of policymaking, as they are in most other important things—**and the details are to be found at the agency level**. This would remain true, moreover, even if the nondelegation doctrine were revived and statutes were written with somewhat greater specificity, for many of the most significant impacts on members of the public would still be indeterminate until the agency grappled with and defined them. Finally, the agency is often the site in which public participation is most effective. This is not only because the details of the regulatory impacts are hammered out there. It is also because the agency is where the public can best educate the government about the true nature of the problem that Congress has tried to address. Only the interested parties, reacting to specific agency proposals for rules or other actions, possess (or have the incentives to acquire) the information necessary to identify, explicate, quantify, and evaluate the real-world consequences of these and alternative proposals. Even when Congress can identify the first-order effects of the laws that it enacts, these direct impacts seldom exhaust the laws’ policy consequences. Indeed, **first-order effects of policies** usually **are less significant than** the **aggregate of more remote effects that ripple through a complex, interrelated, opaque society**. When policies fail, it is usually **not because** the congressional **purpose was misunderstood**. More commonly, they fail because Congress did not fully appreciate how the details **of policy implementation would confound its purpose**. Often, however, **this knowledge can only be gained through active public participation in the policymaking process at the agency level** where these implementation issues are **most clearly focused and the stakes in their correct resolution are highest**.

Extra Topicality Bad

Extra Topicality is a voting issue:

A. De-justifies the Resolution – something more is needed to solve, proving the resolution insufficient

B. Ground – the topic is written to provide negative ground isolated from the affirmative – extra T allows the affirmative to co-opt resolution ground, even solvency arguments radically disrupt the balance of ground

C. Limits – justifies any topical plan plus anything – extra topical parts allow the affirmative to destroy negative ground

Extra Topicality Bad - AT: Severance

1. Strategic Skew

The entire 1NC strategy is skewed by extra topical parts in terms of time and choice

Shouldn't have to run arguments just to get back to ground zero – this encourages more egregious affirmative abuse because they can simply jettison abusive parts

2. Unconditional affirmative advocacy key to debate – severance allows them to destroy all negative ground and prevents a stable position to attack

Extra Topicality Bad - AT: Increases NEG Ground

- 1. Allows the affirmative to frame the debate – they control the ground and have better prep time to predict arguments***
- 2. Negative Can't Access the Ground – we're only prepared to debate resolution ground – we can't be prepared to access anything else***
- 3. Trades off with predictable ground – the affirmative gets to use extra-topical parts of the plan to offset critical negative solvency and DA ground***

Extra Topicality Bad - AT: Counterplans Check

- 1. Forcing the negative to counterplan further spirals the abuse – we then have to justify all theory issues regarding the CP***
- 2. Hurts negative Ground – counterplans hurt politics link ground and other necessary counterplan ground***
- 3. Shouldn't have to run arguments just to get back to ground zero – this encourages more egregious affirmative abuse because they can simply jettison abusive parts***

PICs Good

Offense

- 1. Fair side balance – PICs offset advantage of case selection, literature biased advantages, and the inherent problems with the status quo***
- 2. Depth of Education – focusing on intricacies highlights comparative argument quality as well as moving past a vague “good/bad” focus***
- 3. Strategic Research – PICs encourage innovative research that avoids stale debates and bridges different parts of the literature***
- 4. Effective Policy Analysis – differences between similar options is an inherent part of policy decisions and the academic literature***
- 5. Intelligent Plan Writing and AFF Research – AFFs are forced to defend and research every part of the plan through in-depth analysis***
- 6. Key to CP Ground – virtually every CP could be classified as a PIC; this undermines core negative ground***

Defense

- 1. Not a PIC – Our CP engages in a different process; it is not a penny-less. At worst, it's a non-topical PIC, which establishes a fair and predictable division of ground***

2. Doesn't Skew Ground – the AFF can turn our net benefits or defend the entirety of their plan

3. No Infinite Regress – competition is an adequate standard and the AFF literature predictably defines what we can run

4. No right to case harms – debate is about policy making, not about who finds the best impact arguments

5. Not a Voting Issue – reject the argument, not the negative

6. DA's aren't enough

A. CPs are needed to deal with entrenched status quo trends as well as understand different processes

B. CPs are a critical part of reciprocity, while DAs alone create unfairness

Agent Counterplans Good

Offense

- 1. Education – agent debates are paramount policy questions because certain agents are better suited for particular policies and the process is often more relevant than the substance in real politics***
- 2. Side Balance – agent ground is vital on a diverse and large topic with no predictable limit as well as the ability to offset literature biased impacts such as racism and sexism***
- 3. Lobbying – knowing about substance only matters if you can create change – this vastly expands the impact of debate education***
- 4. Limits – agent CPs provide a natural limiting function on the topic size by weeding out insignificant cases – this is especially important on a non-list topic***
- 5. Counterplan Ground – agent CPs constitute a substantial portion of negative counterplan ground, excluding agent CPs functionally erodes the CP as a negative option devastating side balance and fairness***

Defense

- 1. Predictable – the affirmative choice of agent provides a predictable set of agent debates and ground for both sides***
- 2. Not Hard to Debate – a predictable, balanced, and large debate exists over the process of agent questions***

3. Not Trivial – our net benefits prove substance, congress versus the executive is far from trivial, and debate turns on small but important distinctions

4. Not Generic – agent debates always center on solvency questions, very few other teams or argument styles are punished for being generic, and not defending their agent makes the AFF more generic

5. DAs Aren't Enough

A. Comparative necessity - backlash DAs don't help decide which branch is better suited in foreign policy

B. CPs are needed to deal with entrenched status quo trends as well as understand different processes, instead of simply debating DAs every round that never get the heart of agent debates

Answer to No Neg Fiat

- 1. Reciprocal – they fiat a should action, its only reciprocal that the NEG gets to fiat a “should not” action – topicality limits them, while competition limits us***
- 2. Fair Side Balance – CPs are a critical part of NEG ground – simply defending the status quo leaves the NEG unable to deal with try-or-die scenarios and entrenched status quo trends***
- 3. Fiat is a Normative Tool – it is simply a way for the judge to endorse or reject policy options, no team controls it***
- 4. One-sided Harms – absent CPs the negative would be forced to impact turn everything, ignoring the middle ground of debate and encouraging AFFs to run racism and genocide impacts all the time***
- 5. Real World – policy makers are never forced to simply negate with the status quo – the AFF argument constitutes an extreme departure from policymaking***
- 6. Limits – CPs are the only way to prevent a topic explosion – an endless number of cases are possible if there is no CP ground***
- 7. Tests the Plan – the CP offers the only real way to determine that plan is both necessary and sufficient to solve the harms***

International Fiat Good

Offense

- 1. Education – international actors are at the heart of foreign policy debates and the CP avoids dogmatic adherence to US policy***
- 2. Fair side balance – international fiat checks the affirmative ability to exploit benefits of US action and one-sided harms***
- 3. Circumvents the literature – US action is always defined relative to other actions***
- 4. Minority views in debate – international fiat is balanced way to create inclusion for debaters with international life experience as well as avoiding a Eurocentric focus***
- 5. Critical test of the topic– avoiding international agents ignores the necessity of United States policy towards China – disads aren't comparative, can never overcome AFF inevitability arguments, and don't educate us on government processes***
- 6. Resolutional ground – AFF ability to circumvent resolutional ground undermines its predictability function***
- 7. Real world – Congress always seeks burden sharing and necessity of US action – the AFF is calling for an extreme departure from US policymaking***

Defense

- 1. Competition checks – credible net benefit means no risk of abuse and checks trivialization**
- 2. US key arguments solve – the literature is replete with justifications for why only the US can act – this allows the AFF to be prepared against any CP**
- 3. Fiat is only a normative tool – its no more far fetched to pretend to be US policy maker than an international actor AND as a US policymaker you can choose to defer/encourage another actor**
- 4. No Literature Problems – constraints exist for both sides, virtually every country has major publications in English, and this is only a reason to debate CP, not outlaw it**
- 5. Justification – The affirmative must justify the USFG in the resolution otherwise the aff always wins and proves that the resolution is neither necessary nor sufficient**

Dispositionality Good

Offense

- 1. Fair side balance – it balances against strategic advantage of case selection, AFF conditionality in the form of permutations, and many CPs would never be run without it***
- 2. Policy Analysis – hypothetical argumentation is the staple method of flexible questioning of policy and is best suited to debate***
- 3. Puts the AFF in control – they can determine the status of the CP just like a DA***
- 4. Logical decision making – not having the option of the status quo would constitute an extreme departure from natural decision making***
- 5. Critical thinking – it forces argument thought on the fly and understanding argument interactions***
- 6. Multiple perms worse – makes the AFF a moving target, creates strategy skew, and not reciprocal to our one CP***

Defense

- 1. No strategic skew – CPs require time investment, arguments spillover to other issues even after the CP is gone, and time skews are inevitable***
- 2. CPs aren't unique – most are less complex than major DAs or critiques, are susceptible to multiple attacks, and the 1AC is already an indict to the status quo***

3. Doesn't reduce depth of education – teams inevitably go for arguments with little coverage, justifies only running disads, and throwaway arguments are inevitable

4. No impact to multiple worlds – permutations create the same problem and complexity isn't applied to critiques

5. No potential for abuse – clear limits such as only one CP check and the status quo is a logical, limited, and consistent fallback

6. Doesn't justify AFF conditionality – permutations are a reciprocal form of conditionality, the plan must be the focus in order to ensure debate, and case selection is enough advantage

7. Doesn't force the AFF to debate themselves – they only have to defend the plan, straight turn checks, and it's counterintuitive to let them vacate defense against the status quo

8. Perms aren't just tests – judges vote for them, this standard justifies intrinsicness, and the CP is also just a "test" of plan's necessity

9. Doesn't hurt advocacy – giving limited flexibility compared to the AFF produces the best balance of policy analysis and we are always rejecting the plan

10. No argument irresponsibility – straight turn checks, natural disincentives ensure no repugnant arguments, and other arguments don't entail same responsibility

11. Not a voting issue – just stick us to the CP

Conditionality Good

Offense

- 1. Fair side balance – it balances against strategic advantage of case selection, AFF conditionality in the form of permutations, and many CPs would never be run without it***
- 2. Policy Analysis – hypothetical argumentation is the staple method of flexible questioning of policy and is best suited to debate***
- 3. Puts the AFF in control – they can determine the status of the CP just like a DA***
- 4. Logical decision making – not having the option of the status quo would constitute an extreme departure from natural decision making***
- 5. Critical thinking – it forces argument thought on the fly and understanding argument interactions***
- 6. Multiple perms worse – makes the AFF a moving target, creates strategy skew, and not reciprocal to our one CP***

Defense

- 1. No strategic skew – CPs require time investment, arguments spillover to other issues even after the CP is gone, and time skews are inevitable***
- 2. CPs aren't unique – most are less complex than major DAs or critiques, are susceptible to multiple attacks, and the 1AC is already an indict to the status quo***

- 3. Doesn't reduce depth of education – teams inevitably go for arguments with little coverage, justifies only running disads, and throwaway arguments are inevitable**
- 4. No impact to multiple worlds – permutations create the same problem and complexity isn't applied to critiques**
- 5. No potential for abuse – clear limits such as only one CP check and the status quo is a logical, limited, and consistent fallback**
- 6. Doesn't justify AFF conditionality – permutations are a reciprocal form of conditionality, the plan must be the focus in order to ensure debate, and case selection is enough advantage**
- 7. Doesn't force the AFF to debate themselves – they only have to defend the plan, and it's counterintuitive to let them vacate defense against the status quo**
- 8. Perms aren't just tests – judges vote for them, this standard justifies intrinsicness, and the CP is also just a "test" of plan's necessity**
- 9. Doesn't hurt advocacy – giving limited flexibility compared to the AFF produces the best balance of policy analysis and we are always rejecting the plan**
- 10. No argument irresponsibility – natural disincentives ensure no repugnant arguments, and other arguments don't entail same responsibility**
- 11. Not a voting issue – reject the argument not the team**

Extra Topicality Good

Extra Topicality isn't a voting issue

A. Increases NEG ground through DA links

B. They can always CP out or simply sever extra-topical parts

C. Increases policy analysis and education – every plan includes some extra topical part

Agent Specification Bad

1. Cross-Ex Checks

A. It only takes a few seconds and if the AFF is vague, then go for vagueness

B. We would have specified _____. Not asking simply means you don't Agent ground you were going to run.

C. Textual competition isn't needed and cross-ex is always binding when the AFF specifies their agent

2. Infinite regressive

A. There are infinite number of agent questions the NEG can propose – funding, implementation, delegation versus non-delegation, vote count, etc – this is net worse for education and devastates AFF ground

B. Even if specification is not infinitely regressive, the plan requirement IS infinitely regressive – this would force the AFF to have onerous plan texts that devastate AFF ground

3. FG ground – they can access States/Federalism, International Relations, International Fiat, and Politics ground simply through FG action – further specification isn't needed

4. Err AFF – non-resolutional based theory arguments mean you should err for the AFF especially when its as simple as them asking a cross-ex question

5. Agent ground is bad for debate

A. Eliminates Focus on Substantive Issues – instead of topic specific education, we debate politics and SOP every year

B. Trivializes Debate – their net benefits rely on minute distinctions in process rather than the heart of policy substance which forms the basis for different topics

C. Overly Generic – agent CPs can be run every year and against every case decreasing the amount of clash and in-depth analysis

International Fiat Bad

International fiat is a voting issue

A. Infinitely Regressive – there are hundreds of different countries that the AFF would have to be prepared for, decreasing depth of education and ground

B. Education – literature is limited by language and resource barriers ensuring Int'l CPs distort policymaking and create shallow education

C. Object fiat – energy policy defines supply from other countries – they allow the NEG to fiat out of these concerns

D. No Offense - DAs and solvency arguments solve any education or ground loss, without unfairly damaging the AFF

Agent CPs Bad

Agent CPs are a voting issue

A. Eliminates Focus on Substantive Issues – instead of topic specific education, we debate politics and SOP every year

B. Trivializes Debate – their net benefits rely on minute distinctions in process rather than the heart of policy substance which forms the basis for different topics

C. Overly Generic – agent CPs can be run every year and against every case decreasing the amount of clash and in-depth analysis

D. No Offense – agent DAs, Federal Government ground, and years of agent debates check any ground or education loss

PICs Bad

PICs are a voting issue

A. Reciprocal Ground – we defend the entirety of the plan, they should attack – PICs steal critical affirmative ground

B. Time Skew – PICs constitute a time skew from the 1AC – our entire harms contention is lost

C. Infinitely regressive – they justify trivial CPs that undermine education and any number of infinite methods, including penny-less CPs, to do the plan

D. No Offense – they can always run DAs and solvency arguments to test the plan and use micro-advantage CPs

Conditionality Bad

Conditionality is a voting issue

A. Education – the NEG only goes for what has the least coverage and analysis, preventing in-depth discussion

B. Strategic Skew – conditionality undermines AFF ability to generate offense and skews time allocation undermining AFF ability to hedge against the block

C. Advocacy – conditionality prevents the NEG from learning consistent advocacy and encourages argument irresponsibility

D. No Offense – pre-tournament research and dispositional CPs capture all NEG offense, while still preserving side balance

Dispositionality Bad

Dispositionality is a voting issue

A. Education – the NEG only goes for what has the least coverage and analysis, preventing in-depth discussion

B. Strategic Skew – dispo undermines AFF ability to generate offense and skews time allocation undermining AFF ability to hedge against the block

C. Advocacy – dispo prevents the NEG from learning consistent advocacy and encourages argument irresponsibility

D. No Offense – pre-tournament research capture all NEG offense and straight turn option is hollow, since the NEG has the block and permutations are essential AFF defense

CONSULTATION COUNTERPLAN

Consult Good

Offense:

1. **Best Policy Option** – If we win that multilateral action is good then consultation is the best policy option
2. **Education** – Forces 2AC strategic thinking and increases knowledge of both domestic and international issues via the net benefits.
3. **Counter-Interpretation** – Only allow consultation with countries that the U.S. has a formal consultation framework with – solves all their offense because there are only 5 possible actors
4. **Checks Aff Side Bias** – They speak first and last, have infinite prep time and have a higher win percentage
5. **Key to Test Resolution** –

Substantial: Capable of being treated as fact – WordNet 03.

Resolved: To Make a Firm Decision About – American Heritage Dictionary 00.

Only counterplans can effectively test each word of the resolution – disads can't win alone
6. **Key to Check 2AC Add-Ons** – Only consultation CP's allow the negative to not get beat by 2AC sandbagging

Defense:

1. Reject the argument not the team
2. **Not Wholly Plan Inclusive** – We don't advocate unilateral action. They can get offense to working with other institutions
3. **Predictable** – Consultation CP's have been run since Jason Russell was debating - - they should have blocks by now
4. **Lit Checks**- Our say yes evidence proves there is a direct correlation between the country being consulted and the action of the plan - - this checks the "Consult Djibouti" CP
5. **No Artificial Competition** – We sever out of unilateral action and have a disad predicated off of it

Consult Bad

1. **they steal 1AC – killing debatability because we can't leverage our 8 minutes against anything**
 2. **time frame counterplans are illegit – they create uniqueness through consulting – we have to defend if the plan SHOULD pass, not WHEN – future fiat is illegit because it's not reciprocal**
 3. **Regressive – we could never prepare for all possibilities – crushing predictability which is the gateway to fairness and education. 190 some countries, thousands of international organizations, and billions of humans could all be consulted about the plan. This is particularly dangerous for the aff given that the threshold for the neg's disad doesn't need to be large if the plan does the case, forcing affs to generate offensive args against the net benefit when they ought to expect to outweigh these disads.**
 4. **Reciprocity – For the purposes of disads, the plan has no contingency, but the aff gets the right to alter only the nature of the implementation of the plan only to match neg counterplans.**
- a. **Solves their moving target argument**
 - b. **Forces the aff to defend the plan**
 - c. **Maintains a balance of aff and neg ground**
 - d. **Generates aff predictability which is predicated on the plan.**

Consult CPs Bad - A2: not infinitely regressive

1. Even if whoever they consult is predictable – they create the capacity for anyone or any combination of agents to consult – that potential abuse is voter for competitive equity
2. Competing interps is critical – The standard that they apply is necessary to judge the allowable range of power of the neg. Only interpretations are not arbitrary, preventing the “only our case is topical” view of T.

Consult CPs Bad - A2: Don't Steal Entirety

1. This is a LIE – Consultation risk they say yes means they steal every aspect of the aff – they pass the plan exactly as we defend
2. They create their offense – we can't even read uniqueness arguments – which means that the counterplan allows them to create unique offense while taking ALL of our offense – which proves it is unpredictable and unfair.

Consult CPs Bad - A2: Must Defend Immediacy

1. Either:

- A) No part of the text says immediate – proves the CP isn't competitive and the perm solves
- OR**
- B) We defend the immediacy of the plan – we don't spike out of ANY disads or counterplans – FIAT is the least means necessary - they don't negate the plan, means that you vote aff because both sides say the plan SHOULD pass

2. This is arbitrary– it isn't a reason why passing the plan now is bad – it is a reason why waiting to do something else is good – proves that the CP is contrived with no strategic cost against the negative – killing reciprocity
3. this legitimizes DELAY counterplans – which are uniquely abusive because they make debate about absurdity – we can never predict, research, or defend against them.
4. there's no offense – they have zero reason why the aff defending immediacy in a world of an artificial counterplan is good for debate

Consult CPs Bad - A2: Aff Side Bias

1. Consultation Counterplans go too far – they eliminate the entirety of the 1ac and ALL predictable 2ac offense PLUS they give the negative INFINITE PREP against the aff by creating artificial offense
2. The side bias doesn't exist – they block to check any structural aff bias

Consult CPs Bad - A2: Lit Checks

1. There is no literature – yes they may have evidence about X_____ in Africa, but it's not in context of the plan and the CP
2. LITERATURE is a bad standard –
 - A. literature is limitless – hemorrhoids in Djibouti, Nietzsche, super-intelligent dinosaurs proves it's arbitrary and provides no fair check
 - B. not educational – it's a matter of what is best for topic-specific debate NOT what is available

Consult CPs Bad – A2: Best Policy Option

- A “Best policy” arguments allows us to use private fiat or make run abusive strategies if it resulted in a good policy.
- B Even if we search for the best policy – the search must be reciprocal. Our specific abuse claim should be preferred over their general warrant.
- C Justifies severance and intrinsic perms because those would be the “best policy option”.

Counterplan Attacks By The Affirmative

COUNTERPLANS ARE ILLEGITIMATE

1. REDUCE CLASH WITH THE AFFIRMATIVE

The purpose of debate is to clash. When the negative argues a counterplan, it makes first affirmative irrelevant. The focus of the debate shifts to the counterplan which shifts or reduces clash by ten minutes. It's better to have the negative attack case, because it logically increases the clash.

2. THE TOPIC MAKES COUNTERPLANS ILLEGITIMATE

As a judge you must either vote for or against the resolution. There is no provision in the topic for voting for something that is not resolutional.

3. COUNTERPLANS GIVE THE NEGATIVE AN UNFAIR ADVANTAGE

Even though the counterplan is a policy option just like the affirmative, it does not have the same burdens. The counterplan must only meet three, competitiveness non-topicality and an advantage. The affirmative plan has a much larger burden of proof. It must meet the burden of harms, a structural or attitudinal barrier, causality between harms and inherency, significance of harm, solvency, causality of solvency over inherency and a higher burden of proof standard.

4. COUNTERPLANS DECREASE EDUCATIONAL VALUE OF DEBATE

By developing a stock counterplan, the negative deprives itself of the educational necessity of researching many different topic areas along with the necessity of analyzing many different areas under the resolution.

5. COUNTERPLANS GIVE THE AFFIRMATIVE PRESUMPTION

Prof. Ziegelmüller, (THE LOGICAL FRAMEWORK OF ARGUMENT, 1975, p. 179)

"Those negatives who assume the counterproposal approach abandon the logical advantage or presumption and assume a burden of proof ... since the counterplan negative does not wish to see a status quo continue, it opposes presumption."

6. COUNTERPLAN ADMITS STATUS QUO IS BOGUS

R. Wood, (Dean of Northwestern U. School of Speech, STRATEGIC DEBATE, p. 28)

"The negative team, then, must surrender its presumption in the debate. It has admitted the status quo is guilty."

7. NEGATIVE MUST SHOW OVERWHELMING ADVANTAGES

Prof. Baird, (ARGUMENTATION DEBATE AND DISCUSSION, 1950, p. 134)

"If at the end of the debate, the negative has succeeded in showing in only that its plan is of equal merit it has failed to show that the affirmative's satisfactory remedy for the admittedly bad situation should not be adopted ... Therefore, the affirmative should win."

8. NOT A VOTING ISSUE

Logically, in order to be a voting issue it must either confirm or deny the resolution. A counterplan does neither, it only gives an unreasonable, unrelated alternative.

9. CONDITIONAL COUNTERPLANS ARE ABUSIVE

Prof. Freeley, (John Carroll Univ., ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE, 1990, p. 240)

"Two important constraints the student debater must make before selecting this approach are: First, the time constraints of academic debate make it impossible to develop both the defense of the status quo and the counterplan adequately. Second, conditional arguments must be presented with great clarity. Student debaters are cautioned that many judges reject this approach, holding that the counterplan must be fully developed policy and requiring the negative to argue its case in depth."

10. UTOPIAN COUNTERPLANS ARE INDOLENT AND ABUSIVE

Prof. Freeley, (John Carroll Univ., ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE, 1990, p. 240)

“Judges object to Utopian counterplans and are easily convinced to vote against them. They hold that such counterplans are topic limitless; that is, they may be used against any affirmative policy and thus are of doubtful educational value since debaters using them no longer have the incentive or need to research new topic-specific arguments.”

11. NEGATIVE HAS NO FIAT, THUS CANNOT IMPLEMENT THE COUNTERPLAN

Roger Solt, (Forensic Theorist, Ass. Dir. of Forensics, U of Kentucky, JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN FORENSIC ASSOCIATION, 1989, p. 127)

“The crux of Branham's position, as I understand it, is that one of the primary costs of adopting any policy is that one forgoes the opportunity to obtain the benefits of other competitive policies (Branham, 1989). These opportunity costs can be accrued either because the first policy physically excused the second, because it undercuts its benefits, or because it makes it politically less feasible to adopt. The degree to which the opportunity costs is a relevant one, however, depends upon the degree to which the counterplan was a politically realistic option.”

COUNTERPLANS MUST BE NON-TOPICAL

1. MUST BE RESOLUTIONAL

Allan J. Lichman, (Professor, American University, JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN FORENSIC ASSOCIATION, Fall 1975, p. 71)

“But rather than admit that the affirmative plan offers an optimal solution to these problems, the negative debater argues for the adoption of a counterproposal which differs both from the present system and the debate resolution.”

2. NEGATIVE MUST DEFEND NON-TOPICALITY

Louis Kaplow, (JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN FORENSIC ASSOCIATION, Spring 1981, p. 216)

“The desire to maintain definitional consistency, without sacrificing the “any reasonable definition” rule, demands at minimum that the negative demonstrates the existence of some reasonable definition that simultaneously renders the counterplan non-topical and maintains the affirmative plan as topic.”

3. ONE WORD DETERMINES NON-TOPICALITY

Since the negative must only prove one word non-topical for the affirmative, the affirmative must prove one thing is topical under the counterplan.

4. AFF WINS IF COUNTERPLAN IS TOPICAL

Louis Kaplow, (JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN FORENSIC ASSOCIATION, Spring 1981, p. 216)

“If the counterplan is proved to be topical, and the affirming advocates the resolution, the affirmative should win, so long as one views the decision as being based upon what is presented in the debate.

Resolution (topical) counterplan agrees the topic should be adopted. If the topic is adopted an affirmative ballot is necessitated.”

5. COUNTERPLANS MUST BE NON-TOPICAL

Louis Kaplow, (JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN FORENSIC ASSOCIATION, Spring 1981, p. 216)

“Legitimate counterplans must not fulfill the affirmative resolution.”

Vance Trefethen, 2007 (Third Edition, Strategic Debate, Negative Counterplans and Minor Repairs)
The Counterplan must be non-topical. The judge must have a clear alternative between voting FOR the proposition (Affirmative) or AGAINST the proposition (Negative). If both teams are offering plans that change policy in accordance with the proposition, then both teams are affirming there resolution. If so, then no matter who wins, the Judge should write Affirmative on the ballot, since a) the Affirmative side was upheld throughout the debate; and b) the Affirmatives position was so convincing that the Negative team was persuaded and adopted it for themselves! If they're good enough to persuade their opponents, then the Affirmative must be pretty good debaters and deserve to win.

COUNTERPLANS MUST BE COMPETITIVE

1. AFF. WINS

If they are not competitive the aff should win because the only aff. burden is to show that they are a good example of the resolution. If the counterplan is not competitive then both plan and counterplan can be adopted and the aff. wins.

2. JURISDICTION

The purpose of competitiveness is to evenly divide ground between the Aff. and Neg. **Vance Trefethen, 2007** (Third Edition, Strategic Debate, Negative Counterplans and Minor Repairs)

The Counterplan must be exclusive to the Affirmative plan (or at least, the Negative must show why the Judge "should" not adopt both at the same time). This means that it would be physically or practically impossible to vote for BOTH the Affirmative plan AND the Negative counterplan at the same time. The reason for this is that it ensures clash between the two competing ideas. If the Judge need not choose between the two options, then there is no effective debate. When that happens, a Judge could accept both plans by voting Affirmative (because the proposition has been upheld and the Affirmatives plan has been proven good) and by agreeing with the Negative that the status quo should also do their plan (which does not require any vote by the Judge, since it does not require affirming or denying the resolution).

3. DECREASED CLASH

Every counterplan plank must be competitive or it decreases clash because the neg. could throw in objects that are in no way related to aff. plan.

4. MUST BE CLEAR

A good policy maker does not vote for a policy she doesn't understand.

5. ELIMINATE NON-COMPETITIVE PARTS

James J. Unger and James Copeland, (Copeland, Executive Director of the National Forensic League, Unger, Professor at Georgetown, **SECOND THOUGHTS**, 1973, p. 62)

"If the aff plan and distinct portions of the neg counterplan can exist simultaneously, that is, they could coexist at the same time without interfering with each other's operations, then those portions of the counterplan are not a valid substitute for the original proposal and must be rejected."

6. MUST JUSTIFY REJECTION OF THE AFFIRMATIVE

Allan J. Lichman, (Professor, American University, **JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN FORENSIC ASSOCIATION**, Fall 1975, p. 74)

"The goal of the negative team is not to justify adoption of the counterplan, but to justify rejection of the affirmative plan. If the affirmative plan were not rejected, an affirmative victory would be mandatory irrespective of the disposition of the counterplan."

7. SIMULTANEOUS ADOPTION IS LEGITIMATE, AND MANDATES AN AFF BALLOT

Allan J. Lichman, (Professor, American University, **JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN FORENSIC ASSOCIATION**, Fall 1975, p. 74)

A counterplan may yield greater net benefits than an affirmative plan without providing reasons for rejection of the affirmative plan. It may be possible to adopt both plans and achieve greater net benefits than would derive from adoption of the counterplan alone."

8. ONLY TWO WAYS TO BE COMPETITIVE

Allan J. Lichman, (Professor, American University, **JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN FORENSIC ASSOCIATION**, Fall 1975, p. 74)

"A counterplan is competitive with an affirmative plan if it satisfies either of two criteria. The first criterion is that the plan and counterplan are mutually exclusive. The second criterion is that simultaneous adoption of the plan and counterplan, although possible, is less desirable than adoption of the counterplan alone."

9. PARTIAL PERMUTATION WARRANTS AN AFF BALLOT

Sometimes both the plan and counterplan cannot exist at the same time, but the portions of the counterplan that gain the negative advantage could be passed along with the plan. In this case, a wise policy maker would adopt the affirmative plan, and those portions of the counterplan that are desirable for an aff vote."

POLICY PARADIGM MEANS NO CONDITIONAL/MULTIPLE CP'S

1. AS A JUDGE, NOT ACCEPTABLE

John Cross & Ronald Melton, ("An Analysis of Judging Philosophies in Academic Debate", DEBATE JUDGING, W. Bennett, ed. 1981, p. 25)

"Most policy-making judges do not prefer conditional or hypothetical presentation of counterplans."

2. CONDITIONAL CP ABUSIVE

Prof. Freeley, (John Carroll Univ., ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE, 1990, p. 240)

"Student debaters are cautioned that many judges reject this approach, holding that the counterplan must be fully developed policy and requiring the negative to argue this case in depth."

3. NO ADVOCACY

Advocates must endorse a policy position; conditional CP does not do this; as policy maker neg. should lose.

4. DESTROYS CLASH

With conditional CP, neg. can merely drop CP at any time. This is unfair.

5. CLASH IS KEY TO DECISIONS

James Weaver, (Iowa State Univ., JUDGING DEBATE, 1975, p. 37)

"Because of lack of experience and a resulting lack of clash, debaters wander around in a quagmire of confusion leaving the judge bewildered and wondering if either team really deserves a victory."

6. COND/MULT CP COUNTERPRODUCTIVE

They are objects of abuse and insecurity of the negative and have no place in a good policy debate.

7. MULTIPLE CP ABUSIVE

Aff. defends one policy, neg. should also; more than one is abusive and shows neg. insecurity. Make them commit to one policy, so we can really debate.

8. KEY ISSUE

We must evaluate the boundaries of any paradigm, in this case policy making, and in doing so we have found that conditional and/or multiple Cps are abusive and not allowed under this paradigm. This should be a voting issue for the affirmative.

Textual Competition Bad

1. **Kills Policy Making:** debate as semantics turns the activity into who can write good plans, not what the best policy option for the real world is.
2. **Increases intervention:** the critic still has to pull texts and compare, which is removed from the flow and the actual arguments against the counterplan.
3. **Contextual analysis inevitable:** its quite possible to pass conflicting legislation at the same time. only a contextual lense of how they would interact on the books can show competition, making our method best.
4. **Encourages shifty debate:** adding 'reject plan' to bottom of counterplan text makes any counterplan textually competitive.
5. **Allows aff abuse:** any 'do both' permutation would win a round because they don't weigh whether the perm is net beneficial, destroying all negative counterplan ground which is uniquely key on such a broad topic.
6. **Encourages and rewards bad plans:** Vague plans undermine neg ground and offer the aff the advantage of clarifying later what the loose plan means. Both undermine balanced competition.

COUNTERPLANS ARE LIMITED TO POLITICAL FEASIBILITY

1. POLITICAL FEASIBILITY IS GOOD

Roger Solt, (Ass. Dir. Of Debate, U of Kentucky, NEGATIVE FIAT: RESOLVING the AMBIGUITIES OF “SHOULD”, JAFA, Winter 1989, p. 130)

“The first standard for limiting negative fiat is Dallas Perkins' (1989) concept of the “realm of discourse.” Perkins position suggests that negative fiat should be allowed only for policies at least as politically feasible as the affirmative (i.e., enjoying at least as great a likelihood of passage). Any other “counterplan” would not enjoy fiat and would be forced to function simply as disadvantages. Perkins' position represents, I believe, a major theoretical advance. Its great merit is that it recognizes that argument does function within a realm of discourse – that it operates within certain implicit limits as to the proper scope of argument.”

2. UTOPIAN COUNTERPLANS ARE INDOLENT

Prof. Freeley, (John Carroll Univ., ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE, 7th ed., 1990, p. 240)

“Judges object to Utopian counterplans and are easily convinced to vote against them. They hold that such counterplans are topic limitless; that is, they may be used against any affirmative policy and thus are of doubtful educational value since debaters using them no longer have the incentive or need to research new topic-specific arguments.”

3. UTOPIAN ABUSE REQUIRES LIMITING NEGATIVE

Prof. Freeley, (John Carroll Univ., ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE, 1990, p. 240)

“While it is not clear the “utopianism” is an adequate ground or criterion for limiting negative fiat, it does seem clear that the extreme abuse potential present in limitless fiat provides a rationale for setting some limits.”

4. POLITICAL FEASIBILITY = BETTER EDUCATION

Utopian counterplans decrease education by allowing the negative to run the same position no matter what the resolution or the affirmative case.

5. POLITICAL FEASIBILITY = REAL DEBATE

Political feasibility pushes for a real world debate, by not allowing the neg. to run radical and unreal world positions.

SEVERANCE PERMUTATIONS ARE BAD

Explanation: Severance permutations are permutations that do not include all of aff plan, and part or all of counterplan.

1. **SEVERANCE PERMS ENSURE THAT COUNTERPLANS WILL NEVER COMPETE**
If they can perm all of plan, except the part that counterplan competes with, and all of counterplan, we'll never win.
2. **ITS INTELLECTUALLY DISHONEST**
The aff presented the 1AC as their justification for an affirmative ballot, allowing them to change that undermines legitimacy.
3. **JUSTIFIES COUNTER-PERMUTATIONS**
If they can sever parts of their plan in 2AC, we should be able to change our advocacy as late as the 2NR.
4. **NON RECIPROCAL**
We can't sever parts of the Counterplan, they shouldn't be able to sever parts of the plan.
5. **JUSTIFIES DISPOSITIONALITY/CONDITIONALITY**
If they can sever parts to the 1AC we should be able to drop the counterplan.
6. **DENIES ANY LEGITIMATE CRITICAL DISCOURSE**
If they don't defend any position, their discursive advantages, Kritik perms and turns become meaningless, since their defense of them can't be justified as advocacy.
7. **INDEPENDENT VOTING ISSUE FOR ALL THE REASONS ABOVE**

2NC COUNTERPLANS ARE ILLEGITIMATE

1. COUNTERPLANS SHOULD BE INTRODUCED IN THE 1NC

James J. Unger and James Copeland, (Copeland, Executive Director of the National Forensic League, Unger, Professor at Georgetown, **SECOND THOUGHTS**, 1973, p. 62)

“The location of the counterplan should be at the outset of the first negative constructive speech. The rest of that speaker's time should be occupied discussing (the comparison of the two systems.) Such a locational requirement obviously facilitates the maximum comparison of the two systems which will be involved in the debate – a process which has already been somewhat upset by the negatives choice of strategy.”

2. NOT ENOUGH TIME TO DEVELOP THE COUNTERPLAN

When the counterplan is introduced in the 2NC it does not have enough time to be developed throughout the round therefore making it a small argument and not debatable.

3. UNFAIR TO THE 1AR

The 1AR's time allocation is distorted by a 2NC shift in advocacy, we don't know what strategy they will be going for.

4. ADMITS BAD NEGATIVE POSITION

In their first speech the negative argued direct policy comparisons as the unstated premise for their attacks. Now the negative offers a counterplan. This switch in policy stance is an admission that they are inconsistent and offer no clear policy alternative to the affirmative.

5. JUSTIFIES 1AR:

A. Severance and intrinsicness perms. If they can change their advocacy in the 2NC we need to be able to adjust in the 1AR, and their abandonment and addition to their policy analysis in the 2NC justifies us doing the same.

B. Replanning. If they can change their core advocacy, we need to be able to do so too.

C. Replan, or perm.

COUNTERPLANS MUST BE NON-TOPICAL

1. MUST BE RESOLUTIONAL

Allan J. Lichman, (Professor, American University, JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN FORENSIC ASSOCIATION, Fall 1975, p. 71)

“But rather than admit that the affirmative plan offers an optimal solution to these problems, the negative debater argues for the adoption of a counterproposal which differs both from the present system and the debate resolution.”

2. NEGATIVE MUST DEFEND NON-TOPICALITY

Louis Kaplow, (JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN FORENSIC ASSOCIATION, Spring 1981, p. 216)

“The desire to maintain definitional consistency, without sacrificing the “any reasonable definition” rule, demands at minimum that the negative demonstrates the existence of some reasonable definition that simultaneously renders the counterplan non-topical and maintains the affirmative plan as topic.”

3. ONE WORD DETERMINES NON-TOPICALITY

Since the negative must only prove one word non-topical for the affirmative, the affirmative must prove one thing is topical under the counterplan.

4. AFF WINS IF COUNTERPLAN IS TOPICAL

Louis Kaplow, (JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN FORENSIC ASSOCIATION, Spring 1981, p. 216)

“If the counterplan is proved to be topical, and the affirming advocates the resolution, the affirmative should win, so long as one views the decision as being based upon what is presented in the debate.

Resolution (topical) counterplan agrees the topic should be adopted. If the topic is adopted an affirmative ballot is necessitated.”

5. COUNTERPLANS MUST BE NON-TOPICAL

Louis Kaplow, (JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN FORENSIC ASSOCIATION, Spring 1981, p. 216)

“Legitimate counterplans must not fulfill the affirmative resolution.”

TOPICAL COUNTERPLANS ILLEGITIMATE

1. RESOLUTION FOCUS SUPERIOR

D. Herbeck et al., (JAFA, Vol. 25, 1989, p. 151)

“Hynes contends the resolutional focus view of debate is superior to the plan focus interpretation expressed by Herbeck and Katsulas. He offers the following five arguments in support of his claim:

- a. Whether we like it or not, the fact that the activity utilizes resolutions means we are stuck debating them.
- b. Pragmatic arguments in defense of plan primacy are irrelevant considerations in the dispute over the focus of debate.
- c. The plan focus position fails to account for changes in the wording of the resolutions.
- d. The plan focus is problematic in that it legitimizes topical counterplans.
- e. The plan primacy view allows the negative to advocate artificially competitive counterplans which preclude the affirmative plan from coming into existence.

The resolution is focus not the plan. A topical counterplan affirms the resolution. Therefore, even if the negative wins the counterplan, a ballot is still issued for the affirmative and the resolution they were to uphold. In the case of topical counterplans the negative does the Affs job for them.

2. DESTROYS RESOLUTIONAL FOCUS

In a debate round there are only two options open for the judge. To affirm or negate the validity of the resolution. A topical counterplan destroys these abilities.

3. THE AFFIRMATIVE WINS IF THE COUNTERPLAN IS PROVEN TOPICAL

Louis Kaplow, (JAVA, Rethinking Counterplans, 1981, p. 216)

“If the counterplan is proved to be topical, and the affirming advocates the resolution, the affirmative should win, so long as one views the decision as being based upon what is presented in the debate.”

4. CREATES MORE REAL WORLD POLICY MAKING

Instead of forcing the negative to argue semi-applicable generics, a topical counterplan provides for a competitive and realistic real world option.

5. REJECTING TOPICAL COUNTERPLANS IS HYPOCRITICAL

Affirmatives often complain about low quality generics. They also severely chastise negative teams for ignoring case side arguments. The entire purpose of a topical counterplan is policy to policy comparisons. It is abusive for the affirmative to call for direct policy argumentation and then cry foul when it is used.

6. AFFIRMATIVE TOPICALITY ASSURES DIVISION OF GROUND

E. Panetta & S. Dolley, (JAFA, VI. 25, Winter 1989, p. 424)

“Our position is that by requiring proof of topicality from the affirmative alone, adequate division of ground can be maintained and the quality of argumentation enhanced.”

Agent Counterplans Bad

1. Not reciprocal – the Neg can take any USFG agent they want – we're bound to the USFG as a whole.
2. Forces aff to debate against itself – neg steals all our offense and arguing against counterplan is arguing against plan.
3. Unpredictable- allows the neg to choose any part of the USFG, it's too big to research all the possible agents.
4. Kills topic specific education – we don't talk about the actual impacts of energy policy, we only talk about the process in the USFG
5. Not key to education/ground- DA's test the comparative necessity of the plan. The CP is not necessary.
6. Voter for fairness and education.

Delay CP's Bad

1. Unpredictable- we can't predict what time they'll delay action to.
2. Unfair research burden- it's difficult to research the future because the future is uncertain.
3. Kills Aff ground- it's difficult to produce offense against the uncertain future.
4. Education- we don't learn about the future, we just guess.
5. Time skew- they steal the entire 1ac with a counterplan that does the plan.
6. Forces us to debate against ourselves- they pass our plan, forcing us to debate against our plan, which is unfair.
7. Infinite regression- they could pick an infinite number of times to delay action to.
8. Voter for fairness and education.

Counterplan Defense or Advocacy

TOPICAL OR DIRECTIONAL COUNTERPLANS ARE LEGITIMATE

1. PLAN-INCLUSIVE COUNTERPLANS ARE OK

Mitchell, Gordon, (Northwestern University, NEW TOOLS FOR THE NEGATIVE – INTERNATIONAL FIAT AND PLAN INCLUSIVE COUNTERPLANS, 92)

“The negative should have the option of offering topical and nontopical plan-inclusive counterplans (PICs), with one important stipulation, that the exception carved out of the plan must meet a certain significance standard. Those debaters who can fashion and persuasively defend exact provisions of such a standard will meet with the most success. One possible standard is that the part of the plan which the negative focuses on via PIC must be significant enough to generate meaningful public – policy discussion. This standard could be employed by the affirmative to defeat a microscopic exception PIC, or by the negative to support a directional focus PIC.”

2. THEY ARE PERMITTED

Panetta, (NEW TOOLS FOR THE NEGATIVE – INTERNATIONAL FIAT AND PLAN INCLUSIVE COUNTERPLANS, 92)

“The topical counterplan mitigates against the huge advantage that is provided by the directionless topics.”

3. TCPs DESTROY MULTI-DIRECTIONAL PLANS

Mitchell, Gordon, (Northwestern University, NEW TOOLS FOR THE NEGATIVE – INTERNATIONAL FIAT AND PLAN INCLUSIVE COUNTERPLANS, 92)

“The contention that the negative should be allowed to advance topical counterplans on bidirectional topics has been floating around for awhile. Perhaps a corollary of this increasingly-accepted view is that the negative should be allowed to advance PICs when faced with multi-directional affirmative plans.”

4. PROVIDES FAIR GROUND AGAINST A MULTI-PLAN CASE

Mitchell, Gordon, (Northwestern University, NEW TOOLS FOR THE NEGATIVE – INTERNATIONAL FIAT AND PLAN INCLUSIVE COUNTERPLANS, 92)

“Given this year's likely affirmative breadth, in many rounds where the negative lacks on point evidence, pinning down a directional link on a generic trade/aid policy disadvantage may be the only hope. Bidirectional topics severely complicate the task of negative preparation.”

5. THEORETICALLY CORRECT

Mitchell, Gordon, (Northwestern University, NEW TOOLS FOR THE NEGATIVE – INTERNATIONAL FIAT AND PLAN INCLUSIVE COUNTERPLANS, 92)

“The “directional focus” PIC offers a potential remedy for the negative. By counterplanning with part of the plan, the negative sets up the opportunity to demonstrate a net benefit by proving the directional action contained in the other part of the plan to be, on the whole, disadvantageous.

Since the Negative team has given logical reasoning through evidence why the directional focus counterplan is legitimate, the PIC counterplan should be accepted as an alternative against a multi-directional plan.”

REDUNDANCY EQUALS COMPETITION

1. THIS IS CONSISTENT WITH THE POLICY PARADIGM

If two different bills gain the same adv., the policy maker will only vote for one, whichever is best.

2. THIS IS CONSISTENT WITH HYPO-TESTING

If the neg. accrues the same adv. While proving the resolution is invalid, he has shown justification for a negative ballot.

3. REDUNDANCY IS COMPETITIVE

Allan J. Lichtman and Daniel M. Rorher, (Lichtman, Prof. of History, American U., Rorher, Dir. Of Forensics at Boston College, ADVANCED DEBATE, 3rd ed., 1987, p. 248)

“A CP also is competitive with an aff. Plan if simultaneous adoption of both, although possible, is less desirable than adoption of the CP alone.”

4. REDUNDANCY ENFORCES AFF. BURDENS

The burden is on the aff. to explain why redundancy is a bad standard of competition.

5. REDUNDANCY INCREASES AFF. BURDENS

Allan J. Lichtman and Daniel M. Rorher, (Lichtman, Prof. of History, American U., Rorher, Dir. Of Forensics at Boston College, ADVANCED DEBATE, 1987, p. 251)

“Similarly, an aff. seeking to argue that a CP is not competitive must demonstrate that both the aff. plan and the CP can co-exist and that adoption of the aff. plan and CP is superior to adoption of the CP alone.

Textual Competition Good

1. Most Objective: A text is the only unmovable way to determine competition, giving a clear delineation.
2. Justifies delay counter-plans which are bad because they allow the negative to steal affirmative ground and change when the plan gets implemented.
3. Decreases judge intervention: comparing texts is removed from the flow and requires no weighing of arguments, ensuring fairer decisions and debate.
4. Prevents advocacy shifts: Holding a team to text prevents abusive shifts sustaining competitive equity and ground.
5. Only true way to test competition: Without seeing what plan allows and precludes through text, competition can't be ascertained.
6. Disads solve their offense – It's not that the aff doesn't defend their aff against normal means disads, but that those disads don't deserve the added advantage of wiping away the aff case.
7. Aff predictability – The neg isn't the only team that deserves it. Aff predictability is limited by the wording of the plan text. Some CPs may have "advantages" theoretically but not meet the need to make those CPs topical.
8. Functional competitions justifies aff intrinsicness – If the neg gets unlimited tests of the aff the aff gets unlimited tests of the opportunity costs of the plan which justifies a perm to do x on another issue. Solves their net benefits while passing the plan, the best of both worlds.

Voting Issue

COUNTERPLANS DON'T HAVE TO BE COMPETITIVE

1. COUNTERPLANS DON'T GET AFF. PROBLEMS

William H. Bennett, (PRAGMATIC DEBATE, 2008, p. 69)

Lichtman and Rohrer contend that “A counterplan can fulfill the criterion of mutual exclusivity without tacitly conceding affirmative criticisms of the existing order, and without even dealing with the problem areas of the affirmative case.”

2. PROMOTES GOOD POLICY DECISIONS

Increases policy making because the judge only has to vote for the best policy in the round.

3. ADOPTION – NEG WINS

If neg proves that both can be adopted then the ballot should flow neg.

4. INCREASED EDUCATION

Increases education because a fight between which policy is better is more educational and clear than just arguing that the aff. won't work.

5. BETTER DECISION MAKING

Good because the judge has two policies to weigh which makes for better decisions.

6. JUST COMPETE WITH RESOLUTION

William H. Bennett, (PRAGMATIC DEBATE, 2008, p. 70)

“The plans are not rational or legal substitute for each other yet it would be very difficult for the affirmative to argue that we could have both at the same time because the negative plan runs directly opposite to the resolution.”

International Actor Fiat Good

OUR INTERPRETATION-

The negative can read one competitive policy option which advocates the action of an internationally recognized government or coalition of governments on the condition that the counter plan does not use fiat to eliminate the harms of the affirmative.

DEFENSE

- 1. Predictable-** There may be many international actors, but literature limits the number of viable options for the neg.
- 2. Reasonable research burden-** The aff doesn't have to find evidence indicating every other country is bad, only that the US is the best.
- 3. Reciprocity-** The aff can pick harms area, solvency mechanism, advantages and any of their permutations. The neg should be able to pick any international actor to do the plan.
- 4. Preserves aff ground-** The aff can use the risk of a solvency deficit to weigh advantages against the CP just like they must win the risk of a no-link to weigh case against a "DA-turns case" argument
- 5. Checks aff side bias-** Infinite prep and first and last speech justify

OFFENSE

- 1. Key to test to test the resolution-** International actor fiat tests the words "United States federal government."
- 2. Increases education-** We learn about the USFG through comparative political analysis of US foreign policy as it compares to other nations' policies. We learn about two nations, doubling education
- 3. Real world-** International and national actors both present viable actors to trans-national issues. This is magnified by the foreign nature of the topic.
- 4. Promotes critical thinking through solvency focus-** Solvency education is more important than harms education because it allows us to evaluate single problems with multiple approaches to solutions, increasing problem solving skills.

COUNTERPLANS IN 2NC ARE OUR FRIEND

1. NO THEORETICAL REASON WHY THIS ISN'T TRUE
2. IMPOSITION OF AFF. STANDARD IS UNFAIR TO NEG.
 - A. CP is given in a constructive speech.
 - B. All other constructives defend policy, why not in the 2NC?
 - C. This theory is actually regressive...in the past, the 2AC always delivered the plan.
 - D. 2AC runs add-ons, 2NC should be able to run counterplans.
 1. Fairness Standpoint. Should still be able to counterplan out new advantages, or provide a competitive alternative.
 2. Practicality Standard. Add-ons in the 2AC take out any possibility of running a 1NC counterplan that is competitive and meets the aff. advantages, because neg. is in the dark as to what those requirements will be until 2AC.
 - E. No time problems here. Aff. must prove it's harder in 1AR to cover counterplans than DAs, but this is not possible. Counterplan gives aff. a chance to concentrate on specific issues in 1AR. They don't have to cover an entire DA, just take out one voting issue in the counterplan.

TOPICAL COUNTERPLANS LEGITIMATE

1. CREATES MORE CASE SPECIFIC ARGUMENTATION

By allowing the affirmative policy to be the focus of the debate, case specific argumentation is increased. This allows proposals to be accepted or rejected strictly on their inherent benefits.

2. TOPICAL COUNTERPLANS INCREASE EDUCATION

E. Panetta & S. Dolley, (JAFA, VI. 25, Winter 1989, p. 175)

“The topical counterplan clearly enhances the educational value of the activity. Initially, the topical counterplan moves debate in the direction of substantive disputation.

3. TOPICAL COUNTERPLANS INSURE EQUAL GROUND

E. Panetta & S. Dolley, (JAFA, VI. 25, Winter 1989, p. 175)

“An objection to the topical counterplan is that it violates the concept of equal ground. Such an objection is based on the belief that the resolution and not an affirmative policy determines ground. As pointed out earlier in this essay, such an assumption is fallacious...”

4. TOPICAL COUNTERPLANS INCREASE DEBATE QUALITY

E. Panetta & S. Dolley, (JAFA, VI. 25, Winter 1989, p. 175)

“While there may be significant discussion concerning the legitimacy of a topical counterplan when it is first utilized in the debate community, we believe that in the long run they (topical counterplans) will advance the quality of the substantive issues raised and the debate over counterplan competition.”

5. DIRECTIONALITY BURDENS

The negative cannot steal ground from the affirmative. The counterplans competitiveness burden is more important and thus prevents the credibility of this argument. The aff. crosses their ground, the neg. runs a counterplan that advocates a policy that rejects the aff. plan. To reject this standard is to say that the aff. can defend both sides of an issue. This standpoint would eliminate the need for debate.

EXTENSIONS ON 2 – INCREASES EDUCATION

1. SUBSTANTIVE COMPARISONS MAXIMIZED

Now both teams argue key policy differences that are exactly on the topic. Generics are reduced.

2. IMPORTANT COMPARISONS BECOME THE FOCUS

E. Panetta & S. Dolley, (JAFA, VI. 25, Winter 1989, p. 426)

“In debate the topical counterplan would be a validating mechanism that tests the strength of the affirmatives claims. The topical counterplan allows the debaters to unpack the substantive issue in the topic area. For instance, the student can compare seatbelt and airbags to gain a better understanding of auto safety. The problem area of a debate resolution represents an important social issue that needs to be addressed by students. The topical counterplan effectively limits discussion to the substantial issue unique to that year's topics.

3. TOPICAL COUNTERPLANS INCREASE EDUCATIONAL VALUE OF DEBATE

A. The negatives counterplan would test the strength of the affirmative claims it will allow the nitty-gritty discussion of issues important to the round.

B. Real World: In congress they debate several policies, not just the pros and cons to one. Topical counterplans provide real world policy analysis.

EXTENSIONS ON 3 – EQUAL GROUND

1. AFF. SETS ITS OWN GROUND BY GIVING A CASE.

Our job is to defeat the case.

2. STILL LEAVES THE AFF. MAJOR GROUND

E. Panetta & S. Dolley, (JAFA, VI. 25, Winter 1989, p. 427)

“In fact, the topical counterplan reestablishes negative ground. From the policy making perspective, the affirmative maintains ground because they still determine the specific problem area for discussion. Affirmative choice of ground is maintained and, in some instances, enhanced with the presentation of a topical counterplan.

As should be obvious, the topical counterplan expands negative ground. The negative is allowed to choose from a larger group of policy alternatives if they argue a topical position. If the affirmative anticipated a topical counterplan, the effect might also be an expansion of negative ground. The perception that a topical counterplan may be argued could force a usually hesitant affirmative into specifying the mandates and implementing agents of a plan.”

EXTENSION TO 4 – DEBATE QUALITY

1. ORIGINAL ANALYSIS IGNORED

2. EVIDENCE MATCHES THE TAG

And good analysis is in the evidence.

E. Panetta & S. Dolley, (JAFA, VI. 25, Winter 1989, p. 413)

“The topical counterplan enhances the quality of policy debate. We believe that the topical counterplan promotes the educational value of debate while maintaining ground for both the negative and affirmative teams. Given the assumptions of a policy systems approach, there is little justification for maintaining the application of the topicality convention to a negative counterplan.”

3. DEPTH INCREASES

E. Panetta & S. Dolley, (JAFA, VI. 25, Winter 1989, p. 424)

“From the policymaking perspective the topical counterplan enhances the quality of debate. The topical counterplan substitutes in-depth argumentation on a policy for the shallower understanding of an expansive topic. A policy emphasis has the effect of crystallizing the issues to be discussed, whereas a focus on the topic as the area of discussion significantly reduces the likelihood of good on-point argumentation. The expansive scope of a debate

resolution makes it more difficult for the negative to anticipate and prepare coherent argumentation. To present a competitive, topical counterplan, a negative team has to be well read on the substantive issues of the topic. The presentation of well-researched competitive positions highlights the important arguments early in the debate, and good clash usually ensues.”

4. **DIVISION OF GROUND IS DEARER AND FAIRER**

A. Affirmative chooses choice of ground with the affirmative they decide to run. The topical counterplan would therefore establish negative ground outside of the affirmative ground.

B. Topical counterplan expands negative ground. This forces the affirmative to specification of mandates in plan so they can clearly keep their affirmative ground.

5. **TOPICAL COUNTERPLANS INCREASE QUALITY OF DEBATE**

A. Without topicality to debate a counterplan with, heavy emphasis would fall upon competition – raising the negatives chances of losing the debate with a non-competitive plan.

B. Would ensure in-depth argumentation rather than shallow – in order to present a Topical Competitive Counterplan – the negative would have to be widely read on many facets of the topic. Coherent, competitive argumentation would increase clash in the debate round.

EXTENSION – AFF. SAYS THEORISTS SAY CP MUST BE UNTOPICAL

1. **DEBATE IS A DYNAMIC ACTIVITY, NOT A STATIC ONE**

To limit the neg. to traditional counterplans stops the evolutionary process of debate. Take a stand and vote for progress.

2. **NEG. EVIDENCES THEORY TOO**

Panetta and Dolley were both cited in the original shell.

3. **“EVIDENCE ON THEORY” IS AN OXYMORON**

This equals opinion on conjecture. It is not empirical, statistical, or analytically proven.

4. **GROUND IS NOT STOLEN. AFF. HAS AMPLE GROUND**

A. Negative cannot steal ground from affirmative – the counterplans competitiveness burden is more important and thus presents the credibility of this argument. The aff. chooses their ground, the neg. runs a counterplan that advocates a policy that rejects the aff. plan – to reject this standard is to say the aff. can defend both sides – pro and con – of an issue – which would eliminate the need for debate.

B. Advocacy Burdens – once the aff. presents plan – they must advocate it. They must clash with negative counterplan, topical or not or risk unfairness by shirking the advocacy burdens of the affirmative.

50 State Fiat Good (States Counterplan Advocacy)

1. Tests the Resolution- tests the words “Federal Government” in the resolution
2. Key to Neg Ground- 50 states cp key part of neg ground especially on energy incentives
3. Increases Critical Thinking- forces arg thought on the fly and the aff to defend all parts of their plan
4. Education- we learn about policy making at the state level versus the national level.
5. Real world impossible- debate is not real world. Fiat doesn't exist in the real world.
6. Resolution mandates- states are an integral part of energy policy that needs to be debated.
7. Increases aff ground- allows aff to read a DA against one of 50 states
8. Rooted in the Lit- many authors discuss energy policy at the state and federal level.
9. Reciprocal- USFG includes many branches and agencies that the aff gets to have act.

Generics

Checks Aff bias- aff gets infinite prep, first and last speeches, and lit bias

Negation theory- we are fulfilling our job which is to reject the plan

Search for the best policy- we use the arg to find the best policy

No voter- reject the arg not the team.

OPERATIONALLY DEFINED COUNTERPLAN IS LEGITIMATE

1. OPERATIONALLY DEFINED AS THEORY

William H. Bennett, (High school/College Teacher, Author/Editor of 50 textbooks, PRAGMATIC DEBATE, 2008, p. 70)

“Current Debate “fashion” find many terms operationally defining terms, that is “no conceptual definition of the proposition is offered at all, the affirmative simply alleges that for the purpose of this debate its plan ALONE constitutes its definition of terms...”

2. AN OPERATIONALLY DEFINED CP IS DESIRABLE

If the negative team can encompass the affirmative plan and advantages WITHOUT the undesirable disadvantages, then it would be the best choice for a policy maker in Congress or a Voter in a booth.

3. AN OPERATIONALLY DEFINED COUNTERPLAN IS LEGITIMATE

William H. Bennett, (High school/College Teacher, Author/Editor of 50 textbooks, PRAGMATIC DEBATE, 2008, p. 70)

“Thus, the negative might use a counterplan which is exactly the same as the affirmative except for a difference in who administers it and/or any other single variation which they are prepared to argue improves the desirability of the proposal to the negatives advantage.”

4. AN OPERATIONALLY DEFINED COUNTERPLAN IS COMPETITIVE

A. The two plans are mutually exclusive.

You cannot adopt both the CP and the plan at the same time because they use identical resources to accrue advantages, i.e., Funding, Manpower, Administration, Enforcement.

B. Encourages resource conservation.

It would foster resource irresponsibility to vote for both the counterplan and affirmative plan. By voting only negative, resource duplication and waste would be eliminated.

5. THE OPERATIONALLY DEFINED CP IS NONTOPICAL

William H. Bennett, (High school/College Teacher, Author/Editor of 50 textbooks, PRAGMATIC DEBATE, 2008, p. 70)

“Thus ANY POLICY SYSTEM which is not the affirmative plan - no matter how slight its deviation from the affirmative structure might seem to be – is also NOT the resolution, and hence, cannot be charged with being topical.”

6. THE COUNTERPLAN IS FAIR

By failing to define terms other than operationally, the affirmative proves little research and restricts topicality attacks by the negative. The counterplan, though it may sound illegitimate, is simply a method to punish the affirmative for poor research and evidence skills, and the unfairness of their topicality.

POLITICAL FEASIBILITY DOES NOT LIMIT COUNTERPLANS

1. POLITICAL FEASIBILITY IS BAD

Roger Solt, (Ass. Dir. Of Debate, U of Kentucky, JAFA, Winter 1989, p. 132)

Sixth, the political feasibility standard is difficult to debate. Most public policy argument is normative – it concerns the desirability of policies, not the probability of their adoption. It is an attempt to persuade, not an attempt to predict political outcomes.

2. POLITICAL FEASIBILITY OVER-LIMITS

Roger Solt, (Ass. Dir. Of Debate, U of Kentucky, JAFA, Winter 1989, p. 131)

“The political feasibility standard would eliminate most of the popular generic counterplans that have been run in recent years. Except as a response to the most radical of affirmatives, alternative form government counterplans would clearly be excluded. Further, systemic but topic specific counterplans (deschooling, disarmament, etc.) would also be excluded. So would most process counterplans ... Even the exception counterplan might not fare well under this approach since to carve out a narrow exception to a general policy might be less politically feasible than a more all encompassing policy.”

3. POLITICAL FEASIBILITY – MUDDLED DEBATE

Robert J. Branham, (Prof. of Rhetoric and Dir. of Debate at Bates College, ROADS NOT TAKEN: COUNTERPLANS AND OPPORTUNITY COSTS, JAFA, Spring, 1989, p. 253)

“However, because of this, and because it relies upon the forecasting of uncertain events, political feasibility remains among the most difficult forms of plan-counterplan competition to substantiate and defend.”

4. RADICAL COUNTERPLANS ARE GOOD

It is ridiculous not to debate a counterplan because it seems “radical” or is an “Utopian” counterplan.

5. GENERIC COUNTERPLANS ARE OK

If a counterplan is generic enough to run from year to year, then the affirmative should have responses to it by now!

CONDITIONAL AND OR UTOPIAN COUNTERPLANS ARE NIFTY

1. CONDITIONAL COUNTERPLANS ARE LEGITIMATE

Austin J. Freeley, (Prof. Emeritus John Carroll Univ., ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE, 1990, p. 240)

“The conditional counterplan is a variation of the conditional refutation considered earlier. In developing this type of case, the negative argues 1) the status quo can solve the problem; and 2) if the status quo can't solve the problem, the negative counterplan can.”

2. HYPOTHETICAL COUNTERPLANS ARE LEGITIMATE

Austin J. Freeley, (Prof. Emeritus John Carroll Univ., ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE, 1990, p. 240)

“The hypothetical counterplan was developed as a response to the alternate justification affirmative. One debater argued it this way: 'We would suggest a hypothetical counterplan. That is, at the end of the debate, if the affirmative doesn't carry all three advantages, adopt whatever ones they do carry and use the rest of the money to fund things like tax rebates, pollution control, etc. That, we suggest, would be a superior policy system unless they can carry all three advantages, which is the resolution.'”

3. UTOPIAN COUNTERPLANS ARE LEGITIMATE

Austin J. Freeley, (Prof. Emeritus John Carroll Univ., ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE, 1990, p. 241)

“In developing the Utopian counterplan the negative typically mandates a single plank that the nation or world will be arranged in a manner consistent with anarchy, world government, socialism, authoritarianism, or some other future strategy and claims that this strategy will better solve the problem than the federal government or whatever agency of change is provided in the proposition under debate.”

4. UTOPIAN COUNTERPLANS ARE ATTRACTIVE

Austin J. Freeley, (Prof. Emeritus John Carroll Univ., ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE, 1990, p. 241)

“The attraction of Utopian counterplans of the negative is twofold: 1) Utopia is defined as 'a place of ideal perfection, especially in laws, government, and social conditions' – certainly a most desirable locale for one's plan, and 2) the Utopian counterplan may be the ultimate generic argument in that it may be applied to an almost limitless variety of affirmative cases.”

POLITICAL FEASIBILITY BAD TEST FOR UTOPIAN COUNTERPLANS

1. CANNOT DEFINE 'UTOPIAN COUNTERPLAN'

Roger Solt, (Forensic Theorist, Ass. Dir. of Forensics, U of Kentucky, JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN FORENSIC ASSOCIATION, 1989, p. 125)

“First, it seems very difficult to define the “Utopian.” Each of these forms of government has advocates who believe in its viability. They may not believe in the immediate political practicality of such reforms, but they clearly don't believe them to be “Utopian.” All policies, affirmative or negative, fall on a continuum of political practicality, and there is certainly no clear dividing line between Utopian and non-Utopian policies.”

2. POLITICAL FEASIBILITY IS TOO SUBJECTIVE

To determine whether or not a counterplan is politically feasible requires judge intervention. This is an unfair burden to put on the judge.

3. POLITICAL FEASIBILITY DEPENDS ON TIME

Roger Solt, (Forensic Theorist, Ass. Dir. of Forensics, U of Kentucky, JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN FORENSIC ASSOCIATION, 1989, p. 125)

“Second, what is considered “Utopian” depends critically on time and place. Most of the world's population lives under a government or with an economic system that could be labeled either authoritarian or socialist. None of these alternatives may be very likely in contemporary America, but certainly there are circumstances, such as an ecological crisis or serious depression, under which one or more might be seriously considered.”

4. NON RECIPROCAL TEST

The affs fiat is not limited by political feasibility, there is no reason the negative should have different fiat burdens, if anything our fiat is broader.

5. COUNTER-RESOLUTION JUSTIFIES ACTION

If the aff must prove we “should” do something, its our burden to prove that thing “shouldn't” be done, and thus we gain the ability to advocate any non-topical, competitive action.

6. LOSS OF FIAT DOESN'T MATTER

A. WE STILL DISPROVE THE RESOLUTION

Even if we don't assume that counterplan is implemented, it still proves that the resolution is not worth adopting, since non-topical alternatives are better.

B. DISADVANTAGE ANALYSIS ENSURES NEGATIVE BALLOT

All policies have opportunity costs. If we prove that the counterplan is competitive, then a choice between the Aff and Neg is incumbent upon the judge. Not passing the counterplan becomes a disadvantage to the plan.

Delay CP's Good

1. Education- we learn more by debating the future and the present.
2. Net benefit checks abuse- we need a net benefit for a counterplan. This solves back their unpredictability and infinite regression claims.
3. Tests the entirety of the plan text- makes the aff defend the time of implementation of their plan.
4. Test of the resolution- "should" implies immediate action which is tested by the delay CP.

Generics

Checks Aff bias- aff gets infinite prep, first and last speeches, and lit bias

Negation theory- we are fulfilling our job which is to reject the plan

Search for the best policy- we use the arg to find the best policy

No voter- reject the arg not the team.

Counterplans Do/Don't Limit Negative Arguments

COUNTERPLANS SHOULD NOT LIMIT CASE ATTACKS

1. COUNTERPLANS AND CASE ATTACKS LEGITIMATE

Freeley, (Prof. Emeritus John Carroll Univ., ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE, Seventh Ed., p. 240)

“The conditional counterplan is a variation of the conditional refutation considered earlier. In developing this type of case, the negative argues 1) the status quo can solve the problem; and 2) if the status quo can't solve the problem, the negative counterplan can.”

2. MORE EDUCATIONAL

Allows the debate to be run on two levels, the traditional workability and the policy comparison which leads to higher analysis.

3. NEGATIVE'S RIGHT

The negative should have the right to attack the plan on all levels, after all, the paramount goal of debate is to develop the best, workable policy.

4. EVEN DIVISION OF GROUND

Allowing the negative to run case attacks makes the ground completely even – both teams have a policy to uphold, and the right to attack an opposing policy.

5. DETERMINES THE BEST POLICY

Allows the judge to view the debate on all facets, how the affirmative case compares to other alternatives, and it's ability to solve.

6. CREATES MORE CLASH

Allows for more direct on case clash, teams should be allowed to expose their opponents flaws, and how they can be solved through a different proposal.

7. MORE REAL WORLD

Real world decision-makers weigh all options, the proposal's merits, the ability of the proposal to solve, and the benefits of other alternatives.

8. BEST TEST FOR AFFIRMATIVE PLAN

Counterplans test whether or not the affirmative is the best option available, while case attacks test the workability and practicality of the plan.

9. MAKES FOR GOOD DEBATE

The goal of debate is to prove or disprove the resolution, and the negative can or should do both.

COUNTERPLANS SHOULD PROHIBIT CASE ATTACKS

1. CAUSES A REGRESSION IN ANALYSIS

Prof. Freeley, (John Carroll Univ., ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE, 1990, p. 240)

“Two important constraints the student debater must make before selecting this approach are: First, the time constraints of academic debate make it impossible to develop both the defense of the status quo and the counterplan adequately.”

2. BETTER POLICY COMPARISON

Once a counterplan is run, debate should become a policy comparison, and ballots should be based on the comparative advantages.

3. ABUSIVE TO AFFIRMATIVE

It is abusive to the affirmative team to have to uphold the resolution, show how it is better than the counterplan, and answer case attacks.

4. GROUND IS EVENLY DIVIDED

A counterplan divides the ground fairly by giving each team a proposal to compare, allowing the negative to attack case results in an imbalance of ground.

5. CAUSES BAD DEBATE

When a counterplan is run, usually containing advantages similar to the affirmative, the judge should vote by weighing the effectiveness of the policies on external issues.

6. UNFAIR BURDEN TO THE AFFIRMATIVE

The affirmative should have to uphold either the burden of proof, or the burden of proving they have the best policy, since the negative team has the extra advantage of presumption.

7. LESSENS THE QUALITY OF DEBATE

When the negative runs a counterplan, both teams ought to bear the burden of proof, as long as both policies are prima facie, shouldn't waste our time on petty case attacks that have already been proven.

NEGATIVE ABANDONS PRESENT SYSTEM

NEGATIVE CANNOT GIVE COUNTERPLAN AND ATTACK AFFIRMATIVE CASE AT THE SAME TIME

1. BY GIVING A COUNTERPLAN

The negative has dropped this defense of the status quo.

2. NEG. ADMITS A GUILTY STATUS QUO

R. Wood, (Dean of Northwestern U. School of Speech, STRATEGIC DEBATE, p. 28)

“The negative team, then, must surrender its presumption in the debate. It has admitted the status quo is guilty.”

3. NEGATIVE ADMITS FLAWED SYSTEM

Ronald Lee et al., (Prof. of Rhetoric at Indiana Univ. at Bloomington, ARGUING PERSUASIVELY, 1989, p. 189)

“By counterplanning the negative admits that the present system cannot address the serious problems that presently exist. However, the negative advocates maintains that an alternative policy can do a better job than the affirmative policy.

4. NEG. ADMITS HARM

By running a counterplan, the negative is granting affirmative analysis of the topic when it comes to harms. Since they are offering a proposal to solve those harms, they must not believe that the status quo can do it.

5. THE NEGATIVE HAS THE BURDEN OF PROOF

Prof. Ziegelmüller, (THE LOGICAL FRAMEWORK OF ARGUMENT, 1975, p. 179)

“Those negatives who assume the counterproposal approach abandon the logical advantage or presumption and assume a burden of proof ... since the counterplan negative does not wish to see a status quo continue, it opposes presumption.”

6. CLOSE ROUND WARRANTS AN AFFIRMATIVE VOTE

Prof. Baird, (ARGUMENTATION DEBATE AND DISCUSSION, 1950, p. 134)

“If at the end of the debate, the negative has succeeded in showing in only that its plan is of equal merit it has failed to show that the affirmatives satisfactory remedy for the admittedly bad situation should not be adopted ... Therefore, the affirmative should win.”

COUNTERPLANNING DOES LIMIT OTHER ARGUMENTS

1. COMPARING ALLOWS OTHER ARGUMENTS

James J. Unger and James Copeland, (Copeland, Executive Director of the National Forensic League, Unger, Professor at Georgetown, SECOND THOUGHTS, 1973, p. 65)

“There is no question but that the negative remains entirely free to attack the significance of the affirmatives evils ... since the two policy systems ... are being compared ... the negative will, of course, wish to maximize the comparative areas in which it is the strongest and minimize those it is the weakest.”

2. HYPOTESTING ALLOWS

Any argument that disproves the resolution is allowable under the topic.

3. STOCK ISSUES ALLOWS IT

Inherency and Counterplans are just one of many Stock issues.

4. GAME PLAYING ALLOWS

Aff. can knowing several attacks could be used. There is no surprise to them that there are many voting issues.

5. NO TURN

Even if some of our case attacks and disadvantages link to the counterplan, they link equally to the Aff. We'll still win a net benefit to the counterplan and that's of a reason enough to vote.

6. CONTRADICTIONS UNIMPORTANT

Who wins is not who contradicts themselves the least. The Aff wins if they prove the resolution. The Negative wins if they disprove the resolution.

7. CONDITIONALLY/DISPOSITIONALITY JUSTIFIES

Since we reserve the right to revert to the status quo, we should be able to make answers that defend the status quo even if they link to part of our conditional advocacy.

8. NO ABUSE

We promise to only go for arguments that don't contradict by the 2NR, we will drop the rest.

COUNTERPLANNING DOES NOT LIMIT THE NEG TO JUST THE COUNTERPLAN

1. COMPARING ALLOWS OTHER ARGUMENTS

James J. Unger et al., (SECOND THOUGHTS, 1973, p. 65)

“There is no question but that the negative remains entirely free to attack the significance of the affirmatives evils ... since the two policy systems ... are being compared ... the negative will, of course, wish to maximize the comparative areas in which it is the strongest and minimize those it is the weakest.”

2. HYPO TEST ALLOWS

Any argument that disproves the resolution is allowable under the topic.

3. STOCK ISSUES ALLOW IT

Inherency and counterplans are just one of many Stock issues.

4. GAME PLAYING ALLOWS

Aff. came knowing several attacks could be used. There is no surprise to them that there are many voting issues.

5. CONTRADICTIONS UNIMPORTANT

Who wins is not who contradicts themselves the least. The Aff wins if they prove the resolution. The Negative wins if they disprove the resolution.

6. CAN DO BOTH

Vance Trefethen, 2007 (Third Edition, Strategic Debate, Negative Counterplans and Minor Repairs)

A Negative can offer a counterplan that doesn't concede the harms of the case (for example, Plank One can be “Conduct more studies of the problem”) or one that is offered as an alternative reason to vote Negative just in case the Affirmatives harms are persuasive, even though the Negative intends to argue the harms. A carefully executed counterplan can sometimes allow the Negative to have it both ways, but it requires some skill on the Negatives part to explain this to the Judge and not to confuse themselves on what their position really is.

**OTHER ATTACKS NOT PREEMPTED:
NEG. MAY ARGUE STOCK ISSUES AS WELL AS COUNTERPLAN**

1. NEG. MUST SHOW ONLY THAT THE PRESENT SYSTEM OR THE COUNTERPLAN IS SUPERIOR TO ADOPTING THE RESOLUTION.

Allan J. Lichtman and Daniel M. Rorher, (Lichtman, Prof. of History, American U., Rorher, Dir. Of Forensics at Boston College, ADVANCED DEBATE, 1987, p. 248)

“Moreover, in attempting to demonstrate the greater net benefits of the counterplan, the negative is perfectly free to criticize any aspect of the affirmative case including its indictment of the status quo. By supporting a counterplan the negative argues in effect that the present system plus suggested counter-alterations are superior to the present system plus the alterations suggested by the affirmative.”

2. POLICY MAKER PARADIGM VALIDATES

Comparing benefits of two policies means you try to knock down the legitimacy of the other.

James J. Unger, (Former Dir. of Forensics, Georgetown Univ., SECOND THOUGHTS, 1973, p. 65)

“There is no question but that the negative remains entirely free to attack the significance of the affirmatives evils ... since the two policy systems ... are being compared ... the negative will, of course, wish to maximize the comparative areas in which it is the strongest and minimize those it is the weakest.”

3. AFFIRMATIVE STILL MUST PROVE THAT THEY ARE PRIMA FACIE

Just because a debate is a counterplan round does not mean that typical affirmative burdens must not be met.

4. THE HYPO-TESTING PARADIGM LEGITIMIZES MULTIPLE ATTACKS

If an argument shows the resolution false, the resolution should be rejected in light of another.

5. STOCK ISSUES PARADIGM LEGITIMIZES TWO-PRONGED APPROACHES

Inherency, harm, and significance are voting issues. If an affirmative fails to prove one, they should lose.

6. GAMES PLAYING PARADIGM ALLOWS

Affirmative had prior knowledge of what types of attacks could be run. Voting issues are always voting issues. It's a rule of the game.

7. CONTRADICTIONS IN PHILOSOPHIES ARE IRRELEVANT

Contradictions don't disqualify the negative. However, proving the resolution untrue does disqualify the affirmative.

Counterplan Dispositionality or Conditionality

DISPOSITIONALITY

What it is: Dispositionality is a counterplan theory development. It is effectively a combination of Conditionality and Traditional counterplan advocacy. Dispositionality argues that they cannot drop the counterplan unless there is a competition claim made by the affirmative. Effectively the negative says the counterplan can be dropped like a disadvantage, with permutations and other competition answers acting like “no link” answers. The negative can extend perms and make the counterplan go away.

DISPOSITIONALITY GOOD

1. **GIVES AFFS CONTROL**

As long as they don't make any competitiveness arguments, we will be forced to keep the counterplan, means there is no time skew.

2. **NO MOVING TARGET**

We will not mute the counterplan, or change advocacy.

3. **NO GROUND ABUSE**

The Aff indicted the status quo for 8 minutes in the IAC, they should be prepared to defend it.

4. **GROUND EQUALIZED**

2AR last speech checks, they will always get the last chance to frame the round, so they can always react to any change in out advocacy.

5. **NO UNIQUE ABUSE**

We can drop any other argument in the round, counterplans shouldn't be any different.

6. **WE'RE LOGICALLY SUPERIOR**

If the counterplans not competitive, it just means that it can exist as the same time as the aff, not that our advocacy is worse.

7. **AFF SKEW CHECKS ABUSE**

Aff wins almost 70% of rounds, has first and last speeches, and gets to determine the focus of ground, dispositionality is just a small check on that abuse.

8. **THOUGHT GOOD**

Forcing the aff to think in two worlds increases education and strategic maneuvering the core of good debate.

9. **TIME-SKEW GOOD**

The negatives job is to skew time, don't punish us for utilizing our largest strategic advantage.

10. **NEGATIVE DON'T HAVE ADVOCACY**

The only thing we have to argue is “not aff,” were not tied to one way to prove that.

DISPOSITIONALITY BAD

1. MOVING TARGET

Allows the negative to change their advocacy midround from CP to Status Quo.

2. DESTROYS PREDICTABILITY

Time constraints; allowing the negative to advocate the two worlds means the aff can never make strategic choices because they kick out of the counterplan as soon as we answer it, it wastes 2AC time because we have to answer all positions even though the counterplan links too.

3. INTELLECTUAL HYPOCRISY

Debate is a game where you get points for intellectual consistency, punish them opening the door to legitimate contradiction.

4. MEANS OUR PENN WILL ALWAYS WIN

If they can advocate two contradictory worlds (Status Quo and Counterplan), we should be able to do the same (Plan and Counterplan).

5. COUNTERPLANS ARE ADVOCACY

Their not like DAs because they offer a change from the status quo. They should have to defend their change. That's a voting issue.

6. REDUCED EDUCATION

Instead of real discussion about the issues, we get strategic maneuvering, that doesn't feed good debate.

7. REDUCED RESEARCH

Allowing the negative to kick counterplans encourages the "counterplan of the week" phenomenon, that means we'll never have in depth research on any of them.

8. GROUND ABUSE

Gives neg more policy position latitude than the aff, playing ground in unequal.

CONDITIONAL ARGUMENTS ARE HORRIBLE

1. THEY ARE ABUSIVE

Conditional arguments allow the negative to contradict themselves without penalty.

2. ITS AN UNFAIR DOUBLE STANDARD

The affirmative has to take a clear permanent position. Apply the same standard to the negative.

3. IT ADMITS NEGATIVE WEAKNESS

They aren't sure what to say or do so they run conditional arguments.

4. CONDITIONALITY REDUCES EDUCATION AND ANALYSIS

By forcing us to look at many unconnected issues it reduces the depth with which we pursue each issue.

5. POLICY PARADIGM REJECTS CONDITIONALITY

Debate is supposed to compare two policies. Conditionality means that the negative has no set policy so they deserve to lose.

6. DEBATE PREMISES REJECT CONDITIONALITY

Legal and legislative models serve as the basis for debate. Both reject conditionality. In a court you can enter only one plea, not several. In the legislature only one bill on a subject is considered at a time: several contradictory bills would not be under debate at the same time.

7. CONDITIONALITY HURTS DEBATE

"Conditional arguments abuse debate. They create shallow analysis, confuse issues, and questionably promote a 'position' that is almost always internally contradictory and sometimes self-defeating."

8. PUNISH THEM FOR IT

Any team that takes a position which is unfair, abusive, reduces education, encourages contradictions and shallow thought, and creates an ethically questionable double standard deserves to be punished.

CONDITIONAL ARGUMENTS ARE WONDERFUL

1. THEY PROMOTE QUALITY DEBATE

Debate is a test of the resolution, whether it is true or not. Only conditional arguments can fully expose the resolution to all the tests it must defeat to be proven true.

2. JUDGING PARADIGMS ALLOW CONDITIONALITY

Games playing, hypothesis testing, skills, and tabula rosa all or even encourage conditional arguments.

3. FAIR NOTICE WAS GIVEN

Theory works and earlier debate rounds have let the affirmative know that conditional arguments are common.

4. BANNING CONDITIONAL ARGUMENTS CREATES AN UNFAIR DOUBLE STANDARD

Affirmatives can run min-affirmatives, alternative justification cases, and independent advantage cases. Since the aff. is allowed to be conditional so can the negative.

5. CONDITIONALITY INCREASES EDUCATION

It increases the number of issues we confront, research and debate.

6. ANALYSIS IS IMPROVED

Conditionality forces the affirmative to consider more issues, and it forces both teams to debate the implications of more issues.

7. THE RESOLUTION IS BETTER TESTED

The affirmative obligation is to prove the resolution true. The resolution can only be proven true or false by examining ALL arguments against it. Banning conditionality reduces resolutorial tests.

8. FAIRNESS DEMANDS CONDITIONALITY

The aff. can choose from hundreds of cases on this topic, they get the first speech, they get the last speech. Conditionality arguments are a small step to restoring equity.

9. EXPERTS SUPPORT CONDITIONALITY

William H. Bennett, (Political consultant & author and debate theorist, PRAGMATIC DEBATE, 4th edition, 2008, p. 71)

“But debate can be placed in a scientific paradigm whereby the resolution is treated as a hypothesis to be tested against the null hypothesis that is – any and all possible other causes and/or solutions. If a negative team is willing to advocate and defend this outlook then they can offer an indefinite number of counterplans.”

Dispositionality Good

1. Time and strategy skews are inevitable—Some teams will always be faster, and theory and topicality arguments will always produce a time and strategy tradeoff. The CP is preferable to these debates because it increases education and equalizes time tradeoffs.
2. Turn—We put the strategic ball in their court. They can stick us with the CP simply by straight-turning it, which means they control where the debate goes. This turns all of their reasons why dispo is bad.
3. 2NR defines advocacy—we'll always pinpoint our position and they get another speech. This is our worldview on all theory questions and solves all abuse claims.
4. Non-unique—All negative arguments are dispositional. The affirmative isn't complaining about us potentially kicking out of topicality or a disad that's not straight-turned.
5. Best balance—we increases education by allowing real debate to occur on the counterplan, whereas conditionality discourages the affirmative to do so and skews their strategy, and unconditionality hinders the search for the best policy option and unfairly restricts the neg.
6. Increases critical thinking by encouraging strategic 2ACs with good time allocation and encourages affs to think more about the interaction of our arguments.
7. Promotes crystallization—getting rid of dead arguments allows the round to narrow down to more developed ones, maximizing depth-based education.
8. Offense checks abuse—even if we kick the CP, we can't retract any evidence read. That evidence can still form the basis for a turn, and offense on the net benefit answers our strategy in both worlds.
9. Key to negative flexibility—Our only burden is to disprove the plan. Being able to test it at multiple levels is essential to neg strategy and ground, which outweighs their voters because neg flex is key to balancing an aff bias.
10. Err neg on theory—Aff gets infinite prep time, the structural advantage of first and last speeches, gets to choose how to interpret the resolution, and now presumption. Err neg to check this inherent affirmative bias in the round.
11. Rejection is the wrong remedy. There's no in-round abuse and voting on potential abuse is like voting on a potential disad. At worst you should drop the counterplan, not the team.

Conditionality Bad

Conditionality is bad; it's a voter for the following reasons:

Offense:

1. **Time/Strategy Skew**—They could read 10 conditional counterplans in the 1NC and kick out of all but the one with the least offense in the block
2. **Moving target**—We don't know what the issues in the debate will be until the 2NR so any offense we put on the counterplan is time wasted; this hurts fairness and education and makes it impossible to win.
3. **Counter-interpretation**—they should read their K/CP dispositionally; it allows the aff a change to straight-turn in the 2AC and checks any abuse. It solves all their offense.
4. **Not reciprocal**—Justifies the aff kicking case and reading a new one in the 2AC.
5. **Justifies severance and intrinsicness**—if the neg can change their advocacy whenever they want, the aff should be able to do the same
6. **Promotes argumentative irresponsibility**—the neg isn't responsible for their advocacy- they could run multiple contradictory arguments without any recourse

Defense:

1. **Perms don't check abuse**—they're a test of competition, advocated perms justify intrinsicness
2. **Neg flex is bad**—They have thousands of Ks, DAs, T violations, and whatever CPs they read dispositionally.
3. **Its not real world**—policy makers can't propose competing pieces of legislation and a senator never unrolls a list of 30 bills they might advocate that day
4. **Negation theory doesn't check**—they could force us to double turn ourselves answering all of their positions
5. **No aff side bias**—they have the 13 minute block to the 5 minute 1AR and they have issue choice
6. **A conditional counterplan is different than any other conditional issue**—it changes whether we're defending our plan against the world of a counterplan or the world of the status quo
7. **There is legitimate abuse**—the 2AC has already happened; they've already skewed our time and strategy
8. **Not key to find the best policy option/doesn't increase critical thinking**—it doesn't increase critical thinking or find the best policy option because whenever the neg is put in a tough position they'll just kick the counterplan

Conditionality Good – Offense

- 1. Breadth is better than depth**
 - a. the plan was the focus of the debate, and neg. should be able to attack the plan from multiple vantage points.**
 - b. advocacy training is central to the educational mission of debate**
 - c. It's best to force each team to "scan" the available policy options, select one and debate it to the max**
- 2. Best policy option-many ideas must be compared to the aff in order to find the best policy option, which is the point of the round**
- 3. Reciprocity-if the aff gets a policy option, so should the neg. The fact that the aff can perm and advocate multiple perms means that the neg can run multiple conditional counterplans**
- 4. Neg flex – The aff has intrinsic advantages in terms of framing the debate, giving both the first and last speeches, and win/loss percentages prove. The neg needs a variety of approaches to answer the aff.**
- 5. Neg theory- Either of the squo or the plan prove the aff is a bad idea. The neg's responsibility is to answer the aff by illustrating opportunity costs to the adoption of the plan.**
- 6. Real world-in the real world, legislators are allowed to propose and drop new bills all the time**
- 7. Harder debate is better for debate-forces us to work harder, learn more and make debate a more productive activity. It doesn't matter if it is infinitely regressive or not.**
- 8. Best policy option-we're here to see which is the best policy option, and that is best found by having multiple policy options to weigh in the round. This should be our found in the round, is thus justifies why we can advocate and then drop args.**
- 9. Dispo doesn't solve – Limits neg flex, undermines the discussion of policy options, and makes the aff capable of dictating the CP which undermines examination of logical opportunity costs of the plan's adoption, preventing the degree of difficulty of debates from increasing. In effect, it bails out the aff.**

Conditionality Good – Defense

- 1. Time skew inevitable-if we hadn't run another "policy option," we would have just run another kick-able case arg, DA or K argument, or we could have just had more arguments on another flow**
- 2. We aren't a moving target because we will have to pick one and because the status quo is always an option**
 - a. All arguments are conditional. The aff will kick advantages and we can concede disads. All of their arguments prove the CP isn't competitive by answering the net benefits.**
 - b. If the negative claims that either of two policies is superior to the plan and one of their policies is shown to be inferior, they can still logically win on the other**
- 3. Strat Skew is inevitable, and harder debate is better debate**
 - a. The 1AC is stacked with advantages and the SQ is not a policy option, so we have to have another policy option**
 - b. Increased critical thinking on how to answer arguments is good**
 - c. fewer arguments are not necessarily better**
- 4. Aff bias – first and last speech, frame the debate, infinite prep, and win/loss %.**
- 5. Perms check – the aff can advocate multiple worlds too. Our CPs simply test logical opportunity costs of adopting the aff.**
- 6. Debating the Squo isn't an additional burden – The 1AC is stacked against the squo, and typically includes some CP answers too.**

Conditionality Good

1. Spurs critical thinking – Aff has to pick their best arguments for both the squo and the cp.
2. Perms check abuse – their perms are a greater time skew.
3. No impact to multiple worlds.
4. Most real world – Congressmen change their minds all the time for no reason. Policy debate trains us for the world of policy making.
5. Logical decision making- not having the option of the squo would be an extreme departure from decision making.
6. Time skew inevitable- the 1AR has 5 minutes to answer the 13 minute block.
7. All arguments are condi- we should be able to drop a CP just as we drop T.

Generics

Checks Aff bias- aff gets infinite prep, first and last speeches, and lit bias

Negation theory- we are fulfilling our job which is to reject the plan

Search for the best policy- we use the arg to find the best policy

No voter- reject the arg not the team.

Dispo Good

1. Puts the aff in control – they can straight turn forcing us to have the counterplan the rest of the debate.
2. All arguments are dispo – we should be able to kick cp's like we kick DA's or topicality.
3. Perms check abuse – multiple perms are a worse times screw.
4. No impact to multiple worlds.
5. Logical decision making- not having the option of the squo would be an extreme departure from decision making.
6. Time skew inevitable –a thirteen minute neg block is always going to pressure the 1AR.
7. Increases strategic thinking- forces the aff to pick their best args against the squo and the counterplan, improving education.
8. Real world- policy makers change their minds all the time if they see an option is not as good.

Generics

Checks Aff bias- aff gets infinite prep, first and last speeches, and lit bias

Negation theory- we are fulfilling our job which is to reject the plan

Search for the best policy- we use the arg to find the best policy

No voter- reject the arg not the team.

Counterplan Presumption

THE NEGATIVE HAS PRESUMPTION ON THE COUNTERPLAN

1. THE AFFIRMATIVE MUST STILL MEET IT'S BURDEN OF PROOF

Austin Freely, (ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE, 1976, p. 216)

“If the negative's counterplan is as good as the affirmative's plan; the affirmative has failed to carry it's burden of proof, then the decision in and educational debate must be awarded to the negative.”

2. REAL WORLD TACTICS PROVE

Congressmen often offer a counterproposal that they feel would better solve the problem while they lay the first proposal on the table.

3. HYPO-TESTING PROVES

If the judge accepts the role of a scientist and gives weight to all hypotheses until proven false, then the negative still has presumption.

THE AFFIRMATIVE NOW HAS PRESUMPTION IN THIS ROUND

1. BY GIVING A COUNTERPLAN

The negative has dropped its defense of the present system, of the Status Quo.

2. THE NEGATIVE NOW HAS A BURDEN OF PROOF

Prof. Ziegelmueeller, (THE LOGICAL FRAMEWORK OF ARGUMENT, 1975, p. 179)

“Those negatives who assume the counterproposal approach abandon the logical advantage or presumption and assume a burden of proof ... since the counterplan negative does not wish to see a status quo continue, it opposes presumption.”

3. THE NEGATIVE HAS ADMITTED THAT THE PRESENT SYSTEM IS GUILTY

R. Wood, (Dean of Northwestern U. School of Speech, STRATEGIC DEBATE, p. 28)

“The negative team, then, must surrender its presumption in the debate. It has admitted the status quo is guilty.”

4. THE NEGATIVE COMPLETELY LOSES PRESUMPTION

(ARGUMENTATION AS ADVOCACY, 1976, p. 51)

“The negative in offering a counterplan loses the presumption of the argument and assumes the burden of proof on the alternate solution. Furthermore, the negative must prove that its counterplan is superior to the affirmatives proposal.”

EXTENSION EVIDENCE:

Debate theory says a close debate should go affirmative.

Prof. Baird, (ARGUMENTATION, DEBATE & DISCUSSION, 1950, p. 134)

“If, at the end of the debate, the negative has succeeded in showing only that its plan is of equal merit it has failed to show that the affirmatives satisfactory remedy for the admittedly bad situation should not be adopted ... Therefore, the affirmative should win.”

Vance Trefethen, 2007 (Third Edition, Strategic Debate, Negative Counterplans and Minor Repairs)
The Counterplan risks sacrificing Negative presumption. When the Negative started the debate, they had the presumption that the status quo is acceptable until the Affirmative proves otherwise. However, if the Negative runs a counterplan, they are also changing the status quo, and they can no longer lay claim to be presumed the winners in case of a tie or an unclear/unconvincing Affirmative case. They can only regain this presumption if they show that their counterplan performs fewer or less-significant changes to the status quo than the Affirmatives change performs.

Counterwarrants

COUNTERWARRANTS ARE LEGITIMATE VOTING ISSUES

1. LOGICALLY LEGITIMATE
Gives the Neg. more ground to argue on squirrel cases.
2. FAIRNESS TO THE NEGATIVE DEMANDS IT
It's unfair to allow the Aff. to defend one position of the resolution which takes away Neg. ground.
3. CLASH IS INCREASED
Clash is increased because you are debating the entire resolution not just a small part of it.
4. TRADITIONALITY
Counterwarrants are traditional.
5. PARAMOUNT GOAL IS SUPPORTED
Tom Goodnight et al., (M. A., Kansan, JAFA, Spring 1974, p. 205)
“A debate team is arguing for only one goal, ultimately, the adoption of the resolution.”
6. ENHANCES DECISION MAKING
More information on the resolution makes deciding whether or not to adopt it easier.
7. COUNTERWARRANTS ARE THE JUDGE'S DUTY
James W. Paulson and Jack Rhodes, (JAFA, Spring 1979, p. 234)
“In this view of debate, the ultimate duty of the judge, regardless of his feelings toward the specific policy proposal offered by the affirmative is to cast a ballot on the resolution.”
8. TIME CONSTRAINTS NO PROBLEM
Both sides have the same amount of time, what each says the other has time to answer.

COUNTERWARRANTS ARE BAD

1. COUNTERWARRANTS ARE ILLOGICAL

The resolutorial interpretations for the negative are too broad.

2. ARE UNFAIR

Counterwarrants place unreasonable burden on the Aff to fend off every interpretation of the resolution.

3. CLASH IS DECREASED

Prof. Ulrich, (JAFA, 1980, p. 201)

“Counterwarrants would decrease clash. Rather than emphasizing the affirmative case, negative teams would try to introduce cases that have little relationship to the affirmative case.”

4. RESOLUTION IS ONLY A PARAMETER

The resolution is only a guide line in writing affirmative cases.

5. REDUCES QUALITY OF ARGUMENTS

Prof. Ulrich, (JAFA, 1980, p. 201)

“Increase use of the counterwarrant also would hurt the quality of argument. Paulson and Rhodes concede that on balance, 'the counterwarrants might exacerbate an already bad situation,' by increasing a trend towards superficial analysis.”

6. HINDERS DECISION MAKING

Clark Olsen, (Nov. 1981)

“The counterwarrant presents particular problems for the judge in academic debate. Whatever decision making paradigm is adopted, counterwarrants avoid clash and hinder the decision making process.”

7. CAUSE BAD DEBATE

Counterwarrants distort the whole game theory of debate.

8. COUNTERWARRANTS MUST BE PRIMA FACIE

If the negative argues that other cases are included in the topic they must evidence how, why, and what the plan mandates would be.

Decision Rules

DECISION RULES AREN'T VOTING ISSUES

1. JUDGE'S OPINION OUTWEIGHS DEBATER'S OPINIONS

A debater's opinion shouldn't take any precedence in around since they aren't as experienced as the judge. Even if debaters find evidence to support their opinion, it doesn't mean that their opinions now take precedence in the round. It only means that they found someone to agree with them.

2. DECISIONS RULES ARE MESSY

Decision Rules don't make rounds any easier since both teams end up arguing the standards. Eventually the arguments must be weighed by the judge, who's standards were the only valid ones to begin with.

3. NOT REAL WORLD

In Congress, congressmen don't vote on a bill just because someone told them to according to certain criteria. They vote the way they think is right by their own standards.

4. ONE DECISIONS RULE AT MOST

If you allow more than one decision rule, then you are contradicting the theory behind decision rules. These standards say that there is one key argument that the whole round rests upon. But if you introduce two standards, you destroy the theory by eliminating that central focus which the round rested upon.

DECISION RULES ARE VOTING ISSUES

1. DECISIONS REQUIRE CRITERIA

Without criteria the judge has no way to tell which argument is right or wrong.

2. DECISION RULES CLARIFY ISSUES

With more standards on arguments it is easier for the judge to decide issues.

3. PROMOTES CLASH AND ANALYSIS

Decision Rules require analysis to prove to the judge how they apply to certain arguments. If the other team doesn't like the Decision Rule, they argue for the judge to reject, thereby, promoting clash.

4. INCREASES EDUCATION

Decision Rule arguments force debaters to move away from just spewing forth evidence and moves them towards evaluating the evidence and arguments for themselves.

5. DECISION RULE LEGITIMATE

Jim Hanson, (USC Forensics, NTC'S DICTIONARY OF DEBATE, 1990, p. 49)

“Decision Rule Definition: A standard for choosing which side to vote for. Usage: This is a decision rule. Third World poverty must be reduced. (The team that most decreases Third World poverty should win the debate). Standard: A rule that ought to be met.”

6. DECISION RULE IS A STANDARD

William H. Bennett, (Former Chair--Bowdoin College, PRAGMATIC DEBATE, 2008, p. 195)

“A decision rule is a standard by which we evaluate how to determine what criteria to use in determining who wins an argument or a debate.”

Disadvantages (Includes Intrinsicness)

INTRINSICNESS ILLEGITIMATE

1. PLAN CREATES MOVING TARGET

By employing intrinsicness arguments the affirmatives plan becomes a moving target, altering itself in form and content with every speech until the final rebuttal when time constraints dictate that the repairs are complete. This is blatant infinite regression on the part of the affirmative. They are trying to duck Disads, instead of arguing them.

2. DESTROYS ALL NEGATIVE GROUND

Michael Mankins, (U. Kentucky, DEBATERS RESEARCH GUIDE, 1984, p. 12)

“The concept of intrinsicness as currently argued and formulated, has the potential to destroy huge quantities, if not all, of negative ground. The irreparable disadvantage is a dying breed, if not altogether extinct, and as alternative mechanisms are permitted to become increasingly abstract and counterintuitive, the affirmative can conceivably minor repair anything and everything. As a result, there is no disadvantage ground left to the negative from which to argue against the plan or it's adoption.”

3. INTRINSICNESS = FANTASY DEBATE

Notice in the card read on the previous sub-point where it specifically states, “... as alternative mechanisms are permitted to become increasingly abstract and counterintuitive...” The affirmative, by using intrinsicness responses, is taking debate further and further from it's real world ideals and into the realm of fantasy. Intrinsicness wrongfully allows the affirmative to fabricate fictional solutions to real world problems.

4. INTRINSICNESS OUT-DATED

Michael Mankins, (U. Kentucky, DEBATERS RESEARCH GUIDE, 1984, p. 12)

“To a large degree intrinsicness is a theory whose time has come and, I hope, gone. As resolutions become broader in scope and depth, the resolution-plan tautology clearly breaks down.”

5. INTRINSIC RESPONSES MUST BE RESOLUTIONAL

If the negative is not allowed to implement resolutional policies then it is only fair and reasonable that the affirmative should be restricted to resolutional action when minor repairing on intrinsicness responses.

6. D.A. MINOR REPAIRS MUST MEET STANDARDS

Michael Mankins, (U. Kentucky, DEBATERS RESEARCH GUIDE, 1984, p. 12)

“It seems that as a minimum burden the D.A. Minor repair should meet the same burdens demanded of the traditional minor repair, namely, propensity, solvency, and some sort of implementation procedure.”

NEG-PREEMPTS FOR DISADVANTAGES

Use when ever you run a disad. and this brief as a 'preempt' to the bottom of a disadvantage to anticipate and 1AR turnarounds. It will make your 2NR much easier – particularly if the 1AR does not address theoretical limitations of turnarounds.

1. TURNAROUNDS MUST BE RESOLUTIONAL

Walter Ulrich et al., (Vanderbilt University, ADVANCED DEBATE, 3rd edition, 1987, p. 87)

“Third, a turnaround must be inherent to the resolution. While this may seem evident, it is often neglected by negative teams.”

2. MUST BE PRIMA FACIE

Walter Ulrich et al., (Vanderbilt University, ADVANCED DEBATE, 3rd edition, 1987, p. 88)

“Second, a turnaround should meet all prima facie requirements. In most cases, however, these requirements are met by the second negative.”

3. 2 AR RESPONSES ABUSIVE

Steven M. Mister et al., (CEDA YEARBOOK, 1987, p. 6)

“Our final recommendation relates to affirmatives that wait until 2AR to unveil a turnaround. Like conditional claims and independent justifications, new turns in 2AR denies the speaker of legitimate responses. WE propose that critics adopt a strong, but rebuttable presumption against 2AR turns, allowing only those turns that answer 2NR responses and could not be represented prior to 2AR.

4. TURNAROUNDS MUST BE LABELED A TURNAROUND

Walter Ulrich et al., (Vanderbilt University, ADVANCED DEBATE, 3rd edition, 1987, p. 88)

“Finally, the affirmative needs to give adequate warning to the negative team that a disadvantage has been 'turned.' The turnaround should be claimed in both affirmative rebuttals, and the initial explanation should be adequate enough for the negative to be able to respond to the argument in a critical manner. Failure to do this will undermine the viability of the critical evaluation of policies, since the turnaround would not become clear until it is impossible for it to be critically evaluated by the negative team.”

5. MUST BE EXPLAINED

Steven M. Mister et al., (CEDA YEARBOOK, 1987, p. 6)

“Because the importance of turnarounds (both as a strategic device and as an educational tool), there is a duty upon advocates to elaborate on their responses. Debaters should state when a turnaround exists, whether it is a turn on the link or the impact and how it operates in the context of the round.”

6. MUST FLOW FROM INITIAL DISADVANTAGE

Walter Ulrich et al., (Vanderbilt University, ADVANCED DEBATE, 3rd edition, 1987, p. 87)

“Fifth, the turnaround must flow from the initial disadvantage. There is a distinction between presenting a new argument in rebuttal and extending an old argument. The second type of argument is considered to be legitimate; the first is generally viewed as unfair. No affirmative team would be allowed to urn an entirely new case in rebuttals for example. The question becomes, when is a turnaround a new argument and when is it a legitimate extension?”

7. REASONABLE BURDENS

Steven M. Mister et al., (CEDA YEARBOOK, 1987, p. 6)

“These are not oppressive burdens, especially given the time-saving benefits of turnarounds discussed earlier. Furthermore, any imposition will be far outweighed by the improved quality and clarity of argumentations that is likely to result.”

A DISADVANTAGE MUST BE INTRINSIC TO THE RESOLUTION

1. INCREASES EDUCATION

If we allow the Neg. to simply argue anything, we encourage their laziness as a researcher.

2. INCREASES CLASH

With intrinsicness, the Neg. is encouraged to research case specific issues, and, at least, research case disadvantages. Logically, this increases “case side” issues.

3. FAIRNESS

The resolution serves as parameters for the debate. By allowing the Neg. to argue everything outside the resolution, you severely reduce Aff. grounds.

Bill Hill and Richard W. Leeman, (Ass. Profs. at University of North Carolina at Charlotte, ARGUMENTATION AND ADVOCACY, Vol. 26, No. 4, Spring 1990, p. 139)

“The debate resolution provides that specific context. We do not debate words in a vacuum, rather, the purpose of the resolution is to provide a common ground within which the issues are understood to lie.”

4. LOGICAL

The Framer's wrote the resolution for a reason. They intended it to be debated. Non-intrinsic D/A's don't negate the resolution.

5. PUNISHMENT PARADIGM

The Neg. must prove the D/A intrinsic to the resolution, or drop it and lose the round because they didn't intend to debate the frivolous disadvantages.

--Neg. must give specific plan link

Vance Trefethen, 2007 (Third Edition, Strategic Debate, Disadvantages)

The Disadvantage must directly “link” to something in the Affirmative plan – that is, the Negative must show that something in the plan directly causes the chain of events leading to the bad end result.

Neg must prove a threshold

Vance Trefethen, 2007 (Third Edition, Strategic Debate, Disadvantages)

Sometimes also referred to as “threshold”, this refers to the issue of whether the Affirmative policy, even if it tends to provoke some undesirable side-effect, would be enough to “push us over the brink” to where the harm actually takes place. Maybe it would take several things to cause the impacts to occur, and the affirmative policy change is only one of them – not enough by itself to cause the harm.

Intrinsickness Bad

- A. **Ground** – Intrinsickness allows the aff to get out of any disad, case argument, or counterplan. Even offense germane to the plan becomes moot – the aff would win every debate and kill the activity. Importantly, these moves are unpredictable, and only predictable ground is useful.
- B. **Limits** – Permitting intrinsic permutations to disads permits a world where there are 30 unpredictable advocacies in the 2AR that they can choose to go for.
- C. **Real World Education**- Allowing the affirmative to dodge arguments directly related to the plan ensures there is no discussion about relevant topics that would be discussed when the plan is passed.
- D. **No checks** – Just because the aff only uses intrinsickness on one of our arguments doesn't mean that the theory doesn't allow essentially washing away of all negative disad links, especially those on critical topics like politics and economics. The intrinsickness argument could always be do the plan and don't raise rates or do the plan and have Hillary drop out of the race.
- E. **Voter**- for fairness and ground

Intrinsicness Good – Answer To Kills DA Ground

1. Intrinsicness forces more specific disads. Education is the terminal impact to all theory args. As long as we win that specific disads are better for education, ground loss doesn't matter
2. Good teams will always be able to generate specific links
3. No reason the neg gets generic disad ground
4. It's reciprocal to the fiat that the neg gets to CP out of advantages

Intrinsicness Good – AT Makes Plan Not T

1. Intrinsicness is like a permutation to the disad. That means intrinsicness only tests the direct cost of the Disad. It's not a net benefit to the plan.
2. Non Topical counter-plans mean the judge has jurisdiction over non-topical fiat as well
3. C/I – the resolution only exists as a starting point for the debate. This means the neg can have all competitive alternatives to the plan, but we still get intrinsicness

Intrinsicness Good – AT Moving Target

1. They get more ground. They can garner offense on the intrinsic disad perm
2. Key to check Advantage and 2NC counter plans which functionally do the something
3. The plan is STATIC. They can still read their case args and disads, as long as they are good

Intrinsickness Good – AT Infinite Regression

1. c/I – The aff only gets intrinsic perms in the 2AC
2. Regression is inevitable. Perms prove. New perms to new disads to perms would resolve in the 2ar.
3. Not possible. Infinite regression is too complicated to occur normally

Intrinsickness Good – AT No Risk / Irresponsible

1. Counterinterp – we one intrinsickness perm per disad. The neg gets one case specific CP per advantage
2. Germane disad links solve
3. Debate over competition is inevitable. We fiat in disad takeouts that they would have to address at some point anyway

Intrinsicness Perms Good

First is our offense:

1. Key to checking abusive counterplans – Keeping the equity of the debate.
2. Force debate about the Aff – checks neg from running generic arguments. Forcing negative to research case specific strategies increasing education
3. Improves research burden on the negative – intrinsicness perms make the neg research all possible ways their impacts can be solved. This improves clash and creates more actor specific knowledge.
4. Increases critical thinking – forces teams to think quickly and effectively to answer strategic permutations.

Now the defense-

1. Potential abuse is not a voter – we didn't do it and it's impossible to quantify. Since the ballot doesn't set a precedent, in-round abuse is the fairest way to judge theory.
2. Reject the argument, not the team – the punishment paradigm rewards theory over substance, decreasing education. Plus, they can't prove a reason why we jacked their ability to beat the rest of our positions.

Intrinsicness Perms Bad

Intrinsicness is bad and a voting issue:

1. Decrease clash in rounds- allows the affirmative to get out of every disad or counterplan with the intrinsic permutation; it discourages participation within the activity.
2. The perm makes the aff a moving target- the permutation advocates the plan and other action that the 1AC does not endorse. Stable plans are key to predictable ground and strategy.
3. Infinitely regressive- The permutation could do the plan, the counterplan, and create world peace or feed the hungry in Africa, the negative would never be able to predict which of the thousands of different ways the affirmative could add something to the perm to get around the net benefits
4. Time and strategy skew- allowing intrinsicness perms takes all the time the negative spent developing the net benefit and the affirmative can just test their way out of it, this increases the aff side bias and is akin to doubling the 1AR's speech time
5. The perms allow for extra topical plans - which are bad for debate, because the aff can always claim to be topical by adding on extra planks to their plan text.
6. It's a voter for fairness and education.

Evidence

EVIDENCE CHALLENGES ARE GOOD

1. PRESSES AVOID EVIDENCE ABUSE

Doug Sigel, (NATIONAL DEBATE TOURNAMENT BOOKLET OF JUDGES, 1987)

“I predict a return of evidence misuse once we can't look at evidence. How can anyone ethically support the no reading of evidence rules.”

2. EVIDENCE CHALLENGES ARE VOTING ISSUES

Of the 133 judging philosophies that appeared in the 1987 Nat. Debate Tournament Booklet of Judges, forty-five made direct statements that they considered evidentiary challenges to be a Voting Issue.

3. DEMOCRACY DEMANDS ETHICAL DEBATING

We must continue to concern ourselves with ethics in debate if we honestly believe that argumentation and debate will continue to be a powerful instrument for the preservation of our free and democratic society for the continuation of such a society does demand ethical conduct of its members.

4. EVIDENCE CHALLENGES INCREASES DEBATABILITY

By looking at the piece of evidence or the author it increases clash and encourages better debating.

5. AVOIDS GENERIC RESPONSES

By using specific card attacks you head away from having the same round each time. Rather you develop good picks and presses.

Extratopicality

THE AFFIRMATIVE IS EXTRATOPICAL

1. Solvency stems from plan plank #_____.
2. But plan plank # _____ is outside the resolution. We could adopt that plank without adopting the resolution.
3. Therefore, the solvency/advantage is extratopical
THE FORENSIC QUARTERLY, Fall 1984, p. 94
“Since the advantage does not flow from a topical plan provision, the advantage cannot be used to justify the resolution.”
W. Bennett, (PRAGMATIC DEBATE, 2008, former Chair of Comm. At Bowdoin College, p. 6)
“If an advantage or a harm solution stems from an extratopical plan plank the affirmative has not, in that area, shown that the topic should be adopted.”
4. EXTRATOPICALITY IS A VOTING ISSUE
A. Logically it is. If the case or advantage can be gained without adopting the topic then the affirmative has not proven we should adopt the topic. If we defeat the resolution then a negative ballot is warranted.

B. Experts agree
Bennett, p. 67
“If the negative can show that the problem and/or plan the affirmative discussed does not pertain to the topic ... then they will probably win because the affirmative had not done its job of convincing a reasonable person that the topic should be adopted.”
D. Thomas, (Professor, Auburn University, ADVANCED DEBATE, 1981, p. 72-73)
“Judges are requested to accept the resolution both teams are invited to argue over, not the affirmative plan whether it implements the resolution or not.”
5. UNFAIR TO THE NEGATIVE
The affirmative has the ability to adopt a plan within the resolution, but if you allow Extratopicality provisions, then it allows the affirmative to go beyond this power.
6. REAL WORLD
The judge has only one vote for or against the resolution. If part of a bill is found not to be germane or flawed it must go back to the drawing board. There is no line item veto.

PARADIGMS SUPPORT EXTRATOPICALITY IS A VOTING ISSUE

1. POLICYMAKING SUPPORTS

When the president vetoes a bill he vetoes the whole bill. A legislator can only vote for or against a bill not for some parts and against other parts.

2. STOCK ISSUES SUPPORTS

J.W. Patterson and David Zarefsky, (profs. Of communication, U. of Kentucky and Northwestern U., CONTEMPORARY DEBATE, 1983, p. 115)

“This argument establishes that there is no unique merit to the resolution and hence that presumption has not been overturned.

3. JUDICIAL PARADIGM SUPPORTS

If a law has unconstitutional provisions it will be completely overturned by the courts. If the affirmative contains any extratopical provisions it should likewise be rejected.

4. HYPOTHESIS TESTING SUPPORTS

The case does not prove the truth of the resolution; it proves the truth of some mixture of resolutional and non-resolutional options. This also indicates that the affirmative advantages could be achieved through non-resolutional means; hence the resolution should be rejected.

5. GAMES THEORY SUPPORTS

Extratopical provisions generate extraneous issues to debate and detract from time available for resolutional issues. Extratopical provisions should be a basis for decisions because they limit clash.

AFFIRMATIVE ANSWERS TO EXTRATOPICALITY

1. AFFIRMATIVE IS NOT EXTRATOPICAL

The only way an affirmative advantage could be considered extra topical is if it is derived from a nontopical plan mandate. Affirmative advantages are not extratopical. They are merely a spin-off advantage from a topical plan mandate, which gives the judge all the more reason to adopt the resolution.

2. DOUBLE STANDARD

The negative requires that the affirmative place extratopical mandates in the plan (i.e., funding and enforcement). Then they condemn us for doing so. This line of reasoning is absurd and unfair to the affirmative.

3. NOT A VOTING ISSUE

Extratopicality attacks are not absolute voting issues. IF we are extratopical, the most that the judge could do is drop the advantage that is in question.

4. THEORISTS AGREE

W. H. Bennett, (PRAGMATIC DEBATE, 2008, former Chair—Bowdoin College p. 82)
“Even when a part of a case is extratopical it is not necessarily a voting issue.”

5. DON'T VOTE AGAINST THE RESOLUTION

Even if the affirmative case does go beyond the resolution, it still doesn't give you a reason not to accept the resolution.

6. WE CLAIM NO ADVANTAGE FROM EXTRATOPICAL PROVISIONS

7. IMPLEMENTING PROVISIONS ARE ACCEPTABLE

Without financing, enforcement etc..the plan could not fulfill the mandates of the resolution. It is reasonable to allow us to have extratopical implementing provisions.

8. SEVER OFFENDING PLANKS

The traditional remedy for extratopicality is simply not considering advantages from that plank.

9. THEORETICAL POSITIONS SUPPORT

A. POLICYMAKING

A real world policymaker would not ignore a whole proposal simply because a small part of it was beyond his/her jurisdiction.

B. HYPOTHESIS TESTING

A hypothesis tester would not deny the truth of the resolution simply because the affirmative had something besides the resolution in the plan, as long as advantages to the resolution could be established.

J.W. Patterson and David Zarefsky, (profs. Of communication, U. of Kentucky and Northwestern U., CONTEMPORARY DEBATE, 1983, p. 117-18)

“If an affirmative argument is found to be extratopical, the effects is to moot consideration of that argument...extratopicality is not necessarily an absolute issue, the affirmative still may win the debate by defeating the negative on the remaining arguments.”

Fiat

NEG. FIAT NOT LIMITED

NEGATIVE FIAT DEFINED

Roger Solt, (Ass. Dir. Of Debate, U of Kentucky, ARGUMENTATION AND ADVOCACY, No. 3, Vol 25, Winter 1989, p. 122)

“While affirmative fiat is a necessary consequence of the resolution's wording, negative fiat is definitely more problematic. If affirmative fiat involves imagining that the affirmative plan were adopted, negative fiat is the act of imagining alternatives to the affirmative.”

FIATING COUNTERPLANS

1. LIMITING TOO NARROW

Roger Solt, (Ass. Dir. Of Debate, U of Kentucky, ARGUMENTATION AND ADVOCACY, No. 3, Vol 25, Winter 1989, p. 132)

“Ulrich's standard, however, posits a very narrow policy-making view of the debate process. It assumes that the judge actually adopts the role of a federal decision maker, or whatever the topic agent may be.”

2. LIMITING STOPS FAIR PLAN ARGUMENTATION

To show all possible flaws with the affirmative plan, the negative should be allowed to argue all positions that show why the affirmative plan should be adopted.

3. LIMITING DECREASES EDUCATIONAL VALUE

Without all available options, the affirmative only has to prepare for the expected possibilities, and many times, unexpected but real world arguments may show some reason not to adopt the affirmative (i.e. another agent may do it better).

4. LIMITING DECREASES RESEARCH

By not allowing other arguments, including these counterplans, to be submitted, the affirmative must only prepare for some of the total number of arguments against it.

5. LIMITING MAKES DEBATE LESS INTERESTING

By only running the same arguments that fall within the limits of the restrictions, argumentation falls into a redundant routine of the exact same arguments, making these debates extremely boring.

6. POLITICAL FEASIBILITY OVER-LIMITS

Roger Solt, (Ass. Dir. Of Debate, U of Kentucky, JAF, Winter 1989, p. 130)

“The political feasibility standard would eliminate most of the popular generic counterplans that have been run in recent years. Except as a response to the most radical of affirmatives, alternative form government counterplans would clearly be excluded. Further, systemic but topic specific counterplans (deschooling, disarmament, etc.) would also be excluded. So would most process counterplans ... Even the exception counterplan might not fare well under this approach since to carve out a narrow exception to a general policy might be less politically feasible than a more all encompassing policy.”

7. FEASIBILITY STANDARD DESTROYS DEBATE

Roger Solt, (Ass. Dir. Of Debate, U of Kentucky, JAF, Winter 1989, p. 134)

“The feasibility standard is difficult to debate. Most public policy debate is normative .. it concerns the desirability of policies, not the probability of their adoption. It is an attempt to persuade, not an attempt to predict political outcomes. Except for policies under immediate consideration, there may be little if any evidence about the probability of adoption. Political feasibility turns on many imponderables: Who is the bill's key sponsor? How many political debts can s/he call in? How will the media react? How much money will go into the lobbying effort? How many phone calls will Reagan make?”

8. FIAT EXTENDS BEYOND FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Non-U.S. and non-governmental organizations are legitimate if they demonstrate an inclination to act.

Robert H. Gass, (Director of Forensics at California State University, ADVANCED DEBATE, 1987, p. 287)

“General Motors has no history of donating its corporate profits to feeding the starving millions, so this approach to reform would appear unjustified. On the other hand, the Catholic Relief fund does have a demonstrated inclination to distribute food and organize disaster relief, so related actions by this agent in this area would not stretch the bounds of imagination. By limiting fiat to existing agencies acting within their existing capacities, a more real world approach to fiat is assured.”

9. FIAT NOT LIMITED TO U. S. GOVERNMENT

Robert H. Gass, (Director of Forensics at California State University, ADVANCED DEBATE, 1987, p. 281)

“Such a view of fiat power places the negative at an unfair disadvantage.

Ulrich's approach involves a fundamental misunderstanding regarding the role of the agent specified in the resolution and the role of the judge in evaluating the merits of the resolution. It is my belief that the agent in the resolution should be considered separate and distinct from the judge of the resolution. Their roles are not synonymous, nor need they be.”

10. PRACTICALITY IS IRRELEVANT

Roger Solt, (Ass. Dir. Of Debate, U of Kentucky, Jafa, Winter 1989, p. 129)

“The affirmative is allowed to design, in detail, a policy and offer it for consideration on its own merits, regardless of its potential practicality. Thus, there seems to be at least some equity in allowing the negative to design its own policy and advocate it on its own merits.”

11. UTOPIAN COUNTERPLANS RETAIN FAIRNESS

Roger Solt, (Ass. Dir. Of Debate, U of Kentucky, Jafa, Winter 1989, p. 134)

“Conspicuously absent from this history lesson is a description of the affirmative position in these debates. One of the few specific topics to which he refers involves the rejection of socialism as a solution to the depression. Surely, the validity of the negative support of socialism on that resolution fails to conclude the argument when the affirmative is arguing, for a more mundane policy, such as teaching CPR to high school students. In the other examples mentioned I suspect that the negative teams' advocacy of totalitarianism, surrender and so forth came in response to similarly grandiose positions by the affirmative.”

12. CHALLENGING ANY RESOLUTIONAL WORD IS LEGITIMATE

Robert H. Gass, (Dir. Of Forensics at Calif. State Univ., ADVANCED DEBATE, 1987, p. 285)

“If the negative is to counter the advantage enjoyed by the affirmative of choosing which reasonable interpretation of the resolution to advocate, then the negative must be granted the countervailing advantage of deciding which features of the resolution to oppose.”

NEG HAS FIAT POWER

1. NEG FIAT IS REALISTIC

Roger Solt, (Ass. Dir. Of Debate, U of Kentucky, JAFA, Vol. 25, p. 129)

“The equivalent of negative fiat exists in most forums other than academic debate which considers these types of policy questions.”

2. IT ONLY MAKES SENSE

If the negative team is proposing an alternative policy then it only makes sense that they have as much fiat power as the affirmative.

3. NEGATIVE FIAT IS LEGITIMATE

Fiat is derived from should, therefore if the negative is presenting an alternative policy then they are trying to show that their policy SHOULD be adopted over the affirmatives, thus negative fiat is legitimate.

4. INCREASES DEBATABILITY

Roger Solt, (Ass. Dir. Of Debate, U of Kentucky, JAFA, Vol. 25, p. 129)

“It (the abolition of neg fiat) would tie the debaters to a realm of policies which are currently realistic, offering essentially no option for the consideration for alternatives outside the political mainstream. The result is likely to be intellectual tunnel vision.”

5. INCREASES EDUCATIONAL VALUE

When the negative has fiat power it forces both sides to really strive to have the best policy and to be more knowledgeable of the topic area thus increasing the educational value of the debate.

NON- U.S. FIAT IS LEGITIMATE

1. FOREIGN FIAT IS LEGITIMATE

Roger Solt, (Ass. Dir. Of Debate, U of Kentucky, JAF A, Winter 1989, p. 135)

“Unions, for example, are ostensibly dedicated to the interest of their members. By this logic, counterplans where unions took action to aid their own membership would have been legitimate on the labor topic. Foreign fiat would become legitimate by this standard provided that it could be shown that such a counterplan was consistent with the interests of the nation's citizens.”

2. INTERNATIONAL FIAT IS LEGITIMATE

Roger Solt, (Ass. Dir. Of Debate, U of Kentucky, JAF A, Winter 1989, p. 134)

“American citizens are citizens of the United States, but they are also citizens of the world. They can attempt to persuade their own domestic institutions, but they can also persuade international institutions; thus, arguments for what global institutions “should” do is also appropriate and important.”

3. POLITICAL FEASIBILITY OVER-LIMITS

Roger Solt, (Ass. Dir. Of Debate, U of Kentucky, JAF A,)

“The political feasibility standard would eliminate most of the popular generic counterplans that have been run in recent years. Except as a response to the most radical of affirmatives, alternative form government counterplans would clearly be excluded. Further, systemic but topic specific counterplans (deschooling, disarmament, etc.) would also be excluded. So would most process counterplans ... Even the exception counterplan might not fare well under this approach since to carve out a narrow exception to a general policy might be less politically feasible than a more all encompassing policy.”

4. FIAT EXTENDS BEYOND FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Non-U.S. and non-governmental organizations are legitimate if they demonstrate an inclination to act.

Robert H. Gass, (Director of Forensics at California State University, ADVANCED DEBATE, 1987, p. 287)

“General Motors has no history of donating its corporate profits to feeding the starving millions, so this approach to reform would appear unjustified. On the other hand, the Catholic Relief fund does have a demonstrated inclination to distribute food and organize disaster relief, so related actions by this agent in this area would not stretch the bounds of imagination. By limiting fiat to existing agencies acting within their existing capacities, a more real world approach to fiat is assured.”

5. FIAT NOT LIMITED TO U. S. GOVERNMENT

Such a view of fiat power places the negative at an unfair disadvantage.

Ulrich's approach involves a fundamental misunderstanding regarding the role of the agent specified in the resolution and the role of the judge in evaluating the merits of the resolution. It is my belief that the agent in the resolution should be considered separate and distinct from the judge of the resolution. Their roles are not synonymous, nor need they be.

6. PRACTICALITY IS IRRELEVANT

Roger Solt, (Ass. Dir. Of Debate, U of Kentucky, JAF A, Winter 1989, p. 129)

“The affirmative is allowed to design, in detail, a policy and offer it for consideration on its own merits, regardless of its potential practicality. Thus, there seems to be at least some equity in allowing the negative to design its own policy and advocate it on its own merits.”

7. UTOPIAN COUNTERPLANS RETAIN FAIRNESS

Roger Solt, (Ass. Dir. Of Debate, U of Kentucky, JAF A, Winter 1989, p. 134)

“Conspicuously absent from this history lesson is a description of the affirmative position in these debates. One of the few specific topics to which he refers involves the rejection of socialism as a solution to the depression. Surely, the validity of the negative support of socialism on that resolution fails to conclude the argument when the affirmative is arguing, for a more mundane policy, such as teaching CPR to high school students. In the other examples mentioned I suspect that the negative teams' advocacy of totalitarianism, surrender and so forth came in response to similarly grandiose positions by the affirmative.”

8. CHALLENGING ANY RESOLUTIONAL WORD IS LEGITIMATE

Robert H. Gass, (Dir. Of Forensics at Calif. State Univ., ADVANCED DEBATE, 1987, p. 285)

“If the negative is to counter the advantage enjoyed by the affirmative of choosing which reasonable interpretation of the resolution to advocate, then the negative must be granted the countervailing advantage of deciding which features of the resolution to oppose.”

NEGATIVE DOESN'T HAVE FIAT

1. NEGATIVE HAS NO FIAT POWER

Roger Solt, (Forensic Theorist, Ass. Dir. of Forensics, U of Kentucky, JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN FORENSIC ASSOCIATION, 1989, p. 127)

“The crux of Branham's position, as I understand it, is that one of the primary costs of adopting any policy is that one forgoes the opportunity to obtain the benefits of other competitive policies (Branham, 1989). These opportunity costs can be accrued either because the first policy physically excused the second, because it undercuts its benefits, or because it makes it politically less feasible to adopt. The degree to which the opportunity costs is a relevant one, however, depends upon the degree to which the counterplan was a politically realistic option.”

2. “FIAT” ATTACHES TO THE WORD “SHOULD”

Thus only the topic gives fiat. Only the aff supports the topic, so only the aff gets fiat.

3. NEGATIVE HAS PRESUMPTION, AFF HAS FIAT

That fairly divided ground.

4. NEG IS ABUSIVE

Giving neg fiat eliminates aff ground, giving the negative too much territory.

5. THEORY SAYS NO NEG FIAT

Roger Solt, (Forensic Theorist, Ass. Dir. of Forensics, U of Kentucky, JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN FORENSIC ASSOCIATION, 1989, p. 127)

“It (Branham's view) also seems to be a very sensible way to evaluate the costs of an individual policy considered in isolation.”

Neg Fiat Bad

1. Illogical decision making- logical decision making is the squo versus the plan. Neg fiat is a departure from this.
2. Unfair Balance of ground- neg fiat gives the neg counterplans and the squo which skews ground unfairly.
3. Predictability- we can't predict what they will fiat.
4. Infinite regression- there are an infinite number of things they could fiat. This explodes the research burden and kills fairness.
5. In depth education- neg fiat prevents us from going in depth into the status quo.
6. Resolutional basis- "should not" is not in the resolution, so neg has no basis for fiat. "Should" gives the aff a normative basis for fiat.
7. Not key to ground/education- DA's test the comparative necessity of the plan. The CP isn't necessary.
8. Voter for fairness and education.

NON-U.S. (FOREIGN AND NGO) FIAT IS NOT LEGITIMATE

1. FOREIGN AND NGO FIAT IS ABUSIVE

Roger Solt, (Ass. Dir. Of Debate, U of Kentucky, JAF A, Winter 1989, p. 127)

“In a debate over pollution control, the negative could argue that the government should not establish stricter standards because industry 'should' voluntarily control its emissions. Or in a debate over defense policy, the negative could argue that the U.S. should not build a new weapon system because the Soviet Union 'should' unilaterally disarm. Intuitively, these two examples seem highly abusive.”

2. DECREASES EDUCATIONAL VALUE

Foreign fiat would allow the negative to advocate policy options that have no real world value, e.g. that the third world “should” stop polluting.

3. FOREIGN/NGO FIAT DESTROYS FAIRNESS

While the affirmative is almost always limited to the U.S. government, the negative could choose any agent of action, regardless of its practicality.

4. NEGATIVE MUST USE RESOLUTIONAL AGENT

Walter Ulrich, (Forensic Theorist, cited by Roger Solt, JAF A, Winter 1989, p. 127)

“A second standard for limiting negative fiat has been proposed by Walter Ulrich. His suggestion is that negative fiat should be limited to acts which could be undertaken by the agent specified in the resolution. The basic argument is that in considering, for example, a federal resolution, the judge is assuming the role of a federal decision maker (or perhaps the federal government in general). A decision maker occupying that institutional role would not simultaneously occupy an institutional role at another level of government; hence, there would be no fiat power at those alternative levels. I believe that Ulrich's standard is the best which had been proposed thus far.”

5. FIAT LIMITED TO U.S. PUBLIC ACTORS

Roger Solt, (Ass. Dir. Of Debate, U of Kentucky, JAF A, Winter 1989, p. 133)

“Over the past twenty years, every topic except one at the high school level has called for action by some agent of the United States government. (Even on apparently agentless topics, there has been an implicit U.S. government agent.) These debate topics have embodied liberal and conservative values; they have addressed both domestic and foreign policies; they have allowed both state and federal actions. They have varied in innumerable ways but with one exception they have shared a common perspective: they have raised questions of United States public policy. This suggests to me that U.S. public policy is the implicit frame of reference (or realm of discourse) for this type of debate.”

6. PUBLIC ACTOR RETAINS EDUCATIONAL VALUE

Effective policy discussion must be limited to domestic public entities.

Roger Solt, (Ass. Dir. Of Debate, U of Kentucky, JAF A, Winter 1989, p. 133)

“Thus, my primary conclusion is that when a question of U.S. public policy is raised in almost any argumentative forum it is likely to be considered appropriate to juxtapose alternative U.S. public policies, but it is very unlikely that policies involving non-U.S. Or non-governmental actors would be considered, absent arguments about their likelihood. The limitation to domestic public actors seems to correspond to an implicit limitation already observed in public policy argument.”

NEGATIVE FIAT DEFINED

1. NEGATIVE FIAT DEFINED

Roger Solt, (Ass. Dir. Of Forensics, U of Kentucky, ARGUMENTATION AND ADVOCACY, No. 3, Vol 25, Winter 1989, p. 132)

“While affirmative fiat is a necessary consequence of the resolution's wording, negative fiat is definitely more problematic. If affirmative fiat involves imagining that the affirmative plan were adopted, negative fiat is the act of imagining alternatives to the affirmative.”

2. ABUSES FIAT TO ALLOW COUNTERPLAN TO USE ANOTHER AGENT

Roger Solt, (Ass. Dir. Of Forensics, U of Kentucky, ARGUMENTATION AND ADVOCACY, No. 3, Vol 25, Winter 1989, p. 132)

“The basic argument is that in considering, for example, a federal resolution, the judge is assuming the role of a federal decision maker (or perhaps the federal government in general). A decision maker occupying that institutional role would not simultaneously occupy an institutional role at another level of government; hence, there would be no fiat power at those alternative levels.”

3. MORE REAL WORLD

Allowing other agents is both unrealistic and unfair.

A. FOREIGN NATIONS

It is impossible to fiat or force forcing countries against their will. And it gives the negative the ability to unfairly fiat solvency.

B. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

It is impossible to fiat international organizations that the US Government doesn't control. The negative can only fiat the agent of change, the US Government. Allowing international fiat greatly expands negative ground and allows them the fiat the world they wish.

C. UTOPIAN COUNTERPLANS

It is impossible to insure Utopian counterplans, which are abusive to the affirmative. If there was the choice between the affirmative plan the Utopian counterplan, the Utopian counterplan would automatically be assumed to be the 'best policy' and therefore every debate would go negative. Utopian counterplan create absolute solvency by ignoring reality; that eliminates all fair limits.

4. NO LIMITS DECREASE CLASH

If the negative runs an illegitimate counterplan, the aff would be fully prepared, and therefore, argumentation and clash would be diminished.

5. THEIR FIAT IS NON-RECIPROCAL

If the aff can only fiat the agent of change the negative should be placed within these boundaries as well so as to keep the argumentation centered on the topic.

6. ALTERNATE ACTOR FIAT HURST DEBATE

THEORY: THE AFFIRMATIVE TEAM ABUSES FIAT

1. SOLVENCY CANNOT BE FIATED

A. C. Snider, (Debate Coach at Boston College, ADVANCED DEBATE, 1983, p. 94)

“Fiat power allows the plan's mechanisms to come into existence, but after creation of the plan must be examined as a separate policy system; fiat power is then useless.”

2. FIATE CAN'T ELIMINATE EVIDENCE

David A. Thomas, (Univ. of Houston, ADVANCED DEBATE: Readings in Practice & Teaching, 1983, p. 96)

“Fiat power is the right to establish a program, but not the power to eliminate substantial, empirical, evidentiary ramifications of the proposal; otherwise, fiat power is nothing more than the fallacy of the begging the question.”

3. THEY ABUSE FIAT

They try to fiat _____ (Solvency, foreign government help, etc.)

4. THEY MUST STAY WITH THE RESOLUTIONAL AGENT OF ACTION, THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

Any other attempts at implementation are null because you cannot fiat into another government.

5. PUNISHMENT PARADIGM

A. It teaches the Aff. the severity of the offense.

B. It increases education because it will prevent any further misaction by the Aff.

Generic Attacks Good?

EXTENSION BLOCK: GENERIC ATTACKS ARE GOOD

1. THEY RESTORE FOCUS TO THE TOPIC.

2. THEY RETARD SQUIRREL CASES.

3. THEY INCREASE TOPIC UNDERSTANDING

Jeffrey T. Bile, (Southern Illinois U – Carbondale, CEDA YEARBOOK, “When the whole is greater than the sum of the parts: the implications of holistic resolutional focus, 1987, p. 13)

“Initially, general education enhances content relevance. Ulrich (1985) suggests that arguing generics can force the debater to understand issues common to a wide range of affairs.”

4. DESERVE MORE WEIGHT THAN AFFIRMATIVE CASES

Jeffrey T. Bile, (Southern Illinois U – Carbondale, CEDA YEARBOOK, “When the whole is greater than the sum of the parts: the implications of holistic resolutional focus, 1987, p. 13)

“The first implication is that generic arguments should take precedence. If the purpose of debate is to establish the probable truth of the whole resolution, then arguments which are more generic to the resolution should have greater weight than those less generic.”

5. COMPLAINING “ITS GENERIC” ISN'T AN ATTACK. IT'S WHINING.

6. IF THE ATTACK IS WEAK THEN MAKE THEM PROVE IT WITH QUALITY EVIDENCE AND ANALYSIS.

Hasty Generalization

DISADV. _____: AFF. CASE IS A HASTY GENERALIZATION

1. It is the Affirmative burden of proof to show that they are a representation of the resolution rather than an A-typical example.

2. ADOPTING THE RESOLUTION ON ONLY THE AFFIRMATIVE EXAMPLE IS A DANGEROUS PROCESS

a. Drawing conclusions on the value of the topic at this point is a hasty generalization.

James Carney and Richard Scheer, (FUNDAMENTALS OF LOGIC, 1977, p. 44)

“The fallacy of hasty generalization is committed when after observing that a small number, or a special sort of the members of some group have the same property, it is concluded that the whole group has the property.”

b. Hasty generalizations are dangerous leaps of logic.

James W. Paulson and Jack Rhodes, (JAFA, Spring 1979, p. 206)

“Blisky refers to an inductive leap on the basis of too few examples as 'a particularly dangerous form of error.'”

3. VOTING ISSUE. Risks outweigh the gains.

James P. Jorgensen, 2009 (THE PROBLEM IS, Prof. of Rhetoric and Logic, p. 45)

Inductive reasoning is inherently dangerous and, by definition, incomplete or based on incomplete proofs. The hasty generalization based on claiming a truth from an example is risky, very risky. In most situations counter-examples are hidden, ignored, and or pose greater risks or costs. In the political and policy arena these risks often outweigh the claimed truth or benefit.

(OPTIONAL) 4. COUNTERWARRANTS BEST SOLVE THIS PROBLEM

a. The criteria for deciding on the resolution.

Craig Baird, (ARGUMENTATION DEBATE AND DISCUSSION, 1950, p. 117)

“1) Are the instances examined sufficient in number to warrant the generalization? 2) Are the instances representative or typical? 3) Are negative instances discoverable? 4) Are the instances actually 'true', or what they appear to be? 5) Does the generalization conform to the requirements of the laws of probability and causation?”

b. Counterwarrants solve. Obviously you need a lot of examples to draw from. Only by having a large number can you as a judge decide whether the resolution is worth adopting or not. Counterwarrants provide those examples.

c. Counterwarrants are advantageous. They help offer a viable alternative to negatives confronted with squirrels or cases made topical only by narrow definitions. Clearly, counterwarrants are the best policy.)

Incrementalism

INCREMENTALISM IS TOO VAGUE

1. THERE IS NO AGREEMENT ON WHAT INCREMENTALISM MEANS.
2. INCREMENTALISM SHOULD NOT BECOME AN ISSUE IF WE DON'T KNOW WHAT IT IS.
3. INCREMENTALISM IS TOO VAGUE.

William D. Berry, (U. of Kentucky, "The Confusing Case of Budgetary Incrementalism: Too Many Meanings for a Single Concept", J OF POLITICS, Vol. 52, No. 1, Feb 1990, p. 173)

"Since there are so many different conceptions of incrementalism, it is important to assess the logical connections – if any – among the various meanings, it may be fruitful to view each of these meaning as one of a set of characteristics of a decision-making process that together constitute 'incrementalism'. On the other hand, if there are few logical connections among the various meanings of incrementalism, a strong case might be that the clarity of the literature would be enhanced if the term incrementalism were purged from the future research on public budgeting in favor of concepts describing specific characteristics of a budgetary process."

4. INCREMENTALISM HAS MANY MEANINGS

William D. Berry, (U. of Kentucky, "The Confusing Case of Budgetary Incrementalism: Too Many Meanings for a Single Concept", J OF POLITICS, Vol. 52, No. 1, Feb 1990, p. 168)

"I find that the meaning of incrementalism is far from uniform across the studies; there are numerous different definitions. After identifying the range of meanings, I maintain that they have very little logical relation. That is, a process incremental by one definition is not necessarily incremental by another. This leads to a conclusion that incrementalism has come to mean so many things that it is no longer analytically useful."

5. INCREMENTALISM DEFINITIONS ARE TOO DIVERSE

William D. Berry, (U. of Kentucky, "The Confusing Case of Budgetary Incrementalism: Too Many Meanings for a Single Concept", J OF POLITICS, Vol. 52, No. 1, Feb 1990, p. 173)

"But I would argue that much of the variation in empirical results is a consequence of different authors conceptualizing incrementalism in much different ways."

INCREMENTALISM IS A STRUCTURAL CHANGE

1. INCREMENTALISM MUST BE NON-TOPICAL

Carl D. Flanigam, (U. of South Dakota, Jafa, Vol. 20, Spring 1984)

“Initially, incremental change must meet tests for nontopicality for the reasons mentioned with regard to the relationship between topicality and inherency.”

2. INCREMENTALISM MUST HAVE BETTER NET BENEFITS

Carl D. Flanigam, (U. of South Dakota, Jafa, Vol. 20, Spring 1984)

“Therefore, an incremental change defense is a nontopical alternative which justifies the rejection of the affirmative resolution if it secures an equal or superior level of net benefits.”

3. MUST BE COMPETITIVE

Carl D. Flanigam, (U. of South Dakota, Jafa, Vol. 20, Spring 1984)

“Incremental change must also meet counterplan competitiveness standards.”

4. INCREMENTALISM IS DISTINCT FROM A COUNTERPLAN

Carl D. Flanigam, (U. of South Dakota, Jafa, Vol. 20, Spring 1984)

“The second section of this paper argues that incremental change is indistinct from counterplans;”

5. INCREMENTALISM IS BOGUS INHERENCY ATTACK

John T. Morello, (Prof. at Madison U, Jafa, Vol. 19, Fall 1982, p. 118)

“The incremental potential of the present system cannot be used to advance the negative inherency position in a debate about a proposition for large-scale change.”

6. INCREMENTALISM IS A STRUCTURAL CHANGE

The analysis behind is that a counterplan is a structural change, and incrementalism is essentially the same as a counterplan.

INCREMENTALISM IS NOT A VOTER

1. INCREMENTALISM MUDDLES DEBATE

Incrementalism is a messy inherency argument which is vague and muddles debate.

2. INCREMENTALISM IS UNREALISTIC AND CAUSES BAD DEBATE

Carl D. Flanigam, (U. of South Dakota, JAF, Vol. 20, Spring 1984)

“If such a choice is not forced, proof of the validity of the claims made for incremental changes (or counterplans) would not provide a basis for selecting the negative alternative.”

3. INCREMENTALISM NOT VALID FOR MOST TOPICS

John T. Morello, (James Madison U, INCREMENTAL CHANGE AND INHERENCY ARGUMENTS ON PROPOSITIONS OF DEGREE: A Reply to Flanigam, JAF, Vol. 20, 1984, p. 237)

“The Incrementalist inherency position was logically sound ONLY when debating a proposition that was a quantitative change from something the present system was, to some extent, already doing.”

4. TIME FRAME MUST GO NEGATIVE

Otherwise issue totally irrelevant. If aff plan solves sooner than SQ, then there is no reason to vote for it. The neg must set the time frame, and if not then there is no possible way the aff can meet it.

5. CONFUSION AND CONTRADICTIONS INCREASED BY NEG.

Michael Pfau. (Director of Forensics, Augustana College S.D., “The Present System Revisited Part One: Incremental Change, JAF, Vol. 17, Fall 1980, p. 81)

“In short, the present system is not always sure what it wants to achieve, but it can identify specific conditions that it wants to escape from. The result is confusion over ultimate aims. If the present system appears to be working at cross purposes, it is because it is in fact working at cross purposes.”

INCREMENTALISM IS DISADVANTAGEOUS

1. DANGEROUS, FUTILE, STIFLING POLICY RESULTS FROM INCREMENTALISM

Walter A. Rosenbaum, (ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS AND POLICY, 1991, p. 73)

“But incrementalism can also become a prison to the imagination by inhibiting policy innovation and stifling new solutions to issues. Especially when officials treat new policy issues as if they were familiar ones and deal with them in the accustomed ways, a futile and possibly dangerous repetition of the past in the face of issues requiring a fresh approach can result.”

2. COMPREHENSIVE CHANGE REJECTED BY INCREMENTALISM

Walter A. Rosenbaum, (ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS AND POLICY, 1991, p. 73)

“Generally, incrementalism favors reliance on past experience as a guide for new policies, careful deliberation before policy changes, and a rejection of rapid or comprehensive policy innovation.”

3. TOO SMALL A CHANGE TO SOLVE

Walter A. Rosenbaum, (ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS AND POLICY, 1991, p. 73)

“Public officials strongly favor making and changing policy incrementally. “Policy making typically is part of a political process in which the only feasible political change is that which changes social states by relatively small steps,” writes Charles A. Lindblom. “Hence, decision makers typically consider, among all the alternative policies that might be imagined to consider, only those relatively few alternatives that represent small or incremental changes from existing policies.”

4. ONLY MARGINAL CHANGE PROMOTED

Walter A. Rosenbaum, (ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS AND POLICY, 1991, p. 73)

“Incrementalism is politically seductive. It permits policy makers to draw upon their own experience in the face of unfamiliar problems and encourages the making of small policy adjustments “at the margins” to reduce anticipated, perhaps irreversible, and politically risky consequences.

INCREMENTALISM SHELL

1. AFFIRMATIVE PLAN TOO RISKY

A. NOT NECESSARY FOR CHANGE

John T. Morello, (Prof. at Madison U, JAFA, Vol. 19, Fall 1982, p. 119)

“...the creation of new laws and bureaucracy via the affirmative proposal is unnecessary, and probably more risky, than the step-by-step policy alterations inevitable in the present system.”

B. PLAN MUST CREATE DISADVANTAGE

Michael Pfau, (Director of Forensics, Augustana College, JAFA, Vol. 17, Fall 1980, p. 83)

“A single-minded shift along a continuum especially a large shift, carries with it the potential for grave consequences. These must manifest themselves as significant disadvantages.”

C. DECISION MAKERS WOULDN'T ADVOCATE PROGRAMS

...decision makers would not, however, voluntarily initiate a sweeping reform such as government ownership of basic industries, since a comprehensive revision like this would be at odds with the norms and procedure which guided these decision-makers in the past.”

D. IS A VALID ARGUMENT

John T. Morello, (Prof. at Madison U, JAFA, Vol. 19, Fall 1982, p. 119)

“Defending the present system's potential for incremental change is a valid approach both logically and strategically.

John T. Morello, (Prof. at Madison U, JAFA, Spring 1984, p. 238)

“To deprive the negative of the ability to discuss the incremental capabilities of the present system is both logically and strategically unsound. All systems grow and change.”

E. MANDATES NEGATIVE BALLOT

John T. Morello, (Prof. at Madison U, JAFA, Vol. 19, Fall 1982, p. 121)

“If the negative demonstrates that the present system can, through incremental change, repair itself to work toward the goals envisioned by the affirmative, then the adoption of the proposition for debate is not warranted.”

INCREMENTALISM IS GREAT VOTING ISSUE

1. PROMOTES CLASH

John T. Morello, (Prof. at Madison U, Jafa, Vol. 19, Fall 1982, p. 116)

“Applied to a policy proposition, this burden means that the affirmative must show why the adoption of the debate propositions necessary in light of the fact that the present system may already have some programs or agencies working on the very problems that the affirmative indicates.”

2. REALISTIC

A. FORCES POLICY COMPARISON

Michael Pfau, (Director of Forensics, Augustana College, Jafa, Vol. 17, Fall 1980, p. 81)

“The policy systems paradigm demands a comparison between the efficacy of present system options and an affirmative alternative.”

B. FAIRLY LIMITS THE AFFIRMATIVE

If incrementalism isn't argued, then the affirmative can present any topical plan, ignoring existing processes.

C. AFFIRMATIVE MUST JUSTIFY IMMEDIATE ACTION

Michael Pfau, (Director of Forensics, Augustana College, Jafa, Vol. 17, Winter 1981, p. 147)

“The adoption of an affirmative course of action necessitates the loss of present system programs which may be as, or more, valuable.”

3. NOT UNFAIR – AFFIRMATIVE CAN ESTABLISH INHERENCY

Carl D. Flanigam, (U. of South Dakota, Jafa, Vol. 20, Spring 1984)

“Affirmatives are to establish inherency by locating “counter causes”, reasons why incremental change is inadequate to solve the problem.”

INCREMENTALISM NOT A STRUCTURAL CHANGE

1. INCLUDES PROCESSES INHERENT TO STATUS QUO

2. STATUS QUO EVOLUTION IS NON-STRUCTURAL

3. INCREMENTAL CHANGE IS GRADUAL

Carl D. Flanigan, (U. of South Dakota, Jafa, Vol. 20, Spring 1984)

“Minor repairs are Morello's embodiment of incremental change: gradual adjustment by existent governmental agencies is contrasted with swift and single-mined change in solving problems.”

4. INCREMENTALISM IMPLIES RESULT

William D. Berry, (U. of Kentucky, JOURNAL OF POLITICS, Vol. 52, Feb 1990, p. 171)

“Another common conception of incrementalism focuses on the result of the process. For instance, what uses the term “descriptive incrementalism” to characterize a situation in which “changes in appropriations from one year to another have been small relative to the precious appropriations level.” One dispute among the various definitions of incrementalism based on “smallness of the ultimate change” is whether the “small change” can be a decrease as well as an increase.”

5. INCREMENTALISM INCLUDES STATUS QUO GOALS

Michael Pfau, (Director of Forensics, Augustana College, Jafa, Vol. 17, Winter 1981, p. 146)

“The basic comparison must be changed so that the choice is once again between the present system (where it is now and where it is heading) and the affirmatives plan.”

6. INCREMENTALISM CONSIDERS ALL OPTIONS

Michael Pfau, (Director of Forensics, Augustana College, Jafa, Vol. 17, Winter 1981, p. 80)

“This is the decision making process employed by the present system. It involves the slow, deliberate pursuit of diverse and often conflicting values. It stands in contrast to most affirmative plans which feature the swift and single-minded pursuit of a single goal.”

7. INCREMENTALISM IS STATUS QUO

John T. Morello, (Prof. at Madison U, Jafa, Vol. 19, Fall 1982, p. 118)

“Writers have previously observed that the present system is not a static entity. Rather any present system moves, changes, and adapts itself to new conditions.”

8. EMPIRICALLY: STATUS QUO SOLVES INCREMENTALLY

William D. Berry, (U. of Kentucky, JOURNAL OF POLITICS, Vol. 52, Feb 1990, p. 83)

“No single concept has been more central to the study of public budgeting over the last three decades than incrementalism. Throughout the 1950's and early 1960's, Charles Lindblom, Aaron Wildavsky, and other defined the term and developed theories explaining why government decision making generally – and budgeting specifically – tends to be incremental.”

INCREMENTALISM AVOIDS DISADVANTAGES

1. INCREMENTALISM AVOIDS DA'S

Michael Pfau, (Director of Forensics, Augustana College, Jafa, Vol. 17, 1980, p. 84)

"For the slow, deliberate pursuit of diverse goals, in face, makes sense. On the other hand, disadvantages stem for significant value shifts. On the other hand, the incremental approach is more adaptive, which means that it is both better tailored to multiple causation and is safer."

2. ADAPTIVITY IS SAFER

Michael Pfau, (Director of Forensics, Augustana College, Jafa, Vol. 17, 1980, p. 84)

"In addition, the present system's more adaptive approach is safer. Multiple programs in the pursuit of multiple objectives takes on the form of an indefinite sequence of policy moves. As a result, mistake can be observed early and corrected."

3. MORE ROOM FOR SELF-CORRECTION

Michael Pfau, (Director of Forensics, Augustana College, Jafa, Vol. 17, 1980, p. 84)

"This deliberate use of multiple approaches in the pursuit of multiple objective facilitates adjustment. In contrast, the affirmative's swift and single-minded pursuit of a single goals allows much less room for self-correction. In fact, all too often the scope of affirmative change renders self-correction virtually impossible."

4. INCREMENTALISM PROVIDES INSURANCE

Michael Pfau, (Director of Forensics, Augustana College, Jafa, Vol. 17, 1980, p. 84)

"The virtue of incrementalism is to shun any policies whose scope it is that if they miscarry, the evils will exceed the remedial powers of existing institutions... Limited departures are in general better insured. They are safer because they leave so much more room, in the way of other factors that can be adjusted, for remedying unforeseen consequences."

