Aff Critique Toolbox

Miami Oxford Scholars 2008
Aff Critique Toolbox

State Good

(_) Debating about the state does not mean capitulating to it --- discussing government policy creates critical understanding that facilitates resistance against its worst abuses

Donovan and Larkin '06 (Clair and Phil, Australian National University, *Politics*, Vol. 26, No. 1)

We do not suggest that political science should merely fall into line with the **government instrumentalism** that we have identified, **becoming a 'slave social science'** (see Donovan, 2005). **But**, we maintain that **political scientists should be able to engage with practical politics** on their own terms and should be able to provide research output that is of value to practitioners. **It is because of its focus on understanding, explanation, conceptualisation and classification that political science has the potential to contribute more to practical politics, and more successfully**. As Brian Barry notes, 'Granting (for the sake of argument) that [students of politics] have some methods that enable us to improve on the deliverances of untutored common sense or political journalism, what good do they do? The answer to that question is: not much. But if we change the question and ask what good they could do, I believe that it is possible to justify a more positive answer' (Bany, 2004, p. 22). **A clear understanding of how institutions and individuals interact** or how different institutions interact with each other **can provide clear and useful insights that practitioners can successfully use**, making - or perhaps **remaking - a political science that** 'directs research efforts to good questions and **enables** incremental **improvements to be made**' (ibid., 19). In this sense, political science already has the raw material to make this contribution, but it chooses not to utilise it in this way: no doubt, in part, because academics are motivated to present their findings to other academics and not the practitioners within the institutions they study.

(_) Change outside the state is temporary --- only engaging institutions produces lasting remedies

Milbrath '96 (Lester W., Professor Emeritus of Political Science and Sociology – SUNY Buffalo, Building Sustainable Societies, Ed. Pirages, p. 289)

In some respects personal change cannot be separated from societal change. Societal transformation will not be successful without change at the personal level; such change is a necessary but not sufficient step on the route to sustainability. People hoping to live sustainably must adopt new beliefs, new values, new lifestyles, and new worldview. But **lasting personal change is unlikely without simultaneous transformation of the** socioeconomic/political **system** in which people function. **Persons may** solemnly **resolve to change, but that resolve is likely to weaken** as they perform day-today **within a system reinforcing different** beliefs and **values. Change** agents typically **are met with denial and** great **resistance**. Reluctance to challenge mainstream society is the major reason most efforts emphasizing education to bring about change are ineffective. **If societal transformation must be speedy**, and most of us believe it must, **pleading with individuals to change is not likely to be effective**.

State Good

(_) State power is flexible and open to reorientation

Krause and Williams '97 (Keith, Professor of Political Science – York U., and Michael, Professor of Political Science – U Southern Main, Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases, p. xvi)

Many of the chapters in this volume thus **retain a concern with the centrality of the state as a locus not only of obligation but of effective political action. In the realm of organized violence, states** also **remain the preeminent actors. The task of a critical approach is not to deny the centrality of the state in this realm but, rather, to understand more fully its structures, dynamics, and possibilities for reorientation. From a critical perspective, state action is flexible and capable of reorientation, and analyzing state policy need not** therefore **be tantamount to embracing the statist assumptions of orthodox conceptions. To exclude a focus on state action** from a critical perspective **on the grounds that it plays** inevitably **within the rules of existing conceptions simply reverses the error of essentializing the state.** Moreover**, it loses the possibility of influencing what remains the most structurally capable actor in contemporary world politics.**

(_) Only debating state policies can avert nuclear conflict --- this doesn't mean accepting the system

Spanier '90 (John, PhD – Yale and Teacher – U Florida, Games Nations Play, p. 115)

Whether the observer personally approves of the "logic of behavior" that **a particular framework** seems to suggest **is not the point. It is one thing to say**, as done here, that **the state system condemns each state to be** continually **concerned with its powe**r relative to that of other states, which, in an anarchical system, it regards as potential aggressors. **It is quite another** thing **to approve morally of power politics**. The utility of the state-system framework is simply that is points to the "essence" of state behavior. It does not pretend to account for all factors, such as moral norms, that motivate states. As a necessarily simplified version of reality, it clarifies what most basically concerns and drives states and what kinds of behavior can be expected. We, as observers, may deplore that behavior and the anarchical system that produces it and we may wish that international politics were not as conflictual and violent as the twentieth century has already amply demonstrated. We may prefer a system other that one in which states are so committed to advancing their own national interests and protecting their sovereignty. Nevertheless, **however much we may deplore the current system and prefer a more peaceful** and harmonious **world, we must first understand the contemporary one if we are to learn how to "manage" it and avoid the catastrophe of a nuclear war**.

State Good

(_) Ignoring the state is politically disastrous --- only opposition to specific institutions can meaningfully challenge domination

Grossberg '92 (Lawrence, Professor of Communication – U Illinois, We Gotta Get Out of This Place, p. 390-1)

But this would mean that **the Left** could not remain outside of the systems of governance. It **has** sometimes **to work** with, **against and with in bureaucratic systems of governance. Consider** the case of **Amnesty International,** an immensely effective organization when its major strategy was (similar to that of the Right) exerting pressure directly on the bureaucracies of specific governments. In recent years (marked by the recent rock tour), it has apparently redirected its energy and resources, seeking new members (who may not be committed to actually doing anything; **membership becomes little more than a statement of ideological support for a position that few are likely to oppose**) and public visibility. In stark contrast, **the most effective struggle of the Left** in recent times has been the dramatic (and, one hopes continuing) dismantling of apartheid in South Africa. It **was accomplished by mobilizing popular pressure on** the institutions and bureaucracies of economic and **governmental institutions**, and it depended upon a highly sophisticated organizational structure. **The Left too often thinks that it can end racism and sexism and classism by changing people's attitude and everyday practices** (e.g. the 1990 Black boycott of Korean stores in New York). Unfortunately, **while such struggles may be extremely visible, they are often less effective than attempts to move the institutions** (e.g. banks, taxing structures, distributors) which have put the economic relations of bleack an immigrant populations in place and **which condition people's everyday practices**. The Left needs institutions which can operate within the system of governance, understanding that such **institutions are the mediating structures by which power is actively realized. It is often by directing opposition against specific institutions that power can be challenged**. The Left assumed for some time now that, since it has so little access to the apparatuses of agency, its only alternative is to seek a public voice in the media through tactical protests. The Left does in fact need more visibility, but it also needs greater access to the entire range of apparatuses of decision making power. Otherwise **the Left has nothing but its own self-righteousness**. It is not individuals who have produced starvation and the other social disgraces of our world, although it is individuals who must take responsibility for eliminating them. But to do so, they must act with organizations, and within the systems of organizations which in fact have the capacity (as well as responsibility) to fight them. Without such organizations, the only models of political commitment are self-interest and charity. Charity suggests that we act on behalf of others who cannot act on their own behalf. But we are all precariously caught in the circuits of global capitalism, and everyone's position is increasingly precarious and uncertain. It will not take much to change the position of any individual in the United States, as the experience of many of the homeless, the elderly and the "fallen" middle class demonstrates. Nor are there any guarantees about the future of any single nation. We can imagine ourselves involved in a politics where acting for another is always acting for oneself as well, a politics in which everyone struggles with the resources they have to make their lives (and the world) better, since the two are so intimately tied together! For example, we need to think of affirmation action as in everyone's best interests, because of the possibilities it opens. We need to think with what Axelos has described as a "planetary thought" which "would be a coherent thought—but not a rationalizing and 'rationalist' inflection; it would be a fragmentary thought of the open totality—for what we can grasp are fragments unveiled on the horizon of the totality. Such a politics will not begin by distinguishing between the local and the global (and certainly not by valorizing one over the other) for the ways in which the former are incorporated into the latter preclude the luxury of such choices. **Resistance is always a local struggle, even when** (as in parts of the ecology movement) **it is imagined to connect into its global structures of articulation**: Think globally, act locally. Opposition is predicated precisely on locating the points of articulation between them, the points at which the global becomes local, and the local opens up onto the global. Since the meaning of these terms has to be understood in the context of any particular struggle, one is always acting both globally and locally: Think globally, act appropriately! **Fight locally because that is the scene of action, but aim for the global because that is the scene of agency.** "Local struggles directly target national and international axioms, at the precise point of their insertion into the field of immanence." This requires the imagination and construction of forms of unity, commonality and social agency which do not deny differences. Without such commonality, politics is too easily reduced to a question of individual rights (i.e., in the terms of classical utility theory); difference ends up "trumping" politics, bringing it to an end. The struggle against the disciplined mobilization of everyday life can only be built on affective commonalities, a shared "responsible yearning: a yearning out towards something more and something better than this and this place now." The Left, after all, is defined by its common commitment to principles of justice, equality and democracy (although these might conflict) in economic, political and cultural life. It is based on the hope, perhaps even the illusion, that such things are possible. The construction of an affective commonality attempts to mobilize people in a common struggle, despite the fact that they have no common identity or character, recognizing that they are the only force capable of providing a new historical and oppositional agency. It strives to organize minorities into a new majority.

A2: State Bad (Gender)

(_) The state is not inherently patriarchal –- reformism is a more effective way to challenge patriarchy

Rhode '94 (Deborah L., Professor of Law – Stanford, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1181, April, Lexis)

Neither can the state be understood solely as an instrument of men's interests. As a threshold matter, what constitutes those interests is not self-evident, as MacKinnon's own illustrations suggest. If, for example, policies liberalizing abortion serve male objectives by enhancing access to female sexuality, policies curtailing abortion presumably also serve male objectives by reducing female autonomy. n23 **In effect, patriarchal frameworks verge on tautology**. Almost **any gender-related policy can be seen as either** directly **serving men's** immediate **interests, or as** compromising short-term concerns in the service of broader, long-term goals, such as "**normalizing" the system** and stabilizing power relations. **A framework that can characterize all state interventions as** directly or indirectly **patriarchal offers little practical guidance in challenging the conditions it condemns**. And if women are not a homogenous group with unitary concerns, surely the same is true of men. Moreover, if the state is best understood as a network of institutions with complex, sometimes competing agendas, then the patriarchal model of single-minded instrumentalism seems highly implausible. It is difficult to dismiss all the anti-discrimination initiatives of the last quarter century as purely counter-revolutionary strategies. And it is precisely these initiatives, with their appeal to "male" norms of "objectivity and the impersonality of procedure, that [have created] [*1186] leverage for the representation of women's interests." n24 **Cross-cultural research** also **suggests that the status of women is positively correlated with a strong state, which is scarcely the relationship that patriarchal frameworks imply**. n25 While the "tyrannies" of public and private dependence are plainly related, many feminists challenge the claim that they are the same. As Carole Pateman notes, women do not "live with the state and are better able to make collective struggle against institutions than individuals." n26 To advance that struggle, feminists need more concrete and contextual accounts of state institutions than patriarchal frameworks have supplied. **Lumping together police, welfare workers, and Pentagon officials as agents of a unitary patriarchal structure does more to obscure than to advance analysis.** What seems necessary is a contextual approach that can account for greater complexities in women's relationships with governing institutions. Yet despite their limitations, patriarchal theories underscore an insight that generally informs feminist theorizing. As Part II reflects, governmental institutions are implicated in the most fundamental structures of sex-based inequality and in the strategies necessary to address it. [**Continues**] These tensions within the women's movement are, of course, by no means unique. **For any subordinate group, the state is a primary source of both repression and assistance** in the struggle for equality. These constituencies cannot be "for" or "against" state involvement in any categorical sense. The questions are always what forms of involvement, to what ends, and who makes these decisions. From some feminist perspectives, liberalism has failed to respond adequately to those questions because of deeper difficulties. In part, the problem stems from undue faith in formal rights. The priority granted to individual entitlements undermines the public's sense of collective responsibility. This critique has attracted its own share of criticism from within as well as from outside the feminist community. As many left feminists, including critical race theorists, have noted, **rights-based claims have played a crucial role in advancing group** as well as individual **interests**. n32 **Such claims** can **express desires** not only for autonomy, but also **for participation in the struggles that shape women's collective existence**. The priority that state institutions place on rights is not in itself problematic. The central difficulty is the limited scope and inadequate enforcement of currently recognized entitlements. Since rights-oriented campaigns can advance as well as restrict political struggle, evaluation of their strategic value demands historically-situated contextual analysis.

A2: State Bad (Environment)

(_) The immediacy of environmental degradation makes state action essential --- anti-statist critiques fail and reproduce violence

Eckersley '04 (Robyn, Department of Political Science, University of Melbourne, THE GREEN STATE: RETHINKING DEMOCRACY AND SOVEREIGNTY, p. 90-93)

It might be tempting to conclude from this general critique **that states are part of the problem rather than the solution to ecological degradation.** With its roots in the peace and antinuclear movements, **the green movement** has long been critical of the coercive modality of state power—including the state-military-industrial complex—and **might** therefore **be understandably skeptical toward the very possibility of reforming** or transforming **states** into more democratic and ecologically responsive structures of government. The notion that the state might come to represent an ecological savior and trustee appears both fanciful and dangerous rather than empowering. **Yet such an anti-statist posture cannot withstand critical scrutiny from a critical ecological perspective**. The problem seems to be that **while states have been associated with violence**, insecurity, bureaucratic domination, injustice, **and ecological degradation, there is no reason to assume that any alternatives** we might imagine or develop **will** necessarily **be** free of, or **less burdened by, such proble**ms. As Hedley Bull warns, **violence**, insecurity, injustice, and **ecological degradation pre-date the state** system, **and** we cannot rule out the possibility that they **are likely to survive the demise of the state system, regardless of what new political structures may arise**. '9 Now it could be plausibly argued that these problems might be lessened under a more democratic and possibly decentralized global political architecture (as bioregionalists and other green decentralists have argued). However, there is no basis upon which to assume that they will be lessened any more than under a more deeply democratized state system. **Given the seriousness and urgency of many ecological problems** (e.g., global warming), **building on the state governance structures that already exist seems to be a more fruitful path to take than any attempt to move beyond** or around **states** in the quest for environmental sustainability.20 Moreover, as a matter of principle, it can be argued that environmental benefits are public goods that ought best be managed by democratically organized public power and not by private power.2l Such an approach is consistent with critical theory's concern to work creatively with current historical practices and associated understandings rather than fashion utopias that have no purchase on such practices aid understandings. In short, there is more mileage to be gained by enlisting and creatively developing the existing norms, rules, and practices of state governance in ways that make state power more democratically and ecologically accountable than designing a new architecture of global governance de novo (a daunting and despairing proposition). Skeptics should take heart from the fact that the organized coercive power of democratic states is not a totally untamed power, insofar as such power must be exercised according to the rule of law and principles of democratic oversight. This is not to deny that state power can sometimes be seriously abused (e.g., by the police or national intelligence agencies). Rather, it is merely to argue that such powers are not unlimited and beyond democratic control and redress. The focus of critical ecological attention should therefore be on how effective this control and redress has been, and how it might be strengthened. The same argument may be extended to the bureaucratic arm of the state. In liberal democratic states, with the gradual enlargement, specialization, and depersonalization of state administrative power have also come legal norms and procedures that limit such power according to the principle of democratic accountability. As Gianfranco Poggi has observed, at the same time as the political power of the state has become more extensive in terms of its subject matter and reach, so too have claims for public participation in the exercise of this power widened.22 This is also to acknowledge the considerable scope for further, more deep-seated democratic oversight. Indeed, it is possible to point to a raft of new ecological discursive designs that have already emerged as partial antidotes to the technocratic dimensions of the administrative state, such as community right-to-know legislation, community environmental monitoring and reporting, third-party litigation rights, environmental and technology impact assessment, statutory policy advisory committees, citizens' juries, consensus conferences, and public environmental inquiries. Each of these initiatives may be understood as attempts to confront both public and private power with its consequences, to widen the range of voices and perspectives in state administration, to expose or prevent problem displacement, and/or to ensure that the sites of economic, social, and political power that create and/or are responsible for ecological risks are made answerable to all those who may suffer the consequences. This is precisely where an ongoing green critical focus on the state can remain productive. Insofar as any agency of the state (military, police, or environmental protection agencies) is no longer properly accountable to citizens (whether directly and/or via the executive or the parliament), then the democratic state is failing its citizens. Seen in this light**, the green critique of the** administrative **state should be understood not as a critique of the state per se but rather a critique of illegitimate power**. It is a power that is no longer properly accountable to citizens according to the ideals of liberal democracy. The ultimate challenge for critical political ecologists should not be simply to bring liberal democratic practice into alignment with liberal democratic ideals (although this would be a good start) but to outline a distinctively green set of regulative ideals, and a green democratic constitutional state that is less exclusionary and more public spirited than the liberal democratic state. **The concern should not be the mere fact that states exercise power but rather how this power can be made more accountable and hence more legitimate**.

Reformism Good - Rorty

(_) The alternative values theory over practice, meaning it can never solve.

Rorty in 98 (Richard, PhD in Philosophy from Yale, Achieving Our Country: Leftist Thought in Twentieth-Century America pg 36)

This leads them to step back from their country and, as they say, **"theorize" it**. **It leads them to** do what Henry Adams did: to **give cultural politics preference over real politics, and to mock the very idea that democratic institutions might once again be made to serve social justice**. **It leads them to prefer knowledge to hope.** I see this preference as a turn away from secularism and pragmatism-as an attempt to do precisely what Dewey and Whitman thought should not be done: namely, to see the American adventure within a fixed frame of reference, a frame supplied by theory. Paradoxically, **the leftists who are most concerned not to "totalize," and who insist that everything be seen as the play of discursive differences rather than in the old metaphysics-of-presence way, are also the most eager to theorize, to become spectators rather than agents**.37 **But that is helping yourself with one hand to what you push away with the other**. The further you get from Greek metaphysics, Dewey urged, the less anxious you should be to find a frame within which to fit an ongoing historical process. **This retreat from secularism and pragmatism to theory has accompanied a revival of ineffability**. We are told over and over again that Lacan has shown human desire to be inherently unsatisfiable, that Derrida has shown meaning to be undecidable, that Lyotard has shown commensuration between oppressed and oppressors to be impossible, and that events such as the Holocaust or the massacre of the original Americans are unrepresentable. **Hopelessness has become fashionable on the Left-principled, theorized, philosophical hopelessness.** The Whitrnanesque hope which lifted the hearts of the American Left before the 1960s is now thought to have been a symptom of a naive "humanism." I see this preference for knowledge over hope as repeating the move made by leftist intellectuals who, earlier in the century, got their Hegelianism from Marx rather than Dewey. Marx thought we should be scientific rather than merely utopian-that we should interpret the historical events of our day within a larger theory. Dewey did not. He thought one had to view these events as the protocols of social experiments whose outcomes are unpredictable. The Foucauldian Left represents an unfortunate regression to the Marxist obsession with scientific rigor. **This Left still wants to put historical events in a theoretical context. It exaggerates the importance of philosophy for politics, and wastes its energy on sophisticated theoretical analyses of the significance of current events.** But Foucauldian theoretical sophistication is even more useless to leftist politics than was Engels' dialectical materialism. Engels at least had an eschatology. Foucauldians do not even have that**. Because they regard liberal reformist initiatives as symptoms of a discredited liberal "humanism," they have little interest in designing new social experiments.** This distrust of humanism, with its retreat from practice to theory, is the sort of failure of nerve which leads people to abandon secularism for a belief in sin, and in Delbanco's "fixed standard by which deviance from the truth can be measured and denounced." **It leads them to look for a frame of reference outside the process of experimentation and decision that is an individual or a national life.** Grand theorieseschatologies like Hegel's or Marx's, inverted eschatologies like Heidegger's, and rationalizations of hopelessness like Foucault's and Lacan's-satisfy the urges that theology used to satisfy. These are urges which Dewey hoped Americans might cease to feel. Dewey wanted Americans to share a civic religion that substituted utopian striving for claims to theological knowledge.

Reformism Good - Rorty

(_) The alternative provides no method of implementation and overlooks political solutions

Rorty in 98 (Richard, PhD in Philosophy from Yale, Achieving Our Country: Leftist Thought in Twentieth-Century America pg 76)

With this partial substitution of Freud for Marx as a source of social theory, sadism rather than selfishness has become the principal target of the Left. The heirs of the New Left of the Sixties have created, within the academy, a cultural Left**. Many members of this Left specialize in what they call the "politics of difference" or "of identity" or "of recognition." This cultural Left thinks more about stigma than about money, more about deep and hidden psychosexual motivations than about shallow and evident greed.** This shift of attention came at the same time that intellectuals began to lose interest in the labor unions, partly as a result of resentment over the union members' failure to back George McGovern over Richard Nixon in 1972. Simultaneously, the leftist ferment which had been centered, before the Sixties, in the social science departments of the colleges and the universities moved into the literature departments. The study of philosophy-mostly apocalyptic French and German philosophy-replaced that of political economy as an essential preparation for participation in leftist initiatives. **The new cultural Left** which has resulted from these changes **has few ties to** what remains of **the** pre-Sixties **reformist Left.** That saving remnant consists largely of labor lawyers and labor organizers, congressional staffers, lowlevel bureaucrats hoping to rescue the welfare state from the Republicans, journalists, social workers, and people who work for foundations. These are the people who worry about the way in which the practices of the National Labor Relations Board changed under the Reagan administration, about the details of alternative proposals for universal health care, about budgetary constraints on Head Start and daycare programs, and about the reversion of welfare programs to state and local governments. **This residual reformist Left thinks more about laws that need to be passed than about a culture that needs to be changed**. The difference between this residual Left and the academic Left is the difference between the people who read books like Thomas Geoghegan's Which Side Are You On?-a brilliant explanation of how unions get busted-and people who read Fredric Jameson's Postmodemism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism. The latter is an equally brilliant book, but it operates on a level of abstraction too high to encourage any particular political initiative. After reading Geoghegan, you have views on some of the things which need to be done. After reading Jameson, you have views on practically everything except what needs to be done. The academic, cultural Left approves-in a rather distant and lofty way--of the activities of these surviving reformists. But it retains a conviction which solidified in the late Sixties. It thinks that the system, and not just the laws, must be changed. Reformism is not good enough. Because the very vocabulary of liberal politics is infected with dubious presuppositions which need to be exposed, the first task of the Left must be, just as Confucius said, the rectification of names. The concern to do what the Sixties called "naming the system" takes precedence overreforming the laws.

Reformism Good - Rorty

(_) The alternative is too abstract – it creates a spectatorial approach rather than an activist one

Rorty in 98 (Richard, PhD in Philosophy from Yale, Achieving Our Country: Leftist Thought in Twentieth-Century America pg 91)

It is often said that we Americans, at the end of the twentieth century, no longer have a Left. Since nobody denies the existence of what I have called **the cultural Left**, this amounts to an admission that that Left **is unable to engage in national politics. It is not the sort of Left which can be asked to deal with the consequences of globalization.** To get the country to deal with those consequences, the present cultural Left would have to transform itself by opening relations with the residue of the old reformist Left, and in particular with the labor unions. It would have to talk much more about money, even at the cost of talking less about stigma. I have two suggestions about how to effect this transition. The first is that **the Left should put a moratorium on theory**. It should try to kick its philosophy habit. The second is that the Left should try to mobilize what remains of our pride in being Americans. It should ask the public to consider how the country of 'Lincoln and Whitman might be achieved. In support of my first suggestion, let me cite a passage from Dewey's Reconstruction in Philosophy in which he expresses his exasperation with **the** sort of sterile **debate** now going on **under the rubric of "individualism versus communitarianism."** Dewey thought that **all discussions which took this dichotomy seriously suffer from a common defect**. They are all committed to the logic of general notions under which specific situations are to be brought. What we want is light upon this or that group of individuals, this or that concrete human being, this or that special institution or social arrangement. For such a logic of inquiry, the traditionally accepted logic substitutes discussion of the meaning of concepts and their dialectical relationships with one another. Dewey was right to be exasperated by sociopolitical theory conducted at this level of abstraction. He was wrong when he went on to say that ascending to this level is typically a rightist maneuver, one which supplies "the apparatus for intellectual justifications of the established order. "9 For such ascents are now more common on the Left than on the Right. **The contemporary academic Left seems to think that the higher your level of abstraction, the more subversive of the established order you can be. The more sweeping and novel your conceptual apparatus, the more radical your critique.** When one of today' s academic leftists says that some topic has been "inadequately theorized," you can be pretty certain that he or she is going to drag in either philosophy of language, or Lacanian psychoanalysis, or some neo-Marxist version of economic determinism. **Theorists of the Left think that dissolving political agents into plays of differential subjectivity, or political initiatives into pursuits of Lacan's impossible object of desire, helps to subvert the established order. Such subversion, they say, is accomplished by "problematizing familiar concepts."** Recent attempts to subvert social institutions by problematizing concepts have produced a few very good books. They have also produced many thousands of books which represent scholastic philosophizing at its worst. The authors of these purportedly "subversive" books honestly believe that they are serving human liberty. But it is almost impossible to clamber back down from their books to a level of abstraction on which one might discuss the merits of a law, a treaty, a candidate, or a political strategy. **Even though what these authors "theorize" is often something very concrete and near at hand**-a current TV show, a media celebrity, a recent scandal-**they offer the most abstract and barren explanations imaginable. These futile attempts to philosophize one's way into political relevance are a symptom of what happens when a Left retreats from activism and adopts a spectatorial approach to the problems of its country**. **Disengagement from practice produces theoretical hallucinations.** These result in an intellectual environment which is, as Mark Edmundson says in his book Nightmare on Main Street, Gothic. **The cultural Left is haunted by ubiquitous specters, the most frightening of which is called "power." This is the name of what Edmundson calls Foucault's "haunting agency, which is everywhere and nowhere, as evanescent and insistent as a resourceful spook**."

Reformism Good - Rorty

(_) Even if their criticism is right, we need to keep the alternative private, while still taking public political action

Rorty 98[Richard, PhD in Philosophy from Yale, **Achieving Our Country: Leftist Thought in Twentieth-Century America** pg 96]

I have argued in various books that the **philosophers** most often cited by cultural leftists-Nietzsche, Heidegger, Foucault, and Derrida-**are largely right in their criticisms** of Enlightenment rationalism. I have argued further that traditional **liberalism and** traditional **humanism are entirely compatible with such criticisms**. **We can still be** old-fashioned reformist **liberals even if**, like Dewey, **we give up the correspondence theory of truth** and start treating moral and scientific beliefs as tools for achieving greater human happiness, rather than as representations of the intrinsic nature of reality. We can be this kind of liberal even after we turn our backs on Descartes, linguistify subjectivity, and see everything around us and within us as one more replaceable social construction.

But I have also urged that insofar as these antimetaphysical, anti-Cartesian philosophers offer a quasi-religious form of spiritual pathos, **they should be relegated to private life and not taken as guides to political deliberation**. The notion of "infinite responsibility," formulated by Emmanuel Levinas and sometimes deployed by Derrida-as well as Derrida's own frequent discoveries of impossibility, unreachability, and unrepresentabflity-e-may be useful to some of us in our individual quests for private perfection. **When we take up our public responsibilities, however, the infinite and the unrepresentable are merely nuisances. Thinking of our responsibilities in these terms is as much of a stumbling-block to effective political organization as is the sense of sin**. Emphasizing the impossibility of meaning, or of justice, as Derrida sometimes does, is a temptation to Gothicize--to view democratic politics as ineffectual, because unable to cope with preternatural forces.

Whitman and Dewey, I have argued, gave us all the romance, and all the spiritual uplift, we Americans need to go about our public business. As Edmundson remarks, we should not allow Emerson, who was a precursor of both Whitman and Dewey, to be displaced by Poe, who was a precursor of Lacan. **For purposes of thinking about how to achieve our country, we do not need to worry about the correspondence theory of truth, the grounds of normativity, the impossibility of justice, or the infinite distance which separates us from the other.** For those purposes, **we can give both religion and philosophy a pass. We can just get on with trying to solve** what Dewey called "**the problems of men. "**

Reformism Good - Rorty

(_) Only political action can revive the Left –- the plan is a key step to building alliances

Rorty in 98 (Richard, PhD in Philosophy from Yale, Achieving Our Country: Leftist Thought in Twentieth-Century America pg 98)

The cultural Left often seems convinced that the nation-state is obsolete, and that there is therefore no point in attempting to revive national politics. The trouble with this claim is that **the government of our nation-state will be**, for the foreseeable future, **the only agent capable of making any real difference in the amount of selfishness and sadism inflicted on Americans. It is no comfort to those in danger of being immiserated by globalization to be told that, since national governments are now irrelevant, we must think up a replacement for such governments**. **The cosmopolitan super-rich do not think any replacements are needed, and they are likely to prevail.** Bill Readings was right to say that "the nation-state [has ceased] to be the elemental unit of capitalism," but it remains the entity which makes decisions about social benefits, and thus about social justice.12 The current leftist habit of taking the long view and looking beyond nationhood to a global polity is as useless as was faith in Marx's philosophy of history, for which it has become a substitute. Both are equally irrelevant to the question of how to prevent the reemergence of hereditary castes, or of how to prevent right-wing populists from taking advantage of resentment at that reemergence. When we think about these latter questions, we begin to realize that one of the essential transformations which the cultural Left will have to undergo is the shedding of its semiconscious anti-Americanism, which it carried over from the rage of the late Sixties. **This Left will have to stop thinking up ever more abstract and abusive names for "the system" and start trying to construct inspiring images of the country. Only by doing so can it begin to form alliances with people outside the academy**-and, specifically, with the labor unions. Outside the academy, Americans still want to feel patriotic. They still want to feel part of a nation which can take control of its destiny and make itself a better place. **If the Left forms no such alliances, it will never have any effect on the laws of the United States**. **To form them will require the cultural Left** to forget about Baudrillard' s account of America as Disneyland-as a country of simulacra-and **to start proposing changes in the laws of a real country, inhabited by real people who are enduring unnecessary suffering, much of which can be cured by governmental action**. 13 **Nothing would do more to resurrect the American Left than agreement on a concrete political platform,** a People's Charter, a list of specific reforms. The existence of such a listendlessly reprinted and debated, equally familiar to professors and production workers, imprinted on the memory both of professional people and of those who clean the professionals' toilets-might revitalize leftist politics. 14 --1 **The problems which can be cured by governmental action, and which such a list would canvass, are mostly those that stem from selfishness rather than sadism. But to bring about such cures it would help if the Left would change the tone in which it now discusses sadism.** The pre-Sixties reformist Left, insofar as it concerned itself with oppressed minorities, did so by proclaiming that all of us-black, white, and brown-are Americans, and that we should respect one another as such. This strategy gave rise to the "platoon" movies, which showed Americans of various ethnic backgrounds fighting and dying side by side. By contrast, **the contemporary cultural Left urges that America should not be a melting-pot, because we need to respect one another in our differences. This Left wants to preserve otherness rather than ignore it.**

Reformism Good - Rorty

(_) Current reformism will solve the criticism – we should stick with concrete solutions like the plan

Rorty in 98 (Richard, PhD in Philosophy from Yale, Achieving Our Country: Leftist Thought in Twentieth-Century America pg 102)

Edmundson, Delbanco, and other cultural commentators have remarked that the contemporary United States is filled with visions of demons and angels. Stephen King and Tony Kushner have helped form a national collective unconscious which is "Gothic" in Edmundson's sense. It produces dreams not of political reforms but of inexplicable, magical transformations. **The cultural Left has contributed to the formation of this politically useless unconscious not only by adopting "power" as the name of an invisible, ubiquitous, and malevolent presence, but by adopting ideals which nobody is yet able to imagine being actualized.** Among these ideals are participatory democracy and the end of capitalism**. Power will pass to the people,** the Sixties Left ,believed, **only when decisions are made by all those who may be affected by their results.** This means, for example, that economic decisions will be made by stakeholders rather than by shareholders, and that entrepreneurship and markets will cease to play their present role. When they do, capitalism as we know it will have ended, and something new will have taken its place. But what this new thing will be, nobody knows. The Sixties did not ask how the various groups of stakeholders were to reach a consensus about when to remodel a factory rather than build a new one, what prices to pay for raw materials, and the like. Sixties leftists skipped lightly over all the questions which had been raised by the experience of nonmarket economies in the so-called socialist countries. They seemed to be suggesting that once we were rid of both bureaucrats and entrepreneurs, "the people" would know how to handle competition from steel mills or textile factories in the developing world, price hikes on imported oil, and so on. But they never told us how "the people" would learn how to do this. **The cultural Left still skips over such questions. Doing so is a consequence of its preference for talking about "the system" rather than about specific social practices and specific changes in those practices. The rhetoric of this Left remains revolutionary rather than reformist and pragmatic**. **Its insouciant use of terms like "late capitalism" suggests that we can just wait for capitalism to collapse, rather than figuring out what, in the absence of markets, will set prices and regulate distribution.** The voting public, the public which must be won over if the Left is to emerge from the academy into the public square, sensibly wants to be told the details. It wants to know how things are going to work after markets are put behind us. It wants to know how participatory democracy is supposed to function. **The cultural Left offers no answers to such demands for further information, but until it confronts them it will not be able to be a political Left. The public, sensibly, has no interest in getting rid of capitalism until it is offered details about the alternatives**. Nor should it be interested in participatory democracy-the liberation of the people from the power of the technocrats-until it is told how deliberative assemblies will acquire the same know-how which only the technocrats presently possess. Even someone like myself, whose admiration for John Dewey is almost unlimited, cannot take seriously his defense of participatory democracy against Walter Lippmann's insistence on the need for expertise. IS The cultural Left has a vision of an America in which the white patriarchs have stopped voting and have left all the voting to be done by members of previously victimized groups, people who have somehow come into possession of more foresight and imagination than the selfish suburbanites. These formerly oppressed and newly powerful people are expected to be as angelic as the straight white males were diabolical. If I shared this expectation, I too would want to live under this new dispensation. Since I see no reason to share it, I think that the Left should get back into the business of piecemeal reform within the framework of a market economy. This was the business the American Left was in during the first two-thirds of the century. **Someday, perhaps, cumulative piecemeal reforms will be found to have brought about revolutionary change**. Such reforms might someday produce a presently unimaginable nonmarket economy, and much more widely distributed powers of decisionmaking. They might also, given similar reforms in other countries, bring about an international federation, a world government. In such a new world, American national pride would become as quaint as pride in being from Nebraska or Kazakhstan or Sicily. But in the meantime, **we should not let the abstractly described best be the enemy of the better. We should not let speculation about a totally changed system, and a totally different way of thinking about human life and human affairs, replace step-by-step reform of the system we presently have.**

Reformism Good - Rorty - Impact

(_) A collapse of the Reformist Left means a return to discrimination and inevitable war

Rorty in 98 (Richard, PhD in Philosophy from Yale, Achieving Our Country: Leftist Thought in Twentieth-Century America pg 87)

If the formation of hereditary castes continues unimpeded, and **if the pressures of globalization create such castes not only in the United States** but in all the old democracies, **we shall end up in an Orwellian world.** In such a world, there may be no supernational analogue of Big Brother, or any official creed analogous to Ingsoc. But there will be an analogue of the Inner Party-namely, the international, cosmopolitan super-rich. They will make all the important decisions. The analogue of Orwell's Outer Party will be educated, comfortably off, cosmopolitan professionals-Lind's "overclass," the people like you and me. The job of people like us will be to make sure that the decisions made by the Inner Party are carried out smoothly and efficiently. It will be in the interest of the international superrich to keep our class relatively prosperous and happy. For they need people who can pretend to be the political class of each of the individual nation-states. For the sake of keeping the proles quiet, the super-rich will have to keep up the pretense that national politics might someday make a difference. Since economic decisions are their prerogative, they will encourage politicians, of both the Left and the Right, to specialize in cultural issues," The aim will be to keep the minds of the proles elsewhere--to keep the bottom 75 percent of Americans and the bottom 95 percent of the world's population busy with ethnic and religious hostilities, and with debates about sexual mores. If the proles can be distracted from their own despair by media-created pseudo-events, including the occasional brief and bloody war, the super-rich will have little to fear. Contemplation of this possible world invites two responses from **the Left.** The first **is to insist that the inequalities between nations need to be mitigated**-and, in particular, that the Northern Hemisphere must share its wealth with the Southern. The second is to insist that the primary responsibility of each democratic nation-state is to its own least advantaged citizens**.** These two responses obviously conflict with each other. In particular, the first response suggests that the old democracies should open their borders, whereas the second suggests that they should close them. 8 **The** first **response comes naturally to academic leftists**, who have always been internationally minded. The second response comes naturally to members of trade unions, and to the marginally employed people who can most easily be recruited into right-wing populist movements. Union members in the United States have watched factory after factory close, only to reopen in Slovenia, Thailand, or Mexico. It is no wonder that they see the result of international free trade as prosperity for managers and stockholders, a better standard of living for workers in developing countries, and a very much worse standard of living for American workers. It would be no wonder if they saw the American leftist intelligentsia as on the side of the managers and stockholders-as sharing the same class interests. For we intellectuals, who are mostly academics, are ourselves quite well insulated, at least in the short run, from the effects of globalization. To make things worse, **we often seem more interested in the workers of the developing world than in the fate of our fellow citizens.** Many writers on socioeconomic policy have warned that the old industrialized democracies are heading into a Weimar-like period, one in which populist movements are likely to overturn constitutional governments. Edward Luttwak, for example, has suggested that fascism may be the American future. The point of his book The Endangered American Dream is that members of labor unions, and unorganized unskilled workers, will sooner or later realize that their government is not even trying to prevent wages from sinking or to prevent jobs from being exported. Around the same time, they will realize that suburban white-collar workers-them-selves desperately afraid of being downsized-are not going to let themselves be taxed to provide social benefits for anyone else. At that point, **something will crack**. The nonsuburban electorate will decide that **the system has failed and start looking around for a strongman to vote for**--someone willing to assure them that, once he is elected, the smug bureaucrats, tricky lawyers, overpaid bond salesmen, and postmodernist professors will no longer be calling the shots. A scenario like that of Sinclair Lewis' novel It Can't Happen Here may then be played out**. For once such a strongman takes office, nobody can predict what will happen**. In 1932, most of the predictions made about what would happen if Hindenburg named Hitler chancellor were wildly overoptimistic. **One thing that is very likely to happen is that the gains made in the past forty years by black and brown Americans, and by homosexuals, will be wiped out. Jocular contempt for women will come back into fashion.** The words "nigger" and "kike" will once again be heard in the workplace. **All the sadism which the academic Left has tried to make unacceptable to its students will come flooding back. All the resentment which badly educated Americans feel about having their manners dictated to them by college graduates will find an outlet.** But such a renewal of sadism will not alter the effects of selfishness. **For after my imagined strongman takes charge, he will quickly make his peace with the international superrich, just as Hitler made his with the German industrialists. He will invoke the glorious memory of the Gulf War to provoke military adventures which will generate short-term prosperity. He will be a disaster for the country and the world. People will wonder why there was so little resistance to his evitable rise. Where**, they will ask**, was the American Left**? Why was it only rightists like Buchanan who spoke to the workers about the consequences of globalization? Why could not the Left channel the mounting rage of the newly dispossessed?

Political Vacuum Turn

(_) Abdicating political engagement creates a vacuum that will be filled by violent elites

Cook in 92 (Anthony, Associate Professor, Georgetown Law, New England LR, Spring, 26 New Eng.L. Rev. 751)

The effect of **deconstructing the power** of the author **to** impose a fixed meaning on the text or **offer a continuous narrative is** both **debilitating** and liberating. It is debilitating in that **any attempt to say what should be done** within even our insular Foucaultian preoccupations **may be oppositionalized** and deconstructed **as an illegitimate privileging of one** term, value, **perspective** or narrative **over another**. The struggle over meaning might continue ad infinitum. That is, if **a deconstructionist** is theoretically consistent **and sees deconstruction** not as a political tool but **as a philosophical orientation, political action is impossible, because** such **action requires a degree of closure** that deconstruction, as a theoretical matter, does not permit. Moreover, the approach is debilitating because **deconstruction without material rootedness**, without goals and vision, **creates a political** and spiritual **void into which the socially real power** we theoretically deconstruct **steps and steps on the disempowered and dispossessed**. [*762] **To those dying** from AIDS, stifled by poverty, **dehumanized** by sexism and racism, crippled by drugs **and brutalized by** the many forms of physical, political and economic **violence** that characterizes our narcissistic culture, **power hardly seems a matter of illegitimate theoretical privileging. When vision,** social theory a**nd political struggle do not accompany critique, the void will be filled by the** rich, the **powerful** and the charismatic, **those who influence us through their** eloquence, prestige, wealth and **power**.

