Aff Environment K Toolbox

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Predictions Good

Cards in certain sections may be useful in other contexts, so you should be familiar with everything that is here. For example, "externalization" answers are useful against "global/local" and "anthropocentrism" answers are useful against most anything, especially "deep ecology."

Environmental Pragmatism

Saving the environment requires effective political engagement—environmental philosophers must abandon abstract 'biocentric' theorizing in order to build the public support necessary to create effective policies.

Avner **De-Shalit**, **2000**. Professor of Political Theory at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and Associate Fellow at the Oxford Centre for Environment, Ethics, and Society, Mansfield College, Oxford University. "The Environment: Between Theory and Practice," p. 4-6, Questia.

However, it would be wrong, if not dangerous, to blame the 'other'. From the prophets in biblical times to the French revolutionaries and the early Fabians, history is full of examples of theorists and philosophers who abandoned all hope of persuading others through deliberation, and became impatient and hence more radical in their ideas. This explains why the shift from humanistic to misanthropic attitudes has been rapid. Perhaps the 'easiest' way to solve a problem is to lose faith in a form of gradual change that can still remain respectful of humans. Such an attitude, I believe, **only brings about a new series of problems encompassing dictatorship, totalitarianism, and lack of personal freedom**. In this book I seek to maintain the philosophical impetus, not to point the finger at the politicians or the activists. Rather, I wish to examine ourselves—the philosophers who engage in discussing the environment—to discover how we might construct a theory that is much more accessible to the activists and the general public (without relinquishing any of our goals), and which can be harnessed to the aims of political philosophy. Here, the counter-argument would go something like this: 'OK, so the argumentation supplied by environmental philosophers is so removed from that used by activists and governments. So what? The only outcome of this is that more arguments, or, if you like, a pluralistic set of arguments, will emerge. Some arguments are relevant to academia alone; others can be used in politics. Thus, for example, in the university we could maintain an ecocentric environmental philosophy, 7 whereas in politics anthropocentric 8 arguments would dominate.' In response to this, it could be argued that plurality of argument is indeed welcome. Moreover, as we saw earlier, the divergence between, say, ecocentric environmental philosophy and anthropocentric environmental philosophy is not so vast in terms of the policies they recommend. In fact, as John Barry argues, 'reformed naturalistic humanism' is capable of supporting a stewardship ethics just as well (J. Barry 1999 : ch. 3). But my point is that **saving the environment is not just a matter of theory: it is an urgent political mission**. In a democratic system, however, one cannot expect policies to be decided without giving any thought to **how these policies should be explained to the public**, and thereby gain legitimacy. In other words, the rationale of a policy is an increasingly important, if not inseparable, part of the policy; in particular, the openness and transparency of the democratic regime makes the rationale a crucial aspect of the policy. A policy whose rationale is not open to the public, or one that is believed to be arrived at through a process not open to the public, is considered a-democratic (cf. Ezrahi 1990). Consequently, a policy's legitimacy is owed not only to its effectiveness, but also to the degree of moral persuasion and conviction it generates within the public arena. So, when constructing environmental policies in democratic regimes, there is a need for a theory that can be used not only by academics, but also by politicians and activists. Hence the first question in this book is, Why has the major part of environmental philosophy failed to penetrate environmental policy and serve as its rationale? The first part of this book, then, discusses this question and offers two explanations in response. These explanations are based on the premiss that environmental ethics and political theory should be differentiated and well defined so that later on they may join hands, rather than that they should be united in a single theory. It is assumed that they answer two questions. Environmental ethics is about the moral grounds for an environment-friendly attitude. Political theory with regard to the environment relates to the institutions needed to implement and support environmental policies. Thus, the failure to distinguish properly between environmental ethics and political theory underlies the failure of the major part of environmental philosophy to penetrate environmental policy and provide its rationale. In Chapter 1 it is claimed that in a way environmental philosophers have moved too rapidly away from anthropocentrism—mainstream ethical discourses—towards biocentrism and ecocentrism. 9 My argument is that **the public on the whole is not ready for this**, and therefore many activists and potential supporters of the environmental movement become alienated from the philosophical discourse on the environment. In addition, I suggest that the reason for the gap between on the one hand environmental philosophers and on the other activists and politicians is that environmental philosophers have applied the wrong approach to political philosophy. I claim that all moral reasoning involves a process of reflective equilibrium between intuitions and theory. I distinguish between 'private', 'contextual', and 'public' modes of reflective equilibrium, arguing that environmental philosophers use either the first or second mode of reasoning, whereas political philosophy requires the third: the public mode of reflective equilibrium. The latter differs from the other two models in that it weighs both the intuitions and the theories put forward by activists and the general public (and not just those of professional philosophers). The argument for this being so is that reasoning about the environment needs to include political and democratic philosophy. And yet, most of environmental philosophers' efforts so far have focused on such questions of meta-ethics as 'intrinsic value theories' and 'biocentrism'. Environmental philosophers have been pushed in this direction out of a genuine desire to seek out the 'good' and the truth, in an effort to ascertain the moral grounds for an environment-friendly attitude. I suggest that **environmental philosophers** should not limit themselves to discussing the moral grounds for attitudes, or to trying to reveal the good and the truth, although these are important and fascinating questions. At least some of them **should instead go beyond this and address the matter of the necessary institutions for implementing policies, and finally, and of no less importance, find a way to persuade others to act on behalf of the environment**. In other words, while there is a place for meta-ethics, it should not be the only approach to philosophizing about the environment; it should not replace political philosophy.

Environmental Pragmatism

Environmental philosophy must be oriented towards constructing policies.

Avner **De-Shalit**, **2000**. Professor of Political Theory at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and Associate Fellow at the Oxford Centre for Environment, Ethics, and Society, Mansfield College, Oxford University. "The Environment: Between Theory and Practice," p. 21-2, Questia.

One might still ask, What's wrong with claiming—philosophically—that animals have rights? Indeed, one can claim that animal rights arguments, perhaps philosophy in general, is first and foremost meant to have an impact on the elite—that is, other philosophers and maybe other scholars, intellectuals, and artists. Only later will the idea penetrate to the decision-makers, and later still to the general public. The public in general is important, but not that important, because it is not the public that has to be convinced, but the philosophers and decision-makers. I will therefore raise the question of how political philosophy, such as environmental philosophy, should be conducted. First, two clarifications are in order. I am not dismissing the claim that philosophy in general is an elite practice, one less about convincing people and more about finding the truth or even about constructing aesthetic theories about the world. This could be argued. Those who see philosophy in this way might regard political, or applied, philosophy as inferior branches of philosophy. Others might think that philosophy is only about changing the world, and that everything else is a waste of time, a petit bourgeois preoccupation. I cannot devote too much space to debate either of these positions. Suffice it to say that I tend to find that there is room and need—both scientific and social need—for both: there is a time for 'pure' philosophy, and there is a time for 'political' philosophy. There is a time—and a need—to search for the truth, to be engaged in debates for the sake of the debate, and there is a time to change the world. 11 However, what is important, I think, is to remember that environmental philosophy grew out of a desperate need to supply sound philosophical, normative arguments against the continuation of several policies that were causing damage to the environment, putting people's lives at serious risks, ignoring the well-being of future generations, and harming other species. In that sense, at least, **the need for environmental philosophy was a need for political philosophy**. Now some people distinguish between political, applied and practical philosophy. Some claim that environmental philosophy should be practical; others may call it 'pragmatism' (Light and Katz 1996). Practical philosophy is distinguished from applied philosophy with regard to the question of what comes first—the case or the theory. Political and applied philosophy usually start with the assumption that theories are there to be applied to cases; the theory is, so to speak, 'given'. The question is how to solve the case with the help of the theory. Practical philosophy begins with the case and seeks a proper theory to solve it. This distinction is sound. However, in this book I use the term 'political philosophy' to mean, in general, philosophy that is policy-oriented. I think that **there is a strong need for a 'political' way of philosophizing about the environment**, including humans relations with animals. Such philosophizing, while constructing the theory, will take into account two conditions: first, that **the theory must relate to real life cases** and, second, that the theory **must relate to the existing deliberation** about the case, hence to the **actual arguments that have already been put forward**. I think that animal rights philosophers have been meaning to supply not a theory that can actually be applied to both the case and the debate, as well as the reasoning, but a theory that is 'true' and logical. Thus, I shall now describe the way I believe environmental philosophy should be practised.

Abstract environmental philosophy cannot save the environment—using human-centered justifications can motivate people to support pragmatic environment protections.

Andrew **Light**, July **2002**. Associate professor of philosophy and environmental policy, and director of the Center for Global Ethics at George Mason University. "Contemporary Environmental Ethics From Metaethics to Public Philosophy," Metaphilosophy 33.4, Ebsco.

Even with the ample development in the field of various theories designed to answer these questions, I believe that environmental ethics is, for the most part, not succeeding as an area of applied philosophy. For while the dominant goal of most work in the field, to find a philosophically sound basis for the direct moral consideration of nature, is commendable, it has tended to engender two unfortunate results: (1) debates about the value of nature as such have largely **excluded discussion of the beneficial ways in which arguments for environmental protection can be based on human interests**, and relatedly (2) the focus on somewhat abstract concepts of value theory has pushed environmental ethics **away from discussion of which arguments morally motivate people to embrace more supportive environmental views**. As a consequence, those agents of change who will effect efforts at environmental protection – namely, humans – have oddly been left out of discussions about the moral value of nature. As a result, environmental ethics has been less able to contribute to cross-disciplinary discussions with other environmental professionals (such as environmen- tal sociologists or lawyers) on the resolution of environmental problems, especially those professionals who also have an interest in issues concern- ing human welfare in relation to the equal distribution of environmental goods. But can environmental philosophy afford to be quiescent about the public reception of ethical arguments over the value of nature? The original motivations for environmental philosophers to turn their philosophical insights to the environment belie such a position. Environmental philosophy evolved out of a concern about the state of the growing environmental crisis and a conviction that a philosophical contribution could be made to the resolution of this crisis. If environmental philosophers spend most of their time debating non-human-centered forms of value theory, **they will arguably never be able to make such a contribution**.

Environmental Pragmatism

Environmental pragmatism is the only way to prevent ecological catastrophe.

Andrew **Light and** Eric **Katz**, **1996**. Director of the Science, Technology and Society Program at the New Jersey Institute of Technology, teaches environmental philosophy, engineering ethics and the philosophy of technology, and a research fellow in the Environmental Health Program and Adjunct Professor of Philosophy at the University of Alberta. "Environmental Pragmatism," p. 1-2, Google Books.

The problematic situation of environmental ethics greatly troubles us, both as philosophers and as citizens. We are deeply concerned about the precarious state of the natural world, the environmental hazards that threaten humans, and the maintenance of long-term sustainable life on this planet. The environmental crisis that surrounds us is a fact of experience. It is thus imperative that environmental philosophy, as a discipline, address this crisis – its meaning, its causes and its possible resolution. Can philosophers contribute anything to an investigation of environmental problems? Do the traditions, history and skills of philosophical thought have any relevance to the development of environmental policy? We believe that the answer is yes. Despite the problematic (and, heretofore, ineffectual) status of environmental ethics as a practical discipline, the field has much to offer. But the fruits of this philosophical enterprise **must be directed towards the practical resolution of environmental problems** – environmental ethics cannot remain mired in long-running theoretical debates in an attempt to achieve philosophical certainty. As Mark Sagoff has written: [W]e have to get along with certainty; we have to solve practical, not theoretical, problems; and we must adjust the ends we pursue to the means available to accomplish them. Otherwise, method becomes an obstacle to morality, dogma the foe of deliberation, and **the ideal society we aspire to in theory will become a formidable enemy of the good society we can achieve in fact.** In short, environmental ethics must develop for itself a methodology of environmental pragmatism – fueled by a recognition that theoretical debates are problematic for the development of environmental policy. This collection is an attempt to bring together in one place the broad range of positions encompassed by calls for an environmental pragmatism. For us, environmental pragmatism is the open-ended inquiry into the specific real-life problems of humanity's relationship with the environment. The new position ranges from arguments for an environmental philosophy informed by the legacy of classical American pragmatist philosophy, to the formulation of a new basis for the reassessment of our practice through a more general pragmatist methodology.

Only a pragmatic approach can solve real world environmental problems.

Bryan G. **Norton**, **2005**. Ph.D. Professor of Philosophy at Georgia Tech, Ivan Allen College School of Public Policy. "Sustainability: A Philosophy of Adaptive Ecosystem Management," p. 48-49, Google Books.

One of the defining features of the pragmatist outlook on things is taking a problem-oriented approach to intellectual as well as practical dilemmas. Historically, of course, philosophers have addressed questions of great abstraction and generality, believing that if one gets first principles right, solutions to particular problems will fall out as corollaries of the general principles. Many philosophers believe that they confront special problems with special tools and that philosophy occupies a special intellectual space, with a form of access to truth not associated with the empirical methods of the other sciences. Indeed, in Western philosophy there is a venerable tradition, traceable back at least as far as Plato, that philosophy has a rational method that will allow penetration beyond the veil of language and experience, apprehending reality itself. Pragmatists, by contrast, doubt that philosophy has, or needs, a method that is independent of experience. Pragmatists aspire to an ideal of a unified conception of inquiry in which philosophers are one kind of workers in a larger enterprise. Pragmatists seek a unified method of inquiry – a method that is self-correcting, based in experience, but also involving interpretation and theory-building. Philosophy, on this view, differs only in degree from other sciences, all of which have truth as their ideal; philosophy may occupy the more abstract end of the continuum of knowledge, but it is a continuum, with all knowledge and wisdom – including definitions – ultimately answering to experience. Pragmatists therefore reject "higher intuitions" and prefer to deal with specific problems whenever possible. What unifies inquiry, according to pragmatists, is a community's shared focus on a real-world problem. Aside from creating a healthy urgency, a problem orientation can go a long way toward setting a context, clarifying what values and interests are at stake in any question, and shaping disagreements as testable hypotheses. So what exactly is the problem to which this book offers the beginnings of a solution? The central problem, as we saw in Chapter 1, is that there is a nearly complete breakdown in communication regarding environmental policy right at the crucial nexus where the particular sciences are integrated with social values and translated into public policy. This is where scientific data-gathering, model-building, and physical observations of scientists from many specialized disciplines – ecology, toxicology, economics, sociology, and so on – are brought together in the context of policy decisions. At this crucial point of unification, values are also brought into the process of policy study and formation, and this is precisely the locus – as we saw in our brief visit to the EPA building in Chapter 1 – of the deepest confusion and the most abysmal lack of adequate vocabulary for communicating about environmental problems, values, and goals.

Environmental Pragmatism—Sustainable Solutions

Environmental solutions must be sustainable—ignoring human needs means there will be an inevitable backlash that dismantles the alternative.

Daniel **Farber**, **1999**. Professor of Law at the University of Minnesota. Eco-Pragmatism, Pg. 12-3.

The ultimate challenge for environmental law is social sustainability. It will do little good to save the planet today, only to lose it tomorrow. Thus, we need an approach that not only embodies our firm commitment to the environment, but also recognizes competing goals and the need to keep up with changing scientific knowledge. Otherwise, we will have a regulatory structure that is too draconian for us to live with in the long run. Among the components of the global eco-system are the clever, idealistic, aggressive, acquisitive creatures known as homo sapiens. Environmental law must create a hospitable environment for them as well as for other organisms. Environmental law must be pluralistic and flexible if it is to endure. Eco-pragmatism is a rough and ready approach to environmental policy, perhaps lacking in elegance, but durable enough for hard wear. The need to make environmental law "sustainable" is a theme that runs through much of the book. It helps drive arguments on a wide range of topics. For instance, chapter 2 argues that we should reject the premise that economic interests are mere "preferences," entitled to little or no consideration compared with environmental values. Underlying the argument, in part, is a concern about sustainability. Given the nature of human behavior in modern societies, it is unrealistic to expect environmental programs base on such an austere premise to endure long. In chapter 4, for similar reasons, I argue that we should be prepared to modify environmental regulations whenever their costs are grossly disproportionate to any possible benefits. Chapter 5 discusses the extent to which current generations can realistically be expected to make sacrifices on behalf of distant descendants, and among other topics, chapter 6 considers how we can prevent outmoded regulations from eroding the overall credibility of environmental law. In taking these positions, my goal is not to undermine environmental values, but to implement them in a way that we can expect to endure, as opposed to heroic efforts that are likely to fade after a few years. Environmental protection is a marathon, not a sprint.

Environmental Pragmatism—Backlash DA

Radical environmental movements fuel counter-movements that destroy alternative solvency.
Martin **Lewis**, **1994**. Lecturer in history and director of the International Relations program at Stanford. Green Delusions, p. 6-7, Google Books.

The most direct way in which eco-extremists threaten the environment is simply by fueling the anti-environmental countermovement. When green radicals like Christopher Manes (1990) call for the total destruction of civilization, many begin to listen to the voices of reaction. Indeed, the mere linking of environmental initiatives to radical groups such as Earth First! often severely dampens what would otherwise be widespread public support (see Gabriel 1990:64). As radicalism depends within the environmental movement, the oppositional anti-ecological forces accordingly gain strength. The Center for the Defense of Free Enterprise, a think tank for the so-called wise use movement, has, for example, recently published a manifesto calling for such outrages as the opening of all national parks to mineral production, the logging of all old-growth forests, and the gutting of the endangered species act. This group's ideologues contend that certain environmental philosophies represent nothing less than mental illnesses, a theory anonymously propounded in the "intellectual ammunition department" of their Wise Use Memo (Center for the Defense of Free Enterprise 1990:2). Even more worrisome is the fact that a former high-ranking CIA agent is now spreading rumors that environmental scientists are presently attempting to concoct a virus that could destroy humankind (See "Tale of a Plot to Rid Earth of Humankind," San Francisco Examiner, April 14, 1991: A-2). My fear is that if green extremism captures the environmental movement's upper hand, the public would be much less likely to recognize such a claim as paranoid fantasy; while a handful of ecoradicals would be happy to destroy humanity, such individuals also reject science and thus would never be able to act on such convictions.

Environmental Pragmatism—Reform Good

Radical alternatives prevent pragmatic reform and worsen environmental degradation.
Martin **Lewis**, **1994**. Lecturer in history and director of the International Relations program at Stanford. Green Delusions, p. 7, Google Books.

More frightening, and more immediate, is the specter of a few radicals actually opposing necessary environmental reforms. Such individuals conclude that "reform environmentalism" is "worse than useless because by correcting short-term symptoms it postpones the necessary reconstruction of the entire human relationship with the natural world" (Nash 1989:150). From here it is a short step to argue that reform would only forestall an ecological apocalypse – which some evidently believe is a necessary precondition for the construction of an environmentally benign social order. The insanity of pushing the planet even closer to destruction in order to save it in the future should be readily apparent. While such are the fantasies only of the most moonstruck extremists, even moderate radicals (if one may be permitted the oxymoron) espouse an ideology that would preclude the development of an ecologically sustainable economy. Most environmentalists, for instance, aver that a sustainable economy must be based on solar power. Yet the radicals' agenda, calling for total decentralization, deurbanization, economic autarky, a ban on most forms of high technology, and the complete dismantling of capitalism, would not only prevent future improvements in solar power but would actually destroy the gains that have already been made. While most radical greens embrace "appropriate technologies" (just as anti-environmentalists denounce "pollution"), their program would, if enacted, undercut the foundations of all technological research and development. Appropriate technology, in fact, often turns out to mean little more than well-engineered medieval apparatuses: we may expect crude mechanical power from the wind, but certainly not electricity from the sun. Equally important, the systematic dismantling of large economic organizations in favor of small ones would likely result in a substantial increase in pollution, since few small-scale firms are able to devise, or afford, adequate pollution abatement equipment.