5. INCREMENTALISM ALLOWS COMPROMISE

Michael Pfau, (Director of Forensics, Augustana College, Jafa, Vol. 17, 1980, p. 148)

"Avoiding social cleavage along ideological lines, which is exacerbated when issues of ultimate principle are raised, incremental politics explores a continuing series of remedial moves on which some agreement can be developed even among members of opposing ideological camps."

6. INCREMENTALISM AND DISADVANTAGES; NO LINKAGE

John T. Morello, (Prof. at Madison U, Jafa, Vol. 19, Fall 1982, p. 115)

"Thus far, however, the potential for defending the incremental nature of the present system has been most fully explored in terms of the linkage between inherency and disadvantage arguments."

7. AFFIRMATIVE PLAN ELIMINATES ALTERNATIVES

Michael Pfau, (Director of Forensics, Augustana College, Jafa, Vol. 17, 1980, p. 148)

"Any valued program – which exists now or might be adopted in the near future might be sacrificed or an affirmative alternative which is mandated via fiat."

Inherency

INHERENCY IS A VOTING ISSUE

1. DIVIDES GROUND

In debate the affirmative position is to oppose the Status Quo. By eliminating inherency as a voting issue. The aff. Could defend a plan in the status quo and would therefore eliminate all negative ground.

2. ELIMINATES NEGATIVE STRATEGY OF MINOR REPAIR

David Zarefsky, (JAFA, Winter 1969, p. 13)

“If the condition can be attained simply by doing more or less of what we are doing it is not considered Inherent.”

3. OBLIGATORY STEP

Charles W. LaGrave, (ADVANCED DEBATE, 1975, p. 50)

“The majority of theorists and text writers after 1930 include inherency as an obligatory step.”

4. MUST PROVE THE PROBLEM IS RECURRING

Charles W. LaGrave, (ADVANCED DEBATE, 1975, p. 50)

“Not only must one diagnose the cause of the problem, but also he must prove that the problem is a recurring and persistent one. Or as Rowland and Eubank contend, with inherency one proves that the harms are not temporary and not incidental.”

5. ONLY METHODOLOGY OF SOLVING MUST BE AFFIRMATIVE PLAN

Charles W. LaGrave, (ADVANCED DEBATE, 1975, p. 51)

“The affirmative proves a problem is inherent if the only way to save it is through the affirmative plan.”

6. TRADITIONALLY IS A VOTING ISSUE

Inherency was set up as a stock issue and designed to be a voting issue.

HARM DOES NOT PROVE INHERENCY

Vance Trefethen, 2007 (Third Edition, Strategic Debate, Inherency)

A point often missed by novice and even intermediate debaters is that it isn't enough to show that harms exist in the Status Quo and that your plan claims to solve them. The IAC must also present an Inherency contention that shows why the Status Quo does not, cannot or will not carry out the policy changes mandated in the plan.

Justification Affirmative

AFFIRMATIVE ATTACK: Justification is not a voting issue

1. THE RESOLUTION IS NOT THE FOCUS

Dale Herbeck and John Katsalus, (JAFA, Vol. 21, 1985)

“The resolution exists to establish common argumentative ground. The resolution itself is not the subject of debate.”

2. AFFIRMATIVE NEED ONLY BE SUPERIOR TO THE STATUS QUO

Professor Keeshan, (JAFA, 1980 p. 200)

“The affirmative can argue that they only need be superior to the present system or the present policy(ies).

This logic claims that so long as the affirmative shows a better topical policy the judge should vote for the affirmative.”

3. JUSTIFICATION DECREASES CLASH

Edward Panetta and Steven Dolly, (JAFA, Vol. 25, Winter 1989)

“A policy emphasis has the effect of crystallizing the issues to be discussed, whereas a focus on the topic as the area of discussion significantly reduces the likelihood of good point on point argumentation.”

4. ENCOURAGES UNDESIRABLE ELEMENTS OF DEBATE TO ENTER THE ROUND

William H. Bennett, (VARSITY DEBATE, 1996, p. 95-97)

“Critics say accepting justification as a requirement or voting issue encourages other undesirable issues to enter a debate. If the resolution becomes the focus of most debates, the reasoning goes on, one must accept counterwarrants and counter-propositional counterplans.”

5. ACCEPTING JUSTIFICATION DECREASES RESEARCH AND HURTS THE ACTIVITY

D. Srader, (ROSTRUM, April 1990, p. 15)

“The implications (of justification) for debate are unambiguously detrimental: negative need only do a scintilla of research, enough to prepare to dejustify one or more items in the resolution through one or more alternatives; furthermore, as affirmatives are forced to debate the same issues round after round, debate becomes dull and loses participants.”

6. INCREASES BOREDOM

Cross-apply number 5 evidence.

7. TIME RESTRAINTS PRECLUDE

To require the affirmative to defend the entire resolution in the time provided is ludicrous. To give a reasonable example is adequate.

8. CONGRESSIONAL EXAMPLE DISPROVES

When a bill is passed, the plan need not justify every word in the bill.

9. THE RESOLUTION IS NOT THE SOLE FOCUS, THE ONLY PURPOSE IS TO PROVIDE PARAMETERS

10. LEGAL EXAMPLE DISPROVES

A lawyer need not justify every word in the charge, only determine whether or not someone should go to jail.

11. THIS ATTACK IS ABUSIVE

It is just a hidden counterplan which requires no negative counterplan burdens.

12. UNFAIR FOR US TO DEFEND A BAD TOPIC

According to negative analysis, the resolution is flawed and should be thrown out. Under this thinking, no affirmative team could ever win. This is certainly abusive.

13. INCREASES GENERIC ARGUMENTATION

When the resolution becomes the issue, focus is drawn away from arguing case specifically, which makes for a shallow debate.

JUSTIFICATION IS NOT A VOTER-EXTENSIONS

1. JUSTIFICATION REDUCES CLASH

Glen Strickland, (Dir. Forensics, ROSTRUM, April 1989, p. 10)

“Olsen and Vasilus wrote that this strategy (Resolutional Justification) focuses around the resolution rather than the affirmative case 'Not only is this approach inconsistent with plan focus but it also serves to decrease clash.'”

2. JUSTIFICATION DOES NOT SUPPORT A NEGATIVE BALLOT

Glen Strickland, (Dir. Forensics, ROSTRUM, April 1989, p. 10)

“Justification is not a procedural burden, a failure to give substantive merit to each resolutional term does not mandate a negative ballot.”

3. IS A COUNTERPLAN

(ADVANCED DEBATE, third edition, 1987)

“A justification argument is one which is charged that an affirmative case fails to justify the resolution, whatever other merits may be shown for the case because it is extratopical. As a negative strategy, the argument is sometimes phrased as a hypothetical counterplan which is identical to the affirmative plan, minus the planks, related to the resolution, to show how the advantages of the affirmative case do not stem from the resolution itself.”

4. DOESN'T CARRY A PRIORI STATUS

Glen Strickland, (Dir. Forensics, ROSTRUM, April 1989, p. 10)

“...Justification arguments do not share the a priori status of topicality arguments.”

5. NOT A VOTER

Glen Strickland, (Dir. Forensics, ROSTRUM, April 1989, p. 11)

“...Justification should not be treated as a jurisdictional argument and, hence should not be an a priori reason for a negative ballot.”

6. NOT A STOCK ISSUE

Glen Strickland, (Dir. Forensics, ROSTRUM, April 1989, p. 11)

“Justification is not a stock issue in and of itself but rather is a subset of the major stock issues of significance, inherency, solvency and disadvantages ...”

7. NOT AN AFFIRMATIVE BURDEN

Glen Strickland, (Dir. Forensics, ROSTRUM, April 1989, p. 11)

“It is not the burden of an affirmative to demonstrate substantive advantages from each word or phrases (sic) in the resolution.”

JUSTIFICATION BURDEN IS ILLOGICAL

1. LEGISLATIVE PARADIGM PRECLUDES

Profs. Keeshan and Ulrich, (p. 200)

“Another view of the resolution that avoids the problems of the counterwarrants is to view the resolution as the title of a piece of legislation.”

“The implication is that the mere existence of undesirable forms of the resolution is not cause to reject the resolution. The only question is whether there is a form of the proposition that is desirable. On this view, the affirmative team in presenting a plan is suggesting that this plan is a desirable form of the resolution that Congress would adopt if it were forced to adopt the resolution.”

2. WORDING

At the bottom of the ballot asks you to vote for the team which did the better debating not to adopt the resolution.

3. TIME CONSTRAINTS

We don't have time to debate all the possible aspects of the resolution in 60 minutes.

4. DENY ALL PARADIGMS

Clark Olsen, (presented at the Speech Communication Assoc. Convention, Anaheim California, COUNTERWARRANTS AND CLASH: Never the Twain Shall Meet, Nov. 1981, p. 3-5)

“For the policy maker, the use of counterwarrants impede the direct comparison of competing policies by injecting incomparable argument into the round ... For the stock issues judge, Counterwarrants circumvent refutation of the main stock issues ... Counterwarrants are the antithesis of arguments the hypothesis tester would accept .. as they are by definition 'propositional'. Counterwarrants only serve to confuse the tabula rasa judge, forcing him or her to sort out the arguments presented by the debaters and weigh them on some scale not presented in the context of the round ... counterwarrants would also be a futile technique from a legislative decision making model.”

5. HINDER DECISION MAKING

Clark Olsen, (presented at the Speech Communication Assoc. Convention, Anaheim California, COUNTERWARRANTS AND CLASH: Never the Twain Shall Meet, Nov. 1981, p. 3-5)

“The counterwarrant presents particular problems for the judge in academic debate. Whatever decision making paradigm is adopted, counterwarrants avoid clash and hinder the decision making process.”

6. DISTORTS GAME THEORY

Clark Olsen, (presented at the Speech Communication Assoc. Convention, Anaheim California, COUNTERWARRANTS AND CLASH: Never the Twain Shall Meet, Nov. 1981, p. 3-5)

“Counterwarrants would thus have the adverse effect of contributing to a serious distortion of game theory in academic debate.”

Justification Negative

JUSTIFICATION IS A VOTING ISSUE

1. UNDER JUSTIFICATION

Because the affirmative could prove case is true without proving the resolution is true.

2. DECREASES SQUIRRELS

Enforcing justification as a voting issue creates the atmosphere that better controls the number of affirmative cases because whole resolution focus strengthens significance requirements.

3. LEVELS THE PLAYING FIELD

Affirmative gets surprise and the first and last speech while the neg. gets to attack the whole topic.

4. TO REJECT JUSTIFICATION PUTS CASE ABOVE THE RESOLUTION

Dale A. Herbeck, (The Focus of Debate Controversy Re-Examined: Implications For Counterplan Theory, JAF, Vol. 25, 1989, p. 151)

“Support for resolutional primacy persist because many believe that the alternative, plan focus, too narrowly defines negative counterplan ground.”

5. TEACHES MORE BECAUSE IT ADDRESSES BROADER ISSUES – THE WHOLE TOPIC

Austin J. Freeley, (Wadsworth Publishing, Belmont, Calif, ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE, 1986)

“Focusing on the whole resolution teaches students more than encouraging subtopical or parametric debates. This approach requires more substantive and example education.”

6. DECREASES SURPRISE

Increases generics attacks, and this creates more depth and clash.

7. AFFIRMATIVE IGNORES SHELL SUBPOINT E ANALYSIS AND EVIDENCE

8. BILE EVIDENCE GIVING 10 REASONS JUSTIFICATION IS A VOTER IS UNDENIED

That's in subpoint F of the shell.

9. IT DRAMATICALLY INCREASES SKILL AND REASONING

A. S. Biscount and L. C. Soloman, (The CPC Foundation, Bethlehem, Penn, COLLEGE EDUCATION ON THE JOB, 1976)

“Learning intellectual skills and reasoning techniques is more useful to a career and to life contentment than specific facts.”

10. IT UNFAIRLY GIVES PRESUMPTION TO THE AFFIRMATIVE

To deny justification as priori status reverses the burden of proof.

11. GENERIC ATTACKS ARE GOOD

They broaden the issues and are more real world.

JUSTIFICATION ATTACK # _____ : THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

1. DEFINITIONS

THE, (from Webster's Third New International Dictionary, by Merriam-Webster Incorporated, 1986, p. 2364)
“THE – Used as a function word before a noun to limit its application to that specified by the noun.”

2. VIOLATION

The affirmative team has failed to show that the Government is the only one that could implement this plan. This year's resolution calls for the U.S. Government to change its policy. The Affirmative team must show that the U.S. Government can only do this by itself, and that no other private agency, or foreign government could do it better.

3. STANDARDS

A. The affirmative team has a Prima Facie burden to justify the government as the only one that could do this.

B. Bright Line – the resolution provides a clear bright line. The Affirmative team must justify the U.S. Government, as opposed to any other organization or foreign governments.

4. VOTER

A. Cross apply the 2 standards from subpoint 3.

B. We are here to debate whether or not the resolution should be accepted. If the Affirmative team doesn't justify the resolution, then the negative team should win this round.

5. A PRIORI

The first decision of the debate is whether or not the case justifies the resolution.

JUSTIFICATION ATTACK # _____: THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

1. DEFINITIONS

A. POLICY from Blacks Law Dictionary, 1979

“POLICY – the general principles by which a government is guided in its management of public affairs, or the legislature in its measure.”

B. PROGRAM from The Compact Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary, 1971, p. 2319

“PROGRAM – a definite plan or scheme of any intended proceedings.”

2. VIOLATION

The affirmative team has failed to justify why there should be a policy change as opposed to a program change. This year's resolution calls for a policy change toward _____, but in their plan, the affirmative team tells us that there should be a program change toward _____.

3. STANDARDS

A. The affirmative team has a Prima Facie burden to justify why the resolution calls for a policy change.

B. Bright Line – the resolution provides a clear bright line. The affirmative team must justify a policy change, as opposed to any other change.

4. VOTER

A. Cross apply the 2 standards in subpoint 3.

B. Not voting on Justification reduces education and makes for unfair debate.

William Bennett, (Author and Debate Theorist, VARSITY DEBATE, 2010, p. 91)

“Rejecting justification reduces negative options and often focuses clash on areas only favorable to the Affirmative. It encourages parametric topicality, reduces significance to resolution links, rewards affirmative teams for making hasty generalizations, and reduces the number of voting issues the negative can use to win the round. This is unfair and reduces the educational value of the activity.”

NEGATIVE EXTENSION BLOCK: Justification: Affirmative says resolution is not the focus

1. DESTROYS NEGATIVE GROUND

William Bennett, (Debate Theorist, Debate Coach, VARSITY DEBATE, 2010, p. 91)

“Many theorists argue that to ignore justification is to ignore the intent of having a resolution. If debaters do not have to show why important parts of the topic are needed, then we are delimiting the topic and giving the affirmative an unfair advantage.”

2. FOCUS ON THE RESOLUTION INCREASES EDUCATION

William Bennett, (Debate Theorist, Debate Coach, VARSITY DEBATE, 2010, p. 91)

“Education increases when a whole resolution focus is required.”

Austin J. Freeley, (Wadsworth Publishing, Belmont, Calif, ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE, 1986)

“Focusing on the whole resolution teaches students more than encouraging subtopical or parametric debates. This approach requires more substantive and example education.”

3. ABUSIVE TOWARD THE NEGATIVE

If the resolution is not the focus, then the affirmative could present any plan they wanted to and it would have to be accepted by the negative according to affirmative logic.

4. ABUSIVE TOWARD THE NEGATIVE

The affirmative cannot rewrite the rules of debate when and where they please. The affirmative must uphold the resolution in order to be Prima Facie. If they are not Prima Facie, the negative wins automatically.

NEGATIVE EXTENSION BLOCK: Justification: Affirmative says resolution is not the focus

1. NOT ALL JUSTIFICATION ATTACKS REQUIRE A NEW OPTION OR PLAN TO BE GIVEN, BEFORE THE ATTACK IS VALID
2. NEGATIVE COULD DEFEND STATUS QUO
William H. Bennett, (Former Chair of Comm. Dept. at Bowdoin College, VARSITY DEBATE, 2010, p. 96)
“Certainly the negative is free to assume a defense of the present system and or present system agencies and methods. To rely on such structures does not require a counterplan.”
3. THE AFFIRMATIVE TEAM NEVER GIVES AN EVIDENCED OR LOGIC LINK TO SHOW US HOW THE JUSTIFICATION ATTACK SUDDENLY BECAME A COUNTERPLAN
4. THE NEGATIVE TEAM RAN JUSTIFICATION
The affirmative team is trying to say it is a counterplan. This is abusive, and should be disregarded.
5. THE AFFIRMATIVE MISUNDERSTOOD THE ATTACK
Justification points out that the affirmative has not explained why one word or section of the topic should be believed or adopted over other nontopical options. There are no hidden strings attached.
6. THE NEGATIVE DOESN'T HAVE TO RUN A COUNTERPLAN WHEN RUNNING JUSTIFICATION
William H. Bennett, (Renowned Author and Debate Theorist, VARSITY DEBATE, 2010, p. 96)
“To argue that the negative must present a counterplan falsely assumes that the affirmative has already given prima facie justification for the entire resolution or that the negative has the burden of proof to disprove the resolution.”
7. JUSTIFICATION IS A VOTING ISSUE
 - a. It increases education.
 - b. It divides ground equally
 - c. It increases clash

NEGATIVE EXTENSION BLOCK: Affirmative say Justification causes decrease in research

1. JUSTIFICATION INCREASES RESEARCH

William H. Bennett, (VARSITY DEBATE, 2010, former Chair at Bowdoin College, p. 92)

“Requiring topic justification forces debaters to look at, research, and continually debate multiple examples and broader value and policy implications.”

2. JUSTIFICATION DOES NOT REDUCE RESEARCH

At worst, the only thing that justification can do is focus the research to more beneficial material. The resulting increased knowledge of the subject matter improves the quality of debates.

3. JUSTIFICATION INCREASES QUALITY OF RESEARCH

A. Justification Narrows the Number of Possible Affirmative Cases

William H. Bennett, (VARSITY DEBATE, 2010, p. 92, former Chair. Of Comm. Dept. at Bowdoin College)

“Without justification as a voting issue, hundreds of cases become viable under almost any topic; with justification as a voting issue the number of viable affirmative cases becomes much smaller.”

B. Less Affirmative Cases Increases Quality of Research and Clash

William H. Bennett, (VARSITY DEBATE, 2010, p. 92)

“If the goal is quality of research, clash, and extension, debate is better served by a fewer number of affirmative cases.”

NEGATIVE EXTENSION BLOCK: Affirmative says they need only to be superior to the Status Quo

1. WRONG. THE AFFIRMATIVE MUST BE PRIMA FACIE IN ORDER TO WIN THE DEBATE AND JUSTIFICATION IS A PRIMA FACIE BURDEN

William H. Bennett, (VARSITY DEBATE, 2010, p. 91, former Dept. Chair at Bowdoin College)

“To ignore justification as a voting issue is to eliminate part of the affirmative burden of proof. How can a case be prima facie if it does not explain why all major parts of the topic are needed? Jeffrey Bile reminds us that ‘..arguments from subsets are not prima facie. By this I mean that a part is not on its face logically self-sufficient to prove the whole subsets do not necessarily support the larger claim.’”

2. AFFIRMATIVE CASE GIVES NO REASON TO VOTE FOR THE RESOLUTION

William H. Bennett, (VARSITY DEBATE, 2010 p. 91)

“Many theorists argue that to ignore justification is to ignore the intent of having a resolution. If debaters do not have to show why important parts of the topic are needed, then we are delimiting the topic and giving the affirmative an unfair advantage. Listeners could agree with everything the affirmative has presented and still have no reason to vote for the resolution.”

3. SO? THE AFFIRMATIVE STILL HAS TO UPHOLD THE RESOLUTION OR THEY ARE NOT PRIMA FACIE

4. ABUSIVE TO THE NEGATIVE

If the affirmative only has to prove it's better than the Status Quo, then that eliminates harm, solvency, topicality, disadvantages, and completely destroys negative ground.

5. THE RESOLUTION IS THE FOCUS

Thomas J. Hynes Jr., (University of Louisville, SOCIAL ARGUMENTATION, October 15, 1985)

“The focus of the debate should rightly be the proposition which gives rise to debate.”

6. IT'S THE PARAMOUNT GOAL OF DEBATE

Tom Goodnight et al., (University of Kansas, JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN FORENSICS ASSOCIATION, Spring 1974, p. 205)

“A debate team is arguing for only one goal. Ultimately, the adoption of the resolution.”

7. IT'S THE JUDGE'S DUTY

James W. Paulsen et al., (JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN FORENSICS ASSOCIATION, Spring 1974, p. 234)

“In this view of debate, then, the ultimate duty of the judge, regardless of his feelings toward the specific policy proposal offered by the affirmative, is to cast a ballot on the resolution.”

8. JUSTIFICATION GIVES FAIR GROUND

William H. Bennett, (Author and Political Consultant, CDE NATIONAL INSTITUTE PAPER #2, 1993, p. 1)

“The affirmative gets to pick what case to run. The affirmative has both the first and last speech. All the negative has is the limits of the topic. To not vote on justification delimits the topic and comes close to abolishing negative ground.”

9. IT IS AN PRIORI ISSUE

It supersedes other stock issues.

Kritiks Are Good/Desirable

1. RECOGNIZING FLAWED ASSUMPTIONS ALLOWS CHANGE TO OCCUR

Richard Quinney, (Editor, Prof. of Sociology, Northern Illinois University, *CRIMINOLOGY AS PEACEMAKING*, 1991)

“Without empty mind – without mindfulness – we are attached to our ideas, our thoughts, our mental constructions; and we take these productions to be reality itself. Many of our concepts are so deeply ingrained in our minds, in our education, and in our culture, that we forget that they completely condition our perceptions of reality. In attachment to these mental productions, we are chained in the cave, observing merely the shadows of appearance on the wall before us. Awareness is a breaking of the chains of conditioned thought and a viewing of the reality beyond the shadows.”

2. OUR OWN PERSONAL EXPLORATIONS ARE KEY FOR SOCIAL CHANGE

Dennis Sullivan, (Criminal Justice Scholar, *THE MASK OF LOVE*, 1980)

“When it comes to social theory or a social ideal, each of us is a theorist, a mapmaker. This is a core aspect of our humanity, not one that comes from our affiliation with scientific method or with professional certification. “All moral culture springs solely and immediately from the inner life of the soul and can only be stimulated in human nature and never produced by external and artificial contrivances.” It is through the continuing awareness and expression of our dreams and visions that we map out a journey for ourselves, a life's work and the social conditions in which this work is possible, is safe. In our own unique and different ways, each of us is a Columbus, making preparations, setting sail, discovering new worlds, always celebrating a potential discovery but always weighted by the possibility that our word may be fiat and we may sail off.”

3. AFFIRMING ALTERNATIVE MORAL VISIONS ALLOWS CHANGE TO OCCUR

Mark Johnson, (Chair of Philosophy Department, Sill, *MORAL IMAGINATION*, 1993)

“Transperspectivity involves acts of imagination. To some it will seem strange and even inappropriate to combine objectivity and imagination. But forms of imaginative rationality are, in fact, what make human objectivity possible. They are what permit us to take up various perspectives as a way of criticizing any given position, our own or others'. We do this, as we have seen, by means of different kinds of imaginative acts: by envisioning different framings and metaphorical structuring of situations, by empathetically taking up the part of others in order to understand what they experience and how various possible actions might affect them, and by exploring the range of possibilities for action open to us. Imaginative activity of this sort is our sole means for assuming different perspectives and tracing out what they would mean for how we develop our identity, how we affect others, and how we compose our relationships. Such acts of imagination are what allow us to see that and how things might be different and better.”

CRITIQUES ENHANCE EDUCATION

1. WE MUST ALLOW CRITICAL DIALOGUE TO ENHANCE EDUCATION

Judith D. Hoover and Leigh Anne Howard, (Behavioral Scientists at Western Kentucky and Louisiana State, respectively, *AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST*, June/July 1995, p. 973)

“In sum, educators who refuse to engage in critical dialogue violate one of the very foundations of higher education – discussion of broad views to enhance understanding. Unfortunately, as seen in the political correctness episode, opponents refuse to study opposing views. Humans try to keep chaos at bay by preserving the boundaries of their reality and their selfhood and by ignoring their changing society. However, by accepting change, by finding or forging a shared vocabulary, and by admitting diverse options, we can begin to unify and affect social change.”

2. CRITICAL DIALOGUE IS NECESSARY FOR DEMOCRACY AND COMMUNITY

Judith D. Hoover and Leigh Anne Howard, (Behavioral Scientists at Western Kentucky and Louisiana State, respectively, *AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST*, June/July 1995, p. 971)

“Although Willard prescribes argumentation, Richard Rorty (1989) explains that public discussion rather than argumentation serves as a better response. He writes that an ideal society requires an intricate balance between peace, wealth, and freedom, particularly when the situation seems to encourage that one item be sacrificed for another. Free discussion does not avoid conflict or 'ideology.' Instead, free discussion encourages 'critical dialogue' that equalizes opportunities for self-creation, that maximizes opportunities for social and individual choice, that motivates people to work for change, and that affirms new categories of thought (L. Bennett, 1985; Rothenbuhler, 1991). Critical dialogue, then, consists of commitment to discussion, to understanding, to acceptance not necessarily of the position of the other, but of the right of the other to a position, all without fear of retribution or of loss. Critical dialogue therefore provides the key to community formation. Critical dialogue raises questions, stimulates conflict, suggests alternatives, and ensures interaction among members.”

3. THE APPROACH OF THE CRITIQUE ALLOWS DEMOCRACY TO FLOURISH

John Forester, (Associate Prof. of City and Regional Planning at Cornell, *CRITICAL THEORY, PUBLIC POLICY AND PLANNING PRACTICE*, 1993, p. 161)

“Yet any critical social theory has its own limits. It can be no panacea, no guarantee, no key or gimmick to 'social transformation,' 'major structural changes' (or the euphemism you prefer). A critical pragmatism can reveal, expose, reevaluate, illuminate, encourage, explain, decipher, simplify, inform, educate, challenge, threaten, or support only as it is articulated in practice, including in situated text: article, tract, pamphlet, leaflet, media report, newsletter item, position paper, and so on. Such a critical theory can have little meaning in deed apart from the understanding, the application, the continued “articulation as the actual calling of others” attention that it receives from its bearers. To paraphrase the ordinary language analysts, we can say that it is not properly a 'theory' that is confused, but rather theorists. In the same vein, it is likely not to be a 'theory' in the abstract that is critical and 'practical' but those who articulate that theory in the course of their lives, those human beings who by virtue of being able to anticipate and respond to the exercise of domination are able to organize practically against it, who by virtue of being able to distinguish authority from tyranny are able to articulate critically and move pragmatically toward a vision of a more free and democratic society.”

ANSWERS TO 'CRITIQUES ARE INFINITELY REGRESSIVE'

1. NEGATIVE CRITIQUES ARE NOT INFINITELY REGRESSIVE FOR TWO REASONS

Raymie McKerrow, (Prof. of Communication Studies, Univ. of Maine, QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF SPEECH, Fall 1991)

“In theory, Charland is correct – the logical result of continual critique implies the absence of a permanent stance. Is that an inherent flaw, a negative in need of resolution? First, the critique is not essentially regressive, in the sense that it is backward looking and downward spiraling toward first causes. Rather, it may be progressive, of a kind envisioned by Rescher without invoking his modernist systematicity. Second, a theoretical orientation does not preclude taking a stance as a practitioner. Critical rhetoric is multidimensional, not undimensional with respect to action. The recursiveness of critique does not preclude taking a stance.”

2. CRITICAL PROCESS IS ALWAYS PROGRESSIVE AND FORWARD LOOKING RATHER THAN NIHILISTIC

Michael Walzer, (Philos, Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton, COMPANY OF CRITICS, 1988)

“Perhaps there is one common mark of the critical enterprise. It is founded in hope; it cannot be carried on without some sense of historical possibility. Criticism is oriented toward the future: the critic must believe that the conduct of his fellows can conform more closely to a moral standard than it does now or that their self-understanding can be greater than it is now or that their institutions can be more justly organized than they are now. For all his foretelling of doom, a prophet like Amos must hold open the possibility of repentance and reform, else there would be no reason to prophesy. Socrates' claim that he should be paid to criticize his fellow citizens is similarly optimistic – not because he believes that the claim will be accepted but because he believes that his criticism is a real service: it can make Athens a better city. Even the most savage satire of contemporary minds and morals might be different in the future. The standard conservative lamentation that things are sliding steadily downhill, despite its undertones of melancholy and despair, is written to arrest the slide or, at least, to slow it down. There is no such thing as a strictly backward looking social criticism, as if criticism were a kind of retributive punishment for past crimes; the critic may take his standards from the past, but he intends those standards to have some future resonance.”

3. ARGUMENT IS LOGICALLY FLAWED – THIS ARGUMENT COMMITS THE FALLACY OF 'SLIPPERY SLOPE' ARGUMENTATION

We are not advocating an abandonment of every single assumption, all we ask is that you rethink the certain set of assumptions indicted by the critique. The other team must prove the connection between these assumptions and all others.

CRITIQUES GOOD – CHECK OPPRESSION

1. FAILURE TO CHALLENGE ASSUMPTIONS IN LEGISLATIVE PROCESS ALLOWS OPPRESSION

Jeffery Fresia, (Constitutional Scholar, Political Activist, TOWARD AN AMERICAN REVOLUTION, 1988)

“The theme which I wish to develop in this section is this: legislation, of necessity, fits within and becomes part of this overall process of expanding the opportunities for investment and profit, and of limiting political 'opposition' so that it too does not challenge the assumption that all of this makes for a free and healthy society. The legislative process is an instrument of conquest and social control. Therefore when we do legislative work, without at the same time trying to expose and challenge its limitations, we inadvertently become complicit in the act of conquest and our efforts at social change slide into measures of social control.”

2. ONLY WITH COMMUNICATION CAN WE AVOID BEING FOOLED

Critiques allow us to examine not only the logistical processes involved, but also the underlying methods and intentions. This thorough examination allows us to make informed decisions and avoid being fooled and unknowingly oppressed.

3. CRITIQUE PROCESS NECESSARY TO AVOID OPPRESSION

John Forester, (Associate Prof. of City and Regional Planning at Cornell, CRITICAL THEORY, PUBLIC POLICY AND PLANNING PRACTICE: Toward a Critical Pragmatism, 1993)

“As the next chapter will also argue, democratizing efforts need to anticipate and resist privatizing or hegemonic efforts to control the 'turf' of these infra structural domains. The institutions that make possible the reproduction of belief and world view consent, obligation and allegiance, trust, reputation and identity will be contested – for as they are controlled, so will the political definition of issues be controlled; so will political pressure be mobilized and brought to bear; and so will expression of popular interest and sentiments be molded, channeled, guided or misguided.”

4. WE NEED THE CRITIQUE TO AVOID POWERLESSNESS

John Forester, (Associate Prof. of City and Regional Planning at Cornell, CRITICAL THEORY, PUBLIC POLICY AND PLANNING PRACTICE, Toward a Critical Pragmatism, 1993)

“Without institutionalized means of checking knowledge and truth claims (about chemical toxicity, administrative efficiency, technological success, energy efficiency, work safety, housing quality, and so on), citizens will remain subject to the opportunistic stories and systematically selective representations of those already in power, without being able to check the misrepresentation, false claims, exaggerations, or unsupportable ideological beliefs that they may actually face. Without institutional means of freely checking and criticizing legitimacy and rightness claims, citizens will be politically disenfranchised, incapable of the autonomous political actions and participation that alone can truly legitimate public policy.”

DISCOURSE SHAPES REALITY

() Language creates our perceptions and attitudes

Richard Garner, Professor of Ethics, Ohio State, 1994 (Beyond Morality, p. 343)

“What does language do for us? Bronowski says that because we have language ‘we have built a world of outside objects, a world which does not exist for animals.’ according to Jayne’s, each new stage of words “*literally created new perceptions and attentions*”. Leakey and Lewin agree with Jayne’s and Bronowski and add that “it makes good biological sense to see language as a rather useful by-product of an ever sharpening pressure to understand and manipulate the components of the environment.” because we use names and form concepts, they say, we create “a more sharply delineated world” inside our heads. This improves our ability to imagine, looking back into the past, and to project into the future.”

() Understanding impact of language allows change to occur

Richard Garner, Professor of Ethics, Ohio State, 1994 (Beyond Morality, p. 343)

“If we develop a clear view of the use of our words; we come to understand something about the ways we are influenced by our concepts and metaphors, and manipulated by those whose use them. When we get a clear view of some particularly dangerous or confused notion, we can begin to build up an immunity to its influence. Sometimes we are changed by an understanding of how some habitual way of thinking sets off feelings and behavior we find undesirable. A full and painful awareness of the actual effects of our envy, hatred, meanness, or jealousy might be enough to start us on the path of reform.”

() Persuasive discourse and argument can shape reality

Michael Burner and Max Oelschaleger, University of North Texas, 1994 (Dept. Of Philosophy, and Dept. Of Communication Studies, Environmental Ethics, Winter)

“In addition, rhetoric teaches that all language is persuasive, the primary means by which we come to know and then to share what we know about the world. In this deep sense, rhetoric constructs social realities and our perspectives on them. Meaning and knowledge--what is taken the linguistic turn, such as Rorty and Toulmin, have helped to advance this case, that is, the rhetorical nature of social reality. Rorty argues, for example, that metaphor is the essential element of moral and intellectual progress. Toulmin argues persuasively, as already noted, for the evolutionary nature of successful that is epistemic persuasive argument. Scholars sometimes use the phrase ‘epistemic rhetoric’ when referring to this perspective.

() Policymaking process helps create societal meaning

Robert Hoppe, Professor of Political Science, University of Amsterdam, 1993 (The Argumentative Turn in Policy Analysis and Planning, “Political Judgment and the Cycle: The Case of Ethnicity Policy Arguments in the Netherlands”, Edited by Frank Fischer and John Forester)

“Defined as an attempt to control shared meaning, politics thus becomes and renal for conflict over the concepts used in framing political judgments on social problems, public policies, and political leaders and enemies. In the case of democracies, this conflict is managed by public debate on and a negotiated definition of shared meanings. Policymaking becomes the capacity to define the nature of shared meaning; it is a never-ending series of communications and strategic moves by which various policy actors in loosely couple forums of public deliberation projects, plans, actions and artifacts, which become the issues in the next cycle of political judgments and meaning constructions, and so on.”

() Discourse shapes our conceptions of reality

Angela P. Harris, Professor of Law, Berkeley, 1994 (California Law Review, July, P. 741)

“Discourse theory relies on a social constructionist understanding of the concepts ‘language’ and ‘power’ The central insight of discourse theory with respect to language is the blurring of the line between the ‘real’ and the ‘ideal.’ Discourse theory puts language at the center of human experience by asserting that language not only describes the world, it makes it. We only make sense of experience through the conceptual categories we use to interpret and classify it. Even sensory perception itself, which we tend to think of as an unmediated encounter with pure ‘reality,’ is better described as a process of interpretation in which our brains pick and choose the stimuli to which to pay attention on the basis of reestablished conceptual frameworks.”

MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS IS GOOD--FINDS TRUTH

() Faith in the marketplace of ideas needed to solve all world problems

Albert Smolla, Communications Scholar, Northwestern University, 1992 (Anneberg Washington Program, Communications Policy Studies, Free Speech in an Open Society)

“Even a nation as committed to the freedom of speech as the United States will often be sorely tempted to let paranoia triumph over liberty, treating speech from other nations as contraband, like drugs or smuggled goods. But in the end, the towering hopes of the world for a new century of pluralistic tolerance and peace must be wagered on the faith that the free flow of information across international borders avoids more wars than it causes, averts more terrorism than it feeds, uncovers more violation of human rights than it incites. The international marketplace of ideas is not a myth; it is inevitable. The global electronic village is not a dream, it is here. There is no better way to conquer hunger and disease, not better check on tyranny and exploitation, no better nourishment for the art, music, and poetry that stir the human spirit, than a world committed to open cultures and freedom of speech.”

() We must have faith in the marketplace of ideas to find truth

Albert Smolla, Communications Scholar, Northwestern University, 1992 (Anneberg Washington Program, Communications Policy Studies, Free Speech in an Open Society)

“There is, indeed a curiously inescapable irony to the marketplace image. We can never empirically test the proposition that truth will triumph over error, because that would itself require some objective measure of what ideas are true and what ideas are false--a measurement that the marketplace theory itself forbids. The leap of faith thus required by the marketplace image, however, is not its weakness, but its deepest strength, for it spurs us to accept the noblest challenge of the life of the mind: never to stop searching. As John Stuart Mill eloquently instructed, even when we are relatively confident in the truth of received opinion, “if it is not full, frequently, and fearlessly discussed, it will be held as dead dogmas, not a living truth.” the marketplace metaphor is thus especially relevant in the modern world, which grows suspicious and weary of eternal verities in the wisdom that the; truths; of science, art or politics are subject to constant revision.”

() Marketplace of ideas will inevitably find truth

Albert Smolla, Communications Scholar, Northwestern University, 1992 (Anneberg Washington Program, Communications Policy Studies, Free Speech in an Open Society)

“Despite these infirmities and uncertainties, the marketplace rationale has much to commend it. It is possible to be both a realist and an optimist. That combination, indeed, may be the most important legacy of the framers of the First Amendment. The marketplace metaphor thus appeals to our optimism that good will finally conquer evil. As long as this optimism is not blind naiveté but is rather a motive force that encourages us to keep the faith in the long view of history, it can be a self-fulfilling prophecy. Just as we often have nothing to fear but fear, hope is often our best hope. Humanity may be fallible and though illusive, but the hope of humanity lies in its faith in progress. The marketplace metaphor reminds us to take the long view. Truth has a stubborn persistence. Persecution may eliminate all visible traces of a truth, like the scorched earth after a napalm bombing. Yet truth somehow comes back, because its roots are in the soil or its seed in the air. Cut down again and again, truth will still not be stamped out; it gets rediscovered and rejuvenated, until it finally flourishes.”

THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS IS SUPERIOR-WE SHOULD ALLOW ALL IDEAS

() Freedom of speech leads to the search for truth.

Gora, 1991 (Joel M., et al., THE RIGHT TO PROTEST, ACLU)

“First, freedom of speech facilitates the search for truth. This theme was powerfully stated by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes:

“When men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.”

Second, and equally important, freedom of speech is indispensable to individual self-fulfillment through self-expression. Freedom of speech is vital, not just because it may lead to the truth, but because its very exercise is essential to the development of individual liberty and personality our Constitution safeguards. This notion was most clearly expressed by Justice Louis D. Brandeis: ‘Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the State was to make men free to develop their faculties...They valued liberty both as an end and as a means. They believed liberty to be the secret of happiness and courage to be the secret of liberty.’”

ANSWERS TO ‘CRITIQUES ARE INFINITELY REGRESSIVE’

() Negative critiques are not infinitely regressive for two reasons

Raymie McKerrow, Prof. Of Communication Studies, Univ. Of Maine, 1991 (Quarterly Journal Of Speech, Fall)
“In theory, Char land is correct--the logical result of continual critique implies the absence of a permanent stance. Is that an inherent flaw, a negative in need of resolution? First, the critique is not essentially regressive, in the sense that it is backward looking and downward and downward spiraling toward first causes. Rather, it may be progressive, of a kind envisioned by Rescuer without invoking his modernist systematicity. Second, a theoretical orientation does not preclude taking a stance as a practitioner. Critical rhetoric is multidimensional, not undimensional with respect to action. The excursiveness of critique does not preclude taking a stance.”

() Critical process is always progressive and forward looking rather than nihilistic

Michael Walzer, Philos., 1988 (Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton, Company of Critics)

“Perhaps there is one common mark of the critical enterprise. It is founded in hope; it cannot be carried on without some sense of historical possibility. Criticism is oriented toward the future: the critic must believe that the conduct of his fellows can conform more closely to a moral standard than it does now or that their self-understanding can be greater than it is now or that their institutions can be more justly organized than they are now. For all his foretelling of doom, a prophet like Amos must hold open the possibility of repentance and reform, else there would be no reason to prophesy. Socrates’ claim that he should be paid to citizen his fellow citizens is similarly optimistic--not because he believes that the claim will be accepted but because he believes that his criticism is a real service: it can make Athens a better city. Even the most savage satire of contemporary minds and mores might be different in the future. The standard conservative lamentation that things are sliding steadily downhill, despite its undertones of melancholy and despair, is written to arrest the slide, or, at least, to slow it down. There is no such thing as a strictly backward looking social criticism, as if criticism were a kind of retributive punishment for past crimes; the critic may take his standards from the past, but he indents those standards to have some future resonance.”

() Argument is logically flawed-This argument commits the fallacy of ‘slippery slope’ argumentation. We are not advocating an abandonment of every single assumption, all we ask is that you rethink the certain set of assumptions indicated by the critique. The other team must prove the connection between these assumptions and all others.

SHOULD REJECT DEONTOLOGICAL CRITERIA

() Tremendous consequences nullify deontological limits

Charles Fried, Harvard Philosopher, 1979, (Right and wrong, p. 10)

“Even with such boundaries we can imagine extreme cases where killing an innocent person may save a whole nation. In such cases it seems fanatical to maintain the absoluteness of the judgment, to do right even if the heavens will in fact fall. And so the catastrophic may cause the absoluteness of right and wrong to yield, but even then it would be a non sequitur to argue (As consequentiality are fond of doing) that this proves that judgments of the right and wrong are always a matter of degree, depending on the relative goods to be attained and harms to be avoided. I believe, on the contrary, that the concept of the catastrophic is a distinct concept just because it identifies the extreme situation in which the usual categories of judgment (including the category of right and wrong) no longer apply.”

() Deontological ethics allow too much misery to occur

J.J.C. Smart, Famous Philosopher, University of Adelaide, 1973 (Utilitarianism, p. 62)

“The chief of persuasive argument in favor of utilitarianism has been that the dictates of any deontological ethics will always, on some occasions, lead to the existence of misery that could on utilitarian principles, have been prevented. Thus if the deontologist says that promises should be kept (or even if, like Ross, he says that there is a prima facie duty to keep them) we may confront him with a situation like the following, the well-known ‘desert island promise’: I have promised a dying man on a desert island, from which subsequently I alone am rescued, to give his hoard of gold to the South Australian Jockey Club. On my return, I give it to the Royal Adelaide Hospital, which we may suppose badly needs it for a new X-ray machine. Could anybody deny that I have done rightly without being open to the charge of heartlessness?”

SHOULD REJECT CONSEQUENTIALISM

() Should never attempt to make decisions based on ‘body counts’

Joram Graf Haber, Prof. Philosophy of Bergen Community College, 1993 (Absolutism and its Consequentialist Critics, “Introduction”, p.12)

“Taurek argues that there are no value-comparative truths about various states of affairs that obtain as a result of an agent’s conduct. He maintains that if faced with the choice of giving a lifesaving drug to five people who could all be saved by it or to one who could be saved by it but only if she got it all, Taurek says we should flip a coin. He rejects the view that ‘from an impartial standpoint,’ five dead and one alive is a worse scenario than one dead and five alive. For Taurek, there is only the standpoints of the parties involved. And since, from each party’s standpoint, it is a worse thing that the party should die rather than the other, it follows that no one party’s loss is greater than another from some alleged but fanciful impartial point of view.”

() Human life is incalculable and cannot be assessed through consequentialism

Joram Graf Haber, Prof. Philosophy of Bergen Community College, 1993 (Absolutism and its Consequentialist Critics, “Introduction”, p.12)

“Human life [should be] regarded not as a concrete, specific, essentially quantifiable object but as a good in which each person participates but which none exhausts or sums up in himself. In such a view of reality it is simply not possible to make the sort of calculation which weighs lives against each other...and thus determine whose life shall be respected and whose sacrificed. The value of life, each human life, is incalculable, not in any merely poetic sense but simply because it is something not susceptible to calculation, measurement, weighing and balancing.”

() Weighing impacts only reflects oppressive, patriarchal logic

Petra Kelley, 1994 (Co-Founder of Germany’s Green Party, *Earth Island Journal*, Winter 93-94)

“People often argue about which of the world’s many evils is most primary and should therefore be the one first confronted. Such a fragmentary approach is itself part of the problem, reflecting as it does the linear and hierarchical character of patriarchal thinking. It fails to grasp the complex dynamics of living systems. What is needed is a change of form and content that articulates the interconnections and linkages that affect our lives, a perspective that integrates the many problems we face and approaches them holistically. There can be no peace when one group dominates another.”

() Focusing only on the ends allows hypocrisy

Dale Jamieson, Prof. Of Philosophy at Univ. Of Colorado, 1993 (Applied Ethics (1993), ed. Winkler and Coombs, p. 336)

“Finally, we should focus more on character than on calculation. Focusing on outcomes has made due cynical calculators and had institutionalized hypocrisy. We can each reason, since my contribution is small, outcomes are likely to be determined by the behavior of others. Reasoning in this way I can justify driving my car while advocating bicycles, or enjoy using my fireplace while favoring regulations against them.”

CRITIQUING ASSUMPTIONS ALLOWS CHANGE

() Recognizing flawed assumptions allows change to occur

Richard Quinney, Professor of Sociology, 1991 (Northern Illinois University, Editor, Criminology as Peacemaking)
“Without empty mind-without mindfulness-we are attached to our ideas, our thought, our mental constructions; and we take these productions to be reality itself. Many of our concepts are so deeply ingrained in our minds, in our education, and in our culture that we forget that they completely condition our perceptions of reality. In attachment to these mental productions, we are chained in the cave, over serving merely the shadows of appearance on the wall before us. Awareness is a breaking of the chains of conditioned thought and a viewing of the reality beyond the shadows.”

() Our own personal explorations are key for social change

Dennis Sullivan, Criminal Justice Scholar, 1980 (The Mask of Love)

“When it comes to social theory or social ideal, each of us is a theorist, a mapmaker. This is a core aspect of our humanity, not note that comes from our affiliation with scientific method or with professional certification. “All moral culture springs solely and immediately from the inner life of the soul, and can only be stimulated in human nature and never produced by external and artificial contrivances...” it is through the continuing awareness and expression of our dreams and visions that we map our a journey for ourselves, a life’s work and the social conditions in which this work is possible, is safe. In our own unique and different ways, each of us is a Columbus, making preparations, dotting said, discovering new worlds, always celebrating a potential discovery but always weighted by the possibility that our world may be flat and we may sail off.”

() Affirming Alternative moral visions allows change to occur

Mark Johnson, Chair of Philosophy Department, SIU, 1993 (Moral Imagination)

“Transperspectivity involves acts of imagination. To some it will seem strange and even inappropriate to combine objectivity and imagination. But forms of imaginative rationality are, in fact, what make human objectivity possible. They are what permit us to take up various perspectives as a way of criticizing any given position, our own or others. We do this, as we have seen, by means of different kinds of imaginative acts: by envisioning different framings and metaphorical strutting of situations, but empathetically taking up the part of others in order to understand what they experience and how various actions might affect them, and by exploring the range of possibilities for action open to us. Imaginative activity of this sort is our sole means for assuming different perspectives and tracing out what they would mean for how we develop our identity, how we affect others, and how we compose our relationships. Such acts of imagination are what allow us to see that and how things might be different and better.”

() Uncovering flawed is a critical step for action

M. Kay Harris, Prof. Of Criminal Justice, 1991 (Temple Univ., “Moving into the New Millennium”, in Criminology as Peacemaking ed. By Harold Pepinsky, 1991)

“However, we can expand the conceptual and practical possibilities for change in criminal justice by re-examining our assumptions and expectations. “We need to begin picturing the new order in our minds, fantasizing it, playing with possibilities... An exercise in first stepping into desired future in imagination, then consciously elaborating the structures needed to maintain it, and finally imagining the future history that would get us there, is a very liberating experience for people who feel trapped in an unyielding present...Societies move toward what they image. If we remain frozen in the present as we have done since World War II, society stagnates. Imagining the future gives us action ideas for the present. (Boulding, 1987)”

() Critiquing institution allows change to occur

John Caputo and Mark Yount, Profs. Of Philosophy at Villanova and St. Joseph’s 1993(Foucault and the Critique of Institutions, “Institutions, Normalization and Power”, p. 9)

“Thus to give weight to domination, to show its ruthlessness, requires this new analytics of power to expose the domination within lateral relations of power. “The multiple forms of subjugation that have a place and function within the social organism.” that is where criticism of institutions comes in. institutions are where power becomes embodied in techniques, and equips itself with instruments and eventually even violent means of material intervention. Criticism attempts to flush out the thought and institution, to show as much that it can be changed as

that it must be.” to show that things are not as self evident as one believed, to see that what is accepted as self-evident will no longer be accepted as such. Practicing criticism is a matter of making facile gestures difficult.”

ANSWERS TO 'POLITICAL CORRECTNESS IS BAD'

() Political correctness is only a myth

John K. Wilson, University of Chicago, 1995 (Committee on Social Thought, The Myth of Political Correctness)

“Despite all the complaints about multiculturalism, students today are ignorant of Western culture not because they are having to learn about other cultures but because business and paraprofessional majors now predominate in college. Despite all the complaints that the Western Tradition is being discarded, the curriculum at American colleges remains dominated by Western Works. Despite all the complaints about conservatives being censored by intolerant minorities, the average female, black Hispanic, gay, or lesbian student is far more likely to face harassment and abuse than the average white male conservative. Despite all the complaints about 'Political Correctness,' the truth is that radical students and faculty face much more discrimination and oppression on campus. Conservative correctness, not political correctness, is the greatest threat to freedom of expression in America.”

() Attacks on arguments as being 'politically correct' amount to censorship

John K. Wilson, University of Chicago, 1995 (Committee on Social Thought, The Myth of Political Correctness)

“The refusal of conservatives to see anything but a conspiracy of malicious legists in recent efforts to broaden the college curriculum has created the very atmosphere of intellectual intimidation that critics blame on the left. Although the attacks on political correctness have helped to stimulate some debates about higher education, they have mostly silenced discussion. Critics frequently make no effort to argue about the ideas they deride, and opposing views are mocked rather than refuted--with 'PC' itself being an unanswerable form of ridicule. By criticizing anyone who dares to discuss race, class, and gender, by attacking all multiculturalism as political indoctrination, by misrepresenting the facts about the PC controversy, and by failing to consider the arguments of the other side, the conservatives and the media distorted what might have been (and what still can be) a productive debate about our universities.”

CRITIQUES GOOD-CHECK OPPRESSION

() Failure to challenge assumptions in legislative process allows oppression

Jeffery Fresia, Constitutional Scholar, 1988 (Political Activist, Toward an American Revolution)

“The theme which I wish to develop in this section is this: legislation, of necessity, fits within and becomes part of this overall process of expanding the opportunities for investment and profit, and of limiting political ‘opposition’ so that it too does not challenge the assumption that all of this makes for a free and healthy society. The legislative process is an instrument of conquest and social control. Therefore when we do legislative work, without at the same time trying to expose and challenge its limitations, we inadvertently become complicit in the act of conquest and our efforts at social change slide into measures of social control.”

() Critique process necessary to avoid oppression

John Forester, Prof. Of City and Regional Planning at Cornell, 1993 (Critical Theory, Public Policy and Planning Practice: Toward a Critical Pragmatism)

“As the next chapter will also argue, democratizing efforts need to anticipate and resist privatizing or hegemonic efforts to control the ‘turf’ of these infrastructural domains. The institutions that make possible the reproduction of belief and world view consent, obligation and allegiance, trust reputation and identify will be contested- for as they are controlled, so will the political definition of issue be controllers; so will political pressure be mobilized and brought to bears, and so will expression of popular interest and sentiments be molded, channeled, guided, or misguided.”

() We need the critique to avoid powerlessness

John Forester, Prof. Of City and Regional Planning at Cornell, 1993 (Critical Theory, Public Policy and Planning Practice: Toward a Critical Pragmatism)

“Without institutionalized means of checking knowledge and truth claims (about chemical toxicity, administrative efficiency, technological success, energy efficiency, work safety, housing quality, and so on), citizen will remain subject to the opportunistic stories and systematically selective representations of those already in power, without being able to check the misrepresentation, false claims, exaggerations, or unsupportable ideological beliefs that they may actually face. Without institutional means of freely chewing and cruising elegiac and rightness claims, citizens will be politically Sid franchised, incapable of the autonomous political actions and participation that alone can truly legitimate public policy.”

CRITIQUES ENHANCE EDUCATION

() We must allow critical dialogue to enhance education

Hoover and Howard, June/July 1995 (Judith D. and Leigh Anne, Behavioral Scientists at Western Kentucky and Louisiana State, respectively, AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST, p.973)

“In sum, educators who refuse to engage in critical dialogue violate one of the very foundations of higher education discussion of broad views to enhance the understanding. Unfortunately, as seen in the political correctness episode, opponents refuse to study opposing views to enhance understanding. Unfortunately, as seen in the police correctness episode, opponents refuse to study opposing views. Humans try to keep chaos at bay by preserving the boundaries of their reality and their selfhood and by ignoring their changing society. However, by accepting change, by finding or forging a shared vocabulary, and by admitting diverse options, we can begin to unify and affect social change.”

() Critical dialogue is necessary for democracy and community

Hoover and Howard, June/July 1995 (Judith D. and Leigh Anne, Behavioral Scientists at Western Kentucky and Louisiana State, respectively, AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST, p.973)

“Although Willard prescribes argumentation, Richard Rorty (1989) explains that the public discussion rather than argumentation serves as a better response. Hew writes that an ideal society requires an intricate balance between peace, wealth, and freedom, particularly when the situation seems to encourage that one item be sacrificed for another. Free discussion does not avoid conflict or ‘ideology.’ Instead, free discussion encourages ‘critical dialogue’ that equalizes opportunities for self-creation, the maximized opportunities for social and individual choice, that motivates people to work for change, and that affirms new categories of thought (L. Bennett, 1985; Rothenbuhler, 1991). Critical dialogue, then, consists of commitment to discussion, to understanding, to acceptance not necessarily of the position of the other, but of the right of the other to a position, all without fear of retribution or of loss. Critical dialogue therefore provides the key to community formation. Critical dialogue raises questions, stimulates conflict, suggests alternatives, and ensures interaction among members.”

() The approach of the critique allows democracy to flourish

Forester, 1993 (John, Associate Professor of City and Regional Planning at Cornell, CRITICAL THEORY, PUBLIC POLICY AND PLANNING PRACTICE, p. 161)

“Yet any critical social theory has its own limits. It can be no panacea, no guarantee, no key or gimmick to ‘social transformations’, major structural changes’ (or the euphemism you prefer). A critical pragmatism can reveal, espouse, reevaluate, illuminate, encourage, explain, decipher, simplify, inform, educate, challenge, threaten, or support only as it is articulated in practice, including in situated text: article, tract, pamphlet, leaflet, media report, newsletter item, position paper, and so on. Such a critical theory can have little meaning in deed apart from the understanding, the application, the continued articulation as the actual calling of others; attention, that it revives from its bearers. To paraphrase the ordinary language analysts, we can say that it is not properly a ‘theory’ that is confused, but rather theorists. In the same vein, it is likely not to be a ‘theory’ in the obstetric that is critical and ‘practical; but those who articulate that theory in the course of their lives, those human beings who by virtue of being able to anticipate and respond to the exercise of domination are available to organize practically against it, who by virtue of being able to distrust authority for tyranny are able to articulate crucially and move pragmatically toward a vision of a more free and democratic society.”

() No vision of social progress is beyond our reach.

McDermott, 1988 (E. Basil, University of Columbia, Alternative Magazine ON THE FUTURE OF IMPOSSIBLE, p. 105)

“Much of what our ancestors could never accomplish we find child’s play. From the ashes of historical ignorance the phoenix of impossibility has arisen and taken flight on the wings of modern knowledge. Nearly everywhere we can or dare look the impossible is no longer an impersonal oppressor of human hope. We are living in the midst of a vast transformation in how we think about the impossible and what we intend to do about it. This is an astounding and unprecedented happening. After all, a mere twinkling of time ago, well-educated people confidently assessed the human condition and calmly insisted that a visit to the moon, an organ transplant, an atomic bomb, or the existence of microbes were all quite impossible. Today the well-educated person is much more captious and the list of future impossibilities is much more modest. The impossible no longer intimidates

humanity. It no longer appears as a fixed and insurmountable barrier to our aspirations. Indeed, it would be an extraordinary bold and sour prophet who would dare risk our scorn by presenting us with a detailed list of important things we shall never know nor achieve.”

Therefore, everything is within our reach, and nothing is impossible. Critiques emphasize this notion of possibility; since nothing is impossible, critiques are possible to debate and argue.”

() ENCOURAGE PRE-FIAT THOUGHT AND EDUCATION

Vance Trefethen, 2007 (Third Edition, Strategic Debate, A Brief Word About Kritiks)

A kritik is an argument, usually briefed and outlined well in advance of the round like other Negative briefs, that argues that either 1) the resolution itself is so flawed that it cannot be debated (resolutional kritik); or 2) the behavior of the affirmative team (including the wording of their case) during the round is harmful and therefore the Affirmative team should not deserve to win (case kritik). Some have called kritiks “pre-fiat” arguments because they do not deal with disadvantages that occur after the policy is implemented, but rather harms that occur during the debate round itself, before any policy changes are made.

CRITIQUES GOOD -PRACTICAL POLICYMAKING REQUIRES THEM

() Must examine discourse and assumptions underlying policies to ensure effectiveness

Sanford F. Schram University of Wisconsin, 1993 (Professor of Policy Sciences, Policy Sciences, “Postmodern Policy Analysis: Discourses and Identify in Welfare Policy”)

“Not so much rejecting as deconstructing positivistic approached to policy analysis, postmodern representation s of reality. This orientation throws into question key distinctions created by positivist policy analysis, such as those between theoretical and empirical, objective and subjective, interpretive and scientific. Policy analysis is at best insufficient and at worst seriously misleading if it fails to examine the presupposition basis for what are taken to be ‘the facts’ of any policy. As an alternative, post-modern policy analysis examines how policy discourse is itself constitutive of the reality upon which it focuses.”

() The critique is necessary to determine solvency

Frank Fischer, Prof. Of Political Science, Rutgers University, 1993 (The augmentative Turn in Policy Analysis and Planning, Ed by John Forester and Frank Fischer)

“First, we can appreciate the many ways practitioners formulate and construct what ;the problem; shall be taken practically to be -before they can delineate plausible alternatives or recommendations. In a few words, problem solution depends on the prior work of problem construction and reconstruction, and this work is deeply rhetorical and interpretive, if little understood.”

() Must abandon flawed policy analysis in favor of a critical approach

Lance Dehaven-Smith, Ohio State University, 1988 (Political Scientist, Philosophical Critiques of Policy Analysis)

“Was the Great Society a valuable contribution to equality, or instead a misguided initiative that did more harm than good? It all depends on how you look at it. At this point in both politics and social science, we have four too much partisan speculation and not nearly enough critical analysis to reach a conclusion. The source of our confusion is a methodology of policy research that produces evidence devoid of clear theoretical implications. The facts confront us like pebbles in a kaleidoscope, capable of being rearranged and reinterpreted with each twist of the theoretical lens. It is time to discard this fruitless approach to policy evaluation and to explore alternatives grounded in comprehensive social and political theory.”

CRITIQUES GOOD-ETHICAL POLICYMAKING REQUIRES THEM

() Ethical policymaking will fail without an examination of assumptions

John Gilroy, Political Science Philosopher, Trinity College, 1992 (Environmental Ethics, Summer, "Public Policy and Environmental Risk", p. 217-218)

"Each day bureaucrats and policy analysts are asked to make decision that affect huge numbers of individuals and create the political and economic reality of our collective future. In the process of this decision making, one can assume two things: first, that it is impossible for the individuals charged with a decision to respond to each and every constituent, and second, that decision makers, therefore, analyze the policy options on the basis of streamlined guideposts. They must be able to approach a proposed policy in terms of assumptions that reflect the reality of the world affected by the policy to the objectives of the legislative initiative. Normally, one thinks of these guideposts, or rules of thumb. As infusing the policy choice with reason and moral justification. Without an accurate description of the elements (actors, principles, and values) involved in the decision, however, the policy analyst is likely to misunderstand the demands of rationality and fail to justify his public choice on proper moral grounds."

() Policymaking must examine assumptions and values

John Forester, Prof. Of City and Regional Planning at Cornell, 1993 (Critical Theory, Public Policy, and Planning Practice: Toward a Critical Pragmatism)

"Since planning is a value-laden activity whose success or failure has consequences for the society encompassing it. Any theory of planning must meet broader requirements than those demanded of theories in the natural or physical science. Not only must an adequate account of planning practice be empirically fitting, it must also be both practically appropriate to the setting in which planners work and ethically illuminating helping planners and citizens understand and assess the ethical and political consequences of various possibilities of action, policy, or intervention."

() Ethical policymaking requires an examination of assumptions

John Forester, Prof. Of City and Regional Planning at Cornell, 1993 (Critical Theory, Public Policy, and Planning Practice: Toward a Critical Pragmatism)

"To be ethically illuminating, an account of practice must begin with the recognition that no theory of action can be fundamentally neutral, for any theory reflects on the organization of our attention, to the neglect of other possibilities. Any account of planning practice makes normative claims to its readers: "you ought to consider these variables. To understand what planners do, and how they might act better still, you ought to watch out for those problems, or formulating process, for example: a political theory may neglect questions of economic exchange or class relationship."

CRITIQUES ARE LEGITIMATE

() Critiques enhance policy making - Critiques act to enhance the policymaking process by challenging common underlying assumptions. They do not act to replace or remove policymaking.”

() Critiques enhance education - Critiques force both teams to explore issues that normality wouldn't get a hearing in debate.

() Critiques do not 'destroy ground' - Ground is what you walk on to the library. Our critiques explore relevant issues of the topic. Ground is 'destroyed' when one side runs an argument that excludes the other side from making a set of arguments. For example, a topicality argument that says the only topical case is graffiti is destroying ground, because it deals with only one case, or a special condition. The critique does not say you can't make arguments or hold assumptions. It says you must DEFEND THEM.

() Infinite regression is absurd - in no part of our analysis do we accept a nihilistic posture of 'reject everything.' to assume that rejecting one assumption will cause all assumptions to fall is to commit the fallacy of the slippery-slope argumentation. For example, it's absurd to think that if I begin to feed a child food, I will eventually feed her arsenic. Slippery-slope arguments must have a reason why rejecting this one assumption destroys all others.

() 'Critiques don't belong in policy debate' arguments are ridiculous- says who? There are no rules that eliminate critiques from the activity, just as there are no rules that demand you as a judge must perpetually play the role of 'policy maker.' your job is to decide whose arguments make the most sense or who did the better job of debating. Policymaking often has to consider assumptions and values such as the Congressional Debates over sending aid to South Africa during the Apartheid Era.

CRITIQUING ASSUMPTIONS ALLOWS FOR CHANGE

() Recognizing flawed assumptions allows change to occur

Quinney, 1991 (Richard, Professor of Sociology, Northern Illinois University, ED. OF CRIMINOLOGY AS PEACEMAKING)

“Without empty mind-without mindfulness-we are attached to our ideas, our thoughts, our mental constructions; are we take these productions to be reality itself. Many of our concepts are so deeply ingrained in our minds, in our education, and in our culture, that we forget that they completely condition our perceptions of reality (see Krishnamurti, 1975). In attachment to these mental productions, we are chained in the cave, observing merely the shadows of appearance on the wall before us. Awareness is a breaking of the chains of conditioned thought and a viewing of the reality beyond the shadows.”

() Critiques institutions allows change to occur

Caputo and Yount, 1993 (John and Mark, Professors of Philosophy at Villanova and St. Joseph’s FOUCAULT AND THE CRITIQUE OF INSTITUTIONS, “Institutions, Normalization and Power,” p. 9)

“Thus to give due weight to domination, to show its ruthlessness, requires this new analytics of power to expose the domination within lateral relations of power: ‘the multiple forms of subjugation that have a place and function within the social organism.’

That is where criticism of institutions comes in. institutions are where power ‘becomes embodied in techniques, and equips itself with instruments and eventually even violent means of material intervention.’ criticism attempts to flush out the thought that animates even the most stupid institutions in order to try to change both thought and instituting, to show as much that it can be changed as that it must be:

To show things are not as self-evident as one believed, to see that what is accepted as self-evident will no longer be accepted as such. Practicing criticism is a matter of making facile gestures difficult.”

() Our own personal exploration are key for social change.

Sullivan, 1980 (Dennis, Criminal Justice Scholar, THE MASK OF LOVE, p. 49)

“When it comes to social theory or a social ideal, each of us is a theorist, a mapmaker. This is a core aspect of our humanity, not one that comes from our affiliation with scientific method or professional certification. ‘All moral culture springs solely and immediately from the inner life of the soul, and can only be stimulated in human nature and never produced by external and artificial contrivances...’ (Humboldt, 1792, 63, 28). It is through the contemplating awareness and expression of our dreams and visions that we map out a journey for ourselves, a life’s work and the social conditions in which this work is possible, is safe. In our own unique and different ways, each of us is a Columbus, making preparations, setting sail, discovering new worlds, always celebrating a potential discovery but always weighted by the possibility that our world may be flat and we may sail off.”

() Our conversations and visions are the only alternatives necessary

Allan, 1990 (George, Professor of Philosophy, Dickinson College, REALIZATIONS OF THE FUTURE, p. 294)

“And so the threads of our common tale began to unravel. We came to the conclusion that we do not argue and compromise in order that there might emerge a clear and accurate articulation of who we are and what we ought someday to become. Our conversation is all there is. In talking we create ourselves, stipulate the conditions of our communality and then build generation after generation our own sense of shared significance. Soon we were questioning the validity of even this. Our storytelling was not taken to be the way we make rules governing the world in which we dwell but rather as the way we rationalize, after the fact, our world-makings. Yet there are as many ways to tell that tale as there are standpoints from which to tell it, nor can the voice of the activist be slighted, nor favored, over that of the reflective interpreter. Our conversation were breaking up into huddles of the like-minded, sameness replacing difference as a value within any particular group at the same time as it was celebrated as the sole value governing the relationship among groups. A plurality of separated cliques was replacing a plurality of interacting perspectives as the highest good. Our conversations had once more become tête-à-têtes, our community a gigantic cocktail party of a thousand unrelated, unreliable confabulations.”

() Envisioning alternative future allows them to emerge

Johnson, 1993 (Mark, Department Chair of Philosophy at SIU, MORAL IMAGINATION, p 203)

“The envisioning of possibilities for fruitful, meaningful, and constructive action requires moral imagination. Our ability to criticize a moral view deepens on our capacity for imagining alternative viewpoints on, and solutions to, a particular morale problem. In order to adapt and grow, we must be able to see beyond our present vantage point and to grow beyond our present selves. We must be able to imagine new dimensions for our character, new directions for our relationships with others, and even new forms of social organization. Roberto Unger has articulated both the need and the condition of possibility for imaginative transformation of this sort.

So you know...that, though it is your fate to live with conditional worlds, you also have the power to break outside them. When you do that, however, you do not reach the unconditional: the thought beyond limiting method and language, the society beyond limiting practical and imaginative structure, the personality beyond limiting character. You can, nevertheless, work toward a situation that keeps alive the power to break the limits: to think thoughts that shatter the available canon of reason and discourse, to experiment with forms of collective life that the established practical and imaginative order of society locks our or puts down, to reach our toward the person beyond the chanter.

It is precisely by recognizing the always partial nature of our metaphors, schemas, and narratives that we can keep ourselves alerted to the constant necessity of stretching ourselves beyond our present identify and context. No person can be moral in a suitably reflective way who cannot imagine alternative viewpoints as a means of understanding and transforming the limits of his own convictions and commitments. This is an activity of moral imagination.”

() Affirming alternative moral visions allows change to occur

Johnson, 1993 (Mark, Department Chair of Philosophy at SIU, MORAL IMAGINATION, p 203)

“Transperepectivity involves acts of imagination. To some it will seem strange and even inappropriate to combine ‘objectivity’ and ‘imagination.’ But forms of imaginative rationality are, in fact, what make human objectivity possible. They are what permit us to take up various perspectives as a way of criticizing any given position, our own on others. We do this, as we have seen, by means of different kinds of imaginative acts: by envisioning different framings and metaphorical structuring of situations, by empathetically taking up the part of others in order to understand what they experience and how various possible actions might affect them, and by expiring the range of possibilities for action open to us.

Imaginative activity of this sort is our sole means for assuming different perspectives and tracing our what they would mean for how we develop our identity, how we affect others, and how we compose our relationship. Such acts of imagination are what allow us to see that and how things might be different, and better.”

Critique Good – Long Shell (1/3)

A. The traditional framework of policy debate assumes that discourse is a neutral medium through which thoughts are transmitted. This whitewashes the fact that discourses are produced such that they define what can and cannot be said through a violent process of control and exclusion

Roland Bleiker, "Forget IR Theory," *Alternatives*; 1997

The doorkeepers of IR are those who, knowingly or unknowingly, make sure that the discipline's discursive boundaries remain intact. Discourses, in a Foucaultian sense, are subtle mechanisms that frame our thinking process. They determine the limits of what can be thought, talked, and written of in a normal and rational way. In every society the production of discourses is controlled, selected, organized, and diffused by certain procedures. They create systems of exclusion that elevate one group of discourses to a hegemonic status while condemning others to exile. Although the boundaries of discourses change, at times gradually, at times abruptly, they maintain a certain unity across time, a unity that dominates and transgresses individual authors, texts, or social practices. They explain, to return to Nietzsche, why "all things that live long are gradually so saturated with reason that their origin in unreason thereby becomes improbable."²⁸ Academic disciplines are powerful mechanisms to direct and control the production and diffusion of discourses. They establish the rules of intellectual exchange and define the methods, techniques, and instruments that are considered proper for the pursuit of knowledge. Within these margins, each discipline recognizes true and false propositions based on the standards of evaluation it established to assess them.²⁹ <63-64>

B. The procedural language of traditional framework arguments searches unceasingly for the capital-T Truth which purges the world of difference deemed irreducible to Identity.

Roland Bleiker, 2000. (Professor of International Relations Harvard and Cambridge, Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics, Cambridge University Press, 2000. p. 227-29)

The domain of global politics contains an unlimited number of terrains that offer possibilities for linguistic forms of dissent to interfere with the course of transversal struggles.

Before scrutinising a particular, linguistically based site of transversal dissent (the subject of the subsequent chapter), it is necessary to theorise in more detail how the written word offers opportunities to engender human agency. For this purpose an engagement with the work of Theodor Adorno is useful, particularly with his reading of Nietzsche. Adorno is ideally suited for this task because he epitomises both the strengths

and dangers of writing dissent. Adorno's approach to language emerges out of opposition to what he calls identity thinking. 'To think,' he claims, 'is to identify.'

37 It is a process through which we try to understand the bewildering world that surrounds us.

Thinking expresses a will to truth, a desire to control and impose order upon random and idiosyncratic events. When we think we identify choices, privilege one interpretation over others, and, often without knowing it, exclude what does not fit into the way we want to see things. There is no escape from the subjective dimension of thought, no possibility of extracting pure facts from observation. Thinking cannot be done without language. And language, of course, has always already established a preconceived conceptual order prior to what thinking is trying to understand. 38

In fact, Adorno even claims that before dealing with specific speech contents, languages mould a thought such that it gets drawn into subordination even where it appears to resist this tendency. ³⁹ Identity thinking, he points out, is the form of thinking that ignores these unavoidable socio-linguistic restraints. It embarks on a fatal search for essences, seeks to extract the general out of the particular and thus forces unique things into an artificial unitary system of thought. But thinking, Adorno claims, is not only obeying the power of language and discourse. Thinking also contains critical potential, for it is in itself already a process of negating, of resisting what is forced upon it. ⁴⁰

Stretching the boundaries of language games, engaging in *Sprachkritik*, is the key to realising this potential. It permits us to break loose from the claws of the established order and to venture beyond the givenness of life. Adorno's conceptual starting point for this journey is negative dialectics, the refusal to subsume the particular under the general. This entails creating thinking space without succumbing to the temptation of searching for a Hegelean synthesis, a new totalising and exclusionary system of thought that would drift us

back into the dangerous waters of identity thinking. Negative dialectics is the constant awareness of non-identity. It refuses to rely upon a preconceived standpoint. It rescues and develops what does not fit into prevailing totalising practices or what may emerge as a potential alternative to them.⁴¹ Adorno tries to open up such thinking spaces through a critique of language that calls for a radical departure from both the traditional usage of concepts and the style in which they are presented.

C. Identity-thinking culminates in violence against the Other

Connolly in 2k2 (William, Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science @ Johns Hopkins University, Identity/Difference, expanded edition)

Here in a nutshell is the thesis of this study: to confess a. particular identity is also to belong to difference. To come to terms affirmatively with the complexity of that connection is to support an ethos of identity and difference suitable to a democratic culture of deep pluralism. A few more things can be said to unpack that thesis, and I proceed by reviewing, refining, and augmenting a few formulations.

An identity is established in relation to a series of differences that have become socially recognized. These differences are essential to its being. If they did not coexist as differences, it would not exist in its distinctness and solidity. Entrenched in this indispensable relation is a second set of tendencies. . . to congeal established identities into fixed forms, thought and lived as if their structure expressed the true order of things.... Identity requires difference in order to be, and it converts difference into otherness in order to secure its own self-certainty.

(Identity/Difference, 64)

Identity is relational and collective. My personal identity is defined through the collective constituencies with which I identify or am identified by others (as white, male, American, a sports fan, and so on); it is further specified by comparison to a variety of things I am not. Identity, then, is always connected to a series of differences that help it be what it is. The initial tendency is to describe the differences on which you depend in a way that gives privilege or priority to you. Jews, said Kant, are legalistic; that definition allowed him to define Kantian-Christian morality as a more spiritual orientation to duties and rights. Atheists, said Tocqueville, are restless, egoistic, and amoral, lacking the spiritual source of morality upon which stability, trustworthiness, and care for others are anchored. That definition allowed him to honor the American passion to exclude professed atheists from public office. Built into the dynamic of identity is a polemical temptation to translate differences through which it is specified into moral failings or abnormalities. The pursuit of identity feeds the polemicism Foucault describes in the epigraph at the beginning of this essay. You need identity to act and to be ethical, but there is a drive to diminish difference to complete itself inside the pursuit of identity. There is thus a paradoxical element in the politics of identity. It is not an airtight paradox conforming to a textbook example in logic, but a social paradox that might be negotiated. It operates as pressure to make space for the fullness of self-identity for one constituency by marginalizing, demeaning, or excluding the differences on which it depends to specify itself. The depth grammar of a political theory is shaped, first, by the way in which it either acknowledges or suppresses this paradox, and, second, by whether it negotiates it pluralistically or translates it into an aggressive politics of exclusive universality. Traditionally, the first problem of evil is the question of how a benevolent, omnipotent God could allow intense suffering in the world. Typically, the answer involves attribution of free will to humans to engender a gap between the creative power of the God and the behavior of humanity. What I call in this book "the second problem of evil" flows from the social logic of identity/difference relations. It is the proclivity to marginalize or demonize difference to sanctify the identity you confess. Intensifying the second problem of evil is the fact that we also experience the source of morality through our most heartfelt experiences of identity. How could someone be moral, many believers say, without belief in free will and God? How could a morally responsible agent, others say, criticize the Enlightenment, the very achievement that grounds the moral disposition they profess? Don't they presuppose the very basis they criticize? <XIV-XV>

D. Critique solves—disruption of the status quo frees theory from the constraints of fact-sorting and opens thought to methodological pluralism.

Bleiker, 00 Ph.D. visiting research and teaching affiliations at Harvard, Cambridge, Humboldt, Tampere, Yonsei and Pusan National University as well as the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology and the

What follows may thus be called '**disruptive writing**', a process that Shapiro describes **as tackling an issue not by way of well-rehearsed debates, but through an alternative set of texts and narratives**.⁴⁶ My analysis juxtaposes familiar images of agency in global politics, such as the collapse of the Berlin Wall, with relatively unusual sites of investigation, such as Renaissance perceptions of dissent or contemporary poetics. **The objective of this disruptive process is not to declare alternative forms of knowledge true or even superior, but to reveal what has been discussed above: that the nature of international relations is intrinsically linked to the stories that are being told about it, and that an unsettling of these stories has the potential to redirect the theory and practice of global politics.**

Disruptive writing disturbs. It inevitably creates anxieties. Max Horkheimer observed half a century ago that **widespread hostility emerges as soon as theorists fail to limit themselves to verifying facts and ordering them into familiar categories** — categories which are indispensable for the sustenance of entrenched forms of life.⁴⁷ Likewise, **a disruptive reading of agency in global politics will not be met with uniform approval. There are those who are concerned with maintaining the proper epistemological boundaries of a coherent and self-contained discipline.**

Jack Levy, for instance, defends a distinct separation between the work of historians and international relations scholars. The former, he points out, use theory 'primarily to structure their interpretations of particular events'. The latter, by contrast, are political scientists whose task is to 'formulate and test general theoretical propositions about relationships between variables and classes of events'.⁴⁸ **Ensuing methodological principles, which are strongly influenced by a positivist understanding of social dynamics, have often been discussed in the context of the level of analysis problem. That is, they have been evoked to determine what is and is not a proper subject-study of international relations.** Barry Buzan convincingly points out that such approaches, which have become particularly influential in North American academia, fail to see that there are two different issues at stake. **On one side are ontological questions that have to do with determining the proper units of analysis (individuals, state, system, etc.), and on the other side are epistemological questions that concern the proper research method, the manner in which one explains the units' behaviour.**⁴⁹ By combining these two forms of delineating theoretical and analytical activities, the discipline of international relations has turned into a rather narrowly sketched field of inquiry. **A focus that is all too often confined to states and systemic factors is further restricted by limits imposed on the types of knowledge that are considered legitimate to understand global politics.** Consider how a group of highly influential scholars argue that the objective of proper research is 'to learn facts about the world' and that all hypotheses about them 'need to be evaluated empirically before they can make a contribution to knowledge'.⁵⁰ **As soon as these epistemological boundaries are transgressed, anxieties emerge and defensive mechanisms become operative. The warning against such transgressions is loud and clear: 'A proposed topic that cannot be refined into a specific research project permitting valid descriptive or causal interference should be modified along the way or abandoned.'**⁵¹ **A disruptive reading and writing of the agency** problematique in international theory **combines a commitment to methodological pluralism with an interdisciplinary and multi-layered understanding of transversal struggles.** International relations, then, is to be treated primarily as a broadly sketched theme of inquiry, rather than a disciplinary set of rules that determine where to locate and how to study global politics.

Gazing beyond the boundaries of disciplinary knowledge is necessary to open up questions of transversal dissent and human agency. Academic disciplines, by virtue of what they are, discipline the production and diffusion of knowledge. They establish the rules of intellectual exchange and define the methods, techniques and instruments that are considered proper for

this purpose. Such conventions not only suggest on what ground things can be studied legitimately, but also decide what issues are worthwhile to be assessed in the first place.

Critique Good – Short Shell

The traditional framework of policy debate assumes that discourse is a neutral medium through which thoughts are transmitted. This whitewashes the fact that discourses are produced such that they define what can and cannot be said through a violent process of control and exclusion

Roland Bleiker, “Forget IR Theory,” *Alternatives*; 1997

The doorkeepers of IR are those who, knowingly or unknowingly, **make sure that the discipline’s discursive boundaries remain intact. Discourses, in a Foucaultian sense, are subtle mechanisms that frame our thinking process. They determine the limits of what can be thought, talked, and written of in a normal and rational way. In every society the production of discourses is controlled, selected, organized, and diffused by certain procedures. They create systems of exclusion that elevate one group of discourses to a hegemonic status while condemning others to exile.** Although the boundaries of discourses change, at times gradually, at times abruptly, they maintain a certain unity across time, a unity that dominates and transgresses individual authors, texts, or social practices. **They explain, to return to Nietzsche, why “all things that live long are gradually so saturated with reason that their origin in unreason thereby becomes improbable.”²⁸ Academic disciplines are powerful mechanisms to direct and control the production and diffusion of discourses. They establish the rules of intellectual exchange and define the methods, techniques, and instruments that are considered proper for the pursuit of knowledge. Within these margins, each discipline recognizes true and false propositions based on the standards of evaluation it established to assess them.²⁹ <63-64>**

Critique solves - Dissent at the epistemological and ontological level runs through the discursive cracks of hegemony to the heart of social change.

Bleiker, 00 Ph.D. visiting research and teaching affiliations at Harvard, Cambridge, Humboldt, Tampere, Yonsei and Pusan National University as well as the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology and the Institute of Social Studies in The Hague, (Roland, *Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics*, Cambridge University Press)

This chapter has mapped out some of the discursive terrains in which transversal dissent takes place. **Discourses are not invincible monolithic forces that subsume everything in reach. Despite their power to frame social practices, a discursively entrenched hegemonic order can be fragmented and thin at times. To excavate the possibilities for dissent that linger in these cracks, a shift of foci from epistemological to ontological issues is necessary.** Scrutinising the level of Being reveals how individuals can escape aspects of hegemony. Dasein, the existential awareness of Being, always already contains the potential to become something else than what it is. By shifting back and forth between hyphenated identities, an individual can travel across various discursive fields of power and gain the critical insight necessary to escape at least some aspect of the prevailing order.

Transversal practices of dissent that issue from such mobile subjectivities operate at the level of dailiness. Through a range of seemingly mundane acts of resistance, people can gradually transform societal values and thus promote powerful processes of social change. These transformations are not limited to existing boundaries of sovereignty. The power of discursive practices is not circumscribed by some ultimate spatial delineation, and neither are the practices of dissent that interfere with them. At a time when the flow of capital and information is increasingly trans-territorial, the sphere of everyday life has become an integral aspect of global politics — one that deserves the attention of scholars who devote themselves to the analysis of international relations. The remaining chapters seek to sustain this claim and, in doing so, articulate a viable and non-essentialist concept of human agency.

Epistemology First

Epistemology comes first- The question of action must take a backseat to questions of policy formation and assumptions surrounding problem-solving techniques.

Owen 02, Reader in Political Theory at the University of Southampton (David, “Reorienting International Relations: On Pragmatism, Pluralism and Practical Reasoning”, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 31, No. 3, <http://mil.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/31/3/653>)

The first dimension concerns the relationship between positivist IR theory and postmodernist IR ‘theory’ (and the examples illustrate the claims concerning pluralism and factionalism made in the introduction to this section). It is exhibited when we read Walt warning of the danger of postmodernism as a kind of theoretical decadence since ‘issues of peace and war are too important for the field [of IR] to be diverted into a prolix and self-indulgent discourse that is divorced from the real world’,¹² or find Keohane asserting sniffily that Neither neorealist nor neoliberal institutionalists are content with interpreting texts: both sets of theorists believe that there is an international political reality that can be partly understood, even if it will always remain to some extent veiled.¹³ **We should be wary of such denunciations precisely because the issue at stake for the practitioners of this ‘prolix and self-indulgent discourse’ is the picturing of international politics and the implications of this picturing for the epistemic and ethical framing of the discipline**, namely, the constitution of what phenomena are appropriate objects of theoretical or other forms of enquiry. **The kind of accounts provided by practitioners of this type are not competing theories** (hence Keohane’s complaint) **but conceptual reproblematisations of the background that informs theory construction, namely, the distinctions, concepts, assumptions, inferences and assertability warrants that are taken for granted in** the course of the **debate** between, for example, neorealists and neoliberal institutionalists (hence the point-missing character of Keohane’s complaint). Thus, for example, Michael Shapiro writes: **The global system of sovereign states has been familiar both structurally and symbolically in the daily acts of imagination through which space and human identity are construed. The persistence of this international imaginary has helped to support the political privilege of sovereignty affiliations and territorialities.** In recent years, however, **a variety of disciplines have offered conceptualizations that challenge the familiar, bordered world of the discourse of international relations.**¹⁴ **The point of these remarks is to call critically into question the background picture** (or, to use another term of art, the horizon) **against which the disciplinary discourse and practices of IR are conducted in order** to make this background itself an object of reflection and evaluation. In a similar vein, Rob Walker argues: **Under the present circumstances the question ‘What is to be done?’ invites a degree of arrogance that is all too visible in the behaviour of the dominant political forces of our time. . . . The most pressing questions of the age call not only for concrete policy options to be offered to existing elites and institutions, but also, and more crucially, for a serious rethinking of the ways in which it is possible for human beings to live together.**¹⁵ The aim of these comments is to draw to our attention the easily forgotten fact that **our existing ways of picturing international politics emerge from, and in relation to, the very practices of international politics with which they are engaged and it is entirely plausible** (on standard Humean grounds) **that, under changing conditions of political activity, these ways of guiding reflection and action may lose their epistemic and/or ethical value such that a deeper interrogation of the terms of international politics is required.** Whether or not one agrees with Walker that this is currently required, it is a perfectly reasonable issue to raise. After all, as Quentin Skinner has recently reminded us, it is remarkably difficult to avoid falling under the spell of our own intellectual heritage. . . . **As we analyse and reflect on our normative concepts, it is easy to become bewitched into believing that the ways of thinking about them bequeathed to us by the mainstream of our intellectual traditions must be the ways of thinking about them.**¹⁶ In this respect, one effect of the kind of challenge posed by

postmodernists like Michael Shapiro and Rob Walker is to prevent us from becoming too readily bewitched.

Critique solves “Root Cause”

Critical lenses allow us to view policymaking in a “comparativist approach,” evaluating the present along with its underlying causes and roots

Shampa Biswas, Professor of Politics at Whitman College, December 2007, “Empire and Global Public Intellectuals: Reading Edward Said as an International Relations Theorist,” *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 36, No. 1, p. 127-128

What the exilic orientation makes possible is this ability to universalise by enabling first, ‘a double perspective that never sees things in isolation’ so that from the juxtaposition of ideas and experiences **‘one gets a better, perhaps even more universal idea of how to think, say, about a human rights issue in one situation by comparison with another’**, 39 and second, **an ability to see things ‘not simply as they are, but as they have come to be that way’**, as contingent ‘historical choices made by men and women’ that are changeable. 40 The second of these abilities displaces the ontological given-ness of the nation-state in the study of global politics; for the intellectual who feels pulled by the demands of loyalty and patriotism, Said suggests, ‘[n]ever solidarity before criticism’, arguing that **it is the intellectual’s task to show how the nation ‘is not a natural or god-given entity but is a constructed, manufactured, even in some cases invented object, with a history of struggle and conquest behind it’**. 41 **The first of these abilities interjects a comparativist approach as critical to the study of global politics, locating one’s work in a temporal and spatial plane that is always larger than one’s immediate (national) context and in the process historicising and politicising what may appear naturalised in any particular (national) context.** The now famous passage from Hugo of St Victor, cited by Auerbach, appears in Said’s writings on at least four different occasions: The man who finds his homeland sweet is still a tender beginner; he to whom every soil is as his native one is already strong; but he is perfect to whom the entire world is as a foreign land. The tender soul has fixed his love on one spot in the world; the strong man has extended his love to all places; the perfect man has extinguished his. 42

Performativity Shell (1/2)

A. The decisionmaking paradigm inherent in the traditional forms of political engagement engages in an unconscious exercise of power over the self which regulates discourse and produces for itself legitimate methods for engagement which rarely result in change.

Kulynych, 97, Winthrop U Prof of Polysci (Jessica, "Performing Politics: Foucault, Habermas, and Postmodern Participation, Polity, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Winter, 1997), 315-346, accessed Jstor)

While separately both Habermas and Foucault challenge the traditional understanding of participation, their combined insights further and irrevocably extend that challenge. Theoretical focus on the distinctions between Habermas and Foucault has all too often obscured important parallels between these two theorists. Specifically, the Habermas-Foucault debate has underemphasized the extent to which Habermas also describes a disciplinary society. In his descriptions of bureaucracy, technocracy, and system colonization, Habermas is also describing a world where power is productive and dispersed and where political action is constrained and normalized. Habermas, like Foucault, describes a type of power that cannot be adequately characterized in terms of the intentions of those who possess it. Colonization is not the result of conscious intention, but is rather the unintended consequence of a multitude of small adjustments. The gender and racial subtexts infusing the system are not the results of conscious intention, but rather of implicit gender and racial norms and expectations infecting the economy and the state.

Bureaucratic power is not a power that is possessed by any individual or agency, but exists in the exercise of decisionmaking.

As Iris Young points out, **we must "analyze the exercise of power [in contemporary societies] as the effect of often liberal and humane practices of education, bureaucratic administration,** production and distribution of consumer goods, medicine and so on."⁸ The very practices that Habermas chronicles are exemplary of a power that has no definitive subject. As Young explains, **"the conscious actions of many individuals daily contribute to maintaining and reproducing oppression, but those people are simply** doing their jobs or **living their lives, and do not understand themselves as agents of oppression."**⁸

Colonization and bureaucratization also fit the pattern of a power that is not primarily repressive but productive. **Disciplinary technologies** are, as Sawicki describes, not... repressive mechanisms ... [that] operate primarily through violence ... or seizure ... but rather [they **operate**] **by producing new objects and subjects of knowledge, by inciting and channeling desires, generating and focusing individual and group energies, and establishing bodily norms and techniques for observing, monitoring and controlling bodily movements, processes, and capacities.**⁹ **The very practices of** administration, distribution, and **decisionmaking** on which Habermas focuses his attention **can and must be analyzed as productive disciplinary practices.** Although these practices can clearly be repressive, their most insidious effects are productive. **Rather than simply holding people back, bureaucratization breaks up, categorizes, and systemizes projects and people.** It creates new categories of knowledge and expertise. Bureaucratization and colonization also create new subjects as the objects of bureaucratic expertise. The social welfare client and the consumer citizen are the creation of bureaucratic power, not merely its target. The extension of lifeworld gender norms into the system creates the possibility for sexual harassment, job segregation, parental leave, and consensual corporate decisionmaking. Created as a part of these subjectivities are new gestures and norms of bodily behavior, such as the embarrassed shuffling of food stamps at the grocery checkout and the demeaning sexual reference at the office copier. Bodily movements are monitored and regularized by means of political opinion polls, welfare lists, sexual harassment protocols, flex-time work schedules, and so forth. **Modern disciplinary power,** as described by Foucault and implied by Habermas, **does not merely prevent us from developing, but creates us differently as the effect of its functioning.** These disciplinary techniques not only control us, but also enable us to be more efficient and more productive, and often more powerful.

Focusing on the disciplinary elements of the Habermasian critique opens the door for exploring the postmodern character of Habermasian politics. Because Habermas does describe a disciplinary world, his prescription for contemporary democracy (**discursive politics**) **ought to be sensitive to, and appropriate for, a disciplinary world.** Foucault's sensitivity to the workings of disciplinary power is central to the articulation of a plausible, postmodern version of discursive politics. In the following discussion I will argue for a performative redefinition of participation that will reinvigorate the micro-politics demanded by Foucault, as well as provide a more nuanced version of the discursive politics demanded by Habermas.

B. The impact is discipline and domination. Kritikal arguments are key to break down the illusion of active change brought on by the hegemony of political calculation within debate, while there may be some disadvantages to allowing kritiks, there is only a risk of education and real change in a world where we embrace their presence.

Kulynych, 97, Winthrop U Prof of Polysci (Jessica, "Performing Politics: Foucault, Habermas, and Postmodern Participation, *Polity*, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Winter, 1997), 315-346, accessed Jstor)

The notion of performativity as both identity- or world-creating and as demonstration, is crucial for understanding contemporary political action. Performative **resistance does not eliminate power and it is not effected in the name of some subjugated agency,** but **rather its purpose is disruption and re-creation.** **It is a reoccurring disruption that ensures an endless reconstitution of power.** **Disciplinary technologies effect the internalization of norms-a removal from view of the mechanisms that create us as subjects,** making our identities self-evident. **Resistance brings those norms back into an arena of contestation.** **By its very existence resistance ensures resistibility, which is the very thing internalized norms are designed to suppress.** In other words, resistance is not undertaken as a protest against the subjugation of a reified ideal subject, but rather **resistance, as the action of thoroughly constructed subjects, reveals the contingency of both subjectivity and subjection.** While Chaloupka suggests that the role of the protestor is "tellingly different" from that of the citizen, I disagree. Often **only the act of resistance provides any meaningful sense of "citizenship" in this privatized contemporary world.** As Dana Villa points out, resistance "can be seen as a successor concept to Arendt's notion of political action: **where the space for action is usurped, where action in the strict sense is no longer possible, resistance becomes the primary vehicle of spontaneity and agonistic subjectivity.**"⁷⁰ **Performative resistance recognizes disciplinary power, enables action in the face of that power, enables innovation in deliberation, and thus allows us to see the world of political action differently.** Consequently, it is possible, and more meaningful, to conceptualize contemporary participation as a performative rather than a representative action. **The failure to reconceptualize political participation as resistance furthers an illusion of democratic control that obscures the techniques of disciplinary power and their role in global strategies of domination, fundamentally missing the real, although much more humble opportunities for citizens to "take part" in their own "governance."** Accepting the idea of participation as resistance has two broad implications that fundamentally transform the participation debate. First, it widens the parameters of participation to include a host of new actors, activities, and locations for political action. **A performative concept redirects our attention away from the normal apparatus of government and economy, and therefore allows us to see a much broader range of political actions.** Second, **it requires that we look anew at traditional participatory activities and evaluate their performative potential.**

Link – Traditional Politics

The post-modern nature of today's world prohibits traditional modes of participation- it is impossible to effectively engage in modern democratic society through traditional means.

Kulynych, 97 Winthrop U Prof of Polysci (Jessica, "Performing Politics: Foucault, Habermas, and Postmodern Participation, Polity, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Winter, 1997), 315-346, accessed Jstor)

Though political scientists have often asked why people participate in politics, today it is more fitting to ask what participation means. This question is particularly urgent if we recognize and accept the emergence of a postmodern world. To say that the world is now

"postmodern" is to highlight fundamental changes in both the condition of the contemporary world, and in our attitude toward this world. **The unique political and economic configuration of advanced, welfare state capitalism, the subtlety and ubiquity of disciplinary power, the simultaneous solidification and fracture of personal and collective identity, and the advance of technology and bureaucracy combine with an increasing philosophical skepticism toward truth and subjectivity to produce a world that is often incompatible with our traditional understandings of democracy. These fundamental changes inevitably alter the meaning of basic democratic concepts such as political participation.** While numerous political and social theorists have sought

to portray and understand this change, few have been more influential than Jurgen Habermas and Michel Foucault. Each provides valuable conceptual resources for understanding contemporary societies and the kinds of dominations, repressions, oppressions, constructions, subjectifications, identities, and possibilities that exist therein. They also provide promising, albeit incomplete suggestions for reconceptualizing political participation in ways appropriate for postmodern societies. Habermas recommends a discursive concept of participation based on communicative action in a deliberative public sphere, and Foucault recommends a micro-politics of resistance. Unfortunately, their insights have not yet been integrated into a postmodern understanding of political participation. This failure of integration is a direct result of an excessively polarized debate that has elided their similarities and exaggerated their differences.¹ Rather than focus primarily on the differences between discursive participation and resistance, I maintain that it is possible and fruitful to combine these two strategies.² In the following discussion I utilize the contemporary concept of performativity to integrate both deliberation and resistance into a new understanding of political participation as performative resistance.

Traditional ideals of political participation including policy analysis fail to engage the modern systems of state function and in fact lessen the possibility for public criticism to influence political change.

Kulynych, 97 Winthrop U Prof of Polysci (Jessica, "Performing Politics: Foucault, Habermas, and Postmodern Participation, Polity, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Winter, 1997), 315-346, accessed Jstor)

Political scientists have traditionally understood political participation as an activity that

assures individual influence over the political system, protection of private interests, system legitimacy, and perhaps even self-development. Habermas and Foucault describe the impact of the conditions of postmodernity on the possibility for efficacious political

action in remarkably similar ways. Habermas describes a world where the possibilities for efficacious political action are quite limited. **The**

escalating interdependence of state and economy, the expansive increase in bureaucratization,

the increasingly technical nature of political decisionmaking, and the subsequent colonization of a formerly sacred private sphere by a ubiquitous administrative state render traditional modes of political participation unable to provide influence, privacy, legitimacy, and self-development.³ **As the state is forced to take an ever larger role in directing a complex global,**

capitalist, welfare state economy, the scope of administration inevitably grows. In order to fulfill its function as the manager of the economy, the administrative state must also manage the details of our lives formerly considered private. Yet, as the state's role in our "private" lives continues to grow, the public has become less and less interested in government, focusing instead on personal and social mores, leisure, and consumption. **Ironically, we have become less interested in politics at precisely the same moment**

when our lives are becoming increasingly "politicized" and administered. This siege of private life and the complicity of this ideology of "civil privatism" in the functioning of the modern

administrative state **makes a mockery of the idea that there exist private interests that can be**

protected from state intervention.⁴ Correlatively, the technical and instrumental rationality of **modern policymaking significantly lessens the possibility for public influence on state policy.**⁵

The difficulty of participation in Habermas's world is exacerbated by the added complexity of a political system structured by hierarchical gender and

racial norms. Nancy Fraser uses Habermas's analysis of the contemporary situation to demonstrate how the infusion of these **hierarchical gender and racial norms into the functioning of the state and economy ensures that political channels of communication between**

citizens and the state are unequally structured and therefore cannot function as mechanisms for the equal protection of interests.⁶ Accordingly, **theorists are much less optimistic about the possibilities for citizens to acquire** or develop feelings of

autonomy and efficacy from the attempt to communicate interests to a system that is essentially impervious to citizen interests, eschews discussion of long-term goals, and requires exclusively technical and instrumental debate. Similarly,

Foucault's complex genealogical descriptions of disciplinary power net- works challenge the traditional assumption that political

power is located primarily in the formal apparatus of the state. **The traditional understanding of political participation tells us**

nothing about what types of political action are appropriate in a world where power is typically and predominantly

disciplinary, productive, and normalizing. As long as we define the purpose of participation only in terms of influence, privacy, legitimacy, and self-development, **we will be unable to see how political action can be effective in the contemporary world.**

Link – Ideal Speech

A procedural method of policymaking debate posits an ‘ideal speech’ which necessarily excludes other forms of discourse, making any definition of participation that is limited exclusively to regulated political discourse inevitably exclusionary, racist and sexist.

Kulynych, 97, Winthrop U Prof of Polysci (Jessica, “Performing Politics: Foucault, Habermas, and Postmodern Participation, *Polity*, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Winter, 1997), 315-346, accessed Jstor)

Certainly, one might suggest that the above cases are really just failures of speech, and, therefore, not a critique of ideal speech as it is formulated by Habermas. Indeed Seyla Benhabib reformulates Habermas's speech act perspective to make it sensitive to the above critique. She argues that feminists concerned with the discourse model of democracy have often confused the historically biased practices of deliberative assemblies with the normative ideal of rational deliberation.²⁶ She suggests that feminists concerned with inequities and imbalances in communication can actually benefit from the Habermasian requirement that all positions and issues be made " 'public' in the sense of making [them] accessible to debate, reflection, action and moral-political transformation."²⁷

The "radical proceduralism" of the discourse model makes it ideally suited to identify inequities in communication because it precludes our accepting unexamined and unjustified positions.²⁸

Even such a sophisticated and sensitive approach to ideal speech as Benhabib's cannot cleanse communicative action of its exclusivity. It is not only that acquiring language is a process of mastering a symbolic heritage that is systematically gendered, but **the entire attempt to set conditions for "ideal speech" is inevitably exclusive. The model of an ideal speech situation establishes a norm of rational interaction that is defined by the very types of interaction it excludes.**

The norm of rational debate favors critical argument and reasoned debate over other forms of communication.²⁹ **Defining ideal speech inevitably entails defining unacceptable speech.** What has been defined as unacceptable in Habermas's formulation is any speech that is not intended to convey an idea. Speech evocative of identity, culture, or emotion has no necessary place in the ideal speech situation, and hence persons whose speech is richly colored with rhetoric, gesture, humor, spirit, or affectation could be defined as deviant or immature communicators. Therefore, **a definition of citizenship based on participation in an ideal form of interaction can easily become a tool for the exclusion of deviant communicators from the category of citizens. This sort of normalization creates citizens as subjects of rational debate.**

Correlatively, as Fraser explains, because the communicative action approach is procedural it is particularly unsuited to address issues of speech content.³⁰ Therefore, by definition, it misses the relationship between procedure and content that is at the core of feminist and deconstructive critiques of language. **A procedural approach can require that we accommodate all utterances and that we not marginalize speaking subjects. It cannot require that we take seriously or be convinced by the statements of such interlocutors. In other words, a procedural approach does not address the cultural context that makes some statements convincing and others not.**

Performance key to Political Participation

Engaging in nontraditional debate which has moved away from the exclusive focus on policy analysis is key to reinvigorate true democracy and encouraging real participation.

Kulynych, 97, Winthrop U Prof of Polysci (Jessica, "Performing Politics: Foucault, Habermas, and Postmodern Participation, *Polity*, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Winter, 1997), 315-346, accessed Jstor)

Habermas regards a public sphere of rational debate as the only possible foundation for democratic politics in the contemporary world. For Habermas, like Schumpeter, democracy is a method.

Democracies are systems that achieve the formation of public opinion and public will through a correct process of public communication, and then "translate" that communicative power into administrative power via the procedurally regulated public spheres of parliaments and the judiciary. The extent to which this translation occurs is the measure of a healthy constitutional democracy. Thus, **the "political public sphere" is the "fundamental concept of a theory of democracy."**¹⁰

In this discursive definition of democracy, political participation takes on a new character. **Participation equals discursive participation; it is communication governed by rational, communicatively achieved argument and negotiation.** Habermas distinguishes two types of discursive participation: **problem-solving or decision-oriented deliberation, which takes place primarily in formal democratic institutions such as parliaments and is regulated or governed by democratic procedures; and informal opinion-formation, which is opinion-formation "uncoupled from decisions..."** [and] effected in an open and inclusive network of overlapping, subcultural publics having fluid temporal, social and substantive boundaries."

"In many ways this two-tiered description of discursive participation is a radically different understanding of political participation, and one better suited to the sort of societies we currently inhabit. **Habermas moves the focus of participation away from policymaking and toward redefining legitimate democratic processes that serve as the necessary background for subsequent policymaking. While only a limited number of specially trained individuals can reasonably engage in decisionmaking participation, the entire populous can and must participate in the informal deliberation that takes place outside of, or uncoupled from, formal decisionmaking structures.** This **informal participation is primarily about generating "public discourses that uncover topics of relevance to all of society, interpret values, contribute to the resolution of problems, generate good reasons, and debunk bad ones."**¹² Informal participation has two main functions. First, it acts as a "warning system with sensors that, though unspecialized, are sensitive throughout society."³ This system communicates problems "that must be processed by the political system."¹⁴ Habermas labels this the "signal" function. Second, **informal participation must not only indicate when problems need to be addressed, it must also provide an "effective problematization" of those issues.** As Habermas argues, from the perspective of democratic theory, the public sphere must, in addition, amplify the pressure of problems, that is, not only detect and identify problems but also convincingly and influentially thematize them, furnish them with possible solutions, and dramatize them in such a way that they are taken up and dealt with by parliamentary complexes."

Informal participation is crucial because it is the source of both legitimacy and innovation in formal decisionmaking. As long as decisionmaking is open to the influence of informal opinion-formation, then state policies are legitimate because they are grounded in free and equal communication that meets the democratic requirement of equal participation. Informal participation originating in the public sphere is also the resource for innovative descriptions and presentations of interests, preferences, and issues. **If they ignore informal participation, state decisionmakers have no connection to the center of democracy: the political public sphere.**

Performance key to Political Participation

Kritiks access citizenship better- they allow engagement without relying on exclusionary political calculus and technical knowledge. The power of the kritik is that it blurs the line between laypeople and political analysts- allowing a radically inclusive reformation of the democratic processes.

Kulynych, 97, Winthrop U Prof of Polysci (Jessica, "Performing Politics: Foucault, Habermas, and Postmodern Participation, *Polity*, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Winter, 1997), 315-346, accessed Jstor)

A performative perspective on participation enriches our understanding of deliberative democracy.

This enlarged understanding can be demonstrated by considering the examination of citizen politics in Germany presented in Carol Hager's Technological Democracy: Bureaucracy and Citizenry in the West German Energy Debate. 86 Her work skillfully maps the precarious position of citizen groups as they enter into problem- solving in contemporary democracies. After detailing the German citizen foray into technical debate and the subsequent creation of energy commissions to deliberate on the long-term goals of energy policy, she concludes that **a dual standard of interpretation and evaluation is required for full understanding of the prospects for citizen participation. Where traditional understandings of participation focus on the policy dimension and concern themselves with the citizens' success or failure to attain policy preferences, she advocates focusing as well on the discursive, legitimation dimension of citizen action.** Hager follows Habermas in reconstituting participation discursively and asserts that **the legitimation dimension offers an alternative reason for optimism about the efficacy of citizen action. In the discursive understanding of participation, success is not defined in terms of getting, but rather in terms of solving through consensus. Deliberation is thus an end in itself, and citizens have succeeded whenever they are able to secure a realm of deliberative politics where the aim is forging consensus among participants, rather than achieving victory by some over others.** Through the creation of numerous networks of communication and the generation of publicity, **citizen action furthers democracy by assuming a substantive role in governing and by forcing participants in the policy process to legitimate their positions politically rather than technically.** Hager maintains that **a sense of political efficacy is enhanced by this politically interactive role even though citizens were only minimally successful in influencing or controlling the outcome of the policy debate, and experienced a real lack of autonomy as they were coerced into adopting the terms of the technical debate.** She agrees with Alberto Melucci that **the impact of [these] movements cannot ... be judged by normal criteria of efficacy and success. ... These groups offer a different way of perceiving and naming the world. They demonstrate that alternatives are possible, and they expand the communicative as opposed to the bureaucratic or market realms of societal activity.**87 Yet her analysis is incomplete. Like Habermas, Hager relies too heavily on a discursive reconstitution of political action. Though she recognized many of the limitations of Habermas's theory discussed above, she insists on the innovative and creative potential of citizen initiatives. She insists that deliberative politics can resist the tendency toward authoritarianism common to even a communicative, deliberative search for objective truth, and that legitimation debates can avoid the tendency to devolve into the technical search for the better argument. She bases her optimism on the non-hierarchical, sometimes even chaotic and incoherent, forms of decisionmaking practiced by citizen initiatives, and on the diversity and spontaneity of citizen groups. Unfortunately, it is precisely these elements of citizen action that cannot be explained by a theory of communicative action. It is here that a performative conception of political action implicitly informs Hager's discussion. **From a performative perspective, the goal of action is not only to secure a realm for deliberative politics, but to disrupt and resist the norms and identities that structure such a realm and its participants.** While Habermas theorizes that political solutions will emerge from dialogue, **a performative understanding of participation highlights the limits of dialogue and the creative and often**

uncontrollable effect of unpremeditated action on the very foundations of communication. When we look at the success of citizen initiatives from a performative perspective, we look precisely at those moments of defiance and disruption that bring the invisible and unimaginable into view. Although citizens were minimally successful in influencing or controlling the outcome of the policy debate and experienced a considerable lack of autonomy in their coercion into the technical debate, the goal-oriented debate within the energy commissions could be seen as a defiant moment of performative politics. The existence of a goal-oriented debate within a technically dominated arena defied the normalizing separation between expert policymakers and consuming citizens. Citizens momentarily recreated themselves as policymakers in a system that defined citizens out of the policy process, thereby refusing their construction as passive clients. The disruptive potential of the energy commissions continues to defy technical bureaucracy even while their decisions are non-binding. Where traditional understandings of political participation see the energy commissions' failure to recapture the decisionmaking process as an expression of the power of the bureaucracy, and discursive understandings see the tendency toward devolution into technical debate and procedural imperative, the performative perspective explains and high- lights the moments of defiant creativity and disruptive diversity that inevitably accompany citizen expeditions into unexplored territory. This attitude of defiance, manifest in the very chaos and spontaneity that Hager points toward as a counter to Habermas's strictly dialogic and procedural approach, simply cannot be explained by an exclusively discursive theory. It is the performative aspects of participation that cannot be captured or constrained within the confines of rational discourse, that gesture toward meanings that are inexpressible and identities that are unimaginable within the current cultural imagery. These performances provide the resource for diversity and spontaneity. Consider, for example, a public hearing. When seen from a discursive, legitimation perspective, deliberation and debate are about the sincere, controlled attempt to discern the best, most rational, least biased arguments that most precisely express an interlocutor's ideas and interests. In practice, however, deliberation is a much less deliberative and much more performative activity. The literary aspects of debate-irony, satire, sarcasm, and wit-work precisely on the slippage between what is said and what is meant, or what can be said and what can be conceived. Strategies such as humor are not merely rational, but visceral and often uncontrollable, as is the laughter that is evoked from such strategies. Performative actions are not alternative ways of deliberating; rather they are agonistic expressions of what cannot be captured by deliberative rationality. As such, they resist the confines of that rationality and gesture toward places where words, arguments, and claims are not enough. Without an understanding of the performative aspect of political action, Hager cannot explain how citizens are able to introduce genuinely new and different "ways of perceiving and naming the world" into a realm where such epistemic standards are unimaginable. It is in the process of acting as citizens in a technical bureaucratic setting, where citizen action is by definition precluded, that alternative, epistemic standards of evaluation become possible. Only when scholars recognize the performative will they be able to grasp the intricacies of contemporary political action and the possibilities for an actually diverse and participatory democracy.

Performance key to Education

Political engagement is more than simple argument- the form of the message is just as influential as the content, and no message can be understood without understanding its method.

Kulynych, 97, Winthrop U Prof of Polysci (Jessica, "Performing Politics: Foucault, Habermas, and Postmodern Participation, *Polity*, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Winter, 1997), 315-346, accessed Jstor)

How to convincingly thematize an alternative to something that is taken for granted is the very problem postmodernists have so often taken up. Habermas also recognizes this problem, as is evident in some of the terminology he employs in describing the role of public discourses.

Discourses must not only identify, they must also thematize and dramatize.⁴² They can be metaphorically described as "performances" and "presentations" that invoke not only "forums" but also "stages" and "arenas."⁴³ These are images that imply more than the careful presentation of validity claims. Habermas's demand that public discourses be both "attention catching" and "innovative" as well as "convincing" and "justifiable" requires more than rational argumentation. It requires a kind of political action that can effectively disrupt the culturally common sensical and actually provide new and compelling alternatives to disciplinary constructions of such things as gender difference. It is here that Habermas would benefit from attending to the productive character of disciplinary power in creating distinctly and authentically gendered beings in the first place.

Performance key to Change

Performative resistance is a crucial break with traditional political debate- resistance is a self-constituted activity that is necessary for the inclusion of alternative perspectives.

Kulynych, 97, Winthrop U Prof of Polysci (Jessica, "Performing Politics: Foucault, Habermas, and Postmodern Participation, *Polity*, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Winter, 1997), 315-346, accessed Jstor)

Performative resistance brings into being the citizen it purports to represent. The thoroughly privatized, client-citizen is re-created as a public actor in the moment of resistance. Foucault himself seemed to be leaning toward this sort of notion of performative action in his focus on care for the self and on an aesthetic of "self-creation." In these later thoughts, Foucault seems clearly to be searching for a way to understand innovative and experimental subjectivities that are not a return to the idea of a liberated human essence. His focus on the active constitution of the self is additional evidence of a move toward a more performative notion of resistance. As he stated in a 1984 interview, I would say that if now I am interested, in fact, in the way **the subject constitutes himself in an active fashion, by the practices of the self, these practices are nevertheless not something that the individual invents by himself.** They are patterns that he finds in his culture and which are proposed, suggested and imposed on him by his culture, his society, and his social group.⁶² As long as we look at this type of resistance as expressive of the subject, then McCarthy is right: the intent of the subject's actions are proposed, suggested, and imposed, and hardly what we would label autonomous. But, **once we think of the activity of self-creation performatively, then the possibility of a resistant citizen emerges. It is indeed incongruous to ask what it is that resists, since the citizen as participant, the resistant citizen, is created by the act of resistance. The above notion of performativity as "world creating," or identity- creating is crucial given the subjectifying nature of modern power** that McCarthy so clearly recognizes. However, the world-creating facet of performativity is not adequate for answering Fraser's normative query. Fraser's concerns reflect a real normative confusion in Foucault. He interrogates the development of disciplinary power at the same time he denies that there is a foundation for his own normativity.⁶³ He utilizes liberal ideals, such as personal liberty, to expose the malevolence of enlightenment liberation, but combines them with a critique that eschews normative grounding. Again, an understanding of resistance as per- formative helps explain this apparent contradiction. William Chaloupka provides a second understanding of performativity that helps explain Foucault's "cryptonormativism." Chaloupka plays upon the dual meaning of demonstration to highlight the performative aspects of protest. In the typical usage, to demonstrate means "to point out, to make known, to describe and explain."⁶⁴ In this sense, **protesters utilize their actions as a vehicle for their interests. They make their point, which already exists, through the use of the demonstration as tactic. But demonstration has also an alternative meaning, a meaning derived from the French démontrer** (to demonstrate), and montrer (to show).⁶⁵ Thus, as Chaloupka sees it, **a demonstration is also "a show." The demonstration in this sense is not an explanation but an exposure, a defiance embodied in action that flies in the face of acceptability. Accordingly, the protestor's usage moves toward the contingent realm of strategies and emotions. Here demonstration does not establish objectivity and logic, so much as it shows up the objective order, assertively getting in the way.**⁶⁶ Thus **the performative aspect of demonstration cannot be adequately captured with the lens of truth and justice. The protestor is not trying to make a point, to prove that the system is unjust. Rather, the protestor exposes the contingency of justice itself.**

Performance key to Policymaking

Kritik is a pre-requisite to policy- revealing that which is excluded from normal discussions is key to identifying effective solutions. In effect, the question is not “Should we resist?”, but rather “How and what are we resisting?”

Kulynych, 97, Winthrop U Prof of Polysci (Jessica, “Performing Politics: Foucault, Habermas, and Postmodern Participation, *Polity*, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Winter, 1997), 315-346, accessed Jstor)

Foucault comes close to saying what Chaloupka argues here when he states, a critique is not a matter of saying that things are not right as they are. It is a matter of pointing out on what kinds of assumptions, what kinds of familiar, unchallenged, unconsidered modes of thought the practices we accept rest. ... Criticism is a matter of flushing out that thought and trying to change it: to show that things are not as self-evident as one believes, to see that what is accepted as self-evident will no longer be accepted as such.⁶⁷ If we interpret the "to show" here not as pointing out what is wrong with disciplinary society (which would leave Foucault subject to Fraser's normative criticism), but rather as "showing," or "showing up," then we no longer need the introduction of normative notions, we are merely doing disciplinary society one better. **Making a point is a function of discourse, the ability to align and arrange arguments that support a position. Yet, the performative protestor does not argue against the state, he mocks it. The protestor works at the margins of discourse, utilizing puns and jokes and caricature to "expose" the limits of what is being said. Thus, performative resistance, when considered as critique, does not need to tell us what is wrong, rather it reveals the existence of subjection where we had not previously seen it.** I am not suggesting that we can get a normative anchor out of the notion of performativity. To the contrary, I am suggesting **performative resistance makes no such normative distinctions, or rather, that performativity is not about normative distinctions. We bring normativity to our performances as ethical principles that are themselves subject to resistance. By unearthing the contingency of the "self-evident," performative resistance enables politics. Thus, the question is not should we resist (since resistance is always, already present), but rather what and how we should resist.** This notion of performativity is also important for understanding the possibilities for innovation in Habermasian deliberative participation. **Just as a protestor exposes the contingency of concepts like justice, a dialogue exposes the limits and contingency of rational argumentation. Once we are sensitive to the performative nature of speech, language and discourse, then we can see that deliberative politics cannot be confined to the rational statement of validity claims. Deliberation must be theatrical: it is in the performance of deliberation that that which cannot be argued for finds expression. Indeed it is precisely the non-rational aspects of deliberation that carry the potential for innovation.** In his description of the poignant reminders of demonstration Chaloupka recognizes that it is at the margins that the actual force of the demonstration resides, no matter what happens at the microphone. The oral histories of demonstrations (the next day over coffee) linger over the jokes and funny signs and slogans, the outrages and improprieties, more than the speeches and carefully coherent position papers.⁶⁸ **Any convincing account of the politics of deliberation must take account of the creative potential that resides in the performance of debate.**

Performance key to Inclusion

Incorporating kritiks expands the domain of the political, returning to policymaking arguments by reinvigorating their effectiveness in the public sphere.

Kulynych, 97, Winthrop U Prof of Polysci (Jessica, "Performing Politics: Foucault, Habermas, and Postmodern Participation, *Polity*, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Winter, 1997), 315-346, accessed Jstor)

Understanding participation as performative resistance also provides a theoretical grounding for rethinking conventional participatory activities. The breakdown of the distinction between participation and resistance means that conventional political activities may also take on the character of resistance. For example, a performative concept of participation may shed new light on phenomena such as the "Perot vote," where **citizens admittedly cast their vote with little expectation of influencing the outcome. In other words, the vote is not merely a conduit for the expression of particular citizen interests or preferences; rather, its purpose depends upon the surrounding environment. Lacking clear choices and substantive discussion of long-term goals, voting or nonvoting itself may become a form of protest. Performative participation captures the sense of destabilization and disruption that more and more characterizes today's electorate. Likewise, unconventional activities such as protest marches may in turn appear to communicate citizen preferences and sustain system legitimacy in systems where those activities become institutionalized. Yearly Washington marches, for example, may actually diffuse discontent by providing a legitimate outlet for protest; at the same time they verify**

system legitimacy by focusing protest toward the formal legal structures of government. Political participation must also account for the performative potential of traditional acts of participation in modern societies where these acts no longer fill traditional purposes, as well as the complicity of formalized protest in bolstering the status quo. Overall, both Habermas and Foucault direct attention away from traditional participatory activities directed at the formal apparatus of government. Yet they also connect these participatory activities back to larger, more globalized, and more institutionalized power regimes. While Foucault concentrates on contests at the micro-level, he contends that those contests provide the raw material for global domination. Similarly Habermas has moved from a relatively pessimistic and defensive view of the political process (where democracy was limited to a communicative but protected public sphere whose legitimate opinions made few inroads into political administration), to a more promising theorization of a "democratized administration" in a constitutional state that "translates" legitimate influence into political and administrative power. Although my theorization of a performative concept of participation as resistance is designed to

reiterate the importance of focusing on more surprising instances of participation, **this expansion and redefinition of participation does not preclude the continuance of representative institutions and formalized participation. Rather it rearranges their purpose and priority. An expanded notion of political participation as performative resistance allows for a more effective thematization of social problems, and it demonstrates how performative resistance is not above or below traditional participation, but necessarily within it.** Performative resistance is evident in intimate and personal relationships, in the deliberations of civil society, and in the problem-solving institutions of the constitutional state. While Habermas insists on a separation between the problem-solving that takes place in parliaments and the world-disclosing that is the function of the public sphere, **a performative conception of participation effectively undermines any firm separation between problem solving and world disclosure. Proposals for group representation in legislative institutions** by theorists such as Young and Guinier make more sense from a performative perspective because **they encourage the performative reconstitution of identity not only in private life, but also at the level of public decisionmaking.**⁸⁵

The division between "policymaking" and "kritik" is a false one; we must embrace nontraditional forms of participation as ways to return otherwise excluded issues to the political sphere.

Kulynych, 97, Winthrop U Prof of Polysci (Jessica, "Performing Politics: Foucault, Habermas, and Postmodern Participation, *Polity*, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Winter, 1997), 315-346, accessed Jstor)

A performative concept of participation as resistance explodes the distinction between public and private, between the political and the apolitical. As Foucault explains, **what was formerly considered apolitical, or social rather than political, is revealed as the foundation of technologies of state control. Contests over identity and everyday social life are not merely additions to the realm of the political, but actually create the very character of those things traditionally considered political. The state itself is "superstructural" in relation to a whole**

series of power networks that invest the body, sexuality, the family, kinship, knowledge, technology and so forth."⁷² **Thus it is contestations at the micro-level, over the intricacies of everyday life, that provide the raw material for global domination, and the key to disrupting global strategies of domination. Therefore, the location of political participation extends way beyond the formal apparatus of government,** or the formal organization of the workplace, to the intimacy of daily actions and iterations.

Epistemology First (Epistemology [from [Greek ἐπιστήμη](#) - episteme-, "knowledge, science" + [λόγος](#), "logos"] or theory of knowledge is the branch of [philosophy](#) concerned with the nature and scope [limitations] of [knowledge](#). It addresses the questions:
 What is knowledge?
 How is knowledge acquired?
 What do people know?
 How do we know what we know?)

The assumption that policymaking occurs in an objective vacuum is false--the preconditions for any communicative exchange include the establishment of some normative framework for evaluation. Their framework arguments only serve to whitewash the value-ladenness of their procedural standards.

Owen 02, Reader in Political Theory at the University of Southampton (David, "Reorienting International Relations: On Pragmatism, Pluralism and Practical Reasoning", Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 31, No. 3, <http://mil.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/31/3/653>)

The third dimension concerns the relationship between positivist IR theory and critical IR theory, where White's distinction enables us to make sense of a related confusion, namely, **the confusion between holding that forms of positivist IR theory (e.g., neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism) are necessarily either value-free or evaluative. It does so because we can now see that, although forms of positivist IR theory are not normative theories, they presuppose a background picture which orients our thinking through the framing of not only what can be intelligibly up for grabs as true-or-false (the epistemic framing) but also what can be intelligibly up for grabs as good-or-bad (the ethical framing).** As Charles Taylor has argued, **a condition of our intelligibility as agents is that we inhabit a moral framework which orients us in ethical space and our practices of epistemic theorising cannot be intelligibly conceived as existing independently of this orientation** in thinking.²¹ The confusion in IR theory arises because, on the one hand, **positivist IR theory typically suppresses acknowledgement of its own ethical presuppositions** under the influence of the scientific model (e.g., Waltz's neorealism and Keohane's neoliberal institutionalism), while, on the other hand, its (radical) critics typically view **its ethical characteristics as** indicating that there is an evaluative or normative theory **hidden**, as it were, **within the folds of what presents itself as a value-free account**. Consequently, **both regard the other as, in some sense, producing ideological forms of knowledge**; the positivist's claim is that critical IR theory is ideological by virtue of its explicitly normative character, the critical theorist's claim is that positivist IR theory is ideological by virtue of its failure to acknowledge and reflect on its own implicit normative commitments. But **this mutual disdain is also a product of the confusion of pictures and theories**. Firstly, **there is a confusion between pictures and theories combined with the scientific suppression of the ethical presuppositions of IR theory. This finds expression in the thought that we need to get our epistemic account of the world sorted out before we can engage responsibly in ethical judgement about what to do, where such epistemic adequacy requires the construction of a positive theory that can explain the features of the world** at issue. An example of this position is provided by Waltz's neorealism.²² **Against this first position, we may reasonably point out that epistemic adequacy cannot be intelligibly specified independently of background ethical commitments concerning what matters to us and how it matters to us**. Secondly, there is the confusion of pictures and theories combined with the moralist overestimation of the ethical (ideological) commitments of IR theory. This finds expression in the thought that **we need to get our ethical account sorted out before we can engage responsibly in epistemic judgement about what to know, where such ethical adequacy requires the construction of a moral theory and, more particularly, a moral ideal that can direct the enterprise of epistemic theorising**. An example of this position is provided by Linklater's version of critical IR theory.²³ Against this position, we can reasonably point out that **the kind of ethical adequacy required does not entail the construction of a moral ideal but**

only the existence of some shared ethical judgements concerning what matters to us that orient our epistemic enquiries. The dual confusion in question leads fairly straightforwardly to the thought that what is at stake here are incompatible epistemological commitments and hence that debate between positivist and critical forms of IR theory needs to be conducted at an epistemological level. However, as my remarks indicate, this thought is mistaken insofar as the apparent incompatibility from which it derives is an illusion.

Kritiks are Bad/Flawed

GENERIC KRITIK ANSWERS

1. **KRITIKS ARE INAPPROPRIATE**

Because debate is an Artificial Construct in and of itself so Kritiks critique the debate itself, rather than the affirmative team.

2. **KRITIKS HAVE NO COMPARATIVE OR QUANTIFIABLE SYSTEM**

To what extent do we violate? Debate should be gray, rather than black or white.

3. **FIAT IS RELEVANT**

For purposes of discussion about merit of policies, which is why we are here, fiat is needed.

4. **DEBATE IS THE FORUM FOR POLICY DISCUSSION**

If you want to discuss this, now isn't the right time or place. Debate has time limits which make it impossible to discuss the basis of the Kritik and its ideas.

5. **INFINITE REGRESSION**

If we must question every assumption in a debate, it would never end. We would be here forever questioning causality, rational thought, and every word in the world.

6. **POLICY DEBATE ASSUMES PRIOR MORAL AND AGREED ASSUMPTIONS**

Kritiks make debate meaningless, debate itself is based on rational and causal thought, as is every response.

7. **THE NEGATIVE DOESN'T POSE AN ALTERNATIVE**

It leaves them without intellectual responsibility because they don't have to advocate anything.

8. **THE NEGATIVE ISN'T RUNNING THE KRITIK TO EDUCATE YOU**

They are running it for the sole purpose of winning this round.

9. **JUST PERMUTE IT**

We can adopt their attitude and our plan at the same time.

10. **KRITIKS SHOULD NOT BE IN POLICY DEBATE**

Roger Solt, (University of Kentucky, DEMYSTIFYING THE CRITIQUE, 1993, p. A-9)

“Critiques almost invariably operate outside the normal policy framework of debate. It is clear why this is the case: if critiques were powerful as policy arguments (or at least as powerful), then they would probably have been formulated as such. What the critique seems to challenge most fundamentally is what we are essentially engaged in is a policy debate.”

11. **BREAKS THE RULES OF THE GAME**

The tournament invitation stipulated the topic; if they did not want focus on topic debate, they should not have entered the tournament.

12. **KRITIKS DESTROY EQUAL BURDENS AND FOR DIVISION OF GROUND**

Matthew Shors et al., (University of Michigan, THE CRITIQUE: Screaming Without Raising Its Voice, 1993, p. A-14)

“The Critique does not attempt to meet the conventional burdens of a debate argument; there is no 'uniqueness,' no 'impact', no 'probability', and no 'threshold'. In short all of the requisites of comparative discussion are ignored by the Critique.”

CRITIQUES MUST HAVE ALTERNATIVES

1. CRITICAL DISCOURSE REQUIRES ACTION TO BE PRACTICAL

Paulo Freire, (Famous Author, Social Critic, PEDAGOGY OF THE OPPRESSED, 1970)

“As we attempt to analyze dialogue as a human phenomenon, we discover something which is the essence of dialogue itself: the word. But the word is more than just an instrument which makes dialogue possible; accordingly, we must seek its constitutive elements. Within the word we find two dimensions, reflection and action, in such radical interaction that if one is sacrificed even in part the other immediately suffers.”

2. CRITIQUES WITHOUT ALTERNATIVES ARE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE

John Ellis, (Prof. of Gennan, AGAINST DECONSTRUCTION, 1989)

“As a program for criticism, then, this version of deconstructive criticism is vacuous in theory and counterproductive in practice. To oppose a particular tradition or viewpoint with a particular alternative program is to set out a real position; but to announce simply an indiscriminate and unspecified opposition to any tradition in general and none in particular, with no particular alternative in mind in any given case, is not to take a position at all but only to gain rather too easily acquired feelings of iconoclastic superiority. Thinking about real problems is thus circumvented.”

3. SHOULD ABANDON POLICY CRITIQUES IN FAVOR OF ACTION AND ACTIVISM

Sanford F. Schram, (Prof. Political Science, Macalester, POLICY SCIENCE, 1995, p. 381)

“While I am in full agreement that new social movements often are doing important work in unearthing the embedded biases of the dominant assumptions that inform policy decision-making, there is not much to say here beyond noting the point and then doing the work in specific instances. I say: give up the policy analysis as a theorization of policy struggle and join the fray, highlight the exclusionary practices of discursive economies and leverage political change. Why convert policy struggle into an academic exercise of the quest for epistemic privilege that will inform all such struggles? Why place social movements in the theoretical museum of knowledge as specimens to be examined for their analytical work, neglecting all-the-while the non-universal pragmatics of such struggles?”

4. INTELLECTUALLY DEFEATED

Matthew Shors et al., (University of Michigan, THE CRITIQUE, 1993, p. A-14)

“Since the Critique is an overriding claim which should be a priori in a debate context, comparisons are irrelevant, say its advocates. Hence if it can be demonstrated that, in order to successfully reject a proposal, one must defend an alternative, then the Critique, as is currently argued, is intellectually defeated.”

5. WITHOUT ALTERNATIVES, SHOULD REJECT CRITIQUES

Ken Krebs, (Prof. of Law, U. of Iowa, CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW, 1989, p. 320)

“But critique is not enough. All legal systems and all legal theories are flawed. We are, after all, humans, not gods. Legal argument is core, and so is theory. We decide which theory to believe by provisionally accepting that theory which has the best overall combination of virtues and vices. It is therefore incumbent on critical scholars to present not only critiques, but also alternatives preferable to the doctrines and theories they critique, but also alternatives preferable to the doctrine and theories they critique. (Some critical scholars are now vigorously making that attempt). Otherwise, critical scholars give us no cause to change our beliefs or our action.”

CRITIQUES BAD-INFINITELY REGRESSIVE

1. NEGATIVE CRITIQUES ARE INFINITELY REGRESSIVE

Maurice Charland, (Prof. of Communication Studies at Concordia University, QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF SPEECH, Fall 1991)

“The difficulty with all of this, however, is that Professor McKerrow does not guide us out of the infinite regress of negative critique. Thus, while the Critical Rhetorician struggles within a local context, he or she has no place to call home. The Critical Rhetorician suffers the perpetual anomie that Barthes assigned the critic of mythology: sufficiently within his or her culture to understand myths, but still enough of an outsider to recognize them for what they are. Continually identifying the relations of power to knowledge, with their necessary structures of domination, the Critical Rhetorician would have no place to take a stand.”

2. INFINITE REGRESSION

If we must question every assumption in a debate, it would never end. We would be here forever questioning causality, rational thought, and every word in the world.

CRITIQUES BAD-SPEECH RESTRICTIONS ARE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE

1. LANGUAGE ARGUMENTS ARE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE FOR FOUR REASONS

Matthew Roskoski and Joe Peabody, (Florida State University, a paper published and available on the internet at <http://www.debate.central/library>, A LINGUISTIC AND PHILOSOPHIC CRITIQUE OF LANGUAGE ARGUMENTS, 1991)

“We have defended the thesis that reality shapes language rather than the obverse. Now we will also contend that to attempt to solve a problem by editing the language which is symptomatic of that problem will generally trade off with solving the reality which is the source of the problem. There are several reasons why this is true. The first, and most obvious, is that we may often be fooled into thinking that language “arguments” have generated real change. As Graddol and Swan observe, “when compared with a larger social and ideological struggles, linguistic reform may seem quite a trivial concern,” further noting “there is also the danger that effective change at this level is-mistaken-for-real social change” (Graddol & Swan 195). The second reason is that the language we find objectionable can serve as a signal or an indicator of the corresponding objectionable reality. The third reason is that restricting language only limits the overt expressions of any objectionable reality, while leaving subtle and hence more dangerous expressions unregulated. Once we drive the objectionable idea underground it will be more difficult to identify, more difficult to root out, more difficult to counteract, and more likely to have its undesirable effect. The fourth reason is that objectionable speech can create a “backlash” effect that raises the consciousness of people exposed to the speech. Strossen observes that “ugly and abominable as these expressions are, they undoubtedly have had the beneficial result of raising social consciousness about the underlying societal problem..”

2. PATERNALISTIC INTERVENTION TO REDUCE OPPRESSIVE SPEECH IN DEBATE ROUNDS WILL ONLY ENCOURAGE IT OUTSIDE OF THE DEBATE ROUND

Matthew Roskoski and Joe Peabody, (Florida State University, a paper published and available on the internet at <http://www.debate.central/library>, A LINGUISTIC AND PHILOSOPHIC CRITIQUE OF LANGUAGE ARGUMENTS, 1991)

“Hyde and Fishman further explain that to protect students from offensive views, is to deprive them of the experiences through which they “attain intellectual and moral maturity and become self-reliant” (Hyde and Fishman 1485). The application of these notions to the debate round is clear and relevant. If language “arguments” become a dominant trend, debaters will not change their attitudes. Rather they will manifest their attitudes in non-debate contexts. Under these conditions, the debaters will not have the moderating effects of the critic or the other debaters. Simply put, sexism at home or at lunch is worse than sexism in a debate round because in the round there is a critic to provide negative thought not punitive feedback.”

CRITIQUES ILLEGITIMATE

1. NO NORMAL ARGUMENTS ARE VALID

Robert I. Arrington, (RATIONALISM, REALISM, AND RELATIVISM, 1989, p. 14)

“This is the well-known error theory of ethics, which maintains that most people think, in error, that some moral judgments are true. No moral judgments are true because there are no moral properties; all moral judgments are false. We believe that persons, actions, and objects have moral properties because we project our feelings of approval, love, disappointment and hatred upon them. We have been tricked by this projection into thinking falsely that moral judgments reflect an independent 'real' of moral facts.”

2. THERE ARE NO REAL WORLD IMPACTS TO CRITIQUES

3. CRITIQUES TAKE FOCUS OFF OF THE RESOLUTION

Critiques make us look at issues that have nothing to do with the topic at hand. Instead they make us focus on irrelevant issues that waste your time judge. Punish them.

Vance Trefethen, 2007 (Third Edition, Strategic Debate, A Brief Word About Kritiks)

They sometimes introduce issues into the debate that are irrelevant and not sufficiently like real-world policy making. When was the last time you ever heard of a debate in Congress over some policy change (say, about trade policy) where one Congressman makes a motion to stop the debate because the other Congressman's trade bill doesn't resolve the role of feminism in society?

4. CRITIQUE IS INFINITELY REGRESSIVE

Maurice Charland, (Prof. of Communication Studies at Concordia University, “Finding a horizon and telos: the challenge to critical rhetoric”, QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF SPEECH, Vol. 77, Fall 1991, p. 71)

“The difficulty with all of this, however, is that Professor McKerrow does not guide us out of the infinite regress of negative critique. Thus, while the Critical Rhetorician struggles within a local context, he or she has no place to call home. The Critical Rhetorician suffers the perpetual anomie that Barthes assigned the critic of mythology: sufficiently within his or her culture to understand myths, but still enough of an outsider to recognize them for what they are.”

5. CRITIQUES DESTROY THE FAIR AND RATIONAL DYNAMIC OF A DEBATE

Jeremy Rosen, (Debate Scholar, Cornell, CEDA-L STRING, Dec. 8, 1993)

“Calling culture a resolutive critique destroys the fair and rational dynamic of a debate because it allows the neg. to say culture is a-priori. That means that the judge is supposed to evaluate the culture position without looking at the aff case impacts. This gives an unfair advantage to the negative, and I do not believe that it is intellectually defensible to give the neg. disad some special magical powers.”

6. POLITICAL CORRECTNESS IS TOTALITARIAN

Thomas Short, (Ass. Prof. of Philosophy at Kenyon College, ARE YOU POLITICALLY CORRECT, 1993, pp. 106-107)

“There is a perfect agreement between the pedagogical strategy and it's ultimate practical effect. I do not mean to suggest that all or even many of those calling for diversity intend bringing about a totalitarian form of government. Surely they believe they are doing just the opposite. I am only suggesting that what lies behind their efforts is an animus against their efforts is an animus against their own society and it's institutions and it's principles and that this animus, if unchecked, will lead eventually to a form of education in which rational inquiry and variety of opinion sink from sight together, pointing to a form of government similarly totalitarian.”

Kritik Alternatives Need a Text

1. Interpretation: The neg needs a written text to their advocacy.
2. Reasons to Prefer:
 - a. Predictability: pinning the neg to a stable advocacy is key to predictable debate. No ground is usable without predictability.
 - b. Moving Target: Neg needs an alt text so they can't change their alt to avoid arguments. The impact is time and strategy skew, which alter the nature of the entire debate. Justifies new args.
 - c. Reciprocity: The aff presents a plan text so the neg needs a written description of the difference between the SQ and their approach.
3. Voter for fairness and education

Sample Critique Permutation Block

The negative critique exists as an alternative framework in false opposition to affirmative plan. This can be proven by three points.

_____ Firstly, an alternative must exist or the critique is a counterproductive, naïve dream.

John Ellis, 1989 (Prof. of German, AGAINST DECONSTRUCTION, p.1)

To oppose a particular tradition or viewpoint with a particular alternative program is to set out a real position; but to announce simply an indiscriminate and unspecified opposition to any tradition in general and non in particular, with no particular affirmative at all, is not to take a position at all.

_____ Secondly, there is no 'link' to the critique.

My partner and I do not advocate the flawed framework; we simply advocate our plan as an improvement on the status quo. There is no proven connection between the affirmative plan and the flawed framework.

_____ Finally, there is no competition between the plan and the alternative framework. We could simply adopt our plan in the alternative framework. The negative must establish that 'but for the affirmative plan, the flawed framework would crumble.'

DISCOURSE DOES NOT SHAPE REALITY-SAPIR WHORF THEORY IS WRONG

() Linguistic philosophers have already abandoned Sapir-Whorf theory

Matthew Roskoski and Joe Peabody, Florida State University, 1911."A Linguistic and Philosophic Critique of Language Arguments" a paper published and available on the Internet at <http://www.debate.central/library>)

"Initially, it is important to note that the Sapir-Whorf hypotheses does not intrinsically deserve presumption, although many authors assume its validity without empirical support. The reason it does not deserve presumption is that "on a priori grounds one can contest it by asking how, if we are unable to organize our thinking beyond the limits set by our native language, we could ever become aware of these limits" (Robins 1010). Au explains that "because it has received so little convincing support, the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis has stimulated little research."

() Critique authors take flawed Sapir-Whorf hypothesis for granted.

Matthew Roskoski and Joe Peabody, Florida State University, 1911."A Linguistic and Philosophic Critique of Language Arguments" a paper published and available on the Internet at <http://www.debate.central/library>)

"However, many critical scholars take the hypothesis for granted because it is necessary but uninteresting precondition for the claims they really want to defend. Khosroshahi explains: However, the empirical tests of the hypothesis of linguistic relativity have yielded more equivocal results. But independently of its empirical status, Whorf's view is quite widely held. In fact, many social movements have attempted reforms of language and have thus taken Whorf's thesis for granted. (Khosroshahi 505)."

() Sapir-Whorf hypothesis is beyond proof

Matthew Roskoski and Joe Peabody, Florida State University, 1911."A Linguistic and Philosophic Critique of Language Arguments" a paper published and available on the Internet at <http://www.debate.central/library>)

"The first reason is that it is impossible to generate empirical validation for the hypothesis. Because the hypothesis is so metaphysical and because it relies so heavily on intuition it is difficult if not impossible to operationalize. Rosch asserts that "profound and ineffable truths are not, in that form, subject to scientific investigation" (Rosch 259). We concur for two reasons. The first is that the hypothesis is phrased as a philosophical first principle and hence would not have an objective referent. The second is there would be intrinsic problems in any such test. The independent variable would be the language used by the subject. The dependent variable would be the subject's subjective reality. The problem is that the dependent variable can only be measured through self reporting, which naturally-entails the use of language. Hence, it is impossible to separate the dependent and independent variable. In other words, we have no way of knowing if the effects on 'reality' are actual or merely artifacts of the language being used as a measuring tool."

DISCOURSE DOES NOT SHAPE REALITY-SAPIR WHORF THEORY IS WRONG

() Sapir-Whorf hypothesis fails to account for words with different meanings.

Matthew Roskoski and Joe Peabody, Florida State University, 1991 ("A Linguistic and Philosophic Critique of Language Arguments" a paper published and available on the internet at <http://www.debate.central/library>)

"The Fourth and final objection is that the hypothesis cannot account for single words with multiple meanings. For example, as Takano notes, the word "bank" has multiple meanings (Takano 149). If language truly created reality then this would not be possible. Further, most if not all language "arguments" in debate are accompanied by the claim that intent is irrelevant because the actual rhetoric exists apart from the rhetoric intent. If this is so, then the Whorfian advocate cannot claim that the intent of the speaker distinguishes what reality the rhetoric creates. The prevalence of such multiple meanings in debate context is demonstrated with every new topicality debate, where debaters spend entire rounds quibbling over multiple interpretations of a few words."

() Sapir-Wharf hypothesis self implodes

Matthew Roskoski and Joe Peabody, Florida State University, 1991 ("A Linguistic and Philosophic Critique of Language Arguments" a paper published and available on the internet at <http://www.debate.central/library>)

"The third objection is that the hypothesis self-implodes. If language creates reality, then different cultures with different languages would have different realities. Were that the case, then meaningful cross-cultural communication would be difficult if not impossible. In Au's words: "it is never the case that something expressed in Zuni or Hopi or Latin cannot be expressed at all in English. Were it the case Whorf could not have written his articles as he did entirely in English"(Au 156).

MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS BAD-FAILS TO FIND TRUTH

() Proof for marketplace of ideas relies on flawed circular logic

Benjamin Duval Jr., Prof. Of Law at University of Louisville, 1972 (Georg Washington Law Review, December, "Free Communication of Ideas". 190)

"Moreover, apart from these practical difficulties, it seems questionable that a determination that free discussion will lead to greater knowledge is theoretically possible. To determine the relative degree of error at different points of time requires a knowledge of what is true, or at least knowledge that current beliefs are more accurate than those held during the period under evaluation. Yet this flies in the face of the fundamental premise of the marketplace theory itself--that experience has taught then no matter how firmly and proposition is believed to be true, there is a substantial possibility that is untrue. This is not to suggest that there is no evidence in support of existing beliefs, but only that more convincing evidence to the contrary may subsequently develop. The difficulty is that any proof that existing beliefs are more accurate than past beliefs is inherently circular."

() Impossible to prove marketplace of ideas can reach truth

Benjamin Duval Jr., Prof. Of Law at University of Louisville, 1972 (Georg Washington Law Review, December, "Free Communication of Ideas". 190)

"A more fundamental skepticism questions the assumptions made by both sides of the argument that discussion, if it can be free, will lead to truth. The practical difficulties in establishing such a propositions are forbidding. To prove that a society operating on the principle of free discussion has progressed toward truth, it would seem necessary to determine the relative degree of error of the beliefs of the population at two different times. If error had declined, and if factors unrelated to the legal treatment of free expression had not contributed to that change, it would be reasonable to assert that free discussion had led to truth. The difficulty of determining the beliefs of an entire population and the effect of factors other than free expression is obvious. Even more difficult is the determination of the weight to be ascribed to varying degrees of error. Indeed, it seems impossible to rank errors for the purpose of determining whether rejection of one fallacy for another reflects progress toward truth."

() Marketplace of ideas structurally incapable of finding truth

Benjamin Duval Jr., Prof. Of Law at University of Louisville, 1972 (Georg Washington Law Review, December, "Free Communication of Ideas". 190)

"In recent times, however, this theory has been subjected to skeptical attacks. It has been asserted that all too frequently the desire of one dies to win the game overrides the desire to reach the truth, that concentration of mass media in a few hands distorts the functioning of the market, and that the multiplicity of arguments presented today

is greater than man's ability to assimilate them. These attacks, however, question the operation of the market only at the mechanical level, where correction is quite possible. They implicitly assume that if the market operated at peak efficiency, truth would be discovered, and suggest only that there exists a partial disequilibrium which renders the market temporarily incapable of correctly tabulating the results of free devotes. Answers to these attacks have not been offered, but the answers, like the questions, do not go to the core of the problem."

CRITIQUES BAD-INFINITELY REGRESSIVE-THEY LACK ALTERNATIVES

() Negative critiques are infinitely regressive

Maurice Char land, Professor of Communities Studies at Concordia University, 1991 (Quarterly Journal of Speech, Fall)

“The difficulty with all of this, however, is that Professor McKerrow does not guide us out of the infinite regress of negative critique. Thus, while the Critical Rhetorician struggles within a local context, he or she has no place to call home. The Critical Rhetorician suffers the perpetual anomie that Bares assigned the critic of mythology : sufficiently within his or her culture to understand myths, but still enough of an outsider to recognize them for what are. Continually identifying the reactions of power to knowledge, with their necessary structures of domination, the Critical Rhetorician would have no place to take a stand.”

() Critiques offer no hope of an alternative

Maurice Char land, Professor of Communities Studies at Concordia University, 1991 (Quarterly Journal of Speech, Fall)

“In its current form, Critical Rhetoric strengthen our powers of observation. It directs us to look at the dynamic of social reactions that are discursively instantiated and at the agents, agencies, and objects constituted in rhetoric’s that address publics. It assist us somewhat in diagnosis, but here its contribution is limited because diagnosis occurs with respect to a conception of the healthy organism. What would the healthy social body be? The critique of domination, and Enlightenment project, privileges freedom through reason. Foucault’s critique freedom so central to professor McKerrow’s project offers no social vision, no healthy social form, no tells except for constant critique. Under these circumstances, praxis is halted because we have no reason to intervene one way or another. Thus Critical Rhetoric only carries praxis so far. To map out a critical praxis more fully requires that we consider again how praxis is practical.

CRITIQUES MUST HAVE ALTERNATIVES

() Critical discourse requires action to be practical

Paulo Freire, Social Critic, 1970 (Famous author, Pedagogy of the Oppressed)

“As we attempt to analyze dialogue as a human phenomenon, we discover something which is the essence of dialogue itself: the word. But the word is more than just an instrument which makes dialogue possible; accordingly, we must seek in constrictive elements. Within the word we find two dimensions, reflection and action, in such radical interaction that if one is sacrificed -even in part-the other immediately suffers. There is no true word that is not at the same time a praxis. Thus, to speak a true word is to transform the world.”

() Critiques without alternatives are counterproductive

John Ellis, Prof. Of German, 1989 (Against Deconstruction)

“As a program for criticism, then, this version of deconstructive criticism is vacuous in theory and counterproductive in practice. To oppose a particular tradition or viewpoint with a particular alternative program is to set out real portion; but to announce simply an indiscriminate and unspecified opposition to any tradition in general and none in particular, with no particular alternative in mind in any given case, is not to take a position at all but only to gain rather too easily acquired feelings of iconoclastic superiority. Thinking about real problems is thus circumvented.”

() Should abandon policy critiques in favor of action and activism

Sanford F. Schram, Prof. Of Political Science, Macalester, 1995 (Policy Science, p. 381)

“While I am in full agreement that new social movements often are doing important work in unearthing the embedded biases of the dominant assumptions that inform policy decision-making there is not much to say here beyond nothing the point and then doing the work in specific instances. I say: give up the policy analysis as a theorization of policy struggle and join the fray, highlight the exclusionary practice of discursive economies and leverage political change. Why convert policy struggle into an academic exercise of the quest for epistemic privilege that will inform all such struggles? Why place social movements in the theoretical museum of knowledge as specimens to be examined for their analytical work, neglecting all-the-while the non-universal pragmatics of such struggles?”

() Should reject critiques in favor of actual activism

Sanford F. Schram, Prof. Of Political Science, Macalester, 1995 (Policy Science, p. 381)

“I therefore want to suggest that it is time to be against policy analysis as an activity designed to create normative models for the policy process. I instead side with interrogating discursive practice as it is invoked in policy struggles, recognizing that the considerations of what ought to be done, when and how, are contingent Upon the time, place and purpose of those struggles and connote be legislated in theory ahead of time. We can then best learn from Forester by moving beyond him. We can begin to take seriously his call to interrogate these practices for their political consequences in specific instances. Beyond Forester, we can, as in the Nike ad, just do it. When we do, we can do it in ways that will not try to legislate a priori or seek to envision for some Olympian perspective. Instead, we can participate in engendering the pluralistic and dialogic, deliberative, democratic planning processes Forester implies he supports. Perhaps by leaving critical theory behind and accepting that the policy process is about politics that cannot be modeled ahead of time, we can begin to become more effective participants in the policy struggles of our time. Perhaps, then, it is very much time to be against policy analysis.”

() Action and struggle should precede critical analysis

Antonio Faundez and Paulo Freire, Social Critics, 1989 (Poli. Scholars, Learning to Question)

“I believe that any political, ideological struggle has precisely to begin with an understanding of these acts of resistance. In other words, you should not fight ideology with ideas alone, but beginning with those concrete elements of popular resistance. Therefore, any struggle against a dominant ideology or ideologies should be based on the resistance offered by the people, and on that basis you produce ideologies to oppose the dominant ideology or ideologies. Not the other way around, by creating ideologies in opposition to the dominant ideologies, without realizing that you must have a concrete base as your starting point in the form of acts of resistance by the masses. And that is where the ideological battle will be won-beginning form that and not form ideas. Because to fight ideologies ideologically is to lapse into an ideology of ideology. It is to consider as important-which is what the

dominant ideology wants-that the fight should be conducted on the plane of ideas because, when the struggle is conducted on the plane of ideas, it takes concrete shape and its expressed in mass action, so as to allow the political and ideological embodiment on the basis of the people's resistance to it, the people themselves can and must contribute to the creation of an ideology and of actions to fight against the dominant ideology of ideologies."

() Critical discourse must maintain relation with reality

Freire, 1970 (Paulo, Famous Social Critic and Activist, PEDAGOGY OF THE OPPRESSED, p. 85)

"We must never merely discourse on the present situation, must never provide the people with programs which have little or nothing to do with their own preoccupations, doubts, hopes, and fears programs which at times in fact increase the fears of the oppressed consciousness. It is not our role to speak to the people about our own view of the world, not to attempt to impose that view on them, but rather to dialogue with the people about their view and ours. We must realize that their view of the world, manifested variously in their action, reflects their situation in the world. Educational and political action which is not critically aware of this situation runs the risk either of 'banking' or of preaching in the desert."

() Activism will fail if accompanied by ideas and not action

Antonio Faundez and Paulo Freire, Social Critics, 1989 (Poli. Scholars, Learning to Question)

"Antonio. The difficult, Paulo in understanding the importance of the analysis of everyday life lies in the fact that we intellectuals are accustomed to working with ideas as models. Now, of course, people, and particularly intellectuals, need ideas in order to understand the world. But if these ideas become models, in other words, if they are not applied creatively to reality, we run the risk of regarding them as reality. And so concrete reality has to be made to fit in with our ideas and not the other way round. We would tend lapse into what I would call 'popular Hegelianism': the belief that the Idea is reality, and that reality is nothing more than the development of the Idea by means of concepts. And so, in order to explain the discrepancy between ideas and reality, to explain why concepts and concrete reality fail to concede, to explain people's failure to understand and change historical reality, it is firmly maintained that it is reality that is wrong and not our ideas or system of ideas."

CRITIQUES BAD- SPEECH RESTRICTIONS ARE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE

() Language arguments are counterproductive for FOUR reasons

Matthew Roskoski and Joe Peabody, Florida State University, 1991 (“A Linguistic and Philosophic Critique of Language Arguments” a paper published and available on the Internet at <http://www.debate.central/library>)

“We have defended the thesis that reality shapes language, rather than the obverse. Now we will also contend that to attempt to solve a problem by editing the language which is symptomatic of that problem will generally trade off with solving the reality which is the source of the problem. There are several reasons why this is true. The first, and most obvious, is that we may often be fooled into thinking that language “arguments” have generated real change. As Graddol and Swan observe, “when compared with larger social and ideological struggles, linguistic reform may seem quite a trivial concern,” further nothing” there is also the danger that effective change at this level is mistaken for real social change” (Graddol & Swan 1995). The second reason is that the language we find objectionable can serve as signal or an indicator of the corresponding objectionable reality. The third reason is that restricting language only limits the overt expressions of any objectionable reality, while leaving subtle and hence more dangerous expressions unregulated. Once we drive the objectionable idea underground it will be more difficult to identify, more difficult to root out, more difficult to counteract, and more likely to have its undesirable effect. The fourth reason is that objectionable speech can create a “backlash” effect that raises the consciousness of people exposed to the speech. Strossen observes that “ugly and abominable as these expressions are, they undoubtedly have had the beneficial result of raising social consciousness about the underlying societal problems...”(560).