(_) Their alternative grants tacit support to neo-liberal violence --- political engagement is necessary to check statist abuses

Barbrook in 97 (Dr. Richard, School of Westminster, Nettime, "More Provocations", 6-5, http://www.nettime.org/Lists-Archives/nettime-l-9706/msg00034.html)

I thought that this position is clear from my remarks about the ultra-left posturing of the 'zero-work' demand. In Europe, **we have real social problems** of deprivation and poverty **which**, in part, **can only be solved by state action. This does not make me a statist, but rather an anti-anti-statist. By opposing** such **intervention because they are carried out by the state, anarchists are tacitly lining up with the neo-liberals**. Even worse, refusing even to vote for the left, they acquiese to rule by neo-liberal parties. I deeply admire direct action movements. I was a radio pirate and we provide server space for anti-roads and environmental movements. However, this doesn't mean that I support political abstentionism or, even worse, the mystical nonsense produced by Hakim Bey. **It is great for artists** and others **to adopt** a **marginality** as a life style choice, **but most** of the people **who are** economically and socially **marginalised were never given any choice. They are excluded** from society **as a result of deliberate policies** of deregulation, privatisation and welfare cutbacks carried out by neo-liberal governments. **During the '70s**, I was a pro-situ punk rocker until Thatcher got elected. Then **we learnt** the hard way **that voting did change things and lots of people suffered if state power was withdrawn from certain areas of our life**, such as welfare and employment. **Anarchism can be** a **fun** artistic pose. **However, human suffering is not**.

Political Vacuum Turn

(_) Only concrete action can prevent mass suffering

Ling in 01 (LHM, Professor, The New School, New York, Post-Colonial International Relations: Conquest and Desire Between Asia and the West)

Without concrete action for change, postmodernism's `dissident voices' have remained bracketed, disconnected, not really real**. In maintaining `a critical distance' or `position offshore' from which to `see the possibility of change' (Shapiro, 1992: 49), **the postmodern critic brushed off too conveniently the immediate cries of those who know they are burning in the hells of exploitation, racism, sexism, starvation, civil war, and the like but who have few means or strategies to deal with them. What hope do *they* have of overthrowing the shackles of sovereignty without a program of action? After all, asked Mark Neufeld, `What is political without partisanship?' (Neufeld, 1994: 31). In not answering these questions, **postmodernists recycled, despite their avowals to the contrary, the same sovereign outcome as (neo)realism: that is, discourse divorced from practice, analysis from policy, deconstruction from reconstruction, particulars from universals, and critical theory from problem-solving.** Dissident international relations could not accommodate an interactive, articulating, self-generative Other. Its exclusive focus on the Western Self ensured, instead, (neo)realism's sovereignty by relegating the Other to a familiar, subordinate identity: that is, as a mute, passive reflection of the West or utopian projection of the West's dissatisfaction with itself. **Critique became romanticized into a totalizing affair - especially for those who must bear the brunt of its repercussions**. bell hooks asked, appropriately: `[s]hould we not be suspicious of postmodern critiques of the "subject" when they surface at a historical moment when many subjugated people feel themselves coming to voice for the first time?' (hooks, 1990: 28) Without this recognition, **postmodernists ended up marginalizing, silencing, and exiling precisely those who are `the greatest victims of the West's essentialist conceits** (**the excolonials and neocolonials, Blacks, women, and so forth**)' (Krishna, 1993: 405). Worse yet, added Roger Spegele, **dissidence as offshore observation has `freed us from the recognition that we have a moral obligation to do anything about it'** (Spegele, 1992: 174).

Micro-Politics Fail

(_) Micropolitics fail – they prevent coalition building that is essential to achieving real goals, this ensures groups continual existence on the margins of power and eventual cooptation by dominant power structures

Best and Kellner in 02 (Steven Best, prof phil @ UT el paso and Douglas Kellner, prof phil @ UCLA "Postmodern Politics and the Battle for the Future" http://www.gseis.ucla.edu/faculty/kellner/Illumina%20Folder/kell28.htm)

The emphasis on local struggles and micropower, cultural politics which redefine the political, and attempts to develop political forms relevant to the problems and developments of the contemporary age is extremely valuable, but there are also certain limitations to the dominant forms of postmodern politics. **While an emphasis on micropolitics** and local struggles **can be a healthy substitute for excessively utopian and ambitious political projects, one should not lose sight that key sources of political power and oppression are precisely the big targets aimed at by modern theory**, **including capital, the state, imperialism, and patriarchy. Taking on such major targets involves coalitions and multi-front struggle**, **often requiring a politics of alliance and solidarity that cuts across group identifications to mobilize sufficient power** to struggle against, say, the evils of capitalism or the state. Thus, while today we need the expansion of localized cultural practices, they attain their real significance only within the struggle for the transformation of society as a whole. Without this systemic emphasis, **cultural and identity politics remain confined to the margins of society and are in danger of degenerating into narcissism, hedonism, aestheticism, or personal therapy, where they pose no danger and are immediately coopted by the culture industries**. In such cases, the political is merely the personal, and the original intentions of the 1960s goal to broaden the political field are inverted and perverted. Just as economic and political demands have their referent in subjectivity in everyday life, so these cultural and existential issues find their ultimate meaning in the demand for a new society and mode of production

Micro-Politics Permutation

(_) The permutation solves – a combination of macro and micropolitics is best

Best and Kellner in 02 (Steven Best, prof phil @ UT el paso and Douglas Kellner, prof phil @ UCLA "Postmodern Politics and the Battle for the Future" http://www.gseis.ucla.edu/faculty/kellner/Illumina%20Folder/kell28.htm)

Yet we would insist that **it is not a question of micro vs macropolitics**, as if it were an either/or proposition, **but rather both dimensions are important for the struggles of the present and future**.[15] Likewise, we would argue that **we need to combine the most affirmative and negative perspectives,** embodying Marcuse's declaration that critical social theory should be both more negative and utopian in reference to the status quo.[16] **There are certainly many things to be depressed about** is in the negative and cynical postmodernism of a Baudrillard, **yet without a positive political vision merely citing the negative might lead to apathy and depression that only benefits the existing order**. For a dialectical politics, however, positive vision of what could be is articulated in conjunction with critical analysis of what is in a multioptic perspective that focuses on the forces of domination as well as possibilities of emancipation **While postmodern politics and theory tend to polarize** into either the extremely negative or excessively affirmative, **key forms of postmodern literature have a more dialectical vision**. Indeed, some of the more interesting forms of postmodern critique today are found in fictional genres such as cyberpunk and magical realism. Cyberpunk, a subgenre within science fiction, brings science fiction down to earth, focusing not on the intergalactic battles in the distant future, but the social problems facing people on earth in the present.[17] Cyberpunk writers such as Bruce Sterling and William Gibson offer an unflinching look at a grim social reality characterized by transnational capitalist domination, Social Darwinist cultural settings, radical environmental ruination, and the implosion of the body and technology, such that humans become more and more machine like and machines increasingly become like human beings. Yet cyberpunk novels foreground this nightmare world in order to warn us that it is an immanent possibility for the near future, in order to awaken readers to a critical reflection on technology and social control, and to offer hope for alternative uses of technology and modes of social life. Similarly, magical realism examines the wreckage of centuries of European colonialism, but also maintains a positive outlook, one that embraces the strength and creativity of the human spirit, social solidarity, and spiritual and political transcendence. Like cyberpunk novels, magical realism incorporate various aesthetic forms and conventions in an eclectic mixture that fuses postmodernism with social critique and models of resistance. **But it is also a mistake, we believe, to ground one's politics in either modern or postmodern theory alone**. Against one-sided positions, **we advocate a version of reconstructive postmodernism that we call a politics of alliance and solidarity that builds on** both **modern and postmodern traditions.** Unlike Laclau and Mouffe who believe that postmodern theory basically provides a basis for a new politics, and who tend to reject the Enlightenment per se, we believe that **the Enlightenment continues to provide resources for political struggle today** and are skeptical whether postmodern theory alone can provide sufficient assets for an emancipatory new politics. Yet **the Enlightenment has its blindspots and dark sides** (such as its relentless pursuit of the domination of nature, and naive belief in "progress," so we believe that aspects of the postmodern critique of Enlightenment are valid and force us to rethink and reconstruct Enlightenment philosophy for the present age. And while we agree with Habermas that **a reconstruction of the Enlightenment and modernity are in order,** unlike Habermas we believe that **postmodern theory has important contributions to make to this project**)

Identity Politics Fail

(_) Identity politics fail – it forces a splinter into sub-groups, preventing any possible positive change

Best and Kellner in 02 (Steven Best, prof phil @ UT el paso and Douglas Kellner, prof phil @ UCLA "Postmodern Politics and the Battle for the Future" http://www.gseis.ucla.edu/faculty/kellner/Illumina%20Folder/kell28.htm)

Various forms of postmodern politics have been liberatory in breaking away from the abstract and ideological universalism of the Enlightenment and the reductionist class politics of Marxism, but they **tend to be insular and fragmenting, focusing solely on the experiences and political issues of a given group**, **even splintering further into distinct subgroups such as divide the feminist community. Identity politics are often structured around simplistic binary oppositions such as Us vs. Them** and Good vs. Bad **that pit people against one another**, making alliances, consensus, and compromise difficult or impossible. **This has been the case**, for example, **with tendencies within radical feminism and ecofeminism which reproduce essentialism by stigmatizing men and "male rationality" while exalting women as the bearers of peaceful and loving value** and as being "closer to nature."[18] Elements in the black nationalist liberation movement in the 1960s and the early politics of Malcolm X were exclusionist and racist, literally demonizing white people as an evil and inferior race. Similarly, **the sexual politics of some gay and lesbian groups tend to exclusively focus on their own interests**, while the mainstream environmental movement is notorious for resisting alliances with people of color and grass roots movements.[19] **Even though each group needs to assert their identity as aggressively as possible, postmodern identity politics should avoid falling into seriality and sheer fragmentation.** These struggles, though independent of one another, should be articulated within counterhegemonic alliances, and attack power formations on both the micro- and macro-levels. Not all universalistic appeals are ideological in the sense criticized by Marx; there are common grounds of experience, common concerns, and common forms of oppression that different groups share which should be articulated -- concerns such as the degradation of the environment and common forms of oppression that stem from capitalist exploitation and alienated labor

PoMo Bad – Public Sphere

(_) Their alternative crushes social engagement in the public sphere

Boggs '97 (Carl, Professor of Political Science – National University, Theory & Society 26, December, p. 766-68)

Postmodernism and its offshoots (poststructuralism, semiotics, difference feminism, etc.) have indeed **reshaped** much of **academia**, including such disciplines as sociology, history, literature, film, and communications. More than that, the theory (if that is the correct label for some- thing so diffuse) amounts to a kind of anti-paradigm paradigm, which often refocuses debates around defining motifs of the post-Fordist order: commodification of culture, the media spectacle, proliferation of images and symbols, fragmentation of identities, the dispersion of local movements, and loss of faith in conventional political ideologies and organizations. So far as all this is concerned, post-modernism can be viewed as marking a rather healthy break with the past.50 **The problem is that** the main thrust of **postmodernism so devalues the common realm of power**, governance, and economy **that the dynamics of social and institutional life vanish from sight**. **Where the reality of corporate, state, and military power wind up vanishing within a post-modern amorphousness, the very effort to analyze social forces and locate** agencies or **strategies of change becomes impossible.** In its reaction against the comprehensive historical scope of Marxism**, the micro approach dismisses in toto macropolitics and with it any conceivable modern project of radical transformation.** An extreme ``micro'' focus is most visible in such theorists as Baudrillard who, as Steven Best and Douglas Kellner put it, in effect ``announce the end of the political project in the end of history and society''51 – a stance that replicates the logic of a profoundly depoliticized culture. Postmodern theory has been interpreted as a current fully in sync with the mood of political defeat that has overcome the left in most industrialized countries since the early 1980s.52 **It is hardly coincidental that postmodernism grew into an academic fashion in the wake of** failed hopes after the sixties and **the** later **decline of** popular **movements in the face of** a rising **conservative hegemony**. The crisis of Marxism and the disintegration of Communist regimes in Eastern Europe further intensifed feelings of resignation on the left. The new middle strata that was the backbone of the new left and new social movements turned in larger numbers toward careers and more affluent lifestyles. Radicalism, where it persisted to any extent, took on the veneer of an ``aesthetic pose.'' Thus, at a time of mounting pessimism and retreat, the rhetorical question posed by Alex Callinicos scarcely demands an answer: ``What political subject does the idea of a postmodern epoch help constitute?''53 By the 1990s even the discussion of political subjectivity or agency among leftist academics seemed rather passe" .54 In politics as in the cultural and intellectual realm**, a postmodern fascination with indeterminacy, ambiguity, and chaos easily supports a drift toward cynicism and passivity; the subject becomes powerless to change** either itself or **society**. Further, **the pretentious, jargon-filled, and** often **indecipherable discourse of postmodernism reinforces the most faddish tendencies in academia. Endless (and** often **pointless) attempts to deconstruct texts** and narratives **readily become a facade behind which** professional **scholars justify their own retreat from political commitment.** In Russell Jacoby's words: ``At the end of the radical theorizing project is a surprise: a celebration of academic hierarchy, professions, and success. Never has so much criticism yielded so much affirmation. From Foucault the professor learned that power and institutions saturate everything. Power is universal; complicity with power is universal, and this means university practices and malpractices are no better or worse than anything else.''55 While multiple sites of power and resistance need to be more clearly theorized than in the past, and while Marxian fixation on class struggle, the primacy of capital-labor relations, and social totality has lost its rationale, **the extreme postmodern assault on macro institutions severs the connection between critique and action.** Moreover**, to the extent that postmodernism embraces a notion of subjectivity that is decentered and fragmented, the very idea of citizenship gets obscured**. As Philip Wexler argues, the social, legal, and political requirements of citizenship were historically founded upon universal norms of democracy, freedom, and equality, but **postmodernism**, which blurs everything and **dissolves politics into the sphere of culture** and everyday life, destroys this foundation**. Once the subject melts into a murky cultural diffuseness**, into a world of images and spectacles, **the elements of citizenship simply evaporate**.56 Various democratic ideals may be kept alive within the official ideology, mainly to legitimate the electoral ritual, but they fail to resonate with the times. As Wexler concludes: ``For now, citizen- ship will remain the appropriate sign of post-modernism and semiotic society – a restored sign artifact that may be recycled and used so long as it does not disturb contemporary society's profound need for superficiality.''57 **In the splintered, discontinuous world inhabited by Baurdrillard, Foucault, and kindred theorists, social bonds are weakened and the link between personal life and the public sphere is fractured**. Where truth, language, and ideology are perpetually contested, nothing is settled or taken for granted. While this ethos corresponds well to an era in which emphasis is placed on local knowledge and identity movements, **it is a depoliticizing ethos insofar as it blurs or dismisses macro forms of** economic and political **power. Where the state is** either **ignored** or broken down into a mosaic of localized and partial entities**, politics too winds up obliterated. Symbols** and images **become far more important than concrete struggles** involving rival claims to power, economic interests, **and visions of a better society**.58 In a social order where symbols and images dominate mass consciousness, the splintering of local identities coincides with the decline of political opposition**. Corporate colonization is left only feebly challenged by the proliferation of local groups,** by the celebration of diversity and multiculturalism that has entered into American public discourse since the 1980s. **Dispersed identities**, however constructed, **are easily assimilated into** the sphere of the all-powerful **commodity**, which coincides with the spread of anti-political sentiment. As communities assume what Zygmunt Bauman calls an ``imaginary'' character,59 identities become detached from the public sphere, and politics is allowed to descend into a spectacle. **Hence the eclipse of the collective subject** and the atrophy of political language that defines so much postmodern theorizing **is** now **linked** more and more **to** the stubborn reality of **corporate domination**.

PoMo Bad – Public Sphere

(_) Extinction results ---- only robust engagement can check elite influences that intensify all violence

Boggs '97 (Carl, Professor of Political Science – National University, Theory & Society 26, December, p. 773-4)

The decline of the public sphere in late twentieth-century America **poses a series of great dilemmas and challenges**. **Many ideological currents** scrutinized here ^ localism, metaphysics, spontaneism, post- modernism, Deep Ecology – intersect with and reinforce each other. While these currents have deep origins in popular movements of the 1960s and 1970s, they remain very much alive in the 1990s. Despite their different outlooks and trajectories, they all **share one thing in common: a depoliticized expression of struggles to combat and overcome alienation**. **The false sense of empowerment** that comes with such mesmerizing impulses **is accompanied by a loss of public engagement, an erosion of citizenship and a depleted capacity of individuals** in large groups **to work for social change. As this** ideological quagmire **worsens, urgent problems** that are destroying the fabric of American society **will go unsolved** – perhaps even unrecognized – **only to fester more ominously into the future. And such problems (ecological crisis, poverty,** urban decay, **spread of** infectious **diseases**, technological displacement of workers) **cannot be understood outside the larger** social and **global context** of internationalized markets, finance, and communications. **Paradoxically, the widespread retreat from politics**, often inspired by localist sentiment, **comes at a time when agendas that ignore** or side- step **these global realities will,** more than ever, **be reduced to impotence**. In his commentary on the state of citizenship today, Wolin refers to the increasing sublimation and dilution of politics, as larger numbers of people turn away from public concerns toward private ones. **By diluting the life of common involvements, we negate the very idea of politics as a source of public ideals and visions**.74 In the meantime**, the fate of the world hangs in the balance**. The **unyielding truth is that**, even as the ethos of anti-politics becomes more compelling and even fashionable in the United States, it is **the vagaries of political power that will continue to decide the fate of human societies.** This last point demands further elaboration. **The shrinkage of politics hardly means that corporate colonization will be less of a reality, that** social **hierarchies will** somehow **disappear, or that** gigantic **state** and military **structures will lose their hold** over people's lives. **Far from it: the space abdicated by a broad citizenry**, well-informed and ready to participate at many levels, **can** in fact **be filled by authoritarian and reactionary elites** – an already familiar dynamic in many lesser- developed countries. **The** fragmentation and **chaos of a Hobbesian world**, not very far removed from the rampant individualism, social Darwinism, and civic violence that have been so much a part of the American landscape, **could be the prelude to a powerful Leviathan designed to impose order in the face of** disunity and **atomized retreat**. In this way **the eclipse of politics might set the stage for a reassertion of politics in more virulent guise** – or it might help further rationalize the existing power structure. In either case, the state would likely become what Hobbes anticipated: the embodiment of those universal, collective interests that had vanished from civil society.75

Ext – PoMo Jacks Public Engagement

(_) Postmodernism cements depoliticization and cements corporate colonization

Boggs in 2k (Carl, "The End of Politics, Corporate Power and the Deline of the Public Sphere" pg 220-221)

In the splintered, discontinuous universe theorized by **Foucault, Baudrillard, Richard Rorty, and kindred writers, social coherence is weakened and the linkage between personal and public, micro and macro, and local and global is fractured-a devastating turn for politics**, especially radical politics, in an age of globalization. Further, where truth, language, and social referents are so tenaciously contested as to dissolve into limitless interpretations of what constitutes basic social trends in the world, where nothing is ever settled, no strategy for change is even thinkable. While this perspective may correspond well to a milieu in which greater attention is devoted (perhaps rightly) to local knowledge and concerns, **it is nonetheless depoliticizing insofar as it tends to obscure what in fact needs to be retheorized-that is, macro levels of** economic and **political power**. Where the state system, for example, is devalued or broken down into a mosaic of dispersed and partial entities, politics too ends up obliterated. Oddly enough for a discourse that embodies such radical pretensions, the whole realm of symbols and images-central to what Norman Denzin describes as the "cinematic age"30-becomes far more important than concrete struggles around rival claims to power, economic interests, and visions of a better society. Despite its critical and oppositional language, therefore, **postmodernism is actually system-reproducing in its celebration of fragmented, localized, and** (occasionally) **privatized discourses; it fits the imperatives of corporate colonization, partly because it reflects an ethos of public disintegration and partly because, in its extreme formulations, it gives rise to a disempowering nihilism.**

PoMo Bad – Best + Kellner

(_) Exclusive emphasis on postmodern micro-politics misses the key sources of power --- only multi-faceted coalitional politics prevent degeneration into narcissism and defeat

Best and Kellner '01 (Steven, Prof Philosophy, UT El Paso and Douglass, Philosophy Chair, Postmodern Politics and the Battle for the Future, Democracy and Nature: The International Journal of Inclusive Democracy, Vol. 7, No. 1)

The emphasis on local struggles and micropower, cultural politics which redefine the political, and attempts to develop political forms relevant to the problems and developments of the contemporary age **is** extremely **valuable, but there are** also certain **limitations to the dominant forms of postmodern politics.** While an emphasis on micropolitics and local struggles can be a healthy substitute for excessively utopian and ambitious political projects**, one should not lose sight that key sources of political power and oppression are precisely the big targets aimed at by modern theory, including capital**, the state, imperialism, and patriarchy. **Taking on such major targets involves coalitions and multi-front struggle, often requiring a politics of alliance** and solidarity **that cuts across group identifications to mobilize sufficient power to struggle against**, say, **the evils of capitalism** or the state. Thus, while today we need the expansion of localized cultural practices, they attain their real significance only within the struggle for the transformation of society as a whole**. Without this systemic emphasis**, cultural and **identity politics remain confined to the margins of society and are in danger of degenerating into narcissism, hedonism, aestheticism, or personal therapy, where they pose no danger and are immediately coopted by the culture industries**. In such cases, the political is merely the personal, and the original intentions of the 1960s goal to broaden the political field are inverted and perverted. Just as economic and political demands have their referent in subjectivity in everyday life, so these cultural and existential issues find their ultimate meaning in the demand for a new society and mode of production. Yet we would insist that it is not a question of micro vs macropolitics, as if it were an either/or proposition, but rather both dimensions are important for the struggles of the present and future.[15] Likewise, we would argue that **we need to combine** the most **affirmative and negative perspectives,** embodying Marcuse's declaration that critical social theory should be both more negative and utopian in reference to the status quo.[16] **There are** certainly **many things to be depressed about** is **in the negative and cynical postmodernism of a Baudrillard**, **yet without a positive political vision merely citing the negative might lead to apathy and depression that only benefits the existing order.** For a dialectical politics, however, **positive vision** of what **could be is articulated in conjunction with critical analysis** of what is in a multioptic perspective that focuses on the forces of domination as well as possibilities of emancipation. While postmodern politics and theory tend to polarize into either the extremely negative or excessively affirmative, key forms of postmodern literature have a more dialectical vision. Indeed, some of the more interesting forms of postmodern critique today are found in fictional genres such as cyberpunk and magical realism. Cyberpunk, a subgenre within science fiction, brings science fiction down to earth, focusing not on the intergalactic battles in the distant future, but the social problems facing people on earth in the present.[17] Cyberpunk writers such as Bruce Sterling and William Gibson offer an unflinching look at a grim social reality characterized by transnational capitalist domination, Social Darwinist cultural settings, radical environmental ruination, and the implosion of the body and technology, such that humans become more and more machine like and machines increasingly become like human beings. Yet cyberpunk novels foreground this nightmare world in order to warn us that it is an immanent possibility for the near future, in order to awaken readers to a critical reflection on technology and social control, and to offer hope for alternative uses of technology and modes of social life. Similarly, magical realism examines the wreckage of centuries of European colonialism, but also maintains a positive outlook, one that embraces the strength and creativity of the human spirit, social solidarity, and spiritual and political transcendence. Like cyberpunk novels, magical realism incorporate various aesthetic forms and conventions in an eclectic mixture that fuses postmodernism with social critique and models of resistance. But **it is** also **a mistake**, we believe, **to ground one's politics in either modern or postmodern theory alone. Against one-sided positions, we advocate a** version of reconstructive postmodernism that we call a **politics of alliance** and solidarity **that builds on both modern and postmodern traditions**. Unlike Laclau and Mouffe who believe that postmodern theory basically provides a basis for a new politics, and who tend to reject the Enlightenment per se**, we believe that the Enlightenment continues to provide resources for political struggle today and are skeptical whether postmodern theory alone can provide sufficient assets for an emancipatory new politics.** Yet the Enlightenment has its blindspots and dark sides (such as its relentless pursuit of the domination of nature, and naive belief in "progress," so we believe that aspects of the postmodern critique of Enlightenment are valid and force us to rethink and reconstruct Enlightenment philosophy for the present age. And while we agree with Habermas that a reconstruction of the Enlightenment and modernity are in order, unlike Habermas we believe that postmodern theory has important contributions to make to this project. Various **forms of postmodern politics have been liberatory** in breaking away from the abstract and ideological universalism of the Enlightenment and the reductionist class politics of Marxism**, but** they **tend to be insular and fragmenting**, **focusing solely on the experiences** and political issues **of a given group, even splintering further into distinct subgroups** such as divide the feminist community. Identity politics are often structured around simplistic binary oppositions such as Us vs. Them and Good vs. Bad **that pit people against one another, making alliances**, consensus, and compromise difficult or **impossible**. **This has been the case**, for example, **with** tendencies within radical feminism and **ecofeminism** which reproduce essentialism by stigmatizing men and "male rationality" while exalting women as the bearers of peaceful and loving value and as being "closer to nature."[18] Elements in the black nationalist liberation movement in the 1960s and the early politics of Malcolm X were exclusionist and racist, literally demonizing white people as an evil and inferior race. Similarly, the sexual politics of some gay and lesbian groups tend to exclusively focus on their own interests, while the mainstream environmental movement is notorious for resisting alliances with people of color and grass roots movements.[19] Even though each group needs to assert their identity as aggressively as possible, postmodern **identity politics should avoid falling into seriality and sheer fragmentation. These struggles**, though independent of one another, **should be articulated within counterhegemonic alliances, and attack power formations on both the micro- and macro-levels**. **Not all universalistic appeals are ideological** in the sense criticized by Marx; **there are common grounds** of experience, common concerns, and common forms of oppression **that** different groups share which **should be articulated** -- concerns **such as the** degradation of the environment and c**ommon forms of oppression that stem from capitalist exploitation and alienated labor**.

PoMo Bad – Best + Kellner

(_) Postmodernism draws distinctions between different social identities; this legitimates the formation of hierarchies of power, allowing for class privilege

Kellner in 98 (Douglas Kellner, Prof. of Philosophy @ UCLA, "Boundaries and Borderlines: Reflections on Jean Baudrillard and Critical Theory" http://www.uta.edu/huma/illuminations/kell2.htm)

Since contemporary capitalism was producing in effect a new metaphysics and new ideology, philosophical critique defined as the critique of ideology became an integral part of its social theory. In this context, it is relevant to note that **one of the generally overlooked functions of ideology is to draw false boundaries within such domains as sex, race, and class, so as to construct ideological divisions** between men and women, the "better classes" and "the lower classes," whites and peoples of color, etc. **Ideology constructs divisions between proper and improper behavior, while constructing a hierarchy within each of these domains which justifies** the **domination** of one sex, race, and class over others by virtue of its alleged superiority, or the natural order of things. For example, women are said to be by nature passive, domestic, submissive, etc., and their proper domain is thus deemed to be the private sphere, the home, while the public sphere was reserved for, allegedly, more active, rational, and domineering men. **In these ideological operations we see abstraction at work: ideologies which legitimate the superiority of men over women**, or of capitalism over other social systems, **so as to attempt to justify the privileges of the ruling classes** or strata, -- such patriarchal capitalist ideologies abstract from the injustices, inequities, and suffering produced by patriarchal capitalism, such as the glaring inequities of power and wealth within a supposedly egalitarian society. Thus I believe that **abstraction is fundamentally related to the key features of ideology such as legitimation, domination, and mystification, and that the drawing of boundaries** (between allegedly inferior and superior systems, groups, policies, values, etc.) **also plays a fundamental role in this process.**[1] **Boundary maintainence** (between men and women, capitalists and workers, whites and non-whites, Americans and the rest of the world, capitalism and communism, etc. etc.) **serves the interests of social domination, as well as the functions of legitimation and mystification of social reality.** Thus I am proposing that the "distortion," "mystification," "masking," and other occluding functions usually associated with ideology are related to a certain sort of abstraction and to a specific type of ideological boundaries.

AT: Deconstruction

(_) Deconstruction creates a political void that will be filled by elites, locking in oppression

Cook '92 (Anthony, Associate Professor, Georgetown Law, New England LR, Spring, 26 New Eng.L. Rev. 751)

The effect of **deconstructing the power** of the author **to** impose a fixed meaning on the text or **offer a continuous narrative is** both **debilitating** and liberating. It is debilitating in that **any attempt to say what should be done** within even our insular Foucaultian preoccupations **may be oppositionalized** and deconstructed **as an illegitimate privileging of one** term, value, **perspective** or narrative **over another**. The struggle over meaning might continue ad infinitum. That is, if **a deconstructionist** is theoretically consistent **and sees deconstruction** not as a political tool but **as a philosophical orientation, political action is impossible, because** such **action requires a degree of closure** that deconstruction, as a theoretical matter, does not permit. Moreover, the approach is debilitating because **deconstruction without material rootedness**, without goals and vision, **creates a political** and spiritual **void into which the socially real power** we theoretically deconstruct **steps and steps on the disempowered and dispossessed**. [*762] **To those dying** from AIDS, stifled by poverty, **dehumanized** by sexism and racism, crippled by drugs **and brutalized by** the many forms of physical, political and economic **violence** that characterizes our narcissistic culture, **power hardly seems a matter of illegitimate theoretical privileging. When vision,** social theory a**nd political struggle do not accompany critique, the void will be filled by the** rich, the **powerful** and the charismatic, **those who influence us through their** eloquence, prestige, wealth and **power**.

AT: Baudrillard

(_) Baudrillard leaves the masses to collapse, only engaging in macro-politics solves

Best and Kellner in 02 (Steven Best, prof phil @ UT el paso and Douglas Kellner, prof phil @ UCLA "Postmodern Politics and the Battle for the Future" http://www.gseis.ucla.edu/faculty/kellner/Illumina%20Folder/kell28.htm)

A postmodern politics begins to take shape during the 1960s, when numerous new political groups and struggles emerged. The development of a new postmodern politics is strongly informed by the vicissitudes of social movements in France, the United States, and elsewhere, as well as by emerging postmodern theories. The utopian visions of modern politics proved, in this context, difficult to sustain and were either rejected in favor of cynicism, nihilism, and, in some cases, a turn to the right, or were dramatically recast and scaled down to more "modest" proportions. **The modern emphasis on collective struggle, solidarity, and alliance politics gave way to extreme fragmentation, as the "movement" of the 1960s splintered into various competing struggles for rights and liberties. The previous emphasis on transforming the public sphere and institutions of domination gave way to new emphases on culture,** personal identity, and everyday life, **as macropolitics were replaced by the micropolitics** of local transformation and subjectivity. In the aftermath of the 1960s, novel and conflicting conceptions of postmodern politics emerged**. Postmodern politics thus take a variety of forms and would include the anti-politics of Baudrillard and his followers, who exhibit a cynical, despairing rejection of the belief in emancipatory social transformation**, as well as a variety of efforts to create a new or reconstructed politics. On the extreme and apolitical position of a Baudrillard**, we are stranded at the end of history, paralyzed and frozen, as the masses collapse into inertia and indifference, and simulacra and technology triumph over agency**. Thus, from Baudrillard's perspective, **all we can do is "accommodate ourselves to the time left to us."**

AT: Baudrillard

(_) Baudrillard's radical theory is incapable solving the problem it critiques, only totalizing solutions are capable of breaking down capitalist structures that are the root cause

Kellner in 98 (Douglas Kellner, prof phil @ UCLA, "Boundaries and Borderlines: Reflections on Jean Baudrillard and Critical Theory" http://www.uta.edu/huma/illuminations/kell2.htm)

Against Foucault, Lyotard, and others who reject macro-theory, the category of totality, or meta-narratives, I would argue that precisely **now we need such totalizing theories to attempt to capture the new totalizations being undertaken by capitalism** in the realm of consumption, the media, information, etc. Now, more than ever, **we need macro-theories that will attempt to cognitively map the context of the new forms of social develoment and the relationships between spheres** like the economy, culture, education, politics, etc. Furthermore, unlike Mark Poster (forthcoming) and others, I believe that **it is a mistake to sever the mode of information from the mode of production**, and believe that there continues to be "determination in the last instance" by the economic in the current stage of capitalism. Thus I would propose that **the new social conditions, new technological developments, and new political challenges should be conceptualized in terms of a theory of techno-capitalism rather than postmodernism**. With Fredric Jameson (1984), I would propose that **we are currently in a new configuration of capitalism where postmodernism can be read as the cultural logic of capital but where the hegemony of capital is still the fundamental principle of social organization and where capital attempts to control ever more domains of life**. I would, however, agree with those who claim that **we need to rethink the problematics of radical politics,** of socialism or even radical social transformation or emancipation, in the light of the new social conditions and challenges -- though I shall not address this issue here Yet **against a radical implosive postmodernism such as one finds in Baudrillard** -- and Arthur Kroker's and David Cook's The Postmodern Scene (1986) **is an even more extreme case** -- I would argue for **the need to draw boundaries**, or conceptual distinctions, and to make what Marx calls "rational abstractions" rather **than leaping into the delirious postmodern implosion of all boundaries, abstractions, and distinctions in the vertiginous flux of the hyperreal**. As Wittgenstein and Derrida attacked metaphysical abstractions which dissolved differences in unifying schemes, we should undertake to criticize ideological-metaphysical abstractions yet should also draw distinctions which make connections and which conceptualize important differences. As Marx put it in his introduction to the Grundrisse: "It might seem, therefore, that in order to talk about production at all we must either pursue the process of historic development through its different phases, or declare beforehand that we are dealing with a specific historical epoch such as e.g. modern bourgeois production, which is indeed our particular theme. However, all epochs of production have certain common traits, common characteristics. Production in general is an abstraction, but a rational abstraction insofar as it really brings out and fixes a common element" (i.e. in different modes of production). Yet Marx goes on to insist that: "Still, this general category, this common element sifted out by comparison, is itself segmented many times over and splits into different determinations. Some determinations belong to all epochs, others only to a few" (Marx 1976, p. 106). Thus, while there are general "determinations valid for production as such," and so for all epochs, we must not, he warns, obscure "their essential differences" (Marx 1976, p. 101). Consequently, for Marx "rational abstraction" fixes a "common element" that plays a constitutive role in various situations and contexts. The "concrete" in this analysis is itself a product of many determinations, many relations, and "rational abstraction" thus designates specific determinations in a multiple and multi-dimensional relational chain. "Bad abstraction" is thus overcome by situating abstractions back into a specific set of differential relations, contextualizing one's concepts and analyses within a set of historically specific and complex social relations. This is what, I maintain, **we need to do in the postmodernism debate: we should grasp the differences between the old and the new stages of society** (or art, philosophy, etc.), **and the continuities between the previous and new stage of society** -- a continuity constituted precisely by the continuing primacy of capitalist relations of production in the current organization of society.[4] Thus, against postmodernists who celebrate the radically "new" -- **and rupture, discontinuity**, and difference, -- I would argue that **we need to characterize both the continuities and the discontinuities in the historical process and that this involves both pointing to ruptures and breaks in recent history as well as continuities**. Consequently, **while New French Theory has attempted to cross the borderline** and to chart out the terrain of the new, **their claims for an absolute break between modernity and postmodernity are not always convincing**. **Although we may be living within a borderline**, or transitional space, between the modern and the postmodern, and may be entering a terrain where old modes of thought and language are not always useful, **it seems at this point in time that in many ways,** New **French Theory is itself flawed and not of much use in helping us to understand and resolve many of the crucial theoretical and political problems that we currently face** (i.e. moving beyond the current age of conservative hegemony, learning to use and live with new technologies in ways that will enhance human life, and understanding and dealing with a wide range of social problems from technological unemployment to AIDS). Thus **while we clearly need new theories and politics to understand the conflicts, problems, and developments of the contemporary era I believe that we need new concatenations of Marxism, Critical Theory, and New French theory to solve the theoretical and political problems which confront us today**.

AT: Baudrillard

(_) Baudrillard is wrong --- his theory rests on untenable premises and ignores the important role that capitalism plays in the creation of the media

Kellner in 98 (Douglas Kellner, prof phil @ UCLA, "Boundaries and Borderlines: Reflections on Jean Baudrillard and Critical Theory" http://www.uta.edu/huma/illuminations/kell2.htm)

It is here, I suggest, on Baudrillard's borderline between the modern and the postmodern, that a critical interrogation of his thought and politics should begin. On this point, **almost every discussion of Baudrillard** in English **seems to presuppose that he is right**, that we are in something like a postmodern condition, that we have left modernity behind and are in a qualitatively new society where the old categories and old distinctions no longer hold. **Such a vision rests**, I believe, **partly on wishful thinking and partly on a desire to differentiate oneself from old-fashioned traditionalists**, while positioning oneself as avant-garde. Stronger, in my forthcoming book on Baudrillard, I shall that **his postmodern social theory rests on some shaky theoretical premises, especially concerning the role of the media, cybernetics and design, and representation and social reproduction in the contemporary world** (Kellner 1989b). Living on the Borderline Consequently, in confronting the differences between Baudrillard and the now classical Critical Theory, the following issues arise: is Baudrillard correct that we have entered a postmodern society, or are we still stuck in a more stream-lined and advanced version of the old capitalist society? Are the fundamental boundaries within social theory (between classes, forces and relations of production, Left and Right, domination and emancipation, representations and reality, etc.) still intact and effective, or have they been superseded and imploded by contemporary social developments? What is the status of representation, social critique, emancipation, and socialism in the allegedly postmodern world? In short, are Marxism and Critical Theory still viable enterprises, or have their assumptions and positions been vitiated by contemporary social developments? My own position is that if Marxism and Critical Theory want to continue to be relevant to the theoretical and political concerns of the present age, they must address the issues advanced by the postmodern challenge to previous traditions of social theory. This means that **critical social theory today must attempt to theorize the new social conditions and phenomena analyzed by the postmodernists, and must demonstrate that their categories and theories continue to be applicable and illuminating in theorizing the new social conditions**. This in turn requires rethinking such enterprises as Marxism and Critical Theory in terms of the new issues posed and the new challenges advanced by the current configurations of the media, consumer and information societies; by cybernetics and design; by the restructuring of labor and production; by the new configurations of class; and by the new modes of the colonization of everyday life. The responses of those identified with Critical Theory to New French Theory and the postmodernism debate so far, however, have been highly defensive and not particularly productive. Habermas has tended to interpret postmodern thinkers under the sign of irrationalism, and has himself continued to defend modernity and rationalism without always successfully addressing the critiques of modernity, rationalism, and his own work advanced by the postmodernists and New French Theory (Habermas 1987). Most recent articles on postmodernism and New French Theory in Telos -- which has consistently championed certain versions of neo-Marxism and Critical Theory in the U.S. over the past two decades -- are primarily hostile, dismissive, and not particularly illuminating (Berman 1984 and Wolin 1984). Their mode of reception is primarily an Adornesque absolute negation rather than a Benjaminian redemptive hermeneutic which would attempt to appropriate or redeem what is valuable and useful in New French Theory. Indeed, I would maintain that Critical Theory has so far rejected New French Theory precisely at those points where its own classical theories are most in need of revision and development: i.e. in attempting to theorize new social conditions and phenomena like the consumer society, media, information, computerization, etc. The classical Critical Theory of the consumer society tends to downplay the importance of sign-value and the semiological dimension, while its media theories and ideology critique of popular culture often underemphasized the importance of form, of codes, of the nature and structure of media themselves --precisely the focus of the best of the New French Theory (Kellner 1989a and 1989b). And, finally, New French Theory has focused on such new phenomena as cybernetics, computerization, the information society, etc. that have appeared since the classical texts of Critical Theory were produced which Critical Theory today must deal with if it is not to become irrelevant to the current problems of the present age. **The attempts of New French Theory,** however, **to conceptualize these new phenomena in terms of a "post," and often anti-Marxian discourse and framework**, however, **are highly problematical as is their frequent denunciation of macro-social theory in favor of micro theory and politics** (this is particularly true of Lyotard, Deleuze and Guattari, and others). It is my view that New French **Theorists like Baudrillard**, Lyotard and Foucault **have made a serious theoretical and political mistake in severing their work from the Marxian critique of capitalism precisely at a point when the logic of capital has been playing an increasingly important role in structuring the new stage of society which I conceptualize as a new stage of capitalism** -- capitalism as techno-capital (Kellner 1989a). Indeed, I would argue that **Marxian categories are of central importance precisely in analyzing the phenomena focused on by Baudrillard** and New French Theory: **the consumer society**, the media, information, computers, etc. **For it is capitalism that is determining what sort of media, information, computers, etc. are being produced and distributed precisely according to their logic and interests**. That is, **in techno-capitalist societies, information,** as Herbert Schiller and others have shown, **is being more and more commodified, accessible only to those who can pay for it and who have access to it. Education itself is becoming more and more commodified as computers become more essential to the process of education, while more and more domains of knowledge and information are commodified and transmitted through computers** (I'm thinking both of computer learning programs which force consumers to buy programs to learn typing, math, history, foreign languages, etc. as well as modem-programs and firms like Compu-Serve which make access an abundance of information, entertainment, networking, etc. via computer for those who can afford to pay its per minute information prices).

