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The rhetoric of alternative energy furthers a purely technological understanding of being –nature becomes something to be exploited and violently controlled.

Beckman 2000 (Tad, HMC Philosophy teacher, “Heidegger Background from 20th Century Philosophy Course”)

Perhaps it is not difficult to understand the separate paths of the fine arts, craftsmanship, and modern technology. Each seems to have followed different human intentions and to have addressed different human skills. However, while the fine arts and craftsmanship remained relatively consistent with *techne* in the ancient sense, modern technology withdrew in a radically different direction. As Heidegger saw it, “the revealing that rules in modern technology is a challenging [*Herausfordern*], which puts to nature the unreasonable demand that it supply energy that can be extracted and stored as such.” (P. 14) Modern technology sets-upon nature and challenges-forth its energies, in contrast to *techne* which was always a bringing-forth in harmony with nature. The activity of modern technology lies at a different and more advanced level wherein the natural is not merely decisively re-directed; nature is actually “set-upon.” The rhetoric in which the discussion is couched conveys an atmosphere of violence and exploitation.

To uncover the essence of modern technology is to discover why technology stands today as the danger. To accomplish this insight, we must understand why modern technology must be viewed as a “challenging-forth,” what affect this has on our relationship with nature, and how this relationship affects us. Is there really a difference? Has technology really left the domain of *techne* in a significant way? In modern technology, has human agency withdrawn in some way beyond involvement and, instead, acquired an attitude of violence with respect to the other causal factors?

Heidegger clearly saw the development of “energy resources” as symbolic of this evolutionary path; while the transformation into modern technology undoubtedly began early, the first definitive signs of its new character began with the harnessing of energy resources, as we would say. As a representative of the old technology, the windmill took energy from the wind but converted it immediately into other manifestations such as the grinding of grain; the windmill did not unlock energy from the wind in order to store it for later arbitrary distribution. Modern wind-generators, on the other hand, convert the energy of wind into electrical power which can be stored in batteries or otherwise. The significance of storage is that it places the energy at our disposal; and because of this storage the powers of nature can be turned back upon itself. The storing of energy is, in this sense, the symbol of our over-coming of nature as a potent object. “...a tract of land is challenged into the putting out of coal and ore. The earth now reveals itself as a coal mining district, the soil as a mineral deposit.” (p. 14) This and other examples that Heidegger used throughout this essay illustrate the difference between a technology that diverts the natural course cooperatively and modern technology that achieves the unnatural by force. Not only is this achieved by force but it is achieved by placing nature in our subjective context, setting aside natural processes entirely, and conceiving of all revealing as being relevant only to human subjective needs.

The essence of technology originally was a revealing of life and nature in which human intervention deflected the natural course while still regarding nature as the teacher and, for that matter, the keeper. The essence of modern technology is a revealing of phenomena, often far removed from anything that resembles “life and nature,” in which human intrusion not only diverts nature but fundamentally changes it. As a mode of revealing, technology today is a challenging-forth of nature so that the technologically altered nature of things is always a situation in which nature and objects wait, standing in reserve for our use. We pump crude oil from the ground and we ship it to refineries where it is fractionally distilled into volatile substances and we ship these to gas stations around the world where they reside in huge underground tanks, standing ready to power our automobiles or airplanes. Technology has intruded upon nature in a far more active mode that represents a consistent direction of domination. Everything is viewed as “standing-reserve” and, in that, loses its natural objective identity. The river, for instance, is not seen as a river; it is seen as a source of hydro-electric power, as a water supply, or as an avenue of navigation through which to contact inland markets. In the era of *techne* humans were relationally involved with other objects in the coming to presence; in the era of modern technology, humans challenge-forth the subjectively valued elements of the universe so that, within this new form of revealing, objects lose their significance to anything but their subjective status of standing-ready for human design.

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And, pragmatic reform through technology forces our surroundings into standing reserve where even human beings expendable and obliterates our connection with Being.

Dreyfus 2006 (Hubert, Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, Berkeley, "Nihilism, Art, Technology, and Politics", The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger)

Again, a comparison with Kuhn can help us see Heidegger's point. According to Kuhn, a science becomes normal when the practitioners in a certain area all agree that a particular piece of work identifies the important problems in a field and demonstrates how certain of these problems can be successfully solved. Thus, a scientific paradigm sets up normal science as an activity of puzzle solving. It is the job of normal science to eliminate anomalies by showing how they fit into the total theory the paradigm sketches out in advance. In a similar way, the technological paradigm embodies and furthers our technological understanding of being according to which what does not fit in with our current paradigm -- that is, that which is not yet at our disposal to use efficiently (e.g., the wilderness, friendship, the stars) -- will finally be brought under our control, and turned into a resource. The contrast with the Greek temple is obvious. The temple is not a totalizing paradigm that makes everything clear and promises to bring it under control. The temple shows people not only what they stand for but also that there is an earthly aspect of things that withdraws and that can never be articulated and dominated. In the face of the totalizing tendency of the technological artwork, the earth's resistance to total ordering shows up as a source of what Kuhn calls anomalies. **What cannot be ordered is treated as recalcitrant human beings who are deviant and must be reformed or as natural forces that have yet to be understood and mastered.** All cultures inculcate norms of human behavior and find some order in nature, but ours is the only culture which tries to make the social and natural order total by transforming or **destroying all exceptions**. Kierkegaard already saw that the individual or exceptional was menaced by leveling. Heidegger sees that all our marginal practices are in danger of being taken over and normalized. It looks to us, of course, as if this is for our own good. Heidegger, however, sees in these marginal practices the only possibility of resistance to technology. Greek practices such as friendship and the cultivation of the erotic are not efficient. When friendship becomes efficient networking, it is no longer the mutual trust and respect the Greeks admired. Likewise the mystical merging power of the erotic is lost when we turn to private sexual experience. Similarly, Greek respect for the irrational in the form of music and Dionysian frenzy do not fit into an efficiently ordered technological world. Indeed, such "pagan" practices did not even fit into the Christian understanding of being and were marginalized in the name of disinterested, agapè love, and peace. These Christian practices in turn were seen as trivial or dangerous given the Enlightenment's emphasis on individual maturity, self-control, and autonomy. In order to combat modern nihilism Heidegger attempts to point out to us the peculiar and dangerous aspects of our technological understanding of being. But Heidegger does not oppose technology. In The Question Concerning Technology he hopes to reveal the essence of technology in a way that "in no way confines us to a stultified compulsion to push on blindly with technology or, what comes to the same thing, to rebel helplessly against it". Indeed, he promises that "when we once open ourselves expressly to the essence of technology, we find ourselves unexpectedly taken into a freeing claim". (QCT 25-26, VA 33) We will need to explain opening, essence and freeing before we can understand Heidegger here. But already Heidegger's project should alert us to the fact that he is not announcing one more reactionary rebellion against technology, although many take him to be doing just that. Nor is he doing what progressive thinkers would like to do: proposing a way to get technology under control so that it can serve our rationally chosen ends. The difficulty in locating just where Heidegger stands on technology is no accident. Heidegger has not always been clear about what distinguishes his approach from a romantic reaction to the domination of nature, and when he does finally arrive at a clear formulation of his own original view, it is so strange that in order to understand it everyone is tempted to translate it into conventional platitudes. Thus Heidegger's ontological concerns are mistakenly assimilated to ecologically-minded worries about the devastation of nature. Those who want to make Heidegger intelligible in terms of current antitechnological banalities can find support in his texts. During the war he attacked consumerism. The circularity of consumption for the sake of consumption is the sole procedure which distinctively characterizes the history of a world which has become an unworld. (EP 107, VA 96) And as late as 1955, in an address to the Schwarzwald peasants, he points out: The world now appears as an object open to the attacks of calculative thought.

... Nature becomes a gigantic gasoline station, an energy source for modern technology and industry. (DOT 50, G 19-20) In this address he also laments the appearance of television antennae on the peasants' dwellings, and gives his own version of an attack on the levelling power of the media. Hourly and daily they are chained to radio and television. ... All that with which modern techniques of communication stimulate, assail, and drive man -- all that is already much closer to man today than his fields around his farmstead, closer than the sky over the earth, closer than the change from night to day, closer than the conventions and customs of his village, than the tradition of his native world. (DOT 50, G 17) Such quotes make it seem Heidegger is a ludite who would like to return from consumerism, the exploitation of the earth, and mass media to the world of the pre-Socratic Greeks or the good old Schwarzwald peasants. Nevertheless, although Heidegger does not deny that technology presents us with serious problems, as his thinking develops he comes to the surprising and provocative conclusion that focusing on loss and destruction is still technological. All attempts to reckon existing reality ... in terms of decline and loss, in terms of fate, catastrophe, and destruction, are merely technological behavior. (QCT 48, TK 45-46) Seeing our situation as posing a problem that must be solved by appropriate action is technological too: [T]he instrumental conception of technology conditions every attempt to bring man into the right relation to technology. ... The will to mastery becomes all the more urgent the more technology threatens to slip from human control. (QCT 5, VA 14-15) Heidegger is clear this approach will not work. "No single man, no group of men," he tells us, "no commission of prominent statesmen, scientists, and technicians, no conference of leaders of commerce and industry, can brake or direct the progress of history in the atomic age." (DOT 52, G 22) Heidegger's view is both darker and more hopeful. He thinks there is a more dangerous situation facing modern man than the technological destruction of nature and civilization, yet this is a situation about which something can be done -- at least indirectly. Heidegger's concern is the human distress caused by the technological understanding of being, rather than the destruction caused by specific technologies. Consequently, he distinguishes the current problems caused by technology -- ecological destruction, nuclear danger, consumerism, etc. -- from the devastation that would result should technology solve all our problems. What threatens man in his very nature is ... that man, by the peaceful release, transformation, storage, and channeling of the energies of physical nature, could render the human condition ... tolerable for everybody and happy in all respects. (PLT 116, G 5 294) The "the greatest danger" is that the approaching tide of technological revolution in the atomic age could so captivate, bewitch, dazzle, and beguile man that calculative thinking may someday come to be accepted and practiced as the only way of thinking.

(DOT 56, G 27) The danger, then, is not the destruction of nature or culture but certain totalizing kinds of practices -- a levelling of our understanding of being. This threat is not a problem for which we must find a solution, but an ontological condition that requires a transformation of our understanding of being. What, then, is the essence of technology -- i.e., the technological understanding of being, or the technological clearing -- and how does opening ourselves to it give us a free relation to technological devices? To begin with, when he asks about the essence of technology we must understand that Heidegger is not seeking a definition. His question cannot be answered by defining our concept of technology. Technology is as old as civilization. Heidegger notes that it can be correctly defined as "a means and a human activity." But if we ask about the essence of technology (the technological understanding of being) we find that modern technology is "something completely different and ... new." (QCT 5, VA 15) It even goes beyond using styrofoam cups to satisfy our desires. The essence of modern technology Heidegger tells us, is to seek to order everything so as to achieve more and more flexibility and efficiency: "[E]xpediting is always itself directed from the beginning ... towards driving on to the maximum yield at the minimum expense." (QCT 15, VA 23) That is, our only goal is optimal ordering, for its own sake. Everywhere everything is ordered to stand by, to be immediately at hand, indeed to stand there just so that it may be on call for a further ordering. Whatever is ordered about in this way has its own standing. We call it standing-reserve. (QCT 17, VA 24) No more do we have subjects turning nature into an object of exploitation: The subject-object relation thus reaches, for the first time, its pure "relational," i.e., ordering, character in which both the subject and the object are sucked up as standing-reserves. (QCT 173, VA 61) Heidegger concludes: "Whatever stands by in the sense of standing-reserve no longer stands over against us as object." (QCT 17, VA 24) He tells us that a modern airliner, understood in its technological essence, is not a tool we use; it is not an object at all, but rather a flexible and efficient cog in the transportation system. Likewise, we are not subjects who use the transportation system, but rather we are used by it to fill the planes. In this technological perspective, ultimate goals like serving God, society, our fellow men, or even ourselves no longer make sense.

Human beings, on this view, become a resource to be used -- but more importantly, to be enhanced -- like any other. Man, who no longer conceals his character of being the most important raw material, is also drawn into this process. (EP 104, VA 90) In the film, 2001: A Space Odyssey, the robot, HAL, when asked if he is happy on the mission, says: "I'm using all my capacities to the maximum. What more could a rational entity want?" This is a brilliant expression of what anyone would say who is in touch with our current understanding of being. We pursue the development of our potential simply for the sake of further growth. We have no specific goals. The human potential movement perfectly expresses this technological understanding of being, as does the attempt to better organize the future use of our natural resources. We thus become part of a system which no one directs but which moves towards the total mobilization and enhancement of all beings, even us. This is why Heidegger thinks the perfectly ordered society dedicated to the welfare of all is not the solution of our problems but the culmination of the technological understanding of being.