Environmental Pragmatism—Deep Ecology Link

Deep ecology's focus on creating a new psyche alienates the public.

Avner **De-Shalit**, **2000**. Professor of Political Theory at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and Associate Fellow at the Oxford Centre for Environment, Ethics, and Society, Mansfield College, Oxford University. "The Environment: Between Theory and Practice," p. 49-50, Questia.

One may ask: so what? Does it matter that Deep Ecology uses the term 'environment' differently from science? My answer is: it may not matter, as long as we recognize that this is indeed the case, that Deep Ecology is a political (or psychological) theory whose goals do not always seek to reform our attitudes about the environment, but rather seek to replace politics by a non-political system. If, however, Deep Ecology claims to respect the environment and treat it 'as it is', then this claim may be deceptive because environmental attitudes become a means of changing the 'system'. Their theory, then, is not about the moral grounds for respecting the environment, but about non-environmental goals. 19 If we understand this, it is clear at least why Deep Ecology has **rarely, if at all, served as a rationale for environmental policies**. The general public, including activists, may have sensed that, when they want to justify recycling or the treatment of sewage, talks about the new psyche will not do. The deeper problem, I fear, is that, since Deep Ecology is rather dominant in environmental philosophy, many people in the general public conclude that 'this is environmental philosophy' and therefore that 'arguments taken from environmental philosophy in general will not suffice in real cases'.

Environmental Pragmatism—Anthropocentrism Link

Rejection of anthropocentrism undermines pragmatic attempts at environmental protection.

Andrew **Light**, July **2002**. Associate professor of philosophy and environmental policy, and director of the Center for Global Ethics at George Mason University. "Contemporary Environmental Ethics From Metaethics to Public Philosophy," Metaphilosophy 33.4, Ebsco.

With this variety of views in the field, how should environmental ethics proceed? One answer would be that it will simply proceed, whether it should or not, as a new set of debates between the more traditional non anthropocentric views and the biocentric, anthropocentric, or other alternative views briefly mentioned at the end of the previous section. Many anthropocentric environmental ethicists seem determined to do just that (see Norton 1995 and Callicott 1996). There is, however, an alternative: in addition to continuing the tradition of most environmental ethics as philosophical sparring among philosophers, we could turn our attention to the question of how the work of environmental ethicists could be made more useful in taking on the environmental problems to which environmental ethics is addressed as those problems are undertaken in policy terms. The problems with contemporary environmental ethics are arguably more practical than philosophical, or at least their resolution in more practical terms is more important than their resolution in philosophical terms at the present time. For even though there are several dissenters from the dominant traditions in environmental ethics, the more important consideration is the fact that the world of natural-resource management (in which environmental ethicists should hope to have some influence, in the same way that medical ethicists have worked for influence over the medical professions) takes a predominantly anthropocentric approach to assessing natural value, as do most other humans (more on this point in the next section). Environmental ethics appears more concerned with overcoming human interests than redirecting them toward environmental concerns. As a consequence, a nonanthropocentric form of ethics has limited appeal to such an audience, even if it were true that this literature provides the best reasons for why nature has value (de-Shalit 2000).9 And **not to appeal to such an audience arguably means that we are not having an effect either on the formation of better environmental polices or on the project of engendering public support for them**. As such, I would argue, environmental ethics is not living up to its promise as a field of philosophy attempting to help resolve environmental problems. It is instead evolving mostly as a field of intramural philosophical debate. To demonstrate better how the dominant framework of environmental ethics is hindering our ability to help address environmental problems, let us examine a more specific case where the narrow rejection of anthropocentrism has hindered a more effective philosophical contribution to debates in environmental policy.

Rejection of anthropocentrism prevents environmentalists from engaging the policymaking process and creating better policy.

Andrew **Light**, July **2002**. Associate professor of philosophy and environmental policy, and director of the Center for Global Ethics at George Mason University. "Contemporary Environmental Ethics From Metaethics to Public Philosophy," Metaphilosophy 33.4, Ebsco.

A second problem with this overall approach is political. As advice to environmentalists, the approach would be politically suicidal. To the extent that such considerations as utility benefits for preservation or development are a reasonably persistent part of the discussion over whether to develop the Amazon, adopting an approach that conveniently skirts around such issues ensures that environmentalists will be excluded from such discussions, or at least easy to ignore. To come to the bargaining table armed with a theory "making questions of human benefit and satisfaction irrelevant," when issues of human benefit and satisfaction are necessarily on the table, and when representatives of those interests are the only ones who are at the table and able to articulate those interests, would make bargaining irrevocably caustic if not impossible. To negotiate environmental priorities from the point of view of an irreconcilable and intractable moral view opposing human interests is not to engage in negotiations but simply to make demands from a presumed superior moral position. To the extent that it is difficult for environmentalists even to find themselves with a voice at a forum where such decisions are made, this approach would be, at the very least, naïve and imprudent. It also stands against the substantial amount of research that has been done on negotiations and policy making (for an application to similar cases see de-Shalit 2001).

Environmental Pragmatism—Anthropocentrism Link

The environmental community functions in an anthropocentric framework—accepting this is critical for philosophers to make real contributions to environmental policy.

Andrew **Light**, July **2002**. Associate professor of philosophy and environmental policy, and director of the Center for Global Ethics at George Mason University. "Contemporary Environmental Ethics From Metaethics to Public Philosophy," Metaphilosophy 33.4, Ebsco.

In addition to the reasons offered above, there are at least two practical reasons for reconsidering the rejection of anthropocentrism to consider as well. First, consider that the focus in environmental ethics on the search for a description of the nonanthropocentric value of nature also separates it from other forms of environmental inquiry. Most other environmental professionals look at environmental problems in a human context rather than try to define an abstract sense of natural value outside the human appreciation of interaction with nature. Fields like environmental sociol- ogy and environmental health, for example, are concerned not with the environment per se but with the environment as the location of human community. This is not to say that these fields reduce the value of nature to a crude resource instrumentalism. It is to say instead that they realize that a discussion of nature outside the human context impedes our ability to discuss ways in which anthropogenic impacts on nature can be under- stood and ameliorated. If environmental philosophers continue to pursue their work only as a contribution to value theory, they cut themselves off from the rest of the environmental community, which seeks to provide practical solutions to environmental problems, solutions that it is almost trite these days to suggest must be interdisciplinary. One may fairly wonder how environmental philosophers can make a contribution to something other than value theory. After all, what else are they trained to do as philosophers? My claim is that if philosophers could help to articulate moral reasons for environmental policies in a way that is translatable to the general anthropocentric intuitions of the public, they will have made a contribution to the resolution of environmental problems commensurate with their talents. But making such a contribution may require doing environmental philosophy in some different ways. At a mini- mum it requires a more public philosophy, as the American pragmatist philosopher John Dewey envisioned, though one more focused on making the kind of arguments that resonate with the moral intuitions that most people carry around with them on an everyday basis.

The public functions in anthropocentric framework—rejection of anthropocentrism prevents the alternative from gaining necessary public support.

Andrew **Light**, July **2002**. Associate professor of philosophy and environmental policy, and director of the Center for Global Ethics at George Mason University. "Contemporary Environmental Ethics From Metaethics to Public Philosophy," Metaphilosophy 33.4, Ebsco.

It is the empirically demonstrable prevalence of anthropocentric views on environmental issues that is the second practical reason for reconsider- ing the wholesale rejection of anthropocentrism. In a survey by Ben Minteer and Robert Manning about the sources of positive attitudes toward environmental protection in Vermont, respondents overwhelmingly indi- cated that the reason they most thought the environment should be protected is that they think we have positive obligations to protect nature for future human generations (Minteer and Manning 1999). More exhaus- tive surveys of American attitudes toward environmental protection have also found such results. In the preparatory work for their landmark study of environmental attitudes in the United States, Willett Kempton and his colleagues found that obligations to future generations was so powerfully intuitive a reason for most people to favor environmental protection that they would volunteer this view before they were asked. In a series of inter- views that helped determine the focus of their questions for the survey, the authors remarked: We found that our informants' descendants loom large in their thinking about environmental issues. Although our initial set of questions never asked about children, seventeen of the twenty lay informants themselves brought up chil- dren or future generations as a justification for environmental protection. Such a high proportion of respondents mentioning the same topic is unusual in answering an open-ended question. In fact, concern for the future of children and descendants emerged as one of the strongest values in the interviews. (Kempton et al. 1997, 95)

The larger survey conducted by Kempton, which included questions about obligations to the future, confirmed these findings. Therefore, a public environmental philosophy that took as one of its tasks the translation of the converged ends of environmental ethicists to arguments that would morally motivate humans would have to take seriously the prospects of making these arguments in terms of obligations to future generations. **We are empirically more likely to motivate humans to protect some part of nature if they consider it part of their generalizable obligations to the future**. Other anthropocentric claims will no doubt also be warranted as targets for this translation exercise, but this one will be certain.

Permutation Solvency

The alternative fails—idealism cannot save the environment, only specific reforms.

Martin **Lewis**, **1994**. Lecturer in history and director of the International Relations program at Stanford. Green Delusions, p. 12-3, Google Books.

It is certainly not my belief that ideas are insignificant or that attempting to change others' opinions is a futile endeavor. If that were true I would hardly feel compelled to write a polemic work of this kind. But I am also convinced that changing ideals **alone is insufficient**. Widespread ideological conversion, even if it were to occur, would hardly be adequate for genuine social transformation. Specific policies must still be formulated, and specific political plans must be devised if those policies are ever to be realized. Many of the more sophisticated eco-radicals would agree with this notion. But even the political moves advocated by the more savvy among them remain committed to a radicalism that the great majority of the American public finds unpalatable. Radical green strategists may call for alliances with new social movements or with radical political parties, but even a concerted coalition of the disaffected would be unable to approach the critical mass needed to gain effective power. And several radical thinkers have proposed that much narrower constituencies form potentially eco-revolutionary groups that might lead society as a whole to its necessary transformation. According to one theory, only the unemployed can seek real change, rather than just a redistribution of spoils, because only they do no participate in the wicked system (Dobson 1990:163). Although this represents a fringe view, the general process of seeking ever more radical foundations for social reinvention leads ecoextremists to reduce their own potential bases for political power to ever more minuscule, and powerless, groups. At the same time most green extremists overtly denounce more moderate environmentalists who are willing to seek compromises with individuals or groups of opposing political philosophies. **Since compromise, in one form or another, is necessary for any kind of effective political action, the quest for purity will in the end only undercut the prospects for change**. Even moderate environmentalists often adopt an unnecessarily exclusive political strategy. Robert Paehlke, whose Environmentalism and the Future of Progressive Politics stands as a monument to reason within the field, insists on attaching the movement firmly to the traditional left, urging environmentalists to appeal primarily to "industrial workers, public servants, and those employed in health, education, and the arts" (1989: 276, 263). Since in the United States this traditional liberal constituency by itself has no immediate chance of gaining national power, such a tactic would again only diminish the prospects for much needed reform. At the same time, **the pernicious fear of compromise seriously diminishes the possibility of creating a broader coalition for environmental action**. Barry Commoner, for example, warns environmentalists that if they compromise with corporations they may be come "hostages" and eventually even assume "the ideology of [their] captors" (1990: 177). The end result of this kind of thinking – to which we are painfully close in the United States – is an ideological stalemate in which opposed camps are increasingly unable even to communicate. In such a political environment, the creation of an ecologically sustainable society becomes little more than an impossible dream.

Permutation solves best—even if our claims should be critically examined, they should still be used as the starting point for philosophy in order to appeal to the public.

Avner **De-Shalit**, **2000**. Professor of Political Theory at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and Associate Fellow at the Oxford Centre for Environment, Ethics, and Society, Mansfield College, Oxford University. "The Environment: Between Theory and Practice," p. 29-30, Questia.

A theory in political philosophy should lack 'external tensions': it should relate to real cases and should be relevant to real life. To do this, it should also arise from the cases in question. The best way to achieve this would be to start with the activists and their dilemmas. Hence an environmental philosophy theory should derive from extended sources, i.e. not only from the laid-back philosopher or anthropological explorer, but from the general public as well. It is therefore a theory that reflects the actual philosophical needs of the activist **seeking to convince by appealing to practical issues**, and not necessarily the philosophical needs of the philosopher, who convinces others by appealing to consistency and simplicity (despite the fact that the more coherent, consistent, etc., the environmental theory is, besides being relevant, the better it is). Naturally, the philosopher should not take the value of the activists' claims for granted; their intuitions, arguments, claims, and theories should also be scrutinized. 16 However, **the fact that they need to be critically examined does not affect the main point: that the activists' intuitions, claims, and theories ought to be the starting point for a philosophy aimed at policy change**. As such, environmental philosophy theory is radical in a third sense, in that it derives from, and speaks to, those previously denied access to the formation of the morality of our institutions (since, at the time, only 'professional' philosophy counted), and in that it derives from issues previously marginalized by what has been considered the 'real' or 'important' issues on the moral agenda. (In the case before us, these would be growth, economical considerations, etc.)

Permutation Solvency

Broad coalitions key—refusal by radicals to compromise with moderates will prevent environmental sustainability.

Martin **Lewis**, **1994**. Lecturer in history and director of the International Relations program at Stanford. Green Delusions, p. 22-3, Google Books.

If we are to preserve the earth, environmentalists must forge the broadest possible coalition. Major changes need to be made in public policy, changes that will require massive public support. That support can only be obtained by appealing to a centrist coalition. Yet at present, the large center ground of American voters, those who find merit in appeals both to economic efficiency and to social justice and environmental protection, is largely without an articulated platform. Party stalwarts, let alone radicals, often regard moderates with contempt, viewing them as ideological weaklings unwilling to take a stand. I would argue the opposite. If we are to take seriously the task of devising a sustainable future, it is essential to admit that worthwhile ideas may be found on both sides of this overdrawn political divide. As E. J. Dionne (1991:27) so brilliantly argues, what is necessary is the creation of a new political center that avoids "bland centrism" and instead seeks to build a genuine "coalition for social reform." Since critical theorists rightly point out that all writing is informed by a political perspective, it is desirable to specify precisely the political stance from which this work is composed. In simplest terms, I would identify myself as a liberal moderate. The modifier "liberal" is apposite because the great majority of the positions taken here, both explicitly and implicitly, would be commonly classified as left of center. Moreover, I fully concur with David Barash (1992) that the fundamental need is to humanize capitalism, a project that he defines as the core of contemporary liberalism. But the essential term remains "moderate" because of my insistence that dialogue and negotiation must be carried out across the central divide of American ideology. In order to build an adequately broad environmental consensus, we should endeavor to make that divide as permeable to ideas as we possibly can. It is especially important that environmentalists work with the leaders of the largest corporations. Without corporate consent, a far-reaching environmental reform program will prove chimerical. As will be discussed in chapter four, some companies have already made significant environmental groups, a process that has great potential if it is not undermined by eco-extremists. To be sure, contemporary American leftist radicalism, in all of its varied forms, exerts strong intellectual claims. Many of the thinkers with whom I contend have come to a profound understanding of specific problems and processes. Similarly, the visions they hold for a more just future are rich and important. These thinkers must be taken seriously, and I would not impugn the sincerity of their beliefs and actions. But one must take equal care to avoid confusing moral outrage and sophisticated dialectics with a legitimate claim to political power or with a desirable (let alone possible) vision for humanity's future.

Radical ecology alienates the public—only compromise allows us to prevent environmental catastrophe.

Martin **Lewis**, **1994**. Lecturer in history and director of the International Relations program at Stanford. Green Delusions, p. 250-1, Google Books.

The best hope I see is through a new alliance of moderates from both the left and the right – a coalition in which moderate conservatives continue to insist on efficiency and prudence, and where liberals forward an agenda aimed at social progress and environmental protection, **but in which both contingents are willing to compromise** in the interests of a common nation and, ultimately, a common humanity. **The environmental reforms necessary to ensure planetary survival will require the forging of such a broad-ranging political consensus**. By thwarting its development, eco-radicalism undermines our best chance of salvaging the earth – offering instead only the peace of mind that comes from knowing that one's own ideology is ecologically and politically pure. It is time for the environmental movement to recognize such thinking for the fantasy that it is. We must first relinquish our hopes for utopia if we really wish to save the earth. Promethean environmentalism is not simply a watered down, compromised form of the radical doctrine. Although its concrete proposals and its philosophical positions are consistently at odds with those of ecoradicalism (see the appendix), its ultimate purpose is in fact the same: to return the surface of the earth to life, to life in all its abundance, diversity, and evolutionary potential. Prometheans maintain, however, that for the foreseeable future we must actively manage the planet to ensure the survival of as much biological diversity as possible. No less is necessary if we are to begin atoning for our very real environmental sins – for our fall from grace that began at the end of the Pleistocene epoch. Eco-radicalism tells us that we must dismantle our technolgocial and economic system, and ultimately our entire civilization. Once we do so, the rifts between humanity and nature will purportedly heal automatically. I disagree. What I believe we must do is disengage humanity from nature by cleaving to, but carefully guiding, the path of technological progress. It is for the environmental community to decide which alternative offers the best hope for ecological salvation.

Permutation Solvency—Still Solves the Alt

Theoretical questions can be discussed but they cannot *replace* pragmatism political theory about the environment—the combination is best.

Avner **De-Shalit**, **2000**. Professor of Political Theory at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and Associate Fellow at the Oxford Centre for Environment, Ethics, and Society, Mansfield College, Oxford University. "The Environment: Between Theory and Practice," p. 36, Questia.

Before continuing, I would like point out a possible challenge to my argument so far. I have claimed that environmental philosophers should decide how to persuade the public of the need for environmental policies. It could, however, be argued that many of these philosophers are convinced that animals have rights, or that there is intrinsic value in nature (I discuss this idea in depth in the next chapter), and they may feel they have to discuss this, as a mission. They don't want to give up persuading people about animal rights or intrinsic value, and they don't want to 'sell out' just in order to persuade. It seems (the argument would continue) that I might expect these philosophers to suppress their ideas and feelings. However, philosophers should be loyal to their ideas and thoughts as well: they should be authentic; their role is not merely to persuade for the sake of forming a majority of well-informed citizens. I need of course to emphasize that this is not what I expect philosophers to do. Indeed, I think that a place does exist for environmental ethics and meta-ethics and that there is also a time to discuss issues bearing no relation to policies. However, **environmental philosophers cannot escape the need to engage in real-life public deliberation** because what they discuss is not wholly 'academic'. 18 The issues at stake are crucial both to human beings and their welfare, and to ecosystems and the state of the environment. The ecological crisis is not a question that can be discussed in tranquillity, and one cannot experiment with thinking about it for too long. **There is a strong and urgent need for some thoughts and theories that are oriented towards institutions and policies**. So, while accepting that environmental ethics and meta-ethics reflect sincere and authentic concerns, and that these concerns should be voiced, as an important part of this debate, I would stress that these **cannot replace political theory concerning the environment**. Such theory is vital for obvious reasons.

The permutation doesn't prevent the alternative—we can have philosophical discussions but still engage the policy community—rejecting dogma is key.

Andrew **Light**, July **2002**. Associate professor of philosophy and environmental policy, and director of the Center for Global Ethics at George Mason University. "Contemporary Environmental Ethics From Metaethics to Public Philosophy," Metaphilosophy 33.4, Ebsco.

Making environmental ethics more useful to the larger environmental community does not require giving up all of our lively philosophical debates. These debates are deserving of continued attention. But if we are to attend to the needs of our larger community we must give up the dogmas in the field, at the very least in those contexts where various views have converged and where incommensurabilities between positions do not arise. Other changes in the application of ethics to environmental problems would have to occur as well. Here, following my observations in the previous section, I shall only make one other suggestion. A more fully responsible environmental ethics must abandon the wholesale rejection of anthropocentric reasons for protecting the environment, at least as part of our public philosophical task.