AT: Foucault

(_) Foucault's rejection of meta-solutions dooms the alternative, it prevents the formation of new totalizing theories that are essential to breaking down the capitalist structures that are the root cause of the problem

Kellner in 98 (Douglas Kellner, prof phil @ UCLA, "Boundaries and Borderlines: Reflections on Jean Baudrillard and Critical Theory" http://www.uta.edu/huma/illuminations/kell2.htm)

Against Foucault, Lyotard, and others who reject macro-theory, the category of totality, or meta-narratives, I would argue that precisely **now we need such totalizing theories to attempt to capture the new totalizations being undertaken by capitalism** in the realm of consumption, the media, information, etc. Now, more than ever, **we need macro-theories that will attempt to cognitively map the context of the new forms of social develoment and the relationships between spheres** like the economy, culture, education, politics, etc. Furthermore, unlike Mark Poster (forthcoming) and others, I believe that **it is a mistake to sever the mode of information from the mode of production,** and believe that there continues to be "determination in the last instance" by the economic in the current stage of capitalism. Thus I would propose that **the new social conditions, new technological developments, and new political challenges should be conceptualized in terms of a theory of techno-capitalism rather than postmodernism**. With Fredric Jameson (1984), I would propose that **we are currently in a new configuration of capitalism where postmodernism can be read as the cultural logic of capital but where the hegemony of capital is still the fundamental principle of social organization and where capital attempts to control ever more domains of life**. I would, however, agree with those who claim that **we need to rethink the problematics of radical politics,** of socialism or even radical social transformation or emancipation, in the light of the new social conditions and challenges -- though I shall not address this issue here

AT: Foucault

(_) Biopower in contemporary society is an expression of the enhancement of life, not the power to kill

Ojakangus in 05 (Mika, Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies , "Impossible Dialogue on Bio-power" http://www.foucault-studies.com/no2/ojakangas1.pdf)

In fact, the history of modern Western societies would be quite incomprehensible without taking into account that there exists a form o power which refrains from killing but which nevertheless is capable of directing people's lives**. The effectiveness of biopower can be seen lying precisely in that it refrains and withdraws before every demand of killing, even though these demands would derive from the demand of justice.** In bio-political societies, according to Foucault, **capital punishment could not be maintained except by invoking less the enormity of the crime itself than the monstrosity of the criminal: "One had the right to kill those who represented a kind of biological danger to others."**112 However, given that the "right to kill" is precisely a sovereign right, it can be argued that the biopolitical societies analyzed by Foucault were not entirely bio-political. Perhaps, there neither has been nor can be a society that is entirely bio-political. Nevertheless**, the fact is that present-day European societies have abolished capital punishment.** In them, there are no longer exceptions. It is the very "right to kill" that has been called into question. However, it is not called into question because of enlightened moral sentiments, but rather because of the deployment of bio-political thinking and practice. For all these reasons**, Agamben's thesis**, a**ccording to which the concentration camp is the fundamental bio-political paradigm of the West, has to be corrected**.**113 The bio-political paradigm of the West is not the concentration camp, but,** rather, **the present-day welfare society and, instead of homo sacer, the paradigmatic figure of the bio-political society can be seen,** for example, **in the middle-class** Swedish social democrat. **Although this figure is an object** – and a product – of the huge bio-political machinery, **it does not mean that he is permitted to kill without committing homicide**. Actually, **the fact that he eventually dies, seems to be his greatest "crime" against the machinery**. (In bio-political societies, death is not only "something to be hidden away," but, also, as Foucault stresses, the most "shameful thing of all".114) **Therefore, he is not exposed to an unconditional threat of death, but rather to an unconditional retreat of all dying.** In fact, **the bio-political machinery does not want to threaten him, but to encourage him,** with all its material and spiritual capacities**, to live healthily**, to live long and to live happily – even when, in biological terms, he "should have been dead long ago".115 This is because **bio-power is not bloody power over bare life for its own sake but pure power over all life for the sake of the living. It is not power but the living, the condition of all life** – individual as well as collective **– that is the measure of the success of bio-power.**

AT: Foucault

(_) Engaging liberalism is essential to breaking down biopower, it promotes a form of rationality that limits state power

Lacombe in 96 (Danny, Criminology Simon Fraser U, "Reforming Foucault: A Critique of the Social Control Thesis" The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 47, No. 2 Jstor)

The nature of the relation between the individual and the political order concerned Foucault in his studies of 'bio-power' and 'bio-politics'. In this work, he implicitly negates his earlier claims that rights in the West were unequivocally linked to the sovereign (1980b, 1988, 199 1). Foucault introduced the notion of 'bio-power' in his work on sexuality to designate the proliferation of a technology of power-knowledge primarily concerned with life. **Bio-power was a mechanism that took charge of life by 'investing the body, health,** modes of subsistence and habitation, living conditions, the whole space of existence' (Foucault 1980b: 14344, emphasis added). **The notion of bio-power** is useful for our understanding of the phenomenon of resistance because while it **represents a totalizing or universal mechanism -**one that interpellates the subject as a member of a population **- it also contains the seed for a counter-power** or a counter-politics **because that mechanism individualizes the subject of a population**. It is this aspect of bio-power, its simultaneous totalizing and individual-izing tendencies, that is of importance in understanding the strategies by which individual subjects can claim the right to self-determination. Foucault explains that against this [bio-]power that was still new in the nineteenth century, **the forces that resisted relied for support on the very thing it invested, that is, on life and man as a living being**. Since the last century, the great struggles that have challenged the general system of power were not guided by the belief in a return to former rights, or by the age-old dream of a cycle of time or a Golden Age. (. . .) [Wlhat was demanded and what served as an objective was life, understood as the basic needs, man's concrete essence, the realization of his potential, a plentitude of the possible. Whether or not it was Utopia that was wanted is of little importance; what we have seen has been a very real process of struggle; life as a political object was in a sense taken at face value and turned back against the system that was bent on controlling it. It was life more than the law that became the issue of political struggles, even if the latter were formulated through affirmations concerningrights. The 'right' tolife, to one's body, to health, to happiness, to the satisfaction of needs, and beyond all the oppressions or 'alienations,' the 'right' to rediscover what one is and all that one can be, this 'right' (. . .) was the political response to all these new procedures of power which did not derive, either, from the traditional right of sovereignty. (Foucault 1980b: 144-5) **If life, understood here as 'man's concrete essence',** is affirmed through rights claims, **then,** like Foucault **we can no longer conceive law as necessarily linked to the sovereign. It must be linked to a different political rationality,** one I believe, in which human rights are at the centre. While Foucault never specifically addressed the question of human rights, his lectures on 'bio-politics' (at the College de France between 1978 and 1979) suggest that **struggles for life and for self-determination are to be understood in the context of liberalism.** In his lectures, **he explores the relation between bio-power -the mechanisms taking charge of life -**and the emergence of bio-politics, by which he means the way in which a rationalization was attempted, dating from the eighteenth century, for the problems posed to governmental practice by the phenomena specific to an ensemble of living beings: health, hygiene, birthrate, longevity, races . . .(198 1 :353) **Foucault's statement is significant because it suggests that we cannot dissociate the problems posed by the question of population** (bio-power) **from the political rationality within which they emerged, liberalism.** Far from conceiving it as a political theory or a representation of society**, Foucault understands liberalism as an 'art of government',** that is, **as a particular practice, activity and rationality used to administer, shape, and direct the conduct of people** (1981 :358). **As a rationality of government** - a 'governmentality' -liberalism, towards the beginning of the eighteenth century, breaks from reason of state (la raison d'e'tat) which since the sixteenth century had sought to 'justify the growing exercise of government' (Foucault 198 1 :354). **What distinguishes liberalism from reason of state as an art of government is that for liberalism 'there is always too much government'** (Foucault 1981: 354-5). In fact, **far from being organized around the principle of a strong state, liberalism upholds the principle of maximal economy with minimal government** (Foucault 1981: 354). **The question of liberalism,** that of 'too much governing,' **regulates itself**, according to Foucault, 'by means of a continuing reflection' (1 98 1: 354). **The idea of reflexivity here is significant because it refers to a mechanism of self-critique, and self-limitation, inherent in liberalism**. Foucault claims that Liberalism (. . .) constitutes - and this is the reason both for its polymorphous character and for its recurrences - an instrument for the criticism of reality. **Liberalism criticizes an earlier functioning government from which one tries to escape;** it examines an actual practice of government that one attempts to reform and to rationalize by a fundamental analysis; it criticizes a practice of government to which one is opposed and whose abuses one wishes to curb. As a result of this, one can discover liberalism under different but simultaneous forms, both as a schema for the regulation of governmental practice and as a theme for sometimes radical opposition to such practice. (Foucault 198 1 : 356) **What allows liberalism to oppose state power**, then, **is not the principle of sovereignty or the idea of a natural right external to the state; rather it is a rationality, a governmentality of life that takes on 'the character of a challenge'** (Foucault 1981 :353). **People resist the conditions under which they live, they make claims for or against the state, because they have been submitted to government.** In other words**, the political technologies that seek to render us governable as a population** (bio-power and bio-politics) **simultaneously make possible the critique of these same technologies.'**

AT: Foucault

(_) Foucault's relativism dooms his project, it forces the alternative into a morally bankrupt mode of thinking – the only ethical action is to take action to increase access to public health

Masena and Nijhuis in 99 (Laurent J G van der Maesena, Netherlands Institute for the Social Sciences and Harry G Nijhuis Municipal Department of Public Health, , "Continuing the debate on the philosophy of modern public health: social quality as a point of reference" http://jech.bmj.com/cgi/content/full/54/2/134?ck=nck)

Foucault's conceptual scheme is highly stimulating for analysing propositions and points of view on ethical questions. **The position taken** by Petersen and Lupton however also **implies a form of relativism**. The world is appreciated as totally contingent and dependent on the structure of human minds. **Claims for an objective reality are judged as arrogant**. Doyal and Gough commented implicitly on Foucault's perspective by stating **the consistent relativist** one who regards the whole of social life as a "construction", each aspect of which has no more or less veracity than the other **enters a moral wasteland into which few have feared to tread**.78 Roy Bhaskar's conclusion concerning the epistemic fallacy can be applied to Peterson's and Lupton's study as well. **Statements about being can be reduced to or analysed in terms of statements about knowledge**—that is, **that ontological questions can always be transposed into epistemological terms**. **This results in the systematic dissolution of the idea of a world independent of but investigated by science.**79 From our perspective, **society is to be conceived both as the totality of conditions of human actions and as the result of human actions**. **For a valid comprehension of society as a subject of public heath, the multi-layered mechanisms that can change these human actions and strategies need to be analysed. The challenge of our modern enterprise of public health is to improve social conditions related to health**. **In doing so**, **we are** in fact **meeting our values and norms**, **in other words, the ethical questions of public health.** The social quality theory tries to respond to this challenge. In our opinion, **modern public health,** based on a theory of which we have attempted to outline some principles**, has to play an important part in this moral endeavour.**

AT: Agamben

(_) Sovereignty must be used strategically –-- critique can be simultaneous

Lombardi '96 (Mark Owen, Associate Prof Political Science – Tampa, Perspectives on Third-World Sovereignty, p. 161)

Sovereignty is in our collective minds. What we look at, the way we look at it and what we expect to see must be altered. This is the call for international scholars and actors. **The assumptions of the paradigm will dictate the solution and approaches considered. Yet, a mere call to change this structure of the system does little except activate reactionary impulses and intellectual retrenchment. Questioning the very precepts of sovereignty,** as has been done in many instances, **does not in and of itself address the problems and issues so critical to transnational relations. That is why theoretical changes and paradigm shifts must be coterminous with applicative studies. One does not and should not precede the other. We cannot wait until we have a neat self-contained and accurate theory of transnational relations before we launch into studies of** Third-World issues and **problem-solving. If we wait we will never address the latter and arguably most important issue-area: the welfare and quality of life for the human race.**

(_) Agamben's criticism fetishizes biopolitics, using it as an excuse for action or instrument for confronting it blocking critical thought

Virno, 2002 (Paolo,"General intellect, exodus, multitude," in Archipelago number 54, June, http://www.neuralyte.org/~joey/generation-online/p/fpvirno2.htm)

Agamben is a thinker of great value but also, in my opinion, a thinker with no political vocation. Then, when Agamben speaks of the biopolitical he has the tendency to transform it into an ontological category with value already since the archaic Roman right. And, in this, in my opinion, he is very wrong-headed. The problem is, I believe, that the biopolitical is only an effect derived from the concept of labor-power. When there is a commodity that is called labor-power it is already implicitly government over life. Agamben says, on the other hand, that labor-power is only one of the aspects of the biopolitical; I say the contrary: over all because labor power is a paradoxical commodity, because it is not a real commodity like a book or a bottle of water, but rather is simply the potential to produce. As soon as this potential is transformed into a commodity, then, it is necessary to govern the living body that maintains this potential, that contains this potential. Toni (Negri) and Michael (Hardt), on the other hand, use biopolitics in a historically determined sense, basing it on Foucault, but Foucault spoke in few pages of the biopolitical - in relation to the birth of liberalism - that Foucault is not a sufficient base for founding a discourse over the biopolitical and my apprehension, my fear, is that the biopolitical can be transformed into a word that hides, covers problems instead of being an instrument for confronting them. A fetish word, an "open doors" word, a word with an exclamation point, a word that carries the risk of blocking critical thought instead of helping it. Then, my fear is of fetish words in politics because it seems like the cries of a child that is afraid of the dark..., the child that says "mama, mama!", "biopolitics, biopolitics!". I don't negate that there can be a serious content in the term, however I see that the use of the term biopolitics sometimes is a consolatory use, like the cry of a child, when what serves us are, in all cases, instruments of work and not propaganda words.

AT: Agamben

(_) Agamben's critique fails, another state formation will always rise instead wehsould use the state in strategic instances for responsibility of human needs.

Passavant in 07 (Paul A, Political Theory 2007; 35; 147, "The Contradictory State of Giorgi Agamben," http://ptx.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/35/2/147, Pg25-26)

Finally, Agamben indicates, through the example of the apostle Paul and the remnant of those who faithfully adhere to messianic law, **the possibility of active political subjects adequate to the challenge of state sovereignty.** This argument, however, contradicts his earlier positions embracing potentiality over the acts emblematic of sovereign decisions, and an experience of being beyond any idea of law. It also, **by relying on a determinate situation to create the conditions of possibility for a successful speech act**, **occludes the forms of power needed to maintain this situation against other ontological possibilitie**s much as his first theory of passage beyond the state of integrated spectacle did. This argument also begs the question of how this messianic community might relate to that which remains other to its situation. That is, **Agamben must address the very questions that his ontological approach to state sovereignty intended to avoid— questions of power and otherness.** In sum**, Agamben remains haunted by the very problems that motivated not only his critique of the state but also his attempt to remove this inquiry from political philosophy** to "first" philosophy. 43 At the end of Agamben's theory of the state, politics remains. **There are four implications of this critique for political theory and the state.** First, the modern state is poorly understood as transcendent, unitary, and sovereign. **The "state" encompasses a variety of institutions, many of which predate modernity.**44 The Foucauldian understanding of *government*, I suggested, is the practice by which articulations between these institutions are forged—and non-state institutions are joined to this chain—and they are mobilized toward various purposes. **The plural nature of this ensemble is precisely what gives extension to the modern state**.45 **Second, if we treat the state as an ensemble of institutions, then the concept of a state of emergency is poorly suited to understanding our political present**. Agamben rightly criticizes the USA PATRIOT Act in *State of Exception*. This law, like most laws that are passed in an ongoing legal system, amends a variety of other laws and sits on a foundation created by these other laws, such as the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. The Antiterrorism Act created the possibility of attributing guilt by association since it criminalized the provision of material support for organizations that the administration deems "terrorist"—provisions that the USA PATRIOT Act builds upon.46 From this perspective, current policies are less "exceptional," unfortunately, and more a continuing development of a national security state apparatus that has been built through legislation like the National Security Act of 1947, through discourse, and through the creation of stakeholders (the military-industrial complex).47 In other words, **another state formation is struggling to emerge through the ruin of liberal democracy in the United States, and this emergence (and ruin) is hastened by those who seek to enhance surveillance and presidential powers,** while diminishing the power of courts and legislative oversight as a response to September 11, 2001.48 Third, **any social formation is constituted by elements of both contingency and determination**. By emphasizing pure potentiality, **Agamben misses this** and either cherishes the excessive quality of pure potentiality to the neglect of the exigent needs of the present, or **neglects how the active political subjects he does defend are embedded within finite commitments that necessarily persevere through the foreclosure of other possibilities.** Some contemporary political theorists concerned with injustice and the lack of democracy also emphasize contingency, excess, and potentiality over determination, finitude, and acts.49 These theorists correctly seek to disrupt oppressive patterns. Since politics—hence political change—would not be possible under conditions of absolute determination, emphasizing contingency or excess makes sense. Yet reflection upon the retraction of certain state services from places like the Bronx during the late 1970s permits us to see how neither justice nor democracy is served by excessive economic duress or violence. Not only are these contingencies unjust, but also their *incapacitating* effects prevent democratic practices of government where the latter necessarily presupposes some collective *capacity* to direct and achieve collective purposes. **State actions that mitigate chaos, economic inequality, and violence, then, potentially contribute to the improved justice of outcomes and democracy.** Political theorists must temper celebrating contingency with a simultaneous consideration of the complicated relation that determination has to democratic purposes.5 **Fourth, the state's institutions are among the few with the capacity to respond to the exigency of human needs** identified by political theorists. These actions will necessarily be finite and less than wholly adequate, but **responsibility may lie on the side of acknowledging these limitations and seeking to redress what is lacking in state action rather than calling for pure potentiality and an end to the state.** We may conclude that claims to justice or democracy based on the wish to rid ourselves of the state once and for all are like George W. Bush claiming to be an environmentalist because he has proposed converting all of our cars so that they will run on hydrogen.51 Meanwhile, in the here and now, there are urgent claims that demand finite acts that by definition will be both divisive and less than what a situation demands.52 **In the end, the state remains. Let us defend this state of due process and equal protection against its ruinous other.**

A2: Ontology

(_) Preventing widespread death precedes ontological questioning

Davidson '89 (Arnold L., Associate Prof Philosophy – U Chicago, Critical Inquiry, Winter, p. 426)

I understand **Levinas'** work to **suggest another path to the recovery of the human, one that leads through or toward other human beings**: "The dimension of the divine opens forth from the human face… Hence **metaphysics is enacted where the social relation is enacted**- in our relations with men… The Other is not the incarnation of God, but precisely by his face, in which he is disincarnate, is the manifestation of the height in which God is revealed. It is our relations with men… that give to theological concepts the sole signification they admit of." **Levinas places ethics before ontology by beginning with our experience of the human face**: and, in a clear reference to Heidegger's idolatry of the village life of peasants, **he associated himself with Socrates, who preferred the city where he encountered men to the country** with its trees. In his discussion of skepticism and the problem of others, **Cavell also aligns himself with this path of thought, with the recovery of the finite human self through the acknowledgement of others**: "As long as God exists, I am not alone. And couldn't the other suffer the fate of God?… I wish to understand how the other now bears the weight of God, shows me that I am not alone in the universe. This requires understanding the philosophical problem of the other as the trace or scar of the departure of God [CR, p.470]." **The suppression of the other, the human, in Heidegger's thought accounts**, I believe, **for the absence**, in his writing after the war, **of the experience of horror. Horror is always directed toward the human; every object of horror bears the imprint of the human will**. So **Levinas can see in Heidegger's silence about the gas chambers and death camps "a kind of consent to the horror."** And **Cavell can characterize Nazis as "those who have lost the capacity for being horrified by what they do**." Where was Heidegger's horror? How could he have failed to know what he had consented to? Hannah **Arendt associates Heidegger with** Paul **Valery's aphorism**, "Les evenements ne sont que l'ecume des choses' ('**Events are but the foam of things**')." I think one understands the source of her intuition. **The mass extermination of human beings, however, does not produce foam, but dust and ashes; and it is here that questioning must stop**.

(_) It's impossible to determine an answer to being –-- ontological questioning results in an infinite regress and total political paralysis

Levinas and Nemo '85 (Emmanuel, Professor of Philosophy, and Philippe, Professor of New Philosophy, Ethics and Infinity, p. 6-7)

Are we not in need of still more precautions**? Must we not step back from this question to raise another, to recognize the obvious circularity of asking what is** the "What is …? question? It seems to beg the question. Is our new suspicion, then, that **Heidegger begs the question of metaphysics when he asks "What is poetry?" or "What is thinking?"? Yet his thought is insistently anti-metaphysical**. **Why, then, does he retain the metaphysical question par excellence?** Aware of just such an objection, he proposes, against the vicious circle of the *petitio principi,* an alternative, productive circularity: hermeneutic questioning. **To ask "What is. …? does not partake of onto-theo-logy if one acknowledges** (1) **that the answer can never be** fixed absolutely, **but** calls **essentially**, **endlessly**, for additional "What is …? questions. Dialectical refinement here replaces vicious circularity. **Further**, beyond **the** openmindedness called for by dialectical refinement, hermeneutic **questioning** (2) **insists on avoiding subjective impositions**, on avoiding reading into rather than harkening to things. **One must harken to the things themselves**, ultimately to being, in a careful attunement to what is. But do the refinement and care of the hermeneutic question …which succeed in avoiding ontotheo-logy succeed in avoiding all viciousness? Certainly they convert a simple fallacy into a productive inquiry, they open a path for thought. **But is it not the case that however much refinement and care one brings to bear, to ask what something is leads to asking what something else is, and so on and so forth, ad infinitum***?* What is disturbing in this is not so much the infinity of interpretive depth, which has the virtue of escaping onto-theo-logy and remaining true to the way things are, to the phenomena, **the coming to be and passing away of being. Rather, the problem lies in the influence the endlessly open horizon of such thinking exerts on the way of such thought. That is, the problem lies in what seems to be the very virtue of hermeneutic thought, namely, the doggedness of the "What is . . .?" question, in its inability to escape itself, to escape being and essence**.

AT: Heidegger/Critique of Technology

NOTE: ep·i·gone: n. A second-rate imitator or follower, especially of an artist or a philosopher.

(_) No Link and Turn – only the negative forgets Being when they engage in a totalizing account of technologization – abandoning empiricism and the traditional sciences is the fastest path to their impacts

Latour in 93 (Bruno, Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris, We Have Never Been Modern, pp 65-67)

Who Has Forgotten Being? . In the beginning, though, the idea of the difference between Being and beings seemed a fairly good mçans of harbouring the quasi-objects, a third strategy added to that of the modernizing philosophers and to that of linguistic turns. Quasi-objects do not belong to Nature, or to Society, or to the subject; they do not belong to language, either. **By deconstructing metaphysics** (that is, the modern Constitution taken in its isolation from the work of hybridization), Martin **Heidegger designates the central point where everything holds together, remote from subjects and objects alike**. 'What is strange in the thinking of Being is its simplicity. Precisely this keeps us from it' (Heidegger, 1977a). By revolving around this navel, this omphalos, the philosopher does assert the existence of an articulation between metaphysical purification and the work of mediation. 'Thinking is on the descent to the poverty of its provisional essence. Thinking gathers language into simple saying. In this way language is the language of Being, as the clouds are the clouds of the sky' (p.242). **But immediately the philosopher loses this well-intentioned simplicity. Why? Ironically, he himself indicates the reason for this, in an apologue on Heraclitus who used to take shelter in a baker's oven**. 'Einai gar kai entautha theous' — '**here, too, the gods are present,' said Heraditus to visitors who were astonished to see him warming his poor carcass like an ordinary mortal** (Heidegger, 1977b, p.233). 'Auch hier namlich wesen Götter an.' **But Heidegger is taken in as much as those naive visitors, since he and his epigones do not expect to find Being except along the Black Forest** Holzwege. **Being cannot reside in ordinary beings. Everywhere, there is desert. The gods cannot reside in technology — that pure Enframing (Zimmerman, 1990) of being** [Ge-Stell], that ineluctable fate [Geschickj, **that supreme danger** [Gefahr]. **They are not to be sought in science, either, since science has no other essence but that of technology** (Heidegger, 1977b). **They are absent from politics**, sociology, psychology, anthropology, history — which is the history of Being, and counts its epochs in millennia. **The gods cannot reside in economics — that pure calculation forever mired in beings and worry.** They are not to be found in philosophy, either, or in ontology, both of which lost sight of their destiny 2,500 years ago. **Thus Heidegger treats the modern world** as the visitors treat Heraclitus; **with contempt**. **And yet — 'here too the gods are present': in a hydroelectric plan**t on the banks of the Rhine, **in subatomic particles, in Adidas shoes** as well as in the old wooden clogs hollowed out by hand, **in agribusiness as well as in time worn landscapes**, in shopkeepers' calculations as well as in Hölderlin's heartrending verse. **But why do those philosophers no longer recognize them? Because they believe what the modern Constitution says about itself! This paradox should no longer astonish us**. The modems indeed declare that technology is nothing but pure instrumental mastery, science pure Enframing and pure Stamping [Das Ge-Stell], that economics is pure calculation, capitalism pure reproduction, the subject pure consciousness. Purity everywhere! **They claim this, but we must be careful not to take them at their word, since what they are asserting is only half of the modern world, the work of purification that distils what the work of hybridization supplies**. **Who has forgotten Being? No one, no one ever has, otherwise Nature would be truly available as a pure 'stock'. Look around you: scientific objects are circulating simultaneously as subjects objects and discourse. Networks are full of Being. As for machines, they are laden with subjects and collectives. How could a being lose its difference, its incompleteness, its mark, its trace of Being? This is never in anyone's power**; otherwise we should have to imagine that we have truly been modem, we should be taken in by the upper half of the modern Constitution.

<<<continues on next page>>>

AT: Heidegger/Critique of Technology

<<<Latour in 93, continued from previous page, no text removed>>>

Has someone, however, **actually forgotten Being? Yes; anyone who really thinks that Being has really been forgotten**. **As Levi-Strauss says, 'the barbarian is first and foremost the man who believes in barbarism.**' (Levi-Strauss, [1952] 1987, p. 12). **Those who have failed to undertake empirical studies of sciences, technologies, law, politics, economics, religion or fiction have lost the traces of Being that are distributed everywhere among beings. If, scorning empiricism, you opt out of the exact sciences, then the human sciences, then traditional philosophy, then the sciences .of language, and you hunker down in your forest — then you will indeed feel a tragic loss. But what is missing is you yourself, not the world! Heidegger's epigones have converted that glaring weakness into a strength. 'We don't know anything empirical, but that doesn't matter, since your world is empty of Being. We are keeping the little flame of Being safe from everything, and you, who have all the rest, have nothing.' On the contrary: we have everything, since we have Being, and beings, and we have never lost track of the difference between Being and beings. We are carrying out the impossible project undertaken by Heidegger,** who believed what the modem Constitution said about itself without understanding that what is at issue there is only half of a larger mechanism which has never abandoned the old anthropological matrix. **No one can forget Being, since there has never been a modem world,** or, by the same token, metaphysics. We have always remained pre-Socratic, pre-Cartesian, pre-Kantian, pre-Nietzschean. **No radical revolution can separate us from these pasts, so there is no need for reactionary counter- revolutions to lead us back to what has never been abandoned**. Yes, Heraclitus is a surer guide than Heidegger: 'Einai gar kai entautha theous.'

AT: Heidegger

(_) Heidegger's alternative can never yield positive change – it tips the balances toward dogmatic authoritarianism

Thiele in 03 (Leslie, Professor of Political Science at the University of Florida. "The Ethics and Politics of Narrative" Foucault and Heidegger: Critical Encounters)

The pursuit of knowledge continues unabated for the skeptic. Yet it proceeds with a suspicious eye. There are inherent limitations toand a price to pay for-the pursuit of knowledge. Charles Scott describes Foucault's efforts in this regard: "Far from the skepticism that argues that nothing is really knowable ... genealogies embody a sense of the historical limits that define our capacities for knowing and believing. Things are known. But they are known in ways that have considerable social and cultural costs."" Both **Heidegger** and Foucault **maintain[s]** that **there is no legitimate basis for the radical skeptic's conviction that knowledge is impossible or unworthy of pursuit**. **This sort of skepticism**, Heidegger states**, consists merely in an "addiction to doubt**."? **The skeptical nature of political philosophical thought**, in contrast, **is grounded in the imperative of endless inquiry.** The point for Heidegger and Foucault is to inquire not in order to sustain doubt, but to doubt that one might better sustain inquiry. At the same time, **inquiry is tempered with a sensibility of the ethico-political costs of any "knowledge" that is gained. Doing political philosophy of this sort might be likened to walking on a tightrope. If vertigo is experienced, a precarious balance may be lost. Falling to one side leaves one mired in apathy, cynicism, and apoliticism. This results when skeptical inquiry degenerates into a radical skepticism, an addictive doubt that denies the value of (the search for) knowledge and undermines the engagements of collective life, which invariably demand commitment (based on tentatively embraced knowledge). Falling to the other side of the tightrope leaves one mired in dogmatic belief or blind activism. Authoritarian ideologies come to serve as stable foundations, or a reactive iconoclasm leads to irresponsible defiance. Apathy, cynicism, and apoliticism, on the one side, and dogmatic authoritarianism or reactive iconoclasm, on the other, are the dangerous consequences of losing one's balance.** These states of mind and their corresponding patterns of behavior relieve the vertigo of political philosophical inquiry, but at a prohibitive cost. It has been argued that Foucault did not so much walk the tightrope of political philosophy as straddle it, at times leaving his readers hopeless and cynical, at times egging them on to an irresponsible monkeywrenching. For some, the Foucauldian flight from the ubiquitous powers of normalization undermines any defensible normative position. Hopelessness accompanies lost innocence. Cynicism or nihilism become the only alternatives for those who spurn all ethical and political foundations. By refusing to paint a picture of a better future, Foucault is said to undercut the impetus to struggle. Others focus on Foucault's development of a "tool kit" whose contents are to be employed to deconstruct the apparatuses of modern power. Yet the danger remains that Foucault's "hyperactive" tool-kit users will be unprincipled activists, Luddites at best, terrorists at worst. In either case, Foucault provides no overarching theoretical vision. Indeed, Foucault is upfront about his rejection of ethical and political theories and ideals. "I think that to imagine another system is to extend our participation in the present system," Foucault stipulates. "Reject theory and all forms of general discourse. This need for theory is still part of the system we reject."!" One might worry whether action is meant to take the place of thought. If Foucault occasionally straddles the tightrope of political philosophy, **Heidegger obviously stumbled off it**. In the 1930S, **Heidegger enclosed himself within an authoritarian system of thought grounded in ontological reifications of a "folk" and its history. Heidegger's historicization of metaphysics** led him to believe that a new philosophic epoch was about to be inaugurated. It implicitly **called for a philosophical Fuehrer who could put an end to two millennia of ontological forgetting**. **The temptation for Heidegger to identify himself as this intellectual messiah and to attach himself to an authoritarian social and political movement capable of sustaining cultural renewal proved irresistible**. Whether Heidegger ever fully recovered his balance has been the topic of much discussion**. Some argue that Heidegger's prerogative for political philosophizing was wholly undermined by his infatuation with folk destiny, salvational gods, and political authority.** 12

AT: Heidegger

(_) The alternative will destroy ethics and only cause suffering

Thiele in 03 (Leslie, Professor of Political Science at the University of Florida. "The Ethics and Politics of Narrative" Foucault and Heidegger: Critical Encounters)

The complementarity of Heidegger's and Foucault's accounts of modern demons and saving graces should not be too surprising. Foucault's indebtedness to and fascination with Heidegger is well documented.' My intent in this chapter is neither to focus on the complementarity of these visions, nor to outline the striking philosophical and political differences that remain in Heidegger's and Foucault's work. Rather, I attempt to make a claim for what at first blush might appear a lost cause. Despite their originality and intellectual brilliance, **Heidegger and Foucault are often castigated as ethico-political dead-ends. They are criticized for their unwillingness or inability to supply the grounds for sound moral and political judgment. Heidegger's embrace of Nazism**, in particular, **is frequently identified as proof positive that he has little, if anything, to contribute to the ethico-political domain. The standard charge is that his highly abstract form of philosophizing, empyrean ontological vantage point, and depreciation of "das Man" undermines moral principle and political responsibility.** From his philosophical heights, it is suggested, **Heidegger remained blind to human sufferings, ethical imperatives, and political practicalities. He immunized himself against the moral sensitivity, compassion, and prudence that might have dissuaded him from endorsing and identifying with a brutal regime. Those who embrace his philosophy, critics warn, court similar dangers.** In like fashion, it is held that Foucault dug himself into an equally deep, though ideologically relocated, moral and political hole. Genealogical studies left Foucault convinced of the ubiquity of the disciplinary matrix. There would be no final liberation. The sticky, normalizing webs of power were inescapable and a "hermeneutics of suspicion" quashed any hope of gaining the ethical and political high ground.? As such, critics charge, Foucault stripped from us all reason for resistance to unjust power and all hope of legitimating alternative ethico-political institutions. In a Foucauldian world of panoptic power that shapes wants, needs, and selves, critics worry, one would have no justification for fighting and nothing worth fighting for.' In sum, Heidegger's and Foucault's critics suggest that both thinkers undermine the foundations of the practical wisdom needed to ethically and politically navigate late modernity. Despite the brilliance and originality of their thought, arguably the greatest philosopher and the greatest social and political theorist of the twentieth century remain ungrounded ethically and divorced from political responsibility. **Critics argue that Heidegger's statements and actions endorsing and defending Nazi authoritarianism and Foucault's radical anarchism, as displayed in his discussions of popular justice with Maoists, demonstrate that neither thinker is capable of supplying us with the resources for sound moral and political judgment.**

AT: Ontology/Heidegger Alt (Graham)

(_) Their alternative can't solve their links – waiting for the world and existence to reveal itself only cedes the battle to the very forces of destructive hyper-capitalism that their links and impacts indentify

Graham in 99 (Phil Graham, Graduate School of Management , University of Queensland, "Heidegger's Hippies: A dissenting voice on the "problem of the subject" in cyberspace", [Conference paper] Identities in action! 10-12 December, 1999, University of Wales, http://www.philgraham.net/HH_conf.pdf)

Societies should get worried when Wagner's music becomes popular because it usually means that distorted interpretations of Nietzsche's philosophy are not far away. Existentialists create problems about what is, especially identity (Heidegger 1947). **Existentialism inevitably leads to an authoritarian worldview**:

> this, my Dionysian world of the eternally self-creating, the eternally self-destroying, this mystery world of twofold voluptuous delight, my "beyond good and evil," without a goal, unless the joy of the circle itself is a goal; without will, unless a ring feels good will towards itself – do you want a name for this world? A solution to all its riddles? A light for you, too, you best-concealed, strongest, most intrepid, most midnightly men? – This world is the will to power – and nothing besides! And you yourselves are also this will to power – and nothing besides! (Nietzsche 1967/1997).

Armed with a volume of Nietzsche, some considerable oratory skills, several Wagner records, **and an existentialist** University Rector **in the form of** Martin **Heidegger**, **Hitler managed some truly astounding feats of strategic identity engineering** (cf. Bullock, 1991). Upon being appointed to the Freiberg University, Heidegger pronounced the end of thought, history, ideology, and civilisation: 'No dogmas and ideas will any longer be the laws of your being. The Fuhrer himself, and he alone, is the present and future reality for Germany' (in Bullock 1991: 345). Heidegger signed up to an ideology-free politics: Hitler's 'Third Way' (Eatwell 1997). The idealised identity, the new symbol of mythological worship, Nietzsche's European Superman, was to rule from that day hence. Hitler took control of the means of propaganda: the media; the means of mental production: the education system; the means of violence: the police, army, and prison system; and pandered to the means of material production: industry and agriculture; and proclaimed a New beginning and a New world order. He ordered Germany to look forward into the next thousand years and forget the past. Heidegger and existentialism remain influential to this day, and history remains bunk (e.g. Giddens4, 1991, Chapt. 2). Giddens's **claims that 'humans live in circumstances of … existential contradiction', and that 'subjective death' and 'biological death' are somehow unrelated, is a an ultimately repressive abstraction: from that perspective, life is merely a series of subjective deaths, as if death were the ultimate motor of life itself** (cf. Adorno 1964/1973). **History is**, in fact, **the simple and straightforward answer to the "problem of the subject**". "**The problem" is also a handy device for confusing, entertaining, and selling trash to the masses. By emphasising the problem of the 'ontological self'** (Giddens 1991: 49), **informationalism and 'consumerism' confines the navel-gazing, 'narcissistic' masses to a permanent present which they self-consciously sacrifice for a Utopian future** (cf. Adorno 1973: 303; Hitchens 1999; Lasch 1984: 25-59). **Meanwhile transnational businesses go about their work, raping the environment; swindling each other and whole nations; and inflicting populations with declining wages, declining working conditions, and declining social security. Slavery is once again on the increase** (Castells, 1998; Graham, 1999; ILO, 1998). **There is no "problem of the subject"**, just as there is no "global society"; **there is only the mass amnesia of utopian propaganda, the strains of which have historically accompanied revolutions in communication technologies.** Each person's identity is, quite simply, their subjective account of a unique and objective history of interactions within the objective social and material environments they inhabit, create, and inherit. The identity of each person is their most intimate historical information, and they are its material expression: each person is a record of their own history at any given time. Thus, each person is a recognisably material, identifiable entity: an identity. This is their condition. **People are not theoretical entities; they are people. As such, they have an intrinsic identity with an intrinsic value. No amount of theory or propaganda will make it go away**. **The widespread multilateral attempts to prop up consumer society and hypercapitalism as a valid and useful means of sustainable growth, indeed**, **as the path to** an inevitable, international **democratic Utopia, are already showing their disatrous cracks. The "problem" of subjective death threatens to give way, once again, to unprecedented mass slaughter. The numbed condition of a narcissistic society, rooted in a permanent "now", a blissful state of Heideggerian Dasein, threatens to wake up to a world in which "subjective death" and ontology are the least of all worries**.