() Paternalistic intervention to reduce oppressive speech in debate rounds will only encourage it outside of the debate round.

Matthew Roskoski and Joe Peabody, Florida State University, 1991 (“A Linguistic and Philosophic Critique of Language Arguments” a paper published and available on the Internet at <http://www.debate.central/library>)

“Hyde & Fishman further explain that to protect students from offensive views, is to deprive them of the experiences through which they “attain intellectual and moral maturity and become self-reliant: (Hyde & Fishman 1485). The application of these notions to the debate round is clear and relevant. If language “arguments” become a dominant trend, debaters will not change their attitude. Rather they will manifest their attitude in non-debate context. Under these conditions, the debaters will not have the moderating effects of the critic or the other debaters. Simply put, sexism at home or at lunch is worse than sexism in a debate round because in the round there is a critic to provide negative through not punitive feedback.”

CRITIQUES BAD--SPEECH RESTRICTIONS HURT FREEDOM OF SPEECH

() Should never attempt to censor a debater’s offensive speech

Matthew Roskoski and Joe Peabody, Florida State University, 1991 (“A Linguistic and Philosophic Critique of Language Arguments” a paper published and available on the Internet at <http://www.debate.central/library>)

“Certainly this principle would prohibit the enforcement of any language “argument.” If one despised the rhetoric of a given debater enough to vote against that debater than as Holmes suggests, the principles of the Constitution require one to refrain from censorship. The Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts articulated the essence of this argument so eloquently that their entire statement deserves repetition here: When language wounds, the natural and immediate impulse is to take steps to shut up those who utter the wounding words. When, as here, that impulse is likely to be felt by those who are normally the first amendment’s staunchest defenders, free expression faces its greatest threat. As such times, it is important for those committed to principles of free expressions to remind each other of what they have always known regarding the long term costs of short term victories bought through compromising first amendment principles (Strossen 487).

() Free speech is essential for self-governance

Albert Smolla, Communications Scholar, Northwestern University, 1992 (Anneberg Washington Program, “Communications Policy Studies, Free Speech in an Open Society)

“Free speech is an indispensable tool of self governance in a democratic society. The Supreme Court has stated that “Whatever difference may exist about interpretations of the First Amendment, there is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.”

Justice Louis Brandeis wrote that “freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth.”

() Freedom of speech necessary for individual dignity

Albert Smolla, Communications Scholar, Northwestern University, 1992 (Anneberg Washington Program, “Communications Policy Studies, Free Speech in an Open Society)

“The marketplace theory justifies free speech as a means to an end. But free speech is also an end itself, an end intimately intertwined with human autonomy and dignity. In the words of Justice Thurgood Marshall, “The First Amendment serves not only the needs of the polity but also those of the human spirit—a spirit, that demands self expression.” free speech is thus specially valuable for reasons that have nothing to do with the collective search for truth or the processes of self-government, or for any other conceptualization of the common good. It is a right defiantly, robustly and irreverently to speak one’s mind just because it is one’s mind. Even when the speaker has no realistic hope that the audience will be persuaded to his or her viewpoint, even when no plausible case can be made that the search for truth will be advanced, freedom to speak without restraint provides the speaker with an inner satisfaction and realization of self identity essential to individual fulfillment.”

CRITIQUES ILLEGITIMATE

() No moral arguments are valid

Arrington, 1989 (Robert I., no quals cited, RATIONALISM, REALISM, AND RELATIVISM, p. 14)

“This is the well-known error theory of ethics, which maintains that most people think, in error, that some moral judgments are true. No moral judgments are true because there are no moral properties; all moral judgments are false. we believe that persons, actions, and abject have moral properties because we project our feelings of approval, love, disappointment and hatred upon tem. We have even tricked by this projection into thinking falsely that moral judgments reflect an independent ‘real; of moral facts.”

() There are no real world impacts to critiques

() Critiques take focus off the resolution

Critiques make us look at issues that have nothing to do with the topic at hand. Instead they make us focus on irrevlevent issues that waste your time judgment. Punish them.

() Critique is infinitely regressive

Charland, 1991 (Maurice, Ass. Prof. of comm. Studies at Concordia U., “finding a horizon and tells: the challenge to critical rhetoric; QUARTERLY JOURANL OF SPEECH, vol. 77, p. 71)

“The difficulty with all of this, however, if that Professor McKerrow does not guide us out of the infinite regression of the negative critique. Thus while the Critical Rhetoric struggles within a local context, he or she had no place to call home. The Critical rhetorician suffers the perpetual anomie that Barths assigned the critic of mythology: sufficient within his or her culture to understand myths, but still enough of an outsider to recognize them for what they are.”

() Critiques destroy the fair and rational dynamic of a debate

Rosen, December , 1993 (Jeremy; Debate Scholar, Cornell; CEDA-L STRING, Dec. 8)

“Calling Culture a resolution critique destroys the fair and rational dynamic of a debate because it allows the neg. to say Culture is a-priori. That means that the judge is supposed to evaluate the Culture position without looking at the aff. Case impacts. This gives an unfair advantage to the negative, and I do not believe that it is intellectually defensible to give the neg. disad some special magical powers.”

() Political correctness is totalitarian

Short, 1993 (Thomas, ass. Prof of philosophy at Kenyon college, ARE YOU POLICICALLY CORRECT, pp. 106-107)

“There is a perfect agreement between the pedagogical strategy and its ultimate practical effect. I do not mean to suggest that all or even many of those calling for diversity intend bringing about a totalitarian form of government. Surely they believe they are doing just the opposite. I am only suggesting that what lies behind their efforts is an animus against their efforts is an animus against their own society and it’s institutions and it’s principles and that this animus, if unchecked, will lead eventually to a form of education in which rational inquiry and variety of opinion sink from sight together, pointing to a form of government similarly totalitarian.”

() Extinction overrides all frameworks

Schell, 1982 (Jonathon, Journalist, THE FATE OF THE EARTH)

“But it is clear that at present with some twenty-thousand megatons of nuclear explosive power in existence. And with more being added every day, we have entered into the zone of uncertainty, which is to say the zone of the risk of extinction. But the mere risk of extinction has a significance that is categorically different form and immeasurably greater than that of any other risk, and as we make our decisions we have to take that significance into account. Up to now, every risk has been contained within the frame of life, extinction would shatter that frame. It represents not the defeat of some purpose but an abyss in which all human purpose would be drowned for all time.”

() There is no clear and coherent reason why some arguments are critiques

Rosen, December , 1993 (Jeremy; Debate Scholar, Cornell; CEDA-L STRING, Dec. 8)

“The second problem that I have with resolution critiques, is that they are extremely arbitrary. Why did culture get to be resolution critique but Japanese RE-arm was merely a disad? Why couldn't a team just call the Japanese re-arm position a critique which means that the neg. impacts count but the aff. Ones do not. In have judged/debated in at least 3040 rounds where critiques have been run. In none of them, did the negative give any cogent reason why their particular argument got to be invested with these special powers given to critiques. I do not think that this is only the fault of the debaters. I do not think it is possible to come up with a coherent and consistent rationale why some things are and some things are not critiques.”

() Critiques without alternatives are oppressive

Ellis, 1989 (John, Prof. of German, Univ. Of Calif-Santa-Cruz, AGAINST DECONSTRUCTION, p. 91-92)

“As a program for criticism, then, this vision of deconstructive criticism is vacuous in theory and counterproductive in practice. To oppose a particular tradition of viewpoint with a particular alternative program is to set out a real position; but to announce simply an indiscriminate and unspecified opposition to any tradition in general and non in particular, with no particular alternative in mind in any given case, is not to take a position at all but only to gain rather too easily acquired feelings of iconoclastic superiority. Thing about real problems is thus circumvented.”

() Without alternatives, should reject critiques

Kerbs, 1989 (Ken, University of Iowa Prof. Of Law, CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW, p. 320)

“But critique is not enough. All legal systems and all illegal theories are flawed. we are, after all, humans, not gods. Legal argument is comparative, and so is theory. We decide which theory to believe by provisionally accepting that theory which has the best overall combinations of virtues and vices. Is therefore incumbent on critical scholars to present not only critiques, but also alternatives preferable to the doctrines and theories they critique, but also alternatives preferable to the doctrine and theories they critique. (Some critical scholars are now vigorously making that attempt). Otherwise, critical scholars give use no cause to change our beliefs or our action.”

() Critiques stifle debate

Rosen, December , 1993 (Jeremy; Debate Scholar, Cornell; CEDA-L STRING, Dec. 8)

“I fail to see the fundamental difference between critiques and disads. Unless you are willing to say that certain impacts have been deemed always to higher than others. This type of view, in my mind, stifles debate.”

() Critiques impacts are outweighed by our impacts

Rosen, December , 1993 (Jeremy; Debate Scholar, Cornell; CEDA-L STRING, Dec. 8)

“I think that the sexist language position should be treated like any other argument in a round. There are lost of cards that give reasons why sexist language must always be rejected. Wey should this argument be given the extra special power of being apriori? It has an impact just like any other argument. The other team should be able to attempt to outweigh it in other impacts.”

() Critiques give the negative an unfair advantage

Rosen, December , 1993 (Jeremy; Debate Scholar, Cornell; CEDA-L STRING, Dec. 8)

“Resolution critiques always appear to me be diads with such poor brinks/probability that the only way they will be able to outweigh case is if they are a-priori which means that they are weighed against nothing. Thus, the negative seems to get an unfair advantage because they get to have their impacts weighed in the round. But the affirmative team does not.”

() Critiques deny the right of impact comparison

Rosen, December , 1993 (Jeremy; Debate Scholar, Cornell; CEDA-L STRING, Dec. 8)

“I have relied heavily on a notion of impact comparison. Before concluding, I want to clarify what I mean. By impact comparison, I do not meant that any risk of a nuclear war outweighs anything. That is silly. What I mean, is that beginning with criteria or discoing rules, debaters should be free to debate what the most important impact is whether it be life or rejecting sexism or western values. But both teams should be able to compare their impacts with the other teams. Critiques deny one team that right.”

KRITIK ANSWERS

- 1. Kritiks are inappropriate because debate is an artificial construct in and of itself** so kritiks critique the debate itself, rather than the affirmative team.
- 2. Kritiks have no comparative or quantifiable system.** To what extent do we violate? Debate should be gray, rather than black and white.
- 3. Flat is irrelevant.** For purposes of discussion about merit of policies, which is why we are here, fiat is needed.
- 4. Debate is the forum for policy discussion;** if you want to discuss this, now isn't the right time or place. Debate has time limits which make it impossible to discuss the basis of the Kritik and its ideas.
- 5. Infinite regression:** If we must question every assumption in a debate, it would never end. We would be here forever questioning causality, rational thought, and every word in the world.
- 6. Policy debate assumes prior moral and agreed assumptions.** Kritiks make debate meaningless, debate itself is based on rational and causal thought, as is every response.
- 7. The negative doesn't pose an alternative.** It leaves them without intellectual responsibility because they don't have to advocate anything.
- 8. The Negative isn't running the kritik to educate you:** they are running it for the sole purpose of winning this round.
- 9. Kritiks destroy ground**
Roger Solt, 1993 (University of Kentucky, Demystifying the Critique p. A-9)
"The language of the critique remains, sometimes laterally, foreign. Debating against critiques can prove to be a mystifying experience, as argumentative ground shifts rapidly under one's feet. My purpose in this article is neither to praise the critique nor to bury it, but rather, in part at least, to demystify it."
- 10. Kritiks are generic**
Roger Solt, 1993 (University of Kentucky, Demystifying the Critique p. A-9)
"This is not an easy task. Critiques vary widely. Some critiques are epistemological; others are moral, political, or even metaphysical. They can attack opponents' premises, opponents' method of reasoning, even opponents' language choices."
- 11. Kritiks should not be in policy debate**
Roger Solt, 1993 (University of Kentucky, Demystifying the Critique p. A-9)
"Critiques almost invariably operate outside the normal policy framework of debate. It is clear why this is the case: if critiques were powerful as policy arguments (or at least as powerful), then they would probably have been formulated as such. What the critique seems to challenge most fundamentally is that what we are essentially engaged in is a policy debate."
- 12. Kritiks should be rejected**
Matthew Shors and Steve Mancuso, 1993 (University of Michigan, The Critique: Skreaming Without raising its Voice, p. A-14)
"(2) Debates should instead be focused on rejecting ideas which unwittingly uphold questionable institutions, language, ideology, or worldviews. What perhaps most distances the Critique from other debates arguments is its

refusal to consider the alternative to that which is being critiqued. For the Critique advocate, the job of the debater is to reject, not to embrace.”

13. Kritiks only show flaws in logic

Matthew Shors and Steve Mancuso, 1993 (University of Michigan, The Critique: Skreaming Without raising its Voice, p. A-14)

“Since the Critique is an overriding claim which should be a priori in a debate context, comparisons are irrelevant, say its advocates. Hence if it can be demonstrated that, in order to successfully reject a proposal, one must defend an alternative, then the Critique, as is currently argued, is intellectually defeated.”

14. Kritiks destroy conventionality

Matthew Shors and Steve Mancuso, 1993 (University of Michigan, The Critique: Skreaming Without raising its Voice, p. A-14)

“The Critique does not attempt to meet the conventional burdens of a debate argument there is no ‘uniqueness,’ no ‘impact,’ no ‘probability,’ and no ‘threshold.’ In short all of the requisites of comparative discussion are ignored by the Critique.”

DECONSTRUCTION BAD- THORETICALLY FLAWED

() Advocates of deconstruction even disagree on the proper interpretation of theory

John Ellis, Prof. of German, 1989 (Against Deconstruction)

“When discussing deconstruction amongst themselves (and therefore not under attack from the outside) deconstructionists do not hesitate to state a position or to talk of correct and incorrect versions of that position, often asking directly whether a particular formulation is correct. J. Hillis Miller, for example, in reviewing his fellow deconstructionist Joseph Riddell’s book, *The Inverted Bell*, asks the perfectly old-fashioned question, “First, there is the question of Riddell’s reading of Heidegger and Derrida. Has he got them right?” Rodolphe Gasche even goes so far as to say that all American advocates of deconstruction are guilty of misunderstanding it.”

() Deconstruction strategy destroys meaningful debate

John Ellis, Prof. of German, 1989 (Against Deconstruction)

“The most enduring fault of literary criticism as a field had been its readiness to abandon the communal sense of a shared inquiry, in which individual perceptions are expected to be tested and sifted by others. A shared inquiry means a commitment to argument and dialogue, which a criticism that insists on the value of each individual critic’s perspective, in effect refuses to make that commitment. Before deconstruction, theory of criticism worked against the laissez-faire tendencies of criticism; but now deconstruction, an intensified expression of those tendencies, had attempted to seize the mantle of theory in order to pursue this antithetical program. The result is an apparent novelty that, looked at more closely, consists in resistance to change and, more particularly, to that change that is most urgently needed; the development of some check on and control of the indigestible, chaotic flow of critical writing through reflection on what is and what is not in principle worthwhile- that is, through genuine, rather than illusory, theoretical reflection.”

() Deconstruction process accomplished nothing at all

John Ellis, Prof. of German, 1989 (Against Deconstruction)

“There are, in fact, grounds for concluding that this aspect of the deconstructive program is, from a logical point of view, vacuous: that is, it may seem to be saying something but really is not. Imagine a conference on cancer research at which the general sense is that recent research is going nowhere. A deconstructionist raised to tell the conference that it must look to hitherto marginalized, thus neglected ideas. A researcher intrigued by the possibility of a new idea, asks what specific suggestion or suggestions the deconstructionist has in mind. But the deconstructionist replies only that the field must question its concept of what is central to cancer research. Evidently, replies the researcher, but just what aspect of the current consensus on centrality is the problem, and which of the thousands of currently neglected chemical possibilities is the one the deconstructionist is recommending? If now the deconstructionist replies that he is recommending a general strategy, not a concrete proposal, the audience will conclude, correctly, that he has nothing to say at all. For what he has just said is rather like saying ‘have a new good idea.’ this is not even a strategy for finding new ideas, much less a new idea in itself.”

DECONSTRUCTION BAD-- COUNTERPRODUCTIVE

() Critical theory is counterproductive for multiple reasons

Anthony V. Alfieri, Assoc. Prof. of Law, 1993 (Georgetown Law Review, August)

“To be sure, the project of deconstructing and reconstructing a theoretic of practice risks error. Theory may also commit materialist errors by blundering into structuralism hypotheses about detours and history. Conversely, theory may inflict idealist errors by mistaking material constraint or necessity for individual choice and group consensus. Alternatively, theory may wreak paradigmatic errors by restricting the supply of permissible beliefs, values, and techniques (e.g. analogies and metaphors) available to assay a particular field. As a result, the field may become less accessible to analysis, understanding, and change.”

() Deconstruction only furthers conservative forces

John Ellis, Prof. of German, 1989 (Against Deconstruction)

“In general, any wild and incoherent attack on conservatism always tends to strengthen it and to give it added legitimacy. Instead of slowly changing and relaxing with the passage of time, it is suddenly given new life as the legitimate alternative to the current excesses. But in the case of deconstruction, there are added reasons to believe that it promotes rather than erodes conservatism. For, as we have seen, when deconstruction puts such heavy emphasis on the undermining of the traditional view, it is giving that view a privileged status. A permanent existence at stage center where it is to stay while being deconstructed. The real way forward from a conservative viewpoint that needs revision is to go on from it -- to find something better, and that something will not just oppose the older view but replace it. Finding something better is genuinely progressive move; running rings around a dying idea is neither original nor productive. Deconstruction and conservatism are in a kind of symbiosis in which the two feed on each other; and thus ideas that deserve to die will not be allowed to do so.”

() Effects of deconstruction are on balance negative

John Ellis, Prof. of German, 1989 (Against Deconstruction)

“It is sometimes suggested that deconstruction’s attack on the traditional is in practice a healthy development in America, whatever is theoretical deficiency, for two reasons: first, it helps to loosen up raining pockets of old-fashioned literary-historical rapidity, and second, it promotes an awareness that reading of literature should look deeper than they have done into the hidden subtleties of texts. I must confess that I am always doubtful of the practical advantages of unsound ideas; they are usually impressive only if one ignores the practical disadvantage that must of necessity flow from anything that is inherently incoherent. Indeed, the net results of the good and bad effects of deconstruction in the present situation seems to me clearly on the minus side.”

CRITICAL DISCOURSE BAD--EXCLUDES MINORITY VIEWS

() Critical discourse is exclusionary and oppressive rather than progressive

Sharon Crowley, Prof. Of English, Northern Ariz. Univ., 1992 (Quart Jour. Of ?Speech, Summer)

"I think I have demonstrated that traditional criticism does make unwarranted claims to universality and that one effect of its doing so is its partisans' continuing domination of critical conversations. And if the Enlightenment ethic supports the partial and exclusionary critical practices that moved Wander to write "The ideological Turn," it supports the unequal gender, race, and class constructions that concern me as well. Even though the current critical conversation may seem to be expansive and pluralist, it is actually exclusionary: it excludes certain kinds of criticism and it excludes certain sorts of critics."

() Critical rhetoric always excludes the opinions of others

Sharon Crowley, Prof. Of English, Northern Ariz. Univ., 1992 (Quart Jour. Of ?Speech, Summer)

"In 'The Third Persona,' Wander eloquently addressed the exclusionary potential of language. Every affirmative discourse, he wrote, carries with it an implicit negation: "The potentiality of language to commend being carries with it the potential to spell out being unacceptable, undesirable, insignificant." He continued "The objectification of certain individuals and groups disclosed itself through what is and is not said about them and through actual conditions affecting their ability to speak for themselves. Operating through existing social, political, and economic arrangements, negation extends beyond the 'text' to include the ability to produce to pay attention to the audience who was not constituted within current critical discourse, those whose absence from consideration, for whatever reason, made possible the construction of the audience that was present."

() Ideological criticisms are inevitably exclusionary

Sharon Crowley, Prof. Of English, Northern Ariz. Univ., 1992 (Quart Jour. Of ?Speech, Summer)

"All criticisms are exclusive of someone, somewhere. This means that ideological criticisms are inevitable exclusionary as well. Ideological critics must remember that their acknowledgement of partiality does not guarantee that their criticism will be inclusive. Feminist women of color have persuasively demonstrated that white feminist politics regularly overlooks or forgets the need of third world women; critics of Marxist politics have shown that Marxist definitions of the 'working class' do not describe many persons who labor for their subsistence-home makers and child care workers, for example. At the same time, ideological critics should be wary of making arbitrary exclusions. That ideological critics like me fail to grasp the poetical point of symbolic criticism must not keep it from being written. Nor more should feminist critics exclude men from their ranks or Marxists claim that class analyses produce the only useful social criticism."

POSTSTRUCTURALISM BAD--COUNTERPRODUCTIVE

() Best case scenario for critique is to entrench what it rejects

Robert Hariman, Professor of Speech communication at Drake University, 1991 (Quarterly Journal of Speech, Fall)
“Stated otherwise, at best, critical rhetoric falls squarely on one side of what Jorgen Habermas labels “the philosophical discourse of modernity”: it is a countermovement against any claim that current versions of freedom or reason exemplify the maximum achievement of rational self determination of the individual articulation of the operations of self-consciousness, achieving justice through the achievement of rational social relations, etc., and consequently it is suspect able to appropriation by the very practices of modern political hegemony it would critique.”

() the poststructuralist philosophy that power is located in the dominant discourses serves the forces of totalitarianism and oppression

Daniel A. Farber and Suzanne Sherry, Professors of Law at Univ. of Minnesota, 1995 (California Law Review, May 1995)

“The core of the radical constructivist paradigm is a rejection of the Enlightenment and its emphasis on rationality and scientific exhalation. Instead, radical constructivists seek to explain the world solely as the result--deliberate or unconscious--of ideology and the pursuit of dominance. But that standard leaves little room for shared concepts of merit, morality, or anything else. As other scholars have noted, radical constructivism ‘leaves no ground whatsoever for distinguishing reliable knowledge from superstition.’ as a feminist philosopher who sympathizes with what we have called radical constructivism has warned, it can readily slide into moral relativism--only one step away from relying on raw power to determine truth. For if ideas are mere reflections of the exercise of power, it becomes difficult to find a basis for critiquing social arrangements. And if raw powers the test of truth, totalitarians are merely the most unabashed constructors of reality. Much as radical constructivists may dislike this conclusion, its potential is present in their conceptual apparatus.”

() Poststructural analysis leads to ‘numbing’ and ‘despair’

Paul R. Gross, University of Virginia, Professor of Life Sciences, and Norman Levitt, Rutgers University, Professor of Mathematics, 1994 (Higher superstition p. 82)

“For its part, Foucauldian analysis despite the tender-heartedness of some of its instinct, seems equally to lead to resignation and quietism. If consciousness is such a prisoner of power--and Foucault seems much more gloomy than Marx in this respect--then hopes for a break with the oppressive past must be futile indeed. Notes Alan Ryan, Princeton, Professor of politics: “It is, for instance, pretty suicidal for embattled minorities to embrace Michael Foucault, let alone Jacques Derrida. The minority view was always that power could be undermined by truth...Once you read Foucault as saying that truth is simply an effect of power, you’ve had it...”

ACTION SHOULD PRECEDE CRITICAL ANALYSIS

() Should abandon policy kritiks in favor of activism

Schram, 1995 (Sanford F., Department of Political Science, Macalaster, POLICY SCIENCES, p. 375)

“While I am in full agreement that new social movements often are doing important work in unearthing the embedded biases of the dominate assumptions that inform policy decision-making, there is not much to say here beyond nothing the point and then doing the work in specific instances.

I say: give up policy analysis as a theorization of policy struggle and join the fray, highlight the exclusionary practices of discursive economies and leverage political change. Why convert policy struggle into an academic exercise of the quest for epistemic privilege that will inform all such struggles? Why place social movements in the theoretical museum-house of knowledge as specimens to be examined for their analytical work, neglecting all-the-while the non-universal pragmatics of such struggles?”

() Should abandon policy kritiks in favor of actual activism

Schram, 1995 (Sanford F., Department of Political Science, Macalaster, POLICY SCIENCES, p. 375)

“I therefore want to suggest that it is time to be against policy analysis as an activity designed to create normative models for the policy process. I instead side with interrogating ongoing discursive practice as it is invoked in policy struggles, recognizing that the consideration of what ought to be done, when and how, are contingent upon the time, place and purpose of those struggles and cannot be legislated in theory ahead of time.

We can then best learn from Forester by moving beyond him. We can begin to take seriously his call to interrogate these practices for their political consequences in specific instances. Beyond legislate a priori or seek to envision from some Olympian perspective. Instead, we can participate in engendering the pluralistic and dialogic, deliberative, democratic planning processes. Forester implies has supports. Perhaps by leaving critical theory behind and accepting the policy process is about politics that cannot be modeled ahead of time, we can begin to become more effective participants in the policy struggles of our time. Perhaps, then, it is very much time to be against policy analysis.”

CENSORSHIP OF SPEECH IS COUNTERPRODUCTIVE

() We should not fight oppressive speech with censorship

Smolia, 1992 (Albert, "Free Speech and Open Society", Annenberg Washington program, Communication policy studies, Northwestern University, p. 169)

"Hate speech in any of the contexts in which speech may be punished under recognized First Amendment doctrines- as when it poses a clear and present danger of violence, or is intertwined with actual discriminatory conduct.

But outside of those narrowly defined First Amendment categories, the battle against hate speech will be fought more effectively through persuasive and creative educational leadership than through punishment and coercion. The conflict felt by most decent Americans is that we hate speech as much as we love free speech. The conflict, however, is not reconcilable. It is most constructively resolved by a staunch commitment to free expression principles, supplemented with an equally vigorous attack on hate speech in all its forms, emphasizing energetic leadership and education on the values of tolerance, civility, and respect for human dignity, rather than punitive and coercive measures.

In a just society, reason and tolerance must triumph over prejudice and hate. But that triumph is best achieved through education, not coercion. Tolerance should be a dominant voice in the marketplace of ideas, but it should not preempt that marketplace."

As we can see, coercion is bad, and the marketplace of ideas should be tempered by tolerance, but not coerced into it. Our opponents would coerce us away from the marketplace of ideas into their own particular critique area, and this is not educational, productive, or good. Such coercion censors our marketplace of ideas, limiting us.

() Even oppressive messages may not be censored

Gora, 1991 (Joel M., et al., THE RIGHT TO PROTEST, ACLU)

"The ideas of the Klan may be propagated...Communists may speak freely and run for office...The Nazi Party may march through a city with a large Jewish population...People may criticize the President by misrepresenting his positions...People may teach religions that others despise...People may seek to repeal laws guaranteeing equal opportunity in employment or to revoke the constitutional amendments granting the vote to blacks and women." But the alternative would be to have government or the majority dictate what ideas are acceptable and what are not- in other words, what is the truth and what is false- the hallmark of censorship. That is why the Supreme Court has firmly declared, "[Above] all else, The First Amendment meant that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content."

In effect, our opponents are trying to become a tyrannical government, abusing their power by restricting free expression with censorship. This is unfair, unjust, totalitarian, and bad.

Affirmative Shell: Plan and Policy Should Be Focus – Long (1/4)

A. Interpretation: the aff should win if the topical plan is the best policy option in the debate. The neg should win if the plan is proven worse than the status quo or a policy option competitive with the plan.

B. Violation:

C. Standards

1) Plan focus – our framework ensures a stable locus for links and the comparison of alternatives. Alternative frameworks which do not ensure that the plan is the starting-point of the debate make confusion and judge intervention inevitable.

Michael Ignatieff, Carr Professor of Human Rights Practice, Director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at the JFK School of Government, Harvard University, 2004, *The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror*, p. 20-1

There are two problems with a perfectionist stance, leaving aside the question of whether it is realistic. The first is that articulating nonrevocable, nonderogable moral standards is relatively easy. The problem is deciding how to apply them in specific cases. What is the line between interrogation and torture, between targeted killing and unlawful assassination, between preemption and aggression? Even when legal and moral distinctions between these are clear in the abstract, abstractions are less than helpful when political leaders have to choose between them in practice. Furthermore, the problem with perfectionist standards is that they contradict each other. The same person who shudders, rightly, at the prospect of torturing a suspect might be prepared to kill the same suspect in a preemptive attack on a terrorist base. Equally, the perfectionist commitment to the right to life might preclude such attacks altogether and restrict our response to judicial pursuit of offenders through process of law. Judicial responses to the problem of terror have their place, but they are no substitute for military operations when terrorists possess bases, training camps, and heavy weapons. To stick to a perfectionist commitment to the right to life when under terrorist attack might achieve moral consistency at the price of leaving us defenseless in the face of evildoers. Security, moreover, is a human right, and thus respect for one right might lead us to betray another. A lesser evil morality is antiperfectionist in its assumptions. It accepts as inevitable that it is not always possible to save human beings from harm without killing other human beings; not always possible to preserve full democratic disclosure and transparency in counterterrorist operations; not always desirable for democratic leaders to avoid deception and perfidy; not always possible to preserve the liberty of the majority without suspending the liberties of a minority; not always possible to anticipate terrible consequences of well-meant acts, and so on. Far from making ethical reflection irrelevant, these dilemmas make ethical realism all the more essential to democratic reflection and good public policy. The fact that liberal democratic leaders may order the surreptitious killing of terrorists, may withhold information from their voters, may order the suspension of civil liberties need not mean that “anything goes.” Even if liberties must be suspended, their suspension can be made temporary; if executives must withhold information from a legislature in public, they can be obliged to disclose it in private session or at a later date. Public disinformation whose sole purpose is to deceive the enemy might be justified, but deliberately misleading a democratic electorate with a view to exaggerating risk or minimizing hazard can never be. The same balancing act needs to be observed in other cases. If the targeted killing of terrorists proves necessary, it can be constrained by strict rules of engagement and subjected to legislative oversight and review. The interrogation of terrorist suspects can be kept free of torture. Drawing these lines means keeping in clear sight the question of whether these means reinforce or betray the democratic identity they are supposed to defend.

2) Ground – there is an infinite number of unpredictable K frameworks, K links, and K impacts. Forcing the aff to debate in whatever framework the neg picks moots eight minutes of our speech time. Because the K could literally be about anything, their so-called framework destroys aff ground because we can never predict what we'll have to compare our plan to. Even if there's some ground for us to respond to their arg, it's not good or predictable and losing the 1AC puts us at an inherent disadvantage. In other words, fair and predictable ground is key to debate.

Ruth Lessl **Shively**, Associate Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M, **2000**, Political Theory and Partisan Politics, p. 182-3

The point may seem trite, as surely the ambiguists would agree that **basic terms must be shared before they can be resisted** and problematized. In fact, they are often very candid about this seeming paradox in their approach: the paradoxical or "parasitic" need of the subversive for an order to subvert. But admitting the paradox is not helpful if, as usually happens here, its implications are ignored; or if the only implication drawn is that order or harmony is an unhappy fixture of human life. For what **the paradox should tell us** is **that some kinds of harmonies or orders are, in fact, good for resistance**; and some ought to be fully supported. As such, **it should counsel against the kind of careless rhetoric that lumps all orders or harmonies together as arbitrary and inhumane**. Clearly **some basic accord about the terms of contest is a necessary ground for all further contest**. It may be that if the ambiguists wish to remain full-fledged ambiguists, they cannot admit to these implications, for to open the door to some agreements or reasons as good and some orders as helpful or necessary, is to open the door to some sort of rationalism. Perhaps they might just continue to insist that this initial condition is ironic, but that the irony should not stand in the way of the real business of subversion. Yet difficulties remain. **For agreement is not simply the initial condition, but the continuing ground, for contest. If we are to successfully communicate our disagreements, we cannot simply agree on basic terms** and then proceed to debate without attention to further agreements. For **debate and contest are forms of dialogue**: that is, they are activities **premised on the building of progressive agreements**. Imagine, for instance, that two people are having an argument about the issue of gun control. As noted earlier, in any argument, certain initial agreements will be needed just to begin the discussion. At the very least, the two **discussants** must agree on basic terms: for example, they must have some shared sense of what gun control is about; what is at issue in arguing about it; what facts are being contested, and so on. **They must also agree—and they do so simply by entering into debate—that they will not use violence or threats** in making their cases **and that they are willing to listen to, and to be persuaded by, good arguments**. **Such agreements are simply implicit in the act of argumentation**.

3) Topic-specific education – only debates about the plan translate into education about the topic. There would be no reason to switch topics every year if not for plan-focus debate. K frameworks encourage ultra-generics like the 'state bad' K that are stale and uneducational.

4) Policymaking – debating about institutional implementation of plans is key to citizen agency and deliberation.

Adolf G. **Gundersen**, Associate Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M, **2000**, Political Theory and Partisan Politics, p. 108-9

Will deliberation work the same way among ordinary citizens? Yes and no. Yes, deliberation will tend to heighten citizens appreciation of their interdependence. At the same time, the results are likely to be analogous rather than identical to those in formal governmental bodies, since citizen deliberation must of course function in the absence of the institutional interdependence established by the US constitution, with its clear specification of joint responsibilities. The theoretical mutuality of interests assumed by the Constitution exists among ordinary citizens, too. The difference is that

they have only their interests, not the impetus of divided power, to encourage them to discover and articulate them. Granted. But once they begin to do so, they are every bit as likely to succeed as the average representative. Citizen deliberation, in other words, will intensify citizens' appreciation of interdependence. Although I cannot prove the point, **there are compelling reasons to think that citizen deliberation yields an awareness of overlapping interests**. I have already alluded to the first, and perhaps most telling of these: if governors in a system of divided government such as our own succeed in deliberating their way to the public interest (however imperfectly or irregularly), surely ordinary citizens can be counted upon to do the same thing. Indeed, if my initial argument that decision-making spells the end of deliberation is on the mark, then **we have good reason to expect citizens to deliberate better than their representatives**. One can add to these theoretical considerations a lengthening list of **empirical findings** which **suggest not only that citizens are willing and able to engage in political deliberation, but also that they are quite able to do so**—able, that is, precisely in the sense of coming to a deeper appreciation of the collective nature of the problems they face (Dale et al. 1995; Gundersen 1995; Dryzek 1990; see also Gundersen n.d., chapter 4). In the end, the claim that deliberation enhances interdependence is hardly a radical one. After all, if **deliberation will** of itself diminish partisanship, as I started out by saying, it must at the same time **enhance interdependence**. To aim between Athens and Philadelphia requires, perhaps more than anything else, a changed way of thinking about partisanship. **Institutions and ways of thinking tend to change together; hence if the institutional reorientation suggested here is to take root, it must be accompanied by a new way of thinking about partisanship. Shifting our appraisal of partisanship will amount to a nothing less than a new attitude toward politics. It will require that we aspire to something new**, something that is at once less lofty (and less threatening) than the unity to which direct democracy is supposed to lead, but more democratic (and more deliberative) than encouraging political deliberation among a selected group of representatives. As I argued above, it will require **that we seek to stimulate deliberation among all citizens**. With Madison, we need to view partisanship as inevitable. Collective choice, indeed choice itself, is a partisan affair. But we also need to resist the equation of politics and partisanship. If politics is seen as nothing more than a clash of partisan interests, it is likely to stay at that level. Conversely, for deliberation to work, it must be seen as reasonable, if not all-illuminating—as efficacious, if not all-powerful. At the same time, of course, **citizens must** borrow a page from the participatory democrat's book by coming to **view deliberation as their responsibility rather than something that is done only by others in city hall, the state capitol, or Congress—others who are**, after all, **under** direct and constant **pressure to act rather than deliberate**. **Politics**, in other words, **must be resuscitated as an allegiance to democratic deliberation**.

D. Defense

1) We don't exclude them - they get their kritik if it links to the plan, and they get their alternative if it is either the status quo or a governmental action. If their arg can't meet these requirements that proves it's unfair and not germane.

2) We get our aff – even if they win that their arg should be included, we get to weigh the impact of the 1AC against it.

E. Voter for education and fairness – framework is a precondition for debate.

Ruth Lessl Shively, Associate Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M, 2000, Political Theory and Partisan Politics, p. 181-182

The requirements given thus far are primarily negative. The **ambiguists** must say "no" to—they **must reject and limit—some ideas and actions**. In what follows, we will also find that they must say "yes" to some things. In particular, they must say "yes" to the idea of rational persuasion. This

means, first, that they must recognize the role of agreement in political contest, or the basic accord that is necessary to discord. The mistake that the ambiguists make here is a common one. The mistake is in thinking that agreement marks the end of contest—that consensus kills debate. But this is true only if the agreement is perfect—if there is nothing at all left to question or contest. In most cases, however, our agreements are highly imperfect. **We agree on** some matters but not on others, on **generalities but not on specifics, on principles but not on their applications**, and so on. And **this kind of limited agreement is the starting condition of contest and debate**. As John Courtney Murray writes: We hold certain truths; therefore we can argue about them. It seems to have been one of the corruptions of intelligence by positivism to assume that argument ends when agreement is reached. In a basic sense, the reverse is true. **There can be no argument except** on the premise, and **within a context, of agreement**. (Murray 1960, 10) In other words, **we cannot argue about something** if we are not communicating: **if we cannot agree on the topic and terms of argument or if we have utterly different ideas about what counts as evidence** or good argument. At the very least, **we must agree about what it is that is being debated before we can debate it**. For instance, **one cannot have an argument about euthanasia with someone who thinks euthanasia is a musical group**. One cannot successfully stage a sit-in if one's target audience simply thinks everyone is resting or if those doing the sitting have no complaints. Nor can one demonstrate resistance to a policy if no one knows that it is a policy. In other words, **contest is meaningless if there is a lack of agreement or communication about what is being contested**. Resisters, demonstrators, and **debaters must have some shared ideas about the subject and/or the terms of their disagreements**. The participants and the target of a sit-in must share an understanding of the complaint at hand. And a demonstrator's audience must know what is being resisted. In short, the contesting of an idea presumes some agreement about what that idea is and how one might go about intelligibly contesting it. In other words, **contestation rests on some basic agreement** or harmony.

Affirmative Shell: Plan and Policy Should Be Focus - Short

A. Interpretation: the aff should win if the topical plan is the best policy option in the debate. The neg should win if the plan is proven worse than the status quo or a policy option competitive with the plan.

B. Violation:

C. Standards

1) Plan focus – our framework ensures a stable locus for links and the comparison of alternatives. Alternative frameworks which do not ensure that the plan is the starting-point of the debate make confusion and judge intervention inevitable.

2) Ground – there is an infinite number of unpredictable K frameworks, K links, and K impacts. Forcing the aff to debate in whatever framework the neg picks moots eight minutes of our speech time. Because the K could literally be about anything, their so-called framework destroys aff ground because we can never predict what we'll have to compare our plan to. Even if there's some ground for us to respond to their arg, it's not good or predictable and losing the 1AC puts us at an inherent disadvantage.

3) Topic-specific education – only debates about the plan translate into education about the topic. There would be no reason to switch topics every year if not for plan-focus debate. K frameworks encourage ultra-generics like the 'state bad' K that are stale and noneducational.

D. Voter for fairness and education

***Definitions

Definition – USFG is the Agent of the Resolution

() The topic is defined by the phrase following the colon – the USFG is the agent of the resolution, not the individual debaters

Webster's Guide to Grammar and Writing, 2000, online:

<http://ccc.commnet.edu/grammar/marks/colon.htm>

Use of a colon before a list or an explanation that is preceded by a clause that can stand by itself.

Think of the colon as a gate, inviting one to go on... If the introductory phrase preceding the colon is very brief and the clause following the colon represents the real business of the sentence, begin the clause after the colon with a capital letter.

Definition – Resolved Relates to the Resolution, Not Debaters

() “Resolved” expresses intent to solve the question posed by the resolution – this is distinct from individual debaters being ‘resolved’

American Heritage Dictionary 2000, online: www.dictionary.com/cgi-bin/dict.pl?term=resolved

To find a solution to; solve ...

To bring to a usually successful conclusion

Definition – Should Implies Expectation

() “Should” denotes an expectation – this means the resolution shows expectation that its agent will enact the plan

American Heritage Dictionary – 2000 [www.dictionary.com]

3 Used to express probability or expectation

Rules Are The key to Ethics

Rules are key to checking evil; the only way to oppose something is to align yourself with its opposite. This means that a minimum of shared agreement is the necessary condition for preventing atrocity.

Ruth Lessl Shively, Associate Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M, 2000, Political Theory and Partisan Politics, p. 180

Thus far, I have argued that if the ambiguists mean to be subversive about anything, they need to be conservative about some things. They need to be steadfast supporters of the structures of openness and democracy: willing to say "no" to certain forms of contest; willing to set up certain clear limitations about acceptable behavior. To this, finally, I would add that if the ambiguists mean to stretch the boundaries of behavior—if they want to be revolutionary and disruptive in their skepticism and iconoclasm—they need first to be firm believers in something. Which is to say, again, they need to set clear limits about what they will and will not support, what they do and do not believe to be best. As G. K. Chesterton observed, the true revolutionary has always willed something "definite and limited." For example, "The Jacobin could tell you not only the system he would rebel against, but (what was more important) the system he would not rebel against..." He "desired the freedoms of democracy." He "wished to have votes and not to have titles . . ." But "because the new rebel is a skeptic"—because he cannot bring himself to will something definite and limited— "he cannot be a revolutionary." For "the fact that he wants to doubt everything really gets in his way when he wants to denounce anything" (Chesterton 1959,41). Thus, the most radical skepticism ends in the most radical conservatism. In other words, a refusal to judge among ideas and activities is, in the end, an endorsement of the status quo. To embrace everything is to be unable to embrace a particular plan of action, for to embrace a particular plan of action is to reject all others, at least for that moment. Moreover, as observed in our discussion of openness, to embrace everything is to embrace self-contradiction: to hold to both one's purposes and to that which defeats one's purposes—to tolerance and intolerance, open-mindedness and close-mindedness, democracy and tyranny. In the same manner, then, the ambiguists' refusals to will something "definite and limited" undermines their revolutionary impulses. In their refusal to say what they will not celebrate and what they will not rebel against, they deny themselves (and everyone else in their political world) a particular plan or ground to work from. By refusing to deny incivility, they deny themselves a civil public space from which to speak. They cannot say "no" to the terrorist who would silence dissent. They cannot turn their backs on the bullying of the white supremacist. And, as such, in refusing to bar the tactics of the anti-democrat, they refuse to support the tactics of the democrat. In short, then, to be a true ambiguist, there must be some limit to what is ambiguous. To fully support political contest, one must fully support some uncontested rules and reasons. To generally reject the silencing or exclusion of others, one must sometimes silence or exclude those who reject civility and democracy.

Rules key to Education

Without concrete terms for discussion, disputes become meaningless and valueless, only once a consensus has been arrived at can there be any engagement.

Kemerling, 97 professor of philosophy at Newberry College, (Garth, "Definition and Meaning",

<http://www.philosophypages.com/lg/e05.htm>)

We've seen that sloppy or misleading use of ordinary language can seriously limit our ability to create and communicate correct reasoning. As philosopher John Locke pointed out three centuries ago, the achievement of human knowledge is often hampered by the use of words without fixed signification. Needless controversy is sometimes produced and perpetuated by an unacknowledged ambiguity in the application of key terms. We can distinguish disputes of three sorts:

Genuine disputes involve disagreement about whether or not some specific proposition is true.

Since the people engaged in a genuine dispute agree on the meaning of the words by means of which they convey their respective positions, each of them can propose and assess logical arguments that might eventually lead to a resolution of their differences.

Merely verbal disputes, on the other hand, arise entirely from ambiguities in the language used to express the positions of the disputants. A verbal dispute disappears entirely once the people involved arrive at an agreement on the meaning of their terms, since doing so reveals their underlying agreement in belief.

Apparently verbal but really genuine disputes can also occur, of course. In cases of this sort, the resolution of every ambiguity only reveals an underlying genuine dispute. Once that's been discovered, it can be addressed fruitfully by appropriate methods of reasoning.

We can save a lot of time, sharpen our reasoning abilities, and communicate with each other more effectively if we watch for disagreements about the meaning of words and try to resolve them whenever we can.

Debate leads to education about the real world

Christopher C. Joyner (prof. of International law at Georgetown) Spring 1999 "teaching international law: views from an international relations political scientist" ILSA journal of international & comparative law 5 ILSA J Int'l & Comp L 377

The debate exercises carry several specific educational objectives. First, students on each team must work together to refine a cogent argument that compellingly asserts their legal position on a foreign policy issue confronting the United States. In this way, they gain greater insight into the real-world legal dilemmas faced by policy makers. Second, as they work with other members of their team, they realize the complexities of applying and implementing international law, and the difficulty of bridging the gaps between United States policy and international legal principles, either by reworking the former or creatively reinterpreting the latter. Finally, research for the debates forces students to become familiarized with contemporary issues on the United States foreign policy agenda and the role that international law plays in formulating and executing these policies.ⁿ⁸ The debate thus becomes an excellent vehicle for pushing students beyond stale arguments over principles into the real world of policy analysis, political critique, and legal defense.

Rules key to Deliberation

Critique is not a matter of rejecting categories categorically but rather of choosing the right categories; this is especially true when critique is held to the standard of competitive judgment which must defer to shared sets of basic assumptions.

Ruth Lessl Shively, Assoc Prof Polisci at Texas A&M, 2000 *Political Theory and Partisan Politics* p. 188-9

This is why the ambiguists need to do more than call for a wholesale resistance to categories. Because resistance to some categorizations always involves acceptance of others, they need to own up to, and justify, their own choices.⁶ If they propose that we choose their version of reality and their favored categorizations, they must give us reasons. If they think we ought to be skeptical ambiguists rather than truth- or harmony-seekers, they must make a case for this prescription. Simply being against established categories is disingenuous when the argument is designed to establish new categories in replace of the old. We are brought back, then, to the issues of rational judgment and persuasion. Earlier I argued that political contest rests on certain un-contested foundations or rational conditions. Here I have added that the policy of anti-categorization rests on certain stable categories of its own. Thus, the subversives are not free from the responsibility of choosing and justifying the subversive categories that define and guide them. For once we recognize the inescapability of choosing categories, we see that subversion or any other political project is a matter of choosing the right categories, not of escaping them. Thus, to be truly subversive requires taking a stand: judging what is good and bad, legitimate and illegitimate, allowed and disallowed, in the best subversive society. The desire to avoid this sort of judgment is understandable, for it tends to be associated with intolerant and oppressive attitudes and behaviors. And the situations within which we must judge are often dauntingly complex and uncertain. Rarely can we be certain that our judgments are right. Nonetheless, judgments must be made—not only in the development of political theory, but also in confronting the decisions of everyday political life. Thus, even in the face of great uncertainty and ambiguity, we are compelled to act and, in so doing, to judge what is good and bad, reasonable and unreasonable, and so on. The ambiguity of our situation does nothing, as such, to alter the need for judgment. As John Courtney Murray writes, to say that uncertainty and complexity must keep us from judging or acting is as senseless as a surgeon in the midst of a gastroenterostomy [saying] that the highly complex situation in front of him is so full of paradox ("The patient is at once receiving blood and losing it"), and irony ("Half a stomach will be better than a whole one") and dilemma ("Not too much, nor too little, anesthesia") that all surgical solutions are necessarily ambiguous. (Murray 1960, 283) *Political Theory and the Postmodern Politics of Ambiguity* The point, of course, is that there is no avoiding judgment and action here, and that in political theory and politics, as in surgery, we are often compelled to deal with the complexities we meet as best we can. Thus, if we must judge, there is no point in trying to avoid the task through a policy of indiscriminate subversion. Our choice is not whether to judge, but whether to judge through open, reasoned argument or not. And the point of this essay has been to say that the former option is best.

Rules key to Deliberation

Communicative persuasion is at the heart of politics; the difference between intimidation and political speech is precisely the attempt to persuade through reason.

Ruth Lessl Shively, Assoc Prof Polisci at Texas A&M, 2000 Political Theory and Partisan Politics p. 183

Earlier we asked how the ambiguists distinguish legitimate political behaviors, like contest or resistance, from illegitimate behaviors, like cruelty and subjugation. We find a more complete answer here. The former are legitimate because they have civil or rational persuasion as their end. That is, **legitimate forms of contest and resistance seek to inform or convince others by appeal to reasons rather than by force or manipulation. The idea is implicit in democracy** because democracy implies a basic respect for self-determination: a respect for people's rights to direct their own lives as much as possible by their own choices, to work and carry on relationships as they see fit, to participate in community and politics according to decisions freely made by them rather than decisions forced on them, and so on. Thus, **to say that rational persuasion is the end of political action is simply to acknowledge that, in democratic politics, this is the way we show respect for others' capacities for self-direction. In public debate, our goal is to persuade others with ideas that they recognize as true rather than by trying to manipulate them or move them** without their conscious, rational assent. Of course, to say that **this** is the **implicit end of political action** is not to say that we always recognize or act in accord with it. Like most ideals, it is, strictly speaking, unattainable. Yet, like most ideals, it nonetheless **defines our judgments on the subject**. It is the gauge against which we judge progress or decline. Nor is **this recognition of rational persuasion a rejection of the role of interest or power in politics**. Clearly, the reasons we may give in persuading others may be based on issues of interest or power. We may try to convince others, for example, that a certain policy position is in their self-interest or that a certain action will increase their bargaining power. Though I should quickly add that, **in a democracy, there must be other reasons recognized beside power and interest**. For **if power trumps everything, then those with the most power will always win and those with less will always lose** (unless, by happy chance, their interests coincide), **and there is no point in talking about democratic concepts** like rights or equality or freedom. Democracy necessarily assumes that **certain ideas trump power**: for example, that ideas like the right to assemble, the right to free speech and representation, the rights of the accused, and so on, are to be rendered to people regardless of their positions in society. I should also say that by calling these activities "rational" I do not mean to conjure up universal, rational principles or Rawlsian original positions, but only to say that democratic political activities have as their end persuasion by appeal to shared reasons. The "rational" tag simply serves to distinguish voluntary from less-than-voluntary kinds of persuasions. Thus, for example, I may "persuade" a man to do something by hypnotizing him or by holding a gun to his head, but I would not be using rational persuasion; I would not be giving him reasons upon which he might make his own judgment. Instead, I would be deciding for him. Again, the point is that **in order to respect the self-determination of others, we must give them reasons they can recognize, or grounds that allow them to weigh their own thoughts and choose**. Nor, finally, should the "rational" or "civil" tag suggest that democratic actions are always inoffensive or acceptable to the majority. There are many actions that can be considered persuasive and political in the broad sense used here, while yet being offensive to majorities: we might list among these **gay rights groups' disruptions of church services**, animal rights groups' splashing of blood on fur owners, or anti-abortion groups' attempts to block clinic entrances. Leaving aside legal or moral questions about these tactics, we can say that they **are political in a way that burning crosses is not**. That is, **they are political to the extent that they are aimed at rational persuasion of some kind**: at communicating or heightening awareness of an idea, at enhancing others' understandings of an issue, and thus **at enhancing others' freedom and ability to make political decisions—rather, that is, than** being aimed at merely **intimidating them**. We can further grasp the intuition here by

noting the different response we would have upon learning that an animal rights activist was splashing blood on people with the intent merely of bullying them or frightening them out of the habit of wearing furs. In such a case, most of us sense that the action is no longer legitimately political because (or to the extent that) it is aimed at intimidation rather than rational persuasion.»

Rules key to Deliberation

Empty abstractions are like cyanide to democracy – only through robust dialogue and meaningful conversation can we learn and improve as beings and democratic participants

Christopher A. Bracey, Associate Professor of Law, Associate Professor of African & African American Studies, Washington University in St. Louis, September 2006, Southern California Law Review, 79 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1231, p. 1311-1314, LexisNexis

Robust dialogue on public policy matters also promotes the individual growth of the dialogue participants. Conversation helps people become more knowledgeable and hold better developed

opinions because "opinions can be tested and enlarged only where there is a genuine encounter with differing opinions." ⁿ²⁶⁷ Moreover, **meaningful conversation serves to broaden people's moral**

perspectives to include matters of public good, because appeals to the public good are often the most persuasive arguments available in public deliberation. ⁿ²⁶⁸ Indeed, even if people are

thinking self-interested thoughts while making public good arguments, cognitive dissonance will create an incentive for such individuals to reconcile their self interest with the public good. ⁿ²⁶⁹ At

the same time, **because political dialogue is a material manifestation of democracy in action, it promotes a feeling of democratic community and instills in the people a will for political**

action to advance reasoned public policy in the spirit of promoting the public good. n270 For these reasons, the collective aspiration of those interested in pursuing serious, sustained, and

policy-legitimizing dialogue on race matters must be to cultivate a reasoned discourse that is relatively free of retrograde ideological baggage that feeds skepticism, engenders distrust, and

effectively forecloses constructive conversation on the most corrosive and divisive issue in American history and contemporary life. As the forgoing sections suggest, **the continued**

reliance upon pedigreed rhetorical themes has and continues to poison racial legal discourse.

Given the various normative and ideological commitments that might be ascribed to [*1314] opponents of race preferences, the question thus becomes, how are we to approach the task of breaking through the conversational impasse and creating intellectual space for meaningful discourse on this issue?

Deliberation Impact – Agency

Political deliberation radically empowers personal agency

Adolf G. Gundersen, Assoc Prof Polisci at Texas A&M, 2000, Political Theory and Partisan Politics p. 105

Fortunately, we now have innovative recommendations aplenty for stimulating deliberation,⁵ covering virtually every institution in American society, including, of course, government itself. The problem at the moment is choosing from among them in such a way as to achieve the widest and longest lasting impact. Although prioritizing deliberative reforms is a far more complex task than it might appear to be at first glance,⁶ each element of the *via media* I am recommending here establishes a separate criterion that reform proposals ought to meet. These four criteria helps us sort through the plethora of proposals now being discussed by academics and policymakers. This is as true of this first element as it is of the other three, for it calls not for expanding deliberation tout court but, rather, for expanding deliberation outside the context of public decision-making bodies. Hence, it calls on us to resist plans for stimulating deliberation through the radical decentralization of society. It likewise recommends that we demand more of deliberative reform than that it shore up existing deliberative institutions, however valuable that might be. Instead, **the premium this strategy places on indirect political engagement asks us to look for deliberative opportunities** precisely in those places we are least accustomed to looking for them: families, churches, civic organizations, professions, public spaces, and the like. **To encourage indirect political engagement by encouraging political deliberation is**, in one sense, **quite radical**, **for** although it is not at all the same thing as adopting the view that "everything is political," **it is tantamount to claiming that "everything can be a site for political deliberation."** **Conversely**, from another perspective this view hardly represents much of a challenge at all, for **it simply asks us to recognize the obvious fact that**, ever since Athenian citizens carried the business of the assembly and courts into the agora, **politics has always seeped out through the cracks of formal institutions**. And it is to recognize that, at least within certain limits, **this is not only proper, but desirable**—desirable **because decisions that are discussed are likely to be wiser than those that are not, wherever they happen to be discussed**. In general terms, then, aiming somewhere between Athens and Philadelphia means spurring deliberation. But we can locate our target more precisely than that. We saw earlier that the second element of this strategy is to counter partisanship not only at the institutional treetops, but at the grass roots as well. This second criteria narrows our search to reforms that might stimulate deliberation there—where it is insulated from the inherently partisan pressure to adjudicate disputes and issue policy. But just what does **stimulating grass-roots deliberation** mean? It **means encouraging citizens to actively deliberate outside of formal decision-making institutions at what is normally thought of as the "pre-political" level**. It **means stimulating political discourse in places that are not normally thought of as "political."** It **means working to promote thoughtful exchanges** among those who are political, but not yet partisan. It means **cultivating a public both willing and able to engage one another in political discussion**. Finally, and most centrally, it means finding creative ways to support the civic fabric of society, of **strengthening those institutions which, while not charged with the responsibility for making political decisions, are potential sites for political deliberation**.

Deliberation Impact – Peace

Democratic deliberation is key to peace

Thomas A. Spragens, Professor of Political Science at Duke, 2000, Political Theory and Partisan Politics, p. 90-1

In another equally important respect, however, Plato was, as a consequence of his philosophical positivism and attendant political authoritarianism, quite wrong. So long as we are fallibilist but not pyrrhonist in our moral epistemology, we should recognize that liberal democratic regimes are the natural homes of political theory and the places where the functions of political theory are most integral to the premises and practices of political life and legitimacy. For it is these regimes that make legitimacy consist in the consent of a citizenry presumed to be both rational and possessed of the moral powers. In that context, **rational discourse about what is to be done seems an essential component of legitimate politics**, since **that form of contestation is essential to the creation of a popular will** that can pass muster—that is, to the formation of a popular will **that can claim to be rational consent rather than aggregate whimsy**. To say that liberal democratic regimes are the natural homes of political theory is not to say that tensions do not characterize the relationship between them. In its deployment of critical reason, political theory must seem somewhat subversive to all regimes, liberal democracies included. Political theoretical critique casts a skeptical eye on all legitimacy myths, and it must puncture claims to political certitude and hegemony. It also will be subject to critical and potentially corrosive scrutiny the justifications set forth on their own behalf by powerful interests in democratic societies, including perhaps those enshrined by a democratic majority. This constant critique is socially useful but often not politically welcome. This critical function of political theory is one that even moral cynics and epistemological skeptics can appreciate and accredit. But political theory also plays a more constructive role in liberal democracies, one that the cynic fails to appreciate and one that a thoroughgoing and unqualified cynicism would ultimately undermine. Relying upon the moral powers and their attendant passions for its energy and relying upon the logical and linguistic constraints of moral discourse for its direction, **political theoretical dialogue assists the movement toward the more complex form of objectivity in political and practical affairs** envisioned by Karl Mannheim, someone who was as aware as anyone of the ways that our sociological particularities and partisan interests produce competing perspectives. Mannheim explained: The problem, he wrote, is not how we might arrive at a non-perspectivistic picture but how, by juxtaposing the various points of view, each perspective may be recognized as such and thereby a new level of objectivity attained. Thus we come to the point where the false ideal of a detached, impersonal point of view must be replaced by the ideal of an essentially human point of view which is within the limits of a human perspective, constantly trying to enlarge itself. (Mannheim 1936, 296-297) Political theory at its best, I would argue, functions constructively in precisely this fashion. It admits into its conversation conflicting perspectives and arguments that ineluctably are grounded in our sociological particularities and our partisan political interests. These perspectives are then set against each other and subjected to critical scrutiny in the context of those logical and linguistic constraints that constitute the discipline of reason. From that agonistic dialectic, narrowly partisan perspectives tend to lose credence and get winnowed out. Or they become broadened, amended, and complexified into new, more capacious and synthetic normative conceptions of the political world. These syntheses are neither final nor complete but continue to undergo continual change and revision under the impact of further challenge. **What results** from this process of critical moral dialogue between competing perspectives is, then, not some final Hegelian scientific super-synthesis, much less some Cartesian perfect transcendence. But what does result, I would argue, **is a greater tendency among all participants to be self-critical about their naive attachments and premises and a great and salutary pressure toward inducing in them a more enlarged, more comprehensive, and more impartial viewpoint regarding their society, their fellow citizens, and the issues of public**

policy they must address. From the kind of robust and rationally disciplined political dialogue embodied in political theory, **one learns**, as John Stuart Mill (1962, 168) put it, "**to feel for and with his fellow citizens and becomes consciously a member of a great community.**" **This is a form of discourse** and discipline that pushes toward those "more comprehensive and distant views" (Mill 1962, 138) that are the cognitive base of the public spiritedness that Mill, Tocqueville, the civic republicans, and even James Madison thought **essential to the health of a democratic body politic. It is a form of discourse**, moreover, **that sharpens the habits and skills necessary for serious democratic deliberation.** And **this**, I would insist, **is no small contribution to the democratic enterprise of self-governance.**

Deliberation Impact – Democracy/Discrimination

Rejection of critical dialogue signals the failure of democracy – it creates discriminatory polarization and kills political power

Christopher A. Bracey, Associate Professor of Law, Associate Professor of African & African American Studies, Washington University in St. Louis, September 2006, Southern California Law Review, 79 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1231, p. 1311-1314, LexisNexis

A deepened appreciation and open acknowledgment of this pedigree is crucial to restoring public conversation on race preferences. Opponents of race preferences must come to understand that this pedigree, if left unaddressed, tends to overwhelm the underlying merit of arguments against race preferences in the eyes of proponents. At the same time, proponents should understand that the deployment of these pedigreed rhetorical themes does not necessarily signal agreement with the nineteenth-century racial norms from which they are sourced. For both proponents and opponents, the avoidance of a rapid retreat into ideological trench warfare not only preserves space for reasoned, substantive debate regarding race preferences, but also allows for the possibility of overcoming our collective fixation on race preferences as the issue in American race relations and advancing the conversation to reach the larger issue of producing a more racially inclusive society.

Our failing public conversation on race matters not only presents a particularly tragic moment in American race relations, but also evinces a greater failure of democracy. Sustained, meaningful dialogue is a critical, if not indispensable feature of our liberal democracy. n260 It is through [*1312] meaningful public conversation about what actions government should take (or refrain from taking) that public policy determinations ultimately gain legitimacy. Conversation is particularly important in our democracy, given the profoundly diverse and often contradictory cultural and political traditions that are the sine qua non of American life. Under these particular circumstances, "persons ought to strive to engage in a mutual process of critical interaction, because if they do not, no uncoerced common understanding can possibly be attained." n261 Sincere deliberation, in its broadest idealized form, ensures that a broad array of input is heard and considered, legitimizing the resulting decision. Under this view, "if the preferences that determine the results of democratic procedures are unreflective or ignorant, then they lose their claim to political authority over us." n262 In the absence of self-conscious, reflective dialogue, "democracy loses its capacity to generate legitimate political power." n263

Rules key to Community

The individualist anarchy of a world without rules makes community and communication impossible

Michael Ignatieff, Carr Professor of Human Rights Practice, Director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at the JFK School of Government, Harvard University, 2004, *The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror*, p. 169

The challenge of an ethical life in liberal democracy is to live up, as individuals, to the engagements expressed in our constitutions and to seek to ensure that these engagements are kept in respect of the least advantaged of our fellow citizens. The task is also to ensure that each of us actually believes in our society as much of the time as possible. **In an age in which individuals are monstrously empowered**, by technology and freedom, **to bring Armageddon down** upon their fellow human beings, **it is suddenly no longer a minor matter that some of our fellow citizens**, and some of the noncitizens who live among us, **happen not to believe in liberal democracy but instead profess a variety of paranoid pretensions to be politics. The existence of wild, vengeful, and deluded political opinions**, if married to lethal technology in the possession of a single individual, **suddenly becomes a threat to us all**. I am haunted, as I think we all might be, by the specter of the superempowered loner as the cruel nemesis of the very moral care our society lavishes on the idea of the individual. **It is a condition of our freedom that we cannot compel anyone to believe in the premises of a liberal democracy Either these premises freely convince others or they are useless**. They cannot be imposed, and we violate everything we stand for if we coerce those who do not believe what we do. In any event, we cannot preemptively detain all the discontent in our midst.

Community Impact - Humanity

Debate and politics is key to humanity itself; a mere collection of individuals is not a community. Community is characterized by the kind of consensus which enables political thought and action.

Arlene W. Saxonhouse, Professor of Political Science at the University of Michigan, 2000, Political Theory and Partisan Politics, p. 24-6

Hannah Arendt, who without question romanticizes the life of the ancient polis, nevertheless creates a model of political action that exalts the partisan, or at least the one who articulates well through debate with others views that address the broad issues of communal life. This is the political actor who may seek glory for himself, but does so through engagement in controversies in the open about public decisions. It is conflict on this level of thought and will that transforms us from the mindless pursuers of the material necessities of our lives to the human beings who can act. Such divisions, then, which come to the fore in the public space, are necessary for our humanity. Partisanship in this sense is not to be avoided, but exercised skillfully with a focus beyond the petty concerns of everyday life to a concern with choices that politics make in their confrontations with barbarism. To enter into this debate is to demonstrate the courage of the human being to lift himself out of the struggle for mere survival. In writing of the world of the ancient polis, she notes: Whoever entered the political realm had first to be ready to risk his life, and too great a love for life obstructed freedom, was a sure sign of slavishness. Courage therefore became the political virtue par excellence, and only those men who possessed it could be admitted to a fellowship that was political in content and purpose and thereby transcended the mere togetherness imposed on all—slaves, barbarians, and Greeks alike—through the urgencies of life ... by overcoming the innate urge of all living creatures for their own survival, it [the good life] was no longer bound to the biological life process (Arendt 1958, 36-37). In a way that is similar to Wolin's criticism of the universalizing science of the American founders, Arendt criticizes the statistical methods that likewise assimilate individuals to one another and thus have the effect of "leveling out fluctuation." Arguing that "statistical uniformity is by no means a harmless scientific ideal," she worries about the immersion of the self in society and thus the failure to distinguish oneself in the arena of public action. To so distinguish oneself entails the engagement in debate and conflict, to rise out of the biological life processes. "Human plurality," she says, is "the basic condition of both action and speech" (Arendt 1958, 175). And it is this plurality that allows for the initiation of the new, the transformation of what appears to be. Without an attachment to the self, the pursuit of a public identity which earns immortality is lost. "Partisanship" here appears at its highest level, as the basis for our humanity and only a political regime that can accommodate this sort of partisanship is worthy of praise. Arendt builds her analysis of the plures of human interaction on a somewhat idiosyncratic reading of Aristotle. Despite the idiosyncrasies, she does draw attention to the ways in which Aristotle is perhaps the most powerful exponent of a theory of plures, of a theory that enables us to conceptualize the partisan as a key player in the construction of the polity and not as the destroyer of a beautiful unity. Aristotle is known for his quotable assertion that by nature [humans are] man is a political animal. By this he means that [humans] man as the only creature who possesses speech and reason (logos) and can thus debate the advantageous and disadvantageous, the just and unjust, must have a realm in which that capacity can be exercised. The polis provides that realm where [one] man exercises his rationality in the process of making choices for the collective community of the polis. Other actions, such as those that go on within the family are usually governed by inclination and lack the generality of the larger community of the polis.

Community Impact - Humanity

Community key: we are not present to ourselves. Social participation grounds individual human meaning.

Carlson 99, Professor of Law at Cardozo, (David Grey, "Review: Duellism in Modern American Jurisprudence", Colombia Law Review v. 99)

Schlag excoriates legal practice for its want of a "robust referent," but never quite defines what he means by this. What would count as a "robust referent"? We can only infer his meaning by studying what he thinks law is not. Thus, we learn from Schlag that natural things have robust referents.²⁷ Hence, one **may infer that the absent robust referent is some "natural" thing beyond language.**²⁸ **Law cannot signify the thing-beyond-language.** This is a good Lacanian insight.²⁹ But **does this fault differentiate law from any other linguistic practice that we might identify? Is law different from politics or mathematics or geology** **30 No. These practices likewise do nothing but refer to other signifiers in the same infinite regress that law does.**³¹ **One must conclude that law is not and never was the culprit. Language is.**³² If language always reduces to a chain of signifiers without end, **why single law out for abuse? Because law promises justice. Justice is law's Master Signifier its "exceptional element."**³³ Yet just because justice is exceptional, law cannot deliver it.³⁴ The inability of law to deliver what it promises can best be appreciated in the context of Lacanian theory. According to Lacan, the human subject is angry at language itself. This anger is inscribed in a false auto-biography,³⁵ according to which there once was a time in which the human subject felt no pain or desire; but something bad intervened to harm, maim or reduce our integrity. This story has been told a thousand times in myth, in the doctrine of Original Sin, in romantic nostalgia, in conservative or radical politics, even in Hegelian philosophy, where the human subject is portrayed as the diremption of Spirit into the world.³⁶ In Lacanian theory, **a subject who enters the symbolic realm of language can speak words recognized by other subjects who can speak back. The very idea of speaking presupposes some other subject who can listen and understand. Hence, our ability to differentiate** (and thus identify) **ourselves in language can only be bestowed on us by other speaking subjects. On this dialectical view of human subjectivity, we are, by definition, not whole not entirely present to ourselves.**³⁷ A basic part of ourselves is beyond us. We are alienated in language.³⁸ We suffer from "being-for-other."³⁹

Answers To: Rules = Violence

Conventions of communication are not a matter of violent exclusion but rather the preconditions for consensus.

Mary Dietz, Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota, 2000, Political Theory and Partisan Politics p. 123-4

Habermas's distinction between "pure" communicative action and strategic action raises many difficulties, not the least of which is its adherence to an idealized model of communication that, as Habermas himself acknowledges, does not fit a great deal of everyday social interaction (McCarthy 1991, 132). Machiavelli's famous riposte to those thinkers who "have imagined republics and principalities which have never been seen or known to exist in reality" (Machiavelli 1950, 56) seems pertinent here, for the idealized model that Habermas imagines and the distinction that supports it appear boldly to deny the Machiavellian insight that "how we live is so far removed from how we ought to live, that he who abandons what is done for what ought to be done, will rather learn to bring about his own ruin than his preservation" (56). I will return to this point as it relates to politics later. For now, it is important to underscore that Habermas relies upon the communicative-strategic distinction to do at least two things: first, to show that on the level of linguistics, communicative action enjoys an "originary" priority over strategic and all other modes of linguistic usage, which are themselves "parasitic" (Rasmussen 1990, 38) or "derivative" (McCarthy 1991, 133) upon the former.¹² Second, on the level of political theory, Habermas introduces the distinction in order to limit the exercise of threats and coercion (or strategic action) by enumerating a formal-pragmatic system of discursive accountability (or communicative action) that is geared toward human agreement and mutuality. Despite its thoroughly modern accouterments, communicative action aims at something like the twentieth-century discourse-equivalent of the chivalric codes of the late Middle Ages; as a normative system it articulates the conventions of fair and honorable engagement between interlocutors. To be sure, Habermas's concept of communicative action is neither as refined nor as situationally embedded as were the protocols that governed honorable combat across European cultural and territorial boundaries and between Christian knights; but it is nonetheless a (cross-cultural) protocol for all that. The entire framework that Habermas establishes is an attempt to limit human violence by elaborating a code of communicative conduct that is designed to hold power in check by channeling it into persuasion, or the "unforced" force of the better argument (Habermas 1993b, 160).[^]

A/T: Rules = Exclusion

Political ethics is committed to pluralizing the body politic

William Connolly, Prof of Polisci at Johns Hopkins, 2000, Political Theory and Partisan Politics p. 168-9

When such a line is pursued,⁷ a positive ethical case can be built for a bi-valent, robust ethos of politics. This would be one in which an enlarged number of constituencies acknowledge more vigorously comparative elements of partisanship and contestability in their own identities and fold this shift in self-recognition into pursuit of greater forbearance and generosity in social relations. It would also be a pluralism in which new drives to pluralization, say, in the domains of gender, sexuality, household organization, ethnicity, metaphysical faith, and orientations to death, were met with greater responsiveness than some traditions of secular pluralism now authorize. For, if the possibilities of life are as protean and diverse as some of us project them to be while historically contingent dictates of social organization regularly narrow their range, we can expect existing formations to be challenged periodically by new movements that seek to transfigure injuries, grievances, energies, and uncertain hopes, circulating through them into new possibilities of being. Appreciation of such a pluralist/pluralizing ethos need not draw upon Nietzschean sources alone, though they do provide an excellent source for it, and they do deserve agonistic respect from those not moved by them. It can draw selective support from a variety of currents flowing through theistic doctrines, particularly those which emphasize the mystery of God or the place of love in a faith receptive to the surprise of alterity. It can also draw sustenance from a modest rewriting of the Rawlsian problematic. In this refigured Rawlsianism, we pursue restrained terms of contestation and collaboration between multiple, overlapping traditions, each of which recognizes a certain reciprocity between the element of contestability in its own faith and in the alternative faiths with which it contends and collaborates. Such a rewriting touches the Rawlsian idea that the modern age is incompatible with a fixed conception of the good. But it no longer calls upon each constituency to leave its metaphysical/religious doctrine in the private sphere before it enters public, secular life. Rather, it calls upon it to acknowledge the contestability of its own presumptions and to allow that acknowledgment to infuse restraint, agonistic respect, and responsiveness into its relations with other constituencies. That is, it calls upon each to revise its self-understanding in the light of these considerations. Such an ethos of pluralism neither rises above partisanship nor reduces politics to unfettered partisanship. It fosters restrained partisanship within and between multiple constituencies, each of which may be able to identify lines of connection and collaboration with a series of others. This is, then, a political ethic, an ethic in which politics plays a constitutive role and a politics in which ethics plays a constitutive role. It does not, of course, provide an accurate description of the contemporary condition in America, with its steep inequalities and large classes of people closed out of effective participation in political life. It is a critical ideal. As such, it is perhaps more appropriate to the times in which we live than the Rawlsian model it rewrites. It is presented not as the standard to which every ethic must appeal but as an ethical sensibility able to enter into critical dialogue and selective collaboration with a variety of other perspectives. The very indispensability and contestability of contending onto-theo and onto-non-theistic stances in the late-modern world supports the case for cultivating relations of agonistic respect and selective collaboration between multiple, overlapping constituencies, each of which draws pertinent aspects of its fundamental doctrine into public life when, as so very often happens, the occasion demands it. And several of which also invoke the essential contestability of the ethical sources they honor the most. Out of these diverse lines of connection across multiple lines of difference, a politics of creative coalitions might even be forged to enable action in concert through the state to support the economic and cultural preconditions of justice and pluralism.⁸ Sr

A/T: “Kritiks are too cool for rules”

Even radical criticism assumes the minimum requirements of argument; debate requires a positive defense of application NOT because debate is ideological but rather because of the necessary structures of argument.

Ruth Lessl Shively, Associate Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M, 2000, Political Theory and Partisan Politics, p. 186-7

In response to these arguments, the ambiguists might counter that they do not mean to contest the basic structures of democracy—that they mean simply to resist the cruel and subjugating tendencies that prevail within these structures. Thus, assuming that we live in an open, democratic society, they may simply set out to challenge our categorizations of people and behaviors as good or evil, licit or illicit, normal or abnormal, and so on. And within our given system, they may simply seek to remind us that these categories are our creations—that we need the irrational and the deviant to have our own sense of rational and communal identity. Thus, perhaps it is possible to pursue a general policy of contest and subversion—a policy designed to resist social pressure to categorize and judge others—without contesting or subverting the basic structures of openness and democracy. I would like to finish this discussion by briefly suggesting why such a policy of general subversion is not the best answer to the important issues the ambiguists raise, or why a policy of rational judgment is a preferable approach to these issues. The first problem with the ambiguists' position here is one that they typically acknowledge. The problem is that it is impossible to subvert all categorizations, for in subverting one categorization, one necessarily embraces another. Thus, in subverting traditional categories—like good versus bad, normal versus abnormal, right versus wrong—the ambiguists necessarily embrace the alternative categories of the ambiguist: categories like those of open-mindedness versus close-mindedness, flexibility versus rigidity, creativity versus conformity, skepticism versus trust, tolerance versus intolerance, and the like. Which is to say that in denouncing anything, theorists cannot help but suggest what it is that they are not denouncing—or what they are accepting as preferable. While, as I said, the ambiguists acknowledge the impossibility of subverting all categorizations, they do not think that this undermines their general policy of subversion. Rather, they maintain that the acknowledgment of this fact should make us approach our own (and others') ideas with skepticism and flexibility, prompting us to see our ideas not as justified truths but as useful positions from which to unmask truth claims and not as enduring grounds for political theory but as temporary resting points from which to unsettle others—points that can themselves be expected to be challenged and changed down the road. The problem with this position is that even temporary and unstable positions need justification. That is, even if we acknowledge that our categorizations are apt to be undermined and overthrown, they must be given reasons at the moment we are using them. If we are denouncing others' choices, we are necessarily commending our own and, as such, we need to say why we think our own commendable. Likewise then, in denouncing traditional categories, the ambiguists cannot avoid suggesting that their own categories are superior; and, as such, they cannot avoid making positive moral claims or presenting a general, alternative theory about humanity and society. Thus, they are obligated to present their reasons for this alternative vision.

Fiat Good

() Utopian thinking makes politics possible by giving political thought a direction

Streeter '99 (Paul, Econ prof @ Boston, Development, v. 42, n. 2, p 118)

First, Utopian thinking can be useful as a framework for analysis. Just as physicists assume an atmospheric vacuum for some purposes, so policy analysts can assume a political vacuum from which they can start afresh. The physicists' assumption plainly would not be useful for the design of parachutes, but can serve other purposes well. Similarly, when thinking of tomorrow's problems, Utopianism is not helpful. But for long-term strategic purposes it is essential. Second, the Utopian vision gives a sense of direction, which can get lost in approaches that are preoccupied with the feasible. In a world that is regarded as the second-best of all feasible worlds, everything becomes a necessary constraint. All vision is lost. Third, excessive concern with the feasible tends to reinforce the status quo. In negotiations, it strengthens the hand of those opposed to any reform.

Unless the case for change can be represented in the same detail as the case for no change, it tends to be lost. Fourth, it is sometimes the case that the conjuncture of circumstances changes quite suddenly and that the constellation of forces, unexpectedly, turns out to be favourable to even radical innovation.

Unless we are prepared with a carefully worked out, detailed plan, that yesterday could have appeared utterly Utopian, the reformers will lose out by default. Only a few years ago nobody would have

expected the end of communism in Central and Eastern Europe, the disappearance of the Soviet Union, the unification of Germany, the break-up of Yugoslavia, the marketization of China, the end of apartheid in South Africa. And the handshake on the White House lawn between Mr Peres and Mr Arafat. Fifth, the Utopian reformers themselves can constitute a pressure group, countervailing the selfinterested pressures of the obstructionist groups. Ideas thought to be Utopian have become realistic at

moments in history when large numbers of people support them, and those in power have to yield to their demands. The demand for ending slavery is a historical example. It is for these five

reasons that Utopians should not be discouraged from formulating their proposals and from thinking the unthinkable, unencumbered by the inhibitions and obstacles of political constraints. They should elaborate them in the same detail that the defenders of the status quo devote to its elaboration and celebration. Utopianism and idealism will then turn out to be the most

realistic vision. It is well known that there are three types of economists: those who can count and those who can't. But being able to count up to two, I want to distinguish between two types of people. Let us call them, for want of a better name, the Pedants and the Utopians. The names are due to Peter Berger, who uses them in a different context. The Pedants or technicians are those who know all the details about the way things are and work, and they have acquired an emotional vested interest in keeping them this way. I have come across them in the British civil service, in the bureaucracy of the World Bank, and elsewhere. They are admirable people but they are conservative, and no good companions for reform. On the other hand, there are the Utopians, the idealists, the visionaries who dare think the unthinkable. They are also admirable, many of them young people. But they lack the attention to detail that the Pedants have. When the day of the revolution comes, they will have entered it on the wrong date in their diaries and fail to turn up, or, if they do turn up, they will be on the wrong side of the barricades. What we need is a marriage between the

Pedants and the Utopians, between the technicians who pay attention to the details and the idealists who have the vision of a better future. There will be tensions in combining the two, but they will be creative tensions. We

need Pedantic Utopian Pedants who will work out in considerable detail the ideal world and ways of getting to it, and promote the good cause with informed fantasy. Otherwise, when the opportunity arises, we shall miss it for lack of preparedness and lose out to the opponents of reform, to those who want to preserve the status quo.

() "WOULD" A BAD or UNNECESSARY BURDEN

Vance Trefethen, 2007 (Third Edition, Strategic Debate, Fiat – The Power to Make Things Happen)

Affirmative teams are never required to prove that their plan "would" take effect, only that it "should", and this is due to the magic of fiat power.

Plan Focus key to Deliberation

Deliberation assumes certain institutional structures and shared values.

Adolf G. Gundersen, Associate Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M, 2000, Political Theory and Partisan Politics, p. 104-5

Indirect political engagement is perhaps the single most important element of the strategy I am recommending here. It is also the most emblematic, as it **results from a fusion of confrontation and separation**. But what kind of political engagement might conceivably qualify as being both confrontational and separated from actual political decision-making? There is only one type, so far as I can see, and that is deliberation. **Political deliberation is by definition a form of engagement with the collectivity of which one is a member**. This is all the more true when two or more citizens deliberate together. **Yet deliberation is also a form of political action that precedes the actual taking and implementation of decisions. It is thus simultaneously connected and disconnected, confrontational and separate**. It is, in other words, a form of indirect political engagement. This conclusion, namely, that we ought to call upon deliberation to counter partisanship and thus clear the way for deliberation, looks rather circular at first glance. And, semantically at least, it certainly is. Yet this ought not to concern us very much. **Politics, after all, is not a matter of avoiding semantic inconveniences, but of doing the right thing and getting desirable results**. In political theory, therefore, the real concern is always whether a circular argument translates into a self-defeating prescription. And here that is plainly not the case, for what I am suggesting is that deliberation can diminish partisanship, which will in turn contribute to conditions amenable to continued or extended deliberation. That "deliberation promotes deliberation" is surely a circular claim, but it is just as surely an accurate description of the real world of lived politics, as observers as far back as Thucydides have documented. **It may well be that deliberation rests on certain preconditions**. I am not arguing that there is no such thing as a deliberative "first cause." Indeed, it seems obvious to me both that **deliberators require something to deliberate about and that deliberation presumes certain institutional structures and shared values**. Clearly **something must get the deliberative ball rolling and, to keep it rolling**, the cultural terrain must be free of deep chasms and sinkholes. Nevertheless, however extensive and demanding deliberation's preconditions might be, we ought not to lose sight of the fact that, once begun, deliberation tends to be self-sustaining. Just as partisanship begets partisanship, deliberation begets deliberation. If that is so, the question of limiting partisanship and stimulating deliberation are to an important extent the same question.

Education focused on public policy is key to political participation

Schmidt, Director Center Life Sciences University of Vermont, 1998

(Fred, University of Arizona, "Citizen Participation: An Essay on Applications of Citizen Participation to Extension Programming", 5/8/1998, http://ag.arizona.edu/fcs/cyfernet/nowg/cd_essay.html, 6/30/09, TAZ

Involvement in public decision-making is the major goal of citizen participation. According to Heberlein (1976), **increasing demand for public involvement is a matter of trust in government**. **"Concern for participation arises almost entirely in the context of real or imagined failure of government to respond appropriately to the more competitive needs and demands of citizens..."** (p. 1). Summers (1987) defines **citizen participation as "the active involvement of citizens outside the electoral process in making decisions affecting their lives"** (p.16). Arnstein (1969) refers to citizen participation as "a categorical term for citizen power. It is the redistribution of power that enables the have-not citizens, presently excluded from the political and economic processes, to be deliberately included in the future (p. 216). Clearly there is some disagreement in the literature regarding just when citizen participation includes activity in electoral process. In our work here, we side with Heberlein and Arnstein, recognizing that **the implication for citizen participation in electoral process is appropriately rooted in an individual's concern for policy and, related program implementation. From an extension program perspective, an important characteristic of citizen participation is the education required in responding to concern for making appropriate policy related decisions. We will argue that it is the call for information required in selecting from among policy/program alternatives that represents the much vaulted "teachable moment" sought after by extension outreach and other adult educators.**

Plan Focus key to Change

Critique is not an end in and of itself—refusing political action in favor of some pure subversion maintains the status quo.

Ruth Lessl **Shively**, Associate Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M, **2000**, Political Theory and Partisan Politics, p. 178-80

The first point here is that the ambiguists cannot embrace all disruptive actions or resist all attempts to categorize activities in terms of "good" and "bad," "legitimate" and "illegitimate," "civil" and "uncivil." For if their aim is to give voice to those who have been silenced or marginalized, they must, at the very least, distinguish between activities that silence and marginalize versus those that do not. They must tell us, for example, what makes an act an act of resistance rather than of cruelty or tyranny, or what defines behavior as contestation as opposed to mere bullying or ostracization. They do not tell us these things, of course, since their own assumptions require them to resist such attempts at closure and categorization. Yet, an answer is implied. It is implicit in their democratic vision of society and, indeed, in any democratic vision of society. "Good" political acts—acts of legitimate resistance and contest—are, for them, as for most other people, civil acts: meaning, essentially, acts that are respectful of the goods of democracy and liberty; acts that are nonviolent and designed to increase others' freedom and knowledge. For example, no ambiguityists (in my readings) seek or sanction acts of "contest" that involve behaviors like burning crosses on people's lawns, lying to the public, shouting others into silence, hitting or killing or threatening political opponents, or the like. Rather, their political examples uniformly suggest that the expansion of contest would involve only civil kinds of resistance and subversion: things like teaching, protesting, demonstrating, arguing, raising awareness, questioning and the like. After all, the point of being in the ambiguityist camp in the first place is to protest acts of tyranny and compulsion. So, despite strong rhetoric about disrupting all orders and undermining all rules, they cannot, and do not, contest or undermine basic rules of civility (rules which I will define further in a moment). In keeping with their democratic ambitions, they do not seek to annihilate or silence opposition, but to diversify and increase its voices and opportunities. My point here is not just to say that the ambiguityists are nice people who happen to reject violent and tyrannical tactics. It is to say that their goals imply and require this. For certain subversive or disruptive political activities—like threatening others with violence or shouting opponents into silence—are such that they undermine any further subversions and disruptions. In this sense, some disruptions turn out to solidify the status quo and some subversions turn out to be counter-subversive. Which is why the ambiguists must stop short of celebrating all differences or disorders, for what would be the point of rejecting the old system for its supposed tyrannies—its bullying and silencing tactics—only to take up more of the same?

Wholesale rejection maintains the status quo

Christopher A. **Bracey**, Associate Professor of Law, Associate Professor of African & African American Studies, Washington University in St. Louis, September **2006**, Southern California Law Review, 79 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1231, p. 1311-1314, LexisNexis

At the other end of the responsive spectrum is wholesale rejection. One might view the pedigree as providing good reason to dismiss opponents of race entirely. Proponents of this view may choose to indulge fully this liberal skepticism and simply reject the message along with the messenger. n276 The tradition of legal discourse on American race relations [*1316] has been one steeped in racial animus and characterized by circumlocution, evasiveness, reluctance and denial. When opponents avail themselves of rhetorical strategies used by nineteenth-century legal elites, they necessarily invoke the specter of this tragic racial past. Moreover, their continued reliance upon pedigreed rhetoric to justify a system that only modestly responds to persistent racial disparities in the material lives of racial minorities suggests a deep, unarticulated

normative commitment to preserving the racial status quo in which whites remain comfortably above blacks. The steadfast reliance upon pedigreed rhetoric, coupled with the apparent disconnect between claims of racial egalitarianism and material conditions of racial subordination as a result of persistent racial disparities, spoils the credibility of modern opponents of race preferences and creates an incentive for proponents to dismiss them without serious interrogation, consideration, and weighing of the arguments they advance.

Plan Focus key to Change

The abstractions of critique are attempts to secure a perfectionist stance insulated from the demands of political decisionmaking. However, the value of any given abstraction is dependent on its ability to lend itself to practical decisions.

Michael Ignatieff, Carr Professor of Human Rights Practice, Director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at the JFK School of Government, Harvard University, 2004, *The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror*, p. 20-1

There are two problems with a perfectionist stance, leaving aside the question of whether it is realistic. The first is that articulating nonrevocable, nonderogable moral standards is relatively easy. The problem is deciding how to apply them in specific cases. What is the line between interrogation and torture, between targeted killing and unlawful assassination, between preemption and aggression? Even when legal and moral distinctions between these are clear in the abstract, abstractions are less than helpful when political leaders have to choose between them in practice. Furthermore, the problem with perfectionist standards is that they contradict each other. The same person who shudders, rightly, at the prospect of torturing a suspect might be prepared to kill the same suspect in a preemptive attack on a terrorist base. Equally, the perfectionist commitment to the right to life might preclude such attacks altogether and restrict our response to judicial pursuit of offenders through process of law. Judicial responses to the problem of terror have their place, but they are no substitute for military operations when terrorists possess bases, training camps, and heavy weapons. To stick to a perfectionist commitment to the right to life when under terrorist attack might achieve moral consistency at the price of leaving us defenseless in the face of evildoers. Security, moreover, is a human right, and thus respect for one right might lead us to betray another. A lesser evil morality is antiperfectionist in its assumptions. It accepts as inevitable that it is not always possible to save human beings from harm without killing other human beings; not always possible to preserve full democratic disclosure and transparency in counterterrorist operations; not always desirable for democratic leaders to avoid deception and perfidy; not always possible to preserve the liberty of the majority without suspending the liberties of a minority; not always possible to anticipate terrible consequences of well-meant acts, and so on. Far from making ethical reflection irrelevant, these dilemmas make ethical realism all the more essential to democratic reflection and good public policy. The fact that liberal democratic leaders may order the surreptitious killing of terrorists, may withhold information from their voters, may order the suspension of civil liberties need not mean that “anything goes.” Even if liberties must be suspended, their suspension can be made temporary; if executives must withhold information from a legislature in public, they can be obliged to disclose it in private session or at a later date. Public disinformation whose sole purpose is to deceive the enemy might be justified, but deliberately misleading a democratic electorate with a view to exaggerating risk or minimizing hazard can never be. The same balancing act needs to be observed in other cases. If the targeted killing of terrorists proves necessary, it can be constrained by strict rules of engagement and subjected to legislative oversight and review. The interrogation of terrorist suspects can be kept free of torture. Drawing these lines means keeping in clear sight the question of whether these means reinforce or betray the democratic identity they are supposed to defend.

Policymaking key to Deliberation/Agency

Public policy role playing in Academia is key to political agency and participation

Larson, Associate Professor of Political Science at Dickinson College, '04

("Stephanie Greco, 'We the People': Diversifying Role Playing in Undergraduate American Politics Courses"

American Political Science Association, PS: Political Science and Politics, Vol. 37, No. 2 (Apr., 2004), pg. 303, JKY)

Students are not asked to be members of the American public. The assignment described here **brings "the people" back into politics through role playing by focusing specifically on people who tend to be left out of the political process.** The **public is an essential part of a democracy** and arguably the one whose challenges and processes are the most immediately relevant for students in an American Government class. While some students might go on to hold elective or appointed offices in government, most will not. This is particularly true of those in introductory classes who might take only one class in political science. Yet, most **students** are, and **will continue to be, members of the American public** after they graduate. **They need to see how this role can,** and arguably, should **be an active one.** While our textbooks and lectures might make this point, a **simulation can effectively illustrate it through active learning.** A **role-playing experience can be instructive preparation for "real (political) life"** when it focuses on the activities of those outside of officialdom. Playing the roles of citizens, or prospective citizens, **can also address diversity issues that elite role-playing assignments do not.** By focusing on elite roles, most assignments do not fully utilize the potential of role playing for social attitude change. Studies show that after role playing students "become more aware of their own roles and understand more clearly other people's points of view" (Van Ments 1989, 30). Therefore, they are ideal for sensitizing students to the perspectives of people different from themselves. By **having students role play other members of the mass public,** an American government class can help students understand and empathize with people of different races, classes, genders, sexual orientations, occupations, ages, and from various geographic locations. For many years, I have been using such a public role-playing assignment in my "Introduction to American Government" course to challenge students and satisfy course goals. The assignment **utilizes active learning through the use of role playing,** interviewing, and a myriad of web resources. It teaches students about American government, diversity, and the challenges confronted by "outside" groups in their attempts to get representation. Ultimately, the paper addresses **the fundamental question** underlying the debate between elitists and pluralists: **"Does the public matter?"** It does this by asking students to **explore a political problem** relevant to a fictional member of the public whom they are randomly assigned. By looking at a problem, government action **and debate on the issues relevant to it,** **and ways that the person could try to get government to address the problem,** students see the interconnectedness **of** the various topics in the course (**policy,** public opinion, elections, interest groups, the three branches, and federalism). Students explore **different types of information** and sources in order to **understand someone else's political problem and** its history, proposed solutions, and the obstacles to **enacting these solutions.**

Polycymaking key to Deliberation/Agency

Deliberation about what institutions should do is key to citizen agency.

Adolf G. Gundersen, Associate Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M, 2000, Political Theory and Partisan Politics, p. 108-9

Will deliberation work the same way among ordinary citizens? Yes and no. Yes, deliberation will tend to heighten citizens appreciation of their interdependence. At the same time, the results are likely to be analogous rather than identical to those in formal governmental bodies, since citizen deliberation must of course function in the absence of the institutional interdependence established by the US constitution, with its clear specification of joint responsibilities. The theoretical mutuality of interests assumed by the Constitution exists among ordinary citizens, too. The difference is that they have only their interests, not the impetus of divided power, to encourage them to discover and articulate them. Granted. But once they begin to do so, they are every bit as likely to succeed as the average representative. Citizen deliberation, in other words, will intensify citizens' appreciation of interdependence. Although I cannot prove the point, **there are compelling reasons to think that citizen deliberation yields an awareness of overlapping interests**. I have already alluded to the first, and perhaps most telling of these: if governors in a system of divided government such as our own succeed in deliberating their way to the public interest (however imperfectly or irregularly), surely ordinary citizens can be counted upon to do the same thing. Indeed, if my initial argument that decision-making spells the end of deliberation is on the mark, then **we have good reason to expect citizens to deliberate better than their representatives**. One can add to these theoretical considerations a lengthening list of **empirical findings** which **suggest not only that citizens are willing and able to engage in political deliberation, but also that they are quite able to do so**—able, that is, precisely in the sense of coming to a deeper appreciation of the collective nature of the problems they face (Dale et al. 1995; Gundersen 1995; Dryzek 1990; see also Gundersen n.d., chapter 4). In the end, the claim that deliberation enhances interdependence is hardly a radical one. After all, if **deliberation will** of itself diminish partisanship, as I started out by saying, it must at the same time **enhance interdependence**. To aim between Athens and Philadelphia requires, perhaps more than anything else, a changed way of thinking about partisanship. **Institutions and ways of thinking tend to change together; hence if the institutional reorientation suggested here is to take root, it must be accompanied by a new way of thinking about partisanship. Shifting our appraisal of partisanship will amount to a nothing less than a new attitude toward politics. It will require that we aspire to something new,** something that is at once less lofty (and less threatening) than the unity to which direct democracy is supposed to lead, but more democratic (and more deliberative) than encouraging political deliberation among a selected group of representatives. As I argued above, it will require **that we seek to stimulate deliberation among all citizens**. With Madison, we need to view partisanship as inevitable. Collective choice, indeed choice itself, is a partisan affair. But we also need to resist the equation of politics and partisanship. If politics is seen as nothing more than a clash of partisan interests, it is likely to stay at that level. Conversely, for deliberation to work, it must be seen as reasonable, if not all-illuminating—as efficacious, if not all-powerful. At the same time, of course, **citizens must** borrow a page from the participatory democrat's book by coming to **view deliberation as their responsibility rather than something that is done only by others in city hall, the state capitol, or Congress—others who are,** after all, **under** direct and constant **pressure to act rather than deliberate**. **Politics,** in other words, **must be resuscitated as an allegiance to democratic deliberation.**

Policymaking key to Education

1. Policymaking empowers debates by encouraging informed decisionmaking and good judgement about practical, everyday problems. This is good for two reasons, first is that it increases real world education and allows for debaters who are planning on entering the realm of policymaking to be prepared for that career.

Ignatieff, 07 member of the independent international commission on Kosovo and former fellow at King's College, Cambridge; École des Hautes Études, Paris; and St. Antony's College, Oxford; and Visiting Prof of Human Rights Practice at Harvard (Michael, August 5, 2007 "Getting Iraq Wrong," The New York Times, <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/05/magazine/05iraq-t.html?ei=5090&en=cb304d04accc6df8&ex=1343966400&partner=rssuserland&emc=rss&pagewanted=all>)

Improvisation may not stave off failure. The game usually ends in tears. **Political careers often end badly because politicians live the human situation: making choices among competing goods with only ordinary instincts and fallible information to go by. Of course, better information and factual criteria for decision-making can reduce the margin of uncertainty.** Benchmarks for progress in Iraq can help to decide how long America should stay there. But in the end, no one knows — because no one can know — what exactly America can still do to create stability in Iraq. The decision facing the United States over Iraq is paradigmatic of political judgment at its most difficult. Staying and leaving each have huge costs. One thing is clear: The costs of staying will be borne by Americans, while the cost of leaving will be mostly borne by Iraqis. That in itself suggests how American leaders are likely to decide the question.

But they must decide, and soon. **Procrastination is even costlier in politics than it is in private life.** The sign on Truman's desk — "The buck stops here!" — reminds us that **those who make good judgments in politics tend to be those who do not shrink from the responsibility of making them.** In the case of Iraq, deciding what course of action to pursue next requires first admitting that all courses of action thus far have failed.

In politics, learning from failure matters as much as exploiting success. Samuel Beckett's "Fail again. Fail better" captures the inner obstinacy necessary to the political art. Churchill and De Gaulle kept faith with their own judgment when smart opinion believed them to be mistaken. Their willingness to wait for historical validation, even if far off, looks now like greatness. In the current president the same faith that history will judge him kindly seems like brute stubbornness.

Machiavelli argued that **political judgment, to be effective, must follow principles more ruthless than those acceptable in ordinary life. He wrote that "it is necessary for a prince wishing to hold his own to know how to do wrong, and to make use of it or not according to necessity."**

Roosevelt and Churchill knew how to do wrong, yet they did not demand to be judged by different ethical standards than their fellow citizens did. They accepted that democratic leaders cannot make up their own moral rules, a stricture that applies both at home and abroad — in Guantanamo, at Abu Ghraib or anywhere else. They must live and be judged by the same rules as everyone else.

Yet in some areas **political and personal judgments are very different. In private life, you take attacks personally** and would be a cold fish if you didn't. **In politics, if you take attacks personally, you display vulnerability. Politicians have to learn to appear invulnerable without appearing inhuman. Being human, they are bound to revenge insults.** But they also have to learn that revenge, as it has been said, is a dish best served cold.

Nothing is personal in politics, because politics is theater. It is part of the job to pretend to have emotions that you do not actually feel. It is a common spectacle in legislatures for representatives to insult one another in the chamber and then retreat for a drink in the bar afterward. This saving hypocrisy of public life is not available in private life. There we play for keeps.

2. Policymaking is more real world- while their kritikal arguments are admirable, they fall prey to the allure of popularity and sacrifice practical implications, the mark of bad decisionmaking.

Ignatieff, 07 member of the independent international commission on Kosovo and former fellow at King's College, Cambridge; École des Hautes Études, Paris; and St. Antony's College, Oxford; and Visiting Prof of Human Rights Practice at Harvard (Michael, August 5, 2007 "Getting Iraq Wrong," The New York Times, <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/05/magazine/05iraq-t.html?ei=5090&en=cb304d04accc6df8&ex=1343966400&partner=rssuserland&emc=rss&pagewanted=all>)

In my political-science classes, I used to teach that **exercising good judgment meant making good public policy. In the real world, bad public policy can often turn out to be very popular politics indeed. Resisting the popular isn't easy, because resisting the popular isn't always wise.** Good **judgment in politics** is messy. It **means balancing policy and politics in imperfect compromises that always leave someone unhappy** — often yourself.

Knowing the difference between a good and a bad compromise is more important in politics than holding onto pure principle at any price. A good compromise restores the peace and enables both parties to go about their business with some element of their vital interest satisfied. A bad one surrenders the public interest to compulsion or force.

Measuring good judgment in politics is not easy. Campaigns and primaries test a candidate's charm, stamina, money-raising ability and rhetorical powers but not necessarily judgment in office and under fire.

We might test judgment by asking, on the issue of Iraq, who best anticipated how events turned out. But many of those who correctly anticipated catastrophe did so not by exercising judgment but by indulging in ideology. They opposed the invasion because they believed the president was only after the oil or because they believed America is always and in every situation wrong.

The people who truly showed good judgment on Iraq predicted the consequences that actually ensued but also rightly evaluated the motives that led to the action. They did not necessarily possess more knowledge than the rest of us. They labored, as everyone did, with the same faulty intelligence and lack of knowledge of Iraq's fissured sectarian history. What they didn't do was take wishes for reality. They didn't suppose, as President Bush did, that because they believed in the integrity of their own motives everyone else in the region would believe in it, too. They didn't suppose that a free state could arise on the foundations of 35 years of police terror. They didn't suppose that America had the power to shape political outcomes in a faraway country of which most Americans knew little. They didn't believe that because America defended human rights and freedom in Bosnia and Kosovo it had to be doing so in Iraq. They avoided all these mistakes.

3. Debate requires a distinction between plain intellectualism and political calculation, whereas intellectual concerns are with exploring ideals regardless of their practical implications, policymaker concerns must be of the reality of policy actions

Ignatieff, 07 member of the independent international commission on Kosovo and former fellow at King's College, Cambridge; École des Hautes Études, Paris; and St. Antony's College, Oxford; and Visiting Prof of Human Rights Practice at Harvard (Michael, August 5, 2007 "Getting Iraq Wrong," The New York Times, <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/05/magazine/05iraq-t.html?ei=5090&en=cb304d04accc6df8&ex=1343966400&partner=rssuserland&emc=rss&pagewanted=all>)

The philosopher Isaiah Berlin once said that **the trouble with academics and commentators is that they care more about whether ideas are interesting than whether they are true.**

Politicians live by ideas just as much as professional thinkers do, but they can't afford the luxury of entertaining ideas that are merely interesting. They have to work with the small number of ideas that happen to be true and the even smaller number that happen to be applicable to real life. In academic life, false ideas are merely false and useless ones can be fun to play with. In political life, false ideas can ruin the lives of millions and useless ones can waste precious resources. **An intellectual's responsibility for his ideas is to follow their consequences**

wherever they may lead. A politician's responsibility is to master those consequences and prevent them from doing harm.

I've learned that good judgment in politics looks different from good judgment in intellectual life. Among intellectuals, judgment is about generalizing and interpreting particular facts as instances of some big idea. **In politics, everything is what it is and not another thing.** Specifics matter more than generalities. Theory gets in the way.

The attribute that underpins good judgment in politicians is a sense of reality. "What is called wisdom in statesmen," Berlin wrote, referring to figures like Roosevelt and Churchill, "is **understanding rather than knowledge** — some kind of **acquaintance with relevant facts of such a kind that it enables those who have it to tell what fits with what; what can be done in given circumstances and what cannot**, what means will work in what situations and how far, without necessarily being able to explain how they know this or even what they know." **Politicians cannot afford to cocoon themselves in the inner world of their own imaginings. They must not confuse the world as it is with the world as they wish it to be.** They must see Iraq — or anywhere else — as it is.

As a former denizen of Harvard, I've had to learn that a sense of reality doesn't always flourish in elite institutions. It is the street virtue par excellence. Bus drivers can display a shrewder grasp of what's what than Nobel Prize winners. **The only way any of us can improve our grasp of reality is to confront the world every day and learn, mostly from our mistakes, what works and what doesn't.** Yet even lengthy experience can fail us in life and in politics. Experience can imprison decision-makers in worn-out solutions while blinding them to the untried remedy that does the trick.

Policymaking key to Change

1. The popularization of more philosophical approaches to political discourse may be evident, but it is also undesirable- it prioritizes kritik over action and disavows any attempt to act to fix concrete problem and creates a vicious cycle whereby kritik overdetermines action entirely and paralyzes change.

Owen 02, Reader in Political Theory at the University of Southampton (David, “Reorienting International Relations: On Pragmatism, Pluralism and Practical Reasoning”, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 31, No. 3, <http://mil.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/31/3/653>)

Commenting on the ‘philosophical turn’ in IR, Wæver remarks that **‘[a] frenzy for words like “epistemology” and “ontology” often signals this philosophical turn’**, although he goes on to comment that these terms are often used loosely.⁴ However, loosely deployed or not, **it is clear that debates concerning ontology and epistemology play a central role in the contemporary IR theory wars**. In one respect, this is unsurprising since it is a characteristic feature of the social sciences that periods of disciplinary disorientation involve recourse to reflection on the philosophical commitments of different theoretical approaches, and there is no doubt that such reflection can play a valuable role in making explicit the commitments that characterise (and help individuate) diverse theoretical positions. Yet, **such a philosophical turn is not without its dangers** and I will briefly mention three before turning to consider a confusion that has, I will suggest, helped to promote the IR theory wars by motivating this philosophical turn. The first danger with **the philosophical turn is that it has an inbuilt tendency to prioritise issues of ontology and epistemology over explanatory and/or interpretive power** as if the latter two were merely a simple function of the former. But **while the explanatory and/or interpretive power of a theoretical account is not wholly independent of its ontological and/or epistemological commitments** (otherwise criticism of these features would not be a criticism that had any value), **it is by no means clear that it is, in contrast, wholly dependent on these philosophical commitments**. Thus, for example, one need not be sympathetic to rational choice theory to recognise that it can provide powerful accounts of certain kinds of problems, such as the tragedy of the commons in which dilemmas of collective action are foregrounded. It may, of course, be the case that the advocates of rational choice theory cannot give a good account of why this type of theory is powerful in accounting for this class of problems (i.e., how it is that the relevant actors come to exhibit features in these circumstances that approximate the assumptions of rational choice theory) and, if this is the case, it is a philosophical weakness—but this does not undermine the point that, **for a certain class of problems, rational choice theory may provide the best account available to us. In other words, while the critical judgement of theoretical accounts in terms of their ontological and/or epistemological sophistication is one kind of critical judgement, it is not the only or even necessarily the most important kind**. The second danger run by the philosophical turn is that **because prioritisation of ontology and epistemology promotes theory-construction from philosophical first principles, it cultivates a theory-driven rather than problem-driven approach to IR**. Paraphrasing Ian Shapiro, the point can be put like this: since it is the case that there is always a plurality of possible true descriptions of a given action, event or phenomenon, **the challenge is to decide which is the most apt in terms of getting a perspicuous grip on the action, event or phenomenon in question given the purposes of the inquiry**; yet, from this standpoint, **‘theory-driven work is part of a reductionist program’ in that it ‘dictates always opting for the description that calls for the explanation that flows from the preferred model or theory’**.⁵ The justification offered for this strategy rests on the mistaken belief that it is necessary for social science because general explanations are required to characterise the classes of phenomena studied in similar terms. However, as Shapiro points out, this is to misunderstand the enterprise of science since ‘whether there are general explanations for classes of phenomena is a question for social-scientific inquiry, not to be prejudged before conducting that inquiry’.⁶

Moreover, this strategy easily slips into the promotion of the pursuit of generality over that of empirical validity. The third danger is that the preceding two combine to encourage the formation of a particular image of disciplinary debate in IR—what might be called (only slightly tongue in cheek) ‘the Highlander view’—namely, an image of warring theoretical approaches with each, despite occasional temporary tactical alliances, dedicated to the strategic achievement of sovereignty over the disciplinary field. It encourages this view because the turn to, and prioritisation of, ontology and epistemology stimulates the idea that there can only be one theoretical approach which gets things right, namely, the theoretical approach that gets its ontology and epistemology right. This image feeds back into IR exacerbating the first and second dangers, and so a potentially vicious circle arises.

2,. Attempts by citizens or professionals to engage or change the law are worthwhile engagements which make it more effective and permanent and increasing freedom and activism within the public sphere.

Carlson 99, Professor of Law at Cardozo, (David Grey, “Review: Duellism in Modern American Jurisprudence”, Colombia Law Review v. 99)

Vicarious participation in litigation or legislation can nevertheless be defended as a participation in culture itself. Law professors can contribute to that culture by making law more coherent, and in this sense their project is at least as worthy as any that philosophy, history or astrophysics could devise. Law has an objective structure that exceeds mere subjectivity. This objective structure can be altered by hard work. An altered legal world, however, is not the point. Evidence of consequential impact is gratifying, but this is simply what mere egotism requires. It is in the work itself that the value of legal scholarship can be found. Work is what reconciles the failure of the unhappy consciousness to achieve justice. Work is, in Hegel's view, desire held in check, fleetingness staved off. . . work forms and shapes the thing. The negative relation to the object becomes its form and something permanent.... This negative middle term or the formative activity is at the same time the individuality or pure being-for-self of consciousness which now . . . acquires an element of permanence.³¹⁷ Hegel, then, gives a spiritual turn to that worthy slogan "publish or perish." By working the law, lawyers, judges, private citizens, and even academics can make it more permanent, more resilient, more "existential,"³¹⁸ but, more to the point, they make themselves more resilient, more "existential."³¹⁹ Work on law can increase freedom; the positive freedom that relieves the worker of "anxiety", fear of disappearance into the Real.³²⁰ When work is done, the legal universe swells and fills itself out like an appetite that "grows by what it feeds on."³²¹ But far more important, the self gains a place in the world by the very work done. Work is the means of "subjective destitution" or "narcissistic loss"³²² the complete externalization of the subject and the surrender of the fantasy support upon which the subject otherwise depends. In Lacanian terms, "subjective destitution" is the wages of cure at the end of analysis.³²³ Or, in Hegelian terms, cure is "the ascesis that is necessary if consciousness is to reach genuine philosophic knowledge."³²⁴ In this state, we precisely lose the suspicion that law (i.e., the big Other) does not exist.³²⁵

Policymaking key to Ethics

Uncertainty does not imply deference to fate and fortune but rather that we either fight evil or we succumb to it; learning about policymaking is key to fostering the kind of critical thought which makes decision possible.

Michael Ignatieff, Carr Professor of Human Rights Practice, Director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at the JFK School of Government, Harvard University, 2004, *The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror*, p. 18-19

In a war on terror, I would argue, **the issue is not whether we can avoid evil acts altogether, but whether we can succeed in choosing lesser evils and keep them from becoming greater ones. We should do so**, I would argue, **by** making some starting commitments—to the conservative principle (**maintaining the free institutions we have**), to the dignity principle (**preserving individuals from gross harms**)—**and then reasoning out the consequences of various courses of action, anticipating harms and coming to a rational judgment of which course of action is likely to inflict the least damage** on the two principles. When we are satisfied that a coercive measure is a genuine last resort, justified by the facts as we can understand them, we have chosen the lesser evil, and we are entitled to stick to it even if the price proves higher than we anticipated. But not indefinitely so. At some point—when we “have to destroy the village in order to save it”—we may conclude that we have slipped from the lesser to the greater. Then we have no choice but to admit our error and reverse course. **In the situation of factual uncertainty in which most decisions about terrorism have to be taken, error is probably unavoidable. It is tempting to suppose that moral life can avoid this slope simply by avoiding evil means altogether. But no such angelic option may exist. Either we fight evil with evil or we succumb.** So if we resort to the lesser evil, we should do so, first, in full awareness that evil is involved. Second, we should act under a demonstrable state of necessity. Third, we should choose evil means only as a last resort, having tried everything else. Finally, we must satisfy a fourth obligation: **we must justify our actions publicly to our fellow citizens and submit to their judgment as to their correctness.**

Policymaking key to Moral Decision Making

Policymaking builds moral decision making skills

Fine, Department of Sociology Northwestern University, 2k

(Gary, "GAMES AND TRUTHS: Learning To Construct Social Problems In High School Debate", 103-104, tch)

Yet, similar to much interactionist analysis (a frequent criticism, for instance, of dramaturgical analysis), the means through which individuals acquire the skills to construct problems is understudied. **The assumption is that skills of moral entrepreneurship are easily accessible. However, these discursive skills, including claims making, the presentation of evidence (statistics and narratives), organizing talk to fit temporal slots, and countering potential opponents, involve sophisticated reasoning, retrieval of data, performative abilities, and information processing.'** Participants in policy arenas have acquired abilities that others do not share. Indeed, most citizens feel incapable of participating in domains of, discourse, although of course they express opinions in private spheres and through surveys and voting. While we have learned much about interpretation, impression management, and social construction, we know less about socialization to these techniques through interaction (but see Adler and Adler 1998; Eder 1995; Fine 1987; Thorne 1993). Despite the development of a sociology of childhood and adolescence (Corsaro 1997), as well as a literature on "political socialization"² (e.g., Jennings and Niemi 1974; Niemi and Sobieszak 1977), **little attention has been paid to how children learn to perform social problems discourse. In other words, constructionist research has effectively shown how people play roles in the creation of problems, but it hasn't sufficiently considered how individuals acquire the skills to play these roles. It is not just that individuals "internalize" rules and strategies, but they acquire these skills through guided training in these techniques. One arena in which adolescents confront discourse on social problems is high school policy debate: a school-sponsored contest in which teams of adolescents compete in tournaments where they are evaluated on their ability to engage in claims-making. Through debate, the skills necessary for policy argumentation are developed. By examining how adolescents learn to make claims that they and their (adult) judges define as effective, we can understand how social problems entrepreneurs are socialized. At one time, the majority of the members of Congress were former high school and/or college debaters (Schachtman 1995, p. 249). While the percentage has dropped because of the increased diversity of legislators, the fact that numerous public policy analysts, lawyers, and politicians began as high school debaters suggests that many participants receive an early taste of presenting contentious political discourse in this social sphere. Indeed, a majority of debaters plan on careers in law or politics. For those who become moral entrepreneurs, such training serves them well.**

Political Vacuum DA

A. The alternative causes a political vacuum

Boggs, Professor of Political Science, '97

(Carl, National University, *Theory & Society* 26, December, p. 760-1)

Grassroots politics, of course, remains a significant part of any transformative agenda; clearly there is no iron law favoring an enclave outcome, but in a depoliticized culture it will be difficult to avoid. In many ways the dilemmas of local activism go back to the origins of the American political system, which was set up to allow space for local participation apart from federal structures so that no amount of grass-roots mayhem would disturb the national political system. Thus, even where oppositional groups were able to carve out a local presence, their influence on the national state was likely to be minimal owing to the complex maze of checks and balances, overlapping forms of representation, legislative intricacies, and a cumbersome winner-take-all electoral system that pushes the two main parties toward moderation. Over time, too, the national government became stronger and more bureaucratized, further reducing the scope of local decision-making and rendering much local empowerment illusory. Meanwhile, the federal state, with its expanded role in the military, foreign policy, and global economy, assumed ever greater control over people's lives. Such realities, along with constitutional and legal obstacles to securing a national foothold, often compelled progressive movements to stress local organizing. At the same time, as Mark Kann observes, community radicalism could actually serve elite interests by siphoning off discontent and deflecting it away from the real centers of power.⁴⁰ Like spiritual politics, enclave activism can be understood as a reaction against the chaos of urban life and the eclipse of public space, along with a rejection of normal politics itself. The globalizing pressures exerted on the economy and political system reinforce this trend. Collective action within the enclave has less to do with rejuvenating public discourse, making policy, and gaining levers of institutional power than with erecting barriers against outside intrusions, just as city-dwellers may look to gated communities as a way of protecting themselves against the Hobbesian features of civil society. The end result of this type of populism is a widespread turning-away from the concerns of power, governance, and citizen participation within the general community – one of the hallmarks of a depoliticized society.

B. That causes extinction

Boggs, Professor of Political Science, '97

(Carl, National University, *Theory & Society* 26, December, p. 773-4)

The decline of the public sphere in late twentieth-century America poses a series of great dilemmas and challenges. Many ideological currents scrutinized here ^ localism, metaphysics, spontaneism, post-modernism, Deep Ecology – intersect with and reinforce each other. While these currents have deep origins in popular movements of the 1960s and 1970s, they remain very much alive in the 1990s. Despite their different outlooks and trajectories, they all share one thing in common: a depoliticized expression of struggles to combat and overcome alienation. The false sense of empowerment that comes with such mesmerizing impulses is accompanied by a loss of public engagement, an erosion of citizenship and a depleted capacity of individuals in large groups to work for social change. As this ideological quagmire worsens, urgent problems that are destroying the fabric of American society will go unsolved – perhaps even unrecognized – only to fester more ominously into the future. And such problems (ecological crisis, poverty, urban decay, spread of infectious diseases, technological displacement of workers) cannot be understood outside the larger social and global context of internationalized markets, finance, and communications. Paradoxically, the widespread retreat from politics, often inspired by localist sentiment, comes at a time when agendas that ignore or side-step these global realities will, more than ever, be reduced to impotence. In his commentary on the state of citizenship today, Wolin refers to the increasing sublimation and dilution of politics, as larger numbers of people turn away from public concerns toward private ones. By diluting the life of common involvements, we negate the very idea of politics as a source of public ideals and visions.⁷⁴ In the meantime, the fate of the world hangs in the balance. The unyielding truth is that, even as the ethos of anti-politics becomes more compelling and even fashionable in the United States, it is the vagaries of political power that will continue to decide the fate of human societies. This last point demands further elaboration. The shrinkage of politics hardly means that corporate colonization will be less of a reality, that social hierarchies will somehow disappear, or that

gigantic state and military structures will lose their hold over people's lives. Far from it: the space abdicated by a broad citizenry, well-informed and ready to participate at many levels, can in fact be filled by authoritarian and reactionary elites — an already familiar dynamic in many lesser- developed countries. The fragmentation and chaos of a Hobbesian world, not very far removed from the rampant individualism, social Darwinism, and civic violence that have been so much a part of the American landscape, could be the prelude to a powerful Leviathan designed to impose order in the face of disunity and atomized retreat. In this way the eclipse of politics might set the stage for a reassertion of politics in more virulent guise — or it might help further rationalize the existing power structure. In either case, the state would likely become what Hobbes anticipated: the embodiment of those universal, collective interests that had vanished from civil society.⁷⁵

Consequentialism key to Deliberation/Accountability

We must evaluate the consequences of institutional implementation of plan; political accountability and deliberation require decision.

Adolf G. Gundersen, Associate Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M, 2000, Political Theory and Partisan Politics p. 98-9

Deliberation, however closely tied to action, is not the same thing as acting. However we construe the relationship between thought and action, most of us would agree that there is an essential difference between thinking through a course of action and deciding upon or choosing one. Deliberation requires the consideration of alternatives; choice requires the elimination of all but one alternative. Hence, collective action—the raison d'être of deliberation— paradoxically requires that deliberation give way to partisanship. Except in the abstract world of an ideal speech situation, deliberation is limited by partisanship. Choice, in other words, is always partial, always partisan. Without deliberation, action is a mere exercise of will; but without action, deliberation is reduced to mere contemplation. The distinction between deliberation and contemplation is often missed or glossed over by deliberative democrats in their zeal to drive home the distinction between raw power (or partisanship) and deliberation. However distinct deliberation and partisanship might be, we also need to recognize that eliminating partisanship is not only impossible, it is undesirable—for to do so would be to abolish deliberation in the process. Indeed, the very existence of political deliberation requires, even entails, partisanship. This seeming paradox is really no paradox at all: deliberation is thought that is directed at action, thought whose telos is a decision. Take away all prospect of action, take away the need to decide or choose, and deliberation does not simply wilt, it ceases to exist altogether. When we also remember that political choice is by definition collective, we can see why political deliberation depends on partisanship: deliberation requires action, which requires choice, which in political life is collective, which (in a democracy) requires moving from "the many as individuals" to "the many as one."

Consequentialism key to Ethics

We're obligated to attend to material suffering – even if some of our epistemology is flawed, ideas can be reclaimed for good purposes

Ken **Booth** – professor of International Politics at University of Wales, Aberystwyth - Jan 1995

International Affairs Vol. 71, No. 1. "Human Wrongs and International Relations"

Philosophical sceptics, for whom nothing is certain, and so for whom the bases of action are always problematic, are a f a d a r feature of academic life. Tom Stoppard enjoyably caricatured them in his clever comedy Jumpers, and in particular in the scene in which philosophical sceptics were discussing whether the train for Bristol left yesterday from Paddington station.³³ On what basis could they ever know? Even if they were actually on the train that was supposed to leave for Bristol, might not the happening be explained by Paddington leaving the train? We all know such conundrums, and indeed such people. Meanwhile, **flesh is being fed or famished, and people are being tortured or killed.** And even philosophical sceptics have to catch trains. Some of them do. **Unless academics are merely to spread confusion, or snipe from the windows of ivory towers, we must engage with the real. This means** having 'the courage of our confusions' and **thinking and acting without certainty.** In reply to those sensitive to post-colonial critiques of Western imperialism I would argue that **just because many Western ideas were spread by commerce and the Gatling gun, it does not follow that every idea originating in the West, or backed by Western opinion, should therefore simply be labelled 'imperialist' and rejected.** There are some ethnocentric ideas-and individual human rights is one of them-for which we should not apologize. Furthermore, **I do not see the dissemination of powerful social and political ideas as necessarily occurring in one direction only.** As the economic and political power of Asia grows, for example, so wdl its cultural power. World politics in the next century wdl be more Asian than the present one. **What matters from a cosmopolitan perspective is not the birthplace of an idea, but the meaning we give it.**

Morality must take a backseat to the possibility of catastrophic consequences

Tim **Stelzig**, Attorney Advisor in the Competition Policy Division of the FCC's Wireline Competition Bureau, former associate with Arnold & Porter in Washington, D.C., JD from the University of Pennsylvania Law School, March 1998, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 146 U. Pa. L. Rev. 901, p. 959

Rights act as "trumps,"(n3) "side-constraints,"(n4) or "shields"(n5) against the intrusive designs of the utility-maximizing consequenualist,(n6) insulating each person from being sacrificed for the public good. For example, torturing an innocent child is morally impermissible not because it fails to produce the greatest good, but because doing so would violate the child's rights.(n7)

Nothing more need be said.(n8)

Yet, as Blackstone also realizes, the "local or occasional necessities of the state" sometimes demand that rights be "modified, narrowed, or enlarged."(n9) **Bluntly put, sometimes the public good wins out. Rights clearly must give way in catastrophic cases, where harms of colossal proportion will be suffered unless some fight is violated. For example, if stopping a terrorist from launching a salvo of nuclear missiles against China required killing several innocent hostages, it would be undeniably(n10)**Libertarians have argued that such a state violates deontological norms, that governmental intervention going beyond what is minimally necessary to preserve social order is not justified.

Consequentialism key – Nuclear War

We have an ethical obligation to discuss consequences about nuclear war

David **Krieger**, President of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, May 17, **2007**, “Responsibility in an Era of Consequences,” online:

http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2007/05/17_krieger_Responsibility_In_An_Era.htm, accessed August 12, 2007

The inaugural meeting of the World Future Council was recently held in Hamburg, Germany. It brought together 50 Councilors from all continents, chosen for their diversity and pioneering commitment to building a better world. At the conclusion of the four-day meeting, the Council released the Hamburg Call to Action, a document calling for action to protect the future of all life. It began, **“Today we stand at the crossroads of human history. Our actions – and our failures to act – will decide the future of life on earth for thousands of years, if not forever.”**

The Call to Action is a challenge to each of us to take responsibility for assuring a positive future for humanity and for preserving life on our planet. The document states: **“Today there is no alternative to an ethics of global responsibility for we are entering an era of consequences. We must share, co-operate and innovate together in building a world worthy of our highest aspirations.** The decision lies with each one of us!”

We are challenged to consider what we are individually and collectively doing not only to radically undermine our present world through war and its preparation, resource depletion, pollution and global warming, but also the effects of what we are doing upon future generations. Those of us alive now have the responsibility to pass the world on intact to the next generation, and to assure that our actions do not foreclose the future.

The Hamburg Call to Action is a great document and I urge you to read and reflect upon it. But I **draw your attention specifically to the section on nuclear weapons: “Nuclear weapons remain humanity’s most immediate catastrophic threat. These weapons would destroy cities, countries, civilization and possibly humanity itself. The danger posed by nuclear weapons in any hands must be confronted directly and urgently** through a new initiative for the elimination of these instruments of annihilation.”

Consequentialism key – States (1/2)

A. Equating states and individual morally is a misappropriation of ethical analysis; while it may be possible for individuals to follow strict moral codes of conduct, states can only justify their decisions consequentially.

Tim **Stelzig**, Attorney Advisor in the Competition Policy Division of the FCC's Wireline Competition Bureau, former associate with Arnold & Porter in Washington, D.C., JD from the University of Pennsylvania Law School, March **1998**, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 146 U. Pa. L. Rev. 901, p. 959

This observation forms the basis for a deep objection to the applicability of the distributive exemption to state action. **It might be argued that because the intervention of the modern state is so pervasive and burdensome, state action has become a threat by its very ubiquity. The argument here is not that the costs of governmental action outweigh the benefits.** Instead, the claim is that the ubiquity of governmental action has altered the character of state intervention, such that it is no longer appropriate to conceptualize governmental intervention as a diversion for purposes of the distributive exemption. If so, deontological morality might require a government akin to the classic libertarian "night-watchman" state.(n256) **That is, state intervention might still be justified under the distributive exemption in order to protect society from the anarchy threatened by the state of nature. Trying to do more, however, might transform the diversionary character of the state's intervention into an independent threat that is not justified under the distributive exemption. If this objection succeeds, governmental action must be neither pervasive nor frequent.**

One response is simply to say that governmental intervention is permissible until the state's pervasiveness, as such, develops into a threat. This response is not particularly useful, however, because the property of pervasiveness lies on a continuum. No clear boundaries separate the state that is oppressive due to its pervasiveness from the nonoppressive, but still activist, state. Thus, instead of attempting to counter the libertarian objection directly, let us grant its premise. Take it as given that over a period of many years and gradual expansion, the state has evolved such that it, along with previously recognized threats (e.g., the unchecked passions of others), now constitutes a threat. What is the result? The first thing to note is that because we are still working within the moral framework of deontology, the distributive exemption is still pertinent. The difference is that instead of drawing the analogy between the state and the passerby, we should draw the analogy between the state and the trolley. We, as citizens exercising control over our democratic state.(n257) now have the role analogous to the passerby in Thomson's example.(n258) As will be demonstrated below, this change has fewer implications than might be expected. It might be thought obvious that minimizing state-caused harm requires scaling back government. Even if downsizing government resulted in less overall good, one might argue that the inevitability(n259) and lesser-harm(n260) requirements that are embedded in the distributive exemption, their deontological character not perturbed by consequentialist concerns, mandate this result. However, things are not so simple. There are at least two reasons why an essentially libertarian conclusion does not follow from the second-order application of the distributive exemption to the state. First, the state is not the only threat facing society. Although the anarchy of the state of nature may not be lurking just around the corner, unfettered human passions are still a significant threat in the absence of the stabilizing influence of governmental action. The distributive exemption justifies governmental action to remedy those harms up to the point where the state is so pervasive that its ubiquity threatens harm. This limitation potentially still leaves significant room for an active state. As noted above, however, no clear boundary separates the pervasively oppressive state from the nonoppressive but active state. Thus, those who believe that indefensible ubiquity lies just beyond the night-watchman state bear the burden of demonstrating why this is so. In defending this claim, the libertarian must heed two points. First, traditional appeals to property rights and the like will not provide the libertarian with a sufficient defense, since the arguments above already have established that the distributive exemption permits infringement of such rights. The only harm relevant at this point in the argument is the harm resulting from the ubiquity of the modern state. Second, in arguing that the more-than-minimal state constitutes a threat by its ubiquity, the libertarian must show more than that a powerful government may be threatening to a citizen who feels insignificant in comparison. Vague anxieties of this sort are not harms protected by stringent rights. It is important to remember that the version of rights defended here is not absolute. Thomson's Tradeoff Idea, followed here, allows rights to be infringed when doing so produces significantly much more good.(n261) The libertarian therefore must show that the harms caused by the pervasiveness of the ubiquitous state are not significantly outweighed by the benefits of the governmental action in question. Demonstrating that we have stringent rights against governmental ubiquity would satisfy this burden, but defending that claim would be no easy task. Because this first point depends, in part, on drawing a line about which no clear standard exists, I will not press further here. The second reason that an essentially libertarian conclusion does not follow from the second-order application of the distributive exemption to the state is more fundamental. Because the state fills a special role in society, state action and the exercise of passion are interrelated and cannot properly be understood independently.(n262) In the case of an individual, "inaction" is not properly counted as action.(n263) But because the state is the only legitimate creator of certain types of social rules (i.e., legal rules), people act in reliance on both the existence and nonexistence of these rules. The special role of the state encompasses coordinating collective action by establishing the rules that define, in part, the parameters of permissible behavior. Therefore, the lack of state sanction against doing a particular thing legitimately may be relied on as a prima facie reason to think the thing socially permissible.(n264) Deregulation has causal impact. For example, the problems in the savings-and-loan industry in the 1980s are usually causally attributed to governmental deregulation.(n265) Failure to regulate also clearly has consequences. For instance, the future vitality of the Internet arguably depends in part on the degree to which the government fails to regulate its

development.(n266) Thus, in the special case of the state, lack of intervention, and certainly deregulation, are actions for purposes of the distributive exemption. **So although threats may be found in state action, threats also may exist in state inaction.(n267) If scaling back the state causes more societal harm than good, the state is the proximate cause of the resulting harm.**

Minimizing governmental harm is no simple matter. It involves complex calculations and the interweaving of policies of inaction with policies of civil, criminal, and regulatory action. However one thinks these processes ideally should work in detail, this conclusion comports well with broadly liberal(n268) notions of proper governmental action. The distributive exemption claims that the desirable role for government is to attempt to provide for the general welfare as consequentially calculated, while taking into account the cost of governmental intervention. **Deontological principles of good standing have thus explained why the state is permitted to do that which would be deontologically impermissible for individuals to do.** In short, an exception to deontology has swallowed up the rule with respect to state action.

CONCLUSION

This Comment seeks to dissipate the tension Blackstone broached when he stated that the "eternal boundaries" provided by our "indelible rights" sometimes must be "modified" or "narrowed" by the "local or occasional necessities of the state."(n269) **Rights, as trumps against the world, ostensibly ought not to be things that may be cast aside. Yet, it is intuitively obvious that the state justifiably acts in ways impermissible for individuals as it collects taxes, punishes wrongdoers, and the like.** Others have offered explanations for why coercive state action is morally justified. This Comment adds another.

This Comment began by adopting deontology as a foundational theoretic assumption and briefly describing how deontology was to be understood herein. I then examined the characteristics of two leading theories of rights—Dworkin's theory of legal rights and Thomson's theory of moral rights. Although **neither Dworkin nor Thomson** is an absolutist

with respect to rights, neither account **explains why the state, but not individuals, may act in ways seemingly justifiable only on consequentialist grounds: that is, why the state may override the trumping effect of rights.** In attempting to provide an answer to this question, I first noted that deontology does not exhaust moral discourse. The deontologist is forced to recognize that rights cannot capture everything of moral importance. I then provided several examples of distinctions recognized in the philosophical literature that delimit areas in which deontology does not apply, focusing in particular on the Trolley Problem and the distributive

exemption from deontological norms that the Trolley Problem illustrates. The deontological exemption was examined fairly closely in order to enumerate the criteria that trigger the exemption and understand the principles that guide its application.

By applying the distributive exemption to the state, I accomplished two things. First, I was able to provide a new justification for the existence of the coercive state, both when premised on the traditional assumptions of social contractarians, and when premised on a more realistic understanding of the modern state. Second, I was able to sketch the relationship between the constraints of rights and the demands of policy, justifying a state that provides for the general welfare without violating rights in a way objectionable to liberals.

Libertarians have argued that such a state violates deontological norms, that governmental intervention going beyond what is minimally necessary to preserve social order is not justified. Deontology does not require such a timid state and, moreover, finds desirable a state which promotes the general welfare to the fullest extent possible, even if in so doing it acts in ways deontologically objectionable for anyone other than one filling the government's unique role in society.

More specifically, I argued that the government must consequentially justify its policy choices. The elegance of this particular rationale for the contours of permissible governmental action is that it remains a deontological justification at base. One of the worries of full-blown consequentialism is that it requires too much, that any putative right may be set aside if doing so would produce greater good. The justification offered here does not suffer that flaw. The distributive exemption does not permit that any one be sacrificed for the betterment of others; rather, it only permits a redistribution of inevitable harms, a diversion of an existing threatened harm to many such that it results in harm to fewer individuals.

B. Governments are uniquely obligate to rely on consequentialism

Harries, is a Visiting Fellow at the Lowy Institute for International Policy, a Senior Fellow at the Centre for Independent Studies in Sydney, Australia, and editor emeritus of *The National Interest*, a leading Washington-based foreign policy quarterly, **2005**

(Owen, *Orbis*, p. 64 NB)

The same point, expressed in different terms, is that **those who conduct foreign policy are in the position of agents or trustees, not principals.** As in the case of trustees, **their first and overriding responsibility is not to give expression to their own moral views or preferences, but to secure the interests of those they serve. If they feel that the two conflict and that they are morally constrained from subordinating their own values to their duties as trustees, their proper course is not to insist on giving preference to the former but to resign.**

Critique Prevents Change (1/2)

Moral absolutism makes politics impossible—without analyzing the consequences of the institutional implementation of plans, it becomes impossible to actualize the goals of the critique.

Jeffrey Isaac, James H. Rudy Professor of Political Science and director of the Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life at Indiana University, Bloomington, Spring 2002, Dissent, vol. 49, no. 2

POLITICS IS ABOUT ends and means--about the values that we pursue and the methods by which we pursue them. In a perfect world, there would be a perfect congruence between ends and means: our ends would always be achievable through means that were fully consistent with them; the tension between ends and means would not exist. But then there would be no need to pursue just ends, for these would already be realized. Such a world of absolute justice lies beyond politics.

The left has historically been burdened by the image of such a world. Marx's vision of the "riddle of history solved" and Engels's vision of the "withering away of the state" were two canonical expressions of the belief in an end-state in which perfect justice could be achieved once and for all. But the left has also developed a concurrent tradition of serious strategic thinking about politics. Centered around but not reducible to classical Marxism, this tradition has focused on such questions as the relations of class, party, and state; the consequences of parliamentary versus revolutionary strategies of social change; the problem of hegemony and the limits of mass politics; the role of violence in class struggle; and the relationship between class struggle and war. These questions preoccupied Karl Kautsky, V.I. Lenin, Leon Trotsky, Rosa Luxemburg, Georg Lukacs, and Antonio Gramsci--and also John Dewey, Arthur Koestler, Ignazio Silone, George Orwell, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Albert Camus. The history of left political thought in the twentieth century is a history of serious arguments about ends and means in politics, arguments about how to pursue the difficult work of achieving social justice in an unjust world. Many of these arguments were foolish, many of their conclusions were specious, and many of the actions followed from them were barbaric. The problem of ends and means in politics was often handled poorly, but it was nonetheless taken seriously, even if so many on the left failed to think clearly about the proper relationship between their perfectionist visions and their often Machiavellian strategies.

What is striking about much of the political discussion on the left today is its failure to engage this earlier tradition of argument. The left, particularly the campus left--by which I mean "progressive" faculty and student groups, often centered around labor solidarity organizations and campus Green affiliates--has become moralistic rather than politically serious. Some of its moralizing--about Chiapas, Palestine, and Iraq--continues the third worldism that plagued the New Left in its waning years. Some of it--about globalization and sweatshops--is new and in some ways promising (see my "Thinking About the Antisweatshop Movement," Dissent, Fall 2001). But what characterizes much campus left discourse is a substitution of moral rhetoric about evil policies or institutions for a sober consideration of what might improve or replace them, how the improvement might be achieved, and what the likely costs, as well as the benefits, are of any reasonable strategy.

One consequence of this tendency is a failure to worry about methods of securing political support through democratic means or to recognize the distinctive value of democracy itself. It is not that conspiratorial or antidemocratic means are promoted. On the contrary, the means employed tend to be preeminently democratic--petitions, demonstrations, marches, boycotts, corporate campaigns, vigorous public criticism. And it is not that political democracy is derided. Projects such as the Green Party engage with electoral politics, locally and nationally, in order to win public office and achieve political objectives.

BUT WHAT IS absent is a sober reckoning with the preoccupations and opinions of the vast majority of Americans, who are not drawn to vocal denunciations of the International Monetary Fund and World Trade Organization and who do not believe that the discourse of "anti-imperialism" speaks to their lives. Equally absent is critical thinking about why citizens of liberal democratic states--including most workers and the poor--value liberal democracy and subscribe to what Jurgen Habermas has called "constitutional patriotism": a patriotic identification with the democratic state because of the civil, political, and social rights it defends. Vicarious identifications with Subcommandante Marcos or starving Iraqi children allow left activists to express a genuine solidarity with the oppressed elsewhere that is surely legitimate in a globalizing age. But these symbolic avowals are not an effective way of contending for political influence or power in the society in which these activists live.

The ease with which the campus left responded to September 11 by rehearsing an all-too-familiar narrative of American militarism and imperialism is not simply disturbing. It is a sign of this left's alienation from the society in which it operates (the worst examples of this are statements of the Student Peace Action Coalition Network, which declare that "the United States Government is the world's greatest terror organization," and suggest that "homicidal psychopaths of the United States Government" engineered the World Trade Center attacks as a pretext for imperialist aggression. See <http://www.gospan.org>). Many left activists seem more able to identify with (idealized versions of) Iraqi or Afghan civilians than with American citizens, whether these are the people who perished in the Twin Towers or the rest of us who legitimately fear that we might be next. This is not because of any "disloyalty." Charges like that lack intellectual or political merit. It is because of a debilitating moralism; because it is easier to denounce wrong than to take real responsibility for correcting it, easier to locate and to oppose a remote evil than to address a proximate difficulty. The campus left says what it thinks. But it exhibits little interest in how and why so many Americans think differently.

The "peace" demonstrations organized across the country within a few days of the September 11 attacks--in which local Green Party activists often played a crucial role--were, whatever else they were, a sign of their organizers' lack of judgment and common sense. Although they often expressed genuine horror about the terrorism, they focused their energy not on the legitimate fear and outrage of American citizens but rather on the evils of the American government and its widely supported response to the terror. Hardly anyone was paying attention, but they alienated anyone who was. This was utterly predictable. And that is my point. The predictable consequences did not matter. What mattered was simply the expression of righteous indignation about what is wrong with the United States, as if September 11 hadn't really happened. Whatever one thinks about America's deficiencies, it must be acknowledged that a political praxis preoccupation with this is foolish and self-defeating.

The other, more serious consequence of this moralizing tendency is the failure to think seriously about global politics. The campus left is rightly interested in the ills of global capitalism. But politically it seems limited to two options: expressions of "solidarity" with certain oppressed groups--Palestinians but not Syrians, Afghan civilians (though not those who welcome liberation from the Taliban), but not Bosnians or Kosovars or Rwandans--and automatic opposition to

American foreign policy in the name of anti-imperialism. The economic discourse of the campus left is a universalist discourse of human needs and workers rights; but it is accompanied by a refusal to think in political terms about the realities of states, international institutions, violence, and power. This refusal is linked to a peculiar strain of pacifism, according to which any use of military force by the United States is viewed as aggression or militarism.

A CASE IN POINT is a petition circulated on the campus of Indiana University within days of September 11. Drafted by the Bloomington Peace Coalition, it opposed what was then an imminent war in Afghanistan against al-Qaeda, and called for peace. It declared: "Retaliation will not lead to healing; rather it will harm innocent people and further the cycle of violence. Rather than engage in military aggression, those in authority should apprehend and charge those individuals believed to be directly responsible for the attacks and try them in a court of law in accordance with due process of international law." This declaration was hardly unique. Similar statements were issued on college campuses across the country, by local student or faculty coalitions, the national Campus Greens, 9-11peace.org, and the National Youth and Student Peace Coalition. As Global Exchange declared in its antiwar statement of September 11: "vengeance offers no relief... retaliation can never guarantee healing... and to meet violence with violence breeds more rage and more senseless deaths. Only

love leads to peace with justice, while hate takes us toward war and injustice." On this view **military action of any kind is figured as "aggression" or "vengeance"; harm to innocents, whether substantial or marginal, intended or unintended, is absolutely proscribed; legality is treated as having its own force, independent of any means of enforcement; and, most revealingly, "healing" is treated as the principal goal of any legitimate response.**

None of these points withstands serious scrutiny. A military response to terrorist aggression is not in any obvious sense an act of aggression, unless any military response--or at least any U.S. military response--is simply defined as aggression. While any justifiable military response should certainly be governed by just-war principles, the criterion of absolute harm avoidance would rule out the possibility of any military response. It is virtually impossible either to "apprehend" and prosecute terrorists or to put an end to terrorist networks without the use of military force, for the "criminals" in question are not law-abiding citizens but mass murderers, and there are no police to "arrest" them. And, finally, while "healing" is surely a legitimate moral goal, it is not clear that it is a political goal. Justice, however, most assuredly is a political goal. The most notable thing about the Bloomington statement is its avoidance of political justice. Like many antiwar texts, it calls for "social justice abroad." It supports redistributing wealth. But criminal and retributive justice, protection against terrorist violence, or the political enforcement of the minimal conditions of global civility--these are unmentioned.

They are unmentioned because to broach them is to enter a terrain that the campus left is unwilling to enter--the terrain of violence, a realm of complex choices and dirty hands. This aversion to violence is understandable and in some ways laudable. America's use of violence has caused much harm in the world, from Southeast Asia to Central and Latin America to Africa. The so-called "Vietnam Syndrome" was the product of a real learning experience that should not be forgotten. In addition, the destructive capacities of modern warfare--which jeopardize the civilian/combatant distinction, and introduce the possibility of enormous ecological devastation--make war under any circumstances something to be feared. No civilized person should approach the topic of war with anything other than great trepidation.

And yet the left's reflexive hostility toward violence in the international domain is strange. It is inconsistent with avowals of "materialism" and evocations of "struggle," especially on the part of those many who are not pacifists; it is in tension with a commitment to human emancipation (is there no cause for which it is justifiable to fight?); and it is oblivious to the tradition of left thinking about ends and means. To compare the debates within the left about the two world wars or the Spanish Civil War with the predictable "anti-militarism" of today's campus left is to compare a discourse that was serious about political power with a discourse that is not.

This unpragmatic approach has become a hallmark of post-cold war left commentary, from the Gulf War protests of 1991, to the denunciation of the 1999 U.S.-led NATO intervention in Kosovo, to the current post-September 11 antiwar movement. In each case protesters have raised serious questions about U.S. policy and its likely consequences, but in a strikingly ineffective way. They sound a few key themes: the broader context of grievances that supposedly explains why Saddam Hussein, or Slobodan Milosevic, or Osama bin Laden have done what they have done; the hypocrisy of official U.S. rhetoric, which denounces terrorism even though the U.S. government has often supported terrorism; the harm that will come to ordinary Iraqi or Serbian or Afghan citizens as a result of intervention; and the cycle of violence that is likely to ensue. These are important issues. But they typically are raised by left critics not to promote real debate about practical alternatives, but to avoid such a debate or to trump it.

As a result, the most important political questions are simply not asked. It is assumed that U.S. military intervention is an act of "aggression," but no consideration is given to the aggression to which intervention is a response. The status quo ante in Afghanistan is not, as peace activists would have it, peace, but rather terrorist violence abetted by a regime--the Taliban--that rose to power through brutality and repression. This requires us to ask a question that most "peace" activists would prefer not to ask: What should be done to respond to the violence of a Saddam Hussein, or a Milosevic, or a Taliban regime? What means are likely to stop violence and bring criminals to justice? Calls for diplomacy and international law are well intended and important; they implicate a decent and civilized ethic of global order. But they are also vague and empty, because they are not accompanied by any account of how diplomacy or international law can work effectively to address the problem at hand. The campus left offers no such account. To do so would require it to contemplate tragic choices in which moral goodness is of limited utility. Here what matters is not purity of intention but the intelligent exercise of power.

Power is not a dirty word or an unfortunate feature of the world. It is the core of politics. Power is the ability to effect outcomes in the world. Politics, in large part, involves contests over the distribution and use of power. To accomplish anything in the political world, one must attend to the means that are necessary to bring it about. And to develop such means is to develop, and to exercise, power. To say this is not to say that power is beyond morality. It is to say that power is not reducible to morality.

As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one's intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. **This is why, from the standpoint of politics--as opposed to religion--**

pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as

much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with "good" may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of "good" that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one's goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

Calculability Good

A retreat to the incalculable and a refusal to evaluate the consequences of action leaves the status quo intact

Touraine 03, research director at L'ecole des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, where he founded the Centre d'étude des mouvements sociaux (Alain, *Constellations*, Vol. 10, No. 3, p. 307-308)

These observations assume still more importance if they are placed in a broader context. In fact, we see a retreat from politics in most countries, a weakening of political institutions as well as of people's interest and confidence in their political representatives. We see the arbitrariness of those in power and their discourses on the one hand, and protests that are less political than ideological and moral on the other. It is in this sense that the declaration of a struggle of good and evil is acceptable, since these categories are by definition constructed by societies themselves. Everything occurs as if discourses, equally devoid of content, are at war – at the price of reduced military operations, but higher civilian casualties. Could one not be led here to paint a very pessimistic picture of political life around the world? There seem to be neither political actors nor social conflicts from which political actors could draw support. We hear only two equally nonpolitical discourses: that of the mission conferred by God upon the US and that of a pacifism that risks being weakened by its lack of seriousness in analyzing the situation in the Middle East. These are two mutually opposed types of moral discourse. Neither has any social content or real capacity for political influence. How far we are from the Cold War! Almost always, political debates and decisions created the impression of having a pronounced real historical content, so much so that the principal actors seemed to have been fulfilling roles imposed on them by history. Today, one can, even must, doubt the reality of the problems and realities invoked by the leaders of the two camps. This leads one to think that the actors and stakes at the center of world politics could well be nothing but shadows – in other words, that the leaders of states would sooner address God than their own populations and care little to nourish the political life of calculations and projects that might have direct consequences for the populations in question. This impression of unreality is certainly great in dictatorships, whose violence can never conceal their fragility and incoherence. But the fragility is just as great at what can be called the center of the world system, where the president of today's only great power constructs an image of reality that is almost entirely artificial and is refuted by events every day. The unreality of the discourses and policies of the opposed camps is so great that it empties of their content the European negotiation initiatives, which on first view seemed, to the contrary, to be justified by their resistance to the unreality of the situations created by American policy. Europe has no analysis, no initiative, no model of the future to propose. This somber observation is all the easier to accept as Europe is also conscious of defending social rights and systems of social redistribution that no longer correspond to the hopes placed in the welfare state little more than a half century ago. On the whole, the Security Council, if it has not succeeded in imposing a mediation or intervention, has played a positive role to the extent that it has not let itself be convinced of the reality of confrontations that seem to correspond more to the discourse of the media and the White House than to the real world.

Policy before Discourse

Policy analysis should precede discourse – most effective way to challenge power

Jill Taft-Kaufman, Speech prof @ CMU, 1995, Southern Comm. Journal, Spring, v. 60, Iss. 3, "Other Ways", p pq

The postmodern passwords of "polyvocality," "Otherness," and "difference," unsupported by substantial analysis of the concrete contexts of subjects, creates a solipsistic quagmire. The political sympathies of the new cultural critics, with their ostensible concern for the lack of power experienced by marginalized people, aligns them with the political left. Yet, **despite their adversarial posture and talk of opposition, their discourses on intertextuality and inter-referentiality isolate them from and ignore the conditions that have produced leftist politics-- conflict, racism, poverty, and injustice.** In short, as Clarke (1991) asserts, postmodern emphasis on new subjects conceals the old subjects, those who have limited access to good jobs, food, housing, health care, and transportation, as well as to the media that depict them. Merod (1987) decries **this** situation as one which **leaves no vision, will, or commitment to activism.** He notes that academic lip service to the oppositional is underscored by the absence of focused collective or politically active intellectual communities. Provoked by the academic manifestations of this problem Di Leonardo (1990) echoes Merod and laments: **Has there ever been a historical era characterized by as little radical analysis or activism and as much radical-chic writing as ours? Maundering on about Otherness: phallocentrism or Eurocentric tropes has become a lazy academic substitute for actual engagement with the detailed histories and contemporary realities** of Western racial minorities, white women, or any Third World population. (p. 530) **Clarke's assessment of the postmodern elevation of language to the "sine qua non" of critical discussion is an even stronger indictment against the trend.** Clarke examines Lyotard's (1984) *The Postmodern Condition* in which Lyotard maintains that virtually all social relations are linguistic, and, therefore, it is through the coercion that threatens speech that we enter the "realm of terror" and society falls apart. To this assertion, Clarke replies: **I can think of few more striking indicators of the political and intellectual impoverishment of a view of society that can only recognize the discursive. If the worst terror we can envisage is the threat not to be allowed to speak, we are appallingly ignorant of terror in its elaborate contemporary forms. It may be the intellectual's conception of terror** (what else do we do but speak?), **but its projection onto the rest of the world would be calamitous....**(pp. 2-27) **The realm of the discursive is derived from the requisites for human life, which are in the physical world, rather than in a world of ideas or symbols.**(4) Nutrition, shelter, and protection are basic human needs that require collective activity for their fulfillment. **Postmodern emphasis on the discursive without an accompanying analysis of how the discursive emerges from material circumstances hides the complex task of envisioning and working towards concrete social goals** (Merod, 1987). Although the material conditions that create the situation of marginality escape the purview of the postmodernist, the situation and its consequences are not overlooked by scholars from marginalized groups. Robinson (1990) for example, argues that **"the justice that working people deserve is economic, not just textual"** (p. 571). Lopez (1992) states that **"the starting point for organizing the program content of education or political action must be the present existential, concrete situation"** (p. 299). West (1988) asserts that borrowing French post-structuralist discourses about "Otherness" blinds us to realities of American difference going on in front of us (p. 170). Unlike postmodern "textual radicals" who Rabinow (1986) acknowledges are "fuzzy about power and the realities of socioeconomic constraints" (p. 255), most writers from marginalized groups are clear about how discourse interweaves with the concrete circumstances that create lived experience. **People whose lives form the material for postmodern counter-hegemonic discourse do not share the optimism over the new recognition of their discursive subjectivities, because such an acknowledgment does not address sufficiently their collective historical and current struggles**

against racism, sexism, homophobia, and economic injustice. They do not appreciate being told they are living in a world in which there are no more real subjects. Ideas have consequences. Emphasizing the discursive self when a person is hungry and homeless represents both a cultural and humane failure. The need to look beyond texts to the perception and attainment of concrete social goals keeps writers from marginalized groups ever-mindful of the specifics of how power works through political agendas, institutions, agencies, and the budgets that fuel them.

Representations Good - Nuclear

Nuclear war representations are the only way we can begin to process the dangers that accompany nuclear war

Brian Martin, Professor of Social Sciences in the School of Social Sciences, Media and Communication at the University of Wollongong, September 3, 2002, "Activism After Nuclear War?," online: <http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/sts/bmartin/pubs/02tff.html>, accessed August 13, 2007

If worst comes to worst and nuclear weapons cause physical effects close to home, then survival becomes a priority. It makes sense to know the basics about the effects of nuclear war - blast, heat, radiation - and how to protect. Knowing basic first aid is important too. There is plenty of information on what to do in the event of nuclear war, but most social activists have avoided even thinking about it on the grounds that preparation makes nuclear war more likely. I disagree. If activists are seen to be ready, this makes nuclear war less likely. Nuclear weapons are severely stigmatised largely due to the efforts of peace activists. Governments have been reluctant to use nuclear weapons because they realise there will be an enormous political backlash. From the 1940s on, US leaders have considered using nuclear weapons on quite a number of occasions - such as during the Vietnam war - but always refrained, largely due to the fear of a backlash. If, despite this, nuclear weapons are used, it is vital that social activists capitalise on the widespread revulsion that will occur. To do this, activists need to be prepared. Otherwise, the next nuclear war will be only the beginning of a series of nuclear wars. A further implication is that activists need to be psychologically prepared for nuclear war. For decades, many people have thought of nuclear war as "the end": as extinction or the end of civilisation. But limited nuclear war has always been possible and even a major nuclear war could leave billions of people alive. Therefore it makes sense to think through the implications and make suitable preparations. Nuclear war is almost bound to be a disaster, not only in human and environmental terms but as well in terms of political prospects for achieving a better world. Activists are doing what they can to prevent nuclear war, but they are not the ones who design and produce the weapons and prepare to use them. Given that nuclear weapons may be used despite the best efforts of peace activists, it makes sense to be prepared for the aftermath. That means preparing organisationally and psychologically.