Environmental philosophers can engage in abstract discussions and still support pragmatic reform.

Andrew **Light**, July **2002**. Associate professor of philosophy and environmental policy, and director of the Center for Global Ethics at George Mason University. "Contemporary Environmental Ethics From Metaethics to Public Philosophy," Metaphilosophy 33.4, Ebsco.

Taking seriously this public task for environmental ethics does not, however, mean that those who do so must give up their pursuit of a theory of nonanthropocentric natural value. They can continue this work as one of their other tasks as environmental ethicists. But when the goal at hand is to influence policy makers or the public, they must not dogmatically apply these views. Elsewhere (Light 2001) I have sketched in more detail how such a two-pronged approach would work - continuing one's commitment to one side or another of the metaethical debates in the field while setting aside those commitments in certain circumstances. Here I shall simply note that what I am calling the "public" task of this strategy is only valid where convergence has been reached. That is, where the preponderance of views among environmental ethicists of various camps, as well as among environmentalists themselves, has converged on the same end, the public work of the philosopher is to articulate the arguments that would most effectively morally motivate nonenvironmentalists to accept that end. Empirically, for many issues this will involve making weak anthropocentric arguments (which also have the virtue of often being less philosophically contentious). But one can imagine that in some cases nonanthropocentric claims would be more appealing as well. What appeals best is an empirical question. Where convergence has not been achieved, however, this public task of translation is not warranted. There we must continue with our "environmental first philosophy," attempting to hammer out the most plausible and defensible views. 14 There are of course many details in this approach that have yet to be filled in; I trust charitable read- ers will allow for its full defense elsewhere.

Permutation Solvency—Discourse

The permutation solves best—it creates a shared discourse that allows philosophers to influence policy.

Bryan G. **Norton**, **2005**. Ph.D. Professor of Philosophy at Georgia Tech, Ivan Allen College School of Public Policy. "Sustainability: A Philosophy of Adaptive Ecosystem Management," p. 50, Google Books.

Speaking generally, the problem featured in this book is the lack of common language or shared discourse in which scientists and the public can discuss environmental problems, environmental goals, and possible environmental actions. Still speaking generally, our current language is inadequate because – as noted in the preface – it leads to the polarization over environmental values and to ideological environmentalism. Speaking generally, however, is just that; a pragmatist is committed to looking at real cases. Speaking more specifically, lack of effective communication pervades and corrupts most contexts in which human communities are struggling to live within their environmental limits. And yet **we cannot solve this problem on the most general scale until we have some idea of its manifestations at local levels and in real policy contexts**. We must survey a number of specific environmental problems, looking for general features from our survey. To get the cards on the table, however, let me state at the outset a general hypothesis: at all levels of society, and in all kinds of places across our country, there are failures of communication in discussions of environmental problems. These failures are most basically due to the lack of an adequate language for integrating environmental science and environmental values, and as a result little true communication occurs in the process of formulating and discussing environmental policies. To be more specific, I will argue that in public policy debate regarding environmental choices, we lack a crucial type of term that can (1) encapsulate a great deal of information and (2) present this information in such a way that the its importance for widely held social values is transparent.

Permutation Solvency—Science

The permutation solves best—scientific and value-based arguments must be considered together.

Bryan G. **Norton**, **2005**. Ph.D. Professor of Philosophy at Georgia Tech, Ivan Allen College School of Public Policy. "Sustainability: A Philosophy of Adaptive Ecosystem Management," p. xii, Google Books.

In providing a philosophy of adaptive management, I have also proposed an important amendment to adaptive management as it is currently practiced. Most of the practitioners and advocates of adaptive management, self-avowed or not, are scientists by training, and they adhere sharply to the positivist precept that factual and normative discourse are best separated. Writing as an environmental philosopher-ethicist with a strong pragmatic bent, I argue (1) that in all situations affecting policy, facts and values must be discussed together: environmental science must abandon the myth that it can be pursued as value-neutral science; and (2) that norms and environmental values should, like scientific hypotheses, be considered open for revision through testing in the face of expanding experience – experience that can be guided by international and controlled experiments in many cases. So I also follow the pragmatist idea of the unity of inquiry, which holds that there is only one way to improve both empirical understanding and normative judgment: experience. That method must, in turn, be supported by a commitment to norms of procedure and by acceptance of an obligation to communicate and give reasons when we disagree. This method – the "scientific method" – is applicable no less to moral problems than to physical ones. My analysis of environmental problems therefore responds to scientific claims and value claims in pretty much the same way: "Show me the evidence!" This amendment in the usual scope of adaptive management has the advantage of making values and goals endogenous to the adaptive management process; no less than scientific hypotheses, our norms and stated goals are help up to the standard of experience and corrected through ongoing adjustment in the face of new experience about their viability in an evolving situation.

Permutation Solvency—Specificity Key

Permutation solves best—we must combine general values about the environment with details of the specific case at hand.

Daniel **Farber**, **1999**. Professor of Law at the University of Minnesota. Eco-Pragmatism, Pg. 9-11.

In this book, I argue for a pragmatic approach to environmental problems, in which economic analysis is useful, but not controlling. Critics of cost-benefit analysis are right that economic efficiency is an inadequate basis for environmental policy. Indeed, the "state of the art" of cost-benefit analysis would limit its ability to generate firm answers to environmental questions even if we did want to make it our sole basis for decision making. But the critics are wrong to build a wall between economics and ethics. In practice, the cost-benefit analyst needs to make numerous technical decisions that turn out to also involve ethical issues. Moreover, many economic insights turn out to be relevant to a broader policy analysis. Properly understood, then, the dichotomy between economics and value judgments turns out to be a false one. The approach that I take in this book is part of a broader movement in legal scholar ship, which is sometimes called practical reasoning or legal pragmatism. Legal pragmatists are, in part, reacting against the increased obsession of some other legal scholars with grand theories such as economic reductionism. **A convincing analysis should be like a web, drawing on the coherence of many sources, rather than a tower, built on a single unified foundation**. Intelligent analysis requires the use of theories, but as tools, not as ends in themselves. Environmental decisions involve a complex network of scientific, economic, and normative judgments. It is unlikely that we can construct a structure in which all of these considerations will point to a single conclusion. We can have better hopes of building an interlocking web of arguments that will support a decision based on diverse, overlapping considerations. Being pragmatic does not mean the rejection of rules or principles in favor of ad hoc decision making or raw intuition. Rather, it means a rejection of the view that rules, in and of themselves, dictate outcomes. Thus, we shouldn't expect some mechanical technique to give cut-and-dried answers to hard policy questions. Hard policy decisions can't be programmed into a spreadsheet. To the extent that cost-benefit analysts purport to provide such techniques, they are doomed by their inability to capture the richness of actual policy decisions. Yet this does not mean that we should rely merely on intuition. **There is no escape from the need for deep involvement with all the details and perplexities of each specific environmental problem**. But we also need an analytic framework to help structure the process of making environmental decisions. Intuition is often an unhelpful guide because environmental law concerns issues outside of our normal, everyday experience. (Answer quickly: Just how much would it be worth spending to retard the greenhouse effect by a century? A billion dollars? A hundred billion? A trillion?) Ad hoc decision making also makes it difficult to achieve even rough consistency between different decisions. Yet we need some kind of uniformity among public health decisions relating to various kinds of toxic chemicals. We also need some overall policy about issues such as preservation of various endangered species, rather than a patchwork of ad hoc decisions. Ad hoc decision making poses the risk that policy will shift radically after every election, leaving us unable to maintain a coherent policy over time. For all these reasons, we need mediating principles to guide decision making. Rather than rigid rules or mechanical techniques, we need a framework that leaves us open to the unique attributes of each case, without losing track of our more general normative commitments.

"Back to the Earth" Bad—Environment

The world of the alternative would be comparatively worse—returning to nature would put too much pressure on the environment, hastening extinction.

Martin **Lewis**, **1994**. Lecturer in history and director of the International Relations program at Stanford. Green Delusions, p. 8, Google Books.

Finally, the radical green movement threatens nature by advocating a return to the land, seeking to immerse the human community even more fully within the intricate webs of the natural world. Given the present human population, this is hardly possible, and even if it were to occur it would result only in accelerated destruction. Ecological philosophers may argue that we could follow the paths of the primal peoples who live in intrinsic harmony with nature, but they are mistaken. Tribal groups usually do live lightly on the earth, but often only because their population densities are low. To return to preindustrial "harmony" would necessarily entail much more than merely decimating the human population. Yet unless our numbers could be reduced to a small fraction of present levels, any return to nature would be an environmental catastrophe. The more the human presence is placed directly on the land and the more immediately it is provisioned from nature, the fewer resources will be available for non-human species. If all Americans were to flee from metropolitan areas, rural populations would soar and wildlife habitat would necessarily diminish. An instructive example of the deadly implications of returning to nature may be found when one considers the issue of fuel. Although more common in the 1970s than the 1990s, "split wood not atoms" is still one of the green radicals' favored credos. To hold such a view one must remain oblivious to the clearly devastating consequences of wood burning, including suffocating winter air pollution in the enclosed basins of the American West, widespread indoor carbon monoxide poisoning, and the ongoing destruction of the oak woodlands and savannahs of California. If we were all to split wood, the United States would be a deforested, soot-choked wasteland within a few decades. To be sure, the pollution threat of wood stoves can be mitigated by the use of catalytic converters, but note that these are technologically sophisticated devices developed by capitalist firms. If the most extreme version of the radical green agenda were to be fully enacted without a truly massive human die-off first, forests would be stripped clean of wood and all large animals would be hunted to extinction by hordes of neo-primitives desperate for food and warmth. If, on the other hand, eco-extremeists were to succeed only in paralyzing the economy's capacity for further research, development, and expansion, our future could turn out to be reminiscent of the environmental nightmare of Poland in the 1980s, with a stagnant economy continuing to rely on outmoded, pollution-belching industries. A throttled steady-state economy would simply lack the resources necessary to create an environmentally benign technological base for a populace that shows every sign of continuing to demand electricity, hot water, and other conveniences. Eastern Europe shows well the environmental devastation that occurs when economic growth stalls out in an already industrialized society.

AT: Role of Ballot is Intellectual

Abstract intellectualism is useless—environmental philosophers should orient themselves towards real-life problems.

Avner **De-Shalit**, **2000**. Professor of Political Theory at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and Associate Fellow at the Oxford Centre for Environment, Ethics, and Society, Mansfield College, Oxford University. "The Environment: Between Theory and Practice," p. 20, Questia.

So animal rights philosophers have been missing the chance to find a way to many people's hearts. But why is this so crucial? I think it is crucial because it is the wrong way of practising political philosophy. To see why, let us recall a classical book by Max Weber (1968). In Politics als Beruf, Weber presented an important distinction between two approaches to moral reasoning. One is the 'ethics of conviction', which often follows deontology, or a set of rules of conduct; the other is the ethics of responsibility, according to which it would be irresponsible to act according to one's principles alone: rather, one should also consider what others will do as a result of one's actions. It seems to me that political philosophy has this approach in mind. **Political philosophy should orient itself towards real-life problems, including the problem of public good and collective action, where people tend to react in certain undesirable ways to what others do**. In such cases there must be a way of taking into account the effect that my actions have (we include here both what I claim to be doing and the reasons I give for doing it) on others' behaviour and actions. Political reasoning would then have two stages: first, a discussion of principles, but second, a consideration of their actual application and their effect on others' behaviour. However, many environmental philosophers, while ascribing rights to animals, ignore the way others may react. I believe that many people who might have been persuaded of the importance of treating animals fairly (using the argument of what cruelty can do to the human soul) will regard the notion of animal rights as so obscure or absurd that they dismiss as mad philosophers who suggest this idea, and scorn all such claims as nonsense.

Political Focus Key to Educational Value

Environmental philosophers must learn how to address policy issues to prevent irrelevancy.
Bryan **Norton**, Fall **2007**. Ph.D. Professor of Philosophy at Georgia Tech, Ivan Allen College School of Public Policy. "THE PAST AND FUTURE OF ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS/PHILOSOPHY," Ethics & the Environment 12.2, Project Muse.

About 15 years ago, at one of the first meetings of the group known as the International Society for Environmental Ethics (ISEE) at American Philosophical Association (APA) meetings, I drew an analogy with the field of medical ethics, arguing that environmental ethicists should look beyond philosophy departments and seek liaisons with Schools of Forestry, Schools of Marine Science, and Environmental Studies Programs, and that philosophers should take a more active role in policy discussions and process. At that time, I was actively engaged in the actual policy processes, at the Environmental Protection Agency and other agencies, and perceived that: (a) These agencies desperately needed the kinds of conceptual and normative analysis philosophers could provide; but that (b) Practitioners of environmental policy did not find that the categories and concepts of traditional "metaphysical" approaches to environmental value provided them with useful guidance in policy decision making. My urging gained me some heavy criticism, and even made me some enemies, as leading members of the environmental ethics establishment openly complained that my judgment—in seeing philosophy of environmental protection as needing a basis in analysis of possible actions—had been compromised by "spending too much time inside the beltway." Since those early years, I have watched my colleagues in environmental ethics debate this point, but mainly as a sideline to their metaphysical speculation. In the meantime, my colleagues in medical ethics have populated medical schools, formed liaisons with medical research institutions, and become regular commentators on newscasts about ethically controversial medical issues. Meanwhile, Chris Stone, the legal scholar, had his students do a word search of the Congressional Record over several years, and found almost no references to "environmental ethics." As I see it, there are three differences between the environmental ethics and the medical ethics cases: (1) Philosophers have responded to medical issues by engaging practitioners, while most environmental ethicists have become, at best, "token" members of philosophy departments and, whereas medical ethics practitioners tend to talk about decision criteria ("informed consent", etc.), environmental ethicist continue to concentrate on the metaphysical foundations of environmental values; (2) The medical profession, beset with public controversies, recognized the need for more ethical discourse about medical choices, and actively embraced philosophers in their programs, whereas most environmental practioners cannot see how philosophical analysis will help them to make better decisions; and (3) Being much wealthier than environmentalists, the medical schools and professionals were able to initiate positions and offer financial support, while environmental ethicists have to compete with other environmental researchers and commentators for small pots of funding. While we can't do much about (3), we can, I assert, do a lot more about (1) and (2). With respect to philosophy departments, the trend may be(and in my view should be) toward developing joint appointments between philosophy departments and policy schools, forestry schools, and environmental studies programs. This **will bring philosophers and students into more direct contact with real problems and the language of decision making, rather than metaphysics**. And with respect to point (2), **I continue to urge environmental philosophers to address real problems, rather than operating on an abstract level and then finding "applications" of these abstractions**. Philosophers, in other words, should become more "pragmatic" in their approach to both policy and philosophy. One aspect of this move is the need—after years of thinking of environmental philosophy as environmental ethics—to concentrate on epistemological, not metaphysical, aspects of environmental science and decision making. Let me expand on this last point, because it seems to me to be the most important consideration affecting the future of environmental ethics, at least in the short and medium run. I think the central debates about whether nonhumans have "intrinsic value" will be (and should be) replaced with a vigorous discussion of the epistemology of all environmental values. Recently, two leading environmental philosophers, Baird Callicott and Mark Sagoff, have strongly endorsed what would traditionally be called "non-naturalist" approaches to the epistemology of environmental ethics. For Sagoff, this involved positing "ethical and aesthetic" facts which should guide environmental policy discourse away from any discussion of the utilitarian benefits of an improved environment. On the other hand, Callicott embraces "subjectivism," claiming that attributions of intrinsic value are based on personal whim—that one could, without reproach, attribute intrinsic = noninstrumental value to "an old worn-out shoe." These non-naturalist approaches, which rests on a sharp separation of empirical knowledge and ethical content, if followed, will certainly lead to a continued separation of environmental science, environmental philosophy, and environmental ethics. They also shift the debate from the type of value that environmental values are, to a debate about how one might justify a claim that some aspect of nature should be protected. In Sagoff's case, we need an account of how ethical facts are established. In Callicott's case, we need to explore whether and how environmental values (as construed by him) can have a rational impact on policy choices, since (presumably) I would be laughed off the stage if we insisted that public resources be devoted to saving my old shoes. In my view then, it is time—way past time—that the discussions in environmental ethics should shift from metaphysics to epistemology. Characterizing environmental values does very little good if we have no way to support them with reasonable arguments. But now, with the rise of environmental pragmatism—which explicitly supports a naturalistic epistemology of environmental values—the debate needs to be about the prospects for providing philosophical and ethical advice to policy makers. That debate can only be joined if we develop, far more fully than has been done, a reason-based approach to justifying environmental goals and policies.

Anthropocentrism Good—Solves Environment

Human-centered ethics necessitate protecting the environment—change is possible without adopting a bio-centric ethic.

Kyung-sig **Hwang**, **2003**. Professor in the Department of Philosophy at Seoul National University. "Apology for Environmental Anthropocentrism," Asian Bioethics in the 21st Century, http://eubios.info/ABC4/abc4304.htm.

The third view, which will be defended here, is that there is no need for a specifically ecological ethic to explain our obligations toward nature, that our moral rights and duties **can satisfactorily be explained in terms of traditional, human-centered ethical theory**.[4] In terms of this view, ecology bears on ethics and morality in that it brings out the far-reaching, extremely important effects of man's actions, that much that seemed simply to happen-extinction of species, depletion of resources, pollution, over rapid growth of population, undesirable, harmful, dangerous, and damaging uses of technology and science - is due to human actions that are controllable, preventable, by men and hence such that men can be held accountable for what occurs. Ecology brings out that, often acting from the best motives, however, simply from short-sighted self-interest without regard for others living today and for those yet to be born, brings about very damaging and often irreversible changes in the environment, changes such as the extinction of plant and animal species, destruction of wilderness and valuable natural phenomena such as forests, lakes, rivers, seas. Many reproduce at a rate with which their environment cannot cope, so that damage is done, to and at the same time, those who are born are ill-fed, ill-clad, ill-sheltered, ill-educated. Moralists concerned with the environment have pressed the need for a basic rethinking of the nature of our moral obligations in the light of the knowledge provided by ecology on the basis of personal, social, and species prudence, as well as on general moral grounds in terms of hitherto unrecognized and neglected duties in respect of other people, people now living and persons yet to be born, those of the third world, and those of future generation, and also in respect of preservation of natural species, wilderness, and valuable natural phenomena. Hence we find ecological moralists who adopt this third approach, writing to the effect that concern for our duties entail concern for our environment and the ecosystems it contains. Environmental ethics is concerned with the moral relation that holds between humans and the natural world, the ethical principles governing those relations determine our duties, obligations, and responsibilities with regard to the earth's natural environment and all the animals and plants inhabit it. A **human-centered theory of environmental ethics** holds that our moral duties with respect to the natural world are all **ultimately derived from the duties we owe to one another as human beings**. It is because we should respect the human rights, or should protect and promote the well being of humans, that we must place certain constraints on our treatment of the earth's environment and its non-human habitants.[5]

Anthropocentrism Good—Solves Environment

Anthropocentrism is critical to protect the environment—it allows environmentalists to advocate environmental protection to the general public using language that will get them on board.

David **Watson**, **2007**. Professor at the Department of Psychology in the University of Iowa. "Conservative anthropocentrism provides the best basis and framework for an environmental ethic," http://philosophy.cnu.edu/thesis_papers/DavidWatsonSpring07HTML.htm.