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The Impacts-

First, quick fixes and technical solutions become the problem turning the case – calculative thought is the root cause of the harms

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(Ladelle, Heidegger and the Earth, ed. by Ladelle McWhorter)

<Thinking today must concern itself with the earth. Wherever we turn on newsstands, on the airwaves, and in even the most casual of conversations everywhere - we are inundated by predictions of ecological catastrophe and omnicidal doom. And many of these predictions bear themselves out in our own experience. We now live with the ugly, painful, and impoverishing consequences of decades of technological innovation and expansion without restraint, of at least a century of disastrous "natural resource management" policies, and of more than two centuries of virtually unchecked industrial pollution - consequences that include the fact that millions of us on any given day are suffering, many of us dying of diseases and malnutrition that are the results of humanly produced ecological devastation; the fact that thousands of species now in existence will no longer exist on this planet by the turn of the century; the fact that our planet's climate has been altered, probably irreversibly, by the carbon dioxide and chlorofluorocarbons we have heedlessly poured into our atmosphere; and the mind-boggling fact that it may now be within humanity's power to destroy all life on this globe. Our usual response to such prophecies of doom is to ignore them or, when we cannot do that, to scramble to find some way to manage our problems, some quick solution, some technological fix. But over and over again new resource management techniques, new solutions, new technologies disrupt delicate systems even further, doing still more damage to a planet already dangerously out of ecological balance. Our ceaseless interventions seem only to make things worse, to perpetuate a cycle of human activity followed by ecological disaster followed by human intervention followed by a new disaster of another kind. In fact, it would appear that our trying to do things, change things, fix things cannot be the solution, because it is part of the problem itself. But, if we cannot act to solve our problems, what should we do?

And, Environmental management thwarts value to life and makes extinction through nuclear war and environmental destruction inevitable

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(Ladelle, Heidegger and the Earth, ed. by Ladelle McWhorter)JRC—no change

<What is most illustrative is often also what is most common. Today, on all sides of ecological debate we hear, with greater and greater frequency, the word *management*. On the one hand, business people want to manage natural resources so as to keep up profits. On the other hand, conservationists want to manage natural resources so that there will be plenty of coal and oil and recreational facilities for future generations. These groups and factions within them debate vociferously over which management policies are the best, that is, the most efficient and manageable. Radical environmentalists damn both groups and claim it is human population growth and rising expectations that are in need of management. But wherever we look, wherever we listen, we see and hear the term *management*. We are living in a veritable age of management. Before a middle class child graduates from high school she or he is already preliminarily trained in the arts of weight management, stress management, and time management, to name just a few. As we approach middle age we continue to practice these essential arts, refining and adapting our regulatory regimes as the pressures of life increase and the body begins to break down. We have become a society of managers - of our homes, careers, portfolios, estates, even of our own bodies - so is it surprising that we set ourselves up as the managers of the earth itself? And yet, as thoughtful earth-dwellers we must ask, what does this signify?

In numerous essays - in particular the beautiful 1953 essay, "The Question Concerning Technology" - Heidegger speaks of what he sees as the danger of dangers in this, our age. This danger is a kind of forgetfulness, a forgetfulness that Heidegger thought could result not only in nuclear disaster or environmental catastrophe, but in the loss of what makes us the kind of beings we are, beings who can think and who can stand in thoughtful relationship to things. This forgetfulness is not a forgetting of facts and their relationships; it is a forgetfulness of something far more important and far more fundamental than that. He called it forgetfulness of 'the mystery'. >

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Our Alternative is a recognition of human's solidarity with nature in its current state of standing reserve- This represents a radical break from technology that can reconnect humans with their nature and remove themselves and nature from standing reserve, now is the key time

Best and Nocella, 06 –associate professor of philosophy at the University of Texas at El Paso (Igniting a Revolution: Voices in Defense of the Earth, p. 82-84, google books)//JRC

Yet, for both Heidegger and revolutionary environmentalists, there exist possibilities for transformation despite the destructiveness of Enframing. In the midst of technological peril – indeed, precisely because the peril strikes at and thus awakens us to the bond between human and nonhuman life – there emerges a sense of solidarity of human with nonhuman beings. Looking at the well-heeled, bureaucratic discourse of “human resource management” and “personnel resources,” the challenging forth of human beings into standing reserve is fairly evident. Factory-farmed cows, pigs, and chickens obviously have it far worse than people, but in both cases the purpose is to harness resources for maximum efficiency and profit. Ultimately human and nonhuman beings are similarly enframed within one giant “gasoline station.” It is precisely the experience of this solidarity which must be constantly rearticulated – in arts, poetry, ceremony, music, and especially in socioeconomic and political action – in order to provide a historically and ontologically authentic break with the metaphysics of technical control and capitalist exploitation. Action will only be truly revolutionary if it revolves around engagement in solidarity with nature, where liberation is always seen both as human liberation from the confines of Enframing and simultaneously as liberation of animal nations and eco-regions from human technics. Anything less will always lapse back into the false and oppressive hierarchy of “man” over “nature” and “man” over animals with attendant effects of technological, disciplinary control over humans, nonhumans, and the Earth. Using a familiar title from the anarchist Crimethinc collective, revolutionary environmentalism is truly an instance of “fighting for our lives” where the pronoun refers to all life not just human life. Heidegger describes the possibility of transformation through a return of Being as a re-figured humanism. It is the possibility of suspending the will and attaining a lucid sense of the free play of Being within which all of life emerges and is sustained. A human being, like any entity, *is* – s/he stands forth as present. But “his distinctive feature lies in [the fact] that he, as the being who thinks, is open to Being....Man is essentially this relationship of responding to Being. Such experience is the clearing of a space (symbolically represented, for example, in the building of an arbor for a ceremony or in the awesome silence created by the space within a cathedral or a grove of old-growth Redwoods), and the patient readiness for Being to be brought to language. Given the appropriate bearing and evocation through language, human beings can become aware of dwelling, along with all other existent beings, within Being – the open realm within which entities are “released” into presence (Gelassenheit – or “releasement”). What comes to the fore in suspension of willed manipulation is an embrace of other beings and the enduring process of evolution within which all beings emerge and develop. By reflecting on or experiencing oneself within the dimension of freedom that is the domain through which all beings pass, human beings can repair the willed manipulation inherent in calculative thinking and realize a patient equanimity toward Life. It is only in the context of this reawakened sense of the unity of life that revolutionary action gains an authentic basis. It is the engagement with “the Other” that shows the ELF actions are truly about defense of plant and animal life, and they demonstrate genuine liberation concerns that typically are trapped within Enframing. That is to say, ELF (and similar) actions, show themselves as part of a dynamic and necessary historical evolution and transformation process, not merely a gesture of opposition and negation, because of their profound solidarity with animals and the Earth. Such guidance solidarity thus serves as a general basis for a post-Enframing, post-capitalist order, an ecological, not a capitalist society. What will change is, first, the pre-eminence of Enframing as that which animates the epoch and, correspondingly, our relationship to technology. No longer will technical solutions be sought after in realms of activity where technique is not applicable. No longer will everyday activities be pervaded by the standardization and frenzied pace of technology. No longer will nature be looked upon as a homogenous field of resources to be extracted and exploited. No longer will resource-intensive and polluting technologies be utilized simply because they serve the blind interests of corporations over the needs of the Earth. No longer will human beings take from the Earth without thought of the far-reaching consequences of such actions on all present and future forms of life. Critics would wrongly denounce this position as atavistic, primitivist, or anti-science/technology. But as the turning toward the re-emergence of Being unfolds, both through revolutionary action rooted in solidarity with nature and through new, non-exploitative modes of acting in the world, technics will not disappear; instead, the limits of technology as a mode of revealing will begin to be discerned so that new forms and uses of technology can emerge. Questions about technology will center on whether a given technology can be developed and used so that plant and animal life can appear as it is and not be reduced to standing reserve. The question, for Heidegger, is not whether technology, in the sense of a set of tools, is done away with, but whether Enframing is surmounted. It is in this sense of releasement Heidegger writes:

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“Mortals dwell in that they save the earth....Saving does not only snatch something from a danger. To save really means to set something free into its own presencing. I take this as the literal equivalent of the masked ALF activist reclaiming a puppy from a research lab so that it can become a dog rather than a unit of research, or an ELF activist who stops the destruction of an aquifer or forest so that it can remain an aquifer or forest rather than become a water or wood resource. It is just this new ethos which must guide a revolutionary reconstruction of society on grounds that preserve the openness to Being and the ability of each kind of being to become what it is in its essence. For those who charge Heidegger with merely recycling, and not transcending, Western anthropocentrism, it is important to note that there are possibilities here for an emerging post-humanism – a new orientation to nature beyond egocentric forms of human agency and towards interrelation with other beings and Being itself. Heidegger’s philosophy allows for multiple modes of engagement with others and nature as equals, all of them rooted in a relationship of solidarity, respect, and concern. I call this kind of pluralistic, egalitarian, and ecological outlook ontological anarchism. It begins with the rejection of illegitimate “rule” of metaphysical constructs that have served to justify unlimited technological appropriation of the world. In place of Enframing with its subjectivist metaphysical underpinnings, ontological anarchism proclaims a multiplicity of forms of experience in which a sense of revealing comes to the fore – such as in art, music, religion, and philosophy. One such experience, a pre-dominant theme of spiritual re-awakening in the ELF communiques, is found in Native American philosophy and practice.

And, the alternative and the affirmative are mutually exclusive- We cannot engage with preoccupations with technical objects and discover an authentic way of living

Rubin 90- Associate Professor of Political Science at Duquesne University (Charles T., 1990, “Review: Heidegger's Ecology of Modernity”, The Review of Politics, Vol. 52, No. 4, pp. 640-1 //VR)//JRC

A recent book by a world leader in artificial intelligence extols an evolutionary replacement of human beings by smarter, faster, more adaptable machines. As a leading popularizer of evolutionary theory has noted, DNA is simply a way of passing on information, and that might be done more readily by silicon-based electronic means. Besides, as an engineer points out, from the perspective of manufacturing, humans are "walking filth factories. Environmentalist speculation that "the world has cancer, and that the cancer cell is man" has long been around, but recently there are calls for drastic surgery. Arno Naess, philosophical father of the "Deep Ecology" movement, suggests a global population goal of 100 million (about the size of Pakistan today). Another deep ecologist would not be satisfied with 100 million human beings, but looks forward to the development of another being, that can live with nature with the ease of the mythical Sasquatch. These misanthropic visions of the future are all responses to dilemmas posed by modern technology. Common sense may revolt against them, but the frequency with which yesterday's extreme becomes today's common sense should give us pause before we dismiss them. How is it that modern technology calls them forth? Michael Zimmerman thinks a good place to begin to raise such questions is Martin Heidegger's "meditation" on modern technology. Heidegger can lead us to the discussion necessary if we are to have "any hope of dis-covering authentic ways of living within the dangerous and wondrous possibilities opened up" by the technological age (p. xxii). What does Heidegger teach about technology? In the second half of his book, Zimmerman presents an often told story in a thorough and lucid, if not highly original, way. Technology cannot be understood if we are preoccupied with technical objects and their problems, since it is a way of seeing the world through which everything comes to view as an exploitable re-source. Thus, a personnel director speaks of his company's "human re-source assets" held in Iraq. This way of thinking is the working out of an impulse to mastery immanent in the history of philosophy at least since Plato. That we assume we can master nature is not a product of human creativity, reason, wishing or willing, but rather a mysterious, fateful dispensation that is, like any way of revealing, beyond our power to change. The calculative thinking of technology conceals this mystery, hence distorting man's understanding of himself. The best we can hope for is that, thus aware of it, we may be prepared for the coming of some new dispensation.

Links – Industry

The development of industry and tech renders the environment in standing reserve

Heidegger, 77 (Martin, The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, translated by William Lovitt, p18, ASG/JRC)

Only to the extent that man for his part is already challenged to exploit the energies of nature can this ordering revealing happen. If man is challenged, ordered, to do this, then does not man himself belong even more originally than nature within the standing-reserve? The current talk about human resources, about the supply of patients for a clinic, gives evidence of this. The forester who, in the wood, measures the felled timber and to all appearances walks the same forest path in the same way as did his grandfather is today commanded by profit-making in the lumber industry, whether he knows it or not. He is made subordinate to the orderability of cellulose, which for its part is challenged forth by the need for paper, which is then delivered to newspapers and illustrated magazines. The latter, in their turn, set public opinion to swallowing what is printed, so that a set configuration of opinion becomes available on demand. Yet precisely because man is challenged more originally than are the energies of nature, i.e., into the process of ordering, he never is transformed into mere standing-reserve. Since man drives technology forward, he takes part in ordering as a way of revealing. But the unconcealment itself, within which ordering unfolds, is never a human handiwork, any more than is the realm through which man is already passing every time he as a subject relates to an object.