Offensive Language

Punishing offensive language makes it worse—censorship only drives it underground where its effects are more acutely felt.

Matthew Roskoski and Joe Peabody, "A Linguistic and Philosophical Critique of Language 'Arguments,'" 1991, <http://debate.uvm.edu/Library/DebateTheoryLibrary/Roskoski&Peabody-LangCritiques>, accessed 10/17/02

If language "arguments" become a dominant trend, debaters will not change their attitudes. Rather they will manifest their attitudes in non-debate contexts. Under these conditions, the debaters will not have the moderating effects of the critic or the other debaters. Simply put, sexism at home or at lunch is worse than sexism in a debate round because in the round there is a critic to provide negative though not punitive feedback. The publicization effects of censorship are well known. "Psychological studies reveal that whenever the government attempts to censor speech, the censored speech - for that very reason - becomes more appealing to many people" (Strossen 559). These studies would suggest that language which is critiqued by language "arguments" becomes more attractive simply because of the critique. Hence language "arguments" are counterproductive. Conclusion Rodney Smolla offered the following insightful assessment of the interaction between offensive language and language "arguments": The battle against {offensive speech} will be fought most effectively through persuasive and creative educational leadership rather than through punishment and coercion... The sense of a community of scholars, an island of reason and tolerance, is the pervasive ethos. But that ethos should be advanced with education, not coercion. It should be the dominant voice of the university within the marketplace of ideas; but it should not preempt that marketplace. (Smolla 224-225).¹ We emphatically concur. It is our position that a debater who feels strongly enough about a given language "argument" ought to actualize that belief through interpersonal conversation rather than through a plea for censorship and coercion. Each debater in a given round has three minutes of cross-examination time during which he or she may engage the other team in a dialogue about the ramifications of the language the opposition has just used. Additionally even given the efficacy of Rich Edwards' efficient tabulation program, there will inevitably be long periods between rounds during which further dialogue can take place.

Punishing offensive language creates a backlash and drives it underground

Matthew Roskoski and Joe Peabody, A Linguistic and Philosophical Critique of Language Arguments, 1991

Previously, we have argued that the language advocates have erroneously reversed the causal relationship between language and reality. We have defended the thesis that reality shapes language, rather than the obverse. Now we will also contend that to attempt to solve a problem by editing the language which is symptomatic of that problem will generally trade off with solving the reality which is the source of the problem. There are several reasons why this is true. The first, and most obvious, is that we may often be fooled into thinking that language "arguments" have generated real change. As Graddol and Swan observe, "when compared with larger social and ideological struggles, linguistic reform may seem quite a trivial concern," further noting "there is also the danger that effective change at this level is mistaken for real social change" (Graddol & Swan 195). The second reason is that the language we find objectionable can serve as a signal or an indicator of the corresponding objectionable reality. The third reason is that restricting language only limits the overt expressions of any objectionable reality, while leaving subtle and hence more dangerous expressions unregulated. Once we drive the objectionable idea underground it will be more difficult to identify, more difficult to root out, more difficult to counteract, and more likely to have its undesirable effect. The fourth reason is that objectionable speech can create a "backlash" effect that raises the consciousness of people

exposed to the speech. Strossen observes that "ugly and abominable as these expressions are, they undoubtably have had the beneficial result of raising social consciousness about the underlying societal problem..." (560).

Academic Discourse Good (1/2)

Their rejection of 'academic theory' is disastrous for the oppressed – it encourages a form of politics where we all already have our minds made up that policymaking can't help us. This forecloses connections with potential allies and essentializes the experience of the oppressed.

Paul Bowman, Lecturer in Cultural Studies at Bath Spa University College, England, 2002, online: <http://culturemachine.tees.ac.uk/Cmach/Backissues/j004/Articles/bowman.htm>, accessed February 21, 2005

The supposed 'difficulty' of the language of such political theory, and of the language of cultural theory in general, and the supposed apparent 'clarity' of many more popular modes, actually suggests the many difficulties of 'confronting' the object of analysis called the political or the socio-political in anything other than a turgid masculinist mode when one hopes this work will register 'in' the field one is concerned with, a 'field' whose construction has always been dominated by one or another manifestation of 'masculinist' discourse. The whole field is polarised between appeals to 'common sense' and appeals to apodictic 'logic'. Laclau and Mouffe have 'clearly', in some measure, inherited, comfortably and happily, an unambivalent sense of what political debate should be; it's just that it doesn't conform to more popular notions of what it should be. Discoursing 'otherwise' is apparently not really taken seriously by either camp (Derrida, 1996: 30). But this 'difficulty' – and the fact that it is a difficulty not often perceived – illustrates the stranglehold that 'reasonable' language, of whatever inflection, has on discourse of the properly political. You would be right to state that 'I' am clearly not going out of my way to try to construct an 'alternative'. But my justification for deferring the attempt devolves on the inevitable subordination of performance to its obligatory explanation or interpretation. I raise the matter here, albeit somewhat turgidly, because acknowledging this gendered contingency of rationality and logicity may sow the seeds of their deconstruction and, perhaps, transformation. So, that being said, what have I said? One point is that when people accuse 'Theory' of being useless, unrelated or unconnected, distracted, self-absorbed abstraction, then that accusation is tropologically aligned with the standard slippage into a charge of masturbation – as in, theory just plays with itself. That which is ostensibly disconnected or not putatively immediately related to real and pressing issues is readily said to be 'castrated', lacking direct purchase, direct utility, and any ability to 'intervene' directly into real and pressing issues. When Rorty, no mean theorist himself, accuses Laclau, Critchley, and Derrida of just playing with themselves, this is not least because deconstruction, for Rorty, is a kind of masturbation, primarily because it does not 'connect'. Rorty's charge is exemplary of the general tenor of criticisms levelled against Theory: that it just plays with itself. What is especially telling about this facile and dominant binary between 'worthwhile work versus worthless wank' is that it can also be mapped onto the dominant binary structuring debate about university education in general that has dominated discourse about knowledge for at least two hundred years: namely, the debate about whether knowledge should have any 'use' (see Young, 1992: 97-126). Usefulness, today, is invariably coordinated with connection, penetration, control, prediction and production; in short, with technical, scientific, or financial utility and mastery. The Thatcherite assault on the arts and humanities exemplified this hegemonisation of cultural values with the ascendancy of the equation 'value equals usefulness equals profit'. But, given capital's attempted hegemonisation of all values, it becomes not imponderable to suspect that cultural studies' own obsession with themes supposedly contrary to this ethos, like ethics, politics, policy, intervention, and so on, is itself a symptom of the techno-capitalist hegemonic injunction to be intelligibly productive, in some way, as the determination of worth and value increasingly obliges all to render reason for everything in terms intelligible to discourses tropologically and analytically dominated by the discourse or ideology of capital. So, how should cultural studies elaborate itself? According to what protocols of discussion? I have implicitly painted a picture of a scene polarised by two improprieties: hyper-academic versus hypo-academic. The difference between the former, a cultural studies fixated on supposedly unintelligible or 'too difficult' (or too theoretical, too self-obsessed, too masturbatory) exploration of the ethico-political, on the one hand, and the latter on the other hand, a cultural studies that only takes seriously empirical, fact-based discourse ('practical', 'real'), is crucially that the theoretically inflected approach deliberately (and, I would say,

dogmatically³) leaves itself space in its remit to question how, why, to what ends, in whose interests, and supporting what ethico-political values and agenda, any discourse imposes itself as the as-is (i.e., the ‘true’, ‘correct’, ‘common sense’, etc.); while empirically inflected approaches subordinate or tend to factor out such reflection from the outset. Both positions can readily deem the other a waste of time, misguided digression, distraction, or, as Shakespeare put it, the ‘expense of spirit in a waste of shame’. (Perhaps Shakespeare was speaking as a theorist here, as he was critiquing ‘proper’ procreational activity.) Theory easily deems empiricism to be subject to an inadequately thought-through agenda – often implying its culpability in and as the reproduction and strengthening of capitalist and especially panoptical power. Empiricism deems theory to be distracted, unrelated, playing with itself. But this binary itself operates and is intelligible only thanks to a tacit universal that remains to be questioned or acknowledged, by both parties: worthwhile and worthless, valuable work and useless wank are accusations all too easily levelled by all against all. If this is a war of all against all, then what is common to all is the belittling of masturbation as the dominant trope of discourse on knowledge and especially on academic orientation. But as long as the determination of worth is tropologically dominated by the fantasy of simple, direct, unmediated, face to face, missionary position heterosexual penetrative intervention leading to proper production, then our thinking remains beholden to the rules of a closed economic system imposed on thought. For the theorists here, this means that we are thereby still unconsciously trafficking the preference for insemination, no matter how consciously we subscribe to dissemination. For those who think theory is a load of old wank, my argument means that all supposedly normal, sensible, concern for real issues remains a simulation whose parameters are imposed by limits placed to police and regulate the acceptable interpretation of what normal and sensible ‘are’. If these limits are accepted, this sentences us to remaining incapable of even thinking about why we think the way we do. If thinking is thought of as less important than doing, you still have to think about why one might think that, and whose interests it is in. Supplementary acts of mental masturbation are more fundamental than supposedly proper intercourse. The imperative that we must have productive intercourse with ‘the real world’ skews thought, sentences us to guilt (as such ‘immediate connection’ is an impossibility), and always consigns arts and humanities to the prejudgement of being less worthwhile than science and business. But our obligation is not to mime their ‘success’, to impose their remit and their kind of ‘success’ as our own. Our own obligation as academics is, first, to be academic. And wherever and whenever the potentially limitless reserves of playful, apparently pointless conjecture and reflection on any point ever meets a limitation which says ‘stop!’, then it is still our duty to ask why we should stop there, who gives the order, and whose interests it is in. Put simply: the onus to justify one’s activity is actually not on the theorist, who thinks and thinks and thinks, but actually it is on the non-theorist, who should justify why they think thinking should be low-level, pedestrian, less than and other than it could be, in short, wanting, lacking, or failing to carry itself further than is acceptable in whatever status quo. Perhaps we should try not to come too quickly to the conclusion. The incessant mind-wank of theorists needs no justification, if you think about it. If you won’t think about it, then you are the intellectual imposture. But, moreover, and this is I think my most important point: if you won’t engage with certain forms of academic thought, if you can’t be bothered to understand, find out, learn, if you think that theories are disconnected, unrelated, irrelevant to the real world, then you must also stop to ask yourself precisely how and in what way and if at all your own sensible, reasonable academic activity ‘connects’ with anything more real than other unrelated academic activity. Because it doesn’t. Neither more nor less. We are all wankers here.

Permutation – Coalitions

Total critique shatters coalition-building necessary to confront oppression – perm solves best

Sankaran Krishna, Professor of Political Science at the University of Hawaii, 1993, Alternatives, v. 18

While this point is, perhaps, debatable, Der Derian's further assertion, that a postmodern critique of the Gulf War mobilization would be somehow more effective, sounds less convincing. An alternative, late-modern tactic against total war was to war on totality itself, to delegitimize all sovereign truths based on class, nationalist, or internationalist metanarratives ... better strategically to

play with apt critiques of the powerful new forces unleashed by cyberwar than to hold positions with antiquated tactics and nostalgic unities. (AD: 177-178; emphasis in original) **The dichotomous choice presented in this excerpt is straightforward: one either indulges in total critique, delegitimizing all sovereign truths, or one is committed to "nostalgic" essentialist unities that have become obsolete and have been the grounds for all our oppressions.** In offering this dichotomous choice, Der Derian replicates a move made by Chaloupka in his equally dismissive critique of the more mainstream nuclear opposition, the Nuclear Freeze movement of the early 1980s, that, according to him, was operating along obsolete lines, emphasizing "facts" and "realities" while a "postmodern" President Reagan easily outflanked them through an illusory Star Wars program. (See KN: chapter 4) Chaloupka centers this difference between his own supposedly total critique of all sovereign truths (which he describes as nuclear criticism in an echo of literary criticism) and the

more partial (and issue-based) criticism of what he calls "nuclear opposition" or "antinuclearists" at the very outset of his book. (KN: xvi) Once again, **the unhappy choice forced upon the reader is to join Chaloupka in his total critique of all sovereign truths or be trapped in obsolete essentialisms. This leads to a disastrous politics, pitting groups that have the most in common (and need to unite on some basis to be effective) against each other. Both Chaloupka and Der Derian thus reserve their most trenchant critique for political groups that should, in any analysis, be regarded as the closest to them in terms of an oppositional politics and their desired futures. Instead of finding ways to live with these differences and to (if fleetingly) coalesce against the New Right, this fratricidal critique is politically suicidal. It obliterates the space for a political activism based on provisional and contingent coalitions, for uniting behind a common cause even as one recognizes that the coalition is comprised of groups that have very differing (and possibly unresolvable) views of reality.** Moreover, it fails to consider the possibility that there may have been other, more compelling reasons for the "failure" of the Nuclear Freeze movement or anti-Gulf War movement. Like many a worthwhile cause in our times, they failed to garner sufficient support

to influence state policy. The response to that need not be a totalizing critique that delegitimizes all narratives. **The blackmail inherent in the choice offered by Der Derian and Chaloupka, between total critique and "ineffective" partial critique ought to be transparent. Among other things, it effectively militates against the construction of provisional or strategic essentialisms in our attempts to create space for an activist politics.** In the next section, I focus more widely on the genre of critical international theory and its impact on such an activist politics.

Only a combination of micro and macro politics can solve oppression

Steven Best, Assoc. Prof Phil. And Human. U Texas and Douglas Kellner, Phil. Of Ed. Chair, 2001, "Postmodern Politics and the Battle for the Future," Illuminations,

www.uta.edu/huma/illuminations/kell28.htm

The **emphasis on local struggles and micropower**, cultural politics which redefine the political, and attempts to develop political forms relevant to the problems and developments of the contemporary age **is extremely valuable, but** there are also certain limitations to the dominant forms of postmodern politics. While an emphasis on micropolitics and local struggles can be a healthy substitute for excessively utopian and ambitious political projects, one should not lose sight that **key sources of political power and oppression are precisely the big targets aimed at by modern theory, including capital, the state, imperialism, and patriarchy. Taking on such major targets involves coalitions and multi-front struggle, often requiring a politics of alliance and solidarity that cuts across group identifications to mobilize sufficient power** to struggle against, say, the evils of capitalism or the state. Thus, while today we need the expansion of localized cultural practices, they attain their real significance only within the struggle for the transformation of society as a whole. **Without this systemic emphasis, cultural and identity politics remain confined to the margins of society and are in danger of degenerating into narcissism, hedonism, aestheticism, or personal therapy, where they pose no danger and are immediately coopted** by the culture industries. In such cases, **the political is merely the personal, and the original intentions of the 1960s goal to broaden the political field are inverted and perverted.** Just as economic and political demands have their referent in subjectivity in everyday life, so these cultural and existential issues find their ultimate meaning in the demand for a new society and mode of production. Yet we would insist that **it is not a question of micro vs macropolitics**, as if it were an **either/or** proposition, **but rather both dimensions are important** for the struggles of the present and future.[15] Likewise, we would argue that **we need to combine the most affirmative and negative perspectives**, embodying Marcuse's declaration that critical social theory should be both more negative and utopian in reference to the status quo.[16] There are certainly many things to be depressed about in the negative and cynical

postmodernism of a Baudrillard, yet without a positive political vision merely citing the negative might lead to apathy and depression that only benefits the existing order. For a dialectical politics, however, positive vision of what could be is articulated in conjunction with critical analysis of what is in a multiopic perspective that focuses on the forces of domination as well as possibilities of emancipation.

Permutation – Interpretations

The death of rules is the death of politics: we must combine institutional analysis and critical philosophy under the rubric of deliberation and consensus.

Donald S. Lutz, Professor of Polisci at Houston, 2000 Political Theory and Partisan Politics p. 47

Constitutionalism, like the rule of law upon which it is built, requires some level of consensus among the people, elite and common, who would use these constructs as more than window dressing. At the beginning, the level of consensus may be low in terms of breadth or weak in terms of depth, but without a certain level of consensus we can have neither political institutions nor constitutional principles to guide these institutions. Consensus cannot be produced constitutionally, but must result from politics—literally the decision to replace force and violence with some modus vivendi of discourse about how to proceed collectively. Such discourse in turn requires guiding principles and rules that will serve to undergird and safeguard the continued use of speech and persuasion rather than force and violence. The institutional/constitutional construct, if it is successful over time, will enhance consensus, but along with an increased depth in consensus may come an enhanced breadth in the range of problems and issues that are subject to such disciplined speech. That is, success in some vital areas of political conflict is likely to lead to the desire to bring all conflict under these successful, accepted rules. The temptation is to increasingly constitutionalize political conflict, and the danger here is one of overconstitutionalizing politics. Part of the institutional/ constitutional perspective is an emphasis on phronesis, or practical wisdom. There is wisdom in knowing the limits of the constitutionalism. In the face of the natural tendency to overemphasize the importance and beneficial consequences of what we happen to do, humility requires that we admit limits to what political theory can accomplish. Too much constitutionalism, and too much focus on only institutions, is as much a pathology as too little. Overconstitutionalizing manifests itself in a tendency toward including all policy matters in the constitution in an attempt to rationalize and settle these conflicts. Because change is inevitable, and change brings the need to alter public policy, overconstitutionalizing politics leads to the constitution becoming a tightening straightjacket of rules that must be constantly addressed, which in turn makes the constitution, and the basic rules of political discourse it encodes, increasingly the source of conflict. The constitution, and constitutionalism itself, becomes increasingly controversial, and is progressively discredited. Political instability and public demoralization follow in the wake of this tendency. The decline of constitutionalism benefits only the powerful. As political theorists we need to ask ourselves if we are helping to effectively encode justice, or undercutting the "marriage" which we take so much for granted that we heedlessly ignore its importance and contribute to its decline. To the extent we function as a cognitive elite of mandarins who refuse to engage in the discussion with political actors, and give aid to those among them who might preserve the marriage, to that extent we must plead guilty. In the end, if we do not face the possibility of guilt, the day of reckoning will judge us guilty anyway, and political theory will, in fact, be, despite all our protestations to the contrary, not dead, but sublimely irrelevant to the people it was designed to serve.[^]

Kritik and policy can coexist; they are simply blocked from doing so by the modern oppositional framing of political, freeing ourselves from these polemics is a prerequisite to determine the roles of these disciplines within debate.

Owen 02, Reader in Political Theory at the University of Southampton (David, "Reorienting International Relations: On Pragmatism, Pluralism and Practical Reasoning", Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 31, No. 3, <http://mil.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/31/3/653>)

Secondly, there is the confusion of pictures and theories combined with the moralist overestimation of the ethical (ideological) commitments of IR theory. This finds expression in the thought that we need to get our ethical account sorted out before we can engage responsibly in epistemic judgement about what to know, where such ethical adequacy requires the construction of a moral theory and, more particularly, a moral ideal that can direct the enterprise of epistemic theorising. An example of this position is provided by Linklater 's version of critical IR theory.²³ Against this position, we can reasonably point out that the kind of ethical adequacy required does not entail the construction of a moral ideal but only the existence of some shared ethical judgements concerning what matters to us that orient our epistemic enquiries. The dual confusion in question leads fairly straightforwardly to the thought that what is at stake here are incompatible epistemological commitments and hence that debate between positivist and critical forms of IR theory needs to be conducted at an epistemological level. However, as my remarks indicate, this thought is mistaken insofar as the apparent incompatibility from which it derives is an illusion. It should now, hopefully, be clear why the conflation of picture and theory supports the philosophical turn in IR theory; it does so because it suggests that positivist IR theory, critical IR theory and postmodern IR theory are to be conceived as direct theoretical competitors. It is, consequently, unsurprising that critical debate between these stances should take the form of recourse to ontological and epistemological reflection since this is one way in which competing theories can be evaluated with respect to each other. But the conflation of picture and theory is particularly designed to encourage this turn, because it supports the thought that only one of these distinct kinds of theoretical approach can be the correct approach and

this is to be determined by consideration of their ontological and epistemological commitments. However, once the confusion between picture and theory which manifests itself in these three dimensions of the IR theory wars has been dissolved, we are in a position to acknowledge the different roles the distinct forms of IR theory can play and it is to specify these roles that I now turn to the pragmatist focus on the topic of government.

Minor Repairs

MINOR REPAIR THEORY – MINOR REPAIR LEGITIMATE

1. MINOR REPAIRS ARE NON-TOPICAL, NON-FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES

Russel T. Church et al., (U. of Tenn., VALUES & POLICIES IN CONTROVERSY: An Introduction to Argumentation & Debate, 1986, p. 191)

“If the affirmative team has identified a legitimate problem, it might be solved through a nonresolutional and no fundamental remedy. In other words, minor repairs are not indications of a breakdown of the present system, but simply a recognition that minor improvements in the status quo might be beneficial. These remedies are called minor repairs.”

2. MUST BE PROBABLE

Russel T. Church et al., (U. of Tenn., VALUES & POLICIES IN CONTROVERSY: An Introduction to Argumentation & Debate, 1986, p. 191)

“Second, the negative should demonstrate that the improvements they claim will result form the repairs probable.

3. POSITION IS REALISTIC

George W. Ziegelmuller & Cause, (ARGUMENTATION, INQUIRY AND ADVOCACY, 1975, p. 176)

“The repair position is a realistic one in that it recognizes the possibility for improvement within the system. In offering repairs, however, it is necessary to be careful not to suggest changes which are inconsistent with the cost argument.”

4. MUST BE PHILOSOPHICALLY DIFFERENT BUT CONSISTENT

George W. Ziegelmuller & Cause, (ARGUMENTATION, INQUIRY AND ADVOCACY, 1975, p. 176)

“a repair, to be legitimate, must be different from the philosophical principle of the affirmative resolution and consistent with the essential features of the status quo.”

5. AFF. MUST RESPOND TO MINOR REPAIRS

Russel T. Church et al., (U. of Tenn., VALUES & POLICIES IN CONTROVERSY: An Introduction to Argumentation & Debate, 1986, p. 191)

“They (the affirmative) must be prepared to argue that no less than a fundamental alteration of the system will alleviate the deficiencies (in the present system).”

6. MINOR REPAIR IS VOTING ISSUE

If the negative can do the plan in the status quo with just a small change then this would be a better method than a whole new plan.

Paradigms

GAMES PLAYER IS A BAD PARADIGM

1. CREATES SHALLOW ACTIVITY

Merely the name of the paradigm shows that it is turning debate, a serious activity, into a shallow game.

2. DECREASES EDUCATION

Bennett, (ESSAY ON PARADIGMS, 1995, p. 7)

“Game theory encourages debaters to “test the rules” by allocating disparate speech time to one speaker on a team, doing tagteam speeches and/or cross examination, and striking out in other new directions that involve creative practices which too often diverts the debate from depth of clash and analysis to other less educational “ploys”.”

3. ABUSIVE

Games Player gives debaters an excuse to abuse debate by allowing them to discuss issues not at all relevant to the debate or resolution.

4. GAMES PLAYER ENCOURAGES CHEAP SHOTS

Walter Ulrich, (ESSAY ON PARADIGMS, 1995, p. 7)

“Game theory reduces the seriousness of debate and encourages trying to win by taking “cheap shots” rather than by logic and analysis.”

5. VIOLATES SOCIAL CONTRACT

When the debaters enter the tournament they agreed to play by the rules of the game and debate the resolution.

6. HURTS DEBATE

Creates instability of the few rules that we have.

HYPOTHESIS TESTING PARADIGM BAD

1. DECREASES EDUCATION IN THREE WAYS

First, it requires no specific negative research. Second, it requires no in depth clash, Third, it requires no analytical thinking on anybody's part.

2. COMMUNICATIONS STANDARDS DIFFER FROM SCIENTIFIC STANDARDS

David Thomas, (ADVANCED DEBATE, 1992)

“The analogy that a debate resolution is like a scientific hypothesis has frequently been attacked as a false analogy, since public argument is not scientific, nor are arguers constrained by professional standards to meet high standards of reliability and validity.”

3. EXTREMELY ABUSIVE TO THE AFFIRMATIVE

William H. Bennett, (VARSITY DEBATE, 2010, former Chair of Comm. Dept. at Bowdoin College)

“By tolerating or even encouraging contradictory negative positions it contributes to shallow intellectual development and training, it appears more pedantic than substantive. It gives the negative team a much larger part of the playing field than it gives the affirmative. By seeming to imply higher standards for the affirmative argumentation than what the negative must give it encourages shallow thinking and the most destructive elements of spread debating. By assuming an empirical nature to all resolutions the paradigm makes an unproven assumption. By deemphasizing the plan (especially by deemphasizing the examination of plan mechanics) this paradigm reduces the social science and real world policy decision education that is one of the important values gained from policy debate.”

4. ELIMINATES ADVANTAGES OF DEBATE

Clash, development of thought, and education are lost.

5. NOT FOR THE DEBATE WORLD

It is meant for the science lab, where communication skills, equal ground and the word “debate” mean nothing.

6. CREATES IMPOSSIBLE AFFIRMATIVE BURDEN

David Thomas, (ADVANCED DEBATE, 1992)

“In practice, this means that the affirmative not only has the burden to prove it's own case, but also to disprove the unsupported assertions made by the negative. Since so much nonpolicy argumentations is circumstantial rather than material, negating the opponent's speculative interpretations is logically impossible.”

POLICY PARADIGM BEST

1. PROVIDES FOR SUPERIOR ARGUMENTATION

By making the aff and neg teams both show you how to evaluate certain issues.

2. DEBATE HINGES ON POLICIES

Lichtman & Rohrer & Corsi (Prof of History American University, reprinted in *ADVANCED DEBATE*, 3rd edition, 1990, p. 216-30)

“Debate pivots on the comparison of policy systems. Affirmative teams seek to demonstrate that their policy systems are superior to the alternative systems defended by the negative teams. This chapter will explore the nature of policy systems. Policy systems have definite functions and structures, which must be thoroughly understood by advocated if they are to construct coherent and persuasive cases.”

3. PROMOTES BETTER DEBATE

We are here to debate policy and find one that will get the job done. If the aff cannot, it has not met its burden of proof, and thus the negative should win. But debating these issues – solvency, plan workability, and counterplans – is what policy debate is all about.

4. THE ONLY LEGITIMATE PARADIGM

Lichtman & Rohrer & Corsi (Prof of History American University, reprinted in *ADVANCED DEBATE*, 4th edition, 1990, p. 278)

“Within the context of policy resolutions and prevailing debate practice, the policy-making model remains the only legitimate paradigm.”

5. PROMOTES CLASH AND ANALYSIS

When we directly contrast and weigh policies, or examine the effectiveness of plan, we get direct clash.

6. PROMOTES BEST POSSIBLE DECISION

William Bennett, (Political Consultant, Debate Champion, *DEBATE JUDGING*, 1981, p. 4)

“The measurement of policy superiority sounds simple but requires a conscientious judge to pay close attention and take copious notes during the debate.”

7. DIVIDES GROUND EVENLY

The negative is welcomed to suggest a policy of its own; this helps to give the two teams fair and equal ground.

8. MOST JUDGES ADVOCATE POLICY MAKING

J. Robert Cox, (*DEBATE JUDGING*, Bennett, Ed. 1981, P. 9)

“The predominate (42.9%) orientation viewed the debate process essentially as “a comparison of alternate policy systems” and the judge as one who makes a “policy decision”.

9. PROMOTES EDUCATION

By examining in detail the benefits and shortcomings of policies, much is learned in critical thinking skills and comparison.

STOCK ISSUES IS A BAD PARADIGM

1. NEWER PARADIGMS PROVE TO BE MORE FORMIDABLE

Walter Ulrich, (ADVANCED DEBATE, 1992, p. 250)

“Many of the newer paradigms have begun as reactions against the stock issues paradigm (which is why attacks on it are easy to find) and attempt to address its weaknesses.”

2. HURTS EDUCATION

Stock issues paradigm automatically dictates that the six issues are voters. This decreases education, depth, and creativity.

3. STOCK ISSUES PARADIGMS ARE ABUSIVE TO THE AFFIRMATIVE

Walter Ulrich, (ADVANCED DEBATE, 1992, p. 250)

“The best view of the stock issues paradigm would view the stock issues as potential targets for the negative team. When confronted by an affirmative case, the stock issues paradigm identifies potential areas to look at in order to seek weaknesses in the case. While the affirmative team needs to respond to these arguments when they are made, it does seem unreasonable for a judge to expect the affirmative to anticipate all potential negative attacks and to respond to them in a single speech.”

4. RELEVANCE OF ISSUES LOST

With stock as a paradigm the debate on relevance of issues is lost, and the debate comes down to who subpoints the other better.

5. STOCK ISSUES REQUIRES PRIMA FACIE, WHICH IS VAGUE

Walter Ulrich, (ADVANCED DEBATE, 1992, p. 250)

“Many stock issues judges require that an affirmative team present a prima facie case in the first affirmative. The nature of a prima facie case is somewhat unclear.”

6. NOT ALL ISSUES ARE INDEPENDENT

For instance, harm proves an inherent problem in the system. Which means that one issue can be lost while the round could still be won by the affirmative.

7. NO FAIR DIVISION OF GROUND

William Bennett, (BEGINNING DEBATE, Stock Issues, 1995, p. 2)

“It (Stock paradigm) gives the affirmative an onerous and thus potentially unfair duty. Fair division of work and a fair chance to win, critics note, are denied to the affirmative in this paradigm because the negative can win the ballot by winning only one of eight attacks.”

8. VAGUE CONCEPT

There is no quantification of what is necessary to meet the stock issues. How many people have to die to prove significance? How much of the problem do we need to be able to solve?

TABULA RASA IS A BAD PARADIGM

1. TABULA RASA ENCOURAGES SPREAD (which is evil of course)

Walter Ulrich, (ADVANCED DEBATE, 1992, p. 250)

“The prescribed adherence to dropped/unrefuted arguments is fair, but it does nothing to insure that those who argue well are rewarded. Critics are forced to reward those who give scant attention to the core issues of a controversy on order to refute all arguments in a spread, regardless of their quality of relevance.”

2. LIMITS GROUND

Tabula Rasa is bad because it limits ground by allowing either position to run mass quantities of arguments that really have no impact.

3. TABULA RASA DOES NOT SOLVE FOR BIAS

Walter Ulrich, (ADVANCED DEBATE, 1992, p. 250)

“How can we trust the same idiosyncratic judge to evaluate the outcome of those arguments that are argued by both teams through the rebuttals? Surely some individual standards must be applied before the critic can determine which side of these arguments is superior and whether a given argument is a “voting issue.”

4. WASTES TIME

Tabula Rasa requires debaters to reinvent the wheel every time they debate, by making them set new rules, voting issues, theory, etc.

GAMES PLAYER PARADIGM BEST

1. DEBATE ALREADY A GAME

C. Alfred, (reprinted ADVANCED DEBATE, 1992, p. 328)

“Educational debate already possesses the characteristics of a game, thus no one needs to be persuaded to change debate so that it fits gaming. This is important to understand before comparing gaming to other paradigms.”

2. GAMING PARADIGM “INTERNAL DESCRIPTIVE”

C. Alfred, (reprinted ADVANCED DEBATE, 1992, p. 328)

“Most of the educational debate paradigms (policy making, ideology, issues and agendas, etc.) take some portion of discourse and then try to make academic debate fit the model suggested by that outside discourse. In other words, most of the paradigms are “external-prescriptive,” in that they require debate to be modeled after some outside phenomenon. Gaming, on the other hand, is an “internal-descriptive” paradigm because it uses the characteristics already internal to educational debate to describe it.”

3. GAMING MUST BE ADOPTED IN THIS ROUND

C. Alfred, (reprinted ADVANCED DEBATE, 1992, p. 328)

“The new debate exists in all debate rounds that actually take place, and without guidance from paradigmatic theoreticians. In this new debate, students use various theoretical concepts as ploys within the game setting to win the game. The old debate can be thought of as our current set of theories, whereas the new debate can be thought of as the practices students and judges actually engage in. The old debate is dead, and the paradigms of the old debate have become nothing more than available strategies in the new debate. Snider states (p. 233), “My contention is that these issues of theory and practice need to be united. Specifically, the contention is that gaming can serve as a viable theory which will fit the practice satisfactorily.”

4. FITS DEBATE WITHOUT OMITTING OR IGNORING ANY OF ITS ASPECTS

Policy paradigms try to impose either some outside model on debate and debate judging, or the paradigm overemphasizes some parts of debate while ignoring or underemphasizing other parts.

5. GAMING UNIFIES ALL PARADIGMS

C. Alfred, (reprinted ADVANCED DEBATE, 1992, p. 328)

“Gaming can provide a unifying theoretical perspective. Debate formats in America are changing. It is hard to imagine policy-making applying as a paradigm for CEDA, or nonpolicy debate, just as it is hard to imagine the narrative paradigm as applying to NDT, or policy, debate. Gaming is a paradigm that applies to all of the existing debate formats. The other paradigms tend to isolate formats from each other by making them dependent on mutually exclusive theoretical concepts. Gaming tends to operate in a new relationship with the old paradigms, in that it subsumes them rather than calling for their rejection.”

HYPOTHESIS TESTING PARADIGM GOOD

1. FINDS THE TRUTH IN THE RESOLUTION

John D. Cross and Ronald J. Matlon, (DEBATE JUDGING, 1981, p. 21)

“Finally, the judge of argument is the counterpart of the scientist, his goal is to test the hypothesis to determine whether it is probably true.”

2. BEST STANDARD OF EVALUATION

To find truth in the resolution is the best way to debate.

A. All argumentation focuses on the quest for truth.

B. Affirmative proves this. They do extensive research into their cases to find the underlying truth.

3. ADDS SKILLS

Hypo testing gives value to critical analysis in a way policy debate cannot.

4. RESTORES FAIR BALANCE BETWEEN NEG AND AFF

5. SIMPLIFIES JUDGE'S DECISION

Because the judge has only to decide whether or not the resolution should be adopted as opposed to a comparison between two policies, it simplifies his or her decision making process considerably.

6. REINSTATES POWER AND INTENT OF PRESUMPTION

Hypothesis Testing states that the affirmative must prove the hypothesis true. Lacking this would restore the issue of presumption into the debate rounds.

7. CALLS FOR A 'YES OR NO' DECISION

David Zarefsky, (ADVANCED DEBATE, 1992, p. 258)

“Finally, the hypothesis-testing model directs that the judge make a yes-or-no decision, rather than a this-versus-that decision. His choice is not similar to the one he faces when he votes for candidates for public office and must answer the question, “Which shall I choose, X or Y?” Rather, his choice is similar to the one he faces when deciding whether to support a tax increase in his school district: “Shall I choose X, yes or no?” Only one hypothesis is being tested – the hypothesis that takes the form of the proposition at hand. To affirm the proposition is to commit oneself to its probable truth. To reject the proposition, however is not necessarily to make any commitments with respect to alternatives. The decision to reject X need not imply the affirmation of Y. instead, the choice is between the central principles of the proposition and the universe of nonpropositional alternatives.”

8. REINVIGORATES THE RESPECT FOR TRUTH IN DEBATE

By arguing that there is a truth to the resolution, it forces debaters to confront the search for truth rather than solely focusing on the search for strategies and tactics.

EXTENSIONS TO () HYPO IS GOOD

1. DEF. OF HYPO TEST:

Method of debating which looks at the resolution as a hypothesis which must be tested against any and all alternatives in order to find the truth of the resolution. Finding that truth supersedes any assumed obligations the negative team has to present compatible an/or traditional arguments.

2. RESOLUTION RIGOROUSLY TESTED:

A. TESTING BEST WAY TO PROVE

David Zarefsky, (Chairman of Speech and Communication Dept., Northwestern University, JOURNAL OF AMERICAN FORENSIC ASSOCIATION, Fall 1978, p. 10)

“The argumentative encounter is the counterpart of the scientific procedure or logical deduction. The proposition being debated is the counterpart of the scientists. Hypothesis and placing presumption against the proposition is the means of proving for a rigorous test of the proposition.”

B. TESTING IS JUDGE'S GOAL

David Zarefsky, (Chairman of Speech and Communication Dept., Northwestern University, JOURNAL OF AMERICAN FORENSIC ASSOCIATION, Fall 1978, p. 10)

“Finally, the judge of arguments is the counterpart of the scientist, his goal is to test the hypothesis; whether it is true.”

C. THEORETICAL APPROACH FAVORED BY JUDGES

R. Martin, (Prof. U. of Mass, JAJA, Fall 1978, p. 128)

“It should be noted that in all judging groups the overwhelming majority of all judges indicate that at least they would consider most new theories of argument if these new approaches are well thought out and explained. No judge indicates that he/she is unwilling to evaluate new theoretical approaches.”

D. ALLOWS US TO SEE NEW THINGS

R. Rowland, (quoting T. Kuhn, JAJA, Winter 1982, p. 133)

“Led by a new paradigm, scientist adopt new instruments and look in new places. Even more important, during revolutions, scientists see new and different things when looking with familiar instruments in places they have looked before.”

POLICY IS A BAD PARADIGM

1. IGNORES STOCK ISSUES

The stock issues are the limiting issues in the round, by ignoring them and focusing on comparative advantages, the rules of policy debate are broken.

2. ENCOURAGES PARAMETRICS (WHICH IS BAD)

By being a policymaker, the judge observes the round as if we were debating the merits of the aff plan instead of the resolution.

3. OVERLY NARROWS THE TOPIC

Jeffrey T. Bile, (CEDA YEARBOOK, Vol. 8, "When the whole is greater than the sum of the parts: the implications of holistic resolutorial focus, 1987, p. 8-15)

"The usual application of the parametric approach to debate allows the affirmative to choose a case anywhere within the resolutorial boundary, however small, and force the negative to debate only this example, completely ignoring significance and reasonability issues."

4. NEGATIVE ARGUMENTATION LIMITED

Since the decision is based upon comparative advantage, the neg is at a severe disadvantage without running a type of counterplan, disadvantage, or Kritik.

5. DECREASES NEG GROUND

Since the neg is forced to run disadvantages or counterplans to gain a comparative advantage, they cannot run solvency or inherency because they would contradict their own arguments.

6. BROADNESS OF INTERPRETATIONS LEADS TO VAGUENESS OF ISSUES

William H. Bennett, (Dir of Forensics, University of South Dakota, VARSITY DEBATE, 1996, p. 210)

"So broad is the support for policy paradigm that critics claim it has become a vague umbrella for seemingly contradictory paradigm presumptions. Prof. Robert Rowland charges it has "become so vague as to be all things to all people.""

7. INCONSISTENCY PROVES BAD PARADIGM

Supporters of the policy paradigm are very inconsistent in whether or not the paradigm allows either or both sides to argue multiple policies.

8. POLICY TENDS TO OVERLOOK SOFT VARIABLES

There are factors that cannot be quantified or numerically measured, but which, nonetheless, play an important role in the assessment of alternative decisions.

9. DECISION SHOULD NOT ONLY BE BASED ON ISSUES

Voting on a combination of good issue development and argumentation skills is fairer to both teams than just basing the decision on issue development.

STOCK ISSUES PARADIGM BEST

1. **REAL WORLD**
In the real world, a policy is defeated if it has even one main flaw.
2. **PROMOTES COMMON GROUND**
Bennett, (Author, debate theorist, BEGINNING DEBATE, 1995)
“Very early on, debaters and coaches decided to answer by identifying stock or expected issues. This lets both participants and judges share a common ground in language and expectations.”
3. **VOTING ON THE STOCK ISSUES IS A RULE OF THE GAME**
It insures that the aff team uphold their burden of proof.
4. **STOCK ISSUES SHOWS THE CLEAR RULES OF THE GAME**
Bennett, (Author, debate theorist, BEGINNING DEBATE, 1995)
“Stock issues provides a very clear set of expectations, a bright line to know that all on one side are affirmative winners and all on the other side are negative ballot winners. Researched clash in the debate can be clearly focused.”
5. **INCREASES EDUCATION AND RESEARCH**
Aff must research and win all areas of case to win, not just one.
6. **GUARANTEES FAIRNESS**
Bennett, (Author, debate theorist, BEGINNING DEBATE, 1995)
“What little statistical research has been done shows that there is no inherent advantage to either side under this paradigm.”
7. **STOCK ISSUES INCREASES CLASH**
The aff team needs to respond to all the negative's attacks and the neg has to follow through on those attacks.
8. **NUMBER ONE PARADIGM FOR THE LAST 15 YEARS**
Walter Ulrich, (reprinted in ADVANCED DEBATE, 1992, p. 245-251)
“It is probably the most dominant paradigm among high school judges. It has set the agenda for the paradigm debates in the past decade and a half.”
9. **EASY DECISION**
With stock issues, the judge has a framework within which to judge the round that is uniform and objective.
10. **INCREASES CLASH**
By clearly defining the debate down to a set series of issues, research and clash can be clearly focused.

TABULA RASA PARADIGM BEST

1. TABULA RASA PROMOTES BETTER ARGUMENTATION

Walter Ulrich, (reprinted in ADVANCED DEBATE, 1992, p. 250)

“First, the tabula rasa approach encourages the development of perspective for the evaluation of argument. There is a great value in encouraging the development of a diversity of viewpoints about argument.”

2. INCREASES DIVERSITY OF ISSUES

Tabula rasa allows for debatability of a wide range of possible issues.

3. INCREASES EDUCATION

Walter Ulrich, (reprinted in ADVANCED DEBATE, 1992, p. 250)

“A second justification of the tabula rasa approach to argumentation is that it promotes educationally sound goals. By requiring that debaters be able to defend argumentation theory, we require that they understand argument.”

4. MULTIPLE OPTIONS

Tabula rasa gives the judge multiple options rather than making the judge weed through one issue.

5. PRESERVES DEBATE

Walter Ulrich, (reprinted in ADVANCED DEBATE, 1992, p. 250)

“The final justification of the tabula rasa approach to judging is that it is consistent with the adversary system. Argument can take place in many forums; in academic debate we choose to use an advocacy forum.”

6. EXPANDS CREATIVITY

Makes teams think more rather than just being used to a small number of issues.

Permutations

PERMUTATIONS ARE GOOD

Explanation: Permutation is the power of the aff to attach the negative counterplan to aff case, or show that parts of the counterplan can coexist with the aff plan. Where the negative argues that the best policy is their counterplan position, the aff argues the combination of the aff plan and the neg counterplan, or at least major parts thereof, is the best policy. If the two plans can occur simultaneously, the aff has the right of permutation to add the neg's counterplan to the aff plan. If part of the counterplan is not competitive that part can be permuted by the affirmative. Permutation arguments are usually not advocated by affirmatives, but instead a theoretical test of the counterplans competition burdens.

1. BEST POLICIES ARE COMPARED

Dale Herbeck, (Professor Boston College, ADVANCED DEBATE, 3rd edition, 1987, p. 259)

“Thus, instead of choosing between the plan and the counterplan, the judge would have the choice between the counterplan alone, and the optimal combination of the plan and the counterplan. Since the counterplan would presumably embody the optimal alternative to the plan, the resulting combination of provisions would guarantee that the best policies would be compared.”

2. DEBATING PERMUTATION CREATES CLASH

Dale Herbeck, (Professor Boston College, ADVANCED DEBATE, 3rd edition, 1987, p. 258)

“To truly prove that the counterplan constitutes a reason to reject plan, the negative should have to prove that it would be better to adopt the counterplan than to adopt the best combination of the plan and the counterplan.”

3. PERMUTATIONS TEST THE COMPETITIVENESS OF THE COUNTERPLAN

Dale Herbeck, (Professor Boston College, ADVANCED DEBATE, 3rd edition, 1987, p. 259)

“If two policies were truly mutually exclusive, then it would be impossible to permute the policies into a distinct policy.”

4. PERMUTATIONS IMPROVE SPEECH

Rather than attempting to continually avoid debate through trickery, the permutation focuses research back upon the heart of the resolution.

5. TESTING THE COUNTERPLAN PROVIDES BEST ANALYSIS

No real advantages stem from permutation of the counterplan itself. Permutations exist for best analysis by testing lack of competitiveness between aff plan and the counterplan.

6. RETURNS FOCUS TO DEBATE

Rather than making the plan harder to debate, permutations make the plan the key, artificial, generic counterplans are guilty of eroding the position of the plan.

PERMUTATIONS ARE LEGITIMATE

1. PERMUTATION EXPLAINED

Counterplans need to be more than just competitive against the exact words of the plan. If that were their only burden, debating them would become a semantic game only. Counterplans must also serve as a reason to reject the aff. Viewed in context of acceptable, supportive alterations, artificially competitive counterplans no longer warrant the rejection of the plan.

2. NO INFINITE REGRESSION WILL RESULT

In fact, the permutation offered correlates exactly to their need in terms of counterplans. Only as the burdens of competition are weakened does the number of arguments increase. Since permutations strengthen that burden, they limit the argumentation to mutually accepted values.

3. RETURN DEBATE FOCUS TO PLAN

Rather than making the plan harder to debate, permutations make the plan the key. Artificial, generic counterplans are in fact guilty of eroding the position of the plan.

4. PERMUTATIONS ARE ONLY A TEST

They do not expand the nature of the plan in any way since they are not really adopted. They merely serve as a test to illustrate the lack of competition between the plan and the counterplan. No further advantages flow from them.

5. PERMUTATIONS IMPROVE DEBATE

Rather than attempting to continually avoid debate through trickery, the permutation focuses research back upon the heart of the resolution.

6. PERMUTATIONS JUSTIFY THE RESOLUTION

If we can prove that the resolution is necessary, if not entirely sufficient, to solve the harms in the resolution, you should vote affirmative. Otherwise, you would always have to vote negative since funding and enforcement may not be topical, hence rendering the plan always insufficient.

7. RATIONALITY OF CURRENT POLICY-MAKERS IRRELEVANT

Since current policy-makers may not be cognizant of the affirmative at all, surely the affirmative team should be able to suggest reasonable permutations.

8. CONDITIONALITY

Since counterplans can be conditional, they are open to each of the objections the negative has to permutations. The permutation is merely a response to the abuse of conditionality.

SEVERANCE PERMUTATIONS GOOD

1. IT'S A TEST OF COMPETITION

If we can't check the counterplan there is nothing stopping them from running the Feed Africa Counterplan every round.

2. NO GROUND ABUSE

Severing hurts us as much as it does them. We lose an integral part of plan.

3. LEVELS GROUND

Neg gets to sever parts of their 1NC advocacy like DAs, and case arguments, we should get to sever parts of 1AC too.

4. REAL WORLD

In real law making you don't throw out whole bills just because one part is bad.

5. COMPETITIVE EQUITY

Neg changes their advocacy by running the counterplan, we should get equal ground.

6. RESOLUTIONAL PARAMETRICS CHECKS ABUSE

We can only parametricise down to topical plans, and their links should all link to the resolution anyway.

7. NO GROUND LOSS

We only sever parts of plan that don't matter, our core advocacy remains intact, that's what they should be attacking.

8. EDUCATION

Allowing us to sever forces more specific debates, increasing the depth of understanding.

9. AFFIRMATION THEORY

Our only job is to prove the resolution, how we do that is irrelevant as long as it is proven at the end of the round.

PERMUTATIONS ARE ILLEGITIMATE

1. DECREASES CLASH

Permutations serve as an excuse for poor preparation as well as poor choice of aff. case area. It weakens clash, muddles the debate, and encourages superficial analysis.

2. DECREASES NEGATIVE GROUND

When the affirmative is allowed to permute, negative ground is decreased by allowing the affirmative ground to increase as they take over the counterplan.

3. DECREASES EDUCATIONAL VALUE

As with the decrease in clash, the educational value of the debate is reduced by encouraging superficial analysis, and is an excuse for poor preparation.

4. AFFIRMATIVE IS NOT PRIMA FACIE

The 1AC has been altered by the affirmative, therefore, they have not met their burden of proof.

5. AFFIRMATIVE BECOMES MOVING TARGET

Allowing permutation limits the negative's ability to present a coherent policy.

6. MAKES THE AFFIRMATIVE UNTOPICAL

If Aff. permutes a different agent of action, etc., it would cause the affirmative to be untopical.

7. CONSECUTIVE ADOPTION ILLEGITIMATE

The judge has only one ballot, so they only have one chance to fiat.

8. PUTS AFFIRMATIVE INTO HYPO-TESTING

Permutation argues that the affirmative is debating the resolution and may incorporate resolutional permutations. Aff. then enters hypo-testing paradigm legitimizes both negative hypotheses and absolute burden of proof.

9. CHANGES AFFIRMATIVE ADVANTAGES

Madsen, (ARGUMENTATION AND ADVOCACY, Fall 1989, p. 77)

“Disruption of the goals of both systems would occur with the combination of two policies.”

10. AFFIRMATIVE MISUSES PERMUTATION

Permutation is a rearrangement to clarify where conflict and choice must be made, it doesn't allow combining plans.

D. Herbeck, (Ass. Prof. of Communication, ADVANCED DEBATE, 3rd edition, 1987, p. 262)

“When the plan and the counterplan are permuted to form the optimal policy, neither policy is materially changed. Rather, features of the counterplan which are permuted with the plan are not added into the plan ...”

11. TAKES AWAY NEG. COUNTERPLAN OPTION

Madsen, (ARGUMENTATION AND ADVOCACY, Fall 1989, p. 75)

“The first problem associated with permutations and re-planning as tests of counterplan competition is that they open the possibility for elimination of the counterplan as a negative option.”

12. CONSIDER ZERO NET BENEFITS

Madsen, (ARGUMENTATION AND ADVOCACY, Fall 1989, p. 77)

“The combination resulting from the permutation or plan amendment completely subsumes the operative elements of the counterplan and suggest that the two problems could co-exist yet the combination does nothing to consider the desirability (net benefits) of such a mix.”

13. NET BENEFITS IMPORTANT

Madsen, (ARGUMENTATION AND ADVOCACY, Fall 1989, p. 77)

“Even counterplans which blatantly attack the core values of the affirmative plan become non-competitive because the theory that merges the two options ignores the question of net benefits.”

14. PERMUTATIONS ARE IMPOSSIBLE

Madsen, (ARGUMENTATION AND ADVOCACY, Fall 1989, p. 77)

“Alternatively systems policy analysts would conclude that systemic elements inherent in the combination of policies make simultaneous adoption undesirable or impossible.”

15. UNFAIR TO NEGATIVE

Madsen, (ARGUMENTATION AND ADVOCACY, Fall 1989, p. 78)

“The final problems with permutations and replanning theory is the negative may be called upon to defend their counterplan against multiple permutations or plan amendments in a single debate in effect forcing them to defeat multiple affirmative cases.”

16. WITH MULTIPLE ALTERATIONS, NEG. IS NEVER CLEARLY COMPETITIVE

Madsen, (ARGUMENTATION AND ADVOCACY, Fall 1989, p. 77)

“The counterplan could be buried under a series of one-line under-developed permutations.”

PERMUTATIONS ILLEGITIMATE-EXTENSIONS

1. SYSTEM THEORY GOOD A. INCREASES CLASH

Madsen, (Doctoral candidate in the Dept. of Communications Studies at Northwestern Univ., “Systems Theory and Counterplans”, ARGUMENTATION AND ADVOCACY, Fall 1989, p. 77)

“The primary advantage of the systems approach should be readily apparent: an increase in clash over the substantive differences between the two proposals.”

B. ADDS TO EDUCATION

Increases in clash equally increases the educational value of debate.

C. ARGUMENTS POLICY ANALYSIS

Madsen, (Doctoral candidate in the Dept. of Communications Studies at Northwestern Univ., “Systems Theory and Counterplans”, ARGUMENTATION AND ADVOCACY, Fall 1989, p. 77)

“A second benefit to the system view is that it results in more complete policy analysis.”

2. TIME-ORDERED COUNTERPLANS UNFAIR

Madsen, (Doctoral candidate in the Dept. of Communications Studies at Northwestern Univ., “Systems Theory and Counterplans”, ARGUMENTATION AND ADVOCACY, Fall 1989, p. 77)

“A time-ordered permutation would adopt the affirmative plan and then repeal that action upon enactment of the counterplan. Such theory essentially returns debate to the era of no counterplan option for the negative, severely restricting an accepted strategy of refutation.”

3. PERMUTATIONS LEGITIMIZE HYPO-TESTING

The aff. And neg. are expected to uphold distinct positions in a policy round. By permuting, the affirmative has altered their policy position. As such, they are now debating the resolution rather than specific policy, legitimizing the hypo-testing paradigm.

4. AFF. MISUSES PERMUTATION

D. Herbeck, (Ass. Prof. of Communication, ADVANCED DEBATE, 3rd edition, 1987, p. 262)

“When the plan and the counterplan are permuted to form the optimal policy, neither policy is materially changed. Rather, features of the counterplan which are permuted with the plan are NOT added into the plan ...”

INTRINSICNESS PERMS BAD

1. **ITS 2AC REPLANNING**
 Their using out counterplan as an excuse to change their advocacy in the 2AC, reject them for that.
2. **MEANS COUNTERPLANS WILL NEVER COMPETE**
 If their perm can just be “do plan but not the bad parts,” we'll never be able to give counter advocacies.
3. **KILLS PREDICTABILITY**
 We make strategy choices dependent on what plan does, if they can add to that in the 2AC, our ability to link DAs goes out the window.
4. **UNDERMINES INTELLECTUAL ADVOCACY**
 The aff stated their advocacy in the 1AC allowing them to change it now undermines real discussion of the issues.
5. **GIVES AFFS UNFAIR ADVANTAGE**
 Allows them to run add ons in the 2AC that are not based on the 1AC that we are not prepared for.
6. **UNDERMINES RESEARCH**
 We prepare for future rounds against this team based on their plan text, allowing them to change it later means we'll never be prepared.
7. **INDEPENDENT VOTER**
 If we win even one reason that its abusive, we should win.

SEVERANCE PERMUTATIONS BAD

1. UNDERMINES ADVOCACY

The Aff can't argue that they believe anything if there willing to dump any part of plan given the slightest question.

2. KILLS PREDICTABILITY

There's no way we can create a strategy if they can just dump the part of plan that gives us links.

3. KILLS COUNTERPLAN COMPETITION

If they can just sever parts of plan they will always sever the part that allows the counterplan to link. In extreme cases their perm would be "sever plan and do counterplan."

4. NO RECIPROCITY

We can't kick parts of the counterplan, they shouldn't be able to kick parts of plan.

5. ABUSE JUSTIFIES INTRINSICNESS RESPONSES IN 2NR

If they can sever parts of plan, we can add parts to the counterplan in response.

6. JUSTIFIES COUNTERPLANNING

We should be able to combine plan, counterplan, and the perm into the best combination possible if they can sever parts of plan.

7. JUSTIFIES NEW 2M RESPONSES

If they are not going to have stable advocacy, at least let us react in rebuttals.

8. REWARDS LAZY RESEARCH

They can just sever down one infatesamil part of plan, and spend the entire 1AR reading why that's good, we can never prepare for that.

9. ITS AN INDEPENDENT VOTER

For all the abuse mentioned above.

Severance Perms Good

1. Best policy option –we debate the perm, the plan, and the counterplan, allowing us to find the best policy option.
2. Most real world – congress is allowed to remove sections of bills. Debate trains us to be policy makers.
3. Neg Block checks – they have 13 minutes of the block to answer the 8 minute 2AC with the perm.
4. Increases strategic thinking – severance makes the neg adapt just as the 2AC adapts to the 1NC.
5. Education- debating the perm, plan, and cp increases education.
6. Reject the argument not the team- perms are just a test of competition, not an advocacy, so we shouldn't be voted down for a bad perm.

Intrinsic Perms Good

1. Search for the best policy- debating the perm, plan, and cp allows us to find the best policy.
2. Real World- congressmen add sections to legislation all the time. The purpose of debate is to train policy makers.
3. The Block checks abuse- the neg has 13 minutes to answer the 8 minute 2AC with the perm.
4. Education- debating the perm, plan, and cp increases education.
5. Reject the argument not the team- perms are just a test of competition, not an advocacy, so we shouldn't be voted down for a bad perm.

Multiple Perms Good

1. Tests of competition – they're not advocacies, so we don't open up more worlds.
 2. Neg block checks time skew – neg block skews 1ar time more than perms skew the block.
 3. Reciprocal – neg gets to read multiple off cases, we respond with multiple perms.
 4. Education – we get to go more in-depth into the competitiveness of the counterplan and more perms means more education.
 5. Condi/Dispo checks- they can drop the CP, mooted the time we spent on the perms.
- Reject the arguments not the team- perms are just a test of competition, not an advocacy, so we shouldn't be voted down.

Multiple Perms Bad

1. Time skew – aff is able to read perms in a short time – we have to take much more time answering them, that's unfair because they make less time available to answer the rest of the speech.
2. Multiple worlds- aff allows for more scenarios- this is bad because it's unpredictable and they could advocate any of the perms in the end of the round
3. Spikes out of links- aff can just put perms on the counterplans to spike out of all our disads – makes it impossible to win that our cp is competitive.
4. Kills in-depth education – we don't spend time talking about the actual plan and the way it works – we come here to learn about policy and the perms take us away from that.

Multiple perms are a voter for fairness and education.

Severance Perms Bad

1. Plan is the focus of the debate: we base our 1NC on the plan and the 1AC. They must unconditionally advocate the plan.
2. Moving target: severance perms allow the aff to spike out of our DA's and net benefit, which is illegit.
3. Unpredictable: we can't predict what parts of the plan they will sever out of. This jacks fairness.
4. Education- we lose education on the part of the plan they sever out of.
5. Voter for fairness and education

Intrinsic Perms Bad

1. Unpredictable- we can't predict what they will add to their plan text, so we can't be prepared to debate it, meaning we will always lose. This is bad for fairness and education.
2. Kills Neg Ground- they can use intrinsic perms to spike out of links or uniqueness to our DA.
3. Fairness- they can get extra advantages outside the resolution that we will be unprepared to defend against. Killing education and causing the neg to always lose.
4. Voter for fairness and education.

PIC COUNTERPLAN

PICs Bad

- 1. Steals aff ground- arguing against a PIC forces us to argue against our own case, hurts our ability to offensively attack the CP, this ground is key to fairness**
- 2. Breadth is better than Depth- focusing on a portion of the plan is not as educational as evaluating it as a whole**
- 3. Encourages vague plan writing- allowing PICs allows affirmatives to write plans that force generic strategies, that hurts education**
- 4. PICs are regressive- allowing the neg to PIC out of one part of the plan justifies them doing the same in the block and the 2nr, this ruins debate as the debate is never about the topic but instead PICs that get out of aff offense, this ruins education**
- 5. Clash- PICs limit aff arguments ruining clash within the debate decreasing education**
- 6. Aff Predictability- the negative can PIC out of any country of sub-saharan Africa exploding the ground the aff has to defend, this ruins fairness**
- 7. Reciprocity- There is no affirmative equal to PICs, they justify abusive perms like severance and intrinsic perms which makes debate unfair**
- 8. Unpredictable Net Benefits- means we never have the pre-round preparation to garner offense against the CP voter for ground loss, fairness and education**
- 9. There is in-round abuse- The damage has been done- the 2AC strategy is dependent on the 1NC, even if you don't buy this Potential Abuse is a voter**
 - A. In round abuse is arbitrary and encourages judge intervention ruining fairness**
 - B. If we win our interpretation is best it proves why what the other team has done deserves to be rejected**
- 10. Argumentative Responsibility- reject the team, time skew proves the unique abuse of PICs, it limits the aff in the round, the affirmative must defend all of the plan so should the negative voter for fairness**
- 11. PICs are not real world- Bills are amended, not rejected based on a singular flaw**
- 12. Disads check neg ground loss- if there is one portion of our plan they think is bad they can run a DA on it**

PICs Good

- 1) Checks Inherit Aff advantages – Aff picks the focus of the round, speaks first and last and gets infinite prep.
- 2) Most real world – Bills in congress must defend every word in them, the same should apply to the Aff plan
- 3) Best Policy Option – if we win that the counterplan is competitive and better than the plan then it shouldn't matter how the CP works.
- 4) Competition checks abuse –the net benefit must have links to the plan with real impacts
- 5) Neg Ground – PICs are the only way the negative can generate offense against a racism bad aff. Without them, the negative would have to defend fundamentally untrue arguments like racism good.
- 6) Net benefits checks abuse – net benefits are a unique reason not to do the plan, and the Aff always has offense on the net benefit.
- 7) No potential abuse – In round abuse arguments answer in round abuse, there is no reason to abuse the negative for something that didn't happen
- 8) Not a voting issue – at worst you reject the CP and evaluate the net benefit against the plan

Prima Facie

PRIMA FACIE THEORY

1. A CASE MUST STAND ON ITS OWN MERIT

Russel T. Church et al., (U. of Tenn., VALUES & POLICIES IN CONTROVERSY, 1986, p. 57)

“These questions (such as “What available evidence indicated the proposed solution will work?”) suggest a third stock issue, often referred to as solvency: Can a new policy solve the harmful conditions?”

2. MUST PROVE HARM AND SIGNIFICANCE

Russel T. Church et al., (U. of Tenn., VALUES & POLICIES IN CONTROVERSY, 1986, p. 56)

“These kinds of questions (“Is there an extensive harm?” and “Is the situation serious enough to justify immediate action?” illustrate the first stock issue of policy advocacy analysis immediate change in existing policy.”

3. MOST PROVE INHERENCY

Austin J. Freeley, (John Carroll Univ., ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE: Reasoned Decision Making, 5th ed., 1981, p. 151)

“A structurally inherent need is one so fixed, so embedded, so firmly a part of the status quo that it cannot be solved by modifications, adjustments or repairs.”

4. DECISION RULE: LOSE ONE AND YOU LOSE THE DEBATE

Russel T. Church et al., (U. of Tenn., VALUES & POLICIES IN CONTROVERSY, 1986, p. 56)

“Stock issues assessment is not difficult for most debaters to comprehend or for most judges to explain and follow. The paradigm utilizes issues that are well defined. As a result of this clarity, most decisions are clear. Issues might be decided closely, but once the issues are decided, the final decision should be easy. If the affirmative fails to satisfy any of the issues (significance of harm, inherency, solvency, cost-benefits comparison), they lose.”

Re-Planning

RE-PLANNING IS ILLEGITIMATE

1. DESTROYS NEGATIVE GROUND

Madsen, (ARGUMENTATION AND ADVOCACY, Fall 1989, p. 75)

“The first problem associated with permutations and re-planning as tests of counterplan competition is that they open the possibility for elimination of the counterplan as a negative option.”

2. DESTROYS EDUCATIONAL VALUE

It is impossible to evaluate the implications of any policy if it is abandoned or radically altered in the middle of the round.

3. CREATES MOVING TARGET

Allowing the affirmative to replan in the middle of the round would essentially make for a moving target to which no attacks could possibly apply.

4. RENDERS CASE MOOT

While a specific plan alteration may seek only to avoid a disadvantage, it would also undoubtedly have an effect on all facets of the way the plan operates, thus rendering case solvency and advantages moot.

5. THEORISTS CONCUR

Madsen, (ARGUMENTATION AND ADVOCACY, Fall 1989, p. 75)

“A second problem with permutations and plan amendments is the assumption that the advantages created in the original plan and counterplan would continue unaltered after the merger. Yet direct contradictions in solvency assumptions are likely to exist.”

REPLANNING, ALTERING PLAN = NEW AFF CASE, ALL ADVANTAGES AND SOLVENCY MUST BE PROVEN

1. MOVING TARGET

If the aff. plan is changed then they are a moving target. Moving targets unfairly divide aff. and neg. ground.

2. PUNISH MOVING AFFS

If the aff. changes plan and alters the advantage in any way punish them by eliminating the entire advantage.

3. SLIMY

The aff. has the advantage of coming to the round with a prepared plan. Changing the plan shows lack of preparation and anticipation of neg. attacks. Punish an unprepared team.

4. DIFFERENT PLAN = DIFFERENT ADVANTAGES

When you change the method (the plan) of solving for a harm the outcome is different thus altering aff. advantages. (apply sub. pt. 2)

5. DECREASES CLASH

Allowing aff. to change plan in the round decreases clash because the 2AC could totally ignore neg. attacks thus eliminating any clash made in the round.

6. DECREASES EDUCATION

There is no education of or ignorance. By making a new aff. plan the aff. team is being ignorant of neg. attacks. Changing plan only shows that the aff. team was not prepared for all neg. attacks and that they are trying to ignore them and hope that they go away.

Significance

SIGNIFICANCE IS NOT A VOTING ISSUE

1. **EVERYTHING IS SIGNIFICANT**
(THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, 1973, p. 649)
“significant ...1. Having some meaning; meaningful.”
2. **ADVANTAGES ARE ENOUGH**
As long as the affirmative plan is advantageous you should vote for it.
3. **BETTER THAN THE STATUS QUO**
All the plan has to do is to be proven better than the status quo. As long as the plan is an improvement, you should vote for it.
4. **THE RESOLUTION ASSUMES HARMS**
The existence of the resolution and the problem area assumes there are harms. The affirmative shouldn't have to waste time repeating what is known.
5. **SIGNIFICANCE CAN'T BE DETERMINED**
Significance is too subjective. What one person may consider significant another man might consider irrelevant.
6. **ADVANTAGES AND SOLVENCY PROVE SIGNIFICANCE**
We can't have one without the other.
7. **NEG. NEVER EVIDENCES LACK OF SIGNIFICANCE**
8. **MANY JUDGING PARADIGMS REJECT SIGNIFICANCE**
Games playing, tabula rosa, hypothesis testing, and even some views of policy selection do not require significance.

Solvency

SOLVENCY NOT A VOTER

1. “SHOULD” REMOVES AFF. Obligation. Negative obligation is equal, if they attack solvency they Need to prove it will not happen.

2. AFFIRMATIVE FIAT REMOVES THIS BURDEN

Vance Trefethen, 2007 (Third Edition, Strategic Debate, Fiat – The Power to Make Things Happen)
Affirmative teams are never required to prove that their plan “would” take effect, only that it “should”, and this is due to the magic of fiat power.

Vance Trefethen, 2007 (Third Edition, Strategic Debate, Fiat – The Power to Make Things Happen)
Affirmatives have the power to fiat anything that falls within the bounds of the resolution. If the resolution says that the Federal government should change something, then they can use any and all parts of the Federal government to implement their plan. They can change any policies that fall within the topical area of the resolution, simply by stating that somebody (Congress, the Supreme Court, the Department of Agriculture, etc.) changes a policy into something else.

Vance Trefethen, 2007 (Third Edition, Strategic Debate, Fiat – The Power to Make Things Happen)
They also have the power to fiat into their plan any incidental supporting planks that are needed for plan implementation, such as funding and enforcement, as long as they don't try to use those planks for any extra-topical purposes.

3. EVEN PARTIAL OR REDUCED SOLVENCY PROVES AN ADVANTAGE

And a comparative benefit to the present situation is all that we need to deserve your ballot.

4. OUR SOLVENCY EVIDENCE IS BETTER BECAUSE ...

5. TO BE A VOTING ISSUE THE JUDGE MUST BE A STOCK ISSUES JUDGE

But that paradigm is not the best for this round. Instead we should use ...

6. THEORISTS AGREE THAT SOLVENCY IS NOT ALWAYS A VOTING ISSUE

Prof. Freeley, (John Carroll Univ., ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE, 1990, p. 415)

“Fiat Power: the power of the affirmative (in policy debate) to argue that a certain policy should be adopted and to dismiss as irrelevant arguments that the policy would not be adopted.”

William H. Bennett, (former Chairman of Dept. of Communication, Bowdoin College, PRAGMATIC DEBATE, 5TH Edition, 2008, p. 90)

“A partial PMN is an attack which says that only part of the problem would be solved because of a solvency barrier. Partial PMNs are generally ineffective...”

7. HARM AND LINKS PROVE SOLVENCY

So long as we win that there is a harm and what causes it then the solution will work because it removes the causal link to harm.

8. UNFAIR DOUBLE STANDARD

To win inherency we have to show our plan is not being done or used now but to prove solvency we have to show that our plan has been tried and is working. These are mutually exclusive and thus unfair demands.

SOLVENCY/PMNS A VOTING ISSUE

1. IF PLAN CAN'T SOLVE NO REASON TO ACT
Why do something that will not eliminate the problem?

2. PRESUMPTION OUTWEIGHS SMALL LEVEL OF SOLVENCY
Small improvement not enough to warrant change.

3. SOLVENCY IS A VOTING ISSUE
By tradition and the rules of the game this is always a voting issue.

Vance Trefethen, 2007 (Third Edition, Strategic Debate, Solvency)

Solvency is a voting issue for the Affirmative team because they must show that their plan meets and solves the harms that they document in the status quo.

4. SMALL OR LOW SOLVENCY EQUALS INCREMENTALISM
And incrementalism is present system policy. So small solvency does not prove any need to change.

5. ARGUING PARTIAL SOLVENCY IS AN UNFAIR DOUBLE STANDARD
The affirmative has a duty to prove significance of solvency just like it must prove significance of harm. Saying that the negative solvency attacks are not absolute does not defeat them because the affirmative obligation is to prove large or significant solvency.

D. Ehninger & W. Brockriede, (Prof. Univ. of Iowa & Prof. U. of Colo., DECISION BY DEBATE, 1968, p. 227)
“A remedy need not remove every trace of a problem, but the SERIOUSNESS of the problem-situation MUST be removed.”

6. TOPIC WORDING PROVES THAT SOLVENCY IS A VOTING ISSUE.
The debate topic includes the word “should” and should demands workability.
Prof. A. Freeley, (John Carroll Univ., ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE, 7th ed., 1990, p. 416)
“Should: 'as used in policy debate' means that intelligent self-interest, social welfare, or the national interest prompts an action that is both desirable AND WORKABLE.”

7. IS A STOCK VOTING ISSUE
Jim Hanson, (USC, NTC'S DICTIONARY OF DEBATE, 1990, p. 172)
“In a policy debate, with a judge who uses the stock issues paradigm, the affirmative must show ...3) that the affirmative plan will solve this problem.”

8. SOLVENCY IS A UNIQUE OBLIGATION
Affirmative has a special obligation here.
Prof. A. Freeley, (John Carroll Univ., ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE, 7th ed., 1990, p. 198)
“Solvency must be unique to the plan. In developing this portion of the case, the affirmative must be careful to demonstrate that ONLY (emphasis in the original) the plan can solve the problem in the most advantageous way.”

9. Cannot mandate solvency

Vance Trefethen, 2007 (Third Edition, Strategic Debate, Solvency)

Another example of this kind of mistake is when the Affirmative puts a line in their plan that is an outcome rather than a mandate. Affirmatives are required and allowed to specify what they are changing but they are not allowed to mandate the results.

Spread

DISADVANTAGE #_____: The _____ **destroys the sacred values of debate.**

1. THE _____ UTILIZES THE SPREAD

A. THE SPREAD IS FAST

Michael McGough, (editor of the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette and Ex-debater, THE NEW REPUBLIC, October 10, 1988, p. 19)

“The velocity of the argument starts to increase – as it must do if the other team is to be well and truly “spread.””

B. THE SPREAD TRIES TO MAKE OPPONENTS DROP ARGUMENTS

Michael McGough, (editor of the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette and Ex-debater, THE NEW REPUBLIC, October 10, 1988, p. 19)

“The spread – as in spreading your opponent thin by loading your speech with so many arguments that he can never adequately refute them all.”

2. THE SPREAD IS BAD

A. THE SPREAD IS QUANTITY INSTEAD OF QUALITY

Michael McGough, (editor of the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette and Ex-debater, THE NEW REPUBLIC, October 10, 1988, p. 19)

“Quantity of arguments, however, comes at the expense of quality.”

B. THE SPREAD ALLOWS FOR ABSURDITY

Michael McGough, (editor of the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette and Ex-debater, THE NEW REPUBLIC, October 10, 1988, p. 19)

“Equally important, the absurdity of the argument won't be held against you.”

C. THE NATURE OF DEBATE IS DESTROYED

William Southward, (University of Redlands, THE ROSTRUM, #5, January 1985, p. 7)

“They supplement the oral element in the decision making process. As such, they seem to me in principle, violate the nature of the activity.”

D. PERSUASION IS KILLED

William Southward, (University of Redlands, THE ROSTRUM, #5, January 1985, p. 7)

“What passes now for oral persuasion in the typical debate has virtually no application at all in any other oral setting demanding persuasive skills.”

E. UNETHICAL EVIDENCE IS TOLERATED

The spread promotes source citations such as “Johnson in 90”. This violates NFL rules and hides the bias or possible distortion of evidence, which a full source citation would not.

3. THE _____ SHOULD BE PUNISHED FOR THE SPREAD

A. the _____ UTILIZES THE SPREAD

This is seen by the high velocity, the fact aht they just read evidence, and htat they use no logic or persuasion.

B. THE SPREAD IS ILLEGITIMATE

It ruins debate (apply 2 above)

C. IMPACT – VOTING ISSUE – PUNISHMENT IS REQUIRED

Because the _____ changes debate and speaking into a competition of who can read the most evidence the fastest.

D. PUNISHMENT IS A VOTING ISSUE

Doug Sigel, (Northwestern University, DEBATERS RESEARCH GUIDE, 1984, p. 3-4)

“There are at least four reasons that can be isolated for voting on punishment positions irrespective of what occurs in the rest of the round. First, most central to the entire notion of punishment is the deterrent view...A second reason for punishment sees the judge as an educator ... A third reason that can be introduced in the support of punishment is fairness ... The final reason that will be isolated here to vote for punishment arguments is the notion of responsibility.”

Theory

THEORY ARTICLES ARE NOT EVIDENCE

THEY SHOULD NOT BE GIVEN THE WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE IN A ROUND.

1. **IT IS ONLY A THEORY ABOUT A THEORY**

Clearly it is not an empirical assumption or scientific statement. It cannot be proven per se.

2. **THEORY ARTICLES ARE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE**

They are accepted only because they are unique and thought-provoking. They certainly do not represent the mainstream theory. Writers make their articles controversial to ensure publication.

3. **IT'S ONLY ONE OR TWO PERSONS' OPINION**

Why is this person more qualified as an advocate of this theory than anyone else, let alone the debaters who have to defend the theory in this round?

4. **JAF A EMPIRICALLY PROVES THAT THEORY ARTICLES SHOULD NOT CARRY THE WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE**

An example can be found in the 1982 symposium on paradigms that was led by Robby Roland. The article gives both sides to each argument, thus leaving the validity of these arguments up to the debaters and the judges rather than making these articles the be-all and end-all of debate theory.

5. **THE AFFIRMATIVE OFFERS THE PLAN AS AN OPERATIONAL DEFINITION OF THE RESOLUTION**

The inclusion of (nontopical) or extratopical provisions makes the plan an illegitimate operational definition. None of the before-mentioned items can be operationally equated with the topic. They go beyond the scope of the resolution. They are simply not analogous, and thus the plan as a total statement does not represent a reasonable operational definition, and should be rejected.

6. **EMPIRICALLY THEORY EVIDENCE IS NOT USEFUL**

If theory articles were to carry the weight of evidence, everyone in the country would be running counterwarrants. People do not run counterwarrants because judges do not accept the theory even in light of the would-be theory evidence read from Jack Rhodes.

THEORY BRIEF: THEORY IS THE FOUNDATION OF DEBATE

1. DEBATE ROUNDS ARE THE PROVING GROUND OF NEW THEORY

Robert H. Gass Jr., (Ass. Prof. of Speech and Comm., Cal State U/Fullerton, JAFSA, THEORETICAL ARGUMENTS IN DEBATE ROUNDS: Toward a Justification, 1987, p. 222)

“My point is simply that debate rounds, rather than the debate literature, serve as the initial “proving ground” for new theoretical innovations regardless of who the originators of theoretical arguments are.”

2. THEORY RESPONDS TO PRAGMATIC ISSUES

Russel Taylor Church, (CEDA YEARBOOK: On Being 'Prima Facie' – An Application to non-policy argument, 1986, p. 35)

“Certainly, debaters can benefit educationally by participating in the theory building process.”

3. THEORETICAL ARGUMENTS AID EDUCATIONAL PROCESS

Robert H. Gass Jr., (Ass. Prof. of Speech and Comm., Cal State U/Fullerton, JAFSA, THEORETICAL ARGUMENTS IN DEBATE ROUNDS: Toward a Justification, 1987, p. 224)

“The educational importance of being able to advance and defend theoretical positions should thus not be underestimated. An understanding of what arguments to make has little educational value if debaters lack an understanding of how those arguments are important to make. Thus, by granting debaters the right to make theoretical arguments we, as educators, encourage them to understand the reasons behind the reasons they present. It is one thing for a debater to issue an inherency argument; it is quite another thing for that debater to possess a grasp of why inherency arguments are important, e.g., why an opponent should be required to demonstrate the cause of the harm.”

4. THE DEBATE ROUND DEMONSTRATES BAD THEORIES

Robert H. Gass Jr., (Ass. Prof. of Speech and Comm., Cal State U/Fullerton, JAFSA, THEORETICAL ARGUMENTS IN DEBATE ROUNDS: Toward a Justification, 1987, p. 222)

“To a large extent, debaters have already demonstrated their ability to call good theories from bad in debater rounds. Ulrich (1984), for example, attributes the decline in the popularity of “alternative justification” cases and “counterwarrants” to the academic indefensibility of those who strategize in debate rounds. Strategies such as “topical counterplan” and “studies counterplans” have similarly lost favor owing to their inherent difficulties involved in their defense. Thus, debaters themselves appear educationally unsound theories.”

Topicality—Affirmative Rights or Aff. Presumption?

AFF. HAS SEVERAL TOPICALITY BURDENS.

They must meet the following standards:

1. EACH WORD HAS MEANING.

This standard logically argues that each word in a topic was inserted for a purpose, and thus no word is meaningless.

2. CONTEXTUALITY.

To ignore or reject the rules of grammar as a standard is to argue that the topic is not grammatically phrased; it leaves you (the judge) without a standard for selecting between contrasting or even contradicting meanings.

3. BEST DEFINITION.

By requiring the best definition we decrease ambiguity and confusion in this debate. Allowing the affirmative to just be “reasonable” allows vagueness.

4. CERTAINTY.

The affirmative must meet its burden of proof; they must prove that they are topical. If you have a doubt at the end of the debate then you should vote negative.

5. FRAMERS INTENT.

The people who wrote the topic had something in mind. They didn't just randomly pick words out of the sky. Debate is meaningless unless we try to adhere to that intent because without it topics serve no function.

6. DEBATABILITY.

A topic must be defined in such a way as to fairly divide ground between the negative and the affirmative. The affirmative approach attempts to give them great latitude at the expense of fairness to the affirmative.

7. LIMITS.

A topic must limit affirmative ground or it serves no purpose.

AFFIRMATIVE IS NOT PRESUMPTIVELY TOPICAL

1. NEGATIVE DEFINITIONS SHOULD HAVE PRESUMPTION

If the negative is given presumption on definitions then affirmatives probably would run a narrower range of cases – all of which were clearly topical. This would enhance the educational value of debate because we could focus research and analysis on a narrower range of issues and increase our understanding of those issues.

2. AFFIRMATIVE PRESUMPTION IS PATENTLY UNFAIR

Thomas Goodnight, (Northwestern, THE QUESTION OF JUSTICE, 1983, p. 6)

“Given the shifting nature of presumption, a rule which always grants topicality presumption to the affirmative is patently unfair.”

3. NEGATIVE TRADITIONALLY HAS PRESUMPTION

4. ARGUMENTATION VOIDS AFFIRMATIVE PRESUMPTION

The standard only grants the affirmative topicality until we present an argument and the presumption has disappeared.

NEGATIVE FAILS TO MEET TOPICALITY BURDENS

1. NEGATIVE MUST WIN TOPICALITY CONVINCINGLY

Without clear proof that the affirmative is not topical, you should vote for the resolution and its advantages.

2. NEGATIVE MUST GIVE CRITERIA FOR EVALUATION

Until the negative establishes criteria and shows how we fail to meet those criteria the affirmative cannot argue whether we are topical. We should be allowed to give new answers once the negative establishes criteria.

3. NEGATIVE MUST SHOW HOW GROUND IS SKEWED

The negative shouldn't be able to merely show a technical violation. They must indicate how that violation actually harms them. We cannot evaluate topicality until harm is established.

4. STANDARDS MUST ALLOW REASONABLE DEBATE

The negative must be able to prove that their standards encourage fairness and promote good debate. They must be able to prove that their standards establish a range of legitimate affirmative cases.

5. REVERSE VOTING ISSUE

The negative has argued that topicality is sufficient for a decision in the debate because affirmative topic interpretations preclude negative ground. By this logic, a decision ought to be awarded to the affirmative if negative topic standards and interpretations leave the affirmative with little or no ground for argumentation.

NO AFFIRMATIVE RIGHT TO DEFINE TERMS

1. OBLIGATION, NOT A RIGHT

This entire notion grew out of the obligation affirmatives had at one point to provide definitions of terms at the top of the first affirmative constructive.

2. BOTH TEAMS HAVE EQUAL RIGHT

Since both teams must debate under the definitions used in the round, there is no reason to give either side a right to define. Both should have an equal right.

3. JUDICIAL PARADIGM PRECLUDES

The courts always receive the right to redefine words and are thus the ultimate authority. In this round, the judge may do the same thing, depending on the arguments.

4. DEFINITION COMPARISONS NEEDED

Otherwise a judge subjectively would decide to vote for the team that s/he favors with a personal bias involved, thus destroying fairness.

5. THE THEORY IS WRONG

The only rules in debate are that each team has equal speaking time, and that the affirmative must start the debate. Everything else is debatable.

6. DEFINITIONS MUST MEET STANDARDS

Even if the affirmative is allowed some right to present initial definitions, those definitions must still meet the standards argued in the round, or else the affirmative could define terms in any way they choose.

7. THE AFFIRMATIVE HAS MISUSED THE RIGHT

This encourages the affirmative to define the topic in order to meet their own definitions and destroy negative ground.

AFFIRMATIVE HAS PRESUMPTION ON TOPICALITY

1. **THE AFFIRMATIVE HAS THE RIGHT TO DEFINE**
Since we are forced to defend the resolution, we should be allowed to determine what it means.
2. **DEBATABILITY IS THE ULTIMATE STANDARD**
The purpose of this topic is to foster debate. If debate occurs, we achieve the aims of topicality.
3. **NO RISK ISSUE FOR THE NEGATIVE**
The negative can run many topicality violations, force us to spend lots of time on it, and then they can drop it without penalty. This is a reason to make the negative do more than blip out topicality without explanations.
4. **FAIR WARNING – THIS IS A REVERSE VOTING ISSUE**
Promote argument responsibility. If they continue to argue this then make it a voting issue for both of us.
5. **THEY HAD PRIOR NOTICE**
6. **PRESUMPTION IS AFFIRMATIVE**
M.B.W. Sinclair, (Asst. Prof. of Law, Indiana, U. OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW, Vol. 46, “Law & Language: The Role of Pragmatics in Statutory Interpretation,” Winter 1985, pp. 389-90)
“A source interpreting a statute should assume, unless the contrary unmistakably appears, that the legislature was made up of reasonable persons pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably. It should presume conclusively that these persons, whether or not entertaining concepts of reasonableness shared by the court, were trying responsibly and in good faith to discharge their constitutional powers and duties.”

AFFIRMATIVE HAS PRESUMPTION ON DEFINITIONS

1. AFFIRMATIVE HAS RIGHT TO DEFINE

A. ALL PROPONENTS HAVE RIGHT TO DEFINE

In the real world, the proponents of a bill or a study are allowed to define terms.

B. FORCED TO DEFEND THE RESOLUTION

Since the affirmative must defend the resolution, it is legitimate that they be able to specify what the resolution means.

2. AFFIRMATIVE HAS PRESUMPTION ON TOPICALITY

A. TOPICALITY NOT A SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE

It forces debaters to squabble over grammatics.

B. BALANCES OUT WITH NEGATIVE PRESUMPTION

Just as the status quo is presumed advantageous absent proof of harm, etc., the affirmative should be presumed topical unless clearly prove otherwise.

C. MAXIMIZES POLICY MAKING

Voting on topicality ignores the policy implications of the topic, undermining some of its educational value. Therefore, you should be 100% sure this case is not topical. Any doubt means you assume topicality.

D. ANY DOUBTS EQUALS TOPICAL AFFIRMATIVE

John Gossett, (Judging Philosophy Statement, NATIONAL DEBATE TOURNAMENT JUDGES BOOKLET, 1981)

“The affirmative has presumption on topicality. Therefore, the negative must win the topicality argument, not just place doubt in my mind, in order to win the round on that single issue.”

3. NO RIGHT OR WRONG ISSUES

Otis Walker, (Prof. of Rhetoric, SPEAKING INTELLIGENTLY, 1976, p. 145)

“A definition is never right or wrong, it can only state what a given person means by a term. Some meanings are, indeed, more useful than others, but since there is no way to prove a definition right or wrong, it should not be looked upon as a law.”

4. DEBATABILITY IS MOST IMPORTANT

The purpose of the resolution is to provide a forum for the debate. Therefore, definition should be examined in context of their effect on the activity. The negative attacked the case, so it is debatable.

(CORPUS JURIS SECUNDRUM, Vol. 82, 1953, sec. 340)

“The general purpose of a statute is a more important aid to meaning than any rule which grammar or formal logic may lay down.”

Francis McCaffrey, (STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, 1953, p. 5)

“Where a particular application of a statute in accordance with its apparent intention will occasion great inconvenience or produce inequality or injustice, another and more reasonable interpretation is to be sought. In short, the effect of an asserted construction of a statute is of primary concern.”

(CORPUS JURIS SECUNDRUM, 1960, p. 871)

“A particular construction of a statute which will occasion great inconveniences or produce inequality and injustice is to be avoided if another, more reasonable interpretation is present in the statutes.”

5. BROAD DEFINITIONS ARE GOOD

A. INCREASE EDUCATION

They allow a greater variety of discussion.

B. INCREASE CREATIVE THINKING SKILLS

By allowing more diversity they demand new and different ideas.

C. REDUCE JUDGE INTERVENTION

By reducing subjective determination that a case is nontopical judge intervention is reduced.

D. MORE EQUITABLY ALLOCATE RISK

Topicality is an absolute voting issue against the affirmative (a blunt tool), but the negative can win on many other issues even if they lose topicality. Therefore, you should err on the side of topicality and allow broad definitions.

E. REDUCES BIAS FOR THE NEGATIVE

The negative can win on many stock or voting issues already.

Topicality By Effects

EFFECTS TOPICALITY ILLEGITIMATE

1. COMBINES SOLVENCY AND TOPICALITY

By accepting effects, we combine topicality and solvency. This puts solvency as the most important and that is wrong. Topicality should be the separate, most important issue in the round.

2. MAKES THE RESOLUTION MEANINGLESS

A. IT DELIMITS THE RESOLUTION

Almost anything can have some effect on this topic. Therefore almost any case could be topical through effects.

B. EXAGGERATES AFFIRMATIVE ADVANTAGES

Without limiting the affirmative strictly to resolutive action they could claim large numbers of advantages through effects.

3. REDUCES NEGATIVE GROUND

It unfairly reduces the number of issues the affirmative must win while decreasing the number of issues the negative can win on.

4. DECREASES EDUCATION

Squirrel cases, that just effect the resolution, can be run if you accept effects. These cases decrease the educational value of the debate and the clash within the round.

Stan Rivers, (JAFA, Summer 1972, p. 291)

“The proliferations of squirrel cases runs directly counter to the purpose of debate-to treat a specific problem of urgent national concern.”

EXTENSIONS

1. LUDICROUS AND NONSENSICAL

David Shepard, (JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN FORENSICS ASSOCIATION, Winter 1975, p. 363)

“Someone must step in to announce that we are through with ludicrous and nonsensical stipulations and that common sense is to be returned to its rightful place in intercollegiate debate.”

2. SURPRISE AND SQUIRRELS HURT DEBATE

National Development Conference on Forensics, (FORENSICS AND COMMUNICATION, 1975, p. 32)

“Academic debate is based on the premise that decisions are best made after rigorous testing of opposing arguments. Rigorous testing is not achieved when arguments are encountered by surprise, without the opportunity for prior research or reflection by the opposition.”

3. EFFECTS IS INVALID APPROACH

William H. Bennett, (Chairman, CDE National Institute, PRAGMATIC DEBATE, 4TH Edition, 1989, p. 58)

“But an effects topical case must win at least partial solvency before it is topical. This denies the primacy of topicality and makes such an approach invalid.”

4. EFFECTS MAKES THE TOPIC MEANINGLESS

William H. Bennett, (Chairman, CDE National Institute, PRAGMATIC DEBATE, 4TH Edition, 1989, p. 58)

“If effects topicality is allowed the negative has almost no ground left to argue. Allowing effects cases would make hundreds of cases legitimate and thus reduce the likelihood of direct evidence clash, lessen the likelihood of good analysis, and other similar harms because no negative could do the research and thought necessary to prepare for so many cases. The educational value of debate would be decreased.”

5. A PRIORI ISSUE VIOLATED

Without the sanction of the proposition, the affirmative has no right to enter the debater. Effects, however, cannot be determined until the conclusion of the debate. We must judge topicality prior to the other issues, not after an examination of the effects of the plan.

6. DELIMITS THE RESOLUTION

An infinite number of cases may somehow have an effect which coincides with the resolution. If effects are legitimized then negatives would be responsible for debating an incredibly large number of potential affirmative cases. Effects topicality produces a topic without limits. This is a bad practice which should be discouraged by balloting against the affirmative now.

7. EFFECTS MIXES OTHER BURDENS WITH TOPICALITY

Topicality loses all value as an argument – the negative must prove that the affirmative has no solvency, little significance, i.e., NO EFFECT, in order to carry the issue of topicality. If the affirmative wins significance and solvency then they are also automatically topical. This mixes these stock burdens and destroys the meaning of “topicality.”

8. EFFECTS ELIMINATES NEGATIVE GROUND

These definitions do not clearly demarcate negative from affirmative ground. Any counterplan that gains the affirmative advantage would also be topical.

EFFECTS TOPICALITY

Top. #_____: Aff. Violates because its indirect effects. Indirect effects are illegitimate.

1. Plan takes three steps. First step is the plan, second step is _____, and only with the third step do we get a topical result.
2. 3 STEPS IS INDIRECT EFFECT
Michael Pfau, (Director of Forensics, Augustana College, ARGUING TOPICALITY: PERSPECTIVES AND TECHNIQUES, 1985, p. 15-16)
In Carter v. Carter case:
“Whether the effect of a given activity or condition is direct or indirect is not always easy to determine. The word “direct” implies that the activity or condition invoked or blamed shall operate proximately – not mediately, remotely, or collaterally – to produce the effect. It connotes the absence of an efficient, intervening agency or condition.”
3. NO TOPICALITY IF INDIRECT EFFECTS
Michael Pfau, (Director of Forensics, Augustana College, ARGUING TOPICALITY: PERSPECTIVES AND TECHNIQUES, 1985, p. 15)
“All topicality is by “effects”: no plan itself embodies the resolution – only the legal effect of the plan does. The critical distinction is not between direct topicality and topicality by effects, but rather between direct and indirect effects; legitimate topicality is by direct effects.”
4. TOPICALITY IS A VOTING ISSUE
3 reasons this is true: it sets jurisdiction, theorists say so, and it’s a rule of the game.
5. PREEMPT
Don’t let aff. Say all cases are effects. The C card from Pfau makes it clear this is irrelevant because we acknowledge that direct effects are NOT the issue. The key is they take 3 steps and that’s indirect and illegitimate.

EXTENSIONS TO: EFFECTS TOPICALITY

1. EXAMPLE OF DIRECT
Michael Pfau, (Director of Forensics, Augustana College, ARGUING TOPICALITY: PERSPECTIVES AND TECHNIQUES, 1985, p. 16)
Step one (PLAN).....Step two (TOPICAL RESULT OF PLAN)
2. EXAMPLE OF INDIRECT
Michael Pfau, (Director of Forensics, Augustana College, ARGUING TOPICALITY: PERSPECTIVES AND TECHNIQUES, 1985, p. 16)
Step one (PLAN).....Step two (RESULT OF PLAN)
Step three(TOPICAL RESULT OF PLAN)
3. INDIRECT EFFECTS MEANS BOGUS AFF. TOPICALITY CLAIM
Michael Pfau, (Director of Forensics, Augustana College, ARGUING TOPICALITY: PERSPECTIVES AND TECHNIQUES, 1985, p. 16)
“Indirect effects constitute a bogus affirmative topicality claim for a variety of reasons. First, topicality loses its a priori station. The use of indirect effects subordinates topicality to other issues in the debate. In many instances, as in the examples above, the outcome of topicality argumentation becomes dependent on the outcome of affirmative significance claims. Topicality thus becomes an uncertain issue, wholly dependent on the proof of other issue which admit degree.”
4. INDIRECT EFFECTS RESTRICTS NEGATIVE GROUND

Michael Pfau, (Director of Forensics, Augustana College, ARGUING TOPICALITY: PERSPECTIVES AND TECHNIQUES, 1985, p. 16)

“Second, indirect effects delimit, thus restricting negative ground. If providing an indirect effects or securing an advantage is what makes an affirmative topical, affirmative ground expands significantly. An expansion of affirmative ground, or course, restricts negative options. Where topicality stems from achieving an indirect result or gaining an advantage, when a negative counterplan which achieved the same end would be topical as well – regardless of the method. If this ground is usurped by affirmatives, few negative generic options remain.”

EFFECTS TOPICALITY IS LEGITIMATE

1. **ALL CASES ARE EFFECTS TOPICAL**
Everything takes a step or two to set up. Nothing happens directly.
2. **THE TOPIC WORDING REQUIRES EFFECTS**
The word _____ in the resolution allows cases to be topical by effects.
3. **INTENT IS _____**(state key phrase of topic)
You only need to be topical by intent. Everything takes a few steps to set up. If the intent of each plan plank is to deal with overcrowding then there's no reason the affirmative should not be deemed topical.
4. **INCREASES THE VALUE OF DEBATE**
It broadens the topic which promotes greater research obligations. This is educational and increases the value of debate.
5. **EFFECTS IS MORE REAL WORLD**
Every policy takes steps before it actually works.
6. **NEGATIVE IS ABUSIVE**
This is a ridiculous argument that can be run against any affirmative plan. It is simply a time-waster. Don't let them do this. It reduces clash in the round.
7. **FAIRLY PENALIZES UNPREPARED NEGATIVES**
Debate is an educational activity and increases knowledge when effort is put into the activity. When negative teams don't research parts of the topic they hurt educational growth and deserve to lose.
8. **REASONABLE INTERPRETATION SUPPORTS THE AFFIRMATIVE**
A. Lichtman et. al., (Prof. of History, American U., ADVANCED DEBATE, 3rd ed., 1987, p. 129)
“In actuality, and dispute over the legitimacy of a given affirmative plan can be resolved only by determining whether or not the affirmation of that plan entails a reasonable interpretation of the debate resolution.”
9. **EFFECTS TOPICALITY IS NOT A VOTING ISSUE**
There are four reasons this should be true. Such an attitude will encourage creative ideas by affirmatives. It will follow what the ballot says because at the bottom you fill in who did the better debating, not a vote for or against the resolution. Allowing effects promotes academic freedom, and it increases the amount of research and case clash done by both teams.
10. **STILL LIMITS THE RESOLUTION**
Things that do not cause a topical effect to come about with high certainty still cannot be run.
11. **TOPICALITY IS STILL DEBATABLE**
It is certainly possible to determine the effect of an action from evidence given in the round, hence we can determine topicality.
12. **NO STANDARD TO EVALUATE**
The negative never establishes how many generations removed and effect must be before the affirmative becomes nontopical.
13. **COUNTERPLANS CAN STILL BE RUN**
The negative can still run counterplans. They need only establish that it will not reasonably cause the resolution to be adopted.

Topicality Standards

BEST DEFINITION IS BEST

1. IT INCREASES EDUCATION

James Unger, (ROSTRUM, October 1981, p. 8)

“The new standard (best) provides for a superior education concentration upon the use and meaning of words. Both sides would now be forced to examine the proposition, not in an attempt to discover the most esoteric to individualistic of definitions, but rather to uncover and build upon the most central, reasonable, and acceptable approaches. Such linguistic inquiry would be of immense value to all debaters.”

2. IT'S MORE RATIONAL AND EQUITABLE

James Unger, (ROSTRUM, October 1981, p. 8)

“The radical nature, in the best sense of that term, of this approach needs to be stressed. It totally eliminates the current emphasis upon a single threshold concept of acceptability, i.e. 'reasonability,' and puts into its place a comparative assessment which requires both teams to discover the superiority of one of their definitions through a process of comparison and contrast. In doing so, it places topicality argumentation on a more rational and equitable level with all other portions of the debate processed.”

3. IT LIMITS THE TOPIC

With the best of all possible definitions, we will be debating the true intent of the resolution, instead of the reasonable, if not topical, affirmative case.

4. INCREASES CLASH

By narrowing the topical cases, limitation insures in depth consideration of issues and guarantees clash.

5. PRECISION IS NEEDED

Precise and narrow definitions are needed to ensure communication and understanding.

Henry Cohen, (Bureau of Contracts. New York, PUBLIC CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS AND THE LAW, 1961, p. 154)

“Certainty is an essential element in all contracts, otherwise it is impossible to determine as to what the parties have agreed.”

6. EQUALS SUPERIORITY IN ANALYTICAL/EVIDENTIAL SUPPORT

Michael Pfau. (Director of Debate, Augustana College, DEBATING UNITED STATES JUSTICE SYSTEM, 1983, P. 110)

“The 'better definition' is that definition which is superior in analytical and evidential support, drawn from the relevant subject matter area, as introduced in a particular round.”

7. ALLOWS BETTER ENFORCEMENT OF PLAN

If we use the unquestionable best source, then the affirmative policy has a better chance of being properly enacted, because it avoids possibly wrong interpretations.

8. BEST MEETS LEGAL AND LEGISLATIVE PARADIGM

Their own plan plank uses legislative intent as a means of interpretation. The best standard more accurately meets a legislative interpretation.

9. NDT COMMITTEE ADOPTED BEST STANDARD

Michael Pfau. (Director of Debate, Augustana College, DEBATING UNITED STATES JUSTICE SYSTEM, 1983, P. 110)

“(The National Debate Tournament Committee, starting with the 1983 NDT, adopted) a 'better definition standard' to replace the traditional 'reasonability standard' as the appropriate lenses for the evaluation of topicality during a round.”

BEST DEFINITION STANDARD ADVOCACY

1. Preserves educational value of debate by deciding Topicality Issue on the effectiveness of the definitions and not on a race to whom ever can put out the most definitions.
2. Legislation and real world situations would choose the best definition.
3. **BEST DEFINITION PROMOTES BEST DEBATE**
Debaters are rewarded for restricting their cases to these considered most meaningful and relevant in the topic area. This is good for academic debate practices.
4. **COURTS USE**
The judicial system decides within the context of each trial what is the best definition to understand and rule upon the case.
5. **ANALOGOUS TO OTHER ARGUMENTS**
All other issues are based on better evidence and other analysis.
6. **INCREASES OBJECTIVITY**
Reason ability calls for an intuitive judgment. Best definition involves the relatively more objective process of comparison.
7. **PROMOTES EQUITY**
Since the affirmative has the option of choosing any case area, the requirement of superior definition, by allowing the negative to develop its own argumentative position, would promote a more balanced way of evaluating topicality. This would have the likely benefit of reducing the overwhelming affirmative bias that exists in debate today.
8. **TOPICALITY SHOULD BE VIEWED AS OTHER ISSUES ARE – VOTING FOR BEST ARGUMENTS**
Walter Ulrich, (Vanderbilt University, as quoted by David A Thomas and Jack Hart, *ADVANCED DEBATE*, 1987, p. 470)
“Like any other stock issue, this issue is best evaluated by determining which side has the superior arguments on the issue. This would suggest that the best definition standard should be employed. We do not resolve other issues by asking if one side has a reasonable position. Why should this stock issue be treated differently from any other.”
9. **BETTER DEFINITION PRESERVES MEANING**
Words are important and we must strive to preserve their full meaning and context.
10. **PREVENTS AFFIRMATIVE ABUSES**
Letting the affirmative use mediocre or obscure definitions is abusive.
11. **BEST DEFINITION ENCOURAGES PRECISION**
Walter Ulrich, (Vanderbilt University, as quoted by David A Thomas and Jack Hart, *ADVANCED DEBATE*, 1987, p. 470)
“The best definition is also consistent with the purpose of the resolution. If we are asked to support the resolution, we need to ask ourselves what the resolution means, either as a statement to others as to the probably state affairs of the world. In either case (this) precision would be desirable.”
12. **AMBIGUITY IS AVOIDABLE**
Harold Lasswell, (Law professor, Yale, *POWER AND SOCIETY*, 1957, p. xix)

“Semantic confusions in political theory as elsewhere, have markedly interfered with fruitful research, but obscurity, vagueness and ambiguity are not inherent in the subject matter of political science; they are escapable only when effort is made to escape them.”

BROAD DEFINITIONS ARE GOOD

1. BETTER THAN GRAMMAR OR LOGIC

(CORPUS JURIS SECUNDRUM, Vol. 82, 1953, sec. 340)

“The general purpose of a statute is a more important aid to meaning than any rule which grammar or formal logic may lay down.”

2. INCREASES REASONABILITY

Francis McCaffrey, (STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, 1953, p. 5)

“Where a particular application of a statute in accordance with its apparent intention will occasion great inconvenience or produce inequality or injustice, another and more reasonable interpretation is to be sought. In short, the effect of an asserted construction of a statute is of primary concern.”

(CORPUS JURIS SECUNDRUM, 1960, p. 871)

“A particular construction of a statute which will occasion great inconveniences or produce inequality and injustice is to be avoided if another, more reasonable interpretation is present in the statutes.”

3. INCREASE EDUCATION

They allow a greater variety of discussion.

4. INCREASE CREATIVE THINKING SKILLS

By allowing more diversity they demand new and different ideas.

5. REDUCE JUDGE INTERVENTION

By reducing subjective determination that a case is non-topical judge intervention is reduced.

6. MORE EQUITABLY ALLOCATE RISK

Topicality is an absolute voting issue against the affirmative (a blunt tool), but the negative can win on many other issues even if they lose topicality. Therefore, you should err on the side of topicality and allow broad definitions.

7. REDUCES BIAS FOR THE NEGATIVE

The negative can win on many stock or voting issues already.

8. “BEST” IS UNREASONABLE AND UNREALISTIC

(ECONOMICS AND ARGUMENTATION, 1984, p. 4)

“A debater would be hard pressed to find anyone who would argue that our present system cannot be improved on. And since the affirmative need only prove that its plan is better than the present system – not necessarily the best policy – it should be easy to prove need for change.”

9. NOT NEUTRAL WAY TO DETERMINE “BEST”

One source will argue one criteria, other sources different criteria. If we use a legal paradigm legal sources might nest, under a medical topic some will consider medical sources best, other topics will demand other criteria. Different court cases use different meanings, different medical journals use different meanings. It is unrealistic to demand a “best” definition.

10. NEVER SHOW WE AREN'T REASONABLE

They never evidence why we are not reasonable or why their definition is actually best.

BROAD TOPICALITY IS DESIRABLE

1. REDUCES JUDGE INTERVENTION

Reduces subjective determinations that a case is nontopical.

2. LIBERAL INTERPRETATIONS ARE BEST

They enhance the educational objectives of debate, for example, creative thought, broad research, and new forms of argumentations.

3. NO JUSTIFICATION FOR LIMITS

Any limits are arbitrary; there is no right or wrong definition of a word.

4. IMPROVES EDUCATION

It becomes possible to investigate a broad range of issues.

5. MORE EQUITABLY ALLOCATES RISK

Topicality is an absolute voting issue against the affirmative (a blunt tool), but the negative can win on many other issues even if they loose topicality. Therefore, you should err on the side of topicality and allow broad definitions.

6. CANNOT DETERMINE THE SCOPE OF THE RESOLUTION

It is arbitrary and unfair to penalize the affirmative when limits are exceeded since we cannot know where limits can be set.

7. IMPROVES RESEARCH

If there are more case to debate, the negatives will need to hone their skills in order to use their research time effectively to debate many cases.

8. ACCURACY AND LOGIC IS INCREASED

Dennis Barron, (Assoc. Prof. Of English and Linguistics, U. of Ill., Urbana, GRAMMAR AND GOOD TASTE, REFORMING THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE, 1982, p. 4)

“Von Jagemann warns against the common assumption of the language planners of his day that regularity and simplicity are desirable in language: 'What tends to regularity may also tend to destroy variety and euphony, what promotes simplicity may destroy accuracy.'”

9. ENHANCES CREATIVITY FOR BOTH SIDES

Both sides have room to maneuver and raise new issues. Furthermore, it is unfair to punish debaters simply because they have a more creative mind than the negative. We should not lose because we have a different interpretation of the topic.

10. IMPROVES FAIRNESS

It becomes possible to investigate a broad range of issues.

CONTEXT IS BEST STANDARD

1. NEED CONTEXT FOR MEANING

S I Hayakawa, (former professor of Language, San Francisco State College, LANGUAGE IN THOUGHT AND ACTION, 1978, 4th ed., p. 58)

“Words do not have a single “correct meaning”; they apply to GROUPS of similar situations which might be called AREAS OF MEANING.”

2. NEED SENTENCE FOR MEANING

James Edie, (Chair, Department of Philosophy, Northwestern University, SPEAKING AND MEANING: THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF LANGUAGE, 1976, p. 71)

“There can be no language, Husserl would argue, which is not formed on the bases of units of meaning (that is, sentences as 'wholes' composed of syntactically formed 'members'), because this is what IS MEANT by language.” (Emphasis in original)

3. SINGLE WORDS DON'T SUPPLY MEANING

James Edie, (Chair, Department of Philosophy, Northwestern University, SPEAKING AND MEANING: THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF LANGUAGE, 1976, p. 140)

“The MEANING of a sentence must be distinguished from the words which compose it taken in isolation.”

4. NON-CONTEXTUAL DEFINITIONS ARE NONSENSE

Farhang Zabeech, (quoted in John Brigham, CONSTITUTIONAL LANGUAGE, AN INTERPRETATION OF JUDICIAL DECISION, 1977, p. 83)

“If we sever an utterance from its particular conditions or condition which does not belong to it, we may produce nonsense.”

5. IGNORING CONTEXT IS VICIOUS AND STUPID

S I Hayakawa, (former professor of Language, San Francisco State College, LANGUAGE IN THOUGHT AND ACTION, 1978, 4th ed., p. 58)

“It is clear, then, that the ignoring of contexts in any act of interpretation is at best a stupid practice. AT its worst, it can be a vicious practice.”

6. DICTIONARY DEFINITIONS ARE INADEQUATE

Jacques Barzun, (Professor of History, Dean of Faculties, Columbia University, Wilson and Follett (eds), MODERN AMERICAN USAGE: A GUIDE, 1966, p. 6)

“(A) dictionary does not give reasons even when it gives examples of varying usage in one or two brief quotations. Often, what makes a word preferable is its relation to others in a passage. The narrow context of a dictionary sentence gives too few clues to the force and versatility of a particular word. Definitions must be supplemented with discussion.”

7. CONTEXT PROVIDES SUPERIOR UNDERSTANDING

S I Hayakawa, (former professor of Language, San Francisco State College, LANGUAGE IN THOUGHT AND ACTION, 1978, 4th ed., p. 56)

“Contexts often indicate our meaning so clearly that we do not even have to say what we mean in order to be understood.”

8. KEY WORDS HAVE CONTEXTUAL MEANING

Donn Parsons, (Director of Debate, University of Kansas, PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECOND SUMMER CONFERENCE ON ARGUMENTATIONS, 1981, p. 539)

“While a debate may present terms that are “new” to the debaters who undertake to research it, the key terms of that resolution will not be new to others – primarily those in fields or disciplines where the terms are commonplace.”

DEBATABILITY IS A GOOD STANDARD

1. NEGATIVE ARGUMENTATION IS COUNTER-INTUITIVE

Defining the topic by our case provides the greatest negative ground, since they get all of the remaining ground. Limited definitions of the resolution provide the negative with the greatest jurisdiction and ground for argumentation.

2. THE NEGATIVE STANDARD IS COUNTERPRODUCTIVE

The issue of topicality, stifles thought, discussion, and research that could produce new strategies to create ground for the negative.

3. THE NEGATIVE ASSUMES UNIVERSAL TOPIC DEFINITIONS

Universal definitions of the resolution do not exist. There is no acceptable set of definitions that can be employed in all debates. Without a universal definition, the fairest standard is to examine the negatives ability to debate this particular case.

4. NEGATIVE USES A DOUBLE STANDARD

They often use generic blocks and/or conditional arguments and defend them because they are debatable.

5. NOT A VOTING ISSUE

If the negative can attack the case then the case falls in the realm of fairness.

DICTIONARY DEFINITIONS ARE GROOVY

1. THEY ARE DEBATABLE

With dictionary definitions a resolutional interpretation is given and that is all that is needed. They also preserve both affirmative and negative ground.

2. ALLOWS FOR DEBATERS TO DEBATE

Instead of bringing in someone else's definition you should allow debaters to defend one for their own reasons.

3. DICTIONARY DEFINITIONS – INCREASED EDUCATION

They force debaters to defend their definition instead of using one that has been defended before.

4. DICTIONARIES ARE WRITTEN FOR COMMON USAGE AND PRESENT MORE THAN ONE DEFINITION.

5. FAIRNESS IS MAXIMIZED

Even tiny rural schools have access to dictionaries. So access is equal for all.

EACH WORD SHOULD HAVE MEANING

1. PRESUMPTIVELY

We should assume that there was a reason for putting each word into the resolution in this particular order. Therefore, each word deserves distinct treatment.

2. SINGLE WORD ERRORS VIOLATE TOPICALITY

David Thomas (Director of Debate, University of Houston, *ADVANCED DEBATE*, 1975, p. 91)

“A plan failing to incorporate even one of the operative terms would fail to fully implement the resolution.”

3. COURT CASES AGREE

When judges review contract cases, they look at each word of the contract to see if it has meaning.

4. EACH WORD IS IMPORTANT

William Alstine, (*PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE*, 1964, p. 36)

“A single word is not itself used to perform an illocutionary act. But perhaps we can think of each word within a sentence making some distinctive contribution to the illocutionary potential of the sentence, in such a way that the omission of the word or its replacement with a synonymous word would bring about a change in the potential of the sentence.”

5. AFFIRMATIVE POSITION IS INSULTING

It assumes the 12 months of research spent on writing the proposal for the topic resulted in a conference that randomly added useless words.

FIELD CONTEXT IS BEST STANDARD

1. NEED CONTEXT FOR MEANING

S I Hayakawa, (former professor of Language, San Francisco State College, *LANGUAGE IN THOUGHT AND ACTION*, 1978, 4th ed., p. 58)

“Words do not have a single “correct meaning”; they apply to GROUPS of similar situations, which might be called AREAS OF MEANING.”

2. NEED SENTENCE FOR MEANING

James Edie, (Chair, Department of Philosophy, Northwestern University, *SPEAKING AND MEANING: THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF LANGUAGE*, 1976, p. 71)

“There can be no language, Husserl would argue, which is not formed on the bases of units of meaning (that is, sentences as ‘wholes’ composed of syntactically formed ‘members’), because this is what IS MEANT by language.” (Emphasis in original)

3. SINGLE WORDS DON’T SUPPLY MEANING

James Edie, (Chair, Department of Philosophy, Northwestern University, *SPEAKING AND MEANING: THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF LANGUAGE*, 1976, p. 71)

“The MEANING of a sentence must be distinguished from the words which compose it taken in isolation.”

4. NON-CONTEXTUAL DEFINITIONS ARE NONSENSE

Farhang Zabeech, (quoted in John Brigham, *CONSTITUTIONAL LANGUAGE, AN INTERPRETATION OF JUDICIAL DECISION*, 1977, p. 83)

“If we sever an utterance from its particular conditions or condition which does not belong to it, we may produce nonsense.”

5. IGNORING CONTEXT IS VICIOUS AND STUPID

S I Hayakawa, (former professor of Language, San Francisco State College, *LANGUAGE IN THOUGHT AND ACTION*, 1978, 4th ed., p. 56)

“It is clear, then, that the ignoring of contexts in any act of interpretation is at best a stupid practice. At its worst, it can be a vicious practice.”

6. DICTIONARY DEFINITIONS ARE INADEQUATE

Jacques Barzun, (Professor of History, Dean of Faculties, Columbia University, Wilson and Follett (eds), *MODERN AMERICAN USAGE: A GUIDE*, 1966, p. 6)

“(A) dictionary does not give reasons even when it gives examples of varying usage in one or two brief quotations. Often, what makes a word preferable is its relation to others in a passage. The narrow context of a dictionary sentence gives too few clues to the force and versatility of a particular word. Definitions must be supplemented with discussion.”

FIELD CONTEXT IS BEST

1. MEANING AND REFERENTS CLEARER THIS WAY

James Rosenau, (professor, political science, JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, 1968, p. 176)

“Disciplines also required, so that words have the same meaning and ideas the same referants. For this to occur one must be ready to forego the luxury of common-sense analysis and accept the rigors of a technical language and the boundaries of a specialized set of concepts.”

2. FIELD CONTEXT INSURES ACCURATE MEANING

Robert Benson, (prof. of law, Loyola Law School, NYU REVIEW OF LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE, vol. 13, “The End of Legalese: The Game is Over,” 1984-85, p. 532)

“The field test is the most direct and accurate way to tell whether language is comprehended.”

3. GENERAL DICTIONARIES ADMIT FIELD CONTEXT IS SUPERIOR

Sidney Landau, (lexicographer; ed., Funk & Wagnall's Standard Dictionary, DICTIONARIES: THE ART AND CRAFT OF LEXICOGRAPHY, 1984, p. 21)

“General dictionaries have always relied chiefly on subject-field dictionaries for technical definitions.”

4. PROPER CONTEXT IMPORTANT

Sidney Landau, (lexicographer; ed., Funk & Wagnall's Standard Dictionary, DICTIONARIES: THE ART AND CRAFT OF LEXICOGRAPHY, 1984, p. 209)

“What may be standard for one social context would be improper for another.”

GRAMMAR IS BEST STANDARD

1. NO INTELLIGIBILITY WITHOUT GRAMMAR

John Gumperz (anthropological communication theorist, INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, Vol. 9, 1968, p. 381)

“(I)ntelligibility presupposes underlying grammatical rules.”

2. OPPONENTS STANDARD SUBSERVIENT TO GRAMMAR STANDARD

Other standards create meaningless isolated words unless grammar is used to control context.

3. IF GRAMMAR NOT FIRST THEN CONFUSION REIGNS

Jacques Barzun, (Professor of History, Dean of Faculties, Columbia University, Wilson and Follett (eds), MODERN AMERICAN USAGE: A GUIDE, 1966, p. 25)

“(I)f in taking up speech and writing we throw grammar overboard, we shall find that little will be left that can be generalized about. The language will have become a catalogue of forms and phrases, a confusion of idioms to be individually conquered, a jungle of irregularities; we shall be like the beginning student of Chinese, who must memorize ideograms by the thousand.”

4. TOPIC FRAMERS ASSUME GRAMMAR STANDARD

Austin Freely, (ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE, 1986, p. 52)

“The presumption are that the framers of the proposition are knowledgeable in the conventions of English grammar and syntax, that each word in the proposition is there for a good reason, and that each word further refines the meaning and scope of the sentence. Thus you must prove that your definition considers all the terms of the proposition and that none of the terms is redundant or contradictory.”

5. WINNING WITH BAD GRAMMAR IS CHEATING

John Simon (linguist, PARADIGMS LOST, 1980, p. 206)

“Playing without rules and winning –in this instance, managing to communicate without using good English –is no more satisfactory than winning in a sport or game by accident or by disregarding the rules: which is really cheating.”

6. DEBATE REQUIRES PROPER GRAMMAR

Debate is a communication activity. Since good grammar is the prerequisite for communication and mutual understanding, there can be no debate without observance of the rules of grammar.

7. GRAMMAR STANDARD PROMOTES EDUCATION

By requiring proper grammar for topicality we are reinforcing our education in the English language. This is a useful skill.

8. GOOD GRAMMAR IS ESSENTIAL TO COMMUNICATION

John Simon (linguist, PARADIGMS LOST, 1980, p. 206)

“Good English helps communication and is a SIN QUA NON of mutual understanding.”

9. NO GRAMMAR MEANS NO LANGUAGE

Sidney Landau, (lexicographer; ed., Funk & Wagnall's Standard Dictionary, DICTIONARIES: THE ART AND CRAFT OF LEXICOGRAPHY, 1984, p. 136)

“We cannot use language either for scientific inquiry or for the play of wit in literature without standards, even if they are only employed as a measure from which to deviate.”

10. ERRORS REDUCED WITH GRAMMAR STANDARD

Jeremy Campbell, (information theorist, GRAMMATICAL MAN, 1982, p. 165)

“Grammar, which is part of competence, acts as a filter, screening out errors and incorrect arrangements of words, showing a speaker which sentence forms are admissible, and whether they are connected with certain other sentences forms by rules of transformation.”

11. CREATES ORDER BETTER THAN OTHER STANDARD

Jacques Barzun, (Professor of History, Dean of Faculties, Columbia University, Wilson and Follett (eds), MODERN AMERICAN USAGE: A GUIDE, 1966, p. 22)

“The perceptions codified in grammar supplement the orderly mind if one has it, and serve as a substitute for it if one has it not.”

INVARIANT IS THE BEST STANDARD

1. INVARIANT STANDARD CONSISTS OF

- A. LAYMAN'S DEFINITION
- B. LAW DEFINITION
- C. FIELD CONTEXTUAL DEFINITION

2. MUST FIND INTRINSIC CHARACTERISTICS

Bill Hill & Richard W. Leeman, (Ass. Prof's at U. of North Carolina at Charlotte, ARGUMENTATION AND ADVOCACY, Spring 1990, p. 134)

“According to his proposal, one simply looks at the use of the word across situations and distills the essence, or intrinsic characteristics, of the word. Berube teats intrinsic characteristics similarly, using them to delineate relevant examples.”

3. BEST BECAUSE IT IS SIMPLE

Bill Hill & Richard W. Leeman, (Ass. Prof's at U. of North Carolina at Charlotte, ARGUMENTATION AND ADVOCACY, Spring 1990, p. 134)

“Bahm's application of essence, variation and intrinsic justification is deceptively attractive because of its simplicity.”

4. VARIATION SETS RESOLUTIONAL TERMS

Bill Hill & Richard W. Leeman, (Ass. Prof's at U. of North Carolina at Charlotte, ARGUMENTATION AND ADVOCACY, Spring 1990, p. 134)

“In order to determine which properties are “invariant” and “temporally unbounded,” Bahm proposes the phenomenological method of variation. Variation requires one to observe the application of a term across all possible usages in order to discover those properties which are constant – i.e., essential or intrinsic – and those which are not – i.e., contingent or accidental. The essential properties would then be deemed “resolutional,” and the contingent properties labeled “non-resolutional.””

5. FAIRLY LIMITS AFFIRMATIVE

- By having the affirmative meet all the definitions for the word, the limits fairly administer affirmative ground without allowing squirrely cases that obviously don't fit the resolution, but have one small definition allowing them to be topical.

6. BEST SUITS FRAMER'S INTENT

- This standard best suits framer's intent by allowing the designated area to be debated, while disallowing the affirmative the ability to present cases that would otherwise not fit the topic.

7. RETURNS DEBATE FOCUS TO TOPIC

- This standard allows debatability of the topic and the related plans that fall within it, thus allowing debate focus to return to the topic, rather than blatantly untropical plans.

8. INCREASES CLASH

- By returning debate to the topic, the standard increases clash by allowing only the topical plans to be debated thoroughly while untropical cases would be defeated by the standard.

9. INCREASES RESEARCH

- By allowing this standard, more intensive research can be done to the remaining topical cases, instead of doing minimal research on a variety of unrelated topics.

10. FORCES AGREEMENT

- This standard forces agreement between all sources, so that the debate can focus on the other areas of the topical plan, and not have to waste time bickering about T arguments.

LEGAL SOURCES GREAT

1. DEFINITIONS STUDIES AT GREAT DETAIL BEST ACCOUNT FOR MEANING
 In a court case the judge picks the very best definition after listening to all the arguments for and against the definition.
2. DEFINITION BETTER CONSIDERED AND DEVELOPED
3. DEBATE IS A LEGAL-DERIVED ACTIVITY
 William H. Bennett, (Former Chairman, Comm. Dept. Bowdoin College, PRAGMATIC DEBATE, 2008)
 “American debate is centered on judicial or courtroom comparisons, the judge sitting at the back of the room in a debate round shares a great deal in common, as far as what he expects, with his courtroom counterparts.”
4. LEGAL DEFINITIONS MOST PRECISE
 William H. Bennett, (Former Chairman, Comm. Dept. Bowdoin College, PRAGMATIC DEBATE, 2008)
 “The nature of the legal system demands precision.”
5. EXPERTS AND FIELD CONTEXT SUPPORT
 Frank Cross, (DEBATING TOPICALITY, 1987)
 “The courts reply on the experts consulted by congress. This experience bolsters the use of filed context in debate.”
6. LEGAL SOURCES BEST CONSIDER CONTEXT
7. LEGAL ARE MOST REAL WORLD

EXTENSIONS TO LEGAL DEFINITIONS GOOD

EXTENSION TO #1:

1. BEST ACCOUNT FOR MEANING

James White, (Professor of Law and The English Language and Literature, University of Michigan, UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW, Vol. 25, 1985, p. 692)

“The Language that the lawyer uses and remake is a language of meaning in the fullest sense. It is a language in which our perceptions of the natural universe are constricted and related, in which our values and motives are defined, and in which our methods of reasoning are elaborated and enacted. By defining roles and actors, and by establishing expectations as to the propriety of speech and conduct, it gives us the terms for constructing a social universe.”

EXTENSION TO #2: BETTER CONSIDERED AND DEVELOPED

1. COURTS DELIBERATE

Courts must balance competing ideas and nations of specificity, breadth and relevance before making a decision.

2. TIME FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW

Judges take the time to examine all the evidence and facts relevant in defining a word.

3. HIGHER COURTS ARE SUPERIOR

Higher courts have better judges, better lawyers. They also allow the judge more time for judicial review since it takes time to get to the higher court.

4. DEFINITIONS LOGICALLY CONSISTENT

Legal definitions and applications follow precedents. This means that the definition will be logically consistent with other related factors and concepts.

5. BETTER THAN COMMON USAGE

Legal definitions and the judge take common usage into account but define the word based on not only common usage but all relevant factors. This gives a better rationale to the definition, hence a better definition.

EXTENSION TO #4:

1. LEGAL LANGUAGE IS PRECISE

Robert Benson, (prof. of law, Loyola Law School, NYU REVIEW OF LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE, vol. 13, 1985, p. 561)

“(L)egal language gradually has become precise and relatively certain; when a word, term or phrase is used in a contract, and that contract has been the subject of judicial interpretation, the precise meaning of the words therein has become more certain or determinable. Thus, one can depend upon what the particular word means (or certainly what they do not mean) because a court has rules, and probably would rule in the future they mean just that.”

EXTENSION TO #6:

1. LEGAL DEFINITIONS ARE CONTEXTUAL

Michael Moore, (prof. of law, USC, SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW, vol. 58, “A Natural Law Theory of INTERPRETATION”, January 1985, p. 304) (Judge Traynor, 1968)

“Words ... do not have absolute and constant referents ... The meaning of particular words or groups of words varies with the ... verbal context and surrounding circumstances ...”

“Cohen was also a contextualist. See Cohen, FIELD THEORY AND JUDICIAL LOGIC, 59 Yale L. J., 1950, 238, 240-41)

“Perhaps, if we look closely enough, a sentence never means exactly the same thing to any two different people. For no two minds bring the same apperceptive mass of understanding and background to bear on the external fact of a sound or a series of marks.”

EXTENSION TO #7:

1. MOST REAL WORLD

James White, (Professor of Law and The English Language and Literature, University of Michigan,
UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW, Vol. 52, 1985, p. 692)

“Law always operates through speakers located in particular times and places speaking to actual audiences about real people; its language is continuous with ordinary language; it always operates by narrative; it is not conceptual in its structure; it is perpetually reaffirmed or rejected in a social process; and it contains a system of internal translation by which it can reach a range of hearers.”

MOST LIMITING DEFINITIONS ARE BEST

1. LIMITED DEFINITIONS PROVIDE FOR SUPERIOR CLASH

Glen Mills, (ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE, 1967, p. 28)

“The clarification of terms, of meaning, and of intent, thus serves the very useful purpose of joining the debaters on a precise issue.”

2. DEFINITIONS SHOULD LIMIT DEBATE

The purpose of the topic is to establish a limited area for clash. If definitions are overly broad they are bad because they undermine this purpose of the topic and reduce substantive clash.

3. “BROAD DEFINITIONS” IS AN OXYMORON

The purpose of a definition is to clarify and narrow, not to obfuscate and broaden.

4. MUST ALWAYS VOTE FOR LIMITS

William Statsky (professor, Law, Antioch College, LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS, 1975, p. 35)

“We cannot avoid what Mr. Justice Cardozo deemed inherent in the problem of construction, making a choice between uncertainties. We must be content to choose the lesser evil.”

OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS ARE GOOD

1. INDICATES TRUE MEANING

S I Hayakawa, (former professor of Language, San Francisco State College, LANGUAGE IN THOUGHT AND ACTION, 1978, 4th ed., p. 119)

“For of course the true meaning of a term is to be found by observing what a man does with it, not by what he says about it.” (P. W. Bridgman)

2. KEEPS TOPIC WORDS MEANINGFUL

S I Hayakawa, (former professor of Language, San Francisco State College, LANGUAGE IN THOUGHT AND ACTION, 1978, 4th ed., p. 160)

“The operational point of view does much to keep our words meaningful.”

3. PRECISION IS INCREASED BY OPERATIONAL DEFINITION

S I Hayakawa, (former professor of Language, San Francisco State College, LANGUAGE IN THOUGHT AND ACTION, 1978, 4th ed., p. 159)

“The operational definition, then, as Anatol Rapoport explains, is one that tells you 'what to do and what to observe in order to bring the thing defined or its effects within the range of one's experience.'”

4. SCIENCE USES OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS

And so do theoretical mathematicians. And so did Plato. We should be allowed the same right.

PRECISE DEFINITIONS ARE UNNECESSARY

1. THERE IS NO PRECISION IN LANGUAGE

Precise language is an oxymoron.

Michel Foucault, (Philosopher/Linguist, *THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE*, 1972, p. 85)

“No statement is indispensable for a language to exist – and one can always posit, in place of any statement, another statement that would in no way modify the language.”

2. IMPRECISION DOES NOT IMPEDE DEBATE

Each debater and team has a different approach, a different interpretation of the resolution, and yet we have always had debate. It is because of the fact that we do not always think the same thoughts in exactly the same way that we produce clash and create novel strategic and argumentative approaches to the topic.

3. PRECISION VERSUS PRECISION IS AN OXYMORON

Our definition is precise, theirs is precise and yet we disagree. Reasonable judging would therefore allow both to be legitimate.

QUESTIONABLE GRAMMAR IS NOT HARMFUL

1. IMPROPER GRAMMAR DOES NOT IMPEDE COMMUNICATION

James Edie, (Chair, Department of Philosophy, Northwestern University, *SPEAKING AND MEANING: THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF LANGUAGE*, 1976, p. 142)

“We do not really speak or think grammatically; any taped example of unedited speech will show many false starts, half sentences, changes of tense and verb sequence which are ungrammatical. It is only the edited, printed text which is fully 'grammatical'...”

2. GRAMMAR IS DICTIONARIAL RITUAL THAT DESERVES REJECTION

Geoffrey Nunberg, (prof., theoretical linguistics, Stanford U., Supervisor for writing usage notes, *AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY*, 3rd Ed, ATLANTIC, December 1983, p. 32)

“Rather, grammar comes increasingly to be regarded as a mandarin code that requires only ritual justification.”

3. ABUSES ENHANCE LINGUISTIC ART

Geoffrey Nunberg, (prof., theoretical linguistics, Stanford U., ATLANTIC, December 1983, p. 32)

“The long run will surely prove the linguists right; English will survive whatever 'abuses' its current critics complain of. And by that I mean not just that people will go on using English and its descendants in their daily commerce but that they will continue to make art with it as well.”

4. GOOD GRAMMAR DOES NOT CLARIFY OR IMPROVE COMMUNICATION

Noam Chomsky, (Linguist, MIT, *LANGUAGE AND RESPONSIBILITY*, 1977, p. 187)

“One cannot verify a condition by referring to a traditional grammar, or by asking an informant ... only too often one's early assumptions prove wrong.”

REASONABILITY STANDARD IS BEST

1. IT INCREASES EDUCATION

Prof. Freely, (ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE, 4th Ed., 1976, p. 46)

“The apparently unusual definition might be a perfectly reasonable one, and it might take the opposing advocates by surprise only because they failed to do a thorough job of analyzing the proposition.”

2. IT ENHANCES COMMUNICATION

It allows us to examine a more reasonable variety of definition and sources. A reasonable definition is much more likely to be understood than a more restricted one – it leaves room for different levels of understanding and better guarantees common ground.

3. REASONABILITY NOT HARD TO DETERMINE

Obviously, absurd definitions would be excluded as would those definitions inappropriate to the context of the sentence.

4. IT IS MORE OBJECTIVE

One man's best definition is another's worst. Reasonability puts us in a more realistic arena.

5. WE WASTE LESS TIME QUIBBLING

If we accept a reasonable topicality standard we move on quickly to the real issues of the debate.

Prof. Pacilio & Stites, (INTRODUCTION TO DEBATE, Unit 2, 1974, p. 6)

“The negative must be careful about quibbling over definition of terms as this is a waste of everybody's time.

As a general rule, the negative should accept the affirmatives definitions of terms unless they are unreasonable or unfair.

6. IT'S FAIRER TO THE AFFIRMATIVE

No affirmative can know what each different judge will accept as the 'best' definition. On the other hand, teams can know what most judge swill accept as reasonable.

7. THE DEBATE COMMUNITY SUPPORTS REASONABILITY

Argumentation theorists and scholars support this standard.

Prof. Freely, (ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE, 4th Ed., 1976, p. 47)

“When the affirmative stipulates a reasonable definition, it is usually wisest for the negative to accept it and to proceed with the debate.”

Profs. Ziegelmuller & Rhodes, (DIMENSIONS OF ARGUMENTATION, 1981, p. 534 & p. 543)

“Nearly every debate text written suggests that the affirmative present a reasonable definition of terms. The criterion for establishing terms is reasonability, the same standard used for evaluating how well they are developed and defended.”

“So long as a definition seems 'reasonable' it should not become the basis for rejection.”

8. MEETS GOALS OF THE TOPIC

A reasonability standard meets the goals of the topic. Reasonability still sets limits on the topic.

9. BROADER MEANINGS ARE NECESSARY

Only if you allow reasonably broad interpretations can the full intent of a topic be appreciated.

Hart, (Prof. of Jurisprudence, Oxford, THE CONCEPT OF THE LAW, p. 15)

“Very often the ordinary, or even the technical, usage of a term is quite 'open' in that it does not forbid the extension of the term to cases where only some of the normally concomitant characteristics are present.”

Extension evidence:

Ward S. Miller, (Prof. of English, Univ. Redlands, WORD WEALTH, 1978, p. xv)

“English is not a dead language like Latin. It is a living language in which each word grows and changes. The definitions in a dictionary or in this book set up guidelines, not limits.”

Ward S. Miller, (Prof. of English, Univ. Redlands, WORD WEALTH, 1978, p. xiv)

“Many words have more than one level of meaning. In addition to the referent, or the literal level of the object, two or three levels of abstraction may also exist.”

WORDS HAVE MANY MEANINGS

1. CERTAINTY ON TOPICALITY IS IMPOSSIBLE

The very fact that we are expected to define terms implies that there is uncertainty about what the topic means.

2. MANIFOLD MEANINGS IS ESTABLISHED FACT

Northrop Frye, (Semiotologist, ANATOMY OF CRITICISM, 1957, p. 72)

“The principle of manifold or 'polysemous' meaning, as Dante calls it, is not a theory any more, still less an exploded superstition, but an established fact.”

3. NO DEFINITION IS COMPLETE

Sidney Landau, (lexicographer; ed., Funk & Wagnall's Standard Dictionary, DICTIONARIES: THE ART AND CRAFT OF LEXICOGRAPHY, 1984, p. 148)

“No definition can take in all of the particular things referred to by the word defined. There will always be marginal cases that are not covered by any definition.”

4. NO SINGLE CORRECT MEANING EXISTS

S I Hayakawa, (former professor of Language, San Francisco State College, LANGUAGE IN THOUGHT AND ACTION, 1978, 4th ed., p. 58)

“Words do not have a single “correct meaning”; they apply to groups of similar situations which might be called areas of meaning.”

EACH WORD NEED NOT HAVE MEANING

1. ONLY NOUNS AND VERBS ARE ESSENTIAL

Professor Bryant, (English, ENGLISH IN THE LAW COURTS, 1980, p. 7)

“Nouns and verbs are the only kinds of words essential to the communication of thoughts. Verbs and nouns are the immediate signs of ideas of objects.”

2. EACH WORD IS NOT IMPORTANT

Since the purpose of the topic is to give us an area to debate, violation of a single word is not harmful to debate as long as the area debated is forewarned and clash is promoted through other terms in the resolution.

3. SOME WORDS SHOULD BE IGNORED

Words that limit the logical application of the topic but do not add to its usefulness as a means of fair warning and clash should be ignored.

Professor McCaffrey, (Law, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, 1953, p. 55)

“If it clearly appears that a word or clause in an argument was inserted through inadvertence or mistake, especially if it is repugnant to the rest of the act and would tend to limit or impair this application, and if the enactment is complete, sensible, and operative without it, such word or clause may be disregarded.”

4. PROCESS DISPROVES THE ATTACK

The meeting that nominates topics often fails to even discuss or review some topic words.

Topicality Standards Attacked

BEST STANDARD IS UNDESIRABLE

1. BEST DEFINITION CANNOT BE DETERMINED

What one person may consider the best definition another may consider the worst. There is no way to determine which definition is best.

Edward A. Hinck & Andrew J. Rist, (University of Kansas, "Status and the Development of hierarchies for the Resolution of Topicality", ARGUMENT IN TRANSITION, PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRD SUMMER CONFERENCE ON ARGUMENTATION, p. 809)

"Second, "best definition" provides no method by which to evaluate definitions and interpretations: it's, at best, a quality which critics determine at the conclusion of the debate."

2. WORDS HAVE MANY DEFINITIONS

No one definition can be determined to be better than another.

Ward S. Miller, (Prof. of English, Univ. Redlands, WORD WEALTH, 1978, p. xiv)

"Many words have more than one level of meaning. In addition to the referent, or the literal level of the object, two or three levels of abstraction may also exist."

"A word is hard to define because it often has numerous meanings or shades of meaning. Even a simple word like chair may denote any one of a hundred different objects, from a broken kindergarten chair to an elaborately upholstered lounge chair. It is difficult to discover precisely what the essence of chairness really is. If chair is hard to define, however, what about hope, courage, or imagination? At best, words are terribly elusive, as well as illusive, especially abstract words."

3. PRECISION IS IMPOSSIBLE

Prof. Hayakawa, (Prof. of Semantics and Former U.S. Senator, LANGUAGE IN THOUGHT AND ACTION, p. 60)

"No word ever has exactly the same meaning twice."

4. BEST TOO LIMITING

Interesting, challenging cases would be eliminated under this standard.

5. IT DEMEANS DEBATE

A "best" standard makes debate a semantics game. With a reasonability standard the topic area lets us focus on more meaningful analysis.

6. "BEST" IS UNREASONABLE AND UNREALISTIC (ECONOMICS AND ARGUMENTATION, 1984, p. 4)

"A debater would be hard pressed to find anyone who would argue that our present system cannot be improved on. And since the affirmative need only prove that its plan is better than the present system – not necessarily the best policy – it should be easy to prove need for change.

7. NO NEUTRAL WAY TO DETERMINE "BEST"

One source will argue one criteria, other sources different criteria. If we use a legal paradigm legal sources might nest, under a medical topic some will consider medical sources best, other topics will demand other criteria. Different court cases use different meanings, different medical journals use different meanings. It is unrealistic to demand a "best" definition.

8. NEVER SHOW WE AREN'T REASONABLE

They never evidence why we are not reasonable or why their definition is actually best.

BEST DEFINITION IS A BAD STANDARD

1. JUDICIAL ANALOGY DISPROVES

The plaintiff doesn't have to prove his case is the “best,” merely that it has standing.

2. CONGRESSIONAL ANALOGY DISPROVES

Bills will be debated whether or not they are “most” germane, so long as they are on the agenda.

3. STANDARD IS FALLACIOUS

There is no such thing as a “best” definition. Dictionaries list many meanings and the order varies from one dictionary to another.

4. STANDARD IS TAUTOLOGICAL

The only way to determine which definition is “best” is to use standards like limits, field context, and so on. These are the same standards used to determine which definitions are reasonable. Indeed, the standard compounds the problems of reasonability by searching for “the most reasonable” definition.

5. UNFAIR TO THE AFFIRMATIVE

The “best definition” will obviously vary from round to round in ways we cannot predict and for which we could not prepare even if we wanted to.

6. BEST DEFINITION IS IRRELEVANT

The affirmative has the right to define terms.

7. THE STANDARD HELPS THE NEGATIVE

The standard will not decrease the number of cases.

Roger Solt, (Debate Coach, *ARMS SALES: THE POLITICS OF DESTRUCTION*, 1982, p. 35)

“(N)arrower definitions might well not reduce the number of cases run. It is even conceivable that if liberal definitional standards permit teams to select cases with which they are more comfortable, they may switch cases less often and in fact improve negative preparation.”

8. TOO SUBJECTIVE, NO CLEAR STANDARD EXISTS

Words have multiple meanings. Evaluation of this standard requires extreme subjectivity of the part of the judge.

9. BEST DEFINITION UNDERMINES THE TOPIC FUNCTION

Rather than increasing clash and attention to substantive issues, this standard encourages elaborate semantic gamesmanship. As topicality ballots become easier for the negative, they will obviously increase the time devoted to the issue.

10. DISTORTS THE TOPIC

The topic exists merely to divide negative and affirmative ground. When the negative argues best definition, they advocate drawing another meaningless line to follow.

11. DISTORTS THE FOCUS OF DEBATE

The purpose of the topic is to learn as much as we can on an issue. As long as our definition is reasonable, we shouldn't get bogged down in a confusing game of semantics.

COMMON OR LAY DEFINITIONS BAD

1. PRECISION IS NEEDED

Henry Cohen, (Bureau of Contracts. New York, PUBLIC CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS AND THE LAW, 1961, p. 154)

“Certainty is an essential element in all contracts, otherwise it is impossible to determine as to what the parties have agreed.”

2. COMMON DEFINITIONS ARE BAD. THEY CAUSE CONFUSION AND INACCURACY.

C.W. & Hazel C. Besserer, (Space analysts, GUIDE TO THE SPACE AGE, 1959, p. V.)

“Inevitably there follows divergence in the definitions of many terms. In addition to use by technical and supporting personnel directly involved in the industry, the 'jargon' has been adopted by newspapers, broadcasters, and telecasters in disseminating news, with resulting confusion of the public who, in general, lack the basic technical training and general knowledge for interpretation of what they read and hear.”

3. COMMON MAN STILTIFIES KNOWLEDGE

John Simon (Linguist, PARADIGMS LOST, 1980, p. 210)

“Why should we lose this useful distinction (between good grammar and bad grammar)? Just because a million or ten million or a billion people less educated than we are cannot master the difference? Surely it behooves us to try to educate the ignorant up to our level rather than to stiltify ourselves down to theirs.”

4. FIELD CONTEXTUAL DEFINITIONS ARE IMPORTANT

_____ is a highly technological field. Common definitions lack the necessary precision for adequate interpretation of the debate topic.

5. DICTIONARIES HAVE ARISTOCRATIC BIAS DEFINITION

Robinson, (1950, p. 37)

“Dictionaries, then, tend to be histories not of all the usages prevailing at a given time and place but of those of the preferred group of persons. The average small one language dictionary is designed largely to enable people to talk and write without arousing contempt in the preferred class.”

6. CLEAR DEFINITIONS PROMOTE CLASH

Glen Mills, (ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE, 1967, p. 28)

“The clarification of terms, of meaning, and of intent, thus serves the very useful purpose of joining the debaters on a precise issue.”

CORRECT USAGE IS BAD STANDARD

1. NEGATIVE RESTRICTION IS HARMFUL

Jeremy Campbell, (information theorist, GRAMMATICAL MAN, 1982, p. 166)

“(L)anguage is inexhaustible in its capacity to generate new messages, to convey fresh meanings. The information a speaker can produce is very much richer than the information obtained by listening to others speak. The speaker's output is unpredictable, in the sense that it cannot be wholly accounted for externally, in terms of the input of experience, though it is essentially systematic and regular, obeying the rules of the game of language as all other speakers do.”

2. NEGATIVE DEFINITION IS INHERENTLY FLAWED

Randolph Quirk, (Prof. of English, University College, London, THE USE OF ENGLISH, 2nd Ed., 1968, p. 268)

“(A) language is always changing; its development in vocabulary, in syntax, pronunciation and intonation.”

3. PRECISE INTERPRETATIONS ARE IMPOSSIBLE

S I Hayakawa, (former professor of Language, San Francisco State College, LANGUAGE IN THOUGHT AND ACTION, 1978, 4th ed., p. 52)

“To insist dogmatically that we know what a word means *in advance of its utterance* is nonsense. All we can know in advance is *approximately* what it will mean. After the utterance, we interpret what has been said in the light of both verbal and physical contexts and act according to our interpretation.”

4. NATURAL USAGE FACILITATES COMMUNICATION

Randolph Quirk, (Prof. of English, University College, London, THE USE OF ENGLISH, 2nd Ed., 1968, p. 269)

“We need only say that both poet and scientist must undergo the discipline of basing their expression on the vocabulary, grammar and transmission systems used naturally in speech and as used naturally in speech, if they are to perform the social function of communication.”

5. PREMISE OF NEGATIVE ATTACK REJECTED

Jeremy Campbell, (information theorist, GRAMMATICAL MAN, 1982, p. 166)

“In 1957, with the publication of his Syntactic Structures, Chomsky exposed the folly of supposing that English, or any natural language, is a finite-state system.”

6. LANGUAGE EVOLVES

Stuart Chase, (Semanticist, THE POWER OF WORDS, 1953, p. 92)

“Language grows organically in the culture; new terms are invented as needs arise.”

7. NEGATIVE IS ARBITRARY AND ARTIFICIAL

Roland Barthes, (Prof. Semiology, ELEMENTS OF SEMIOLOGY, 1964, p. 31)

“(L)anguage is elaborated not by the 'speaking mass' but by a decided group. It is in this sense that it can be held that in most semiological languages, the sign is really and truly 'arbitrary' since it is founded in artificial fashion by a unilateral decision; these re in fact fabricated languages.”

8. PREJUDICE WARPS NEGATIVE ATTACK

Ivan Illich, (Prof. Medieval History, SHADOW WORK, 1981, p. 58)

“(T)erms are specialized, tainted with some ideological prejudice, and each in a different way, badly limps.”

9. PRECISE STANDARDS REFLECT IDEOLOGICAL BIASES

Carlos Otero, (Linguistics, UCLA, RADICAL PRIORITIES, 1981, p. 23)

“In every society, there will emerge a caste of propagandists who labor to disguise the obvious, to conceal the actual workings of power, and to spin a web of mythical goals and purposes, utterly benign, that allegedly guide national policy.”

10. INSTITUTIONALIZED MEANINGS DESTROY CREATIVITY

S I Hayakawa, (former professor of Language, San Francisco State College, LANGUAGE IN THOUGHT AND ACTION, 1978, 4th ed., p. 290)

“(T)o have nothing but institutionalized attitudes is eventually to have no personality of one’s own, and therefore to have nothing original or creative to contribute to the institutions of which one is a member. Furthermore, there is the danger to one’s personal adjustment implicit in continually living by high-level generalizations and repressing (or avoiding) extensional evaluations.”

11. SOURCES AREN'T THE DEFINITION

Randolph Quirk, (Prof. of English, University College, London, THE USE OF ENGLISH, 2nd Ed., 1968, p. 269)

“It should be recognized, textbooks cannot do everything; they are, at best, static, cumbersome and indirect. We should try to think of them as guides to language, not as language itself; otherwise we may find that our talent for language is merely inhibited by textbook rules. We learn above all by taking part in the actual situations in which English is used, by living the language as fully as we can, by attending, and attending to, what Webster called 'that excellent school, the world.'”

DICTIONARY DEFINITIONS ARE TOO RESTRICTIVE

1. OUTDATED BIGOTED DEFINITIONS PREDOMINATE

Richard Robinson, (Oriel College, Oxford, DEFINITION, 1950, p. 37)

“Dictionaries, then, tend to be histories not of all the usages prevailing at a given time and place but of those of the preferred group of persons.”

2. KEY MEANINGS ARE OMITTED

Richard Robinson, (Oriel College, Oxford, DEFINITION, 1950, p. 37)

“No brief lexical definition of a word, then, is likely to embrace the multiplicity of uses the word has had at different times or even at one time.”

3. DEFINITIONS ARE INCOMPLETE

Sidney Landau, (lexicographer; ed., Funk & Wagnall's Standard Dictionary, DICTIONARIES: THE ART AND CRAFT OF LEXICOGRAPHY, 1984, p. 123)

“Dictionaries deal only with certain kinds of meaning and ignore other kinds no less important, and we must not suppose that associated meanings cease to exist because dictionaries fail to note them.”

4. SOURCE DOESN'T FIT DEBATE. IT OMITTS ORAL MEANINGS

Sidney Landau, (lexicographer; ed., Funk & Wagnall's Standard Dictionary, DICTIONARIES: THE ART AND CRAFT OF LEXICOGRAPHY, 1984, pp. 207-8)

“Dictionaries are not based on the spoken language; they are preeminently records of the written language...They are loath to admit this overwhelmingly obvious fact.

5. OPPONENTS DEFINITION INHERENTLY INCOMPLETE

Sidney Landau, (lexicographer; ed., Funk & Wagnall's Standard Dictionary, DICTIONARIES: THE ART AND CRAFT OF LEXICOGRAPHY, 1984, p. 148)

“No definition can take in all of the particular things referred to by the word defined.”

6. FEAR ELIMINATES ACCURATE DEFINITIONS FROM OPPONENTS SOURCE

Sidney Landau, (lexicographer; ed., Funk & Wagnall's Standard Dictionary, DICTIONARIES: THE ART AND CRAFT OF LEXICOGRAPHY, 1984, p. 148)

“Fear of criticism and the safety of conformity are the driving forces behind many conventional dictionary practices.”

DEBATABILITY IS A BAD STANDARD

1. MOOTS TOPICALITY AS AN ISSUE

By saying that ability to debate is all that matters, the affirmative avoids the issue of topicality. Topicality becomes meaningless as an issue. This is unfair to the negative; why have a topic at all if we cannot debate topicality?

2. NO STANDARD FOR DEBATABILITY

What is the level of clash needed for a negative team to be considered prepared to debate the case? A negative team could sputter through and fill its speech time without making a serious threat to the affirmative, yet still be “debating.” The affirmative must justify a level of clash which the negative must meet to have the case considered debatable.

3. REWARDS POOR PREPARATION

Since preparedness to debate is the standard for topicality, negative teams would be rewarded if they did no work against the case and said it is therefore undebatable. Negatives could win more debates by doing no research at all. This encourages bad practices and is a reason to vote against the affirmative in this debate.

DICTIONARIES ARE BAD

1. MEANINGS ARE GROSSLY INACCURATE

Richard Robinson, (Oriel College, Oxford, DEFINITION, 1950, p. 52)

“Every brief lexical definition of a word in common use is grossly inaccurate or at best grossly partial, because all words that have been used by many people have many sorts and nuances and dimensions of meaning.”

2. CONFUSION AND AMBIGUITY INCREASED

S. I. Hayakawa, (former Prof. of Language, San Francisco State College, LANGUAGE IN THOUGHT AND ACTION, 1978, p. 159)

“Having defined a word, people often believe that some kind of understanding has been established, ignoring the fact that the words in the definition often conceal even more serious confusions and ambiguities than the word defined.”

3. DEFINITIONS PREJUDICED AND POPULARIZED

Mark Poster, (Professor of History at The University of California, Irvine, SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW, January 1985, Vol. 58, p. 4)

“Because the publishers of books must cater to the desires and superstitions of buyers, no dictionary, according to Fries, ‘even for the sake of scientific truth and language accuracy, could afford to oppose the prejudices and the common beliefs of the school public which buys the dictionaries.’”

4. SMALLER DICTIONARIES ARE AMATEURISH AND IGNORANT

Sidney Landau, (Lexicographer, Editor Funk and Wagnall’s Standard Dictionary, THE ART AND CRAFT OF LEXICOGRAPHY, 1984, p. 21-22)

“Many of the smaller dictionaries are amateurish, compiled by people who may be expert in their subjects but who are often ignorant of the basic principles for writing definitions.”

DICTIONARY DEFINITIONS ARE ILLEGITIMATE

1. DICTIONARIES ARE INADEQUATE

Philip P. Gove, (Price Institute & New York University, WEBSTER'S 3RD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, 1961, preface)

"It (the dictionary) does not attempt to dictate what usage should be."

2. DICTIONARIES ARE OUTDATED

Falk, (Professor of Linguistics, LINGUISTICS & LANGUAGE, 1978, p. 73)

"Once a major dictionary is published, it is usually not revised for approximately 20 years."

3. NO RIGHT OR WRONG DEFINITIONS

Richard M. Weaver, (ON THE NATURE OF RHETORIC, TAKEN FROM Johannesen et al., LANGUAGE IS SEMANTIC, 1970, p. 117)

"There can be no absolute position from which the application of a word can be judged 'right' or 'wrong'."

4. CONTEXT CHANGES WORDS

Justice Holmes, (TOWN V. EISNER, 24US418, 1918, p. 425)

"A word is not crystal, transparent and unchanged; it is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in color and content according to the circumstances and times in which it is used."

5. LANGUAGE CHANGES

Jess Stien, (Editor in Chief, RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY, 1981, preface)

"Language, most people agree, is never static – except when dead. It had a capacity for constant change and growth that enables it to serve effectively the requirements of the society in which it exists."

6. DICTIONARIES SHAPE AN ARISTOCRATIC BIAS

Richard Robinson, (Oriol College, Oxford, DEFINITION, 1950, p. 37)

"Dictionaries, then, tend to be histories not of all the usages prevailing at a given time and place but of those of the preferred group of persons. The average small one language dictionary is designed largely to enable people to talk and write without arousing contempt in the preferred class."

7. MEANINGS ARE GROSSLY INACCURATE

Richard Robinson, (Oriol College, Oxford, DEFINITION, 1950, p. 52)

"Every brief lexical definition of a word in common use is grossly inaccurate or at best grossly partial, because all words that have been used by many people have many sorts and nuances and dimensions of meaning."

8. MULTIPLE MEANINGS ARE OMITTED

Richard Robinson, (Oriol College, Oxford, DEFINITION, 1950, p. 52)

"No brief Lexical definition of a word, then, is likely to embrace the multiplicity of uses the word has at different times or even at one time."