Opponents of a conservative anthropocentric environmental ethic will object to the priority of human survival in an environmental ethic. Those who oppose any anthropocentric ethic would look to the concept of value to support their argument. They would claim that other members of the biosphere possess intrinsic value and that their value cannot be considered less than that of a human. Thus, other members of the biosphere cannot be sacrificed for the betterment of humanity. According to such arguments, the intrinsic value of these other members prohibits any anthropocentric environmental ethic. Emotionally the arguments of the non-anthropocentrists have great appeal. Philosophically justified, moral and ethical theorists often gravitate to non-anthropocentric environmental ethics. However, there are several problems with the concepts they assert. Non-anthropocentrists claim that other members of the biosphere have intrinsic value, and this prohibits any anthropocentric environmental ethic. Compelling examples along these lines are often cited to justify non-anthropocentrism. The 'slaughtering' of animals such as cows, deer, or chickens for human use is wrong because the chickens and cows possess as much value as humans. However, whether or not these arguments are valid and justified is not the only consideration necessary. The discussions of philosophers and intellectuals are not the end of environmental ethics. **The people of Western societies**, as consumers of vast amounts of resources, **must realize the importance of the other members of the biosphere if this issue is to be addressed**. Humans are part of nature, or the biosphere, as are all other living and non-living entities on the earth. Though humanity often seems separate and distinct from nature, humans emerged from the already thriving biosphere. This earth has been the only home to humanity. Without the earth and its parts, the necessary conditions for the existence and survival of humanity are lacking. **Environmental anthropocentrism does not necessitate an adversarial relationship between humans and the rest of nature**, contrary to popular opinion. In fact, humanity has a great interest in the welfare of the biosphere: There is very good reason for thinking ecologically, and for encouraging human beings to act in such a way as to preserve a rich and balanced planetary ecology: human survival depends on it. (Massanari 45) Environmental ethics need to embrace anthropocentrism and the insights of conservation ethics. Human self-interest, regardless of its moral status, is present in human nature and culturally around the world. However, this self-interest and the direct relation it should have with the welfare of the biotic community is often overlooked. Instead of continuing the debate of whether to champion all members of the biosphere or to promote the advancement of humanity, we need to embrace all members of the biosphere in order to promote the advancement of humanity. There are many different factors that allow for life on earth, particularly human life. The 'resources,' as they are often called, necessary for the survival of humanity are limited. If the finite resources necessary for human life are gone, then the existence of humanity will no longer be viable on Earth. The recent trend of human attitude toward and interaction with the environment is frighteningly shortsighted. Only a sector of the scientific community attempts to address the potential environmental problems facing humanity in the near and distant future. Those that do, however, often express what seems like helpless concern: A great change in our stewardship of the earth and the life on it, is required, if vast human misery is to be avoided and our global home on this planet is not to be irretrievably mutilated. ("Warning to Humanity" 783) Looking only as far as twenty-five to fifty years into the future of the environment is commonly considered long-term thinking. More than likely, this will only be an intermediate point in the environmental change humans have caused. The future viability of life on the planet is necessary for human survival, and humanity can yet have a say in this future. Humans came about among a preexisting world of living and non-living agents. We are just one of many species that have inhabited, or do inhabit the earth. These various species serve different functions in the biosphere and are interdependent upon one another for the survival of themselves and the biosphere.

Anthropocentrism Good—Solves Environment

Bio-centrism is not a pre-requisite to protecting the environment—anthropocentric ethics still necessitate environmental protection.

Kyung-sig **Hwang**, **2003**. Professor in the Department of Philosophy at Seoul National University. "Apology for Environmental Anthropocentrism," Asian Bioethics in the 21st Century, http://eubios.info/ABC4/abc4304.htm.

The most obvious reason for raising the question about our obligations to future generations stems from a simple perception: that what we do now will have consequences, good or ill, for those who come after us. Just as the actions, choices and thinking of our ancestors, close and distant, influence the way we live our lives, what we do influences the lives of those for whom we will be ancestors.[12] That we do not know how or by what particular chain of events this influence will exert or express itself, or a thousand or ten thousand years from now is beside the point for the moment. What matters at the outset is to recognize that there will be some influences. The first argument, which is an argument from future generations, may sound almost like a confession and avoidance - a confession that argument for ecocentrism cannot be made and its avoidance diverting through the anticipated interests of future generations.[13] Even if rivers lack interests, future humans may have interests in at least some rivers. Pursuing such a line of thought, one might suppose it no trick to derive a present reason for modifying contemporary conduct affecting at least some non-personal being, even if doing so does not serve our welfare. From our perspective alone, the benefits from concerning some endangered species may not be worth the sacrifices. But when we pool with our own interests, the interests of the unborn, and recalculate, the new majority may favor conservation. A typical human-centered argument, which I want to defend, goes as follows. Future generations of people have as much right to live a physically secure and healthy life as those of the present generation. Each of us is therefore under an obligation not to allow the natural environment to deteriorate to such an extent that the survival and well being of later human inhabitants of the earth are jeopardized. We also have a duty to consume natural resources so that future generations will be able to enjoy their fair share of benefits derived from those resources. Even **our present responsibility to protect endangered species of wild life is linked to human values**. We also have a duty, the argument continues, to preserve the beauty of wild nature so that those of future generations can have as much opportunity to experience and appreciate it as we do. It would be unfair of us to destroy the world's natural wonders and leave only ugly trash heaps for others to contemplate.[14] Thus a whole system of standards and rules governing our present conduct in relation to the ethic's natural environment can be **grounded on human needs and interests alone**. Moreover, if we take human-centered ethics more seriously in the perspective of not only anthropocentric realism but also anthropocentric idealism,[15] it is very difficult to find any reason to blame anthropocentrism for its narrowness or imprudence. As I have indicated, what makes the future-generations arguments appealing is that it appears to retain human wants as the touchstone of moral analysis. But surely wants are not the only data on which moral reflection can be based. Historically few moral theories have accepted what one wants as either given or good without qualification. More commonly, what we instinctively desire is regarded as a variable, subject to - indeed, the precise target of - some disciplining virtues. The self-interest, on which the rational person acts, if it must be put that way, is our moral self.

Anthropocentrism Good—Extinction

Anthropocentrism key to survival—understanding the importance of ecosystems to future generations solves environmental destruction but radical biocentrism causes extinction.

Kyung-sig **Hwang**, **2003**. Professor in the Department of Philosophy at Seoul National University. "Apology for Environmental Anthropocentrism," Asian Bioethics in the 21st Century, http://eubios.info/ABC4/abc4304.htm.

While our ability to affect the future is immense, our ability to foresee the results of our environmental interventions is not. I think that our moral responsibility grows with foresight. And yet, paradoxically in some cases grave moral responsibility is entailed by the fact of one's ignorance. If the planetary life-support system appears to be complex and mysterious, humble ignorance should indicate respect and restraint. However, as many life scientists have complained, these virtues have not been apparent in these generations. Instead they point out, we have boldly marched ahead, shredding delicate ecosystems and obliterating countless species, and with them the unique genetic codes that evolved through millions of years; we have altered the climate and even the chemistry of the atmosphere, and as a result of all this-what?[18] A few results are immediately to our benefit; more energy, more mineral resources, more cropland, convenient waste disposal. Indeed, these short-term payoffs motivated us to alter our natural environment. But by far the larger and more significant results, the permanent results, are unknown and perhaps unknowable. Nature, says poet, Nancy Newhall, "holds answers to more questions than we know how to ask." And we have scarcely bothered to ask.[19] Year and year, the natural habitants diminish and the species disappear, and thus our planetary ecosystem (our household) is forever impoverished. It is awareness of ecological crisis that has led to the now common claim that we need transvaluation of value, new values, a new ethic, and an ethic that is essentially and not simply contingently new and ecological. Closer inspection usually reveals that the writer who states this does not really mean to advance such a radical thesis, that all he is arguing for is the application of old, recognized, ethical values of the kind noted under the characterization of respect for persons, justice, honesty, promotion of good, where pleasure and happiness are seen as goods. Thus, although W. T. Blackstone writes; "we do not need the kind of transvaluation that Nietzsche wanted, but we do need that for which ecologists are calling, that is, basic changes in man's attitude toward nature and man's place in nature, toward population growth, toward the use of technology, and toward the production and distribution of goods and services." We need to develop what I call the ecological attitude. The transvaluation of values, which is needed, will require fundamental changes in the social, legal, political and economic institutions that embody our values. He concludes his article by explicitly noting that he does not really demand a new ethic, or a transvaluation of values. A human being is a hierarchical system and a component of super-individual, hierarchical system of sets. What is needed is **not the denial of anthropocentrism**, the placing of the highest value on humans and their ends and the conceiving of the rest of the nature as an instrument for those ends. Rather what is needed is the explicit recognition of these hierarchical systems and an ecological approach to science and the accumulation of scientific knowledge in which the myriad casual relationships between different hierarchical systems are recognized and put to the use of humanity. The freedom to use the environment must be restricted to rational and human use. If there is irrational use - pollution, overpopulation, crowding, a growth in poverty, and so on - people may wipe out hierarchies of life related to their own survival and to the quality of their own lives. This sort of **anthropocentrism is essential even to human survival and a radical biotic egalitarianism would undermine conditions for that survival**.[20] Rational anthropocentrism, one that recognizes the value of human life "transcends our individual life" and one in which we form a collective bond of identity with the future generations is essential is the process of human evolution.

Anthropocentrism Good—Extinction

Anthropocentrism is critical to human survival but still forces environmental protection in order to preserve future generations.

David **Watson**, **2007**. Professor at the Department of Psychology in the University of Iowa. "Conservative anthropocentrism provides the best basis and framework for an environmental ethic," http://philosophy.cnu.edu/thesis_papers/DavidWatsonSpring07HTML.htm.

The most important consideration in an environmental ethic should be the survival of humanity. Survival is the most important function of humans instinctively and biologically. G.G. Simpson held this view and stated it concisely: ….even if he were the lowest animal, the anthropocentric point of view would still be manifestly the only one to adopt for consideration of his place in the scheme of things and when seeking a guide on which to base his actions and evaluations of them. (Norton 144) Science considers self-interest to be a driving force in nature. Simpson explains that humans can only evaluate their actions as they relate to themselves, and that anthropocentrism is natural. G.H. Murdy simplifies the concept by saying, "it is proper for men to be anthropocentric and for spiders to be arachnocentric" (Norton 144). All living things are physiologically constructed for survival and procreation. All issues related to environmental ethics cannot be discussed without consideration of humans. There is one common trait held by all living things, and that is reproduction. All living things have the ability to procreate. Scientists believe that individual survival is not the only goal of living things, but also the reproduction of their DNA. This importance placed on the future of the DNA is analogous to the importance of the future of humanity. As much as individuals function to ensure their survival, they also function to ensure the chances of survival of their species. Likewise, an environmental ethic should function to ensure survival in the present, as well as functioning to increase the chances for future survival and humanity's longevity. The theory of natural selection revolutionized biological discussions. This theory holds that the members of each species "must and should act to increase the survival chances of their species" (Norton 145). Similar to other species included in this theory, humans should act to increase the chances of the survival of their species. According to the laws of nature we should and must act to increase the chances of present human survival as well as the future of humanity. One of the main issues of environmental treatment is that of the earth's condition when inherited by future generations. Gillespie asserts: ….there is the ethical argument that the future is barely represented in most contemporary decision making. Yet, by the time future generations are living with the environmental problems that this generation has left them, this generation will have gone, having taken the benefits of such decisions, but leaving the costs behind. (Gillespie 111-112) Making decisions that are fair to future generations of humanity may require sacrifice. Such sacrifice might be significant, but would pale in comparison to the misery future generations may face on an exhausted and devastated earth. Though acting in the interests of the present may be easier, humanity as a whole should act to increase the chances for future humans. One of the most basic needs of future generations is to have a healthy biosphere in which to live, and this must be addressed before time runs out.

Animals Don't Deserve Rights

Animals can't have rights—they aren't moral agents.

Joel **Feinberg**, **1974**. American political and social philosopher who taught at institutions including Brown University, UCLA, Princeton, retired as Regents Professor of Philosophy and Law at the University of Arizona. "The Rights of Animals and Future Generations," Philosophy and Environmental Crisis, http://www.animal-rights-library.com/texts-m/feinberg01.htm.

Even if we allow, as I think we must, that animals are the directly intended beneficiaries of legislation forbidding cruelty to animals, it does not follow directly that animals have legal rights; and Gray himself, for one, refused to draw this further inference. Animals cannot have rights, he thought, for the same reason they cannot have duties, namely, that they are not genuine "moral agents." Now, it is relatively easy to see why animals cannot have duties, and this matter is largely beyond controversy. Animals cannot be "reasoned with" or instructed in their responsibilities; they are inflexible and unadaptable to future contingencies; they are incapable of controlling instinctive impulses. Hence, they cannot enter into contractual agreements, or make promises; they cannot be trusted; and they cannot (except within very narrow limits and for purposes of conditioning) be blamed for what would be called "moral failures" in a human being. They are therefore incapable of being moral subjects, of acting rightly or wrongly in the moral senses, of having, discharging, or breaching duties and obligations. But what is there about the intellectual incompetence of animals (which admittedly disqualifies them for duties) that makes them logically unsuitable for rights? The most common reply to this question is that animals are incapable of claiming rights on their own. They cannot make motion, on their own, to courts to have their claims recognized or enforced; they cannot initiate, on their own, any kind of legal proceedings; nor are they capable of even understanding when their rights are being violated, or distinguishing harm from wrongful injury, and responding with indignation and an outraged sense of justice instead of mere anger or fear.

Permutation Solvency

Permutation solves best—understanding that nature has both intrinsic and instrumental value allows pragmatic conservation efforts.

Ben A. **Minteer**, **2006**. Assistant Professor in the Human Dimensions of Biology Faculty in the School of Life Sciences at Arizona State University. "The Landscape of Reform: Civic Pragmatism and Environmental Thought in America," p. 3, Google Books.

Although I describe it more fully in the individual chapters, one of the noteworthy features of the third way tradition in environmental thought is its embrace of a pluralistic mode of environmental value and action that accommodates both the prudent use and the preservation of nature, rather than demanding that we must always choose between these commitments. It is a way of thinking, in other words, that accepts the interpenetrating character of intrinsic and instrumental values in experience, the basic continuity of means and ends in environmental thought and practice. As such, the third way tradition is a strand within environmentalism that cannot be accurately characterized as either narrowly anthropocentric or ecocentric. Rather, it incorporates critical elements of both sensibilities in a more holistic, balanced, and practical vision of human environmental experience. Furthermore, **this pragmatic strain in environmental thought views humans as thoroughly embedded in natural systems**. Yet this recognition does not lead to the conclusion that humans have carte blanche with respect to the natural world, or that there is no moral limit to the domination of human will over the landscape. Instead, the third way view supports a wider and more integrative perspective in which human ideals and interests (including economic interests, but also other nonmaterial social, cultural, and political values) are understood to be wrapped up in the natural and built environment, and are secured and promoted through deliberate and broad-based planning and conservation efforts. While respectful of wilderness geographies and values, this tradition nevertheless represents a retreat from pure preservationist forms of environmentalism to views that accommodate ecologically benign and adaptive forms of technological enterprise and sustainable community development on the landscape.

Permutation solves best—a universal embrace of either anthropocentrism or ecocentrism alienates the public—only a pragmatic middle ground can get them on board for environmental protections.

Ben A. **Minteer**, **2006**. Assistant Professor in the Human Dimensions of Biology Faculty in the School of Life Sciences at Arizona State University. "The Landscape of Reform: Civic Pragmatism and Environmental Thought in America," p. 6-7, Google Books.

Perhaps the most salient feature of pragmatism is its instrumentalist character and the emphasis it places on the realm of practice (As opposed to the sphere of the ideal). Pragmatism is not a mirroring philosophy that seeks to reflect ideas said to exist outside of human culture, nor does it claim to register an objective, preexperiential understanding of nature. It is rather an active constructive (or reconstructive) philosophy, one that arises from practical experience and takes shape as individuals – and communities – confront problems, learn about their (and others') values and beliefs, and adjust and progressively improve their natural and built environments. To paraphrase Ian Hacking, pragmatism suggests less the image of the philosopher's armchair than it does the craftsman's workbench. Ideas, as well as values and moral principles, are not abstractions; they are tools for social experimentation with the goal of bettering the human condition and enhancing our cultural adaptation to the environment. Among other things, this emphasis on instrumental action and social practice suggests that new knowledge and novel values can emerge from reflective and well-planned human activity on the landscape. Indeed, such activities have the potential to expand human experience and generate cultural wisdom in a manner that can improve our ability to achieve valued social goals, as well as deepen our appreciation of our natural and built environments. Pragmatism is also known for it's acceptance, if not hearty embrace, of the condition of pluralism; i.e., that individuals are differently situated and are shaped to a significant degree by dissimilar traditions and experiences. Any claim to a universal or singular "good" is thus illusory to most pragmatists. This commitment to pluralism (including both its metaphysical and ethical varieties) prompts in turn the acknowledgement of the fallibility of our beliefs and moral commitments. It requires an openness to revision and change as we come into contact with the views of others and accept that new evidence and further discussion may show our beliefs to be mistaken and our values to be ill-considered or to have unacceptable implications. In the environmental case, a growing body of social scientific research on public opinion has shown that citizens embrace a range of moral stances toward the environment, including both anthropocentric and ecocentric positions. In light of this evidence, the notion that we should be searching for a final and universal ethical principle (or even a small set of ultimate principles) to govern all of our problematic environmental situations seems misguided to pragmatists. Such a view not only sweeps aside real moral diversity, it also fails to acknowledge that values can and do change in the context of public debate and deliberation over environmental programs and policies.

Permutation Solvency

Total rejection of anthropocentrism fails—understanding humans as part of the environment allows environmental protection..

William **Grey**, **1993**. Reader in Philosophy at the University of Queensland. "Anthropocentrism and Deep Ecology," Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71.4, pages 463-475, http://www.uq.edu.au/~pdwgrey/pubs/anthropocentrism.html.

There is an obvious tension which arises when attempting to rectify the first two worries at the same time. For extolling the virtues of the natural, while at the same time vilifying the man-made or artificial, depends on a distinction between the natural and the artificial which the stress on a continuity between human and nonhuman (the focus of the second worry) undermines. On the one side there is emphasis on continuity and dependency, and on the other on distinctness and separation. It seems that, while we are a part of nature, our actions are nevertheless unnatural. This is one of the points where deep ecologists often risk lapsing into an incoherence, from which they are able to save themselves (as I will illustrate) with the help of a little covert anthropocentrism. Or putting the point another way, a suitably enriched (non-atomistic) conception of humans as an integral part of larger systems—that is, correcting the misconception of humanity as distinct and separate from the natural world—means that anthropocentric concern for our own well-being **naturally flows on to concern for the nonhuman world**. If we value ourselves and our projects, and part of us is constituted by the natural world, then these evaluations will be transmitted to the world. That we habitually assume characteristically anthropocentric perspectives and values is claimed by deep ecologists to be a defect. And as a corrective to this parochialism, we are invited to assume an "ecocentric" (Rolston 1986, Callicott 1989) or "biocentric" (Taylor 1986) perspective. I am not persuaded, however, that it is intelligible to abandon our anthropocentric perspective in favour of one which is more inclusive or expansive. We should certainly abandon a crude conception of human needs which equates them (roughly) with the sort of needs which are satisfied by extravagant resource use. But the problem with so-called "shallow" views lies not in their anthropocentrism, but rather with the fact that they are characteristically short-term, sectional, and self-regarding. A suitably enriched and enlightened anthropocentrism provides the wherewithal for a satisfactory ethic of obligation and concern for the nonhuman world. And a genuinely non-anthropocentric view delivers only confusion.