Heidegger = Nazi

(_) Heidegger's alternative results in Nazism to avoid the problems of the world it presents

Zizek in 99 (Professor of Philosophy at the University of Ljubljana. The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Centre of Political Ontology, pg 21)

The standard story about Heidegger is that he accomplished his *Kehre* (turn) after becoming aware of how the original project of *Being and Time* leads back to transcendental subjectivism: owing to the unreflected remainder of subjectivism (decisionism, etc.), **Heidegger let himself be seduced into his Nazi engagement**; when, however, he became aware of how he had burnt his fingers' with it, he cleared up the remainders of subjectivism and developed the idea of the historical-epochal character of Being itself. . . One is tempted to invert this standard story: **there is a kind of ~vanishing mediator' between Heidegger I and Heidegger II, a position of radicalized subjectivity coinciding with its opposite that is, reduced to an empty gesture, the impossible intersection between the 'decisionism' of Heidegger I and his late 'fatalism'** (the event of Being 'takes place' in man, who serves as its shepherd . . .). Far from being the 'practical consequence' of this radicalized subjectivity, **Heidegger's Nazi engagement was a desperate attempt to avoid it.** . . . In other words, what Heidegger later dismissed as the remainder of the subjectivist transcendental approach in *Being and Time* is what he should have stuck to. **Heidegger's ultimate failure is not that he remained stuck in the horizon of transcendental subjectivity, but that he abandoned this horizon all too quickly, before thinking out all its inherent possibilities. Nazism was not a political expression of the 'nihilist, demoniac potential of modern subjectivity' but, rather, its exact opposite: a desperate attempt to avoid this potential.**

(_) Heidegger's Nazism can't be separated from his philosophy

Thiele in 03 (Leslie, Professor of Political Science at the University of Florida. "The Ethics and Politics of Narrative" Foucault and Heidegger: Critical Encounters)

Heidegger was a Nazi and a rather unrepentant one at that. Some suggest Heidegger's Nazism cannot be separated from his philosophy, that indeed the former follows from the latter. The argument, in short, is that **Heidegger's political biography pretty well tells the whole story.** This position has been rearticulated periodically since the end of the Second World War, each time creating something of an academic row. To be sure, **the story of Heidegger's life does not well illustrate an education in sound moral and political judgment**, except perhaps as an example of a lesson left unlearned. Yet the story that Heidegger himself tells about human life, about human being in history, can do much to cultivate moral and political judgment. I assert this despite insightful critiques of Heidegger that accuse him of ignoring and eliding phronesis as human potentiality. My argument, then, is not that Heidegger's work explicitly celebrates prudence, but that **his philosophical narrative facilitates its cultivation.**

AT: Spanos

(_) Spanos' rejection of Humanism destroys any political project and/ or allies and allows the right to take over

Perkin in 93 (J. Russell, Professor of English at Saint Mary's University, Theorizing the Culture Wars, Postmodern Culture PMC 3.3, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/postmodern_culture/v003/3.3r_perkin.html)

My final criticism is that **Spanos**. by his attempt to put all humanists into the same category and to break totally with the tradition of humanism**, isolates himself in a posture of ultra leftist purity that cuts him off from many potential political allies**, especially when, as I will note in conclusion. **His practical recommendations for the practical role of an adversarial intellectual seem similar to those of the liberal pluralists he attacks**. **He seems ill-informed about what goes on in the everyday work of the academy**, for instance, in the field of composition studies. Spanos laments the "unwarranted neglect" (202) of the work of Paulo Freire, yet in reading composition and pedagogy journals over the last few years, I have noticed few thinkers who have been so consistently cited. Spanos refers several times to the fact that the discourse of the documents comprising The Pentagon Papers was linked to the kind of discourse that first-year composition courses produce (this was Richard Ohmann's argument): here again, however, Spanos is not up to date. For the last decade the field of composition studies has been the most vigorous site of the kind of oppositional practices The End of Education recommends. **The academy, in short, is more diverse. more complex, more genuinely full of difference than Spanos allows, and it is precisely that difference that neoconservatives want to erase. By seeking to seperate out only the pure** (posthumanist) **believers, Spanos seems to me to ensure his self-marginalization**. For example, several times he includes pluralists like Wayne Booth and even Gerald Graff in lists of "humanists" that include William Bennett, Roger Kimball and Dinesh D'Souza. Of course. there is a polemical purpose to this, but it is one that is counterproductive. In fact, I would even question the validity of calling shoddy and often inaccurate journalists like Kimball and D'Souza with the title "humanist intellectuals." Henry Louis Gates's final chapter contains some cogent criticism of the kind of position, which Spanos has taken. Gates argues that the "hard" left's opposition to liberalism is as mistaken as its opposition to conservatism, and refers to Cornel West's remarks about the field of critical legal studies, **"If you don't build on liberalism, you build on air"** (I 87). **Building on air seems -- to me precisely what Spanos is recommending**. *Gates,* on the other hand, criticizes "those rnassively totalizing theories that marginalize practical political action as a jejune indulgence" (192), and endorses a coalition of liberalism and the left.

AT: Spanos

(_) Spanos misrepresents history and fails to correctly build off others' philosophies

Perkin in 93 (J. Russell, Professor of English at Saint Mary's University, Theorizing the Culture Wars, Postmodern Culture PMC 3.3, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/postmodern_culture/v003/3.3r_perkin.html)

Another problem is that **the book makes huge historical assertions that have the effect of lessening difference, even while it attacks the metaphysical principle "that identity is the condition for the possibility of difference and not the other way around"** (4; emphasis in original). This is something Spanos has in common with some followers of Derrida who turn deconstruction into a dogma, rather than realizing that it is a strategy of reading that must take account of the particular logic of the texts being read. Spanos asserts that the classical Greeks were characterized by "originative, differential, and errant thinking" (105), which every subsequent age, beginning with the Alexandrian Greek, through the Romans, the Renaissance, the Enlightenment, and the Victorians, and right up to the present, misunderstood in a reifying and imperialistic appropriation. **This not only implies a somewhat simplistic reception-history of ancient Greek culture; it also, significantly, perpetuates a myth**--the favourite American myth that Spanos in other contexts attacks in the book--**of an original period of innocence, a fall, and the possibility of redemption.** There are further problems with the narrative built into The End of Education. **Humanism is always and everywhere, for Spanos, panoptic, repressive, characterized by "the metaphysics of the centered circle,"** which is repeatedly attacked by reference to the same overcited passage from Derrida's "Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences"--not coincidentally one of the places where Derrida allows himself to make large claims unqualified by their derivation from reading a particular text. In order to make this assertion, Spanos must show that all apparent difference is in fact contained by the same old metaphysical discourse. Thus, within the space of four pages, in the context of making absolute claims about Western education (or thought, or theory), Spanos uses the following constructions: "whatever its historically specific permutations," "despite the historically specific permutations," "Apparent historical dissimilarities," "Despite the historically specific ruptures." (12-15) Western thought, he repeats, has "always reaffirmed a nostalgic and recuperative circuitous educational journey back to the origin" (15). This over-insistence suggests to me that **Spanos is a poor reader of Derrida, for he is not attentive to difference at particular moments or within particular texts. He seems to believe that one can leap bodily out of the metaphysical tradition simply by compiling enough citations from Heidegger**, whereas his rather anticlimactic final chapter shows, as Derrida recognizes more explicitly, that **one cannot escape logocentrism simply by wishing to.**

(_) Spanos ignores real violence and politics in the world

Dutton in 93 (Dennis, Professor of Philosophy at Cantuerbury, "Faking Your Way to Tenure" http://denisdutton.com/faking_tenure.htm)

The End of Education has a chapter entitled "The Violence of Disinterestedness." Now **disinterestedness is not normally what I'd consider violent**, at least compared, say, to a couple of skinheads with baseball bats. But **Spanos finds in its advocacy** (by Arnold, Babbitt, and I.A. Richards) **"a recurrent call for the recuperation of a logocentric pedagogy in the face of historical ruptures that betrayed the complicity of humanistic discourse with an essentially reactionary bourgeois ideology and its discreetly repressive capitalist state apparatuses, which have dominated the vision and practices of liberal Western industrial societies, especially in North America."** Isn't it crazy, when you think of it? **The Western industrial societies, especially in North America, were just about the first places in the world where the vision and practices of liberalism have been given, however imperfectly, a chance to dominate repressive state apparatuses, rather than vice versa. Does it ever occur to Spanos what the military police in Burma do to people they don't like? In Iran? El Salvador? Those cosy Marxist dictatorships in Africa? Give me the "discreet" repression of the Western liberal societies any day. Spanos is a man stuck in the 1960s: he doesn't notice Tiananmen Square because he's still obsessed with Kent State.**

AT: Spanos

(_) Spanos's theory has no historical backing and his writing style only recreates what he rejects

Bryant in 97 (John, Professor of English at Hofstra. "Review: Democracy, Being, and the Art of Becoming America" College English, Vol. 59, No. 6. (Oct., 1997), pp. 705-711)

As bracing as **Spanos's subversive thesis is**, and despite his attempts to rectify the New Americanist approach with a finer grounding in philosophy, its credibility is undermined by the book's wooden historicism and authoritarian style. Generally speaking, Spanos's "thematizing" of Ahab and Ishmael amounts to reductions **supported more by assertion and endless reiteration than by textual demonstration**. **The result is a pronouncement, rather than an analysis**, that never penetrates to the way Melville's words work to bring readers into his ontological dilemma. **Spanos's historicism is** similarly **lacking**. He reduces the development of American culture to a sequence of tableaux vivants with helpful intervening placards: The Puritans Hand Over the Mantle of American Identity to Andrew Jackson. He speaks of Lewis's American Adam and Bercovitch's American Jeremiad as if they were facts, or pieces of legislation fully endorsed by the populace, rather than cultural theses proposed by modern critics to extend, not end, debate on who we are and why. **Spanos** is most effective in discussing the more immediate aspects of Vietnam, but he **never makes more distant eras come** equally **to life. His repeated reference to the "Salem Witch Burnings"-they were hanged-would be a dismissable gaffe if it did not suggest that the author is not sufficiently engaged in historical reality to deal with it except as a set of abstractions.** Spanos's use of Heidegger is necessarily problematic. In purely metaphysical terms the philosopher's Nietzschean notion of the "will to power" is an intelligible means of comprehending Being's temporal differentiations: very transcendental. But then, Heidegger was no Emerson; he joined the Nazi party, took his Jewish mentor Husserl's job, sent a few colleagues racing to the border, but paradoxically conducted an affair with Hannah Arendt. Surely, Heidegger's nazism does not invalidate the notion of errancy that so effectively explains Ishmael. However, in a study such as this, in which politics is said to derail ontological interpretation, we naturally expect a full disclosure of an ontology's political potential. In Spanos's view, the liberal reaction to Stalin "blinded" Americanists to the true ontological value of Moby-Dick and led us into political disaster. Interestingly enough, the optician who crafted the lenses by which we might read Moby-Dick ontologically, with Ishmael as errant hero, was himself blind to that errancy; Heidegger somehow missed his own point and became the authoritarian his philosophy would deny. This fact alone suggests the need for a deeper ontological inquiry into the determinants in Melville's fiction (personality? sex? philosophy?) that cause individuals to mistake Heideggerian fluidity and become an Ahab, or a Heidegger. To be fair, Spanos has written on Heidegger's nazism elsewhere, but his obscure and parenthetical allusions to the issue in this book fail to take this matter to its fullest ontological extent. Spanos's style is a curious self-negation of his principal ideas. It would be too easy to dismiss Spanos for his Heideggerian jargon and Derridean patois. I, for one, enjoy healthy licks of jargon; I love a patois: they encourage a certain critical economy. But **Spanos uses language as a weapon to polarize readers. He consigns past critics to tidy, benighted "post-humanist" camps** and virtually ignores more recent explorers of Melville's complex marginalizing rhetoric (including Barbara Johnson, Nina Bayrn, Lawrence Buell, Michael Rogin, Carolyn Porter, John Samson, and myself)**. This needless drawing of "boundaries" is precisely the opposite of** what **Spanos** (editor of *bounhq* 2, which seeks to break-and break again-critical boundaries) takes to be "errant" Ishmael's supreme achievement. **Spanos uses language to claim hegemony over readers even as he tries to disclose** Melville's **counterhegemonic strategies**. **His sentences wage war against comprehension: it is not simply that abstract subjects perform abstract acts upon abstract objects in his sentences, but that these consmctions are nested within larger equivalent abstractions-clause within clause--each interrupted by dashes into the contrapositive, each larded with oxymorons and paradoxes**. And when such a sentence achieves a period, Spanos begins again with "In other words. ..." But his other words bring no relief. (Spanos's excessive use of mammoth, sometimes two-page block quotes would be offensive if not for the fact that they provide an occasional Tahiti of literary excellence amidst the ocean of his prose.) One might think this mimicry of Heidegger's famously dense style is a postmodern strategy to induce in readers an apt ontological crisis commensurate with Ishmael's condition, In fact, **it simply erects a wall of language that circumscribes an academic domain alien to his ontological project.** This book is the second in a projected trilogy. Let's hope Spanos finds a more effective voice.

Humanism Good

(_) Humanism is critical to fighting wars and oppression – empirically proven

Radest in 89 (Howard, Dean of Humanist Institute and Director of Ethical Culture Schools, "Doing Good: Humanism and the Liberal Temptation", Humanism Today, Vol 5. http://www.humanismtoday.org/vol5/radest.pdf]

HUMANISTS SUPPORT all the "right" causes. We will be found defending peace and arguing for disarmament and opposing nuclear proliferation. Our agenda will include population control and environmental protection, fair housing and civil rights. We will attack censorship and fight for civil liberties. Separation of church and state and religious freedom will stand high among our priorities as will "pro-choice" and public schooling. To our credit, Humanists will tend to be actively engaged in these and other causes, although our engagement will take characteristic form. With rare exceptions as in the "freedom marches" during the 1960's in the South **Humanists will be more likely to petition than to demonstrate, to lobby than to march, to proclaim rather than to analyze.**2 In that**, we exhibit a certain confidence in the processes of democratic change and a certain conservatism in our approach to power and the state.** When pushed, Humanists, reflecting our 18th century rationalist origins, will still exhibit confidence in schooling 3 and will reject the barricade as the way to get political reconstruction.

(_) Humanism is inescapable – and giving up on it dooms the planet to extinction

Davies in 97 (Tony, Professor of English at Birmignham. Humanism. 130)

So there will not after all be, nor indeed could there be, any tidy definitions. **The several humanisms** – the civic humanism of the quattrocento Italian city-states, the Protestant humanism of sixteenth century northern Europe, the rationalistic humanism that attended at the revolutions of enlightened modernity, and the romantic and positivistic humanisms through which the European bourgeoisies established their hegemony over it, the revolutionary humanism that shook the world and the liberal humanism that sought to tame it, the humanism of the Nazis and the humanism of their victims and opponents, the antihumanist humanism of Heidegger and the humanist antihumanism of Foucault and Althusser – **are not reducible to one, or even to a single line or pattern**. Each has its distinctive historical curve, its particular discursive poetics, its own problematic scansion of the human. Each seeks, as all discourses must, to impose its own answer to the question of 'which is to be master'. Meanwhile, **the problem of humanism remains, for the present, an inescapable horizon within which all attempts to think about the ways in which human being have, do, might live together in and on the world are contained.** Not that the actual humanisms described here necessarily provide a model, or even a useful history, least of all for those very numerous people, and peoples, for whom they have been alien and oppressive. Some, at least, offer a grim warning. Certainly it should no longer be possible to formulate phrases like 'the destiny of man' or 'the triumph of human reason' without an instant consciousness of the folly and brutality they drag behind them. **All humanisms, until now, have been imperial.** They speak of the human in the accents and the interests of a class, a sex, a 'race'. **Their embrace suffocates those whom it does not ignore.** The first humanists scripted the tyranny of Borgias, Medicis and Tudors. Later humanisms dreamed of freedom and celebrated Frederick II, Bonaparte, Bismarck, Stalin. The liberators of colonial America, like the Greek and Roman thinkers they emulated, owned slaves. At various times, not excluding the present, the circuit of the human has excluded women, those who do not speak Greek or Latin or English, those whose complexions are not pink, children, Jews. It is almost impossible to think of a crime that has not been committed in the name of humanity. **At the same time, though it is clear that the master narrative of transcendental Man has outlasted its usefulness, it would be unwise simply to abandon the ground occupied by the historical humanisms. For one thing, some variety of humanism remains, on many occasions, the only available alternative to bigotry and persecution. The freedom to speak and write, to organize and campaign in defence of individual or collective interests, to protest and disobey: all these, and the prospect of a world in which they will be secured, can only be articulated in humanist terms. It is true that** the Baconian 'Knowledge of Causes, and Secrett Motions of Things', harnessed to an **overweening rationality** and an unbridled technological will to power, **has enlarged the bounds** of human empire **to the point of endangering the survival of the** violated **planet** on which we live. **But how, if not by mobilizing collective resources of human understanding and responsibility of 'enlightened self-interest' even, can that danger be turned aside?**

Humanism Good

(_) Humanism is key to preventing atrocities such as the Holocaust. By denying humanism, they legitimize abuses of human rights

Ketels in 96 (Violet, associate professor of English at Temple University, The Holocaust: Remembering for the Future: 'Havel to the Castle!' The Power of the Word," The Annals of The American Academy of Political and Social Science, November, 1996)

In the Germany of the 1930s, a demonic idea was born in a demented brain; the word went forth; **orders were given, repeated, widely broadcast; and men, women, and children were herded into death camps. Their offshore signals, cries for help, did not summon us to rescue. We had become inured to the reality of human suffering. We could no longer hear what the words meant or did not credit them or not enough of us joined the chorus. Shrieking victims perished in the cold blankness of inhumane silence. We were deaf to the apocalyptic urgency in Solzhenitsyn's declaration from the Gulag that we must check the disastrous course of history. We were heedless of the lesson of his experience that only the unbending strength of the human spirit, fully taking its stand on the shifting frontier of encroaching violence and declaring "not one step further," though death may be the end of it--only this unwavering firmness offers any genuine defense of peace for the individual, of genuine peace for mankind at large.** 2 In past human crises, writers and thinkers strained language to the breaking point to keep alive the memory of the unimaginable, to keep the human conscience from forgetting. In the current context, however**, intellectuals seem more devoted to abstract assaults on values than to thoughtful probing of the moral dimensions of human experience.** "Heirs of the ancient possessions of higher knowledge and literacy skills," 3 we seem to have lost our nerve, and not only because of Holocaust history and its tragic aftermath. We feel insecure before the empirical absolutes of hard science. We are intimidated by the "high modernist rage against mimesis and content," 4 monstrous progeny of the union between Nietzsche and philosophical formalism, the grim proposal we have bought into that there is no truth, no objectivity, and no disinterested knowledge. 5 Less certain about the power of language, that "oldest flame of the [*47] humanist soul," 6 to frame a credo to live by or criteria to judge by, we are vulnerable even to the discredited Paul de Man's indecent hint that "wars and revolutions are not empirical events . . . but 'texts' masquerading as facts." 7 **Truth and reality seem more elusive than they ever were in the past; values are pronounced to be mere fictions of ruling elites to retain power. We are embarrassed by virtue.** Words collide and crack under these new skeptical strains, dissolving into banalities the colossal enormity of what must be expressed lest we forget. Remembering for the future has become doubly dispiriting by our having to remember for the present, too, our having to register and confront what is wrong here and now. The reality to be fixed in memory shifts as we seek words for it; the memory we set down is flawed by our subjectivities. It is selective, deceptive, partial, unreliable, and amoral. It plays tricks and can be invented. It stops up its ears to shut out what it does not dare to face. 8 Lodged in our brains, such axioms, certified by science and statistics, tempt us to concede the final irrelevance of words and memory. We have to get on with our lives. Besides, memories reconstructed in words, even when they are documented by evidence, have not often changed the world or fended off the powerful seductions to silence, forgetting, or denying. Especially denying, which, in the case of the Holocaust, has become an obscene industry competing in the open market of ideas for control of our sense of the past. It is said that the Holocaust never happened. Revisionist history with a vengeance is purveyed in words; something in words must be set against it. Yet what? How do we nerve to the task when we are increasingly disposed to cast both words and memory in a condition of cryogenic dubiety? Not only before but also since 1945, the criminality of governments, paraded as politics and fattening on linguistic manipulation and deliberately reimplanted memory of past real or imagined grievance, has spread calamity across the planet. "The cancer that has eaten at the entrails of Yugoslavia since Tito's death [has] Kosovo for its locus," but not merely as a piece of land. The country's rogue adventurers use the word "Kosovo" to reinvoke as sacred the land where Serbs were defeated by Turks in 1389! 9 Memory of bloody massacres in 1389, sloganized and distorted in 1989, demands the bloody revenge of new massacres and returns civilization not to its past glory but to its gory tribal wars. As Matija Beckovic, the bard of Serb nationalism, writes, "It is as if the Serbian people waged only one battle--by widening the Kosovo charnel-house, by adding wailing upon wailing, by counting new martyrs. to the martyrs of Kosovo. . . . Kosovo is the Serbianized [*48] history of the Flood--the Serbian New Testament." 10 A cover of Suddeutsche Zeitung in 1994 was printed with blood donated by refugee women from Bosnia in an eerily perverse afterbirth of violence revisited. 11 **We stand benumbed before multiplying horrors**. As Vaclav Havel warned more than a decade ago**, regimes that generate them "are the avant garde of a global crisis in civilization." The depersonalization of power in "system, ideology and apparat," pathological suspicions about human motives and meanings, the loosening of individual responsibility, the swiftness by which disastrous events follow one upon another "have deprived us of our conscience, of our common sense and natural speech and thereby, of our actual humanity."** 12 Nothing less than the transformation of human consciousness is likely to rescue us.

Consequentialist Security 2AC

(_) The negative's wholesale rejection of securitization fails – adopting a framework of issue-specific consequentialist evaluation of securitization can solve the neg's impacts while still solving the case

Floyd in 07 (Rita Floyd, University of Warwick, Review of International Studies, Vol 33 p 327-250)

Towards a consequentialist evaluation of security Considering the two brief overviews of the different schools provided in the first section, it could be argued that Wæver has an overly negative conception of security, whereas Booth and Wyn Jones have an overly positive conception of security. This article will aim to show that **what form security takes is entirely issue-dependent, leaving both camps having something important and valid to contribute to the study of security as both camps can potentially be right. Issue-dependent** hereby **does not mean that,** for example, **all securitisations in one particular sector are always positive** (negative) – indeed this article will show how differently securitisations in the environmental sector can turn out – **it** rather **means that every incidence of securitisation is unique.** Since this is the case, however, s**ecurity in general is neither as good nor as bad as the two camps argue, but rather it is a mixed bag**. In the approach proposed here, **principles that determine whether a securitisation is positive or negative can only be derived by considering what would have been the alternative solution**. **Given that** for the Copenhagen School, **securitisation is nothing but 'an extreme version of politicisation',**45 **the question to consider in evaluating the nature of securitisation must be: did the securitisation in question achieve more, and/or better results than a mere politicisation of the issue would have done?** It is important to note here, that **'more and better', is not equivalent to the success of the speech act** (successful securitisation can still be negative), **but rather it refers to whether the consequences of, and the gains from, the securitisation are preferable relative to the consequences and gains from a politicisation. The idea that the moral rightness** (or wrongness) **of a securitisation depends on its consequences corresponds to** what in moral philosophy is known as **a consequentialist ethics**. Consequentialism46 referring to a set of moral philosophies, which hold 'that the rightness of an action is to be judged solely by consequences, states of affairs brought about by the action'.47 Or, put slightly differently 'a consequentialist theory [. . .] is an account of what justifies an option over alternatives – the fact that it promotes values.'48 **These premises capture well what is meant by positive and negative securitisation in this article, for the adjectives positive and negative** do not **refer to** the relative success of the speech act that is securitisation, but rather to **how well any given security policy addresses the insecurity in question**. The approach introduced in this article will henceforth be referred to as a consequentialist evaluation of security. In moral philosophy **the idea that the moral rightness** (or wrongness) **of an action is attributable to its consequences alone is of course contentious** (see also fn. 46). **The question that arises is thus, why, in the evaluation of security/ securitisation, focus on consequences as opposed to, for example, rights as deontologists would have it**, or indeed virtues, as virtue theorists suggest? Much of the answer to this question already lies in the argument of this article. Thus it is not only this author's opinion that the key to security evaluation lies with its consequences, rather **scholars from both** the **schools** discussed above, **with their respective positive and negative views of security, themselves already focus on what they take to be the consequences of security**. **That is to say these scholars themselves are consequentialists**. However, and as this article aims to show, **the consequentialism proposed by them is neither very balanced nor, in the long run, particularly helpful, as in both cases, consequentialism is constricted by the nature of their respective theoretical frameworks. Frameworks, whereby one promotes security as emancipation, therefore generating a necessarily positive view of security, whilst the other school's framework for analysis is void of emancipation altogether, therefore partial to a negative view of security. That security is neither always positive nor negative but rather issue dependent is the key hypothesis** of this article. **If this hypothesis holds true we are – as a discipline – much in need of a more balanced and indeed critical evaluation of security than proposed by either school**, a provision of which is the purpose of this article. Given what has been said so far **it should have become clear that the** herewith **proposed consequentialist evaluation of security is also the key to rendering the above-mentioned 'normative dilemma of speaking and writing security' less important, as it enables the analyst to critically evaluate his/her speaking and writing security, rather than**

his/her simply speaking and writing security. This approach thus enables the previously solely analytical securitisation analyst to step into the security equation and on behalf of the actors encourage some securitisations and renounce others, depending on the moral rightness of the respective securitisation's consequences. It is precisely at this point where the emancipatory nature of the Welsh School's security studies **becomes crucially relevant for a consequentialist evaluation of security, for** – under this approach – **it is the task of the analyst to fight ignorance** (or, put differently, false consciousness) **on the part of existing and/or potential securitising actors and inform** (or better enlighten) **them of the best possible actions**. But how does the analyst know what the best possible actions are? Or, put differently, with what standards in mind are the consequences to be evaluated? **Is it enough to problematise securitisation by elites for elites, and make majority consensus the measuring unit behind the principles for positive/negative securitisation?** One should think not. Although it is useful to assume, that the narrower the interest group behind the securitisation, the more likely it is to be negative, this cannot be ascertained as the only general principle. After all, **majority consensus does not prevent the effective securitisation of something that is morally/ethically wrong. But how to determine what is morally/ethically right? In security studies, one way of doing so, is by entering the evaluation of positive/negative through the discourses of security prevalent in the different sectors of security**. Here, **by working out the specific security relations in the competing discourses that make up the individual sector** – who or what is the referent object of security, who is the securitising actor and what is the nature of the threat – **it should be possible to determine the most and the least advantageous strategies in addressing insecurity; thereby determining which approach to security** (in the individual sector) **is the best** (most positive) **all-round** – morally, ethically, effective – **strategy. A consequentialist evaluation of security thus postulates the maximisation of genuine security as its overarching value. The invocation of values itself is perfectly legitimate, particularly considering that 'every moral theory invokes values such that it can make sense to recommend in consequentialist fashion that they be promoted or in non-consequentialist fashion that they be honoured**,

1AR Ext: Consequentialist Security

(_) Critiques of security are a rigged game – they pre-determine the outcome of securitization, making them normatively powerless

Floyd in 08 (Rita Floyd, ESRC Postdoctoral fellow, Department of Politics and International Studies (PAIS), University of Warwick, "Consequentialist evaluation of security for cooperative International Society: A framework for analysis" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the ISA's 49th ANNUAL CONVENTION, BRIDGING MULTIPLE DIVIDES, Hilton San Francisco, SAN FRANCISCO, CA, USA, Mar 26, 2008 Online <PDF>. 2008-06-25 http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p251976_index.html)

Since the end of the Cold War security studies has changed greatly and by now nontraditional security issues such as the environment have become established alongside more traditional military security issues.2 The debate characteristic for the 1990s between the so-called 'wideners' and the 'traditionalists' of security has been 'won' by the former, with security both widened and at the same time deepened to include alongside the state other referent objects of security, for example, the individual.3 **Non-traditional or alternative approaches to the study of security** -at least in Europe **have become firmly established alongside more traditional security studies**, with the latter now more commonly referred to by the label strategic studies.4 No longer primarily concerned with the debate of 'widening' and 'deepening', analysts working with such approaches have had time to develop their research agendas and with the so-called Copenhagen-, Welsh- and Paris schools5, as well as with the human security approach four distinct, if at times overlapping approaches, have emerged. **Proponents** of each of these four different approaches to security **are concerned with the consequences of securitisation** and desecuritisation **in so far as** in each case **their anticipation of these consequences forms the basis for their normative position, with the latter informing their policy-making recommendations. The constructivist security analyst is** necessarily **concerned with the consequences of securitisation** and desecuritisation, **because any such analyst realises that she contributes to the coconstitution of social and political reality simply by virtue of writing about security. Despite this realisation**, however, and as the remainder of this section shows, each of **the** four **alternative approaches' view of the consequences of** desecuritisation and **securitisation is one-sided, as in each case these anticipated consequences are already enshrined into the individual theoretical framework of the respective approach, disallowing conceptual room for alternative consequences of either**. As a result all **current normative security theory is fundamentally limited.** The here proposed consequentialist evaluation of security takes this shortcoming of all exiting alternative security theories as its point of departure.

1AR Ext: Consequentialist SecurityAT: Security

(_) Consequentialist evaluation of securitization is legitimate when the securitization is vale neutral and affects all persons equally

Floyd in 08 (Rita Floyd, ESRC Postdoctoral fellow, Department of Politics and International Studies (PAIS), University of Warwick, "Consequentialist evaluation of security for cooperative International Society: A framework for analysis" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the ISA's 49th ANNUAL CONVENTION, BRIDGING MULTIPLE DIVIDES, Hilton San Francisco, SAN FRANCISCO, CA, USA, Mar 26, 2008 Online <PDF>. 2008-06-25 http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p251976_index.html)

In summary then, CES builds on the assumption that not all securitisations are the same, but rather that they differ in terms of who or what they benefit. In line with consequentialism, under CES, securitisation has no intrinsic value; rather its moral value is entirely dependent on its consequences. Consequences are evaluated in terms of who or what benefits from any given securitisation, an approach that moves the hitherto largely ignored question 'securitisation for whom' into the foreground. So doing, brings with it one important problem/question. Hence, whilst the agent-neutral consequentialist fashion facilitated or indeed enabled the conceptualisation of positive and negative securitisation in the environmental sector of security, it complicates the same for the other sectors of security. Thus, in the other sectors of security we do not have the obvious luxury of an agent-neutrally valuable entity; rather in each sector we have different groups of people each claiming a right to survival. The research question this paper thus seeks to answer is: what within contemporary international relations is agent-neutrally valuable and as such informs the concept of positive securitisation?

AT: Dillon/Der Derian

(_) Post-structuralist critiques of security are incapable of making material change in the world – they leave the victims of violence helpless and leave power where it is in the world

Booth 2005 (Ken, Professor of International Politics at the University of Wales–Aberystwyth, Critical Security Studies and World Politics, p. 270-71, footnote on 277)

Postmodern/**poststructural engagement with** the subject of **security** in international relations **has been characterized by** some of the general problems of the genre, notably obscurantism, relativism, and **faux radicalism**.26 What has particularly troubled critics of the postmodern sensibility has been the latter's underlying conception of politics.27 Terry Eagleton, for one, has praised the "rich body of work" by postmodern writers in some areas but at the same time has contested the genre's "cultural relativism and moral conventionalism, its scepticism, pragmatism and localism, its distaste for ideas of solidarity and disciplined organization, [and] its lack of any adequate theory of political agency."28 Eagleton made these comments as part of a general critique of the postmodern sensibility, but I would argue that specific writing on security in international relations from postmodern and poststructuralist perspectives has generally done nothing to ease such concerns. Eagleton's fundamental worry was how postmodernism would "shape up" to the test of fascism as a serious political challenge. Other **writers**, studying particular political contexts, such as postapartheid South Africa, have shown similar worries; they **have questioned the lack of concrete or specific resources that such theories can add to the repertoire of reconstruction strategies**.29 Richard A. Wilson, an anthropologist interested in human rights, has generalized exactly the same concern, namely, that the **postmodernist rejection** of metanarratives and universal solidarities **does not deliver a helpful politics to people in trouble**. As he puts it, "**Rights without a metanarrative are like a car without seat-belts; on hitting the first moral bump with ontological implications, the passenger's safety is jeopardised**."30 The struggle within South Africa to bring down the institutionalized racism of apartheid benefited greatly from the growing strength of universal human rights values (which delegitimized racism and legitimized equality) and their advocacy by groups in different countries and cultures showing their political solidarity in material and other ways. Anxiety about the politics of postmodernism and poststructuralism is provoked, in part, by the negative conceptualization of security projected by their exponents. **The poststructuralist approach seems to assume that security** cannot be common or positive-sum but **must always be zero-sum**, with somebody's security always being at the cost of the insecurity of others. At the same time, security itself is questioned as a desirable goal for societies because of the assumption of **poststructuralist writers** that the search for security is necessarily conservative and will result in negative consequences for somebody. They **tend** also **to celebrate insecurity, which I regard as a middle-class affront to the truly insecure**.31

Cut to footnote on page 277—

31. **Examples of the approach are Dillon**, *The Politics of Security*; **and Der Derian**, "The Value of Security," in Lipschutz (ed.), *On Security*.

In the shadow of such views, it is not surprising that the postmodern/poststructuralist genre is sometimes seen as having affinities with realism. Political **realists and poststructuralists seem to share a fatalistic view that humans are doomed to insecurity**; regard the search for emancipation as both futile and dangerous; believe in a notion of the human condition; and relativize norms. **Both leave power where it is in the world**: deconstruction and deterrence are equally static theories.

AT: Security K – Perm Solves

(_) Permutation solves – only making positivist judgments about the nature of securitizations creates space for normative critique – only a "securitization plus" theory offers any solvency

Floyd in 08 (Rita Floyd, ESRC Postdoctoral fellow, Department of Politics and International Studies (PAIS), University of Warwick, "Consequentialist evaluation of security for cooperative International Society: A framework for analysis" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the ISA's 49th ANNUAL CONVENTION, BRIDGING MULTIPLE DIVIDES, Hilton San Francisco, SAN FRANCISCO, CA, USA, Mar 26, 2008 Online <PDF>. 2008-06-25 http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p251976_index.html)

In said book, informed by the Coxian idea that 'theory is always for someone for some purpose'27 Booth explicitly denies the possibility that the security analyst and the securitising actor can be functionally distinct entities. Indeed, **Booth argues that because 'ontology is always for someone for some purpose'**28; **the choice of referent object of security tells us something about an individual theorist's normative commitments.**29 On that basis Booth criticises the Copenhagen school and their 'statedominated analyses'30 as elitist, which is nothing but a slightly new variant of an old Welsh school (and others) critique of alleged state centricism in the Copenhagen school. **In place of focusing on the state, Booth suggests, security analysts must exercise 'ontological imagination' and conceive of other referent objects of security altogethe**r. He argues: Ontology […] is not a matter of abstract philosophy; it is what we take to be real, and so in security policy it is the basis of what we believe needs to be protected. This in turn impacts directly on such important issues as what we consider to be relevant knowledge, what the chief struggles are deemed to be, and how we might act. This is why the debate over understandings of 'security' is so important and why ontology must be turned into one of the battlefields in the study of international relations.'31 **What Booth fails to see here, however, is that the 'battleground' he sketches out is not primarily one of ontology; rather it is one of epistemology.** Thus unlike its Welsh school counterpart, the Copenhagen school is not interested in making normative prescriptions for what ought to be securitised, rather they are interested in analysing what is securitised, in who securitises, by what means and to what effect.32 Informed by the functional distinction between the security analyst and the securitising actor the Copenhagen school do not choose the referent object of security as a result of their normative preference, instead it is a reflection of what goes on in practice.33 In other words, if the state features heavily in the Copenhagen school's analysis it is neither a sign of elitism, nor is it a personal preference on the part of Wæver et al (the security analysts); rather it is a description of the way the world is.34 Be that as it may, **Booth ostensibly finds further confirmation for his belief that all theory is necessarily normative**35 (which would make the above an ontological battle) **in the existence of the 'normative dilemma of speaking and writing security'**.36 In so doing, however, **he fails to take the dilemma for what it is, namely an involuntary co-constitution of social and political reality on the part of the security analyst. In order to transcend 'the normative dilemma of speaking and writing security' Booth suggests that a theorist must achieve a 'critical distance',** which he defines as follows: The idea of attempting to achieve a degree of critical distance […] is to step back from one's context [….], while realising that one is not stepping onto neutral ground, an Archimedean point, from which to describe and observe matters of interest. While the aim of critical distance shares the aims of objectivity (trying to free oneself from biases and so on) it recognises what is possible and what is not, and in that sense begins from a categorically different place.37 **Without doubt the attainment of 'critical distance'** is not only a valid idea; rather it **is a necessary requirement for security analysis. Unless, that is, a functional distinction between the role of the security analyst and that of the securitising actor is maintained it is extremely difficult to achieve such 'critical distance'. The collapse of analyst and actor into one entity is likely to affect not only the nature of the security analysis offered, but also likely to influence how practically viable the normative security theory developed is**. In other words, **normativity must be limited to what is possible. We can determine what is possible in security relations only by separating the task of the analyst from that of the securitising actor,** hence **by looking at who can securitise, by what means and under what circumstances.** Only after we have done this, in a second step, can we move onto normative territory and, in the light of what is, suggest feasible scenarios for what ought to be the case. Given that out of the above named approaches to the study of security **the functional distinction between security analyst and securitising actor** is maintained by the Copenhagen school only, their securitisation theory **is the only approach that allows us to analyse what i**s. This is the main reason why I choose securitisation theory as the bedrock for my own normative security theory. **Considering that securitisation theory's utility begins and ends with its analytical utility, it should be clear that it can be no more than the bedrock** for my approach. **What is needed thus is a securitisation theory plus approach, whereby the 'plus' designates the missing normative element**.38 **Such an approach should be able to account for a range of possible consequences of securitisation, allowing the theorisation of both positive and negative securitisation**. Such an approach is offered by the here proposed consequentialist evaluation of security.

AT: Security K

(_) Criticisms of security are incapable of reconfiguring securitization discourses – disconnection from empirical study renders them impotent

Hyde –Price in 01 (Adrian Hyde-Price, Professor in the Institute for German Studies @ University of Birmingham, Europe's New Security Challenges, 2001. p. 38-39)

Another conceptual innovation from the Copenhagen school—one associated in particular with Ole Wæver—is **the notion of securitization.** This concept **has been presented as the solution to the problems involved in broadening the definition of security without thereby robbing it of its analytical utility**. Wæver and his colleagues **start from the assumption that security** is not a concept with a fixed meaning or a determinate social condition. Security, in other words, **cannot be objectively defined**. Rather, they argue that it constitutes a distinctive form of politics. To securitize an issue means to take it out of the normal realm of political discourse and to signal a need for it to be addressed urgently and with exceptional means. Moreover, security is not just any threat or problem. Rather, **security issues are "existential threats to a referent object by a securitizing actor who thereby generates endorsement of emergency measures beyond rules that would otherwise bind" Securitization thus focuses almost exclusively on the discursive domain and eschews any attempt to determine empirically what constitutes security concerns. It does not aspire to comment on the reality behind a securitization discourse or on the appropriate instruments for tackling security problems**. **Instead**, It suggests that security studies - or what Wæver calls **securitization studies** - should **focus on the discursive moves whereby issues are securitized**. The Copenhagen school thus emphasizes the need to understand the "speech acts" that accomplish a process of securitization. Their focus is on the linguistic and conceptual dynamics involved, even though they recognize the importance of the institutional setting within which securitization takes place. **The concept of securitization offers some important insights for security studies. However, it is too epistemologically restricted to contribute to a significant retooling of security studies**. On the positive side, it draws attention to the way in which security agendas are constructed by politicians and other political actors. It also indicates the utility of discourse analysis as an additional tool of analysis for security studies. However, **at best, securitization studies can constitute one aspect of security studies. It cannot provide the foundations for a paradigm shift in the subdiscipline. Its greatest weakness is** its epistemological hypochondria, that is, **its tendency to reify epistemological problems and push sound observations about knowledge claims to their logical absurdity. Although it is important to understand the discursive moves involved in perceptions of security** in, say, the Middle East, **it is also necessary to make some assessment of nondiscursive factors** like the military balance or access to freshwater supplies. For the Copenhagen school, however, these **nondiscursive factors are relegated to second place. They are considered only to the extent that they facilitate or impede the speech act. In this way, the Copenhagen school is in danger of cutting security studies off from serious empirical research and setting it adrift on a sea of floating signifiers**.