9. MANY WORDS ARE OMITTED

Sidney Landau, (DICTIONARIES: THE ART AND CRAFT OF LEXICOGRAPHY, April 2001, p. 161)

"Clarence Barnhart estimates that eight hundred or so new words come into the common or working vocabulary of English each year, and that of these about five hundred find their way into dictionaries of various sizes and types."

10. DEFINITIONS ARE TOO CONSERVATIVE

Sidney Landau, (DICTIONARIES: THE ART AND CRAFT OF LEXICOGRAPHY, April 2001, p. 161)

"Fear of criticism and the safety of conformity are the driving forces behind many conventional dictionary practices."

ESSENTIAL PROPERTIES – BAD STANDARD

1. ESSENTIAL PROPERTIES IS BAD

Hill and Leeman, (Bill Hill, Associate Prof. at U. of North Carolina, Richard Leeman, Assistant Prof. at U. of North Carolina, ARGUMENTATION AND ADVOCACY, Spring 1990, p. 137)

“Besides facing inherent theoretical problems and contradictions when used as a definitional standard, the use of intrinsic justification in the context of debate possess phenomenology and competitive debate are fundamentally alien to each other. Second, Bahm's operationalization of intrinsic justification is inadequate. Third, intrinsic justification reduces substantive clash, and the quality of argumentation in academic debate.”

2. ESSENTIAL PROPERTIES ARE POOR STANDARDS

“Essential properties make poor definitional guidelines because they constitute a conception of language designed for radically different purpose.”

3. LOOKING TO SINGLE WORDS IS STUPID

S I Hayakawa, (former professor of Language, San Francisco State College, LANGUAGE IN THOUGHT AND ACTION, 1978, 4th ed., p. 22)

“Ignoring of contexts in any act of interpretation is at best a stupid practice. At worst, it can be a vicious practice.”

4. WORDS HAVE NO MEANINGS

Hanley, (Linguistics, COMMUNICATION AND INTERPERSONAL RELATION, 1979, p. 43)

“Words, of course, do not “contain” or “have” meanings. Apart from the people who use them, words are merely marks on paper, vibrations in the air, raised dots on a Braille card, and so on. Words really do not mean at all – only the users of words can mean something with the words they use.”

5. NO DEFINITE DEFINITIONS

Since people put meaning to words when they use them, and do not have meaning themselves, then there is no way that one can ever meet the essential priorities standard. Without a single definite definition that everyone agrees on within society there cannot be a essential priorities standard.

FIELD CONTEXT IS A BAD STANDARD

1. NO FIELD CONTEXT EXISTS

The resolution was not written by experts on the topic. It is a statement from the debate community and should be interpreted as such.

2. NO STANDARDS FOR EVALUATING CONTEXTS

They never give us criteria establishing how to evaluate and determine which expert in which field should be used. They just pick one and go from there. They must provide a rationale for why this expert was picked and why this field was picked.

3. DIFFERENT CONTEXTS EXIST

The resolution can be interpreted as implying many different contexts and requiring many different types of experts, e.g., scientific, economic, political, debate, etc... There is no rationale for which context is best and should be used.

4. FIELDS FRAGMENT KNOWLEDGE AND DISTORT DEBATE

Sidney Landau, (lexicographer; ed., Funk & Wagnall's Standard Dictionary, **DICTIONARIES: THE ART AND CRAFT OF LEXICOGRAPHY**, 1984, p. 181)

“The profligate use of field labels has the effect of fragmenting knowledge and presenting each definition in the narrow terms of a specialty instead of simply letting it stand for what it is.”

5. CONTEXTUAL REFERENCES FLUCTUATE

Statements that merely use a word in a sentence are not defining. Merely proving that authorities use a word one way does not prove that they do not also use it another way.

6. EXPERTS ARE BIASED

Sometimes an expert will find and use an obscure definition to bolster and support claims. Thus, expert definitions are not automatically acceptable since so many experts purposely construe words to suit their own needs.

7. ENGLISH LANGUAGE IS THE CONTEXT

The resolution is an English sentence and the English language would be the context of the resolution.

FIELD CONTEXT – SPECIALIZED/SUBJECT-DICTIONARIES ARE BAD

1. THEY DON'T RECORD HOW TERMS ARE USED

Sidney Landau, (lexicographer; ed., Funk & Wagnall's Standard Dictionary, **DICTIONARIES: THE ART AND CRAFT OF LEXICOGRAPHY**, 1984, p. 20)

“Subject-field dictionaries ... are likely to consist of authoritative definitions composed by other experts whose concern is maintaining the internal coherence of their discipline rather than faithfully recording how terms are used.”

2. THEY IGNORE VOTERS' INTENT

When coaches voted for this topic they did so with lay term understanding.

3. ARE LIMITED AND PAROCHIAL

Sidney Landau, (lexicographer; ed., Funk & Wagnall's Standard Dictionary, **DICTIONARIES: THE ART AND CRAFT OF LEXICOGRAPHY**, 1984, p. 20)

“Citation files for technical terms do not exist; no frequency count is possible. The specialist is forced to rely on his own experience which is necessarily limited both in time and place; and in case of disputed usage is apt to be parochial.”

4. THEY IGNORE DEBATE RESOLUTION CONTEXT

GRAMMAR IS A BAD STANDARD

1. GRAMMAR IS AN EXAMPLE, NOT A RULE

Professor Nunberg, (Stanford, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, December 1983, p. 34)

“The point of traditional grammar was to demonstrate a way of thinking about grammatical problems that encouraged thoughtful attention to language, not to canonize a set of arbitrary rules and structures.”

2. NEW MEANINGS ARE ACCEPTABLE

Randolph Quirk, (Prof. of English, University College, London, THE USE OF ENGLISH, 2nd Ed., 1968, p. 268)

“(W)e have decoding devices in our linguistic faculty that enable us to understand 'new' sentences and new interrelations of sentences and their parts.”

3. ATTACK IS OPPRESSIVE AND USES A REJECTED PREMISE

Jacques Barzun, (Professor of History, Dean of Faculties, Columbia University, Wilson and Follett (eds), MODERN AMERICAN USAGE: A GUIDE, 1966, p. 3-4)

“(T)he very idea of better or worse in speech, is a hangover from aristocratic and oppressive times.”

4. NO LOGICAL JUSTIFICATION FOR STANDARD

Geoffrey Nunberg, (prof., theoretical linguistics, Stanford U., Supervisor for writing usage notes, AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY, 3rd Ed, ATLANTIC, The Decline of Grammar, December 1983, p. 32)

“Linguistics, of course, have been arguing for a long time that the rules of traditional grammar have no scientific or logical justification, and that the only reason grammarians consider certain usages 'correct' is that they happen to have been adopted by the privileged classes in the past.”

5. GRAMMATICAL STANDARDS VARY

Thomas Elliott Berry, (Prof. of English, West Chester State College, THE MOST COMMON MISTAKES IN ENGLISH USAGE, 1961, p. v)

“In some instances, specialists find that competent users of English differ in their observance of a given practice – e.g., the splitting of the infinitive.”

6. OUR DEFINITION IS PERFECTLY SERVICEABLE

Geoffrey Nunberg, (prof., theoretical linguistics, Stanford U., Supervisor for writing usage notes, AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY, 3rd Ed, ATLANTIC, The Decline of Grammar, December 1983, p. 32)

“As the linguists Anthony Kroch and Cathy Small put it in a recent article, 'prescriptivism' (that is, traditional grammar) is simply the ideology by which the guardians of the standard language impose their linguistic norms on people who have perfectly serviceable norms of their own.”

CORRECT GRAMMAR IS UNNECESSARY

1. INTERPRETABILITY IS MORE IMPORTANT

Michel Foucault, (Philosopher/Linguist, *THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE*, 1972, p. 82)

“(Grammarians) recognize as 'acceptable' sentence groups of linguistic elements that have not been correctly constructed, providing they are interpretable ...”

2. GRAMMATICAL ACCURACY IS INAPPROPRIATE

Gary Cronkhite, (Prof. of Communication, U. C. Davis, *COMMUNICATION AND AWARENESS*, 1976, p. 260)

“As a matter of fact, there are many situations in which it is inappropriate to apply the rules of correct usage.”

3. GRAMMAR IS NOT REQUIRED

Michel Foucault, (Philosopher/Linguist, *THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE*, 1972, p. 86)

“(A) regular linguistic construction is not required in order to form a statement ...”

4. GRAMMATICAL ACCURACY IS UNIMPORTANT

Gary Cronkhite, (Prof. of Communication, U. C. Davis, *COMMUNICATION AND AWARENESS*, 1976, p. 260)

“Those rules (of correct usage) are violated almost as frequently as they are followed and usually **WITHOUT ANY NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES** – so long as the speaker know when and where they may be violated.”

LEGAL SOURCES BAD

1. COURT CASE DEFINITIONS OVERTURNED

Definitions are changed all the time. Any old court case definition could have been recently updated or proved false. How could we take that chance to use it.

2. DEFINITIONS OUT OF CONTEXT DISTORT MEANING

Frank Cross, (DEBATING TOPICALITY, 1987)

“Non-dictionary sources have their limitations. Many times, these sources, especially court cases, are defining words in a very specific immediate context. Generalizing such definitions can lead to substantial inaccuracies. At other times, these sources are not defining terms but rather describing the words as in a metaphor. In these cases, the sources re unreliable sources of definitional meaning.”

3. NON-LEGAL DEFINITIONS BEST

Frank Cross, (DEBATING TOPICALITY, 1987)

“These judicial definitions arise in the context of a specific case between two particular parties. On other occasions the court may be interpreting a word in a given specific astute and may not be generalized to the more abstract debate forum. Its not unusual to find directly contradictory definitions in Words and Phrases because of this fact accordingly there is very little reason for a judge to prefer a legal definition for topic interpretation. Indeed, a stronger case could be made to the contrary that certain non-legal sources provide a more reliable foundation for definitions.”

4. NOT RELIABLE

Frank Cross, (DEBATING TOPICALITY, 1987)

“Legal definitions have serious shortcomings. Lawyers themselves do not consider such sources as CORPUS JURIS SECUNDUM to be particularly reliable references for definitions or otherwise.”

5. SOURCE CONTEXT CAN WIN TOPICALITY

Dr. Don Parsons, (Prof. of Kansas University, 1987)

“Consequently, source context can be an important standard for evaluating definitions in resolving topicality debates.”

6. BURDEN IS ON THE OPPOSITION

The opposition wants to apply a specialized definition to a different specialized field – that of debate. It is therefore their burden to prove that the two fields are analogous in this instance.

7. DEFINITION IS NOT UNIVERSAL

Words and Phrases, CORPUS JURIS SECUNDUM, etc., provide court cases defining words as they are meant to be used in a particular statute or situation. They are specific and without universal meaning.

8. APPLICATION IS LIMITED

(CORPUS JURIS SECUNDUM, 1956, p. 146)

“Legal definitions in particular are not usually well regarded, as they are generally a posteriori and involve at some stage the inductive process and not the deductive process familiar to a priori disciplines.”

9. LEGAL LANGUAGE IS EMPIRICALLY HARMFUL

Robert Benson, (prof. of law, Loyola Law School, NYU REVIEW OF LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE, vol. 13, “The End of Legalese: The Game is Over,” 1984-85, p. 520)

“With cynical rhetoric bolstered by uncontradicted empirical evidence that legal language does not do what it is supposed to do, does many harmful things that it is not supposed to do, and is quite unnecessary, the critics score their points.”

10. LEGAL LANGUAGE IS POLITICALLY BIASED

Gary Peller, (Asst. Prof. Of Law, U. of VA., CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW, Vol 73, 1985, pp. 1152-53)

“(L)egal reasoning is political and ideological in the manner in which legal discourse excludes (or suppresses) other modes of discourse, the way in which it differentiates itself from 'mere' opinion or will.”

11. DEFINITION CAN'T BE JUSTIFIED

Gary Peller, (Asst. Prof. Of Law, U. of VA., CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW, Vol 73, 1985, pp. 1155)

“Dominant legal thought in recent American history merely institutionalizes particular visions of the social world. These visions cannot be justified under legal thought's own criteria of rationality. Thus, the violence of legal thought consists in the arbitrary exclusion of other ways of understanding the world, other knowledges, and in the redefinition of violence itself.”

LEGAL DEFINITIONS NOT PRECISE

1. LEGAL LANGUAGE IS NOT PRECISE

David Mellinkoff, (Prof. of Law, UCLA, UCLA LAW REVIEW, Vol. 31, "The Myth of Precision and the Law Dictionary, December 1983, p. 424)

"(P)recision as justification for the language of the law is myth. Only the smallest part of legal language is precise."

2. LEGAL LANGUAGE IS IMPRECISE

Robert Benson, (prof. of law, Loyola Law School, NYU REVIEW OF LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE, vol. 13, "The End of Legalese: The Game is Over," 1984-85, p. 560)

"(I)n fact there is relatively little precision, intelligible or unintelligible, in legal language."

3. LEGAL DEFINITION IS ANTITHESIS OF PRECISION

David Mellinkoff, (Prof. of Law, UCLA, UCLA LAW REVIEW, Vol. 31, "The Myth of Precision and the Law Dictionary, December 1983, p. 432)

"Despite a common mode of decision and a reliance on precedent, the essence of the common law tradition is the room for diversity. Alter the facts a little, and the law changes just a little to meet the change, shadings of interpretation. So there is new precedent, tons of it. Precedent for everything. Precedents on law and precedents in language. Precedents in every directions: the antithesis of precision; the law's own best rejection of its prized myth."

4. NOT OBJECTIVE SOURCE

Gary Peller, (Asst. Prof. Of Law, U. of VA., CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW, Vol 73, 1985, pp. 1181)

"(O)ne might analyze judicial interpretation of the Constitution, statutes, precedent, contracts, or wills to show that no innocent reading of them is possible. Such applications debunk the claims that legal interpretation is ruled by objective, determinate meaning residing in a written text."

5. AMBIGUITY AND CONFUSION FROM LEGAL SOURCES

Robert Benson, (prof. of law, Loyola Law School, NYU REVIEW OF LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE, vol. 13, "The End of Legalese: The Game is Over," 1984-85, p. 560)

"Anyone who believes the law is precise has not read Mellinkoff's 100 pages or so. In those pages he exposes the ambiguity, confusion, and litigation generated by the ... alleged precision tools of the trade."

LEGAL DEFINITIONS HURT DEBATE

1. CONFUSION, NONSENSE, AND EMPTINESS RESULT

Robert Benson, (prof. of law, Loyola Law School, NYU REVIEW OF LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE, vol. 13, "The End of Legalese: The Game is Over," 1984-85, p. 521-2)

"Rodell scorned legal language as 'nonsense' and 'solemn hocus-pocus' that reads as if it had been 'translated from the German by someone with a rather meager knowledge of English.' It serves only to 'conceal the confusion and vagueness and emptiness of legal thinking.'"

2. EMPIRICAL PROOF THAT COMPREHENSION DECREASES

Robert Benson, (prof. of law, Loyola Law School, NYU REVIEW OF LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE, vol. 13, "The End of Legalese: The Game is Over," 1984-85, p. 531)

"There is plentiful evidence that lawyers' language is hocus pocus to nonlawyers, and that nonlawyers cannot comprehend it. There exist scores of empirical studies showing that most of the linguistic features found in legalese cause comprehension difficulties."

3. LEGAL LANGUAGE DAMAGES PEOPLE

Robert Benson, (prof. of law, Loyola Law School, NYU REVIEW OF LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE, vol. 13, "The End of Legalese: The Game is Over," 1984-85, p. 543)

"The law causes people to lose their bank accounts, their liberty, or even their heads on the assumption that such passages of legal prose are adequately, perhaps fully, understood."

4. INCOHERENT AND EMOTIONAL RESULTS

Gary Peller, (Asst. Prof. Of Law, U. of VA., CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW, Vol 73, 1985, pp. 1155)

"The study of the underlying metaphysical assumptions of legal thought suggests that the purported distinction between rational legal argumentation and irrational emotional appeal is incoherent."

5. SETS IRRATIONAL LIMITS

Gary Peller, (Asst. Prof. Of Law, U. of VA., CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW, Vol 73, 1985, pp. 1155)

"Legal 'rationality,' the felt necessity with which one proposition seems to follow from another, is based on underlying structures of meaning. These instituted codes of 'common sense' freeze the argumentative play of analogy by providing categories that form boundaries for 'real' similarity and difference. These metaphors for organizing perception and communication, however, cannot themselves be justified as rational rather than rhetorical."

6. NO BETTER THAN A BAD MYTH

Gary Peller, (Asst. Prof. Of Law, U. of VA., CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW, Vol 73, 1985, pp. 1156)

"The presentation of legal activity as 'reasoning' depends on the institutionalization of metaphysical beliefs about the social world and thus legal reasoning may be seen as an instance of social mythologizing."

7. VOTING ISSUE

Punish them for using confused, empirically damaging definition sources.

OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS ARE UNACCEPTABLE

1. Neg. now has definition presumption, since the affirmative offers no sources and no sources and no derivation for their unstated definitions we occupy the ground first.

2. THEY ARE IMPRECISE

There is no way to distinguish plans that would be within the topic from those that would be outside of it. Use of operational definitions burdens the negative with guessing thousands of possible uses for words by authors.

3. THEY AVOID DEFINING

What the affirmative is saying is “we don't know what the resolution means per se, but we are sure that this plan falls under it.” We still have no idea how to divide ground. This makes topicality an irrelevant issue, which is unfair to the negative.

4. THE NEGATIVE GETS THE REST

All counterplans are legitimate, all generic disads. Link. Debate is a zero-sum game. The affirmative gets the resolution, the negative gets the rest of the potential ground. If the affirmative is saying that their plan is resolution, then the negative gets all the rest of the ground from which to choose its position. This is legitimate since the affirmative has taken away our ability to argue topicality.

REASONABILITY IS BAD

1. IT IS TOO VAGUE – WITH REASONABILITY YOU DON'T KNOW WHAT YOU ARE GETTING.

James Unger, (ROSTRUM, October 1981, p. 6)

“The language of reasonableness does surely possess a certain superficial attraction. Unfortunately, closer examination reveals that it is totally ineffective in setting acceptable limits to affirmative definitional abuse. This is so because a word or concept itself is extremely vague and ambiguous. As one court put it, 'an attempt to give specific meaning to the word- reasonable- is trying to count what is not a number and to measure what is not space.’”

2. EDUCATION IS DECREASED – NO GUIDANCE IS SET

James Unger, (ROSTRUM, October 1981, p. 8)

“One man's reasonableness is another man's irrationality. Yet this situation is totally ad odds with the role we have assigned to this concept. Theoretically, 'reasonability' provides a clear, objective standard to judgment against which each and every aff approach can be compared and weighed. Practically, it is less than useless in offering such guidance.”

3. UNFAIR TO THE NEGATIVE

The affirmative can claim almost any definition is reasonable and therefore there is no limit to the kind of cases the affirmative could run. The result would be an unfair debate with negative ground extremely limited.

4. IT MAKES DEBATE SHALLOW

The topic becomes too broad. With so much encompassed under the topic, it can all be only superficial, thus weakening the clash and the debate.

5. ELIMINATES TRUE/FALSE TEST OF RESOLUTION

If the resolution cannot be proven topical because of its broad interpretation, then we have no way of knowing if the resolution is a true or false proposition.

6. IT REWARDS LAZY RESEARCH

Instead of being required to use the best definition, or even a better one, we are allowing a lazy debater to use the reasonable definition.

EXTENSIONS TO REASONABILITY IS BAD

IS TOO VAGUE (#1)

1. Sets no limits
2. Is ambiguous
3. Makes topicality a nonissue. Anything can be viewed as reasonable.
4. Unger evidence analysis not denied by other evidence.
5. Unbiased experts agree.

Leo Pfeiffer, (RELIGION IN AMERICA, 1968, p. 90)

“Justice Black called the word reasonable “that irresponsible, vague and elusive standard which at times threatens to engulf the entire law, including the Constitution itself, in a sea of judicial indirection.”

6. Not ascertainable by objective referent.

(CORPUS JURIS SECUNDUM, vol. 75, supplement, 1980, p. 108)

“The term 'reasonable' is a factual expression not ascertainable by reference to rule, law, or formula, and is not subject to exactness of definition.”

EDUCATION IS DECREASED (#2)

1. Not clear or objective standard.
2. Unger evidence analysis not confronted by other evidence.
3. Reduces chance for finding truth. Complex issues more prone to misanalysis.

James Rosenau, (professor, political science, JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, 1968, p. 176)

“Burdened with a common sense terminology, the political analyst must be especially conscious of the technical meanings he ascribes to it. Otherwise he can easily slip into the popular rhetoric without knowing it, thus greatly reducing his chance of successfully probing the complex processes in which he is interested.”

ELIMINATES TRUE/FALSE TEST (#5)

1. GOAL OF DEBATE IS THE TRUE/FALSE TEST.

2. AFF. POSITION CREATES A “MAYBE’ ATMOSPHERE. THIS IS ABUSIVE.

3. AFF. POSITION IGNORES SEARCH FOR TRUTH.

Their position makes truth irrelevant, their position makes debate an irrelevant game with no real world validity.

4. COMMON SENSE IS FALSE AND MISLEADING ISSUE.

Horwitz and Ferleger, (STATISTICS FOR SOCIAL CHANGE, 1980, p. 14)

“Common sense can be misleading. Sometimes we are in danger of rejecting a new truth because it seems to run counter to our common sense. There are some people who still refuse to believe that the earth is round. Common sense tells us that if it were, the people underneath would fall off.”

5. “REASONABLE” IS ELASTIC AND ALWAYS CHANGING.

(BALLANTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY, 3rd Edition, 1969, p. 1060)

“What is reasonable depends on a variety of circumstances and considerations. It is an elastic term which is of uncertain value in a definition.”

REDUNDANCY IS A BAD COUNTERPLAN STANDARD

1. REDUNDANCY IS NOT A LEGITIMATE STANDARD

A. The purpose of a counterplan, or for any neg. argument is to give you a reason to vote against the resolution. They could serve no other possible purpose. Even if you could do plan another way, if you can still vote aff we are justified.

B. Redundancy does not disprove the topic or plan. Redundancy only proves another proposal achieves the same advantages. You cannot vote for a third alternative, you vote aff or neg and just because another proposal exists and is redundant, that doesn't mean you should reject ours.

2. NO PROOF THAT REDUNDANCY IS BAD

There is no evidence or analysis why identical law would be bad, negative has the burden of proof, and have chosen to initiate the counterplan.

3. REDUNDANCY ASSUMES NO BENEFITS

A. Net benefits is the only answer. If two laws can be adopted at the same time with no cost there is no reason not to. It's the negatives burden to prove that simultaneous adoption would be harmful, otherwise you vote aff.

B. Previous arguments take out net benefits analysis. We've proven that if you advocate plan and counterplan, you actually gain a net benefit.

4. TURN: REDUNDANCY IS GOOD.

Redundancy increases safeguards, and enforcement. There is a net benefit to having local, state and federal actors all enforcing the same laws.

RESOLUTIONAL CONTEXT IS A BAD STANDARD

1. DEFINITIONS BY PHRASE ARE ARBITRARY

It is arbitrary and capricious to assume a phrase is in context in contrast to single words. We do not know that their phrases are any more contextual than our definitions. A true contextual definition must define the entire resolution or it is just as bad as defining a single word.

2. DEFINITIONS ARE SUBJECTIVE

Gary Peller, (Asst. Prof. Of Law, U. of VA., CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW, Vol 73, 1985, pp. 1189)

“Contextualization, however, still requires the screening of the event through the interpreter's own representational system.”

3. EVERY DEFINITION INTERPRETS

Gary Peller, (Asst. Prof. Of Law, U. of VA., CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW, Vol 73, 1985, pp. 1172-3)

“A particular description of the context involves screening the text through representational terms use by the interpreter. It is an effect of the interpreter's differentiation of what outside the work counts and what doesn't. Accordingly, context is the result of the interpreter's activity rather than the ground for it.”

4. CONTEXTUAL DEFINITIONS VARY CONSTANTLY

S I Hayakawa, (former professor of Language, San Francisco State College, LANGUAGE IN THOUGHT AND ACTION, 1978, 4th ed., p. 54)

“(If we accept the proposition that the contexts of an utterance determine its meaning, it becomes apparent that since no two contexts are ever *exactly* the same, no two meanings can every be exactly the same.” (emphasis in original)

5. NO OBJECTIVE CONTEXTS EXISTS

Gary Peller, (Asst. Prof. Of Law, U. of VA., CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW, Vol 73, 1985, pp. 1172)

“Any attempt to fix the meaning of a text by the specification of context runs up against the problem that any given context is open to further description. Context does not exist somewhere. Context is constructed by the interpreter according to her calculus of relevance and irrelevance.”

6. NEGATIVE DEFINITIONS VARY CONSTANTLY

James Edie, (Chair, Department of Philosophy, Northwestern University, SPEAKING AND MEANING: THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF LANGUAGE, 1976, p. 18)

“No two occurrences of a given sentence or word are ever, strictly speaking, physically identical with any other, and their physical properties do not, in themselves, guarantee that this particular employment of these particular sounds will or will not carry meaning either for the one here and now who utters the linguistic string or for the hearer to whom it is addressed.”

Topicality is/is not a Voting Issue

AFFIRMATIVES SHOULD NOT GET LEEWAY ON TOPICALITY

1. **JUDGE'S BELIEFS SHOULD NOT DECIDE ANY ISSUE**
If you give leeway you are letting biases rather than clash and the flow settle who wins.
2. **IS UNFAIR DOUBLE STANDARD**
Gives aff. Unethical edge at winning. It reduces the number of voting issues for the affirmative.
3. **AFFIRMATIVE HAS OFFSETTING ADVANTAGES**
Speaking first and last is at least as great an advantage as the negative block – in fact they are traditionally viewed as off-setting advantages.
4. **AFFIRMATIVE HAD AMPLE TIME**
Our topicality arguments were among the first issues we put out, and the affirmative has had virtually all of their speaking time to answer them. There is no reason that they should be given additional leeway.
5. **IMPOSSIBLE TO DEBATE**
The logical implication on this position is that even if we defeat all arguments that the affirmative presents they would still win because they have leeway.
6. **UNLIMITING STANDARD**
This is one of the most unlimiting standards imaginable because if accepted it would give affirmative wide presumption on topicality.
7. **SHOULD SEEK BETTER DEFINITION**
It is preferable to seek the better definition than give the affirmative leeway on topicality. That's what debate is supposed to be all about.

FAIR WARNING DOES NOT ELIMINATE TOPICALITY

1. **FAIR WARNING IS A CONTEXTUAL OXYMORON**
If warning is necessary the case isn't fair. We don't need warning on topical cases.
2. **TURN THIS ANALYSIS AGAINST THE AFFIRMATIVE**
Our topicality attacks are no surprise so they've had fair warnings and should have more and better answers.
3. **IRRELEVANT TO JURISDICTION**
The affirmative is still non-topical, and the judge still lacks jurisdiction to consider the substantive issues.
4. **COMPLETELY UNLIMITS THE TOPIC**
If you accept this standard the affirmative could run anything as long as they gave people fair warning.
5. **NO STANDARDS FOR "FAIR"**
What constitutes 'fair' warning? How much advance notification must we be given? The affirmative must justify a standard or we have no way of determining if the amount of warning was "fair."
6. **PUNISHES GOOD RESEARCH**
Just because the negative has evidence does not make your case topical. The Aff. Is asking the judge to punish the negative for their good research skills.
7. **THIS ARGUMENT PROVES THE ABUSE**
The Aff expansion the topic, forces us to do more research on any case they "warn" us about. Negative research burdens expands infinitely if they call me every night and tell me about another case idea.

DECISION RULE: MISUSE OF LANGUAGE IS DISASTROUS

1. POOR USAGE ENDANGERS SOCIETY

Thomas Elliott Berry, (prof. of English, West Chester State College, *THE MOST COMMON MISTAKES IN ENGLISH USAGE*, 1961, p. vi)

“(O)ne should realize that rules for usage are necessary to maintain the uniformity of meaning that language has had across the years. If everyone were suddenly permitted to speak and write as he pleased, a chaotic situation would soon result...Guidelines for usage, therefore, are actually one of society's most important safeguards.”

2. CORRECT USAGE ESSENTIAL TO NATIONAL SURVIVAL

Edwin Newman (NBC, DEPT. OF COMMERCE REPORT: *THE PRODUCTIVITY OF PLAIN ENGLISH*, January 1983, p. 9)

“We must use the language competently and accurately; the well being of the nation requires it... That may not seem to be as dramatic a challenge as some others that face the country. But in the long run it is as pressing as any, and it may be in the short run as well.”

3. SLOPPY LANGUAGE LEADS TO TOTALITARIANISM AND VIOLENCE

Geoffrey Nunberg, (prof., theoretical linguistics, Stanford U., *ATLANTIC*, December 1983, p. 38)

‘The most widely cited of all 20th century essays on the language is Orwell's *POLITICS AND THE ENGLISH LANGUAGES*, the burden of which is that sloppy language makes for sloppy thinking and totalitarianism. In the same vein, Auden wrote of the language, ‘when it's corrupted, people lose faith in what they hear, and that leads to violence.’”

4. POOR USAGE IMPOVERISHES MILLIONS

Edwin Newman (NBC, DEPT. OF COMMERCE REPORT: *THE PRODUCTIVITY OF PLAIN ENGLISH*, January 1983, p. 9)

“(W)hen it comes to language, millions of Americans are cheated ... because they have never been led to understand the pleasure and satisfaction that come from using the language imaginatively and precisely. Their lives are narrowed and impoverished as a result.”

5. MISUSE HINDERS TRUE KNOWLEDGE

John Locke in S I Hayakawa, (former professor of Language, San Francisco State College, *LANGUAGE IN THOUGHT AND ACTION*, 1978, 4th ed., p. 32)

“Vague and insignificant forms of speech, and abuse of language ... are but the covers of ignorance and hindrance of true knowledge.”

JUDGES MUST VOTE WITHIN THEIR JURISDICTION

1. JUDGES HAVE JURISDICTION

Thomas L. Murphy, (Lecturer in the Greenspan School of Communications, Director of Forensics, University of Nevada, ARGUMENTATION AND ADVOCACY, 1990, p. 145)

“The role of the judge in this process is to hear evidence, and if jurisdiction is challenged decide whether a subject matter or person is properly before the court.”

2. RESOLUTION IS THE JURISDICTION

The judge enters the room with a duty; to either vote or against for the resolution. If the aff time is non-topical, or outside the resolution, then the judge cannot vote for them because they are outside your jurisdiction.

3. REAL WORLD PROVES

If something is brought up in a trial that is outside the jurisdiction of the judge an/or their court, then they simply throw it out of the trial. Just the same, you should throw the aff case out of the round if it is outside of your jurisdiction.

4. EMPIRICAL EXAMPLES EXIST

Thomas L. Murphy, (Lecturer in the Greenspan School of Communications, Director of Forensics, University of Nevada, ARGUMENTATION AND ADVOCACY, 1990, p. 145)

“Thus an appellate court doesn't conduct trial, a family court will not adjudicate an antitrust matter, and a state court will not decide a purely federal matter.”

5. FAILURE DEMANDS A NEGATIVE BALLOT

If the aff team fails to fall within the jurisdiction of the judge or is untopical, then because the judge can't vote outside the resolution, this demands a negative ballot.

LIBERAL TOPIC INTERPRETATIONS ARE INTOLERABLE

1. THEY ARE UNFAIR

Broad topic interpretations fail to consider debate as a competition. Fair competition requires rules that afford participants equal opportunities for success.

2. THREATENS DEBATE FREEDOM

An institutional reaction to broad topic interpretations would lead to framing more restrictive topics. Such topics would include binding parameters for the resolution, and even more pernicious means control. Self-regulation is needed to avoid institutional restrictions.

3. REDUCES BURDEN OF PROOF

Broad topic interpretations significantly reduce the burden of proof requirements for affirmative arguments. Broad topics make careful negative preparation a counterproductive strategy.

4. NARROW INTERPRETATIONS HAVE LESS SUBJECTIVITY, LESS BIASED INTERVENTION

More narrow interpretations make topicality more concise and requires less subjectivity by judges.

5. NON EDUCATIONAL

Broad interpretations promote superficial research and analysis. A deep understanding of the topic is sacrificed for the shallow knowledge necessary when many cases are tolerated.

6. UNFAIR RESEARCH BURDENS

Allowing broad interpretations means the negative must research so much that few case specifics can be developed or, alternatively, we continue to make ourselves look stupid to outsiders by running meatball disadvantages and counterplans.

7. THEY VITIATE THE FUNDAMENTAL TOPIC PURPOSE

The function of the resolution is to offer prior notice of the issues to be debated. Liberal interpretations do not serve to sufficiently direct the discussion to provide prior notice of the range of issues.

8. DEPTH BETTER THAN BREADTH

The very fact that we choose to put limits on debate is proof that the debate community has already decided in depth debate is better than broad debate.

9. UNREASON ABILITY RESTRICTS NEGATIVE GROUND

Broad topic interpretations have the unfortunate consequences of limiting the potential areas of negative argumentation. (For example, broad topic interpretations reduce counterplan possibilities.

10. DETERS DEBATE

11. EDUCATIONAL SACRIFICES UNFAIRLY REQUIRED

The amount of research required for in-depth knowledge of all the cases means that classes must be sacrificed. Academic debate must strive to be compatible with the other components of a well rounded education.

12. REDUCES AFFIRMATIVE BIAS

Perfectly fair debate would result in an even number of affirmative and negative wins. However, overly broad interpretations of the topic have enhanced the affirmative advantage of surprise which results in an affirmative bias. Narrower interpretations would facilitate the restoration of a balance between the affirmative and negative.

PRECISE DEFINITION(S) CRITICAL

1. ONLY WAY TO FIND TRUTH

John Wilson, (LANGUAGE AND THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH, 1967, p. 46)

“Most of the time we use words unconsciously, without thinking what we are saying. If we can become conscious of them and interested in them for their own sake and for the sake of the job they do, we shall be well on the road to understanding. And if we can do the same with statements, we shall have equipped ourselves with an effective method of discovering truth and knowledge.”

2. AVOIDS CONFUSION

A strict definition cannot be mistaken in its true implications.

3. DECREASES JUDGE SUBJECTIVITY

A precise definition has a precise meaning; therefore, the judge does not have to use his/her own subjectivity to decide what the word means and if it includes a resolutive meaning.

4. PRESUMPTION SUPPORTS SPECIFICITY

If one is not specific in definitions, a word can, in essence, lose its value since it can be said to mean a variety of things.

5. IMPROVES CLASH, EXTENSION AND FOCUS

By using specific definitions, the negative research capacities are decreased and a more fair debate can be achieved. Thus, not every case an affirmative pulls out is topical and negatives have a more equal chance of winning.

6. CLARIFIES ISSUES

The purpose of definition is to communicate a specific meaning to a listener. If a definition is ambiguous it does not meet its purpose, and is therefore a bad definition.

EXTENSION FOR PRECISE DEFINITION(S)

Extend 1 – ONLY WAY TO FIND TRUTH

John Wilson, (LANGUAGE AND THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH, 1967, p. ix)

“All the most important problems, the problems of religion, morals, politics, and sociology, can only be solved via the use of words. To understand the use of words properly is plainly a prior condition of solving them successfully.”

Extend 2 – AVOIDS CONFUSION. ANYTHING LESS IS NOT A DEFINITION

(WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, 1967, p. 297)

“Define (means) ... to make distinct, clear, or detailed. To identify the essential qualities or meaning of.”

Extend 6 – CLARIFIES ISSUES. ANY LESS BREAKS THE RULES

John Wilson, (LANGUAGE AND THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH, 1967, p. 18)

“Learning to communicate by means of a language is rather like learning to play a game. We have to learn the rules and the purposes of the rules, and how the various parts of the game are related. Only by learning these can we play the game successfully. In just the same way, successful communication depends on our understanding of the language-rules which govern the use of words.”

REVERSE TOPICALITY IS NOT A VOTER

1. LEGISLATIVE POLICY MAKING DOES NOT OPERATE THIS WAY

A legislator, upon deciding he has actual jurisdiction over the policy does not automatically vote for the policy. When topicality is at issue and the affirmative proves their own topicality this does not grant the decision in its favor. It merely puts the issue to rest so debate can continue.

2. TOPICALITY SETS THE STAGE FOR DETERMINING PRIMA-FACIE.

This is to say that the affirmative case must be proven within the boundaries of the resolution much like a court of law.

Roy V. Wood, (STRATEGIC DEBATE, 1972, p. 16)

“Such a case, which represent the minimum required to meet the burden of proof, is called a prima-facie case. If the prosecution (affirmative) does not have a prima-facie case, it cannot meet the obligation implied in the fundamental presumption that a man is innocent until he is proven guilty.”

3. TOPICALITY AS A REVERSE VOTER IS CONTRARY TO THE AFFIRMATIVE BURDEN OF PROOF.

They must still prove that their policy is superior to any other argument the negative could enter in the course of the debate.

4. REVERSE TOPICALITY IS NOT TRADITIONAL

5. UNFAIR DOUBLE STANDARD

Affirmative emphasizes some issues and minimized others in rebuttals. Neg. should have same right.

TOPICALITY IS A VOTING ISSUE

1. VIOLATES JUDGE'S JURISDICTION

You gave no authority to vote affirmative because the case is outside the scope of the resolution.

2. HAS GREAT VALUE

More educational than policy clashes.

3. RESOLUTION IS KEY

The affirmative is trying to prove the resolution is better than the status quo. If they are not topical, they are not an example of the resolution and debate becomes meaningless.

W. H. Bennett, (Former Chairman, Comm. Dept. Bowdoin College, PRAGMATIC DEBATE, 2008, p. 9)

“If a significant part of the case is not topical, the affirmative has not met their burden of showing that the topic should be adopted.”

4. SOCIAL CONTRACT

Debaters make a social contract to debate only the topic by entering under tournament rules. All tournaments include adherence to the current topic in the invitation. They should debate elsewhere if they cannot accept the social contract.

5. PRIMA FACIE REQUIREMENT

6. RULE OF THE GAME

Topicality is an issue like every other issue of debate. If the affirmative is not topical then they deserve to lose.

7. PRESERVES LANGUAGE

If it is impossible to determine concrete meanings for words, then debate itself becomes impossible because we will be unable to understand key ideas.

8. PRESERVES DEBATE BY GUARANTEEING FAIR DIVISION OF GROUND

Retaining topicality as a voting issue is the only way to be sure the topic stays manageable. Without topicality as a voting issue negative teams would be faced with a whole slew of non-topical plans, destroying the negatives ability to argue effectively.

EXTENSIONS TO T IS A VOTING ISSUE

1. VIOLATES JURISDICTION

1. Experts agree with neg.

Dale A. Herbeck and John P. Katsulas, (U of IA, JRNL. OF THE AM. FORENSIC ASSOC., Win 1985, p. 136-37)

“In many respects topicality is a jurisdictional question. If the affirmative presents a nonresolutional case, a judge does not have the authority to adjudicate the matter since it falls outside the scope of the resolution.”

2. Ignoring jurisdiction makes debate silly and meaningless.

James J. Unger, (Paper (CA), Georgetown U, SPEECH COMM. ASSOC., November 14, 1981, p. 1-2)

“Imagine if you will, the Supreme court suddenly declaring that it will adjudicate any and all cases to which it takes fancy. Constitutionality or federal questions are no longer “voting issues” to them. Or the typical college professor assigned to each Advanced Calculus who amazes his eager students by informing them that their intellectual breadth will be better served if he offers them a course in Introductory Russian. Let us not even lawn who decided that his First Amendment free expression rights were being infringed upon and chopped down all your trees instead.”

3. Unlimited jurisdiction means unlimited aff. Ground. And that gives aff. unfair advantage.

2. RESOLUTION IS KEY

1. Bennett evidence is uncontested.

2. If case doesn't prove need for all resolution then only part of topic is warranted.

3. Being subtopical reduces aff. Burdens. This is unfair, reduces intellectual growth, reduces research skill development, and avoids prima facie obligations.

4. Being subtopical means neg. ballot

David Thomas, (Director of Forensics at Auburn University, ADVANCED DEBATE, 1983, p. 72)

“Thus, if the negative can show that adoption of the affirmative plan would not result in full implementation of the resolution, no more and no less, or if the negative can show that the affirmative case fails to justify the proposed change, then the affirmative must fail in its bid to earn acceptance of the resolution.”

3. PRIMA FACIE REQUIREMENT

1. Texts support neg.

2. Topicality is not assumed. Aff. must demonstrate that plan implements all of resolution or are not prima facie.

David Williams et. al., (U. of Kansas, UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS HANDBOOK ON FOREIGN TRADE POL., p. 1-3)

“The negative can argue that topicality is an aspect of the prima facie burden of the affirmative. Normally a “prima facie case must include a specific plan to implement the resolution”, and the “justification of the plan” must be one “that a reasonable and prudent man would accept” at first look. Unless the affirmative demonstrates that the plan does implement the resolution (i.e., that it is a topical plan), they have not fulfilled their prima facie burden, and, the negative can argue, they should lose.”

4. RULE OF THE GAME

- A. Changing ground rules horribly unfair.

Every competitive activity has ground rules which must be followed. Just as time constraints and speaking order are not subject to dispute, neither should be the procedural issue of what is to be debated.

- B. Rules and equity demand it.

Dale A. Herbeck and John P. Katsulas, (U of IA, JRNL. OF THE AM. FORENSIC ASSOC., Win 1985, p. 136-37)

“Similar to the rules which govern the time limits and the number of speeches for a debate, the rule that topicality is a voting issue remains nondebatable. For equity reasons, the participants of all competitive games arrive at some consensual agreement on the rules prior to the start of the contest.”

C. All paradigms support it.

a. POLICY MAKING

A Senate committee can't offer bills which aren't in its policy domain just as a judge can't vote on a case outside his jurisdiction.

Zarefsky & Patterson, (CONTEMPORARY DEBATE, 1983, p. 124)

“These jurisdictional questions preempt the substantive issues, meaning that if the negative can defeat the resolution or jurisdictional grounds, it usually will not need to consider the resolution's merits.”

b. HYPO TESTING

A scientist would view a non-topical plan as an incorrect test of the resolution.

c. STOCK ISSUES

Topicality is a stock issue, much the same as solvency or inherency.

d. GAMES

We started this debate with the idea that the topic was the area of discussion, now the affirmative is trying to change the accepted rules after the game has started.

D. Tournament invitation requires it. By accepting the invitation they accepted debating the topic.

5. PRESERVES DEBATE

a. Division of ground essential equity, honesty, fairness, textbooks all require it.

b. Not voting on it rewards weak teams.

G. T. Goodnight, (Director of Graduate Studies, Northwestern University, CARE FOR THE POOR, 1984, p. 29)

“If the affirmative could win every round of debate because the resolution was so self-evidently necessary and undoubtedly justified, then fair competition could not be provided. The worst team would always succeed against the better, when on the appropriate side. The team that did no research would win over the team that was well prepared, spending long, diligent hours in the library. Rounds of debate would not be an educational experience, for nothing would be learned, except the side that is true is always true. Debate would be utterly valueless, except perhaps as an exercise in public speaking.”

c. Preserves ground. Counterplans and Justification attacks are gone if T is gone.

TOPICALITY ARGUMENTATION IS HARMFUL

1. TOPICALITY ARGUMENTS STIFLE CREATIVITY AND EXPRESSION

Reliance upon the language of history and contemporary definitions will prevent an exploration of new events and systems and prevent development of more accurate, complete, and personal forms of communication.

2. WE PROMOTE NEW IDEAS AND NEW THOUGHT

Frederik Schauer, (Professor of Law, William and Mary University, *FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY*, May 1982, p. 99)

“We must often break the rules of language in order to convey new ideas and new experiences. We see this in the use of metaphor, and in much that we call creative thinking – breaking the rules of language in order to penetrate through the structural constraints on thought imposed by ordinary language.”

3. HISTORICAL EXAMPLES PROVE

Control over language use hurts individual creativity and provides an instrument for social control.

Ivan Illich, (Prof. Medieval History, *SHADOW WORK*, 1981, p. 63)

“Dependence on taught mother tongue can be taken as the paradigm of all other dependencies typical of humans in an age of commodity-defined needs.”

4. PROGRESS AND THOUGHT PROMOTED BY AFFIRMATIVE

Frederik Schauer, (Professor of Law, William and Mary University, *FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY*, May 1982, p. 99)

“The exclusion of all non-traditional methods of communication may impair the development of novel communication tools.”

5. DEFINITIONS RESTRICT LANGUAGE DEVELOPMENT

The imposition of definitions by the negative will halt the evolutionary development of language that can increase understanding. The imposition of meaning by reference to definitions can only produce an anti-intellectual, destructive language.

TOPICALITY IS NOT A VOTING ISSUE

1. CANNOT BE WRONG ON TOPICALITY

Robert Hall, (Prof. of Linguistics, Cornell University, LINGUISTICS AND YOUR LANGUAGE, 1960, pp. 28-9)

“Right and wrong, then, have no meaning as applied to language. That is, by definition, we can never be wrong in our own language.”

2. REWARDS LAZY RESEARCH

It allows the negative to spend all their time on bad topicality violations so they never have to research case specifics.

3. TOPICALITY DECREASES EDUCATION

With no topicality burden you can discuss more cases and ideas and therefore learn more.

4. CLASH IS THE KEY

The purpose of debate is to compare opposite ideas. The negative read evidence against our case so there is clash. They must obviously think our case is topical if they researched against it.

5. EXPAND JURISDICTION

If the affirmative case can save lives or prevent a war, the judge should expand his jurisdiction and vote for the plan.

6. TIME SUCK

The negative runs topicality as a time suck to avoid other, more substantive issues.

7. OBSOLETE ISSUE

With the many innovations in debate topicality has become irrelevant.

8. AMBIGUITY

Words have different meanings. We could debate this for hours and reach no firm conclusions. Avoid wasting time on topicality by not voting for it.

9. DENIES ACADEMIC FREEDOM

We should have the right to speak out and research any relevant question.

10. VOTE FOR THE TEAM NOT THE RESOLUTION

The ballot says the better debating was done by _____ not that the resolution was affirmed. Vote for the best debaters.

11. EQUALS BETTER ARGUMENTATION

We will be able to debate substantive issues instead of topicality. Too often, topicality becomes a mind boggling argument over meaningless standards or silly violations.

12. JUDICIAL ANALOGY INAPPROPRIATE

The only reason why judges strictly interpret within their own jurisdictions is that should they not have the jurisdiction another judge would hear the case. If a debate judge decides against jurisdiction no one else will listen to the case and its substantive value.

13. NO CORRECT INTERPRETATION POSSIBLE

Robert Hall, (Prof. of Linguistics, Cornell University, LINGUISTICS AND YOUR LANGUAGE, 1960, p. 6)

“There is no such thing as good and bad or correct and incorrect, grammatical and ungrammatical, right and wrong in language.”

14. PRESERVES FAIRNESS

The negative still has all of the other stock issues to attack.

15. TOPIC LIMITS EQUAL DISTORTION

John Condon, (Prof. Of Speech, Northwestern University, SEMANTICS AND COMMUNICATION, 1966, p.

14)

“Any verbal system is arbitrary and no matter how many ways we slice up the world we are still distorting it. But to limit the number to just two possibilities is extremely distorting and is a semantic problem to be avoided at all costs.”

16. INCREASES CLASH

We will have more clash on the case now since negatives will not be arguing topicality.

17. DISCUSSION IS ENHANCED

Now we can discuss important areas that deal with part of the topic but would be considered nontopical otherwise.

PARADIGMS SUPPORT NON-VOTING ISSUE

1. **POLICYMAKING SUPPORTS**
Both Congress and the President often expand or exceed their jurisdiction.
2. **GAMES THEORY SUPPORTS**
Topicality is not a rule of debate. Speaker positions and time limits are the only rules.
3. **HYPO-TESTING SUPPORTS**
Scientists do not reject a hypothesis on the basis of definitions. They want to disprove it scientifically.
4. **TABULA ROSA SUPPORTS**
Nothing is automatically a voting issue for a tabula rosa judge.
5. **JUDGE INTERVENTION IS UNFAIR AND HARMFUL**
You should vote what's on your flowsheet, not what your prejudices are.

TOPICAL COUNTERPLAN ADVOCACY OR DEFENSE

Framework

Affirmative Shell – Long

A. Interpretation: the aff should win if the topical plan is the best policy option in the debate. The neg should win if the plan is proven worse than the status quo or a policy option competitive with the plan.

B. Violation:

C. Standards

1) Plan focus – our framework ensures a stable locus for links and the comparison of alternatives. Alternative frameworks which do not ensure that the plan is the starting-point of the debate make confusion and judge intervention inevitable.

Michael Ignatieff, Carr Professor of Human Rights Practice, Director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at the JFK School of Government, Harvard University, 2004, *The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror*, p. 20-1

There are two problems with a perfectionist stance, leaving aside the question of whether it is realistic. The first is that articulating nonrevocable, nonderogable moral standards is relatively easy. The problem is deciding how to apply them in specific cases. What is the line between interrogation and torture, between targeted killing and unlawful assassination, between preemption and aggression? Even when legal and moral distinctions between these are clear in the abstract, abstractions are less than helpful when political leaders have to choose between them in practice. Furthermore, the problem with perfectionist standards is that they contradict each other. The same person who shudders, rightly, at the prospect of torturing a suspect might be prepared to kill the same suspect in a preemptive attack on a terrorist base. Equally, the perfectionist commitment to the right to life might preclude such attacks altogether and restrict our response to judicial pursuit of offenders through process of law. Judicial responses to the problem of terror have their place, but they are no substitute for military operations when terrorists possess bases, training camps, and heavy weapons. To stick to a perfectionist commitment to the right to life when under terrorist attack might achieve moral consistency at the price of leaving us defenseless in the face of evildoers. Security, moreover, is a human right, and thus respect for one right might lead us to betray another. A lesser evil morality is antiperfectionist in its assumptions. It accepts as inevitable that it is not always possible to save human beings from harm without killing other human beings; not always possible to preserve full democratic disclosure and transparency in counterterrorist operations; not always desirable for democratic leaders to avoid deception and perfidy; not always possible to preserve the liberty of the majority without suspending the liberties of a minority; not always possible to anticipate terrible consequences of well-meant acts, and so on. Far from making ethical reflection irrelevant, these dilemmas make ethical realism all the more essential to democratic reflection and good public policy. The fact that liberal democratic leaders may order the surreptitious killing of terrorists, may withhold information from their voters, may order the suspension of civil liberties need not mean that “anything goes.” Even if liberties must be suspended, their suspension can be made temporary; if executives must withhold information from a legislature in public, they can be obliged to disclose it in private session or at a later date. Public disinformation whose sole purpose is to deceive the enemy might be justified, but deliberately misleading a democratic electorate with a view to exaggerating risk or minimizing hazard can never be. The same balancing act needs to be observed in other cases. If the

targeted killing of terrorists proves necessary, it can be constrained by strict rules of engagement and subjected to legislative oversight and review. The interrogation of terrorist suspects can be kept free of torture. Drawing these lines means keeping in clear sight the question of whether these means reinforce or betray the democratic identity they are supposed to defend.

2) Ground – there is an infinite number of unpredictable K frameworks, K links, and K impacts. Forcing the aff to debate in whatever framework the neg picks moots eight minutes of our speech time. Because the K could literally be about anything, their so-called framework destroys aff ground because we can never predict what we'll have to compare our plan to. Even if there's some ground for us to respond to their arg, it's not good or predictable and losing the 1AC puts us at an inherent disadvantage. In other words, fair and predictable ground is key to debate.

Ruth Lessl Shively, Associate Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M, 2000, Political Theory and Partisan Politics, p. 182-3

The point may seem trite, as surely the ambiguists would agree that basic terms must be shared before they can be resisted and problematized. In fact, they are often very candid about this seeming paradox in their approach: the paradoxical or "parasitic" need of the subversive for an order to subvert. But admitting the paradox is not helpful if, as usually happens here, its implications are ignored; or if the only implication drawn is that order or harmony is an unhappy fixture of human life. For what the paradox should tell us is that some kinds of harmonies or orders are, in fact, good for resistance; and some ought to be fully supported. As such, it should counsel against the kind of careless rhetoric that lumps all orders or harmonies together as arbitrary and inhumane. Clearly some basic accord about the terms of contest is a necessary ground for all further contest. It may be that if the ambiguists wish to remain full-fledged ambiguists, they cannot admit to these implications, for to open the door to some agreements or reasons as good and some orders as helpful or necessary, is to open the door to some sort of rationalism. Perhaps they might just continue to insist that this initial condition is ironic, but that the irony should not stand in the way of the real business of subversion. Yet difficulties remain. For agreement is not simply the initial condition, but the continuing ground, for contest. If we are to successfully communicate our disagreements, we cannot simply agree on basic terms and then proceed to debate without attention to further agreements. For debate and contest are forms of dialogue: that is, they are activities premised on the building of progressive agreements. Imagine, for instance, that two people are having an argument about the issue of gun control. As noted earlier, in any argument, certain initial agreements will be needed just to begin the discussion. At the very least, the two discussants must agree on basic terms: for example, they must have some shared sense of what gun control is about; what is at issue in arguing about it; what facts are being contested, and so on. They must also agree—and they do so simply by entering into debate—that they will not use violence or threats in making their cases and that they are willing to listen to, and to be persuaded by, good arguments. Such agreements are simply implicit in the act of argumentation.

3) Topic-specific education – only debates about the plan translate into education about the topic. There would be no reason to switch topics every year if not for plan-focus debate. K frameworks encourage ultra-generics like the ‘state bad’ K that are stale and uneducational.

4) Policymaking – debating about institutional implementation of plans is key to citizen agency and deliberation.

Adolf G. Gundersen, Associate Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M, 2000, Political Theory and Partisan Politics, p. 108-9

Will deliberation work the same way among ordinary citizens? Yes and no. Yes, deliberation will tend to heighten citizens appreciation of their interdependence. At the same time, the results are likely to be analogous rather than identical to those in formal governmental bodies, since citizen deliberation must of course function in the absence of the institutional interdependence established by the US constitution, with its clear specification of joint responsibilities. The theoretical mutuality of interests assumed by the Constitution exists among ordinary citizens, too. The difference is that they have only their interests, not the impetus of divided power, to encourage them to discover and articulate them. Granted. But once they begin to do so, they are every bit as likely to succeed as the average representative. Citizen deliberation, in other words, will intensify citizens' appreciation of interdependence. Although I cannot prove the point, **there are compelling reasons to think that citizen deliberation yields an awareness of overlapping interests**. I have already alluded to the first, and perhaps most telling of these: if governors in a system of divided government such as our own succeed in deliberating their way to the public interest (however imperfectly or irregularly), surely ordinary citizens can be counted upon to do the same thing. Indeed, if my initial argument that decision-making spells the end of deliberation is on the mark, then **we have good reason to expect citizens to deliberate better than their representatives**. One can add to these theoretical considerations a lengthening list of **empirical findings** which **suggest not only that citizens are willing and able to engage in political deliberation, but also that they are quite able to do so**—able, that is, precisely in the sense of coming to a deeper appreciation of the collective nature of the problems they face (Dale et al. 1995; Gundersen 1995; Dryzek 1990; see also Gundersen n.d., chapter 4). In the end, the claim that deliberation enhances interdependence is hardly a radical one. After all, if **deliberation will** of itself diminish partisanship, as I started out by saying, it must at the same time **enhance interdependence**. To aim between Athens and Philadelphia requires, perhaps more than anything else, a changed way of thinking about partisanship. **Institutions and ways of thinking tend to change together; hence if the institutional reorientation suggested here is to take root, it must be accompanied by a new way of thinking about partisanship. Shifting our appraisal of partisanship will amount to a nothing less than a new attitude toward politics. It will require that we aspire to something new**, something that is at once less lofty (and less threatening) than the unity to which direct democracy is supposed to lead, but more democratic (and more deliberative) than encouraging political deliberation among a selected group of representatives. As I argued above, it will require **that we seek to stimulate deliberation among all citizens**. With Madison, we need to view partisanship as inevitable. Collective choice, indeed choice itself, is a partisan affair. But we also need to resist the equation of politics and partisanship. If politics is seen as nothing more than a clash of partisan interests, it is likely to stay at that level. Conversely, for deliberation to work, it must be seen as reasonable, if not all-illuminating—as efficacious, if not all-powerful. At the same time, of course, **citizens must** borrow a page from the participatory democrat's book by coming to **view deliberation as their responsibility rather than something that is done only by others in city hall, the state capitol, or Congress—others who are**, after all, **under** direct and constant **pressure to act rather than deliberate**. **Politics**, in other words, **must be resuscitated as an allegiance to democratic deliberation**.

D. Defense

1) We don't exclude them - they get their kritik if it links to the plan, and they get their alternative if it is either the status quo or a governmental action. If their arg can't meet these requirements that proves it's unfair and not germane.

2) We get our aff – even if they win that their arg should be included, we get to weigh the impact of the 1AC against it.

E. Voter for education and fairness – framework is a precondition for debate.

Ruth Lessl **Shively**, Associate Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M, **2000**, Political Theory and Partisan Politics, p. 181-182

The requirements given thus far are primarily negative. The **ambiguists** must say "no" to—they **must reject and limit—some ideas and actions**. In what follows, we will also find that they must say "yes" to some things. In particular, they must say "yes" to the idea of rational persuasion. This means, first, that they must recognize the role of agreement in political contest, or the basic accord that is necessary to discord. The mistake that the ambiguists make here is a common one. The mistake is in thinking that agreement marks the end of contest—that consensus kills debate. But this is true only if the agreement is perfect—if there is nothing at all left to question or contest. In most cases, however, our agreements are highly imperfect. **We agree on** some matters but not on others, on **generalities but not on specifics, on principles but not on their applications**, and so on. And **this kind of limited agreement is the starting condition of contest and debate**. As John Courtney Murray writes: We hold certain truths; therefore we can argue about them. It seems to have been one of the corruptions of intelligence by positivism to assume that argument ends when agreement is reached. In a basic sense, the reverse is true. **There can be no argument except** on the premise, and **within a context, of agreement**. (Murray 1960, 10) In other words, **we cannot argue about something** if we are not communicating: **if we cannot agree on the topic and terms of argument or if we have utterly different ideas about what counts as evidence** or good argument. At the very least, **we must agree about what it is that is being debated before we can debate it**. For instance, **one cannot have an argument about euthanasia with someone who thinks euthanasia is a musical group**. One cannot successfully stage a sit-in if one's target audience simply thinks everyone is resting or if those doing the sitting have no complaints. Nor can one demonstrate resistance to a policy if no one knows that it is a policy. In other words, **contest is meaningless if there is a lack of agreement or communication about what is being contested**. Resisters, demonstrators, and **debaters must have some shared ideas about the subject and/or the terms of their disagreements**. The participants and the target of a sit-in must share an understanding of the complaint at hand. And a demonstrator's audience must know what is being resisted. In short, the contesting of an idea presumes some agreement about what that idea is and how one might go about intelligibly contesting it. In other words, **contestation rests on some basic agreement** or harmony.

Affirmative Shell - Short

A. Interpretation: the aff should win if the topical plan is the best policy option in the debate. The neg should win if the plan is proven worse than the status quo or a policy option competitive with the plan.

B. Violation:

C. Standards

1) Plan focus – our framework ensures a stable locus for links and the comparison of alternatives. Alternative frameworks which do not ensure that the plan is the starting-point of the debate make confusion and judge intervention inevitable.

2) Ground – there is an infinite number of unpredictable K frameworks, K links, and K impacts. Forcing the aff to debate in whatever framework the neg picks moots eight minutes of our speech time. Because the K could literally be about anything, their so-called framework destroys aff ground because we can never predict what we'll have to compare our plan to. Even if there's some ground for us to respond to their arg, it's not good or predictable and losing the 1AC puts us at an inherent disadvantage.

3) Topic-specific education – only debates about the plan translate into education about the topic. There would be no reason to switch topics every year if not for plan-focus debate. K frameworks encourage ultra-generics like the 'state bad' K that are stale and uneducational.

D. Voter for fairness and education

Negative Shell – Long (1/4)

A. Interpretation: the aff can only defend advantages based on the consequences of hypothetical enactment of their plan by the USFG. They should win if the topical plan is the best policy option presented. The neg should win if the plan is worse than the status quo or an alternative competitive with the plan.

B. Violation – the aff claims advantages independent of the enactment of a plan by the USFG

C. Standards

1) Plan focus – The plan is the starting-point for debate. If they claim advantages in the 1AC which do not stem from the plan, there is no way for us to predict what the content of those advantages will be. Consequently, there is no way for us to generate stable and predictable offense. Without plan focus, they would always leverage an artificial ground advantage—even if there are impact turns to the critiques, we should not have to be prepared to run them against their aff; and, in any case, they will always be better prepared to debate their own unpredictable drivel than we will. Ruth Lessl Shively, Associate Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M, 2000, Political Theory and Partisan Politics, p. 182-3

The point may seem trite, as surely the ambiguists would agree that basic terms must be shared before they can be resisted and problematized. In fact, they are often very candid about this seeming paradox in their approach: the paradoxical or "parasitic" need of the subversive for an order to subvert. But admitting the paradox is not helpful if, as usually happens here, its implications are ignored; or if the only implication drawn is that order or harmony is an unhappy fixture of human life. For what the paradox should tell us is that some kinds of harmonies or orders are, in fact, good for resistance; and some ought to be fully supported. As such, it should counsel against the kind of careless rhetoric that lumps all orders or harmonies together as arbitrary and inhumane. Clearly some basic accord about the terms of contest is a necessary ground for all further contest. It may be that if the ambiguists wish to remain full-fledged ambiguists, they cannot admit to these implications, for to open the door to some agreements or reasons as good and some orders as helpful or necessary, is to open the door to some sort of rationalism. Perhaps they might just continue to insist that this initial condition is ironic, but that the irony should not stand in the way of the real business of subversion. Yet difficulties remain. For agreement is not simply the initial condition, but the continuing ground, for contest. If we are to successfully communicate our disagreements, we cannot simply agree on basic terms and then proceed to debate without attention to further agreements. For debate and contest are forms of dialogue: that is, they are activities premised on the building of progressive agreements. Imagine, for instance, that two people are having an argument about the issue of gun control. As noted earlier, in any argument, certain initial agreements will be needed just to begin the discussion. At the very least, the two discussants must agree on basic terms: for example, they must have some shared sense of what gun control is about; what is at issue in arguing about it; what facts are being contested, and so on. They must also agree—and they do so simply by entering into debate—that they will not use violence or threats in making their cases and that they are willing to listen to, and to be persuaded by, good arguments. Such agreements are simply implicit in the act of argumentation.

Negative Shell – Long (2/4)

2) Judge evaluation – their framework provides no coherent criteria for how the judge should assess competing claims or weigh impacts. We give criteria by which one can make decisions, whereas their arguments amount to empty speculation at best.

Michael Ignatieff, Carr Professor of Human Rights Practice, Director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at the JFK School of Government, Harvard University, 2004, *The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror*, p. 20-1

There are two problems with a perfectionist stance, leaving aside the question of whether it is realistic. The first is that articulating nonrevocable, nonderogable moral standards is relatively easy. The problem is deciding how to apply them in specific cases. What is the line between interrogation and torture, between targeted killing and unlawful assassination, between preemption and aggression? Even when legal and moral distinctions between these are clear in the abstract, abstractions are less than helpful when political leaders have to choose between them in practice. Furthermore, the problem with perfectionist standards is that they contradict each other. The same person who shudders, rightly, at the prospect of torturing a suspect might be prepared to kill the same suspect in a preemptive attack on a terrorist base. Equally, the perfectionist commitment to the right to life might preclude such attacks altogether and restrict our response to judicial pursuit of offenders through process of law. Judicial responses to the problem of terror have their place, but they are no substitute for military operations when terrorists possess bases, training camps, and heavy weapons. To stick to a perfectionist commitment to the right to life when under terrorist attack might achieve moral consistency at the price of leaving us defenseless in the face of evildoers. Security, moreover, is a human right, and thus respect for one right might lead us to betray another. A lesser evil morality is antiperfectionist in its assumptions. It accepts as inevitable that it is not always possible to save human beings from harm without killing other human beings; not always possible to preserve full democratic disclosure and transparency in counterterrorist operations; not always desirable for democratic leaders to avoid deception and perfidy; not always possible to preserve the liberty of the majority without suspending the liberties of a minority; not always possible to anticipate terrible consequences of well-meant acts, and so on. Far from making ethical reflection irrelevant, these dilemmas make ethical realism all the more essential to democratic reflection and good public policy. The fact that liberal democratic leaders may order the surreptitious killing of terrorists, may withhold information from their voters, may order the suspension of civil liberties need not mean that “anything goes.” Even if liberties must be suspended, their suspension can be made temporary; if executives must withhold information from a legislature in public, they can be obliged to disclose it in private session or at a later date. Public disinformation whose sole purpose is to deceive the enemy might be justified, but deliberately misleading a democratic electorate with a view to exaggerating risk or minimizing hazard can never be. The same balancing act needs to be observed in other cases. If the targeted killing of terrorists proves necessary, it can be constrained by strict rules of engagement and subjected to legislative oversight and review. The interrogation of terrorist suspects can be kept free of torture. Drawing these lines means keeping in clear sight the question of whether these means reinforce or betray the democratic identity they are supposed to defend.

Negative Shell – Long (3/4)

3) Topic education – their framework is designed to dodge education about the core questions of alternative energy policy, which makes debate devolve into repetitive discussions of [insert critique vocabulary here] that aren't about the topic. Lack of predictability means the aff is never tested in-depth and every debate is shallow. Education about policymaking is key to politics as a whole: we have a responsibility to forge an allegiance between politics and democratic deliberation.

Adolf G. Gundersen, Associate Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M, 2000, Political Theory and Partisan Politics, p. 108-9

Will deliberation work the same way among ordinary citizens? Yes and no. Yes, deliberation will tend to heighten citizens appreciation of their interdependence. At the same time, the results are likely to be analogous rather than identical to those in formal governmental bodies, since citizen deliberation must of course function in the absence of the institutional interdependence established by the US constitution, with its clear specification of joint responsibilities. The theoretical mutuality of interests assumed by the Constitution exists among ordinary citizens, too. The difference is that they have only their interests, not the impetus of divided power, to encourage them to discover and articulate them. Granted. But once they begin to do so, they are every bit as likely to succeed as the average representative. Citizen deliberation, in other words, will intensify citizens' appreciation of interdependence. Although I cannot prove the point, **there are compelling reasons to think that citizen deliberation yields an awareness of overlapping interests**. I have already alluded to the first, and perhaps most telling of these: if governors in a system of divided government such as our own succeed in deliberating their way to the public interest (however imperfectly or irregularly), surely ordinary citizens can be counted upon to do the same thing. Indeed, if my initial argument that decision-making spells the end of deliberation is on the mark, then **we have good reason to expect citizens to deliberate better than their representatives**. One can add to these theoretical considerations a lengthening list of **empirical findings** which **suggest not only that citizens are willing and able to engage in political deliberation, but also that they are quite able to do so**—able, that is, precisely in the sense of coming to a deeper appreciation of the collective nature of the problems they face (Dale et al. 1995; Gundersen 1995; Dryzek 1990; see also Gundersen n.d., chapter 4). In the end, the claim that deliberation enhances interdependence is hardly a radical one. After all, if **deliberation will** of itself diminish partisanship, as I started out by saying, it must at the same time **enhance interdependence**. To aim between Athens and Philadelphia requires, perhaps more than anything else, a changed way of thinking about partisanship. **Institutions and ways of thinking tend to change together; hence if the institutional reorientation suggested here is to take root, it must be accompanied by a new way of thinking about partisanship. Shifting our appraisal of partisanship will amount to a nothing less than a new attitude toward politics. It will require that we aspire to something new,** something that is at once less lofty (and less threatening) than the unity to which direct democracy is supposed to lead, but more democratic (and more deliberative) than encouraging political deliberation among a selected group of representatives. As I argued above, it will require **that we seek to stimulate deliberation among all citizens**. With Madison, we need to view partisanship as inevitable. Collective choice, indeed choice itself, is a partisan affair. But we also need to resist the equation of politics and partisanship. If politics is seen as nothing more than a clash of partisan interests, it is likely to stay at that level. Conversely, for deliberation to work, it must be seen as reasonable, if not all-illuminating—as efficacious, if not all-powerful. At the same time, of course, **citizens must** borrow a page from the participatory democrat's book by coming to **view deliberation as their responsibility rather than something that is done only by others in city hall, the state capitol, or Congress—others who are,** after all, **under** direct and constant **pressure to act rather than deliberate**. **Politics,** in other words, **must be resuscitated as an allegiance to democratic deliberation.**

Negative Shell – Long (4/4)

D. Voter for fairness and education. Framework is a prerequisite to debate.

Ruth Lessl Shively, Associate Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M, 2000, Political Theory and Partisan Politics, p. 181-182

The requirements given thus far are primarily negative. The ambiguists must say "no" to—they must reject and limit—some ideas and actions. In what follows, we will also find that they must say "yes" to some things. In particular, they must say "yes" to the idea of rational persuasion. This means, first, that they must recognize the role of agreement in political contest, or the basic accord that is necessary to discord. The mistake that the ambiguists make here is a common one. The mistake is in thinking that agreement marks the end of contest—that consensus kills debate. But this is true only if the agreement is perfect—if there is nothing at all left to question or contest. In most cases, however, our agreements are highly imperfect. We agree on some matters but not on others, on generalities but not on specifics, on principles but not on their applications, and so on. And this kind of limited agreement is the starting condition of contest and debate. As John Courtney Murray writes: We hold certain truths; therefore we can argue about them. It seems to have been one of the corruptions of intelligence by positivism to assume that argument ends when agreement is reached. In a basic sense, the reverse is true. There can be no argument except on the premise, and within a context, of agreement. (Murray 1960, 10) In other words, we cannot argue about something if we are not communicating: if we cannot agree on the topic and terms of argument or if we have utterly different ideas about what counts as evidence or good argument. At the very least, we must agree about what it is that is being debated before we can debate it. For instance, one cannot have an argument about euthanasia with someone who thinks euthanasia is a musical group. One cannot successfully stage a sit-in if one's target audience simply thinks everyone is resting or if those doing the sitting have no complaints. Nor can one demonstrate resistance to a policy if no one knows that it is a policy. In other words, contest is meaningless if there is a lack of agreement or communication about what is being contested. Resisters, demonstrators, and debaters must have some shared ideas about the subject and/or the terms of their disagreements. The participants and the target of a sit-in must share an understanding of the complaint at hand. And a demonstrator's audience must know what is being resisted. In short, the contesting of an idea presumes some agreement about what that idea is and how one might go about intelligibly contesting it. In other words, contestation rests on some basic agreement or harmony.

Negative Shell – Short

A. Interpretation: the aff can only defend advantages based on the consequences of hypothetical enactment of their plan by the USFG. They should win if the topical plan is the best policy option presented. The neg should win if the plan is worse than the status quo or an alternative competitive with the plan.

B. Violation – the aff claims advantages independent of the enactment of a plan by the USFG

C. Standards

1) Plan focus – The plan is the starting-point for debate. If they claim advantages in the 1AC which do not stem from the plan, there is no way for us to predict what the content of those advantages will be. Consequently, there is no way for us to generate stable and predictable offense. Without plan focus, they would always leverage an artificial ground advantage—even if there are impact turns to the critiques, we should not have to be prepared to run them against their aff; and, in any case, they will always be better prepared to debate their own unpredictable drivel than we will.

2) Judge evaluation – their framework provides no coherent criteria for how the judge should assess competing claims or weigh impacts. We give criteria by which one can make decisions, whereas their arguments amount to empty speculation at best.

3) Topic education – their framework is designed to dodge education about the core questions of alternative energy policy, which makes debate devolve into repetitive discussions of [insert critique vocabulary here] that aren't about the topic. Lack of predictability means the aff is never tested in-depth and every debate is shallow. Education about policymaking is key to politics as a whole: we have a responsibility to forge an allegiance between politics and democratic deliberation.

D. Voter for fairness and education. Framework is a prerequisite to debate.

****Definitions**

Definition – USFG is the Agent of the Resolution

- () The topic is defined by the phrase following the colon – the USFG is the agent of the resolution, not the individual debaters

Webster's Guide to Grammar and Writing, 2000, online:

<http://ccc.commnet.edu/grammar/marks/colon.htm>

Use of a colon before a list or an explanation that is preceded by a clause that can stand by itself. Think of the colon as a gate, inviting one to go on... If the introductory phrase preceding the colon is very brief and the clause following the colon represents the real business of the sentence, begin the clause after the colon with a capital letter.

Definition – USFG is in D.C. (Not 'the People')

- () "The USFG" is the government in Washington D.C. – not individuals

Microsoft Encarta Online Encyclopedia 2000 [<http://encarta.msn.com>]

"The federal government of the United States is centered in Washington DC."

- () Our definition excludes action by smaller political groups or individuals.

Black's Law Dictionary Seventh Edition Ed. Bryan A. Garner (chief) 1999

Federal government 1. A national government that exercises some degree of control over smaller political units that have surrendered some degree of power in exchange for the right to participate in national political matters.

Definition – Resolved Relates to the Resolution, Not Debaters

- () "Resolved" expresses intent to solve the question posed by the resolution – this is distinct from individual debaters being 'resolved'

American Heritage Dictionary 2000, online: www.dictionary.com/cgi-bin/dict.pl?term=resolved

To find a solution to; solve ...

To bring to a usually successful conclusion

Definition – Should Implies Expectation

- () "Should" denotes an expectation – this means the resolution shows expectation that its agent will enact the plan

American Heritage Dictionary – 2000 [www.dictionary.com]

3 Used to express probability or expectation

****Rules Good**

Critical Frameworks Fail - Environment

Radical ecological frameworks deprive nature of any intrinsic value such that humanity becomes the center of politics

Paul Wapner, associate professor and director of the Global Environmental Policy Program at American University, Winter 2003, Dissent, online:

<http://www.dissentmagazine.org/menutest/archives/2003/wi03/wapner.htm>

THESE MAY SEEM like academic questions, but they go to the heart of environmentalism and have begun to worry even the most committed environmentalists. After scholars such as William Cronon, Timothy Luke, and J. Baird Callicott introduced "eco-criticism" to the scholarly and popular publics, various environmental activists and thinkers have struggled to articulate a response. Their inability to do so in a decisive and persuasive manner has further damaged the environmentalist position. Even more troubling, now that the critique is out of the bag, it is being co-opted by people on the right. **Anti-environmentalists** such as Charles Rubin and Alston Chase, for example, **now claim that, if there is no such thing as "real" nature, we need not treat the nonhuman world with unqualified respect. If we think it is in our interest, we can freely choose to pave the rainforest, wipe out the last panda bear, or pump high levels of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere.** What is critical to notice in both cases is that criticisms of "nature," whether they come from the left or are co-opted by the right, are playing an increasing role in structuring the confrontation between anti- and pro-environmentalists. And they are re-setting the fault lines within the environmental movement itself. **So far, there have been two responses from traditional environmentalists to postmodern eco-criticism. The first comes from those who dismiss postmodernism out of hand and simply reassert a modernist narrative of nature and its imperatives.** According to activists such as Gary Snyder and Dave Foreman, eco-criticism is at odds with common sense and contemporary science. Yes, they say, there is a social dimension to how we think about nature, but **nature is fundamentally a physical entity, and our understanding of it can be based on clear-eyed observation, direct experience, and scientific description. The whole notion that nature is constructed is simply intellectual sophistry practiced by those who either spend too much time indoors or who work at such high levels of abstraction that they never engage the phenomenal world.** Those making this argument see postmodern attacks on nature as simply the latest manifestation of a long tradition associated with what David Ehrenfeld calls the "arrogance of humanism." **Eco-criticism places human beings at the center of all phenomena and then is overly impressed with the self-referential character of human experience. Consequently, it is blind, as philosopher Albert Borgmann says, to nature's nonhuman "commanding presence."**

Dispensing with the category of "nature" leaves no means of fixing things, offering no incentive to any particular school of thought

Paul Wapner, associate professor and director of the Global Environmental Policy Program at American University, Winter 2003, Dissent, online:

<http://www.dissentmagazine.org/menutest/archives/2003/wi03/wapner.htm>

A second, more engaging, response goes in the other direction. It comes from people who agree with the critique of "nature" and, by way of response, advocate a post-nature environmentalism. Because everything we call "nature" is relative to our ideas, they argue, we should accept (indeed, embrace) our role as creators of "nature" and assume full responsibility for governing the so-called natural world. Environmentalists in this camp call for fully utilizing technology to confront environmental problems and ask that we be content with human-made landscapes and artificial substitutes for natural resources. **They counsel ecological stewardship, of course, but maintain that our vision of stewardship need not be hindered by any preconceived notion of what is genuinely natural. Noting the ungrounded character of the idea of nature, Walter Truett Anderson suggests that we see ourselves for what we, in fact, are: eco-artists-designers and builders of the nonhuman world.** This second response calls for dispensing with the category of nature altogether and fashioning an environmentalism along other lines of interest and concern. The eco-artists clearly represent a position compatible with postmodern sensibilities. **But dispensing with the category of "nature"**

means that there are no reigning guidelines for valuing one set of arrangements, or one artistic creation, over another. Yes, environmentalists favoring this second response can advocate certain environment-friendly actions, but how do they make their case? They have no ground on which to argue for this set rather than that set of ecological conditions. Certainly, their environmentalism would make most traditional environmentalists very uncomfortable. How could an Emerson, Muir, Leopold, Carson, or Brower sign on to such a viewpoint? What would it mean to be a post-nature environmentalist? Doesn't this position make a mockery of the long tradition of environmental concern?

Rules key to Ethics

Rules are key to checking evil; the only way to oppose something is to align yourself with its opposite. This means that a minimum of shared agreement is the necessary condition for preventing atrocity.

Ruth Lessl Shively, Associate Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M, 2000, Political Theory and Partisan Politics, p. 180

Thus far, I have argued that **if the ambiguiests mean to be subversive about anything, they need to be conservative about some things. They need to be** steadfast supporters of the structures of openness and democracy: **willing to say "no" to certain forms of contest; willing to set up certain clear limitations about acceptable behavior.** To this, finally, I would add that if the ambiguiests mean to stretch the boundaries of behavior—**if they want to be revolutionary and disruptive** in their skepticism and iconoclasm—they need first to be firm believers in something. Which is to say, again, **they need to set clear limits about what they will and will not support**, what they do and do not believe to be best. As G. K. Chesterton observed, **the true revolutionary has always willed something "definite and limited."** For example, "The Jacobin could tell you not only the system he would rebel against, but (what was more important) the system he would not rebel against..." He "desired the freedoms of democracy." He "wished to have votes and not to have titles . . ." But "because the new rebel is a skeptic"—because he cannot bring himself to will something definite and limited— "he cannot be a revolutionary." For "the fact that he wants to doubt everything really gets in his way when he wants to denounce anything" (Chesterton 1959,41). Thus, **the most radical skepticism ends in the most radical conservatism.** In other words, **a refusal to judge among ideas and activities is, in the end, an endorsement of the status quo. To embrace everything is to be unable to embrace a particular plan of action, for to embrace a particular plan of action is to reject all others, at least for that moment.** Moreover, as observed in our discussion of openness, **to embrace everything is to embrace self-contradiction: to hold to both one's purposes and to that which defeats one's purposes—to tolerance and intolerance, open-mindedness and close-mindedness, democracy and tyranny.** In the same manner, then, **the ambiguiests' refusals to will something "definite and limited" undermines their revolutionary impulses.** In their refusal to say what they will not celebrate and what they will not rebel against, **they deny themselves (and everyone else in their political world) a particular plan or ground to work from. By refusing to deny incivility, they deny themselves a civil public space from which to speak. They cannot say "no" to the terrorist who would silence dissent. They cannot turn their backs on the bullying of the white supremacist.** And, as such, in refusing to bar the tactics of the anti-democrat, they refuse to support the tactics of the democrat. In short, then, to be a true ambiguiest, **there must be some limit** to what is ambiguous. **To fully support political contest, one must fully support some uncontested rules and reasons. To generally reject the silencing or exclusion of others, one must sometimes silence or exclude those who reject civility and democracy.**

Rules key to Policymaking

Every political action takes place within a context of rules, shared assumptions, and conventions. Thomas A. Spragens, Professor of Political Science at Duke, 2000 Political Theory and Partisan Politics p. 82-3

The first of these modalities of **political association will be essentially contractual. This is a mode of association that governs** the economy and **a significant part of political interaction.** This is the realm in which **bargaining, horse trading, wheeling and dealing, brokering, compromising, and vote-swapping occupy center stage.** **This realm encompasses much of everyday political life,** and it is a perfectly legitimate component of a democratic society. This is the realm in which **instrumental rationality reigns supreme,** the arena in which **straightforward "rational choice" explanations are proper and effective.** It is a thoroughly partisan realm because it is grounded in the pursuit of self-interest, and interests in a free society always are in conflict. Interests, of course, may also coincide in important ways, as, for example, when Ben Franklin admonished his colleagues that they would either all hang together or hang separately. **This phenomenon is what sustains the logic of collective action and what makes it important for a society to develop ways to facilitate cooperative behavior** when that is clearly in everyone's interest to have that happen. This cooperation could be deemed an expression of what Aristotle deemed to be the lowest form of friendship, friendship based upon mutual usefulness one to another (Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics, 8.3). **Even this self-interested, instrumental rationality mode of political association,** it should be noted, **has its own ethic. This ethic is essentially** what is sometimes depicted as that of **good business practice. It encompasses honesty, fair dealing, the avoidance of fraud or misrepresentation, and living up to one's promises.** What is important to observe here, moreover, is that **this fair dealing business ethos is made possible** in part **because the contractual realm is situated in the context of the other layers and modalities of democratic association.** Those we bargain with are also people who share with us a commitment to justice and people with whom we seek the good life. **Without that shaping and constraining context, the bargaining mode of social interaction tends to slide almost ineluctably toward mutual predation.**"

Rules key to Competition

Debate is a form of forensics, which means legal speaking. Thus we apply the same standards we use for law to debate.

Decker and Morello, professors of communication and debate coaches, 90

The American Debate Association: Rule-Based Policy Debate., By: Decker, Warren D., Morello, John T., Argumentation and Advocacy, 19900101, Vol. 27, Issue 2

Perhaps the function and utility of set rules can be clarified through a comparison to the American legal system's use of rules. Academic debate has always drawn heavily on the analogy to law for both its theory and context. Forensics, of course, was defined by Aristotle as legal speaking. Furthermore, comparisons to law are appropriate since many debaters engage in the activity as preparation for law school and the legal profession.

The American legal system is a system of rules. "The plethora of rules prescribe, in essence, who can present the evidence, what evidence can be admitted, and how the evidence can be introduced" (Loh 14). The rules ensure fairness and promote the willingness of disputants to accept the outcomes of trials (Loh). Rules of procedure predate particular trials. Lawyers do not argue, for instance, whether or not there ought to be a hearsay rule and, if so, what the elements of such a rule should be. Testimony judged in violation of the hearsay rule is excluded, and there is no recourse to the "hearsay is not a voting issue" brief.

To promote equity and to prevent abusive practices from demeaning the conduct of the proceedings, the legal system--and many governmental and business decision-making bodies--establish governing rules. Organizations sponsoring competitive activities have both the right and the duty to develop procedures designed to safeguard the integrity of the event in question. Debate should be no different.

Rules key to Education

Fairness key to education

Patrick Speice and Jim Lyle 2003 “traditional policy debate: now more than ever” Oceans Policy Adrift
<http://www.wfu.edu/Student-organizations/debate/MiscSites/DRGArticles/SpeiceLyle2003htm.htm>

Having dispensed with the “impact assessment” portion of this section, it is time to move to a fuller consideration of the educational “impacts” that the TPD formula brings to the table. **Not only is the TPD format best for reasons of competition, it is also best for providing debaters an educational benefit to the activity. These benefits are of use to students in the academic, professional, and social realms. In addition to teaching general communication and argumentation skills, TPD helps develop at least three different skills: research skills, logic skills** (aimed at both the development of general argument structure and sustained political advocacy), **and critical thinking skills** (Solt, 1993; Parcher, 1996; Mitchell, 1998; Freeley, 1996). **Furthermore, requiring the critique team** (presuming they are negative) **to at least defend the status quo also is beneficial educationally by serving as a “valuable exercise to build power of critical theory”** (Truett, 2001, p. online).

Without concrete terms for discussion, disputes become meaningless and valueless, only once a consensus has been arrived at can there be any engagement.

Kemerling, 97 professor of philosophy at Newberry College, (Garth, “Definition and Meaning”,
<http://www.philosophypages.com/lg/e05.htm>)

We've seen that **sloppy or misleading use of ordinary language can seriously limit our ability to create and communicate correct reasoning**. As philosopher John Locke pointed out three centuries ago, **the achievement of human knowledge is often hampered by the use of words without fixed signification. Needless controversy is sometimes produced and perpetuated by an unacknowledged ambiguity** in the application of key terms. We can distinguish disputes of three sorts:

Genuine disputes involve disagreement about whether or not some specific proposition is true. Since the people engaged in a genuine dispute agree on the meaning of the words by means of which they convey their respective positions, each of them can propose and assess logical arguments that might eventually lead to a resolution of their differences.

Merely **verbal disputes**, on the other hand, arise **entirely from ambiguities in the language** used to express the positions of the disputants. **A verbal dispute disappears entirely once the people involved arrive at an agreement on the meaning of their terms, since doing so reveals their underlying agreement in belief.**

Apparently verbal but really genuine disputes can also occur, of course. In cases of this sort, the resolution of every ambiguity only reveals an underlying genuine dispute. Once that's been discovered, it can be addressed fruitfully by appropriate methods of reasoning.

We can save a lot of time, sharpen our reasoning abilities, and communicate with each other more effectively if we watch for disagreements about the meaning of words and try to resolve them whenever we can.

Debate leads to education about the real world

Christopher C. Joyner (prof. of International law at Georgetown) Spring 1999 “teaching international law: views from an international relations political scientist” ILSA journal of international & comparative law 5 ILSA J Int'l & Comp L 377

The debate exercises carry several specific educational objectives. First, students on each team must work together to refine a cogent argument that compellingly asserts their legal position on a foreign policy issue confronting the United States. In this way, **they gain greater insight into the real-world legal dilemmas faced by policy makers.** Second, as they work with other members of

their team, they realize the complexities of applying and implementing international law, and the difficulty of bridging the gaps between United States policy and international legal principles, either by reworking the former or creatively reinterpreting the latter. Finally, research for the debates forces students to become familiarized with contemporary issues on the United States foreign policy agenda and the role that international law plays in formulating and executing these policies. ⁿ⁸ **The debate** thus becomes **an excellent vehicle for pushing students beyond stale arguments over principles into the real world of policy analysis, political critique, and legal defense.**

Rules key to Deliberation

Critique is not a matter of rejecting categories categorically but rather of choosing the right categories; this is especially true when critique is held to the standard of competitive judgment which must defer to shared sets of basic assumptions.

Ruth Lessl Shively, Assoc Prof Polisci at Texas A&M, 2000 *Political Theory and Partisan Politics* p. 188-9

This is why the ambiguists need to do more than call for a wholesale resistance to categories. Because resistance to some categorizations always involves acceptance of others, they need to own up to, and justify, their own choices.⁶ If they propose that we choose their version of reality and their favored categorizations, they must give us reasons. If they think we ought to be skeptical ambiguists rather than truth- or harmony-seekers, they must make a case for this prescription. Simply being against established categories is disingenuous when the argument is designed to establish new categories in replace of the old. We are brought back, then, to the issues of rational judgment and persuasion. Earlier I argued that political contest rests on certain un-contested foundations or rational conditions. Here I have added that the policy of anti-categorization rests on certain stable categories of its own. Thus, the subversives are not free from the responsibility of choosing and justifying the subversive categories that define and guide them. For once we recognize the inescapability of choosing categories, we see that subversion or any other political project is a matter of choosing the right categories, not of escaping them. Thus, to be truly subversive requires taking a stand: judging what is good and bad, legitimate and illegitimate, allowed and disallowed, in the best subversive society. The desire to avoid this sort of judgment is understandable, for it tends to be associated with intolerant and oppressive attitudes and behaviors. And the situations within which we must judge are often dauntingly complex and uncertain. Rarely can we be certain that our judgments are right. Nonetheless, judgments must be made—not only in the development of political theory, but also in confronting the decisions of everyday political life. Thus, even in the face of great uncertainty and ambiguity, we are compelled to act and, in so doing, to judge what is good and bad, reasonable and unreasonable, and so on. The ambiguity of our situation does nothing, as such, to alter the need for judgment. As John Courtney Murray writes, to say that uncertainty and complexity must keep us from judging or acting is as senseless as a surgeon in the midst of a gastroenterostomy [saying] that the highly complex situation in front of him is so full of paradox ("The patient is at once receiving blood and losing it"), and irony ("Half a stomach will be better than a whole one") and dilemma ("Not too much, nor too little, anesthesia") that all surgical solutions are necessarily ambiguous. (Murray 1960, 283) *Political Theory and the Postmodern Politics of Ambiguity* The point, of course, is that there is no avoiding judgment and action here, and that in political theory and politics, as in surgery, we are often compelled to deal with the complexities we meet as best we can. Thus, if we must judge, there is no point in trying to avoid the task through a policy of indiscriminate subversion. Our choice is not whether to judge, but whether to judge through open, reasoned argument or not. And the point of this essay has been to say that the former option is best.

Rules key to Deliberation

Communicative persuasion is at the heart of politics; the difference between intimidation and political speech is precisely the attempt to persuade through reason.

Ruth Lessl Shively, Assoc Prof Polisci at Texas A&M, 2000 Political Theory and Partisan Politics p. 183

Earlier we asked how the ambiguists distinguish legitimate political behaviors, like contest or resistance, from illegitimate behaviors, like cruelty and subjugation. We find a more complete answer here. The former are legitimate because they have civil or rational persuasion as their end. That is, **legitimate forms of contest and resistance seek to inform or convince others by appeal to reasons rather than by force or manipulation. The idea is implicit in democracy** because democracy implies a basic respect for self-determination: a respect for people's rights to direct their own lives as much as possible by their own choices, to work and carry on relationships as they see fit, to participate in community and politics according to decisions freely made by them rather than decisions forced on them, and so on. Thus, **to say that rational persuasion is the end of political action is simply to acknowledge that, in democratic politics, this is the way we show respect for others' capacities for self-direction. In public debate, our goal is to persuade others with ideas that they recognize as true rather than by trying to manipulate them or move them** without their conscious, rational assent. Of course, to say that **this** is the **implicit end of political action** is not to say that we always recognize or act in accord with it. Like most ideals, it is, strictly speaking, unattainable. Yet, like most ideals, it nonetheless **defines our judgments on the subject**. It is the gauge against which we judge progress or decline. Nor is **this recognition of rational persuasion a rejection of the role of interest or power in politics**. Clearly, the reasons we may give in persuading others may be based on issues of interest or power. We may try to convince others, for example, that a certain policy position is in their self-interest or that a certain action will increase their bargaining power. Though I should quickly add that, **in a democracy, there must be other reasons recognized beside power and interest**. For **if power trumps everything, then those with the most power will always win and those with less will always lose** (unless, by happy chance, their interests coincide), **and there is no point in talking about democratic concepts** like rights or equality or freedom. Democracy necessarily assumes that **certain ideas trump power**: for example, that ideas like the right to assemble, the right to free speech and representation, the rights of the accused, and so on, are to be rendered to people regardless of their positions in society. I should also say that by calling these activities "rational" I do not mean to conjure up universal, rational principles or Rawlsian original positions, but only to say that democratic political activities have as their end persuasion by appeal to shared reasons. The "rational" tag simply serves to distinguish voluntary from less-than-voluntary kinds of persuasions. Thus, for example, I may "persuade" a man to do something by hypnotizing him or by holding a gun to his head, but I would not be using rational persuasion; I would not be giving him reasons upon which he might make his own judgment. Instead, I would be deciding for him. Again, the point is that **in order to respect the self-determination of others, we must give them reasons they can recognize, or grounds that allow them to weigh their own thoughts and choose**. Nor, finally, should the "rational" or "civil" tag suggest that democratic actions are always inoffensive or acceptable to the majority. There are many actions that can be considered persuasive and political in the broad sense used here, while yet being offensive to majorities: we might list among these **gay rights groups' disruptions of church services**, animal rights groups' splashing of blood on fur owners, or anti-abortion groups' attempts to block clinic entrances. Leaving aside legal or moral questions about these tactics, we can say that they **are political in a way that burning crosses is not**. That is, **they are political to the extent that they are aimed at rational persuasion of some kind**: at communicating or heightening awareness of an idea, at enhancing others' understandings of an issue, and thus **at enhancing others' freedom and ability to make political decisions—rather, that is, than** being aimed at merely **intimidating them**. We can further grasp the intuition here by

noting the different response we would have upon learning that an animal rights activist was splashing blood on people with the intent merely of bullying them or frightening them out of the habit of wearing furs. In such a case, most of us sense that the action is no longer legitimately political because (or to the extent that) it is aimed at intimidation rather than rational persuasion.»

Rules key to Deliberation

Empty abstractions are like cyanide to democracy – only through robust dialogue and meaningful conversation can we learn and improve as beings and democratic participants

Christopher A. Bracey, Associate Professor of Law, Associate Professor of African & African American Studies, Washington University in St. Louis, September 2006, Southern California Law Review, 79 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1231, p. 1311-1314, LexisNexis

Robust dialogue on public policy matters also promotes the individual growth of the dialogue participants. Conversation helps people become more knowledgeable and hold better developed

opinions because "opinions can be tested and enlarged only where there is a genuine encounter with differing opinions." ⁿ²⁶⁷ Moreover, **meaningful conversation serves to broaden people's moral**

perspectives to include matters of public good, because appeals to the public good are often the most persuasive arguments available in public deliberation. ⁿ²⁶⁸ Indeed, even if people are

thinking self-interested thoughts while making public good arguments, cognitive dissonance will create an incentive for such individuals to reconcile their self interest with the public good. ⁿ²⁶⁹ At

the same time, **because political dialogue is a material manifestation of democracy in action, it promotes a feeling of democratic community and instills in the people a will for political**

action to advance reasoned public policy in the spirit of promoting the public good. n270 For these reasons, the collective aspiration of those interested in pursuing serious, sustained, and

policy-legitimizing dialogue on race matters must be to cultivate a reasoned discourse that is relatively free of retrograde ideological baggage that feeds skepticism, engenders distrust, and

effectively forecloses constructive conversation on the most corrosive and divisive issue in American history and contemporary life. As the forgoing sections suggest, **the continued**

reliance upon pedigreed rhetorical themes has and continues to poison racial legal discourse.

Given the various normative and ideological commitments that might be ascribed to [*1314] opponents of race preferences, the question thus becomes, how are we to approach the task of breaking through the conversational impasse and creating intellectual space for meaningful discourse on this issue?

Deliberation Impact – Partisanship

The alternative to a politics of deliberation is rampant partisanship

Adolf G. Gundersen, Associate Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M, 2000, Political Theory and Partisan Politics p. 97-8

In contrast to "deliberation," which means "the thoughtful consideration of alternative courses of action,"¹ we might think of "partisanship" as "struggle to enact a fixed course of action."

So defined, the differences between deliberation and partisanship are as obvious as they are profound: deliberation requires openness and the cooperative exercise of the intellect;

partisanship presumes closure and involves the factional exercise of rhetorical manipulation or raw power. As a general rule, it also follows that deliberative democracy will flourish in inverse proportion to partisanship.

For this reason deliberative democrats need a strategy for eliminating (or at least containing) partisanship. This paper advances such a strategy, a strategy which I recommend based on a critique of the two alternatives that have for some time dominated thinking in this area. The first of these alternatives is advanced by a wide-range of participatory democrats. On their view, partisanship can not only be contained, but also perhaps eliminated altogether, by having would-be partisans confront one another in public decision-making bodies.

The participatory strategy ultimately rests on the belief that all partisan conflict is susceptible to transformation as long as partisanship is confronted directly. Indeed, the participatory strategy for dealing with partisanship enjoins two sorts of confrontation: confrontation among citizens and confrontation with an actual decision. The second alternative strategy for dealing with partisanship that I examine here, no less well known, is Madisonian. Its strategy for limiting partisanship is in many ways the mirror image of that proposed by participatory democrats. Where the participatory strategy puts its faith in confrontation, the Madisonian strategy puts its faith in separation—again of two sorts. For the Madisonian, the worst effects of partisanship can be contained by first separating citizens from the actual task of decision-making and then by institutionalizing separate sources of decision-making power. Although I believe there is something to be learned from both the participatory and the Madisonian strategies for dealing with partisanship, I end up rejecting both of them in favor of an alternative which weds Madisonian institutional insights to participatory democrats' concern with the individual citizen. I argue that the best way to limit the unavoidable

influence of partisanship is to confine partisan maneuvering to the latter stages of decision making and policy formation. I conclude that both distance and proximity can be made to

serve the ends of deliberative democracy, that, indeed, distance and proximity must be combined in any effective strategy for limiting partisanship.

That deliberation and partisanship are mutually exclusive does not seem particularly controversial. Deliberation is a process of weighing alternative courses of action. Partisanship is the exercise of power on behalf of a chosen course of action. Especially when viewed in the context of democratic politics, deliberation and partisanship thus seem irreconcilable.

First, and most obviously, deliberation involves weighing alternatives; partisanship involves coercion, negotiation, or, in its most discursive form,

rhetorical manipulation. Second, deliberation requires balancing or adjudicating between a

plurality of views; partisanship presupposes that one view has been judged superior (or advantageous). Third, deliberation requires only an opposing viewpoint; partisanship requires an opponent.

Deliberation Impact – Agency

Political deliberation radically empowers personal agency

Adolf G. Gundersen, Assoc Prof Polisci at Texas A&M, 2000, Political Theory and Partisan Politics p. 105

Fortunately, we now have innovative recommendations aplenty for stimulating deliberation,⁵ covering virtually every institution in American society, including, of course, government itself. The problem at the moment is choosing from among them in such a way as to achieve the widest and longest lasting impact. Although prioritizing deliberative reforms is a far more complex task than it might appear to be at first glance,⁶ each element of the *via media* I am recommending here establishes a separate criterion that reform proposals ought to meet. These four criteria helps us sort through the plethora of proposals now being discussed by academics and policymakers. This is as true of this first element as it is of the other three, for it calls not for expanding deliberation tout court but, rather, for expanding deliberation outside the context of public decision-making bodies. Hence, it calls on us to resist plans for stimulating deliberation through the radical decentralization of society. It likewise recommends that we demand more of deliberative reform than that it shore up existing deliberative institutions, however valuable that might be. Instead, **the premium this strategy places on indirect political engagement asks us to look for deliberative opportunities** precisely in those places we are least accustomed to looking for them: families, churches, civic organizations, professions, public spaces, and the like. **To encourage indirect political engagement by encouraging political deliberation is**, in one sense, **quite radical**, **for** although it is not at all the same thing as adopting the view that "everything is political," **it is tantamount to claiming that "everything can be a site for political deliberation."** **Conversely**, from another perspective this view hardly represents much of a challenge at all, for **it simply asks us to recognize the obvious fact that**, ever since Athenian citizens carried the business of the assembly and courts into the agora, **politics has always seeped out through the cracks of formal institutions**. And it is to recognize that, at least within certain limits, **this is not only proper, but desirable**—desirable **because decisions that are discussed are likely to be wiser than those that are not, wherever they happen to be discussed**. In general terms, then, aiming somewhere between Athens and Philadelphia means spurring deliberation. But we can locate our target more precisely than that. We saw earlier that the second element of this strategy is to counter partisanship not only at the institutional treetops, but at the grass roots as well. This second criteria narrows our search to reforms that might stimulate deliberation there—where it is insulated from the inherently partisan pressure to adjudicate disputes and issue policy. But just what does **stimulating grass-roots deliberation** mean? It **means encouraging citizens to actively deliberate outside of formal decision-making institutions at what is normally thought of as the "pre-political" level**. It **means stimulating political discourse in places that are not normally thought of as "political."** It **means working to promote thoughtful exchanges** among those who are political, but not yet partisan. It means **cultivating a public both willing and able to engage one another in political discussion**. Finally, and most centrally, it means finding creative ways to support the civic fabric of society, of **strengthening those institutions which, while not charged with the responsibility for making political decisions, are potential sites for political deliberation**.

Deliberation Impact – Peace

Democratic deliberation is key to peace

Thomas A. Spragens, Professor of Political Science at Duke, 2000, Political Theory and Partisan Politics, p. 90-1

In another equally important respect, however, Plato was, as a consequence of his philosophical positivism and attendant political authoritarianism, quite wrong. So long as we are fallibilist but not pyrrhonist in our moral epistemology, we should recognize that liberal democratic regimes are the natural homes of political theory and the places where the functions of political theory are most integral to the premises and practices of political life and legitimacy. For it is these regimes that make legitimacy consist in the consent of a citizenry presumed to be both rational and possessed of the moral powers. In that context, **rational discourse about what is to be done seems an essential component of legitimate politics**, since **that form of contestation is essential to the creation of a popular will** that can pass muster—that is, to the formation of a popular will **that can claim to be rational consent rather than aggregate whimsy**. To say that liberal democratic regimes are the natural homes of political theory is not to say that tensions do not characterize the relationship between them. In its deployment of critical reason, political theory must seem somewhat subversive to all regimes, liberal democracies included. Political theoretical critique casts a skeptical eye on all legitimacy myths, and it must puncture claims to political certitude and hegemony. It also will be subject to critical and potentially corrosive scrutiny the justifications set forth on their own behalf by powerful interests in democratic societies, including perhaps those enshrined by a democratic majority. This constant critique is socially useful but often not politically welcome. This critical function of political theory is one that even moral cynics and epistemological skeptics can appreciate and accredit. But political theory also plays a more constructive role in liberal democracies, one that the cynic fails to appreciate and one that a thoroughgoing and unqualified cynicism would ultimately undermine. Relying upon the moral powers and their attendant passions for its energy and relying upon the logical and linguistic constraints of moral discourse for its direction, **political theoretical dialogue assists the movement toward the more complex form of objectivity in political and practical affairs** envisioned by Karl Mannheim, someone who was as aware as anyone of the ways that our sociological particularities and partisan interests produce competing perspectives. Mannheim explained: The problem, he wrote, is not how we might arrive at a non-perspectivistic picture but how, by juxtaposing the various points of view, each perspective may be recognized as such and thereby a new level of objectivity attained. Thus we come to the point where the false ideal of a detached, impersonal point of view must be replaced by the ideal of an essentially human point of view which is within the limits of a human perspective, constantly trying to enlarge itself. (Mannheim 1936, 296-297) Political theory at its best, I would argue, functions constructively in precisely this fashion. It admits into its conversation conflicting perspectives and arguments that ineluctably are grounded in our sociological particularities and our partisan political interests. These perspectives are then set against each other and subjected to critical scrutiny in the context of those logical and linguistic constraints that constitute the discipline of reason. From that agonistic dialectic, narrowly partisan perspectives tend to lose credence and get winnowed out. Or they become broadened, amended, and complexified into new, more capacious and synthetic normative conceptions of the political world. These syntheses are neither final nor complete but continue to undergo continual change and revision under the impact of further challenge. **What results** from this process of critical moral dialogue between competing perspectives is, then, not some final Hegelian scientific super-synthesis, much less some Cartesian perfect transcendence. But what does result, I would argue, **is a greater tendency among all participants to be self-critical about their naive attachments and premises and a great and salutary pressure toward inducing in them a more enlarged, more comprehensive, and more impartial viewpoint regarding their society, their fellow citizens, and the issues of public**

policy they must address. From the kind of robust and rationally disciplined political dialogue embodied in political theory, one learns, as John Stuart Mill (1962, 168) put it, "to feel for and with his fellow citizens and becomes consciously a member of a great community." This is a form of discourse and discipline that pushes toward those "more comprehensive and distant views" (Mill 1962, 138) that are the cognitive base of the public spiritedness that Mill, Tocqueville, the civic republicans, and even James Madison thought essential to the health of a democratic body politic. It is a form of discourse, moreover, that sharpens the habits and skills necessary for serious democratic deliberation. And this, I would insist, is no small contribution to the democratic enterprise of self-governance.

Deliberation Impact – Democracy/Discrimination

Rejection of critical dialogue signals the failure of democracy – it creates discriminatory polarization and kills political power

Christopher A. Bracey, Associate Professor of Law, Associate Professor of African & African American Studies, Washington University in St. Louis, September 2006, Southern California Law Review, 79 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1231, p. 1311-1314, LexisNexis

A deepened appreciation and open acknowledgment of this pedigree is crucial to restoring public conversation on race preferences. Opponents of race preferences must come to understand that this pedigree, if left unaddressed, tends to overwhelm the underlying merit of arguments against race preferences in the eyes of proponents. At the same time, proponents should understand that the deployment of these pedigreed rhetorical themes does not necessarily signal agreement with the nineteenth-century racial norms from which they are sourced. For both proponents and opponents, the avoidance of a rapid retreat into ideological trench warfare not only preserves space for reasoned, substantive debate regarding race preferences, but also allows for the possibility of overcoming our collective fixation on race preferences as the issue in American race relations and advancing the conversation to reach the larger issue of producing a more racially inclusive society.

Our failing public conversation on race matters not only presents a particularly tragic moment in American race relations, but also evinces a greater failure of democracy. Sustained, meaningful dialogue is a critical, if not indispensable feature of our liberal democracy. n260 It is through [*1312] meaningful public conversation about what actions government should take (or refrain from taking) that public policy determinations ultimately gain legitimacy. Conversation is particularly important in our democracy, given the profoundly diverse and often contradictory cultural and political traditions that are the sine qua non of American life. Under these particular circumstances, "persons ought to strive to engage in a mutual process of critical interaction, because if they do not, no uncoerced common understanding can possibly be attained." n261 Sincere deliberation, in its broadest idealized form, ensures that a broad array of input is heard and considered, legitimizing the resulting decision. Under this view, "if the preferences that determine the results of democratic procedures are unreflective or ignorant, then they lose their claim to political authority over us." n262 In the absence of self-conscious, reflective dialogue, "democracy loses its capacity to generate legitimate political power." n263

Deliberation Impact – Determinism

Political deliberation is key to check determinism; by robbing ourselves of the possibility of political action we doom ourselves to be defined by the forces of partisan politics and impersonal interests.

Thomas A. Spragens, Professor of Political Science at Duke, 2000, Political Theory and Partisan Politics p. 86-8

The strong form of the thesis is more interesting but also more problematic. Indeed, I would argue that it is patently false. That thesis, often more implied than directly stated, is that we cannot rise to any extent at all above self-interest or attain a somewhat broader and larger perspective on politics than the partial viewpoint with which we unavoidably begin. It is only this strong form of the thesis, however, that leads to the cynical conclusion that collective prudence and moral deliberation have no genuine and important role to play in political life. In the cynic's view, we are so utterly mired within an attachment to our narrow interests and so hopelessly blinkered by our particular perspective that we should cut the hypocritical moralistic malarkey and get on with an honest and unadorned version of our agonism. The counsel becomes that of blatant partisanship unconstrained by principle or inhibition. Thus, Fish's (1994, 114) counsel on free speech issues: so long as so-called free-speech principles have been fashioned by your enemy (so long as it is his hoops you have to jump through), contest their relevance to the issue at hand; but if you manage to refashion them in line with your purposes, urge them with a vengeance. Thus, a sophistic form of argumentation (i.e. claim to have sustained a strong thesis with arguments that bear only upon a weak thesis) leads to the sophistic admonition to pursue partisan ends without scruple. Whatever the merits of the realist's insistence that no one can legitimately claim to have self-evident truths in practical matters or claim to be utterly non-partisan, the cynical claim that we cannot soften, mitigate, and partly rise above narrow partisanship and idiosyncratic perspectives in our political pursuits is both wrong and pernicious. We falsify this claim every day in our associations with family, friends, and the larger public. We don't achieve utter dispassion, complete impartiality, philosophical or scientific veridicality. But we rise above our narrowest interests and perceptions to understand others' viewpoints and desires (Mansbridge 1990). And we understand that political legitimacy requires taking these viewpoints and desires into account. If only saints could transcend partisanship entirely, only sociopaths fail to do so at all. Were we incapable of this feat of mind and will, Madison (Federalist 55) is right in that case: "Nothing less than the chains of despotism [could] restrain [us] from destroying and devouring one another." There are two principal cognitive resources available for this feat of partial transcendence of narrow self-interestedness and narrow perceptions that I am claiming to be both possible and important. Each of these cognitive resources, in turn, is effectual in practical terms only to the extent that it is linked with and fueled by the relevant moral passions in each case. With Hobbes (Leviathan 1.13), then, I would contend that the "possibility to come out of [the war of all against all] consists partly in the passions, partly in reason." But my account would suggest that Hobbes's conception of the range of both the passions and reason is too limited and that is why he is left with the logic of absolutism. His reason is purely calculative, his passions purely preservative and acquisitive. Hence, the Sovereign awaits with his necessarily swift sword. In parallel but in contrast, I would argue that the first cognitive resource that sustains the upper layers of democratic association, hence providing a way of escaping a predatory politics, is the sympathetic imagination. Human beings have—to a considerably varying degree, to be sure—an imaginative capability of indwelling the situation, the feelings, and the responses of others. Possessing this capability to some degree is necessary not only to function successfully in everyday human interaction, but also is arguably essential to providing historical or sociological explanations of behavior (Collingwood 1956). When this cognitive ability is conjoined with compassion, it becomes one way of rising above the destructive dynamics of all against all. Various accounts have been offered of this process and its socially beneficent

effects—accounts that diverge in some respects but nonetheless overlap in essentials. The Scottish moralists, including Adam Smith in his *Theory of the Moral Sentiments*, gave it a central place in their account of human sociability and morality. In a similar vein, James Q. Wilson begins his etiology of the moral sense with sympathy. Jean-Jacques Rousseau places considerable emphasis on the social functions of "natural pity." And it seems fairly clear that **some element of sympathetic imagination is a necessary part of the movement from resentment to generosity** in a post-Nietzschean morality (Wilson 1993; Rousseau *A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality*; and Connolly 1991).

Determinism Impact – V2L

Determinism = NV2L, judge

Thomas A. Spragens, Professor of Political Science at Duke, 2000, Political Theory and Partisan Politics p. 80-1

On the other hand, it also follows from my basic thesis that **the bargaining/instrumental rationality mode of politics is not in itself adequate to sustain a well-ordered society.** That suggests that modus vivendi theories, or libertarian theories, or pluralist theories of democracy should not receive our endorsement. The reasons here are both moral and pragmatic. The moral reason is, quite simply, that **a human being whose associations with his or her fellow human beings are purely instrumental is not living much of a life.** John Stuart Mill makes the point rather eloquently in chapter 3 of his Considerations on Representative, Government (1962, 73): **A neighbor, not being an ally or an associate, since he is never engaged in any common undertaking for the joint benefit, is therefore only a rival.** Thus even private morality suffers, while public is actually extinct. **Were this the universal and only possible state of things, the utmost aspirations of the lawgiver or the moralist could only stretch to making the bulk of the community a flock of sheep innocently nibbling the grass side by side.** The pragmatic reservation about the modus vivendi/bargaining conception of liberal society concerns its long-term coherence and stability. Both the libertarian and the pluralist models embody **a presumption,** likely taken from classical economics, **that the natural outcome of a bargaining process is an equilibrium.** But this presumption **is highly questionable.** It takes for granted background conditions of widespread agreement to established rules of the game. That may be a defensible assumption when the market is purely an economic one, contained within sociological, political, and moral frameworks that buffer and sustain it. But when generalized to the social order as a whole, one may rightly wonder whether the sustaining context no longer exists and whether, therefore, political pluralism may not be guilty of making excessively sanguine empirical forecasts on the basis of a purely conceptual analogy. **Social bonds keep economic competition from turning into outright warfare. The "dog eat dog" world of the marketplace is not literally that, because norms and institutions are in place to constrain it.** But **if all of society is a marketplace in which each is a rival to all others, this anomic condition can easily prove disintegrative. If we relate only as competitors, what begins as bargaining easily becomes offers you can't refuse, and those in turn may easily precipitate more violent conflicts and political disaggregation.** The pluralist equilibrium may be, in short, an incipient war of all against all viewed through rose-tinted spectacles.

Rules key to Community

The individualist anarchy of a world without rules makes community and communication impossible

Michael Ignatieff, Carr Professor of Human Rights Practice, Director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at the JFK School of Government, Harvard University, 2004, *The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror*, p. 169

The challenge of an ethical life in liberal democracy is to live up, as individuals, to the engagements expressed in our constitutions and to seek to ensure that these engagements are kept in respect of the least advantaged of our fellow citizens. The task is also to ensure that each of us actually believes in our society as much of the time as possible. **In an age in which individuals are monstrously empowered, by technology and freedom, to bring Armageddon down upon their fellow human beings, it is suddenly no longer a minor matter that some of our fellow citizens, and some of the noncitizens who live among us, happen not to believe in liberal democracy but instead profess a variety of paranoias pretending to be politics. The existence of wild, vengeful, and deluded political opinions, if married to lethal technology in the possession of a single individual, suddenly becomes a threat to us all.** I am haunted, as I think we all might be, by the specter of the superempowered loner as the cruel nemesis of the very moral care our society lavishes on the idea of the individual. **It is a condition of our freedom that we cannot compel anyone to believe in the premises of a liberal democracy Either these premises freely convince others or they are useless.** They cannot be imposed, and we violate everything we stand for if we coerce those who do not believe what we do. In any event, we cannot preemptively detain all the discontent in our midst.

Community Impact - Humanity

Debate and politics is key to humanity itself; a mere collection of individuals is not a community. Community is characterized by the kind of consensus which enables political thought and action.

Arlene W. Saxonhouse, Professor of Political Science at the University of Michigan, 2000, Political Theory and Partisan Politics, p. 24-6

Hannah Arendt, who without question romanticizes the life of the ancient polis, nevertheless creates a model of political action that exalts the partisan, or at least the one who articulates well through debate with others views that address the broad issues of communal life. This is the political actor who may seek glory for himself, but does so through engagement in controversies in the open about public decisions. It is conflict on this level of thought and will that transforms us from the mindless pursuers of the material necessities of our lives to the human beings who can act. Such divisions, then, which come to the fore in the public space, are necessary for our humanity. Partisanship in this sense is not to be avoided, but exercised skillfully with a focus beyond the petty concerns of everyday life to a concern with choices that politics make in their confrontations with barbarism. To enter into this debate is to demonstrate the courage of the human being to lift himself out of the struggle for mere survival. In writing of the world of the ancient polis, she notes: Whoever entered the political realm had first to be ready to risk his life, and too great a love for life obstructed freedom, was a sure sign of slavishness. Courage therefore became the political virtue par excellence, and only those men who possessed it could be admitted to a fellowship that was political in content and purpose and thereby transcended the mere togetherness imposed on all—slaves, barbarians, and Greeks alike—through the urgencies of life ... by overcoming the innate urge of all living creatures for their own survival, it [the good life] was no longer bound to the biological life process (Arendt 1958, 36-37). In a way that is similar to Wolin's criticism of the universalizing science of the American founders, Arendt criticizes the statistical methods that likewise assimilate individuals to one another and thus have the effect of "leveling out fluctuation." Arguing that "statistical uniformity is by no means a harmless scientific ideal," she worries about the immersion of the self in society and thus the failure to distinguish oneself in the arena of public action. To so distinguish oneself entails the engagement in debate and conflict, to rise out of the biological life processes. "Human plurality," she says, is "the basic condition of both action and speech" (Arendt 1958, 175). And it is this plurality that allows for the initiation of the new, the transformation of what appears to be. Without an attachment to the self, the pursuit of a public identity which earns immortality is lost. "Partisanship" here appears at its highest level, as the basis for our humanity and only a political regime that can accommodate this sort of partisanship is worthy of praise. Arendt builds her analysis of the plures of human interaction on a somewhat idiosyncratic reading of Aristotle. Despite the idiosyncrasies, she does draw attention to the ways in which Aristotle is perhaps the most powerful exponent of a theory of plures, of a theory that enables us to conceptualize the partisan as a key player in the construction of the polity and not as the destroyer of a beautiful unity. Aristotle is known for his quotable assertion that by nature [humans are] man is a political animal. By this he means that [humans] man as the only creature who possesses speech and reason (logos) and can thus debate the advantageous and disadvantageous, the just and unjust, must have a realm in which that capacity can be exercised. The polis provides that realm where [one] man exercises his rationality in the process of making choices for the collective community of the polis. Other actions, such as those that go on within the family are usually governed by inclination and lack the generality of the larger community of the polis.

Community Impact - Humanity

Community key: we are not present to ourselves. Social participation grounds individual human meaning.

Carlson 99, Professor of Law at Cardozo, (David Grey, "Review: Duellism in Modern American Jurisprudence", Colombia Law Review v. 99)

Schlag excoriates legal practice for its want of a "robust referent," but never quite defines what he means by this. What would count as a "robust referent"? We can only infer his meaning by studying what he thinks law is not. Thus, we learn from Schlag that natural things have robust referents.²⁷ Hence, one **may infer that the absent robust referent is some "natural" thing beyond language.**²⁸ **Law cannot signify the thing-beyond-language.** This is a good Lacanian insight.²⁹ But **does this fault differentiate law from any other linguistic practice that we might identify? Is law different from politics or mathematics or geology** **30 No. These practices likewise do nothing but refer to other signifiers in the same infinite regress that law does.**³¹ **One must conclude that law is not and never was the culprit. Language is.**³² If language always reduces to a chain of signifiers without end, **why single law out for abuse? Because law promises justice. Justice is law's Master Signifier its "exceptional element."**³³ Yet just because justice is exceptional, law cannot deliver it.³⁴ The inability of law to deliver what it promises can best be appreciated in the context of Lacanian theory. According to Lacan, the human subject is angry at language itself. This anger is inscribed in a false auto-biography,³⁵ according to which there once was a time in which the human subject felt no pain or desire; but something bad intervened to harm, maim or reduce our integrity. This story has been told a thousand times in myth, in the doctrine of Original Sin, in romantic nostalgia, in conservative or radical politics, even in Hegelian philosophy, where the human subject is portrayed as the diremption of Spirit into the world.³⁶ In Lacanian theory, **a subject who enters the symbolic realm of language can speak words recognized by other subjects who can speak back. The very idea of speaking presupposes some other subject who can listen and understand. Hence, our ability to differentiate** (and thus identify) **ourselves in language can only be bestowed on us by other speaking subjects. On this dialectical view of human subjectivity, we are, by definition, not whole not entirely present to ourselves.**³⁷ A basic part of ourselves is beyond us. We are alienated in language.³⁸ We suffer from "being-for-other."³⁹

Role of the Ballot

We must conceive of the ballot communicatively in order to produce effective political action; our framework provides the preconditions necessary to establishing a discursive community.

Mary Dietz, Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota, 2000, Political Theory and Partisan Politics p. 121-3

Jürgen Habermas has recently been developing a strong link between a philosophical conception of language (as communicative rationality) geared toward the redemption of validity claims; and the concrete dynamics of politics as speech-action. He unites the two in a discourse theory of politics as deliberative democracy, where the public use of reason is distinguished by the enactment of procedures (validity relations) through which participants (as free and equal citizens) achieve agreement through critical discussion, or at least engage in "action oriented toward reaching understanding" (Habermas 1993b, 133). Habermasian citizens are truth-seekers insofar as, in Habermas's words, "the sphere of validity relations is ... internally differentiated in terms of the viewpoints proper to truth, normative Tightness, and subjective truthfulness or authenticity" (Habermas 1990, 115).⁸ In short, Habermas's defense of rationality and reasonableness, and his equally compelling conception of politics as democratic deliberation, are both directed toward identifying and rooting out of politics "distorted communicative" conditions. In clarifying the relation between speech and politics, Habermas notes that "discourse theory has the success of deliberative politics depend not on a collectively acting citizenry but on the institutionalization of the corresponding procedures and conditions of communication" (n.d. 12, italics mine). The "procedures and conditions" to which Habermas refers emerge out of a theory that (a) thematizes a "terrain of argumentation" in which validity claims are made; (b) assumes that all speech presupposes a "background consensus" among participants; and (c) anticipates that the validity claims inherent in the performing of a speech action can be "vindicated" or "redeemed" (Einlösen) when the background consensus among interlocutors breaks down or is challenged.⁹ Habermas links linguistic intersubjectivity as practical discourse to the vindication of validity-claims that all citizens make (either implicitly or explicitly) as speakers. Therefore, discourse theory reconstructs four claims that are potentially redeemable in every statement a speaker makes, and grounded in the very character (or the "universal pragmatics") of our linguistic intersubjectivity: (1) intelligibility (or com-prehensibility); (2) truth (regarding the propositional content); (3) justifiability (or appropriateness, in terms of the norms invoked); and (4) truthfulness (or sincerity, in the sense that the speaker does not intend to deceive the listener). Undistorted communication (and hence the success of deliberative politics) is thus secured in procedures and conditions in which interlocutors can, if necessary, redeem the four validity-claims to intelligibility, truth, justifiability, and truthfulness that are themselves embedded in every speech-act. The premise behind the highly specialized discussion that Habermas calls "practical discourse" is the desire to reach agreement on the basis of "rationally motivated approval of the substance of an utterance" (Habermas 1993b, 134). Thus, discourse ethics establishes what Habermas calls a "fundamental idea": interactions are communicative "when the participants coordinate their plans of action consensually, with the agreement reached at any point being evaluated in terms of the intersubjective recognition of validity claims" (Habermas 1993b, 58).¹⁰ To clarify this point, Habermas draws his now well-known distinction between two types of social interaction—communicative and strategic: Whereas in strategic action one actor seeks to influence the behavior of another by means of the threat of sanctions or the prospect of gratification in order to cause the interaction to continue as the first actor desires, in communicative action one actor seeks rationally to motivate another by relying on the illocutionary binding/bonding effect (Bindungseffekt) of the offer contained in his speech act. (Habermas 1993b, 58)" The normative and procedural implications of Habermas's analytic distinction are instructively sketched by Simone Chambers: As opposed to strategic action, where

participants are primarily interested in bringing about a desired behavioral response, in communicative action, participants are interested in bringing about a "change of heart." For example, in strategic action participants often attempt to sway each other by introducing influences unrelated to the merits of an argument, for example, threats, bribes, or coercion. . . . Communicative actors are primarily interested in mutual understanding as opposed to external behavior.... Only the "force of the better argument" should have the power to sway participants. (Chambers, 1996, 99) 9

Fairness outweighs Education

Fairness outweighs education

Patrick Speice and Jim Lyle 2003 “traditional policy debate: now more than ever” Oceans Policy Adrift
<http://www.wfu.edu/Student-organizations/debate/MiscSites/DRGArticles/SpeiceLyle2003htm.htm>

If it were decided that the promotion of education is of greater importance than preserving debate as a game, then the activity would begin to fall apart. Imagine that if instead of having two teams argue over competing viewpoints about a particular resolution/plan that debate instead asked debaters to simply inform the other participants of a different viewpoint regarding the plan. What would the activity look like then? Instead of hearing why the plan was good and bad, or why one policy alternative was better than another, we instead would hear why the plan is good, and why the plan reminded us of a story about one's childhood. How would the judge evaluate such claims? If the desirability of the plan loses its importance and debate ceases to answer a yes/no question, what criteria should be used to resolve the “debate”

(Smith, 2002)? While promoting intellectual development and enterprise are important components of the activity, the promotion of these values at the expense of the value of clash can only lead to the transformation of debate into discussion. In fact, it is not only that such a development spurs the loss of competitiveness, such a turn for the activity risks the loss of debate itself. Teams can begin to argue however they wish, and the “2 + 2 = 4” strategy becomes viable. What comes to matter then is word choice or performance. The result is a loss of depth of the education provided by the activity. Learning loses direction and begins to wander into the realm of acquiring random trivia. The entire purpose of having a policy resolution is rendered moot. Certainly one of the things most debaters enjoy about debate is that it really has no rules, however, if we decide to completely throw away “rules,” even as guiding principles, then the activity becomes something other than debate as an activity premised on fairness and competitive equity.

A/T: Deliberation = Elitist

Deliberation is not elitist

Adolf G. Gundersen, Associate Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M, 2000, Political Theory and Partisan Politics p. 106

The argument for countering partisanship at the grass roots by supporting political deliberation there is pretty simple: If deliberation is a good thing in "deliberative bodies" like congress, isn't a good thing among average citizens, too? To suppose otherwise is to hold either that the average citizen is incapable of deliberation or that the average citizen is less capable of deliberation than the average representative. Both positions collapse upon even the most glancing scrutiny. To hold that the average citizen is incapable of deliberation is both patently antidemocratic and empirically questionable, to say the very least. To hold that the average citizen is less capable of deliberation than the average representatives is perhaps slightly less antidemocratic and empirically dubious, but achieves this very modest gain in credibility only at the cost of landing in the out-and-out contradiction of valorizing deliberation in one place while denigrating it in another. If deliberation contains moments of both confrontation and engagement, democratizing deliberation by making it the province of the citizenry rather than leaving it in the hands of representatives has the potential of greatly expanding the degree to which confrontation and engagement become society-wide traits, traits which work on an ongoing basis to blunt the worst effects of partisanship. At least as important, such a democratization of deliberation is likely to enhance the deliberativeness of the polity since it will encourage deliberation at one removed from the locus of decision making—precisely the place it is most likely to succeed.

A/T: Rules = Biopower

Biopower inevitable

William Connolly, Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins, 2005, Pluralism, p. 138-9

There is often ambivalence in people's orientation to the sacred, an ambivalence concealed through fear of retribution by God or their compatriots. Those demanding punishment of others who defile what they take to be sacred, familiarly enough, often intensify the demand because of the very ambivalence that they themselves feel. Spinoza, Nietzsche, and Freud, among others, read the punishment of blasphemy in this way. And each himself was accused of blasphemy because of that very analysis. None, however, says that homo sacer is part of the sacred. The issue is pertinent because in a political culture of deep pluralism – a culture in which people honor different existential faiths and final sources of morality – different images of the sacred unavoidably and repeatedly bump into each other. What is needed today is a cautious relaxation of discourse about the sacred, one that allows us to come to terms affirmatively with the irreducible plurality of sacred objects in late modern life. With respect to sovereignty it is important to underline the significance of acts by which deep conflicts are settled, but it is equally important not to elevate them to the level of the sacred. Agamben also contends that biopolitics has intensified today. That intensification translates the paradox of sovereignty into a potential disaster. It is well to recall, however, that every way of life involves the infusion of norms, judgments, and standards into the affective life of participants. Every way of life is biocultural and biopolitical. Lucretius, Augustine, Spinoza, Rousseau, and Merleau-Ponty, writing at different periods, all appreciate the layering of culture into biological life. They treat the biological not merely as the genetic or the fixed but also as the introjections of culture into intertwined layers of corporeality.

A/T: Rules = Violence

Conventions of communication are not a matter of violent exclusion but rather the preconditions for consensus.

Mary Dietz, Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota, 2000, Political Theory and Partisan Politics p. 123-4

Habermas's distinction between "pure" communicative action and strategic action raises many difficulties, not the least of which is its adherence to an idealized model of communication that, as Habermas himself acknowledges, does not fit a great deal of everyday social interaction (McCarthy 1991, 132). Machiavelli's famous riposte to those thinkers who "have imagined republics and principalities which have never been seen or known to exist in reality" (Machiavelli 1950, 56) seems pertinent here, for the idealized model that Habermas imagines and the distinction that supports it appear boldly to deny the Machiavellian insight that "how we live is so far removed from how we ought to live, that he who abandons what is done for what ought to be done, will rather learn to bring about his own ruin than his preservation" (56). I will return to this point as it relates to politics later. For now, it is important to underscore that Habermas relies upon the communicative-strategic distinction to do at least two things: first, to show that on the level of linguistics, communicative action enjoys an "originary" priority over strategic and all other modes of linguistic usage, which are themselves "parasitic" (Rasmussen 1990, 38) or "derivative" (McCarthy 1991, 133) upon the former.¹² Second, on the level of political theory, Habermas introduces the distinction in order to limit the exercise of threats and coercion (or strategic action) by enumerating a formal-pragmatic system of discursive accountability (or communicative action) that is geared toward human agreement and mutuality. Despite its thoroughly modern accouterments, communicative action aims at something like the twentieth-century discourse-equivalent of the chivalric codes of the late Middle Ages; as a normative system it articulates the conventions of fair and honorable engagement between interlocutors. To be sure, Habermas's concept of communicative action is neither as refined nor as situationally embedded as were the protocols that governed honorable combat across European cultural and territorial boundaries and between Christian knights; but it is nonetheless a (cross-cultural) protocol for all that. The entire framework that Habermas establishes is an attempt to limit human violence by elaborating a code of communicative conduct that is designed to hold power in check by channeling it into persuasion, or the "unforced" force of the better argument (Habermas 1993b, 160).[^]

A/T: Rules = Exclusion

Political ethics is committed to pluralizing the body politic

William Connolly, Prof of Polisci at Johns Hopkins, 2000, Political Theory and Partisan Politics p. 168-9

When such a line is pursued,⁷ a positive ethical case can be built for a bi-valent, robust ethos of politics. This would be one in which an enlarged number of constituencies acknowledge more vigorously comparative elements of partisanship and contestability in their own identities and fold this shift in self-recognition into pursuit of greater forbearance and generosity in social relations. It would also be a pluralism in which new drives to pluralization, say, in the domains of gender, sexuality, household organization, ethnicity, metaphysical faith, and orientations to death, were met with greater responsiveness than some traditions of secular pluralism now authorize. For, if the possibilities of life are as protean and diverse as some of us project them to be while historically contingent dictates of social organization regularly narrow their range, we can expect existing formations to be challenged periodically by new movements that seek to transfigure injuries, grievances, energies, and uncertain hopes, circulating through them into new possibilities of being. Appreciation of such a pluralist/pluralizing ethos need not draw upon Nietzschean sources alone, though they do provide an excellent source for it, and they do deserve agonistic respect from those not moved by them. It can draw selective support from a variety of currents flowing through theistic doctrines, particularly those which emphasize the mystery of God or the place of love in a faith receptive to the surprise of alterity. It can also draw sustenance from a modest rewriting of the Rawlsian problematic. In this refigured Rawlsianism, we pursue restrained terms of contestation and collaboration between multiple, overlapping traditions, each of which recognizes a certain reciprocity between the element of contestability in its own faith and in the alternative faiths with which it contends and collaborates. Such a rewriting touches the Rawlsian idea that the modern age is incompatible with a fixed conception of the good. But it no longer calls upon each constituency to leave its metaphysical/religious doctrine in the private sphere before it enters public, secular life. Rather, it calls upon it to acknowledge the contestability of its own presumptions and to allow that acknowledgment to infuse restraint, agonistic respect, and responsiveness into its relations with other constituencies. That is, it calls upon each to revise its self-understanding in the light of these considerations. Such an ethos of pluralism neither rises above partisanship nor reduces politics to unfettered partisanship. It fosters restrained partisanship within and between multiple constituencies, each of which may be able to identify lines of connection and collaboration with a series of others. This is, then, a political ethic, an ethic in which politics plays a constitutive role and a politics in which ethics plays a constitutive role. It does not, of course, provide an accurate description of the contemporary condition in America, with its steep inequalities and large classes of people closed out of effective participation in political life. It is a critical ideal. As such, it is perhaps more appropriate to the times in which we live than the Rawlsian model it rewrites. It is presented not as the standard to which every ethic must appeal but as an ethical sensibility able to enter into critical dialogue and selective collaboration with a variety of other perspectives. The very indispensability and contestability of contending onto-theo and onto-non-theistic stances in the late-modern world supports the case for cultivating relations of agonistic respect and selective collaboration between multiple, overlapping constituencies, each of which draws pertinent aspects of its fundamental doctrine into public life when, as so very often happens, the occasion demands it. And several of which also invoke the essential contestability of the ethical sources they honor the most. Out of these diverse lines of connection across multiple lines of difference, a politics of creative coalitions might even be forged to enable action in concert through the state to support the economic and cultural preconditions of justice and pluralism.⁸ Sr

A/T: “Kritiks are too cool for rules”

Even radical criticism assumes the minimum requirements of argument; debate requires a positive defense of application NOT because debate is ideological but rather because of the necessary structures of argument.

Ruth Lessl Shively, Associate Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M, 2000, Political Theory and Partisan Politics, p. 186-7

In response to these arguments, the ambiguists might counter that they do not mean to contest the basic structures of democracy—that they mean simply to resist the cruel and subjugating tendencies that prevail within these structures. Thus, assuming that we live in an open, democratic society, they may simply set out to challenge our categorizations of people and behaviors as good or evil, licit or illicit, normal or abnormal, and so on. And within our given system, they may simply seek to remind us that these categories are our creations—that we need the irrational and the deviant to have our own sense of rational and communal identity. Thus, perhaps it is possible to pursue a general policy of contest and subversion—a policy designed to resist social pressure to categorize and judge others—without contesting or subverting the basic structures of openness and democracy. I would like to finish this discussion by briefly suggesting why such a policy of general subversion is not the best answer to the important issues the ambiguists raise, or why a policy of rational judgment is a preferable approach to these issues. The first problem with the ambiguists' position here is one that they typically acknowledge. The problem is that it is impossible to subvert all categorizations, for in subverting one categorization, one necessarily embraces another. Thus, in subverting traditional categories—like good versus bad, normal versus abnormal, right versus wrong—the ambiguists necessarily embrace the alternative categories of the ambiguist: categories like those of open-mindedness versus close-mindedness, flexibility versus rigidity, creativity versus conformity, skepticism versus trust, tolerance versus intolerance, and the like. Which is to say that in denouncing anything, theorists cannot help but suggest what it is that they are not denouncing—or what they are accepting as preferable. While, as I said, the ambiguists acknowledge the impossibility of subverting all categorizations, they do not think that this undermines their general policy of subversion. Rather, they maintain that the acknowledgment of this fact should make us approach our own (and others') ideas with skepticism and flexibility, prompting us to see our ideas not as justified truths but as useful positions from which to unmask truth claims and not as enduring grounds for political theory but as temporary resting points from which to unsettle others—points that can themselves be expected to be challenged and changed down the road. The problem with this position is that even temporary and unstable positions need justification. That is, even if we acknowledge that our categorizations are apt to be undermined and overthrown, they must be given reasons at the moment we are using them. If we are denouncing others' choices, we are necessarily commending our own and, as such, we need to say why we think our own commendable. Likewise then, in denouncing traditional categories, the ambiguists cannot avoid suggesting that their own categories are superior; and, as such, they cannot avoid making positive moral claims or presenting a general, alternative theory about humanity and society. Thus, they are obligated to present their reasons for this alternative vision.

Topic Good

No-Topic discussion skews debate

Preston 2003. Thomas C. Preston summer 2003. Professor of communications at the University of Missouri-St. Louis. "No-topic debating in Parliamentary Debate: Students and Critic Reactions."

<http://cas.bethel.edu/dept/comm/npda/journal/vol9no5.pdf>

Finally, **of the 43 responses, 35, or 81.4 per cent, felt that the no-topic debate skewed the outcome of the debate toward one side or the other.** Of those responses, 32 (91.4 per cent of those indicating a bias, or 74.4 per cent of all respondents) indicated that the no-topic debate gave an advantage to the Government. Three **(8.6 per cent of those indicating a bias, or 7.0 per cent of all respondents) indicated that the no-topic debate gave an advantage to the Opposition.**

No-Topic debate makes debaters resent the activity

Preston 2003. Thomas C. Preston summer 2003. Professor of communications at the University of Missouri-St. Louis. "No-topic debating in Parliamentary Debate: Students and Critic Reactions."

<http://cas.bethel.edu/dept/comm/npda/journal/vol9no5.pdf>

In any event, **an examination of these type comments indicates a strong bipolar reaction to the no topic round, skewed slightly toward those opposing the idea. Some remarks strongly attacked the experiment: "perhaps the most ridiculous notion for debate ever," "two thumbs down," "who needs that nonsense?," "worst parli experiment ever," "this is the most ridiculous round I have ever participated in", "this was a stupid waist [sic] of time," and "the single least educational or entertaining debate experiment in my life" were among such reactions. Others took the opportunity to attack other debate organizations: "I feel that that this form of debate could be abused even worse than CEDA ever thought about being!!!!,"** "This must be some idea of a silly APDA geek. . .if I wanted to run pre-conceived cases (b/c this one was all policy, like most), I'd be wearing "Birks" and beads in CEDA," "Might as well be CEDA," "The bridge you attempt to build between APDA and NPDA is unbelievably silly. It will never work," and "policy should be kept in CEDA" exemplified such remarks. Some students reporting that they had debated many parliamentary rounds, all NPDA, wrote some of the strongest negative remarks and even suggested more restrictions on resolutions. The following exemplified this reaction: **"For us old-timers, we are deeply offended and I am hopeful that this will not happen in the future. Maybe resorting to more specific resolutions rather than creating easy ways out of setting up good round would be a much better solution."**

No-topic debate drives people from the activity

Preston 2003. Thomas C. Preston summer 2003. Professor of communications at the University of Missouri-St. Louis. "No-topic debating in Parliamentary Debate: Students and Critic Reactions."

<http://cas.bethel.edu/dept/comm/npda/journal/vol9no5.pdf>

Reduced to absurdity, the notion of no rules for a debate tournament would result in chaos, bringing up an infinite regress into whether or not chaos is a good thing! At least on the surface, **the results of this particular study would seem to discourage repeating this experiment as conducted for the present study. A number of participants may not want to return to the tournament because of the confusion and perceived lack of educational value.** However, an exact representation and t-tests between results could help not only assess the validity and reliability of the instrument, but whether attitudes and perceptions have changed toward no-topic debating. Therefore, whereas Option III may seem to be out of the questions, benefits can still be gained from it in terms of studying the evolution of parliamentary debate format.

Conventions key

Debate should have rules like everything else in society it works out best

Christopher C. Joyner (prof. of International law at Georgetown) Spring 1999 “teaching international law: views from an international relations political scientist” ILSA journal of international & comparative law 5 ILSA J Int’l & Comp L 377

An essential purpose in teaching a course on international law is to make students think in a reasoned, more analytical fashion. Teaching such legal logic in an international political science course is not intended to prepare them for law school (although many students think it will do so). Rather, such pedagogy aims to instill in students a greater appreciation for the rationale of creating international law to fulfill specific purposes in regulating the conduct of states. The use of the case method approach and hypothetical situations has proved extremely effective in this regard. For example, consider the fundamental question that all professors must confront in teaching international law, namely: Why do governments obey international law? For much the same reason that drivers are inclined to stop at a four-way intersection. Nearly all drivers stop their cars at a four-way intersection in order to protect the driver and passengers from being hit by other vehicles, either those that are being driven recklessly, carelessly, or dangerously by other drivers. Most people do not stop because it's the law and the right thing to do. Most drivers do not stop because they actually fear getting caught by a policeman who might be watching from some hidden location. Rather, drivers stop because they realize that it is in their personal safety and interest to stop, to watch what other cars do, and then to proceed cautiously, even though they have the right of way. Governments tend to obey international legal rules for the same reason. Stop, look and listen. Proceed with caution. That is what the law [*383] says. The expectation is that if you follow through on that, you will in all likelihood pass through international relations unscathed and unharmed. But watch out for the drunk driver, whose senses are impaired (by ideology or parochial national interests). And watch out for the big truck that comes barreling through the intersection (the hegemonic regional power) who does not care who gets in its way because it has the largest engine and greatest bulk on the road. If you drive recklessly long enough, accidents will happen; furthermore, sooner or later, you will pay a high price, perhaps the ultimate price, for your recklessness.

Debate is a social activity marked by expectations and conventions governed by mutual self-interest

Christopher C. Joyner (prof. of International law at Georgetown) Spring 1999 “teaching international law: views from an international relations political scientist” ILSA journal of international & comparative law 5 ILSA J Int’l & Comp L 377

Here is another analogy. International law functions with authority much akin to the role of officials in a football game. Football is a game of power, strategy, and interests, played on a field according to rules. Large, mighty linemen, fast backs, and quick, brutish line-backers all collide during the course of the contest. The referees and other officials determine when rules are broken, and when penalties should be imposed. Why is it that all these strong men, who are much bigger than the officials, all condescend to a referee's rulings? The strength and power of the team does not determine the rules or how the game is played. The rules are actually intended to put the game figuratively on a level playing field-to allow all teams to play by the same rules, and to have expectations about what will happen if those are broken: penalties result, penalties are called and marked off against those big strong football players by little men in black and white striped shirts. The big strong football players accept those penalties, regardless of the power differential between them and the referees. Why? The answer is similar to why governments most often decide to obey international law: because it works to their interests to play by the rules. But if

they get caught in a violation, it is best for them to accept the appropriate penalties for the sake of the game being played out.

Debate Key

Debate's presentation of alternatives and consequences distinguish its educational value from other forms of roleplaying.

Christopher C. Joyner (prof. of International law at Georgetown) Spring 1999 "teaching international law: views from an international relations political scientist" ILSA journal of international & comparative law 5 ILSA J Int'l & Comp L 377

Use of the debate can be an effective pedagogical tool for education in the social sciences.

Debates, like other role-playing simulations, help students understand different perspectives

on a policy issue by adopting a perspective as their own. But, unlike other simulation games,

debates do not require that a student participate directly in order to realize the benefit of the

game. Instead of developing policy alternatives and experiencing the consequences of different

choices in a traditional role-playing game, debates present the alternatives and consequences

in a formal, rhetorical fashion before a judgmental audience. Having the class audience serve as

jury helps each student develop a well-thought-out opinion on the issue by providing contrasting

facts and views and enabling audience members to pose challenges to each debating team.

****Standards Defenses**

Predictable Ground key to Education

It is necessary to arrive at an agreement about what the resolution means before any active discussion can take place- the most predictable way to interpret the debate-space is first to take common usage and then to propose more specific and narrow stipulations.

Kemerling, 97 professor of philosophy at Newberry College, (Garth, "Definition and Meaning", <http://www.philosophypages.com/lg/e05.htm>)

The most common way of preventing or eliminating differences in the use of languages is by agreeing on the definition of our terms. Since these explicit accounts of the meaning of a word or phrase can be offered in distinct contexts and employed in the service of different goals, it's useful to distinguish definitions of several kinds:

A lexical definition simply reports the way in which a term is already used within a language community. The goal here is to inform someone else of the accepted meaning of the term, so the definition is more or less correct depending upon the accuracy with which it captures that usage. In these pages, my definitions of technical terms of logic are lexical because they are intended to inform you about the way in which these terms are actually employed within the discipline of logic. At the other extreme, **a stipulative definition freely assigns meaning to a completely new term, creating a usage that had never previously existed. Since the goal in this case is to propose the adoption of shared use of a novel term, there are no existing standards against which to compare it,** and the definition is always correct (though **it might fail to win acceptance if it turns out to be inapt or useless**). **If I now decree that we will henceforth refer to Presidential speeches delivered in French as "glorsherfs," I have made a (probably pointless) stipulative definition.**

Combining these two techniques is often an effective way to reduce the vagueness of a word or phrase. These **precising definitions begin with the lexical definition of a term but then propose to sharpen it by stipulating more narrow limits on its use. Here, the lexical part must be correct and the stipulative portion should appropriately reduce the troublesome vagueness.** If the USPS announces that "proper notification of a change of address" means that an official form containing the relevant information must be received by the local post office no later than four days prior to the effective date of the change, it has offered a (possibly useful) precising definition.

Think of debates like chairs- unless there is some commonality in the general idea of what a debate (or a chair) is, pretty soon we could all be sitting on tables.

Kemerling, 97 professor of philosophy at Newberry College, (Garth, "Definition and Meaning", <http://www.philosophypages.com/lg/e05.htm>)

The extension of a general term is just the collection of individual things to which it is correctly applied. Thus, **the extension of the word "chair" includes every chair** that is (or ever has been or ever will be) in the world. **The intension of a general term,** on the other hand, **is the set of features which are shared by everything to which it applies.** Thus, the intension of the word "chair" is (something like) "a piece of furniture designed to be sat upon by one person at a time."

Predictability key to Plan Focus

Predictability and plan-focus are inextricably linked; the only way to generate discussion we can prepare about is to focus on the plan as the foundation of argument.

Patrick Speice and Jim Lyle 2003 "traditional policy debate: now more than ever" Oceans Policy Adrift <http://www.wfu.edu/Student-organizations/debate/MiscSites/DRGArticles/SpeiceLyle2003htm.htm>

This notion of **predictability is one that is important for debate as a game. If one team cannot predict what the other will say, then it becomes futile to attempt to research and prepare for**

tournament competition. This problem is even more apparent in the case of critical affirmatives. If an affirmative team is able to argue that the performative effects of the 1AC are a justification to vote affirmative, or if the affirmative team can argue that their 1AC should be endorsed as a tool of cultural change, they are essentially asking the judge to vote for portions of the 1AC that are not necessarily linked to the plan.

Limits key to Politics

Limits key: political philosophy is a question concerning whether or not an ideal is desirable, not the mere formulation of infinite ideals.

Donald S. Lutz, Professor of Political Science at Houston, 2000, Political Theory and Partisan Politics, p. 39-40

Aristotle notes in the Politics that political theory simultaneously proceeds at three levels—discourse about the ideal, about the best possible in the real world, and about existing political systems.⁴ Put another way, **comprehensive political theory must ask several different kinds of questions that are linked, yet distinguishable.** In order to understand the interlocking set of questions that political theory can ask, imagine a continuum stretching from left to right. At the end, to the right, is an ideal form of government, a perfectly wrought construct produced by the imagination. At the other end is the perfect dystopia, the most perfectly wretched system that the human imagination can produce. **Stretching between these two extremes is an infinite set of possibilities,** merging into one another, that describe the logical possibilities created by the characteristics defining the end points. For example, a political system defined primarily by equality would have a perfectly inegalitarian system described at the other end, and the possible states of being between them would vary primarily in the extent to which they embodied equality. An ideal defined primarily by liberty would create a different set of possibilities between the extremes. Of course, visions of the ideal often are inevitably more complex than these single-value examples indicate, but it is also true that in order to imagine an ideal state of affairs a kind of simplification is almost always required since normal states of affairs invariably present themselves to human consciousness as complicated, opaque, and to a significant extent indeterminate. ^t A non-ironic reading of Plato's Republic leads one to conclude that the creation of these visions of the ideal characterizes political philosophy. This is not the case. **Any person can generate a vision of the ideal. One job of political philosophy is to ask the question "Is this ideal worth pursuing?" Before the question can be pursued, however, the ideal state of affairs must be clarified, especially with respect to conceptual precision and the logical relationship between the propositions that describe the ideal.** This pre-theoretical analysis raises the vision of the ideal from the mundane to a level where true philosophical analysis, and the careful comparison with existing systems can proceed fruitfully. The process of pre-theoretical analysis, probably because it works on clarifying ideas that most capture the human imagination, too often looks to some like the entire enterprise of political philosophy.⁵ However, the value of Jean-Jacques Rousseau's concept of the General Will, for example, lies not in its formal logical implications, nor in its compelling hold on the imagination, but on the power and clarity it lends to an analysis and comparison of actual political systems. Among other things it allows him to show that anyone who wishes to pursue a state of affairs closer to that summed up in the concept of the General Will must successfully develop a civil religion. **To the extent politicians believe theorists who tell them that pre-theoretical clarification of language describing an ideal is the essence and sum total of political philosophy, to that extent they will properly conclude that political philosophers have little to tell them, since politics is the realm of the possible not the realm of logical clarity.** However, **once the ideal is clarified, the political philosopher will begin to articulate and assess the reasons why we might want to pursue such an ideal. At this point, analysis leaves the realm of pure logic and enters the realm of the logic of human longing, aspiration, and anxiety. The analysis is now limited by the interior parameters of the human heart (more properly the human psyche) to which the theorist must appeal. Unlike the clarification stage where anything that is logical is possible, there are now definite limits on where logic can take us.** Appeals to self-destruction, less happiness rather than more, psychic isolation, enslavement, loss of identity, a preference for the lives of mollusks over that of humans, to name just a few possibilities, are doomed to failure. The theorist cannot appeal to such values if she or he is to attract an audience of politicians. Much political theory involves the careful, competitive analysis of what a given ideal state of affairs entails, and as Plato shows in his dialogues the discussion between the philosopher and the politician will quickly terminate if he or she cannot convincingly demonstrate the connection between the political ideal being developed and natural human passions. **In this way, the politician can be educated by the possibilities that the political theorist can articulate,** just as the political theorist can be educated by the relative success the normative analysis has in "setting the hook" of interest among nonpolitical theorists. **This realm of discourse, dominated by the logic of humanly worthwhile goals, requires that the theorist carefully observe the responses of others**

in order not to be seduced by what is merely logical as opposed to what is humanly rational. Moral discourse conditioned by the ideal, if it is to be successful, requires the political theorist to be fearless in pursuing normative logic, but it also requires the theorist to have enough humility to remember that, if a non-theorist cannot be led toward an ideal, the fault may well lie in the theory, not in the moral vision of the non-theorist.

Limits key to Inclusion

Limits are key to make openness meaningful: the context in which speech occurs is speech's only source of meaning

Mary Dietz, Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota, 2000, Political Theory and Partisan Politics, p. 131-2

If another of the imperatives of the political world is to avoid becoming contemptible, then speaking the truth is a good, but not an unalloyed good. The paradoxes of politics tend to wreak havoc with the principles of communication because, as Merleau-Ponty observes, "politics is a relationship to [people]men rather than principles" (Merleau-Ponty 1964, 219).³² Thus in politics an openness toward the opinions of others is sometimes not a condition of mutual respect, but antithetical to it. It may be a peculiarity of the political domain that "when everyone can tell you the truth, you lose their respect," but it is a peculiarity that discourse ethicists ignore to their peril (Machiavelli 1950, 87). One might say, then, that speaking the truth is an indispensable element in politics, but not the point of it. To make communicative action, or the enactment of principles of discourse ethics, or moral conversation, the end or goal of politics is to mistake the nature of working in half-truth and thereby misconstrue "the milieu that is proper to politics" itself. The supervenience of strategic (speech) action on communicative (speech) action in politics that I have been alluding to here is what I also think Timothy Garton Ash meant to convey when, in the aftermath of the PEN Congress, he referred to the "qualitatively different responsibility" that the intellectual has for "the validity, intellectual coherence, and truth of what he says and writes," as opposed to the politician, who invariably works in half-truth. The point is not that the intellectual lives in a communicative world of validity, coherence, and truth while the politician does not. (Although Habermas's ideal communication situation might stand a better chance of realization in a scholarly conference or a graduate seminar, as opposed to a press conference, an election campaign, or even a neighborhood caucus.) The politician also inhabits a world of validity, coherence, and truth. Yet validity, coherence, and truth take on different colorations working in the context peculiar to politics—where strategic imperatives and the exercise of power, conflicts of interest and drives of ambition, are ineliminable aspects of collective action. Hence, it is one thing to encourage (or even insist upon) the intellectual's responsibility to keep providing us with various practical (or even imaginary) means for judging the health or sickness of the body politic, and quite another to expect the politician—or the citizen—to "live" them.

Limits and Education key to Politics

Rules good: even openness requires limits, rules and closure. Shared conventions form the basis for the possibility of political discussion and participation.