Links – Science

The use of science separates humans from nature- valuing and devaluing nature

Weinberger 92 (Jerry Weinberger, Professor of Political Science at Michigan State University, “Politics and the Problem of Technology: An Essay on Heidegger and the Tradition of Political Philosophy”, *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 86, No. 1 (Mar. 1992), pp. 112-127, JSTOR/KR/JRC

For Heidegger, modern science and technology are rooted conjointly in the metaphysical worldview. According to this view, the world is conceived of as a spatial whole made up of three parts. These three parts are the demonstrably knowable and eternal ground (objective laws of matter) of every particular entity; all the particular entities; and the human subject who discovers the objective ground and lives among the various entities. In discovering the ground, human beings become able completely to manipulate and transform the various things in nature. In doing so they endow the things with values. Science tells us that only humans, not other entities, have value, and that humans give the world its meaning or value as their knowing discloses the world's manipulability. Science is thus humanistic to its core. In its light every particular entity stands neutrally (not as nature) between the necessity of its objective ground (matter in motion, extension, etc.) and the freedom of subjective human art, between fact and value. When understood as the indubitable vantage point for universal, scientific (mathematical) knowledge, subjectivity is the certain and fixed beginning point for discovering the objective ground of manipulable things. But when experienced as the animus of the individual soul, subjectivity is merely arbitrary. Thus, facts are taken to be objective, and values are taken to be merely subjective, thus revealing the essential kin- ship of subjectivity and manipulable entities, both of which have no fixed character or nature. We cannot hope for salvation from Kant, says Heidegger, because Kant's account of subjectivity-as transcendental unity of apperception and as the free legislation of the absolute moral law-itself assumes dogmatically a metaphysical conception of the subject. Thus, free subjectivity and the manipulability of entities turn out to be the same in comparison to the necessity of objective ground. In fact, for modern science there are no essential differences between subjectivity, objectivity, freedom, and manipulability. These aspects of "reality" are actually united in a technological understanding of being: subjectivity is the Archimedean point for uncovering objectivity (Descartes); the doctrine of moral freedom dogmatically presumes that very subjectivity (Kant); and the identification of being with the knowable and changeless entity (objectivity) grew out of the problem of fixing stable grounds for the arbitrary manipulations of human art (Plato and Aristotle). Even for pure natural science "to be" is "to be the ground of the manipulable." Science is humanistic and humanism is technological. (See Heidegger [1927] 1972, 89-101, 202-208, 317-21; 1962, 122-34, 246-52, 364-68; 1982, 112-17; SchUrmann 1987, 75; Zimmerman 1990, 157-63, 196, 222- 23.)

Links – Science/Technology

The metaphysical worldview established by modern technology makes every entity the standing reserve of an endless industrial business transaction

Weinberger 92- Professor of Political Science at Michigan State University (Jerry, March 1992, "Politics and the Problem of Technology: An Essay on Heidegger and the Tradition of Political Philosophy", The American Political Science Review, Vol. 86, No. 1, 112-113, Jstor //VR)

NIHILISM AND BEING

For Heidegger, modern science and technology are rooted conjointly in the metaphysical worldview. According to this view, the world is conceived of as a spatial whole made up of three parts. These three parts are the demonstrably knowable and eternal ground (objective laws of matter) of every particular entity; all the particular entities; and the human subject who discovers the objective ground and lives among the various entities. In discovering the ground, hu man beings become able completely to manipulate and transform the various things in nature. In doing so they endow the things with values. Science tells us that only humans, not other entities, have value, and that humans give the world its meaning or value as their knowing discloses the world's manipulability. Science is thus humanistic to its core. In its light every particular entity stands neutrally (not as nature) between the necessity of its objective ground (matter in motion, extension, etc.) and the freedom of subjective human art, between fact and value. When understood as the indubitable vantage point for universal, scientific (mathematical) knowledge, subjectivity is the certain and fixed beginning point for discovering the objective ground of manipulable things. But when experienced as the animus of the individual soul, subjectivity is merely arbitrary. Thus, facts are taken to be objective, and values are taken to be merely subjective, thus revealing the essential kinship of subjectivity and manipulable entities, both of which have no fixed character or nature. We cannot hope for salvation from Kant, says Heidegger, be- cause Kant's account of subjectivity-as transcendental unity of apperception and as the free legislation of the absolute moral law-itself assumes dogmatically a metaphysical conception of the subject. Thus, free subjectivity and the manipulability of entities turn out to be the same in comparison to the necessity of objective ground. In fact, for modern science there are no essential differences between subjectivity, objectivity, freedom, and manipulability. These aspects of "reality" are actually united in a technological understanding of being: subjectivity is the Archimedean point for uncovering objectivity (Descartes); the doctrine of moral freedom dogmatically presumes that very subjectivity (Kant); and the identification of being with the knowable and changeless entity (objectivity) grew out of the problem of fixing stable grounds for the arbitrary manipulations of human art (Plato and Aristotle). Even for pure natural science "to be" is "to be the ground of the manipulable." Science is humanistic and humanism is technological. (See Heidegger [1927] 1972, 89-101, 202-208, 317-21; 1962, 122-34, 246-52, 364-68; 1982, 112-17; SchUr- mann 1987, 75; Zimmerman 1990, 157-63, 196, 222- 23.)

But our view of the world (including human beings) as manipulable, as the object of control, is not itself within our control. Modern technology is rooted in the metaphysical conception of being that began long ago with Plato. Metaphysics conceived of being in terms of one particular kind, or "domain," of being-objects permanently present before knowing. The task of metaphysics was thus epistemology, which aimed to establish the conditions for certain knowledge of the objects located in the external world. But metaphysics was dogmatic because it merely assumed that we have access to a privileged position outside the presuppositions of a given practical world, because it assumed and thus missed the character of "being-in-the-world," and because it assumed that being is an entity or thing. Metaphysics assumed an impossible independence of theory from practice and confused one domain of being with being itself, forgetting that being neither is an entity or thing nor is identifiable with one or another or even all of its domains, which include objects of knowledge, tools, human beings, the earth, the heavens, and the gods. Under the sway of metaphysics, the domains of being are so conceived as ultimately to produce the domination of all by one-by objective manipulability. Thus, metaphysics comes to a peak in modern technology, for whose conception of being-which Heidegger calls the enframing (Gestell)-every entity, whether theoretical object, human being, earth, sky, or god, is taken as the manipulable stuff-the standing reserve (Bestand)-of an endless industrial business transaction (Heidegger 1977, 17-28). 1 In the full- blown age of technology, the phenomena of art, politics, and the gods are flattened in being under- stood as the objects of scientific knowledge, in the light of which they become merely useful. In such an age genuine creativity, reverence, loyalty, rootedness, and the full possibilities of astonishment and estrangement are obliterated in a cybernetic swirl that spares nothing, that annihilates everything. The age of technology is the age of the last man, for whom the whole of nature and every human being is the stand- ing reserve of a plethora of industries: publishing, war, travel, entertainment, agriculture, concentration camps, education, and so on. And in this age there are no differences among the great competing social and political systems, all of which are bound together in the embrace of global technology. Yet despite technology's being the dark night of the world, Heidegger tells us that it is a "danger that saves" (1977, 28-35); for the result of technology is nihilism, the frame of mind that forgets completely the differences among the domains of being and between being and its domains.

Links – Science/Technology

Subjecting nature to science and technology results in its destruction and the hollowing of Being

DeLuca '5 (Kevin Michael DeLuca, Associate Professor of Speech Communication and adjunct in the Institute of Ecology at the University of Georgia, "Thinking With Heidegger: Rethinking Environmental Theory and Practice", *Ethics & the Environment* 10.1 (2005) 67-87, Project Muse)//JRC—no change

Machination is unconditional controllability, the domination of all beings, the world, and earth through calculation, acceleration, technicity, and giganticism. Calculation represents a reduction of knowing to mathematics and science and a reduction of the world and earth to what is calculable, a step taken decisively by Descartes (1999, 84–96). Machination is the "pattern of generally calculable explainability, by which everything draws nearer to everything else equally and becomes completely alien to itself" (1999, 92). The unrestrained domination of machination produces a totalizing worldview that enchants: "When machination finally dominates and permeates everything, then there are no longer any conditions by which still actually to detect the enchantment and to protect oneself from it. The bewitchment by technicity and its constantly self-surpassing progress are only one sign of this enchantment, by [End Page 75] virtue of which everything presses forth into calculation, usage, breeding, manageability, and regulation" (1999, 86–87). Heidegger prophetically predicts that machination will produce "a gigantic progress of sciences in the future. These advancements will bring exploitation and usage of the earth as well as rearing and training of humans into conditions that are still inconceivable today" (1999, 108). Animals and plants are reduced to various forms of use value and, more significantly, are banished from Being-in-the-world with us: "What is a plant and an animal to us anymore, when we take away use, embellishment, and entertainment" (1999, 194). "Nature" suffers a similar fate: "What happens to nature in technicity, when nature is separated out from beings by the natural sciences? The growing—or better, the simple rolling unto its end—destruction of 'nature'.... And finally what was left was only 'scenery' and recreational opportunity and even this still calculated into the gigantic and arranged for the masses" (1999, 195). Under the unrestrained domination of machination, humans suffer a "hollowing out" (1999, 91, 348) and Being-in-the-world is replaced by "adventures." (I am here translating Erlebnis as adventure. Others translate it as lived-experience.)

Links – Technology

Failing to recognize technology's ambiguity results in an ethical crisis that strips of ontology

Hodge, 95- Professor of Philosophy at Manchester Metropolitan University (Joanna Hodge, *Heidegger and Ethics*, 1995, pg. 49)

The essence of technology is thus ambiguous, in ways which connect to an ambiguity diagnosed by Heidegger as central to philosophical enquiry. The claim about the ambiguity of technology runs: 'The essence of technology is in an elevated sense ambiguous. Such ambiguity points to the mystery of all revelation: i.e. of truth' (QT: 33). In 'The question of technology', Heidegger discusses the oddness of there being so little reflection on the impact of the spread of technical relations in our world. This failure to reflect marks an ethical crisis, which Heidegger, as a result of his preoccupation with reading and transmitting the philosophical tradition, cannot identify as such. What Heidegger calls the end of philosophy in the completion of metaphysics is here interpreted as the emergence of an ethical challenge to the domination of philosophy by metaphysical concerns, which presume that specifying the nature of entities is the primary aim of philosophical enquiry. This challenge prompts a recognition of the priority of a question about the location from which that specification takes place. Instead of Heidegger's emphasis on a cumulative but illogical development, in which even the traces of a history of being disappear, the lectures in *The Principle of Reason* can be read as locating a tension between that emphasis and an attempt to identify the consequences for the essence of what it is to be human resulting from this disappearance and the consequent uninhibited spread of technical relations in our world. One such consequence is that it becomes unclear what the essence of human beings is.

Links – Technology (Second Nature)

Engagement in the technological age aims to “take-control-of-one’s-self” by controlling the densest and most occluded aspects of nature and human life creating the a ‘second nature’ that autonomously dominates first nature- This coming new age will supplant the technological age and result in catastrophe more dangerous than pollution or nuclear war

Zizek ‘8 – Lady killing suave machine

(“In defense of lost causes” p.434-437)//Collin //JRC

Is this not, more than ever, our reality today? Ericsson phones are no longer, Swedish, Toyota cars are manufactured 60 percent, in the USA, Hollywood culture pervades the remotest parts of the globe ... Furthermore, does the same not, go also for all forms of ethnic and sexual identity? Should we not supplement Marx's description in this sense, adding: that also sexual one sidedness and narrow-mindedness becomes more and more impossible," that concerning sexual practices, it also true that" all that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned," so that capitalism tends to replace standard normative heterosexuality with a proliferation of unstable shifting identities and/or orientations? And today, with the latest biogenetic developments, we are entering a new phase in which it is simply Nature itself which melts into air: the main consequence of the scientific breakthroughs in biogenetics is the end of nature. Once we know the rules of its construction, natural organisms are transformed into objects amenable to manipulation, Nature, human and inhuman, is thus "desubstantialized," deprived of its impenetrable density, of what Heidegger called "earth." This compels us to give a new twist to Freud's title *Unbehagen in der Kultur* ~ discontent, uneasiness, in culture.¹⁹ With the latest developments, the discontent shifts from culture to nature itself: nature is no longer "natural," the reliable "dense" background of our lives; it now appears as a fragile mechanism, which, at any point can explode in a catastrophic manner. Biogenetics, with its reduction of the human psyche itself to an object of technological manipulation, is therefore effectively a kind of empirical instantiation of what Heidegger perceived as the "danger" inherent in modern technology. Crucial here is the interdependence of man and nature: by reducing man to just another natural object whose properties can be manipulated, what we lose is not (only) humanity but nature itself. In this sense, Francis Fukuyama is right: humanity relies on some notion of "human nature" as what we have inherited, as something that has simply been given to us, the impenetrable dimension in/of ourselves into which we are born/thrown. The paradox is thus that there is man only insofar as there is impenetrable inhuman nature (Heidegger's "earth"): with the prospect of biogenetic interventions opened up by the access to the genome, the species freely changes/redefines itself its Own coordinates; this prospect effectively emancipates humankind from the constraints of a finite species, from its enslavement to "selfish genes. This emancipation, however, comes at a price: With interventions into man's genetic inheritance, the domination over nature reverts into an act of taking-control-over-one's self, which changes our generic-ethical self-understanding and can disturb the necessary conditions for an autonomous way of life and universalistic understanding of morals. How, then, should we react to this threat? Habermas's logic is here: since the results of science pose a threat to our (predominant notion of) autonomy and freedom, one should curtail science. The price we pay for this solution is the fetishistic split between science and ethics _ "I know very well what science claims, but, nonetheless, in order to retain (the appearance of) my autonomy, I choose to ignore it and act as if I don't know it." This prevents us from confronting the true question: how do these new condition compel us to transform and reinvent the very notions of freedom, autonomy, and ethical responsibility Science and technology today no longer aim only at understanding and reproducing natural processes, but at generating new forms of life that will surprise us; the goal is no longer just to dominate nature (the way it is), but to generate something new, greater, stronger than ordinary nature, including ourselves-exemplary here is the obsession with artificial intelligence, which aims at producing a brain more powerful than the human brain. The dream that sustains the scientific-technological endeavor is to trigger a process with no return, a process that would exponentially reproduce itself and go on and on autonomously. The notion of "second nature" is therefore today more pertinent than ever, in both its main meanings. First, literally, as the artificially generated new nature: monsters of nature, deformed cows and trees, or-a more positive dream-genetically manipulated organisms, "enhanced" in the manner that suits us then, "second nature" in the more standard sense of the autonomization of the results of our own activity: the way our acts elude us in their consequences, the way they generate a monster with a life of its own. It is thru horror at the unforeseen results of our own acts that causes shock and awe, not the power of nature over which we have no control; it is thru horror that religion tries to domesticate. What is new today is the short-circuit between these two senses of "second nature": "second nature" in the sense of objective Fate, of autonomized social process, is generating "second nature" in the sense of artificially created nature, of natural monsters, namely, the process which threatens to run out of control is no longer just the social process of economic and political development, but new forms of natural processes themselves, from unpredictable nuclear catastrophes to global warming and the unimaginable consequences of biogenetic manipulation. Can one even imagine what would be the unprecedented result of