Permutation Solvency—Environment

Reconciliation of anthropocentrism and ecocentrism key to prevent environmental destruction.
Raphael **Larrere and** Catherine **Larrere**, March **2007**. Agricultural expert and a research director at the Institut National de Recherche Agronomique and Professor of Philosophy and Chair of the Department of Philosophy at the Université Michel Montaigne/Bordeaux. "Should Nature be Respsected," Social Science Information 46.1, p. 9, Sage.

Numerous considerations have militated in favour of adopting biodiversity as the norm. Scientists accept that extinction exists, and that because of its scope and pace it exceeds those that occurred in the course of evo- lution. Human activities seem to be responsible for a complex series of intermingled causes: excessive removal of species, systematic destruction of "pests", cutting down of tropical rainforests, pollution of agricultural or industrial origin, urbanization and infrastructures that fragment habitats. This is a case of the impoverishment of natural resources at the disposal of humanity. In response to Comte, who had envisaged a world composed exclusively of plants and animals useful to humans, going so far as to suggest the methodical elimination of those that are useless or harmful, Mill (1882:180) retorted that it is impossible to anticipate the development of knowledge and techniques: as if anyone can assert that science will not one day discover, perhaps, some property useful to humans in the most insignificant grass". This argument has been repeated many times. It introduces the notion of the interest of future generations. Our activities cause species to disappear and it is not because they are of no utility at present that they will never become useful. This said, we are depriving our descendants of resources from which they might derive some benefit. The argument could be extended to take into consideration disinterested interests, as Norton suggests, because nature is not composed of "economic resources" only, and its objects are also objects of research, contemplation and emotion. But whatever damage this impoverishment of "natural resources" might cause to human life, there is a tendency to believe that there is some- thing intrinsically bad in this, which nothing can justify. The species that are disappearing because of our activities are the result of evolu- tionary processes that have occurred over millions of years. But what disappears is irreplaceable. There is a discrepancy, intuitively shocking, between activities corresponding to short-term interests and their irre- versible consequences. If questions are posed on the natural heritage that will be passed on to future generations,it is easy to deduce that one of the principles guiding our use of this heritage should be to preserve the freedom of choice of our descendants, and to ensure freedom of choice, it is necessary to avoid irreversible effects to the greatest extent possible, and also to maintain the inherited level of biological diversity that has benefited the present generation. Insofar as biodiversity encourages the adaptability of ecological systems (the ecocentric point of view) to changes in their environment that are likely to disturb them, and insofar as it can be considered as an ensemble of material and scientific resources,and the general consensus is to give it an aesthetic value (the anthropocentric points of view), we are tempted to replace Leopold's maxim by "A thing is right when it tends to preserve biodiversity. It is wrong when it tends otherwise". As in Leopold's phrase, it is a question of reconciling the anthropocentric and ecocentric points of view.

Alternative Fails

The alternative provides no course of action—placing equal value to life makes dealing with inevitable difference impossible.

William **Grey**, **2000**. Associate Professor in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Queensland, Australia. "A Critique of Deep Green Theory," Beneath the Surface: Critical Essays in the Philosophy of Deep Ecology, p. 49, Google Books.

Naess' initial formulation of deep ecology was challenged as vague and unsatisfactory. His original articulation was based on an appeal to what he claimed to be "an intuitively clear and obvious value axiom:" biospheric egalitarianism, which affirms ("in principle") the equal value of all life. However, the principle is one that many found neither obvious nor intuitively clear. A fundamental difficulty is that we have to deal with antagonism and conflict within—and concerning—living systems, and that often involves invidious choices. A principle that affirms all living things are of equal value is of no help in establishing preference rankings, and so provides no guidance for choice and action. Sylvan provided an extended critique of Naess as well as other formulations of deep ecology, especially those of Bill Devall and George Sessions and of Warwick Fox. In many cases, it must be said, his interpretation are fairly uncharitable. While Sylvan takes the enthusiastic overstatement of others very literally and trenchantly attacks their metaphors, he is quite relaxes and comfortable about using hyperbole and colorful metaphors of his own.

The alternative's holism is self-defeating.

William **Grey**, **2000**. Associate Professor in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Queensland, Australia. "A Critique of Deep Green Theory," Beneath the Surface: Critical Essays in the Philosophy of Deep Ecology, p. 50, Google Books.

Another problematic component of the deep ecology package that Sylvan attacked is a holistic intuition about the interconnectedness of everything. Certain scientific discoveries in biology—and indeed physics—have revealed a multiplicity of causal connections and interdependencies that are as surprising as they are ubiquitous. But holism becomes self-defeating when it leads to a denial of the existence of the components whose nature and relationships it is trying to explain.

Deep Ecology Bad—Population Fascism

The alternative embraces inhumane forms of population control—this is an endorsement of mass murder.

Karen **Warren and** Barbara **Wells-Howe**, **1994**. Professor of Philosophy at Macalester College. "Ecological Feminism," p. 93, Google Scholar.

From a Deep Ecological perspective, thinking humanely is problematic insofar as doing so is human centered. Of course, if humaneness is merely kindness and compassion, it is not anthropocentric to reflect or act humanely. Naess seems here to conflate humaneness with human-centeredness, as though application of the ethics of human interactions with each other (such as being kind) is anthropocentric. Is this merely a matter of interpretation? Is it true that the overall tone of Naess's work evidences benevolent foundations; his reader would find that he would condone inhumane methods of population reduction. My point is to identify a vagueness, or lack of clarity in Deep Ecological thinking concerning human interactions with each other. Despite Naess' apparent benevolent sensibilities, the writings and recommendations of a number of Deep Ecologists have sometimes verged on the inhumane, and others have put forth the view that phenomena such as the global AIDS epidemic and Third World famine are "necessary solutions" to the "population problem."

Alternative Fails—Bookchin

Bookchin's alternative fails—small societies force conformity that prevents innovation and undermine cooperation between different groups.

Gus **diZerega**, Spring/Summer **1992**. PhD in Political Theory and Visiting Assistant professor in the Department of Government, St. Lawrence University. "SOCIAL ECOLOGY, DEEP ECOLOGY, AND LIBERALISM," Critical Review, http://www.dizerega.com/papers/socecol.pdf.

From a neoliberal perspective I will develop two basic criticisms of Bookchin's argument. First, he does not understand problems of scale. Bookchin ignores differences between face-to-face interactions among people who know one another and those involving strangers, and he appears unaware of the "coordination problem" and how it applies to his praise of a decentralized society. Second, his view of competition and cooperation, both as they occur in the market and in nature, is much too simplistic. As a consequence, he understands neither markets nor ecosystems. The virtues of organic societies are quite real, and modernity has brought a great loss by diminishing their role in our lives. But to a significant degree the virtues of premodern organic society grow from its small scale. Informal means for keeping the peace and preserving social mores can easily operate in such an environment. Help for those who are poorly off through no fault of their own can also flourish under such circumstances, as can friendliness and interest in the well being of known others. Garret Hardin points out that the Hutterites, a growing group of small religious communities now numbering more than 50,000 members in the United States, deliberately limit the size of their communities to 150, for they have discovered that whenever a group grows larger than that, shirking of community work begins to increase faster than population. When population growth within a Hutterite community exceeds 150, it splits into two communities.39 On the other hand, strong pressure for social conformity is often the dark side of premodern society. This pressure, and the power of gossip and ostracism against the deviant, helped maintain behavior in accordance with group norms, and enabled such societies to dispense with the more impersonal means for enforcement characteristic of larger societies. In such societies ostracism and exile were often severe punishments for those who met with widespread disapproval. Moreover, it has usually been in large cities (relative to their societies) that creativity in the arts and sciences best flourishes. In the relative anonymity of big cities, people who march to the beat of different drummers can more easily find kindred souls and avoid social disapproval than in small homogeneous communities. In a word, the good things about small communities stem from everyone's knowing and being interested in one another – and so do the bad things. Failing to appreciate this connection is a consistent problem among communitarian thinkers.40 Not all small face-to-face societies appear inclined to breed conformism. Many, though not all, Native American cultures, such as the Lakota, honored individuality. But those that did so were also frequently highly competitive, which I doubt would please Bookchin. In fact, the wide variety of modes of life among Native American peoples suggests that Bookchin's idealized image of organic societies is based at best on selective extrapolation from some peoples while ignoring the experience of others.41 For an analyst who continually writes of the advantages of holistic reasoning and an ecological perspective, Bookchin displays a peculiar inclination to pick and choose the social features he likes and dislikes, without any apparent awareness that societies cannot be constructed simply by combining together all the things we happen to like and eliminating those we dislike. There is a deeper shortcoming in Bookchin's one-sided praise of the virtues of small societies. They have traditionally been hostile to or indifferent toward strangers. This is even true of the more individualistic Native American cultures. Bookchin acknowledges that they rarely made provision for the needs of strangers, but never pauses to ask why this "oversight" occurred. When our relationships are intensely face-to-face we tend to mistrust those about whom we know little. Bookchin never wonders whether relationships depending upon personal knowledge of one another can be duplicated for humanity as a whole, where our knowledge of particulars must necessarily be small to nonexistent. All this has been discussed by F. A. Hayek, and it is a great pity that Bookchin appears unaware of Hayek's work.42 Face-to-face relationships, in contrast to impersonal market processes, promote intense human interactions. When friendly or loving, this is the greatest of blessings. But intensity is not always enjoyable because it is not always friendly. Wisdom and compassion, which would make it consistently so, are rare. Historically a world of small face-to-face communities or tribes has been a world of countless feuds and petty wars. We cannot know that this was so in prehistoric times, but the archaeological evidence is not encouraging. Bookchin argues that we advance over the past "when we relate on the basis of a simple affinity of tastes, cultural similarities, emotional compatibilities, sexual preferences, and intellectual interests."43 He apparently means that we choose these relations, rather than taking them for granted as in the case of small tribes. Is not such "freedom to choose" the bourgeois ideal? Is it not attained most readily within a large impersonal city, where those seeking different modes of life can locate kindred spirits? In large cities we can choose our friends. Such circumstances are extremely unlikely in the face-to-face societies he advocates. The large-scale achievement of intimacy he advocates within a small group would require intolerable conformity. Bookchin appears unable to perceive the existence of any type of relationship that falls between the extremes of deep intimacy and impersonal hostility. Buyers and sellers in market orders are supposedly "polarized against each other," while it would be better for them "to care for each other's well-being, for them to feel deeply responsible to each other, and for them to be cemented by a deep sense of obligation for their mutual welfare."44 This attitude goes well beyond respect and compassion for others. It is also impossible among people who do not know one another. Further, the great gift liberal civilization gave to humanity, as Hayek and Popper so clearly explain, is that by making cooperation possible along purely abstract and procedural grounds, the scope for peaceful interaction was extraordinarily broadened. People no longer needed to agree about many specifics in order to benefit from peaceful cooperation.45 This extension of the scope of cooperation came at the necessary cost of reducing the intensity of human relations. This observation brings me to a fatal weakness in Bookchin's analysis. In any society needing to provide for more than the needs of a relatively small population, widespread impersonal coordination of goods and services becomes necessary. Bookchin would presumably not want to do without railroads to move food in times of localized crop failure or antibiotics to cure bubonic plague. But to build a rail line or manufacture vaccines requires a very widely integrated economic sphere. An autarkic county in Kansas, or even Vermont, could not do it. Anything like a modern economy cannot be based upon face-to-face relationships. It is simply too complex. Here enters the calculation problem first raised by Mises, a problem that has undermined every attempt to create a nonmarket economy more complex than a village. Bookchin appears unaware that such a problem exists – even though Mises, echoed by Max Weber, first called attention to the matter in the 1920s, subsequently generating an enormous literature, and even though the problem has now become manifest in the fall of communist societies.46 What, then, of Bookchin's proposal for replacing the nation state with a federation of small independent city republics? I agree with him, and with writers going back to Aristotle, that the polis provides a framework where citizenship, that is, membership in a community of political equals, can be easily expressed. Nor is civic localism necessarily anachronistic. Jane Jacobs argues convincingly that cities, not nations, are the fundamental political and economic units of the modern world. Larger units, such as states and nations, have essentially arbitrary political boundaries.47 There would be nothing objectionable about Bookchin's project if its purpose were to envision viable institutions able to encompass small-scale self-government, while simultaneously preserving the advantages made possible by modern institutions. Bookchin's error lies not in his advocacy of municipal values, for in this regard he may well be right (even if they are not quite the cure-all he seems to suggest). Rather, his shortcoming is in failing to discuss the framework wherein small communities could cooperate together. What institutional ties would help them coordinate their activities? In this regard his apparent ignorance of the market's role in coordinating intricate relationships among independent entities is a fatal weakness.48

Alternative Fails—Bookchin

Bookchin's alternative is flawed—oppression of humans and oppression of nature are not connected—better management of nature is superior to anarchy.

James J **Hughes**, **1989**. Assistant Director of Institutional Research and Planning, and Lecturer in Public Policy Studies, at Trinity College in Hartford. "Beyond Bookchinism: A Left Green Response," Socialist Review 89.3, http://www.changesurfer.com/ Bud/Bookchin.html.

SINCE CONSCIOUSNESS plays such a central role in Bookchin's ethics, this appears to be in contradiction to his assertion that humans oppress nature. A key (apparently psychodynamic) point in Bookchin's politics seems to be that we humans began "oppressing" nature because we were oppressing each other. But the "oppression" of nature is fundamentally different from the oppression of sentient beings. It is, in fact, meaningless, since "oppression" only has meaning in reference to sentient beings with conscious intents. It's not wrong to put radioactive waste in the ground because we "oppress" the dirt, but because we and other sentient life forms are threatened by those toxins, and because we, humans, aesthetically value a non-irradiated environment. We don't "oppress" nature, but rather impact on it in a way that causes us, and other sentient beings, harm or displeasure. Bookchin seems confused on this basic point. Walter Truett Anderson's adamantly "managerial" Green line, articulated in To Govern Evolution is an example of an ecological politics that is more compatible with the anthropocentrism of democratic left thought than Bookchin's metaphorical eco-anarchism. Anderson points out that humans have been impacting on the ecosystem for tens of thousands of years, and that our challenge is not to withdraw from nature altogether (as deep ecologists suggest), or to get into organo-anarchic harmony with it (as Bookchin suggests), but to start managing it responsibly. The basic thrust of Bookchin's "social ecology" is the assertion that ecological destruction is a direct result of "social hierarchy." Thus, an anarchic society is the only answer to ecological destruction. While it is probably true that social hierarchies make it more difficult to reorient ourselves toward ecological protection, this seems to be another major weakness of Bookchin's analysis. It seems quite possible that an egalitarian society could be ecologically destructive, and vice-versa. In fact, Bookchin contradicts himself when he points out that feudalism was not ecologically destructive, and acknowledges the possibility that corporate capitalist or bureaucratic collectivist societies could institute ecological policies. If social hierarchy and ecocide are relatively autonomous, the left can only strive to understand how they interact, reinforce, and undercut one another, and build a set of values and movements to change them both. What Bookchin tends toward is the reduction of the struggle against one to the struggle against the other.

The alternative is vague and unsupported by any evidence—hierarchy is inevitable.

Damian Finbar **White**, **2003**. Lecturer at Goldsmith College. "Hierarchy, Domination, Nature," Organization and Environment, Sage Journals.

One immediate problem that arises is that it is difficult to avoid being struck by the sheer vagueness and imprecision that seem to linger around this whole enterprise. So although "organic society" is not presented as a hypothetical "state of nature" but postulated as a historical actuality, as Mary Mellor (1992, p.124) has noted, it is never made very clear by Bookchin when or where this early form of human association actually existed. At points in The Ecology of Freedom, one can find references to an "early Neolithic" village society and get the impression that organic society consequently can be located at a crossover moment when hunter-gatherers first began to settle down into a horticultural society. Elsewhere, in other writings, one can gain the distinct impression that this society stretched well up to the emergence of the early cities.11 Bookchin's narrative does seem further problematic by the manner in which his expositions wings rather dramatically between a "reflexive voice," which appears to accept he is embarking on a highly speculative exercise to a much more confident tone, which at times seems to virtually claim a God's eye view. Thus, one encounters persistent examples of a carefully qualified and tentative insight being quickly reworked into a substantive proposition a few sentences later, where a speculation on "preliterate" practises, values, or institutions is then suddenly transformed into an implausibly detailed account of "how things really were back then."12 Given the time scales that are being dealt with here, and the manner in which these speculations are often **unsupported by evidence or supported by one or two case studies**, it is difficult to avoid an immediate sense that a certain creative embellishing is going on. Additional problems emerge when it becomes evident that Bookchin's own understanding of what he has demonstrated does, at times, seem at odds with the actual narrative he provides. For example, as we have seen, one of the boldest claims that Bookchin makes of his account of historical development is that it "radically reverses" central features of historical materialism. Thus, Marx and Engels, Adorno and Horkheimer, are all chastised for their Victorian image of "stingy nature" and the view that freedom from material want necessitated the "domination of nature." Indeed, at various points, Bookchin (1990b) has emphatically rejected the view "that forms of domination . . . have their sources in economic conditions and needs" (p. 45). On the contrary, we are told the idea of domination initially arose from within societies as part of the development of social hierarchies, "which are not necessarily economically motivated at all" (p. 46). However, an implicit recognition of the role that material factors played in the development of hierarchy, and even a certain sense that the development of hierarchy is inevitable, can also be unearthed from Bookchin's work.

Alternative Fails—National Solutions Key

National-level coordination is key to solve environmental problems.
Neil **Carter**, **2007**. Senior Lecturer in Politics @ University of York. "The Politics of the Environment," p. 59-60.

Another difficulty with decentralization is that many environmental problems are best dealt with at the national or international level. Global commons problems do not respect the political boundaries between existing nation states, let alone small bioregions. Problems such as climate change and ozone depletion require coordinated action across communities and nations, which implies international cooperation between centralized nation states (see Chapter 9). The green slogan 'Think global, act local' may therefore provide an inadequate strategy for dealing with problems of the global commons. Relying on local communities alone to protect the environment assumes that the local community has full knowledge about the causes, impact and solutions to a particular problem; even then, it 'makes sense only when the locals possess an appropriate social and ecological consciousness' (Eckersley 1992: 173).

Local solutions backfire because they are too inwardly focused—only national level policies can create ecological sustainability.
Neil **Carter**, **2007**. Senior Lecturer in Politics @ University of York. "The Politics of the Environment," p. 59-60.

There are many reasons why this response is flawed. What if the communities are unwilling to act? Cooperation within a community may not result in a benevolent attitude towards the outside world. Small parochial communities often define themselves by reference to those outside, so they may be quite averse to considering wider questions, such as the possibility of environmental damage elsewhere. They may even try to free-ride on other communities by producing pollution that damages those living downstream or downwind. Hostility or indifference between communities may be accentuated by the existence of economic inequalities between them; perhaps a poor community might feel less cooperative towards a richer neighbour, It is not difficult to imagine a community being highly sensitive towards its own local environment but unconcerned by damage further afield. It may, therefore, require a central agency (the state?) to persuade localities to change their behaviour. Even if all communities were willing to act collectively to protect the environment, there would still be a role for a central agency to coordinate their actions. Yet, resolute in its rejection of such a central agency, the green anarchist model gives no adequate explanation of how the necessary coordination might take place (Goodin 1992; Martell 1994).

AT: Hierarchy Root of Environmental Problems

Non-heirarchical societies still exploit nature.
Neil **Carter**, **2007**. Senior Lecturer in Politics @ University of York. "The Politics of the Environment," p. 59-60.

Bookchin's thesis is vulnerable to the empirical criticism that there have been many societies characterized by social hierarchy, which have also lived in harmony with nature, such as feudalism. Conversely, a non-heirarchical egalitarian society, such as Marx's post-capitalist utopia, might still exploit nature (Eckersley 1992: 151).