Ruth Lessl Shively, Associate Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M, 2000, Political Theory and Partisan Politics, p. 179

To put this point another way, it turns out that to be open to all things is, in effect, to be open to nothing. While the ambiguists have commendable reasons for wanting to avoid closure—to avoid specifying what is not allowed or celebrated in their political vision—they need to say "no" to some things in order to be open to things in general. They need to say "no" to certain forms of contest, if only to protect contest in general. For if one is to be open to the principles of democracy, for example, one must be dogmatically closed to the principles of fascism. If one would embrace tolerance, one must rigidly reject intolerance. If one would support openness in political speech and action, one must ban the acts of political intimidation, violence or recrimination that squelch that openness. If one would expand deliberation and disruption, one must set up strict legal protections around such activities. And if one would ensure that citizens have reason to engage in political contest—that it has practical meaning and import for them—one must establish and maintain the rules and regulations and laws that protect democracy. In short, openness requires certain clear limits, rules, closure. And to make matters more complex, these structures of openness cannot simply be put into place and forgotten. They need to be taught to new generations of citizens, to be retaught and reenforced among the old, and as the political world changes, to be shored up, rethought, adapted, and applied to new problems and new situations. It will not do, then, to simply assume that these structures are permanently viable and secure without significant work or justification on our part; nor will it do to talk about resisting or subverting them. Indeed, they are such valuable and yet vulnerable goods that they require the most unflagging and firm support that we can give them.

****Education Good**

Roleplaying key to Education

Instrumental affirmation of a policy through role-playing is a prerequisite to liberal democratic participation

John Rawls, *bad-ass*, *The Law of Peoples*, 1999, p. 56-57

To answer this question, we say that, ideally, citizens are to think of themselves as if they were legislators and ask themselves what statutes, supported by what reasons satisfying the criterion of reciprocity, they would think it most reasonable to enact. When firm and widespread, the disposition of citizens to view themselves as ideal legislators, and to repudiate government officials and candidates for public office who violate public reason, forms part of the political and social basis of liberal democracy and is vital for its enduring strength and vigor. Thus in domestic society citizens fulfill their duty of civility and support the idea of public reason, while doing what they can to hold government officials to it. This duty, like other political rights and duties, is an intrinsically moral duty. I emphasize that it is not a legal duty, for in that case it would be incompatible with freedom of speech. Similarly, the ideal of the public reason of free and equal peoples is realized, or satisfied, whenever chief executives and legislators, and other government officials, as well as candidates for public office, act from and follow the principles of the Law of Peoples and explain to other peoples their reasons for pursuing or revising a people's foreign policy and affairs of state that involve other societies. As for private citizens, we say, as before, that ideally citizens are to think of themselves as if they were executives and legislators and ask themselves what foreign policy supported by what considerations they would think it most reasonable to advance. Once again, when firm and widespread, the disposition of citizens to view themselves as ideal executives and legislators, and to repudiate government officials and candidates for public office who violate the public reason of free and equal peoples, is part of the political and social basis of peace and understanding among peoples.

Education key to Deliberation

Politics is the realm of power; education is the only way to check manipulation.

Donald S. Lutz, Professor of Polisci at Houston, 2000, Political Theory and Partisan Politics, p. 36-7

The position argued here is that to the extent such a discussion between political theorists and politicians does not take place we damage the prospects for marrying justice with power.

Since the hope of uniting justice with power was the reason for creating political philosophy in the first place, political theorists need to pursue the dialogue as part of what justifies their intellectual project. Politics is the realm of power. More specifically it is the realm where force and violence are replaced by debates and discussion about how to implement power. Without the meaningful injection of considerations of justice, politics tends to become discourse by the most powerful about how to implement their preferred regime.

Although constitutionalism tends to be disparaged by contemporary political science, a constitution is the very place where justice and power are married. Aristotle first taught us that a constitution must be matched to the realities of the political system—the character, hopes, fears, needs and environment of the people—which requires that constitutionalism be addressed by men and women practiced in the art of the possible.² Aristotle also taught us that a constitution (the politeia, or plan for a way of life) should address the improvement of people toward the best life possible, which requires that constitutionalism be addressed by political theorists who can hold out a vision of justice and the means for advancing toward it. The conversation between politician and political

theorist stands at the center of their respective callings, and a constitution, even though it reflects only a part of the reality of a political system, has a special status in this central conversation. Although the focus of this chapter is on a direct conversation between theorist and politician, there is an important, indirect aspect of the conversation that should not be overlooked—classroom teaching. Too often the conversation between politician and political theorist is described in terms of a direct one between philosophers and those holding power.

Overlooked is the central need to educate as many young people as possible. Since it is difficult to predict who will, in fact, hold power, and because the various peoples who take seriously the marriage of justice with power are overwhelmingly committed to a non-elitist, broad involvement of the population, we should not overlook or minimize our importance as teachers of the many. Political leaders drawn from a people who do not understand what is at stake are neither inclined nor equipped to join the conversation. As we teach, we converse with future leaders. Perhaps not everyone who teaches political theory has had the same experience, but of the more than eight thousand students I have taught, I know of at least forty-nine who later held a major elective office, and at least eighty more who have become important political activists. This comes down to about five students per teaching year, and I could not have predicted which five it would be. The indeterminate future of any given student is one argument against directing our efforts at civic education toward the few, best students. A constitutional perspective suggests not only that those in power rely upon support and direction from a broad segment of the public, but also that reliance upon the successful civic education of the elite is not very effective, by itself for marrying justice with power in the long run.

Education key to Deliberation

Education is key to deliberation and checking partisanship. We can't wish partisanship away—debate is a key space with which to foster the kind of education which checks partisanship.

Adolf G. Gundersen, Assoc Prof Polisci at Texas A&M, 2000 Political Theory and Partisan Politics p. 112-3

A new via media will also encourage a new attitude toward partisanship, one that recognizes its necessity, but believes in the possibility of confining it within clear limits. Citizens, like their representatives in Washington or the state capitol, will deliberate only if they see some value in doing so. Deliberation does not work very well in a world in which everyone behaves like the Athenian ambassadors in the Melian dialogue or in which everyone believes that, when all is said and done, Thomas Hobbes really was right. Here too, every single item on the above list can probably play some role. Deliberation begets deliberation, partly because it works—and people see that it works. At the same time, I would argue that here we must take a long view. Reorienting how society thinks about politics (in this case, how it thinks about a thinking politics), is no small matter. It requires a solution with reach, from an institution that enjoys widespread public support, and in a way that is capable of dealing with the important cognitive component involved in all deliberation. Here I do not think there is an alternative to public schools—which, for starters, means strengthening them, not weakening them, as now seems fashionable. It also means changing curriculum to emphasize the inevitability of partisanship, struggle and manipulation, on the one hand, and the desirability and possibility of public deliberation, on the other. Schools should, of course, also teach deliberative skills. But my view is that the big change must come here: in the broad orientation to political life that they convey. Schools should be places where kids learn the lessons of Pericles and James Madison—and then learn to move beyond them. Most of what I have had to say here stems from the view that partisanship is both the bane of deliberation and its natural outcome. Partisanship puts an end to deliberation—and in one sense that is all well and good, since deliberation is not an end in itself but is, rather, "thought-directed-at-action". Between thought and action, there will always be a place for partisanship in any democratic society worthy of the name. At the same time, partisanship that inordinately encroaches on the thoughtful activity of deliberation itself ought to be limited wherever possible. Here there is broad agreement among democratic theorists. But this agreement quickly breaks down over the issue of how to limit partisanship. The participatory strategy is to turn partisans against each other and to thus extinguish the flames of partisan rivalry. Less optimistic, the Madisonian strategy is to separate decision makers from the heat of partisan conflict, while forcing representatives to cooperate with each other. Having rejected both of these strategies, I argued for a via media between Athens and Philadelphia, one which borrows liberally from both of the older strategies. Its centerpiece is citizen deliberation, which I argued is capable of blunting partisanship. We cannot wish partisanship away. Nor can we force citizens to stop taking sides. All we can do is encourage its opposite. Fortunately, because deliberation begets deliberation, it is entirely reasonable to think that we can do so successfully. That place "between Athens and Philadelphia" is not so far off as we might think. &

Education solves Totalitarianism

The relativist cynicism of radical critique paves the way to fascism; framework is necessary to educate ourselves about positively changing the world for the better such that we don't fall prey to the right-wing totalitarianism at the heart of postmodern critique.

Martin Lewis, Assistant Professor at George Washington, 1992, Green Delusions p. 258

A majority of those born between 1960 and 1980 seem to tend toward cynicism, and we can thus hardly expect them to be converted en masse to radical doctrines of social and environmental salvation by a few committed thinkers. It is actually possible that a radical education may make them even more cynical than they already are. While their professors may find the extreme relativism of subversive postmodernism bracingly liberating, many of today's students may embrace only the new creed's rejection of the past. Stripped of leftist social concerns, radical postmodernism's contempt for established social and political philosophy—indeed, its contempt for liberalism—may well lead to right-wing totalitarianism. When cynical, right-leaning students are taught that democracy is a sham and that all meaning derives from power, they are being schooled in fascism, regardless of their instructors' intentions.

According to sociologist Jeffrey Goldfarb (1991), cynicism is the hallmark—and main defect—of the current age. He persuasively argues that cynicism's roots lie in failed left- and right-wing ideologies—systems of thought that deductively connect "a simple rationalized absolute truth ... to a totalized set of political actions and policies" (1991:82). Although most eco-radicals are anything but cynical when they imagine a "green future," they do take a cynical turn when contemplating the present political order. The dual cynical-ideological mode represents nothing less than the death of liberalism and of reform. Its dangers are eloquently spelled out by Goldfarb (1991:9): "When one thinks ideologically and acts ideologically, opponents become enemies to be vanquished, political compromise becomes a kind of immorality, and constitutional refinements become inconvenient niceties.

Education key to Change

Political education within debate increases self awareness and good judgement. The intentions of the kritik may be noble, but those intentions are rarely translated into action.

Ignatieff, 07 member of the independent international commission on Kosovo and former fellow at King's College, Cambridge; École des Hautes Études, Paris; and St. Antony's College, Oxford; and Visiting Prof of Human Rights Practice at Harvard (Michael, August 5, 2007 "Getting Iraq Wrong," The New York Times, <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/05/magazine/05iraq-t.html?ei=5090&en=cb304d04accc6df8&ex=1343966400&partner=rssuserland&emc=rss&pagewanted=all>)

Good judgment in politics, it turns out, **depends on being a critical judge of yourself**. It was not merely that the president did not take the care to understand Iraq. He also did not take the care to understand himself. The sense of reality that might have saved him from catastrophe would have taken the form of some warning bell sounding inside, alerting him that he did not know what he was doing. But then, it is doubtful that warning bells had ever sounded in him before. He had led a charmed life, and in charmed lives warning bells do not sound.

People with good judgment listen to warning bells within. Prudent leaders force themselves to listen equally to advocates and opponents of the course of action they are thinking of pursuing. They do not suppose that their own good intentions will guarantee good results.

They do not suppose they know all they need to know. If power corrupts, it corrupts this sixth sense of personal limitation on which prudence relies.

A prudent leader will save democracies from the worst, but prudent leaders will not inspire a democracy to give its best. **Democratic peoples should always be looking for something more than prudence** in a leader: daring, vision and — what goes with both — a willingness to risk failure. Daring leaders can be trusted as long as they give some inkling of knowing what it is to fail. They must be men of sorrow acquainted with grief, as the prophet Isaiah says, men and women who have not led charmed lives, who understand us as we really are, who have never given up hope and who know they are in politics to make their country better. These are the leaders whose judgment, even if sometimes wrong, will still prove worthy of trust.

Coverstone: Oasis key to Education

Debate must be isolated from the public sphere to effectively teach the skills that are critical to success in the public sphere

Alan Coverstone, BRILLIANT DEBATE THEORIST, 1995, "An Inward Glance: A Response To Mitchell's Outward Activist Turn," DRG, URL: <http://www.wfu.edu/Student-organizations/debate/MiscSites/DRGArticles/Coverstone1995China.htm>

Mitchell's argument underestimates the nature of academic debate in three ways. **First, debate trains students in the very skills required for navigation in the public sphere of the information age.** In the past, political discourse was controlled by those elements who controlled access to information. While this basic reality will continue in the future, its essential features will change. No longer will mere possession of information determine control of political life. Information is widely available. For the first time in human history we face the prospect of an entirely new threat. The risk of an information overload is already shifting control of political discourse to superior information managers. It is no longer possible to control political discourse by limiting access to information. Instead, control belongs to those who are capable of identifying and delivering bits of information to a thirsty public. Mitchell calls this the "desertification of the public sphere."

The public senses a deep desire for the ability to manage the information around them. Yet, they are unsure how to process and make sense of it all. In this environment, snake charmers

and charlatans abound. The popularity of the evening news wanes as more and more information becomes available. People realize that these half hour glimpses at the news do not even come close to covering all available information. They desperately want to select information for themselves. So they watch CNN until they fall asleep. Gavel to gavel coverage of political events assumes top spots on the Nielsen charts. Desperate to decide for themselves, the public of the twenty-first century drinks deeply from the well of information. When they are finished, they find they are no more able to decide. Those who make decisions are envied and glorified.

Debate teaches individual decision-making for the information age. No other academic activity available today teaches people more about information gathering, assessment, selection, and delivery. Most importantly, debate teaches individuals how to make and defend their own decisions. Debate is the only academic activity that moves at the speed of the information age. Time is required for individuals to achieve escape velocity. Academic debate holds tremendous value as a space for training.

Mitchell's reflections are necessarily more accurate in his own situation. Over a decade of debate has well positioned him to participate actively and directly in the political process. Yet the skills he has did not develop overnight. **Proper training requires time. While there is a tremendous variation in the amount of training required for effective navigation of the public sphere, the relative isolation of academic debate is one of its virtues.** Instead of turning students of debate immediately outward, we should be encouraging more **to enter the oasis. A thirsty public, drunk on the product of anyone who claims a decision, needs to drink from the pool of decision-making skills. Teaching these skills is our virtue.**

DEBATE MUST BE NONPOLITICAL TO EFFECTIVELY TEST IDEAS.

Alan Coverstone, BRILLIANT DEBATE THEORIST, 1995, "An Inward Glance: A Response To Mitchell's Outward Activist Turn," DRG, URL: <http://www.wfu.edu/Student-organizations/debate/MiscSites/DRGArticles/Coverstone1995China.htm>

As we enter the twenty-first century, let us take pride in the unique activity in which we engage.

Debaters, more than any other segment of American society, are capable of functioning effectively in the political world. Debaters acquire superior skills in information management and decision-making. **Because our activity is non-political, students receive the space they need to test ideas, opinions, and beliefs. This testing process is put at risk by an outward activist turn. Yet, even more dangerous is the potential for new forms of domination within our academic oasis.** We must be careful not to replace domination by media/government elites with domination with our community elite.

Mitchell's call for activism, as well as his examples of thriving participation should raise our awareness of both our responsibilities and opportunities. Individuals who have learned to make and defend their own political decisions will continue to move easily into political life. Let us do nothing to lessen that impact.

Let us encourage greater involvement in debate. Such involvement holds greater potential for reinvigoration of political discourse than direct mass activism. Let us not stoop to the level of modern political discourse, but elevate that discourse to our own level of deliberation

A/T: Mitchell

Mitchell changed his mind. Fiat-oriented debate is better than the activist model.

Gordon Mitchell, debate coach at Pittsburgh, Nov 09 2002,

<http://www.ndtceda.com/archives/200211/0136.html>

Politically **I have moved quite a bit since 1998, when I wrote that debate institutions should pay more attention to argumentative agency**, i.e. cultivation of skills that facilitate translation of critical thinking, public speaking, and research acumen into concrete exemplars of democratic empowerment. Back then **I was highly skeptical of the "laboratory model" of "preparatory pedagogy," where students were kept, by fiat, in the proverbial pedagogical bullpen. Now I respect much more the value of a protected space where young people can experiment politically by taking imaginary positions, driving the heuristic process by arguing against their convictions.** In fact, **the integrity of this space could be compromised by "activist turn" initiatives designed to bridge contest round advocacy with political activism. These days I have much more confidence in the importance and necessity of switch-side debating, and the heuristic value for debaters of arguing against their convictions. I think fashioning competitive debate contest rounds as isolated and politically protected safe spaces for communicative experimentation makes sense.** However, I worry that a narrow diet of competitive contest round debating could starve students of opportunities to experience the rich political valence of their debating activities.

DEBATE SHOULD BE ISOLATED--ATTEMPTS TO EXPAND INTO THE PUBLIC SPHERE, CAUSE ELITE COLONIZATION OF DEBATE, CRUSHING POLITICAL DISCOURSE.

Alan Coverstone, BRILLIANT DEBATE THEORIST, 1995, "An Inward Glance: A Response To Mitchell's Outward Activist Turn," DRG, URL: <http://www.wfu.edu/Student-organizations/debate/MiscSites/DRGArticles/Coverstone1995China.htm>

Second, Mitchell's argument underestimates the risks associated with an outward turn. **Individuals trained in the art and practice of debate are, indeed, well suited to the task of entering the political world.** At some unspecified point in one's training, the same motivation and focus that has consumed Mitchell will also consume most of us. At that point, political action becomes a proper endeavor. **However, all of the members of the academic debate community will not reach that point together. A political outward turn threatens to corrupt the oasis in two ways. It makes our oasis a target, and it threatens to politicize the training process.** **As long as debate appears to be focused inwardly, political elites will not feel threatened. Yet one of Mitchell's primary concerns is recognition of our oasis in the political world. In this world we face well trained information managers. Sensing a threat from "debate," they will begin to infiltrate our space.** Ready made information will increase and debaters will eat it up. **Not yet able to truly discern the relative values of information, young debaters will eventually be influenced dramatically by the infiltration of political elites. Retaining our present anonymity in political life offers a better hope for reinvigorating political discourse.**

As perhaps the only truly non-partisan space in American political society, academic debate holds the last real possibility for training active political participants. Nowhere else are people allowed, let alone encouraged, to test all manner of political ideas. This is the process through which debaters learn what they believe and why they believe it. In many ways this natural evolution is made possible by the isolation of the debate community. An example should help illustrate this idea.

Like many young debaters, I learned a great deal about socialism early on. This was not crammed down my throat. Rather, I learned about the issue in the free flow of information that is debate. The intrigue of this, and other outmoded political arguments, was in its relative unfamiliarity. Reading socialist literature avidly, I was ready to take on the world. Yet I only had one side of the story. I was an easy mark for the present political powers. Nevertheless, I decided to fight City Hall. I had received a parking ticket which I felt was unfairly issued. Unable to convince the parking department to see it my way, I went straight to the top. I wrote the Mayor a letter. In this letter, I accused the city of exploitation of its citizens for the purpose of capital accumulation. I presented a strong Marxist critique of parking meters in my town. The mayor's reply was simple and straightforward. He called me a communist. He said I was being silly and should pay the ticket. I was completely embarrassed by the entire exchange. I thought I was ready to start the revolution. In reality, I wasn't even ready to speak to the Mayor. I did learn from the experience, but I did not learn what Gordon might have hoped. I learned to stop reading useless material and to keep my opinions to myself.

Do we really want to force students into that type of situation? I wrote the mayor on my own. Debaters will experiment with political activism on their own. This is all part of the natural impulse for activism which debate inspires. Yet, **in the absence of such individual motivation, an outward turn threatens to short circuit the learning process. Debate should capitalize on its isolation. We can teach our students to examine all sides of an issue and reach individual conclusions before we force them into political exchanges. To prematurely turn debaters out threatens to undo the positive potential of involvement in debate.**

A/T: Mitchell

DEBATE AS ACTIVISM FORCES A HOMOGENIZING AGENDA, CRUSHING POLITICAL DISCOURSE.

Alan Coverstone, BRILLIANT DEBATE THEORIST, 1995, "An Inward Glance: A Response To Mitchell's Outward Activist Turn," DRG, URL: <http://www.wfu.edu/Student-organizations/debate/MiscSites/DRGArticles/Coverstone1995China.htm>

My third, and final reaction to Mitchell's proposal, targets his desire for mass action. **The danger is that we will replace mass control of the media/government elite with a mass control of our own elite. The greatest virtue of academic debate is its ability to teach people that they can and must make their own decisions. An outward turn, organized along the lines of mass action, threatens to homogenize the individual members of the debate community. Such an outcome will, at best, politicize and fracture our community. At worst, it will coerce people to participate before making their own decisions.**

Debate trains people to make decisions by investigating the subtle nuances of public policies. We are at our best when we teach students to tear apart the broad themes around which traditional political activity is organized. As a result, we experience a wide array of political views within academic debate. Even people who support the same proposals or candidates do so for different and inconsistent reasons. Only in academic debate will two supporters of political views argue vehemently against each other. As a group, this reality means that mass political action is doomed to fail. Debaters do not focus on the broad themes that enable mass unity. The only theme that unites debaters is the realization that we are all free to make our own decisions. Debaters learn to agree or disagree with opponents with respect. Yet unity around this theme is not easily translated into unity on a partisan political issue. Still worse, Mitchell's proposal undermines the one unifying principle.

Mitchell must be looking for more. He is looking for a community wide value set that discourages inaction. This means that an activist turn necessarily will compel political action from many who are not yet prepared. The greatest danger in this proposal is the likelihood that the control of the media/government elite will be replaced by control of our own debate elite.

Emphasizing mass action tends to discourage individual political action. Some will decide that they do not need to get involved, but this is by far the lesser of two evils. Most will decide that they must be involved whether or not they feel strongly committed to the issue. **Mitchell** places the cart before the horse. Rather than letting ideas and opinions drive action as they do now, he **encourages an environment where action drives ideas for many people. Young debaters are particularly vulnerable. They are likely to join in political action out of a desire to "fit in."** This cannot be what Mitchell desires. **Political discourse is a dessert now because there are more people trying to "fit in" that there are people trying to break out.**

****Plan Focus Good**

Fiat Good

Utopian thinking makes politics possible by giving political thought a direction

Streeten '99 (Paul, Econ prof @ Boston, Development, v. 42, n. 2, p 118)

First, Utopian thinking can be useful as a framework for analysis. Just as physicists assume an atmospheric vacuum for some purposes, so policy analysts can assume a political vacuum from which they can start afresh. The physicists' assumption plainly would not be useful for the design of parachutes, but can serve other purposes well. Similarly, when thinking of tomorrow's problems, Utopianism is not helpful. But for long-term strategic purposes it is essential. Second, the Utopian vision gives a sense of direction, which can get lost in approaches that are preoccupied with the feasible. In a world that is regarded as the second-best of all feasible worlds, everything becomes a necessary constraint. All vision is lost. Third, excessive concern with the feasible tends to reinforce the status quo. In negotiations, it strengthens the hand of those opposed to any reform. Unless the case for change can be represented in the same detail as the case for no change, it tends to be lost. Fourth, it is sometimes the case that the conjuncture of circumstances changes quite suddenly and that the constellation of forces, unexpectedly, turns out to be favourable to even radical innovation. Unless we are prepared with a carefully worked out, detailed plan, that yesterday could have appeared utterly Utopian, the reformers will lose out by default. Only a few years ago nobody would have expected the end of communism in Central and Eastern Europe, the disappearance of the Soviet Union, the unification of Germany, the break-up of Yugoslavia, the marketization of China, the end of apartheid in South Africa. And the handshake on the White House lawn between Mr Peres and Mr Arafat. Fifth, the Utopian reformers themselves can constitute a pressure group, countervailing the selfinterested pressures of the obstructionist groups. Ideas thought to be Utopian have become realistic at moments in history when large numbers of people support them, and those in power have to yield to their demands. The demand for ending slavery is a historical example. It is for these five reasons that Utopians should not be discouraged from formulating their proposals and from thinking the unthinkable, unencumbered by the inhibitions and obstacles of political constraints. They should elaborate them in the same detail that the defenders of the status quo devote to its elaboration and celebration. Utopianism and idealism will then turn out to be the most realistic vision. It is well known that there are three types of economists: those who can count and those who can't. But being able to count up to two, I want to distinguish between two types of people. Let us call them, for want of a better name, the Pedants and the Utopians. The names are due to Peter Berger, who uses them in a different context. The Pedants or technicians are those who know all the details about the way things are and work, and they have acquired an emotional vested interest in keeping them this way. I have come across them in the British civil service, in the bureaucracy of the World Bank, and elsewhere. They are admirable people but they are conservative, and no good companions for reform. On the other hand, there are the Utopians, the idealists, the visionaries who dare think the unthinkable. They are also admirable, many of them young people. But they lack the attention to detail that the Pedants have. When the day of the revolution comes, they will have entered it on the wrong date in their diaries and fail to turn up, or, if they do turn up, they will be on the wrong side of the barricades. What we need is a marriage between the Pedants and the Utopians, between the technicians who pay attention to the details and the idealists who have the vision of a better future. There will be tensions in combining the two, but they will be creative tensions. We need Pedantic Utopian Pedants who will work out in considerable detail the ideal world and ways of getting to it, and promote the good cause with informed fantasy. Otherwise, when the opportunity arises, we shall miss it for lack of preparedness and lose out to the opponents of reform, to those who want to preserve the status quo.

Even if fiat is illusory, it contextualizes the plan and status quo such that arguments can be had about the desirability of policy implementations.

Patrick Speice and Jim Lyle 2003 "traditional policy debate: now more than ever" Oceans Policy Adrift
<http://www.wfu.edu/Student-organizations/debate/MiscSites/DRGArticles/SpeiceLyle2003htm.htm>

There are several ways those who utilize language and performance critiques have sought to use education to subvert competitive values. First, instead of viewing fiat as a tool that allows for the evaluations and comparisons that necessary for playing the game, fiat is argued to be an educational illusion that has allowed for debate to serve as a weak form of individual/collective expression and activism (Shanahan, 1993). The non-policy focused debaters ignore the fact that fiat serves important competitive purposes for the activity, and focus on fiat's imaginary existence. The arguments that justify the lack of an alternative to the plan, the focus on phrase X, or the absolutist "vote neg" stance common with these arguments are grounded on the belief that fiat doesn't exist: "why vote for the plan, it will never be

enacted as a result of the judge's decision?" Unfortunately, this overlooks the fact that fiat works to contextualize the plan/resolution to the status quo so that each side of the debate can advance arguments about the workability of the competing options vis-à-vis one another.

Plan Focus key to Deliberation

Deliberation assumes certain institutional structures and shared values.

Adolf G. Gundersen, Associate Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M, 2000, Political Theory and Partisan Politics, p. 104-5

Indirect political engagement is perhaps the single most important element of the strategy I am recommending here. It is also the most emblematic, as it results from a fusion of confrontation and separation. But what kind of political engagement might conceivably qualify as being both confrontational and separated from actual political decision-making? There is only one type, so far as I can see, and that is deliberation. Political deliberation is by definition a form of engagement with the collectivity of which one is a member. This is all the more true when two or more citizens deliberate together. Yet deliberation is also a form of political action that precedes the actual taking and implementation of decisions. It is thus simultaneously connected and disconnected, confrontational and separate. It is, in other words, a form of indirect political engagement. This conclusion, namely, that we ought to call upon deliberation to counter partisanship and thus clear the way for deliberation, looks rather circular at first glance. And, semantically at least, it certainly is. Yet this ought not to concern us very much. Politics, after all, is not a matter of avoiding semantic inconveniences, but of doing the right thing and getting desirable results. In political theory, therefore, the real concern is always whether a circular argument translates into a self-defeating prescription. And here that is plainly not the case, for what I am suggesting is that deliberation can diminish partisanship, which will in turn contribute to conditions amenable to continued or extended deliberation. That "deliberation promotes deliberation" is surely a circular claim, but it is just as surely an accurate description of the real world of lived politics, as observers as far back as Thucydides have documented. It may well be that deliberation rests on certain preconditions. I am not arguing that there is no such thing as a deliberative "first cause." Indeed, it seems obvious to me both that deliberators require something to deliberate about and that deliberation presumes certain institutional structures and shared values. Clearly something must get the deliberative ball rolling and, to keep it rolling, the cultural terrain must be free of deep chasms and sinkholes. Nevertheless, however extensive and demanding deliberation's preconditions might be, we ought not to lose sight of the fact that, once begun, deliberation tends to be self-sustaining. Just as partisanship begets partisanship, deliberation begets deliberation. If that is so, the question of limiting partisanship and stimulating deliberation are to an important extent the same question.

Plan Focus key to Fairness

Language and Performance Ks destroy traditional debate

Patrick Speice and Jim Lyle 2003 “traditional policy debate: now more than ever” Oceans Policy Adrift
<http://www.wfu.edu/Student-organizations/debate/MiscSites/DRGArticles/SpeiceLyle2003htm.htm>

Traditional policy debate is suffering as a result of the increasingly widespread adoption of two particular types of critical arguments: language critiques and performance critiques. Language critiques indict the assumptions behind the words and phrases that are used to describe impact claims. As such, teams can run them on the affirmative or the negative, but they rarely implicate the desirability of the plan. Instead, most teams that run language critiques ask the judge to vote for them regardless of whether or not the plan is a good idea, as the offending team’s rhetorical choices become the focus of the debate. There is rarely a specific alternative associated with this type of argument, other than the critiquing team calling for a rejection of the practice that they indict. Performance arguments speak to the aesthetic value of speech. This type of argument may be presented by a negative team arguing that the way the affirmative presented their case has negative aesthetic value; a concern which they will argue justifies voting negative. Affirmative teams may use performance arguments to prove that the judge should vote affirmative because of the way that the 1AC was presented. These arguments may take many forms, but they can include reading poetry, offering an ironic justification for the resolution, or arguing that the resolution itself can be read performatively. In any event, affirmative teams that seek to employ a performance-based method of defending the resolution do not afford negative teams the ability to challenge their plan, as their framework usually makes questions about the net desirability of the proposed policy irrelevant to their criteria for evaluating a debate.

Traditional Policy Framework outweighs critical education and provides fairness

Patrick Speice and Jim Lyle 2003 “traditional policy debate: now more than ever” Oceans Policy Adrift
<http://www.wfu.edu/Student-organizations/debate/MiscSites/DRGArticles/SpeiceLyle2003htm.htm>

TPD is valuable in a number of respects, but the benefits can be grouped into two general categories: gaming and education (Smith, 2001). Gaming refers to the nature of debate as a competitive activity that people engage in because it is fun to play. Education simply refers to the skills that one develops as a debater, including research skills, critical thinking skills, and advocacy skills. Non-traditional debate practices, especially certain types of critique debates, operate to the detriment of these goals in a number of ways.

As with any game or sport, **creating a level playing field that affords each competitor a fair chance of victory is integral to the continued existence of debate as an activity.** If the game is slanted toward one particular competitor, the other participants are likely to pack up their tubs and go home, as they don’t have a realistic shot of winning such a “rigged game.” Debate simply wouldn’t be fun if the outcome was pre-determined and certain teams knew that they would always win or lose. The incentive to work hard to develop new and innovative arguments would be non-existent because wins and losses would not relate to how much research a particular team did. **TPD, as defined above, offers the best hope for a level playing field that makes the game of debate fun and educational for all participants.**

Plan Focus key to Education

Plan focused debate is the only way to preserve reflective analysis

Roger Solt, “What is Debate Theory” Passed out at the MNDI, 1994

It could be argued that we are a society with too many advocates and too few critics or reflective analysts. The question fundamentally may be whether debate’s primary mission should be to teach skills associated with effective advocacy or skills of rational problem solving. The advocacy view of debate implies that debating is mainly a tool of persuasion. A contrary view is that debate should be a tool of problem-solving. The hypothesis testing paradigm asserted that the primary goal of debate should be to find truth. Thus baldly stated, a “truth-seeking” view of debate has its difficulties. First, it may be that policy propositions of the type we debate are neither true nor false, that truth and falsehood are only attributes of propositions of fact. Second, it is often argued that “truth” is rarely seen in debate rounds and that it couldn’t be found in a ninety minute discussion anyway. In response to this second point, it does seem unlikely that a single debate among high school or college students will produce a definitive resolution of a complex policy issue. Even though this is true, it still seems like a valid ideal that we should be closer to the “truth” after a ninety minute discussion than we were before we started. According to this view, intellectual rigor and sound policy analysis are the ideals which should be stressed. As to whether propositions of policy can be true or false, I think that this concern is philosophically valid but may not be pragmatically all that important. We may not find truth in policy debate in a rigorously scientific sense, but we may still be able to find truth in the looser, more popular sense of finding what policy is best, based on the facts and values arrived at in the round. As opposed to the view that a policy debate is designed to persuade an audience of your advocacy position, I would posit the to me intuitive view that the goal of a policy debate should be to find the best policy (or, to be somewhat more technical, whether the topical action proposed by the affirmative is part of the optimal policy package).

Plan Focus key to Change

Critique is not an end in and of itself—refusing political action in favor of some pure subversion maintains the status quo.

Ruth Lessl **Shively**, Associate Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M, **2000**, Political Theory and Partisan Politics, p. 178-80

The first point here is that the ambiguists cannot embrace all disruptive actions or resist all attempts to categorize activities in terms of "good" and "bad," "legitimate" and "illegitimate," "civil" and "uncivil." For if their aim is to give voice to those who have been silenced or marginalized, they must, at the very least, distinguish between activities that silence and marginalize versus those that do not. They must tell us, for example, what makes an act an act of resistance rather than of cruelty or tyranny, or what defines behavior as contestation as opposed to mere bullying or ostracization. They do not tell us these things, of course, since their own assumptions require them to resist such attempts at closure and categorization. Yet, an answer is implied. It is implicit in their democratic vision of society and, indeed, in any democratic vision of society. "Good" political acts—acts of legitimate resistance and contest—are, for them, as for most other people, civil acts: meaning, essentially, acts that are respectful of the goods of democracy and liberty; acts that are nonviolent and designed to increase others' freedom and knowledge. For example, no ambiguityists (in my readings) seek or sanction acts of "contest" that involve behaviors like burning crosses on people's lawns, lying to the public, shouting others into silence, hitting or killing or threatening political opponents, or the like. Rather, their political examples uniformly suggest that the expansion of contest would involve only civil kinds of resistance and subversion: things like teaching, protesting, demonstrating, arguing, raising awareness, questioning and the like. After all, the point of being in the ambiguityist camp in the first place is to protest acts of tyranny and compulsion. So, despite strong rhetoric about disrupting all orders and undermining all rules, they cannot, and do not, contest or undermine basic rules of civility (rules which I will define further in a moment). In keeping with their democratic ambitions, they do not seek to annihilate or silence opposition, but to diversify and increase its voices and opportunities. My point here is not just to say that the ambiguityists are nice people who happen to reject violent and tyrannical tactics. It is to say that their goals imply and require this. For certain subversive or disruptive political activities—like threatening others with violence or shouting opponents into silence—are such that they undermine any further subversions and disruptions. In this sense, some disruptions turn out to solidify the status quo and some subversions turn out to be counter-subversive. Which is why the ambiguists must stop short of celebrating all differences or disorders, for what would be the point of rejecting the old system for its supposed tyrannies—its bullying and silencing tactics—only to take up more of the same?

Wholesale rejection maintains the status quo

Christopher A. **Bracey**, Associate Professor of Law, Associate Professor of African & African American Studies, Washington University in St. Louis, September **2006**, Southern California Law Review, 79 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1231, p. 1311-1314, LexisNexis

At the other end of the responsive spectrum is wholesale rejection. One might view the pedigree as providing good reason to dismiss opponents of race entirely. Proponents of this view may choose to indulge fully this liberal skepticism and simply reject the message along with the messenger. n276 The tradition of legal discourse on American race relations [*1316] has been one steeped in racial animus and characterized by circumlocution, evasiveness, reluctance and denial. When opponents avail themselves of rhetorical strategies used by nineteenth-century legal elites, they necessarily invoke the specter of this tragic racial past. Moreover, their continued reliance upon pedigreed rhetoric to justify a system that only modestly responds to persistent racial disparities in the material lives of racial minorities suggests a deep, unarticulated

normative commitment to preserving the racial status quo in which whites remain comfortably above blacks. The steadfast reliance upon pedigreed rhetoric, coupled with the apparent disconnect between claims of racial egalitarianism and material conditions of racial subordination as a result of persistent racial disparities, spoils the credibility of modern opponents of race preferences and creates an incentive for proponents to dismiss them without serious interrogation, consideration, and weighing of the arguments they advance.

Plan Focus key to Change

The abstractions of critique are attempts to secure a perfectionist stance insulated from the demands of political decisionmaking. However, the value of any given abstraction is dependent on its ability to lend itself to practical decisions.

Michael Ignatieff, Carr Professor of Human Rights Practice, Director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at the JFK School of Government, Harvard University, 2004, *The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror*, p. 20-1

There are two problems with a perfectionist stance, leaving aside the question of whether it is realistic. The first is that articulating nonrevocable, nonderogable moral standards is relatively easy. The problem is deciding how to apply them in specific cases. What is the line between interrogation and torture, between targeted killing and unlawful assassination, between preemption and aggression? Even when legal and moral distinctions between these are clear in the abstract, abstractions are less than helpful when political leaders have to choose between them in practice. Furthermore, the problem with perfectionist standards is that they contradict each other. The same person who shudders, rightly, at the prospect of torturing a suspect might be prepared to kill the same suspect in a preemptive attack on a terrorist base. Equally, the perfectionist commitment to the right to life might preclude such attacks altogether and restrict our response to judicial pursuit of offenders through process of law. Judicial responses to the problem of terror have their place, but they are no substitute for military operations when terrorists possess bases, training camps, and heavy weapons. To stick to a perfectionist commitment to the right to life when under terrorist attack might achieve moral consistency at the price of leaving us defenseless in the face of evildoers. Security, moreover, is a human right, and thus respect for one right might lead us to betray another. A lesser evil morality is antiperfectionist in its assumptions. It accepts as inevitable that it is not always possible to save human beings from harm without killing other human beings; not always possible to preserve full democratic disclosure and transparency in counterterrorist operations; not always desirable for democratic leaders to avoid deception and perfidy; not always possible to preserve the liberty of the majority without suspending the liberties of a minority; not always possible to anticipate terrible consequences of well-meant acts, and so on. Far from making ethical reflection irrelevant, these dilemmas make ethical realism all the more essential to democratic reflection and good public policy. The fact that liberal democratic leaders may order the surreptitious killing of terrorists, may withhold information from their voters, may order the suspension of civil liberties need not mean that “anything goes.” Even if liberties must be suspended, their suspension can be made temporary; if executives must withhold information from a legislature in public, they can be obliged to disclose it in private session or at a later date. Public disinformation whose sole purpose is to deceive the enemy might be justified, but deliberately misleading a democratic electorate with a view to exaggerating risk or minimizing hazard can never be. The same balancing act needs to be observed in other cases. If the targeted killing of terrorists proves necessary, it can be constrained by strict rules of engagement and subjected to legislative oversight and review. The interrogation of terrorist suspects can be kept free of torture. Drawing these lines means keeping in clear sight the question of whether these means reinforce or betray the democratic identity they are supposed to defend.

Plan Focus checks Judge Intervention

Plan focused debate allows for the best framework when evaluating impacts

Patrick Speice and Jim Lyle 2003 “traditional policy debate: now more than ever” Oceans Policy Adrift
<http://www.wfu.edu/Student-organizations/debate/MiscSites/DRGArticles/SpeiceLyle2003htm.htm>

While some criticize the cost-benefit analysis method of evaluating a debate as subjective (for example, how does one weigh the people that may be saved by a plan against the immorality of the action), the role of the judge is much more clearly defined than in a debate about language and performance. **In TPD, the teams are able to make weighing arguments that guide the judge in evaluating competing claims.** For example, teams will regularly argue that even if an action is immoral, it is justified in order to save lives. This type of argument fits neatly into the formula for evaluating a TPD because it seeks to weigh the impact of an argument against the plan and the impact of an argument for the plan. **Weighing impacts is much easier in a round where the plan is the focus of the debate because the judge must simply determine what the largest impact is before determining whether or not the plan is a good idea.** If morality is more important than lives, the plan would be rejected in the above example; if preserving life is more important than acting morally, the plan would be endorsed.

Without a proper criteria debate becomes meaningless because judge intervention reigns

Patrick Speice and Jim Lyle 2003 “traditional policy debate: now more than ever” Oceans Policy Adrift
<http://www.wfu.edu/Student-organizations/debate/MiscSites/DRGArticles/SpeiceLyle2003htm.htm>

Without clearly defined criteria, judges will be likely to make subjective decisions about which team does the better debating. For example, what would happen if the 1AC spoke of the racism that is inherent in US foreign policy and read narratives to that effect and asked the judge to vote for the performative effects of their speaking out against racism? What if the negative did the same sort of performance, but spoke only of sexism? Both performances are good, so how could the judge ever reconcile those competing claims? What if the judge fundamentally disagrees with the ideas presented in the affirmative’s performance? Should the judge intervene and vote against a performance they don’t like, even if the negative fails to highlight those shortcomings that the judge perceives? There is no method for evaluating two “good” performances against one another, even assuming criteria exist for differentiating between a “good” and “bad” performance.

Moreover, teams that run arguments focused on the effects of language will frequently call on the judge to vote for them as a means of political activism. That is, a team will argue that the judge should vote for their arguments to make a particular political statement that could affect the “real world.” **Some judges may feel uncomfortable endorsing a position that they do not personally agree with, even if a team wins their argument. If voting for a certain argument requires the judge to take an overtly political action, they may intervene in the debate and vote against the team who won the argument because they do not agree with the politics of the argument in question. This notion of intervention is related to the lack of criteria for evaluating language and performance critiques. It is not clear if the judge can or should continue to be an objective critic of argument when the team advocating the critique changes the focus of the debate to one of personal preferences.**

But why does it matter if the judge has a clearly defined role in the debate? **If the judge is unable to determine what the criteria are for evaluating a debate, and subjective decisions will therefore be made about which performance or whose language the judge thinks is most valuable, debate would cease to be an educationally rewarding enterprise. Hard work and research would not be rewarded with competitive success.** While the debate would not be slanted in one particular direction (save for that of the judge’s political biases), **those that worked hard to research new positions and hone their skills would not be rewarded. In this sense,**

non-TPD rounds make the game less fun, as the better team would only have a 50% chance of winning any given round, despite the quality of their debating.

Plan Focus checks Judge Intervention

Traditional policy debate gives the best criterion for evaluating a debate any alternative framework that tries to weigh standards such as fairness transforms debate into something that is no longer debate

Patrick Speice and Jim Lyle 2003 “traditional policy debate: now more than ever” Oceans Policy Adrift
<http://www.wfu.edu/Student-organizations/debate/MiscSites/DRGArticles/SpeiceLyle2003htm.htm>

The TPD format avoids this problem by establishing clear criteria for evaluating a debate that are known to both teams prior to entering a debate. This predictability stems from requiring the affirmative to advocate and defend a topical plan as the focus of the debate. Accordingly, the negative is able to use the resolution as a guide to predict what the likely affirmative cases will be. The affirmative has reciprocal predictability in knowing that the negative can only seek to argue against their plan by advocating that the status quo or a competing policy option is superior to the plan based on a cost-benefit analysis. This framework for evaluating debates reduces judge intervention. Accordingly, TPD is a better game than non-TPD, because it affords each team a realistic chance to emerge victorious by making the game fair for both teams.

Of course, teams that run critical arguments are generally prepared to defend the fairness of the criteria that they wish the judge to utilize in evaluating the debate. Certainly, there are multiple ways of evaluating performances, even absent direct competition with one another. These methods of evaluating performances could be imported into debate, but the question to ask is whether or not it would be desirable to do so. There are certainly numerous other competitive activities that rely on aesthetic comparisons to determine winners and losers (the fine arts, for example). None of these activities are the same as debate, however, and it makes little sense to abandon TPD simply because another “fair” way of determining who wins a given debate can be articulated. Doing so would allow debate to be transformed into something that is no longer debate.

Kritikal debate opens doors that make it increasingly harder to evaluate who wins and who loses
Patrick Speice and Jim Lyle 2003 “traditional policy debate: now more than ever” Oceans Policy Adrift
<http://www.wfu.edu/Student-organizations/debate/MiscSites/DRGArticles/SpeiceLyle2003htm.htm>

In a round focused on language and performance, the team advocating a critical position will usually attempt to divorce the judge’s decision from a topical plan-focus. The role of the judge is not to make a cost-benefit calculation that seeks to determine the desirability of a policy, but instead the judge is placed into a realm where his or her decision is based on some other criteria. If the plan seeks to answer the resolutorial question in the affirmative, how does one evaluate a round in which the plan is not the focus of the debate? There is no obvious yes/no question that the judge can answer when attempting to evaluate which team did the better debating (Smith, 2002).

A number of questions arise when one considers how a judge may evaluate a round in which questions of performance replace the plan as the focus of the debate. For example, does the judge listen the same way as each team does? What if each team interprets a performance differently? What makes one performance better than any other? What if the negative re-reads the 1AC with more emphasis or emotion? What if one team gives their speech more quickly or more slowly than the other? What if a performance that is aesthetically pleasing to one person is offensive to another? These questions all point to the lack of criteria that exist for evaluating a non-TPD round around a single yes/no question (Smith, 2002).

Plan Focus key to check Crazy Alts

Lack of plan-focus makes the only standard of action the Floating PIC

Patrick Speice and Jim Lyle 2003 “traditional policy debate: now more than ever” Oceans Policy Adrift
<http://www.wfu.edu/Student-organizations/debate/MiscSites/DRGArticles/SpeiceLyle2003htm.htm>

Initially, language critiques and performance critiques have led to the development of the affirmative-inclusive advocacy, more commonly known as a floating PIC (plan-inclusive counterplan). In conjunction with their critique, a negative team will argue that they are able to coopt the affirmative by advocating almost the entire plan and 1AC, except for the questionable language or negative performative aspects. This sort of argument allows the negative to “steal” almost all of the affirmative’s ground, and it requires a departure from the plan-focus of TPD. For example, if the affirmative runs a case that claims a terrorism advantage and the negative runs a language critique of the term “terrorist,” does that mean that the plan is not a good idea? It seems unlikely that this argument indicts the ability of the plan to reduce instances of violence, but many negative teams will argue that the affirmative should lose simply for invoking the offending language in their defense of the plan. The affirmative will rarely be prepared to defend every word and concept of their 1AC, absent the negative defending an alternative that competes with the text of the affirmative’s plan. For example, an alternative to reject the use of the term “terrorism” is unlikely to compete with the affirmative plan, though it may compete with the justification for the plan, as given in the 1AC. Allowing negative teams to advocate such alternatives makes the debate incredibly difficult for the affirmative.

Utopian alts are unfair

Patrick Speice and Jim Lyle 2003 “traditional policy debate: now more than ever” Oceans Policy Adrift
<http://www.wfu.edu/Student-organizations/debate/MiscSites/DRGArticles/SpeiceLyle2003htm.htm>

Moreover, the alternatives that negative teams advocate are frequently utopian options that are not grounded in the literature. This is true of nearly all language and performance critiques, as well as a number of other critical arguments that negative teams may advance. Not only are such alternatives utopian, which makes them perfect ideas by definition, but they are also unpredictable. The affirmative could not be prepared to debate utopian alternatives, because they simply do not exist in the literature as competitive alternatives to the affirmative plan. Some may argue that plan-inclusive counterplans fall prey to the same criticism, but there are several significant differences. Plan-inclusive counterplans are specific alternatives that are explicitly written out. They are rarely utopian options, and they compete with the plan. If the negative has the burden of only running arguments that compete with the plan, the affirmative is able to have a stable text that they can rely on as their advocacy. As such, they can prepare to defend that text because they get to choose the wording of it, and it is not nearly as lengthy as an entire speech.

Polycymaking key to Deliberation/Agency

Deliberation about what institutions should do is key to citizen agency.

Adolf G. Gundersen, Associate Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M, 2000, Political Theory and Partisan Politics, p. 108-9

Will deliberation work the same way among ordinary citizens? Yes and no. Yes, deliberation will tend to heighten citizens appreciation of their interdependence. At the same time, the results are likely to be analogous rather than identical to those in formal governmental bodies, since citizen deliberation must of course function in the absence of the institutional interdependence established by the US constitution, with its clear specification of joint responsibilities. The theoretical mutuality of interests assumed by the Constitution exists among ordinary citizens, too. The difference is that they have only their interests, not the impetus of divided power, to encourage them to discover and articulate them. Granted. But once they begin to do so, they are every bit as likely to succeed as the average representative. Citizen deliberation, in other words, will intensify citizens' appreciation of interdependence. Although I cannot prove the point, **there are compelling reasons to think that citizen deliberation yields an awareness of overlapping interests**. I have already alluded to the first, and perhaps most telling of these: if governors in a system of divided government such as our own succeed in deliberating their way to the public interest (however imperfectly or irregularly), surely ordinary citizens can be counted upon to do the same thing. Indeed, if my initial argument that decision-making spells the end of deliberation is on the mark, then **we have good reason to expect citizens to deliberate better than their representatives**. One can add to these theoretical considerations a lengthening list of **empirical findings** which **suggest not only that citizens are willing and able to engage in political deliberation, but also that they are quite able to do so**—able, that is, precisely in the sense of coming to a deeper appreciation of the collective nature of the problems they face (Dale et al. 1995; Gundersen 1995; Dryzek 1990; see also Gundersen n.d., chapter 4). In the end, the claim that deliberation enhances interdependence is hardly a radical one. After all, if **deliberation will** of itself diminish partisanship, as I started out by saying, it must at the same time **enhance interdependence**. To aim between Athens and Philadelphia requires, perhaps more than anything else, a changed way of thinking about partisanship. **Institutions and ways of thinking tend to change together; hence if the institutional reorientation suggested here is to take root, it must be accompanied by a new way of thinking about partisanship. Shifting our appraisal of partisanship will amount to a nothing less than a new attitude toward politics. It will require that we aspire to something new,** something that is at once less lofty (and less threatening) than the unity to which direct democracy is supposed to lead, but more democratic (and more deliberative) than encouraging political deliberation among a selected group of representatives. As I argued above, it will require **that we seek to stimulate deliberation among all citizens**. With Madison, we need to view partisanship as inevitable. Collective choice, indeed choice itself, is a partisan affair. But we also need to resist the equation of politics and partisanship. If politics is seen as nothing more than a clash of partisan interests, it is likely to stay at that level. Conversely, for deliberation to work, it must be seen as reasonable, if not all-illuminating—as efficacious, if not all-powerful. At the same time, of course, **citizens must** borrow a page from the participatory democrat's book by coming to **view deliberation as their responsibility rather than something that is done only by others in city hall, the state capitol, or Congress—others who are,** after all, **under** direct and constant **pressure to act rather than deliberate**. **Politics,** in other words, **must be resuscitated as an allegiance to democratic deliberation.**

Policymaking key to Education

Policymaking empowers debates by encouraging informed decisionmaking and good judgement about practical, everyday problems. This is good for two reasons, first is that it increases real world education and allows for debaters who are planning on entering the realm of policymaking to be prepared for that career.

Ignatieff, 07 member of the independent international commission on Kosovo and former fellow at King's College, Cambridge; École des Hautes Études, Paris; and St. Antony's College, Oxford; and Visiting Prof of Human Rights Practice at Harvard (Michael, August 5, 2007 "Getting Iraq Wrong," The New York Times, <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/05/magazine/05iraq-t.html?ei=5090&en=cb304d04accc6df8&ex=1343966400&partner=rssuserland&emc=rss&pagewanted=all>)

Improvisation may not stave off failure. The game usually ends in tears. **Political careers often end badly because politicians live the human situation: making choices among competing goods with only ordinary instincts and fallible information to go by. Of course, better information and factual criteria for decision-making can reduce the margin of uncertainty.** Benchmarks for progress in Iraq can help to decide how long America should stay there. But in the end, no one knows — because no one can know — what exactly America can still do to create stability in Iraq. The decision facing the United States over Iraq is paradigmatic of political judgment at its most difficult. Staying and leaving each have huge costs. One thing is clear: The costs of staying will be borne by Americans, while the cost of leaving will be mostly borne by Iraqis. That in itself suggests how American leaders are likely to decide the question.

But they must decide, and soon. **Procrastination is even costlier in politics than it is in private life.** The sign on Truman's desk — "The buck stops here!" — reminds us that **those who make good judgments in politics tend to be those who do not shrink from the responsibility of making them.** In the case of Iraq, deciding what course of action to pursue next requires first admitting that all courses of action thus far have failed.

In politics, learning from failure matters as much as exploiting success. Samuel Beckett's "Fail again. Fail better" captures the inner obstinacy necessary to the political art. Churchill and De Gaulle kept faith with their own judgment when smart opinion believed them to be mistaken. Their willingness to wait for historical validation, even if far off, looks now like greatness. In the current president the same faith that history will judge him kindly seems like brute stubbornness.

Machiavelli argued that **political judgment, to be effective, must follow principles more ruthless than those acceptable in ordinary life. He wrote that "it is necessary for a prince wishing to hold his own to know how to do wrong, and to make use of it or not according to necessity."**

Roosevelt and Churchill knew how to do wrong, yet they did not demand to be judged by different ethical standards than their fellow citizens did. They accepted that democratic leaders cannot make up their own moral rules, a stricture that applies both at home and abroad — in Guantanamo, at Abu Ghraib or anywhere else. They must live and be judged by the same rules as everyone else.

Yet in some areas **political and personal judgments are very different. In private life, you take attacks personally** and would be a cold fish if you didn't. **In politics, if you take attacks personally, you display vulnerability. Politicians have to learn to appear invulnerable without appearing inhuman. Being human, they are bound to revenge insults.** But they also have to learn that revenge, as it has been said, is a dish best served cold.

Nothing is personal in politics, because politics is theater. It is part of the job to pretend to have emotions that you do not actually feel. It is a common spectacle in legislatures for representatives to insult one another in the chamber and then retreat for a drink in the bar afterward. This saving hypocrisy of public life is not available in private life. There we play for keeps.

Polymaking key to Education

Polymaking is more real world- while their kritikal arguments are admirable, they fall prey to the allure of popularity and sacrifice practical implications, the mark of bad decisionmaking.

Ignatieff, 07 member of the independent international commission on Kosovo and former fellow at King's College, Cambridge; École des Hautes Études, Paris; and St. Antony's College, Oxford; and Visiting Prof of Human Rights Practice at Harvard (Michael, August 5, 2007 "Getting Iraq Wrong," The New York Times, <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/05/magazine/05iraq-t.html?ei=5090&en=cb304d04accc6df8&ex=1343966400&partner=rssuserland&emc=rss&pagewanted=all>)

In my political-science classes, I used to teach that **exercising good judgment meant making good public policy. In the real world, bad public policy can often turn out to be very popular politics indeed. Resisting the popular isn't easy, because resisting the popular isn't always wise.** Good **judgment in politics** is messy. It **means balancing policy and politics in imperfect compromises that always leave someone unhappy** — often yourself.

Knowing the difference between a good and a bad compromise is more important in politics than holding onto pure principle at any price. A good compromise restores the peace and enables both parties to go about their business with some element of their vital interest satisfied. A bad one surrenders the public interest to compulsion or force.

Measuring good judgment in politics is not easy. Campaigns and primaries test a candidate's charm, stamina, money-raising ability and rhetorical powers but not necessarily judgment in office and under fire.

We might test judgment by asking, on the issue of Iraq, who best anticipated how events turned out. But many of those who correctly anticipated catastrophe did so not by exercising judgment but by indulging in ideology. They opposed the invasion because they believed the president was only after the oil or because they believed America is always and in every situation wrong.

The people who truly showed good judgment on Iraq predicted the consequences that actually ensued but also rightly evaluated the motives that led to the action. They did not necessarily possess more knowledge than the rest of us. They labored, as everyone did, with the same faulty intelligence and lack of knowledge of Iraq's fissured sectarian history. What they didn't do was take wishes for reality. They didn't suppose, as President Bush did, that because they believed in the integrity of their own motives everyone else in the region would believe in it, too. They didn't suppose that a free state could arise on the foundations of 35 years of police terror. They didn't suppose that America had the power to shape political outcomes in a faraway country of which most Americans knew little. They didn't believe that because America defended human rights and freedom in Bosnia and Kosovo it had to be doing so in Iraq. They avoided all these mistakes.

Policy making framework good

Patrick Speice and Jim Lyle 2003 "traditional policy debate: now more than ever" Oceans Policy Adrift <http://www.wfu.edu/Student-organizations/debate/MiscSites/DRGArticles/SpeiceLyle2003htm.htm>

Policy debate is an excellent opportunity for students to develop research skills. Debate topics are sophisticated questions about the state of the United States and the world, and in order to be able to answer these questions effectively one has to be well versed on the subjects that the resolutions cover. This burden is magnified by the use of policy resolutions. The policies of the United States on any issue are sophisticated and complex, both quantitatively and qualitatively. Furthermore, there is a considerably large amount of literature addressing every policy area. In order to understand the policies, substantively and procedurally, and understand how the policies actually function, one must conduct as much research as possible to have the most and best information available to them. Sure, debaters could forgo research,

and perhaps there would be those individuals who could still develop solid arguments, but odds are that most debaters would lack the necessary knowledge base to be successful. Debaters would either lack arguments, or they would merely be capable of presenting claims without warrants or grounds.

Polymaking key to Education

Debate requires a distinction between plain intellectualism and political calculation, whereas intellectual concerns are with exploring ideals regardless of their practical implications, policymaker concerns must be of the reality of policy actions

Ignatieff, 07 member of the independent international commission on Kosovo and former fellow at King's College, Cambridge; École des Hautes Études, Paris; and St. Antony's College, Oxford; and Visiting Prof of Human Rights Practice at Harvard (Michael, August 5, 2007 "Getting Iraq Wrong," The New York Times, <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/05/magazine/05iraq-t.html?ei=5090&en=cb304d04accc6df8&ex=1343966400&partner=rssuserland&emc=rss&pagewanted=all>)

The philosopher Isaiah Berlin once said that **the trouble with academics and commentators is that they care more about whether ideas are interesting than whether they are true.**

Politicians live by ideas just as much as professional thinkers do, but they can't afford the luxury of entertaining ideas that are merely interesting. They have to work with the small number of ideas that happen to be true and the even smaller number that happen to be applicable to real life. In academic life, false ideas are merely false and useless ones can be fun to play with. In political life, false ideas can ruin the lives of millions and useless ones can waste precious resources. **An intellectual's responsibility for his ideas is to follow their consequences wherever they may lead. A politician's responsibility is to master those consequences and prevent them from doing harm.**

I've learned that good judgment in politics looks different from good judgment in intellectual life. Among intellectuals, judgment is about generalizing and interpreting particular facts as instances of some big idea. **In politics, everything is what it is and not another thing.** Specifics matter more than generalities. Theory gets in the way.

The attribute that underpins good judgment in politicians is a sense of reality. "What is called wisdom in statesmen," Berlin wrote, referring to figures like Roosevelt and Churchill, "is **understanding rather than knowledge** — some kind of **acquaintance with relevant facts of such a kind that it enables those who have it to tell what fits with what; what can be done in given circumstances and what cannot,** what means will work in what situations and how far, without necessarily being able to explain how they know this or even what they know." **Politicians cannot afford to cocoon themselves in the inner world of their own imaginings. They must not confuse the world as it is with the world as they wish it to be.** They must see Iraq — or anywhere else — as it is.

As a former denizen of Harvard, I've had to learn that a sense of reality doesn't always flourish in elite institutions. It is the street virtue par excellence. Bus drivers can display a shrewder grasp of what's what than Nobel Prize winners. **The only way any of us can improve our grasp of reality is to confront the world every day and learn, mostly from our mistakes, what works and what doesn't.** Yet even lengthy experience can fail us in life and in politics. Experience can imprison decision-makers in worn-out solutions while blinding them to the untried remedy that does the trick.

Policy making framework provides the most educational benefit

Patrick Speice and Jim Lyle 2003 "traditional policy debate: now more than ever" Oceans Policy Adrift <http://www.wfu.edu/Student-organizations/debate/MiscSites/DRGArticles/SpeiceLyle2003htm.htm>

A second reason that the TPD model is the best mode of engaging in this activity is the educational benefit that it offers participants. Debate is a game first and foremost (if it isn't, why do we travel to tournaments with the goal of winning as many debates as we can), **but debate is also an extremely educational activity. It is this educational dimension of the activity that makes debate stand out as unique when compared to other forms of competition. While it does not seem necessary to explain why education is an important goal of the activity, this section will seek to address two important issues relating to education and TPD. First, it will attempt to explain why "the game" should be preserved above, or on par with, concerns for education. This does not mean that the educational benefits of the activity should be sacrificed, rather it means that we should strive for a game that is competitively fair and educational. Certain members of the community recognize this need, but others wish to place education above the game so that new forms of the activity (such as language and performance criticisms) may sprout and flourish. While this is understandable, unfortunately it overlooks the primary function of the activity: to serve as an outlet for students who seek**

competition via argumentative clash. Second, this section will seek to explain why the traditional debate model provides the best educational benefits to the participants of the activity. While each of the many forms of debate have their own unique educational benefits, there are several educational goals that are fulfilled by the TPD format, and from an education perspective, make policy debate the best model. These benefits include a range of academic, professional, and social skills.

Policymaking key to Change

The popularization of more philosophical approaches to political discourse may be evident, but it is also undesirable- it prioritizes kritik over action and disavows any attempt to act to fix concrete problem and creates a vicious cycle whereby kritik overdetermines action entirely and paralyzes change.

Owen 02, Reader in Political Theory at the University of Southampton (David, “Reorienting International Relations: On Pragmatism, Pluralism and Practical Reasoning”, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 31, No. 3, <http://mil.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/31/3/653>)

Commenting on the ‘philosophical turn’ in IR, Wæver remarks that **‘[a] frenzy for words like “epistemology” and “ontology” often signals this philosophical turn’**, although he goes on to comment that these terms are often used loosely.⁴ However, loosely deployed or not, **it is clear that debates concerning ontology and epistemology play a central role in the contemporary IR theory wars**. In one respect, this is unsurprising since it is a characteristic feature of the social sciences that periods of disciplinary disorientation involve recourse to reflection on the philosophical commitments of different theoretical approaches, and there is no doubt that such reflection can play a valuable role in making explicit the commitments that characterise (and help individuate) diverse theoretical positions. Yet, **such a philosophical turn is not without its dangers** and I will briefly mention three before turning to consider a confusion that has, I will suggest, helped to promote the IR theory wars by motivating this philosophical turn. The first danger with **the philosophical turn is that it has an inbuilt tendency to prioritise issues of ontology and epistemology over explanatory and/or interpretive power** as if the latter two were merely a simple function of the former. But **while the explanatory and/or interpretive power of a theoretical account is not wholly independent of its ontological and/or epistemological commitments** (otherwise criticism of these features would not be a criticism that had any value), **it is by no means clear that it is, in contrast, wholly dependent on these philosophical commitments**. Thus, for example, one need not be sympathetic to rational choice theory to recognise that it can provide powerful accounts of certain kinds of problems, such as the tragedy of the commons in which dilemmas of collective action are foregrounded. It may, of course, be the case that the advocates of rational choice theory cannot give a good account of why this type of theory is powerful in accounting for this class of problems (i.e., how it is that the relevant actors come to exhibit features in these circumstances that approximate the assumptions of rational choice theory) and, if this is the case, it is a philosophical weakness—but this does not undermine the point that, **for a certain class of problems, rational choice theory may provide the best account available to us. In other words, while the critical judgement of theoretical accounts in terms of their ontological and/or epistemological sophistication is one kind of critical judgement, it is not the only or even necessarily the most important kind**. The second danger run by the philosophical turn is that **because prioritisation of ontology and epistemology promotes theory-construction from philosophical first principles, it cultivates a theory-driven rather than problem-driven approach to IR**. Paraphrasing Ian Shapiro, the point can be put like this: since it is the case that there is always a plurality of possible true descriptions of a given action, event or phenomenon, **the challenge is to decide which is the most apt in terms of getting a perspicuous grip on the action, event or phenomenon in question given the purposes of the inquiry**; yet, from this standpoint, **‘theory-driven work is part of a reductionist program’ in that it ‘dictates always opting for the description that calls for the explanation that flows from the preferred model or theory’**.⁵ The justification offered for this strategy rests on the mistaken belief that it is necessary for social science because general explanations are required to characterise the classes of phenomena studied in similar terms. However, as Shapiro points out, this is to misunderstand the enterprise of science since ‘whether there are general explanations for classes of phenomena is a question for social-scientific inquiry, not to be prejudged before conducting that inquiry’.⁶

Moreover, this strategy easily slips into the promotion of the pursuit of generality over that of empirical validity. The third danger is that the preceding two combine to encourage the formation of a particular image of disciplinary debate in IR—what might be called (only slightly tongue in cheek) ‘the Highlander view’—namely, an image of warring theoretical approaches with each, despite occasional temporary tactical alliances, dedicated to the strategic achievement of sovereignty over the disciplinary field. It encourages this view because the turn to, and prioritisation of, ontology and epistemology stimulates the idea that there can only be one theoretical approach which gets things right, namely, the theoretical approach that gets its ontology and epistemology right. This image feeds back into IR exacerbating the first and second dangers, and so a potentially vicious circle arises.

Policymaking key to Change

Attempts by citizens or professionals to engage or change the law are worthwhile engagements which make it more effective and permanent and increasing freedom and activism within the public sphere.

Carlson 99, Professor of Law at Cardozo, (David Grey, “Review: Duellism in Modern American Jurisprudence”, *Colombia Law Review* v. 99)

Vicarious participation in litigation or legislation can nevertheless be defended as a participation in culture itself. Law professors can contribute to that culture by making law more coherent, and in this sense their project is at least as worthy as any that philosophy, history or astrophysics could devise. Law has an objective structure that exceeds mere subjectivity. This objective structure can be altered by hard work. An altered legal world, however, is not the point. Evidence of consequential impact is gratifying, but this is simply what mere egotism requires. It is in the work itself that the value of legal scholarship can be found. Work is what reconciles the failure of the unhappy consciousness to achieve justice. Work is, in Hegel's view, desire held in check, fleetingness staved off. . . work forms and shapes the thing. The negative relation to the object becomes its form and something permanent.... This negative middle term or the formative activity is at the same time the individuality or pure being-for-self of consciousness which now . . . acquires an element of permanence.³¹⁷ Hegel, then, gives a spiritual turn to that worthy slogan "publish or perish." By working the law, lawyers, judges, private citizens, and even academics can make it more permanent, more resilient, more "existential,"³¹⁸ but, more to the point, they make themselves more resilient, more "existential."³¹⁹ Work on law can increase freedom; the positive freedom that relieves the worker of "anxiety", fear of disappearance into the Real.³²⁰ When work is done, the legal universe swells and fills itself out like an appetite that "grows by what it feeds on."³²¹ But far more important, the self gains a place in the world by the very work done. Work is the means of "subjective destitution" or "narcissistic loss"³²² the complete externalization of the subject and the surrender of the fantasy support upon which the subject otherwise depends. In Lacanian terms, "subjective destitution" is the wages of cure at the end of analysis.³²³ Or, in Hegelian terms, cure is "the ascesis that is necessary if consciousness is to reach genuine philosophic knowledge."³²⁴ In this state, we precisely lose the suspicion that law (i.e., the big Other) does not exist.³²⁵

Policymaking key to Ethics

Uncertainty does not imply deference to fate and fortune but rather that we either fight evil or we succumb to it; learning about policymaking is key to fostering the kind of critical thought which makes decision possible.

Michael Ignatieff, Carr Professor of Human Rights Practice, Director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at the JFK School of Government, Harvard University, 2004, *The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror*, p. 18-19

In a war on terror, I would argue, **the issue is not whether we can avoid evil acts altogether, but whether we can succeed in choosing lesser evils and keep them from becoming greater ones. We should do so**, I would argue, **by** making some starting commitments—to the conservative principle (**maintaining the free institutions we have**), to the dignity principle (**preserving individuals from gross harms**)—**and then reasoning out the consequences of various courses of action, anticipating harms and coming to a rational judgment of which course of action is likely to inflict the least damage** on the two principles. When we are satisfied that a coercive measure is a genuine last resort, justified by the facts as we can understand them, we have chosen the lesser evil, and we are entitled to stick to it even if the price proves higher than we anticipated. But not indefinitely so. At some point—when we “have to destroy the village in order to save it”—we may conclude that we have slipped from the lesser to the greater. Then we have no choice but to admit our error and reverse course. **In the situation of factual uncertainty in which most decisions about terrorism have to be taken, error is probably unavoidable. It is tempting to suppose that moral life can avoid this slope simply by avoiding evil means altogether. But no such angelic option may exist. Either we fight evil with evil or we succumb.** So if we resort to the lesser evil, we should do so, first, in full awareness that evil is involved. Second, we should act under a demonstrable state of necessity. Third, we should choose evil means only as a last resort, having tried everything else. Finally, we must satisfy a fourth obligation: **we must justify our actions publicly to our fellow citizens and submit to their judgment as to their correctness.**

Policymaking solves Totalitarianism

Instrumental policy debate is key to solve totalitarianism

Douglas Torgerson, professor of poli sci, 1999 “The promise of Green Politics” p. 154-6

One rationale for Arendt's emphasis on the intrinsic value of politics is that this value has been so neglected by modernity that politics itself is threatened. **Without a celebration of the intrinsic value of politics, neither functional nor constitutive political activity has any apparent rationale** for continuing once its ends have been achieved. Functional politics might well be replaced by a technocratic management of advanced industrial society. A constitutive politics intent on social transformation might well be eclipsed by the coordinated direction of a cohesive social movement. In neither case would any need be left for what Arendt takes to be the essence of politics, **there would be no need for debate.** Green authoritarianism, following in the footsteps of Hobbes, has been all too ready to reduce politics to governance. Similarly, proponents of deep ecology, usually vague about politics, at least have been able to recognize totalitarian dangers in a position that disparages public opinion in favor of objective management? Any attempt to plot a comprehensive strategy for a cohesive green movement, moreover, ultimately has to adopt a no-nonsense posture while erecting clear standards by which to identify and excommunicate the enemy that is within. Green politics from its inception, however, has challenged the officialdom of advanced industrial society by invoking the cultural idiom of the carnivalesque. Although tempted by visions of tragic heroism, as we saw in chapter , green politics has also celebrated the irreverence of the comic, of a world turned upside down to crown the fool. In a context of political terror, instrumentalism is often attenuated, at least momentarily displaced by a joy of performance. The comic dimension of political action can also be more than episodic. The image of the Lilliputians tying up the giant suggests well the strength and flexibility of a decentered constitutive politics. In a functional context, green politics offers its own technology of foolishness in response to the dysfunctions of industrialism, even to the point of exceeding the comfortable limits of a so-called responsible foolishness. Highlighting the comic, **these tendencies** within green politics begin to **suggest an intrinsic value to politics.** To the extent that this value is recognized, **politics is inimical to authoritarianism and offers a poison pill to the totalitarian propensities of an industrialized mass society.** **To value political action** for its own sake, in other words, at least **has the significant extrinsic value of defending against the antipolitical inclinations of modernity.** But what is the intrinsic value of politics? Arendt would locate this value in the virtuosity of political action, particularly as displayed in debate. Although **political debate** surely **has extrinsic value**, this does not exhaust its value. Debate is a language game that, to be played well, cannot simply be instrumentalized for the services it can render but must also be played for its own sake. Any game pressed into the service of external goals tends to lose its playful quality; it ceases to be fun. It was in reflecting on the social movements of the 1960s that Arendt proclaimed the discovery that political action was fun. It was fun even though it sprang from moral purposes and even though political debate also enhanced the rationality of opinion formation. Arendt's affirmation of the apparently frivolous value of fun sharply contrasts with her earlier celebration of glory, even of public happiness. The affirmation nonetheless suggests a particular promise of politics, a promise especially contained in the comic dimension of green politics.

Polymaking Education Best

Education about polymaking is better than critical education: feasibility, research, and specificity. Patrick Speice and Jim Lyle 2003 “traditional policy debate: now more than ever” Oceans Policy Adrift <http://www.wfu.edu/Student-organizations/debate/MiscSites/DRGArticles/SpeiceLyle2003htm.htm>

Why are these researching skills important? First, **learning how to conduct research translates in the better academic skills. Better research produces better papers, speeches and presentations, and general knowledge** (Freeley, 1996). **Experience with research also provides debaters with good models for learning how to write. Learning to do conduct research is also useful for many personal purposes. Furthermore, it is not simply the ability to conduct research that debate teaches; rather it is the ability to engage in research efficiently and effectively.** It still ceases to amaze us how poor the research skills are of most non-debaters. It is not that most people cannot do research, but rather how inefficient they are at doing it. **Second, learning how to do policy research, and doing the research is desirable because it provides students with a better understanding of how the American government, and the world, exist and operate. This is useful as academic knowledge, but is of even greater utility in professional and social roles that intersect with the functioning of the American democracy.** As has been noted elsewhere, **engagement in research not only produces disinterested knowledge, it also can facilitate individual argumentative agency** (Mitchell, 1998). **The policy analysis focus of research is particularly desirable in achieving this goal. Experience with policy research also can translate into “post-debate” skills. There are many debaters who have gained employment with a variety of private, governmental, and international policy institutions due in large part to their research skills** (Parcher, 1996). Research is an important part of the activity, and in policy debate it is essential. The specific knowledge requirements for this form of debate are intense, and they are magnified by the switch-side nature of the activity. Do other forms of debate require/teach research skills? Yes, but the results are not the same. Language and performance **critiques produce shallow debate: they are “ultra generic,” have a lower burden of proof associated with them, and provide vague alternatives. First, many of these critiques that fail to challenge the desirability of the plan are “ultra generics” that discourage research across a spectrum of issues.** While there is considerable literature addressing language choices and performance, there is also always a vast amount of literature that addresses the resolution’s policy area. Reality is such that most individuals do not have the time to dedicate to researching all of these issues. Delving into one area of research will trade-off with another. Additionally, **because the language and performance literature is so broad, and not necessarily linked to the policy area of the resolution or the affirmative plan, there is no way to fully research all of these issues, and still have time for policy issues.** Consider last year’s mental illness topic, there were so many options regarding language choice and so many performances available for presentation that one could easily have only researched these issues and never made it into the policy literature. Some of the more recently popularized forms of performance have even resulted in the virtual elimination of research.

Consequentialism key to Deliberation/Accountability

We must evaluate the consequences of institutional implementation of plan; political accountability and deliberation require decision.

Adolf G. Gundersen, Associate Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M, 2000, Political Theory and Partisan Politics p. 98-9

Deliberation, however closely tied to action, is not the same thing as acting. However we construe the relationship between thought and action, most of us would agree that there is an essential difference between thinking through a course of action and deciding upon or choosing one. Deliberation requires the consideration of alternatives; choice requires the elimination of all but one alternative. Hence, collective action—the raison d'être of deliberation— paradoxically requires that deliberation give way to partisanship. Except in the abstract world of an ideal speech situation, deliberation is limited by partisanship. Choice, in other words, is always partial, always partisan. Without deliberation, action is a mere exercise of will; but without action, deliberation is reduced to mere contemplation. The distinction between deliberation and contemplation is often missed or glossed over by deliberative democrats in their zeal to drive home the distinction between raw power (or partisanship) and deliberation. However distinct deliberation and partisanship might be, we also need to recognize that eliminating partisanship is not only impossible, it is undesirable—for to do so would be to abolish deliberation in the process. Indeed, the very existence of political deliberation requires, even entails, partisanship. This seeming paradox is really no paradox at all: deliberation is thought that is directed at action, thought whose telos is a decision. Take away all prospect of action, take away the need to decide or choose, and deliberation does not simply wilt, it ceases to exist altogether. When we also remember that political choice is by definition collective, we can see why political deliberation depends on partisanship: deliberation requires action, which requires choice, which in political life is collective, which (in a democracy) requires moving from "the many as individuals" to "the many as one."

Consequentialism key to Ethics

All morality is the result of consequential analysis; while moral critique has the power to abstract from actual situations, ethical decision takes place within the context of the concrete.

Tim **Stelzig**, Attorney Advisor in the Competition Policy Division of the FCC's Wireline Competition Bureau, former associate with Arnold & Porter in Washington, D.C., JD from the University of Pennsylvania Law School, March **1998**, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 146 U. Pa. L. Rev. 901, p. 959

It is sometimes easy to apply deontological restrictions to actual situations. The examples philosophers and legal theorists bandy about are often straightforward. Torturing an innocent child to achieve some trivial good is obviously wrong. The easy cases found in theoretic discussion are purposely designed to hone our theoretic intuitions so that we may better understand the topography of the abstract.

Only rarely is the real world so simple. Morally comprehending most actual situations requires taking account of much more. For instance, a morally complete understanding must take account of the differences in how situations are actually perceived,⁽ⁿ⁹⁷⁾ because **idealized morality divorced from epistemological realities does not serve us well in practice.** Further, the complex histories of the relevant characters, their reasonable expectations, the **long-term ramifications of the outcome of the case under consideration**, and the subtle duties owed as a result of special relationships and commitments to projects **matter morally.**

These limitations, however, are primarily practical. **Deontology is also limited in principle. Even if deontology were ideally contextually sensitive and epistemically sound, it still would be theoretically insufficient.** Deontology simply is not a comprehensive moral theory, and thus cannot exhaustively account for our moral intuitions.⁽ⁿ⁹⁸⁾ This Part is devoted to defending this claim.

A. Why Deontology Cannot Be Exhaustive of Morality

The structure of deontic norms is equivalent to that of agentrelative injunctions of the form of "You must not do X"⁽ⁿ⁹⁹⁾ As an agent-relative restriction, the point is not that X not occur, but that you, indexed to each, not do X.⁽ⁿ¹⁰⁰⁾ Given this structure, if rights are to have any practical meaning, the variable's referent must be given substantive content.⁽ⁿ¹⁰¹⁾ Otherwise, one will not know which facts should be given accord and will not know how to act properly.

Given this structure, deontology cannot be thought plausibly to exhaust morality. The reason is that the world is virtually saturated with normativity. If deontological maxims were exhaustive of morality, each identifiable situation to which morality applies would have to be governed by a separate deontological maxim. Normativity would be replete with trumping commands, governing even the most picayune situations. This notion is implausible for at least three reasons. Such a view raises an "epistemological problem," a "conflicts problem," and an "insufficiency problem."⁽ⁿ¹⁰²⁾

Take first the epistemological problem. Every view of morality must ultimately give some account of how it is that we come to know what is right. An otherwise impressive moral metaphysics is pointless if epistemologically implausible.⁽ⁿ¹⁰³⁾ With general norms, it is plausible that we may come to learn them gradually, refining our understanding through practice. Naturalistically learning through practice, however, is foreclosed to one who sees deontology as both pervasive and particularist. **Almost every situation is morally different from the rest, even if only slightly so. If deontology is exhaustive of morality, there must be a separate injunction for each situation.** The epistemological problem is that **learning an essentially infinite number of separate rules to govern our conduct is implausible.**

It initially might be thought that the epistemological problem could be overcome by allowing generality within the specific norms, thus making it possible for the student of morality to learn these general principles and then derive the specific deontological prohibitions from them. **The trouble with this response is that the important theoretic work is performed by the underlying principles by which the specific deontological maxims can be learned. This is problematic because theoretic entities are abstract.** As such, **Ockham's Razor**⁽ⁿ¹⁰⁴⁾ **and the principles of pragmatism**⁽ⁿ¹⁰⁵⁾ **dictate that we do better to recognize conceptually the general principles.** There is no logical inconsistency in positing a deontological norm for every morally distinct situation. But **if pervasive, deontological maxims would be superfluous. Thus, it is theoretically preferable to deny them this exclusivity.**⁽ⁿ¹⁰⁶⁾

Consequentialism key to Ethics

We're obligated to attend to material suffering – even if some of our epistemology is flawed, ideas can be reclaimed for good purposes

Ken Booth – professor of International Politics at University of Wales, Aberystwyth - Jan 1995

International Affairs Vol. 71, No. 1. "Human Wrongs and International Relations"

Philosophical sceptics, for whom nothing is certain, and so for whom the bases of action are always problematic, are a familiar feature of academic life. Tom Stoppard enjoyably caricatured them in his clever comedy Jumpers, and in particular in the scene in which philosophical sceptics were discussing whether the train for Bristol left yesterday from Paddington station.³³ On what basis could they ever know? Even if they were actually on the train that was supposed to leave for Bristol, might not the happening be explained by Paddington leaving the train? We all know such conundrums, and indeed such people. Meanwhile, flesh is being fed or famished, and people are being tortured or killed. And even philosophical sceptics have to catch trains. Some of them do. Unless academics are merely to spread confusion, or snipe from the windows of ivory towers, we must engage with the real. This means having 'the courage of our confusions' and thinking and acting without certainty. In reply to those sensitive to post-colonial critiques of Western imperialism I would argue that just because many Western ideas were spread by commerce and the Gatling gun, it does not follow that every idea originating in the West, or backed by Western opinion, should therefore simply be labelled 'imperialist' and rejected. There are some ethnocentric ideas and individual human rights is one of them for which we should not apologize. Furthermore, I do not see the dissemination of powerful social and political ideas as necessarily occurring in one direction only. As the economic and political power of Asia grows, for example, so will its cultural power. World politics in the next century will be more Asian than the present one. What matters from a cosmopolitan perspective is not the birthplace of an idea, but the meaning we give it.

Morality must take a backseat to the possibility of catastrophic consequences

Tim **Stelzig**, Attorney Advisor in the Competition Policy Division of the FCC's Wireline Competition Bureau, former associate with Arnold & Porter in Washington, D.C., JD from the University of Pennsylvania Law School, March **1998**, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 146 U. Pa. L. Rev. 901, p. 959

Rights act as "trumps,"(n3) "side-constraints,"(n4) or "shields"(n5) against the intrusive designs of the utility-maximizing consequentialist,(n6) insulating each person from being sacrificed for the public good. For example, torturing an innocent child is morally impermissible not because it fails to produce the greatest good, but because doing so would violate the child's rights.(n7)

Nothing more need be said.(n8)

Yet, as Blackstone also realizes, the "local or occasional necessities of the state" sometimes demand that rights be "modified, narrowed, or enlarged."⁽ⁿ⁹⁾ **Bluntly put, sometimes the public good wins out. Rights clearly must give way in catastrophic cases, where harms of colossal proportion will be suffered unless some fight is violated. For example, if stopping a terrorist from launching a salvo of nuclear missiles against China required killing several innocent hostages, it would be undeniably(n10)** Libertarians have argued that such a state violates deontological norms, that governmental intervention going beyond what is minimally necessary to preserve social order is not justified.

Consequentialism key to Ethics

Consequentialism and deontology are not mutually exclusive; all morality requires the weighing of consequences at some point in ethical analysis

Tim Stelzig, Attorney Advisor in the Competition Policy Division of the FCC's Wireline Competition Bureau, former associate with Arnold & Porter in Washington, D.C., JD from the University of Pennsylvania Law School, March 1998, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 146 U. Pa. L. Rev. 901, p. 959

Deontology does not require such a timid state and, moreover, **finds desirable a state which promotes the general welfare to the fullest extent possible, even if in so doing it acts in ways deontologically objectionable for anyone other than one filling the government's unique role** in society. More specifically, I argued that the **government must consequentially justify its policy choices.** The elegance of **this** particular rationale **for** the contours of **permissible governmental action** is that it **remains a deontological justification** at base. One of the worries of full-blown consequentialism is that it requires too much, that any putative right may be set aside if doing so would produce greater good. The justification offered here does not suffer that flaw. The distributive exemption does not permit that any one be sacrificed for the betterment of others; rather, it only permits a redistribution of inevitable harms, a diversion of an existing threatened harm to many such that it results in harm to fewer individuals. **The result of** this application of the distributive exemption **is a government that fundamentally seeks to promote to the fullest extent possible the welfare of all;** a government that respects the rights of its citizens; **and** a government **that realizes that its own intervention can have consequences counterproductive to the state's** fundamental **goal** of general welfare that should be avoided for that reason. **Such a state** is a worthy totem, **and accords with our most cherished principles** molded through centuries of grappling with difficult legal and moral issues.

Deontological premises have justified a plausible and attractive version of **the liberal state in which consequential justification predominates,** but rights are not neglected. **This conclusion should be both surprising** and reassuring to the deontologist - surprising **because deontology and consequentialism are typically understood to be in opposition, and reassuring because most people's intuitions that the state is permitted to reason consequentially are firmly entrenched. To the degree that deontology could not account for these intuitions, deontology would be that much less credible.** morally permissible--though nevertheless unfortunate--to sacrifice the hostages for the greater good. Even a healthy respect for the hostages' rights cannot suffer consequences of such magnitude. Catastrophic cases(n11) do not fundamentally challenge the notion that rights protect us from being sacrificed for the public good. Such cases merely reveal that rights have thresholds.(n12)

Most "local or occasional necessities of the state,"(n13) however, are mundane by comparison. That is, the public good frequently wins out when no threat of true catastrophe exists. We can readily cull examples from the popular media. For instance, New York City currently is constructing City Tunnel No. 3, a water-supply tunnel linking the city to water in the Catskill Mountains.(n14) Twenty-four tunnel workers ("sandhogs") have died digging the tunnel thus far, and it is reasonable to expect that another forty-two will die before the project is completed--a rate of more than one worker death per mile.(n15) Although the workers are aware of the risk(n16) and receive hazard pay(n17) one misses much by appealing to traditional tort doctrines or imagining the catastrophe of New York City without water to explain the moral permissibility of New York City's actions.

To illustrate, assume that the value to the community of a new source of water, minus the financial costs of worker-safety measures, outweighs the expected costs in terms of human life resulting from the tunnel construction. That is, assume that whatever amount the city is spending to avoid worker death is sufficient. The legitimate value of a worker's life in this scheme is, let us say, N. (This reasoning is decidedly consequentialist.) Whatever the value of N, if even one worker were trapped in a cave-in, then any further building that would substantially risk death to this worker must stop, even if this would cost the city many times N--indeed, almost regardless of the cost. Rights-based norms prohibit "building over" the trapped worker, however expensive it is to remove her. This tension in the deontologist's views begs explanation.

Consider another example. Most people believe that the state may not intentionally incarcerate a person known to be innocent, even if a significant amount of crime would be deterred as a result of this one violation of rights.(n18) Nevertheless, as a general matter, it is both legally and morally permissible to increase the penalties for crimes, create new crimes, increase funding for more police on the street, and the like even though such anti-crime policies will likely result in some innocent people being jailed.(n19) Examples of similar tensions are commonplace.(n20)

These cases raise the issue of when rights operate to protect the individual from the demands of society, and when, conversely, society's interests come first. This question is about the relationship between morality and societal control.

Consequentialism key – Nuclear War

We have an ethical obligation to discuss consequences about nuclear war

David **Krieger**, President of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, May 17, **2007**, “Responsibility in an Era of Consequences,” online:

http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2007/05/17_krieger_Responsibility_In_An_Era.htm, accessed August 12, 2007

The inaugural meeting of the World Future Council was recently held in Hamburg, Germany. It brought together 50 Councilors from all continents, chosen for their diversity and pioneering commitment to building a better world. At the conclusion of the four-day meeting, the Council released the Hamburg Call to Action, a document calling for action to protect the future of all life. It began, **“Today we stand at the crossroads of human history. Our actions – and our failures to act – will decide the future of life on earth for thousands of years, if not forever.”**

The Call to Action is a challenge to each of us to take responsibility for assuring a positive future for humanity and for preserving life on our planet. The document states: **“Today there is no alternative to an ethics of global responsibility for we are entering an era of consequences. We must share, co-operate and innovate together in building a world worthy of our highest aspirations.** The decision lies with each one of us!”

We are challenged to consider what we are individually and collectively doing not only to radically undermine our present world through war and its preparation, resource depletion, pollution and global warming, but also the effects of what we are doing upon future generations. Those of us alive now have the responsibility to pass the world on intact to the next generation, and to assure that our actions do not foreclose the future.

The Hamburg Call to Action is a great document and I urge you to read and reflect upon it. But I **draw your attention specifically to the section on nuclear weapons: “Nuclear weapons remain humanity’s most immediate catastrophic threat. These weapons would destroy cities, countries, civilization and possibly humanity itself. The danger posed by nuclear weapons in any hands must be confronted directly and urgently** through a new initiative for the elimination of these instruments of annihilation.”

Consequentialism key – States (1/2)

Equating states and individual morally is a misappropriation of ethical analysis; while it may be possible for individuals to follow strict moral codes of conduct, states can only justify their decisions consequentially.

Tim **Stelzig**, Attorney Advisor in the Competition Policy Division of the FCC's Wireline Competition Bureau, former associate with Arnold & Porter in Washington, D.C., JD from the University of Pennsylvania Law School, March **1998**, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 146 U. Pa. L. Rev. 901, p. 959

This observation forms the basis for a deep objection to the applicability of the distributive exemption to state action. **It might be argued that because the intervention of the modern state is so pervasive and burdensome, state action has become a threat by its very ubiquity. The argument here is not that the costs of governmental action outweigh the benefits.** Instead, the claim is that the ubiquity of governmental action has altered the character of state intervention, such that it is no longer appropriate to conceptualize governmental intervention as a diversion for purposes of the distributive exemption. If so, deontological morality might require a government akin to the classic libertarian "night-watchman" state.(n256) **That is, state intervention might still be justified under the distributive exemption in order to protect society from the anarchy threatened by the state of nature. Trying to do more, however, might transform the diversionary character of the state's intervention into an independent threat that is not justified under the distributive exemption. If this objection succeeds, governmental action must be neither pervasive nor frequent.**

One response is simply to say that governmental intervention is permissible until the state's pervasiveness, as such, develops into a threat. This response is not particularly useful, however, because the property of pervasiveness lies on a continuum. No clear boundaries separate the state that is oppressive due to its pervasiveness from the nonoppressive, but still activist, state. Thus, instead of attempting to counter the libertarian objection directly, let us grant its premise. Take it as given that over a period of many years and gradual expansion, the state has evolved such that it, along with previously recognized threats (e.g., the unchecked passions of others), now constitutes a threat. What is the result? The first thing to note is that because we are still working within the moral framework of deontology, the distributive exemption is still pertinent. The difference is that instead of drawing the analogy between the state and the passerby, we should draw the analogy between the state and the trolley. We, as citizens exercising control over our democratic state.(n257) now have the role analogous to the passerby in Thomson's example.(n258) As will be demonstrated below, this change has fewer implications than might be expected. It might be thought obvious that minimizing state-caused harm requires scaling back government. Even if downsizing government resulted in less overall good, one might argue that the inevitability(n259) and lesser-harm(n260) requirements that are embedded in the distributive exemption, their deontological character not perturbed by consequentialist concerns, mandate this result. However, things are not so simple. There are at least two reasons why an essentially libertarian conclusion does not follow from the second-order application of the distributive exemption to the state. First, the state is not the only threat facing society. Although the anarchy of the state of nature may not be lurking just around the corner, unfettered human passions are still a significant threat in the absence of the stabilizing influence of governmental action. The distributive exemption justifies governmental action to remedy those harms up to the point where the state is so pervasive that its ubiquity threatens harm. This limitation potentially still leaves significant room for an active state. As noted above, however, no clear boundary separates the pervasively oppressive state from the nonoppressive but active state. Thus, those who believe that indefensible ubiquity lies just beyond the night-watchman state bear the burden of demonstrating why this is so. In defending this claim, the libertarian must heed two points. First, traditional appeals to property rights and the like will not provide the libertarian with a sufficient defense, since the arguments above already have established that the distributive exemption permits infringement of such rights. The only harm relevant at this point in the argument is the harm resulting from the ubiquity of the modern state. Second, in arguing that the more-than-minimal state constitutes a threat by its ubiquity, the libertarian must show more than that a powerful government may be threatening to a citizen who feels insignificant in comparison. Vague anxieties of this sort are not harms protected by stringent rights. It is important to remember that the version of rights defended here is not absolute. Thomson's Tradeoff Idea, followed here, allows rights to be infringed when doing so produces significantly much more good.(n261) The libertarian therefore must show that the harms caused by the pervasiveness of the ubiquitous state are not significantly outweighed by the benefits of the governmental action in question. Demonstrating that we have stringent rights against governmental ubiquity would satisfy this burden, but defending that claim would be no easy task. Because this first point depends, in part, on drawing a line about which no clear standard exists, I will not press further here. The second reason that an essentially libertarian conclusion does not follow from the second-order application of the distributive exemption to the state is more fundamental. Because the state fills a special role in society, state action and the exercise of passion are interrelated and cannot properly be understood independently.(n262) In the case of an individual, "inaction" is not properly counted as action.(n263) But because the state is the only legitimate creator of certain types of social rules (i.e., legal rules), people act in reliance on both the existence and nonexistence of these rules. The special role of the state encompasses coordinating collective action by establishing the rules that define, in part, the parameters of permissible behavior. Therefore, the lack of state sanction against doing a particular thing legitimately may be relied on as a prima facie reason to think the thing socially permissible.(n264) Deregulation has causal impact. For example, the problems in the savings-and-loan industry in the 1980s are usually causally attributed to governmental deregulation.(n265) Failure to regulate also clearly has consequences. For instance, the future vitality of the Internet arguably depends in part on the degree to which the government fails to regulate its

development.(n266) Thus, in the special case of the state, lack of intervention, and certainly deregulation, are actions for purposes of the distributive exemption. **So although threats may be found in state action, threats also may exist in state inaction.(n267) If scaling back the state causes more societal harm than good, the state is the proximate cause of the resulting harm.**

Minimizing governmental harm is no simple matter. It involves complex calculations and the interweaving of policies of inaction with policies of civil, criminal, and regulatory action. However one thinks these processes ideally should work in detail, this conclusion comports well with broadly liberal(n268) notions of proper governmental action. The distributive exemption claims that the desirable role for government is to attempt to provide for the general welfare as consequentially calculated, while taking into account the cost of governmental intervention. **Deontological principles of good standing have thus explained why the state is permitted to do that which would be deontologically impermissible for individuals to do.** In short, an exception to deontology has swallowed up the rule with respect to state action.

CONCLUSION

This Comment seeks to dissipate the tension Blackstone broached when he stated that the "eternal boundaries" provided by our "indelible rights" sometimes must be "modified" or "narrowed" by the "local or occasional necessities of the state."(n269) **Rights, as trumps against the world, ostensibly ought not to be things that may be cast aside. Yet, it is intuitively obvious that the state justifiably acts in ways impermissible for individuals as it collects taxes, punishes wrongdoers, and the like.** Others have offered explanations for why coercive state action is morally justified. This Comment adds another.

This Comment began by adopting deontology as a foundational theoretic assumption and briefly describing how deontology was to be understood herein. I then examined the characteristics of two leading theories of rights—Dworkin's theory of legal rights and Thomson's theory of moral rights. Although **neither Dworkin nor Thomson** is an absolutist

Consequentialism key – States (2/2)

with respect to rights, neither account **explains why the state, but not individuals, may act in ways seemingly justifiable only on consequentialist grounds: that is, why the state may override the trumping effect of rights.** In attempting to provide an answer to this question, I first noted that deontology does not exhaust moral discourse. The deontologist is forced to recognize that rights cannot capture everything of moral importance. I then provided several examples of distinctions recognized in the philosophical literature that delimit areas in which deontology does not apply, focusing in particular on the Trolley Problem and the distributive exemption from deontological norms that the Trolley Problem illustrates. The deontological exemption was examined fairly closely in order to enumerate the criteria that trigger the exemption and understand the principles that guide its application.

By applying the distributive exemption to the state, I accomplished two things. First, I was able to provide a new justification for the existence of the coercive state, both when premised on the traditional assumptions of social contractarians, and when premised on a more realistic understanding of the modern state. Second, I was able to sketch the relationship between the constraints of rights and the demands of policy, justifying a state that provides for the general welfare without violating rights in a way objectionable to liberals.

Libertarians have argued that such a state violates deontological norms, that governmental intervention going beyond what is minimally necessary to preserve social order is not justified. Deontology does not require such a timid state and, moreover, finds desirable a state which promotes the general welfare to the fullest extent possible, even if in so doing it acts in ways deontologically objectionable for anyone other

than one filling the government's unique role in society. **More specifically, I argued that the government must consequentially justify its policy choices. The elegance of this particular rationale for the contours of permissible governmental action is that it remains a deontological justification at base. One of the worries of full-blown consequentialism is that it requires too much, that any putative right may be set aside if doing so would produce greater good. The justification offered here does not suffer that flaw. The distributive exemption does not permit that any one be sacrificed for the betterment of others; rather, it only permits a redistribution of inevitable harms, a diversion of an existing threatened harm to many such that it results in harm to fewer individuals.**

Consequentialism key to Change

We must evaluate the consequences of particular policy proposals; empty abstraction can only bemoan the state of the world, not change it.

Jeffrey Isaac, James H. Rudy Professor of Political Science and director of the Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life at Indiana University, Bloomington, Spring 2002, Dissent, vol. 49, no. 2

WHAT WOULD IT mean for the American left right now to take seriously the centrality of means in politics?

First, it would mean taking seriously the specific means employed by the September 11 attackers--terrorism. **There is a tendency in some quarters of the left to assimilate the death and destruction of September 11 to more ordinary (and still deplorable) injustices of the world system--the starvation of children in Africa, or the repression of peasants in Mexico, or the continued occupation of the West Bank and Gaza by Israel. But this assimilation is only possible by ignoring the specific modalities of September 11. It is true that in Mexico, Palestine, and elsewhere, too many innocent people suffer, and that is wrong. It may even be true that the experience of suffering is equally terrible in each case. But neither the Mexican nor the Israeli government has ever hijacked civilian airliners and deliberately flown them into crowded office buildings in the middle of cities where innocent civilians work and live, with the intention of killing thousands of people. Al-Qaeda did precisely this. That does not make the other injustices unimportant. It simply makes them different. It makes the September 11 hijackings distinctive, in their defining and malevolent purpose--to kill people and to create terror and havoc. This was not an ordinary injustice. It was an extraordinary injustice. The premise of terrorism is the sheer superfluity of human life. This premise is inconsistent with civilized living anywhere.** It threatens people of every race and class, every ethnicity and religion. Because it threatens everyone, and threatens values central to any decent conception of a good society, it must be fought. And it must be fought in a way commensurate with its malevolence. Ordinary injustice can be remedied. Terrorism can only be stopped.

Second, it would mean frankly acknowledging something well understood, often too eagerly embraced, by the twentieth century Marxist left--that it is often politically necessary to employ morally troubling means in the name of morally valid ends. A just or even a better society can only be realized in and through political practice; in our complex and bloody world, it will sometimes be necessary to respond to barbarous tyrants or criminals, with whom moral suasion won't work. In such situations our choice is not between the wrong that confronts us and our ideal vision of a world beyond wrong. It is between the wrong

that confronts us and the means--perhaps the dangerous means--we have to employ in order to oppose it. **In such situations there is a danger that "realism" can become a rationale for the Machiavellian worship of power. But equally great is the danger of a righteousness that translates, in effect, into a refusal to act in the face of wrong. What is one to do? Proceed with caution. Avoid casting oneself as the incarnation of pure goodness locked in a Manichean struggle with evil. Be wary of violence. Look for alternative means when they are available, and support the development of such means when they are not. And never sacrifice democratic freedoms and open debate. Above all, ask the hard questions about the situation at hand, the means available, and the likely effectiveness of different strategies.**

Most striking about the campus left's response to September 11 was its refusal to ask these questions. Its appeals to "international law" were naive. It exaggerated the likely negative consequences of a military response, but failed to consider the consequences of failing to act decisively against terrorism. In the best of all imaginable worlds, it might be possible to defeat al-Qaeda without using force and without dealing with corrupt regimes and political forces like the Northern Alliance. But in this world it is not possible. And this, alas, is the only world that exists. To be politically responsible is to engage this world and to consider the choices that it presents. To refuse to do this is to evade responsibility. Such a stance may indicate a sincere refusal of unsavory choices. But it should never be mistaken for a serious political commitment.

Critique Prevents Change (1/2)

Moral absolutism makes politics impossible—without analyzing the consequences of the institutional implementation of plans, it becomes impossible to actualize the goals of the critique. Jeffrey Isaac, James H. Rudy Professor of Political Science and director of the Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life at Indiana University, Bloomington, Spring 2002, Dissent, vol. 49, no. 2

POLITICS IS ABOUT ends and means--about the values that we pursue and the methods by which we pursue them. In a perfect world, there would be a perfect congruence between ends and means: our ends would always be achievable through means that were fully consistent with them; the tension between ends and means would not exist. But then there would be no need to pursue just ends, for these would already be realized. Such a world of absolute justice lies beyond politics.

The left has historically been burdened by the image of such a world. Marx's vision of the "riddle of history solved" and Engels's vision of the "withering away of the state" were two canonical expressions of the belief in an end-state in which perfect justice could be achieved once and for all. But the left has also developed a concurrent tradition of serious strategic thinking about politics. Centered around but not reducible to classical Marxism, this tradition has focused on such questions as the relations of class, party, and state; the consequences of parliamentary versus revolutionary strategies of social change; the problem of hegemony and the limits of mass politics; the role of violence in class struggle; and the relationship between class struggle and war. These questions preoccupied Karl Kautsky, V.I. Lenin, Leon Trotsky, Rosa Luxemburg, Georg Lukacs, and Antonio Gramsci--and also John Dewey, Arthur Koestler, Ignazio Silone, George Orwell, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Albert Camus. The history of left political thought in the twentieth century is a history of serious arguments about ends and means in politics, arguments about how to pursue the difficult work of achieving social justice in an unjust world. Many of these arguments were foolish, many of their conclusions were specious, and many of the actions followed from them were barbaric. The problem of ends and means in politics was often handled poorly, but it was nonetheless taken seriously, even if so many on the left failed to think clearly about the proper relationship between their perfectionist visions and their often Machiavellian strategies.

What is striking about much of the political discussion on the left today is its failure to engage this earlier tradition of argument. The left, particularly the campus left--by which I mean "progressive" faculty and student groups, often centered around labor solidarity organizations and campus Green affiliates--has become moralistic rather than politically serious. Some of its moralizing--about Chiapas, Palestine, and Iraq--continues the third worldism that plagued the New Left in its waning years. Some of it--about globalization and sweatshops--is new and in some ways promising (see my "Thinking About the Antisweatshop Movement," Dissent, Fall 2001). But what characterizes much campus left discourse is a substitution of moral rhetoric about evil policies or institutions for a sober consideration of what might improve or replace them, how the improvement might be achieved, and what the likely costs, as well as the benefits, are of any reasonable strategy.

One consequence of this tendency is a failure to worry about methods of securing political support through democratic means or to recognize the distinctive value of democracy itself. It is not that conspiratorial or antidemocratic means are promoted. On the contrary, the means employed tend to be preeminently democratic--petitions, demonstrations, marches, boycotts, corporate campaigns, vigorous public criticism. And it is not that political democracy is derided. Projects such as the Green Party engage with electoral politics, locally and nationally, in order to win public office and achieve political objectives.

BUT WHAT IS absent is a sober reckoning with the preoccupations and opinions of the vast majority of Americans, who are not drawn to vocal denunciations of the International Monetary Fund and World Trade Organization and who do not believe that the discourse of "anti-imperialism" speaks to their lives. Equally absent is critical thinking about why citizens of liberal democratic states--including most workers and the poor--value liberal democracy and subscribe to what Jurgen Habermas has called "constitutional patriotism": a patriotic identification with the democratic state because of the civil, political, and social rights it defends. Vicarious identifications with Subcommandante Marcos or starving Iraqi children allow left activists to express a genuine solidarity with the oppressed elsewhere that is surely legitimate in a globalizing age. But these symbolic avowals are not an effective way of contending for political influence or power in the society in which these activists live.

The ease with which the campus left responded to September 11 by rehearsing an all-too-familiar narrative of American militarism and imperialism is not simply disturbing. It is a sign of this left's alienation from the society in which it operates (the worst examples of this are statements of the Student Peace Action Coalition Network, which declare that "the United States Government is the world's greatest terror organization," and suggest that "homicidal psychopaths of the United States Government" engineered the World Trade Center attacks as a pretext for imperialist aggression. See <http://www.gopan.org>). Many left activists seem more able to identify with (idealized versions of) Iraqi or Afghan civilians than with American citizens, whether these are the people who perished in the Twin Towers or the rest of us who legitimately fear that we might be next. This is not because of any "disloyalty." Charges like that lack intellectual or political merit. It is because of a debilitating moralism; because it is easier to denounce wrong than to take real responsibility for correcting it, easier to locate and to oppose a remote evil than to address a proximate difficulty. The campus left says what it thinks. But it exhibits little interest in how and why so many Americans think differently.

The "peace" demonstrations organized across the country within a few days of the September 11 attacks--in which local Green Party activists often played a crucial role--were, whatever else they were, a sign of their organizers' lack of judgment and common sense. Although they often expressed genuine horror about the terrorism, they focused their energy not on the legitimate fear and outrage of American citizens but rather on the evils of the American government and its widely supported response to the terror. Hardly anyone was paying attention, but they alienated anyone who was. This was utterly predictable. And that is my point. The predictable consequences did not matter. What mattered was simply the expression of righteous indignation about what is wrong with the United States, as if September 11 hadn't really happened. Whatever one thinks about America's deficiencies, it must be acknowledged that a political praxis preoccupation with this is foolish and self-defeating.

The other, more serious consequence of this moralizing tendency is the failure to think seriously about global politics. The campus left is rightly interested in the ills of global capitalism. But politically it seems limited to two options: expressions of "solidarity" with certain oppressed groups--Palestinians but not Syrians, Afghan civilians (though not those who welcome liberation from the Taliban), but not Bosnians or Kosovars or Rwandans--and automatic opposition to American foreign policy in the name of anti-imperialism. The economic discourse of the campus left is a universalist discourse of human needs and workers rights; but it is accompanied by a refusal to think in political terms about the realities of states, international institutions, violence, and power. This refusal is linked to a peculiar strain of pacifism, according to which any use of military force by the United States is viewed as aggression or militarism.

A CASE IN POINT is a petition circulated on the campus of Indiana University within days of September 11. Drafted by the Bloomington Peace Coalition, it opposed what was then an imminent war in Afghanistan against al-Qaeda, and called for peace. It declared: "Retaliation will not lead to healing; rather it will harm innocent people and further the cycle of violence. Rather than engage in military aggression, those in authority should apprehend and charge those individuals believed to be directly responsible for the attacks and try them in a court of law in accordance with due process of international law." This declaration was hardly unique. Similar statements were issued on college campuses across the country, by local student or faculty coalitions, the national Campus Greens, 9-11peace.org, and the National Youth and Student Peace Coalition. As Global Exchange declared in its antiwar statement of September 11: "vengeance offers no relief... retaliation can never guarantee healing... and to meet violence with violence

breeds more rage and more senseless deaths. Only love leads to peace with justice, while hate takes us toward war and injustice." On this view **military action of any kind is figured as "aggression" or "vengeance"; harm to innocents, whether substantial or marginal, intended or unintended, is absolutely proscribed; legality is treated as having its own force, independent of any means of enforcement; and, most revealingly, "healing" is treated as the principal goal of any legitimate response.**

None of these points withstands serious scrutiny. A military response to terrorist aggression is not in any obvious sense an act of aggression, unless any military response—or at least any U.S. military response—is simply defined as aggression. While any justifiable military response should certainly be governed by just-war principles, the criterion of absolute harm avoidance would rule out the possibility of any military response. It is virtually impossible either to "apprehend" and prosecute terrorists or to put an end to terrorist networks without the use of military force, for the "criminals" in question are not law-abiding citizens but mass murderers, and there are no police to "arrest" them. And, finally, while "healing" is surely a legitimate moral goal, it is not clear that it is a political goal. Justice, however, most assuredly is a political goal. The most notable thing about the Bloomington statement is its avoidance of political justice. Like many antiwar texts, it calls for "social justice abroad." It supports redistributing wealth. But criminal and retributive justice, protection against terrorist violence, or the political enforcement of the minimal conditions of global civility—these are unmentioned.

They are unmentioned because to broach them is to enter a terrain that the campus left is unwilling to enter—the terrain of violence, a realm of complex choices and dirty hands. This aversion to violence is understandable and in some ways laudable. America's use of violence has caused much harm in the world, from Southeast Asia to Central and Latin America to Africa. The so-called "Vietnam Syndrome" was the product of a real learning experience that should not be forgotten. In addition, the destructive capacities of modern warfare—which jeopardize the civilian/combatant distinction, and introduce the possibility of enormous ecological devastation—make war under any circumstances something to be feared. No civilized person should approach the topic of war with anything other than great trepidation.

And yet the left's reflexive hostility toward violence in the international domain is strange. It is inconsistent with avowals of "materialism" and evocations of "struggle," especially on the part of those many who are not pacifists; it is in tension with a commitment to human emancipation (is there no cause for which it is justifiable to fight?); and it is oblivious to the tradition of left thinking about ends and means. To compare the debates within the left about the two world wars or the Spanish Civil War with the predictable "anti-militarism" of today's campus left is to compare a discourse that was serious about political power with a discourse that is not.

This unpragmatic approach has become a hallmark of post-cold war left commentary, from the Gulf War protests of 1991, to the denunciation of the 1999 U.S.-led NATO intervention in Kosovo, to the current post-September 11 antiwar movement. In each case protesters have raised serious questions about U.S. policy and its likely consequences, but in a strikingly ineffective way. They sound a few key themes: the broader context of grievances that supposedly explains why Saddam Hussein, or Slobodan Milosevic, or Osama bin Laden have done what they have done; the hypocrisy of official U.S. rhetoric, which denounces terrorism even though the U.S. government has often supported terrorism; the harm that will come to ordinary Iraqi or Serbian or Afghan citizens as a result of intervention; and the cycle of violence that is likely to ensue. These are important issues. But they typically are raised by left critics not to promote real debate about practical alternatives, but to avoid such a debate or to trump it.

As a result, the most important political questions are simply not asked. It is assumed that U.S. military intervention is an act of "aggression," but no consideration is given to the aggression to which intervention is a response. The status quo ante in Afghanistan is not, as peace activists would have it, peace, but rather terrorist violence abetted by a regime—the Taliban—that rose to power through brutality and repression. This requires us to ask a question that most "peace" activists would prefer not to ask: What should be done to respond to the violence of a Saddam Hussein, or a Milosevic, or a Taliban regime? What means are likely to stop violence and bring criminals to justice? Calls for diplomacy and international law are well intended and important; they implicate a decent and civilized ethic of global order. But they are also vague and empty, because they are not accompanied by any account of how diplomacy or international law can work effectively to address the problem at hand. The campus left offers no such account. To do so would require it to contemplate tragic choices in which moral goodness is of limited utility. Here what matters is not purity of intention but the intelligent exercise of power.

Power is not a dirty word or an unfortunate feature of the world. It is the core of politics. Power is the ability to effect outcomes in the world. Politics, in large part, involves contests over the distribution and use of power. To accomplish anything in the political world, one must attend to the means that are necessary to bring it about. And to develop such means is to develop, and to exercise, power. To say this is not to say that power is beyond morality. It is to say that power is not reducible to morality.

As writers such as Niccolò Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one's intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the

clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. **This is why, from the standpoint of politics--as opposed to religion--pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with "good" may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of "good" that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one's goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.**

Calculability Good

A retreat to the incalculable and a refusal to evaluate the consequences of action leaves the status quo intact

Touraine 03, research director at L'ecole des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, where he founded the Centre d'étude des mouvements sociaux (Alain, Constellations, Vol. 10, No. 3, p. 307-308)

These observations assume still more importance if they are placed in a broader context. In fact, we see a retreat from politics in most countries, a weakening of political institutions as well as of people's interest and confidence in their political representatives. We see the arbitrariness of those in power and their discourses on the one hand, and protests that are less political than ideological and moral on the other. It is in this sense that the declaration of a struggle of good and evil is acceptable, since these categories are by definition constructed by societies themselves. Everything occurs as if discourses, equally devoid of content, are at war – at the price of reduced military operations, but higher civilian casualties. Could one not be led here to paint a very pessimistic picture of political life around the world? There seem to be neither political actors nor social conflicts from which political actors could draw support. We hear only two equally nonpolitical discourses: that of the mission conferred by God upon the US and that of a pacifism that risks being weakened by its lack of seriousness in analyzing the situation in the Middle East. These are two mutually opposed types of moral discourse. Neither has any social content or real capacity for political influence. How far we are from the Cold War! Almost always, political debates and decisions created the impression of having a pronounced real historical content, so much so that the principal actors seemed to have been fulfilling roles imposed on them by history. Today, one can, even must, doubt the reality of the problems and realities invoked by the leaders of the two camps. This leads one to think that the actors and stakes at the center of world politics could well be nothing but shadows – in other words, that the leaders of states would sooner address God than their own populations and care little to nourish the political life of calculations and projects that might have direct consequences for the populations in question. This impression of unreality is certainly great in dictatorships, whose violence can never conceal their fragility and incoherence. But the fragility is just as great at what can be called the center of the world system, where the president of today's only great power constructs an image of reality that is almost entirely artificial and is refuted by events every day. The unreality of the discourses and policies of the opposed camps is so great that it empties of their content the European negotiation initiatives, which on first view seemed, to the contrary, to be justified by their resistance to the unreality of the situations created by American policy. Europe has no analysis, no initiative, no model of the future to propose. This somber observation is all the easier to accept as Europe is also conscious of defending social rights and systems of social redistribution that no longer correspond to the hopes placed in the welfare state little more than a half century ago. On the whole, the Security Council, if it has not succeeded in imposing a mediation or intervention, has played a positive role to the extent that it has not let itself be convinced of the reality of confrontations that seem to correspond more to the discourse of the media and the White House than to the real world.

Representations Good

Policy analysis should precede discourse – most effective way to challenge power

Jill Taft-Kaufman, Speech prof @ CMU, 1995, Southern Comm. Journal, Spring, v. 60, Iss. 3, "Other Ways", p pq

The postmodern passwords of "polyvocality," "Otherness," and "difference," unsupported by substantial analysis of the concrete contexts of subjects, creates a solipsistic quagmire. The political sympathies of the new cultural critics, with their ostensible concern for the lack of power experienced by marginalized people, aligns them with the political left. Yet, **despite their adversarial posture and talk of opposition, their discourses on intertextuality and inter-referentiality isolate them from and ignore the conditions that have produced leftist politics-- conflict, racism, poverty, and injustice.** In short, as Clarke (1991) asserts, postmodern emphasis on new subjects conceals the old subjects, those who have limited access to good jobs, food, housing, health care, and transportation, as well as to the media that depict them. Merod (1987) decries **this** situation as one which **leaves no vision, will, or commitment to activism.** He notes that academic lip service to the oppositional is underscored by the absence of focused collective or politically active intellectual communities. Provoked by the academic manifestations of this problem Di Leonardo (1990) echoes Merod and laments: **Has there ever been a historical era characterized by as little radical analysis or activism and as much radical-chic writing as ours? Maundering on about Otherness: phallocentrism or Eurocentric tropes has become a lazy academic substitute for actual engagement with the detailed histories and contemporary realities** of Western racial minorities, white women, or any Third World population. (p. 530) Clarke's assessment of the **postmodern elevation of language to the "sine qua non" of critical discussion is an even stronger indictment against the trend.** Clarke examines Lyotard's (1984) *The Postmodern Condition* in which Lyotard maintains that virtually all social relations are linguistic, and, therefore, it is through the coercion that threatens speech that we enter the "realm of terror" and society falls apart. To this assertion, Clarke replies: **I can think of few more striking indicators of the political and intellectual impoverishment of a view of society that can only recognize the discursive. If the worst terror we can envisage is the threat not to be allowed to speak, we are appallingly ignorant of terror in its elaborate contemporary forms. It may be the intellectual's conception of terror** (what else do we do but speak?), **but its projection onto the rest of the world would be calamitous....**(pp. 2-27) **The realm of the discursive is derived from the requisites for human life, which are in the physical world, rather than in a world of ideas or symbols.**(4) Nutrition, shelter, and protection are basic human needs that require collective activity for their fulfillment. **Postmodern emphasis on the discursive without an accompanying analysis of how the discursive emerges from material circumstances hides the complex task of envisioning and working towards concrete social goals** (Merod, 1987). Although the material conditions that create the situation of marginality escape the purview of the postmodernist, the situation and its consequences are not overlooked by scholars from marginalized groups. Robinson (1990) for example, argues that **"the justice that working people deserve is economic, not just textual"** (p. 571). Lopez (1992) states that **"the starting point for organizing the program content of education or political action must be the present existential, concrete situation"** (p. 299). West (1988) asserts that borrowing French post-structuralist discourses about "Otherness" blinds us to realities of American difference going on in front of us (p. 170). Unlike postmodern "textual radicals" who Rabinow (1986) acknowledges are "fuzzy about power and the realities of socioeconomic constraints" (p. 255), most writers from marginalized groups are clear about how discourse interweaves with the concrete circumstances that create lived experience. **People whose lives form the material for postmodern counter-hegemonic discourse do not share the optimism over the new recognition of their discursive subjectivities, because such an acknowledgment does not address sufficiently their collective historical and current struggles**

against racism, sexism, homophobia, and economic injustice. They do not appreciate being told they are living in a world in which there are no more real subjects. Ideas have consequences. Emphasizing the discursive self when a person is hungry and homeless represents both a cultural and humane failure. The need to look beyond texts to the perception and attainment of concrete social goals keeps writers from marginalized groups ever-mindful of the specifics of how power works through political agendas, institutions, agencies, and the budgets that fuel them.

Representations Good - Nuclear

Only through discourse and representations about nuclear war can we actually transcend the threats that nuclear weapons pose

David **Krieger**, President of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, May 17, **2007**, "Responsibility in an Era of Consequences," online:

http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2007/05/17_krieger_Responsibility_In_An_Era.htm, accessed August 12, 2007

We must also withdraw our support from any programs that seek to maintain nuclear arsenals into the future. A prime example is the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) program now being developed at the US nuclear weapons laboratories. This is but one example of **a dangerous weapons program unworthy of our humanity. Rather than continuing the nuclear arms race,** largely with itself, while ignoring its obligations under international law for nuclear disarmament, **the United States must take a leadership role in ending the nuclear weapons threat to humanity. This is only likely to happen if US citizens demand such action from their government.**

At the University of California, students are challenging the University's management and supposed oversight of the US nuclear weapons laboratories. They are saying, in effect, "Enough is enough. It is time for the University to stop providing a fig leaf of respectability to nuclear weapons laboratories engaged in a dangerous continuation of the nuclear threat to humanity." The students are a voice from the future that is with us today. It is their future, and they are demanding nuclear sanity. They deserve our support as they speak out and confront the University of California Regents, political appointees who seem content to promote any nuclear weapons program proposed by the nuclear labs.

The Hamburg Call to Action challenges each of us to change our way of thinking, and to engage in meaningful actions to assure the future. The time for global sanity has arrived – none too soon.

Representations about nuclear war is the only way to be prepared and maybe prevent an actual nuclear war

Brian **Martin**, Professor of Social Sciences in the School of Social Sciences, Media and Communication at the University of Wollongong, September 3, **2002**, "Activism After Nuclear War?," online:

<http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/sts/bmartin/pubs/02tff.html>, accessed August 13, 2007

Being prepared for nuclear war is not defeatism but realism. Indeed, being prepared may make nuclear war less likely, as I argued 20 years ago in an article titled "How the peace movement should be preparing for nuclear war". Many of the points I made then are just as relevant today. **Groups should have contingency plans in case of emergency. It is worth asking, for example, "What should we do if key members are arrested?" Planning for such possibilities can be useful even if there is no nuclear crisis, since the group could come under attack for other reasons. Various scenarios should be considered, such as intensive surveillance, disruption, infiltration and public discrediting.** Brian Glick's book War at Home is a valuable manual on this topic. **Resources could come under attack: offices destroyed, computers stolen, websites removed. This points to the value of having back-up copies of key information. The same applies to skills: if a knowledgeable person, such as a web designer, is not around, can someone else do the job? Communication networks are absolutely essential in a crisis. Being able to obtain reliable information and consult with others is vital for taking action. Activists should have plans for maintaining communication links in the face of interruption and disruption. If the phones are taken out, for example, what other system can be used?** Schweik Action Wollongong developed some exercises for strengthening communication in groups.

Representations Good - Nuclear

Nuclear war representations are the only way we can begin to process the dangers that accompany nuclear war

Brian Martin, Professor of Social Sciences in the School of Social Sciences, Media and Communication at the University of Wollongong, September 3, 2002, "Activism After Nuclear War?," online: <http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/sts/bmartin/pubs/02tff.html>, accessed August 13, 2007

If worst comes to worst and nuclear weapons cause physical effects close to home, then survival becomes a priority. It makes sense to know the basics about the effects of nuclear war - blast, heat, radiation - and how to protect. Knowing basic first aid is important too. There is plenty of information on what to do in the event of nuclear war, but most social activists have avoided even thinking about it on the grounds that preparation makes nuclear war more likely. I disagree. If activists are seen to be ready, this makes nuclear war less likely. Nuclear weapons are severely stigmatised largely due to the efforts of peace activists. Governments have been reluctant to use nuclear weapons because they realise there will be an enormous political backlash. From the 1940s on, US leaders have considered using nuclear weapons on quite a number of occasions - such as during the Vietnam war - but always refrained, largely due to the fear of a backlash. If, despite this, nuclear weapons are used, it is vital that social activists capitalise on the widespread revulsion that will occur. To do this, activists need to be prepared. Otherwise, the next nuclear war will be only the beginning of a series of nuclear wars. A further implication is that activists need to be psychologically prepared for nuclear war. For decades, many people have thought of nuclear war as "the end": as extinction or the end of civilisation. But limited nuclear war has always been possible and even a major nuclear war could leave billions of people alive. Therefore it makes sense to think through the implications and make suitable preparations. Nuclear war is almost bound to be a disaster, not only in human and environmental terms but as well in terms of political prospects for achieving a better world. Activists are doing what they can to prevent nuclear war, but they are not the ones who design and produce the weapons and prepare to use them. Given that nuclear weapons may be used despite the best efforts of peace activists, it makes sense to be prepared for the aftermath. That means preparing organisationally and psychologically.

Offensive Language

Punishing offensive language makes it worse—censorship only drives it underground where its effects are more acutely felt.

Matthew Roskoski and Joe Peabody, "A Linguistic and Philosophical Critique of Language 'Arguments,'" 1991, <http://debate.uvm.edu/Library/DebateTheoryLibrary/Roskoski&Peabody-LangCritiques>, accessed 10/17/02

If language "arguments" become a dominant trend, debaters will not change their attitudes. Rather they will manifest their attitudes in non-debate contexts. Under these conditions, the debaters will not have the moderating effects of the critic or the other debaters. Simply put, sexism at home or at lunch is worse than sexism in a debate round because in the round there is a critic to provide negative though not punitive feedback. The publicization effects of censorship are well known. "Psychological studies reveal that whenever the government attempts to censor speech, the censored speech - for that very reason - becomes more appealing to many people" (Strossen 559). These studies would suggest that language which is critiqued by language "arguments" becomes more attractive simply because of the critique. Hence language "arguments" are counterproductive. Conclusion Rodney Smolla offered the following insightful assessment of the interaction between offensive language and language "arguments": The battle against {offensive speech} will be fought most effectively through persuasive and creative educational leadership rather than through punishment and coercion... The sense of a community of scholars, an island of reason and tolerance, is the pervasive ethos. But that ethos should be advanced with education, not coercion. It should be the dominant voice of the university within the marketplace of ideas; but it should not preempt that marketplace. (Smolla 224-225).¹ We emphatically concur. It is our position that a debater who feels strongly enough about a given language "argument" ought to actualize that belief through interpersonal conversation rather than through a plea for censorship and coercion. Each debater in a given round has three minutes of cross-examination time during which he or she may engage the other team in a dialogue about the ramifications of the language the opposition has just used. Additionally even given the efficacy of Rich Edwards' efficient tabulation program, there will inevitably be long periods between rounds during which further dialogue can take place.

Punishing offensive language creates a backlash and drives it underground

Matthew Roskoski and Joe Peabody, A Linguistic and Philosophical Critique of Language Arguments, 1991

Previously, we have argued that the language advocates have erroneously reversed the causal relationship between language and reality. We have defended the thesis that reality shapes language, rather than the obverse. Now we will also contend that to attempt to solve a problem by editing the language which is symptomatic of that problem will generally trade off with solving the reality which is the source of the problem. There are several reasons why this is true. The first, and most obvious, is that we may often be fooled into thinking that language "arguments" have generated real change. As Graddol and Swan observe, "when compared with larger social and ideological struggles, linguistic reform may seem quite a trivial concern," further noting "there is also the danger that effective change at this level is mistaken for real social change" (Graddol & Swan 195). The second reason is that the language we find objectionable can serve as a signal or an indicator of the corresponding objectionable reality. The third reason is that restricting language only limits the overt expressions of any objectionable reality, while leaving subtle and hence more dangerous expressions unregulated. Once we drive the objectionable idea underground it will be more difficult to identify, more difficult to root out, more difficult to counteract, and more likely to have its undesirable effect. The fourth reason is that objectionable speech can create a "backlash" effect that raises the consciousness of people

exposed to the speech. Strossen observes that "ugly and abominable as these expressions are, they undoubtedly have had the beneficial result of raising social consciousness about the underlying societal problem..." (560).

Offensive Language

Censorship reduces political analysis to justifications for prosecution

Judith Butler, Professor of Rhetoric and Comparative Literature, UC Berkeley, Performativity and Performance, Ed. Parker and Sedgwick, 1995, p. 204

That words wound seems incontestably true, and that hateful, racist, misogynist, homophobic speech should be vehemently countered seems incontrovertibly right. But does understanding from where speech derives its power to wound alter our conception of what it might mean to counter that wounding power? **Do we accept the notion that injurious speech is attributable to a singular subject and act? If we accept such a juridical constraint on thought - the grammatical requirements of accountability - as a point of departure, what is lost from the political analysis of injury when the discourse of politics becomes fully reduced to juridical requirements?? Indeed, when political discourse is collapsed into juridical discourse, the meaning of political opposition runs the risk of being reduced to the act of prosecution.** How is the analysis of the discursive historicity of power unwittingly restricted when the subject is presumed as the point of departure for such an analysis? A clearly theological construction, the postulation of the subject as the causal origin of the performative act is understood to generate that which it names; indeed, this divinely empowered subject is one for whom the name itself is generative.

Academic Discourse Good (1/2)

Their rejection of 'academic theory' is disastrous for the oppressed – it encourages a form of politics where we all already have our minds made up that policymaking can't help us. This forecloses connections with potential allies and essentializes the experience of the oppressed.

Paul Bowman, Lecturer in Cultural Studies at Bath Spa University College, England, 2002, online: <http://culturemachine.tees.ac.uk/Cmach/Backissues/j004/Articles/bowman.htm>, accessed February 21, 2005

The supposed 'difficulty' of the language of such political theory, and of the language of cultural theory in general, and the supposed apparent 'clarity' of many more popular modes, actually suggests the many difficulties of 'confronting' the object of analysis called the political or the socio-political in anything other than a turgid masculinist mode when one hopes this work will register 'in' the field one is concerned with, a 'field' whose construction has always been dominated by one or another manifestation of 'masculinist' discourse. The whole field is polarised between appeals to 'common sense' and appeals to apodictic 'logic'. Laclau and Mouffe have 'clearly', in some measure, inherited, comfortably and happily, an unambivalent sense of what political debate should be; it's just that it doesn't conform to more popular notions of what it should be. Discoursing 'otherwise' is apparently not really taken seriously by either camp (Derrida, 1996: 30). But this 'difficulty' – and the fact that it is a difficulty not often perceived – illustrates the stranglehold that 'reasonable' language, of whatever inflection, has on discourse of the properly political. You would be right to state that 'I' am clearly not going out of my way to try to construct an 'alternative'. But my justification for deferring the attempt devolves on the inevitable subordination of performance to its obligatory explanation or interpretation. I raise the matter here, albeit somewhat turgidly, because acknowledging this gendered contingency of rationality and logicity may sow the seeds of their deconstruction and, perhaps, transformation. So, that being said, what have I said? One point is that when people accuse 'Theory' of being useless, unrelated or unconnected, distracted, self-absorbed abstraction, then that accusation is tropologically aligned with the standard slippage into a charge of masturbation – as in, theory just plays with itself. That which is ostensibly disconnected or not putatively immediately related to real and pressing issues is readily said to be 'castrated', lacking direct purchase, direct utility, and any ability to 'intervene' directly into real and pressing issues. When Rorty, no mean theorist himself, accuses Laclau, Critchley, and Derrida of just playing with themselves, this is not least because deconstruction, for Rorty, is a kind of masturbation, primarily because it does not 'connect'. Rorty's charge is exemplary of the general tenor of criticisms levelled against Theory: that it just plays with itself. What is especially telling about this facile and dominant binary between 'worthwhile work versus worthless wank' is that it can also be mapped onto the dominant binary structuring debate about university education in general that has dominated discourse about knowledge for at least two hundred years: namely, the debate about whether knowledge should have any 'use' (see Young, 1992: 97-126). Usefulness, today, is invariably coordinated with connection, penetration, control, prediction and production; in short, with technical, scientific, or financial utility and mastery. The Thatcherite assault on the arts and humanities exemplified this hegemonisation of cultural values with the ascendancy of the equation 'value equals usefulness equals profit'. But, given capital's attempted hegemonisation of all values, it becomes not imponderable to suspect that cultural studies' own obsession with themes supposedly contrary to this ethos, like ethics, politics, policy, intervention, and so on, is itself a symptom of the techno-capitalist hegemonic injunction to be intelligibly productive, in some way, as the determination of worth and value increasingly obliges all to render reason for everything in terms intelligible to discourses tropologically and analytically dominated by the discourse or ideology of capital. So, how should cultural studies elaborate itself? According to what protocols of discussion? I have implicitly painted a picture of a scene polarised by two improprieties: hyper-academic versus hypo-academic. The difference between the former, a cultural studies fixated on supposedly unintelligible or 'too difficult' (or too theoretical, too self-obsessed, too masturbatory) exploration of the ethico-political, on the one hand, and the latter on the other hand, a cultural studies that only takes seriously empirical, fact-based discourse ('practical', 'real'), is crucially that the theoretically inflected approach deliberately (and, I would say,

dogmatically³) leaves itself space in its remit to question how, why, to what ends, in whose interests, and supporting what ethico-political values and agenda, any discourse imposes itself as the as-is (i.e., the ‘true’, ‘correct’, ‘common sense’, etc.); while empirically inflected approaches subordinate or tend to factor out such reflection from the outset. Both positions can readily deem the other a waste of time, misguided digression, distraction, or, as Shakespeare put it, the ‘expense of spirit in a waste of shame’. (Perhaps Shakespeare was speaking as a theorist here, as he was critiquing ‘proper’ procreational activity.) Theory easily deems empiricism to be subject to an inadequately thought-through agenda – often implying its culpability in and as the reproduction

Academic Discourse Good (2/2)

[Bowman continued]

and strengthening of capitalist and especially panoptical power. Empiricism deems theory to be distracted, unrelated, playing with itself. But this binary itself operates and is intelligible only thanks to a tacit universal that remains to be questioned or acknowledged, by both parties: worthwhile and worthless, valuable work and useless wank are accusations all too easily levelled by all against all. If this is a war of all against all, then what is common to all is the belittling of masturbation as the dominant trope of discourse on knowledge and especially on academic orientation. But as long as the determination of worth is tropologically dominated by the fantasy of simple, direct, unmediated, face to face, missionary position heterosexual penetrative intervention leading to proper production, then our thinking remains beholden to the rules of a closed economic system imposed on thought. For the theorists here, this means that we are thereby still unconsciously trafficking the preference for insemination, no matter how consciously we subscribe to dissemination. For those who think theory is a load of old wank, my argument means that all supposedly normal, sensible, concern for real issues remains a simulation whose parameters are imposed by limits placed to police and regulate the acceptable interpretation of what normal and sensible ‘are’. If these limits are accepted, this sentences us to remaining incapable of even thinking about why we think the way we do. If thinking is thought of as less important than doing, you still have to think about why one might think that, and whose interests it is in. Supplementary acts of mental masturbation are more fundamental than supposedly proper intercourse. The imperative that we must have productive intercourse with ‘the real world’ skews thought, sentences us to guilt (as such ‘immediate connection’ is an impossibility), and always consigns arts and humanities to the prejudgement of being less worthwhile than science and business. But our obligation is not to mime their ‘success’, to impose their remit and their kind of ‘success’ as our own. Our own obligation as academics is, first, to be academic. And wherever and whenever the potentially limitless reserves of playful, apparently pointless conjecture and reflection on any point ever meets a limitation which says ‘stop!’, then it is still our duty to ask why we should stop there, who gives the order, and whose interests it is in. Put simply: the onus to justify one’s activity is actually not on the theorist, who thinks and thinks and thinks, but actually it is on the non-theorist, who should justify why they think thinking should be low-level, pedestrian, less than and other than it could be, in short, wanting, lacking, or failing to carry itself further than is acceptable in whatever status quo. Perhaps we should try not to come too quickly to the conclusion. The incessant mind-wank of theorists needs no justification, if you think about it. If you won’t think about it, then you are the intellectual imposture. But, moreover, and this is I think my most important point: if you won’t engage with certain forms of academic thought, if you can’t be bothered to understand, find out, learn, if you think that theories are disconnected, unrelated, irrelevant to the real world, then you must also stop to ask yourself precisely how and in what way and if at all your own sensible, reasonable academic activity

'connects' with anything more real than other unrelated academic activity. Because it doesn't. Neither more nor less. We are all wankers here.

****Misc**

Permutation – Coalitions

Total critique shatters coalition-building necessary to confront oppression – perm solves best

Sankaran Krishna, Professor of Political Science at the University of Hawaii, 1993, Alternatives, v. 18

While this point is, perhaps, debatable, Der Derian's further assertion, that a postmodern critique of the Gulf War mobilization would be somehow more effective, sounds less convincing. An alternative, late-modern tactic against total war was to war on totality itself, to delegitimize *all* sovereign truths based on class, nationalist, or internationalist metanarratives ... better strategically to

play with apt critiques of the powerful new forces unleashed by cyberwar than to hold positions with antiquated tactics and nostalgic unities. (AD: 177-178; emphasis in original) **The dichotomous choice presented in this excerpt is straightforward: one either indulges in total critique, delegitimizing all sovereign truths, or one is committed to "nostalgic" essentialist unities that have become obsolete and have been the grounds for all our oppressions.** In offering this dichotomous choice, Der Derian replicates a move made by Chaloupka in his equally dismissive critique of the more mainstream nuclear opposition, the Nuclear Freeze movement of the early 1980s, that, according to him, was operating along obsolete lines, emphasizing "facts" and "realities" while a "postmodern" President Reagan easily outflanked them through an illusory Star Wars program. (See KN: chapter 4) Chaloupka centers this difference between his own supposedly total critique of all sovereign truths (which he describes as nuclear criticism in an echo of literary criticism) and the

more partial (and issue-based) criticism of what he calls "nuclear opposition" or "antinuclearists" at the very outset of his book. (KN: xvi) Once again, **the unhappy choice forced upon the reader is to join Chaloupka in his total critique of all sovereign truths or be trapped in obsolete essentialisms. This leads to a disastrous politics, pitting groups that have the most in common (and need to unite on some basis to be effective) against each other. Both Chaloupka and Der Derian thus reserve their most trenchant critique for political groups that should, in any analysis, be regarded as the closest to them in terms of an oppositional politics and their desired futures. Instead of finding ways to live with these differences and to (if fleetingly) coalesce against the New Right, this fratricidal critique is politically suicidal. It obliterates the space for a political activism based on provisional and contingent coalitions, for uniting behind a common cause even as one recognizes that the coalition is comprised of groups that have very differing (and possibly unresolvable) views of reality.** Moreover, it fails to consider the possibility that there may have been other, more compelling reasons for the "failure" of the Nuclear Freeze movement or anti-Gulf War movement. Like many a worthwhile cause in our times, they failed to garner sufficient support

to influence state policy. The response to that need not be a totalizing critique that delegitimizes all narratives. **The blackmail inherent in the choice offered by Der Derian and Chaloupka, between total critique and "ineffective" partial critique ought to be transparent. Among other things, it effectively militates against the construction of provisional or strategic essentialisms in our attempts to create space for an activist politics.** In the next section, I focus more widely on the genre of critical international theory and its impact on such an activist politics.

Only a combination of micro and macro politics can solve oppression

Steven Best, Assoc. Prof Phil. And Human. U Texas and Douglas Kellner, Phil. Of Ed. Chair, 2001,

"Postmodern Politics and the Battle for the Future," Illuminations,

www.uta.edu/huma/illuminations/kell28.htm

The **emphasis on local struggles and micropower**, cultural politics which redefine the political, and attempts to develop political forms relevant to the problems and developments of the contemporary age **is** extremely **valuable, but** there are also certain limitations to the dominant forms of postmodern politics. While an emphasis on micropolitics and local struggles can be a healthy substitute for excessively utopian and ambitious political projects, one should not lose sight that **key sources of political power and oppression are precisely the big targets aimed at by modern theory, including capital, the state, imperialism, and patriarchy. Taking on such major targets involves coalitions and multi-front struggle, often requiring a politics of alliance and solidarity that cuts across group identifications to mobilize sufficient power** to struggle against, say, the evils of capitalism or the state. Thus, while today we need the expansion of localized cultural practices, they attain their real significance only within the struggle for the transformation of society as a whole. **Without this systemic emphasis, cultural and identity politics remain confined to the margins of society and are in danger of degenerating into narcissism, hedonism, aestheticism, or personal therapy, where they pose no danger and are immediately coopted** by the culture industries. In such cases, **the political is merely the personal, and the original intentions of the 1960s goal to broaden the political field are inverted and perverted.** Just as economic and political demands have their referent in subjectivity in everyday life, so these cultural and existential issues find their ultimate meaning in the demand for a new society and mode of production. Yet we would insist that **it is not a question of micro vs macropolitics**, as if it were an **either/or** proposition, **but rather both dimensions are important** for the struggles of the present and future.[15] Likewise, we would argue that **we need to combine the most affirmative and negative perspectives**, embodying Marcuse's declaration that critical social theory should be both more negative and utopian in reference to the status quo.[16] There are certainly many things to be depressed about in the negative and cynical

postmodernism of a Baudrillard, yet without a positive political vision merely citing the negative might lead to apathy and depression that only benefits the existing order. For a dialectical politics, however, positive vision of what could be is articulated in conjunction with critical analysis of what is in a multioptic perspective that focuses on the forces of domination as well as possibilities of emancipation.

Permutation – Interpretations

The death of rules is the death of politics: we must combine institutional analysis and critical philosophy under the rubric of deliberation and consensus.

Donald S. Lutz, Professor of Polisci at Houston, 2000 Political Theory and Partisan Politics p. 47

Constitutionalism, like the rule of law upon which it is built, requires some level of consensus among the people, elite and common, who would use these constructs as more than window dressing. At the beginning, the level of consensus may be low in terms of breadth or weak in terms of depth, but without a certain level of consensus we can have neither political institutions nor constitutional principles to guide these institutions. Consensus cannot be produced constitutionally, but must result from politics—literally the decision to replace force and violence with some modus vivendi of discourse about how to proceed collectively. Such discourse in turn requires guiding principles and rules that will serve to undergird and safeguard the continued use of speech and persuasion rather than force and violence. The institutional/constitutional construct, if it is successful over time, will enhance consensus, but along with an increased depth in consensus may come an enhanced breadth in the range of problems and issues that are subject to such disciplined speech. That is, success in some vital areas of political conflict is likely to lead to the desire to bring all conflict under these successful, accepted rules. The temptation is to increasingly constitutionalize political conflict, and the danger here is one of overconstitutionalizing politics. Part of the institutional/ constitutional perspective is an emphasis on phronesis, or practical wisdom. There is wisdom in knowing the limits of the constitutionalism. In the face of the natural tendency to overemphasize the importance and beneficial consequences of what we happen to do, humility requires that we admit limits to what political theory can accomplish. Too much constitutionalism, and too much focus on only institutions, is as much a pathology as too little. Overconstitutionalizing manifests itself in a tendency toward including all policy matters in the constitution in an attempt to rationalize and settle these conflicts. Because change is inevitable, and change brings the need to alter public policy, overconstitutionalizing politics leads to the constitution becoming a tightening straightjacket of rules that must be constantly addressed, which in turn makes the constitution, and the basic rules of political discourse it encodes, increasingly the source of conflict. The constitution, and constitutionalism itself, becomes increasingly controversial, and is progressively discredited. Political instability and public demoralization follow in the wake of this tendency. The decline of constitutionalism benefits only the powerful. As political theorists we need to ask ourselves if we are helping to effectively encode justice, or undercutting the "marriage" which we take so much for granted that we heedlessly ignore its importance and contribute to its decline. To the extent we function as a cognitive elite of mandarins who refuse to engage in the discussion with political actors, and give aid to those among them who might preserve the marriage, to that extent we must plead guilty. In the end, if we do not face the possibility of guilt, the day of reckoning will judge us guilty anyway, and political theory will, in fact, be, despite all our protestations to the contrary, not dead, but sublimely irrelevant to the people it was designed to serve.[^]

Kritik and policy can coexist; they are simply blocked from doing so by the modern oppositional framing of political, freeing ourselves from these polemics is a prerequisite to determine the roles of these disciplines within debate.

Owen 02, Reader in Political Theory at the University of Southampton (David, "Reorienting International Relations: On Pragmatism, Pluralism and Practical Reasoning", Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 31, No. 3, <http://mil.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/31/3/653>)

Secondly, there is the confusion of pictures and theories combined with the moralist overestimation of the ethical (ideological) commitments of IR theory. This finds expression in the thought that we need to get our ethical account sorted out before we can engage responsibly in epistemic judgement about what to know, where such ethical adequacy requires the construction of a moral theory and, more particularly, a moral ideal that can direct the enterprise of epistemic theorising. An example of this position is provided by Linklater's version of critical IR theory.²³ Against this position, we can reasonably point out that the kind of ethical adequacy required does not entail the construction of a moral ideal but only the existence of some shared ethical judgements concerning what matters to us that orient our epistemic enquiries. The dual confusion in question leads fairly straightforwardly to the thought that what is at stake here are incompatible epistemological commitments and hence that debate between positivist and critical forms of IR theory needs to be conducted at an epistemological level. However, as my remarks indicate, this thought is mistaken insofar as the apparent incompatibility from which it derives is an illusion. It should now, hopefully, be clear why the conflation of picture and theory supports the philosophical turn in IR theory; it does so because it

suggests that positivist IR theory, critical IR theory and postmodern IR theory are to be conceived as direct theoretical competitors. It is, consequently, unsurprising that critical debate between these stances should take the form of recourse to ontological and epistemological reflection since this is one way in which competing theories can be evaluated with respect to each other. But the conflation of picture and theory is particularly designed to encourage this turn, because it supports the thought that only one of these distinct kinds of theoretical approach can be the correct approach and this is to be determined by consideration of their ontological and epistemological commitments. However, once the confusion between picture and theory which manifests itself in these three dimensions of the IR theory wars has been dissolved, we are in a position to acknowledge the different roles the distinct forms of IR theory can play and it is to specify these roles that I now turn to the pragmatist focus on the topic of government.

Permutation - Interpretations

Both policymaking and kritik have important roles to play- relying upon essentializing view of either approach to debate necessarily excludes important means for decisionmaking.

Owen 02, Reader in Political Theory at the University of Southampton (David, “Reorienting International Relations: On Pragmatism, Pluralism and Practical Reasoning”, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 31, No. 3, <http://mil.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/31/3/653>)

How, though, does **this focus on government act to re-orient the discipline of IR?** The salient point for our immediate concerns is that IR theory as a form of practical philosophy can be situated in three roles here, each of which may require different kinds of theoretical practice. **The first role is that of seeking to bring a public into being by enabling us to perceive significant effects**, to bring them over the threshold of visibility. **This may be directed at effects that that are potential candidates for government**—e.g., as Shacknove points out, persons whose government fails to protect their basic needs and who are accessible to the international community ought to qualify for refugeehood—**or at effects that are products of existing forms of government**—for example, the fact that, because the current refugee regime lacks any criteria on burden-sharing, the majority of refugees are situated in the world’s poorest and weakest states and that this can have destabilising effect on these states.³² At the same time, **this rendering visible may involve contesting the background picture that informs our current perception of consequences**—e.g., contesting the assumptions of territoriality it involves—**or elucidating previously unnoticed consequences within the terms of that background picture by way of better accounts of the practices in question—for example, the elucidation of the gendered effects of the fact that refugeehood is constructed on an exilic bias.** The second role is that of **serving an existing public by offering accounts of the consequences of the practices in question that support the shared moral judgement that constitutes this public and offering practicable ways of addressing these consequences**—for example, focusing on the human rights aspect of refugeehood and the role that human rights legislation can play in supporting refugees. The third role, **finally, is that of seeking to dissolve an existing public by showing that the shared moral judgement that constitutes it as a public is mistaken in that the effects with which it is concerned are either illusory or not sufficiently significant.** In each of these ways, IR can serve the purpose of increasing the intelligence of our reflections on practices of government and it is worth stressing, at least as it seems to me, that some of **the hostilities in contemporary IR theory mark a failure to register the different roles that different kinds of IR theory can play in this process.** Thus, for example, **the point of genealogical investigations is, as Foucault notes, primarily that of attempting to constitute a community of judgement,** a public in Dewey’s terms, and hence it is primarily concerned with transforming our perception through world-disclosure such that previously invisible consequences become visible.³³ Another way of elucidating what is involved in **this re-orientation** is to note that it **links knowledge** (and the value of knowledge) **to action by encouraging reflection on problems and problem-constitution.** With respect to the former, it orients IR to questions that are both epistemic and ethical: what are the effects of this kind of practice? Should we seek to govern these practices? If so, how? At what cost? With respect to the latter, it orients IR to critical reflection on both the political constitution of such-and-such practice as a problem potentially requiring government and IR’s own disciplinary constitution of such-and-such practice as a problem requiring government. In other words, it orients IR both to the task of addressing problematic practices but also to the task of reflecting on how these practices are constituted as problematic; that is, the nature of the assumptions, inferences, etc. that are brought to bear in this process of problem-constitution. Thus, for example, IR is oriented to addressing the problem posed by refugees in terms of how this problem is governed and how existing ways of governing it may be improved. However, IR is also oriented to reflection on the background picture against which this problem is constituted as a problem including, for example, the assumption that the liberty and welfare of the human population is best served by its division into the civic populations of sovereign states who have a primary duty to their own populations. In other words, **while addressing the refugee problem as it is constituted, IR also involves reflecting on the plausibility and value of features of its current constitution as a problem, such as this assumption concerning sovereignty and human welfare.** If this argument has any cogency, it follows that rather than conceiving of IR in terms of a theoretical war of all

against all, we acknowledge that **there is a role for different kinds of theoretical practice in IR that engage with different issues. How though are we to judge between rival positions within these different levels?** Between rival accounts of problems and of problem-constitution? The pragmatist response is to argue that **such judgement involves attending to the capacity of the contesting accounts to guide our judgement and action.** But how is this capacity to be judged? Responding to this question requires that we turn to the pragmatism's concern with growth.

Permutation - Interpretations

Debate is a crucial space for reflection and reconstitution of the private citizen's relation to the government, structures like roleplaying and calculative decisionmaking based upon predictable, real world impacts are critical to education that is both germane to the topic and germane to our lives as political subjects

Owen 02, Reader in Political Theory at the University of Southampton (David, "Reorienting International Relations: On Pragmatism, Pluralism and Practical Reasoning", Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 31, No. 3, <http://mil.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/31/3/653>)

From a processual rather than teleological standpoint, **it is precisely this free activity, this capacity to critically reflect on and transform our ethical orientation to**—and practical relations with—**government that matters** and it is this process, this operation of intelligence, that IR conceived as practical philosophy serves. Second, one might worry that taking growth as the end itself fails to distinguish between different forms of growth, for example those that we consider ethical and those that we do not. The problem with this objection is that it does not think through what taking growth as the end itself entails. There are two points to note here. First, that **growth is conceptualised** by Dewey **in terms of our capacity for critical intelligence, that is, our capacity for discriminating judgement and action.** Thus, for example, an increase in our capacities for ignoring inconvenient evidence, for wilful blindness and for wishful thinking is not growth in terms of Dewey's use of this concept. Second, **taking growth as the end itself means discriminating between forms of growth in terms of the degree to which they support or undermine the further growth of our powers of critical intelligence.** Having (hopefully) disarmed these objections, it is now possible to stress the positive features of Dewey's processual approach. I will focus on three such features. **The first is that it provides a way of accommodating the moral pluralism characteristic of contemporary politics precisely because it does not specify an ethical ideal.** In contrast to, say, much critical IR theory, Dewey does not posit a controversial ideal, but rather asks us to focus on considering ways in which we may improve the intelligence of our practices of government. Now, in practice, Dewey would be sympathetic to the kind of appeal to greater communication, freedom, trust and democracy that critical theorists make, but he would be so because he holds that these are factors that we have good grounds for believing do increase our capacities for intelligent governance—not because they are required by obedience to a moral ideal. The second positive aspect of such an approach is that it avoids the problems of the relationship between ideal and non-ideal theorising (for example, second-best issues) by shifting to a focus on the relationship between the attained and the attainable. **A standard problem with adopting a two-stage approach to normative reflection in which one works out the ideal theory first and then works out the non-ideal version**—and this is the approach of critical theorists like Linklater and Rawlsians like Pogge— is that **it involves the assumption that the non-ideal** (i.e., practicably realisable) **account represents the second-best solution, but this may simply be false.**³⁸ At the same time, this focus on the attained and the attainable emphasises the

need for attention not simply to what we should do but equally to who are the agents of change and how is it to be accomplished. The third positive feature is **that it acknowledges that human beings can adopt a plurality of perspectives on the world guided by different interests, norms and values—and it sees such a plurality as a positive resource for the growth of critical intelligence insofar as it cultivates our capacity for ‘enlarged mentality’**, in Arendt’s perspicuous phrase. The point here is essentially that defended by Aristotle in chapter 11 of Book III of the Politics and summarised by Jeremy Waldron as follows: **The people acting as a body are capable of making better decisions, by pooling their knowledge, experience, and insight, than any individual member of the body, however excellent, is capable of making on his own.**³⁹ Apart from explaining why Dewey sees freedom, communication, trust and democracy as promoting the intelligence of our political decisionmaking, this also makes clear why **it is important that IR be characterised as a mutual agonism rather than antagonism between different standpoints. The view is not simply that such a multitude is more attentive to the factual circumstances of decision-making, but that deliberation among the many is a way of bringing each citizen’s [or IR scholar’s] ethical views and insights—such as they are—to bear on the views and insights of each of the others, so they cast light on each other, providing a basis for reciprocal questioning and criticism and enabling a view to emerge which is better than any of the inputs and much more than a mere aggregation or function of those inputs.**⁴⁰

Realism Good

Rejecting realism makes it more dangerous – we have to use it strategically

Stefano Guzzini, Assis. Prof @ Central European U, Realism in Int'l Relations, 1998, p. 212

Therefore, in a third step, this chapter also claims that it is impossible just to heap realism onto the dustbin of history and start anew. This is a non-option. Although realism as a strictly causal theory has been a disappointment, various realist assumptions are well alive in the minds of many practitioners and observers of international affairs. Although it does not correspond to a theory which helps us to understand a real world with objective laws, it is a world-view which suggests thoughts about it, and which permeates our daily language for making sense of it. Realism has been a rich, albeit very contestable, reservoir of lessons of the past, of metaphors and historical analogies, which, in the hands of its most gifted representatives, have been proposed, at times imposed, and reproduced as guides to a common understanding of international affairs. Realism is alive in the collective memory and self-understanding of our (i.e. Western) foreign policy elite and public whether educated or not. Hence, we cannot but deal with it. For this reason, forgetting realism is also questionable. Of course, academic observers should not bow to the whims of daily politics. But staying at distance, or being critical, does not mean that they should lose the capacity to understand the languages of those who make significant decisions not only in government, but also in firms, NGOs, and other institutions. To the contrary, this understanding, as increasingly varied as it may be, is a prerequisite for their very profession. More particularly, it is a prerequisite for opposing the more irresponsible claims made in the name although not always necessarily in the spirit, of realism.