Links – Technology (Second Nature)

nanotechnological experiments: new life-forms reproducing themselves out of control in a cancer-like way, for example ?21 Here is a standard description of this fear:
Within fifty to a hundred years, a new class of organisms is likely to emerge. These organisms will be artificial in the sense that they will originally be designed by humans. However, they will reproduce, and will "evolve" into something other than their original form; they will be "alive" under any reasonable definition of the word. [...] [The pace of evolutionary change will be extremely rapid. [...] The impact on humanity and the biosphere could be enormous, larger than the industrial revolution, nuclear weapons, or environmental pollution.2~,

Links – Economy

The Affirmative's use of the technological mindset as a tool to green the earth, creates a nihilistic world of production for the sake of production, which divorces the meaning of being

de Beistegui, 97 – Professor of Philosophy at the University of Warwick (Miguel, Heidegger and the Political, ed. by K. Ansell-Pearson and S. Critchely, p.71, ASG)JRC

What monstrousness does Heidegger have in mind here? In what sense can technology be declared “monstrous”? And why associate technology with nihilism? At this stage, nihilism can only be envisaged in the most simple sense, and that is as a phenomenon linked to the effects produced by global technology. Following Junger’s descriptions of the age of the Worker, Heidegger provides his most economic description of the actuality of nihilism in section XXVI of “Overcoming Metaphysics.” Technology defines the way in which the “world,” perceived solely as extended space, is mobilized, ordered, homogenized and used up so as to enhance man’s will to hegemony. The ordering takes the form of a total planning or an equipping (*Ruhestung*), which consists in the division of the whole of being into sectors and areas, and then in the systematic organization and exploitation of such areas. Thus, each domain has its institute of research as well as its ministry, each area is controlled and evaluated with a view to assessing its potential and eventually calibrated for mass consumption. Resources are endlessly extracted, stocked, distributed and transformed, according to a logic which is not that of need, but that of inflated desires and consumption fantasies artificially created by the techniques of our post-industrial era. Beings as a whole have become this “stuff” awaiting consumption. Nothing falls outside of this technological organization: neither politics, which has become the way to organize and optimize the technological seizure of beings at the level of the nation; nor science which, infinitely divided into ultra-specialized sub-sciences, rules over the technical aspect of this seizure, nor the arts (which are now referred to as the “culture industry”); nor even man as such, who has become a commodity and an object of highly sophisticated technological manipulation (whether genetic, cosmetic or cybernetic). The hegemony of technology, which can take various forms according to the domains of being it rules over, seems to be limited only by the power of its own completion. It is, for technology, a question of organizing the conditions of its optimal performance and ultimate plan—whether these be the totalitarian or imperialistic politics of yesterday, the global economics and the new world order of today, or the uniformalized culture and ideology of tomorrow. Yet behind this seemingly ultra-rational organization rules the most nihilistic of all goals: the absence of goals. For why is such an ordering set up? What are all those plans for? For the sole sake of planning. For no other purpose than the artificial creation of needs and desires, which can be fulfilled only by way of an increase in production and further devastation of the earth. Under the sway of technology, man—the man of metaphysics, the rational animal—has become the working animal. For such a man, there is no other truth than the one that produces results, no other reality than that of use and profit. His will, this very will that constitutes his pride and that he erects as an instrument of his domination over the whole of the earth, is nothing but the expression of the will to will. Yet what this man does not realize is that his labor and his will spin in a vacuum, moving him ever more forcefully away from his provenance and his destination, from his position amidst beings and from the relation to being that governs it. Busy as he is at using up and producing, at manipulating and consuming, today’s man no longer has the eyes to see what is essential (namely presence in its epochal configuration) and can no longer greet the discrete echo of presencing which resounds in thinking and poeticizing alone. At best is he in a position to accumulate “experiences” (*Erlebnisse*), which he flaunts as his “truths.”

Links – Economy

Market places have become the new techno war zone where casualties are discarded and rendered expendable

de Beistegui, 97 – Professor of Philosophy at the University of Warwick (Miguel, Heidegger and the Political, ed. by K. Ansell-Pearson and S. Critchely, p.71, ASG)JRC

From the perspective of the essential configuration of the modern age, the Second World War must be seen as the continuation and the confirmation of the total mobilization already operative in the First World War. Yet the planetary conflict from the heart of which Heidegger addressed his students eventually marked the last stage in the development of man's power over the earth. For if that conflict was eventually brought to an end, it was only by way of an escalation in the means of mass destruction as well as by the threat of the complete annihilation of an entire nation, if not of the planet as a whole. Is it not a symptom of our epoch that only the actual possibility of a catastrophe of world magnitude could bring the most deadly of wars to its end? Yet the "peace" that followed from the death of hundreds of thousands in Hiroshima and Nagasaki did not bring the fury of might to an end. That peace was and still is the confirmation of the total mobilization that characterizes our epoch. Brought to its knees by power, Japan has become the very emblem of power, of this kind of power consisting of a meticulous organization and a military discipline, of an optimization of its resources and of an exemplary treatment of planetary information. The distinction between war and peace has become increasingly difficult to draw. War seems to be carried out as much if not more on the economic terrain as it is on battle-fields. The fiercest battles are now being fought on the "markets": the labor market, the securities market, the real-estate market, the culture market. The whole of reality has become a market, saturated to the point of having to invent and simulate for itself an alternate space, the space of virtuality. The voices of technology—in this case of Capital—are impenetrable. Europe itself has become a Common Market, the market of the smallest common denominator of exchange. The "shares" of such markets are being fought for, much in the same way in which nations used to fight (and still do) for territories. One has become entitled to wonder whether the *Führer* are indeed those whom we continue to label as such, or whether they are now only left with the menial task of managing and orchestrating the ordering, the bringing to heel and the empowering of all the sectors of being. And let us not be fooled into thinking that such wars do not bring their share of victims—victims who do not necessarily die, but who find themselves condemned to survive on the periphery of these planetary phenomena, cast out into the sombre zones of para-techno-capitalism.

Links – Technological Thought/Environment

Attempts to manage environmental catastrophe lock us into a calculative mindset that perpetuate the root cause of your impacts

McWhorter, 92 – Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Northeast Missouri State University
(Ladelle, Heidegger and the Earth, ed. by Ladelle McWhorter)/JRC

<Thinking ecologically - that is, thinking the earth in our time means thinking death; it means thinking catastrophe; it means thinking the possibility of utter annihilation not just for human being but for all that lives on this planet and for the living planet itself. Thinking the earth in our time means thinking what presents itself as that which must not be allowed to go on, as that which must be controlled, as that which must be stopped. Such thinking seems to call for immediate action. There is no time to lose. We must work for change, seek solutions, curb appetites, reduce expectations, find cures now, before the problems become greater than anyone's ability to solve them - if they have not already done so. However, in the midst of this urgency, thinking ecologically, thinking Heideggerly, means rethinking the very notion of human action. It means placing in question our typical Western managerial approach to problems, our propensity for technological intervention, our belief in human cognitive power, our commitment to a metaphysics that places active human being over against passive nature. For it is the thoughtless deployment of these approaches and notions that has brought us to the point of ecological catastrophe in the first place. Thinking with Heidegger, thinking Heideggerly and ecologically, means, paradoxically, acting to place in question the acting subject, willing a displacing of our will to action; it means calling ourselves as selves to rethink our very selves, insofar as selfhood in the West is constituted as agent, as actor, as controlling ego, as knowing consciousness. Heidegger's work calls us not to rush in with quick solutions, not to act decisively to put an end to deliberation, but rather to think, to tarry with thinking unfolding itself, to release ourselves to thinking without provision or predetermined aim.>

The aff's engagement in technological thought and mandating the order of natural resources culminates in stripping of the need/desire to help others and culminates in the technological understanding of being

Dreyfus, 93 – Professor of Philosophy at the University of California at Berkeley
(Charles B., "Heidegger on the connection between nihilism, art, technology, and politics" – chapter of "The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger," ed. By Charles B. Guignon, p. 306)JRC

In this technological perspective, ultimate goals like serving God, society, our fellows or even ourselves no longer make sense to us. Human beings, on this view, become a resource to be used-but more important, to be enhanced-like any other: "Man, who no longer conceals his character of being the most important raw material, is also drawn into this process" (EP 104; VA 90). In the film 2001, the robot HAL, when asked if he is happy on the mission, says: "I'm using all my capacities to the maximum. What more could a rational entity want?" This is a brilliant expression of what anyone would say who is in touch with our current understanding of being. We peruse the development of our potential simply of the sake of further growth. We have no specific goals. **The human potential movement perfectly expresses this technological understanding of being, as does the attempt to better organize the future use of our natural resources.** We thus become part of a system that no one directs but that moves toward the total mobilization and enhancement of all beings, even us. This is why Heidegger thinks the perfectly ordered society dedicated to the welfare of all is not the solution to our problem but the culmination of the technological understanding of being.

Links – Environment (Turns Case)

Fear of environmental catastrophe separates our relationship from the earth, turns the case

McWhorter, 92 – Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Northeast Missouri State University
(Ladelle, Heidegger and the Earth, ed. by Ladelle McWhorter)JRC—no change

<Gail Stenstad's essay, "Singing the Earth," takes us further along two of the paths that Malv's thinking indicates: earth as dark (the self-concealing that is both sheltering and frightening) and our longing to be with the earth. She suggests that it is our be-longing to the earth that is at stake. If, when we fear the dark, our desire or longing moves away from what IS earthy, we live disconnected from the earth, with disastrous consequences.

However, if we allow ourselves to be moved by and with the revealing and concealing of earth and earthy things, our longing is also our be-longing. This be-longing will play itself out in, as Heidegger's thinking hints, our language (not just words but also: song, dance, art, buildings, ritual) and our ways of dwelling. "" >

Links – Energy Technology

The act of extracting and storing the earth's energy renders the world in standing reserve leading to inevitable violence and exploitation

Beckman - Emeritus Professor of Philosophy Humanities and Social Sciences Harvey Mudd College - 00 (Tad, "Martin Heidegger and Environmental Ethics," 2000, <http://www2.hmc.edu/~tbeckman/personal/Heidart.html>) //JRC

Both paths of interpretation lead to the same thing. "Technology [in its essence] is a mode of revealing. Technology comes to presence [West] in the realm where revealing and unconcealment take place, where aletheia, truth, happens." {[7], p. 13} (4) What Heidegger wanted us to recognize by bringing technology to the concept of revealing is that technology's essence is to be found in the most basic realm of experience. That realm is the realm of "truths happening." It could be argued, of course, that all of this analysis takes ancient Greece as its focal point and that modern technology has little or nothing to do with ancient Greece. This is true, of course, in the sense that technology has obviously developed far beyond its origins in Greece; however, it is also misguided if it tries to convince us that technology's essence has been fundamentally changed. Heidegger's point is precisely the assertion that the basic essence of technology has remained unchanged and that this essence is most readily observed in the Greek origins of our thinking about these things. The problem remaining, then, is to understand how modern technology has evolved within this essential nature as a mode of revealing. We have arrived at the opening of the essence of modern technology. Technology is a mode of the fundamental way in which things happen in the universe and we, as agents, are involved in this happening within the cooperative elements of causation. But technology has evolved through the intervening three millennia; what was previously called 'techne' and was a form of the general process of bringing-forth has separated into different modes of revealing. What we understand as modern technology can scarcely be recognized as having a common origin with the fine arts or crafts; indeed, modern technology is distinguished in having made its "alliance" with modern physical science rather than with the arts and crafts. (5) Therefore, to understand technology as it is today and in its complete essence, we must understand the course of that separate and unique evolution.

Perhaps it is not difficult to understand the separate paths of the fine arts, craftsmanship, and modern technology. Each seems to have followed different human intentions and to have addressed different human skills. However, while the fine arts and craftsmanship remained relatively consistent with techne in the ancient sense, modern technology withdrew in a radically different direction. As Heidegger saw it, "the revealing that rules in modern technology is a challenging [Herausfordern], which puts to nature the unreasonable demand that it supply energy that can be extracted and stored as such." {[7], p. 14} Modern technology sets-upon nature and challenges-forth its energies, in contrast to techne which was always a bringing-forth in harmony with nature. The activity of modern technology lies at a different and more advanced level wherein the natural is not merely decisively re-directed; nature is actually "set-upon." The rhetoric in which the discussion is couched conveys an atmosphere of violence and exploitation. (6)

Links – Energy Technology

The rhetoric of alternative energy furthers a purely technological understanding of being – everything in our surroundings, every part of nature, is something to be exploited and violently controlled.