Bookchin's flawed historical relationships prove there is no correlation between hierarchy and domination of nature.
Damian Finbar **White**, **2003**. Lecturer at Goldsmith College. "Hierarchy, Domination, Nature," Organization and Environment, Sage Journals.

It would seem evident, though, that the historical sequence Bookchin (1995b) defends is simply not very convincing. Bookchin's starting point here that "the domination of nature first arose within *society* as part of its *institutionalisation* into gerontocracies ... not in any endeavour to control nature or natural forces" (p. 142) would appear completely untenable. The whole strength of this claim is clearly dependent on the rosy image of a singular organic society that we can find in his earlier work. Now, given (a) the criticisms of this that have been offered above, (b) the cautionary words offered by Kuper about recognising the huge spatial variation that was very likely a central feature of the relationship between human societies and their natures, and (c) the manner in which Bookchin himself later retreats from this position, this claim would seem to fall apart. Indeed, if we follow the view of the later Bookchin (1995c), who states, "In the band and tribe societies of pre-history, humanity was *almost completely at the mercy of uncontrollable natural forces*" (p. 122), such an assertion would seem to suggest that if anything, central elements of the basic Marxian thesis are more convincing as an existential statement of the human condition. That is, as Marx argues in Volume 3 of *Capital*, "the associated producers" need to rationally regulate their interchanges with nature, bring it under their common control, instead of being ruled by it as by the blind forces of nature; and achieving this with the least expenditure of energy and under conditions most favourable to, and most worthy of, their human nature. (as cited in Smith, 1996, pp. 48-49) Bookchin's ecocentric critics have flagged a second line of argument that needs to be considered here. Fox (1989, p. 15) and Eckersley (1992) have argued that Bookchin does not fully recognise that **there is not a straightforward relationship between hierarchical forms of social organisation and the actual domination of nature**. Thus, Fox has argued that historical examples can be offered of hierarchical societies (e.g., ancient Egypt) that had relatively benign relations with nature. Equally, Eckersley has argued that it is possible to conceptualise a relatively nonhierarchical society that is nevertheless extremely exploitative ecologically. 22

AT: Hierarchy Root of Environmental Problems

There is no correlation between hierarchy and social domination—the alternative is more likely to increase social domination.

Damian Finbar **White**, **2003**. Lecturer at Goldsmith College. "Hierarchy, Domination, Nature," Organization and Environment, Sage Journals.

To move on from the organic society issue then, how plausible is the rest of Bookchin's social hierarchy thesis? The concept of social hierarchy clearly denotes the most striking and interesting conceptual innovation that can be found in social ecology, delineating Bookchin's position from the preoccupations of classical critical theory. If we consider this issue at the synchronic level for the moment, one considerable advantage of this demand to place "hierarchy" at the centre of critical social theory is that it clearly opens up the possibility of examining multilayered forms of domination, exclusion, and silencing that are not simply reducible to epiphenomena of class relations. Moreover, Bookchin's claim that it is likely forms of social hierarchy based on generontocracies, patriarchies, priest cults, and warrior groups probably provided the precursors to the latter development of class and proto-state structures would seem reasonably uncontroversial (see Giddens, 1981; Mann, 1986). An issue that does need further examination though is that it is not clear that the complexities that play out in the relationships between social hierarchy and social domination are fully theorised by Bookchin. For example, as numerous critics have observed (Eckersley, 1992; Fox, 1989; Kovel, 1998), there is clearly a range of social relations that are in certain senses hierarchical yet do not self-evidently contribute to social domination. Temporary quasi-hierarchical relations based on the acceptance of certain forms of authority such as parent-child relations (Kovel, 1998) can be socially enabling. Student-teacher relationships (Eckersley, 1992) also invariably contain elements of hierarchy and if freely chosen can be enabling. Indeed, one could think of a range of socially stratified relations that are emergent from functionally differentiated social roles and that are hierarchical in a certain sense but that also alleviate social domination. In this latter category, it could well be argued that any socially complex and politically pluralistic society seeking to avail itself of the gains of high technology is going to be marked by certain forms of social stratification through task differentiation. As long as these "hierarchies" are open and subject to democratic recruitment, rotation, and control, and influence in one sphere of social life is not allowed to cumulate in other spheres (Waltzer, 1985), it is simply not given that such relations necessarily contribute to social domination. Indeed, contra certain currents of libertarianism, it clearly needs to be recognised that certain democratically controlled representative structures or socially differentiated roles **might actually relieve social domination**. Conversely, one could imagine certain nonhierarchical societies (perhaps most strikingly the kind of neo-primitivist fantasies advocated by some eco-anarchists) that would surely exacerbate social domination of humans by nature and perhaps through the "tyranny of structurelessness" (Freeman, 1970) further facilitate domination of some humans by others. It would seem important, then, for a credible critical social theory to be able to distinguish more carefully between coercive and oppressive social-stratified social relations and representative political forms—which clearly give rise to social domination—and such relations based on "legitimate authority" or "democratic authority," which perhaps do not. 21 What can we make though of the further diachronic link that Bookchin has sought to forge: between social hierarchy, social domination, and the "idea" of dominating nature?

Cede the Political—Bookchin

Hierarchies are natural and inevitable—Bookchin's utopian alternative destroys the Left.
James J **Hughes**, **1989**. Assistant Director of Institutional Research and Planning, and Lecturer in Public Policy Studies, at Trinity College in Hartford. "Beyond Bookchinism: A Left Green Response," Socialist Review 89.3, http://www.changesurfer.com/ Bud/Bookchin.html.

FINALLY BOOKCHIN SEEMS to lead himself back into one of the same errors that he so eloquently critiques in deep ecology: the separation of the social order from "the natural." On the one hand, Bookchin insists that, since humans are naturally evolved, anything we do is natural. On the other hand, he insists that nature abhors hierarchy, and that once we get back in touch with our continuity with the natural order we will eschew hierarchy, and vice versa. This is again the problem of the leap from IS to OUGHT. Hierarchies exist in the ecosystem, including animal class and gender systems, and our hierarchies are just as "naturally" evolved as theirs. The reason for us to oppose hierarchy has to do with an existential human ethical decision, not with its "unnaturalness." Bookchin's equation of nonhierarchical organization with ecology leads us astray not only philosophically, but also politically; **it leads us into a utopian rejection of engagement with the actual existing** (albeit hierarchical) **political structures**, such as the Democratic Party and Congress. A complex social order, like a complex organism, requires some degree of specialization, centralization and hierarchy. But the range of possibilities within the human social niche is very broad and we need to ethically decide which of these possible adaptations will ensure the survival of the species and the ecosystem, while satisfying our ethical goals. Some historical periods allow only slow and cumulative change, while other "transformative crisis" periods, when the social equilibrium is "punctuated," allow rapid and revolutionary change. Our challenge is discerning when the window of opportunity is open for radical change, and when we must wage a more modest "war of position." The project of the left is to recognize the ever-changing limits of this window, and to position ourselves within it **without** either **extinguishing ourselves in utopian and apocalyptic projects**, or blending into the dominant gene-pool of possibilities.

Bookchin's ideological focus alienates the public and prevents a broad-scale movement.
John **Clark**, **1998**. Professor of Philosophy at Loyola. "Municipal Dreams: A Social Ecological Critique of Bookchin's Politics," http://raforum.info/article.php3?id_article=1039.

While "the People" are identified by Bookchin as the emerging subject of history and agent of social transformation, he also identifies a specific group within this large category that will be essential to its successful formation. Thus, in the strongest sense of agency, the "'agent' of revolutionary change" will be a "radical intelligentsia," which, according to Bookchin, has always been necessary "to catalyze" such change. [17] The nature of such an intelligentsia is not entirely clear, except that it would include theoretically sophisticated activists who would lead a libertarian municipalist movement. Presumably, as has been historically the case, it would also include people in a variety of cultural and intellectual fields who would help spread revolutionary ideas. Bookchin is certainly right in emphasizing the need within a movement for social transformation for a sizable segment of people with developed political commitments and theoretical grounding. However, most of the literature of libertarian municipalism, which emphasizes social critique and political programs very heavily, has seemed thus far to be directed almost exclusively at such a group. Furthermore, it has assumed that the major precondition for effective social action is knowledge of and commitment to Bookchin's theoretical position. This ideological focus, which reflects Bookchin's theoretical and organizational approach to social change, **will inevitably hinder the development of a broadly-based social ecology movement,** to the extent that this development requires a diverse intellectual milieu linking it to a larger public. Particularly as Bookchin has become increasingly suspicious of the imagination, the psychological dimension, and any form of "spirituality," and as he has narrowed his conception of reason, he has created a version of social ecology that is likely to appeal to only a small number of highly-politicized intellectuals. Despite the commitment of social ecology to unity-in-diversity, his approach to social change increasingly emphasizes ideological unity over diversity of forms of expression. If the "radical intelligentsia" within the movement for radical democracy is to include a significant number of poets and creative writers, artists, musicians, and thoughtful people working in various professional and technical fields, a more expansive vision of the socially-transformative practice is necessary.

Alternative Bad—Authoritarianism

The alternative causes oppressive authoritarianism—turns the K.

Neil **Carter**, **2007**. Senior Lecturer in Politics @ University of York. "The Politics of the Environment," p. 59.

Decentralization may be a necessary condition for participatory democracy, but there is no guarantee that a decentralized society will be democratic. Sale (1980) concedes that a society based on a natural bioregion may not always be characterized by democratic or liberal values because another 'natural' principle, diversity, implies that bioregional societies should boast a wide range of political systems, some of which, presumably, might be authoritarian. Even if the political system is democratic, there may be drawbacks about life in a small community. Social control mechanisms may prove oppressive if, as Goldsmith et al. (1972) suggest, offenders are brought to heel by the weight of public opinion. Discrimination against minorities or non-conformist opinion may be rife. Small parochial societies may also be intellectually and culturally impoverished, perhaps reducing innovation in clean technologies (Frankel 1987). So, ironically, the homogenous decentralized society may lack the diversity that ecologists value.

Alternative Bad—Environment

Bookchin uses a flawed methodology—better research demonstrates that his examples of ideal society actually caused substantial environmental degradation.

Damian Finbar **White**, **2003**. Lecturer at Goldsmith College. "Hierarchy, Domination, Nature," Organization and Environment, Sage Journals.

More substantial difficulties with organic society can be found at the methodological level. One central problem here would seem to be that evidence for Bookchin's speculations is not drawn in the main from paleo-anthropological research but rather from 20th-century ethnographic studies of tribal societies and historical accounts of European encounters with the non-European. Thus, his speculation on gender differentiation in organic society is informed by Elizabeth Thomas's studies of the Bantu. Discussions of animism make reference to Edward B. Tylor's observation of the practises of Native Americans. Various other accounts of the ecological embeddedness of humanity at the dawn of civilisation draw from Dorothy Lee's studies of the Hopi and Wintu tribes. Now, this practise is justified in The Ecology of Freedom on the basis that the cultural facts of dress, technics, and environment that link prehistoric peoples with existing "primitives" is so striking that it is difficult to believe that Siberian mammoth hunters of yesteryear ... were so dissimilar from the Arctic seal hunters of de Poncin's day. (Bookchin, 1982, p. 57) Yet reservations could immediately be voiced here given that the implicit (and highly questionable) assumption underlying this is that tribal people have lived in a permanently static state, without change or social development. Given the growing recognition among social anthropologists that many supposedly isolated small-scale societies have been part of wider, often global systems of exchange for many millennia, such an approach would seem to be increasingly problematic (see Ellen, 1986, p. 9). More generally, establishing the exact nature of human-nature relations among tribal people would seem further complicated by the fact that as the historical geographer Ian Simmons (1996) has noted, "The ethnographic picture is rather spotty on this particular topic so it does not seem possible to give a complete picture for all groups even for near-recent times, let alone the past" (p. 66). Indeed, if we turn to the anthropological record, problems with Bookchin's account of organic society would seem to become even more entrenched. Notably, there would now seem to be growing paleo-anthropological evidence that early humans were involved in substantive reshaping of their natural environment, even to the point where **they produced substantive environmental degradation**. 14 Thus, although Bookchin (1982) in The Ecology of Freedom may claim that "Neolithic artefacts seem to reflect a communion of humanity and nature that patently expressed the communion of humans with each other: a solidarity of the community with the world of life that articulated an intense solidarity within the community itself" (p. 61), elsewhere we can find substantive evidence that points directly to the contrary. 15 It could also be noted that even if we accepted the notion that anthropological data on more recent "tribal societies" provide a legitimate basis for speculation about early humanity, these studies would similarly seem to suggest that the development of early human societies was probably marked by much more complex and variable social patterns, practises, and institutions than are found in the composite account provided in The Ecology of Freedom. Thus, concerning Bookchin's (1982) claim that relations in organic society were "distinctly ecological" (p. 5), it could simply be noted here that the anthropological evidence on "tribal" people and hunter-gatherers hardly lends unqualified support to such a generalisation. 16 The claim that organic society was "strikingly non-domineering not only in its institutionalised structure but in its very language" (Bookchin, 1990b, p. 47) similarly could meet any number of contrary examples from small-scale societies,17 as could the related claim of an egalitarian sexual division of labour, 18 and so on. There would seem to be substantive reasons, then, to doubt the whole account of organic society found in The Ecology of Freedom and Remaking Society. By the early 1990s, it increasingly appeared that Bookchin himself had become less and less comfortable with many aspects of this period of his work. Initially responding to certain currents in deep ecology, committed to what Bookchin (1991) now saw as "atavistic celebrations of a mythic Neolithic and Pleistocene" (p. xxx), 19 the second edition of The Ecology of Freedom provided a new introduction that qualified and revised many earlier commitments. Now ceding to the anthropological evidence that early humanity's relations with the natural world may well have been much less harmonious than previously presumed and warning against romanticising early humanity's interconnectedness with nature, one can find an uncomfortable attempt to hang on to certain elements of his own organic society thesis. Thus, we are told, "as humanity began to emerge from first nature, possibly in the Pleistocene and certainly in the Palaeolithic, their relations to animals as other was largely complementary" (p. xlvii).

Alternative Bad—Extinction

Collapse of society into anarchy causes extinction.

Dani **Rubin**, 1/9/**2008**. Earth Editor for PEJ News. "Beyond Post-Apocalyptic Eco-Anarchism," http://www.pej.org/html/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=7133&mode=thread&order=0&thold=0.

Unlike twenty-five years ago, increasingly, people are adopting the anarcho-apocalyptic, civilization-must-fall-to-save-the-world attitude. It is a fairly clean and tight worldview, zealously bulletproof, and it scares me. I want the natural world, the greater community of life beyond our species, with all its beautiful and terrifying manifestations, and its vibrant landscapes to survive intact – I think about this a lot. **A quick collapse of global civilization, will almost certainly lead to greater explosive damage to the biosphere, than a mediated slower meltdown**. When one envisions the collapse of global society, one is not discussing the demise of an ancient Greek city-state, or even the abandonment of an empire like the Mayans. The end of our global civilization would not only result in the death of six billion humans, just wiping nature's slate clean. We also have something like 5,000 nuclear facilities spread across the planet's surface. And this is just one obvious and straightforward fact cutting across new radical arguments in favor of a quick fall. We have inserted ourselves into the web of life on planet Earth, into its interstitial fibers, over the last 500 years. We are now a big part of the world's dynamic biological equation set – its checks and balances. If we get a "fever" and fall into social chaos, even just considering our non-nuclear toys laying about, the damage will be profound. It will be much more devastating than our new visionaries of post-apocalyptic paradise have prophesized. If one expands upon current examples of social chaos that we already see, like Afghanistan or Darfur, extrapolating them across the globe, encompassing Europe, Asia, North and South America, and elsewhere, then one can easily imagine desperate outcomes where nature is sacrificed wholesale in vain attempts to rescue human life. The outcomes would be beyond "ugly"; they would be horrific and enduring. That is why I cannot accept this new wave of puritanical anarcho-apocalyptic theology. The end-point of a quick collapse is quite likely to resemble the landscape of Mars, or even perhaps the Moon. I love life. I do not want the Earth turned barren. I think that those who are dreaming of a world returned to its wilderness state are lovely, naive romantics – dangerous ones. Imagine 100 Chernobyl's spewing indelible death. Imagine a landscape over-run with desperate and starving humans, wiping out one ecosystem after another. Imagine endless tribal wars where there are no restraints on the use of chemical and biological weapons. Imagine a failing industrial infrastructure seeping massive quantities of deadly toxins into the air, water and soil. This is not a picture of primitive liberation, of happy post-civilized life working the organic farm on Salt Spring Island.

Alternative Fails

Ecofeminism is inherently self-contradictory and marginalizes women by embracing patriarchal essentialisms.

Janet **Biehl**, **1991**. Social ecology activist and the author of Rethinking Eco-feminist Politics. "Rethinking Ecofeminist Politics," p. 3-4.

Although most political movements might feel the need to sort out these differences and their theorists might argue for and against them, producing a healthy debate, ecofeminists rarely confront each other en the differences in these writings. Ecofeminists who even acknowledge the existence of serious contradictions tend, in fact, to pride themselves on the contradictions in their works as a healthy sign of "diversity"-presumably in contrast to "dogmatic," fairly consistent, and presumably "male" or "masculine" theories. But dogmatism is clearly not the same thing as coherence, clarity, and at least a minimum level of consistency. Ecofeminism, far from being healthily diverse, is so blatantly self-contradictory as to be incoherent. As one might expect, at least one ecofeminist even rejects the very-notion of coherence itself, arguing that coherence is "totalizing" and by inference oppressive. Moreover, because ecofeminists rarely debate each other, it is nearly impossible to glean from their writings the extent to which they agree or disagree with each other. The reader of this book should be wary of attributing the views of anyone ecofeminist, as they are presented here, to all other ecofeminists. But ecofeminists' apparent aversion to sorting out the differences among themselves leaves the critical observer no choice but to generalize. The self-contradictory nature of ecofeminism raises further problems as well. Some ecofeminists literally celebrate the identification of women with nature as an ontological reality. They thereby speciously biologize the personality traits that patricentric society assigns to women. **The implication of this position is to confine women to the same regressive social definitions from which feminists have fought long and hard to emancipate women**. Other ecofeminists reject such biologizations and rightly consider what are virtually sociobiological definitions of women as regressive for women. But some of the same ecofeminists who reject these definitions nonetheless favor using them to build a movement. Even as they reject them theoretically, even as they fail to confront ecofeminists who accept them, they still disseminate the same "woman-nature" metaphors. Indeed, the very existence of the ecofeminist movement depends on some people believing in such metaphors, whether their theorists regard them as ontologically true or not. In my view, the notion of building a movement on something one knows is a reactionary falsehood raises serious moral questions about deception and manipulation, questions that women in the ecology movement would do well to ask of ecofeminists and that should be a matter of grave concern to serious feminists today generally.

Ecofeminists association of women with nature reinforces patriarchy—this destroys the alternative's potential.

Janet **Biehl**, **1991**. Social ecology activist and the author of Rethinking Eco-feminist Politics. "Rethinking Ecofeminist Politics," p. 15-6.