Perm solves – we can support both realism and critical theory to enable a transition

Alastair J.H. Murray, Politics @ Wales, Reconstructing Realism, 1997, p. 178-9

In Wendt's constructivism, the argument appears in its most basic version, presenting an analysis of realist assumptions which associate it with a conservative account of human nature. In Linklater's critical theory it moves a stage further, presenting an analysis of realist theory which locates it within a conservative discourse of state-centrism. In Ashley's post-structuralism it reaches its highest form, presenting an analysis of realist strategy which locates it not merely within a conservative statist order, but, moreover, within an active conspiracy of silence to reproduce it. Finally, in Tickner's feminism, realism becomes all three simultaneously and more besides, a vital player in a greater, overarching, masculine conspiracy against femininity. Realism thus appears, first, as a doctrine providing the grounds for a relentless pessimism, second, as a theory which provides an active justification for such pessimism, and, third, as a strategy which proactively seeks to enforce this pessimism, before it becomes the vital foundation underlying all such pessimism in international theory. Yet, an examination of the arguments put forward from each of these perspectives suggests not only that the effort to locate realism within a conservative, rationalist camp is untenable but, beyond this, that realism is able to provide reformist strategies which are superior to those that they can generate themselves. The progressive purpose which motivates the critique of realism in these perspectives ultimately generates a bias which undermines their own ability to generate effective strategies of transition. In constructivism, this bias appears in its most limited version, producing strategies so divorced from the obstacles presented by the current structure of international politics that they threaten to become counter-productive. In critical theory it moves a stage further, producing strategies so abstract that one is at a loss to determine what they actually imply in terms of the current structure of international politics. And, in post-modernism, it reaches its highest form producing an

absence of such strategies altogether, until we reach the point at which we are left with nothing but critique. Against this failure, realism contains the potential to act as the basis of a more constructive approach to international relations, incorporating many of the strengths of reflectivism and yet avoiding its weaknesses. It appears, in the final analysis, as an opening within which some synthesis of rationalism and reflectivism, of conservatism and progressivism, might be built.

Switch-Sides Good

Switch-sides debate prevents one-sided partisan politics by educating its participants in both sides of an issue

Mary Dietz, Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota, 2000, Political Theory and Partisan Politics p. 117-8

Against this Vaclavian politics of truth, Ash deploys the alternative formulation of "working in half-truth" in order to distinguish "the professional party politician's job" from the intellectual's, especially as it is "reflected, crucially, in a different use of language" (1995, 35). Here he amplifies what it means to work in the language of half-truth: If a politician gives a partial, one-sided, indeed self-censored account of a particular issue, he [or she] is simply doing his [or her] job. And if he [or she] manages to "sell" the part as the whole then he [or she] is doing his [or her] job effectively.... If an intellectual does that, he [or she] is not doing his [or her] job; he [or she] has failed in it. (1995, 36) Ash is anxious to insist that he is not casting the intellectual as "the guardian or high priest of some metaphysical, ideological or pseudo-scientific Truth with a capital T" (1995, 36). Thus, the difference between the role of intellectual and the role of the politician is not equivalent in any easy way to the epistemological divide between absolute Truth and relativism, or the metaphysical divide between objective reality and subjective experience. Whatever else they are, Ash's intellectuals are not Platonic philosopher-kings; although from the perspective of Platonic philosophy his politicians are surely sophists and rogues. The divide between Ash's truth-seeking intellectual and his partisan politician has rather more to do with the linguistic and ethical terrain on which they work, and not the upper ether of epistemology and metaphysics. If this terrain is organized along lines of "responsibility," then we might understand the divide between the intellectual and the politician as a matter of assuming, as Ash puts it, "qualitatively different responsibilities for the validity, intellectual coherence and truth" of speech in each of these irreducible domains (Ash 1995, 36, italics mine).

*

Realist scenarios and debates provide the best real world education, waxing philosophical robs us of learning useful things through debate.

Dickson, 2k4 Assistant Prof at Queens Collage, Developing "Real-World Intelligence": Teaching Argumentative Writing through Debate Randi Dickson. English Journal.

The modeling of the debate makes everyone eager to participate. Students seem to enjoy debating, especially as part of a team effort, and they feel empowered by becoming knowledgeable on a subject that the outside world has been debating as well. The experience of speaking from a knowledge base and knowing why one feels as one does is powerful. Students feel grown-up, discussing issues their parents and legislators might discuss and knowing that they are conversant on the subject.

For the next round, I ask each student to come in with one or two current and controversial subjects. We put these on the board, and I take a few minutes to discuss each one and its "debatability"; that is, we quickly brainstorm the pros and cons to make sure it is a viable topic for argument. We then vote on the most popular and intriguing topics. Depending on the size of the class, we usually end up with three or four teams of six to eight members who have chosen a topic. Each group then meets and negotiates the positions. Sometimes students have to be on a side they do not personally agree with, but they learn that the skills involved are still the same and investigating the other position is a way to explore one's personal view.

Switch-Sides Good

Debaters build an extraordinarily complex knowledge base by debating on both sides of an issue
Muir 1993 (Star A. PHILOSOPHY AND RHETORIC, "A Defense of the Ethics of Contemporary Debate," v26, n4, p.288)

They learn to look at a problem from many points of view. As debaters analyze the potential affirmative cases and the potential negative cases, including the possibility of negative counter plans, they begin to realize the complexity of most contemporary problems and to appreciate the worth of a multivalued orientation; as they debate both sides of a proposition under consideration, they learn not only that most problems of contemporary affairs have more than one side but also that even one side of a proposition embodies a considerable range of values.[^]

The comparison between moral education and debate is useful because it contextualizes the process of moral development within an educational setting. Several objections have been raised about the practice of moral education, and these objections have direct relevance to the issue of switch-side debate. A view of debate as a form of moral education can be developed by addressing questions of efficacy, of isolation from the real world, and of relativism. The first issue is one of effectiveness: Do clarification activities achieve the espoused goals? Social coercion and peer pressure, for example, still occur in the group setting, leaving the individual choice of values an indoctrination of sorts.^{^^} Likewise, the focus of clarification exercises is arguably less analytic than expressive, less critical than emotive.^{^^} The expression of individual preferences may be guided by simple reaction rather than by rational criteria. These problems are minimized in the debate setting, especially where advocacy is not aligned with personal belief. Such advocacy requires explicit analysis of values and the decision criteria for evaluating them. In contemporary debate, confronted with a case they believe in, debaters assigned to the negative side have several options: present a morass of arguments to see what arguments "stick," concede the problem and offer a "counterplan" as a better way of solving the problem, or attack the value structure of the affirmative and be more effective in defending a particular hierarchy of values. While the first option is certainly exercised with some frequency, the second and third options are also often used and are of critical importance in the development of cognitive skills associated with moral judgment. For example, in attacking a case that restricts police powers and upholds a personal right to privacy, debaters might question the reasoning of scholars and justices in raising privacy rights to such significant heights (analyzing *Griswold v. Connecticut* and other landmark cases), offer alternative value Structures (social order, drug control), and defend the criteria through which such choices are made (utilitarian vs. deontological premises). Even within the context of a "see what sticks" paradigm, these arguments require debaters to assess and evaluate value structures opposite of their own personal feelings about their right to privacy. Social coercion, or peer pressure to adopt certain value structures, is minimized in such a context because of the competitive pressures. Adopting a value just because everyone else does may be the surest way of losing a debate. A second objection to debate as values clarification, consonant with Ehninger's concerns about gamesmanship, is the separation of the educational process from the real world. A significant concern here is how such learning about morality will be used in the rest of a student's life. Some critics question whether moral school knowledge "may be quite separate from living moral experience in a similar way as proficiency in speaking one's native language generally appears quite separate from the knowledge of formal grammar imparted by school."^{^^} Edelstein discusses two forms of segmentation: division between realms of school knowledge (e.g., history separated from science) and between school and living experience (institutional learning separate from everyday life). Ehninger's point, that debate becomes a pastime, and that application of these skills to solving real problems is diminished if it is viewed as a game, is largely a reflection on institutional segmentation. The melding of different areas of knowledge, however, is a particular benefit of debate, as it addresses topics of considerable importance in a real world setting. Recent college and high school topics include energy policy, prison reform, care for the elderly, trade policy, homelessness, and the right to privacy. These topics are notable because they exceed the knowledge boundaries of particular school subjects, they reach into issues of everyday life, and they are broad enough to force students to address a variety of value appeals. The explosion of "squirrels," or small and specific cases, in the 1960s and 1970s has had the effect of opening up each topic to many different case approaches. National topics are no longer of the one-case variety (as in 1955's "the U.S. should recognize Red China"). On the privacy topic, for example, cases include search and seizure issues, abortion, sexual privacy, tradeoffs with the first amendment, birth control, information privacy, pornography, and obscenity. The multiplicity of issues pays

special dividends for debaters required to defend both sides of many issues because the value criteria change from round to round and evolve over the year. **The development of flexibility in coping with the intertwining of issues is an essential component in the interconnection of knowledge, and is a major rationale for switch-side debate.**

Switchside debate is essential to promoting value tolerance and fairness in the world

Muir 1993 (Star A. PHILOSOPHY AND RHETORIC, "A Defense of the Ethics of Contemporary Debate," v26, n4, p.288)

Switch-side debate is not simply a matter of speaking persuasively or organizing ideas clearly (although it does involve these), but of understanding and mobilizing arguments to make an effective case. Proponents of debating both sides observe that the debaters should prepare the best possible case they can, given the facts and information available to them.^{^^} **This process, at its core, involves critical assessment and evaluation of arguments; it is a process of critical thinking not available with many traditional teaching methods.**^{^^}

^{We must progressively learn to recognize how often the concepts of others are discredited by the concepts we use to justify ourselves to ourselves. We must come to see how often our claims are compelling only when expressed in our own egocentric view. We can do this if we learn the art of using concepts without living in them. This is possible only when the intellectual act of stepping outside of our own systems of belief has become second nature, a routine and ordinary responsibility of everyday living. Neither academic schooling nor socialization has yet addressed this moral responsibility.^{^^} but switch-side debating fosters this type of role playing and generates reasoned moral positions based in part on values of tolerance and fairness. Yes, there may be a dangerous sense of competitive pride that comes with successfully advocating a position against one's own views, and there are ex-debaters who excuse their deceptive practices by saying "I'm just doing my job." Ultimately, however, sound convictions are distinguishable from emphatic convictions by a consideration of all sides of a moral stance. Moral education is not a guaranteed formula for rectitude, but the central tendencies of switch-side debate are in line with convictions built on empathic appreciation for alternative points of view and a reasoned assessment}

of arguments both pro and con. Tolerance, as an alternative to dogmatism, is preferable, not because it invites a relativistic view of the world, but because in a framework of equal access to ideas and equal opportunities for expression, the truth that emerges is more defensible and more justifiable. Morality, an emerging focal point of controversy in late twentieth-century American culture, is fostered rather than hampered by empowering students to form their own moral identity. Contemporary debate, even in the context of a vigorous defense, does have its drawbacks. It tends to overemphasize logic and tactics and to downplay personal feelings; it is by nature competitive, and therefore susceptible to competitive impulses and techniques (such as rapid speaking and a multiplicity of arguments); and it can desensitize debaters to real human problems and needs through continual labeling and discussion of abstract issues on paper. These problems, however, are more than matched

by the conceptual flexibility, empathy, and familiarity with significant issues provided by switch-side debate.

The **values of tolerance and fairness, implicit in the metaphor of debate as game, are idealistic in nature. They have a much greater chance of success, however, in an activity that requires students to examine and understand both sides of an issue.**

^{In his description of debating societies, Robert Louis Stevenson questions the prevalence of unreasoned opinion, and summarizes the judgment furthered in this work: Now, as the rule stands, you are saddled with the side you disapprove, and so you are forced, by regard for your own fame, to argue out, to feel with, to elaborate completely, the case as it stands against yourself; and what a fund of wisdom do you not turn up in this idle digging of the vineyard! How many new difficulties take form before your eyes! how many superannuated arguments cripple finally into limbo, under the glance of your enforced eclecticism! . . . It is as a means of melting down this museum of premature petrifications into living and impressionable soul that we insist on their utility.[^]}

Switch-Sides Good

Switchside debate will help debaters influence voting trends, as they will be better prepared to make important political decisions

Muir 1993 (Star A. PHILOSOPHY AND RHETORIC, "A Defense of the Ethics of Contemporary Debate," v26, n4, p.288)

Debaters can become more involved than uninformed citizens because they know about important issues, and because they know how to find out more information about these issues. Switch-side debating is not

peripheral to this value. **A thorough research effort is guided in large part by the knowledge that both sides of the issues must be covered. Where a particular controversy might involve affirmative research**

among conservative sources, the negative must research the liberal perspective. Where scientific studies predominate in justifying a particular policy, research in cultural studies may be necessary to counter the adoption of the policy. Debating a ban on the teaching of creationism in public schools, for example, forces research on the scientific consensus on evolution, the viability of theological grounds for public policy, and a

consideration of the nature of science itself. **A primary value of switch-side debate, that of encouraging research skills, is fundamentally an attachment to the "real world," and is enhanced by requiring debaters to investigate both sides of an issue. A second response to the charge of segmentation is the proclivity of debaters to become involved in public policy and international affairs. Although the stereotype is that debaters become lawyers, students seeking other professional areas also see value in the skills of debate. Business management, government, politics, international relations, teaching, public policy, and so on, are all significant career options for debaters.** In surveys, ex-debaters frequently

respond that debate was the single most educational activity of their college careers." Most classes provide information, but debate compels the use, assimilation, and evaluation of information that is not required in most classrooms. As one debate alumnus writes: "The lessons learned and the experience gained have been more valuable to me than any other aspect of my formal education." It is no wonder, then, that surveys of Congress and other policy-making institutions reveal a high percentage of ex-debaters.[^] The argument that debate isolates participants from the "real world" is not sustained in practice when debaters, trained in research, organization, strategy, and technique, are consistently effective in integrating these skills into success on the job. Even the specialized jargon required to play the game successfully has benefits in terms of analyzing and understanding society's problems. Consider the terminology of the "disadvantage" against the affirmative's plan: There is a "link" between the plan and some effect, or "impact"; the link can be actions that push us over some "threshold" to an impact, or it can be a "linear" relationship where each increase causes an increase in the impact; the link from the affirmative plan to the impact must be "unique," in that the plan itself is largely responsible for the impact; the affirmative may argue a "turnaround" to the disadvantage, claiming it as an advantage for the plan. Such specialized jargon may separate debate talk from other types of discourse, but the ideas represented here are also significant and useful for analyzing the relative desirability of public policies. There really are threshold and brink issues in evaluating public policies. Though listening to debaters talk is somewhat disconcerting for a lay person, familiarity with these concepts is an essential means of connecting the research they do with the evaluation of options confronting citizens and decision makers in political and social contexts. This familiarity is directly related to the motivation and the ability to get involved in issues and controversies of public importance. A third point about isolation from the real world is that

switchside debate develops habits of the mind and instills a lifelong pattern of critical assessment.

Students who have debated both sides of a topic are better voters, Dell writes, because of "their

habit of analyzing both sides before forming a conclusion."^{^^} O'Neill, Laycock and Scales, responding in part to Roosevelt's indictment,

iterated the basic position in 1931. Skill in the use of facts and inferences available may be gained on either side of a question without regard to convictions. Instruction and practice in debate should give young men this skill. And where these matters are properly handled, stress is not laid on getting the speaker to think *rightly* in regard to the merits of either side of these questions—but to think *accurately* on both sides. Reasons for not taking a position counter to one's beliefs (isolation from the "real world," sophistry) are largely outweighed by the benefit of such mental habits throughout an individual's life. The jargon, strategies, and techniques may be alienating to "outsiders," but they are also paradoxically integrative as well. Playing the game of debate involves certain skills, including research and policy evaluation, that evolve along with a debater's consciousness of the complexities of moral and political dilemmas. This conceptual development is a basis for the formation of ideas and relational thinking necessary for effective public decision making, making even the game of debate a significant benefit in solving real world problems. A final indictment of values clarification education is that it encourages relativism. Stewart, for example, sees value clarification as individualistic, personal, and situational. He also characterizes values clarification as possessing a hidden set of values (an absolute relativism) that includes purposefulness, strong beliefs, and thoughtfulness, among others. This "hidden curriculum" of values clarification formulates responses to situations while decrying such pre-judgment. In obvious ways, switch-side debate illustrates the same dilemma: No one value is seen as correct and unassailable, yet certain values get placed above others as a matter of procedure. Both features need to be explicitly addressed since both reflect directly on debate as a tool of moral pedagogy.

The first response to the charge of relativism is that switch-side debate respects the existence of divergent beliefs, but focuses attention on assessing the validity of opposing belief systems. Scriven argues that

the "confusion of *pluralism*, of the proper tolerance for diversity of ideas, with *relativism*—the doctrine that there are no right and wrong answers in ethics or religion—is perhaps the most serious ideological barrier to the implementation of moral education today. The process of ethical inquiry is central to such moral education, but the allowance of just any position is not. Here is where cognitive-development diverges from the formal aims of values clarification. Where clarification ostensibly allows any value position, cognitive-development progresses from individualism to social conformity to social contract theory to universal ethical principles. A pluralistic pedagogy does not imply that all views are acceptable: It is morally and pedagogically correct to teach about ethics, and the skills of moral analysis rather than doctrine, and to set out the arguments for and against tolerance and pluralism. All of this is undone if you also imply that all the various incompatible views about abortion or pornography or war are equally right, or likely

to be right, or deserving of respect. Pluralism requires respecting the right to hold divergent beliefs; it implies neither tolerance of actions based on those beliefs nor respecting the content of the beliefs. **The**

role of switch-side debate is especially important in the oral defense of arguments that foster tolerance without accruing the moral complications of acting on such beliefs. The forum is therefore unique in providing debaters with attitudes of tolerance without committing them to active moral irresponsibility. As Freeley notes, debaters are indeed exposed to a multivalued world, both within and between the sides of a given topic. Yet this exposure

hardly commits them to such "mistaken" values. In this view, the divorce of the game from the "real world" can be seen as a means of gaining perspective without obligating students to validate their hypothetical value structure through immoral actions.^s Values clarification, Stewart is correct in pointing out, does not mean that no values are developed. Two very important values—tolerance and fairness—inhire to a significant degree in the ethics of switch-side debate. A second point about the charge of relativism is that tolerance is related to the development of reasoned

Switch-Sides Good (Muir 2/2)

moral viewpoints. The willingness to recognize the existence of other views, and to grant alternative positions a degree of credibility, is a value fostered by switch-side debate: **Alternately debating both sides of the same question . . . inculcates a deep-seated attitude of tolerance toward differing points of view. To be forced to debate only one side leads to an ego-identification with that side. . . . The other side in contrast is seen only as something to be discredited. Arguing as persuasively as one can for completely opposing views is one way of giving recognition to the idea that a strong case can generally be made for the views of earnest and intelligent men, however such views may clash with one's own. . . .Promoting this kind of tolerance is perhaps one of the greatest benefits debating both sides has to offer.** 5'

The activity should encourage debating both sides of a topic, reasons Thompson, because **debaters are "more likely to realize that propositions are bilateral. It is those who fail to recognize this fact who become intolerant, dogmatic, and bigoted."***"

While Theodore Roosevelt can hardly be said to be advocating bigotry, his efforts to turn out advocates convinced of their rightness is not a position imbued with tolerance.

At a societal level, the value of tolerance is more conducive to a fair and open assessment of competing ideas. John Stuart Mill eloquently states the case this way: Complete liberty of contradicting and disproving our opinion is the very condition which justifies us in assuming its truth for purposes of action; and on no other terms can a being with human faculties have any rational assurance of being right. . . . the peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is, that it is robbing the human race. . . . If the opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth; if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier impression of the truth, produced by its collision with error."* At an individual level, tolerance is related to moral identity via empathic and critical assessments of differing perspectives. Paul posits a strong relationship between tolerance, empathy, and critical thought. Discussing the function of argument in everyday life, he observes that in order to overcome natural tendencies to reason egocentrically and sociocentrically, individuals must gain the capacity to engage in self-reflective questioning, to reason dialogically and dialectically. and to "reconstruct alien and opposing belief systems empathically."*

Our system of beliefs is, by definition, irrational when we are incapable of abandoning a belief for rational reasons; that is, when we egocentrically associate our beliefs with our own integrity. Paul describes an intimate relationship between private inferential habits, moral practices, and the nature of argumentation. Critical thought and moral identity, he urges, must be predicated on discovering the insights of opposing views and the weaknesses of our own beliefs. Role playing, he reasons, is a central element of any effort to gain such insight. Only an activity that requires the defense of both sides of an issue, moving beyond acknowledgement

to exploration and advocacy, can engender such powerful role playing. Redding explains that **"debating both sides is a special instance of role-**

playing," "where debaters are forced to empathize on a constant basis with a position contrary to their own. This role playing, Baird agrees, is an exercise in reflective thinking, an engagement in problem solving that exposes weaknesses and strengths,"** Motivated by the knowledge that they may debate against their own case, debaters

constantly pose arguments and counter-arguments for discussion, erecting defenses and then challenging these defenses with a different tact."* Such conceptual flexibility, Paul argues, is essential for effective

critical thinking, and in turn for the development of a reasoned moral identity. A final point about relativism is that **switch-side debate encourages fairness and equality of opportunity in evaluating competing values.** Initially, it is apparent that *a priori* fairness is a fundamental aspect of games and

gamesmanship."* Players in the game should start out with equal advantage, and the rules should be construed throughout to provide no undue advantage to one side or the other. Both sides, notes Thompson, should have an equal amount of time and a fair chance to present their arguments. Of critical importance, he insists, is an equality of opportunity."* Equality of opportunity is manifest throughout many debate procedures and norms. On the question of topicality—whether the affirmative plan is an example of the stated topic—the issue of "fair ground" for debate is explicitly developed as a criterion for decision. Likewise, when a counterplan is offered against an affirmative plan, the issue of coexistence, or of the "competitiveness" of the plans, frequently turns on the fairness of the affirmative team's suggested "permutation" of the plans. In these and other issues, the value of fairness, and of equality of opportunity, is highlighted and clarified through constant disputation.

The point is simply that debate does teach values, and that these values are instrumental in providing a hearing for alternative points of view. Paying explicit attention to decision criteria, and to the division of ground arguments (a function of competition), effectively renders the value structure pluralistic, rather than relativistic. In a tolerant context, convictions can still be formed regarding the appropriateness and utility of differing values. Responding to the charge that switch-side debaters are hypocritical and sophistical, Windes responds with a series of propositions:

Sound conviction depends upon a thorough understanding of the controversial problem under consideration. . . . This thorough understanding of the problem depends upon careful analysis of the issues and survey of the major arguments and supporting evidence. . . . This measured analysis and examination of the evidence and argument can best be done by the careful testing of each argument pro and con. . . . The learner's sound conviction covering controversial questions [therefore] depends partly upon his experience in defending and/or rejecting tentative affirmative and negative positions."** Sound conviction, a key element of an individual's moral identity, is thus closely linked to a reasoned assessment of both sides. Some have even suggested that it would be immoral not to require debaters

to defend both sides of the issues."* It does seem hypocritical to accept the basic premise of debate, that two opposing accounts are present on everything, and then to allow students the comfort of their own untested convictions. Debate might be rendering students a disservice, insofar as moral education is concerned, if it did not provide them some knowledge of alternative views and the concomitant strength of a reasoned moral conviction. Conclusion Modern debate. Murphy insists, "is not dialectical; it is rhetorical; it appeals for judgment, for acceptance."* Debate, he recalls, has traditionally been associated with conviction, rather than with dialectical exercise. Ehninger argues that the emphasis on technique fragments the whole of a properly unified rhetorical process. Techniques become ends in themselves, and represent a "partialism that is as dangerous as it is fruitless."* Plato charges that making the weaker argument the stronger is a corrupt form of rhetorical training and that seeking a higher truth is a transcendent value. To these perspectives, treating debate as a game perverts the educational process by encouraging the development of a "situational morality."

Firm moral commitment to a value system, however, along with a sense of moral identity, is founded in reflexive assessments of multiple perspectives.

Personal Beliefs Bad

Attempting to count personal beliefs as evidence makes deliberation impossible; the nature of “personal belief” is to be insulated from persuasion by the privilege of individual subjectivity.

Thomas A. Spragens, Professor of Polisci at Duke, 2000, Political Theory and Partisan Politics p. 90

I have argued here that a well-ordered democratic society comprises three layers or modes of association among its citizenry.

The first is the political marketplace of free exchange and contractual agreements among individuals on the basis of mutual interest. The second is the juridical mode of association in which the democratic citizenry seeks to establish norms of social justice and to allocate the benefits and burdens of their common life in accord with them. And the last mode of association is that of civic friendship, in which the democratic citizenry seeks to know and to attain together a humanly good life of its members. Each of these modes of

association, I have argued, deploys a distinctive mode of rationality: instrumental, deontological, and practical respectively. And in the case of the last two of these, the logic of moral

discourse functions to compel a focus on transsubjective principles and norms of behavior, thereby simultaneously compelling the various participants in the public dialogue to transcend their idiosyncratic interests, identities, and viewpoints. Absent this feat of partial and imperfect transcendence of unadorned and unmediated partisanship, I have suggested, a democratic society will begin to succumb to the logic of mutual predation limned for us so memorably by Thomas Hobbes. This argument carries with it, it seems to me, implications

both for democratic practice and for the vocation of political theory. A democratic society, it suggests, needs to nurture what John Rawls has called the "moral powers" and their attendant passions: the devotion to justice and the desire to pursue a humanly good life. It should nurture as well the intellectual virtues that are necessary to render these passions effectual: the powers of the sympathetic imagination and the capacity to consider and assess public policy in a dialogic and rationally disciplined fashion. And it should bolster wherever and however possible those practices and institutions that foster the most broad based public dialogue possible and that force political partisans to perform those feats of partial transcendence which are required of all those who would participate in this form of discourse. *

While rationality may not be perfect, resorting to personal belief as a guide to politics collapses into blind partisanship

Edwin Bryan Portis, Professor Political Science at Texas A&M, 2000, Political Theory and Partisan Politics p. 2

Moral commitment, on the other hand, is not always so readily compromised. Even bargaining with like-minded counterparts of good faith can be difficult, but bargaining with the morally corrupt, dissolute, or obtuse is sordid business. And irrespective of the sincerity with which proponents of divergent moral views attempt to find some way to live together in peace, they ultimately must be committed to changing one another's minds about what is proper and necessary. That is to say, they must be so committed if politics is to be based on fixed moral commitment to human needs.

It is certainly possible for groups with divergent moral commitments, or even religious beliefs, to be unconcerned with one another's priorities and practices, and this mutual indifference undoubtedly facilitates bargaining and accommodation. But this is simply another form of interest (or pseudo) politics, one in which the interests of each self interested group are determined by a

common creed or identity rather than personal advantage. Moral or ideological dispute can be deliberative only if the contestants are convinced they might prevail through public discussion and argument, that minds might be changed. This conviction makes sense if the contestants agree on fundamentals and see themselves divided primarily by matters of interpretation and implementation.

We suspect that to some degree this is usually the case. Even the word partisanship, while denoting divisiveness, implies a whole of which the partisan is part, and this implication may be the source of the negative connotations the word "partisanship" carries with it. To the extent that this is so, the fact that contestants share a larger consensus compels them to consider the costs to the "whole" of unrestrained struggle, as well as consider the political costs to themselves of appearing too partisan. More important in the present context, disputants who see themselves as differing primarily in matters of interpretation are more likely to think that they can convince one another's supporters of the error of their ways and that they themselves might be mistaken. Moreover, they are likely to be justified in these assessments

because a common framework provides criteria by which coherence might be assessed and alternative positions evaluated. In the absence of agreement on fundamentals, however,

ideological partisanship can be displaced by deliberation only if theoretical differences are in principle resolvable through rational discussion. Otherwise, each internally consistent theoretical system would rest upon its own supposedly self-evident conceptual axioms, impervious to criticism

based on rival doctrines. Of course, if there were a set of truly self-evident conceptual premises, this situation would rarely arise, for there would be consensus on fundamentals. Yet it is the rare political theorist who believes that the basic concepts of political thought are self-evident, and not many defend the possibility that rational discussion could establish a rational consensus on fundamental concepts. Indeed, an influential thesis concerning the nature of interpretation in political theory holds that disputes over the meaning of fundamental

concepts are theoretically irresolvable: Such concepts are not simply controversial; they are "essentially contested." As this postulate was first articulated by W. B.

Gallie (1962), it is the normative nature of complex concepts such as "freedom" or "democracy" that inevitably

renders their meaning irredeemingly controversial. As normative concepts, their application is by definition

appraisive, and real world instances are valued achievements. As complex concepts, however, they contain a number of elements that contribute to these valued achievements, and the relative weight of each element's contribution, and therefore its importance in the definition of the concept, cannot be conclusively established by rational means. As a

result, their meaning will always be contested, and the contest must be to some extent political because one position is not necessarily more rational than another.

Speed Good

Rapid delivery of argument creates an avenue for identification – shorthand stories create more effective communication

Holly Doremus, Professor of law at UC Davis, Winter 2000 [57 Wash & Lee L. Rev. 11]

A. Telling Political Stories **It is not difficult to understand why the complex strands of each of the three discourses of nature have been reduced in the political context to a handful of shorthand stories. In the political arena, the most nuanced discourse tends to be simplified in this way. Political argument is better suited to soundbite-sized stories, brief accounts that evoke striking images intended to communicate larger points, than to multifaceted discussion.**

[*42] It is easy to condemn the tendency of political debate to simplify arguments. Political rhetoric certainly can camouflage complexity, encourage people to overlook important principles, and distort issues. n191 Sound-bites can substitute for, or even obscure, principled analysis. But **these brief stories can also serve a valuable, and valid, political function. Stories, particularly familiar ones, are well suited to quick, effective communication.** Every teacher knows the power of a good rhetorical image to communicate a subtle concept. Stories also can invoke intuitions that may otherwise be overlooked because they are not readily accessible through reason alone. n192 Furthermore, **the emotional power of stories can spur listeners to action in ways that abstract rational argument, no matter how logically compelling, typically does not.** n193

Accelerated speaking speed is more persuasive than not – it gives the illusion of expertise and past knowledge of the topic at hand

Underwood, Prof of Communication Studies, 2k1 (Psychology of Communication,
<http://www.cultsock.ndirect.co.uk/MUHome/cshtml/psy/hovland3.html>)

You might think, as I would, **that the communicator should decrease speed in order to be persuasive, especially if dealing with a complex topic. However, the research shows that an increase in speed is likely to be more persuasive - anything up to 50% faster**, in fact! **This probably connects with the notion of 'expertise'. If a communicator can speak fast about a complex issue, then they must know what they're talking about.** It also has the advantage of shutting other people out, denying them the opportunity to interrupt before you've finished what you have to say. It's not necessarily as simple as that, though, since a range of variables have to be taken into account. I, for example, tend to be put off by suits, so someone wearing a suit and talking fast might well be dismissed by me as merely 'slick' rather than 'expert'. Speaking fast can be helpful if you're arguments are weak, because it doesn't give your audience time for cognitive processing of your arguments. However, if you have strong arguments, it can be useful to slow down precisely in order to allow cognitive processing to take place.

Lacan I/L Turn

Kritikal arguments are fascinated with the symbolic castration, the way that the law steals the enjoyment of justice or of change. It is necessary to realize that this surplus enjoyment can never be returned, a critically inclusive framework is just another example of a facile attempt to retrieve this enjoyment which will inevitably fail.

Carlson 99, Professor of Law at Cardozo, (David Grey, "Review: Duellism in Modern American Jurisprudence", Colombia Law Review v. 99)

In his disenchantment with reason, Schlag has written that, just because lawyers pursue their profession "does not establish whether liberal categories such as 'individual rights' are on the order of rocks, trees, dollar bills, rubles, words, advertising images, or angels."⁶⁹ Within the gross and scope of this ontic spectrum, rocks and trees are trenchantly existential. They can be felt. Dollars are perhaps less so, on most measures of the money supply, but rubles, words, advertising images, angels and liberal category drift into the realm of "ontological entities"⁷⁰ mere figments of the imagination. These latter items do not "exist." Perception mediated by thought is not to be trusted. Law's defect, then, is that, like Macbeth's dagger, it is insensible to feeling. Law is nothing but thought. Thought (mediation) does not exist, and neither does law.⁷¹ Tangibility immediacy of intuition is, I infer, Schlag's criterion of epistemic certainty. What is tangible does not rely on language for its integrity.⁷² Tangibility transcends the legal order. It is quite a legal and for this very reason valid.⁷³ Such a criterion of reality means that, in the end, Schlag's program is a romantic one. Law has deprived the subject of its jouissance. If law would kindly step aside, the subject could enjoy an immediate restitution of its lost parts a unity that would be certified by feeling. Therefore, justice supposedly demands that law abolish itself so that the concrete subject in its negative freedom can be guided by its natural, uncomplicated dimension by feeling towards wholeness.⁷⁴ But for law, the subject could enjoy itself all the time.⁷⁵ Now law's restriction of enjoyment is nowhere explicitly stated in Schlag's work. Yet I maintain it is the very point de capiton that underlies it all.⁷⁶ It is part and parcel of the charge that law has stolen the phallus and will not give it back. Subjective feeling the pain of castration tells the subject that he has lost the phallus. It is feeling that underwrites the tangibility of this withheld object the surplus enjoyment held back by law. This nostalgia for tangibility⁷⁷ is reflected in Schlag's harsh condemnation of reason tangibility's great competitor. For empirical, historically situated selves, reason is a trick, says Schlag.⁷⁸ Indeed, reason is simply passion disguised, but an illegitimate passion: "[L]iberalism depends upon a demonstration that it can be the outcome of reasoned choice by those who are ruled. It is thus ironic that the addressee of liberal justification is systematically frightened, shamed, seduced, and romanced into acquiescence."⁷⁹

Critique Good – Long Shell

The traditional framework of policy debate assumes that discourse is a neutral medium through which thoughts are transmitted. This whitewashes the fact that discourses are produced such that they define what can and cannot be said through a violent process of control and exclusion

Roland Bleiker, "Forget IR Theory," *Alternatives*; 1997

The doorkeepers of IR are those who, knowingly or unknowingly, make sure that the discipline's discursive boundaries remain intact. Discourses, in a Foucaultian sense, are subtle mechanisms that frame our thinking process. They determine the limits of what can be thought, talked, and written of in a normal and rational way. In every society the production of discourses is controlled, selected, organized, and diffused by certain procedures. They create systems of exclusion that elevate one group of discourses to a hegemonic status while condemning others to exile. Although the boundaries of discourses change, at times gradually, at times abruptly, they maintain a certain unity across time, a unity that dominates and transgresses individual authors, texts, or social practices. They explain, to return to Nietzsche, why "all things that live long are gradually so saturated with reason that their origin in unreason thereby becomes improbable."²⁸ Academic disciplines are powerful mechanisms to direct and control the production and diffusion of discourses. They establish the rules of intellectual exchange and define the methods, techniques, and instruments that are considered proper for the pursuit of knowledge. Within these margins, each discipline recognizes true and false propositions based on the standards of evaluation it established to assess them.²⁹ <63-64>

The procedural language of traditional framework arguments searches unceasingly for the capital-T Truth which purges the world of difference deemed irreducible to Identity.

Roland Bleiker, 2000. (Professor of International Relations Harvard and Cambridge, Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics, Cambridge University Press, 2000. p. 227-29)

The domain of global politics contains an unlimited number of terrains that offer possibilities for linguistic forms of dissent to interfere with the course of transversal struggles. Before scrutinising a particular, linguistically based site of transversal dissent (the subject of the subsequent chapter), it is necessary to theorise in more detail how the written word offers opportunities to engender human agency. For this purpose an engagement with the work of Theodor Adorno is useful, particularly with his reading of Nietzsche. Adorno is ideally suited for this task because he epitomises both the strengths and dangers of writing dissent. Adorno's approach to language emerges out of opposition to what he calls identity thinking. 'To think,' he claims, 'is to identify.' ³⁷ It is a process through which we try to understand the bewildering world that surrounds us. Thinking expresses a will to truth, a desire to control and impose order upon random and idiosyncratic events. When we think we identify choices, privilege one interpretation over others, and, often without knowing it, exclude what does not fit into the way we want to see things. There is no escape from the subjective dimension of thought, no possibility of extracting pure facts from observation. Thinking cannot be done without language. And language, of course, has always already established a preconceived conceptual order prior to what thinking is trying to understand. ³⁸ In fact, Adorno even claims that before dealing with specific speech contents, languages mould a thought such that it gets drawn into subordination even where it appears to resist this tendency. ³⁹ Identity thinking, he points out, is the form of thinking that ignores these unavoidable socio-linguistic restraints. It embarks on a fatal search for essences, seeks to extract the general out of the particular and thus forces unique things into an artificial unitary system of thought. But thinking, Adorno claims, is not only obeying the power of language and discourse. Thinking also contains critical potential, for it is in itself already a process of negating, of resisting what is forced upon it. ⁴⁰ Stretching the boundaries of language games, engaging in *Sprachkritik*, is the key to realising this potential. It permits us to break loose from the

claws of the established order and to venture beyond the givenness of life. Adorno's conceptual starting point for this journey is negative dialectics, the refusal to subsume the particular under the general. This entails creating thinking space without succumbing to the temptation of searching for a Hegelean synthesis, a new totalising and exclusionary system of thought that would drift us back into the dangerous waters of identity thinking. Negative dialectics is the constant awareness of non-identity. It refuses to rely upon a preconceived standpoint. It rescues and develops what does not fit into prevailing totalising practices or what may emerge as a potential alternative to them.⁴¹ Adorno tries to open up such thinking spaces through a critique of language that calls for a radical departure from both the traditional usage of concepts and the style in which they are presented.

Identity-thinking culminates in violence against the Other

Connolly in 2k2 (William, Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science @ Johns Hopkins University, Identity/Difference, expanded edition)

Here in a nutshell is the thesis of this study: to confess a. particular identity is also to belong to difference. To come to terms affirmatively with the complexity of that connection is to support an ethos of identity and difference suitable to a democratic culture of deep pluralism. A few more things can be said to unpack that thesis, and I proceed by reviewing, refining, and augmenting a few formulations.

An identity is established in relation to a series of differences that have become socially recognized. These differences are essential to its being. If they did not coexist as differences, it would not exist in its distinctness and solidity. Entrenched in this indispensable relation is a second set of tendencies. . . to congeal established identities into fixed forms, thought and lived as if their structure expressed the true order of things.... Identity requires difference in order to be, and it converts difference into otherness in order to secure its own self-certainty.

(Identity/Difference, 64)

Identity is relational and collective. My personal identity is defined through the collective constituencies with which I identify or am identified by others (as white, male, American, a sports fan, and so on); it is further specified by comparison to a variety of things I am not. Identity, then, is always connected to a series of differences that help it be what it is. The initial tendency is to describe the differences on which you depend in a way that gives privilege or priority to you. Jews, said Kant, are legalistic; that definition allowed him to define Kantian-Christian morality as a more spiritual orientation to duties and rights. Atheists, said Tocqueville, are restless, egoistic, and amoral, lacking the spiritual source of morality upon which stability, trustworthiness, and care for others are anchored. That definition allowed him to honor the American passion to exclude professed atheists from public office. Built into the dynamic of identity is a polemical temptation to translate differences through which it is specified into moral failings or abnormalities. The pursuit of identity feeds the polemicism Foucault describes in the epigraph at the beginning of this essay. You need identity to act and to be ethical, but there is a drive to diminish difference to complete itself inside the pursuit of identity. There is thus a paradoxical element in the politics of identity. It is not an airtight paradox conforming to a textbook example in logic, but a social paradox that might be negotiated. It operates as pressure to make space for the fullness of self-identity for one constituency by marginalizing, demeaning, or excluding the differences on which it depends to specify itself. The depth grammar of a political theory is shaped, first, by the way in which it either acknowledges or suppresses this paradox, and, second, by whether it negotiates it pluralistically or translates it into an aggressive politics of exclusive universality. Traditionally, the first problem of evil is the question of how a benevolent, omnipotent God could allow intense suffering in the world. Typically, the answer involves attribution of free will to humans to engender a gap between the creative power of the God and the behavior of humanity. What I call in this book "the second problem of evil" flows from the social logic of identity/difference relations. It is the proclivity to marginalize or demonize difference to sanctify the identity you confess.

Intensifying the second problem of evil is the fact that we also experience the source of morality through our most heartfelt experiences of identity. How could someone be moral, many believers say, without belief in free will and God? How could a morally responsible agent, others say, criticize the Enlightenment, the very achievement that grounds the moral disposition they profess? Don't they presuppose the very basis they criticize? <XIV-XV>

Critique solves—disruption of the status quo frees theory from the constraints of fact-sorting and opens thought to methodological pluralism.

Bleiker, 00 Ph.D. visiting research and teaching affiliations at Harvard, Cambridge, Humboldt, Tampere, Yonsei and Pusan National University as well as the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology and the Institute of Social Studies in The Hague, (Roland, Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics, Cambridge University Press)

What follows may thus be called '**disruptive writing**', a process that Shapiro describes **as tackling an issue not by way of well-rehearsed debates, but through an alternative set of texts and narratives**.⁴⁶ My analysis juxtaposes familiar images of agency in global politics, such as the collapse of the Berlin Wall, with relatively unusual sites of investigation, such as Renaissance perceptions of dissent or contemporary poetics. **The objective of this disruptive process is not to declare alternative forms of knowledge true or even superior, but to reveal what has been discussed above: that the nature of international relations is intrinsically linked to the stories that are being told about it, and that an unsettling of these stories has the potential to redirect the theory and practice of global politics.**

Disruptive writing disturbs. It inevitably creates anxieties. Max Horkheimer observed half a century ago that **widespread hostility emerges as soon as theorists fail to limit themselves to verifying facts and ordering them into familiar categories** — categories which are indispensable for the sustenance of entrenched forms of life.⁴⁷ Likewise, **a disruptive reading of agency in global politics will not be met with uniform approval. There are those who are concerned with maintaining the proper epistemological boundaries of a coherent and self-contained discipline.** Jack Levy, for instance, defends a distinct separation between the work of historians and international relations scholars. The former, he points out, use theory 'primarily to structure their interpretations of particular events'. The latter, by contrast, are political scientists whose task is to 'formulate and test general theoretical propositions about relationships between variables and classes of events'.⁴⁸ **Ensuing methodological principles, which are strongly influenced by a positivist understanding of social dynamics, have often been discussed in the context of the level of analysis problem. That is, they have been evoked to determine what is and is not a proper subject-study of international relations.** Barry Buzan convincingly points out that such approaches, which have become particularly influential in North American academia, fail to see that there are two different issues at stake. **On one side are ontological questions that have to do with determining the proper units of analysis (individuals, state, system, etc.), and on the other side are epistemological questions that concern the proper research method, the manner in which one explains the units' behaviour.**⁴⁹ By combining these two forms of delineating theoretical and analytical activities, the discipline of international relations has turned into a rather narrowly sketched field of inquiry. **A focus that is all too often confined to states and systemic factors is further restricted by limits imposed on the types of knowledge that are considered legitimate to understand global politics.** Consider how a group of highly influential scholars argue that the objective of proper research is 'to learn facts about the world' and that all hypotheses about them 'need to be evaluated empirically before they can make a contribution to knowledge'.⁵⁰ **As soon as these epistemological boundaries are transgressed, anxieties emerge and defensive mechanisms become operative. The warning against such transgressions is loud and clear: 'A proposed topic that cannot be refined into a specific research project permitting valid descriptive or causal inference should be modified along the way or abandoned.'**⁵¹ **A disruptive reading and writing of the agency** problematique in international theory **combines a commitment to methodological pluralism with an interdisciplinary and multi-layered understanding of transversal struggles.** International relations, then, is to be treated primarily as a broadly sketched theme of inquiry, rather than a disciplinary set of rules that determine where to locate and how to study global politics.

Gazing beyond the boundaries of disciplinary knowledge is necessary to open up questions of transversal dissent and human agency. Academic disciplines, by virtue of what they are, discipline the production and diffusion of knowledge. They establish the rules of intellectual

exchange and define the methods, techniques and instruments that are considered proper for this purpose. Such conventions not only suggest on what ground things can be studied legitimately, but also decide what issues are worthwhile to be assessed in the first place.

Critique Good – Short Shell

The traditional framework of policy debate assumes that discourse is a neutral medium through which thoughts are transmitted. This whitewashes the fact that discourses are produced such that they define what can and cannot be said through a violent process of control and exclusion

Roland Bleiker, “Forget IR Theory,” *Alternatives*; 1997

The doorkeepers of IR are those who, knowingly or unknowingly, **make sure that the discipline’s discursive boundaries remain intact. Discourses, in a Foucaultian sense, are subtle mechanisms that frame our thinking process. They determine the limits of what can be thought, talked, and written of in a normal and rational way. In every society the production of discourses is controlled, selected, organized, and diffused by certain procedures. They create systems of exclusion that elevate one group of discourses to a hegemonic status while condemning others to exile.** Although the boundaries of discourses change, at times gradually, at times abruptly, they maintain a certain unity across time, a unity that dominates and transgresses individual authors, texts, or social practices. **They explain, to return to Nietzsche, why “all things that live long are gradually so saturated with reason that their origin in unreason thereby becomes improbable.”²⁸ Academic disciplines are powerful mechanisms to direct and control the production and diffusion of discourses. They establish the rules of intellectual exchange and define the methods, techniques, and instruments that are considered proper for the pursuit of knowledge. Within these margins, each discipline recognizes true and false propositions based on the standards of evaluation it established to assess them.²⁹ <63-64>**

Critique solves - Dissent at the epistemological and ontological level runs through the discursive cracks of hegemony to the heart of social change.

Bleiker, 00 Ph.D. visiting research and teaching affiliations at Harvard, Cambridge, Humboldt, Tampere, Yonsei and Pusan National University as well as the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology and the Institute of Social Studies in The Hague, (Roland, *Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics*, Cambridge University Press)

This chapter has mapped out some of the discursive terrains in which transversal dissent takes place. **Discourses are not invincible monolithic forces that subsume everything in reach. Despite their power to frame social practices, a discursively entrenched hegemonic order can be fragmented and thin at times. To excavate the possibilities for dissent that linger in these cracks, a shift of foci from epistemological to ontological issues is necessary.** Scrutinising the level of Being reveals how individuals can escape aspects of hegemony. Dasein, the existential awareness of Being, always already contains the potential to become something else than what it is. By shifting back and forth between hyphenated identities, an individual can travel across various discursive fields of power and gain the critical insight necessary to escape at least some aspect of the prevailing order.

Transversal practices of dissent that issue from such mobile subjectivities operate at the level of dailiness. Through a range of seemingly mundane acts of resistance, people can gradually transform societal values and thus promote powerful processes of social change. These transformations are not limited to existing boundaries of sovereignty. The power of discursive practices is not circumscribed by some ultimate spatial delineation, and neither are the practices of dissent that interfere with them. At a time when the flow of capital and information is increasingly trans-territorial, the sphere of everyday life has become an integral aspect of global politics — one that deserves the attention of scholars who devote themselves to the analysis of international relations. The remaining chapters seek to sustain this claim and, in doing so, articulate a viable and non-essentialist concept of human agency.

****Epistemology/Methodology**

Epistemology First

Epistemology comes first- The question of action must take a backseat to questions of policy formation and assumptions surrounding problem-solving techniques.

Owen 02, Reader in Political Theory at the University of Southampton (David, “Reorienting International Relations: On Pragmatism, Pluralism and Practical Reasoning”, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 31, No. 3, <http://mil.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/31/3/653>)

The first dimension concerns the relationship between positivist IR theory and postmodernist IR ‘theory’ (and the examples illustrate the claims concerning pluralism and factionalism made in the introduction to this section). It is exhibited when we read Walt warning of the danger of postmodernism as a kind of theoretical decadence since ‘issues of peace and war are too important for the field [of IR] to be diverted into a prolix and self-indulgent discourse that is divorced from the real world’,¹² or find Keohane asserting sniffily that Neither neorealist nor neoliberal institutionalists are content with interpreting texts: both sets of theorists believe that there is an international political reality that can be partly understood, even if it will always remain to some extent veiled.¹³ **We should be wary of such denunciations precisely because the issue at stake for the practitioners of this ‘prolix and self-indulgent discourse’ is the picturing of international politics and the implications of this picturing for the epistemic and ethical framing of the discipline**, namely, the constitution of what phenomena are appropriate objects of theoretical or other forms of enquiry. **The kind of accounts provided by practitioners of this type are not competing theories** (hence Keohane’s complaint) **but conceptual reproblematisations of the background that informs theory construction, namely, the distinctions, concepts, assumptions, inferences and assertability warrants that are taken for granted in** the course of the **debate** between, for example, neorealists and neoliberal institutionalists (hence the point-missing character of Keohane’s complaint). Thus, for example, Michael Shapiro writes: **The global system of sovereign states has been familiar both structurally and symbolically in the daily acts of imagination through which space and human identity are construed. The persistence of this international imaginary has helped to support the political privilege of sovereignty affiliations and territorialities.** In recent years, however, **a variety of disciplines have offered conceptualizations that challenge the familiar, bordered world of the discourse of international relations.**¹⁴ **The point of these remarks is to call critically into question the background picture** (or, to use another term of art, the horizon) **against which the disciplinary discourse and practices of IR are conducted in order** to make this background itself an object of reflection and evaluation. In a similar vein, Rob Walker argues: **Under the present circumstances the question ‘What is to be done?’ invites a degree of arrogance that is all too visible in the behaviour of the dominant political forces of our time. . . . The most pressing questions of the age call not only for concrete policy options to be offered to existing elites and institutions, but also, and more crucially, for a serious rethinking of the ways in which it is possible for human beings to live together.**¹⁵ The aim of these comments is to draw to our attention the easily forgotten fact that **our existing ways of picturing international politics emerge from, and in relation to, the very practices of international politics with which they are engaged and it is entirely plausible** (on standard Humean grounds) **that, under changing conditions of political activity, these ways of guiding reflection and action may lose their epistemic and/or ethical value such that a deeper interrogation of the terms of international politics is required.** Whether or not one agrees with Walker that this is currently required, it is a perfectly reasonable issue to raise. After all, as Quentin Skinner has recently reminded us, it is remarkably difficult to avoid falling under the spell of our own intellectual heritage. . . . **As we analyse and reflect on our normative concepts, it is easy to become bewitched into believing that the ways of thinking about them bequeathed to us by the mainstream of our intellectual traditions must be the ways of thinking about them.**¹⁶ In this respect, one effect of the kind of challenge posed by

postmodernists like Michael Shapiro and Rob Walker is to prevent us from becoming too readily bewitched.

Epistemology First

The assumption that policymaking occurs in an objective vacuum is false--the preconditions for any communicative exchange include the establishment of some normative framework for evaluation. Their framework arguments only serve to whitewash the value-ladenness of their procedural standards.

Owen 02, Reader in Political Theory at the University of Southampton (David, "Reorienting International Relations: On Pragmatism, Pluralism and Practical Reasoning", Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 31, No. 3, <http://mil.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/31/3/653>)

The third dimension concerns the relationship between positivist IR theory and critical IR theory, where White's distinction enables us to make sense of a related confusion, namely, the confusion between holding that forms of positivist IR theory (e.g., neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism) are necessarily either value-free or evaluative. It does so because we can now see that, although forms of positivist IR theory are not normative theories, they presuppose a background picture which orients our thinking through the framing of not only what can be intelligibly up for grabs as true-or-false (the epistemic framing) but also what can be intelligibly up for grabs as good-or-bad (the ethical framing). As Charles Taylor has argued, a condition of our intelligibility as agents is that we inhabit a moral framework which orients us in ethical space and our practices of epistemic theorising cannot be intelligibly conceived as existing independently of this orientation in thinking.²¹ The confusion in IR theory arises because, on the one hand, positivist IR theory typically suppresses acknowledgement of its own ethical presuppositions under the influence of the scientific model (e.g., Waltz's neorealism and Keohane's neoliberal institutionalism), while, on the other hand, its (radical) critics typically view its ethical characteristics as indicating that there is an evaluative or normative theory hidden, as it were, within the folds of what presents itself as a value-free account. Consequently, both regard the other as, in some sense, producing ideological forms of knowledge; the positivist's claim is that critical IR theory is ideological by virtue of its explicitly normative character, the critical theorist's claim is that positivist IR theory is ideological by virtue of its failure to acknowledge and reflect on its own implicit normative commitments. But this mutual disdain is also a product of the confusion of pictures and theories. Firstly, there is a confusion between pictures and theories combined with the scientific suppression of the ethical presuppositions of IR theory. This finds expression in the thought that we need to get our epistemic account of the world sorted out before we can engage responsibly in ethical judgement about what to do, where such epistemic adequacy requires the construction of a positive theory that can explain the features of the world at issue. An example of this position is provided by Waltz's neorealism.²² Against this first position, we may reasonably point out that epistemic adequacy cannot be intelligibly specified independently of background ethical commitments concerning what matters to us and how it matters to us. Secondly, there is the confusion of pictures and theories combined with the moralist overestimation of the ethical (ideological) commitments of IR theory. This finds expression in the thought that we need to get our ethical account sorted out before we can engage responsibly in epistemic judgement about what to know, where such ethical adequacy requires the construction of a moral theory and, more particularly, a moral ideal that can direct the enterprise of epistemic theorising. An example of this position is provided by Linklater's version of critical IR theory.²³ Against this position, we can reasonably point out that the kind of ethical adequacy required does not entail the construction of a moral ideal but only the existence of some shared ethical judgements concerning what matters to us that orient our epistemic enquiries. The dual confusion in question leads fairly straightforwardly to the thought that what is at stake here are incompatible epistemological commitments and hence that debate between positivist and critical forms of IR theory needs to be conducted at

an epistemological level. However, as my remarks indicate, this thought is mistaken insofar as the apparent incompatibility from which it derives is an illusion.

Ontology First

The cracks which litter the façade of hegemony are ontological and epistemological in character; resistance on the level of the everyday and on thought can make possible new ways of life centered around neither a quest for essence nor the renunciation of subjectivity.

Bleiker, Roland. Co-Director of the University of Queensland's Rotary Centre for International Studies in Peace and Conflict Resolution. Contemporary Political Theory, Volume 2, Number 1, March 2003, pp. 25-47

The above-mentioned **refusal to buy milk bottled in non-reusable glass may help to clarify the suggestion that tactical manifestations of human agency are not bound by spatial dynamics.**

The consumer who changes his/her shopping habits engages in a tactical action that escapes the spatial controlling mechanisms of established political and economic boundaries.

The effect of such a tactical action is not limited to the localized target, say, the supermarket. Over an extended period of time, and in conjunction with similar actions, **such tactical dissent may affect practices of production, trade, investment, advertisement and the like.**

The manifestations that issue from such actions operate along an indeterminate trajectory insofar as they promote a slow transformation of values whose effects transgress places and become visible and effective only by maturation over time. In the case of tactical protest actions of environmentally sensitive consumers, it may still be too early to ascertain a definitive manifestation of human agency. However, various indicators render such an assertion highly likely. Changing attitudes and consumption patterns, including an increasing concern for environmental issues, have produced easily recognizable marketing shifts in most parts of the industrial world. For instance, **health food sections are now a common feature in most supermarkets. And there is empirical evidence that suggests that consumer preferences for costly 'ethical' production technologies can lead to increased competition between producers, which, in turn, may**

gradually increase the level of adoption of such ethical technology (Noe and Rebello, 1995, 69-85). Conclusion The task of articulating a discursive notion of human agency towered at the entrance of this essay and has never ceased to be its main puzzle, a cyclically reoccurring dilemma. How can we understand and conceptualize the processes through which people shape social and political life. Where is this fine line between essentialism and relativism, between suffocating in the narrow grip of totalizing knowledge claims and blindly roaming in a nihilistic world of absences? How to make a clear break with positivist forms of representing the political without either abandoning the concept of human agency or falling back into a new form of essentialism?

Confronting the difficulties that arise with this dualistic dilemma, I have sought to advance a positive concept of human agency that is neither grounded in a stable essence nor dependent upon a presupposed notion of the subject.

The ensuing journey has taken me, painted in very broad strokes, along the following circular trajectory of revealing and concealing: discourses are powerful forms of domination. They frame the parameters of thinking processes. They shape political and social interactions. Yet, discourses are not invincible. They may be thin. They may contain cracks. **By moving the gaze from epistemological to ontological spheres, one can explore ways in which individuals use these cracks to escape aspects of the discursive order.**

To recognize the potential for human agency that opens up as a result of this process, one needs to shift foci again, this time from concerns with Being to an inquiry into tactical behaviours.

Moving between various hyphenated identities, **individuals use ensuing mobile subjectivities to engage in daily acts of dissent, which gradually transform societal values.**

Over an extended period of time, such tactical expressions of human agency gradually transform societal values. **By returning to epistemological levels, one can then conceptualize how these transformed discursive practices engender processes of social change.**

I have used everyday forms of resistance to illustrate how discourses not only frame and subjugate our thoughts and behaviour, but also offer possibilities for human agency. Needless to say, discursive dissent is not the only practice of resistance that can exert human agency. There are many political actions that seek immediate changes in policy or institutional structures, rather than 'mere' shifts in societal consciousness. Although some of these actions undoubtedly achieve results, they are often not as potent as they seem. Or, rather, their enduring effect may well be primarily discursive, rather than institutional. Nietzsche (1982b, 243) already knew that **the greatest events**

'are not our loudest but our stillest hours.' This is why he stressed that the world revolves 'not around the inventors of new noise, but around the inventors of new values.' And this is why, for Foucault too, the crucial site for political investigations are not institutions, even though they are often the place where power is inscribed and crystallized. The fundamental point of anchorage of power relations, Foucault claims, is always located outside institutions, deeply entrenched within the social nexus. Hence, instead of looking at power from the vantage point of institutions, one must analyse institutions from the standpoint of power relations (Foucault, 1982, 219-222). A defence of human agency through a Nietzschean approach does inevitably leave some observers unsatisfied -- desiring a more robust account of what constitutes human actions and their influence on political and social

life. However, a more firm and detailed theory of agency is unlikely to achieve more than essentialize a particular and necessarily subjective viewpoint on the political. Needed, instead, is what William Connolly has termed an ethos of critical responsiveness -- that is, an openness towards the unknown, unseen, unthought and a

Ontology First

[Bleiker Continued]

resulting effort to accept and theorize our limits to cognition (see Connolly, 1995, 154, and for a discussion White, 2000, 106-150). The key, then is to turn this inevitable ambiguity into a positive and enabling force, rather than a threat that needs to be warded off or suppressed at all cost. The present essay has sought to demonstrate how such an attitude towards human agency is possible, and indeed necessary, in both theory and practice. **In the domain of political practice, everyday forms of resistance demonstrate that transformative potential is hidden in the very acceptance of ambiguity. Consider the countless and continuously spreading new social movements, pressure groups and other loose organizations that challenge various aspects of local, national or global governance.** These movements operate in a rather chaotic way. They come and go. They are neither centrally controlled nor do they all seek the same objective. Some operate on the right end of the political spectrum. Others on the left. Some oppose globalization. Others hail it. Some seek more environmental regulations. Others defend neo-liberal free trade. And, **it is precisely through this lack of coherence, control and certainty that the respective resistance movements offer a positive contribution to the political. They are in some sense the quintessential aspect of postmodern politics, of local resistance to metanarrative impositions** (see White, 1991, 10-12; Walker, 1988). They embody what Connolly (1995, 154-155) believes is the key to cultural democratization: a certain level of 'productive ambiguity,' that is, the commitment always to resist 'attempts to allow one side or the other to achieve final victory.' Ensuing forms of human agency, anarchical as they may be, thus generate regular and important public scrutiny and discussion of how norms, values and institutions function. At a theoretical level too, an engagement with human agency needs to accept a certain level of ambiguity. And there too, this ambiguity can be turned into a positive force. A discursive notion of human agency is grounded precisely in the recognition that there is no end to circles of revealing and concealing, of opening and closing spaces to think and act. Revealing is always an act, not something that remains stable. Anything else would suggest a static view of the world, one in which human agency is annihilated, one in which the future can never tear down the boundaries of the present. Just as the interaction of domination and resistance has no end, efforts of coming to terms with them will never arrive at a stage of ultimate insight. One must move back and forth not only between unconnected bodies of literature, but also between theory and practice, abstraction and everydayness, epistemology and ontology, space and time, discursive domination and possibilities for dissent that arise from fissures in them. Each of these sites is crucial. Each offers a unique vantage point, but none of them holds the key to ultimate insight. Indeed, every process of revealing is at the same time a process of concealing. This is to say that by opening up a particular perspective, no matter how insightful it is, one conceals everything that is invisible from this vantage point. One must thus think in circles, move between different insights into the question of human agency, even if these insights are at times incommensurable. Since discursive dissent operates through a constant process of becoming something else than what it is, a theoretical engagement with its dynamics can never be exhaustive. An approach to understanding human agency remains useful only as long as it stays open and resists the temptation of 'digging deeper' by anchoring itself in a newly discovered essence, a stable foundation that could bring order and certainty to a complex and turbulent late modern world.

Ontology First

Ontological critique shows of being that-it-is—and thus that being contains within it the potential to be what it is not. Ontologically, everydayness is a site of political contestation, but traditional, non-discursive analysis of politics renders the everyday existence of human being invisible and thus an illegitimate site for a politics of resistance. Discursive criticism is key to formulate individual subjectivity such that it can resist domination.

Bleiker, 00 Ph.D. visiting research and teaching affiliations at Harvard, Cambridge, Humboldt, Tampere, Yonsei and Pusan National University as well as the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology and the Institute of Social Studies in The Hague, (Roland, Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics, Cambridge University Press)

Discourse is the most central concept in a non-essentialist assessment of human agency. A shift from grand theoretical representations of dissent towards a discursive understanding of power relations is necessary to reach a more adequate understanding of the role that human agency plays in contemporary global politics. **A discursive approach is not only able to deal better with entrenched systems of exclusion, but also minimises the danger of imposing one's own subjective vision upon a series of far more complex social events. Instead of focusing on ahistorical theories of power, a discursive approach investigates how social dynamics have been imbued with meaning and how this process of rendering them rational circumscribes the boundaries within which the transversal interaction between domination and resistance takes place.**

While providing compelling evidence of subtle forms of domination, **a discursive approach may run the risk of leaving us with an image of the world in which the capacity for human agency is all but erased, annihilated by impenetrable discursive forces.**

This risk is particularly acute in a world that is characterised by increasingly heterogeneous and perhaps even elusive cross-territorial dynamics. But recognising these transversal complexities does not necessarily lead into a pessimistic cul de sac. **Discourses, even if they take on global dimensions, are not as**

overarching as some analysts suggest. They contain fissures and cracks, weak points which open up chances to turn discursive dynamics against themselves.

The previous chapter has outlined this position in detail. A brief rehearsal — even at the risk of appearing slightly repetitive — is necessary to provide the prerequisite for an adequate discursive conceptualisation of human agency in global politics. For this purpose **we must, as the prologue has already stressed, seek to see beyond the levels of analysis** **problematique that has come to frame international relations theory. Rather than limiting the study of global politics to specific spheres of inquiry** — those related to the role of states and the restraints imposed on them by the structures of the international system — **an analysis of**

transversal struggles pays attention to various political terrains and the crossterritorial

dynamics through which they are intertwined with each other. One of these terrains is the sphere of dailiness, which is all too often eclipsed by investigations that limit the domain of global politics to more visible sites of transversal struggle, such as wars, diplomatic negotiations, financial flows or trade-patterns. The domain of dailiness, though, is at least as crucial to the conduct of global politics, and an investigation into discursive dynamics illustrates why this the case.

Cracks and weaknesses in globalised discursive practices can be seen best by shifting foci

from epistemological to ontological issues. This is to say that in addition to analysing how discourses mould and control our thinking process, we must scrutinise how individuals, at the level of Being, may or may not be able to escape aspects of the prevalent discursive order.

Being is always a product of discourse. But Being also is becoming. It contains future potential, it is always already that which it is not. Being also has multiple dimensions. Hyphenated identities permit a person to shift viewpoints constantly, to move back and forth between various ways of constituting oneself.

Resulting methods of mental displacement, of situating knowledge, open up possibilities for thinking beyond the narrow confines of the transversally established discursive order. **This thinking space provides the opportunity to redraw the boundaries of identity which control the parameters of actions**

available to an individual. Exploring this thinking space already is action, Heidegger claims, for

'thinking acts insofar as it thinks'. Such action, he continues, is 'the simplest and at the same

time the highest, because it concerns the relation of Being to man'. ³ But how is one to understand processes through which critical thinking breaks through the fog of discourse and gives rise to specific and identifiable expressions of human agency?

The concept of tactic offers the opportunity to take a decisive step towards exploring the practical dimensions of Dasein, the existential awareness of Being, without losing the abstract insight provided by Heidegger. The sphere of dailiness is where such practical theorising is most effective. Entering this ubiquitous sphere compels us to one more shift, away from contemplating the becoming of Being towards investigating specific ways in which individuals employ their mobile

subjectivities to escape discursive forms of domination. The focus now rests on everyday forms of resistance, seemingly mundane daily practices by which people constantly shape and reshape their environment. One can find such forms of resistance in acts like writing, laughing, gossiping, singing, dwelling, shopping or cooking. It is in these spheres that societal values are gradually transformed, preparing the ground for more open manifestations of dissent.

Before drawing attention to the inherently transversal character of everyday activities, it is necessary to point out that the effects they produce cannot be understood by drawing direct links between action and outcome. In this sense, the present

analysis departs fundamentally from the manner in which agency in global politics has come to be theorised. Most approaches to international theory, including the influential constructivist contributions to the structure—agency debate, display a clear 'commitment to causal analysis'.⁴

Policymaking – Link

Traditional policy analysis assumes a separation of subject and object ontologically and epistemologically—the level of the assumption guarantees that positivism and realism have the privilege of defining political normalcy and reality.

Bleiker, 98 asst. prof. of International Studies at Pusan National University (Roland, “Retracing and redrawing the boundaries of events: Postmodern interferences with international theory”, *Alternatives*, Oct-Dec 1998, Vol. 23, Issue 4)

It is in this context that the study of international relations emerged as a coherent academic discipline, in the 1920s in the United Kingdom, to be precise. Ever since then, countless scholars have engaged in relentless disputes about how to comprehend and conduct international politics. Several so-called great debates superseded each other: an interwar opposition between idealism and realism was followed by a postwar methodological tension between behavioralism and traditionalism. More recently, various paradigms have tried to convince each other that they have discovered the key to understanding world politics--among them are pluralism, globalism and neoverions of realism and liberalism.[14]

These disputes in international theory display strong parallels with the modern debates mentioned above: they have been waged fiercely and often emotionally. Everything has come under attack. Seemingly nothing has been spared criticism. And yet, these debates have all been well framed. They have been framed by the urge to impose order upon a complex and elusive modern world. In a recent and illuminating essay, Steve Smith has drawn attention to this framing process. For him, positivism is the common theme that runs through a diverse set of traditional approaches to international theory. Even the debates about methodological issues, he points out, were carried out within a positivist frame because they failed to even touch upon issues of epistemology.[15] Positivism entails not only methodological commitments (propositions about how to study world politics) but also epistemological and ontological frameworks (assumptions about how world politics can be known and how the knowers acquire their knowledge). The latter ones are more often latently used than explicitly acknowledged. At its most elementary level, positivism is based on an attempt to separate subject and object. It implies that the social scientist, as detached observer, can produce value-free knowledge, that our comprehension of facts can be separated from our relationship with them. For a postmodernist, thinking expresses a will to truth, a desire to control and impose order upon random and idiosyncratic events. "To think," Adorno says, "is to identify."[16] When we think we identify choices, privilege one interpretation over others, and, often without knowing it, exclude what does not fit into the way we want to see things. There is no escape from this process, no possibility of extracting pure facts from observation. To disrespect these limits to cognition is to endow one particular and necessarily subjective form of knowledge with the power to determine factuality. It is from such a theoretical vantage point that scholars like Jim George or Richard Ashley have tried to show how positivist epistemologies have transformed one specific interpretation of world political realities, the dominant realist one, into reality per se.[17] As a result, realist perceptions of the international have gradually become accepted as common sense, to the point that any critique against them has to be evaluated in terms of an already existing and objectivized (realist) worldview. Smith detects powerful mechanisms of control precisely in this ability to determine meaning and rationality, to decide which issues are or are not legitimate concerns for international theorists. "Defining common sense," he argues, "is the ultimate act of political power."[18] It separates the possible from the impossible and directs the theory and practice of world politics on a particular path. The ability to define

normality interferes with virtually all aspects of the international, but its consequences are particularly evident in the domain of gender relations. World politics has for long been dominated by men. Dominant realist approaches to international theory have, through their positivist epistemologies, not only entrenched this patriarchal form of domination, but also rendered it meaningful and natural. Masculine values and men as a group have been elevated to the status of a norm, with the female constituted as a mere aberration from them.[19]

Polymaking – Impact: Violence/Defense

Serial policy failure drives polymakers to find the truth to make a policy succeed – the lack of evaluation of ontological assumptions to reach this truth spell the end of “politics”

Dillon and Reid 1998 (Michael Dillon, professor of Politics at Lancaster University, and Julian Reid, Doctor of Philosophy in Politics, “Global Governance, Liberal Peace, and Complex Emergency”, <http://www.cross-x.com/vb/showthread.php?t=979961&highlight=dillon+reid>)

Reproblemization of problems is constrained by the institutional and ideological investments surrounding accepted "problems," and by the sheer difficulty of challenging the inescapable ontological and epistemological assumptions that go into their very formation. There is nothing so fiercely contested as an epistemological or ontological assumption. And there is nothing so fiercely ridiculed as the suggestion that the real problem with problematizations exists precisely at the level of such assumptions. Such "paralysis of analysis" is precisely what polymakers seek to avoid since they are compelled constantly to respond to circumstances over which they ordinarily have in fact both more and less control than they proclaim. What they do not have is precisely the control that they want. Yet serial policy failure--the fate and the fuel of all policy--compels them into a continuous search for the new analysis that will extract them from the aporias in which they constantly find themselves enmeshed.[35] Serial policy failure is no simple shortcoming that science and policy--and policy science--will ultimately overcome. Serial policy failure is rooted in the ontological and epistemological assumptions that fashion the ways in which global governance encounters and problematizes life as a process of emergence through fitness landscapes that constantly adaptive and changing ensembles have continuously to negotiate. As a particular kind of intervention into life, global governance promotes the very changes and unintended outcomes that it then serially reproblemizes in terms of policy failure. Thus, global liberal governance is not a linear problem-solving process committed to the resolution of objective policy problems simply by bringing better information and knowledge to bear upon them. A nonlinear economy of power/knowledge, it deliberately installs socially specific and radically inequitable distributions of wealth, opportunity, and mortal danger both locally and globally through the very detailed ways in which life is variously (policy) problematized by it. In consequence, thinking and acting politically is displaced by the institutional and epistemic rivalries that infuse its power/ knowledge networks, and by the local conditions of application that govern the introduction of their policies. These now threaten to exhaust what "politics," locally as well as globally, is about.[36] It is here that the "emergence" characteristic of governance begins to make its appearance. For it is increasingly recognized that there are no definitive policy solutions to objective, neat, discrete policy problems. The "subjects" of policy increasingly also become a matter of definition as well, since the concept population does not have a stable referent either and has itself also evolved in biophilosophical and biomolecular as well as Foucauldian "biopower" ways.

Polymaking is obsolete- the organized structures that inform policy decisions are breaking down around us more and more. It is crucial now to move towards a conception of global politics which views it as a site for transversal struggles which do more than just act- they create areas of discursive contestation which must be accounted for.

Bleiker, 98 asst. prof. of International Studies at Pusan National University (Roland, “Retracing and redrawing the boundaries of events: Postmodern interferences with international theory”, *Alternatives*, Oct-Dec 1998, Vol. 23, Issue 4)

In rendering meaningful, one is not describing or representing, one is intervening.[29] An event today is no longer apprehensible through traditional spatial understandings of world politics. Advances in economic, technological, and informational domains have led to what could be called a "deterritorialization" of the world, a situation in which "the local is instantly global."[32] This transformation has rendered obsolete the convention of investigating world politics through several distinct levels of analysis.[33] David Campbell argues convincingly that globalized life is best seen "as a series of transversal struggles rather than as a complex of inter-national, multi-national or trans-national relations." [34] The latter, he points out, are modes of representation that have strong investments in the very borders that are currently being questioned. By contrast, to conceptualize global politics as a site of transversal struggles is to draw attention to the multiple and multilayered interactions that make up contemporary life. It is to recognize the complex cross-border flow of people, goods, ideas, capital-in short, "the increasing irruptions of accelerated and nonterritorial contingencies upon our horizons." [35]

(A world political event, such as the collapse of the Berlin Wall, cannot be understood through a spatial mode of representation that relies on a distinction between different levels of analysis. The key dynamics took place in various interstices, in the transversal gray zones that

loom along the boundaries between local, domestic, and international politics. The processes that led to the fall of the Berlin Wall are thus best characterized as a series of diverse but interconnected occurrences that transgressed the spatial and political givenness of both East German and Cold War international politics.)(36]

At worst, Totalizing Defense: Political predictions from so called experts are about as accurate as monkeys throwing darts- relying on traditional impact calculus means that all probability of impacts become actualized goes away.

Menand 05, professor of English and American Literature and Language at Harvard University, and a staff writer at The New Yorker. (Louis, “Everybody’s an Expert: Putting Predictions to the Test”, The New Yorker, http://www.newyorker.com/printables/critics/051205crbo_books1)

It is the somewhat gratifying lesson of Philip Tetlock’s new book, “Expert Political Judgment: How Good Is It? How Can We Know?” (Princeton; \$35), that **people who make prediction their business—people who appear as experts on television, get quoted in newspaper articles, advise governments and businesses, and participate in punditry roundtables—are no better than the rest of us. When they’re wrong, they’re rarely held accountable, and they rarely admit it, either.**

They insist that they were just off on timing, or blindsided by an improbable event, or almost right, or wrong for the right reasons. They have the same repertoire of self-justifications that everyone has, and are no more inclined than anyone else to revise their beliefs about the way the world works, or ought to work, just because they made a mistake. No one is paying you for your gratuitous opinions about other people, but the experts are being paid, and Tetlock claims that the better known and more frequently quoted they are, the less reliable their guesses about the future are likely to be. **The**

accuracy of an expert’s predictions actually has an inverse relationship to his or her self-confidence, renown, and, beyond a certain point, depth of knowledge. People who follow current events by reading the papers and newsmagazines regularly can guess what is likely to happen about as accurately as the specialists whom the papers quote. Our system of expertise is completely inside out: it rewards bad judgments over good ones.

“Expert Political Judgment” is not a work of media criticism. **Tetlock** is a psychologist—he teaches at Berkeley—and his conclusions are based on a long-term study that he began twenty years ago. He **picked two hundred and eighty-four people who made their living “commenting or offering advice on political and economic trends,” and he started asking them to assess the probability that various things would or would not come to pass, both in the areas of the world in which they specialized and in areas about which they were not expert.** Would there be a nonviolent end to apartheid in South Africa? Would Gorbachev be ousted in a coup? Would the United States go to war in the Persian Gulf? Would Canada disintegrate? (Many experts believed that it would, on the ground that Quebec would succeed in seceding.)

And so on. **By the end of the study, in 2003, the experts had made 82,361 forecasts.** Tetlock also asked questions designed to determine how they reached their judgments, how they reacted when their predictions proved to be wrong, how they evaluated new information that did not support their views, and how they assessed the probability that rival theories and predictions were accurate. Tetlock got a statistical handle on his task by putting most of the forecasting questions into a “three possible futures” form. The respondents were asked to rate the probability of three alternative outcomes: the persistence of the status quo, more of something (political freedom, economic growth), or less of something (repression, recession). And he measured his experts on two dimensions: how good they were at guessing probabilities (did all the things they said had an x per cent chance of happening happen x per cent of the time?), and how accurate they were at predicting specific outcomes. The results were unimpressive. On the first scale, the experts performed worse than they would have if they had simply assigned an equal probability to all three outcomes—if they had given each possible future a thirty-three-per-cent chance of occurring. Human beings who spend their lives studying the state of the world, in other words, are poorer forecasters than dart-throwing monkeys, who would have distributed their picks evenly over the three choices.

Tetlock also found that specialists are not significantly more reliable than non-specialists in guessing what is going to happen in the region they study. Knowing a little might make someone a more reliable forecaster, but Tetlock found that knowing a lot can actually make a person less reliable. “We reach the point of diminishing marginal predictive returns for knowledge disconcertingly quickly,” he reports. “In this age of academic hyperspecialization, there is no reason for supposing that contributors to top journals—distinguished political scientists, area study specialists, economists, and so on—are any better than journalists or attentive readers of the New York Times in ‘reading’ emerging situations.” And the more famous the forecaster the more overblown the forecasts. “Experts in demand,” Tetlock says, “were more overconfident than their colleagues who eked out existences far from the limelight.”

People who are not experts in the psychology of expertise are likely (I predict) to find Tetlock’s results a surprise and a matter for concern. For psychologists, though, nothing could be less surprising. **“Expert Political Judgment” is just one of more than a hundred studies that have pitted experts against statistical or actuarial formulas, and in almost all of those studies the people either do no better than the formulas or do worse.** In one study, college counsellors were given information about a group of high-school students and asked to predict their freshman grades in college. The counsellors had access to test scores, grades, the results of personality and vocational tests, and personal statements from the students, whom they were also permitted to interview. **Predictions that were produced by a formula using just test scores and grades were more accurate. There are also many studies showing that expertise and experience do not make someone a better reader of the evidence. In one, data from a test used**

to diagnose brain damage were given to a group of clinical psychologists and their secretaries. The psychologists' diagnoses were no better than the secretaries'.

Policymaking – Critique Solves

The power of policymaking lies in its ability to construct a binary opposition between productive and flawed discussions; moving towards epistemological and ontological forms of kritik is key to examine the way in which policymaking predetermines all the answers.

Bleiker, 00 Ph.D. visiting research and teaching affiliations at Harvard, Cambridge, Humboldt, Tampere, Yonsei and Pusan National University as well as the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology and the Institute of Social Studies in The Hague, (Roland, Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics, Cambridge University Press)

An approach that specifies operational schemes recognises these limits to cognition. Instead of establishing a new and better theory of agency, it is content with formulating a framework that facilitates understanding of how human agency is incessantly constituted and reconstituted in the context of transversal struggles. Expressed in de Certeau's language, one must comprehend forms of action in the context of their regulatory environment. Such an approach departs from ways in which traditional philosophy (and, by extension, international theory) has framed the understanding of human action. This framing process has revolved around three ways of explaining action: teleological, causal and intentional. 39 My analysis breaks with most elements that are entailed in this mode of analysis. It does not assume that agency can be assessed only by establishing links between means and ends. It does not assume that every form of agency needs an identifiable agent that causes an identifiable outcome. It does not assume that agency occurs only if it stands in a relationship with a declared intention.

What is left of the concept of human agency if one no longer relies upon causal, teleological and intentional explanations? The Interlude situated between chapters 7 and 8 deals with this question at a conceptual level. Its objective is to outline a framework that facilitates an understanding of the discursive conditions that are necessary for the exertion of human agency. From this vantage point, the most potent forms of transversal dissent operate in tactical, rather than strategic ways. They move along an indeterminate trajectory, transgress political boundaries and slowly transform values. They become visible and effective only through maturation over time and space.

A further deconstruction of the notion of discourse is necessary to appreciate the unfolding of transversal dissent through tactic and temporality. Despite their power to frame the world, discourses are not monolithic forces that crush everything in sight. They are often thin, unstable, fragmented. They contain cracks. By moving from epistemological to ontological levels of analysis, the inquiry explores the ways in which people can resist discursive domination (chapter 7). Human beings have hyphenated identities. Furthermore, these identities are not frozen in time, but part of a constantly unfolding process of becoming. By tapping into these multiple and shifting dimensions of Being, individuals are able to think and act beyond the narrow confines of the established discursive order. They engage in everyday forms of resistance that allow them to reshape the social context in which they are embedded. Such forms of discursive dissent can be found in countless seemingly insignificant daily acts of defiance. They transform values, transgress boundaries and may eventually promote social change far more effectively than the so-called great events of international politics.

Policymaking – Critique Solves

Critical and cross-disciplinary approaches to IR reinvigorate the practice – critical approaches are key to improving the policymaking scene

Shampa Biswas, Professor of Politics at Whitman College, December 2007, “Empire and Global Public Intellectuals: Reading Edward Said as an International Relations Theorist,” *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 36, No. 1, p. 124

What Said offers in the place of professionalism is a spirit of ‘amateurism’ – ‘the desire to be moved not by profit or reward but by love for and unquenchable interest in the larger picture,

in making connections across lines and barriers, in refusing to be tied down to a specialty, in caring for ideas and values despite the restrictions of a profession’, an amateur intellectual being one ‘who considers that to be a thinking and concerned member of a society one is entitled to raise moral issues at the heart of even the most technical and professionalized activity as it involves one’s country, its power, its mode of interacting with its citizens as well as with other societies’. ‘(T)he intellectual’s spirit as an amateur’, Said argues, ‘can enter and transform the merely professional routine most of us go through into something much more lively and radical; instead of doing what one is supposed to do one can ask why one does it, who benefits from it, how can it reconnect with a personal project and original thoughts.’ 24

This requires not just a stubborn intellectual independence, but also shedding habits, jargons, tones that have inhibited IR scholars from conversing with thinkers and intellectuals outside the discipline, colleagues in history, anthropology, cultural studies, comparative literature, sociology as well as in non-academic venues, who raise the question of the global in different and sometimes contradictory ways. Arguing that the intellectual’s role is a ‘non-specialist’ one, 25 Said bemoans the disappearance of the ‘general secular intellectual’ – ‘figures of learning and authority, whose general scope over many fields gave them more than professional competence, that is, a critical intellectual style’. 26

Discarding the professional strait-jacket of expertise-oriented IR to venture into intellectual terrains that raise questions of global power and cultural negotiations in a myriad of intersecting and cross-cutting ways will yield richer and fuller conceptions of the ‘politics’ of global politics. Needless to say, inter- and cross- disciplinarity will also yield richer and fuller conceptions of the ‘global’ of global politics. It is to that that I turn next.

Critical objections to traditional policy debate are valid—action-coordination and world-disclosure do not exist radically separate from each other. Rather, action and thought and co-constituted.

Owen 02, Reader in Political Theory at the University of Southampton (David, “Reorienting International Relations: On Pragmatism, Pluralism and Practical Reasoning”, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 31, No. 3, <http://mil.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/31/3/653>)

To begin, consider Stephen White’s argument that **engagement in practical philosophy involves two basic human capacities: a capacity for world-disclosure and a capacity for action-coordination.** 10

World-disclosure refers to the ways in which we conceptualise the world Or, more precisely, to the world-pictures in terms of which we problematise our experience; the ways in which such-and-such is constituted as an epistemic and ethical issue for us. More formally, world-disclosure refers to our capacity to articulate a picture or perspective in terms of which our reflection on, and action in, the world is guided, where the concept of a picture and the concept of a

perspective are co-extensive in that the former refers in a passive mode to what the latter refers in active mode. **A picture refers to a system of judgements in terms of which our being-in-the-world** (or some feature of it) **takes on its intelligible character; a perspective refers to a system of judgements as a system of judging in terms of which we make sense of ourselves** (or some features of ourselves) as beings in the world. 11 By contrast, **action-coordination refers to our capacity to provide reasons and motives**

for agents to act in such-and-such ways, that is, it refers to the ways in which epistemic and ethical theories or accounts are mobilised to encourage particular forms of conduct on the part of agents. Practical philosophy requires that both of these dimensions are brought into play. It is on the basis of the former that such-and-such are constituted as issues for us; it is on the basis of the latter that we seek to account for, and articulate responses to, these issues. In this respect, a

particular instance of practical philosophy may be challenged at two levels. On the one hand, it can be challenged at the level of action-coordination in terms of its capacity to provide cogent reasons and compelling motives for us to act in such-and-such a way; this can take the form of criticism of its epistemic and/or its ethical character. On the other hand, it can be challenged at the level of world-disclosure in terms of its capacity to make sense of the world in the ways that matter to us, that is to say that it can be challenged at the level of the distinctions, concepts, assumptions, inferences and assertability warrants that it invokes. We can clarify the confusion with which I am concerned by noting that White’s distinction enables us to see that much of what has been taken to be dispute between rival theories or theoretical approaches in IR is not about competing theories but

about the logically distinct issue of competing pictures or perspectives. The point here is that the world can be pictured in a plurality of ways, that is, taken up from a plurality of perspectives (which need not be either reducible to a single basic perspective or synthesisable into a single comprehensive perspective) and that such pictures or perspectives are logically prior to theories in that several theories may inhabit that same 'pictorial' space; thus, one might argue that the inter-paradigm debate took place against the background of, and helped hold in place, a relatively stable picture of international politics. Be that as it may, this difference between pictures and theory has been obscured by the (largely North American) use of the term 'theory' to cover both but, once recovered, the distinction between the two enables us to distinguish between two quite different kinds of disagreement. The significance of this distinction and the confusion that it exposes can be illustrated by reference to examples concerning three dimensions of the recent IR theory wars.

Policymaking – Critique Solves

Kritiks provide the crucial link between knowledge and action- a reorientation of political discourse towards epistemological concerns

Owen 02, Reader in Political Theory at the University of Southampton (David, "Reorienting International Relations: On Pragmatism, Pluralism and Practical Reasoning", Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 31, No. 3, <http://mil.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/31/3/653>)

Another way of elucidating what is involved in this re-orientation is to note that it links knowledge (and the value of knowledge) to action by encouraging reflection on problems and problem-constitution. With respect to the former, it orients IR to questions that are both epistemic and ethical: what are the effects of this kind of practice? Should we seek to govern these practices? If so, how? At what cost? With respect to the latter, it orients IR to critical reflection on both the political constitution of such-and-such practice as a problem potentially requiring government and IR's own disciplinary constitution of such-and-such practice as a problem requiring government. In other words, it orients IR both to the task of addressing problematic practices but also to the task of reflecting on how these practices are constituted as problematic; that is, the nature of the assumptions, inferences, etc. that are brought to bear in this process of problem-constitution. Thus, for example, IR is oriented to addressing the problem posed by refugees in terms of how this problem is governed and how existing ways of governing it may be improved. However, IR is also oriented to reflection on the background picture against which this problem is constituted as a problem including, for example, the assumption that the liberty and welfare of the human population is best served by its division into the civic populations of sovereign states who have a primary duty to their own populations. In other words, while addressing the refugee problem as it is constituted, IR also involves reflecting on the plausibility and value of features of its current constitution as a problem, such as this assumption concerning sovereignty and human welfare. If this argument has any cogency, it follows that rather than conceiving of IR in terms of a theoretical war of all against all, we acknowledge that there is a role for different kinds of theoretical practice in IR that engage with different issues. How though are we to judge between rival positions within these different levels? Between rival accounts of problems and of problem-constitution? The pragmatist response is to argue that such judgement involves attending to the capacity of the contesting accounts to guide our judgement and action. But how is this capacity to be judged? Responding to this question requires that we turn to the pragmatism's concern with growth.

Even so-called apolitical forms of engagement are empowering and have the potential to shape policy- by encouraging public interaction with policy, nontraditional methods of engagement actually create more possibility for productive change.

Bleiker, 00 Ph.D. visiting research and teaching affiliations at Harvard, Cambridge, Humboldt, Tampere, Yonsei and Pusan National University as well as the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology and the Institute of Social Studies in The Hague, (Roland, Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics, Cambridge University Press)

No political system, no matter how authoritarian, is ever able to dominate all aspects of a society. And no form of dissent, no matter how radical, is ever entirely autonomous from the political practices it seeks to engage or distance itself from. There is no easy way out of an existing web of power and knowledge. Poetic resistance, even if it contains transversal

dimensions, cannot achieve success overnight. Indeed, a mere decade, which is the rough life span of the Prenzlauer Berg scene, can hardly be expected to do more than highlight the difficulties and contradictions entailed in breaking through a linguistically entrenched political order. It would have been naive, even absurd, to think that a group of disillusioned underground poets could escape the claws of power and lift themselves and their society into a state of perpetual emancipatory triumph.

Linguistic dissent works slowly, by changing the way we speak and think about ourselves and the world we live in.

The young poets of the 1980s were part of this constant process of reframing meaning. They may not have been the heroic freedom fighters they were sometimes taken to be, but their works and lives can shed light on the complexities that make up the increasingly cross-territorial interaction between domination and resistance. Some of their poetic engagements with daily life in East Germany will remain important, if only because they captured a certain zeitgeist, the spirit of a decaying regime. And, for better or for worse, the Prenzlauer Berg

writers have triggered a series of controversies that led to considerable public debate. The best we can hope for, in a sense, is that the ensuing issues, difficult as they are, remain debated in a serious and sustained manner. It is through the creation of such a debate that the Prenzlauer Berg writers have transcended their immediate sphere of activity. **By embarking on a self-conscious exploration of form, the poets of the 1980s have opened up opportunities to rethink the crucial relationship between language and politics** in spaces that lie far beyond the gradually fading memory of East German wastelands.

State-Centricity – Link

An analysis of policymaking that proceeds from the state cannot provide the resources to articulate a capacity for human agency.

Bleiker, 00 Ph.D. visiting research and teaching affiliations at Harvard, Cambridge, Humboldt, Tampere, Yonsei and Pusan National University as well as the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology and the Institute of Social Studies in The Hague, (Roland, Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics, Cambridge University Press)

While opening up the study of global politics to a variety of new domains, most efforts to rethink the international have not gone as far as they could have, or, indeed, should have gone. Here too, questions of conceptualisation and representation are of crucial importance. Campbell stresses that for all their efforts to understand a wide range of global phenomena, most approaches to international theory have displayed a remarkably persistent compulsion to anchor an understanding of the complexities of global life in a 'something-national' formulation — whether it is 'international', 'multinational', or 'transnational'.¹⁴ Representative for such forms of conceptualising is Mark Zacher's seemingly sensible claim that 'non-state actors such as multi national corporations and banks may increase in importance, but there are few signs that they are edging states from centre stage'.¹⁵

Debates about the role of human agency display similar state-centric tendencies. There are disagreements on various fronts, but virtually all discussions on agency in international theory remain focused on conceptualising state behaviour. Alexander Wendt, who has been instrumental in bringing issues of agency to the study of international relations, has been equally influential in directing ensuing discussions on a state-centric path. He explicitly and repeatedly acknowledges 'a commitment to states as units of analysis' and constructs much of his theoretical work around an examination of states and the constraints within which they operate.¹⁶ Here too, the logic behind adapting a state-centric form of representation rests on the assumption that 'as long as states are the dominant actors in international politics, it is appropriate to focus on the identity and agency of the state rather than, for example, a transnational social movement'.¹⁷

Questions of agency in international theory should not and cannot be reduced to analyses of state behaviour. This book demonstrates how an instance of transversal dissent may influence global politics at least as much as, say, a diplomatic treatise or a foreign policy decision. At a time when processes of globalisation are unfolding and national boundaries are becoming increasingly porous, states can no longer be viewed as the only consequential actors in world affairs. Various scholars have thus begun to question the prevalent spatial modes of representation and the artificial separation of levels of analysis that issues from them. They suggest, as mentioned above, that global life is better understood as a series of transversal struggles that increasingly challenge what Richard Ashley called 'the paradigm of sovereign man.' Transversal struggles, Ashley emphasises, are not limited to established spheres of sovereignty. They are neither domestic nor international. They know no final boundaries between inside and out side.¹⁸ And they have come to be increasingly recognised as central aspects of global politics. James Rosenau is among several scholars who now acknowledge that it is along the shifting frontiers of transversal struggles, 'and not through the nation state system that people sort and play out the many contradictions at work in the global scene'.¹⁹

State-Centricity – Impact: Violence

While states still serve important functions in policymaking- focusing exclusively on the state-centric approach to policymaking legitimates violent exclusion of alternative viewpoints.

Bleiker, 00 Ph.D. visiting research and teaching affiliations at Harvard, Cambridge, Humboldt, Tampere, Yonsei and Pusan National University as well as the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology and the Institute of Social Studies in The Hague, (Roland, Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics, Cambridge University Press)

To expand the scope of international theory and to bring transversal struggles into focus is not to declare the state obsolete. States remain central actors in international politics and they have to be recognised and theorised as such. In fact, my analysis will examine various ways in which states and the boundaries between them have mediated the formation, functioning and impact of dissent. However, my reading of **dissent and agency makes the state neither its main focus nor its starting point**. There are compelling reasons for such a strategy, and they go beyond a mere recognition that **a state-centric approach** to international theory engenders a form of representation that **privileges the authority of the state and thus precludes an adequate understanding of the radical transformations that are currently unfolding** in global life.

Michael Shapiro is among an increasing number of theorists who convincingly portray **the state** not only as an institution, but also, and primarily, **as a set of 'stories' — of which the state-centric approach to international theory is a perfect example. It is part of a legitimisation process that highlights, promotes and naturalises certain political practices and the territorial context within which they take place. Taken together, these stories provide the state with a sense of identity, coherence and unity. They create boundaries between an inside and an outside, between a people and its others.** Shapiro stresses that **such state-stories also exclude, for they seek 'to repress or delegitimise other stories and the practices of identity and space they reflect.'** And it is **these processes of exclusion that impose a certain political order and provide the state with a legitimate rationale for violent encounters.**²²

State-Centricity – Impact: Education

State-centricity makes critical understanding of the world impossible.

Shampa Biswas, Professor of Politics at Whitman College, December 2007, “Empire and Global Public Intellectuals: Reading Edward Said as an International Relations Theorist,” *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 36, No. 1, p. 125-126

In making a case for the exilic orientation, it is the powerful hold of the nation-state upon intellectual thinking that Said most bemoans. 31 The nation-state of course has a particular pride of place in the study of global politics. The state-centricity of International Relations has not just circumscribed the ability of scholars to understand a vast ensemble of globally oriented movements, exchanges and practices not reducible to the state, but also inhibited a critical intellectual orientation to the world outside the national borders within which scholarship is produced. Said acknowledges the fact that all intellectual work occurs in a (national) context which imposes upon one’s intellect certain linguistic boundaries, particular (nationally framed) issues and, most invidiously, certain domestic political constraints and pressures, but he cautions against the dangers of such restrictions upon the intellectual imagination. 32

Comparing the development of IR in two different national contexts – the French and the German ones – Gerard Holden has argued that different intellectual influences, different historical resonances of different issues, different domestic exigencies shape the discipline in different contexts. 33 While this is to be expected to an extent, there is good reason to be cautious about how scholarly sympathies are expressed and circumscribed when the reach of one’s work (issues covered, people affected) so obviously extends beyond the national context. For scholars of the global, the (often unconscious) hold of the nation-state can be especially pernicious in the ways that it limits the scope and range of the intellectual imagination. Said argues that the hold of the nation is such that even intellectuals progressive on domestic issues become collaborators of empire when it comes to state actions abroad. 34 Specifically, he critiques nationalistically based systems of education and the tendency in much of political commentary to frame analysis in terms of ‘we’, ‘us’ and ‘our’ - particularly evident in coverage of the war on terrorism - which automatically sets up a series of (often hostile) oppositions to ‘others’. He points in this context to the rather common intellectual tendency to be alert to the abuses of others while remaining blind to those of one’s own. 35

State-Centricity – Impact: Agency

Agency can only be articulated in opposition to the restrictive structuralisms of the status quo—in other words, we can claim our agency only by rejecting the state-centric view of politics.

Bleiker, 00 Ph.D. visiting research and teaching affiliations at Harvard, Cambridge, Humboldt, Tampere, Yonsei and Pusan National University as well as the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology and the Institute of Social Studies in The Hague, (Roland, Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics, Cambridge University Press)

Questions of agency have been discussed extensively in international theory, mostly in the context of the so-called structure—agency debate. Although strongly wedded to a state-centric view, this debate nevertheless evokes a number of important conceptual issues that are relevant as well to an understanding of transversal dynamics. The roots of the structure—agency debate can be traced back to a feeling of discontent about how traditional approaches to international theory have dealt with issues of agency. Sketched in an overly broad manner, the point of departure looked as follows: At one end of the spectrum were neorealists, who explain state identity and behaviour through a series of structural restraints that are said to emanate from the anarchical nature of the international system. At the other end we find neoliberals, who accept the existence of anarchy but seek to understand the behaviour of states and other international actors in terms of their individual attributes and their ability to engage in cooperative bargaining. If pushed to their logical end-point, the two positions amount, respectively, to a structural determinism and an equally farfetched belief in the autonomy of rational actors. 24

The structure—agency debate is located somewhere between these two poles. **Neither structure nor agency receive analytical priority. Instead, the idea is to understand the interdependent and mutually constitutive relationship between them.** The discussions that have evolved in the wake of this assumption are highly complex and cannot possibly be summarised here. 25 Some of the key premises, though, can be recognised by observing how the work of Anthony Giddens has shaped the structure—agency debate in international relations. Giddens speaks of **the 'duality of structure,' of structural properties that are constraining as well as enabling. They are both 'the medium and outcome of the contingently accomplished activities of situated actors'.** 26 **Expressed in other words, neither agents nor structures have the final word. Human actions are always embedded in and constrained by the structural context within which they form and evolve. But structures are not immutable either. A human being, Giddens stresses, will 'know a great deal about the conditions of reproduction of the society of which he or she is a member'.** 27 **The actions that emerge from this awareness then shape the processes through which social systems are structurally maintained and reproduced.**

State-Centricity – Impact: Identity

It is bad to focus on the state in IR- the state creates boundaries within its self and excludes and represses certain aspects in order to reflect a certain identity

Bleiker in 2000 (Roland, Senior Lecturer and Coordinator of the Peace and Conflict Studies Program at the University of Queensland, Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics)

To expand the scope of international theory and to bring transversal struggles into focus is not to declare the state obsolete. States remain central actors in international politics and they have to be recognised and theorised as such. In fact, my analysis will examine various ways in which states and the boundaries between them have mediated the formation, functioning and impact of dissent. However, my reading of dissent and agency makes the state neither its main focus nor its starting point. There are compelling reasons for such a strategy, and they go beyond a mere recognition that a state-centric approach to international theory engenders a form of representation that privileges the authority of the state and thus precludes an adequate understanding of the radical transformations that are currently unfolding in global life. Michael Shapiro is among an increasing number of theorists who convincingly portray the state not only as an institution, but also, and primarily, as a set of 'stories' — of which the state-centric approach to international theory is a perfect example. It is part of a legitimisation process that highlights, promotes and naturalises certain political practices and the territorial context within which they take place. Taken together, these stories provide the state with a sense of identity, coherence and unity. They create boundaries between an inside and an outside, between a people and its others. Shapiro stresses that such state-stories also exclude, for they seek 'to repress or delegitimise other stories and the practices of identity and space they reflect.' And it is these processes of exclusion that impose a certain political order and provide the state with a legitimate rationale for violent encounters.

The state sustains collective identity through an increasing process of oppressive power struggles, culminating in violence

Connolly in 2k2 (William, Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science @ Johns Hopkins University, Identity/Difference, expanded edition)

In several domains, the state no longer emerges as a consummate agent of efficacy, even though it expands as a pivotal agent of power.⁴ A crack in the very unity of "power" has opened up. We have entered a world in which state power is simultaneously magnified and increasingly disconnected from the ends that justify its magnification. As obstacles to its efficacy multiply, the state increasingly sustains collective identity through theatrical displays of punishment and revenge against those elements that threaten to signify its inefficacy. It launches dramatized crusades against the internal other (low-level criminals, drug users, disloyalists, racial minorities, and the underclass), the external other (foreign enemies and terrorists), and the interior other (those strains of abnormality, subversion, and perversity that may reside within anyone). The state becomes, first, the screen upon which much of the resentment against the adverse effects of the civilization of productivity and private affluence is projected; second, the vehicle through which rhetorical reassurances about the glory and durability of that civilization are transmitted back to the populace; and third, the instrument of campaigns against those elements most disturbing to the collective identity. In the first instance, the welfare apparatus of the state is singled out for criticism and reformation. In the second, the presidency is organized into a medium of rhetorical diversion and reassurance. In the third, the state disciplinary-police-punitive apparatus is marshaled to constitute and stigmatize constituencies whose terms of existence might

otherwise provide signs of defeat, injury, and sacrifice engendered by the civilization of productivity itself. <p206>

Identity Impact

The attempt to view identity through entrenched formations causes violence against both the self and the other

Connolly in 2k2 (William, Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science @ Johns Hopkins University, Identity/Difference, expanded edition)

Without a particular set of entrenched formations you could not have an identity, even though there is more to identity than this. But everything turns upon how these contingent formations are lived and how they relate to different formations in others. The demand to ethicize or universalize the entrenched contingencies on the grounds that they flow from a true identity is a recipe for repression of difference; by treating alternative types of sexuality as immoral, deviant, or sick, it calls upon you to purge any such dispositions lingering in yourself and to support the treatment or punishment of others who manifest them more robustly. This demand grounds your sexual ethic in the self-idealization of a contingent, relational identity that takes itself to be natural and independent. The alternative demand to purge the entrenched contingency in yourself because it is unworthy of ethicization is a recipe for self-repression; it treats another contingent identity as the natural standard everyone must attain. It grounds its ethical idealism in the loathing of a self for what it is. When this track is pursued very far, others will eventually pay a price for the self-loathing you feel . . . for surely you will want to purge any signs of this tendency in them too. <p177>

Modern politics wrongly alienates difference as evil because of its quest to maintain a unified identity. This creates a feeling of responsibility to eradicate the Other for the Self

Connolly in 2k2 (William, Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science @ Johns Hopkins University, Identity/Difference, expanded edition)

The modern normal, responsible individual can redirect resentment against the human condition into the self, first, by treating the rational, self-interested, free, and principled individual as morally responsible for willful deviations from normal identity and, second, by treating that in itself and other selves which falls below the threshold of responsibility as a natural defect in need of conquest or conversion, punishment or love. The modern individual, in short, contains resentment against the human condition in its own identity, and this comes out most clearly in the intensity of the resentment it expresses against any others who deviate significantly from that identity. For such deviations, if they proliferate, make the self-identical self appear to be a sucker for accepting the disciplines and restraints required to maintain itself in this way. Only if these deviations are false or evil can it see itself as true. Resentment against injuries to oneself flowing from the standard of self-responsibility becomes translated into rancor against those whom one construes as escaping the dictates of that standard. <p80>

State-Centricity – Critique Solves

The issue with policymaking is that it is self-legitimizing- it not only justifies its own actions by virtue of discursive framing but it excludes other perspectives by virtue of a monolithic and purely state-centric form of calculation.

Bleiker, 00 Ph.D. visiting research and teaching affiliations at Harvard, Cambridge, Humboldt, Tampere, Yonsei and Pusan National University as well as the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology and the Institute of Social Studies in The Hague, (Roland, Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics, Cambridge University Press)

New concepts can help to widen the purview of traditional perceptions of international relations, but it is important to emphasise that the issue of representation can never be solved, or even understood, at a purely terminological level. From the perspective of the later Wittgenstein, there is no logical and authentic relationship between, for instance, the meaning of term 'international' and a state-centric view of the world. 'International' is only what we make of the term. **The main problem is a discursively entrenched language game in which the term 'international' embodies social practices that assign nation-states priority and thus legitimise and objectivise ensuing political practices, no matter how violent they may be.**

Knowing the dangers of exclusion and objectification inherent in any form of conceptualising does not release us from the need to employ concepts in order to express our thoughts. What, then, is the point? Adorno claims that we must not turn the necessity to operate with concepts into the virtue of assigning them priority. 52

The daring task is to open up with concepts what does not fit into concepts, to resist their distorting power and return the conceptual to the non-conceptual. This disenchantment with the concept is the anti- dote of critical philosophy. It prevents the concept from becoming an absolute in itself. 53 **The first step towards disenchanting the concept is simply refusing to define it monologically. Concepts should achieve meaning only gradually, in relation to each other.**

Adorno even goes as far as intentionally using the same concept in different ways in order to liberate it from the narrow definition that language itself had already imposed upon it. 54 That **contradictions could arise out of this practice** does not bother Adorno. **Indeed, he considers them essential. One cannot eliminate the contradictory, the fragmentary and the discontinuous. Contradictions are only contradictions if one assumes the existence of a prior universal standard of reference.** What is different appears as divergent, dissonant, and negative only as long as our consciousness strives for a totalising standpoint, which we must avoid if we are to escape the dangers of identity thinking. 55

Just as reality is fragmented, we need to think in fragments. Unity is not found by evening out discontinuities. Contradictions are to be preferred over artificially constructed meanings and the silencing of underlying conflicts. Thus Adorno advocates writing in fragments, such that the resulting text appears as if it always could be interrupted, cut off abruptly, any time, any place. 56 Here too we hear the advice of Nietzsche, who recommends that one should approach deep problems like taking a cold bath, 'quickly into them and quickly out again'. 57 The belief that one does not reach deep enough this way, he claims, is simply the superstition of those who fear cold water. But Nietzsche's bath has already catapulted us into the vortex of the next linguistic terrain of resistance, the question of style.

Identity – Critique Solves

Kritiks are better for debate, they reveal the multifaceted nature of the social sphere and avoid totalizing as is the common trap in traditional policy analysis.

Bleiker, 98 asst. prof. of International Studies at Pusan National University (Roland, "Retracing and redrawing the boundaries of events: Postmodern interferences with international theory", *Alternatives*, Oct-Dec 1998, Vol. 23, Issue 4)

Postmodernism can thus be considered, at least at this point, as a methodological and epistemological position, which revolves around the issue of what knowledge is, how it is constructed, and how it relates to language and power. Epistemology here is not, as it was in pre-Kantian philosophy, a privileged form of insight into the human mind. **The postmodern notion of episteme rejects the existence of truth beyond power, a privileged site of knowledge. It draws attention to the constituted and multiple dimensions of social practices.** Given the acceptance of epistemological fragmentation, it is almost self-evident that this search is characterized more by diversity than by a single and coherent set of positions and assumptions about life.

If there is a unifying point in postmodernism then, it is precisely the acceptance of difference, the refusal to uphold one position as the correct and desirable one. "The **postmodern begins,**" Wolfgang Iser says, **"where totality ends."**[26] **Its vision is the vision of plurality, a positive attempt to secure and explore multiple dimensions of the processes that legitimize and ground social practices.** Once the end of totalizing thought is accepted, it becomes, of course, very difficult to talk about the postmodern without descending into clichés or doing grave injustice to individual authors who explore various terrains of difference. Jane Flax recognized this difficulty and admits that by speaking about postmodernism one already runs "the risk of violating some of its central values--heterogeneity, multiplicity, and difference." [27]

There have been numerous attempts to apply postmodern ideas to the domain of world politics. Authors have exposed the state-centrism of realist and liberal approaches to international theory, their narrow perceptions of what the international is, and where its relations take place. They have challenged the masculine and Eurocentric values of existing approaches or reexamined such notions as security, identity, agency, sovereignty, diplomacy, geopolitics, and ethics. And they have used a multitude of postpositivist methodologies to do so--genealogies, deconstruction, and hermeneutics, for instance. It is not my intention here to survey these diverse postmodern approaches to world politics; various authors have already done so competently.[28] Moreover, **surveying a body of literature is not unproblematic. It is, one could say, a modern attempt to bring order and certainty into a world of chaos and flux. It is a desire to squeeze freely floating and thus somewhat worrisome ideas into surveyable categories--to cut off and smoothen the various overlapping edges so that each piece neatly fits into its assigned place.** The task of this article, then, is not to define what postmodern international theories are, but to gaze at some of the multiplicities through which they work. Fragmented insight. Insight through fragmentation. Time to shift.

Link/Impact – Predictability

The predictive model of policymaking is flawed, it doesn't account for individual discourses meaning that its means to arrive at a decision is never guided by realistic projections.

Bleiker, 00 Ph.D. visiting research and teaching affiliations at Harvard, Cambridge, Humboldt, Tampere, Yonsei and Pusan National University as well as the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology and the Institute of Social Studies in The Hague, (Roland, Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics, Cambridge University Press)

Prediction, in particular, **is a highly problematic standard to evaluate the adequacy of theoretical propositions**. Indeed, most international relations theories do not fare well when judged by such a measuring device. Consider, once more, the case of East Germany. **None of the influential contributions to international theory was able to anticipate, let alone predict, the momentous transformations that took place when the Berlin Wall crumbled** and the Soviet-led alliance system fell apart. If existing theories revealed anything, it was how closely they were intertwined with the Cold War and ensuing perceptions of world politics. 'An empire collapsed,' Jean Elshtain points out, 'and many, if not most, practitioners of international relations were entirely unprepared. It seems that precisely when theories of international politics should have best served us, they failed rather strikingly, overtaken, as it were, by politics itself.' 53 For Elshtain this crucial failure demands a rethinking of what theory is and does. 'If 1989 taught us nothing else,' she stresses, 'it should have taught us humility.' 54 > For others, such as Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, **the inability of international theory to anticipate the collapse of the Cold War system calls for a more specific, but equally fundamental, rethinking of the agency** problematique'. 55 This book is devoted to the latter task — and reassessing questions of evaluation is an integral part of it.

The very notion of prediction does, by its own logic, annihilate human agency. To assert that international relations is a domain of political dynamics whose future should be predictable through a convincing set of theoretical propositions is to assume that the course of global politics is to a certain extent predetermined. From such a vantage-point there is no more room for interference and human agency, no more possibility for politics to overtake theory. **A predictive approach thus runs the risk of ending up in a form of inquiry that imposes a static image upon a far more complex set of transversal political practices. The point of a theoretical inquiry, however, is not to ignore the constantly changing domain of international relations. Rather, the main objective must consist of facilitating an understanding of transversal struggles that can grapple with those moments when people walk through walls precisely when nobody expects them to do so.**

Prediction is a problematic assessment tool even if a theory is able to anticipate future events. Important theories, such as realist interpretations of international politics, **may well predict certain events only because their theoretical premises have become so objectivised that they have started to shape decision makers and political dynamics**. Dissent, in this case, is the process that reshapes these entrenched perceptions and the ensuing political practices.

Describing, explaining and prescribing may be less unproblematic processes of evaluation, but only at first sight. If one abandons the notion of Truth, the idea that an event can be apprehended as part of a natural order, authentically and scientifically, **as something that exists independently of the meaning we have given it — if one abandons this separation of object and subject, then the process of judging a particular approach to describing and explaining an event becomes a very muddled affair**. There is no longer an objective measuring device that can set the standard to evaluate whether or not a particular insight into an event, such as the collapse of the Berlin Wall, is true or false. **The very nature of a past event becomes indeterminate insofar as its identification is dependent upon ever-changing forms of linguistic expressions that imbue the event with meaning.** 56

The inability to determine objective meanings is also the reason why various critical international relations scholars stress that there can be no ultimate way of assessing human agency.

Roxanne Doty, for instance, believes that the agent—structure debate 'encounters an aporia, i.e., a self-engendered paradox beyond which it cannot press'. This is to say that the debate is fundamentally undecidable, and that theorists who engage in it 'can claim no scientific, objective grounds for determining whether the force of agency or that of structure is operative at any single instant'.⁵⁷ Hollis and Smith pursue a similar line of argument. They emphasise that there are always two stories to tell — neither of which is likely ever to have the last word — an inside story and an outside story, one about agents and another about structures, one epistemological and the other ontological, one about understanding and one about explaining international relations.⁵⁸

The value of an insight cannot be evaluated in relation to a set of objectively existing criteria.

But this does not mean that all insights have the same value. Not every perception is equally perceptive. Not every thought is equally thoughtful. Not every action is equally justifiable. How, then, can one judge?

Link/Impact – Limits

The concept of limits is based in the same ideal goal of policymaking to posit a single acceptable perspective on things- limits both serves to reign in the discussion but more importantly, it helps to predetermine the answer to every question and exclude alternatives, meaning that even if debate still exists, its value as an activity is completely lost.

Bleiker, 00 Ph.D. visiting research and teaching affiliations at Harvard, Cambridge, Humboldt, Tampere, Yonsei and Pusan National University as well as the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology and the Institute of Social Studies in The Hague, (Roland, Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics, Cambridge University Press)

But while the waging of fierce intellectual debates emerged as a key feature of modernity, the range of these debates is not as boundless as it appears at first sight. William Connolly leads us right to the core of this paradoxical issue. He emphasises that modern debates all have a distinctive character. They are all well framed, and the contours of this framing process, Connolly emphasises, have to a large extent been drawn by the recurring unwillingness to deal with the death of God. ³³ The refusal to accept the contingency of foundations has been a constant modern theme ever since la Boétie and his fellow Renaissance humanists disenchanted the world and placed 'man' at its centre. When the old theocentric world crumbled, when the one and only commonly accepted point of reference vanished, the death of God became the key dilemma around which modern debates were waged. Yet, instead of accepting the absence of stable foundations and dealing with the new burden of responsibility, many prominent modern approaches embarked upon desperate evasive attempts to find replacements for the fallen God. ³⁴

THE AFFIRMATIVES FRAMEWORK ARGUMENTS CALL FOR LIMITATIONS IN HOW THINGS ARE TO BE INTERPRETED-THIS IS THE SAME OBSESSION WITH LIMITS CHARACTERIZED BY MODERN THOUGHT. WE MUST REJECT LIMITS IN FAVOR OF THE POSSIBILITIES OF NEW POLITICAL THOUGHT

DILLON IN 96 (MICHAEL, SENIOR LECTURER IN POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AT THE UNIVERSITY OF LANCASTER, THE POLITICS OF SECURITY)

What is most at issue here, then, is the question of the limit and of how to finesse the closure of the fatally deterministic or apocalyptic thinking to which the issue of limits ordinarily gives rise in onto-theological thought: as the authoritative specification of an eschaton; as the invocation of our submission to it; or in terms of the closure of what it is possible for us to say, do and be in virtue of the operation of it. The question of the limit has therefore to be posed in a way that invokes a thinking which resists the siren calls of fatal philosophers and historians alike. That is why limits have to be thought differently, and why the question concerning limits has to be posed, instead, in terms of that which keeps things in play (for 'demarcation is lacking nothing can come to presence as it is') exciting a thinking, in particular, which seeks continuously to keep 'open the play of [possibility by subtracting the sense of necessity, completeness, and smugness from established organ-izations of life', all of which are promoted by an insistence upon security.

Link/Impact - Limits

THEIR FRAMEWORK ARGUMENTS ARE A FORM OF POLITICIZING VIOLENCE-THE ACT OF SECURING MODES OF THINKING THROUGH STANDARDS AND LIMITATIONS ON WHAT IS ACCEPTABLE IS WHAT PERPETUATES OUR VIOLENCE TOWARD THE OTHER
DILLON IN 96 (MICHAEL, SENIOR LECTURER IN POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AT THE UNIVERSITY OF LANCASTER, THE POLITICS OF SECURITY)

Only violence, it seems, can secure an end to violence, yet not even violence can do that securely because violence, of course, begets violence. Offered as the final guarantor, it is also the chief threat to order: 'the practice of violence changes the world, but the most probable change is to a more violent world'. It, like the being-in-common from which it arises is, therefore, also self-propagating.

The conundrum of violence is consequently not one problem amongst many, it is intimately related to the conundrum of being-in-common itself. For, in its freedom, human being is always potentially a violent mortal puzzle to itself, because the violence which it can always threaten itself with, in consequence of the very differential composition of the life that it is, cannot be mastered and overcome by greater violence. (Another way of saying that danger is inherent to the free (in)security of human being, and not an externality to be exterminated.) More to the point. Neither can it be mastered and overcome by regimes, either of normalising surveillance or of policing love, premised alike upon the violent, and violence-inducing, denial of violence and difference. The political alone offers some way of addressing it short of the dissolution of all limits, particularly that threatened by those who dogmatically insist upon the violent, sovereign decided ness of their own limits.

The political arises precisely because we are condemned by our mortal life to be free. Because we are free we have to enact ourselves. In enacting ourselves, we violently articulate standards and judgements. Herein lies the possibility of a politics of freedom in which the function of politics is to preserve that dangerous and violent freedom, to sustain that capacity to invent standards and exercise judgement — and to enlarge it where possible — against existing standards and judgements, while keeping the question of the very violence entailed in judgement open. That is why the political is always concerned with the remainder or the surplus that politics as rule produces, or relies upon, but is always committed against. <P150-151>

Link/Impact – Ground

Foundations should be viewed as contingent because a subject and its agency are framed by specific regimes of power- social change will occur once these power regimes are reworked

Roland Bleiker, 2000. (Professor of International Relations Harvard and Cambridge, Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics, Cambridge University Press, 2000. p. 37-39)

We know of proclamations that herald the return of the actor. 32 Most of them were advanced against the determinism of structuralist foundations. Most scholarship. Structuralist positions, be it in international theory or in scholarship about revolutions, locate the emergence of social change not in agents and their actions, but in the structural conditions within which their behaviour is confined. Revolutionary change is said to be dependent not upon conscious subjectivity, but upon the underlying logic of functional and structural necessity. 33 Parallel to this defence of the actor against structural determinism I attempt to salvage the notion of human agency from postmodern annihilations of the subject. However, I advance this position not against, but through the body of knowledge referred to, in the largest sense, as postmodernism. I elaborate what could be called a postmodern position on human agency, except that I discard the actual term postmodernism as an unfortunate misnomer. It is misleading in designating a new historical epoche, not only because we have hardly transgressed the parameters of modernity, but also because the act of compartmentalising history expresses an inherently modern urge to control our environment. The term postmodernism may be more useful to indicate a certain epistemological or ontological stance. Yet, many of the authors who are labelled postmodern, such as Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze or Cixous, do not actually use this term. And those who do barely have enough in common to be lumped together into the same category. If anything unites them, it is the acceptance of difference and the ensuing willingness to come to terms with the death of God. Affirming from negation and grounding an understanding of human agency in nothingness is not as problematic as it may appear at first sight. Judith Butler has demonstrated this convincingly. For her, the recognition that power pervades all aspects of society, including the position of the critic, does not necessarily lead to a nihilistic relativism. It merely shows that political closure occurs through attempts to establish foundational norms that lie beyond power. Likewise, to reopen this political domain is not to do away with foundations as such, but to acknowledge their contingent character, to act with more awareness of their function, to illuminate what they authorise, exclude and foreclose. One must come to terms with how the subject and its agency are constituted and framed by specific regimes of power. But this is not the end of human agency. Quite to the contrary. Butler argues persuasively that 'the constituted character of the subject is the very precondition of its agency'. 35 To appreciate the practical relevance of this claim one must investigate the possibilities for agency that arise out of existing webs of power and discourse. One must scrutinise how social change can be brought about by a reworking of the power regimes that constitute our subjectivity. 36

Link – Constructivism

Constructivism makes epistemological and ontological assumptions about the world akin to those made by scientific realism

Bleiker, 00 Ph.D. visiting research and teaching affiliations at Harvard, Cambridge, Humboldt, Tampere, Yonsei and Pusan National University as well as the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology and the Institute of Social Studies in The Hague, (Roland, Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics, Cambridge University Press)

A post-positivist understanding of agency runs counter to currently influential 'constructivist' contributions to questions of agency in international theory. Constructivists share various traits with postmodernists. Among them is a common concern with the social construction of meaning, state identity and international politics in general. Both approaches reject, even at an analytical level, the notion of autonomous and rational actors. Instead, they scrutinise how rules, norms and values shape actors and issues in global affairs. Wendt, for instance, declares himself a 'constructivist', which is to say that he acknowledges that the world is 'socially constructed', that the structures of international politics are social, rather than merely material, and that these structures shape the identity and interests of actors. 34

With regard to questions of epistemology, though, postmodernists and constructivists differ sharply. The former are sceptical of all forms of positivist knowledge while the latter remain faithful, at least to some extent, to traditional scientific and causal principles. Nicholas Onuf stresses that **'constructivists need not repudiate positivism just because it is liable to criticism'.** **Only through a systematic analysis, he insists, can we hope to understand the behaviour of agents and the workings of social arrangements.** 35 Although rejecting the strict tenets of logical positivism, Wendt too acknowledges the importance of causal and scientific analyses. It is through the methodological principles of scientific realism, espoused by writers such as Roy Bhaskar, that Wendt hopes to assess the influence of social structures in a systematic and scientifically legitimate manner. **As opposed to a more narrow empiricist approach, scientific realism provides a legitimate way of recognising the crucial causal impact of unobservable phenomena, such as structures.** 36 So-called **'bracketing' is the method through which** Wendt and other **constructivists attempt to achieve this objective. This is to say that they take 'social structures and agents in turn as temporarily given in order to examine the explanatory effects of the other'.** 37 Various authors have investigated questions of agency in international relations along this path. David Dessler, for instance, has tried to supply a more explicit basis for the empirical applicability of a constructivist approach, and Martha Finnemore has, most recently, embarked on such an application through an alternate bracketing of agency and structure. 38 While offering various insightful contributions, **the constructivist reliance on scientific perceptions of international politics detracts from, rather than adds to our understanding of transversal forms of human agency. For all their efforts to reach beyond the dominant neorealist and neoliberal interpretations of international relations,** Wendt and **other constructivists exhibit,** as Campbell notes, **'an overwhelming but underrecognized commitment to many of the general tenets of that disposition'.** 39 Doty draws attention to some of them. For her, the process of bracketing presupposes, by its very logic, the existence of pre-given units — be they structures or agents. **Combined with the analytical separation between object and subject, which is implied in scientific realism, constructivists thus re-establish the very oppositional conceptualisation that the structure—agency debate was initially supposed to overcome.** 40 To draw attention to these and other positivist pitfalls is not to invalidate constructivist approaches or scientific inquiries as such. There are many domains in which systematic empirical analyses of international relations can be useful. The conceptualisation of agency, however, is not among them.

Critique solves Change

Kritik is key to long term change, even if policymaking is a little better in the short run, critical arguments are necessary to transform and examine values over time, shaping how we respond to these issues.

Bleiker, 00 Ph.D. visiting research and teaching affiliations at Harvard, Cambridge, Humboldt, Tampere, Yonsei and Pusan National University as well as the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology and the Institute of Social Studies in The Hague, (Roland, Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics, Cambridge University Press)

Discursive and transversal forms of dissent unleash their power only through a long process that entails digging, slowly, underneath the foundations of authority. They work through a gradual and largely inaudible transformation of values. A poetic search for thinking space, for instance, acknowledges that there are no quick and miraculous forms of dissent to discursive domination. **Poetry resists the temptation to provide 'concrete' answers to 'concrete' questions. It does not bring certainty. In fact, poetry generates more questions, creates ambivalence and doubt. And in doing so it comes to terms with the death of God, makes room for a more tolerant politics, recognises that a society is oppressive and closed if all major questions either have an answer or are considered irrational, absurd, taboo.**⁴⁸

Critique solves “Root Cause”

Critical lenses allow us to view policymaking in a “comparativist approach,” evaluating the present along with its underlying causes and roots

Shampa Biswas, Professor of Politics at Whitman College, December 2007, “Empire and Global Public Intellectuals: Reading Edward Said as an International Relations Theorist,” *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 36, No. 1, p. 127-128

What the exilic orientation makes possible is this ability to universalise by enabling first, ‘a double perspective that never sees things in isolation’ so that from the juxtaposition of ideas and experiences ‘one gets a better, perhaps even more universal idea of how to think, say, about a human rights issue in one situation by comparison with another’, 39 and second, an ability to see things ‘not simply as they are, but as they have come to be that way’, as contingent ‘historical choices made by men and women’ that are changeable. 40 The second of these abilities displaces the ontological given-ness of the nation-state in the study of global politics; for the intellectual who feels pulled by the demands of loyalty and patriotism, Said suggests, ‘[n]ever solidarity before criticism’, arguing that it is the intellectual’s task to show how the nation ‘is not a natural or god-given entity but is a constructed, manufactured, even in some cases invented object, with a history of struggle and conquest behind it’. 41 The first of these abilities interjects a comparativist approach as critical to the study of global politics, locating one’s work in a temporal and spatial plane that is always larger than one’s immediate (national) context and in the process historicising and politicising what may appear naturalised in any particular (national) context. The now famous passage from Hugo of St Victor, cited by Auerbach, appears in Said’s writings on at least four different occasions: The man who finds his homeland sweet is still a tender beginner; he to whom every soil is as his native one is already strong; but he is perfect to whom the entire world is as a foreign land. The tender soul has fixed his love on one spot in the world; the strong man has extended his love to all places; the perfect man has extinguished his. 42

Rethinking Solves

In rethinking the political we inevitably open up new possibilities for freedom—this affects both the way we interact in public space and our policy decisions

DILLON IN 96 (MICHAEL, SENIOR LECTURER IN POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AT THE UNIVERSITY OF LANCASTER, THE POLITICS OF SECURITY)

Now, if we think the political in the way that we do because of the way that we think, and if the project of thought has taken a significantly different turn, then the entire range of our political concerns must take a different turn as well. The scope of that turn is such that it must traverse all of our traditional political concerns. It re-raises, for example, the thought of the political itself, in what I would call the politics of the thought of the political. It necessarily, also, re-poses the ancient concern with forms of government, in as much as it raises the question of the public space. It has direct purchase, also, upon what most preoccupies everyday politics; namely ‘policy’, or the moment of decision and judgement.

In respect of the question of public space, the turn of thought insists upon a bi focal interpretation of the limits set by the institutional delineation of public space, and the necessary play of both presence and absence which takes place there. For its borders both separate and join — differentiate as they individuate — constitute the politically abject as they constitute the politically subject. That bi-focality, alert to their relationality, emphasises also the undecidability of borders. Necessary but contingent, material but mutable, precise but porous, they are prone to violent foreclosure which excites its own resistance. This is not a question of refusing people individual or collective identity, enframed and sustained by institutional practices. Rather, it is a matter of construing the institutional question of the political in a way, consistent with the openness of human being, that cultivates its freedom to be. A freedom to be that can only be enjoyed within mutably habitable, rather than viciously and unsustainably circumscribed, limits. Limits, too, which are on terms with the ineradicable and irreducible Otherness human beings encounter within themselves as well as with others, because they are indebted to it.

This turn of thought also re-poses the question of policy. It does so as the moment of ethical encounter for human beings; beings which, however rooted they may think that they are, are always already en route, out in the open and on the move. Exposed to, and constituted by, an Otherness they share with others, human beings are always already both decided, and in a position of having to decide, in respect of themselves with others in that Otherness. Their mode of decision en route (simultaneously deciding and being decided) is consequently their ethos.

However much this moment is rendered, politically, as a technologised decisional administration of things, there is, in fact, no escape from encountering it as an ethical encounter. For a way of being that is gratuitously given its being to be, that being is a free being which has responsibly to assume its taking place in the world as a responsive being. Short of death, there is no way out of this

predicament, other than to immerse ourselves in the routinised everyday in the hope that we will never have to confront it. Ironically, because the everyday has a disturbing habit of breaking-down, such a recourse is always unsafe. Generalised routines never satisfactorily fit the singular case, old habits are continuously overwhelmed by the new, or the body inevitably begins to age and crack-up. We are temporal beings and temporality is a motility which treats the everyday like a vagrant. Given no peace, it is continuously told to move-on. <P 7-8>

A/T: Consequentialism

How we evaluate consequences is first determined by the visibility of those consequences vis-à-vis their construction within discourse, meaning that weighing these representation comes 1st insofar as they constitute what is seen as threatening even before responses to those threats can be theorized.

Owen 02, Reader in Political Theory at the University of Southampton (David, “Reorienting International Relations: On Pragmatism, Pluralism and Practical Reasoning”, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 31, No. 3, <http://mil.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/31/3/653>)

First, **‘human acts’ and ‘consequences’ should both be construed** broadly to include, in the former case, human practices in general and, in the latter case, **effects ranging from transformations of being to transformations of environment across both material and conceptual registers**. Second, Dewey’s point concerning the perception of consequences draws to our attention the fact that **the visibility of consequences is dependent on the background picture in terms of which the practices in question are situated and hence the central role that world-disclosure plays in the constitution of** forms of **government**. Third, Dewey’s stress on the relationship between common perception and action-coordination directed to governing the effects of the practices in question. Fourth, and particularly importantly, the reflexive character of this starting point, that is, the fact the **efforts at governing the effects of certain practices themselves involve practices which have consequences**. This fourth point is significant because it indicates that Dewey is providing a way of **accounting not only for the emergence and development of** forms of government, but also for **the emergence and development of forms of contesting or governing government** (such as, for example, criticism in the sense of an art of reflexive indocility which protests against being governed like this, at this costs and with these consequences). In other words, Dewey’s **pragmatist approach to the issue of government links perception, knowledge and action in orienting itself to our conduct and the ways in which we seek to conduct our conduct. Although this approach may be readily aligned with the burgeoning literature within IR on government and governance**, a literature prompted in part by Kratochwil and Ruggie,²⁵ it has two significant advantages with respect to this literature. **First, the focus on perception opens up a space within which questions of the background picture informing the discourse and practices of international relations can be perspicuously posed**. Second, its reflexive **application to practices of government and governance clarifies the relationship between government and freedom such that the legitimacy of practices of government is seen to depend not simply on its efficacy but on the consent of those who are governed by it**. This starting point is, as I have noted, very general and since our concern is not with government in general, but with government of the common or public affairs of humanity, it is appropriate to note that Dewey specifies this more restricted sense by distinguishing between public transactions, transactions which have significant effects for others beyond those involved in the transaction, and private transactions, transactions whose significant effects do not extend beyond the parties engaged in the transaction.²⁶ This is still fairly general, not to mention rough and ready, but that may not be a bad thing since, on this account, publics are formed on the basis of the shared practical judgement that a given (type of) transaction has consequences of extensive significance—and it would be wholly against Dewey’s general ethical orientation to seek to specify standards of significance in advance, as I shall illustrate in the next section. It follows from this account that **(political) publics are specified relative to practices of political government in terms of advocating a practice of government at a given level and/or in terms of contesting a practice, or proposed practice, of government. Publics can be local, regional, national, transnational or global, and** publics form, dissolve and reform over time— some may be relatively enduring, others relatively passing. In the contemporary context, we may take it as a strength of Dewey’s approach that **it does not presuppose** what we might call **methodological statecentrism**; on the contrary, **precisely because it takes government as its focus, it is methodologically suited to reflecting not only on states**

but on the whole panoply of agencies involved in government and governance, or in **contesting**
these practices, without prejudging their significance.²⁷

A/T: Roleplaying

While roleplaying may be good, there is no unique reason to restrict that roleplay to the traditional role of the policymaker.

Bleiker, 00 Ph.D. visiting research and teaching affiliations at Harvard, Cambridge, Humboldt, Tampere, Yonsei and Pusan National University as well as the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology and the Institute of Social Studies in The Hague, (Roland, Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics, Cambridge University Press)

Once one conceptualises global politics as a series of overlapping transversal struggles, various new forms of dissent come into view. **Human agency is then no longer limited to the deliberations of statesmen or the strategic victories of military commanders, but takes place in a variety of other, often mundane and unrecognised domains. Dissent, likewise, is no longer solely associated with mass uprisings and other heroic acts of defiance. It is also operative in powerful but largely inaudible processes that take place against the backdrop of great events.** Indeed, more than anywhere else, **transversal dissent is located in countless non-heroic practices that make up the realm of the everyday and its multiple connections with contemporary global life.**

****Discourse**

Framework = Discourse

Framework is discourse and discourse is framework: discourse is the medium through which we comprehend and constitute the world around us.

Bleiker, 00 Ph.D. visiting research and teaching affiliations at Harvard, Cambridge, Humboldt, Tampere, Yonsei and Pusan National University as well as the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology and the Institute of Social Studies in The Hague, (Roland, Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics, Cambridge University Press)

While appreciating these basic assumptions about contemporary global politics, my conceptualisation of transversal dissent embarks on a different path, and this not only because of the problematic statecentric nature around which the structure—agency debate has developed. Instead of articulating issues of agency in relation to structures, my approach relies on what could be called a discourse—agency axis. **Discourses are, in their broadest meaning, frameworks of knowledge and power through which we comprehend (and constitute) the world around us.** Because the conceptual range of a discursive approach is broader than that of a structural one, it is better suited to scrutinise transversal struggles. **The notion of structure, especially as applied in international theory, is intrinsically linked to neorealist, statist and spatial perceptions of world politics. But even outside the realist paradigm, structures often remain too closely identified with institutional practices** and the type of societal order they sustain. **The notion of discourse, by contrast, encapsulates not only the structural terrains of rules and norms, but also a variety of other aspects, such as language and culture, that interfere with the mutually constituted and transversal production of power and knowledge.** 29 **But posing questions of transversal dissent and human agency in relation to discourses breaks theoretical taboos.** It creates various forms of anxieties. There are possible objections from those who employ the concept of discourse in their work. Neither Heidegger nor Foucault, for instance, nor many of their subsequent interpreters, have dealt with questions of agency in an explicit and systematic way. **This omission has often been equated with an image of the world in which human beings are engulfed by discursive webs to the point that action becomes no more than a reflection of externally imposed circumstances. Towards such interpretations my challenge will consist in demonstrating that it is feasible as well as worthwhile to conceptualise the notion of human agency.** In fact, my analysis will seek to show how **this alleged inability or unwillingness to speak of agency is more often than not a reflection of anti-postmodern polemic, rather than a position that is inherent to or advocated by most authors who have sought to apply a discursive approach to the study of global politics.**

Discourse First – Environment

The postmodern critique of “nature” is key to imagining new possibilities for political action regarding the environment

Donna Haraway, professor of the History of Consciousness at the University of California at Santa Cruz, 2004, *The Haraway Reader*, p. 63-64

“The Promises of Monsters” will be a mapping exercise and travelogue through mindscapes and landscapes of what may count as nature in certain local/global struggles. These contests are situated in a strange, allochronic time—the time of myself and my readers in the last decade of the second Christian millennium—and in a foreign,

allotopic place—the womb of a pregnant monster, here, where we are reading and writing. The purpose of this excursion is to write theory;

i.e., to produce a patterned vision of how to move and what to fear in the topography of an impossible but all-too-real present, in order to find an absent, but perhaps possible, other present.

I do not seek the address of some full presence; reluctantly, I know better. Like Christian in Pilgrim’s Progress, however, I am committed to skirting the slough of despond and the parasite-infested swamps of nowhere to reach more salubrious environs.¹ The theory is meant to orient, to provide the roughest sketch for travel, by means of moving within and through a relentless artifactualism, which forbids any

direct si(gh)tings of nature, to a science fictional, speculative factual, SF place called, simply, elsewhere.

At least for those whom this essay addresses, “nature” outside artifactualism is not so much elsewhere as nowhere, a different matter altogether. Indeed, a reflexive artifactualism offers serious political and analytical hope. This essay’s theory is modest. Not a systematic overview, it is a little siting device in a long line of such craft tools. Such sighting devices have been known to reposition worlds for their devotees—and for their opponents. Optical instruments are subject-shifters. Goddess knows, the subject is being changed relentlessly in the late twentieth century. My diminutive theory’s optical features are set to

produce not effects of distance, but effects of connection, of embodiment, and of responsibility for an imagined elsewhere that we may yet learn to see and build here.

I have high stakes in reclaiming vision from the techno-pornographers, those theorists of minds, bodies, and planets who insist effectively—i.e., in practice—that sight is the sense made to realize the fantasies of the phalocrats.² I think sight can be remade for the activists and advocates engaged in fitting political

filters to see the world in the hues of red, green, and ultraviolet, i.e., from the perspectives of a still possible socialism, feminist and anti-racist environmentalism, and science for the people.

I take as a self-evident premise that “science is culture.”³ Rooted in that premise, this essay is a contribution to the heterogeneous and very lively contemporary discourse of science studies as cultural studies. Of course, what science, culture, or nature—and their “studies”—might mean is far less self-evident.

Nature is discursively constructed

Donna Haraway, professor of the History of Consciousness at the University of California at Santa Cruz, 2004, *The Haraway Reader*, p. 67-68

Let us return briefly to my remark above that organisms are not born, but they are made. Besides troping on Simone de Beauvoir’s observation that one is not born a woman, what work is this statement doing in this essay’s effort to articulate a relentless differential/oppositional artifactualism? I wrote that organisms are

made as objects of knowledge in world-changing practices of scientific discourse by particular and always collective actors in specific times and places.

Let us look more closely at this claim with the aid of the concept of the apparatus of bodily production.¹³ Organisms are biological embodiments; as natural-technical entities,

they are not pre-existing plants, animals, protistes, etc., with boundaries already established and awaiting the right kind of instrument to note them correctly. Organisms emerge from a discursive process. Biology is a discourse, not the living world itself. But humans are not the only actors in the construction of the entities of any scientific discourse; machines (delegates that can

produce surprises) and other partners (not “pre- or extra-discursive objects,” but partners) are active constructors of natural scientific objects.

Like other scientific bodies, organisms are not ideological constructions. The whole point about discursive construction has been that it is not about ideology. Always radically historically specific, always lively, bodies have a different kind of specificity and effectivity; and so they invite a different kind of engagement and intervention. Elsewhere, I have used the term “material-semiotic actor” to highlight the object of knowledge as an active part of the apparatus of bodily production, without ever implying immediate presence of such objects or, what is the same thing, their final or unique determination of what can count as objective knowledge of a biological body at a particular historical juncture. Like Katie King’s objects called “poems,” sites of literary production where language also is an actor,

bodies as objects of knowledge are material-semiotic generative nodes. Their boundaries materialize in social interaction among humans and non-humans, including the machines and other instruments that

mediate exchanges at crucial interfaces and that function as delegates for other actors’ functions and purposes. “Objects” like bodies do not pre-exist as such. Similarly,

“nature” cannot pre-exist as such, but neither is its existence ideological. Nature is a commonplace and a powerful discursive construction, effected in the interactions among material-semiotic actors, human and not. The siting/sighting of such entities is not about disengaged discovery, but about mutual and usually unequal structuring, about taking risks, about delegating competences.¹⁴

The various contending biological bodies emerge at the intersection of biological research, writing, and publishing; medical and other business practices; cultural productions of all kinds, including available metaphors and

narratives; **and technology**, such as the visualization technologies that bring color-enhanced killer T cells and intimate photographs of the developing fetus into high-gloss art books, as well as scientific reports. But also invited into that node of intersection is the analogue to the lively languages that actively intertwine in the production of literary value: the coyote and protean embodiments of a world as witty agent and actor. Perhaps **our hopes for accountability for technobiopolitics in the belly of the monster turn on revisioning the world as coding trickster with whom we must learn to converse**. So while the late twentieth-century immune system, for example, is a construct of an elaborate apparatus of bodily production, neither the immune system nor any other of biology's world-changing bodies—like a virus or an ecosystem—is a ghostly fantasy. Coyote is not a ghost, merely a protean trickster.

Critical accounts of nature are key to environmental policymaking

Paul Wapner, associate professor and director of the Global Environmental Policy Program at American University, Winter 2003, Dissent, online:

<http://www.dissentmagazine.org/menutest/archives/2003/wi03/wapner.htm>

Leftist environmental criticism is the work of a group of postmodern intellectuals and professors.

Postmodernists expose the constructed quality of those things we take for granted. They unmask the given and show that "what is" is not necessarily "meant to be," but rather is a consequence of particular decisions and socio-historical conditions. Postmodernism is a natural ally of the left in that it deconstructs existing conditions and shows that, although they may appear natural or necessary, they are really contingent; they can be changed. This is a doctrine that has helped people look critically at their society and consider the possibility of other arrangements. Leftist critiques of environmentalism start from this same premise. **They point out that our notions of nature—the nonhuman world that environmentalists care so much about—are themselves social constructions and thus subject to various interpretations, none of which can provide absolute guidance for environmental policy.** We never experience nature directly but always through the lenses of our own values and assumptions. **"Nature" is thus not simply a physical entity that is "out there" or given; it is an idea that takes on different meanings in different cultural contexts, a social construction that directs us to see mountains, rivers, trees, and deserts in particular ways.** Raymond Williams expressed this understanding when he wrote, "The idea of nature contains, though often unnoticed, an extraordinary amount of human history."

To postmodernists, "nature" is not something the mind discovers but something that it makes. This understanding of "nature" is helpful in guarding against insensitive environmentalist projects.

We often assume that everyone concerned with a particular environmental issue shares the same understanding of the problem. But this is far from being the case. **When it comes to preserving wilderness areas or protecting biological diversity, one person's wilderness is another person's neighborhood. What one person values as an endangered species is potential income, a threat, or dinner to someone else.** Leftist criticism has been important in reminding us that "nature" is not

a single realm with a universalized meaning, but a canvas on which we project our sensibilities, our culture, and our ideas about what is socially necessary. **The postmodern argument also poses challenges for anyone concerned with environmental protection. Environmentalism is fundamentally about conserving and preserving nature. Whether one worries about climate change, loss of biological diversity, dwindling resources, or overall degradation of the earth's air, water, soil, and species, the nonhuman world is the backdrop of concern.** What happens when critics call this backdrop into question? What happens when they claim that one understanding of "nature" is at odds with another and that there is no definitive way to judge which one is better? How can a movement dedicated to protecting nature operate if the very identity of its concern is in doubt?

Discourse First – Intelligibility

Discourse frames thought; systems of domination become dominant by gradually acquiring greater acceptance in the minds of people such that these ways of thinking become normal. Thus systems of discourse decide upon what can and cannot be said socially.

Bleiker, Roland. Co-Director of the University of Queensland's Rotary Centre for International Studies in Peace and Conflict Resolution. Contemporary Political Theory, Volume 2, Number 1, March 2003, pp. 25-47

'It is within discourse,' one of Foucault's much rehearsed passages (1976, 133) notes, **'that power and knowledge articulate each other.'** The work of the French historian and philosopher epitomizes what is at stake in questions of discourse and agency. For Foucault, **discourses are subtle mechanisms that frame our thinking process. They determine the limits of what can be thought, talked and written in a normal and rational way. In every society the production of discourses is controlled, selected, organized and diffused by certain procedures. This process creates systems of exclusion in which one group of discourses is elevated to a hegemonic status, while others are condemned to exile. Discourses give rise to social rules that decide which statements most people recognize as valid, as debatable or as undoubtedly false. They guide the selection process that ascertains which propositions from previous periods or foreign cultures are retained, imported, valued, and which are forgotten or neglected** (see Foucault, 1969, 1971, 1991, 59-60). **Not everything is discourse, but everything is in discourse. Things exist independently of discourses, but we can only assess them through the lenses of discourse, through the practices of knowing, perceiving and sensing, which we have acquired over time. Discourses render social practices intelligible and rational** -- and by doing so mask the ways in which they have been constituted and framed. **Systems of domination gradually become accepted as normal and silently penetrate every aspect of society. They cling to the most remote corners of our mind**, for, as Nietzsche (1983, 17) once expressed it, 'all things that live long are gradually so saturated with reason that their emergence out of unreason thereby becomes improbable.' While providing compelling evidence of subtle forms of domination, a preoccupation with discourses may run the risk of leaving us with an image of the world in which the capacity for human agency is all but erased, annihilated by forces that are not only impenetrable, but also elude human comprehension. In his reading of Nietzsche, for instance, **Foucault portrays the emergence of things (as the concept of goodness) as taking place in a void between the energy of the strong and the reaction of the weak. Since adversaries do not meet directly in this interstice, so we read, no one is responsible for its outcome. 'Only a single drama is ever staged in this "non-place," the endlessly repeated play of dominations'** (Foucault, 1984, 85). If power and domination are so omnipresent, so invincible, how could anything ever change? If, as Foucault implicitly suggests, there is no conversation, no common language, not even a visible discursive meeting between the inside and the outside, the centre and the margin, how could one explain all those challenges from below, the moments when people take to the street and shake, successfully or not, the foundations of the established order? These questions prompted many critics to dismiss approaches that revolve around discursive explanations of social dynamics.

Discourse First - Intelligibility

Discourse key: it is within discourse that the chaos of the world transubstantiates into experience. Serving as the dynamo of normalcy and judgment, discourse renders the world and the social intelligible.

Bleiker, 00 Ph.D. visiting research and teaching affiliations at Harvard, Cambridge, Humboldt, Tampere, Yonsei and Pusan National University as well as the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology and the Institute of Social Studies in The Hague, (Roland, Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics, Cambridge University Press)

Power is not a stable and steady force, something that exists on its own. **There is no essence to power, for its exercise is dependent upon forms of knowledge that imbue certain actions with power**. This is to say that the manner in which we view and frame power also influences how it functions in practice.

'It is within discourse,' Foucault claims, 'that power and knowledge articulate each other.' **31 Discourses are subtle mechanisms that frame our thinking process. They determine the limits of what can be thought, talked and written in a normal and rational way.** In every **society the production of discourses is controlled, selected, organised and diffused by certain procedures.** **This process creates systems of exclusion in which one group of discourses is elevated to a hegemonic status while others are condemned to exile. Discourses give rise to social rules that decide which statements most people recognise as valid, as debatable or as undoubtedly false.**

They guide the selection process that ascertains which propositions from previous periods or foreign cultures are retained, imported, valued, and which are forgotten or neglected. **32** Although these boundaries change, at times gradually, at times abruptly, they maintain a certain unity across time, a unity that dominates and transgresses individual authors, texts or social practices.

Not everything is discourse, but everything is in discourse. Things exist independently of discourses, but we can only assess them through the lenses of discourse, through the practices of knowing, perceiving and sensing which we have acquired over time. Nietzsche:

That mountain there! That cloud there! What is 'real' in that? Subtract the phantasm and every human contribution from it, my sober friends! If you can! If you can forget your descent, your past, your training — all of your humanity and animality. There is no 'reality' for us — not for you either, my sober friends... **33** Nietzsche's point, of course, is not that mountains and clouds do not exist as such. To claim such would be absurd. Mountains and clouds exist no matter what we think about them. And so do more tangible social practices. But they are not 'real' by some objective standard.

Their appearance, meaning and significance is part of human experiences, part of a specific way of life. A Nietzschean position emphasises that **discourses render social practices intelligible and rational — and by doing so mask the ways in which they have been constituted and framed.**

Systems of domination gradually become accepted as normal and silently penetrate every aspect of society. They cling to the most remote corners of our mind, for 'all things that live long are gradually so saturated with reason that their emergence out of unreason thereby becomes improbable'. **34**

Discourses are more than just masking agents. They provide us with frameworks to view the world, and by doing so influence its course. Discourses express ways of life that actively shape social practices. But more is needed to demonstrate how the concept of discourse can be of use to illuminate transversal dissident practices. More is needed to outline a positive notion of human agency that is not based on stable foundations. This section has merely located the terrains that are to be explored. It is now up to the following chapters to introduce, step by step, the arguments and evidence necessary to develop and sustain a discursive understanding of transversal dissent and its ability to exert human agency.

Discourse First - Intelligibility

Since sensory input is only expressed in discourse, language becomes simply a stand in for actual objects, a representation of a metaphorical interpretation of the world which necessarily interprets and distorts it to our own, personal views which later become constituted in larger ideologies.

Critique exposes the fact that claims to authentic knowledge is impossible.

Bleiker, 00 Ph.D. visiting research and teaching affiliations at Harvard, Cambridge, Humboldt, Tampere, Yonsei and Pusan National University as well as the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology and the Institute of Social Studies in The Hague, (Roland, Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics, Cambridge University Press)

Nietzsche played an important role in the debate about language, for he opened up, Foucault stresses, the possibility of connecting philosophical tasks with radical reflections on language. 4

Language, Nietzsche argues, can never provide us with pure, unmediated knowledge of the world. Thinking can at best grasp imperfect perceptions of things because a word is nothing but an image of a nerve stimulus expressed in sounds. It functions, to simplify his argument, as follows: **a person's intuitive perception creates an image, then a word, then patterns of words, and finally entire linguistic and cultural systems. Each step in this chain of metaphors entails interpretations and distortions of various kinds. When we look at things around us, Nietzsche illustrates, we think we know something objective about them, something of 'the thing in itself'. But all we have are metaphors, which can never capture an essence because they express the relationship between people and things.** 5 For Nietzsche, language systems are sets of prejudices that are expressed via metaphors, selectively filtered images of objects and phenomena that surround us. We cannot but live in conceptual 'prisons' that permit us to take only very narrow and sporadic glimpses at the outside world, glimpses that must entail, eby definition, fundamental errors of judgement. 6

But **there is more to the problem of language than its imperfections as a medium of expression. Languages embody the relationship between people and their environment.** They are part of a larger discursive struggle over meaning and interpretation, an integral element of politics. We are often not aware of this function of language. The process of forgetting that we have been conditioned by linguistically entrenched values largely camouflages the systems of exclusion that are operative in all speech forms. We become accustomed to our distorting metaphors until we 'lie herd-like in a style obligatory for all'. 7 As a result, factuality, observation, judgement and linguistic representation blur to the point that the boundaries between them become all but effaced: This has given me the greatest trouble and still does: to realize that **what things are called is incomparably more important than what they are. The reputation, name, and appearance, the usual measure and weight of a thing, what it counts for — originally almost always wrong and arbitrary, thrown over things like a dress and altogether foreign to their nature and even to their skin — all this grows from generation unto generation, merely because people believe in it, until it gradually grows to be part of the thing and turns into its very body.** What at first was appearance becomes in the end, almost invariably, the essence and is effective as such. 8

As soon as one problematises the existence of objectified values one must recognise that there cannot be authentic knowledge of the world, knowledge that is not in one way or another linked to the values of the perceiver and the language through which s/he gives meaning to social practices. Truth, Nietzsche thus says in a famous passage, is no more than 'a mobile army of metaphors, metonyms and anthropomorphisms — in short, a sum of human relations, which have been enhanced, transposed, and embellished poetically and rhetorically, and which after long use seem firm, canonical, and obligatory to a people: truths are illusions about which one has forgotten that this is what they are'. 9

Discourse First – Political Categories

Language is politics: a discursive analysis of those perspectives that otherwise appear completely and objectively true reveals that they are simply entrenched in discourse.

Bleiker, 00 Ph.D. visiting research and teaching affiliations at Harvard, Cambridge, Humboldt, Tampere, Yonsei and Pusan National University as well as the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology and the Institute of Social Studies in The Hague, (Roland, Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics, Cambridge University Press)

To recognise that language is politics is to acknowledge that form and substance cannot be separated. The manner in which a text is written, a speech is uttered, a thought is thought, is integral to its content. There is no neutral form of representing the world, a form that is somehow detached from the linguistic and social practices in which the speaker or writer is embedded. Science and philosophy, empirical analyses and literature, mathematics and poetry, are all bound by the form through which they convey their ideas. Being built on specific grammatical and rhetorical structures, **all of these stories and accounts,** Michael Shapiro points out, **implicitly advance political arguments. All of them, 'no matter how much their style might protest innocence, contain a mythical level — that is they have a job to do, a perspective to promote, a kind of world to affirm or deny'.** ⁶ This is not to say that every account of social dynamics is equally insightful or valid. But it is to accept that **linguistic practices are metaphorical. Some tropes, however, have been so extensively rehearsed and are so deeply entrenched in linguistic and cultural traditions that they appear as authentic representations of the real. Dissent in global politics is the process that interferes with such objectifications.**

Regarding the interactions of nation-states on an international level, representations are a crucial part to successful analysis of policy options. The way in which the US constructs its relation to other nations relies heavily on spatial representations which change how international politics can function.