AT: Environmental Securitization

(_)

Floyd in 08 (Rita Floyd, ESRC Postdoctoral fellow, Department of Politics and International Studies (PAIS), University of Warwick, "Consequentialist evaluation of security for cooperative International Society: A framework for analysis" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the ISA's 49th ANNUAL CONVENTION, BRIDGING MULTIPLE DIVIDES, Hilton San Francisco, SAN FRANCISCO, CA, USA, Mar 26, 2008 Online <PDF>. 2008-06-25 http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p251976_index.html)

I have previously undertaken the consequentialist evaluation of security for the environmental sector of security.39 Building on top of the Copenhagen school's securitisation theory I began this analysis by developing different types of securitisation that differ in terms of who is benefited by a securitisation. With agency benefiting and with problem-benefiting securitisation I suggested that two such types of securitisation are possible. In the first, the primary beneficiary of securitisation is one or more agency that provides environmental security. In the second the main beneficiary of securitisation is the security problem or insecurity, as identified by the securitising actor. In the environmental sector of security these two types of securitisation lend themselves quite easily to the conceptualisation of negative and positive securitisation respectively. Important to note here is that whether or not a securitisation is positive (morally right & morally good) had nothing to do with how successful the securitisation is, but rather it sought to uncover whether the consequences of one environmental security policy are preferable relative to the consequences from another environmental security policy, or indeed to simple politicisation of the natural non-human environment. The idea that the moral rightness of a securitisation depends on its consequences corresponds to what in moral philosophy is known as a consequentialist ethic. Consequentialism refers to a set of moral philosophies, which hold 'that the rightness of an action is to be judged solely by consequences, states of affairs brought about by the action.'40 It further holds that 'an option is right just in case it is associated with better relevant consequences than alternatives.'41 It is important to note that, in line with securitisation theory, my aim was not to identify objective security threats that when securitised automatically make for a positive securitisation. Rather I worked with the existing security discourses in the environmental sector of security and from what is/was done in practice determined which, if any, such environmental security policies are/were positive. In other words, it is not important here whether there 'really' exists a security threat resulting from the ill-functioning of our natural environment, but what matters is that the environment is in practice a security concern for many governments and/or international institutions.42 Put differently again, I did not wish to claim that environmental security is the only way to address global environmental problems, instead I argued that there are differences in the way the environment is securitised, and that some environmental security policies are more useful than others.43 Arguably characteristic for all consequentialist theories under such a consequentialist approach to the evaluation of security a securitisation is morally good when it can be judged according to an agent-neutral value.44 Agent-neutrality is the property of those values that 'can be articulated without reference back to the valuer'.45 More precisely: If I value a prospect for the increase of happiness it promises, or even for a particular effect it will have, say on planet Earth, then I value it agent-neutrally. If I value it for the benefits it will have for me or mine, or for the fact that it will keep my hands clean, or for any reason of that self-referential kind, then I value it agent-relatively. The theory of the good, or the theory of the valuable, refers to the theory of what ought to be agent-neutrally valued.46 Without doubt, the well-being of our natural environment is agent-neutrally valuable; it is in everyone's interest, as ultimately all life on earth depends on it. Based on this I was able to argue that only those environmental security policies that address environmental insecurity (as identified by the securitising actor) are positive and those that do not are negative. In other words, those environmental security policies that first and foremost benefit specific agents involved in the provision of environmental security as opposed to addressing environmental problems are negative and should not be endorsed by the analyst, whilst – in the environmental sector of security at least - problem-benefiting securitisations are positive concepts which should by all means be endorsed.47

AT: Environmental Securitization

(_) Security rhetoric is key to mobilizing political will to solve

Dabelko and Dabelko in 93 (Geoffrey and David, Fellows at Harrison Program on the Future Global Agenda, HTTP://WWW.BSOS.UMD.EDU/HARRISON/ PAPERS/ PAPER0L.HTML)

Recent U.S. history does indicate that the term national security has often been an honorific concept. **Security labels have been effective for 'mobilizing resources for programs that do not typically fall under the rubric of national security**. Despite being critical of this tactic, Simon **Dalby** (1992: 4) **acknowledges that "security is a very useful term partly because it resonates with widely held personal desires to be unthreatened."** **Because security calls up fundamental issues of survival, the term has often been employed to create a sense of crisis and to engender a subsequent willingness to sacrifice for meeting all important challenges.** President Dwight Eisenhower, for example, justified the interstate highway system as critical to national defense. Congress passed funding for education as the National Defense Education Act of 1958. This tactic does have potential drawbacks. For environmental security, the feared downside would come if the struggle to increase environmental awareness were tied too tightly to the rise and fall of popular on in ion and government attention.

(_) Using environmental security creates a political climate that solves best

Matthew in 02 (Richard, Prof. of IR and Env. Poliics at UC-Irvine, "In Defense of Environment and Security Research", ECSP Report, Summer, p 119)

In addition, **environmental security's language and findings can benefit conservation and sustainable development.**"' **Much environmental security literrature emphasizes the importance of development assistance, sustainable livelihoods, fair and reasonable access to environmental goods, and conservation practices as the vital upstream measures that in the long run will contribute to higher levels of human and state security.** The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) are examples of bodies that have been quick to recognize how the language of environmental security can help them. **The scarcity/conflict thesis has alerted these groups to prepare for the possibility of working on environmental rescue projects in regions that are likely to exhibit high levels of related violence and conflict.** These groups are also aware that **an association with security can expand their acceptance and constituencies in some countries in which the military has political control**, For the first time in its history; the contemporary environmental movement can regard military and intelligence agencies as potential allies in the struggle to contain or reverse humangenerated environmental change. (In many situations, of course, the political history of the military--as well as its environmental record-raise serious concerns about the viability of this cooperation.) Similarly, **the language of security has provided a basis for some fruitful discussions between environmental groups and representatives of extractive industries**. In many parts of the world, mining and petroleum companies have become embroiled in conflict. These companies have been accused of destroying traditional economies, cultures, and environments; of political corruption; and of using private militaries to advance their interests. They have also been targets of violence, Work is now underway through the environmental security arm of the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) to address these issues with the support of multinational corporations. Third, **the general conditions outlined in much environmental security research can help organizations** such as USAID, the World Bank, and IUCN **identify priority cases--areas in which investments are likely to have the greatest ecological and social returns.** For all these reasons, IUCN elected to integrate environmental security into its general plan at the Amman Congress in 2001. **Many other environmental groups and development agencies are taking this perspective seriously** (e.g. Dabelko, Lonergan & Matthew, 1999). However, for the most part these efforts remain preliminary.'

AT: Environmental Security

(_) Environmental securitization empirically promotes international cooperation and sovles

Matthew in 02 (Richard, Prof. of IR and Env. Poliics at UC-Irvine, "In Defense of Environment and Security Research", ECSP Report, Summer, p 119)

Finally it is worth briefly noting that t**he literature on environment and security has also made contributions to a range of more specific intellectual, policy, and activist pursuits.** For example, **efforts to harness security assets to environmental goals** have been praised in some quarters' These efforts f**all into two broad categories: (1) greening the military, and (2) making trdlitary and intelligence assets available for environmental activities. I**n the first case,: Kent Butts argues that **compliance with environmental regulations, military base clean-up, and green technology research have all increased in the U.S. Department of Defense as part of the effort to integrate environmental security into its programs.** The most widely cited example of the second case is the Medea Project initiated by Vice President Al Gore, which brought together CIA analysts and civilian scientists to assess the value of archived satellite imagery for assessing phenomena such as deforestation rates and climate change. Additionally, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has publicized (perhaps excessively) its role in restoring the ecology of the Chesapeake Bay area; and reforestation programs have been undertaken throughout the world with military support.

(_) Only by taking into account security concerns as well as other interests can we achieve the best policies.

Dabelko and Simmons 1997 (Geoffrey and P.J., Ph.D. candidate at the University of Maryland and founding Director of the Environmental Change and Security Project (WWICS) and Editor of the Environmental Change and Security Project Report, "Environment Security: Core Ideas and U.S. Government Initiatives," Johns Hopkins University Press, < http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/sais_review/v017/17.1dabelko.html>) July 11, 2008

At the same time, there are serious limitations to the environment and security conceptual and linguistic framework. As convincing as certain security-related arguments may be, they are not the only reasons why the American public, decisionmakers, and other nations should care about the environment. Value-oriented considerations about the aesthetics of nature, human responsibility for global stewardship, and humanitarian concerns are also important. These considerations [End Page 141] can greatly enhance the process of formulating effective solutions and winning sustained public attention and support for international environmental action. **Policymakers might therefore be best served by framing international environmental priorities in terms of a broad set of interests, including, but not limited to, security concerns**. They should resist the temptation, common in security analyses, to examine environmental problems solely in terms of crises and "threats**." Though helpful in setting priorities**, threat-based analyses can have the unintentional effect of encouraging decisionmakers to pay attention to issues only when crises are imminent, by which time it is often too late for effective interventions and corrective measures**. Examining how environmental preservation will enhance security and other interests over time might lead decisionmakers to adopt more appropriate long-term strategies to address the underlying causes of problems. International environmental issues will be most effectively addressed in the decades to come through a combination of conceptual clarity, a pragmatic and multidisciplinary approach to problem solving, an emphasis on long-term strategies, and an improved willingness and ability among leaders to explain the complexity of environmental change**. As the debates on environment and security continue**, environmentalists' arguments will be strengthened** if they resist the temptation to place all their priorities under the attention-grabbing security rubric. Meanwhile, **skeptical foreign policy experts will benefit from recognizing the real and potential effects of environmental change and their relevance to many critical interests**. As the United States considers security expenditures and priorities for the twenty-first century, the vibrant debates concerning environment and security matters will continue to be instructive.

AT: Epistemology (Campbell)

(_) Campbell's critique of causation is circular – he engages in the same reasoning he criticizes

Kurki 06 (Milja, University of Exeter, Review of International Studies, April 2006, http://journals.cambridge.org/download.php?file=%2FRIS%2FRIS32_02%2FS026021050600698Xa.pdf&code=a0e3b382eba3b3c900062d1042e9273c)

The same paradox characterises David Campbell's work. In Writing Security Campbell declares that the interpretive position he associates himself with is opposed to 'cataloging, calculating and specifying ''the real causes'' ';36 instead, Campbell maintains that his poststructuralist theory aims to inquire into the 'political consequences of adopting one mode of representation over another'.37 While appearing 'anti-causal', his statement evidences an implicit causal commitment: representations matter precisely because they produce certain consequences. This understanding of representations and discourses can be seen as causal, even if not in a 'when A, then B' manner.38 Because Campbell, as other reflectivists, associates causation with the 'mainstream' Humeanism in IR, he does not recognise the implicit causal claims in his own work.

AT: Epistemology (Campbell)

(_) Isolated critique and rejection of the causal claims of the aff fails to effectively criticize the disciplinary politics of IR -

Kurki 06 (Milja, University of Exeter, Review of International Studies, April 2006, http://journals.cambridge.org/download.php?file=%2FRIS%2FRIS32_02%2FS026021050600698Xa.pdf&code=a0e3b382eba3b3c900062d1042e9273c)

In 1998 David **Campbell** famously **attacked** the 'parochial' and 'hegemonic' **mainstream IR and** its efforts to suppress critical work, either by denouncing it as anti-scientific or by coopting identity issues within the mainstream 'causal analysis' that reduces identity issues to study of 'independent variables'.78 Campbell **argued that it was the scientific conception of causal analysis and the efforts to extend this form of inquiry to all questions that is at the core of the problems of the 'divided discipline'**. This assessment is uncannily correct: not only was Campbell correct to point to the deep and politicised nature of the disciplinary divisions in IR, but he also rightly identified the conception of causal analysis as a problem in the division of the discipline. **Yet, Campbell himself did not seek a way out of this predicament. Instead**, being caught up in the Humean discourse himself, **Campbell through his critique perpetuated the dichotomies in the discipline. The disciplinary politics of IR can be criticised – but not through criticising the mainstream approach to causal analysis in isolation, or superficially, by rejecting causation.** A more comprehensive critique is attained through addressing the wider metatheoretical groundings of IR79 in which the Humean conception of cause plays a crucial role. The reconceptualisation of causation advanced here takes steps towards doing away with some of the misleading and unhelpful ways of theorising the social world that have become uncritically accepted in contemporary IR and, thereby, holds open the possibility that IR theorists can start talking to, rather than past, each other. The belief that causal and constitutive approaches are fundamentally different is an illusion created by the acceptance of a Humean empiricist concept of cause. In the light of the conception of cause advanced here, the empiricist conception of causation is ontologically, epistemologically and methodologically overly restrictive. It is also seen to be constrained within straightjacket of the 'efficient cause' metaphor. The reflectivists and constructivists, on the other hand, have been equally constrained by Humean and efficient cause assumptions, in that they reject causal analysis on these grounds. However, when interpreted through a wider lens we can see that, rather than being 'a-causal', they are, in fact, deeply engaged in causal analysis: although causal analysis concentrated on examining the 'constraining and enabling' influence of norms, rules and discourses. The metaphor of 'constitution' has been applied in such a way in IR as to hide the causal nature of ideas, rules, norms and discourses. It has been argued here that, whether we consider ideas constitutive of our identities, theory as constitutive of practice, rules as constitutive of action or structures constitutive of things, 'constitutive' relations are intimately tied up to causal relations. **In a discipline constructed on the basis of** the **metatheoretical grounding** advanced here, **political and theoretical differences will no doubt remain, but theoretical insulation between causal and constitutive approaches, and between different theoretical camps focused on different kind of causal factors, becomes more difficult to justify**. **If we see causal analysis as pluralistic, complexity-sensitive, epistemologically reflective and methodologically open, the constraints and prejudices that the Humean discourse of causation, along with the positivist model of science, has placed upon IR theorising can be lifted**. **On the basis of a reconceptualised concept of cause we can, arguably, open up paths towards more constructive consistent and pragmatic debates on causation and, indeed, on world politics**.

AT: Epistemology/Causation

(_) Exclusionary meta-theoretical critiques of causation fail – only pluralistic approaches that bridge the divide between schools of thought are capable of generating insight into the world political process

Kurki 06 (Milja, University of Exeter, Review of International Studies, April 2006, http://journals.cambridge.org/download.php?file=%2FRIS%2FRIS32_02%2FS026021050600698Xa.pdf&code=a0e3b382eba3b3c900062d1042e9273c)

Also **the IR theoretical camps' 'exclusionary' approach to social explanations can be countered. Too often IR theorists have avoided engaging with each others' theoretical frameworks in explaining concrete world political processes**. Think of the explanations of the end of the Cold War, for example. This complex world political process has been explained in rather reductionist and theoretically 'incommensurable' terms by the realists and the constructivists, one emphasising material and structural determinants, the other 'normative' ones.76 **The key** to providing better explanations of the end of the Cold War, and **to initiating more constructive debate between theoretical schools, lies with the abandonment of the beliefs that single ontological factors (ideas, material concerns, agents, structures) explain an event, and that causal factors are 'independent'**.77 **The approach to causal analysis advanced here enables much more open and multi-causal questions to be asked, which in turn necessitates a turn away from theoretically reductionist explanations. Theorists and researchers are, instead, directed towards providing accounts where the complex interaction of norms and material constraints are analysed in a holistic and historically attuned manner**. The model of causal analysis advocated here, **by advancing causal pluralism and by rejecting the metatheoretical persuasiveness of the causal vs. constitutive theory divide, holds open the possibility for new kinds of integrative and holistic theoretical engagements with world political processes**. **Although the deeper and broader conceptualisation** of causation **does not in itself 'solve' any of the concrete causal puzzles** in IR, **it opens up new lines of inquiry and new ways of dealing with them**. **As well as justifying the use of a variety of methodological tools and accepting the epistemological reflectivity of scientific causal analysis, it also forces IR theorists to ask more pluralistic questions about different types of causal forces and about their interaction**. Thus, **philosophical rethinking of causation is not just a fanciful 'meta-theoretical' exercise but has the potential to redirect the concrete study of world political processes in significant ways**.

A2: Capitalism

(_) Total rejection of capitalism fragments resistance --– the perm solves best

Gibson-Graham '96 (J.K., Feminist Economists – The End of Capitalism)

One of our goals as Marxists has been to produce a knowledge of capitalism. Yet as "that which is known," **Capitalism has become the intimate enemy. We have uncloaked the ideologically-clothed, obscure monster, but we have installed a naked and visible monster in its place. In return for our labors of creation, the monster has robbed us of all force**. We hear – and find it easy to believe – that the left is in disarray. Part of what produces the disarray of the left is the vision of what the left is arrayed against. **When capitalism is represented as a unified system coextensive with the nation or even the world, when it is portrayed as crowding out all other economic forms, when it is allowed to define entire societies, it becomes something that can only be defeated and replaced by a mass collective movement** (or by a process of systemic dissolution that such a movement might assist). **The revolutionary task of replacing capitalism now seems outmoded and unrealistic, yet we do not seem to have an alternative conception of class transformation to take its place.** The old political economic "systems" and "structures" that call forth a vision of revolution as systemic replacement still seem to be dominant in the Marxist political imagination. The New World Order is often represented as political fragmentation founded upon economic unification. In this vision the economy appears as the last stronghold of unity and singularity in a world of diversity and plurality. But why can't the economy be fragmented too? If we theorized it as fragmented in the United States, we could being to see a huge state sector (incorporating a variety of forms of appropriation of surplus labor), a very large sector of self-employed and family-based producers (most noncapitalist), a huge household sector (again, quite various in terms of forms of exploitation, with some households moving towards communal or collective appropriation and others operating in a traditional mode in which one adult appropriates surplus labor from another). None of these things is easy to see. **If capitalism takes up the available social space, there's no room for anything else. If capitalism cannot coexist, there's no possibility of anything else. If capitalism functions as a unity, it cannot be partially or locally replaced. My intent is to help create the discursive conception under which socialist or other noncapitalist construction becomes "realistic" present activity rather than a ludicrous or utopian goal. To achieve this I must smash Capitalism and see it in a thousand pieces**. I must make its unity a fantasy, visible as a denial of diversity and change.

(_) Perm solves –- only using capitalism to fight capitalism can be effective

Monthly Review '90 (March, Vol. 41, No. 10, p. 38)

No institution is or ever has been a seamless monolith. Although the inherent mechanism of American capitalism is as you describe it, **oriented solely to profit without regard to social consequences, this does not preclude significant portions of that very system from joining forces with the worldwide effort for the salvation of civilization, perhaps even to the extent of furnishing the margin of success for that very effort.**

A2: Capitalism

(_) Cap solves war

Bandow in 05 (Doug, fellow @ cato , "Spreading Capitalism Is Good for Peace" http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=5193)

In a world that seems constantly aflame, one naturally asks: **What causes peace**? **Many people,** including U.S. President George W. Bush, **hope that spreading democracy will discourage war.** But **new research suggests that expanding free markets is a far more important factor,** leading to what Columbia University's Erik Gartzke calls a "capitalist peace." It's a reason for even the left to support free markets. The capitalist peace theory isn't new: Montesquieu and Adam Smith believed in it. Many of Britain's classical liberals, such as Richard Cobden, pushed free markets while opposing imperialism. But World War I demonstrated that increased trade was not enough. The prospect of economic ruin did not prevent rampant nationalism, ethnic hatred, and security fears from trumping the power of markets. An even greater conflict followed a generation later. Thankfully, World War II left war essentially unthinkable among leading industrialized - and democratic - states. Support grew for the argument, going back to Immanual Kant, that republics are less warlike than other systems. Today's corollary is that creating democracies out of dictatorships will reduce conflict. This contention animated some support outside as well as inside the United States for the invasion of Iraq. But Gartzke argues that "**the 'democratic peace' is a mirage created by the overlap between economic and political freedom." That is, democracies typically have freer economies than do authoritarian states.** Thus, **while "democracy is desirable for many reasons,**" he notes in a chapter in the latest volume of Economic Freedom in the World, created by the Fraser Institute, **"representative governments are unlikely to contribute directly to international peace." Capitalism is by far the more important factor. The shift from statist mercantilism to high-tech capitalism has transformed the economics behind war. Markets generate economic opportunities that make war less desirable. Territorial aggrandizement no longer provides the best path to riches. Free-flowing capital markets and other aspects of globalization simultaneously draw nations together and raise the economic price of military conflict**. Moreover, **sanctions, which interfere with economic prosperity, provides a coercive step short of war to achieve foreign policy ends.** Positive economic trends are not enough to prevent war, but then, neither is democracy. **It long has been obvious that democracies are willing to fight,** just usually not each other. Contends Gartzke, "liberal political systems, in and of themselves, have no impact on whether states fight." In particular, **poorer democracies perform like non-democracies.** He explains: **"Democracy does not have a measurable impact, while nations with very low levels of economic freedom are 14 times more prone to conflict than those with very high levels."** Gartzke considers other variables, including alliance memberships, nuclear deterrence, and regional differences. Although the causes of conflict vary, the relationship between economic liberty and peace remains. His conclusion hasn't gone unchallenged. Author R.J. Rummel, an avid proponent of the democratic peace theory, challenges Gartzke's methodology and worries that it "may well lead intelligent and policy-wise analysts and commentators to draw the wrong conclusions about the importance of democratization." Gartzke responds in detail, noting that he relied on the same data as most democratic peace theorists. **If it is true that democratic states don't go to war, then it also is true that "states with advanced free market economies never go to war with each other, either.**" The point is not that democracy is valueless. Free political systems naturally entail free elections and are more likely to protect other forms of liberty - civil and economic, for instance. However, **democracy alone doesn't yield peace. To believe is does is dangerous: There's no panacea for creating a conflict-free world.**

AT: Capitalism

(_) Capitalism stops poverty

Stephens 2k (Patrick, Ph.D. candidate, "The morality of capitalism" http://www.objectivistcenter.org/cth--225-The_Morality_Capitalism.aspx)

The beginning of **the twenty-first century is a great time for capitalism. Socialism has been discredited. Countries around the world are opening their markets and removing barriers to trade. America has experienced the longest period of growth that the world has ever seen and produced an explosion of technology that promises to reshape social structures, increase freedom, cure disease, and extend the human life-span. It truly is a wonderful time to be alive**. **But despite the prosperity that capitalism has brought to America and the West, it still suffers from an image problem.** The old Left-wing critiques are fading; Marxist arguments are rare and social experiments in rent-control, welfare benefits, and the public ownership of capital are being abandoned. But in their place, a different critique of capitalism is catching hold. This new critique--which, as it turns out, is not so new--does not challenge the effectiveness of capitalism. **Capitalism,** it acknowledges, **is better than any other system at creating wealth, eradicating poverty, and developing technology. The new critique is aimed instead at the morality of capitalism; it asks if wealth, mass affluence, and technology are really such good things after all.**

A2: Capitalism

(_) Non-capitalist societies destroy the environment

Dominick in 98 (Raymond, Emeritus Professor humanities @ OSU, "Capitalism, communism, and environmental protection: Lessons from the German experience" http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3854/is_199807/ai_n8795240/pg_1

At no time since its inception two hundred years ago has the ideology of free market capitalism stood more dominant than it does today. For much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, communists confidently challenged the advocates of laissez-faire, claiming that their system could produce more wealth than capitalism and distribute it more equitably. In the process, they boasted that communism could cure a broad range of social problems, including environmental pollution.L **Following the worldwide collapse of communism**, **almost all these claims proved to be false, none more so than the promise to protect the environment**. After the Iron Curtain crumbled and uncensored reporting became possible, **academics and the popular press rushed to document the massive environmental devastation in the Soviet zone**.2 The West German magazine Der Spiegel indignantly branded communist East Germany as an "ecological outlaw of the first rank," noting, for example, that the Buna chemical works in the East dumped ten times more mercury into its neighboring river in a day than a comparable West German plant did in a year. The same article also reported that **each of the two-cycle cars commonly operated in the East emitted one hundred times as much carbon monoxide as a western auto equipped with a catalytic converter**. Elaborating on the air pollution problem, an article in Current History pointed out that East German sulphur dioxide emissions per capita were the highest in the world; the burden of that particular pollutant exceeded the corresponding figure for capitalist West Germany by a factor of twelve. **Reflecting on these and other environmental contrasts in the summer of** i99o, **as East and West Germany** moved toward u**nification**, the New York Times reported that "**one issue taking on urgency is how the orderly and clean half of the country can help clean up the disheveled and polluted half....** Quick action is needed because four decades of unbridled industrial spewing and spilling in East Germany have created an acute crisis for man and nature."3
Some commentators used the appalling evidence from the region east of the Iron Curtain to argue that **the fundamental economic principles of communism predictably and inevitably produce environmental disaster**. A Polish economist observed that "**in Marxist ideology, natural resources are free and have no intrinsic value . .** . **Their sole purpose is to serve, not to constrain, humans**." A West German analyst seconded this view, writing that the **"socialist labor theory of value inevitably led to serious, almost universal environmental and health dangers**." **An American observer interpreted these environmental failings as the result of the absence of capitalism**: "**Absent a profit motive, energy, materials, and natural resources could be squandered without care**. And they were."4 **Such an implication-that capitalist economic principles can cure the environmental crises caused by communism-dovetails perfectly with the current zeitgeist, but it is highly questionable from an historical point of view.**

A2: Zizek

(_) Zizek justifies violence of the state through terror as a means to impose good terror

Robinson and Tormey in 05 (Andrew and Simon, "Zizek is not a radical," THESIS ELEVEN, N80, FEBRUARY, http://homepage.ntlworld.com/simon.tormey/articles/Zizeknotradical.pdf pg 20)

What Zizek is telling left radicals, therefore, is **to abandon the notion of the state as a source of violence and to see it as part of the solution** to, rather than the problem of, reordering social life. **Zizek sees the state as a useful ally, and an instrument through which to impose the good terror.** He denounces anti-statism as idealist and hypocritical,129 and attacks the anticapitalist movement for lacking political centralisation.130 **Zizek does not offer an alternative to statist violence**; in Zizek's world (to misquote an anarchist slogan), '**whoever you fight for, the state always wins'. Opponents of the war in Afghanistan and the arms trade, of police racism and repression against demonstrators, will find no alternative in Zizek - only a new militarism, a 'good terror'** and yet another Cheka.

(_) Only the permutation solves. The plan creates the spring board for resistance which is a prerequisite to solving without it the alternative would fail

Robinson and Tormey in 05 (Andrew and Simon, "Zizek is not a radical," THESIS ELEVEN, N80, FEBRUARY, http://homepage.ntlworld.com/simon.tormey/articles/Zizeknotradical.pdf pg 20)

Zizek is right to advocate a transformative stance, but wrong to posit this as a radical break constituted *ex nihilo*. Far from being the disavowed supplement of capitalism, **the space for thinking the not-real which is opened by imaginaries and petty resistances is a prerequisite to building a more active resistance and ultimately, a substantial social transformation**. In practice, **political revolutions emerge through the radicalisation of existing demands and resistances** – not as pure Acts occurring out of nothing. Even when they are incomprehensible from the standpoint of 'normal', conformist bystanders, **they are a product of the development of subterranean resistances and counter hegemonies among subaltern** groups. As Jim Scott argues, when discontent among the subaltern strata generates 'moments of madness', insurrections and revolutions, it does so as an extension of, and in continuity with, existing 'hidden transcripts', dissenting imaginaries and petty resistances. As Scott's evidence shows, **resistance 'requires an experimental spirit and a capacity to test and exploit all the loopholes, ambiguities, silences and lapses available**... [and] setting a course for the very perimeter of what the authorities are obliged to permit or unable to prevent'.144 Such **petty resistance can pass over into more general insurrections.** When prisoners at a Stalinist camp, expected to deliberately lose a race against their guards, 'spoiled the performance' with a 'pantomime of excess effort', **a 'small political victory had real political consequences', producing a 'flurry of activity'.**145 Filipino peasant uprisings often acted out an ideology developed through a subverted version of passion plays,146 and European carnivals often passed over into insurrection.147 **Social change does not come from nothing; it requires the pre-existence of a counter-culture involving nonconformist ideas and practices. 'You have to know how the world isn't in order to change it**'.148 As Gramsci puts it, before coming into existence **a new society must be 'ideally active' in the minds of those struggling for change.149**

A2: Zizek

(_) The Act's form of active nihilism ultimately fails and isn't sociall effective as it gets repressed, allows for violence and doesn't propose methods of solving in modes of isolation

Robinson and Tormey in 05 (Andrew and Simon, "Zizek is not a radical," THESIS ELEVEN, N80, FEBRUARY, http://homepage.ntlworld.com/simon.tormey/articles/Zizeknotradical.pdf pg 20)

The history of resistance gives little reason to support Zizek's politics of the Act. The ability to Act in the manner described by Zizek is largely absent from the subaltern strata. Mary Kay Letourneau (let us recall) did not transform society; rather, **her 'Act' was repressed and she was jailed.** In another case discussed by Zizek, **a group of Siberian miners is said to accomplish an Act - by getting massacred.150 Since Acts are not socially effective, they cannot help the worst-off, let alone transform society**. Zizek's assumption of the effectiveness of Acts rests on a **confusion between individual and social levels of analysis**. Vaneigem eerily foresees Zizek's 'Act' when **he argues against 'active nihilism'**. 'In a gloomy bar where everyone is bored to death, a drunken young man breaks his glass, then picks up a bottle and smashes it against the wall. Nobody gets excited; the disappointed young man lets himself be thrown out... **Nobody responded to the sign which he thought was explicit. He remained alone, like the hooligan who burns down a church or kills a policeman, at one with himself, but condemned to exile for as long as other people remain exiled from their existence. He has not escaped from the magnetic field of isolation; he is suspended in a zone of zero gravity**'.151 The transition from this 'wasteland of the suicide and the solitary killer' to revolutionary politics requires the repetition of negation in a different register,152 connected to a positive project to change the world and relying on the imaginaries Zizek denounces, the carnival spirit and the ability to dream.153

(_) Zizek's advocacy of violence justified actions like Nazism and Soviet terror

Robinson and Tormey in 05 (Andrew and Simon, "Zizek is not a radical," THESIS ELEVEN, N80, FEBRUARY, http://homepage.ntlworld.com/simon.tormey/articles/Zizeknotradical.pdf pg 20)

Secondly, Zizek implies that Lenin must in some sense have 'understood' that the revolution would necessarily betray itself, and that all revolutions are structurally doomed to fall short of whatever ideals and principles motivate them. He also implies that the success or failure of a revolution has nothing to do with whether the modes of thought and action, social relations and institutions which follow are at all related to the original revolutionary ideals and principles. What matters is that power is held by those who 'identify with the symptom', who call themselves 'Proletarian'. Zizek therefore endorses the conservative claim that Lenin's utopian moments were Machiavellian manoeuvres or at best confused delusions, veiling his true intentions to seize power for himself or a small elite: Lenin was the 'ultimate political strategist'.121 **That Zizek endorses the 'Lenin' figure despite endorsing nearly every accusation against Lenin serves to underline the degree to which Zizek's politics are wedded to conservative assumptions that repression, brutality and terror are 'always with us'. Rejecting the claim that politics could be otherwise, Zizek wishes to grasp, embrace and even revel in the grubbiness and violence of modern politics**. The moment of utopia in Russia was for Zizek realised when the Red Guards succumbed to a destructive hedonism in moments of Bataillean excess.122 **The only difference for Zizek between leftist ethics and the standpoint of** Oliver North, the Taleban, the anti-Dreyfusards and even **the Nazis is that such 'rightists' legitimate their acts in reference to some higher good, whereas leftists also suspend the higher good in a truly authentic gesture of suspension**.123 **The Soviet Terror is a good terror whereas the Nazi one is not, only because the Soviet terror was allegedly more total, with everyone being potentially at risk, not only out-groups.124 Zizek goes well beyond advocating violence as a means to an end; for Zizek, violence is part of the end itself, the utopian excess of the Act.** The closest parallel is the nihilism of Nechaev's *Catechism of a Revolution* which proclaims that 'everything is moral that contributes to the triumph of the revolution; everything that hinders it is immoral and criminal'.125 As Peter

Marshall comments in his digest of anarchist writings and movements, the *Catechism* is 'one of the most repulsive documents in the history of terrorism'. One can only speculate what he would have made of 'Repeating Lenin'.126

A2: Zizek

(_) The alternative leaves social exclusion, violence and fails at subversing capitalism

Robinson and Tormey in 05 (Andrew and Simon, "Zizek is not a radical," THESIS ELEVEN, N80, FEBRUARY, http://homepage.ntlworld.com/simon.tormey/articles/Zizeknotradical.pdf pg 20)

The choice of the term 'suspension' is revealing, for although in Zizek's account the surface structure of the social system is changed during such a 'suspension', the deep structure of the social system as set out in Lacanian theory is not (and cannot be) changed in the slightest. **So an Act shatters capitalism, but it leaves intact many of its most objectionable features, including social exclusion,56 violence,57 naturalisation,58 reification and myths,59 all of which are for Zizek primordial, ever-present and necessary in any society.** Further, since the Act involves submission to a Cause and a Leader, **it cannot destroy the authoritarian structure of capitalism:** 'often, one does need a leader in order to be able to "do the impossible"... subordination to [the leader] is the highest act of freedom'.60 So, **while an Act may destroy the specific articulations of oppression within the present system** (e.g. the identification of the Real with illegal immigrants), **it necessarily produces a system which is equally oppressive.**

AT: Zizek

(_) Plan is fully consistent --- most demands are anti-capitalist

Ernesto **Laclau**, Professor of Political Theory at the University of Essex, **2000**, "Contingency, Hegemony, Universality: Contemporary Dialogues on the Left"

Let us start with the Zizekian opposition between class struggle, and what Zizek calls postmodern identity politics. Are they essentially different? Everything depends on the way we conceive class struggle. Where is the fundamental antagonism at its root located? In New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time, I have argued that **class antagonism is not inherent to capitalist relations of production, but that it takes place between those relations and the identity of the worker outside them**. Various aspects must be carefully distinguished. First, **we have to distinguish** the contradiction between forces and **relations of production**- which, I have maintained, is a contradiction without antagonism- **from class struggle**- which is an antagonism without contradiction. So if we concentrate on the latter, **where is the antagonism located**? Certainly **not within the relations of production**. **The capitalists extract surplus-value from the workers, but** both capital and labour should not be conceived of, as far as he logic of capitalism is concerned, not as actual people but as economic categories. So if we are going to maintain that class antagonism is inherent to the relations of production, we would have to prove that from the abstract categories 'capital' and 'wage labour' we can logically derive the antagonism between both – and such a demonstration is impossible. **It does not logically follow** from the fact that the surplus value is extracted from the worker **that the latter will resist such extraction. So if there is going to be antagonism, its source cannot be internal to the capitalist relations of production**, but has to be sought in something that the worker is outside of those relations, something which is threatened by them: the fact that below a certain level of wages the worker cannot live a decent life, and so on. Now, **unless we are confronted with a situation of extreme exploitation, the worker's attitude vis-a-vis capitalism will depend entirely on how his or her identity is constituted**- as socialists knew a long time ago, when they were confronted by reformist tendencies in the trade-union movement. **There is nothing in the worker's demands which is intrinsically anti-capitalist.** Could we perhaps say that these demands have priority over those of other groups because they are closer to the economy, and thus at the heart of the functioning of the capitalist system? This argument does not fare any better. Marxists have known for a long time that **capitalism is** a world system, **structured as an imperialist chain, so crisis at one point in the system created dislocations at many other points**. This means that many sectors are threatened by the capitalist logic, and that the **resulting antagonisms are not necessarily related to particular locations in the relations of production**. As a result, the notion of class struggle is totally insufficient to explain the identity of the agents involved in anti-capitalist struggles. It is simply the remainder of an old-fashioned conception which saw in an assumed general proletarianization of society the emergence of the future burier of capitalism. The notion of 'combined and uneven development' had already pointed out the emergence of complex, non-orthodox political identities as the agencies of revolutionary change in the contemporary world, and the phenomena of globalization have accentuated this tendency. So **my answer to Zizek's dichotomy between class struggle and identity politics is that class struggle is just one species of identity politics, and one which is becoming less and less important in the world in which we live.**

A2: Zizek

(_) Zizek's lack of an alternative and general ambiguity renders his anti-capitalist rhetoric meaningless

Ernesto **Laclau**, Professor of Political Theory at the University of Essex, **2000**, "Contingency, Hegemony, Universality: Contemporary Dialogues on the Left"

Zizek takes a patently anti-capitalist stance, and asserts that the proponents of postmodernism 'as a rule, leave out of sight the resignation at its heart- the acceptance of capitalism as "the only game in town", the renunciation of any real attempt to overcome the existing capitalist liberal regime' (SZ, p. 95). **The difficulty with assertions like this is that they mean absolutely nothing**. **I understand what Marx meant by overcoming the capitalist regime, because he made it quite explicit several times. I also understand what Lenin or Trotsky meant for the same reason. But in the work of Zizek that expression means nothing- unless he has a secret strategic plan of which he is very careful not to inform anybody**. Should we understand that he wants to impose the dictatorship of the proletariat? Or does he want to socialize the means of production and abolish market mechanisms? And **what is his political strategy to achieve these rather peculiar aims? What is the alternative model of society that he is postulating? Without at least the beginning of an answer to these questions, his anti-capitalism is merely empty talk.**

(_) Zizek's alternative is a prescription for political sterility

Ernesto **Laclau**, Professor of Political Theory at the University of Essex, **2000**, "Contingency, Hegemony, Universality: Contemporary Dialogues on the Left"

The imagery around **the base/superstructure metaphor** decisively **shapes Zizek's vision of** political **alternatives**. **Thus he distinguishes between struggles to change the system and struggles within the system. I do not think that this distinction**, posed in those terms, **is a valid one.** The crucial question is: **how systematic is the system**? **If we conceive this systematical as the result of endogenous laws of development**- as in the case of the retroactive reversal of contingency into necessity- t**he only alternatives are either that those laws lead, through their operation, to the self-destruction of the system**(let us remember the debate in the Second International, on the mechanic collapse of the system) **or to the system's destruction from outside**. **If,** on the contrary, **systematicity is seen as a hegemonic construction, historical change is conceivable as a displacement in the relations between elements- some internal and some external to what the system had been**. Questions such as the following may be asked: **How is it possible to maintain a market economy which is compatible with a high degree of social control of the productive progress? What restructuralition of the liberal democratic institutions is necessary so that democratic control becomes effective, and does not degenerate into regulation by an all-powerful bureaucracy?** How should democratization be conceived so that it makes possible global political effects which are, however, compatible with the social and cultural pluralism existing in a given society? These questions are thinkable within the Gramscian strategy of a war on position, while **in Zizek's suggestion of a direct struggle for overthrowing capitalism and abolishing liberal democracy, I can see only a prescription for political quietism and sterility**.

AT: Zizek

(_) Universality is a joke

Ernesto **Laclau**, Professor of Political Theory at the University of Essex, **2000**, "Contingency, Hegemony, Universality: Contemporary Dialogues on the Left"

Zizek thinks that the degree of globality or universality of a struggle depends on its location in the social structure: some struggles, conceived as 'class struggle'- **those of the workers, especially- would spontaneously and tendentially be more 'universal' in their effects because they take place at the 'root' of the capitalist system; while others, more 'cultural' in their aims**- such as multiculturalist ones- **would be** more prone to particularism and, as a result, **easier to integrate into the present system of domination**. **For me this is a spurious distinction. There is no struggle which has inscribed in itself the guarantee of being the privileged locus of universalistic political effects.** Workers' demands- higher wages, shorter working hours, better conditions in the workplace, and so on- can, given the appropriate circumstances, be as easily integrated into the system as those of any other group. **Conversely, given the globalization of capitalism, dislocations could take place which are the basis of anti-systemic movements led by groups who are not directly part of the capitalist relations of production.** So while for Zizek the distinction between 'class struggle' and what he calls 'postmodernism' is fundamental, I tend to blur it.

A2: Empire (Hardt+Negri)

(_) Hardt and Negri's abstract theory of revolution destroys any possibility for political change\

Quinby '04 (Lee, Chair Distinguished Teaching in Humanities – Hobart and William Smith Colleges, Empire's New Clothes, p. 233)

Demonstrating Empire's millennial drift is a complicated undertaking, in no small part because of Hardt's and Negri's tendency to say one thing and yet do another. For example, **even though they** explicitly **claim a nonprophetic stance** by stating that they can see "only shadows of the figures that will animate our future" (205), **much of** what actually animates **the book is its prophetic vision of the nature and role of the militant, the poor, the nomad, the new barbarian, and the multitude**. In place of specific and concrete analysis—a hallmark of a genealogical approach—**they stamp their theory with messianic categories that diminish** rather than expand **our understanding of productive and reproductive life**. This contradiction is particularly noteworthy because Empire's millennialism is what makes it compelling. Millennial rhetoric stirs the imagination toward exhilarating poles of fear and hope, promising a culminating and righteous telos to those who adhere to its tenets of belief. It is hard not to be drawn in. A second interrelated contradiction arises from the fact that **Hardt and Negri specifically reject transcendence**, **making** numerous explicit **claims for the immanence of their materialist approach**, often drawing on Foucault to help make their case. In their opening pages, for example, they "rule out" the "idea that order is dictated by a single power and a single center of rationality transcendent to global forces" (3). Nevertheless, **their recurrent appeals to certain categories of thought cast their theoretical framework back into transcendental molds integral to millennialism, which is both totalizing and abstractionist in its history and basic formulation**.