Beckman - Emeritus Professor of Philosophy Humanities and Social Sciences Harvey Mudd College - 00 (Tad, "Martin Heidegger and Environmental Ethics," 2000, <http://www2.hmc.edu/~tbeckman/personal/Heidart.html>) //JRC

Perhaps it is not difficult to understand the separate paths of the fine arts, craftsmanship, and modern technology. Each seems to have followed different human intentions and to have addressed different human skills. However, while the fine arts and craftsmanship remained relatively consistent with *techne* in the ancient sense, modern technology withdrew in a radically different direction. As Heidegger saw it, "the revealing that rules in modern technology is a challenging [Herausfordern], which puts to nature the unreasonable demand that it supply energy that can be extracted and stored as such." {[7], p. 14} Modern technology sets-upon nature and challenges-forth its energies, in contrast to *techne* which was always a bringing-forth in harmony with nature. The activity of modern technology lies at a different and more advanced level wherein the natural is not merely decisively re-directed; nature is actually "set-upon." The rhetoric in which the discussion is couched conveys an atmosphere of violence and exploitation. (6)

To uncover the essence of modern technology is to discover why technology stands today as the danger. To accomplish this insight, we must understand why modern technology must be viewed as a "challenging-forth," what affect this has on our relationship with nature, and how this relationship affects us. Is there really a difference? Has technology really left the domain of *techne* in a significant way? In modern technology, has human agency withdrawn in some way beyond involvement and, instead, acquired an attitude of violence with respect to the other causal factors?

Heidegger clearly saw the development of "energy resources" as symbolic of this evolutionary path; while the transformation into modern technology undoubtedly began early, the first definitive signs of its new character began with the harnessing of energy resources, as we would say. (7) As a representative of the old technology, the windmill took energy from the wind but converted it immediately into other manifestations such as the grinding of grain; the windmill did not unlock energy from the wind in order to store it for later arbitrary distribution. Modern wind-generators, on the other hand, convert the energy of wind into electrical power which can be stored in batteries or otherwise. The significance of storage is that it places the energy at our disposal; and because of this storage the powers of nature can be turned back upon itself. The storing of energy is, in this sense, the symbol of our over-coming of nature as a potent object. "...a tract of land is challenged into the putting out of coal and ore. The earth now reveals itself as a coal mining district, the soil as a mineral deposit." {[7], p. 14} This and other examples that Heidegger used throughout this essay illustrate the difference between a technology that diverts the natural course cooperatively and modern technology that achieves the unnatural by force. Not only is this achieved by force but it is achieved by placing nature in our subjective context, setting aside natural processes entirely, and conceiving of all revealing as being relevant only to human subjective needs.

The essence of technology originally was a revealing of life and nature in which human intervention deflected the natural course while still regarding nature as the teacher and, for that matter, the keeper. The essence of modern technology is a revealing of phenomena, often far removed from anything that resembles "life and nature," in which human intrusion not only diverts nature but fundamentally changes it. As a mode of revealing, technology today is a challenging-forth of nature so that the technologically altered nature of things is always a situation in which nature and objects wait, standing in reserve for our use. We pump crude oil from the ground and we ship it to refineries where it is fractionally distilled into volatile substances and we ship these to gas stations around the world where they reside in huge underground tanks, standing ready to power our automobiles or airplanes. Technology has intruded upon nature in a far more active mode that represents a consistent direction of domination. Everything is viewed as "standing-reserve" and, in that, loses its natural objective identity. The river, for instance, is not seen as a river; it is seen as a source of hydro-electric power, as a water supply, or as an avenue of navigation through which to contact inland markets. In the era of *techne* humans were relationally involved with other objects in the coming to presence; in the era of modern technology, humans challenge-forth the subjectively valued elements of the universe so that, within this new form of revealing, objects lose their significance to anything but their subjective status of standing-ready for human design. (8)

Links – Energy Technology

Enframing the environment as an object of human construct causes humanity itself to become a standing-reserve

DeLuca '5 (Kevin Michael DeLuca, Associate Professor of Speech Communication and adjunct in the Institute of Ecology at the University of Georgia, "Thinking With Heidegger: Rethinking Environmental Theory and Practice", *Ethics & the Environment* 10.1 (2005) 67-87, Project Muse)

The practice of enframing also has deleterious effects on humanity. In connection with erasure, it blinkers humanity's vision of the earth. "Thus when man, investigating, observing, pursues nature as an area of his own conceiving, he has already been claimed by a way of revealing that challenges him to approach nature as an object of research, until even the object disappears into the objectlessness of standing-reserve" (1993, 324). Further, enframing reduces humanity itself as the orderer of the standing-reserve:
As soon as what is unconcealed no longer concerns man even as object, but exclusively as standing-reserve, and man in the midst of objectlessness is nothing but the orderer of the standing-reserve, then he comes to the very brink of a precipitous fall; that is, he comes to the point where he himself will have to be taken as standing-reserve. Meanwhile, man, precisely as the one so threatened, exalts himself and postures as lord of the earth. In this way the illusion comes to prevail that everything man encounters exists only insofar as it is his construct. This illusion gives rise in turn to one final delusion: it seems as though man everywhere and always encounters only himself. (1993, 332) The ensuing decades have elaborated on Heidegger's insight. The worst tendencies in postmodern theory can be read as illustrating the illusion that everything humanity encounters exists only insofar as it is a human construct. More significant is how this conceit of humanity as lord of the earth manifests itself in environmental discourses, so, in a common example, humans need to save the rainforests because unknown cures for human diseases may be found in them. How this dangerous dynamic reduces humans to standing-reserve plays itself out in the example of the forester: The forester who measures the felled timber in the woods and who to all appearances walks the forest path in the same way his grandfather did is today ordered by the industry that produces commercial woods, [End Page 80]whether he knows it or not. He is made subordinate to the orderability of cellulose, which for its part is challenged forth by the need for paper, which is then delivered to newspapers and illustrated magazines. The latter, in their turn, set public opinion to swallowing what is printed, so that a set configuration of opinion becomes available on demand. (1993, 323)

Using nature as a resource to harvest energy reduces it to a manipulable standing reserve

Rigby '4 (Kate Rigby, Senior Lecturer in German Studies and Comparative Literature and Director of the Centre for Comparative Literature and Cultural Studies at Monash University, "Earth, World, Text: On the (Im)possibility of Ecopoiesis", *New Literary History* 35.3 (2004) 427-442, Project Muse)

Techne, it should be emphasized, is for Heidegger not in itself a bad thing. Following Aristotle, he considers techne to be not so much a strategy for manipulating matter, but rather a mode of bringing forth, revealing a potential that hitherto lay concealed in the material being worked. In this sense it is itself poietic—and as old as humanity (indeed, I would add, considerably older, for we are far from being the only [End Page 428] species with a knack for making things). With the rise of modern science and technology, however, a new form of techne had, in Heidegger's view, come into being: one which does not so much reveal as "challenge" that upon which it works. Modern technology challenges nature by putting to it "the unreasonable demand that it supply energy which can be extracted and stored as such."⁹ Heidegger's famous example of this process is the hydroelectrical power plant on the Rhine. The power plant "sets upon" the river to set its turbines moving in order to produce energy, which will then be dispatched to power further forms of challenging activities. "In the context of the interlocking processes pertaining to the orderly disposition of electrical energy," Heidegger concludes, "even the Rhine itself appears as something at our command" (etwas Bestelltes). As such it has been reduced to "standing reserve," a forestry term, which construes the forest as so much wood waiting to be extracted, utterly available and infinitely manipulable. Power plants, moreover, are not the only things that ply the Rhine in this way: the river is still no more than standing reserve when construed as "an object on call for inspection by a tour group ordered there by the vacation industry."¹⁰ It is in its demand that natural entities be totally present, perpetually available as objects of knowledge and power, that modern technology is said by Heidegger to complete the project of Western metaphysics

Links – Energy Technology (Storage)

The extraction and storage of energy reduces it to a standing-reserve that has no value

DeLuca '05 (Kevin Michael DeLuca, Associate Professor of Speech Communication and adjunct in the Institute of Ecology at the University of Georgia, "Thinking With Heidegger: Rethinking Environmental Theory and Practice", *Ethics & the Environment* 10.1 (2005) 67-87, Project Muse)/JRC

Avoiding the romanticism of a return to the Pleistocene or the utopianism of embracing a Star Trek futurism, from a Heideggerian perspective the question becomes, "What sort of revealing does a particular regime of technology make possible?" More prosaically, what sort of relationships [End Page 78]to the earth and world does a technology enable? To this question, Heidegger provides a stinging critique of modern technology [albeit, admittedly, tempered by an ontological hope (see 1993, 333–41)]. The way of revealing of modern technology is Gestell or enframing: "The revealing that rules throughout modern technology has the character of a setting-upon, in the sense of a challenging-forth. . . . a challenging, which puts to nature the unreasonable demand that it supply energy which can be extracted and stored as such" (1993, 321, 320). Nature, then, is reduced to a "standing-reserve... a calculable coherence of forces" (1993, 322, 326). 6 so that "nature reports itself in some way or other that is identifiable through calculation and that it remains orderable as a system of information" (1993, 328). 7 Heidegger gives examples from the fields of agriculture and energy that ring even more true today (see 1993, 320–21).

The will to power treats the environment as a stockpile of resources for people to take advantage of.

Rohkrämer, '05 – History and Philosophy professor at Lancaster University (Thomas, *How Green Were the Nazis: Martin Heidegger, National Socialism, and Environmentalism*, p. 181)

Heidegger's most comprehensive criticism, however, expressed most sharply in the Nietzsche lectures from 1936 to 1940, was his analysis of the will to power. Especially in the later lectures, Nietzsche was presented as the Nazi philosopher and the will to power as the core of the Third Reich. For Heidegger, the will to shape the world according to the human will gradually became the most dangerous aberration: it was hubris to believe that humans could perfect the world, and this hubris led to a belief that regarded everything as a resource for the will. Humans became blind to the intrinsic value of things because they could only see them as means to an end. The world, including fellow human beings and even one's own self, became nothing but raw material for the endless ambition of their nihilistic will.

Links – Efficiency Movements

Modern efficiency movements are the worst application of technological development and lead us to view Nature solely as standard reserve- we must incorporate the fourfold

Zizek '8 – Lady killing suave machine

("In defense of lost causes" p.448-449)//Collin//jrc

The insufficiency of this reasoning is double. First, as Heidegger would have put it, the survival of the being-human of humans cannot depend on an ontic decision of humans. Even if we try to define the limit of the permissible in this way, the true catastrophe has already taken place: we already experience ourselves as in principle manipulable; we just freely renounce the possibility of fully deploying this potential. "In the technological age, what matters to us most is getting the 'greatest possible use' out of everything.,⁴⁶ Does this not throw a new light on how ecological concerns, at least in their predominant mode, remain within the horizon of technology? Is the point of using the resources sparingly, of recycling, and so forth, not precisely to maximize the use of everything? But the crucial point is that, with biogenetic planning, not only will our universe of meaning disappear-in other words, not only are the utopian descriptions of the digital paradise wrong, since they imply that meaning will persist - but the opposite, negative, critical descriptions of the "meaningless" universe of technological self-manipulation also fall victim to a perspectival fallacy, for they too measure the future by inadequate present-day standards. That is to say, the future of technological self-manipulation only appears as "deprived of meaning" if measured by (or, rather, from within the horizon of) the traditional notion of what a meaningful universe is. Who knows what this "post-human" universe will reveal itself to be "in itself"? What if there is no singular and simple answer; what if the contemporary trends (digitalization, biogenetic self-manipulation) open themselves up to a multitude of possible symbolizations? What if the utopia-the perverted dream of the passage from hardware to software of a subjectivity freely floating between different embodiments-and the dystopia-the nightmare of humans voluntarily transforming themselves into programmed beings-are just the positive and the negative sides of the same ideological fantasy? What if it is only and precisely this technological prospect that fully confronts us with the most radical dimension of our finitude? Heidegger himself remains ambiguous here. It is true that Heidegger's answer to technology is not nostalgic longing for "former objects which perhaps were once on the way to becoming things and even to actually presencing as things" ("The Thing"), but rather allowing ourselves to be conditioned by our world, and then learning to "keep the fourfold in things" by building and nurturing things peculiarly suited to our fourfold. When our practices incorporate the fourfold, our lives and everything around us will have importance far exceeding that of resources, because they and only they will be geared to our way of inhabiting the world.⁴⁸

Links – Nuclear Power

Nuclear power engages in calculative thought kills value to life – turns nature and humanity into standing reserve

McWhorter, 92 – Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Northeast Missouri State University
(Ladelle, Heidegger and the Earth, ed. by Ladelle McWhorter)/JRC

<The danger of a managerial approach to the world lies not, then, in what it knows - not in its penetration into the secrets of galactic emergence or nuclear fission - but in what it forgets, what it itself conceals. It forgets that any other truths are possible, and it forgets that the belonging together of revealing with concealing is forever beyond the power of human management. We can never have, or know, it all: we can never manage everything.