Despite ecofeminism's allegedly "revolutionary" potential, some feminists (who are not ecofeminists) have criticized ecofeminism and its closely associated cultural feminism for their reactionary implications. Ecofeminist images of women, these critics correctly warn, retain the patriarchal stereotypes of what men expect women to be. These stereotypes freeze women as merely caring and nurturing beings, instead of expanding the full range of women's human potentialities and abilities. To focus overwhelmingly on women's "caring nature" as the source of ecologically necessary "values" easily leads to the notion that women are to remain intuitive and discourages them from expanding their human horizons and capacities. It is important to note that de Beauvoir flatly repudiated "the new femininity" such as ecofeminism offers, criticizing its return to an enhanced status for traditional feminine values, such as women and her rapport with nature, woman and her maternal instinct, woman and her physical being ... This renewed attempt to pin women down to their traditional role, together with a small effort to meet some of the demands made by women-that's the formula used to try and keep women quiet. Even women who call themselves feminists don't always see through it. Once again, women are being defined in terms of "the other," once again they are being made into the "second sex." ... Equating ecology with feminism is something that irritates me. They are not automatically one and the same thing at all. (emphasis added)" De Beauvoir's well-placed emphasis on the "traditional role" assigned to women by male-created cultures is a conclusion that can only be highly disconcerting to ecofeminism, for it was from this pioneer in women's liberation that ecofeminists borrowed their basic concept of the "otherness" of women and nature. That it is now women-and not men-who define women as "other" with nature is a milestone in the passage in recent decades from a struggle for women's liberation to assertions of mere female chauvinism in ecofeminism. The fact is that Western associations of women with nonhuman nature-or as closer to nonhuman nature than men-were enormously debasing to women. Ancient Greek culture excluded women from political life because of their presumed intellectual inferiority; Aristotle wrote that their logos or reason "lacks authority." Plato believed that in the origin of the two sexes, women result when men who do not do well in their life on earth come back through transmigration of the soul as females." Euripides in a fragment says that "woman is a more terrible thing than the violence of the raging sea, than the force of torrents, than the sweeping breath of fire."" Semonides delivered a diatribe comparing what he saw as various types of women to various animals. Ancient Roman law regarded women as having a "levity of mind," and in Christian culture, Augustine saw women as "weaker." Eve came to be seen as a temptress for her role in the Fall-in the words of the Christian father Tertullian, "the gateway to hell." Aquinas, following Aristotle, regarded women as "misbegotten" and defective. The association of women with nonhuman nature or as beings closer to nonhuman nature has thus been immensely degrading for women, contributing to untold misery in the lives of countless women in Western culture.

Alternative Fails—Guilt Bad

Personal environmental guilt fosters inaction—only state action can provide a positive outlet for solving environmental problems.

Peter **Currier**, 4/27/**1992**. Social worker. "Stepping away from 'green guilt' THE ENVIRONMENT"We can't escape individual responsibility for pollution but it's vital that, when faced with reams of bad news about carcinogens, ozone depletion and pesticides, we don't begin to feel that things are hopeless and just give up the fight," The Globe and Mail, Lexis.

TO live life without leaving a stain is becoming a daunting task. Fear for the Earth is epidemic, and many blame themselves for their part in turning a green world grey. For me, the most everyday things have taken on an ominous cast. I pluck a Kleenex and hear the hollow "chock" of an axe biting wood. The fridge goes on, and the sluicing of freon through cold steel guts blemishes the homey burble of perking coffee. Pounds of carbon sully the air with every gallon of gas my car burns. But I think it's the sky that affects me most - the haze that lies on the sunny side of all that blueness. Is that cloud, or the ashen pallor of a world in the grip of a tropical fever? Conservation seemed so easy years ago, or perhaps the world was a simpler place back then. "Don't Litter" signs. Smokey the Bear. The 22-inch bass that my dad made me throw back because it was four days out of season. The past was so quaint and simple, and we took the Earth so much for granted. Clean air, pure water and dump sites aplenty. In those days, pollution was an icky substance without a name, not a deadly process that involves us all. From the Black Death to the threat of nuclear annihilation, history has given ample cause for fear. But those threats seemed to come from the outside, caused by forces beyond our control. But with pollution, the "them" is "us." Car drivers. Plastic baggers. Disinfectors. Indeed, al those who manufacture, package, sell, buy or use things that damage the Earth. The greening of conscience is probably not new. When the cedars of Lebanon were hewn into ships' timbers, it's hard to imagine that no one mourned the loss. The cesspool that London once made of the Thames must have repelled many. But now? Technology has truly made the times change. Never has so much innocence been lost by so many. The terms are familiar to us all: ecology, the three R's, clear-cut, carcinogenic, mutagenic, phosphates, greenhouse effect, emission standards - the list will grow endless with time. And if green guilt - that pervasive feeling that we are personally responsible for trashing the Earth - is costing us peace of mind and dashed hopes now, then what of the future? I'm familiar enough with guilt to know that no relationship can sustain boundless doses of it. That includes our relationship with the Earth. Unless we offer Mother Nature more than palliative care, her stare will grow ever sterner and we will start to feel ever more oppressed – cynical and hopeless about this Earth we live with. Eventually, **we may just give up. Healthy outlets for the need to conserve must be created or we, for whom to live is to pollute, will resign ourselves to self-destruction** and abandon our efforts to save the Earth. We need to feel that we can confront the complications of today's litter with something better than a stick with a spike on the end. Otherwise, as the pollution count and ultraviolet index hammer home our failures, and as acid rain dampens our spirits and corrodes our confidence, the stress of living with ecological demands that we can't meet will become unendurable. Green guilt can be directed constructively. When my family visited my sister in Sechelt, B.C., in 1990, we found that processing refuse was mealtime routine. All that washing, label-stripping, composting and paper-sorting seemed like a bag lady's sordid obsession until we saw a week's garbage hit the curb in a single, well-used paper lunch bag. Later, when I drove a trunkful of recyclables to the Sechelt depot and saw all those bins with their different labels, I knew my sister wasn't alone in her eccentricity. The glass, paper and metal there was all headed back onto the shelves. And in-home processing had cut much of the collecting and sorting costs. There, even if recycling was driving the price of raw materials down, affordability wasn't the issue. Paper recycled meant a tree saved. So much for resource gluttony. So much for landfill. So much for green guilt. The recyling issue highlights a more general need to clarify the muddy waters of current ecology: How thin is the ozone layer? Are disposable diapers that bad? Is Styrofoam really worse than paper in fast-food packaging? Is cotton production an environmental hazard? How safe is tap water? There are excellent written references for many such questions, but in a mercurial environment, answers are complex and quickly dated. A credible and visible environmental coalition that addresses ecological issues clearly, objectively and authoritatively would ground green conscience and give direction to the increasing numbers of those who are possessed of it. The state can do more as well. More and better legislation on polluting emissions, packaging, resource management and recycling is called for. If bad news triggers green guilt, then we need to make good news. More initiatives like the one in Sechelt would allow the media more heartening reportage and give us effective in-home options for survival. Changing the image of green work so that it's sexier would help, too, despite the difficulties involved. The best cures for green guilt often get your hands dirty: sorting garbage, using cloths instead of paper towels, using reusable diapers, and so on. Compulsory courses in environmental studies should start in primary school and involve more field trips for students so they know first-hand what we have already lost and what we stand to lose. These things will prevent the legacy of our ecological sins from being visited not just upon our children's world, but upon their sense of self-worth, and their sense of hope.

Permutation Solvency

Governmental action encourages private action—they aren't mutually exclusive.

Margaret **Bowman**, **1992**. Director, Environmental Program for Central and Eastern Europe. "The Role of the Citizen in Environmental Enforcement," Environmental Law Institute, http://www.inece.org/2ndvol1/roberts.htm.

The dynamic between citizens and the government agencies officially charged with enforcing environmental laws adds to the potential effect of citizen participation in this area. In the context of environmental enforcement, citizens and government are presumed to share a goal -- that of maximizing compliance for the good of all. This presumption of a common interest is reflected in the dual meaning of the adjective "public," when used in conjunction with the operation of a democratic system of government. In this context, "public" refers both to the citizenry at large -- which engages in "public participation" -- and to the government -- which formulates and implements "public policy." Citizens, on the other hand, often suspect government agencies of not properly fulfilling their enforcement responsibilities. Citizens may view government employees as overly susceptible to the influence of the business interests they regulate. (4) Or they may attribute government inaction to bureaucratic inertia. Either way, agency enforcers often are seen as overlooking or impeding environmental protection goals. (5) This tension between government and citizens can result in improved environmental enforcement. The government's desire to prevent citizen action it views as disruptive can encourage agencies to take their own regulatory or enforcement steps. The public's suspicion that government may not vigorously implement certain laws may prompt the legislature to grant citizens a statutory right to bring a lawsuit to require the government to perform its assigned regulatory duties. And in instances when the government insists on inaction, citizen participation can replace government enforcement. Not only may compliance be achieved, but the government can be forced to account publicly for its own inaction. (6)

Futurism Good—Movements

Debates by non-government action about future crises are critical to social movements—distopian visions are mobilizing transnational movements that are effectively pressuring governments into preventing everything from nuclear annihilation to slowing the spread of AIDS.

Fuyuki **Kurasawa**, December **2004**. Professor of Sociology, York University of Toronto. "Cautionary Tales: The Global Culture of Prevention and the Work of Foresight," Constellations 11.4, Ebsco.

In the twenty-first century, the lines of political cleavage are being drawn along those of competing dystopian visions. Indeed, one of the notable features of recent public discourse and socio-political struggle is their negationist hue, for they are devoted as much to the prevention of disaster as to the realization of the good, less to what ought to be than what could but must not be. The debates that preceded the war in Iraq provide a vivid illustration of this tendency, as both camps rhetorically invoked incommensurable catastrophic scenarios to make their respective cases. And as many analysts have noted, the multinational antiwar protests culminating on February 15, 2003 marked the first time that a mass movement was able to mobilize substantial numbers of people dedicated to averting war before it had actually broken out. More generally, given past experiences and awareness of what might occur in the future, given the cries of 'never again' (the Second World War, the Holocaust, Bhopal, Rwanda, etc.) and 'not ever' (e.g., nuclear or ecological apocalypse, human cloning) that are emanating from different parts of the world, the avoidance of crises is seemingly on everyone's lips – and everyone's conscience. From the United Nations and regional multilateral organizations to states, from non-governmental organizations to transnational social movements, the determination to prevent the actualization of potential cataclysms has become a new imperative in world affairs. Allowing past disasters to reoccur and unprecedented calamities to unfold is now widely seen as unbearable when, in the process, the suffering of future generations is callously tolerated and our survival is being irresponsibly jeopardized. Hence, we need to pay attention to what a widely circulated report by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty identifies as a burgeoning "culture of prevention,"3 a dynamic that carries major, albeit still poorly understood, normative and political implications. Rather than bemoaning the contemporary preeminence of a dystopian imaginary, I am claiming that it can enable a novel form of transnational socio-political action, a manifestation of globalization from below that can be termed preventive foresight. We should not reduce the latter to a formal principle regulating international relations or an ensemble of policy prescriptions for official players on the world stage, since it is, just as significantly, a mode of ethico-political practice enacted by participants in the emerging realm of global civil society. In other words, what I want to underscore is the work of farsightedness, the social processes through which civic associations are simultaneously constituting and putting into practice a sense of responsibility for the future by attempting to prevent global catastrophes. Although the labor of preventive foresight takes place in varying political and socio-cultural settings – and with different degrees of institutional support and access to symbolic and material resources – it is underpinned by three distinctive features: dialogism, publicity, and transnationalism. In the first instance, preventive foresight is an intersubjective or dialogical process of address, recognition, and response between two parties in global civil society: the 'warners,' who anticipate and send out word of possible perils, and the audiences being warned, those who heed their interlocutors' messages by demanding that governments and/or international organizations take measures to steer away from disaster. Secondly, the work of farsightedness derives its effectiveness and legitimacy from public debate and deliberation. This is not to say that a fully fledged global public sphere is already in existence, since transnational "strong publics" with decisional power in the formal-institutional realm are currently embryonic at best. Rather, in this context, publicity signifies that "weak publics" with distinct yet occasionally overlapping constituencies are coalescing around struggles to avoid specific global catastrophes.4 Hence, despite having little direct decision-making capacity, the environmental and peace movements, humanitarian NGOs, and other similar globally-oriented civic associations are becoming significant actors involved in public opinion formation. Groups like these are active in disseminating information and alerting citizens about looming catastrophes, lobbying states and multilateral organizations from the 'inside' and pressuring them from the 'outside,' as well as fostering public participation in debates about the future. This brings us to the transnational character of preventive foresight, which is most explicit in the now commonplace observation that we live in an interdependent world because of the globalization of the perils that humankind faces (nuclear annihilation, global warming, terrorism, genocide, AIDS and SARS epidemics, and so on); individuals and groups from far-flung parts of the planet are being brought together into "risk communities" that transcend geographical borders.5 Moreover, due to dense media and information flows, knowledge of impeding catastrophes can instantaneously reach the four corners of the earth – sometimes well before individuals in one place experience the actual consequences of a crisis originating in another. My contention is that civic associations are engaging in dialogical, public, and transnational forms of ethico-political action that contribute to the creation of a fledgling global civil society existing 'below' the official and institutionalized architecture of international relations. The work of preventive foresight consists of forging ties between citizens; participating in the circulation of flows of claims, images, and information across borders; promoting an ethos of farsighted cosmopolitanism; and forming and mobilizing weak publics that debate and struggle against possible catastrophes. Over the past few decades, states and international organizations have frequently been content to follow the lead of globally-minded civil society actors, who have been instrumental in placing on the public agenda a host of pivotal issues (such as nuclear war, ecological pollution, species extinction, genetic engineering, and mass human rights violations).

Futurism Good—Movements

Debates from non-governmental actors about futurism and crises aversion have been critical to forming movements addressing pollution, genocide, AIDS, racism, and war. Decades of social activism have been motivated by futurism—this history overwhelms their non-empirical theory.
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Societies emerging from the horrors and devastation of two world wars came to recognize that certain dangers (principally wars of aggression, genocide, crimes against humanity, and nuclear armageddon) needed to be averted at all costs. The international community thereby devised a number of institutional responses, such as the Charter giving birth to the United Nations, the signing of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. However, by paralyzing the United Nations system and fuelling a nuclear arms race, the onset and escalation of the Cold War rendered the institutional sphere largely ineffective. In response to this paralysis came the nuclear disarmament and peace movements, which were spurred on by the terrifying realization that human beings had devised the means for their own annihilation and that the two geopolitical blocs were pursuing an exterminist logic; given that human survival could no longer be entrusted to governments or multilateral institutions, citizens had to organize themselves to tackle the problem head-on. In the 1970s and 1980s, widely circulated reports from the Club of Rome and the Brundtland Commission combined with environmental activism brought another global threat to public attention, the prospect of ecological ruin caused by a rampant industrialism that mercilessly depleted the earth's resources and polluted it at an unsustainably destructive pace. Yet it is since the end of the Cold War that the idea of prevention has truly come into its own in both the formally and informally organized domains of global governance. The dissolution of the bipolar stalemate between East and West opened the door to greater inter-state coordination and collaboration, perhaps most significantly at the United Nations Security Council.9 The creation of supranational judicial institutions (e.g., the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Court) are also signal achievements of the post-Cold War world order, for they may well have a latent deterrence effect despite the fact that they are designed to prosecute crimes against humanity ex post facto. The Rome Treaty establishing the International Criminal Court is itself part of an expanding infrastructure of multinational conferences and agreements that has come into being over the past decade or so; governments and NGOs have participated in large-scale, UN-sponsored summits that have yielded agreements or declarations incorporating strong preventive language: the Rio Summit on the environment, the Kyoto Protocol on climate change, the International Treaty to Ban Landmines, and, of most relevance for our purposes, the Declaration on the Responsibilities of the Present Generations Towards Future Generations.10 Furthermore, the unfolding of a process of globalization from below has meant that certain civil society organizations are increasingly vocal in demanding that governments, multilateral institutions and transnational corporations take preventive action or cease to engage in activities and support policies that imperil humankind. In addition, farsightedness has become a priority in world affairs due to the appearance of new global threats and the resurgence of 'older' ones. Virulent forms of ethno-racial nationalism and religious fundamentalism that had mostly been kept in check or bottled up during the Cold War have reasserted themselves in ways that are now all-too-familiar – civil warfare, genocide, 'ethnic cleansing,' and global terrorism. And if nuclear mutually assured destruction has come to pass, other dangers are filling the vacuum: climate change, AIDS and other diseases (BSE, SARS, etc.), as well as previously unheralded genomic perils (genetically modified organisms, human cloning). Collective remembrance of past atrocities and disasters has galvanized some sectors of public opinion and made the international community's unwillingness to adequately intervene before and during the genocides in the ex-Yugoslavia and Rwanda, or to take remedial steps in the case of the spiraling African and Asian AIDS pandemics, appear particularly glaring.

Futurism Good—Crisis Prevention

Scenario planning is critical in a world where annihilation is a possibility—addressing problems now greatly enhances our ability to avert global catastrophe.

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Independently of this contractualist justification, global civil society actors are putting forth a number of arguments countering temporal myopia on rational grounds. They make the case that no generation, and no part of the world, is immune from catastrophe. Complacency and parochialism are deeply flawed in that even if we earn a temporary reprieve, our children and grandchildren will likely not be so fortunate unless steps are taken today. Similarly, though it might be possible to minimize or contain the risks and harms of actions to faraway places over the short-term, parrying the eventual blowback or spillover effect is improbable. In fact, as I argued in the previous section, all but the smallest and most isolated of crises are rapidly becoming globalized due to the existence of transnational circuits of ideas, images, people, and commodities. Regardless of where they live, our descendants will increasingly be subjected to the impact of environmental degradation, the spread of epidemics, gross North-South socioeconomic inequalities, refugee flows, civil wars, and genocides. What may have previously appeared to be temporally and spatially remote risks are 'coming home to roost' in ever faster cycles. In a word, then, procrastination makes little sense for three principal reasons: it exponentially raises the costs of eventual future action; it reduces preventive options; and it erodes their effectiveness. With the foreclosing of long-range alternatives, later generations may be left with a single course of action, namely, that of merely reacting to large-scale emergencies as they arise. We need only think of how it gradually becomes more difficult to control climate change, let alone reverse it, or to halt mass atrocities once they are underway. Preventive foresight is grounded in the opposite logic, whereby the decision to work through perils today greatly enhances both the subsequent room for maneuver and the chances of success. Humanitarian, environmental, and techno-scientific activists have convincingly shown that we cannot afford not to engage in preventive labor. Moreover, I would contend that farsighted cosmopolitanism is not as remote or idealistic a prospect as it appears to some, for as Falk writes, "[g]lobal justice between temporal communities, however, actually seems to be increasing, as evidenced by various expressions of greater sensitivity to past injustices and future dangers."36 Global civil society may well be helping a new generational self-conception take root, according to which we view ourselves as the provisional caretakers of our planetary commons. Out of our sense of responsibility for the well-being of those who will follow us, we come to be more concerned about the here and now.

Futurism Good—Extinction

Futurism is key to human survival. Debates amongst citizens are the only way to reign in the excesses of statism.

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In recent years, the rise of a dystopian imaginary has accompanied damning assessments and widespread recognition of the international community's repeated failures to adequately intervene in a number of largely preventable disasters (from the genocides in the ex-Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and East Timor to climate change and the spiraling AIDS pandemics in parts of sub-Saharan Africa and Asia). Social movements, NGOs, diasporic groups, and concerned citizens are not mincing words in their criticisms of the United Nations system and its member-states, and thus beginning to shift the discursive and moral terrain in world affairs. As a result, the callousness implicit in disregarding the future has been exposed as a threat to the survival of humanity and its natural surroundings. The Realpolitik of national self-interest and the neoliberal logic of the market will undoubtedly continue to assert themselves, yet demands for farsightedness are increasingly reining them in. Though governments, multilateral institutions, and transnational corporations will probably never completely modify the presentist assumptions underlying their modes of operation, they are, at the very least, finding themselves compelled to account for egregious instances of short-sightedness and rhetorically commit themselves to taking corrective steps. What may seem like a modest development at first glance would have been unimaginable even a few decades ago, indicating the extent to which we have moved toward a culture of prevention. A new imperative has come into being, that of preventive foresight.