Campbell et al, 07, David, Professor of Geography at the University of Durham, (Alison J. Williams, Post-Doctoral Research Associate in the International Boundaries Research Unit in the Department of Geography at Durham University; Luiza Bialasiewicz, Professor of Geography at Royal Holloway University, London; Stuart Elden, Professor of Geography at Durham; Alex Jeffrey, Professor of Geography, Politics & Sociology at the University of Newcastle-upon-Tyne; Stephen Graham, Professor of Geography at Durham, "Performing security: The imaginary geographies of current US strategy", Political Geography, Vol. 26, p. 406-407)

For although the United States may construct itself as the undisputed leader in the new global scenario, its "right" – and the right of its moral-political "mission" of spreading "freedom and justice" – relies on its amplification and support by allies. **The construction of the United States' world role relies also on the selective placement and representation of other international actors who are "hailed" into specific subject positions** (see Weldes, Laffey, Gusterson, & Duvall, 1999). **Of course, different actors are granted different roles and different degrees of agency in the global script: the place of key European allies is different from that bestowed upon the peripheral and semi-peripheral states that make part of the "coalition of the willing". Both, however, are vital in sustaining the representation of the US as the leader of a shared world of values and ideals.** Indeed, the 'lone superpower' has little influence in the absence of support. Another important dimension of integration as the key strategic concept is its dissolution of the inside/outside spatialization of security policy. The concluding lines of the "Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support" are particularly telling. It contends that the Department of Defense can "no longer think in terms of the 'home' game and the 'away' game. There is only one game" (Department of Defense, 2005b: 40). In part this is directed at the previous failure to anticipate an attack from within: indeed, the Strategy remarks that the September 11th 2001 attacks "originated in US airspace and highlighted weaknesses in domestic radar coverage and interagency air defense coordination" (2005b: 22). In other words, the US needs to ensure the security of its homeland from within as much as without, to treat home as away. In part, however, **such rhetoric also reflects a continuity with and reiteration of broader understandings with a much longer history, promoted by a range of US "intellectuals of statecraft" since the end of the Cold War: understandings that specified increasingly hard territorialisations of security and identity both at home and abroad to counter the "geopolitical vertigo"** (see O'Tuathail, 1996) of the post-bipolar era. It is important to note here, moreover, that the 2002 National Security Strategy's affirmation that "today, the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs is diminishing" (The White House, 2002b: 30) also involves the US treating away as a home, or at least, as a concern. From this we can see how the pursuit of integration enables the territorial integrity of other sovereign states to be violated in its name, as specific places are targeted to either ensure or overcome their exclusion (see Elden, 2005). As an example, consider this statement, which recalls the late 1970s enunciation of an 'arc of crisis' stretching from the Horn of Africa through the Middle East to Afghanistan: "There exists an 'arc of instability' stretching from the Western Hemisphere, through Africa and the Middle East and extending to Asia. There are areas in this arc that serve as breeding grounds for threats to our interests. Within these areas rogue states provide sanctuary to terrorists, protecting them from surveillance and attack" (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2004: 5). In his foreword to the 2002 National Security Strategy, Bush declared that "We will defend the peace by fighting terrorists and tyrants. We will preserve the peace by building good relations among the great powers. We will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent" (Bush, 2002b: i). **This notion of extension is crucial in**

understanding the explicitly spatial overtones of this strategy of integration: more than merely about values, democracy and capitalism, it is about a performative geopolitics. Put crudely, it is about specifying the geographies of world politics; it is about specifying “the ways the world (now) is” – a presumably descriptive “geopolitical exercise” but that, as all such exercises, also implicitly contains the prescription for putting the world “right”.

Discourse shapes the role of the subject and the object jointly; both nation-states and specific policies are contextualized in terms of the constitutive discourses around them. This means that discursive evaluation is both inherently political and necessary to the analysis of political impacts. Campbell et al, 07, David, Professor of Geography at the University of Durham, (Alison J. Williams, Post-Doctoral Research Associate in the International Boundaries Research Unit in the Department of Geography at Durham University; Luiza Bialasiewicz, Professor of Geography at Royal Holloway University, London; Stuart Elden, Professor of Geography at Durham; Alex Jeffrey, Professor of Geography, Politics & Sociology at the University of Newcastle-upon-Tyne; Stephen Graham, Professor of Geography at Durham, “Performing security: The imaginary geographies of current US strategy”, Political Geography, Vol. 26, p. 406-407)

In recent years there has been a growing interest in the relationship between imaginative geographies and the foreign and security policies of states (Agnew, 2003; Power & Crampton, 2005). Such policies are said to be both enabled by and productive of specific geographical imaginations. **Too often, though, these analyses are understood as advocating a form of social constructivism, whereby linguistic enunciations and textual statements are** (the critics maintain) **determinative of material practices. This conception invites a misreading of constructivism-as-philosophical idealism,** leading to the assertion that if policy makers thought differently the world would automatically be different. Even within critical geopolitics a trace of this concern is evident when we are warned that the project of critical geopolitics “should not be condensed to a formulaic deconstructionism of the politics of identity in texts” (O’Tuathail, 2003: 164). In this paper we critically examine recent developments in US strategy, drawing attention to the way in which the imagination of place creates political and spatial realities (Gregory, 2004; Kuus, 2004). This argument relies, in the first instance, on an exploration of the new security texts that have been produced in the post-Cold War era and, more recently, in the aftermath of the attacks of September 11th 2001, an event which has attracted much attention in the field (see Harvey, 2003; Smith, 2005; Sparke, 2005). However, we wish to reposition the terms of the debate by arguing that **in the discursive production of imaginative geographies it is performativity rather than construction which is the better theoretical assumption. Discourse refers to a specific series of representations and practices through which meanings are produced, identities constituted, social relations established, and political and ethical outcomes made more or less possible. Those employing the concept are often said** to be claiming that ‘everything is language’, **that** ‘there is no reality’, and **because of their linguistic idealism, they are unable to take a political position and defend an ethical stance. These objections demonstrate how understandings of discourse are bedevilled by the view that interpretation involves only language in contrast to the external, the real, and the material.** These dichotomies of idealism/materialism and realism/idealism remain powerful conceptions of understanding the world. In practice, however, a concern with discourse does not involve a denial of the world’s existence or the significance of materiality. This is well articulated by Laclau and Mouffe (1985: 108): **“the fact that every object is constituted as an object of discourse has nothing to do with whether there is a world external to thought, or with the realism/ idealism opposition. What is denied is not that objects exist externally to thought, but the rather different assertion that they could constitute themselves as objects outside of any discursive condition of emergence.”** This means that **while nothing exists outside of discourse, there are important distinctions between linguistic and non-linguistic phenomena.** There are also modes of representation which are ideational though strictly non-linguistic, such as the aesthetic and pictorial. It is just that **there is no way of comprehending non-linguistic and extradiscursive phenomena except through discursive practices.** **Understanding discourse as involving both the ideal and the material, the linguistic and the non-linguistic, means that discourses are performative. Performative means that discourses**

constitute the objects of which they speak. For example, states are made possible by a wide range of discursive practices that include immigration policies, military deployments and strategies, cultural debates about normal social behaviour, political speeches and economic investments. The meanings, identities, social relations and political assemblages that are enacted in these performances combine the ideal and the material. They are either made or represented in the name of a particular state but that state does not pre-exist those performances. As a consequence, appreciating that discourses are performative moves us away from a reliance on the idea of (social) construction towards materialization, whereby discourse “stabilizes over time to produce the effect of boundary, fixity and surface” (Butler, 1993: 9, 12). Discourse is thus not something that subjects use in order to describe objects; it is that which constitutes both subjects and objects.

Discourse First – Policymaking

Policymaking cannot escape the nature of actions as preconstituted in language- the creation of a single acceptable description of actions is vital to preventing engagement or discussion of these acts, meaning that in a vacuum there is no way to evaluate policy without kritik.

Patton 97, professor of philosophy at the University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia (Paul, “The World Seen From Within: Deleuze and the Philosophy of Events”, Theory and Event 1:1, 1997)

□ There is a parallel here with the views of Anscombe and others in the philosophy of action, according to which actions (a special class of events) are always events under a description. This is because actions involve intentions and intentions presuppose some description of what it is that the agent intends to do. On this view, the bare occurrence (or numerical identity) of actions might be specifiable in purely physical terms, but their identity as actions of a particular kind involves reference to appropriate descriptions. 4 There is thus a necessary connection between the identity of the action and the manner in which it would be described by the agent.

Moreover, to the degree that events involving non-human agencies such as corporate bodies, political movements and nation states are understood in terms of the model of rational action, this connection applies in the case of a broad range of social and political events. Thus, while it may be true that by installing offensive missiles the Soviet authorities reinforced the defensive capabilities of Cuba, this might not be an appropriate description of their action. 5 The same action may have multiple (true) descriptions, but it is not always possible to substitute one description of an action for another in contexts that involve reference to the beliefs or intentions of agents.

□ This thesis about the dependence of actions upon descriptions implies that the nature of such events is not exhausted by any particular description or set of descriptions. Ian Hacking explores some surprising consequences of this thesis. One is the phenomena to which Nietzsche and Foucault drew attention, namely that new forms of description of human behavior make possible new kinds of action. Only after the discursive characterization of behavior in terms of juvenile delinquency or split personality was established did it become possible for individuals to conceive of themselves and therefore to act as delinquents or splits. Not all discursive constructions of subjectivity open up new possibilities for action: some may serve to invalidate or remove possibilities for action. Hacking cites the case of a bill brought before the British Parliament which sought to pardon retrospectively several hundred soldiers who were shot for desertion during the First World War, on the grounds that they would now be regarded as suffering from post-traumatic stress. 6 Such a redescription would pathologize the action of the deserters, retrospectively transforming their actions into symptoms. In other cases, the aim of retroactive redescription is to render reprehensible behavior that was formerly acceptable, as for example, when the European 'settlement' of Aboriginal land in the Australian colonies is redescribed as invasion.

□ The second surprising conclusion which Hacking draws from this account of the nature of actions is that there is no simple fact of the matter which enables us to say whether such redesignations are correct or incorrect. It follows that the nature of past actions is essentially indeterminate: one and the same event may be expressed in an open-ended series of statements. In other words, generalizing the Anscombe thesis about actions points in the same direction as Deleuze's Stoic thesis about the relationship between events and the forms of their linguistic expression: while the event proper or pure event is not reducible to the manner in which it appears or is incarnated in particular states of affairs, the nature of the incarnate or

impure event is closely bound up with the forms of its expression. Moreover, since the manner in which a given occurrence is described or 'represented' within a given social context determines it as a particular kind of event, there is good reason for political actors to contest accepted descriptions.

Discourse First - Policymaking

Assuming that language is a value neutral medium makes it impossible to truly evaluate policymaking, the inherently political nature of language must be realized so that challenges to the 'objectivity' and 'rationality' of policymaking can be heard convincingly.

Bleiker, 00 Ph.D. visiting research and teaching affiliations at Harvard, Cambridge, Humboldt, Tampere, Yonsei and Pusan National University as well as the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology and the Institute of Social Studies in The Hague, (Roland, Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics, Cambridge University Press)

Language is one of the most fundamental aspects of human life. It is omnipresent. It penetrates every aspect of transversal politics, from the local to the global. We speak, Heidegger stresses, when we are awake and when we are asleep, even when we do not utter a single word. We speak when we listen, read or silently pursue an occupation. We are always speaking because we cannot think without language, because 'language is the house of Being', the home within which we dwell. 2

But languages are never neutral. They embody particular values and ideas. They are an integral part of transversal power relations and of global politics in general. Languages impose sets of assumptions on us, frame our thoughts so subtly that we are mostly unaware of the systems of exclusion that are being entrenched through this process.

And yet, a language is not just a form of domination that engulfs the speaker in a web of discursive constraints, it is also a terrain of dissent, one that is not bound by the political logic of national boundaries. Language is itself a form of action — the place where possibilities for social change emerge, where values are slowly transformed, where individuals carve out thinking space and engage in everyday forms of resistance. In short, language epitomises the potential and limits of discursive forms of transversal dissent.

The policymaking paradigm is like a completed version of Orwell's 'newspeak' – it displaces language which it sees as a threat in favor of the common and popular methods which fall prey to the same domination that policymakers purport to avoid.

Bleiker, 00 Ph.D. visiting research and teaching affiliations at Harvard, Cambridge, Humboldt, Tampere, Yonsei and Pusan National University as well as the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology and the Institute of Social Studies in The Hague, (Roland, Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics, Cambridge University Press)

Discourse and language are forms of concealment that offer opportunities to reveal. They are transversal forms of domination that offer opportunities to resist and transform. These practices of concealing and revealing must be examined in their cyclical existence. Without paying attention to the domineering aspects of language one cannot understand its potential for resistance. This is not unproblematic. For many authors the subjugating power of language is overwhelming. According to Heidegger 'man acts as though he were the shaper and master of language, while in fact language remains the master of man'. 22 Benjamin Lee Whorf, in his path-breaking study of Hopi conceptualisations of time and space, object and subject, argues that the individual is utterly unaware of the power of language to construct his/her consciousness and 'constrained completely within its unbreakable bonds'. 23 Roland Barthes goes even further in his notorious remarks during the inaugural lecture at the Collège de France. For him, freedom can exist only outside language. But languages have no outside. A language always imposes. It is, in this sense, 'neither reactionary nor progressive, it is simply fascist, for fascism does not prevent speech, it forces speech'. 24 Barthes' claim, largely dismissed as polemics, has the merit of reminding us that there is always an aspect of subjugation in the use of languages, no matter how objective, neutral and open they may appear.

George Orwell's fictional world provides a perfect illustration for this subjugating power of languages. Consider how Oceania introduced Newspeak to accommodate its official ideology, Ingsoc. New words were invented and undesirable ones either eliminated or stripped of unorthodox meanings. The objective of this exercise was that 'when Newspeak had been adopted once and for all and Oldspeak forgotten, a heretical thought — that is, a thought diverging from the principles of Ingsoc — should be literally unthinkable'. 25 By then history would be rewritten to the point that even if fragments of documents from the past were still to surface, they simply would be unintelligible and untranslatable.

Discourse shapes policymaking- in order to even think status quo issues in the traditional way requires first that those issues be created through performative action – in short, the reason the problem is a problem is because it was first constructed as such in a discursive arena. This makes weighing representations uniquely key because they constitute the root cause of potentially harmful policymaking decisions.

Campbell et al, 07, David, Professor of Geography at the University of Durham, (Alison J. Williams, Post-Doctoral Research Associate in the International Boundaries Research Unit in the Department of Geography at Durham University; Luiza Bialasiewicz, Professor of Geography at Royal Holloway University, London; Stuart Elden, Professor of Geography at Durham; Alex Jeffrey, Professor of Geography, Politics & Sociology at the University of Newcastle-upon-Tyne; Stephen Graham, Professor of Geography at Durham, “Performing security: The imaginary geographies of current US strategy”, Political Geography, Vol. 26, p. 406-407)

Again, it is essential that we conceptualize these strategies as both containing and making imaginative geographies; specifying the ways “the world is” and, in so doing, actively (re)-making that same world. This goes beyond merely the military action or aid programmes that governments follow, but indicates a wider concern with the production of ways of seeing the world, which percolate through media, popular imaginations as well as political strategy.

These performative imaginative geographies are at the heart of this paper and will re-occur throughout it. Our concern lies specifically with the ways in which the US portrays and over the past decade has portrayed certain parts of the world as requiring involvement, as threats, as zones of instability, as rogue states, “states of concern”, as “global hotspots”, as well as the associated suggestion that by bringing these within the “integrated” zones of democratic peace, US security – both economically and militarily – can be preserved. Of course, the translation of such imaginations into actual practice (and certainly results) is never as simple as some might like to suggest. Nonetheless, what we wish to highlight here is how these strategies, in essence, produce the effect they name. This, again, is nothing new: the United States has long constituted its identity at least in part through discourses of danger that materialize others as a threat (see Campbell, 1992). Equally, much has been written about the new set of threats and enemies that emerged to fill the post-Soviet void from radical Islam through the war on drugs to “rogue states” (for a critical analyses see, among others, Benjamin & Simon, 2003; Stokes, 2005; on the genealogies of the idea of “rogue states” see Blum, 2002; Litwak, 2000). What is crucial in the rendering of these strategies, rather, is how those perceived threats are to be dealt with. PNAC, for instance, urged Clinton to take a more hawkish line on Iraq in a 1998 letter (signed by many who would later populate the Bush administration), which concluded with an exhortation: “We urge you to act decisively. If you act now to end the threat of weapons of mass destruction against the U.S. or its allies, you will be acting in the most fundamental national security interests of the country. If we accept a course of weakness and drift, we put our interests and our future at risk” (PNAC, 1998).

Discourse First - Policymaking

The way in which seemingly objective discourse encouraging certain calculations functions is through performative strategies. It will be impossible to understand why these strategies function without first examining them as performances. (Or- Discourse shapes future political activities and thus discursive analysis is better than policymaking)

Campbell et al, 07, David, Professor of Geography at the University of Durham, (Alison J. Williams, Post-Doctoral Research Associate in the International Boundaries Research Unit in the Department of Geography at Durham University; Luiza Bialasiewicz, Professor of Geography at Royal Holloway University, London; Stuart Elden, Professor of Geography at Durham; Alex Jeffrey, Professor of Geography, Politics & Sociology at the University of Newcastle-upon-Tyne; Stephen Graham, Professor of Geography at Durham, "Performing security: The imaginary geographies of current US strategy", Political Geography, Vol. 26, p. 406-407)

To understand the power of the imaginative geographies guiding current US strategy it is important to look back at the recitation, reiteration and resignification of previous strategic formulations. During the Clinton years, **a number of figures** who had been involved in various guises in previous Republican administrations **wrote widely on the geopolitical opportunities and threats of a post-Cold War era. From specifications of the threat posed by international terrorism, 'failed states' and 'rogue regimes', to the dangers posed by cultural/civilisational conflicts.** The individuals and institutions we choose to examine in this section are those whose **geographical imaginations have been central in laying the ground for some of the securitizing strategies of the current Bush administration and, specifically, whose work has been key in specifying the importance of "integrating" a chaotic world where conflict is inevitable.** The writers whose work we highlight here occupy a liminal position within policy circles. **While not paid members of the administration, they have either occupied such positions in the past or were aspiring to them in the future. They do not, therefore, directly speak for the state (a position that grants them a veneer of "objectivity"), and they navigate in the interstices between academic and "policy-oriented" research: a location that, in turn, absolves them from the rigors of a scholarly discipline, including disciplinary critique.** By the term **'non-state scribes'** we wish to indicate those who **occupy a liminal zone between academic and nonacademic work, working in a range of governmental and private research centres, think-tanks and study groups.** What we would like to highlight are some of the ways in which **their influence problematises simple, secure understandings of the state and the constitution of 'state-interest'.** While these individuals appear as impartial commentators-cum-advisers-cumanalysts, **their access to policy circles is open, if not privileged. To the extent that their geographical imaginations are invoked by state power, they are also today's consummate "intellectuals of statecraft": those who "designate a world** and 'fill' it with certain dramas, subjects, histories and dilemmas" (O 'Tuathail & Agnew, 1992: 192). Certainly the most prominent self-styled 'community of experts' intersecting with the Bush administration is the Project for a New American Century (for critical analysis see Sparke, 2005). **The PNAC, founded in the spring of 1997, defines itself as a "non-profit, educational organization whose goal is to promote American global leadership" (see PNAC, 2006). Putatively lying outside "formal" policy networks, the Project from its inception has aimed to provide the intellectual basis for continued US military dominance** and especially the willingness to use its military might. As sole hegemon, PNAC argued, the US could not "avoid the responsibilities of global leadership". But it should not simply "react" to threats as they present themselves: it should, rather, actively shape the global scenario before such threats emerge: "the history of the 20th century should have taught us that it is important to shape circumstances before crises emerge, and to meet threats before they become dire" (PNAC, 2000: i). The resonance of these views with those of the Bush administration should come as no surprise: **among the Project's founders were individuals who had held posts in previous Republican administrations and went on to serve in Bush's cabinet:**

Vice-President Dick Cheney, former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and his deputy and now World Bank President Paul Wolfowitz, along with the former ambassador to Iraq (and soon to be US Ambassador to the UN) Zalmay Khalilzad, in addition to well known neoconservatives shaping policy debates in the US today, including Francis Fukuyama, Norman Podhoretz, and William Kristol (see Fukuyama, 2006; Williams, 2005). Unsurprisingly, the most explicit formulation of what would become goals of the Bush administration can be found in the PNAC's manifesto *Rebuilding America's Defenses*, which appeared in the election year of 2000. Here and in subsequent documents, the PNAC envisages the US military's role to be fourfold: "Defend the American Homeland"; "fight and decisively win multiple, simultaneous major theatre wars"; "perform the 'constabulary' duties associated with shaping the security environment in critical regions"; and "transform U.S. forces to exploit the 'revolution in military affairs'" (PNAC, 2000: iv, 5; cf. The White House, 2002b: 30).

Discourses are intrinsic to political calculation- ignoring their importance is tantamount to saying that the president has no role in shaping policymaking.

Campbell et al, 07, David, Professor of Geography at the University of Durham, (Alison J. Williams, Post-Doctoral Research Associate in the International Boundaries Research Unit in the Department of Geography at Durham University; Luiza Bialasiewicz, Professor of Geography at Royal Holloway University, London; Stuart Elden, Professor of Geography at Durham; Alex Jeffrey, Professor of Geography, Politics & Sociology at the University of Newcastle-upon-Tyne; Stephen Graham, Professor of Geography at Durham, "Performing security: The imaginary geographies of current US strategy", *Political Geography*, Vol. 26, p. 406-407)

It is, finally, important to call attention to the difference between performativity and performance.

Performativity is a discursive mode through which ontological effects (the idea of the autonomous subject or the notion of the pre-existing state) **are established. Performativity thereby challenges the notion of the naturally existing subject. But it does not eradicate the appearance of the subject or the idea of agency. Performance presumes a subject and occurs within the conditions of possibility brought into being by the infrastructure of performativity.** This is especially important when it comes to considering the role of named individuals in the development and furtherance of security policy. Although the citation of such names gives the appearance of wilful subjects exercising agency with volition, we argue in this paper, **despite calling attention to the performances of individuals or policies, that the continuities between groups of security officials and the arguments they propagate demonstrate the importance of performativity** (especially recitation and reiteration as constraints on those performances) **in the production of policy.**

Methodologically this approach requires an alternative model of explanation, one best explicated by the argument of William Connolly (2005: 869) that classical models of explanation based on "efficient causality" – whereby "you first separate factors and then show how one is the basic cause, or they cause each other, or how they together reflect a more basic cause" – need to give way to the idea of "emergent causality". In this conception, **politics is understood as a resonant process in which diverse elements infiltrate into the others, metabolizing into a moving complex** – causation as resonance between elements that become fused together to a considerable degree. Here causality, as relations of dependence between separate factors, morphs into energized complexities of mutual imbrication and interinvolvement, in which heretofore unconnected or loosely associated elements fold, blend, emulsify, and dissolve into each other, forging a qualitative assemblage resistant to classical models of explanation

(Connolly, 2005: 870. See also Connolly, 2004).

In this context, **it is important to understand what an individually named subject signifies, and how we can understand the place of agency within performativity once pre-given subjectivity is contested.** In his account of the contemporary American political condition, William Connolly argues that, in contradistinction to any idea of a conspiratorial cabal exercising command, the US is run by a "theo-econopolitical [resonance] machine" in which the Republican party, evangelical Christians, elements of the electronic media and "cowboy capitalists" come together in emergent and resonant, rather than efficient, relationships (Connolly, 2005: 878).

This means the major public figures like the President and prominent media commentators need to be understood in particular ways. As Connolly (2005: 877) argues: It is pertinent to see how figures such as Bush and O'Reilly dramatize the resonance machine. But while doing so, it is critical to remember that they would merely be oddball characters unless they triggered, expressed and amplified a resonance machine larger than them. They are catalyzing agents and shimmering points in the machine; their departure will weaken it only if it does not spawn new persona to replace them.

Discursive Critique key to Change

Language and politics is indistinct since language is the field under which all things, including politics, are constituted.

Bleiker, 00 Ph.D. visiting research and teaching affiliations at Harvard, Cambridge, Humboldt, Tampere, Yonsei and Pusan National University as well as the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology and the Institute of Social Studies in The Hague, (Roland, *Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics*, Cambridge University Press)

But were these poetic dissident activities, as some fear, a mere play with words, intellectual games devoid of social significance? Not necessarily. Language is always already politics. The links between words and what they signify may not be authentic, but they are constituted as real through the language in which they are embedded. And the ensuing forms of representation, partial and subjective as they are, become our social and political realities. Hence, to engage with language is to engage directly in social struggle. In this sense, poetic dissent is as real and often as effective as the practices of international *Realpolitik*.

Discourse is better than policymaking, it creates the possibility for alternative modes of expression which policymaking automatically rules out.

Bleiker, 98 asst. prof. of International Studies at Pusan National University (Roland, "Retracing and redrawing the boundaries of events: Postmodern interferences with international theory", *Alternatives*, Oct-Dec 1998, Vol. 23, Issue 4)

"Inventions from the unknown," the poet Arthur Rimbaud says, "demand new forms." [37] New forms of speaking create preconditions for new forms of acting.

Opening up different ways of identifying events, of seeing and feeling reality, can occur only through language. It is a process saturated with obstacles and contradictions, obscurities and frustrations. It is never complete. It may not even happen. It certainly does not happen always.

Language has no outside. Only different insides.

There is no easy language. There are only worn-out metaphors.

(How to locate forms of writing and thinking that may turn into new forms of acting and living?)

The point is to stretch language up to its limits: beyond the encrusted layers of silencing speech habits, but only as far as the roots still touch the ground. Disentangle knots of words, liberate from them laughter, shouts, gazes, variations, sensitivities, multiplicities. But do not disregard the manner in which a particular language is embedded in concrete social practices.

"Any war against a form of language," Michael Shapiro says, "must come from within." [38]

Contracting Contradictions

Live the life of contradictions. The contradictions of life. Think through contradictions, not against them. Write about contradictions, not around them. Don't cut off the edges that bother you. They will never fit into your box, even without edges.

(Instead of continuously trying to fill the void left by the fallen God, postmodern thought no longer searches for alternative Archimedean foundations. The increasingly transversal events of contemporary world politics require more than ever that one accepts ambiguities and deals with the fragmented nature of life in the late twentieth century. One must try to comprehend international relations by relying on various forms of insight and levels of analysis even if they are incommensurable and contradict each other's internal logic.

An event like the fall of the Berlin Wall has multiple faces. It is too complex to be viewed adequately through one set of lenses. The masses of people that took to the streets in November 1989 were only one of many factors that contributed to the downfall of the existing regime. Other crucial influences include the evolution of the Soviet-led alliance system, the existence of a second German state, economic decay, or the obsolescence of domestic systems of threats and privileges.

Each of these political sites offers possibilities for different readings of the event in question, readings that may contradict each other. Each provides a unique fragment of insight into the fall of the Berlin Wall. None of them can have the last word. Only in their incomplete and perhaps contradictory complementariness can these insights provide something that resembles an adequate understanding of what happened.)

Discursive approaches to social change are key to understanding social processes that transgress the spatial givenness of global politics.

Bleiker, OO Ph.D. visiting research and teaching affiliations at Harvard, Cambridge, Humboldt, Tampere, Yonsei and Pusan National University as well as the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology and the Institute of Social Studies in The Hague, (Roland, Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics, Cambridge University Press)

The main theoretical task of this endeavour is to facilitate a discursive understanding of power that not only explains, as the previous chapter did, the continuity of domination, but also accounts for practices of dissent and their influence on processes of societal transformation. Such is, of course, an unduly ambitious task. For now the analysis merely locates the broad grounds where such transformations take place. In doing so, the present chapter builds a stepping stone for the third and last part of this book, which articulates a non-essentialist notion of human agency by exploring discourse-oriented terrains of transversal dissent.

Antonio Gramsci's concept of **hegemony is well suited to scrutinise the slow transformation of values that contributed to the collapse of the Berlin Wall.** A focus on the discursive struggle for hegemony explains how **processes of social change are unleashed when a world-view hostile to the prevalent social order has come to be accepted as legitimate and moral by most of the population.** A re-reading of East German politics reveals how such dynamics took place in a transversal context, constantly interweaving domestic social dynamics with discursive forces that operate at global levels. Reading Gramsci in addition to Foucault can overcome the difficulties of locating power. It can counter pessimistic readings of Foucault that interpret his work as an annihilation of human agency. But a fusion of Gramsci and Foucault is not without its problems. The former pays attention to broad hegemonic practices, while the latter focuses on difference and multiplicities.

The key to understanding the complexities of transversal struggles lies precisely in working through such paradoxes, in relying on various forms of insight, even if they are at times incommensurable. With this sense of fragmentation in mind, the present chapter demonstrates how **a discursive approach may facilitate a broad understanding of processes of social change that transgress the spatial givenness of global politics.** Later chapters then embark on a more finely attuned analysis that theorises possibilities for transversal dissent that arise from the thin and fragmented nature of discursive dynamics.

Discursive Critique key to Agency

The critique of language is key: though language is inescapable, the critique of language articulates resistance at the edges of linguistic meaning.

Bleiker, 00 Ph.D. visiting research and teaching affiliations at Harvard, Cambridge, Humboldt, Tampere, Yonsei and Pusan National University as well as the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology and the Institute of Social Studies in The Hague, (Roland, Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics, Cambridge University Press)

How can one turn language from a system of exclusion to a practice of inclusion, from a method of domination to an instrument of resistance? And how can one appreciate the transversal dimensions that are entailed in these sites of everyday struggle? The starting point lies with what is aptly called Sprachkritik in German. Literally translated as 'critique of language', **Sprachkritik is, at least according to the linguist Fritz Mauthner, 'the most important task (Geschäft) of thinking humanity'.** The poet Paul Valéry probably captured its objective best when claiming that 'the secret of well founded thinking is based on suspicion towards language'. **30 If challenges to practices of domination and attempts to open up thinking space are to avoid being absorbed by the dominant discourse, then they must engage in a struggle with conventionally recognised linguistic practices,** or at least with the manner in which these practices have been constituted. **The form of speaking and writing becomes as important as their content. Dissent cannot be separated from critique of language,** for it remains ineffective as long as it does not interfere with the ways in which linguistic systems of exclusion constitute and objectivise social practices.

But can a language so easily be appropriated as a tool of dissent against its own subjugating power? Is it enough, as Nietzsche suggests, **to 'create new names, estimations and probabilities to create eventually new "things."** **31 Of course not.**

One can never be free within language. One can never break free from language. The point is, rather, to acknowledge that **an individual has no possibility to function as an authentic perceiver or agent, that the spaces for action opened up by critique are still circumscribed by the larger boundaries of linguistic structures.** Moreover, critique of language must be careful not to be trapped in an idealism that suggests the world exists only because it is perceived by our mind, that objects outside this mental sphere have no qualities of their own. **Such a working assumption would go astray in a futile search for the perfect language and, by doing so, fall back into the logical positivism** from which the later Wittgenstein so carefully tried to escape. Because there is no direct and logical correspondence between words and meaning, between a name and a thing, a spear-heading into unexplored linguistic terrains can only be socially meaningful if it stretches the rules of existing language games while never losing sight of the ways in which these language games constitute and are constituted by concrete forms of life.

The point, then, is to articulate resistance at the edge of language games, that is, to avoid lifting words out of their social and dialogical context while, at the same time, exploring to the utmost the unstable and transformative nature of languages. This is best done, I argue, by interfering with the ways in which languages constitute sites of political practice, sites where realities are formed, reformed, legitimised and objectivised through a series of transversal discursive dynamics.

Discursive Critique key to Agency

The task of thinking is to expose the discursive possibilities of negating the patterns of thought found in the status quo. Where there is power, there is resistance—discursive criticism makes the self-negation of domination possible. [Ontology]

Bleiker, Roland. Co-Director of the University of Queensland's Rotary Centre for International Studies in Peace and Conflict Resolution. Contemporary Political Theory, Volume 2, Number 1, March 2003, pp. 25-47

Despite their power to frame the world, discourses are not invincible. They are not monolithic forces that subsume everything in sight, crush everything in reach. Discourses are often thin, unstable, and fragmented. There are fissures, there are cracks, there are weak spots: windows of opportunity that lead to transformative pathways. And Foucault, despite the nihilistic traits attributed to him, offers us possibilities of exploring these transformative potentials, for his work can be read in more than just one way. Foucault's earlier so-called archaeological phase (see 1969) privileges systemic and discursive restraints over the individual's capacity to employ power for emancipatory objectives. His later work, however, revolves around a more affirmative core, one that sees power not just as a negative and repressive force, but at least as much as something enabling, an opportunity, an instrument of resistance (Foucault, 1976, 133). Indeed, Foucault (1982, 125, 223) explicitly points out that acknowledging the omnipresence of power is not to say that it is a fatality that cannot be overcome. 'Where there is power,' he says, 'there is resistance.' Patton (1994, 61), extending this line of thought, convincingly argues that Foucault can be read in ways that 'offer a surrogate for hope.' By distinguishing between power, power over and domination, Patton shows that Foucault espouses a conception of human being. Even though this conception is 'thin,' it can 'be filled out in a manner which explains both resistance to domination and the possibility of transforming existing economies of power' (Patton, 1994, 66). Mobile Subjectivities, or How Being Is Always Already That Which It Is Not To excavate the possibilities for human agency that linger in discursive cracks, a shift of foci from epistemological to ontological issues is required. This is to say that in addition to analysing how discourses mould and control our thinking process, we must scrutinize how individuals, at the level of Being, may or may not be able to escape aspects of the existing discursive order. I approach this task through a discussion of Martin Heidegger's notion of Being, which is then brought into dialogue with feminist literature that explores hyphenated identities and mobile subjectivities. Together, these bodies of literature provide a conceptual base with which it becomes possible to understand challenges to discursive orders. Heidegger's concept of Dasein constitutes a good starting point. Dasein is derived literally from a combination of the German words 'Das-sein,' the that-it-is of a being, its existence, as opposed to its essence, the what-it-is (Was-sein) of a thing or person (Heidegger, 1993, 48 (translator's footnote)). Dasein thus is the specific and concrete existence of a Being as incorporated into a cultural setting and constituted through interactions with people and things in this world. It always has a temporal character, it expresses the relation between Being and time. Heidegger (1993, 60) argues that Dasein derives its meaning in temporality, that it is only through time that Dasein can understand Being, that, indeed, 'the meaning of Being of that being we call Dasein proves to be temporality.' Understanding Being through its temporality thus means that the past is not an epoch gone, but an integral part of the presence of Being. In this sense, Dasein is always historical, or, in other words, one cannot separate who one is from how one grew up, from the education, the custom, the language and a whole set of other experiences and impressions that shaped our Being over time. Dasein is always circumscribed by the presence of these past discursive elements. Moreover, Dasein not only regulates what it transmits from the past, but also conceals this very process of regulation. This, in turn, means that all actions of individuals and, indeed, the very notion of human agency, are always delineated by the boundaries of this temporal dimension of Being. However, the inevitable presence of its past is only one aspect of the temporal dimension of Being. Discourses do not overwhelm the subject entirely. Dasein also contains the future and all its various possibilities. In view of Heidegger's unconventional notion of time, this potential is not something that may or may not materialize. It is already contained in the very temporality of Being. Dasein, then, is in constant transformation, it is always in the process of becoming something else than what it is. This process of perpetual transformation is linked to such aspects as dialogue, consciousness and self-reflection: "Dasein...is ontically distinguished by the fact that in its Being this being is concerned about its very Being. Thus it is constitutive of the Being of Dasein to have, in its very Being, a relation of Being to this Being. And this in turn means that Dasein understands itself in its Being in some way and with some explicitness. It is proper to this being that it be disclosed to itself with and through its Being. Understanding of Being is itself a determination of Being of Dasein (Heidegger, 1993, 53-54)." The point, then, is not only that Dasein's awareness of Being influences the constitution of its own nature, but also that Being already embodies the transformative potential of Dasein to be something else than what it is. Dasein, Heidegger (1993, 54) points out, always understands itself 'in terms of its possibility to be itself or not to be itself.' It is the task of thinking to explore the range of options contained in the double-edged character of Being. Self-reflection

has the potential, at least up to a certain point, to undermine forms of concealment by which Being resists the possibility of being something else than what is.

Discursive Critique key to Agency

Their framework's uncritical stance toward language makes agency impossible; human agency cannot take place outside language—it can only take place through language.

Bleiker, 00 Ph.D. visiting research and teaching affiliations at Harvard, Cambridge, Humboldt, Tampere, Yonsei and Pusan National University as well as the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology and the Institute of Social Studies in The Hague, (Roland, Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics, Cambridge University Press)

Language penetrates all aspects of transversal struggles. Whatever we think and do is framed by the language within which these acts are carried out. Hence, **an engagement with the philosophy of language must be part of an adequate approach to questions of agency in global politics, especially if this approach rests upon a view of human life as constituted by self-**

understanding. 40 From such a vantage point language must be seen not as an image of the world or a way of representing realities, but, as Wittgenstein's famous dictum holds, as 'part of an activity, a way of life'. 41 This position has farreaching consequences. If language expresses a particular way of life it is also responsible, at least in part, for the constitution of this way of life. **Human agency cannot take place outside language, in some pre- or extra-linguistic realm. It can only take place through language. Expressed differently: languages are not just frameworks to assess actions. They are themselves forms of action.**

There are, of course, countless domains in which language interferes with transversal struggles. We live at a time when ever-increasing communicative capabilities account for an ever-shrinking globe. Moreover, **transversal politics revolves not only around interactions between various national languages, but also between different types of speech. When a liberal, a realist, a defence technician or a peace movement member describes the same event, they use very different languages to interpret the realities they see. Each of these languages has its own set of rules. Each embodies a world-view that implicitly promotes certain social values and certain political, ethical and spatial perceptions of global politics.** The clash between these forms of speech is the domain where domination and resistance is carried out. It is the process that engenders human agency.

Language is one of the most central aspects of human agency and global politics

Roland **Bleiker, 2000.** (Professor of International Relations Harvard and Cambridge, Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics, Cambridge University Press, 2000. p. 221-22)

From this perspective, one does not try to grasp the meaning and representational aspects of words, but instead pays attention to their function, to the 'workings of our language'. 17 Wittgenstein uses the term 'language game' to draw attention to the ways in which languages are part of culturally specific forms of life. There are countless language games that come and go. He mentions such examples as giving orders and obeying them, translating from one language to another, or asking, thanking, cursing, greeting, praying. 18

An approach that perceives language as human activity, rather than a way of categorising phenomena, opens a whole range of opportunities to study the relationship between language and human agency. Hanna Pitkin, for instance, shows how our understanding of action may be enriched by asking no longer what action is or how it functions, but how we talk about it, how language games guide the implementation of this particular aspect of practice. Language thus becomes action itself because 'we use language not merely to talk about action, but to act — to carry on actions, to

teach actions, to plan or produce actions, to assess actions done and redress any ways in which they have gone wrong'.¹⁹

With Wittgenstein, language is revealed as one of the most central aspects of our lives and, by extension, of politics. It is self-evident that in today's age of globalisation this political dimension entails very explicit transversal components. At a time when media-networks and other technological features facilitate an immediate and global flow of information, the political struggle over language is a worldwide struggle. Language has thus become one of the central features that fuses the local with the global, and elevates the transversal linkages between them to the site where many decisive political battles are waged. The key is to recognise the centrality of these largely inaudible sites of contestation, and to find ways of understanding how they shape our lives.

Only discursive analysis is adequate to the task of understanding human agency

Bleiker, 2003. (Professor of International Relations Harvard and Cambridge, Discourse and Human Agency, Palgrave Macmillan, 2003. p. 44-45)

In the domain of political practice, everyday forms of resistance demonstrate that transformative potential is hidden in the very acceptance of ambiguity. Consider the countless and continuously spreading **new social movements,** pressure groups and other loose organizations **that challenge various aspects of local, national or global governance. These movements operate in a rather chaotic way. They come and go. They are neither centrally controlled nor do they all seek the same objective. Some operate on the right end of the political spectrum. Others on the left. Some oppose globalization. Others hail it. Some seek more environmental regulations. Others defend neo-liberal free trade. And, it is precisely through this lack of coherence, control and certainty that the respective resistance movements offer a positive contribution to the political.** They are in some sense the quintessential aspect of postmodern politics, of local resistance to metanarrative impositions (see White, 1991, 10– 12; Walker, 1988). **They embody** what Connolly (1995, 154–155) believes is **the key to cultural democratization: a certain level of ‘productive ambiguity,’ that is, the commitment always to resist ‘attempts to allow one side or the other to achieve final victory.’ Ensuing forms of human agency, anarchical as they may be, thus generate regular and important public scrutiny and discussion of how norms, values and institutions function. At a theoretical level too, an engagement with human agency needs to accept a certain level of ambiguity. And there too, this ambiguity can be turned into a positive force. A discursive notion of human agency is grounded precisely in the recognition that there is no end to circles of revealing and concealing, of opening and closing spaces to think and act. Revealing is always an act, not something that remains stable. Anything else would suggest a static view of the world, one in which human agency is annihilated, one in which the future can never tear down the boundaries of the present.** Just as the interaction of domination and resistance has no end, efforts of coming to terms with them will never arrive at a stage of ultimate insight. One must move back and forth not only between unconnected bodies of literature, but also between theory and practice, abstraction and everydayness, epistemology and ontology, space and time, discursive domination and possibilities for dissent that arise from fissures in them. Each of these sites is crucial. Each offers a unique vantage point, but none of them holds the key to ultimate insight. Indeed, **every process of revealing is at the same time a process of concealing. This is to say that by opening up a particular perspective, no matter how insightful it is, one conceals everything that is invisible from this vantage point. One must thus think in circles, move between different insights into the question of human agency, even if these insights are at times incommensurable. Since discursive dissent operates through a constant process of becoming something else than what it is, a theoretical engagement with its dynamics can never be exhaustive. An approach to understanding human agency remains useful only as long as it stays open and resists the temptation of ‘digging deeper’ by anchoring itself in a newly**

discovered essence, a stable foundation that could bring order and certainty to a complex and turbulent late modern world.

Discursive Critique key to Education

Social dynamics cannot be understood through the opposition of dominant and marginalized discourses: discursive analysis reveals that domination and marginalization are constantly shifting, and by their very discursive nature transgress the traditional categories of thought. Critique is key for thought to reach that discursive void around which oppression and resistance orbit.

Bleiker, 00 Ph.D. visiting research and teaching affiliations at Harvard, Cambridge, Humboldt, Tampere, Yonsei and Pusan National University as well as the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology and the Institute of Social Studies in The Hague, (Roland, Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics, Cambridge University Press)

But how are we to understand a void? How are we to appreciate the dynamics that evolve within it, the ways in which it plays out the forces that linger on all of its multiple points of entry and exit?

The first step in this direction entails a departure from the deeply entrenched Western practice of viewing the world in dualistic terms. Much of modern thought has revolved around the juxtaposition of antagonistic bipolar opposites, such as rational/non-rational, good/ evil, just/unjust, chaos/order, domestic/international or, precisely, strong/weak. One side of the pairing is considered to be analytically and conceptually separate from the other.

The relationship between them generally expresses the superiority, dominance or desirability of one entity (such as strong/order) over the other (such as weak/chaos). The crucial spaces between them, the grey and indefinable voids, remain unexplored. Departing from this long tradition would, by contrast, emphasise the complementariness of opposites and the overlapping relationships between them. Since one side of the pairing (such as order) can only exist by virtue of its opposite (such as chaos), both form an inseparable and interdependent unit. 4

Non-dualistic conceptualising recognises that social dynamics cannot be understood by juxtaposing dominant and marginalised discourses, or local and global spheres. Discourses overlap, influence each other. They transgress boundaries. They are in a constant state of flux, and so are their multiple and cross-territorial relationships with political practice. A dominant discourse usually incorporates elements of discursive practices that are squeezed into the margins. The influence of these exiled discourses, in turn, may increase to the point of their becoming dominant. The dividing lines between discourses always changes and may be blurred to the point that one needs to accept, as Foucault does, that multiple discursive elements interact at various strategic levels. 5 What deserves our attention, then, is the discursive void, the space where these multiple and overlapping discourses clash, where silent and sometimes not so silent arguments are exchanged, where boundaries are drawn and redrawn.

The second step in appreciating how the discursive void influences transversal struggles requires a break with some aspects of Foucault's thought. It may be the case that confrontations in the discursive void do not take place among equals, that, indeed, the only drama staged there is an endlessly repeated play of domination. 6 But resistance to these plays of domination is an equally constant theme. Foucault, of course, would not necessarily disagree, for he argues that 'wherever there is power, there is resistance'. 7 He is simply less optimistic about the chances of precisely locating and directing these forms of resistance. He even goes as far as arguing that because the dynamic in the space between the strong and the weak takes place in an interstice, a 'non-place' where adversaries do not meet directly, no one is responsible for its outcome. 8 Such an interpretation can easily lead to a fatalistic interpretation that annihilates altogether the concept of human agency — an interpretation that is neither compelling nor necessarily compatible with most of Foucault's remaining arguments.

Discursive Critique key to Education

Discourse comes first- it's a better framework for evaluating change as an active process and it places evaluation within the realm of history and culture

Campbell et al, 07, David, Professor of Geography at the University of Durham, (Alison J. Williams, Post-Doctoral Research Associate in the International Boundaries Research Unit in the Department of Geography at Durham University; Luiza Bialasiewicz, Professor of Geography at Royal Holloway University, London; Stuart Elden, Professor of Geography at Durham; Alex Jeffrey, Professor of Geography, Politics & Sociology at the University of Newcastle-upon-Tyne; Stephen Graham, Professor of Geography at Durham, "Performing security: The imaginary geographies of current US strategy", Political Geography, Vol. 26, p. 406-407)

In addition to the politics of agency engaged through performativity, the value of this theoretical framework for a consideration of state security policy lies in the way performativity can help account for change over time. That is because performativity draws attention to "the reiterative and citational practice by which discourse produces the effects that it names" (Butler, 1993: 2). Instead of there being a singular moment of constitution or invention that brings subjects into being, there is a process of recitation and repetition (which Butler identifies as synonymous with "the more limited notion of resignification", Osborne & Segal, 1994) that is constrained by cultural and historical practices, but which also gives rise to new formations and possibilities (Lloyd, 1999: 197).

As a result, performativity differs from construction because, as Butler has argued, constructivist arguments tend to operate in two predominant ways. In the first, discourse becomes an omnipotent force so deterministic that 'it' acts as the governing subject such that all accounts of human agency are expunged. This would produce an argument that emphasized linguistic features and paid insufficient attention to the materiality of discourse. In the second – which maintains the logic of the first, but changes the character of the subject – the volitional human agent reigns supreme and wilfully engages in construction without constraint (Butler, 1993: 4:12). In the context of international relations, this would produce an argument in which policy makers or other agents are regarded as being engaged in a sort of conscious and deliberate construction of reality. Such a position might assume, at least indirectly, that policymakers are located outside of the domain of constitution, and have intentional control over variables such as culture, history and identity.

The exclusion of discursive analyses prevents both alternative solutions and political engagement.
Bleiker, 00 Ph.D. visiting research and teaching affiliations at Harvard, Cambridge, Humboldt, Tampere, Yonsei and Pusan National University as well as the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology and the Institute of Social Studies in The Hague, (Roland, Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics, Cambridge University Press)

A transversal interpretation of the collapse of the Berlin Wall implies that practices of dissent in global politics should be viewed in discursive terms. This is to say that dissent exerts human agency not primarily through localised spatial dynamics, but through a transformation of values that takes place across a variety of political territories. Viewing dissent in discursive terms opens up possibilities to recognise practices of resistance that have hitherto been obscured.

The third and last part of this study explores their potential and limits. But before such a task can begin, a number of difficult conceptual questions must be confronted. How to lift a concept of human agency out of a genealogical critique? How to ground thought, critique, action, norms, transversal life itself, if there are no universal values that can enable such a process of grounding? How to retain a positive approach to the problem of agency without having to anchor one's position in stable foundations?

Evoking the notion of discourse as a way of investigating the framing of global politics often elicits suspicion. Is discourse not merely a faddish term, destined to wax and wane with fleeting intellectual trends of the postmodern and poststructural kind? Does the concept of discourse, as many fear, reduce the world to playful interactions of texts and meanings that are void of any relevance to the so-called 'real', the concrete daily aspects of our lives?

These questions are being posed very often today, and they must be taken seriously. The prologue has already shown how many international relations theorists are sceptical of authors who employ the concept of discourse. They fear that such an approach cannot but lead, in Robert Keohane's representative words, to 'an intellectual and moral disaster'. 26 This scepticism goes far beyond the domain of

international relations. Critics of so-called postmodern scholarship often draw attention to the pitfalls of discursive approaches, particularly their alleged inability to speak of agents and agency. Seyla Benhabib represents many concerned scholars when arguing that a postmodern position mistakenly dissolves the subject into chains of signification that lie beyond human influence. 27 We would find ourselves in a conceptual order dominated by overarching discursive systems. **People would be reduced to mere bystanders, passive, impotent, irrelevant. Crushed into oblivion. But is this elusive spectre called postmodernism really so menacing that it must be warded off at any cost?** Is it leading us into an apocalyptic world in which 'man would be erased', as a famous Foucauldian passage speculates, 'like a face drawn in the sand at the edge of the sea'? 28

Discursive Critique key to Agency and Dissent

Theorizing dissent is not a matter of isolating the essential properties of human agency but rather of showing that human agency cannot be separated from how we perceive human action and its ability to shape global politics.

Bleiker, 00 Ph.D. visiting research and teaching affiliations at Harvard, Cambridge, Humboldt, Tampere, Yonsei and Pusan National University as well as the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology and the Institute of Social Studies in The Hague, (Roland, Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics, Cambridge University Press)

Tactical action contains transversal potential. The above mentioned refusal to buy milk bottled in non-reusable containers illustrates how tactical manifestations of human agency are not bound by the spatial logic of national sovereignty. **The consumer who changes his/her shopping habits engages in an action that escapes the spatial controlling mechanisms of established political and economic boundaries.** The effect of such a tactical action is not limited to a localised target, say, the supermarket. Over an extended period of time, and in conjunction with similar actions, such tactical dissent may influence globalised practices of production, trade, investment, advertisement and the like. **The transversal manifestations that issue from such actions operate along an indeterminate trajectory insofar as they promote a slow transformation of values whose effects transgress places and become visible and effective only by maturation over time.**

Having introduced, through notions of discourse, tactic and temporality, the conceptual tools for a discursive understanding of human agency, the analysis now proceeds to examine how a specific everyday form of resistance may exert human agency in a cross-territorial manner. **Language, and the dissident potential contained within it, will be the main focal point.** Once more, the inquiry moves back and forth between domination and resistance, abstraction and dailiness, theory and practice, epistemology and ontology. **While navigating through these circular mechanisms of revealing and concealing it is crucial to resist the temptation of endowing human agency with specific attributes. Rather, the task must revolve around theorising dissent in a way that recognises how the nature of human agency cannot be separated from how we perceive human action and its ability to shape global politics.**

Discourse Inevitable

There is functionally no difference between kritiks and policy arguments- events are both a physical occurrence and a discursive construction. Not only is it impossible for any action to take place in a discursive vacuum, but the materiality of an event and its discursive representation are completely inseparable. This makes kritiks inevitable and good because they are necessary to fully understand the way that policymaking functions as an event.

Bleiker, 98 asst. prof. of International Studies at Pusan National University (Roland, “Retracing and redrawing the boundaries of events: Postmodern interferences with international theory”, *Alternatives*, Oct-Dec 1998, Vol. 23, Issue 4)

Events are actualizations of reality in language.

Events are more than the physical state of affairs that they are. **Events are more than the linguistic representations of the physical state of affairs** that they are. **Events are moving realities in motion.**

Events in world politics are world political realities in motion. They are in motion not only because they may take place over time, but because they are physical attributes or occurrences that achieve meaning by means of language. And languages are splattered pluralities floating in a constant state of flux.

Events cannot be apprehended as part of a natural order of things, as something that exists out there, waiting to be unveiled through a flash of authentic insight. Events are, at least in part, determined by what is asked about them in the process of imbuing their existence with sociolinguistic meaning.

A/T: Shively

It is no longer a question of searching for Truth, but rather of accepting difference and facilitating dialog. We cannot rely upon common terms for discussion as they so often freeze alternative thought and prevent real debate from occurring.

Bleiker, 98 asst. prof. of International Studies at Pusan National University (Roland, "Retracing and redrawing the boundaries of events: Postmodern interferences with international theory", *Alternatives*, Oct-Dec 1998, Vol. 23, Issue 4)

In the absence of authentic knowledge, the formulation of theoretical positions and practical action requires modesty. **Accepting difference and facilitating dialogue becomes more important than searching for the elusive Truth.**

But **dialogue is a process**, an ideal, not an end point. **Often there is no common discursive ground, no language that can establish a link between the inside and the outside. The link has to be searched first.**

But the celebration of difference is a process, an ideal, not an end point. A call for tolerance and inclusion cannot be void of power. **Every social order, even the ones that are based on the acceptance of difference, excludes what does not fit into their view of the world.** Every form of thinking, some international theorists recognize, expresses a will to power, a will that cannot but "privilege, oppress, and create in some manner." [54] There is no all-encompassing gaze. **Every process of revealing is at the same time a process of concealing. By opening up a particular perspective, no matter how insightful it is, one conceals everything that is invisible from this vantage point.** The **enframing** that occurs by such processes of revealing, Martin Heidegger argues, **runs the risk of making us forget that enframing is a claim, a disciplinary act that "banishes man into that kind of revealing that is an ordering."** And where this ordering holds sway, Heidegger continues, "it drives out every other possibility for revealing." [55] This is why **one must move back and forth between different, sometimes incommensurable forms of insights.** **Such an approach recognizes that the key to circumventing the ordering mechanisms of revealing is to think in circles**--not to rest too long at one point, but to pay at least as much attention to linkages between than to contents of mental resting places.

Inclusiveness does not lie in the search for a utopian, all-encompassing worldview, but in the acceptance of the will to power--in the recognition that we need to evaluate and judge, but that no form of knowledge can serve as the ultimate arbiter for thought and action. As a critical practice, postmodernism must deal with its own will to power and to subvert that of others. This is not to avoid accountability, but to take on responsibility in the form of bringing modesty to a majority.

****Dissent**

Dissent solves – General

The framework of traditional policy debate is the framework of the status quo. Not only does it accept the assumptions of the dominant order but it also sustains that order. Dissent is key to change the very way international relations are constituted.

Bleiker, 00 Ph.D. visiting research and teaching affiliations at Harvard, Cambridge, Humboldt, Tampere, Yonsei and Pusan National University as well as the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology and the Institute of Social Studies in The Hague, (Roland, Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics, Cambridge University Press)

Human agency is not something that exists in an a priori manner and can be measured scientifically in reference to external realities. Strictly speaking, there is no such thing as human agency, for its nature and its function are, at least in part, determined by how we think about human action and its potential to shape political and social practices. **The mutually constituted and constantly shifting relationship between agents and discourses thus undermines the possibility of observing social dynamics in a value-free way. To embark on such an endeavour nevertheless is to superimpose a static image upon a series of events that can only be understood in their fluidity. It is to objectivise a very particular and necessarily subjective understanding of agency and its corresponding political practices.** The dangers of such an approach have been debated extensively. Authors such as Richard Ashley, Jim George and Steve Smith have shown how positivist epistemologies have transformed one specific interpretation of world political realities, the dominant realist one, into reality per se. 41 **Realist perceptions of the international have gradually become accepted as common sense, to the point that any critique against them has to be evaluated in terms of an already existing and objectivised world-view. There are powerful mechanisms of control precisely in this ability to determine meaning and rationality. 'Defining common sense', Smith thus argues, is 'the ultimate act of political power'. 42 It separates the possible from the impossible and directs the theory and practice of international relations on a particular path.**

Dissent in global politics is precisely about redirecting this path. It is about interfering with the very manner in which international relations have been constituted, perceived and entrenched. The point, then, is not to 'rescue the exploration of identity from postmodernists', 43 but to explore questions of agency and identity in the context of an understanding of social dynamics that takes into account how ideas and practices mutually influence each other. This is to accept and deal with the recognition 'that our rationalisation of the international is itself constitutive of that practice'. 44 The purpose and potential of such an approach are well recognised at least since Robert Cox introduced a distinction between critical and **problem-solving approaches to world politics**. The latter, exemplified by realist and positivist perceptions of the international, **take the prevailing structures of the world as the given framework for action.** They study various aspects of the international system and address the problems that they create. The problem with **such approaches**, according to Cox, is that they **not only accept, explicitly or implicitly, the existing order as given, but also, intentionally or not, sustain it.** 45 **Critical theories, by contrast, problematise the existing power relations and try to understand how they have emerged and how they are undergoing transformation. They engage, rather than circumvent, the multi-layered dynamics that make up transversal struggles.** The notion of **discourse**, I shall demonstrate, is the most viable conceptual tool for such a task. It **facilitates an exploration of the close linkages that exist between theory and practice. It opens up possibilities to locate and explore terrains of transversal dissent whose manifestations of agency are largely obscured, but nevertheless highly significant in shaping the course of contemporary global politics.**

Dissent key to Policymaking

Dissent shapes policy- empirically proven.

Bleiker, 00 Ph.D. visiting research and teaching affiliations at Harvard, Cambridge, Humboldt, Tampere, Yonsei and Pusan National University as well as the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology and the Institute of Social Studies in The Hague, (Roland, Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics, Cambridge University Press)

Popular dissent undoubtedly played an important role in triggering radical processes of social change. Jürgen Habermas, for example, notes that **'the presence of large masses gathering in squares and mobilising on the streets managed, astonishingly, to disempower a regime that was armed to the teeth'**.²

But Habermas, and many others, emphasise that the force of street demonstration must be seen in its reinforcing combination with the impact created by the increasing number of East Germans that were leaving for the West. Albert O. Hirschmann, who termed these two protest forms 'voice' and 'exit', argues that their common force gradually eroded the foundations of the existing regime.³ Both of these **dissident practices were transversal in nature — they transgressed various political**

boundaries and challenged the notion of national sovereignty. A brief elucidation:⁴ **The practice of exit refers to massive waves of East Germans leaving for the West despite the government's desperate attempt to enforce a closed border policy.**

Mass migration occurred primarily through two channels. Starting in August 1989, East German citizens used the extraterritorial status of diplomatic missions in the communist bloc to claim refugee status. Soon, the West German representations in East Berlin, Prague, Budapest and Warsaw had to be closed because they were overcrowded with thousands of East Germans determined to leave their country. **An agreement between Berlin and Bonn at the end**

of September allowed for transport of these refugees by special train — via East German territory — to the West. When news of this evacuation spread, the regime desperately tried to prevent its citizens leaving the country. But the spatial logic of national sovereignty was no

longer operative. Bodies transgressed boundaries with ease. In a matter of days, the diplomatic representations were packed anew and special trains brought again 7,600 refugees to West Germany. These spectacular transversal dynamics attracted worldwide media attention and robbed the regime of what little bit of legitimacy it had left. Even more damaging was Budapest's resolution to dismantle the 'iron curtain'. On 11 September, Hungary unilaterally decided to open its borders to Austria. Within three days, 15,000 East Germans (who could easily travel to Hungary) walked through the iron curtain and then settled in West Germany. This was only the beginning of the exit wave. Illegal border crossings, for which several East Germans had been shot during the preceding decades, became a mass movement by the fall of 1989.⁵ Transversal dissent had begun to challenge the spatial givenness of Cold War politics.

Non-traditional forms of dissent have clear impact in terms of policymaking- the iron curtain proves.

Bleiker, 00 Ph.D. visiting research and teaching affiliations at Harvard, Cambridge, Humboldt, Tampere, Yonsei and Pusan National University as well as the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology and the Institute of Social Studies in The Hague, (Roland, Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics, Cambridge University Press)

The massive street protests transgressed the spatial givenness of German politics at least as much as the exit waves, which were, at the same time, tearing holes in the Iron Curtain. As pictures of mass demonstrations were televised around the globe, **the nature of protest took on various transversal dimensions. It transcended the immediate territoriality of the protest actions and became entangled in the temporal and non-spatial logic of speed.**

The local became instantaneously global. The global, in turn, started to shape local dynamics.

Hundreds of thousands of protesting citizens, shouting 'we are the people', monopolised television screens around the world for weeks during the autumn of 1989. **These images were not without effect. Various foreign governments put pressure**

on East Germany's leadership. The Soviet Union decided not to support Honecker's struggle to retain power. **Maybe most importantly, the spectacular televised images returned, via West German television, to the East German population and thus led to a self-triggering and spiralling dynamic of popular**

dissent. Through easily available Western media sources East German citizens witnessed day by day how mass emigration and large-scale street protests further undermined the legitimacy of their government. **This transversal informational dynamic gave many**

people the necessary courage to join the continuously growing crowds in the streets. The virtuality of global media also provided direct incentives for East Germans to take the risk of participating in the exit wave. For instance, West German television coverage revealed to East Germans how their compatriots who sought refuge in diplomatic representations were brought by special trains to the West, or how barbed-wire installations were removed from the Austro-Hungarian border.⁷

By early November 1989, **the transversal dynamics that took hold of dissident forces in East Germany had clearly undermined not only the legitimacy of the government, but also the very spatial givenness of Cold War international relations. Media coverage of protests was by now a regular global television event.** Meanwhile, **the lack of man and women-power that resulted from the exit wave, which continued at a rate of about 10,000 East Germans a day, further paralysed the country.** Personal accounts, published later by high-ranking party officials, reveal how decisive these illegal transgressions of state boundaries were in triggering processes of social change.

Two important members of the Politburo, Egon Krenz and Günter Schabowski, acknowledge that mass emigration had a tremendous impact on them and other

leading figures involved in the decision-making process. Members of the government believed that they could under no circumstances survive extended mass emigration, that exit created a situation against which the regime was absolutely helpless. 8

Dissent solves State-Centricity

Dissent de-centers the state as the locus of analysis for policymaking; contemporary life is not merely an individual's relation to a state but is rather multi-layered and multiple. Only a transversal logic can counter the repressive tendencies of the state's deployment of spatial logic. Bleiker, 00 Ph.D. visiting research and teaching affiliations at Harvard, Cambridge, Humboldt, Tampere, Yonsei and Pusan National University as well as the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology and the Institute of Social Studies in The Hague, (Roland, Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics, Cambridge University Press)

Dissent has become a significant transnational phenomenon, reflecting and shaping various aspects of global politics. In fact, dissent has become what could be called a transversal phenomenon — a political practice that not only transgresses national boundaries, but also questions the spatial logic through which these boundaries have come to constitute and frame the conduct of international relations. The term transversal draws attention to various political transformations that are currently taking place. It has emerged in response to a growing need to rethink the manner in which the domain of international relations has traditionally been conceptualised. David Campbell, for instance, argues convincingly that globalised life is best seen 'as a series of transversal struggles rather than as a complex of inter-national, multi-national or transnational relations'.² The latter, he points out, are modes of representation that have strong investments in the very borders that are currently being questioned. By contrast, to conceptualise global politics as a site of transversal struggles is to draw attention to the multiple and multi-layered interactions that make up contemporary life. It is to recognise the complex cross-border flow of people, goods, ideas, and capital— in short, 'the increasing irruptions of accelerated and nonterritorial contingencies upon our horizons'.³ What follows is an attempt to grapple with the consequences that emerge from viewing global politics as a series of transversal struggles. More specifically, the challenge consists of understanding the role of dissent at a time when old certainties are giving way to a continuously unfolding array of seemingly disparate political dynamics. Two interrelated objectives are central to this endeavour: To scrutinise the phenomenon of transversal dissent through several concrete case studies: How have practices of popular dissent achieved transversal dimensions? How have we come to understand these practices and how has this understanding affected the manner in which they operate in practice? Are prevalent perceptions of dissent still adequate to appreciate the complex political dynamics of a world that operates increasingly along transversal lines?². To theorise questions of agency that inevitably arise with a conceptualisation of transversal dissent: What is the potential and limit of protest movements that transgress and challenge national boundaries? How can we understand the processes through which various forms of dissent shape — and are shaped by — the social and political struggles they seek to engage? Before embarking on this double task, a relatively elaborate prologue is necessary to outline how an understanding of transversal dissent intersects with concerns that are, or at least ought to be, central to the study of global politics. Traditional approaches to international relations theory have treated dissident practices largely in repressive terms. In a nuclear age dominated by fierce Cold War rivalries, most theories of global politics were implicitly concerned with maintaining order, security and stability — to the point that manifestations of dissent have come to be seen as mere disruptive and disorderly phenomena, as 'breakdowns of otherwise regular processes in national and international society'.⁴

Dissent key to Change

Dissent is an effective strategy for active change throughout a community and within states.

Bleiker, 00 Ph.D. visiting research and teaching affiliations at Harvard, Cambridge, Humboldt, Tampere, Yonsei and Pusan National University as well as the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology and the Institute of Social Studies in The Hague, (Roland, Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics, Cambridge University Press)

The shift from radical individualism to collective action marked the beginning of a coherent and increasingly global tradition of popular dissent. The fact that authors of the stature of Tolstoy or Gandhi advocated this move was instrumental for its dissemination. **Gandhi, in particular, added a truly global dimension to the theory and practice of popular dissent. He provided unprecedented political momentum to a notion of human agency that before had existed primarily on a rhetorical level.** His thoughts and deeds informed countless civil disobedience campaigns. Independently of whether or not we agree with them, our perceptions of popular dissent have been influenced substantially by the ideas and practices that ensued from Gandhi's application of la Boétian rhetoric.

With the move towards collective action, the notion of human agency became intertwined with political activism. Tolstoy lectured workers on exploitation, encouraged peasants to stop obeying their landlords, and advised conscripts to refuse military service — and all this

against the backdrop of the la Boétian idea that suffering is caused by one's own enslavement, that if one desires it, one can be free. **44 Gandhi's entire life**

consisted of activism. His political engagement began when he was a lawyer in South Africa. Appalled by various race related discriminations against Indian immigrants, Gandhi became increasingly active in acts of social non-cooperation. Between 1906 and 1914 he led countless satyagrahi campaigns, including refusals of registration, strikes, protest marches and fasts. Back in his native India, Gandhi and his increasingly numerous followers used the same political techniques to fight British colonial rule. Mass civil disobedience became a powerful tool in the struggle for independence.

Gandhi's activism demonstrated that the idea of withdrawing consent is actually applicable in practice. He was able to establish the dialectical link between intellectuals and the masses that Gramsci so convincingly portrayed as the key to successful resistance. ⁴⁵ Representative for Gandhi's various

campaigns of non-cooperation is the famous salt march of 1930. The production of salt, an indispensable product for every Indian, was a government monopoly and levied with exorbitant taxes. As a protest against this practice, Gandhi and some eighty fellow satyagrahis embarked upon a 240 mile walk to the Gujarat coast, where they intended to extract their own salt from the sea. The immediate objective of this symbolic and carefully planned public defiance was the annulment of the salt tax. On a more fundamental level, the salt march was intended to undermine the legality of the colonial government as such. The satyagrahis tried to attract as much public attention as possible. They walked through many villages, where they paused, informed the people of their cause, and encouraged them to defy the law and manufacture their own salt. In some towns their appearance drew as many as 30,000 eager listeners. The satyagrahis also incited village headmen to resign and stop cooperating with the colonial authorities, an appeal that had considerable success. Although the British salt monopoly was never threatened, the salt march had a dramatic impact. It was the prelude of

a powerful nationwide campaign of mass civil disobedience. By mid 1930, Judith Brown argues, **civil disobedience posed a severe challenge to British colonial rule in India. 46 Knowledge of the Gandhian technique of resistance had spread and non-cooperation was practised in every province. Throughout the one-year-long campaign an estimated 60,000 people were arrested and many more participated in one way or another in acts of non-cooperation, for example by boycotting foreign cloth. 47**

The transcendent nature of dissent means that what seems to be a purely localized form can almost instantaneously become a globalized one.

Bleiker, 00 Ph.D. visiting research and teaching affiliations at Harvard, Cambridge, Humboldt, Tampere, Yonsei and Pusan National University as well as the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology and the Institute of Social Studies in The Hague, (Roland, Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics, Cambridge University Press)

One can acknowledge the phenomena that Virilio and Baudrillard describe without accepting the overall conclusions they have reached from their analyses. Yes, **the blurring of distinctions between global and local, national and international, has altered the interaction between domination and resistance today.** If 'real space' has become absorbed into the domains of speed and simulation, as Virilio and Baudrillard claim, **then dynamics of dissent do not primarily, or at least not only, take place in their immediate spatial environment. Dissent operates as least as much in the virtuality of speed, the instantaneity of globalised communication.**

This phenomenon, however, does not annihilate possibilities of engaging in acts of dissent. Speed may well have erased space to the benefit of some kind of globalised instantaneity. Yet, hyperreal images racing daily over our television screens nevertheless take part in a struggle over 'real time'. Independently of how instantaneous, distorted and simulated they are, these images influence our perceptions of the world and thus also our responses to the issues in question. To accept the logic of speed, then, is not to render 'real time' obsolete, but to acknowledge multiple and overlapping spatial and temporal spheres within which political practices are constantly formed and reformed.

The prevalence of speed in contemporary global politics provides increasing opportunities to interfere with various political processes. Acts of dissent now have the potential to transcend their immediate spatial context and enter domains that lie beyond national boundaries. But how has the nature of dissent itself changed in the wake of these transformations. And how can we — those who seek to understand the political dynamics of a globalised world — conceptualise the complex transversal processes that make up the interactions between domination and resistance today?

Dissent solves Agency

Dissent solves agency: transversal analysis reveals the cracks that exist in the discursive domination of the status quo

Bleiker, 00 Ph.D. visiting research and teaching affiliations at Harvard, Cambridge, Humboldt, Tampere, Yonsei and Pusan National University as well as the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology and the Institute of Social Studies in The Hague, (Roland, Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics, Cambridge University Press)

Fourth, the ensuing exploration of dissent in global politics has led along the following circular trajectory of revealing and concealing: discourses are powerful forms of domination. They frame the parameters of thinking processes. They shape political and social interactions. They disregard national boundaries and take on increasingly transversal and global dimensions. Yet, discourses are not invincible. They may be thin. They may contain cracks. By moving the gaze from epistemology to ontology, I explored ways in which individuals can use these cracks to escape aspects of discursive domination. To recognise the potential for human agency that lingers in these cracks, I shifted foci again, this time from the level of Being to an inquiry into tactical behaviours. Individuals can draw upon the thinking spaces opened up by mobile subjectivities and engage in countless daily acts of dissent, which gradually transform societal values. Many of these tactical forms of dissent defy the spatial logic of national sovereignty. They enter transversal grey zones and, over an extended period of time, may alter the discursive practices that frame the constitution of global politics. I then scrutinised, by returning to epistemological levels, how these discursive interferences may engender processes of social change.

Moving along these constantly shifting transversal terrains of dissent is to resurrect a notion of human agency from a discursive viewpoint. Yet, it is not a notion based on a causal understanding — a perspective that presupposes an autonomous agent and a clearly separable and identifiable object upon which agency is projected. It is not a notion that embodies claims to totality, that believes every process of social change requires an agent to trigger it. Many aspects of social dynamics are beyond the influence of human agency, and certainly far beyond our ability to understand them adequately. Aspirations that deny these limits to cognition must be put to rest, filed ad acta as social science fiction.

Dissent solves Globalization

Dissent solves globalization: globalization's acceleration of the circulation of signs is both the enervation of traditional dissent and the possibility for radical dissent.

Roland Bleiker, Professor, 2000, The Changing Space and Speed of Dissident Politics, Social Alternatives; Jan2000, Vol. 19 Issue 1, p9-15

The contraction of distances has become a strategic reality, said the French philosopher and urbanist Paul Virilio twenty years ago (1977: 131). The corresponding negation of space, he emphasised, carries with it incalculable economic and political consequences. Virilio's

observations are more pertinent than ever at the turn of the new millennium. **We are, in many ways, witnessing a revolution in global relations,** comparable to the fundamental impact of changing mass transportation in the nineteenth century and means of telecommunication in the twentieth. We are undergoing a sea change in social dynamics. **This change revolves around the use and regulation of speed. Speed is the relationship between various phenomena, notably space and time. Space has become annihilated,**

Virilio (1995:21-34) claims, and time has taken over as the criterion around which global dynamics revolve. The instantaneous character of communication and mass media have annihilated duration and locality. The "now" of the emission is privileged to the detriment of the "here," the space where things take place. What matters are no longer the three spatial dimensions of height, depth, and width, but above all a fourth one, time. Or, rather, what matters is the present, for our notion of "real time" has been transformed into a universal fetish, a situation in which local and chronological time has given way to world time, to speed, which regulates our political, social and economic interactions.

What Virilio identifies as speed is in some ways a more precise conceptualisation of what others call globalisation, that is, the "coalescence of varied transnational processes and domestic structures, allowing the economy, politics, culture, and ideology of one country to penetrate another" (Mittelman 1996: 3). Contrary to widely held opinions, this essay seeks to demonstrate that globalisation does not necessarily, or at least not only, lead to a centralisation of power and a corresponding loss of democratic participation and political accountability. Interweaving theoretical insights and practical examples, the essay reveals how **the advent of speed has also increased the potential to engage in acts of dissent that can subvert processes of control and homogenisation.** In doing so, the essay counters images of a hyperreal world, of an increasingly shallow and media dominated globe in which nothing can penetrate beneath the surface. Political dissent, according to this doomsday scenario, becomes all but impossible, for there is nothing left to dissent against. There is only a twenty-for-hour-a-day-blur of information and entertainment. We hear of a nation state that is no longer able to uphold its sovereignty and the spheres of justice and civility that the corresponding boundaries were supposed to protect. We hear of a cruel global market, whose random dynamics have increased the gap between rich and poor to grotesque proportions. A recent report by the United Nations Development Program, for instance, informs us that the assets of the world's three richest people amount to more than the combined GNP of all least developed countries on the planet (Shalom 1999:1; Human Development Report 1999). Nor surprisingly, we hear of a neoliberal world order that is increasingly run by a few powerful multinational corporations — monstrous unaccountable structures whose strategic leitmotifs and decision making principles reflect the imperatives of short-term material objectives, rather than the more widely sketched humane principles that may well be necessary for the survival of a global ecosystem that is becoming more and more stretched.

While these phenomena are undoubtedly occurring — and pose increasingly difficult ethical and political challenges to the world community — they are not the only aspects of globalisation. A focus on speed allows us to recognise the contradictory forces of globalisation, the manner in which its whirlwinds push and pull politics, form the local to the global, in a variety of directions.

Look at the erosion of national sovereignty and how, fatal as this phenomena may appear in some ways, also opens up possibilities for a politics of post-national solidarity. Recent humanitarian interventions in Bosnia, Kosovo and East Timor, controversial and politically debatable as they may be, testify for the emergence of a new kind of global politics — one in which rights and responsibilities are no longer limited by the boundaries of the national state. Some even think ahead towards a time in which we can speak of unconditional hospitality — a situation in which rights and responsibilities would no longer be circumscribed by the spatial and political logic of national sovereignty (Derrida 1999:69-71).

The same type of dynamic holds true for political activism. While circumscribed in some ways by the encroaching dimensions of globalisation, dissident practices have also gained new momentum with the advent of speed. An act of resistance, such as a protest march, is no longer limited to its immediate spatial environment. If the dissident event is picked up by global media networks it has the potential to quire an almost immediate transnational dimension.

The patterns of power and transformation inherent to this evolution will be outlined in more detail below. May it suffice, at least at this stage, to emphasise that the process of doing so consists of posing a number of key questions — not necessarily in order to look for precise responses, but to locate the more broadly perceived domains of inquiry in which possible answers could be worked out in a dialogical way. Adequate solutions to many problems of today may well be reached by recognising that new potential for dissent and political activism emerges out of the very messiness created by processes of globalisation. "Is not everything in flux now?" Zarathustra would ask, with all its good and bad connotations. "Have not all railings and bridges fallen into the water?" (Nietzsche 1954:313).

The world is undergoing fundamental change. The nature and direction of this process, however, are not driven by mysterious extra terrestrial forces. For better or for worse, globalisation is a human product. It is up to us to shape its future directions, to take

responsibility into our own hands. The key, then, lies in recognising and coming to terms with inevitable contradiction brought on by processes of globalisation. "Woe to us! Hail to us! The thawing wind blows!" (Nietzsche 1954:313).

Dissent solves Globalization

The existence of globalization in turn sparks dissent dooming it from the beginning
When dissent is sparked on a local scale and transcended across borders through the mechanism of mass media, dissent can then actually be comparable to globalization

Roland Bleiker, Professor, 2000, The Changing Space and Speed of Dissident Politics, Social Alternatives; Jan2000, Vol. 19 Issue 1, p9-15

The phenomenon of speed has not annihilated dissent. Quite to the contrary. Speed may well have erased space to the benefit of some kind of globalised instantaneity. Yet, hyperreal images racing daily over our television screens nevertheless take part in a struggle over 'real time.'

Independently of how instantaneous, distorted and simulated they are, these images influence our perceptions of the world and thus also our responses to important issues of our time. To accept the logic of speed, then, is not to render 'real time' obsolete, but to acknowledge multiple and overlapping spatial and temporal spheres within which political practices are constantly.

Speed has increased the potential to interfere with the gradual transformation of societal values over 'real time. But where exactly is this potential for political action in a world of blurring boundaries, images and realities? One must acknowledge that with the advent of speed, the terrain of political struggle has changed fundamentally. Manifestations of dissent, such as street demonstrations or acts of civil disobedience, used to take place in a mostly local context. They engaged the spatial dynamics that were operative in the interactive relationship between ruler and ruled. The contraction of space, however, has altered the very foundations of these socio-political dynamics.

Domination and resistance now interact in a much wider and more complex array of power relations. The boundaries of discursive struggles have widened — and so have, consequently, the possible terrains of dissent where human agency can be exerted. Images of a protest march, for instance, may flicker over television screens world-wide only hours after people have taken to the street. As a result, a local act of resistance can acquire almost immediately a much larger, cross-territorial dimension. It may generate a variety of outside pressures on the authorities against which the protest was directed. Any protest action that draws sufficient media attention thus has the potential to engender a political process that transcends its immediate spatial environment. Political activism then no longer takes place solely in the streets of Dilli and Belfast, at the gates of factories or around the Aboriginal Tent Embassy in front of Canberra's Old Parliament House. Political activism, wherever it occurs and whatever form it takes, has become intrinsically linked with the non-spatial logic of speed. Knowledge about this transformed logic of global politics can provide us with the potential for activist engagements and the resulting means to search for a more just world in the new millennium

A/T: Globalization prevents Solvency

Baudrillard and Virilio are wrong: the changing nature of the globalizing world does not make dissent impossible but rather also changes its nature.

Roland Bleiker, Professor, 2000, The Changing Space and Speed of Dissident Politics, Social Alternatives; Jan2000, Vol. 19 Issue 1, p9-15

What can an activist learn from the insights that Virilio and Baudrillard have provided?

Indeed, is activism still possible at a time when political and social consciousness gushes out of five-second sound-bites and corresponding hyper-real images that flicker over our television screens? Do human actions still matter in a world where the exchange of virtual capital through computerised networks plunges the global economy, at random so it seems, into up and down spirals that sweep across traditional boundaries of identity and sovereignty?

Both Virilio and Baudrillard are highly pessimistic about the prospects of direct political action in the late modern world. One of the main themes in Virilio's latest book revolves around the environmental pollution of not only our atmosphere and hydrosphere, but also of our planet's time-space relationship. This "dromospheric pollution," he claims, eludes all democratic controls and will soon precipitate a yet unknown fatal event, "the accident of all accidents, or, in other words, the [global] circulation of the generalised accident" (Virilio 1995: 35, 47, 83-4, 90, 98-9). Baudrillard's apocalyptic vision looks slightly different. For him, the ability to exert human agency has been annihilated because the link between "realities" and "referents" no longer exist. And since we have no more reality, theory can no longer dissent against it (see Smart 1993:122-3; Welsch 1993:208-11)

But things do not necessarily have to look this grim. One can accept the rapidly changing nature of the late modern world and, at the same time, explore new forms of activism that emerge. The most potent of these terrains of dissent are perhaps located in the types of struggles that lead to a slow transformation of societal values. Reading Virilio (1995:31) may help us recognise the contours of such a position:

The question no longer is one that opposes the global in relation to the local, or the transitional in relation to the national. It is, above all, the question of this sudden temporal commutation which blurs not only the inside and the outside, the boundaries of the political territory, but also the before and after of its duration, its history.

One can acknowledge the phenomena that Virilio and Baudrillard describe without necessarily accepting the overall conclusion that they have reached from their analyses. Yes, the blurring of distinctions between local and global, national and transnational, reality and virtuality, has altered the interaction between domination and resistance today. If 'real space' has become absorbed into the domains of speed and simulation, as Virilio and Baudrillard claim, then dynamics of dissent do not primarily, or at least not only, take place in their immediate spatial environment. Dissent operates as least as much in the virtuality of speed, the instantaneity of globalised communication.

A/T: Coverstone

Dissent is never purely local, the nature of modern society transmits every bit of information everywhere instantly- either this means that Coverstone is non-unique since our debate space will inevitably be discovered or it means that activism can create much more change than accounted for by simply examining the local perspective.

Bleiker, 00 Ph.D. visiting research and teaching affiliations at Harvard, Cambridge, Humboldt, Tampere, Yonsei and Pusan National University as well as the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology and the Institute of Social Studies in The Hague, (Roland, Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics, Cambridge University Press)

As remarked at the outset of this book, dissident practices no longer take place in a purely local context. The presence of global media networks now provide a protest march or a civil disobedience campaign with the potential of an immediate worldwide audience. Dissent has become transversal in nature, for it now has the ability to transgress the political and mental boundaries erected by existing practices of international relations. The local, in ò Tuathail's words, is instantly global. The ensuing dynamics, of course, call into question the very spatial organisation of the interstate system, that is, the key pillars of 'state sovereignty, territorial integrity and community identity'. 23

Once one has recognised the transversal nature of contemporary global politics a number of questions immediately arise. The most obvious one is whether or not a long tradition of modern thought can still adequately account for political dynamics that are unfolding in a fundamentally transformed global space. More specifically, does the la Boétiean vision of human agency, which is based on an ahistoric and spatial understanding of relationships between ruler and ruled, remain adequate to assess the changing nature of dissent in a mediainfused contemporary world?

*****Performativity**

Performativity Shell

A. The decisionmaking paradigm inherent in the traditional forms of political engagement engages in an unconscious exercise of power over the self which regulates discourse and produces for itself legitimate methods for engagement which rarely result in change.

Kulynych, 97, Winthrop U Prof of Polysci (Jessica, "Performing Politics: Foucault, Habermas, and Postmodern Participation, Polity, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Winter, 1997), 315-346, accessed Jstor)

While separately both Habermas and Foucault challenge the traditional understanding of participation, their combined insights further and irrevocably extend that challenge. Theoretical focus on the distinctions between Habermas and Foucault has all too often obscured important parallels between these two theorists. Specifically, the Habermas-Foucault debate has underemphasized the extent to which Habermas also describes a disciplinary society. In his descriptions of bureaucracy, technocracy, and system colonization, Habermas is also describing a world where power is productive and dispersed and where political action is constrained and normalized. Habermas, like Foucault, describes a type of power that cannot be adequately characterized in terms of the intentions of those who possess it. Colonization is not the result of conscious intention, but is rather the unintended consequence of a multitude of small adjustments. The gender and racial subtexts infusing the system are not the results of conscious intention, but rather of implicit gender and racial norms and expectations infecting the economy and the state.

Bureaucratic power is not a power that is possessed by any individual or agency, but exists in the exercise of decisionmaking. As Iris Young points out, **we must "analyze the exercise of power [in contemporary societies] as the effect of often liberal and humane practices of education, bureaucratic administration,** production and distribution of consumer goods, medicine and so on."⁸ The very practices that Habermas chronicles are exemplary of a power that has no definitive subject. As Young explains, **"the conscious actions of many individuals daily contribute to maintaining and reproducing oppression, but those people are simply** doing their jobs or **living their lives, and do not understand themselves as agents of oppression.**"⁸ Colonization and bureaucratization also fit the pattern of a power that is not primarily repressive but productive. **Disciplinary technologies** are, as Sawicki describes, not... repressive mechanisms ... [that] operate primarily through violence ... or seizure ... but rather [they **operate**] **by producing new objects and subjects of knowledge, by inciting and channeling desires, generating and focusing individual and group energies, and establishing bodily norms and techniques for observing, monitoring and controlling bodily movements, processes, and capacities.**⁹ **The very practices of** administration, distribution, and **decisionmaking** on which Habermas focuses his attention **can and must be analyzed as productive disciplinary practices.** Although these practices can clearly be repressive, their most insidious effects are productive. **Rather than simply holding people back, bureaucratization breaks up, categorizes, and systemizes projects and people.** It creates new categories of knowledge and expertise. Bureaucratization and colonization also create new subjects as the objects of bureaucratic expertise. The social welfare client and the consumer citizen are the creation of bureaucratic power, not merely its target. The extension of lifeworld gender norms into the system creates the possibility for sexual harassment, job segregation, parental leave, and consensual corporate decisionmaking. Created as a part of these subjectivities are new gestures and norms of bodily behavior, such as the embarrassed shuffling of food stamps at the grocery checkout and the demeaning sexual reference at the office copier. Bodily movements are monitored and regularized by means of political opinion polls, welfare lists, sexual harassment protocols, flex-time work schedules, and so forth. **Modern disciplinary power,** as described by Foucault and implied by Habermas, **does not merely prevent us from developing, but creates us differently as the effect of its functioning.** These disciplinary techniques not only control us, but also enable us to be more efficient and more productive, and often more powerful.

Focusing on the disciplinary elements of the Habermasian critique opens the door for exploring the postmodern character of Habermasian politics. Because Habermas does describe a disciplinary world, his prescription for contemporary democracy (**discursive politics**) **ought to be sensitive to, and appropriate for, a disciplinary world.** Foucault's sensitivity to the workings of disciplinary power is central to the articulation of a plausible, postmodern version of discursive politics. In the following discussion I will argue for a performative redefinition of participation that will reinvigorate the micro-politics demanded by Foucault, as well as provide a more nuanced version of the discursive politics demanded by Habermas.

B. The impact is discipline and domination. Kritikal arguments are key to break down the illusion of active change brought on by the hegemony of political calculation within debate, while there may be some disadvantages to allowing kritiks, there is only a risk of education and real change in a world where we embrace their presence.

Kulynych, 97, Winthrop U Prof of Polysci (Jessica, "Performing Politics: Foucault, Habermas, and Postmodern Participation, *Polity*, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Winter, 1997), 315-346, accessed Jstor)

The notion of performativity as both identity- or world-creating and as demonstration, is crucial for understanding contemporary political action. Performative **resistance does not eliminate power and it is not effected in the name of some subjugated agency,** but **rather its purpose is disruption and re-creation.** **It is a reoccurring disruption that ensures an endless reconstitution of power.** **Disciplinary technologies effect the internalization of norms-a removal from view of the mechanisms that create us as subjects,** making our identities self-evident. **Resistance brings those norms back into an arena of contestation. By its very existence resistance ensures resistibility, which is the very thing internalized norms are designed to suppress.** In other words, resistance is not undertaken as a protest against the subjugation of a reified ideal subject, but rather **resistance, as the action of thoroughly constructed subjects, reveals the contingency of both subjectivity and subjection.** While Chaloupka suggests that the role of the protestor is "tellingly different" from that of the citizen, I disagree. Often **only the act of resistance provides any meaningful sense of "citizenship" in this privatized contemporary world.** As Dana Villa points out, resistance "can be seen as a successor concept to Arendt's notion of political action: **where the space for action is usurped, where action in the strict sense is no longer possible, resistance becomes the primary vehicle of spontaneity and agonistic subjectivity.**"⁷⁰ **Performative resistance recognizes disciplinary power, enables action in the face of that power, enables innovation in deliberation, and thus allows us to see the world of political action differently.** Consequently, it is possible, and more meaningful, to conceptualize contemporary participation as a performative rather than a representative action. **The failure to reconceptualize political participation as resistance furthers an illusion of democratic control that obscures the techniques of disciplinary power and their role in global strategies of domination, fundamentally missing the real, although much more humble opportunities for citizens to "take part" in their own "governance."** Accepting the idea of participation as resistance has two broad implications that fundamentally transform the participation debate. First, it widens the parameters of participation to include a host of new actors, activities, and locations for political action. **A performative concept redirects our attention away from the normal apparatus of government and economy, and therefore allows us to see a much broader range of political actions.** Second, **it requires that we look anew at traditional participatory activities and evaluate their performative potential.**

Link – Traditional Politics

The post-modern nature of today's world prohibits traditional modes of participation- it is impossible to effectively engage in modern democratic society through traditional means.

Kulynych, 97 Winthrop U Prof of Polysci (Jessica, "Performing Politics: Foucault, Habermas, and Postmodern Participation, Polity, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Winter, 1997), 315-346, accessed Jstor)

Though political scientists have often asked why people participate in politics, today it is more fitting to ask what participation means. This question is particularly urgent if we recognize and accept the emergence of a postmodern world. To say that the world is now

"postmodern" is to highlight fundamental changes in both the condition of the contemporary world, and in our attitude toward this world. **The unique political and economic configuration of advanced, welfare state capitalism, the subtlety and ubiquity of disciplinary power, the simultaneous solidification and fracture of personal and collective identity, and the advance of technology and bureaucracy combine with an increasing philosophical skepticism toward truth and subjectivity to produce a world that is often incompatible with our traditional understandings of democracy. These fundamental changes inevitably alter the meaning of basic democratic concepts such as political participation.** While numerous political and social theorists have sought

to portray and understand this change, few have been more influential than Jurgen Habermas and Michel Foucault. Each provides valuable conceptual resources for understanding contemporary societies and the kinds of dominations, repressions, oppressions, constructions, subjectifications, identities, and possibilities that exist therein. They also provide promising, albeit incomplete suggestions for reconceptualizing political participation in ways appropriate for postmodern societies. Habermas recommends a discursive concept of participation based on communicative action in a deliberative public sphere, and Foucault recommends a micro-politics of resistance. Unfortunately, their insights have not yet been integrated into a postmodern understanding of political participation. This failure of integration is a direct result of an excessively polarized debate that has elided their similarities and exaggerated their differences.¹ Rather than focus primarily on the differences between discursive participation and resistance, I maintain that it is possible and fruitful to combine these two strategies.² In the following discussion I utilize the contemporary concept of performativity to integrate both deliberation and resistance into a new understanding of political participation as performative resistance.

Traditional ideals of political participation including policy analysis fail to engage the modern systems of state function and in fact lessen the possibility for public criticism to influence political change.

Kulynych, 97 Winthrop U Prof of Polysci (Jessica, "Performing Politics: Foucault, Habermas, and Postmodern Participation, Polity, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Winter, 1997), 315-346, accessed Jstor)

Political scientists have traditionally understood political participation as an activity that

assures individual influence over the political system, protection of private interests, system legitimacy, and perhaps even self-development. Habermas and Foucault describe the impact of the conditions of postmodernity on the possibility for efficacious political

action in remarkably similar ways. Habermas describes a world where the possibilities for efficacious political action are quite limited. **The**

escalating interdependence of state and economy, the expansive increase in bureaucratization,

the increasingly technical nature of political decisionmaking, and the subsequent colonization of a formerly sacred private sphere by a ubiquitous administrative state render traditional modes of political participation unable to provide influence, privacy, legitimacy, and self-development.³ **As the state is forced to take an ever larger role in directing a complex global,**

capitalist, welfare state economy, the scope of administration inevitably grows. In order to fulfill its function as the manager of the economy, the administrative state must also manage the details of our lives formerly considered private. Yet, as the state's role in our "private" lives continues to grow, the public has become less and less interested in government, focusing instead on personal and social mores, leisure, and consumption. **Ironically, we have become less interested in politics at precisely the same moment**

when our lives are becoming increasingly "politicized" and administered. This siege of private life and the complicity of this ideology of "civil privatism" in the functioning of the modern

administrative state **makes a mockery of the idea that there exist private interests that can be**

protected from state intervention.⁴ Correlatively, the technical and instrumental rationality of **modern policymaking significantly lessens the possibility for public influence on state policy.**⁵

The difficulty of participation in Habermas's world is exacerbated by the added complexity of a political system structured by hierarchical gender and

racial norms. Nancy Fraser uses Habermas's analysis of the contemporary situation to demonstrate how the infusion of these **hierarchical gender and racial norms into the functioning of the state and economy ensures that political channels of communication between**

citizens and the state are unequally structured and therefore cannot function as mechanisms for the equal protection of interests.⁶ Accordingly, **theorists are much less optimistic about the possibilities for citizens to acquire** or develop feelings of

autonomy and efficacy from the attempt to communicate interests to a system that is essentially impervious to citizen interests, eschews discussion of long-term goals, and requires exclusively technical and instrumental debate. Similarly,

Foucault's complex genealogical descriptions of disciplinary power net- works challenge the traditional assumption that political

power is located primarily in the formal apparatus of the state. **The traditional understanding of political participation tells us**

nothing about what types of political action are appropriate in a world where power is typically and predominantly

disciplinary, productive, and normalizing. As long as we define the purpose of participation only in terms of influence,

privacy, legitimacy, and self-development, we will be unable to see how political action can be effective in the contemporary world.

Link – Ideal Speech

A procedural method of policymaking debate posits an ‘ideal speech’ which necessarily excludes other forms of discourse, making any definition of participation that is limited exclusively to regulated political discourse inevitably exclusionary, racist and sexist.

Kulynych, 97, Winthrop U Prof of Polysci (Jessica, “Performing Politics: Foucault, Habermas, and Postmodern Participation, *Polity*, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Winter, 1997), 315-346, accessed Jstor)

Certainly, one might suggest that the above cases are really just failures of speech, and, therefore, not a critique of ideal speech as it is formulated by Habermas. Indeed Seyla Benhabib reformulates Habermas's speech act perspective to make it sensitive to the above critique. She argues that feminists concerned with the discourse model of democracy have often confused the historically biased practices of deliberative assemblies with the normative ideal of rational deliberation.²⁶ She suggests that feminists concerned with inequities and imbalances in communication can actually benefit from the Habermasian requirement that all positions and issues be made " 'public' in the sense of making [them] accessible to debate, reflection, action and moral-political transformation."²⁷ **The "radical proceduralism" of the discourse model makes it ideally suited to identify inequities in communication because it precludes our accepting unexamined and unjustified positions.**²⁸ Even such a sophisticated and sensitive approach to ideal speech as Benhabib's cannot cleanse communicative action of its exclusivity. It is not only that acquiring language is a process of mastering a symbolic heritage that is systematically gendered, but **the entire attempt to set conditions for "ideal speech" is inevitably exclusive. The model of an ideal speech situation establishes a norm of rational interaction that is defined by the very types of interaction it excludes.** The norm of rational debate favors critical argument and reasoned debate over other forms of communication.²⁹ **Defining ideal speech inevitably entails defining unacceptable speech.** What has been defined as unacceptable in Habermas's formulation is any speech that is not intended to convey an idea. Speech evocative of identity, culture, or emotion has no necessary place in the ideal speech situation, and hence persons whose speech is richly colored with rhetoric, gesture, humor, spirit, or affectation could be defined as deviant or immature communicators. Therefore, **a definition of citizenship based on participation in an ideal form of interaction can easily become a tool for the exclusion of deviant communicators from the category of citizens. This sort of normalization creates citizens as subjects of rational debate.** Correlatively, as Fraser explains, because the communicative action approach is procedural it is particularly unsuited to address issues of speech content.³⁰ Therefore, by definition, it misses the relationship between procedure and content that is at the core of feminist and deconstructive critiques of language. **A procedural approach can require that we accommodate all utterances and that we not marginalize speaking subjects. It cannot require that we take seriously or be convinced by the statements of such interlocutors. In other words, a procedural approach does not address the cultural context that makes some statements convincing and others not.**

Performance key to Political Participation

Engaging in nontraditional debate which has moved away from the exclusive focus on policy analysis is key to reinvigorate true democracy and encouraging real participation.

Kulynych, 97, Winthrop U Prof of Polysci (Jessica, "Performing Politics: Foucault, Habermas, and Postmodern Participation, *Polity*, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Winter, 1997), 315-346, accessed Jstor)

Habermas regards a public sphere of rational debate as the only possible foundation for democratic politics in the contemporary world. For Habermas, like Schumpeter, democracy is a method.

Democracies are systems that achieve the formation of public opinion and public will through a correct process of public communication, and then "translate" that communicative power into administrative power via the procedurally regulated public spheres of parliaments and the judiciary. The extent to which this translation occurs is the measure of a healthy constitutional democracy. Thus, **the "political public sphere" is the "fundamental concept of a theory of democracy."**¹⁰

In this discursive definition of democracy, political participation takes on a new character. **Participation equals discursive participation; it is communication governed by rational, communicatively achieved argument and negotiation.** Habermas distinguishes two types of discursive participation: **problem-solving or decision-oriented deliberation, which takes place primarily in formal democratic institutions such as parliaments and is regulated or governed by democratic procedures; and informal opinion-formation, which is opinion-formation "uncoupled from decisions..."** [and] effected in an open and inclusive network of overlapping, subcultural publics having fluid temporal, social and substantive boundaries."

"In many ways this two-tiered description of discursive participation is a radically different understanding of political participation, and one better suited to the sort of societies we currently inhabit. **Habermas moves the focus of participation away from policymaking and toward redefining legitimate democratic processes that serve as the necessary background for subsequent policymaking. While only a limited number of specially trained individuals can reasonably engage in decisionmaking participation, the entire populous can and must participate in the informal deliberation that takes place outside of, or uncoupled from, formal decisionmaking structures.** This **informal participation is primarily about generating "public discourses that uncover topics of relevance to all of society, interpret values, contribute to the resolution of problems, generate good reasons, and debunk bad ones."**¹² Informal participation has two main functions. First, it acts as a "warning system with sensors that, though unspecialized, are sensitive throughout society."³ This system communicates problems "that must be processed by the political system."¹⁴ Habermas labels this the "signal" function. Second, **informal participation must not only indicate when problems need to be addressed, it must also provide an "effective problematization" of those issues.** As Habermas argues, from the perspective of democratic theory, the public sphere must, in addition, amplify the pressure of problems, that is, not only detect and identify problems but also convincingly and influentially thematize them, furnish them with possible solutions, and dramatize them in such a way that they are taken up and dealt with by parliamentary complexes."

Informal participation is crucial because it is the source of both legitimacy and innovation in formal decisionmaking. As long as decisionmaking is open to the influence of informal opinion-formation, then state policies are legitimate because they are grounded in free and equal communication that meets the democratic requirement of equal participation. Informal participation originating in the public sphere is also the resource for innovative descriptions and presentations of interests, preferences, and issues. **If they ignore informal participation, state decisionmakers have no connection to the center of democracy: the political public sphere.**

Performance key to Political Participation

Kritiks access citizenship better- they allow engagement without relying on exclusionary political calculus and technical knowledge. The power of the kritik is that it blurs the line between laypeople and political analysts- allowing a radically inclusive reformation of the democratic processes. Kulynych, 97, Winthrop U Prof of Polysci (Jessica, "Performing Politics: Foucault, Habermas, and Postmodern Participation, *Polity*, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Winter, 1997), 315-346, accessed Jstor)

A performative perspective on participation enriches our understanding of deliberative democracy. This enlarged understanding can be demonstrated by considering the examination of citizen politics in Germany presented in Carol Hager's Technological Democracy: Bureaucracy and Citizenry in the West German Energy Debate. 86 Her work skillfully maps the precarious position of citizen groups as they enter into problem-solving in contemporary democracies. After detailing the German citizen foray into technical debate and the subsequent creation of energy commissions to deliberate on the long-term goals of energy policy, she concludes that **a dual standard of interpretation and evaluation is required for full understanding of the prospects for citizen participation. Where traditional understandings of participation focus on the policy dimension and concern themselves with the citizens' success or failure to attain policy preferences, she advocates focusing as well on the discursive, legitimation dimension of citizen action.** Hager follows Habermas in reconstituting participation discursively and asserts that **the legitimation dimension offers an alternative reason for optimism about the efficacy of citizen action. In the discursive understanding of participation, success is not defined in terms of getting, but rather in terms of solving through consensus. Deliberation is thus an end in itself, and citizens have succeeded whenever they are able to secure a realm of deliberative politics where the aim is forging consensus among participants, rather than achieving victory by some over others.** Through the creation of numerous networks of communication and the generation of publicity, **citizen action furthers democracy by assuming a substantive role in governing and by forcing participants in the policy process to legitimate their positions politically rather than technically.** Hager maintains that **a sense of political efficacy is enhanced by this politically interactive role even though citizens were only minimally successful in influencing or controlling the outcome of the policy debate, and experienced a real lack of autonomy as they were coerced into adopting the terms of the technical debate.** She agrees with Alberto Melucci that **the impact of [these] movements cannot ... be judged by normal criteria of efficacy and success. ... These groups offer a different way of perceiving and naming the world. They demonstrate that alternatives are possible, and they expand the communicative as opposed to the bureaucratic or market realms of societal activity.**⁸⁷ Yet her analysis is incomplete. Like Habermas, Hager relies too heavily on a discursive reconstitution of political action. Though she recognized many of the limitations of Habermas's theory discussed above, she insists on the innovative and creative potential of citizen initiatives. She insists that deliberative politics can resist the tendency toward authoritarianism common to even a communicative, deliberative search for objective truth, and that legitimation debates can avoid the tendency to devolve into the technical search for the better argument. She bases her optimism on the non-hierarchical, sometimes even chaotic and incoherent, forms of decisionmaking practiced by citizen initiatives, and on the diversity and spontaneity of citizen groups. Unfortunately, it is precisely these elements of citizen action that cannot be explained by a theory of communicative action. It is here that a performative conception of political action implicitly informs Hager's discussion. **From a performative perspective, the goal of action is not only to secure a realm for deliberative politics, but to disrupt and resist the norms and identities that structure such a realm and its participants.** While Habermas theorizes that political solutions will emerge from dialogue, **a performative understanding of participation highlights the limits of dialogue and the creative and often**

uncontrollable effect of unpremeditated action on the very foundations of communication. When we look at the success of citizen initiatives from a performative perspective, we look precisely at those moments of defiance and disruption that bring the invisible and unimaginable into view. Although citizens were minimally successful in influencing or controlling the outcome of the policy debate and experienced a considerable lack of autonomy in their coercion into the technical debate, the goal-oriented debate within the energy commissions could be seen as a defiant moment of performative politics. The existence of a goal-oriented debate within a technically dominated arena defied the normalizing separation between expert policymakers and consuming citizens. Citizens momentarily recreated themselves as policymakers in a system that defined citizens out of the policy process, thereby refusing their construction as passive clients. The disruptive potential of the energy commissions continues to defy technical bureaucracy even while their decisions are non-binding. Where traditional understandings of political participation see the energy commissions' failure to recapture the decisionmaking process as an expression of the power of the bureaucracy, and discursive understandings see the tendency toward devolution into technical debate and procedural imperative, the performative perspective explains and high- lights the moments of defiant creativity and disruptive diversity that inevitably accompany citizen expeditions into unexplored territory. This attitude of defiance, manifest in the very chaos and spontaneity that Hager points toward as a counter to Habermas's strictly dialogic and procedural approach, simply cannot be explained by an exclusively discursive theory. It is the performative aspects of participation that cannot be captured or constrained within the confines of rational discourse, that gesture toward meanings that are inexpressible and identities that are unimaginable within the current cultural imagery. These performances provide the resource for diversity and spontaneity. Consider, for example, a public hearing. When seen from a discursive, legitimation perspective, deliberation and debate are about the sincere, controlled attempt to discern the best, most rational, least biased arguments that most precisely express an interlocutor's ideas and interests. In practice, however, deliberation is a much less deliberative and much more performative activity. The literary aspects of debate-irony, satire, sarcasm, and wit-work precisely on the slippage between what is said and what is meant, or what can be said and what can be conceived. Strategies such as humor are not merely rational, but visceral and often uncontrollable, as is the laughter that is evoked from such strategies. Performative actions are not alternative ways of deliberating; rather they are agonistic expressions of what cannot be captured by deliberative rationality. As such, they resist the confines of that rationality and gesture toward places where words, arguments, and claims are not enough. Without an understanding of the performative aspect of political action, Hager cannot explain how citizens are able to introduce genuinely new and different "ways of perceiving and naming the world" into a realm where such epistemic standards are unimaginable. It is in the process of acting as citizens in a technical bureaucratic setting, where citizen action is by definition precluded, that alternative, epistemic standards of evaluation become possible. Only when scholars recognize the performative will they be able to grasp the intricacies of contemporary political action and the possibilities for an actually diverse and participatory democracy.

Performance key to Education

Political engagement is more than simple argument- the form of the message is just as influential as the content, and no message can be understood without understanding its method.

Kulynych, 97, Winthrop U Prof of Polysci (Jessica, "Performing Politics: Foucault, Habermas, and Postmodern Participation, *Polity*, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Winter, 1997), 315-346, accessed Jstor)

How to convincingly thematize an alternative to something that is taken for granted is the very problem postmodernists have so often taken up. Habermas also recognizes this problem, as is evident in some of the terminology he employs in describing the role of public discourses.

Discourses must not only identify, they must also thematize and dramatize.⁴² They can be metaphorically described as "performances" and "presentations" that invoke not only "forums" but also "stages" and "arenas."⁴³ These are images that imply more than the careful presentation of validity claims. Habermas's demand that public discourses be both "attention catching" and "innovative" as well as "convincing" and "justifiable" requires more than rational argumentation. It requires a kind of political action that can effectively disrupt the culturally common sensical and actually provide new and compelling alternatives to disciplinary constructions of such things as gender difference. It is here that Habermas would benefit from attending to the productive character of disciplinary power in creating distinctly and authentically gendered beings in the first place.

Performance key to Change

Performative resistance is a crucial break with traditional political debate- resistance is a self-constituted activity that is necessary for the inclusion of alternative perspectives.

Kulynych, 97, Winthrop U Prof of Polysci (Jessica, "Performing Politics: Foucault, Habermas, and Postmodern Participation, *Polity*, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Winter, 1997), 315-346, accessed Jstor)

Performative resistance brings into being the citizen it purports to represent. The thoroughly privatized, client-citizen is re-created as a public actor in the moment of resistance. Foucault himself seemed to be leaning toward this sort of notion of performative action in his focus on care for the self and on an aesthetic of "self-creation." In these later thoughts, Foucault seems clearly to be searching for a way to understand innovative and experimental subjectivities that are not a return to the idea of a liberated human essence. His focus on the active constitution of the self is additional evidence of a move toward a more performative notion of resistance. As he stated in a 1984 interview, I would say that if now I am interested, in fact, in the way **the subject constitutes himself in an active fashion, by the practices of the self, these practices are nevertheless not something that the individual invents by himself.** They are patterns that he finds in his culture and which are proposed, suggested and imposed on him by his culture, his society, and his social group.⁶² As long as we look at this type of resistance as expressive of the subject, then McCarthy is right: the intent of the subject's actions are proposed, suggested, and imposed, and hardly what we would label autonomous. But, **once we think of the activity of self-creation performatively, then the possibility of a resistant citizen emerges. It is indeed incongruous to ask what it is that resists, since the citizen as participant, the resistant citizen, is created by the act of resistance. The above notion of performativity as "world creating," or identity- creating is crucial given the subjectifying nature of modern power** that McCarthy so clearly recognizes. However, the world-creating facet of performativity is not adequate for answering Fraser's normative query. Fraser's concerns reflect a real normative confusion in Foucault. He interrogates the development of disciplinary power at the same time he denies that there is a foundation for his own normativity.⁶³ He utilizes liberal ideals, such as personal liberty, to expose the malevolence of enlightenment liberation, but combines them with a critique that eschews normative grounding. Again, an understanding of resistance as per- formative helps explain this apparent contradiction. William Chaloupka provides a second understanding of performativity that helps explain Foucault's "cryptonormativism." Chaloupka plays upon the dual meaning of demonstration to highlight the performative aspects of protest. In the typical usage, to demonstrate means "to point out, to make known, to describe and explain."⁶⁴ In this sense, **protesters utilize their actions as a vehicle for their interests. They make their point, which already exists, through the use of the demonstration as tactic. But demonstration has also an alternative meaning, a meaning derived from the French démontrer** (to demonstrate), and montrer (to show).⁶⁵ Thus, as Chaloupka sees it, **a demonstration is also "a show." The demonstration in this sense is not an explanation but an exposure, a defiance embodied in action that flies in the face of acceptability. Accordingly, the protestor's usage moves toward the contingent realm of strategies and emotions. Here demonstration does not establish objectivity and logic, so much as it shows up the objective order, assertively getting in the way.**⁶⁶ Thus **the performative aspect of demonstration cannot be adequately captured with the lens of truth and justice. The protestor is not trying to make a point, to prove that the system is unjust. Rather, the protestor exposes the contingency of justice itself.**

Performance key to Policymaking

Kritik is a pre-requisite to policy- revealing that which is excluded from normal discussions is key to identifying effective solutions. In effect, the question is not “Should we resist?”, but rather “How and what are we resisting?”

Kulynych, 97, Winthrop U Prof of Polysci (Jessica, “Performing Politics: Foucault, Habermas, and Postmodern Participation, *Polity*, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Winter, 1997), 315-346, accessed Jstor)

Foucault comes close to saying what Chaloupka argues here when he states, a critique is not a matter of saying that things are not right as they are. It is a matter of pointing out on what kinds of assumptions, what kinds of familiar, unchallenged, unconsidered modes of thought the practices we accept rest. ... Criticism is a matter of flushing out that thought and trying to change it: to show that things are not as self-evident as one believes, to see that what is accepted as self-evident will no longer be accepted as such.⁶⁷ If we interpret the "to show" here not as pointing out what is wrong with disciplinary society (which would leave Foucault subject to Fraser's normative criticism), but rather as "showing," or "showing up," then we no longer need the introduction of normative notions, we are merely doing disciplinary society one better. **Making a point is a function of discourse, the ability to align and arrange arguments that support a position. Yet, the performative protestor does not argue against the state, he mocks it. The protestor works at the margins of discourse, utilizing puns and jokes and caricature to "expose" the limits of what is being said. Thus, performative resistance, when considered as critique, does not need to tell us what is wrong, rather it reveals the existence of subjection where we had not previously seen it.** I am not suggesting that we can get a normative anchor out of the notion of performativity. To the contrary, I am suggesting **performative resistance makes no such normative distinctions, or rather, that performativity is not about normative distinctions. We bring normativity to our performances as ethical principles that are themselves subject to resistance. By unearthing the contingency of the "self-evident," performative resistance enables politics. Thus, the question is not should we resist (since resistance is always, already present), but rather what and how we should resist.** This notion of performativity is also important for understanding the possibilities for innovation in Habermasian deliberative participation. **Just as a protestor exposes the contingency of concepts like justice, a dialogue exposes the limits and contingency of rational argumentation. Once we are sensitive to the performative nature of speech, language and discourse, then we can see that deliberative politics cannot be confined to the rational statement of validity claims. Deliberation must be theatrical: it is in the performance of deliberation that that which cannot be argued for finds expression. Indeed it is precisely the non-rational aspects of deliberation that carry the potential for innovation.** In his description of the poignant reminders of demonstration Chaloupka recognizes that it is at the margins that the actual force of the demonstration resides, no matter what happens at the microphone. The oral histories of demonstrations (the next day over coffee) linger over the jokes and funny signs and slogans, the outrages and improprieties, more than the speeches and carefully coherent position papers.⁶⁸ **Any convincing account of the politics of deliberation must take account of the creative potential that resides in the performance of debate.**

Performance key to Inclusion

Incorporating kritiks expands the domain of the political, returning to policymaking arguments by reinvigorating their effectiveness in the public sphere.

Kulynych, 97, Winthrop U Prof of Polysci (Jessica, "Performing Politics: Foucault, Habermas, and Postmodern Participation, *Polity*, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Winter, 1997), 315-346, accessed Jstor)

Understanding participation as performative resistance also provides a theoretical grounding for rethinking conventional participatory activities. The breakdown of the distinction between participation and resistance means that conventional political activities may also take on the character of resistance. For example, a performative concept of participation may shed new light on phenomena such as the "Perot vote," where **citizens admittedly cast their vote with little expectation of influencing the outcome. In other words, the vote is not merely a conduit for the expression of particular citizen interests or preferences; rather, its purpose depends upon the surrounding environment. Lacking clear choices and substantive discussion of long-term goals, voting or nonvoting itself may become a form of protest. Performative participation captures the sense of destabilization and disruption that more and more characterizes today's electorate. Likewise, unconventional activities such as protest marches may in turn appear to communicate citizen preferences and sustain system legitimacy in systems where those activities become institutionalized. Yearly Washington marches, for example, may actually diffuse discontent by providing a legitimate outlet for protest; at the same time they verify**

system legitimacy by focusing protest toward the formal legal structures of government. Political participation must also account for the performative potential of traditional acts of participation in modern societies where these acts no longer fill traditional purposes, as well as the complicity of formalized protest in bolstering the status quo. Overall, both Habermas and Foucault direct attention away from traditional participatory activities directed at the formal apparatus of government. Yet they also connect these participatory activities back to larger, more globalized, and more institutionalized power regimes. While Foucault concentrates on contests at the micro-level, he contends that those contests provide the raw material for global domination. Similarly Habermas has moved from a relatively pessimistic and defensive view of the political process (where democracy was limited to a communicative but protected public sphere whose legitimate opinions made few inroads into political administration), to a more promising theorization of a "democratized administration" in a constitutional state that "translates" legitimate influence into political and administrative power. Although my theorization of a performative concept of participation as resistance is designed to

reiterate the importance of focusing on more surprising instances of participation, **this expansion and redefinition of participation does not preclude the continuance of representative institutions and formalized participation. Rather it rearranges their purpose and priority. An expanded notion of political participation as performative resistance allows for a more effective thematization of social problems, and it demonstrates how performative resistance is not above or below traditional participation, but necessarily within it.** Performative resistance is evident in intimate and personal relationships, in the deliberations of civil society, and in the problem-solving institutions of the constitutional state. While Habermas insists on a separation between the problem-solving that takes place in parliaments and the world-disclosing that is the function of the public sphere, **a performative conception of participation effectively undermines any firm separation between problem solving and world disclosure. Proposals for group representation in legislative institutions** by theorists such as Young and Guinier make more sense from a performative perspective because **they encourage the performative reconstitution of identity not only in private life, but also at the level of public decisionmaking.**⁸⁵

The division between "policymaking" and "kritik" is a false one; we must embrace nontraditional forms of participation as ways to return otherwise excluded issues to the political sphere.

Kulynych, 97, Winthrop U Prof of Polysci (Jessica, "Performing Politics: Foucault, Habermas, and Postmodern Participation, *Polity*, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Winter, 1997), 315-346, accessed Jstor)

A performative concept of participation as resistance explodes the distinction between public and private, between the political and the apolitical. As Foucault explains, **what was formerly considered apolitical, or social rather than political, is revealed as the foundation of technologies of state control. Contests over identity and everyday social life are not merely additions to the realm of the political, but actually create the very character of those things traditionally considered political. The state itself is "superstructural" in relation to a whole**

series of power networks that invest the body, sexuality, the family, kinship, knowledge, technology and so forth."⁷² **Thus it is contestations at the micro-level, over the intricacies of everyday life, that provide the raw material for global domination, and the key to disrupting global strategies of domination. Therefore, the location of political participation extends way beyond the formal apparatus of government,** or the formal organization of the workplace, to the intimacy of daily actions and iterations.

Switch Sides Bad

Debating on both sides of an issue severs sincerity and ethics from public speaking; ethical speech becomes impossible

Ronald Walter **Green** and Darrin **Hicks** in **2005** (*Cultural Studies*, Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 100-126, "Lost Convictions: Debating both sides and the ethical self-fashioning of liberal citizens", January 2005)

LOST CONVICTIONS

Debating both sides and the ethical self-fashioning of liberal citizens

This paper takes as its point of departure the ethical problematization of debating both sides #/ having students argue both affirmative and negative on a debate resolution #/ in order to highlight the role of communication as a cultural technology of liberalism. It argues that **debating both sides contributed to the cultural governance of**

cold war liberalism by separating speech from conviction to cultivate the value of debate as a method of democratic decision-making. The valorization of free and full expression as a pre-requisite for 'decision by debate' prepared the ground for dis-

articulating debate from cold war liberalism and rearticulating it as a game of freedom that contributes to the moral education of liberal citizens. In so doing, debate becomes a global technology of liberalism

creating exceptional subjects by circulating the communicative norms of deliberative democracy.

Keywords: conviction; free speech; cold war; debate; American exceptionalism; deliberative democracy

In 1954, the US military academies, and a host of other colleges, refused to

affirm the national debate resolution: 'Resolved: The United States should diplomatically recognize the People's Republic of China'. The problem of speaking in favour of the diplomatic recognition of 'Red China' came amidst an acute moment in the US containment strategy of domestic and international communism (Ross 1989). This, in turn, sparked a national controversy that included discussion in the New York Times (Burns 1954). Due to the growing prevalence of 'switch-side debating', a procedure that required teams to debate both sides of the resolution in consecutive debate rounds at intercollegiate debate tournaments, the controversy manifested itself as an ethical concern about the relationship between public speaking and the moral attributes of good citizenship. At the heart of the 'debate about debate' (Ehninger 1958) was the idea of conviction and how it should guide the moral

economy of liberal citizenship. But why dredge up this event from the archive of communication

education? First, since the collapse of the Soviet Union there has been a vigorous trade in debate as a tool for democratic education, often with the hope of inculcating students with the norms necessary for deliberative democracy. For example, since 1994, the International Debate Education Association 'has introduced debate to secondary schools and universities throughout Central and Eastern Europe, the Former Soviet Union, Central Asia and Haiti and continues to grow throughout the world' (idebate.org 2004). The promotion and circulation of debate as a technique of democratic decision-making suggests a need to explore the history of its ethical problematization. As a cultural technology, the value of debate rests on its claim to cultivate the ethical attributes required for democratic citizenship.

Therefore, those challenges to debate's civic function require special consideration in order to assess the role of communication in the self-fashioning of liberal citizens.¹ In Foucauldian fashion, we are interested in the ethical problematization of debating both sides so that we might learn how this pedagogical technique organizes forms of democratic subjectification available in the present (Foucault 2001). The second reason to write about the debating both sides controversy is because it highlights how communication becomes an object, instrument and field of cultural governance. The emphasis on the linguistic dimension of communication tends to privilege a methodological and political commitment to read the circulation of power as an ideological phenomenon mediated by the process of generating and controlling the meaning of contested values, identities, and symbols (Nelson & Gaonkar 1998, Rosteck 1999). As an alternative to this vision of a 'communicational cultural studies' (Grossberg 1997) this paper highlights the 'technical dimension' of speech, that is, its circulation as an object and instrument for regulating the conduct of citizens/subjects.² Therefore, we approach the debating both sides controversy in terms of what Michel Foucault (2001) calls a 'history of thought' #/ a 'history of how people become anxious about this or that' (p. 74). Moreover, to write a history of debate as a cultural technology reveals how power works productively by augmenting the human capacity for speech/communication. For us, an under-appreciated aspect of the productive power of cultural governance resides in the generation of subjects who come to understand

themselves as speaking subjects willing to regulate and transform their communicative behaviours for the purpose of improving their political, economic, cultural and affective relationships. This paper

argues that **the strong liberal defence of debating both sides separates speech from conviction.**

Debating both sides does so by de-coupling the sincerity principle from the arguments presented by a debater. In place of the assumption that a debater believes in what he or she argues, debating both sides grooms one to appreciate the process of debate as a method of democratic

decision-making. We argue the debating both sides controversy articulates debate to Cold War liberal discourses of 'American exceptionalism' by folding the norm of free and full expression onto the soul of the debater. In

turn, a debater willing to debate both sides becomes a representative of the free world. Furthermore, we will demonstrate how debating both sides as a technique of moral development works alongside specific aesthetic modes of class subjectivity increasingly associated with the efforts of the knowledge class to legitimize the process of judgment. Debating both sides reveals how the globalization of liberalism is less about a set of universal norms and more about the circulation and uptake of cultural technologies. In the first part of this essay, we will offer a thick description of how the relationship between speech and conviction led to the ethical problematization of debating both sides. In the second part of the essay, we contextualize this history through an encounter with Cold War liberalism and the importance of debating both sides as a technology capable of generating a commitment to free speech. The third section of the paper will describe how debate re-invents itself as a game of freedom that instills the ethical attributes of deliberative democracy by re-coding debating both sides as necessary to the moral development of students.⁴ Debate and the problem of conviction In the United States, the 1920s and 1930s saw a veritable explosion in the popularity of intercollegiate debate. To accommodate the growing numbers of students wishing to debate and the rising costs of hosting and travelling to debates, the model of annual contests between rival schools gave way to triangular and quadrilateral debating leagues and eventually to the debate tournament. Intercollegiate debating underwent major transformations during this period, many of them brought on by tournament competition.⁵ Perhaps the most significant #/ and certainly the most controversial #/ transformation resulting from tournament debating was the practice of having participants debate both sides of the proposition. Debating both sides, its proponents argued, had the pragmatic benefit of allowing more teams to participate in more debates and to make scheduling tournaments much more efficient. There was, as well, the pedagogical benefit of rewarding those students with the most refined skills in marshalling evidence and formulating arguments in support of their respective positions. By the 1950s, debating both sides had become so prevalent that the West Point National Debate Tournament, the largest and most prestigious tournament of the day, mandated it as a condition of participation.⁶ The growing professionalization of tournament debating carried out in extra-curricular competitive spaces increasingly relied on debating both sides.¹⁰

² CULTURAL STUDIES As a tournament progresses, a student moves from one side of the resolution to the next, a switch in sides, demarcated by the next 'round' of debate. The technique of debating both sides increases the efficiency of debate to train students in critical thinking and argumentative advocacy by modifying the side of the resolution the debater advocates. Since each debate is a situated rhetorical event with changing interlocutors and different individual judges, each debate round allows a unique pedagogical opportunity to learn and evaluate behaviour. The relationship between debate as a competitive activity amenable to pedagogical intervention and debating both sides as a specific technique of debate pedagogy and tournament administration, however, did not appear naturally, but was the effect of intellectual struggle. While the opposition to debating both sides probably reaches back to the challenges against the ancient practice of *dissoi logoi*, we want to turn our attention to the unique cultural history of debate during the Cold War. In the midst of Joseph McCarthy's impending censure by the US Senate, the US Military Academy, the US Naval Academy and, subsequently, all of the teacher colleges in the state of Nebraska refused to affirm the resolution #/ 'Resolved: The United States should diplomatically recognize the People's Republic of China'. Yet, switch-side debating remained the national standard, and, by the fall of 1955, the military academies and the teacher colleges of Nebraska were debating in favour of the next resolution. Richard Murphy (1957), however, was not content to let the controversy pass without comment. Murphy

launched a series of criticisms that would sustain the debate about debate for the next ten years. Murphy held that **debating both sides of the question was**

unethical because it divorced conviction from advocacy and that it was a dangerous practice because it threatened the integrity of public debate by divorcing it from a genuine search for truth. Murphy's case against the ethics of debating both sides

Switch Sides Bad

rested on what he thought to be a simple and irrefutable rhetorical principle: A public utterance is a public commitment. In Murphy's opinion, debate was best imagined as a species of public speaking akin to public advocacy on the affairs of the day. If debate is a form of public speaking, Murphy reasoned, and a public utterance entails a public commitment, then speakers have an ethical obligation to study the question, discuss it with others until they know their position, take a stand and then #/ and only then #/ engage in public advocacy in favour of their viewpoint.

Murphy had no doubt that intercollegiate debate was a form of public advocacy and was, hence, rhetorical, although this point would be severely attacked by proponents of switch-side debating. Modern debating, Murphy claimed, 'is geared to the public platform and to rhetorical, rather than dialectical principles' (p. 7). Intercollegiate debate was rhetorical, not dialectical, because its propositions were specific and timely rather than speculative and universal. Debaters evidenced their claims by appeals to authority and opinion rather than formal logic, and debaters appealed to an audience, even if that audience was a single person sitting in the back of a room at a relatively isolated debate tournament. As such, debate as a species of public argument should be held to the ethics of the platform. **We would surely hold in contempt any public actor who spoke with equal force, and without genuine conviction, for both sides of a public policy question. Why, asked Murphy,**

would we exempt students from the same ethical obligation? Murphy's master ethic #/ that a public utterance entails a public commitment #/ rested on a classical rhetorical theory that refuses the modern distinctions between cognitive claims of truth (referring to the objective world), normative claims of right (referring to the intersubjective world), and expressive claims of sincerity (referring to the subjective state of the speaker), although this distinction, and Murphy's refusal to make it, would surface as a major point of contention in the 1960s for the proponents of debating both sides.⁷ Murphy is avoiding the idea that the words spoken by a debater can be divorced from what the speaker actually believes to be true, right, or good (expressive claims of sincerity). For Murphy, to stand and publicly proclaim that one affirmed the resolution entailed both a claim that the policy being advocated was indeed the best possible choice, given extant social conditions, and that one sincerely believed that her or his arguments were true and right. In other words, a judge should not make a distinction between the merits of the case presented and the sincerity of the advocates presenting it; rather, the reasons supporting a policy and the ethos of the speakers are mutually constitutive forms of proof. The interdependency of logos and ethos was not only a matter of rhetorical principle for Murphy but also a foundational premise of public reason in a democratic society. Although he never explicitly states why this is true, most likely because he assumed it to be self-evident, a charitable interpretation of Murphy's position, certainly a more generous interpretation than his detractors were willing to give, would show that his axiom rests on the following argument: If

public reason is to have any legitimate force, auditors must believe that advocates are arguing from conviction and not from greed, desire or naked self-interest. **If auditors believe that advocates are insincere, they will not afford legitimacy to their claims and will opt to settle disputes through force or some seemingly neutral modus vivendi such as voting or arbitration. Hence, sincerity is a necessary element of public reason and, therefore, a necessary condition of critical deliberation in a democratic society.**

For Murphy, the assumption of sincerity is intimately articulated to the notion of ethical argumentation in a democratic political culture. If a speaker were to repudiate this assumption by advocating contradictory positions in a public forum, it would completely undermine her or his ethos and result in the loss of the means of identification with an audience. The real danger of undermining the assumption of sincerity was not that individual speakers would be rendered ineffective #/ although this certainly did make training students to debate both 1 0 4 CULTURAL STUDIES sides bad

rhetorical pedagogy. **The ultimate danger of switch-side debating was that it would engender a distrust of public advocates. The public would come to see the debaters who would come to occupy public offices as 'public liars' more interested in politics as vocation than as a calling. Debate would be seen as a game of power rather than the method of democracy.**

The nation's leading debate coaches, taking Murphy's condemnation as an accusation that they had failed in their ethical responsibility as educators, quickly and forcefully responded to his charges. They had four primary rejoinders to Murphy: that he had misunderstood the nature of tournament debate; that switch-side debating was a sound educational procedure; that intercollegiate debate should be held accountable to a different ethic than those of the platform; and that switch-side debating was necessary to the maintenance of intercollegiate debate. Proponents of switch-side debating, such as A. Craig Baird (1955), Nicholas Cripe (1957), and George Dell (1958) agreed that Murphy's ethic applied 'to argument in the pulpit, in the legislative halls, in the courtroom, and the marketplace' (Cripe 1957, p. 209). This ethic, that a public utterance entails a public commitment, should not, however, apply to the forms of advocacy performed in tournament debating. For the proponents of switch-side debating, there was a sharp distinction between school and public debate. School debate, in particular tournament debating, was not a species of public argument geared towards gaining the consent of an audience to the rightness of the speaker's stand on a public issue, but, rather, a pedagogical tool designed to help students develop their critical thinking skills. Not only did tournament debating differ in purpose, but it also differed in method from public debate. Tournament debate was defined as a dialectical method of disputation, a method suitable for adjudication by an expert judge on technical criteria rather than by a public audience. Hence, the sincerity principle simply did not apply to intercollegiate debate. The description of debate as a dialectical method did not mean that the proponents of switch-side debating rejected the importance of conviction for public argument. They did, however, claim that sound conviction, as opposed to dogmatism, was a product of debate, not its prerequisite. Baird (1955), arguing that debate should be understood less as public advocacy and more as a dialectical method of inquiry, claimed that sound conviction was a product of a rigorous analysis of all aspects of a question and that this analysis was best conducted through a method which had students practice defending and rejecting the major arguments on both sides. Thus, debating both sides should be understood as an educational procedure designed to generate 'sound' convictions prior to public advocacy. Baird urged that the critics of switch-side debating should understand the practice as a pedagogical device and to judge it accordingly. 'These student exercises', he told debaters and their coaches, 'are to be sharply distinguished from the later 'practical life' situations in which you are preachers, lawyers, business men and women, politicians and community LOST CONVICTIONS 1 0 5 leaders. Debate and discussion training is essentially training in reflective thinking, in the defence of different sides ('role playing' as some call it), and in the revelation of strength and weakness of each position' (p. 6). It was Baird's recognition that debating both sides was equivalent to role-playing that warranted re-thinking the fit between the speaker and the words spoken. Furthermore, if a debater did in fact appear to be shallow, insincere and prone to manipulate public opinion for her or his own ends, this was certainly not, argued Wayne Thompson (1944) and Nicholas Cripe, the fault of switch-side debating, but the 'result of other causes #/ weakness in the character of the offender or a misunderstanding of the proper functioning of debate' (Thompson 1944, p. 296). The proper way to deal with any ethical shortcomings in debaters, the proponents argued, was for the national forensics associations to develop a code of ethics that would stress the ethical responsibility of intercollegiate debaters (to present the best possible case according to facts as the debater understood them) and to forcefully condemn individual acts of malfeasance such as misconstruing evidence, falsifying sources, and misrepresenting their opponents' positions. For Robert Newman (1963), the controversy over debating both sides was simple to resolve: as long as a good case could be made on each side of the resolution and individual debaters did not lie or cheat, there simply was no ethical dilemma and certainly no need for a disciplinary-based ethic to guide debate practice. Finally, debate coaches justified switch-side debate on the pragmatic grounds that it was a necessary component of tournament debating and that abandoning the practice would mean the end of intercollegiate debating. 'In fact, if the proponents of ethical debate are correct', Cripe warned, 'and it is immoral for a team to debate both sides, then many schools would have to discontinue debate as we practice today' (1957,

p. 209). **Baird's defence of debating both sides #/ in which he defined it as an educational procedure designed to generate sound conviction #/ was the most formidable of the defences of switch-side debating. However, it was defeated, according to Murphy (1957), once educators understood that there were many ways of teaching students to see both sides of an issue. He or she could prepare briefs on both sides of the question, form roundtable discussions where students would play devil's advocate to test the strength of each other's positions, and even have informal practice rounds in a closed club setting where students debated both sides to test and strengthen their convictions. It**

was not the fact that students explored all sides of an issue that worried Murphy. Rather, Baird's defence, and any defence that claimed debating both sides was ethical because it was a pedagogical tool, ignored 'a basic rhetorical principle that the speaker should read and discuss, and inquire, and test his [sic] position before he [sic] takes the platform to present it' (Murphy 1957, p. 5).

Turn: we cannot be educated by just anybody speaking on an issue; real education occurs when those who really care about an issue speak to us about it in earnest.

Ronald Walter Green and Darrin Hicks in 2005 (Cultural Studies, Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 100-126, "Lost Convictions: Debating both sides and the ethical self-fashioning of liberal citizens", January 2005)

Because debate propositions are deliberately worded so good arguments can be made on both sides, there should never be a shortage of speakers on both sides of the issue, speakers who really believe in what they were arguing. The real benefit of hearing both sides of an issue, Murphy claimed, is that it encourages individuals to open their minds to other perspectives and to modify their beliefs if so warranted. Yet, alternative views will not be taken seriously, unless we 'hear them from persons who actually believe them, who defend them in earnest, and do their very utmost for them'

(Murphy 1957, p. 4). Switch-side debating, Murphy argued, is not justified by the principles of free speech; rather, those principles support revoking the practice. For Day, in contrast, the re-coding of free speech as the ethical substance of debate, a substance that was internal to its procedures, allowed for an ethical re-description of debate as a deliberative technique. For instance, as Day argues, the 'prime requisite which must be met if debate is to provide sound decisions is that it be thorough and complete, that all arguments and information relevant to a decision be known and understood' (1966, p. 6). Day's commitment to free speech is based on a radical reading of Mill: Freedom of expression entails more than lifting prior restraints on argumentation; it necessitates the construction of avenues of access for minority views within dominant media outlets and, if necessary, the restructuring of deliberative forums so minority views will not be rejected outright because they challenge hegemonic methods of interpretation. 'Free speech is the necessary prerequisite of full debate', Day argues, because 'it guarantees that full debate can take place' (p. 6). Yet, freedom of speech does not guarantee that full debate will take place. It is in this gap between opportunity and outcome that Day discovers the ethical demand for debating both sides: 'A commitment to debate as the method of democratic decisionmaking demands an overriding ethical responsibility to promote the full confrontation of opposing opinions, arguments, and information relevant to decision. Without the confrontation of opposing ideas debate does not exist, and to the extent that that confrontation is incomplete so is debate incomplete' (p. 6). To promote debate as a democratic mode of decision-making required full and free expression so as to maximize the confrontation of opposing ideas. Debating both sides emerged as a specific pedagogical technique to inculcate and encourage students to embrace the norm of full and free expression. Two practical obligations are entailed in the acceptance of this ethic: First, the forums for public deliberation must be fully inclusive; encouragement and incentive must be provided to those who hold unpopular views to express themselves. Second, and more important, 'all must recognize and accept personal responsibility to present, when necessary, as forcefully as possible, opinions and arguments with which they may personally disagree' (p. 7). Few are likely to challenge the first entailment, but the second provided Day with a radical redefinition of the ethics of conviction. Day argues that persuasively presenting a position that contradicts one's personal conviction is the 'highest ethical act in democratic debate' (p. 7). Moreover, to argue forcefully for a position one abhors is the hallmark of democratic citizenship. To set aside one's convictions and present the argument for the other side demonstrates that the citizen has forsaken her or his personal interests and particular vision of the good for the benefit of the commonweal. That is, the citizen recognizes the moral priority of democratic debate when she or he agrees to be bound by its results regardless of personal conviction. Debating both sides, then, is necessitated by the ethical obligations intrinsic to the technology of democratic debate. Both of Murphy's charges

that **debating both sides is unethical #/ that requiring students to debate both sides is a form of blackmail and that the separation of speech and conviction courts sophistry #/ are answered by this position.**

On the one hand, if debating both sides of a question is an ethical duty, requiring students to do so as a condition of participation is not an immoral imposition but rather an ethical and pedagogical duty. On the other hand, given the political dangers that privileging personal conviction over democratic process courts, divorcing speech from conviction is a prerequisite to democratic legitimacy. In so doing, one's convictions should be reassigned so as to promote a commitment to debate as the fundamental process of a democratic form of public deliberation. The practice of debating both sides does not warrant support simply because it is ethical; it does so because it is an effective pedagogical technique for inculcating the communicative ethics necessary for democratic citizenship. According to Day, 'Debating both sides teaches students to discover, analyze, and test all the arguments, opinions, and evidence relevant to a decision. In addition, it provides an opportunity for students to substantiate for themselves the assumption that "truthful" positions may be taken on both sides of controversial questions' (1966, p. 13).

Realism Bad

The specificity of realist discourse both excludes alternative perspectives and directly shapes state action in dangerous and potentially violent ways.

Bleiker, 00 Ph.D. visiting research and teaching affiliations at Harvard, Cambridge, Humboldt, Tampere, Yonsei and Pusan National University as well as the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology and the Institute of Social Studies in The Hague, (Roland, Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics, Cambridge University Press)

Realism, which is arguably the most important tradition in international theory, has defined the discipline's purview in a rather specific way.

In his influential analysis of international politics, Kenneth Waltz differentiates among three approaches to the study of interstate conflict.

Depending on whether the causes of war are seen in 'man' (i.e., individuals), the attributes of specific states, or the nature of the international system, he labels them first, second and third image analysis.⁷

According to Waltz's neo-realist interpretation, international theory ought to be concerned only with the third, systemic level of analysis. The main task thus consists of theorising how the anarchic structure of the international system affects the behaviour of states.⁸

The result is a rather narrowly perceived understanding of global politics, one that assumes, as K. J. Holsti summarises, that the proper focus of study is the causes of war and that the main units of analysis are the diplomatic-military behaviours of the only essential actors, nation-states.⁹

(Boston, Mass: Unwin Hyman, 1985), p. 10.

Policymaking constructs kritiks as overcomplicated and vague while in actuality the only seem that way against the backdrop of the overly simplified dominant perceptions of political calculations.

Bleiker, 00 Ph.D. visiting research and teaching affiliations at Harvard, Cambridge, Humboldt, Tampere, Yonsei and Pusan National University as well as the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology and the Institute of Social Studies in The Hague, (Roland, Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics, Cambridge University Press)

We easily forget, for instance, that **the language of realism, which has for long dominated the study of global politics, only appears clear because we have acquired familiarity with it.**

Abstract realist concepts like 'unit', 'actor', 'system', 'regime', 'Realpolitik', 'dependent/independent variable' and 'relative/absolute gains', are not clear and intelligible by some objective standard, but only because they have been rehearsed time and again as part of a system of shared meanings that channels our thinking into particular directions. By contrast, **the new terminology applied by recent critiques of international relations theory is often perceived as needless jargon, assaults on language,** ⁶³

a rambling and conceptual menace that is employed 'not to reinforce argument, but to compensate for the lack of it'. ⁶⁴ However, the disturbing **new concepts** in question — such as 'genealogy', 'foundationalism', 'reification', 'logocentrism', or 'incommensurability' — **only appear dissonant because they diverge from or subvert the linguistic conventions that legitimise dominant perceptions of global politics.**

But this is only the beginning. Nietzsche and Adorno suggest that the question of style reaches much further.

For Adorno, **standard modes of communication are inadequate to express a critical thought.**

He even goes as far as arguing — rather provocatively — that clear language is domination. It imposes closure. **Even if critical, an argument presented in a straightforward writing style can,**

at best, articulate an alternative position and replace one orthodoxy with another one. It is unable to open up thinking space.

If a reader is to break free from the subtle repression that the dominant discourse disguises through its linguistic practices, s/he has to struggle with a text, grapple for the meaning of words, and be torn away, painfully, from a deeply entrenched form of communicative subjugation.

If a reader is to come to terms with her/his own prejudices, a text must challenge, puzzle, shake, uproot, disturb, even frustrate and torment her/him.

A/T: Biological Realism

Sociobiology gives little clout to realism – it lacks the evaluation of human or environmental natures
Duncan S.A. **Bell** (doctoral candidate at Center for International Studies, Cambridge) and
Paul K. **MacDonald** (doctoral candidate in Political Science at Columbia) Summer, 2001 “Start the
Evolution without Us” International Security, Vol. 26, No. 1.

Even if sociobiologists were to find not merely plausible but testable linkages between specific behavioral dispositions and genetic selection, it is not clear that these would be of much use in explaining outcomes in international relations, which are the result of complex interactions between myriad human and collective actors. Appropriating sociobiological findings, at least in the cursory manner that Thayer outlines, provides little explanatory leverage for international relations theory in general, and realism in particular. Sociobiological accounts come in two versions. The first attempts to reduce human behavior to genetic imperatives.¹⁷ The second recognizes that social relations result from a complex interplay between inherited characteristics and environmental conditions, including material and cultural factors. Most sophisticated sociobiologists favor the latter version. As Wilson himself argues, "the problem [of sociobiology] can be more clearly cast in these terms: how have genetic evolution and cultural evolution interacted to create the development of the human mind?"¹⁸ But as we argued above, such a position makes it extremely difficult to methodologically distinguish between biological and environmental sources of observed behavior. Thayer concedes this point when he acknowledges that egoism and the drive to dominate may "result from other causes" (p. 130, n. 33) than evolution. Similarly, in his application of sociobiology to the origins of war, Thayer admits that "warfare . . . is greatly influenced by culture and the international system" (p. 144), while in his discussion of ethnic conflict, he grants that ethnocentric behavior can be "reinforced or weakened by environmental factors such as culture or religion" (p. 148).¹⁹ It follows that in international relations, we have no way to tell whether a particular outcome—for instance, the predilection for conflict or balancing behavior of an actor or group of actors is a result of human nature or environmental factors. Thayer provides no scope conditions as to when one should expect genetics to trump environmental factors, nor does he specify mechanisms by which evolutionary and environmental factors combine to create particular patterns of human behavior. For this reason, sociobiology provides at best a limited and probabilistic account of the role of biology in human behavior. To make matters worse, Thayer's conception of sociobiology generates contradictory predictions about what types of behavior evolutionary pressures generate. Because he avoids discussion of the sociobiological debate regarding the unit of selection, Thayer proposes inconsistent evolutionary mechanisms that exert influence at different analytical levels. For example, at the level of the individual, he draws on Richard Dawkins's work to argue that humans will behave egoistically, placing their interests above all others (p. 132). Simultaneously, he argues that humans will often act submissively, sublimating their own interests to dominant individuals in "dominance hierarchies" (pp. 134-136). In his explanation of the origins of war, he contends that genetic pressures encourage individuals to behave altruistically, sacrificing themselves for the collectivity during warfare (pp. 143-144). As a microfoundation for understanding human behavior, therefore, Thayer's account cannot tell us when individual humans will behave egoistically, submissively, or altruistically. Moreover, the diverse and contradictory sociobiological approaches that Thayer strings together cannot conclusively sketch the mechanisms by which these individual motivations aggregate to social groups. The lack of any discussion regarding how individual dispositions influence the behavior of institutionalized social groupings is particularly problematic, because the behaviors that Thayer seeks to explain occur exclusively at the level of the group. In other words, because sociobiology does not present analytically rigorous or empirically persuasive linkages between individual genetic predispositions and group behaviors, importing sociobiology into international relations

theory does not help to illuminate the fundamental issue of international politics-the behavior and interactions of human aggregates, whether they be states, corporations, international organizations, or ethnic groups.

A/T: Biological Realism

Thayer's findings don't contribute to the understanding of IR politics – he leaves the door open for discrimination

Duncan S.A. **Bell** (doctoral candidate at Center for International Studies, Cambridge) and Paul K. **MacDonald** (doctoral candidate in Political Science at Columbia) Summer, **2001** "Start the Evolution without Us" *International Security*, Vol. 26, No. 1.

In his provocative article "Bringing in Darwin: Evolutionary Theory, Realism, and International Politics," Bradley Thayer appropriate~a rguments from sociobiology to provide a scientific basis for realist international relations theory, and in so doing he follows a recent trend in the social sciences.' Thayer's argument is straightforward. First, traditional realist microfoundations are dependent on unacceptably "metaphysical" or "theological" assumptions about human nature (pp. 126-130). Second, findings in sociobiology about human nature provide transhistorical, universal, and sufficiently robust foundations for realist claims about international politics (pp. 131-138). We welcome Thayer's contribution to this debate, but we dispute both his specific formulation of sociobiology and the general project of explaining political phenomenon through biological theories. First, we disagree that evolutionary theory "offers a widely accepted scientific explanation" of human behavior (p. 138). Instead, we argue that **sociobiology remains the object of considerable scientific and ethical controversy, and** that sociobiological approaches contain numerous methodological flaws. Second, we contend that **even if sociobiology could overcome its inherent limitations, the microfoundations that a sociobiologically informed theory of international politics produces are indeterminate and contradictory.** For this reason, **sociobiological microfoundations provide no additional analytical leverage in explaining and understanding international politics.** Finally, we contend that current microfoundations in the social sciences, including structural realist and rational actor approaches, can be just as "scientific" from the perspective of philosophy of science without importing sociobiological hypotheses. Taken together, these three criticisms strongly suggest against using sociobiology as a panacea for realism or for international relations theory in general. **SOCIOBIOLOGY AS A CONTESTED SCIENCE** Thayer advocates the adoption of sociobiological reasoning to augment the traditional realist account of human behavior because sociobiology "offers a firm intellectual foundation" (p. 126) and a "sound scientific substructure" (p. 127) for understanding the ultimate causes of egoistic and dominating behavior by human beings. He implies that sociobiology, which can be broadly defined as the application of evolutionary theory to explain the genetic foundations of an organism's social behavior: is generally accepted as an unproblematic approach within the scientific community and that the extrapolation of findings from sociobiological theories into the realm of human behavior is also widely regarded as legitimate. Neither of these claims can be upheld: The science of sociobiology is the subject of great controversy within biology as well as other cognate discipline^.^ Indeed, given the torrent of scientific criticism since the publication of Edward O. Wilson's *Sociobiology: The New Synthesis*: **Thayer's failure to mention the ethically and scientifically contested nature of sociobiology is surprising.** Some advocates of sociobiology portray their opponents as motivated primarily by political correctness. We believe, however, that **there are serious ethical issues at stake in the attempt to reduce complex social and political behavior to essential elements of human genetics.** When accepted uncritically, **sociobiological claims contain the potential to be utilized in** the naturalization of behaviors that are variable and in the justification of **discriminatory sociopolitical orders** For this reason, **sociobiological theories should be held to a high standard of intellectual and analytical scrutiny before they are adopted as scientific fact, or be avoided altogether.** Given these concerns, international relations theorists should seriously consider the methodological criticisms leveled against sociobiology. We briefly highlight three of the most salient of these criticisms First, the universality of the sociobiological project-and specifically its applicability to the study of human behavior-is

extremely controversial. Thayer downplays the serious disagreements by claiming that the study of humans is central to the sociobiological project (p. 130). In contrast, one commentator has noted that "most 'sociobiologists' . . . are quite uninterested in h~mans." In particular, **many biologists themselves dispute the applicability of sociobiological approaches to humans because of the central role of culture, language, and self-reflexivity in determining human behavior.** Although advocates of human sociobiology acknowledge the dual influences of culture and genetics in shaping human behavior, no consensus exists on how to explain the complex interplay between these factors.

A/T: Postmodernism Bad

Overgeneralized claims about ‘post-modernism’ only serve to exclude what is a very productive and potential crucial method for exploring alternative solutions to common problems.

Bleiker, 98 asst. prof. of International Studies at Pusan National University (Roland, “Retracing and redrawing the boundaries of events: Postmodern interferences with international theory”, *Alternatives*, Oct-Dec 1998, Vol. 23, Issue 4)

The insight of a particular approach can be judged in relation to whether or not a description or redescription of an event is able to open up new perspectives on the event. Expressed in other words, **knowledge can be evaluated by its ability to orient and reorient our thoughts about events and the political actions that issue from them.** (Feminist contributions to international theory, for instance, could be assessed by their ability to demonstrate that the study of gender issues has revealed different insights into world politics; that is, whether or not particular events appear in a new light once they are being scrutinized by an approach that pays attention to factors that have hitherto been ignored. Actual judgments are not my task here, but one could easily recognize, for instance, that Jean Elshtain has revealed how closely modern practices of warfare have been intertwined with patriarchal divisions of labor,[49] or that Cynthia Enloe, Christine Sylvester, and Jan Jindy Pettman have forced us to rethink the actual locations where international relations take place by zooming in, for instance, on migrant workers, assembly lines, rural cooperatives, or the political economy of sex tourism.)[50]

The insight of a particular approach can be judged by the reactions to its attempt at redescribing the identity of events. Any reorientation of thought and action is a painful process, one that may involve giving up comforting identities or political and social privileges. Ensuing processes of interference and dislocation are bound to be met with strong opposition and hostility. Such **reactions can serve as evidence that indicate whether or not interfering interpretations have been successful in uprooting entrenched and objectified perspectives on social reality.** (Judging by this standard, postmodern analyses of world politics have been rather successful. Hardly any other approach to international theory has harvested as much opposition and hostility as postmodernism. Many established scholars express not just indifference or critique: they express fear--fear that a pursuit of postmodern lines of inquiry would, in Robert Keohane's representative words, inevitably lead to "an intellectual and moral disaster." [51] Postmodernism, then, appears as a rambling conceptual menace that is employed "not to reinforce argument, but to compensate for the lack of it." [52] **Concerns about the dangers of relativism** are legitimate and **ought to be taken seriously.** But this is not the end of the story. To draw attention to the moral necessity of grounding values is one thing. **To equate the idea of the postmodern with an automatic and inevitable fall into a nihilistic abyss is an entirely different thing, one that suggests a high level of anxiety about the values that are being scrutinized. No postmodernist would think of implying, yet alone asserting, that "if the text and the discourse is all, then the Earth is flat if you say so."** [53] And yet, such forms of critique are often advanced to discredit, even vilify, postmodern inquiries into the constitution of social and political practices.)

Claims about postmodernism too often rely upon the crippling and false dichotomy between the presence of objective truth and the absence of meaning at all, it doesn't take into account that very few theorists at all defend such radical either/or scenarios.

Bleiker, 98 asst. prof. of International Studies at Pusan National University (Roland, “Retracing and redrawing the boundaries of events: Postmodern interferences with international theory”, *Alternatives*, Oct-Dec 1998, Vol. 23, Issue 4)

The contribution of postmodern thought to international theory can be translated into positive practical actions only once the polemic that surrounds the postmodern is overcome. A flexing of muscles, a brute battle that opposes friends and foes of the postmodern, can never grasp

the complexities that are being defended or besieged. It is itself part of a dualistic mind-set that has dominated modern thinking for too long. International theory today needs what Pierre Bourdieu and Richard Bernstein have proposed elsewhere a while ago: **an attempt to overcome the misleading dichotomy between objectivism and relativism.**^[65] **This dichotomy holds that, either there is an ultimate possibility of grounding knowledge in stable foundation, or there are no foundations at all, nothing but an endless fall into a nihilist void. But there are no either/or extremes, except in our encrusted minds. There are only shades of difference, subtleties that contradict the idea of an exclusionary vantage point.**

A/T: Postmodernism Bad

Postmodernism is a false label which lumps together many inconsistent perspectives.

Bleiker, 00 Ph.D. visiting research and teaching affiliations at Harvard, Cambridge, Humboldt, Tampere, Yonsei and Pusan National University as well as the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology and the Institute of Social Studies in The Hague, (Roland, Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics, Cambridge University Press)

Parallel to this defence of the actor against structural determinism I attempt to salvage the notion of human agency from postmodern annihilations of the subject. However, I advance this position not against, but *through* the body of knowledge referred to, in the largest sense, as postmodernism. I elaborate what could be called a postmodern position on human agency, except that **I discard the actual term postmodernism as an unfortunate misnomer. It is misleading in designating a new historical epoque, not only because we have hardly transgressed the parameters of modernity, but also because the act of compartmentalising history expresses an inherently modern urge to control our environment. The term postmodernism may be more useful to indicate a certain epistemological or ontological stance. Yet, many of the authors who are labelled postmodern, such as Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze or Cixous, do not actually use this term. And those who do barely have enough in common to be lumped together into the same category.** If anything unites them, it is the acceptance of difference and the ensuing willingness to come to terms with the death of God.