(_) Hardt and Negri reject political action and representation, dooming their revolution

Passavant '04 (Paul, Professor of Political Science – Hobart and William Smith Colleges, Empire's New Clothes, p. 115-6)

What **if there was a revolution? Inevitably, there would be disagreements over whether there should be rights in addition to** or other than **those Hardt and Negri claimed** for the multitude. **In practice, there would be struggles** in which the rights claims Hardt and Negri have put forward might be considered antagonistic to other rights that people believe are essential to justice. But **even in the unlikely event of total agreement** on a total list of multitudinous rights, **disagreements would arise whenever rights claims were concretized in specific circumstances**. Outcomes of these interpretive battles over what the rights of the multitude oblige in given circumstances would position those interpretations that do not carry the day as not-multitudinous, if not antimultitudinous. **Where there is politics, there is representation**, as "we" need to figure out who "we" are and what our commitments mean in particular circumstances, circumstances that will be different from those under which we committed ourselves previously. And where there is representation, **there is difference and exclusion**, as Hardt and Negri know and fear. **Hardt and Negri avoid the problematic of representation in order to save the inclusiveness of the multitude, but they cannot do this without sacrificing the political significance of the multitude**. **For the multitude to take on political significance, it will become rent by difference and repression. B**ut sacrificing the chaos of anything goes leads to the possibility that something (good?) can happen. **There will be exclusions and repressions involved** in any one move toward justice. Rather than complacency or a false universality, we must make what remains after an (necessarily) incomplete move toward justice the fuel for subsequent moves toward justice, since total justice will elude our time.

A2: Empire (Hardt+Negri)

(_) Turn- the Multitude would devastate the left, they favor laborer over environmentalist ignoring and creating and fostering dogmatic dissent

Tampino in 05 (Nicholas, Assistant Professor of Government at Hamilton College http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v008/8.2tampio.html, "Can the Multitude Save the Left?"

The concept of **the multitude**, however, **lays out a** questionable and **dangerous project for the Left**. First, **the concept assumes that every significant disagreement within the Left can, in their words, melt away**. In Seattle, rank-and-file unionists joined environmentalists marching with green sea turtle puppets. This event, for Hardt and Negri, signals an epochal shift in the relationship between these two groups. The magic of Seattle was to show that these many grievances were not just a random, haphazard collection, a cacophony of different voices, but a chorus that spoke in common against the global system.[7] **Enduring harmony between unionists and environmentalists in the Pacific Northwest would, indeed, be magical**. Since the passage of the Endangered Species Act of 1973, these two groups have battled recurrently over the management of natural resources in Oregon and Washington. The most famous confrontation, perhaps, occurred when loggers burned spotted owls in effigy to protest environmental regulations protecting the animals' habitat. There are also ongoing debates over how to regulate the salmon and pollock industries. Though some unionists undoubtedly favor sustainable fishing and logging, there may be another explanation for why unionists marched alongside environmentalists in Seattle. The American fishing industry, according to Elizabeth R. DeSombre and J. Samuel Barkin, had an economic incentive to dispute the WTO decision vetoing the United States' prohibition of shrimp imported from countries that do not use "turtle excluder devices" (TEDs) on their nets.[8] The U.S. law banning shrimp from countries such as Mexico acted, in effect, as a tariff. Spokesmen for the fishing industry, in fact, focused on the economic impact of importing cheap shrimp, not on the welfare of sea turtles. **This does not mean that unionists and environmentalists cannot collaborate on legislation or policy. It does suggest, however, that conflict between environmentalists and unionists - over vision and strategy - may persist** after the events of 1999 . **Hardt and Negri do not seem to value deep disagreement** (rather than deep diversity) **within the Left**. In the dispute between labor and environmentalism, **Hardt and Negri seem squarely on the side of labor.** In *Empire*, they criticize as "primordial" and "romantic" environmentalist claims about the sanctity of nature and biodiversity.[9] But **Hardt and Negri never discuss environmental politics at length in** *Empire* **or** *Multitude*.[10] **The second problem with the concept of the multitude, thus, is the dogmatism it fosters in those facing dissent** — in this case, about humanity's relationship to the environment. In an interview, Negri says the following about critics of or obstacles to the multitude: "**Any attempt to stand in the way of this unification and the consequent recognition of common objectives is reactionary, or, rather, expresses sectarian and inimical operations**."[11] What happens, though, when unionists and environmentalists stand on opposite sides of the barricades? Is it productive, then, to use the language of "sectarian and inimical operations"? It is odd that Hardt and Negri, who end *Multitude* with an appeal to James Madison, do not see the intimate connection between liberty and faction. **The concept of the multitude, in short, seems more likely to harm the Left than to help it. The Left ought to engage in the challenging, provisional, but necessary work of building coalitions rather than wait for a secular Messiah.**

A2: Empire (Hardt+Negri)

(_) Alt fails

Angus, 04 (Ian Empire,Borders,Place: A Critique of Hardt and Negri's Concept of Empire, Theory and Event, 2004, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v007/7.3angus.html)

Hardt and Negri think that we have arrived at this historical turning point, that classes (along with nations or peoples) are no longer the subjects of history. Instead the individual has become such (or is in the process of becoming such). **This turning point gives rise to the formation of what they call the "multitude," defined in terms of the "totality of productive and creative subjectivities." Why and how would this turning point occur? Hardt and Negri's texts are quite vague on these questions**. They talk about the transition to "cognitive capitalism" or the emergence of "immaterial production," the new "networked" society or "deterritorialization." They make reference to Foucault's propositions concerning the transition from the disciplinary society to the society of control**. Everything that has been said over the past thirty years, whether good or bad, depending on one's viewpoint, whether indisputable because platitudinous or strongly debatable, is thrown pell-mell into a great pot in preparation for the future**. **A compendium of current fashions does not easily lead to conviction.** The similarity to the theses formulated by Manuel Castells concerning the "networked society" and to the ideas popularized by Jeremy Rifkin, Robert B. Reich, and other American popularizers is such that one is entitled to pose the question: what is new and important in all this hodgepodge of ideas? **I will propose then another hypothesis** to account for the invention of the "multitude" in question. **Our moment is one of defeat for the powerful social and political movements that shaped the twentieth century** (workers', socialist, and national liberation movements). **The loss of perspective that any defeat involves leads to ephemeral unrest and the profusion of para-theoretical propositions that both legitimate that unrest and give rise to the belief that it constitutes an "effective" means for "transforming the world"** (even without wanting to), in the good sense of the term moreover. **One can only gradually solidify new formulations that are both coherent and effective by distancing oneself from the past, rather than proposing a "remake" of it, and by effectively integrating new realities produced by social evolution in all its dimensions.** Such contributions, both debatable and diverse, certainly exist. I do not include Hardt and Negri's discourse among them**. The propositions that Hardt and Negri draw from their discourse on the "multitude" bear witness, even in their very formulation, to the impasse in which they are trapped. The first of these propositions concerns democracy that**, for the first time in history**, is supposedly on the verge of becoming a real possibility on the global scale**. Moreover, **the multitude is defined as the "constitutive" force of democracy. This is a wonderfully naïve proposition**. **Are we moving in this direction? Beyond a few superficial appearances (some elections here or there), which obviously satisfy the liberal powers (particularly Washington), democracy—both necessary and possible—is in crisis. It is threatened with losing its legitimacy to the advantage of religious or ethnic fundamentalisms** (I do not consider the ethnocratic regimes of the former Yugoslavia as democratic progress!). Do elections that overturn the power of one criminal gang (for example, one in the service of the Russian autocracy) to replace it with another one (financed by the CIA!) constitute progress for democracy or a manipulated farce? **Is not the unfolding of the imperialist project for control of the planet at the origin of the frontal attacks that are reducing basic democratic rights in the United States? Is not the liberal consensus in Europe, around which the major political forces of right and left have united, in the process of delegitimizing electoral procedures? Hardt and Negri are silent on all these questions.**

A2: Empire (Hardt+Negri)

(_) The Empire's pursuit of total control creates contradictions and a paradox of power – the unification within Empire is key to resistance.

Wolfe in 01 (Alan, director of the Boisi Center for Religion and American Public Life at Boston College, "The Snake", The New Republic Online, October 4th, http://www.powells.com/review/2001_10_04)

But Hardt and Negri will have none of this talk of human nature, or use value, or labor power. Capital will exploit wherever and whatever it can. With bio-power in command, our bodies are no longer irreducibly ours. Our bodies have instead turned against themselves; they are the very instruments by which we are controlled by forces external to us. We therefore have to "recognize our posthuman bodies and minds" and see ourselves "for the simians and cyborgs we are" before we can begin to unleash whatever creative powers we may have left over. But all is not lost for us simians and cyborgs. Unlike the writers of the Frankfurt School, who also emphasized the authoritarian character of contemporary capitalism, writers such as Gilles **Deleuze and** FÈlix **Guattari,** who are the true intellectual heroes of Empire, **recognize that efforts at total control create contradictions of their own.** Here, in prose that insults language, is how Hardt and Negri summarize what they have understood: "The analysis of real subsumption, when this is understood as investing not only the economic or only the cultural dimension of society but rather the social bios itself, and when it is attentive to the modalities of disciplinarity and/or control, disrupts the linear and totalitarian figure of capitalist development." What this means is that **under Empire there emerges a "paradox of power" in which all elements of social life are unified, but the very act of unification "reveals a new context, a new milieu of maximum plurality and uncontainable singularization—a milieu of the event." Even when Empire seems to rule everywhere and over everything, there are opportunities for resistance, if only those opportunities can be grasped and seen.]**

(_) The negative's alternative is wrong – resistance can only succeed by working within the conditions of the Empire.

Foster, 2001 (John Bellamy, editor of Monthly Review and author of Marx's Ecology: Materialism and Nature and The Vulnerable Planet, "Imperialism and 'Empire'" Monthly Review, http://www.monthlyreview.org/1201jbf.htm)

Empire, the name they give to this new world order, is a product of the struggle over sovereignty and constitutionalism at the global level in an age in which a new global Jeffersonianism—the expansion of the U.S. constitutional form into the global realm—has become possible. **Local struggles against Empire are opposed by these authors, who believe that the struggle now is simply over the form globalization will take—and the extent to which Empire will live up to its promise of bringing to fruition "the global expansion of the internal U.S. constitutional project" Their argument supports the efforts of the "multitude against Empire"—that is, the struggle of the multitude to become an autonomous political subject—yet this can only take place, they argue, within "the ontological conditions that Empire presents"**

Alt Can't Solve

(_) The alt can't solve their links – the only escape from representational force is abandoning the quest for international order altogether – this paralyzes action in the face of carnage – the neg is incapable of articulating a reason why representational force is always bad

Mattern 05 (Janice Bially Mattern, Associate Prof. of International Relations, Lehigh University, Ordering International Politics, 2005, pp268-269)

How then to get away from representational force in the construction of international order? One possibility is to abandon the quest for international order altogether. **This** kind of suggestion **has been the domain of postmodern ethics.** For instance, **Lyotard's** postmodern ethics **jettisons the notion of totalizing orders in favor of particularistic, interpersonal relationships**. Those may occur across time and space (and so globally), but **they are only moral if** the authors of the relationships script their interactions using Tolerance. That is, **subjects** must **maintain an** ever open. minded **approach to the other such that no specific interpretation is demanded or offered**. In practical terms, this is an order in which the shared understanding is of mutual hands-off (Lyotard and Thébaud 1985).

This of course **creates a serious problem in terms of helping or caring for others, which is troubling, especially during times of tragedy. As** David **Campbell has mused with obvious consternation, it offers no option but to wait for the carnage to subside** (Campbell l994).' What is more, **it is unclear that an order based on postmodern ethics would avoid the pitfall of representational force any more than do particular substantive visions or discourse ethics. After all, in the very process of articulating his vision, Lyotard himself deploys representational force—he Exiles by assumption the views of s**uch **classical realists** as Carr and Machiavelli, which hold that representational force need not always be a moral negative. Indeed, **it is a curious, undefended, and unchahhenged presumption in postmodern ethics and poststructuralist philosophical thought, more generally, that power is a moral bad**. Perhaps then this is where a postconstructisist identity turn in ethics might begin; by delving more deeply into the moral logic of representational force.

We Still Solve

(_) Even if representational force is coercive, it is still effective – even in the neg's framework, plan is capable of structuring international relationships that forestall violent conflict

Mattern 05 (Janice Bially Mattern, Associate Prof. of International Relations, Lehigh University, Ordering International Politics, 2005, pp268-269)

Of course, **given a view of international identity as power-laden and fraught**. it may be that on the postconstructivist account, **the hard case is explaining the transition from prosocial or "nice" ideas/identities to prosocial or "nice" state actions like cooperation and nonviolenc**e. **The objection here might be that if identities are the product of Language-power and Self. interest, then a logical ellipses emerges surrounding how**, for instance, **a forcefully fastened we identity could engender such community-oriented behaviors as nonviolence**.' **The question**, more succinctly, **is how those forced against their will into we-ness can be expected to come to treat each other nonviolently? But because representational force leaves its victims with no choice but to comply, no real logical problem exist here at all.** As long as states are effectively trapped into we-ness, and as long as they are Self-interested, it makes sense to think that those states would act in keeping with we-ness. That is, **as long as the power politics of identity have been properly deployed, states will live the experience of we-ness, even if they do not feel it** (Chapter 4). In this way, the account of the relationship between ideas and action offered in postconstructivist idealism is more internally coherent than that offered by the conventional variant, making it a more compelling idealist theory.

Perm

(_) The permutation is theoretically possible and net-beneficial – mutual engagement between realist and negative postconstructionist accounts of international politics creates the best theoretic turn – the negative's rejection of the plan prevents the resolution of these disparities

Mattern 05 (Janice Bially Mattern, Associate Prof. of International Relations, Lehigh University, Ordering International Politics, 2005, pp268-269)

One final theoretic turn is implied by postconstructivism, which emerges especially from the preceding reflections on the postconstructivist view of the relationship between ideas and action. This is **the possibility of theoretic cross-fertilization between realism and postconstructivism**. In particular, it is interesting to note that **the postconstrutivist account formulates the relationship between ideas and state action in a logically parallel fashion to the way that various realists formulate the relationship between material conditions and state action** (Waltz 1979; Morgenthau 2003). In both theories, **power impels states to act in particular manners by playing on their interests**. Of course, on the realist account, power is mediated through material means and impels state action by playing on states' exogenously given physical or material interests, whereas on the postconstructivist account, power is mediated through the Language that expresses ideas and impels state action by playing on states' endogenously constituted subjective (Self) interests. Clearly, **each highlights different expressions of power and different knds of state interests. Yet the correspondence of logic is undeniable. Both put power and interests at the core of their accounts of how states get from disorder to order**. **These logical similarities suggest that** beyond the theoretic emphases on ideas as power, process, agency, and sources of state action, **one significant way in which a postconstructivist identity turn in JR theory can embolden theoretic change is by prompting mutual engagement between the seemingly disparate realist and postconstructivist approaches**. For instance, **such collaboration might usefully center on the continuities and relationship between ideational and material power.** Given that these issues were very much a concern of classical realists like Machiavelli and Carr, a postconstructivist identity turn in theory may end up looking, in some respects, very much like a sophisticated return to the classical realist roots of IR; to a realist or coercive coristructivism (Barkin 2003; Jackson and Krebs 2003).

AT: Representations

(_) Privileging representations locks in violence --- policy analysis is the best way to challenge power

Taft-Kaufman '95 (Jill, Professor of Speech – CMU, *Southern Communication Journal*, Vol. 60, Issue 3, Spring)

The postmodern passwords of "polyvocality," "Otherness," and "difference," unsupported by substantial analysis of the concrete contexts of subjects, creates a solipsistic quagmire. The political sympathies of the new cultural critics, with their ostensible concern for the lack of power experienced by marginalized people, aligns them with the political left. Yet, despite their adversarial posture and talk of opposition, their **discourses on intertextuality** and inter-referentiality **isolate them from** and ignore **the conditions that** have produced leftist politics--**conflict, racism, poverty, and injustice**. In short, as Clarke (1991) asserts, postmodern emphasis on new subjects conceals the old subjects, those who have limited access to good jobs, food, housing, health care, and transportation, as well as to the media that depict them. Merod (1987) decries this situation as one which leaves no vision, will, or commitment to activism. He notes that **academic lip service** to the oppositional **is underscored by the absence of focused** collective or politically active **intellectual communities**. Provoked by the academic manifestations of this problem Di Leonardo (1990) echoes Merod and laments: Has there ever been a historical era characterized by as little radical analysis or activism and as much radical-chic writing as ours? **Maundering on about Otherness**: phallocentrism or Eurocentric tropes **has become a lazy academic substitute for actual engagement with** the detailed histories and **contemporary realities** of Western racial minorities, white women, or any Third World population. (p. 530) Clarke's assessment of **the** postmodern **elevation of language** to the "sine qua non" of critical discussion **is an even stronger indictment against the trend**. Clarke examines Lyotard's (1984) The Postmodern Condition in which Lyotard maintains that virtually all social relations are linguistic, and, therefore, it is through the coercion that threatens speech that we enter the "realm of terror" and society falls apart. To this assertion, **Clarke replies: I can think of few more striking indicators of the political and intellectual impoverishment of a view of society that can only recognize the discursive**. If the worst terror we can envisage is the threat not to be allowed to speak, we are appallingly ignorant of terror in its elaborate contemporary forms. It may be the intellectual's conception of terror (what else do we do but speak?), but its projection onto the rest of the world would be calamitous....(pp. 2-27) The realm of the discursive is derived from the requisites for human life, which are in the physical world, rather than in a world of ideas or symbols.(4) Nutrition, shelter, and protection are basic human needs that require collective activity for their fulfillment. Postmodern **emphasis on the discursive without an accompanying analysis of** how the discursive emerges from **material circumstances hides the** complex **task of** envisioning and **working towards concrete social goals** (Merod, 1987). Although the material conditions that create the situation of marginality escape the purview of the postmodernist, the situation and its consequences are not overlooked by scholars from marginalized groups. Robinson (1990) for example, argues that "the **justice** that working people deserve **is economic, not just textual**" (p. 571). Lopez (1992) states that "the starting point for organizing the program content of education or political action must be the present existential, concrete situation" (p. 299). West (1988) asserts that borrowing French post-structuralist discourses about "Otherness" blinds us to realities of American difference going on in front of us (p. 170). Unlike postmodern "**textual radicals**" who Rabinow (1986) acknowledges **are "fuzzy about** power and the **realities of socioeconomic constraints**" (p. 255), most writers from marginalized groups are clear about how discourse interweaves with the concrete circumstances that create lived experience. People whose lives form the material for postmodern counter-hegemonic discourse do not share the optimism over the new **recognition of** their **discursive subjectivities**, because such an acknowledgment **does not address** sufficiently their collective historical and current **struggles against racism, sexism, homophobia, and economic injustice**. They do not appreciate being told they are living in a world in which there are no more real subjects. Ideas have consequences. **Emphasizing the discursive** self **when a person is hungry** and homeless **represents** both **a** cultural and **humane failure**. The need to look beyond texts to the perception and attainment of concrete social goals keeps writers from marginalized groups ever-mindful of the specifics of how power works through political agendas, institutions, agencies, and the budgets that fuel them.

AT: Representations

(_) Representations don't influence reality

Kocher '2K (Robert L, Author and Philosopher, http://freedom.orlingrabbe.com/lfetimes/reality_sanity1.htm)

While it is not possible to establish many proofs in the verbal world, and it is simultaneously possible to make many uninhibited assertions or word equations in the verbal world, it should be considered that **reality is** more r**igid and does not abide by the** artificial flexibility and **latitude of the verbal world. The world of words and the world of** human **experience are very imperfectly correlated.** That is, **saying something doesn't make it true. A verbal statement** in the world of words **doesn't mean it will occur** as such **in the world of** consistent human experience I call **reality**. In the event verbal statements or assertions disagree with consistent human experience, what proof is there that the concoctions created in the world of words should take precedence or be assumed a greater truth than the world of human physical experience that I define as reality? In the event following a verbal assertion in the verbal world produces pain or catastrophe in the world of human physical reality or experience, which of the two can and should be changed? Is it wiser to live with the pain and catastrophe, or to change the arbitrary collection of words whose direction produced that pain and catastrophe? Which do you want to live with? What proven reason is there to assume that when doubtfulness that can be constructed in verbal equations conflicts with human physical experience, human physical experience should be considered doubtful? It becomes a matter of choice and pride in intellectual argument. My personal advice is that when verbal contortions lead to chronic confusion and difficulty, better you should stop the verbal contortions rather than continuing to expect the difficulty to change. Again, it's a matter of choice. **Does the outcome of the philosophical question of whether reality** or proof **exists decide whether we should** plant crops or **wear clothes in cold weather to protect us from freezing?** Har! Are you crazy? How many committed deconstructionist philosophers walk about naked in subzero temperatures or don't eat? **Try creating** and living in **an alternative** subjective **reality where** food is not needed and where **you can sit naked on icebergs, and find out what happens**. I emphatically encourage people to try it with the stipulation that they don't do it around me, that they don't force me to do it with them, or that they don't come to me complaining about the consequences and demanding to conscript me into paying for the cost of treating frostbite or other consequences. (sounds like there is a parallel to irresponsibility and socialism somewhere in here, doesn't it?). I encourage people to live subjective reality. I also ask them to go off far away from me to try it, where I won't be bothered by them or the consequences. For those who haven't guessed, this encouragement is a clever attempt to bait them into going off to some distant place where they will kill themselves off through the process of social Darwinism — because, let's face it, **a society of** deconstructionists and counterculturalists filled with **people debating** what, **if** any, **reality exists would have the productive functionality of a field of diseased rutabagas and would never survive the first frost.** The attempt to convince people to create and move to such a society never works, however, because they are not as committed or sincere as they claim to be. Consequently, they stay here to work for left wing causes and promote left wing political candidates where there are people who live productive reality who can be fed upon while they continue their arguments. They ain't going to practice what they profess, and they are smart enough not to leave the availability of people to victimize and steal from while they profess what they pretend to believe in.

AT: Fear of Death

(_) Fear is necessary to check extinction – provides an active consciousness which sustains peace

J.A.H. **Futterman**, Former US nuclear weapons scientist, **1994**, "Obscenity and Peace: Meditation on the Bomb," Virtual Church of the Blind Chihuahua, www.dogchurch.org/books/nuke.html

But **the inhibitory effect of** reliable **nuclear weapons** goes deeper than Shirer's deterrence of adventurer-conquerors. It **changes the way we think** individually and culturally, preparing us for a future we cannot now imagine. Jungian psychiatrist Anthony J. Stevens states, [15] **"History would indicate that people cannot rise above their narrow sectarian concerns without some overwhelming paroxysm.** It took the War of Independence and the Civil War to forge the United States, World War I to create the League of Nations, World War II to create the United Nations Organization and the European Economic Community. **Only catastrophe**, it seems, **forces people to take the wider view. Or what about fear? Can the horror which we all experience when we contemplate the possibility of nuclear extinction mobilize in us sufficient libidinal energy to resist the archetypes of war**? Certainly, **the moment we become blasé about the possibility** of holocaust **we are lost. As long as horror of nuclear exchange remains uppermost we can recognize that nothing is worth it. War becomes the impossible option**. Perhaps horror, the experience of horror, the consciousness of **horror, is our only hope**. Perhaps horror alone will enable us to overcome the otherwise invincible attraction of war." Thus I also continue engaging in nuclear weapons work to help fire that world-historical warning shot I mentioned above, namely, that as our beneficial technologies become more powerful, so will our weapons technologies, unless genuine peace precludes it. We must build a future more peaceful than our past, if we are to have a future at all, with or without nuclear weapons — a fact we had better learn before worse things than nuclear weapons are invented. If you're a philosopher, this means that I regard the nature of humankind as mutable rather than fixed, but that I think most people welcome change in their personalities and cultures with all the enthusiasm that they welcome death — thus, the **fear of nuclear annihilation of ourselves and all our values may be what we require in order to become peaceful enough to survive our future technological breakthroughs**.[16]

(_) Collective fear of death is key to check genocide and extinction

Louis Rene **Beres**, PhD Princeton, **1996**, "No Fear, No Trembling Israel, Death and the Meaning of Anxiety," www.freeman.org/m_online/feb96/beresn.htm

Fear of death**, the ultimate source of anxiety, is essential to human survival. This is true not only for individuals, but also for states. Without such fear, states will exhibit an incapacity to confront nonbeing that can hasten their disappearance.** So it is today with the State of Israel. Israel suffers acutely from insufficient existential dread. Refusing to tremble before the growing prospect of collective disintegration - a forseeable prospect connected with both genocide and war - this state is now unable to take the necessary steps toward collective survival. What is more, because death is the one fact of life which is not relative but absolute, Israel's blithe unawareness of its national mortality deprives its still living days of essential absoluteness and growth. For states, just as for individuals, **confronting death can give the most positive reality to life itself.** In this respect, a cultivated awareness of nonbeing is central to each state's pattern of potentialities as well as to its very existence. When a state chooses to block off such an awareness, a choice currently made by the State of Israel, it loses, possibly forever, the altogether critical benefits of "anxiety." There is, of course, a distinctly ironic resonance to this argument**. Anxiety, after all, is generally taken as a negative, as a liability that cripples rather than enhances life. But anxiety is not something we "have." It is something we (states and individuals) "are." I**t is true, to be sure, that anxiety, at the onset of psychosis, can lead individuals to experience literally the threat of self-dissolution, but this is, by definition, not a problem for states. **Anxiety stems from the awareness that existence can actually be destroyed, that one can actually become nothing.** An ontological characteristic, it has been commonly called Angst, a word related to anguish (which comes from the Latin angustus, "narrow," which in turn comes from angere, "to choke.") Herein lies the relevant idea of birth trauma as the prototype of all anxiety, as "pain in narrows" through the "choking" straits of birth. Kierkegaard identified anxiety as "the dizziness of freedom," adding: "**Anxiety is the reality of freedom as a potentiality before this freedom has materialized."** This brings us back to Israel. Both individuals and states may surrender freedom in the hope of ridding themselves of an unbearable anxiety. Regarding states, such surrender can lead to a rampant and delirious collectivism which stamps out all political opposition. It can also lead to a national self-delusion which augments enemy power and hastens catastrophic war. For the Jewish State, **a lack of pertinent anxiety, of the positive aspect of Angst, has already led its people to what is likely an irreversible rendezvous with extinction.**

AT: Fear of Death

(_) Death imagery affirms life

Michael Allen **Fox**, Assoc. Prof Phil. @ Queens, **1985**, "Nuclear War: Philosophical Perspectives," ed. Fox and Groarke, p. 127

There remains but one choice: we must seek a reduction of world tensions, mutual trust, disarmament, and peace.35 Security is not the absence of fear and anxiety, but a degree of stress and uncertainty with which we can cope and remain mentally healthy. For security, understood in this way, to become a feature of our lives, we must admit our nuclear fear and anxiety and identify the mechanisms that dull or mask our emotional and other responses. It is necessary to realist that we cannot entrust security to ourselves, but, strange as it seems and however difficult to accept, must entrust it to our adversary Just as the safety and security of each of us, as individuals, depends upon the good will of every other, any one of whom could harm us at any moment, so the security of nations finally depends upon the good will of other nations, whether or not we willingly accept this fact. The disease for which we must find the cure also requires that we continually come face to face with the unthinkable in image and thought and recoil from it. 36 In this manner we can break its hold over us and free ourselves to begin new initiatives. As Robert J. Lifton points out, "confronting massive death helps us bring ourselves more in touch with what we care most about in life. We [will then] find ourselves in no way on a death trip, but rather responding to a call for personal and professional actions and commitments on behalf of that wondrous and fragile entity we know as human life.

AT: Fear of Death

(_) We do not fear death, we discuss our impacts for the purpose of confronting death and engaging in the idea, it is only by discussing death that we can define its purpose and the true purpose and value of life, this robs all fear from death

Gunaratna Buddhist 1982 (V.F. "Buddhist Reflections on Death"
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/authors/gunaratna/wheel102.html)

To the average man death is by no means a pleasant subject or talk for discussion. It is something dismal and oppressive — a veritable kill-joy, a fit topic for a funeral house only. **The average man** immersed as he is in the self, **ever seeking after the pleasurable, ever pursuing that which excites and gratifies the senses**, **refuses to pause and ponder seriously that these very objects of pleasure and gratification will some day reach their end.** If wise counsel does not prevail and urge the unthinking pleasure-seeking man to consider seriously that death can knock at his door also, it is only the shock of a bereavement under his own roof, the sudden and untimely death of a parent, wife or child that will rouse him up from his delirious round of sense-gratification and rudely awaken him to the hard facts of life. Then only will his eyes open, then only will he begin to ask himself why there is such a phenomenon as death. Why is it inevitable? Why are there these painful partings which rob life of its joys? To most of us, at some moment or another, **the spectacle of death must have given rise to the deepest of thoughts and profoundest of questions. What is life worth, if able bodies that once performed great deeds now lie flat and cold, senseless and lifeless?** What is life worth, if eyes that once sparkled with joy, eyes that once beamed with love are now closed forever, bereft of movement, bereft of life? **Thoughts such as these are not to be repressed. It is just these inquiring thoughts,** if wisely pursued, **that will ultimately unfold the potentialities inherent in the human mind to receive the highest truths.** According to the Buddhist way of thinking, **death,** far from being a subject to be shunned and avoided, **is the key that unlocks the seeming mystery of life. It is by understanding death that we understand life; for death is part of the process of life in the larger sense**. In another sense, **life and death are two ends of the same process and if you understand one end of the process, you also understand the other end.** Hence, **by understanding the purpose of death we also understand the purpose of life. It is the contemplation of death,** the intensive thought that it will some day come upon us, **that softens the hardest of hearts, binds one to another with cords of love and compassion, and destroys the barriers of caste, creed and race among the peoples of this earth all of whom are subject to the common destiny of death. Death is a great leveler.** Pride of birth, pride of position, pride of wealth, pride of power must give way to the all-consuming thought of inevitable death. It is this leveling aspect of death that made the poet say: "Scepter and crown Must tumble down And in the dust be equal made With the poor crooked scythe and spade." **It is the contemplation of death that helps to destroy the infatuation of sense-pleasure. It is the contemplation of death that destroys vanity. It is the contemplation of death that gives balance and a healthy sense of proportion to our highly over-wrought minds with their misguided sense of values.** It is the contemplation of death that gives strength and steadiness and direction to the erratic human mind, now wandering in one direction, now in another, without an aim, without a purpose. It is not for nothing that the Buddha has, in the very highest terms, commended to his disciples the practice of mindfulness regarding death. This is known as "marananussati bhavana." One who wants to practice it must at stated times, and also every now and then, revert to the thought maranam bhavissati — "death will take place." **This contemplation of death is one of the classical meditation-subjects** treated in the Visuddhi Magga which states that in order to obtain the fullest results, **one should practice this meditation in the correct way,** that is, with mindfulness (sati), with a sense of urgency (samvega) and with understanding (ñana). For example, suppose a young disciple fails to realize keenly that death can come upon him at any moment, and regards it as something that will occur in old age in the distant future; his contemplation of death will be lacking strength and clarity, so much so that it will run on lines which are not conducive to success. **How great and useful is the contemplation of death can be** seen from the following beneficial effects enumerated in the Visuddhi Magga: — "**The disciple who devotes himself to this contemplation of death is always vigilant, takes no delight in any form of existence, gives up hankering after life, censures evil doing, is free from craving as regards the requisites of life, his perception of impermanence becomes established, he realizes the painful and soulless nature of existence and**

at the moment of death he is devoid of fear, and remains mindful and self-possessed. Finally, if in this present life he fails to attain to Nibbana, upon the dissolution of the body he is bound for a happy destiny." Thus it will be seen that **mindfulness of death not only purifies and refines the mind but also has the effect of robbing death of its fears and terrors,** and helps one at that solemn moment when he is gasping for his last breath, to face that situation with fortitude and calm. **He is never unnerved at the thought of death but is always prepared for it. It is such a man that can truly exclaim, "O death, where is thy sting?"** In the Anguttara Nikaya the Buddha has said, "Oh Monks, **there are ten ideas**, which if made to grow, made much of, are of great fruit, of great profit for plunging into Nibbana, for ending up in Nibbana." Of these ten, **one is death. Contemplation on death and on other forms of sorrow** such as old age, and disease, **constitutes a convenient starting point for the long line of investigation and meditation that will ultimately lead to Reality. This is exactly what happened in the case of the Buddha.** Was it not the sight of an old man followed by the sight of a sick man and thereafter the sight of a dead man that made Prince Siddhattha, living in the lap of luxury, to give up wife and child, home and the prospect of a kingdom, and to embark on a voyage of discovery of truth, a voyage that ended in the glory of Buddhahood and the bliss of Nibbana? **The marked disinclination of the average man to advert to the problem of death, the distaste that arouses in him the desire to turn away from it whenever the subject is broached, are all due to the weakness of the human mind,** sometimes occasioned by fear, sometimes by tanha or selfishness, but at all times supported by ignorance (avijja). **The disinclination to understand death, is no different from the disinclination of a man to subject himself to a medical check-up although he feels that something is wrong with him. We must learn to value the necessity to face facts. Safety always lies in truth. The sooner we know our condition the safer are we, for we can then take the steps necessary for our betterment**. The saying, "where ignorance is bliss it is folly to be wise" has no application here. **To live with no thought of death is to live in a fool's paradise**.

AT: Love Alternative

(_) Love is impossible as long as domination exists, only the plan solves the root cause

Crass anarchist/activist against racism **2k3** (Chris, "Going To Places That Scare Me: Personal Reflections On Challenging Male Supremacy" http://colours.mahost.org/articles/crass15.html)

This isn't a confessional so that I will be forgiven. T**his is an on-going struggle to be honest about how deeply shaped I am by patriarchy** and these systems of oppression. Patriarchy tears me up. I have so many fears about whether or not I'm capable of being in healthy loving relationships. Fears about whether or not I can be genuinely honest and connected with myself so that I can then open up and share with others. Fears about organizing to genuinely build and share power with others The scars of patriarchy are on every single person I interact with and when I push myself to see it, to really look and take the time to think about it, I'm filled with sadness and rage. **bell hooks**, in her book All About Love, **writes that love is impossible where the will to dominate exists**. Can I genuinely love? I want to believe. I want to believe in a political practice for gendered privileged men forged in opposition to patriarchy.
I do believe that **as we struggle against oppression, as we practice our commitments, we actualize and express our humanity.** There are moments, **experiences and events when I see patriarchy challenged by all genders and it shows what we can do.** I believe that this is our lives' work and that at its core it's a fight for our lives. And **in this fight we realize that even in the face of these systems of oppression, our love, beauty, creativity, passion, dignity and power grows. We can do this.**

(_) No alt – hooks has zero political strategy

Samuel author/reviewer of books **1996** (Julian, Review of "The Fact of Blackness: Frantz Fanon and Visual Representation" http://www.indiastar.com/samuel.htm)

Here is the thinking of the completely delirious American bell hooks -- another super-salaried anti-colonialist:
"In love. I was thinking a lot about the place of empathy in any kind of ethic of care and the notion that part of how one embraces that larger you -- that you that Fanon uses -- is through the capacity to embrace the other in some way. What does it mean if Fanon is unable to embrace the black female -- what part of himself remains unembraced? How does the possibility of love or an ethic of care chart the path to this humanism that he poses as redemptive?"pp. 106
Are these consequential and serious psychological insights? Is there anything at all to be gained from "thinking" about bell hook's words? No. (This passage reminds me of the smell of an epoch when people used to smear on patchouli oil). **Need one really embrace questions of academic freedom of speech and tenure? These passages offer sufficient proof that activists who have anything contestory to say are not permitted anywhere near the university or art institutions.** Tenure protects complacent luminaries.
Read's book is a quintessential dead end. There is no human liberation here. It begins where Fanon began, not where Fanon left off. It is boring to see sloppy professors and artists toying with Fanon's bones in the old-fashioned world of sexual politics, and in the wordy flatulence of "Theory" devoted to more "Theory" and to more "Theory".

AT: Localism (Nayar)

(_) Zero alternative --- breaking down 'global orders' fails and results in cataclysmic violence

Balakrishnan '03 (Uma, Department of Government and Politics – St. John's University, "Taking Charge of the Future", International Studies Review, 5)

Re-Framing the International provides a perfect **starting point for debates** on the construction of the future. It raises a number of interesting questions that need to be explored. Is it possible to create a global community without losing the focus on the individual within this group? How does one balance the interests of larger actors like transnational corporations with those of the community so that we do not exchange one set of absolute rules (embodied in static sovereignty) for another? Where do we locate the norms that will underlie the new order, given the variety and seeming incoherence of demands from across the globe? **In spite of the great sense of hope that underlies** *Re-Framing the International*, **the nagging question of how this can be accomplished without upheaval remains**. Although the arguments for a peaceful transition are logical, **the contributors are unable to show how power can be transcended**. **Given the current intransigence of the** United States and the United Kingdom **with respect to Iraq, it is difficult to envision the triumph of logic without** the thrust provided by **cataclysmic events like those that have characterized the past century**.

(_) Even Nayar concedes

Nayar '99 (Jayan, Critical Theorist, 9 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 599, Lexis)

And so, **what might I contribute to** the present collective exercise toward **a futuristic imaging of human possibilities? I am unsure.** It is only from my view of the "world," after all, that I can project **my visions**. These visions **do not go so far as to visualize any "world" in its totality; they are uncertain even with regard to** worlds closer to home, worlds requiring **transformatory actions** all the same. Instead of fulfilling this task of imagining future therefore I simply submit the following two "poems."

AT: Localism (Nayar)

(_) Retreating into localism siphons off and deflects crucial activist energies from centers of power --- the result is depoliticization and uncontested rule by elites

Boggs '97 (Carl, Professor of Political Science – National University, Theory & Society 26, December, p. 760-1)

Grassroots politics, of course, remains a significant part of any transformative agenda; clearly there is no iron law favoring **an enclave outcome**, but in a depoliticized culture it **will be difficult to avoid**. In many ways the dilemmas of local activism go back to the origins of the American political system, which was set up to allow space for local participation apart from federal structures so that no amount of grass- roots mayhem would disturb the national political system. Thus, **even where oppositional groups** were able to **carve out a local presence, their influence on the national state was** likely to be **minimal** owing to the complex maze of checks and balances, overlapping forms of representation, legislative intricacies, and a cumbersome winner-take-all electoral system that pushes the two main parties toward moderation. Over time, too, the national government became stronger and more bureaucratized, further reducing the scope of local decision-making and rendering much local empowerment illusory. Meanwhile, the federal state, with its expanded role in the military, foreign policy, and global economy, assumed ever greater control over people's lives. **Such realities**, along with constitutional and legal obstacles to securing a national foothold, **often compelled progressive movements to stress local organizing. At the same time**, as Mark Kann observes, **community radicalism could actually serve elite interests by siphoning off discontent and deflecting it away from the real centers of power**.40 Like spiritual politics, **enclave activism can be** understood as a reaction against the chaos of urban life and the eclipse of public space, along with **a rejection of normal politics itself**. The globalizing pressures exerted on the economy and political system reinforce this trend. **Collective action within the enclave has less to do with** rejuvenating public discourse, **making policy**, and gaining levers of institutional power **than with erecting barriers against outside intrusions,** just as city-dwellers may look to gated communities as a way of protecting themselves against the Hobbesian features of civil society. **The end result** of this type of populism **is a widespread turning-away from the concerns of power**, governance, and citizen participation within the general community – **one of the hallmarks of a depoliticized society**.

AT: Localism (Nayar)

(_) Global thinking promotes local action and checks violence

Sachs '92 (Wolfgang, Green Movement Activist and Prof Science – Penn St., **Development Dictionary**, p. 109-113)

But recognizing the pitfalls of global eco-managernent does not solve the dilemma which will stay with us in the decades to come. Both alternatives— to think in categories of one world as well as not to think in such categories—are equally self-destructive. On the one hand, it is a sacrilege in our age of cultural evaporation to apprehend the globe as a united, highly integrated world. On the other hand, **a vision of the globe as a multitude of different and only loosely connected worlds cannot dispense with the idea of ecumenism in the face of lurking violence and the devastation of nature**. Not surprisingly, **calls for global consciousness** abound. Given that local events can affect the conditions of life in remote places, these calls **aim at bringing into congruence the range of our responsibility with the range of our effects.** [Continues] People are seldom residents of only one mental space. They have the ability to change their point of view and to look with the other's eyes at themselves. in fact, people often hold multiple loyalties at one and the same time. In many instances they combine rootedness in a place with affiliation to a larger community. An inhabitant of medieval Cologne knew how to be a member of the Christian Church; a villager in Rajasthan was aware of Bharat, Mother india; and Croatian peasants as well as the citizens of Cracow were part of the Habsburg empire. In a similar vein, the one world may be thought of in terms of a meta-nation instead of a super-nation. It constitutes the horizon within which places live out their density and depth. **In this perspective. 'one world' is not a design for more global planning, but an ever present regulative idea for local action. Cosmopolitan localism seeks to amplify the richness of a place while keeping in mind the rights of a multi-faceted world.** It cherishes a particular place, yet at the same time knows about the relativity of all places.