What is now especially dangerous about this sense of our own managerial power, born of forgetfulness, is that it results in our viewing the world as mere resources to be stored or consumed. Managerial or technological thinkers, Heidegger says, view the earth, the world, all things as mere Bestand, standing-reserve.

All is here simply for human use. No plant, no animal, no ecosystem has a life of its own, has any significance, apart from human desire and need. Nothing, we say, other than human beings, has any intrinsic value. All things are instruments for the working out of human will. Whether we believe that God gave Man dominion or simply that human might (sometimes called intelligence or rationality) in the face of ecological fragility makes us always right, we managerial, technological thinkers tend to believe that the earth is only a stockpile or a set of commodities to be managed, bought, and sold. The forest is timber; the river, a power source. Even people have become resources, human resources, personnel to be managed, or populations to be controlled. >

Nuclear science objectifies nature- objects cease to occur in the world and become meaningless

Hodge 95 (Joanna Hodge, Professor of Philosophy at Manchester Metropolitan University, *Heidegger and Ethics*, 1995, pg. 62)

The nuclear age is special as a planetary epoch of human beings in so far as the power of this enormously powerful principle, the principle of the giveability of reasons (principium reddendae rationis) develops, indeed is let loose in an unsettling [unheimliche] manner in the domain which provides measure for the determinate existence of human beings [des Daseins des Menschen]. He goes on: It is to be thought in word and matter that the unique letting loose of the claim of presenting and providing reasons threatens everything which is settled [alles Heimische] for human beings and robs them of every ground and basis for having a sense of groundedness, robs them of that from which for a long time has grown every great epoch of humanity, every intellectual activity, opening up of worlds, every stamping of a human image [Menschengestalt]. (SG: 60) He then remarks how few people seem to be aware of this as an issue, and here recurs the theme that the most obvious is the least thought about, raised, as noted, in the first lecture in relation to the principle of sufficient reason itself, but also applicable here in the context of the naming of the current historical epoch. In conclusion to this lecture he says: 'It is important to notice in what region we find ourselves, when we think about the principle of sufficient reason reflectively' (SG: 61). With this clue, Heidegger proceeds in the next lecture to consider the effect of this principle on conceptions of objectivity. He makes connections between atomic energy, nuclear science and a particular kind of objectivity in the following way: 'The reason whose production is required accomplishes at the same time what it is to be adequate as a ground, that is to suffice as fully given. For what? In order to place an object firmly in its place' (SG: 64). Heidegger goes on to point out that in fact in nuclear physics there are no objects any more, at least in the Newtonian sense: 'Rigorously thinking, we cannot really any more, as will be shown, speak of objects. We already move in a world, if we look carefully, in which objects, as things which stand over against, no longer occur.' He suggests that there is a connection here to the non-representational character of modern art.

Links – Nuclear Power/Storage

The Storage Logic is the worst form of modern technique manifesting itself in discourses of the environment in order to place Nature in the Standing reserve, Only taking a step back from the development of Modern Technique can avoid total annihilation. Roddey, '2 – Engineering Programs Manager at the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
(Martin Heidegger: “technique and the turn”) // CP

2. What bothers the author about the world's status quo?

Heidegger is concerned with a number of things. First, he is bothered by modern man's universal campaign aimed at “unconcealment” by means of modern technique. Heidegger distinguishes two ways of modern unconcealment, (a) through dissection of things [see “The Thing”], and (b) through putting the actual (i.e., things) in standing-reserve (Bestand) [431]. Putting things into storage/standing-reserve, Heidegger says, is the essence of modern technique [ibid.].

It does not appear that the actual unconcealing causes Heidegger concern – after all, he considers unconcealment of what lies concealed to belong to man's essence. However, Heidegger rejects the modern way of unconcealment through scientific methods such as reductionism and searching for causalities. He states, “In whatever way the destiny of unconcealment may sway, the unconcealedness in which all that is shows itself at any time, harbors .. the peril that man goes astray in the unconcealed and misunderstands it.” [433] In an aim to find the answers to all of his questions, man according to Heidegger is at peril: “The destiny of unconcealment is in itself not some one peril, but the peril.” [434]

The great peril is that modern technique (e.g., nuclear power plant), unlike ancient technique (windmill), puts “to nature the demand to deliver energy that can be furthered [extracted] and stored up [as Bestand].” [422] Heidegger writes, “When man, inquiring and observing, sets out after .. nature as a domain of his representing .., then he is already claimed by a way of unconcealing that summons him to approach nature as an object ... for research, until even the object ... vanishes into the objectlessness ... of Bestand.” [426] Modern technique, Heidegger concludes, “is no mere human doing” [427] – it is a dangerous summoning of nature, an actual extortion of energy, which may culminate in nature's – and thus man's – total annihilation.

Second, in the search for causes, not only are the essences of things lost, but also man loses his understanding of his relationship to God. God becomes a mere cause: “Thus when all that is present exposes itself ... in the light of the cause-effect nexus, even God can, for the representation .. of all things holy and exalted, lose the mysteriousness of his distance.” [434]

Third, man becomes alienated because he loses his understanding of his own being in technique and, in the extreme, sees himself as God. Heidegger writes, “...man goes to the outermost edge of the precipice, namely where he himself is to be taken as only still Bestand. Meanwhile precisely the man who is so threatened props himself up in the Gestalt [appearance, form] of lord of the earth. Thus, the semblance spreads that all one encounters, stands .. only insofar as it is a product of man's world.” Interestingly, this is the moral argument that political conservatives have recently used in opposing bioengineering and genomics regarding cloning and other moleculobiological research.

Last, man's reliance on modern technique yields him unable to find the truth he seeks. Heidegger expresses this view in the phrase “the essence of technique is nothing technical.” [414] By seeking to dissect and analyze things, we miss the thingness that makes the thing a thing; the thingness remains concealedness in “Bestand” (storage), and the truth is not revealed. “All that is only technical never reaches into the essence of technique. It cannot even once recognize its front-court.” [452]

Links – Wind Power

Wind Turbines are the worst manifestations of the device mentality

Brittain '2 – professor of philosophy

(Gordon G. Jr. , “Fitting Wind Power to landscape: a place-based wind turbine”)/CP

Borgmann's interpretation of technology and the character of contemporary life can be criticized in a number of ways. Still, the distinction between “things” and “devices” reveals, I think, the essence of our inability to develop a landscape aesthetic on which contemporary wind turbines are or might be beautiful and thereby explains the widespread resistance to placing them where they might be seen. The fact of the matter is that contemporary wind turbines are for most of us merely *devices*. There is therefore no way to go beyond or beneath their conventionally uncomfortable appearance to the discovery of a latent mechanical or organic or what-have-you beauty. The attempt to do so is blocked from the outset by the character of the machine. Think about it for a moment: Except for the blades, virtually everything is shielded, including the towers of many turbines, hidden from view behind the same sort of stainless steel that sheathes many electronic devices. Moreover, the machinery is located a great distance away from anyone, save the mechanic who must first don climbing gear to access it and often, for liability reasons, behind chain-link fences and locked gates. The lack of disclosure goes together with the fact that the turbines are merely producers of a commodity, electrical energy, and interchangeable in this respect with any other technology that produces the same commodity at least as cheaply and reliably. The only important differences between wind turbines and other energy generating technologies are not intrinsic to what might be called their “design philosophies.” That is, while they differ with respect to their inputs, their “fuels,” and with respect to their environmental impacts, the same sort of description can be given of each. There is, as a result, but a single standard on the basis of which wind turbines are to be evaluated—efficiency. It is not to be wondered that they are, with only small modifications among them, so uniform. In terms of this uniformity, wind turbines are very much unlike other architectural arrivals—for example, houses and traditional windmills. Different styles of architecture developed in different parts of the world in response to local geological and climatic conditions, to the availability of local materials, to the spiritual and philosophical patterns of the local culture. As a result, these buildings create a context. In Heidegger's wonderful, dark expression, these buildings “gather.” But there is nothing “local” or “gathering” about contemporary wind turbines. They are everywhere and anonymously the same, whether produced in Denmark or Japan, placed in India or Spain—alien objects impressed on a region and in no deeper way connected to it. They have nothing to say to us, nothing to express, no “inside.” They “conceal” rather than “reveal.” The sense of place that they might eventually engender cannot, therefore, be unique. In addition, wind turbines are quintessential “devices” in that they preclude engagement. Or rather, the only way in which the vast majority of people can engage with them is visually (and occasionally by ear). People cannot climb over and around them, they cannot get inside them, they cannot tinker with them. They cannot even get close to them. There is no larger and non-trivial physical or biological way in which they can be appropriated or their beauty grasped. The irony, of course, is that, precluded from any other sort of engagement with wind turbines, most people find them visually objectionable, though they might be willing to countenance their existence as the lesser of evils.

Links – Wind/Solar Power

Wind and Solar Power are Devices That Conceal The Process Of Depersonalizing Energy Harvesting Killing The Aesthetic Beauty of Nature.

Brittain '2 – professor of philosophy

(Gordon G. Jr. , “Fitting Wind Power to landscape: a place-based wind turbine”)/CP

The price of oil has more than doubled since 2000, yet there has been little public enthusiasm for the development of alternate forms of energy. In this respect, the situation is very different from that in the 1970s, when dramatic oil price increases were followed by government action to promote wind and solar power. Evidently, opposition to alternate forms of energy has, whatever the occasional poll to the contrary might show, grown. Much of this opposition is aesthetic in character. It is grounded in a rather sharp separation between nature and technology, and expressed in the thought that wind turbines and solar panels in the landscape are ugly. Wind turbines somehow do not “fit” in the landscape. From one point of view (classical), landscapes are beautiful to the extent that they are “scenic,” well-balanced compositions. But wind turbines introduce a discordant note; they are out of “scale.” From another point of view (ecological), landscapes are beautiful if their various elements form a stable and integrated organic whole. But wind turbines are difficult to integrate into the biotic community. At least in certain respects, they are like “weeds.” Moreover, there is a reason why the 100-meter, three-bladed wind turbines now favored by the industry cannot very well be accommodated to any landscape view. They are, as philosopher Albert Borgmann would argue, distanced “devices” for the production of a commodity rather than “things” with which one can engage. I argue here that the only way in which the aesthetic resistance to wind turbines can be overcome is to make them more “thing-like. In attempting to understand public antagonism to conventional wind turbines, we need to understand the character of contemporary technology. No one has done more to clarify it, in my view, than Borgmann (1984), who begins with a distinction between “devices” (those characteristic inventions of our age, among which the pocket calculator, the CD sound system, and the jet plane might be taken as exemplary) and what philosopher Martin Heidegger calls “things” (not only natural objects, but human artifacts such as the traditional windmills of Holland). The pattern of contemporary technology is the device paradigm, which is to say that technology has to do with “devices” as against “things.” Things “engage” us, an engagement which is at once bodily, social, and demands skill. A device, in contrast, disengages and disburdens us. It makes no demands on skill and, in this sense, is disburdening. Further, a device is defined in functional terms—it is anything that serves a certain human-determined function. In other words, a device is a means to procure some human end. Since the end may be obtained in a variety of ways (in other words, devices can be functionally equivalent), a device has no intrinsic features. But a device also “conceals” and, in the process, disengages. The way in which the device obtains its ends is literally hidden from view. The more advanced the device, the more hidden from view it is, sheathed in plastic, stainless steel, or titanium. Moreover, concealment and disburdening go hand in hand. The concealment of the machinery—the fact that it is distanced from us—insures that it makes no demands on our faculties. The device is socially disburdening as well in its isolation and impersonality.