Futurism Good—AT: Turns

Any problem that they identify about futurism will only be worse in a world where we give up. Either others will decide for us or we will be overwhelmed by crises. Futurism may have flaws but scenario planning by citizens is the best hope that we have.

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None of this is to disavow the international community's rather patchy record of avoiding foreseeable calamities over the last decades, or to minimize the difficulties of implementing the kinds of global institutional reforms described above and the perils of historical contingency, presentist indifference toward the future, or alarmism and resignation. To my mind, however, this is all the more reason to pay attention to the work of preventive foresight in global civil society, through which civic associations can build up the latter's coordination mechanisms and institutional leverage, cultivate and mobilize public opinion in distant parts of the world, and compel political leaders and national and transnational governance structures to implement certain policies. While seeking to prevent cataclysms from worsening or, better yet, from occurring in the first place, these sorts of initiatives can and must remain consistent with a vision of a just world order. Furthermore, the labor of farsightedness supports an autonomous view of the future, according to which we are the creators of the field of possibilities within which our successors will dwell. The current socio-political order, with all its short-term biases, is neither natural nor necessary. Accordingly, informed public participation in deliberative processes makes a socially self-instituting future possible, through the involvement of groups and individuals active in domestic and supranational public spaces; prevention is a public practice, and a public responsibility. To believe otherwise is, I would argue, to leave the path clear for a series of alternatives that heteronomously compromise the well-being of those who will come after us. We would thereby effectively abandon the future to the vagaries of history ('let it unfold as it may'), the technocratic or instrumental will of official institutions ('let others decide for us'), or to gambles about the time-lags of risks ('let our progeny deal with their realization'). But, as I have tried to show here, this will not and cannot be accepted. Engaging in autonomous preventive struggles, then, remains our best hope. A farsighted cosmopolitanism that aims to avert crises while working toward the realization of precaution and global justice represents a compelling ethico-political project, for we will not inherit a better future. It must be made, starting with us, in the here and now.

Futurism Good—AT: Paralysis

Crisis scenarios do not cause paralysis—historically, the most effective social movements have used distopian imagery to compel action.

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Returning to the point I made at the beginning of this paper, the significance of foresight is a direct outcome of the transition toward a dystopian imaginary (or what Sontag has called "the imagination of disaster").11 Huxley's Brave New World and Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four, two groundbreaking dystopian novels of the first half of the twentieth century, remain as influential as ever in framing public discourse and understanding current techno-scientific dangers, while recent paradigmatic cultural artifacts – films like The Matrix and novels like Atwood's Oryx and Crake – reflect and give shape to this catastrophic sensibility.12 And yet dystopianism need not imply despondency, paralysis, or fear. Quite the opposite, in fact, since the pervasiveness of a dystopian imaginary can help notions of historical contingency and fallibilism gain traction against their determinist and absolutist counterparts. Once we recognize that the future is uncertain and that any course of action produces both unintended and unexpected consequences, the responsibility to face up to potential disasters and intervene before they strike becomes compelling. From another angle, dystopianism lies at the core of politics in a global civil society where groups mobilize their own nightmare scenarios ('Frankenfoods' and a lifeless planet for environmentalists, totalitarian patriarchy of the sort depicted in Atwood's Handmaid's Tale for Western feminism, McWorld and a global neoliberal oligarchy for the alternative globalization movement, etc.). Such scenarios can act as catalysts for public debate and socio-political action, spurring citizens' involvement in the work of preventive foresight.

Futurism Good—AT: Predictions Wrong

Just because we cannot predict the future with total certainty does not mean that we cannot make educated guesses. And, scenario planning is key to making responsible choices. We are obligated to take care of the planet if we have a significant role to play.

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A radically postmodern line of thinking, for instance, would lead us to believe that it is pointless, perhaps even harmful, to strive for farsightedness in light of the aforementioned crisis of conventional paradigms of historical analysis. If, contra teleological models, history has no intrinsic meaning, direction, or endpoint to be discovered through human reason, and if, contra scientistic futurism, prospective trends cannot be predicted without error, then the abyss of chronological inscrutability supposedly opens up at our feet. The future appears to be unknowable, an outcome of chance. Therefore, rather than embarking upon grandiose speculation about what may occur, we should adopt a pragmatism that abandons itself to the twists and turns of history; let us be content to formulate ad hoc responses to emergencies as they arise. While this argument has the merit of underscoring the fallibilistic nature of all predictive schemes, it conflates the necessary recognition of the contingency of history with unwarranted assertions about the latter's total opacity and indeterminacy. Acknowledging the fact that the future cannot be known with absolute certainty does not imply abandoning the task of trying to understand what is brewing on the horizon and to prepare for crises already coming into their own. In fact, the incorporation of the principle of fallibility into the work of prevention means that we must be ever more vigilant for warning signs of disaster and for responses that provoke unintended or unexpected consequences (a point to which I will return in the final section of this paper). In addition, from a normative point of view, the acceptance of historical contingency and of the self-limiting character of farsightedness places the duty of preventing catastrophe squarely on the shoulders of present generations. The future no longer appears to be a metaphysical creature of destiny or of the cunning of reason, nor can it be sloughed off to pure randomness. It becomes, instead, a result of human action shaped by decisions in the present – including, of course, trying to anticipate and prepare for possible and avoidable sources of harm to our successors. Combining a sense of analytical contingency toward the future and ethical responsibility for it, the idea of early warning is making its way into preventive action on the global stage.

Scenario planning is no longer the product of sterile government number crunching. Debates amongst citizens about future crises have created a global early warning next work that has both been proven relatively accurate and able to influence government action.

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Despite the fact that not all humanitarian, technoscientific, and environmental disasters can be predicted in advance, the multiplication of independent sources of knowledge and detection mechanisms enables us to foresee many of them before it is too late. Indeed, in recent years, global civil society's capacity for early warning has dramatically increased, in no small part due to the impressive number of NGOs that include catastrophe prevention at the heart of their mandates.17 These organizations are often the first to detect signs of trouble, to dispatch investigative or fact-finding missions, and to warn the international community about impending dangers; to wit, the lead role of environmental groups in sounding the alarm about global warming and species depletion or of humanitarian agencies regarding the AIDS crisis in sub-Saharan Africa, frequently months or even years before Western governments or multilateral institutions followed suit. What has come into being, then, is a loose-knit network of watchdog groups that is acquiring finely tuned antennae to pinpoint indicators of forthcoming or already unfolding crises. This network of 'early warners' are working to publicize potential and actual emergencies by locating indicators of danger into larger catastrophic patterns of interpretation, culturally meaningful chains of events whose implications become discernable for decision-makers and ordinary citizens ('this is why you should care').18 Civic associations can thus invest perilous situations with urgency and importance, transforming climate change from an apparently mild and distant possibility to an irreversible and grave threat to human survival, and genocide from a supposedly isolated aberration to an affront to our common humanity. The growing public significance of preventive message in global affairs is part and parcel of what Ignatieff has termed an "advocacy revolution,"19 since threatened populations and allied organizations are acting as early warning beacons that educate citizens about certain perils and appeal for action on the part of states and multilateral institutions. Global civil society players have devised a host of 'naming and shaming' strategies and high-profile information campaigns to this effect, including press conferences, petitions, mass marches, and boycotts, and spectacular stunts that denounce bureaucratic inertia, the reckless pursuit of profit, or the preponderance of national interests in world affairs.20 The advocacy revolution is having both 'trickle-down' and 'trickle-up' effects, establishing audiences of constituents and ordinary citizens conversant with some of the great challenges facing humanity as well as putting pressure on official institutions to be proactive in their long-term planning and shorter-term responses.

Futurism Good—AT: Media Distortions

They are right that the media is not perfect. But, the proliferation of different types of media makes government cover-ups very difficult and can dramatically shape public opinion. And, there is a healthy skepticism of the media that mobilizes citizens to question further.

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None of this would be possible without the existence of global media, whose speed and range make it possible for reports of an unfolding or upcoming disaster to reach viewers or readers in most parts of the world almost instantaneously. Despite the highly selective character of what is deemed newsworthy and state and commercial influence on what is broadcast, several recent attempts to hide evidence of acts of mass violence (Tiananmen Square, East Timor, Chechnya, etc.) and crises (e.g., during the Chernobyl nuclear accident in the Soviet Union or the SARS outbreak in China) have failed; few things now entirely escape from the satellite camera, the cellular telephone, or the notebook computer. And although the internet may never become the populist panacea technological determinists have been heralding for years, it remains a key device through which concerned citizens and activists can share and spread information. While media coverage almost always follows a crisis rather than preceding it, the broadcast of shocking images and testimonies can nevertheless shame governments and international organizations into taking immediate steps. The 'CNN or BBC effect,' to which we should now add the 'Al-Jazeera effect,' is a surprisingly powerful force in impacting world public opinion, as the now notorious Abu Ghraib prison photographs remind us. The possibility that the threat of media exposure may dissuade individuals and groups from enacting genocidal plans or reckless gambles with our future is one of the lynchpins of prevention in our information-saturated age. Are forewarnings of disasters being heard? The mobilization of official intervention and popular interest has certainly been mixed, yet global civil society is having some success in cultivating audiences and advocates coalescing around specific perils (mass human rights violations, ecological devastation, genetic engineering, epidemics, and so on). After Bhopal and Chernobyl, after 'mad cow disease' and the war in Iraq, citizens are scrutinizing, questioning and even contesting official expertise in risk assessment more than ever before.21 Hence, in a world where early warnings of cataclysms are often available, pleading ignorance or helplessness to anticipate what may come in the future becomes less and less plausible.

Futurism Good—AT: No Value to Life

Short-sightedness is what makes life disposable—the techno-strategic logic that they indict is at its worst when we refuse to consider long-term consequences. Future orientation is the only way to make better decisions.

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At another level, instrumental-strategic forms of thought and action, so pervasive in modern societies because institutionally entrenched in the state and the market, are rarely compatible with the demands of farsightedness. The calculation of the most technically efficient means to attain a particular bureaucratic or corporate objective, and the subsequent relentless pursuit of it, intrinsically exclude broader questions of long-term prospects or negative side-effects. What matters is the maximization of profits or national self-interest with the least effort, and as rapidly as possible. Growing risks and perils are transferred to future generations through a series of trade-offs: economic growth versus environmental protection, innovation versus safety, instant gratification versus future well-being. What can be done in the face of short-sightedness? Cosmopolitanism provides some of the clues to an answer, thanks to its formulation of a universal duty of care for humankind that transcends all geographical and socio-cultural borders. I want to expand the notion of cosmopolitan universalism in a temporal direction, so that it can become applicable to future generations and thereby nourish a vibrant culture of prevention. Consequently, we need to begin thinking about a farsighted cosmopolitanism, a chrono-cosmopolitics that takes seriously a sense of "intergenerational solidarity" toward human beings who will live in our wake as much as those living amidst us today. But for a farsighted cosmopolitanism to take root in global civil society, the latter must adopt a thicker regulative principle of care for the future than the one currently in vogue (which amounts to little more than an afterthought of the nondescript 'don't forget later generations' ilk). Hans Jonas's "imperative of responsibility" is valuable precisely because it prescribes an ethico-political relationship to the future consonant with the work of farsightedness.27 Fully appreciating Jonas's position requires that we grasp the rupture it establishes with the presentist assumptions imbedded in the intentionalist tradition of Western ethics. In brief, intentionalism can be explained by reference to its best-known formulation, the Kantian categorical imperative, according to which the moral worth of a deed depends upon whether the a priori "principle of the will" or "volition" of the person performing it – that is, his or her intention – should become a universal law.28 Ex post facto evaluation of an act's outcomes, and of whether they correspond to the initial intention, is peripheral to moral judgment. A variant of this logic is found in Weber's discussion of the "ethic of absolute ends," the "passionate devotion to a cause" elevating the realization of a vision of the world above all other considerations; conviction without the restraint of caution and prudence is intensely presentist.29 By contrast, Jonas's strong consequentialism takes a cue from Weber's "ethic of responsibility," which stipulates that we must carefully ponder the potential impacts of our actions and assume responsibility for them – even for the incidence of unexpected and unintended results. Neither the contingency of outcomes nor the retrospective nature of certain moral judgments exempts an act from normative evaluation. On the contrary, consequentialism reconnects what intentionalism prefers to keep distinct: the moral worth of ends partly depends upon the means selected to attain them (and vice versa), while the correspondence between intentions and results is crucial. At the same time, Jonas goes further than Weber in breaking with presentism by advocating an "ethic of long-range responsibility" that refuses to accept the future's indeterminacy, gesturing instead toward a practice of farsighted preparation for crises that could occur.30 From a consequentialist perspective, then, intergenerational solidarity would consist of striving to prevent our endeavors from causing large-scale human suffering and damage to the natural world over time. Jonas reformulates the categorical imperative along these lines: "Act so that the effects of your action are compatible with the permanence of genuine human life," or "Act so that the effects of your action are not destructive of the future possibility of such life."31 What we find here, I would hold, is a substantive and future-oriented ethos on the basis of which civic associations can enact the work of preventive foresight.

Futurism Good—AT: State Fear Mongering

Debate is the antidote to state fear mongering—scenario planning by informed groups can counter-act official misinformation. And, the alternative is that the governments will continue to scare us but we will be too apolitical and ill informed to counter act lies.

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State and market institutions may seek to produce a culture of fear by deliberately stretching interpretations of reality beyond the limits of the plausible so as to exaggerate the prospects of impending catastrophes, or yet again, by intentionally promoting certain prognoses over others for instrumental purposes. Accordingly, regressive dystopias can operate as Trojan horses advancing political agendas or commercial interests that would otherwise be susceptible to public scrutiny and opposition. Instances of this kind of manipulation of the dystopian imaginary are plentiful: the invasion of Iraq in the name of fighting terrorism and an imminent threat of use of 'weapons of mass destruction'; the severe curtailing of American civil liberties amidst fears of a collapse of 'homeland security'; the neoliberal dismantling of the welfare state as the only remedy for an ideologically constructed fiscal crisis; the conservative expansion of policing and incarceration due to supposedly spiraling crime waves; and so forth. Alarmism constructs and codes the future in particular ways, producing or reinforcing certain crisis narratives, belief structures, and rhetorical conventions. As much as alarmist ideas beget a culture of fear, the reverse is no less true. If fear-mongering is a misappropriation of preventive foresight, resignation about the future represents a problematic outgrowth of the popular acknowledgment of global perils. Some believe that the world to come is so uncertain and dangerous that we should not attempt to modify the course of history; the future will look after itself for better or worse, regardless of what we do or wish. One version of this argument consists in a complacent optimism perceiving the future as fated to be better than either the past or the present. Frequently accompanying it is a self-deluding denial of what is plausible ('the world will not be so bad after all'), or a naively Panglossian pragmatism ('things will work themselves out in spite of everything, because humankind always finds ways to survive').37 Much more common, however, is the opposite reaction, a fatalistic pessimism reconciled to the idea that the future will be necessarily worse than what preceded it. This is sustained by a tragic chronological framework according to which humanity is doomed to decay, or a cyclical one of the endless repetition of the mistakes of the past. On top of their dubious assessments of what is to come, alarmism and resignation would, if widely accepted, undermine a viable practice of farsightedness. Indeed, both of them encourage public disengagement from deliberation about scenarios for the future, a process that appears to be dangerous, pointless, or unnecessary. The resulting 'depublicization' of debate leaves dominant groups and institutions (the state, the market, techno-science) in charge of sorting out the future for the rest of us, thus effectively producing a heteronomous social order. How, then, can we support a democratic process of prevention from below? The answer, I think, lies in cultivating the public capacity for critical judgment and deliberation, so that participants in global civil society subject all claims about potential catastrophes to examination, evaluation, and contestation.

Futurism Good—AT: Statism

Debates amongst citizens about government policy are proof that futurism is not statist—it is able to mobilize citizens to demand change and imagine alternative political futures.

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NGOs and social movements active in global civil society have drawn upon the moral imagination in similar ways, introducing dystopian scenarios less as prophecies than as rhetorical devices that act as 'wake-up calls.' Dystopias are thrust into public spaces to jolt citizens out of their complacency and awaken their concern for those who will follow them. Such tropes are intended to be controversial, their contested character fostering public deliberation about the potential cataclysms facing humankind, the means of addressing them, and the unintended and unexpected consequences flowing from present-day trends. In helping us to imagine the strengths and weaknesses of different positions towards the future, then, the dystopian imaginary crystallizes many of the great issues of the day. Amplifying and extrapolating what could be the long-term consequences of current tendencies, public discourse can thereby clarify the future's seeming opaqueness. Likewise, fostering a dystopian moral imagination has a specifically critical function, for the disquiet it provokes about the prospects of later generations is designed to make us radically question the 'self-evidentness' of the existing social order.34 If we imagine ourselves in the place of our descendants, the takenfor- granted shortsightedness of our institutionalized ways of thinking and acting becomes problematic. Indifference toward the future is neither necessary nor inevitable, but can be – and indeed ought to be – changed. Aside from the moral imagination, and given that the idea of gambling with humanity's future or failing to minimize its possible sources of suffering is logically unsustainable, the appeal to reason represents another main trigger of intergenerational solidarity.

Futurism Good—AT: Chaos Inevitable

Chaos is not inevitable—careful future planning has been enormously effective. Medical research, humanitarian law, and environmental regulations are just a few areas where futurism has prevented enormous suffering. Debates amongst citizens are key to assessing probability and effectively planning.

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Moreover, keeping in mind the sobering lessons of the past century cannot but make us wary about humankind's supposedly unlimited ability for problemsolving or discovering solutions in time to avert calamities. In fact, the historical track-record of last-minute, technical 'quick-fixes' is hardly reassuring. What's more, most of the serious perils that we face today (e.g., nuclear waste, climate change, global terrorism, genocide and civil war) demand complex, sustained, long-term strategies of planning, coordination, and execution. On the other hand, an examination of fatalism makes it readily apparent that the idea that humankind is doomed from the outset puts off any attempt to minimize risks for our successors, essentially condemning them to face cataclysms unprepared. An a priori pessimism is also unsustainable given the fact that long-term preventive action has had (and will continue to have) appreciable beneficial effects; the examples of medical research, the welfare state, international humanitarian law, as well as strict environmental regulations in some countries stand out among many others. The evaluative framework proposed above should not be restricted to the critique of misappropriations of farsightedness, since it can equally support public deliberation with a reconstructive intent, that is, democratic discussion and debate about a future that human beings would freely self-determine. Inverting Foucault's Nietzschean metaphor, we can think of genealogies of the future that could perform a farsighted mapping out of the possible ways of organizing social life. They are, in other words, interventions into the present intended to facilitate global civil society's participation in shaping the field of possibilities of what is to come. Once competing dystopian visions are filtered out on the basis of their analytical credibility, ethical commitments, and political underpinnings and consequences, groups and individuals can assess the remaining legitimate catastrophic scenarios through the lens of genealogical mappings of the future. Hence, our first duty consists in addressing the present-day causes of eventual perils, ensuring that the paths we decide upon do not contract the range of options available for our posterity.42 Just as importantly, the practice of genealogically inspired farsightedness nurtures the project of an autonomous future, one that is socially self-instituting. In so doing, we can acknowledge that the future is a human creation instead of the product of metaphysical and extra-social forces (god, nature, destiny, etc.), and begin to reflect upon and deliberate about the kind of legacy we want to leave for those who will follow us. Participants in global civil society can then take – and in many instances have already taken – a further step by committing themselves to socio-political struggles forging a world order that, aside from not jeopardizing human and environmental survival, is designed to rectify the sources of transnational injustice that will continue to inflict needless suffering upon future generations if left unchallenged.