(_) Global thinking key to check environmental collapse --- impact is extinction

Held '98 (David, Professor of Politics and Sociology – Open U., "Democracy and Globalization", Re-Imagining Political Community, Ed. Archibugi, p. 19-20)

Contemporary environmental problems are perhaps the clearest and starkest examples of the global shift in human organization and **activity, creating some of the most fundamental pressures on the efficacy of** the nation-state and **state-centric politics.** There are three types of problems at issue. First, **there are shared problems involving the global commons**, that is, fundamental elements of our ecosystem. **The clearest examples of the environmental commons are the atmosphere, the climate system and the oceans and seas. And among the most fundamental challenges here are global warming and ozone depletion. A second category** of global environmental problems **involves the interlinked challenges of demographic expansion and resource consumption.** An example of the profoundest importance under this category is desertification. Other examples include questions of biodiversity and challenges to the very existence of certain species. **A third category** of problems **is transboundary pollution of various kinds, such as acid rain or river pollutants.** More dramatic examples arise from the siting and operation of nuclear power plants, for instance, Chernobyl. **In response to the progressive development of, and publicity surrounding, environmental problems, there has been an interlinked process of cultural and political globalization as illustrated by the emergence of new cultural, scientific and intellectual networks; new environmental movements with transnational organizations and transnational concerns; and new institutions and conventions like** those agreed in 1992 at **the Earth Summit** in Brazil. Not all environmental problems are, of course, global. Such an implication would be quite false. **But there has been a striking shift in the physical and environmental circumstances - that is, in the extent and intensity of environmental problems - affecting human affairs in general. These processes have moved politics dramatically away from an activity which crystallizes simply around state and interstate concerns.It is clearer than ever that the political fortunes of communities and peoples can no longer be understood in exclusively** national or **territorial terms.**

AT: Disease K

(_) Securitization of AIDS is a key factor in motivating those ignoring it into action

Singer, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, **2002** (Peter W., "AIDS and International Security", *Survival*, vol.44, no.1, Spring, p. 145-158)

AIDS is a daunting threat, but not an unbeatable foe. It is a disease that **is still preventable. The** present **challenge is to support those programmes and leaders who are facing** the hard issues of **AIDS, while encouraging those** now **shirking their duties to respond**. **Thinking about AIDS as a security threat helps clarify that this scourge reaches beyond individual lives and deaths** into the realm of violence and war – **and** thus **strengthens the case for serious action**. **Fighting AIDS is not just** a matter of **altruism, but enlightened self interest.**

AT: Orientalism (Said)

(_) Said's discourse and alternative links to his own criticism

Cliford 80 [James, University of California at Santa Cruz. "Review: [Untitled]". History and Theory, Vol. 19, No. 2. (Feb., `1980), pp. 204-223.]

Discourse analysis is **always, in a sense, unfair to authors. It is interested not in what they have to say or feel as subjects, but is concerned merely with statements as related to other statements in a fie1d.l1 Escaping an impression of unfairness and reductionism in this kind of analysis is a matter of methodological rigor and stylistic tact. Foucault, at least, seldom appears unfair to authors because he never appeals to any individual intentionality or subjectivity. "Hybrid perspectives" like Said's have considerably more difficulty in escaping reductionism.1 Indeed, Said's methodological catholicity repeatedly blurs his analysis. If he is advancing anthropological arguments, Orientalism appears as the cultural quest for order. When he adopts the stance of a literary critic, it emerges as the processes of writing, textualizing, and interpreting. As an intellectual historian Said portrays Orientalism as a specific series of influences and schools of thought. For the psychohistorian Orientalist discourse becomes a representative series of personal/historical experiences. For the Marxist critic of ideology and culture it is the expression of definite political/economic power interests. Orientalism is also, at times, conflated with Western positivism; with general definitions of the Primitive, with evolutionism, with racism. One could continue the list. Said's discourse analysis does not, itself, escape the all-inclusive "Occidentalism" he specifically rejects as an alternative to Orientalism (328).**

(_) The privileging of the Orient as the oppressed culture ignores other oppressed groups

Halliday 93 [Fred, Prof of IR at the London School of Economics. "Orientalism and its Critics." British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 20:2]

Secondly, **the category of the 'Orient' is rather vague**, since in Orzentalzsm **its usage implies that the Middle East is in some ways special, at least in the kind of imperialist or oppressive writing produced about it**. **Racist or oppressive writing is found about all subject peoples,** whether they are Islamic or not, and there is nothing to choose between then] **The claim of a special European animosity to Arabs-let alone Palestinians-or to Muslims does not bear historical comparison**. Such ideas of persecution rest on some implicit yardstick, a comparative massacrology in which the wrongs done to one people are greater. Such an approach is best avoided, but it may be pointed out that the fate of the native people of the Americas, whose conquest was also presented as a crusade, was far worse than that of the peoples of 'Islam'. **Equally spurious is the implication that the hypostatization and reification of the Middle East are specific, whether by those writing from outside, or from within:** anyone familiar with the writing on Japan entitled Nzhonjiron and books such as Ruth Benedict's The Chrysanthemum and the Sword will be familiar with similar themes-the special place of language studies, the search for the unchanging national character, the stress on the specificities of the Japanese mind, the search for the true 'Japanese' position on women, or the emperor, or flower arrangement or whatever;36 Russia too has had its share of such ahistorical analysis. Here again external authority and internal nationalism collude to create a timeless, and particularist, discourse. About what people has it not been said 'They are like that, 'They will never change' etc**? If any people in the Middle East believe that in some way they have been singled out by the West--but in its historic or contemporary forms, this is an unsustainable idea. The thesis of some enduring, trans-liistorical, hostility to the Orient, the Arabs, the Islamic world, is a myth-albeit one, as already indicated, which many in the region and the West find it convenient to sustain**.

AT: Badiou

(_) Badiou has no way to separate between different types of ethics, causing him to ignore human rights

Brown 04 [Nicholas, Professor at University of Illinois at Chicago. "{□} □ {$} ? Or, Alain Badiou and Slavoj Žižek, Waiting for Something to Happen" CR: The New Centennial Review 4.3]

This apparatus is a powerful lens, and there can be no doubt that Badiou is describing something important; perhaps it is even an aspect of evil. But is it really Evil (Mal) itself? **Badiou's evil**, like his truth, **is indifferent to content, a merely formal label**. In its formalism, its insistence on fidelity to any Event whatever—on "ethical consistency" itself as a value—**Badiou's good is almost an aesthetic rather than an ethical category**. (At one point, in an echo of Kant's purposeless purpose, ethical consistency is even described as "disinterested interest.") **While there is something undeniably attractive in ethical consistency** (and something ugly in its lack**), the most important thing for a modern ethics may be to push these sentimental considerations aside.** The value of ethical consistency is authorized by Lacan's well-known dictum not to give up on one's desire [ne pas céder sur son désir]. But we should not forget that this maxim derives from the reading of Antigone in Séminaire VII. Yes, Sophocles' Antigone, in her awful ethical consistency, is a captivating figure. Brecht's Galileo, on the other hand, in his opportunism and wavering inconsistency, is a bit distasteful. But Antigone is a reactionary, and Galileo invents physics.
Further, **Badiou has no way of sorting out different evils beyond his tripartite division. Ethics tells us what Nazism and scientific obscurantism** [End Page 300] **have in common. But an ethics would have to be able to tell them apart. The distinction between, say, the abandonment of a social movement by its leader and the abandonment of a poem by its author cannot be made without some kind of qualitative supplement**. Since, as we shall see, Badiou's philosophy is predicated precisely on the subtraction from consideration of all qualitative predicates, this supplement can only be vulgar, nonphilosophical. **Perhaps the supplement it requires is the language of human rights, which, whatever its faults, can tell the difference between a concentration camp and a creationist textbook.** (What if, as Žižek suggests, the international war-crimes tribunal were simply to refuse the de facto bifurcation of the subject of human rights which is currently written into its constitution: "arrest Kissinger or shut up!" [Revolution, 266]?) Or perhaps, genuinely spurning such a supplement, it is really no different than Pauline faith. **Since Badiou himself uses the language of grace when speaking of the Event, he cannot regard it as very damning that his conception of the Event shares something with religious revelation. But can we be satisfied with an Ethics that remains in the "category of pious discourse"?**

AT: Badiou

(_) Perm solves --- Badiou doesn't criticize state action

Hallward 02[Peter, Lecturer in French Department at King's College "BADIOU'S POLITICS: EQUALITY AND JUSTICE" http://culturemachine.tees.ac.uk/Cmach/Backissues/j004/Articles/hallward.htm]

We know that Badiou's early and unequivocally hostile attitude to the state has considerably evolved. Just how far it has evolved remains a little unclear. His conception of politics remains resolutely anti-consensual, anti-'re-presentative', and thus anti-democratic (in the ordinary sense of the word). 'A philosophy today is above all something that enables people to have done with the "democratic" submission to the world as it is' ('Entretien avec Alain Badiou', 1999: 2). But he seems more willing, now, to engage with this submission on its own terms. La Distance politique again offers the most precise points de repère. On the one hand, the OP remains suspicious of any political campaign – for instance, electoral contests or petition movements – that operates as a 'prisoner of the parliamentary space' (LDP, 19-20.04.96: 2). It remains 'an absolute necessity [of politics] not to have the state as norm. **The separation of politics and state** is foundational of politics.' On the other hand, however, it is now equally clear that 'their **separation need not lead to the banishment of the state from the field of political thought**' (LDP, 6.05.93: 1).24 The OP now conceives itself in a tense, non-dialectical 'vis-à-vis' with the state, a stance that rejects an intimate cooperation (in the interests of capital) as much as it refuses 'any antagonistic conception of their operation, any conception that smacks of classism.' **There is to no more choice to be made between the state or revolution; the 'vis-à-vis demands the presence of the two terms and not the annihilation of one of the two'** (LDP, 11.01.95: 3-4). Indeed, at the height of the December '95 strikes, the OP recognised that the only contemporary movement of 'désétatisation' with any real power was the corporate-driven movement of partial de-statification in the interests of commercial flexibility and financial mobility. Unsurprisingly, 'we are against this withdrawal of the state to the profit of capital, through general, systematic and brutal privatisation. **The state is what can sometimes take account of people and their situations in other registers and by other modalities than those of profit. The state assures from this point of view the public space and the general interest. And capital does not incarnate the general interest'** (LDP, 15.12.96: 11). Coming from the author of Théorie de la contradiction, these are remarkable words.

The next question is whether the very possibility of such prescription according to the general interest does not itself presuppose that same liberal-parliamentary realm upon whose systematic vilification its own critical distance depends. What kind of state can respond 'responsibly' to political prescriptions, if not one closely responsible to electoral pressure? Badiou maintains that the old socialist states, as states, were 'more sensitive' to workers' strikes than are today's parliamentary states – the great example being the Solidarity campaign in Poland (Letter to the author, 9.12.98).25 But when the OP ventures into the vexing domain of constitutional reform, it is to propose very explicitly parliamentary procedures: an end to a separately elected president (and so an end to the possibility of cohabitation); a purely cosmetic head of state; only one major forum for elections (a legislative chamber of deputies); assurance that the head of government is always the head of the dominant party; and finally, a guarantee 'that there is always a dominant party', thanks to some kind of first-past-the-post electoral system. The whole package is to be softened with calls for more open government and the rule of law ('Proposition de réforme de la Constitution', LDP, 12.02.95: 5-6). The once Maoist Organisation Politique now recommends something almost exactly like the British Constitution!

At this point, the reader has to wonder if the OP's policy of strict non-participation in the state really stands up. The OP declares with some pride that 'we never vote', just as 'in the factories, we keep our distance from trade unionism' (LDP, 12.02.95: 1).26 The OP consistently maintains that its politics of prescription requires a politics of 'non-vote'. **But why, now, this either/or? Once the state has been acknowledged as a possible figure of the general interest, then surely it matters who governs that figure.** Regarding the central public issues of health and education, the OP maintains, like most mainstream socialists, that **the 'positive tasks on behalf of all are incumbent upon the state'** (LDP, 10.11.94: 1).27 **That participation in the state should not replace a prescriptive externality to the state is obvious enough, but the stern either/or** so often proclaimed in the pages of La Distance politique **reads today like a displaced trace of the days when the choice of 'state or revolution' still figured as a genuine alternative.**

AT: Badiou

(_) Badiou wrongly universalizes, destroy any chance for a successful alternative

Rothberg 01[Michael, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign. "Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil" Criticism 43.4 (2001) 478-484]

Another sort of problem emerges when we consider Badiou's attempt to [End Page 482] surpass the discourse of victimization that he and many others see as defining the contemporary moment. **While this critique of victim-centered ethics is crucial, and works well with respect to many situations, it risks overgeneralization.** In his laudable insistence that humanity "does not coincide with the identity of the victim" (11; emphasis in original), **Badiou leaves out of his system the possibility that a human being could be reduced precisely to the status of victim.** Such a case has been investigated by the Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben in Remnants of Auschwitz under the heading of the "Muselmann." Muselmann, or "Muslim," was the name given in certain Nazi camps to prisoners who had been so overcome by hunger, beatings, etc. that they became zombie-like, incapable of human communication or response, trapped in an indeterminate zone between life and death. While surely the product of an extremity not conducive to generalization, the Muselmann nevertheless constitutes the unthought of Badiou's own project: the potential of a victimization so radical that it really does exceed the possibility of any human project or truth-process. Whether this case is at all conducive to ethical or political elaboration must remain open here, but what the counter-example of the Muselmann suggests is the limit of Badiou's will to universality. The **problem with universality surely also returns in the insistence on ignoring questions of cultural difference**. Badiou's absolute commitment to the ethical value of the Same—the fact that truths are addressed equally to all—demonstrates a provocative and radically democratic spirit. In presenting truths as simultaneously multiple and universal, **Badiou poses an imaginative answer to what may be the most intractable antinomy of contemporary left social theory: the difficulty of adjudicating claims for universality and particularlity**. (For other attempts to think through this problem, see the contributions to the recent collective volume by Judith Butler, Ernesto Laclau, and Slavoj Z;akiz;akek, Contingency, Hegemony, Universality [London and New York: Verso, 2000]. And yet, is **his notion that the universality of truths is premised on the simultaneous local nature of truth**—its immanence to a particular situation with which it breaks**—sufficient to ward off fears of homogenization, if not cultural imperialism? How can we differentiate between the Sameness of truth and the homogenization produced by capitalist commodification? Is there an alternative formulation that would respect the universal address of truths while still allowing for a valorization of or commitment to difference? The unease that Badiou's dismissal of cultural difference provokes**, despite the freshness of his formulation, **suggests that the antinomy of the universal and the particular is as much a symptom of the post-Cold War historical moment as a problem solvable in theory**.

AT: Badiou

(_) Badiou has no alt – even waiting for the event ruins it

Brown 04 [Nicholas, Professor at University of Illinois at Chicago. "Or, Alain Badiou and Slavoj Žižek, Waiting for Something to Happen" CR: The New Centennial Review 4.3]

Badiou's ontology cannot usefully displace the dialectic. Because the Event must descend like a grace, Badiou's ontology can only describe situations and never History. **Since the event emerges from outside of the state of the situation, it is rigorously untheorizable: as we saw above, it is theorized as untheorizable**. Despite every protestation to the contrary, **Badiou's system cannot address the question "What is to be done?"** because the only thing to do is to wait for the Event. **What happens when the precipitation of the Event is precisely what needs to be done? Yes, we can be faithful to a previous event,** as Badiou says Lenin was to the Paris Commune. **But surely this solution mitigates the power of the Event as the irruption of the void into this situation.** The dialectic, on the other hand, conceives the void as immanent contradiction. While both contradiction and void are immanent to the situation, contradiction has the tremendous advantage of having movement built in, as it were: the Event does not appear out of an immanent nowhere, but is already fully present in itself in the situation, which it explodes in the movement to for-itself. Meanwhile, the question of the dialectic leads us back to the twofold meaning of "state": both the law and order that govern knowledge, and law and order in the everyday sense. This identification authorizes Badiou's antistatism, forcefully reflected in his own political commitment, the Organisation Politique (whose members do not vote), which has made limited [End Page 306] but effective interventions into the status of immigrant workers. In Badiou's system, nothing can happen within the state of a situation; innovation can only emerge from an evental site, constitutively excluded from the state. But can a principled indifference to the state ground a politics? The state surely has the function of suppressing the anarchic possibilities inherent in the (national) situation. But it can also suppress the possibilities exploited by an anarchic capitalism. It is well known that the current rightist "small-government" movement is an assault on the class compromise represented by the Keynesian state. To be sure, one should be suspicious of that compromise and what it excluded. But it also protected workers against some of capitalism's more baleful effects. As with Ethics, Badiou is certainly describing something: **the utopian moment of a total break with the state may be a part of any genuine political transformation**. **But, unless we are talking about the sad old interplay of transgression and limit—**which posited the state as basically permanent, with transgression as its permanent suspension—**this anarchic moment says nothing about the new state of affairs that will ultimately be imposed on the generic set it constructs. Surely the configuration of that state will be paramount—in which case state power has to be fought for, not merely evaded.** L'Organisation Politique, it must be said, has come to recognize this. But doesn't this recognition imply a philosophical problem as well—one which the dialectic, in Lukács's writings on party organization (on what amounts to the imposition of a state on the evental site itself) is called upon to answer?

AT: Nietzsche

(_) The eternal recurrence is the worst form of nihilism – the attempt to find meaning through repetition conveys a dread at the possibility of a lack of meaning, it is only through denial of meaning can it be possible

Loy prof phil @ Bunkyo U, Japan **1996** (David, "A Buddhist critique of Nietzsche" Asian Philosophy Vol. 6, No. 1, March http://ccbs.ntu.edu.tw/FULLTEXT/JR-ADM/loy.htm)

The answer is complex, of course, and there is much that Buddhists can learn from Nietzsche, the first post-modernist and still the most important one. In order to reach that answer, however, it will first be necessary to gain some understanding of anatman, the 'no self' doctrine central to Buddhism and to the still-widespread misunderstanding of Buddhism as nihilistic. Of the various ways for us to approach anatman, one of the most insightful is through modem psychology. Buddhism anticipated its reluctant conclusions: guilt and anxiety are not adventitious but intrinsic to the ego. That is because our dissatisfaction with life derives from a repression even more immediate than death-terror: the suspicion that 'I' am not real. For Buddhism, the sense-of-self is not some self-existing consciousness but a mental construction which experiences its own groundlessness as a lack. On this account, our most problematic dualism is not so much life fearing death as a fragile sense-of-self dreading its own nothingness. By accepting and yielding to that groundlessness, however, I can discover that I have always been grounded, not as a self-present being but as one manifestation of a web of relationships which encompasses everything. What does this understanding of self-as-lack imply about ethics, truth, and the meaning of life for us? That is the question which motivates this paper, for to raise these issues in the Western tradition is to find ourselves in a dialogue with Nietzsche, whose own texts resonate with many of the same insights: for example, his critiques of the subject ("The 'subject' is not something given, it is something added and invented and projected behind what there is." WP 481) and substance ("The properties of a thing are effects on other 'things' ... there is no 'thing-in-itself.'" WP 557). From this critique, Nietzsche also drew some conclusions quite similar to those of Buddhism: in particular, that morality, knowledge and meaning are not discovered but constructed -- internalised games we learn from each other and play with ourselves. Perhaps the history of his own psyche reveals how momentous these discoveries were; and inevitably his insights were somewhat distorted. Nietzsche understood how the distinction we make between this world and a higher spiritual realm serves our need for security, and he saw the bad faith in religious values motivated by this need. He did not understand how his alternative, more aristocratic values, also reflects the same anxiety. Nietzsche ends up celebrating an impossible ideal, the heroic-ego which overcomes its sense of lack, because he does not see that a heroic ego is our fantasy project for overcoming lack. Nietzsche realised how the search for truth is motivated by a sublimated desire for symbolic security: his solution largely reverses our usual dualism by elevating ignorance and 'untruth' into conditions of life. Philosophy's attempt to create the world reflects the tyrannical will-to-power, becoming the most 'spiritualised' version of the need to impose our will Insofar as truth is our intellectual effort to grasp being symbolically, however, those who no longer need to ground themselves can play the truth-versus-error game with lighter feet. Nietzsche overlooks a different reversal of perspective which could convert the bad-infinite of the heroic will-as-truth into the good infinite of truth-as-play. What he considered the crown of his system -- eternal recurrence -- is actually its denouement. Having seen through the delusion of Being, Nietzsche could not let it go completely, for he still sought a Being within Becoming. 'To impose upon becoming the character of being -- this is the supreme will to power' (WP 617). Having exposed the bad faith of believing in eternity, Nietzsche is nonetheless able to affirm the value of this moment only by making it recur eternally. In place of the neurotic's attempt to rediscover the past in the future he tries to rediscover the present in the future, yet the eternal recurrence of the now can add something only if the now in itself lacks something. Rather than the way to vanquish nihilism, Nietzsche's will-to-power turns out to be pure nihilism, for nihilism is not the debacle of all meaning but our dread of that debacle and what we do to avoid it. This includes compulsively seizing on certain meanings as a bulwark against that form of lack. If so, the only solution to the dread of meaninglessness is meaninglessness itself: only by accepting meaninglessness, by letting it devour the meanings that we use to defend ourselves against our nothingness, can we realise a meaning-freeness open to the possibilities that arise in our world. In sum, when the lack-driven bad infinite transforms into a lacking-nothing good-infinite, the dualisms of good-versus-evil, truth-versus-error, and meaningfulness-versus-meaninglessness are realised to be games. Do I play them or do they play me? As long as we do not understand what is motivating us, we play with the seriousness of a life-versus-death struggle, for that is what the games symbolise for a self preoccupied with its lack. We are trapped in games which cannot be escaped yet cannot be won, since playing well does not resolve one's sense-of-lack. When there is no need to get anything from the game or gain cloture on it, we can play with the seriousness of a child absorbed in its game. [3

AT: Nietzsche

(_) The will to power re-creates the slave morality it intends to criticize – both are attempts to make up for a lack in the self, the only truly ethical action is to view oneself as distinct from the world and view the self as interconnected to all other beings

Loy prof phil @ Bunkyo U, Japan **1996** (David, "A Buddhist critique of Nietzsche" Asian Philosophy Vol. 6, No. 1, March http://ccbs.ntu.edu.tw/FULLTEXT/JR-ADM/loy.htm)

The will-to-power cannot be separated from its sublimation (or 'spiritualisation'), for Nietzsche discovered them together. He was one of the first classicists to realise that the original Olympic games were a sublimated form of war. Nietzsche contended that Greek civilisation was noble and sublime precisely because it had been so cruel and bloodthirsty; the 'golden age' was created by bringing this original ferocity under control. "The thought seems to be: where there is 'the sublime' there must have been that which was made sublime -- sublimated -- after having been for a long time not sublime." [14] Having detected this phenomenon in ancient Greece, Nietzsche began to notice sublimated 'base' impulses in many kinds of activity; for example, Wagner's ferocious will sublimated into the Bayreuth festival. This makes Nietzsche the first, as far as I know, to undertake a systematic study of repression. Nietzsche sees the sublimity of Greek culture as the sublimation of its original ferocity, yet here perhaps the genealogist of morals does not trace his genealogy back far enough. What makes man so ferocious? Can even the will to power, irreducible for Nietzsche, be deconstructed? What, after all, does power mean to us? All power is in essence power to deny mortality. Either that or it is not real power at all, not ultimate power, not the power that mankind is really obsessed with. Power means power to increase oneself, to change one's natural situation from one of smallness, helplessness, finitude, to one of bigness, control, durability, importance. (Becker) [15] We feel we are masters over life and death when we hold the fate of others in our hands, adds Becker; and we feel we are real when the reality of others is in our hands, adds Buddhism. From that perspective, however, desire for power is little different from the slave morality Nietzsche criticises. Both become symptoms of our lack, equally frustrating inasmuch as we are motivated by something that cannot be satisfied in the way we try to satisfy it. No wonder Nietzsche's will-to-power can never rest, that it needs to expand its horizons, and that for most of us morality has been a matter of collecting religious brownie points. In both cases we think that we have found the way to get a grip on our eligibility for immortality -- or being. The whole basis of the urge to goodness is to be something that has value, that endures... Man uses morality to try to get a place of special belongingness and perpetuation in the universe... Do we wonder why one of man's chief characteristics is his tortured dissatisfaction with himself, his constant self-criticism? It is the only way he has to overcome the sense of hopeless limitation inherent in his real situation. (Becker) [16] When I realise that I am not going to attain cloture on that diabolical part of myself, it is time to project it. "The Devil is the one who prevents the heroic victory of immortality in each culture -- even the atheistic, scientific ones." [17] As long as lack keeps gnawing, we need to keep struggling with the Devil, and as we all know the best devil is one outside our own group. Evil is whatever we decide is keeping us from becoming real, and since no victory over any external devil can yield the sense of being we seek, we have become trapped in a paradox of our own making: evil is created by our urge to eliminate evil. Stalin's collectivisation programme was an attempt to build a more perfect socialist society. The Final Solution of the Nazis was an attempt to purify the Earth of its vermin. The Buddhist critique of such ressentiment includes understanding the self-deception involved in such dualistic thinking, when I identify with one pole and vainly try to eliminate its interdependent other. [18] Buddhism gets beyond good and evil not by rebaptising our evil qualities as our best, but with an entirely different perspective. As long as we experience ourselves as alienated from the world, and society as a set of separate selves, the world is devalued into a field-of-play wherein we compete to fulfill ourselves. That is the origin of the ethical problem we struggle with today: without some transcendental ground such as God, what will bind our atomised selves together? When my sense-of-self lets-go and disappears, however, I realise my interdependence with all other phenomena. It is more than being dependent on them: when I discover that I am you, the trace of your traces, the ethical problem of how to relate to you is transformed. [19] Of course, this provides **no simple yardstick** to resolve knotty ethical dilemmas. Yet more important, I think, is that this absolves the sense of separation between us which usually makes those dilemmas so difficult to resolve, including the conceit that I am the one who has privileged access to transcendental principles, or who embodies more fully the will-to-power. Loss of self-preoccupation entails the ability to respond to others without an ulterior motive which needs to gain something from that encounter. Buddhist ethical principles approximate the way of relating to others that nondual experience reveals. As in Christianity, I should love my neighbour as myself -- in this case because my neighbour is myself. In contrast to the 'Thou shalt not -- or else!' implied in Mosaic law, the Buddhist precepts are vows one makes not to some other being but to one's to-be-realised-as-empty self: "I vow to undertake the course of training to perfect myself in non-killing," and so forth. If we have not developed to the degree that we spontaneously experience ourselves as one with others, by following the precepts we endeavour to act as if we did feel that way. Yet even these precepts are eventually realised not to rest on any transcendental, objectively-binding moral principle. There are, finally, no moral limitations on our freedom -- except the dualistic delusions which incline us to abuse that freedom in the first place.

AT: Nietzsche

(_) The alternative enables genocide– the idea of supreme power for a person at the expense of others legitimates actions of violence against the weak

Simpson scholar in human rights/democracy **1995** (Christopher "The Splendid Blond Beast" http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Genocide/SplendidBlondeBeast.html)

Friedrich Nietzsche called the aristocratic predators who write society's laws "the splendid blond beast" precisely because they so often behave as though they are beyond the reach of elementary morality. As he saw things, these elites have cut a path toward a certain sort of excellence consisting mainly of the exercise of power at the expense of others. When dealing with ordinary people, he said, they "revert to the innocence of wild animals.... We can imagine them returning from an orgy of murder, arson, rape and torture, jubilant and at peace with themselves as though they had committed a fraternity prank-convinced, moreover, that the poets for a long time to come will have something to sing about and to praise.'' Their brutality was true courage, Nietzsche thought, and the foundation of social order. Today genocide-the deliberate destruction of a racial, cultural, or political group-is the paramount example of the institutionalized and sanctioned violence of which Nietzsche spoke. Genocide has been a basic mechanism of empire and the national state since their inception and remains widely practiced in "advanced" and "civilized" areas. Most genocides in this century have been perpetrated by nation-states upon ethnic minorities living within the state's own borders; most of the victims have been children. The people responsible for mass murder have by and large gotten away with what they have done. Most have succeeded in keeping wealth that they looted from their victims; most have never faced trial. Genocide is still difficult to eradicate because it is usually tolerated, at least by those who benefit from it.

The Splendid Blond Beast examines how the social mechanisms of genocide often encourage tacit international cooperation in the escape from justice of those who perpetrated the crime... According to psychologist Ervin Staub, who has studied dozens of mass crimes, genocidal societies usually go through an evolution during which the different strata of society literally learn how to carry out group murder. In his book The Roots of Evil, Staub contends that genocidal atrocities most often take place in countries under great political, economic, and often military stress. They are usually led by authoritarian parties that wield great power yet are insecure in their rule, such as the Nazis in Germany or the Ittihad (Committee of Union and Progress) in Turkey. The ideologies of such parties can vary in important respects, but they are nonetheless often similar in that they create unity among "in-group" members through dehumanization of outsiders. Genocidal societies also show a marked tendency toward what psychologists call "justworld" thinking: Victims are believed to have brought their suffering upon themselves and, thus, to deserve what they get. But the ideology of these authoritarian parties and even their seizure of state power are not necessarily enough to trigger a genocide. The leading perpetrators need mass mobilizations to actually implement their agenda. For example, the real spearheads of genocide in Germany-the Nazi party, SS, and similar groups- by themselves lacked the resources to disenfranchise and eventually murder millions of Jews. They succeeded in unleashing the Holocaust, however, by harnessing many of the otherwise ordinary elements of German life-of commerce, the courts, university scholarship, religious observance, routine government administration, and so on-to the specialized tasks necessary for mass murder. Not surprisingly, many of the leaders of these "ordinary" institutions were the existing notables in German society. The Nazi genocide probably would not have been possible without the active or tacit cooperation of many collaborators who did not consider themselves Nazis and, in some cases, even opposed aspects of Hitler's policies, yet nonetheless cooperated in mass murder. Put bluntly, the Nazis succeeded in genocide in part through offering bystanders money, property, status, and other rewards for their active or tacit complicity in the crime.

AT: Nietzsche

(_) Permutation solves best – we must protect society by preventing our impacts before the will to power is possible

Golomb Hebrew U of jeruselum **2k6** (Jacob, "Can One Really Become a "Free Spirit Par Excellence"or an Übermensch?" The Journal of Nietzsche Studies 32 Muse)

In On the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche embarks on the genealogical inquiry also to examine whether the emphasis on the immanence, autarchy, and extreme individuality of authentically powerful persons is compatible with a social context. The genealogical account shows that the moral patterns of positive power (detailed below) were occasionally manifested within this or that social and historical context, though not always in their most perfect or distinct forms. It also shows that factors external to these patterns (like Christianity) were responsible for their disappearance.
Nietzsche's affirmation of society as the necessary condition for the materialization of positive power attenuates the radical stance of his extreme individualism. And because Nietzsche affirms "a community" (e.g., GM II:9) and does not seek to destroy it, he had to explain how the übermenschlich patterns of behavior or the morality of positive power are possible within the social context. He analyzes the nature of the interaction among members of society and maintains that genuine justice is possible only within a social fabric composed of equally powerful members: "Justice . . . is the good will among parties of approximately equal power to come to terms with one another, to reach an 'understanding' by means of a settlement—and to compel parties of lesser power to reach a settlement among themselves" (GM II:8). Nietzsche argues that the powerful individual is characterized by egoism. Avoidance of any altruistic activity and ideology would seemingly contradict any possible moral system. This emphasis on the egoism of genuine power, however, does not prevent Nietzsche from continuing to describe the moral and social network of powerful individuals who would willingly and freely enter the restrictive social fabric:
The noble soul accepts this fact of its egoism without any question mark. . . . [U]nder certain circumstances there are some who have rights equal to its own. . . . [I]t moves among these equals with their equal privileges, showing the same sureness of modesty and delicate reverence that characterize its relation with itself. . . . [E]very star is such an egoist. . . . [I]t honors itself in them and in the rights it cedes to them; it does not doubt that the exchange of honors and rights is of the nature of all social relations and thus also belongs to the natural condition of things.
(BGE 265)
Nietzsche declares here that recognition of the value and freedom of others originates in egoism. Only an individual possessing an abundance of positive [End Page 27] power and a firm selfhood is able to grant similar rights and freedoms to all those who are recognized as equals. This individual is not afraid that this might diminish or destroy her or his own power. It is a self-affirmation and a confidence in one's power and virtues that enable the affirmation of "others" and their uniqueness. For Nietzsche, human egoism and the emphasis on selfhood do not contradict the social and moral order; they actually create the ideal conditions for its proper functioning.

Environmental Pragmatism Good

(_) We must act in spite of uncertainty – ethics without pragmatism crushes any hope of improving the world we live in

Light and Katz in 96 (Andrew, Director of the Science Technology and Society Progra at the New Jersey Institute of Technology; Eric, Adjunct Professor of Philosophy at the University of Alberta, Environmental Pragmatism, Ed. By Light and Katz, p 1-2)

Can philosophers contribute anything to an investigation of environmental problems? Do the traditions, history and skills of philosophical thought have any relevance to the development of environmental policy? We believe that the answer is yes. Despite the problematic (and, heretofore, ineffectual) status of environmental ethics as a practical discipline, the field has much to offer. But **the fruits of this philosophical enterprise must be directed towards the practical resolution of environmental problems – environmental ethics cannot remain mired in long-running theoretic debates in an attempt to achieve philosophical certainty**. As Mark Sagoff has written: [W]e have to get along without certainty; **we have to solve practical, not theoretical, problems;** and we must adjust the ends we pursue to the means available to accomplish them. **Otherwise, method becomes an obstacle to morality, dogma the foe of deliberation, and the ideal society we aspire to in theory will become a formidable enemy of the good society we can achieve in fact**.2 In short, **environmental ethics must develop** for itself **a methodology of environmental pragmatism — fueled by a recognition that theoretical debates are problematic for the development of environmental policy**.

(_) Environmental ethics must be contextual and pragmatic – we must evaluate impacts in order to develop a worthwhile ethics

Norton in 96 (Bryan, Professor of Philosophy at Georgia Tech, Environmental Pragmatism, Ed. By Light and Katz, p 1-2)

A successful integrative ethic for the environment must be morally pluralistic, but it must also be contextual, rather than either objectivist or subjectivist. **Good environmental decisions are ones that take into account likely impacts** on a number of spatio-temporal scales **in specific contexts**. As the world becomes more full of humans and as technology becomes more powerful, there will be more and more cases in which there will be spill-over impacts from one level of hierarchical organization to another, especially from our expanding economic and social systems to the natural systems that form their ecological context. **Environmental policy and action must do more than enhance values in one dynamic**, such as the dynamic driving the economic decision of individual farmers; it is necessary also to examine the impacts on the larger- and usually slower-changing dynamic that determines the structure and diversity of the landscape. Here the focus of moral analysis turns to multiple generations and to the landscape scale.

Environmental Pragmatism Good

(_) Philosophical discussions of environmental policies will effectuate zero change – the crisis at hand justifies pragmatic action

Light and Katz in 96 (Andrew, Director of the Science Technology and Society Progra at the New Jersey Institute of Technology; Eric, Adjunct Professor of Philosophy at the University of Alberta, Environmental Pragmatism, Ed. By Light and Katz, p 1)

As **environmental ethics** approaches its third decade it **is faced with a curious problem**. On the one hand, the discipline has made significant progress in the analysis of the moral relationship between r.umanity and the non-human natural world. **The field has produced a wide variety of positions and theories**1 in an attempt to derive morally justifiable and adequate environmental policies. On the other hand, **it is difficult to see what practical effect the field** of environmental ethics **has had on the formation of environmental policy. The intramural debates of environmental philosophers, although interesting**, provocative and complex, **seem to have no real impact on the deliberations of environmental scientists, activists and policy-makers. The ideas** within environmental ethics are, apparently, inert - like Hume's Treatise, they **fall deadborn from the press**. The problematic situation of environmental ethics greatly troubles us, both as philosophers and as citizens. We are deeply concerned about the precarious state of the natural world, the environmental r.azards that threaten humans, and the maintenance of long-term retainable life on this planet. **The environmental crisis that surrounds us is a fact of experience. It is thus imperative that environmental philosophy, as a discipline, address this crisis - its meaning, its causes and its possible resolution**.

(_) You should privilege action over philosophical debates and endless systemic critique

Varner in 96 (Gary, Associate Professor of Philosophy at Texas A&M University, Environmental Pragmatism, Ed. By Light and Katz, p 1)

Environmental activists commonly express impatience with professional environmental ethicists. Describing his conversion from "a leading moderate among New Mexico conservationists" to a co-founder of Earth First! Dave Foreman reckoned that **"Action is more important than philosophical hair-splitting or endless refining of dogma** (for which radicals are so well known). **Let our actions set the finer points of our philosophy**."1 And later added: **Too often, philosophers are rendered impotent by their [in] ability to act without analyzing everything to an absurd detail. To act**, to trust your instincts, to go with the flow of natural forces, **is an underlying philosophy. Talk is cheap. Action is dear**.2 Christopher Manes went further and opined that "**most radical environmentalists look at systematic philosophy as the problem" rather than a part of the solution**.

Reform Solves

(_) Calls for radical rejection will leave us with the status quo – incremental environmental reform can change the system from within

Hirokawa in 02 (Keith, LLM from the Northwestern School of Law at Lewis and Clark College, Stanford Environmental Law Journal, June, 21 Stan. Envtl. L.J. 225)

Under this reinterpretation of the public trust doctrine and its evolution, pragmatism's perspective of legal progress modifies the notion of revolutionary paradigm shifts. Delgado's pessimism can be avoided by acknowledging that, without contesting the possibility of paradigm dispute, we can question the unavoidability of incommensurability between paradigms. Under the pragmatic view of legal progress, the law shifts in incremental steps. Consequently, **the pragmatist is free to recognize incremental changes as achievements** [*277] **and innovations, rather than having to take a position between "wrong - or at least seriously flawed" 228 - paradigm shifts, or alternatively, no change in the law at all**. Furthermore, the pragmatist can recognize appropriate arguments through which the interpretive community can modify an interpretation or practice. As Holmes stated: A very common phenomenon and one very familiar to the student of history, is this. The customs, beliefs, or needs of primitive time establish a rule or a formula. In the course of centuries the custom, belief, or necessity disappears, but the rule remains. The reason which gave rise to the rule has been forgotten, and ingenuous minds set themselves to inquire how it is to be accounted for. Some ground or policy is thought of, which seems to explain it and to reconcile it with the present state of things; and then the rule adapts itself to the new reasons which have been found for it, and enters on a new career. The old form receives new content, and in time even the form modifies itself to fit the meaning which it has received. 229 Changes in each instance create entirely new contexts in which more (or less) progressive arguments find a hold. **Every time a change occurs, even if it is incremental** or ostensibly seems benign, **the change creates a new context within which an entirely new set of possibilities will arise. 230 The pragmatist therefore evaluates progress by the distance a new idea causes practices to move away from past practices and paradigms**. The difference between the pragmatic version of progress and the Kuhnian version is one only of degree. In the end, the results of both versions of progress are the same - we look back at the change and realize that earlier ideas do not make sense anymore. The effectiveness of the pragmatic approach lies in the simple realization that, in adopting an innovative approach to a legal question, courts will find comfort in adopting what appears to be an incremental change, rather than a radical paradigmatic shift. **In** [*278] **contrast to radical theorists that deny the existence of progress because of a failure to immediately reach the radical goals of alternative paradigms, the pragmatist recognizes that a series of incremental changes eventually add up. Environmental pragmatism enables environmentalists to seek achievable gains by focusing on minor improvements in the law that incrementally close the gap between the values that pre-existed current environmental law and the alternative paradigms of environmental protection**.