Links – Hydropower

Hydropower essentializes the river into a standing reserve --- perpetuating the notion that the world is nothing more than a resource for humanity

Brassington, 7 ---- CSEP, School of Law, University of Manchester (Iain, On Heidegger, medicine, and the modernity of modern medical technology, Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy, 10, pg. 192-193)

Inasmuch as an item would not have brought itself into presence without human intervention, such a bringing forward is, in a sense, violent (biai) – but, of course, all bringing-forward – including truth, inasmuch as aletheia wrests from lethe – is violent anyway, and this is simply a bullet that we have to bite (and, appropriately, Heidegger does associate tekhnē with violence in the Introduction to Metaphysics (Heidegger, 2000, p. 160ff)). What is important is that Heidegger can claim that non-modern technology does not encroach on the world in the same manner as might modern technology, for it does not see the world as a mere standing-reserve from which it might manufacture things. Because pro-duction is not conceived metaphysically, enframing is not likely. The windmill certainly does capture the energy within the breeze, but the millwheels are responsive to the wind, revealing the wind as wind. The supply of energy to the watermill is, perhaps, more constant – however, it, too, is responsive to the world around it. This sort of **technology retains its essence** as bringing-forth in the sense of poiesis, inasmuch as it retains the essence of the wind or the river as wind or river and, in a sense, simply takes advantage of the abundant energy latent therein. This is what Heidegger is driving at in his idea that the water mill “preserves” the river. By contrast, the modern hydroelectric plant (or windfarm) does not respond to, but “challenges” the world around it; it transforms the essence of the river into a “standing-reserve”. The revealing that rules in modern technology is a challenging, which puts to nature the unreasonable demand that it supply energy which can be extracted and stored as such... [E]ven the Rhine itself appears to be something at our command. The hydro-electric plant is not built into the Rhine River as was the old wooden bridge that joined bank with bank for hundreds of years. Rather, the river is dammed up into the power plant. What the river is now, namely, a water- power supplier, derives from the essence of the power station. (Heidegger, 1999a, pp. 320–1) In effect, the water-mill takes advantage of a river that can supply power, while the hydro-electric plant takes advantage of a power supply, the “riveness” of which is incidental. (Admittedly, the difference is not so pronounced in the Letter on “Humanism”, which appears to be more generally anti-technological: while it concedes that technology is a form of truth, it insists that it is “grounded in the history of metaphysics”. There is no distinction between metaphysical and pre-metaphysical tekhnē here, and I am admittedly unsure about how well this claim squares with the remainder of Heidegger’s thought.) Hence, while the essence of technology in its broadest sense is causative, there is still a significant difference between modern technology and non-modern tekhnē. This is why “the correct instrumental definition of technology still does not show us technology’s essence” (Heidegger, 1999a, p. 313). Technology cannot be separated from production and instrumentality, but, while modern technology is enframing, non-modern technology is “poetic”. As far as Heidegger is concerned, [i]nstrumentality is considered to be the fundamental characteristic of technology. If we inquire step by step into what technology, represented as means, actually is, then we shall arrive at revealing. The possibility of all productive manufacturing lies in revealing. Technology is therefore no mere means. Technology is a way of revealing... It reveals whatever does not bring itself forth and does not yet lie here before us, whatever can look and turn out now one way and now another... Thus what is decisive in tekhnē does not at all lie in making and manipulating, nor in the using of means, but rather in the revealing mentioned before. It is as revealing, and not as manufacturing, that tekhnē is a bringing-forth. (Heidegger, 1999a, p. 318–9) Technology reveals the world in a certain manner, although this manner is variable. Modern technology reveals the world as a standing-reserve; the revealing that belongs with non-modern technology is such that things are allowed to come to presence without thereby challenging or enframing the worldness of the world from which they come to presence. To be sure, we might want to say that the hydro-electric plant “preserves” the forces of the river, and this could be correct. Heidegger never seems to confront this possibility. But he does not have to, for human Dasein, as I have pointed out, **eksists and dwells in a world of things, not onto: a world of rivers, not fluid dynamics and force.**

Links – Hydropower

The hydroelectric plant constitutes the heart of humanity's will to mastery over nature –it's a form of technological control over nature's most powerful forces

Heer, 4 --- Toronto based Journalist (Jeet, "Hydro Power and Canadian History," August 12, *National Post*, <http://www.jeetheer.com/politics/hydro.htm>)

Hydroelectric power haunts the Canadian imagination. The German philosopher Martin Heidegger once described hydroelectric projects as the very essence of modernity, the perfect symbol of humanity's conquest of nature whereby primordial and awesome waterfalls are harnessed for technological ends. In Canada, a country richly blessed with freshwater rapids and falls, the romance of hydroelectricity has been a real cultural force for over a century. "Since hydro was at once a triumph of rational scientific progress and a mysterious elemental force, the myth of hydro appealed to both practical and poetic instincts," the historian H.V. Nelles noted in his classic 1974 book *The Politics of Development*. It may sound strange to speak of "the myth of hydro" yet throughout the late 19th and early 20th century, politicians and pundits frequently used a tone of hushed awe when discussing plans to capture electricity from Niagra Falls. "It is a spectacle second only to the Falls themselves as a mighty manifestation of the works of God upon earth, to walk through one of the great power houses at Niagra..." the military historian Francis Vinton Greene exulted in a speech to the Empire Club in 1905. The hypnotic power of hydro in Canada has been explored by the anthropologist Lionel Tiger, internationally famous for developing the concept of "male bonding". Writing in *Canadian Forum* in 1965, Tiger amusingly argued that the Social Credit government of W.A.C. Bennett owed its success to its adroit linkage of B.C. Hydro with images of sexual potency. "One of the crucial symbols of Premier Bennett's Government and a major recent reason for his success in his emphasis on hydroelectric power," Tiger asserted. "The turbines and high tension cables suddenly and magically make of rivers and mountains and rain a source of wealth and a reassurance of significance... In B.C. it is a potency symbol on a grand scale which has been promoted and exploited so that it now possesses an almost mystic importance for many." In Quebec earlier this century, Maurice Duplessis regularly won elections with the promise of rural electrification under the rousing slogan "electeurs, electrices, electricite!" Yet the hydroelectric projects that Duplessis encouraged were under private hands. This would change significantly in the 1960s when the Lesage government pushed to make Quebecers the masters of their own electrical domain. "In a deeply symbolic move, the Lesage government seized the commanding heights of the provincial economy from English capitalists by nationalizing the large, private hydroelectric companies," Nelles notes in his new book, *A Little History of Canada*. "French Canada thus took charge of the largest, most technologically sophisticated organization in the province and set about running it in French." Not only our hopes, but also our fears are tied up in hydroelectric power. In other countries, conspiracy theories cluster around assassination plots and spy agencies like the CIA, MI-6 or the KGB. In Canada, the paranoid are more likely to fret about who controls the engines of electrical wealth. If you lurk in the kookier corners of the internet, you can find cranks arguing that Maurice Strong, the former head of Ontario Hydro, is a key player in "the New World Order." Other theories involve the United Nations using Cree Indians to sabotage the James Bay Project in Quebec, thereby throwing the whole north-east of the continent into darkness and setting the stage for martial law. The "myth of hydro" illustrates a familiar theme, the paramount importance of geography in Canada. The standard quip is that Canada has too much geography and not enough history. It would be more precise to say that in Canada history and geography live on intimate terms, like a couple so long married that they have fused into a single identity. Long before European contact, natives used the rivers of North America as a natural, continent-spanning highway binding together a sprawling commercial network. From that time until now, the landscape has been not just the back-ground to history but an active partner in human endeavors. Given the importance of geography, it is not surprising that the best historians of Canada have had sensibilities akin to landscape painters. In Francis Parkman's work, Indians and French-Canadians fight in a forest as gothic and scary as the woods imagined by J.R.R. Tolkien. Harold Innis re-invented our history by following the trail of fur-trappers while Donald Creighton mapped out the empire of the St. Lawrence. For all these writers, landscape and memory were one. Two new books show the continuing vitality of this tradition of historian-cartographers: H.V. Nelles's *A Little History of Canada* (already alluded to above) and Matthew D. Evenden's *Fish Versus Power: An Environmental History of the Fraser River*. As their titles indicate, Nelles offers a sweeping survey while Evenden's work is a more finely textured case study. Nelles, distilling a lifetime of scholarship into a book short enough to read in an evening, uses the theme of "transformation" to bind together the disparate eras of Canadian history. Always in metamorphosis, Canada has gone from being a land of scattered native communities to a French colony to a British imperial dependency to a precariously united nation-state. The idea of transformation becomes focused and energized when Nelles applies it to his area of specialty, showing how the very landscape of the country has been constantly re-made by human intervention. Here is his account of the impact of the "relentless forest exploitation" of the early 19th century: "After logging, forest fires inevitably raged through the discarded limbs and smaller timber left

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behind. Natural regeneration took generations; quite different tree species rose in succession on the abandoned timber limits. Stripped of its trees the hydrological character of the land changed; rain and snow ran off more quickly; nearby rivers filled with silt. Bark dislodged from logs during the river-drive sank, lining their bottoms with a poisonous anaerobic layer of muck." The beauty of this passage, practically a small poem, derives from a careful deployment of earthy, monosyllabic nouns: limbs, silt, bark, muck. As much as Parkman or Creighton, Nelles is a master of descriptive prose; fans of comic portraiture will want to look up his wicked description of Diefenbaker. The environment looms equally large in Evenden's work, a study of the conflicting claims made by the salmon fishery and hydroelectric power in British Columbia. Cagily, Evenden approaches the story of hydroelectric power from a fresh angle, looking as it were at a dog that didn't bark. Unlike almost every other major river in Canada, the Fraser River remains undammed, although developers saw it as an alluring target for many years. As the book argues, the preservation of the Fraser owes much not only to regional political factors but also the rising prestige of science. Unlike many other environmental histories, Evenden's book offers a relatively hopeful tale, one where a balance between technological progress and preservation is struck. The salient lesson of his book is that **even large-scale technological change remains subject to human control**. Massive hydroelectric projects may seem as intimidating as a force of nature, **yet it is always in our power to reject or tame them.**

Links – Terrorism

Political responses to terrorism are destined to fail – a *thinking* of terrorism is a prior question.

Mitchell 5 [Andrew J. Mitchell, Post-Doctoral Fellow in the Humanities at Stanford University, "Heidegger and Terrorism," [Research in Phenomenology](#), Volume 35, Number 1, 2005 , pp. 181-218]

This does not mean that being exists unperturbed somewhere behind or beyond these beings. The withdrawal of being is found in these abandoned beings themselves and is determinative for the way they exist. Heideggerian thinking, then, allows us to ask the question of our times and *to think terrorism*. My contention in the following is that the withdrawal of being shows itself today in terrorism, where beings exist *as terrorized*. **Terrorism**, in other words, **is not simply the sum total of activities carried out by terrorist groups, but a challenge directed at beings as a whole**. Terrorism is consequently a metaphysical issue, and it names the way in which beings show themselves today, i.e., as terrorized. This "ontological" point demands that there be the "ontic" threat of real terrorists. Further, this metaphysical aspect of terrorism also indicates that a purely political response to terrorism is destined to fail. Political reactions to terrorism, which depict terrorism from the outset as a political problem, miss the fact that terrorism itself, qua metaphysical issue, is coincident with a transformation in politics. That is to say, **political responses to terrorism fail to think terrorism**. In what follows I will elaborate some of the consequences of thinking terrorism as a question of being and sketch a few characteristics of the politico-technological landscape against which terrorism takes place.

Technological enframing makes terrorism inevitable – we should recognize that true security is impossible.

Mitchell 5 [Andrew J. Mitchell, Post-Doctoral Fellow in the Humanities at Stanford University, "Heidegger and Terrorism," [Research in Phenomenology](#), Volume 35, Number 1, 2005 , pp. 181-218]

Insofar as Heideggerian thinking is a thinking of being, then it must be able to think terrorism, for the simple reason that *terrorism names the current countenance of being for our times*, and without such a correspondence to being, Heideggerian thinking is nothing. The issue is not one of applying a preestablished Heideggerian doctrine to an object or situation that would remain outside of thought. Rather, the issue is one of recognizing that the objects and situations of our world themselves call for thought, and that in thinking the world, we enter into a correspondence with being. But what sort of correspondence can be achieved between the thinking of being and terrorism? Heidegger's articulation of the age of technology already contains in germ four routes of access for the thinking of terrorism. First, Heidegger himself witnessed a transformation in the making of war, such that he was led to think beyond the Clausewitzian model of modern warfare and to open the possibility for a "warfare" of a different sort. This thought beyond war is itself an opening to terrorism. Second, Heidegger prioritizes terror (*Erschrecken*) as a fundamental mood appropriate to our age of technological enframing. Terror is a positive mood, not a privative one, and it corresponds to the way that being gives itself today. Third, Heidegger thinks threat and danger in an "ontological" manner that calls into question traditional notions of presence and absence. Terrorism attends this transformation in presence. Finally, and following from all of this, Heidegger rethinks the notion of security in a manner that alerts us to the oxymoronic character of "homeland security" and the impossibility of ever achieving a condition of complete safety from terrorism. In each of these ways, Heideggerian thinking responds to this most uncommon of challenges.

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Terrorism is a symptom of the technological age

Mitchell 5 [Andrew J. Mitchell, Post-Doctoral Fellow in the Humanities at Stanford University, "Heidegger and

Terrorism," *Research in Phenomenology*, Volume 35, Number 1, 2005 , pp. 181-218]//jrc

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Links – Security

Insecurity is an inevitable condition of existence—the drive for perfect security turns life into a standing reserve that necessitates endless warfare.