Critique Delays Action

(_) Philosophical critique shouldn't delay public action – pragmatism incorporates the negative's critique and maintains the necessity of action to help the environment

Light in 96 (Andrew, Director of the Science Technology and Society Progra at the New Jersey Institute of Technology, Environmental Pragmatism, Ed. By Light and Katz, p 1)

In accordance with this goal, metaphilosophical environmental pragmatism is a good principle to embrace. One strategy within this framework is for the pragmatist not to be concerned in public with the outcome of some debates among environmentalists and ecologists within a certain range of issues. For example, **some questions would be shelved for now, such as: What is the intrinsic value of species** that fuels a duty to insure their diversity? **What is the ontological relationship between humans and non-human animals?** Does technology necessarily exercise a pejorative influence on humans or is it a natural development of human cognitive evolution? **In all these cases the environmental pragmatist searches for answers to these questions in private while publicly pursuing the best possible solutions to practical environmental questions. The pragmatist also recognizes that the current state of the world, either economically, politically or ontologically, is the result of a contingent history: existing individual or social relationships with the non-human natural world are not assumed to be the only ones that must be worked within in looking for solutions to environmental problems**. There are no universal statements on the state of nature available for the environmental pragmatist (or rather, the pragmatist does not permit such statements in public) - descriptions of the relationship between humans and nature are descriptions of states of affairs that could have been otherwise. And because they could have been otherwise pragmatists do not essentialize their conceptions of the identity of nature or our duty to it which would limit their ability to re-conceptualize nature in such a way that it can be most expeditiously protected.

AT: Alternative

(_) The alt fails - environmentalists insisting on non-anthropocentrism will be locked out of policy negotiations

Light in 02 (Andrew, Applied Philosophy @ NYU, Metaphilosophy, v 22, n4, July, p 439 ingentaconnect)

A second problem with this overall approach is political. **As advice to environmentalists, the approach would be politically suicidal. To the extent that such considerations as utility benefits for preservation or development are a reasonably persistent part of the discussion over whether to develop the Amazon, adopting an approach that conveniently skirts around such issues ensures that environmentalists will be excluded from such discussions, or at least easy to ignore. To come to the bargaining table armed with a theory "making questions of human benefit and satisfaction irrelevant," when issues of human benefit and satisfaction are necessarily on the table, and when representatives of those interests are the only ones who are at the table and able to articulate those interests, would make bargaining irrevocably caustic if not impossible.** To negotiate environmental priorities from the point of view of an irreconcilable and intractable moral view opposing human interests is not to engage in negotiations but simply to make demands from a presumed superior moral position. **To the extent that it is difficult for environrnrientalists even to find themselves with a voice at a forum where such decisions are made, this approach would be, at the very least, naïve and imprudent. It also stands against the substantial amount of research that has been done on negotiations and policy making** (for an application to similar cases see de-Shalit 2001).

(_) Their critique ignores material reality – there is no single entity of nature or environment, making their alternative totally stupid

Barry in 99 (John Barry, political lecturer Keele University, RETHINKING GREEN POLITICS, 1999, p. 2)

Similarly **we can think of other animal categories** such as 'pet' or 'food animal', **which** like 'vermin' **both describe the particular relation in which that animal stands to us as well as prescribing the appropriate treatment. The point is the ubiquity of this normative 'background' that animals are not mere 'things'.** Morally relevant categories in regard to the inanimate world are less common but conceptualizations such as 'private property', 'garden', 'national park', 'city' and in less enlightened times 'forest', 'uncharted lands', 'wasteland' and 'wilderness' are testament to the ubiquity and naturalness of human moral categorization of the external world.' **This human concern with categorizing the natural world demonstrates that because we do not interact with an entity called 'nature' or the 'environment', there can be no single moral principle to govern this multifaceted and complex relation. In short, such moral categories and the process of categorization are partly constitutive of that relation**.

AT: Alternative

(_) The negative's rejection of anthropocentrism constitutes a overly hasty dismissal – strategic deployment of anthropocentrism is best

Barry in 99 (John Barry, political lecturer Keele University, RETHINKING GREEN POLITICS, 1999, p. 2)

Ecological stewardship, unlike ecocentrism, seeks to emphasize that **a self-reflexive, long-term anthropocentrism. as opposed to an 'arrogant' or 'strong' anthropocentrism can secure many of the policy objectives of ecocentrism. in terms of environmental preservation and conservation**. As argued in Chapter 3, **a reformed, reflexive anthropocentrism is premised on critically evaluating human uses of the non-human world, and distinguishing 'permissible' from 'impermissible' use**s. That is, **an 'ethics of use'. though anthropocentric and rooted in human interests, seeks to regulate human interaction with the environment by distinguishing legitimate 'use' from unjustified 'abuse'.** The premise for this defence of anthropocentric moral reasoning is that **an immanent critique of 'arrogant humanism' is a much more defensible and effective way to express mere moral concerns than rejecting anthropocentrism and developing a 'new ecocentric ethic'. A**s discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, **ecocentric demands are premised on an over-hasty dismissal of anthropocentrism which precludes recognition of the positive resources within anthropocentrism for developing an appropriate and practicable moral idiom to cover social-environmental interaction**.

AT: Impact

(_) There's no impact – anthropocentrism isn't inherently anti-environmental

Barry in 99 (John Barry, political lecturer Keele University, RETHINKING GREEN POLITICS, 1999, p.24-5)

Sensitivity to the various gradations within anthropocentrism is blunted by the definition of anthropocentrism used by deep ecologists. Eckerslcy defines it as "the belief that there is a clear and morally relevant dividing line between humankind and the restore of nature, that humankind is the only or principal source of value and meaning in the world, and that non-human nature is there for no other purpose but to serve humankind. Breaking this statement down into positions, we can discern different aspects of the deep, ecological critique of anthropocentrism. Firstly, that there is a morally relevant divide between humans and non-humans is a statement that all except committed biospheric egalitarians would agree with. As explained in the next chapter, being human counts for something in a way which the charge that anthropocentrism is simply 'ungrounded speciesism' fails to register. That the difference between humans and non-humans may be one of degree rather than kind does not deflate the importance of this basic distinction between how humans Interact with each other and how they interact with the rest of the world. As will be recalled, in the introduction I argued that the moral basis of green political theory is a composite one, made up of two moral spheres, one human only and the other concerning social-environmental relations. **The second statement, that humans are the only morally relevant beings in the world, does not follow from the first. Accepting our status as the only or main source of value and meaning in the world can ground widely different attitudes to the world. From this perspective anything from the complete and unhindered exploitation of the world (the third statement) to the widespread protection of vast tracts of nature from human interference can be forthcoming**. For purely human reasons, informed by the idea that we attribute value in an otherwise valueless world, our action in the world can be either extensive or minimal, and is compatible with extending moral considerations to human interaction with the non-human world. **And finally, there is nothing inherently ecologically unfriendly about the fact that humans, as far as we know. are the only species with a moral sens**e. It is the third statement that goes to the heart of the deep ecology position, where anthropocentrisrn is understood as expressing an exclusively strong instrumentalist conception of the world. In Eckersley's formulation the non-human is said to be exclusively of instrumental concern to the anthropocentrism. **However, it does not follow, either logically or in practice. that the first two positions lead to this instrumentalist one**.

Permutation

(_) Purely non-anthropocentric thought is impossible – inevitability of mixture of anthro- and bio-centric motivations means the permutation is best at actually motivating ecologically sustainable changes

Light in 02 (Andrew, Applied Philosophy @ NYU, Metaphilosophy, v 22, n4, July, p 439 ingentaconnect)

Even if Katz and Oechsli's **arguments are technically correct as a possible statement of the implications of anthropocentrism in environmental policy and environmental activism, the facts of the case do not bear out their worries**. And we can imagine this to be so in many other cases. **Even if sound nonanthropocentric motivations can be described for other policies** are acts of environmental heroism, **at best we would expect that any motivation for any action would be mixed, especially when it is a human performing thal action**. **An environmental ethic that ignored this lesson would be one that would be ill fitted to participate in policy decisions where the context always involves an appeal to a variety of intuitions and not only to a discrete set. We must ask ourselves eventually: What is more important? Settling debates in value theory correct or actually motivating people to act**, with the commitment of someone like Mendes, **to preserve nature? The pressing timeframe of environmental problems should at least warrant a consideration of the latter**.

(_) The perm can facilitate an effective environmental movement -

Barry in 99 (John Barry, political lecturer Keele University, RETHINKING GREEN POLITICS, 1999, p.41- 2)

On the one hand there is the idea that **green politics ought to be aimed at securing public support** for green policies and practices, which is of course essential for the democratic legitimacy of green politics as argued in Chapter 7. On the other hand any agreement must begin from an awareness of the political nature of many of the existing moral injunctions concerning human-nature relations. Prime examples are the various laws prohibiting cruelty to animals in most countries. Building on what was suggested in the last chaptcr, I wish to make the argument that the heart of the green political project lies in the exposition of the contradictions within contemporary moral thought and culture, rather than proclaiming the total crisis of Western culture and the bankruptcy of its anthropocentric moral tradition. It is the supposed bankruptcy, coupled with arguments concerning the 'dangerousness', of anthropocentrism that leads to calls for a 'new' (i.e. external) non-anthropocentric environmental ethic. **However, since anthropocentrism has not been demonstrated to be either bankrupt or a 'dangerous' orientation to the non-human world**, **the compulsion to search beyond anthropocentrism for an appropriate moral idiom loses much of its force. An immanent critique of anthropocentrism ought therefore to be the strategy adopted in order to achieve public support for thc normative ends of green politics. For example, it would seem more likely that greens would secure normative agreement for their position by identifying discrepancies within the present normative underpinning of current human-nature interaction. If greens present their normative case in terms of the contradictory and/or the incomplete nature of the current dominant moral consensus on human-nature relations, the immanence of their position means that it would be both stronger (because non-anthropocentric accounts do not hold up under scrutiny) expressed in a language readily understood by those to whom its message is addressed.**

Case Comes First

(_) Case should come first – over-consumption and nuclear war are not caused by dualism

Guha in 89 (Ramachandra, Ecologist, centre for ecological Sciences, "Radical American Environmentalism and Wilderness Preservation: A Third World Critique," Environmental Ethics, Spring, http://www.eci.ox.ac.uk/~dliverma/articles/Guha%20on%20radical%20environmentalism.pdf) July 10, 2008

Insofar as it has begun to act as a check on man's arrogance and ecological hubris, **the transition** from an anthropocentric (human-centered) **to a biocentric** (humans as only one element in the ecosystem) **view** in both religious and scientific traditions **is only to be welcomed**.4 **What is unacceptable are the radical conclusions drawn by deep ecology**, in particular, **that intervention in nature should be guided primarily by the need to preserve biotic integrity rather than by the needs of humans**. The latter for deep ecologists is anthropocentric, the former biocentric. **This dichotomy is**, however, **of very little use in understanding the dynamics of environmental degradation. The two fundamental ecological problems facing the globe are** (i) **overconsumption** by the industrialized world and by urban elites in the Third World **and** (ii) **growing militarization, both in a short-term sense (i.e., ongoing regional wars) and in a long-term sense (i.e., the arms race and the prospect of nuclear annihilation). Neither of these problems has any tangible connection to the anthropocentric-biocentric distinction**. Indeed, **the agents of these processes would barely comprehend this philosophical dichotomy**. **The proximate causes** of the ecologically wasteful characteristics of industrial society and of militarization **are far more mundane**: at an aggregate level, the dialectic of economic and political structures, and at a micro-level, the life-style choices of individuals. **These causes cannot be reduced**, whatever the level of analysis, **to a deeper anthropocentric attitude toward nature**; on the contrary, **by constituting a grave threat to human survival, the ecological degradation they cause does not even serve the best interests of human beings!** If my identification of the major dangers to the integrity of the natural world is correct, **invoking the bogy of anthropocentricism is at best irrelevant and at worst a dangerous obfuscation**.

(_) Deep Ecology motivations will fail, we can only act to save our lives and the lives of our children.

Taylor in 00 (Bron, Professor Graduate Program in Religion and Nature at the University of Florida, "Beneath the Surface: Critical Essays in the Philosophy of Deep Ecology," The MIT Press, http://www.netlibrary.com/Reader/) July 10, 2008

This was an important finding of my on-the-ground research that explored diverse and widely dispersed example or movements promoting environmental protection which have been variously characterized as "militant" or "radical. This cross-**culture research challenged the prevalent deep ecology conviction that consciousness change toward and ecocentric, deep ecological spirituality is a precondition of "radical" environmental action**. Although we **found examples where deep ecology-like values and spiritualities** animated environmental actors and groups, we also found many cases where such **motivations were missing or not widely shared**. Indeed, **contrary to deep ecological expectations, in the global context the most prevalent factor precipitating and justifying aggressive environmental resistance appears to be a recognition that intensifying environmental degradation directly threatens traditional livelihoods, human health, and the life prospects of children**.

Alt Fails

(_) Nonanthropocentrism fails, it will always turn back to human interests trumping nonhuman intrests.

Light in 02 (Andrew, Associate Professor of Philosophy and Public Affairs University of California, "Contemporary Environmental Ethics From Metaethics to public philosophy," Metaphilosophy,33(4) July, http://journals.ohiolink.edu/ejc/pdf.cgi/Light_Andrew.pdf?issn=00261068&issue=v33i0004&article=426_ceefmtpp) July 10, 2008

Additionally, in theoretical terms, no reason is offered here why the "interests" of nature recommending preservation of the rainforest would necessarily trump the interests of humans for development. This is simply assumed by Katz and Oechsli. After all, a nonanthropogenic theory does not necessarily reduce all human interests to a subservient position in relation to nature. Even if strong second-order principles were justifies in this hypothesized nonanthropocentric theory that provided reasons for resolving conflicts of value, the application of those principles would not in this case ensure that natural welfare would trump considerations of human welfare. Every nonanthropocentric approach acknowledges that in many cases human interests will still trump nonhuman interests where these interests directly come into conflict (see Eckersley 1998 for a helpful discussion). If this were not true, nonanthropocentrism would quickly degenerate into an absurd position (see Lynch and Wells 1998).

AT: Beck/Global Risk Society

(_) Beck's politics of skepticism would be inherently destabilizing and fatal to millions – his alternative merely replicates the worst tendencies of the status quo, allowing conservative forces to highjack decision-making through "doubt"

Smith et al99 [Mick, prof of Enviro Studies and Philo @ Queen's University, Alex Law lecturer of sociology @ U of Abertay Dundee, Hazel Work lecturer of sociology @ U of Abertay Dundee, and Andy Panay teaching fellow @ U of Abertay Dundee, "The Reinvention of Politics: Ulrich Beck and Reflexive Modernity," Environmental Politics 8.3 autumn, pg.171-l72]

Unsurprisingly, **Beck's politics recapitulates his ontology**. As a political pundit, **Beck aligns himself with** contemporary social **theorists** like Giddens **who claim to have moved 'beyond left and right',** (the original title of The Reinvention of Politics) **regarding themselves as heralds of a 'third way'** (1997, p. 142). **This** third way **avoids the stasis Beck associates with communitarianism and has the apparent virtue of offering us more of the same only without the 'extremes'**. Reflexive modernity salvages the rational kernel at modernity's heart and the blame for modernity's own apparent excesses (in particular those of National Socialism) is conveniently laid at the door of the 'counter-modern' forces that sought to arrest its development. **This is a conjuring trick** indeed and one **that flies in the face of careful analyses** like those of Marcuse [1998] or Herf [1986]. Even as we watch, modernity escapes Houdini like from the chains of its own history and stands blameless before us. All those features which others had thought so characteristic of modernity are suddenly ascribable to a devious 'counter-modernity [that] is not at all a shadow of modernity; it is a project, a deed, an institution just as authentic as industrial modernity itself. It is intended and produced with all the means and resources of modernity itself: science and research, technology ... education, organisation, mass media, politics, and so on.' (1997, p.36). **The problem is that many in Beck's audience feel they have missed something. If modernity's associations with instrumental rationality can be wished away with the wave of an intellectual wand what exactly is there left for reflexive modernity to inherit? The answer, it seems, is** the 'art of doubt'. '[T]he political programme of radicalized modernity is **scepticism!**' (1997, p.168) Doubt 'removes the dogmatism from the antagonisms ... it allows a pacification of the conflict that reconciles both sides ... so much that the two extremes, paradise and war, are ruled out' (1997, p.170-71). We must give up revolutionary or Utopian projects. A political consensus is achievable only via a reformism that requires that all recognise the fallibility of their previous ideals. **But what kind of scepticism is it that asks us to sacrifice our principles on the altar of consensus politics while regarding the constructed certainties of our contemporary world** - capitalism, individualisation and globalisation - **as largely inviolable? For while the space for environmental critique in Beck's 'reinvented' politics is reduced to a Machiavellian playing off of one company's dubious environmental claims against another's the potential scope for the abuse of power is immeasurably increased within a now global political order. And is doubt enough? After all, every 'constructed certainty' can just as easily be expressed as a doubt. Those with enough power can be much more successful than Descartes ever was in getting us to question the evidence of our senses. Is global warming really happening?** Do we really need to worry about the environment or change our lifestyles? **Environmental issues provide a good example where the hesitancy induced by certain forms of scepticism may prove fatal to millions**. It also seems unlikely that doubting will 'overcome industrialism's arrogant faith in technology, and will justify tolerance and curiosity for others' (1998, p. 112) **Chronic uncertainty can be just as destabilising as manufactured certainties. Do they have biological weapons? Shouldn't we bomb them first just in case**?

AT: Beck/Global Risk Society

(_) Perm solves best - allows for democratic political control of technological development while not abandoning concrete action in the face of risk

Hajer and Kesselring 99 [Martin, Public Policy @ U Amsterdam and Sven, researcher at the Institute for Sociology of the Ludwig-Maximilians-Universitat, "Democracy in the Risk Society? Learning from the New Politics of Mobility in Munich," Environmental Politics 8.3, pg.20]

The alternative direction for designs for democratic decision-making in the risk society would argue that the smaller co-operative management regimes will not go away but need to be put in a structure of democratic accountability. It would acknowledge that such regimes do not lend themselves to the inclusion of all sorts of stakeholders (since they thrive on informality, interpersonal trust and direct face-to-face interaction among top officials, they would cease to be effective if the practice were opened up to others). One could therefore argue that **democratic governance is in the invention of ways to give such co-operative management regimes a clear political brief.** For instance, in the Munich case the City could have focused its democratic deliberation on the development of an innovative design brief that new technologies would have had to meet. Inzell would then have had to take that brief (which would have included a vision for the city, with a certain prioritisation in terms of policy goals) as its starting point. In the present situation old structures with a proper requirement for democratic accountability are informally shifted aside while new practices set the markers for policy-making and investment programmes. **Enhanced democracy would have to recapture the definition of goals as well as the control over the way in which these goals are interpreted by relevant agencies, both within and outside government**. Ironically, in a period in which governments complain about the lack of 'steering power' they can be seen handing over some of the devices over which they actually hold the monopoly: the development of infrastructure. **In the case of sustainable** regional **transport it seems** as if local **governments are unaware of their potential to co-determine the sort of technologies that are to be developed in order to meet the challenge of making transport more sustainable.** The research on the development of mobility technologies shows that cities are relatively passive 'buyers' in a market. Although cities provide the 'real life laboratories' where new technologies are experimented with, they fail to provide a clear 'design brief explicating the effects they want the technologies to generate. All too often the 'technology push' ends up in applications that do not actually function particularly well in solving concretely perceived local problems. **In risk society the democratisation of the introduction of new technologies stands out as a key concern**.

AT: Beck/Global Risk Society

(_) Beck's critique can't be generalized out of post WWII Europe – his failure to recognize meaningful class differences makes a failed model for politics

Marshall in 03 (Brent K Marshall, Prof of Sociology at Univ of Central Florida, "Globalisation, environmental degredation and Ulrich Beck's risk society", in Globalization: Critical Concepts in Sociology, eds Robertson and White, 2003, p 178-179)

As the following critique delineates. **thc risk society is not generalisabie because the nation-state and national society are treated as sell-evident units of analysis:** the nation-state is abstracted out of the structural configuration of the world. I will provide a critique of Beck's theory on Iwo fronts. The first critique relates to the preconditions for the transition from a modern society to the risk society and the second critique questions whether a society increasingly organised around the distribution of technological risk is classless, as argued by Beck. **The purpose of wealth distribution** (or welfare policies) **is to meet the material needs of society which, in turn, serves a legitimising function of technoscientific development. This condition is crucial to Beck's theory because it is the initial step in the process of reflexive modernisation from which the risk society emerges.** Material needs must be met before the logic of risk distribution supplants the logic of wealth distribution and thus restructures society. Beck is equivocal when it conies to this initial condition; 'material needs' are not defined, the sufficient and necessary level of needs that must be met arc not identified, and what portion of society must have its needs met is not mentioned. What is more, **with pressure from transnational capital on nation-states to adopt neo-liberal policies, the logic of wealth distribution** advanced welfixre systems i **is quickly being eliminated** in those few core countries that were relatively successful in meeting the material needs of its citizens. In the I 980s. the administrations of Reagan in the U.S. and Thatcher in Britain reversed prior efforts to meet the material needs of all citizens through welfare provi.. sion, making the transition to the risk society highly unlikely. As discussed earlier, **structural adjustment policies driven by a neo-liberal agenda have had devastating effects on peripheral countries and populations. The percentage of the world's population living in absolute poverty is increasing at an alarming rate. These trends suggest that Beck's risk society is temporally bound to the post-WWII period and spatially bound to (West) Germany and Scandinavia. The risk society appears to be an anomaly rather than an end-state of social change**. Assuming that risk societies do exist, my second critique relates to whether or not such societies are classless, as argued by Beck. The validity of a classless risk society is contingent on the hypothcsiscd structuring capacity of global risks which is generally not supported empirically. **Many of the global hazards Beck focuses on** — such as, the greenhouse effect, ozone depletion. acid rain--**do not obey juridically defined borders or class division**s. and thus these hazards are thought to affect all members equally. **As a result. social movements organising around global hazards also transcend class divisions.** It is likely that many people are cognisant of global environmental threats, and for some, this awareness ma have altered their world vicw. The emergence and strength of Green Parties in some western European countries seem to support this contention. The issue, though. is not so much whether global hazards transcend class divisions — they do; rather, **the issue is whether or not global hazards hae the capacity to restructure society at the level that Beck's argument requires**. To date, **the environmental risks thai have demonstrated the capacity to organise sectors of society have been micro-level technological hazards** such as toxic contamination, oil spills, and radioactive waste storage (Couch. Kroll-Smith. and Marshall 1997; Picou, Gill. and Cohen 1997; Cable and Cable 1995; Erikson 1994; Cable and Benson 1993: Couch and Kroll-Smith 1991; Reich 1991: Kroll-Smith and Couch 1990; Edclstein 1988). **Yet, any meaningful discussion of localiscd hazards and risks** which have a tendency to reinforce class divisions, not transcend them **is missing from Beck's thesis**. Economically-sound reasons exist for **corporations** to **locate hazardous industries in communities of low socioeconomic status**, for historically it has been the path of least resistance. **The social sciences are replete with studies that tind evidence of environmental injustice and racism.' People of low socioeconomic status are systematically and disproportionately exposed to the hazardous byproducts of modernisation while receiving only a fraction of the benefits. Beck omits theoretical treatment of these class-specific differences.** In addition, even global risks can produce differential impacts 'due to class-specific distribution of coping resources' (Engel and Strasser 1998: 94).

AT: Beck/Global Risk Society

(_) Beck's Risk-Society theory is ethnocentric, ignores spatial and material inequality and denies agency for emancipatory projects for the global underclass

Schuurman in 2k [Frans, institute of development studies, university ofNijrnegen, the Netherlands, "Paradigms Lost, Paradigms Regained? Development Studies in the Twenty-First Century," Third World Quarterly, 21.1, p. 15-16]

Further, **the concept of risk society is not uncontested** with respect to its value for developed countries in the North, let alone its relevance to the poor in the South. Frank Furedi of the University of Kent is one of the concerned, progressive scholars who takes the concepts of reflexive modernisation and risk-consciousness to task (Füredi, 1996). Firstly, **Füredi criticises the idea that global risk is something new**, that it is one of the side-effects or perhaps even one of the constitutive characteristics of the post-Fordist globalisation phase. Füredi **denounces this as a pretty ethnocentric and ahistorical view as he points out the risks which colonised people forcefully had to undergo because of the expansion of Western capitalism. As far as these indigenous peoples are concerned theirs has been a risk society ever since the penetration of colonialism.** Second, **it seems very opportunistic** to Füredi **to come up with a concept like global risk society just at the moment when the risks which the North has always been able to export to the South now also threaten the industrialised nationstates**. Füredi' s third objection is that the concept of risk society invokes the image of risks being evenly spread. **Pointing towards the global dimensions of risks does not take away the fact that** certain nations or more specifically **certain categories of people are more risk prone than others. Risk is unequally distributed** geographically and sociologically, **and thinking otherwise draws away attention from the necessity of emancipatory projects directed at the global underclasses**. Finally, **the concept of risk society underrates the power of human agency and overrates the** (apparent) **autonomous dynamic of technology which would lead us all unequivocally towards the apocalypse**. In relation to the previous objection, **this means that collective social action to fight the unequal distribution of risk could be considered useless** because social change can only be a consequence of technological developments. So, in a risk society we are doomed to keep on running from one panic to the next. **Collective emancipatory projects are relegated to the margin of the broader, global picture**. A new morality based on self-restraint is put forward by the adherents of the risk society. However, **it does not seem likely that risk management through self-restraint is a more powerful beckoning perspective for the poor in the Third World than the notion of progress**.

Ecodoomsaying Good

(_) The framing of the affirmative does not matter. In the context of environmentalism, policies must be couched in anthropothentric terms to achieve non-anthrocentric ends

Light in 96 (Andrew, Director of the Science Technology and Society Progra at the New Jersey Institute of Technology; Environmental Pragmatism, Ed. By Light and Katz, p 332-333)

"Still, when….in total" **Still, when pushed, I expect Katz would agree to the following.** Suppose that it turns out that appeals to anthropocentrism result in the moral consideration of nature that Katz has in mind? '**What if, for example, the US Congress called a series of hearings on the environment, and a philosopher was able to persuade the government on anthropocentric grounds to implement every one of Katz's policies with respect to the human relationship with nature. Suppose that the reason Congress embraced these views was because they understood the arguments better when expressed in anthropocentric terms**. **Would not Katz then agree that anthropocentrism had then served the interests of nature in a non-anthropocentric sense**, **even if it was done for the wrong reasons? Surely he would.** Of course it is not at all likely that this would ever happen, but importantly **we can imagine it very likely that in relevantly similar cases, but on a much smaller scale, an anthropocentric argument for serving the interests of nature might better serve the non-anthropocentrically conceived interests of nature. Even if anthropocentrism is only helpful at the level of communicating ethical principles, it is in the interests of a "workable" environmental ethics to avoid rejecting it in total.**

Ecodoomsaying Good

(_) Our representations are necessary to create an imperative for action. People must glance at environmental destruction to know it

Casey in 03 (Philosophy Chair at State University Edward, "Eco-Phenomenology" p. 197-9)

Or let us say that these sensitive souls—**ecologists** of perception before there was any science of the subject—**apperceived the destruction that was billowing in the air and poisoning the ground. So we, too, at the beginning of this New Millenium can apperceive the initial effects of global warming in such expressive elemental phenomena** as changing weather patterns, whose persistently hotter surfaces we sense in our skins, and whose deadly effects are visible in the massive losses of sea otters and seals in the Pacific Ocean. I say "apperceive" in deference to our earlier discussion of glancing at the face of the other person. When I apperceive disease in the environment, I attend to where it is located, in what place, and especially on which surfaces of that place. This is why the glance is so aptly invoked in this very circumstance: its pointed penetrating power allows it to go straight to where the problem is, like a hawk zeroing in on its prey. Or like a lance launched at its pinpointed target: Ort, the German word for place, derives ultimately from "lip of a spear": the glance, like a lance, is typically thrown at its target (as the French say, when we glance we "throw a blow of the eye": jeter un coup d'oeil). The target in landscape apperception takes the form of a particular place in the environment, a set of surfaces that betrays instantly the state of its health. Analogues to this situation abound: the practiced medical doctor knows by a mere glance what her patient is suffering from, the painter knows by the briefest of looks what has to be added or subtracted from his work, the poet to her text, the cook to the dish being prepared. The person familiar with his or her local environment—the farmer, the gardener, the landscape architect—can tell with similar swiftness if this environment is in trouble, and even if it is only starting to head for trouble. The place-world shows itself in its surfaces, as existing within its own normative parameters, geomorphic or evolutionary, agricultural or wild—or else as exceeding or undermining these parameters, as ill at ease with itself. **The glance takes all this in without needing to pass judgment or to engage in reflection. A bare apperception, a mere moment of attention, is enough: a glance suffices. A glance suffices not just to see distress and disorder. It also picks up the imperative to do something about that disarray. Here we take the crucial step from being noticeable to being compelling**. Certain surfaces of the environment are noticeably in trouble, and we see this at a glance; but what about the ethical demand that we find a way out of that trouble? How can anything so stringent, so uncompromising, as this demand be a matter of mere surfaces and thus something that calls for just as mere glances? We might grant that the glance apperceives environmental problems quickly and accurately. But **does it suffice to grasp the imperative to remedy the earth's maladies? It does, but only if we single out one more factor in the distressed surfaces we notice. To be expressive and to be a comparatively simple foil to the complexities of the environment are both essential to conveying difficulties happening in a place. But a certain intensity is also required: an intensity on and of the very surfaces that draw our attention in the first place**. **A pleasant and healthy landscape lacks intensity; it lulls us into the pleasure of the beautiful.** Only when a landscape is sublime does tension arise. In this case (and in Kant's terms**), the tension is between an imagination not able to comprehend the complexity of the scene and a reason that claims to go far beyond it. In an environmental trauma, a different but equally powerful tension between integrity and disturbance arises: a tension whose intensity calls us to act and not just to speculate.**

Ecodoomsaying Good

(_) Unless we can accurately sense and feel the pain of the environment, we will never take necessary action to address degradation

Casey in 03 (Philosophy Chair at State University Edward, "Eco-Phenomenology" p. 205-6)

In other words: if there is indeed an ethical relation between human beings, **there is also an equally (but differently) ethical relation among all members of the natural environment**—to which Levinas's ethical posture remains relevant even if it calls for revision and expansion. **In both cases, we stand "encumbered." And if glancing is important in the first case**— more important than Levinas allows—**it is just as crucial in the second. Glancing makes the difference between indifference and concern. Environmentally uncaring people look away even before they glance; or if they look, they see little if anything of the suffering in the scarified face of the natural world. Unless we can catch the discordance and the pain, the affliction and the damage, we shall be in no position to act and reflect—to do something that makes a real difference to a diseased or traumatized environment. Then we shall finally begin to own up to our unending responsibility** to the place-worlds in which we live and move and become what we are in their midst.

(_) Environmental catastrophe imagery is instrumental to movement success. Silent Spring, the Quiet Crisis and the Population Bomb prove our argument

Coglianese in 01 (Cary, associate professor of public policy at JFK School, 150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 85, November)

In the 1960s, the American environmental movement reawakened. Controversies in the midcentury had erupted over public dams in the West and the dangers of nuclear conflict, but the movement's renaissance fully blossomed in the 1960s. **In 1962, Rachel Carson published Silent Spring, dramatically warning of the long-term dangers of pesticide use. n18 In succeeding years, Carson's book was joined by others that warned of environmental and social decay** precipitated by unregulated industrial activity, including Stewart Udall's The Quiet Crisis, n19 Ralph Nader's Unsafe at Any Speed, n20 Paul Ehrlich's The Population Bomb, n21 and Barry Commoner's Science and Survival. n22 **These popular books of the time not only warned of dangers from industrial activities, but also provided the public with a new conceptual apparatus for understanding ecological relationships and for constructing a broad-scale political movement.** n23 Moreover, messages of ecological alarm and activism found a receptive audience during the sixties, when there was broader social unrest over civil rights and the Vietnam War. This sense of alarm was further fueled by several highly visible environmental disasters, including a major oil spill in Santa Barbara in 1969, and the infamous burning of the Cuyahoga River in Ohio. n24

Permutation

(_) Perm – reject reps & support the plan -- Our permutation of your representations K is part of ecological pragmatism. It's necessary to refine environmental ethics

Light in 96 (Andrew, Director of the Science Technology and Society Progra at the New Jersey Institute of Technology; Environmental Pragmatism, Ed. By Light and Katz, p. 168-9)

Despite this overlap **the distinction between materialists and ontologists in environmental thought in general and political theory in particular is still useful as an heuristic mechanism that aids in analysis rather than as a hard and fast division that points to necessary contentions of deep disagreement.** The distinction will help us to predict the propensity for certain serious points of contention, such as the earlier example of the status of non-human animals as agents, but it need not be the case that such disagreements are necessary for the distinction to work. The distinction identifies where one's priorities fall on general political questions of environmental reform. But even assuming that split, **we can imagine materialists and ontologists agreeing on a particular question of reform. Given, for example, the choice of whether a particular site should be preserved as a wilderness area, both groups might agree that the area should be set aside even if they differed on the role of wilderness areas in the ultimate transformation to a new social order** (or to the correct individual attitudes towards nature). From the theorists presented so far, it is noteworthy that Bookchin has even reached out to members of the deep ecology camp to at least talk about what they can potentially agree upon. **Attempts at mixing these positions demonstrates the usefulness of developing both types of theories, materialist and ontological, in the pursuit of answers to questions pertaining to both. That is, in the development of a materialist conception of political ecology, certain ontological lessons will be learned along the way which can ultimately be useful to a strict environmental ontologist. The same is true in the other direction.**

Permutation Solves

(_) Formulating specific political projects is critical for consciousness raising and movement construction

Sturgeon 1997 Noel, Professor of Women's Studies Washington State University, "Ecofeminist Natures," Routledge)

The popularity of recent anti-essentialist theories of situational political identities notwithstanding, such theories rarely make explicit the conditions for the creation of a politically "oppositional consciousness" that is strategic and positional. There is acknowledgment that an oppositional consciousness is created by those movements that engage in "consciousness-raising." Bell hooks, among others, points out that **consciousness-raising in small groups is a crucial practice for building both a feminist movement and feminist theory.** But as I will point out later in this book, **simply exploring difference, finding patterns in experience, and bonding between women in such small groups is not sufficient. What is also called for are specific political projects for such small groups that operate with awareness of multiple and intersecting kinds of difference and under conditions that allow these differences to influence the definition of issues and the choice of strategies**. A similar point is made by Val Plumwood, who notes that "forms of oppression" can be seen "as very closely…related, and working together to form a single system without losing a degree of distinctness and differentiation." She recommends that such a conception of oppression as both a "single mutual supporting system" and a "differential system," requires a "cooperative movement strategy [that] suggests a methodological principle for both theory and action, that **whenever there is a choice of strategies or of possibilities for theoretical development, then other things being equal those…that take account of or promote this wider, connected set of objectives are to be preferred to ones that do not. This should be regarded as a minimum principle of cooperative strategy**. Even more specifically, I argue that **radically democratic, participatory, and nonhierarchical movement structures, especially within movements that attempt coalitions, provide the conditions for destabilizing the essentialist moments that are perhaps inevitably involved in the construction of a political collectivity or an oppositional consciousness**. I intend to explore the uses of carious and heterogeneous kinds of essentialist formulations for ecofeminism and at the same point to the ways in which radically democratic ecofeminist organizations and theoretical production constantly revise and contest political identities. I will try to mitigate what I see as prevailing reductionist account of the essentialism of ecofeminism by examining contradiction, factures, and debates within the movement's discursive practices. I also pay particular attention, however, to the moments these essentialisms become barriers to more productive coalitions, especially between ecofeminists and the environmental justice movement, and between U.S. ecofeminist and nonwestern feminist environmentalists.

Perm Solves

(_) Dealing with the web of oppression requires political cooperation at a minimum.

Warren 1994 (Karen J., Professor of Philosophy at Macalester University, "Ecological Feminism," *Routhledge)*

If oppressions form a web, it is a web which now encircles the whole group and begins to stretch out to the stars, and whose strands grow ever tighter and more inimical to life as more and more of the world becomes integrated into the system of the global market and subject to the influence of its global culture. In the methodology and strategy for dealing with such a web it is essential to take account of both its connectedness and the capacity for independent movement along its parts. Rarely if ever can it be said, "Once we have cut this section, solved this problem, all the rest will follow, other forms of oppression will whither away". A web can continue to function and repair itself despite damage to localized parts of its structure. The parts can even be in conflict and perhaps move for a limited time in opposite directions. The strategies for dealing with such a web require cooperation, the creation of political alliances. A cooperative movement strategy suggests and methodological principal for both theory and action, that where there is a choice of strategies or possibilities for theoretical development, the other things being equal those strategies and theoretical developments which take account of our promote this wider connected set of objectives are to be preferred to ones which do not. This could be regarded as a minimum principle of cooperative strategy. But even as a minimum principle it is one which the major green positions of social and deep ecology currently fail.

Essentialism Turns

(_) Eco-feminism contradicts the fundamental premise of anti-patriarchal struggle by endorsing traditional feminine roles

Davion in 94 (Victoria, Prof. of Philosophy @ UGA, Ecological Feinism, ed Karren Warren, p 16)

Feminism pays attention to women. Although ther are many different kinds of feminism, all feminists agree that sexist oppression is wrong and seek to overthrow patriarchy in its various forms. Thus, for an analysis to be feminist, it must include an analysis of sex, gender, and patriarchy. It must look for the various ways that sexist oppression damages women, and seek nonpatriarchal alternatives to them. **In looking at how patriarchy damages women, a feminist analysis must look closely at** the roles women play in various patriarchies, e.g., **the historically identified feminine roles. In so far as these roles are damangin**g (especiall to those who play them) **they must be viewed with suspicion. If feminists fail to assert that at least some of the roels assigned to women under patriarchy are damaging, we fail to assert the very premise that makes feminism, the overthrowing of patriarchy, important.** For, if sexist oppression is not damaging to women, women have no reason to resist it. If it does cause damage, we should expect to see this damage in traditionally assigned feminine roles. **Thus, ecofeminist solutions which assert that feminine roles can provide an aswer to the ecological crisis, without first examining how these roles presently are, or historically been, damaging to those who play them, undermine the very conceptual significance and underpinnings of feinis that ecofeminist philosophers such as Warren and Plumwood assert.**

(_) Eco-feminist essentialism reinforces patriarchy

Merchant, chair of the Department of Conservation and Natural Resources at the University of California, 1990
[Carolyn, Reweaving the World: The Emergence of Ecofeminism. edited by Irene Diamond and Gloria Orenstein, pg. | oi-]

Yet in emphasizing the female, body, and nature components of the dualities male/female, mind/body, and culture/nature, radical ecofeminism runs the risk of perpetuating the very hierarchies it seeks to overthrow. Critics point to the problem of women's own reinforcement of their identification with a nature that Western culture degrades.7 **If "female is to male as nature is to culture,"** as anthropologist Sherry Ortner argues," **then women's hopes for liberation are set back by association with nature. Any analysis that makes women's, essence and qualities special ties them to a biological destiny that thwarts the possibility of liberation. A politics grounded in women's culture, experience, and values can be seen as reactionary**.

Essentialism Turns

(_) "Women = nature" essentialisms lock women *out* of the liberating aspects of Western culture

Biehl, M.A. in liberal arts, 1991 (Janet, **Rethinking Ecofeminist Politics**. p.«2J»%t7

It actually changes very little to propound certain metapuors about women—and then attempt to elude their consequences by claiming that they are social constructions. Ecofeminism's attachment to its own metaphors leaves the movement itself without any clear understanding of women's and men's actual relationship to nonhuman nature, let alone of women's and men's actual relationship to each other. **Even as some ecofeminists reject the categories** of "otherness," their understanding of history greatly depends on them. **By accepting, even celebrating, a male-derived image o**f "w**oman=nature" ecofeminists do not define women's place in the** cultural wealth of the Wes**t but exclude them from i**t. **Ecofeminism, •in effect, "nurtures" a new form of "otherness"—the image**of women as simplistJcally and **genetically other to Western cultur**e. Hence, ecofeminism leaves women with **none of the importan**t **llberatory legacies of Western culture**s**-its democratic tradition, its** quest to u**nderstand how nonhuman and human nature interact, i**ts **high regard for the individual, its fight against superstition, its hig**h ideals o**f rationality, and the like**. **Even ecofeminists who reje**ct male-deriv**ed categories of female "otherness" leave us with** a **nistorical legacy based on/yon women's "otherness" in an atavistic sense—and that**, as we shall see, **is a very slender thread indeed**? and one fraught with many problems.