Mitchell 5 [Andrew J. Mitchell, Post-Doctoral Fellow in the Humanities at Stanford University, "Heidegger and Terrorism," [Research in Phenomenology](#), Volume 35, Number 1, 2005, pp. 181-218]

There can be no security. If being is what threatens then security as the absence of terror would be the absence of being. But the absence of being is precisely the threat. Obviously, security is just as little to be found in the absence of danger as it is in the consummation of the danger, total annihilation. Instead, security is to be found within the danger and threat of being. But how? Heidegger likewise provides us endangered ones with a way of thinking security and preservation. This is his fourth contribution to a thinking of terrorism. Security and assurance, both equally apt translations of the German *Sicherung*, are indissociable from certainty (*Gewissheit*) for Heidegger. In the course of the 1968 seminar in Le Thor, Heidegger provides a brief history of this relation between security and certainty: "the quest for certainty appears first in the domain of faith, as the search for the certainty of salvation (Luther), then in the domain of physics as the search for the mathematical certainty of nature (Galileo)" (VS, 30/13). Heidegger unites these two concerns for certainty within a single concept: assurance (*Sicherung*), "In the quest for mathematical certainty, what is sought is the assurance of man in nature, in the sensible, in the quest for the certainty of salvation, what is sought is the assurance of man in the supra-sensible world" (VS, 30/14).²² Certainty is in the service of assurance or security and is only the epistemological aspect of a greater ontological condition of security. Security is freedom from uncertainty in all of its forms, sensible, super-sensible, and ontological. Salvation and the mathematical certainty of nature are themselves to be understood as instances of an ontological assurance against uncertainty. Ontological uncertainty would be found in conceptions of singularity, where the uniqueness of a thing renders it irreplaceable and thus opens us to the possibility of loss, or in conceptions of alterity, where the other is not anticipated and confined in advance to the strictures of categorical thought. Uncertainty in this broader sense is eliminated in security. One is securely insulated against these differences of the world. For modern thought, the securing of representations for representational thinking provided the backdrop for the arrival of certainty (see GA 7: 82; EP, 98). Modern metaphysics itself, according to Heidegger, "means the securing of the human being by itself and for itself" (GA 67: 167). Such a policy must be abandoned as the human becomes more and more a piece of the standing-reserve like everything else. This postmodern security is accomplished through bestowal and appraisal of value, "Securement, as the obtaining of security, is grounding in valuation" (GA 5: 262/195; tm). What is valued can be replaced by something of equal value, and this fact lies at the center of our conception of security today. Securement, as a giving of value, assures us against loss by making the world replaceable. In this respect, security is nothing other than total availability, imagined as a world of utter transparency where all resources, human and otherwise, are constantly surveilled and traced through their paths of circulation. The transformation in being coincident with the end of modern warfare likewise puts an end to modern politics and establishes in its place an impersonal commitment to the furthering of planned replacement. Security is only possible when everything works according to these plans, and this requires "leaders," whose true function now becomes evident. For the plan, "the necessity of leadership," that is, the planned calculation of the securing of the whole of beings, is required" (GA 7: 89-90/EP, 105; tm). The demand for security is always a call for such *Führers*. Planning is a matter of ensuring the smooth and "frictionless" circulation of resources along channels and pipelines of order and delivery. The plan's success is assured from the outset, because beings are now in essence planable. The mathematical tracking of stock and supplies becomes a total tracking when things have become completely available. Nothing is concealed from this taking of inventory, with the effect that the mathematical model of the thing is no different from the thing itself. The mathematical modeling of things, an operation that Heidegger traces back to Ockham and the nominalist split between word and thing (see VS, 30-31/13-14), is paradigmatic for the disappearance of identifiably discrete beings under the rule of technology. The model is no longer a representation of what is modeled but, in a paradoxical manner, the thing itself. Nothing beyond the thing's mathematical model is recognized. Everything essential to the thing is contained in the model, without remainder. Such is the truth of the standing-reserve; it is a collapse of the distances that made possible representation. Without that spacing, there is only the suffocating rush of the standing-reserve along the circuitry of the plan. The plan makes manifest the self-willing nature of technology, in that the plan has no purpose other than to assure its own expansion and increase. For the plan to function, it is therefore necessary that beings be consumed and their replacements follow right upon them. The plan plans for consumption, outlining the paths and channels that the standing-reserve will occupy in its compelled obedience to order. The world wars have pointed towards this end, according to Heidegger, for "They press toward a securing of resources [*Bestandsicherung*] for a constant form of consumption" (GA 7: 88; EP, 103-4; tm). This consumption is synonymous with replacement, since there is nothing lost in consumption that is not immediately replaced. The plan is to protect itself from loss by completely insulating itself from uncertainty. The plan seeks "the 'all-inclusive' /*restlose*/ securing of the ordering of order" (GA 7: 92; EP, 107; tm). Order is only secured when there is nothing that resists it, nothing that remains in "disorder." Any remainder would stand outside of the prevailing

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order, as would any difference _____, in complete disorder. There is another Nietzschean intimation in this, as Heidegger reads the will to power as a drive to secure and order all chaos. Without remainder (*restlose*), without rest, the standing-reserve threatens to encompass everything in a monotonous, swirling *sameness*. The more secure the world becomes, the greater is the abandonment of being as it is further enframed within the plan. Homeland security is thus an oxymoron, since one of the most prominent effects of planning is the elimination of national differences and "homelands." Security itself is precisely the planned elimination of differences, and as for "homeland," it is ever more difficult to conceive of a homeland that would be nationally distinct from another.

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Security necessitates endlessly expanding threats in order to justify its own existence. Calculative thought leads to increasingly large-scale war on difference.

Mitchell 5 [Andrew J. Mitchell, Post-Doctoral Fellow in the Humanities at Stanford University, "Heidegger and Terrorism," [Research in Phenomenology](#), Volume 35, Number 1, 2005, pp. 181-218]

The uniformity of beings arising from the emptiness of the abandonment of Being, in which it is only a matter of the calculable security of its order, an order which it subjugates to the will to will, this uniformity also conditions everywhere in advance of all national differences the uniformity of leadership [Führerschaft], for which all forms of government are only one instrument of leadership among others. (GA 7: 93; EP, 108; tm) Government and politics are simply further means of directing ways of life according to plan; and no one, neither terrorist nor politician, should be able to alter these carefully constructed ways of life. Ways of life are themselves effects of the plan, and the predominant way of life today is that of an all-consuming Americanism. National differences fall to the wayside. The homeland, when not completely outmoded, can only appear as commodified quaintness. All governments participate in the eradication of national differences. Insofar as Americanism represents the attempt to annihilate the "homeland," then under the aegis of the abandonment of being, all governments and forms of leadership become Americanism. The loss of national differences is accordant with the advent of terrorism, since terrorism knows no national bounds but, rather, threatens difference and boundaries as such. Terrorism is everywhere, where "everywhere" no longer refers to a collection of distinct places and locations but instead to a "here" that is the same as there, as every "there."

The threat of terrorism is not international, but antinational or, to strain a Heideggerian formulation, unnational. Homeland security, insofar as it destroys the very thing that it claims to protect, is nothing opposed to terrorism, but rather the consummation of its threat. Our leaders, in their attempt to secure the world against terrorism, only serve to further drive the world towards its homogenized state. The elimination of difference in the standing-reserve along with the elimination of national differences serve to identify the threat of terrorism with the quest for security. The absence of this threat would be the absence of being, and its consummation would be the absence of being as well. Security is only needed where there is a threat. If a threat is not perceived, if one believes oneself invulnerable, then there is no need for security. Security is for those who know they can be injured, for those who can be damaged. Does America know that it can be damaged? If security requires a recognition of one's own vulnerability, then security can only be found in the acknowledgment of one's threatened condition, and this means that it can only be found in a recognition of being as threat. To be secure, there must be the threat. For this reason, all of the planned securities that attempt to abolish the threat can never achieve the security they seek. Security requires that we preserve the threat, and this means that we must act in the office of preservers. As preservers, what we are charged to preserve is not so much the present being as the concealment that inhabits it. Preserving a thing means to not challenge it forth into technological availability, to let it maintain an essential concealment. That we participate in this essencing of being does not make of it a subjective matter, for there is no isolated subject in preservation, but an opening of being. Heidegger will name this the clearing of the truth (Wahrheit) of being, and it is this clearing that Dasein preserves (bewahrt). When a thing truthfully is, when it is what it is in truth, then it is preserved. In preserving beings, Dasein participates in the truth (preservation) of being. The truth of being is being as threat, and this threat only threatens when Dasein preserves it in terror. Dasein is not innocent in the terrorization of being. On the contrary, Dasein is complicit in it. Dasein refuses to abolish terrorism. For this reason, a Heideggerian thinking of terrorism must remain skeptical of all the various measures taken to oppose terrorism, to root it out or to circumvent it. These are so many attempts to do away with what threatens, measures that are themselves in the highest degree willful. This will can only impose itself upon being, can only draw out more and more of its wrath, and this inward wrath of being maintains itself in a never-ending supply. The will can only devastate the earth. Rather than approaching the world in terms of resources to be secured, true security can only be found in the preservation of the threat of being. It is precisely when we are busy with security measures and the frantic organization of resources that we directly assault the things we would preserve. The threat of being goes unheeded when things are restlessly shuttled back and forth, harried, monitored, and surveilled. The threat of being is only preserved when things are allowed to rest. In the notes to the "Evening Conversation," security is thought in just such terms: *Securi_y* (what one understands by this) arises not from securing and the measures taken for this; security resides in rest [*in der Ruhe*] and is itself made superfluous by this. (MA 77: 244)²³ The rest in question is a rest from the economic cycling and circulating of the standing reserve. The technological unworld, the **situation of total war, is precisely the era of restlessness** ("The term 'totality' says nothing more; it names only the spread of the hitherto known into the 'restless'" [GA 69: 181]). Security is superfluous here, which is only to say that it is unnecessary or useless. It is not found in utility, but in the preserved state of the useless. Utility and function are precisely the dangers of a c'vil that has turned antagonistic towards nature. In rest, they no longer determine the being of the thing. In resting, things are free of security measures, but not for all that rendered insecure. Instead, they are

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preserved. There is no security; this is what we have to preserve. Heideggerian thinking is a thinking that thinks away from simple presence and absence. It thinks what Heidegger calls "the between" (*das Zwischen*). This between is a world of nonpresence and nonabsence. Annihilation is impossible for this world and so is security. The terror experienced today is a clue to the withdrawal of being. The world is denatured, drained of reality. Everything is threatened and the danger only ever increases. Dasein flees to a metaphysics of presence to escape the threatened world, hoping there to find security. But security cannot do away with the threat, rather it must guard it. Dasein guards the truth of being in the experience of terror. What is perhaps repugnant to consider in all this is that being calls for terrorism *and for terrorists*. With the enframing of being and the circulation of standing-reserve, what *is* has already been destroyed. Terrorism is merely the ugly confirmation of this point. As we have seen, being does not linger behind the scenes but is found in the staging itself. If being is to terrorize-if, in other words, this is an age of terrorism-then being must call for terrorists. They are simply more "slaves of the history of being" (GA 69: 209) and, in Heidegger's eyes, no different from the politicians of the day in service to the cause of Americanism. But someone might object, the terrorists are murderers and the politicians are not. Granting this objection despite its obvious naiveté, we can nonetheless see that both politicians and terrorists are called for by the standing-reserve, the one to ensure its nonabsence, that the plan will reach everyone everywhere, and the other to ensure its nonpresence, that all beings will now be put into circulation by the threat of destruction. In this regard, "human resources" are no different from "livestock," and with this, an evil worse than death has already taken place. Human resources do not die, they perish.

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Insecurity is a necessary and inevitable condition of existence—the drive for perfect security turns life into a standing reserve necessitating never-ending warfare.

Mitchell 5 [Andrew J. Mitchell, Post-Doctoral Fellow in the Humanities at Stanford University, "Heidegger and Terrorism," *Research in Phenomenology*, Volume 35, Number 1, 2005, pp. 181-218]no change

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Sicherung, are indissociable from certainty (*Gewissheit*) for Heidegger. In the course of the 1968 seminar in Le Thor, Heidegger provides a brief history of this relation between security and certainty: "the quest for certainty appears first in the domain of faith, as the search for the certainty of salvation (Luther), then in the domain of physics as the search for the mathematical certainty of nature (Galileo)" (*VS*, 30/13).

Heidegger unites these two concerns for certainty within a single concept: assurance (*Sicherung*), "In the quest for mathematical certainty, what is sought is the assurance of man in nature, in the sensible, in the quest for the certainty of salvation, what is sought is the assurance of man in the supra-sensible world" (*VS*, 30/14).²² Certainty is in the service of assurance or security and is only the epistemological aspect of a greater ontological condition of security. Security is freedom from uncertainty in all of its forms, sensible, super-sensible, and ontological. Salvation and the mathematical certainty of nature are themselves to be understood as instances of an ontological assurance against uncertainty. Ontological uncertainty would be found in conceptions of singularity, where the uniqueness of a thing renders it irreplaceable and thus opens us to the possibility of loss, or in conceptions of alterity, where the other is not anticipated and confined in advance to the strictures of categorical thought. Uncertainty in this broader sense is eliminated in security. One is securely insulated against these differences of the world. For modern thought, the securing of representations for representational thinking provided the backdrop for the arrival of certainty (see *GA* 7: 82; *EP*, 98). Modern metaphysics itself, according to Heidegger, "means the securing of the human being by itself and for itself" (*GA* 67: 167). Such a policy must be abandoned as the human becomes more and more a piece of the standing-reserve like everything else. This postmodern security is accomplished through bestowal and appraisal of value. "Securement, as the obtaining of security, is grounding in valuation" (*GA* 5: 262/195; *tin*).

What is valued can be replaced by something of equal value, and this fact lies at the center of our conception of security today. Securement, as a giving of value, assures us against loss by making the world replaceable. In this respect, **security is nothing other than total availability, imagined as a world of utter transparency where all resources, human and otherwise, are constantly surveilled and traced through their paths of circulation.** The transformation in being coincident with the end of modern warfare likewise puts an end to modern politics and establishes in its place an impersonal commitment to the furthering of planned replacement. Security is only possible when everything works according to these plans, and this requires "leaders," whose true function now becomes evident. For the plan, "the necessity of 'leadership', that is, the planned calculation of the securing of the whole of beings, is required" (*GA* 7: 89-90/*EP*, 105; *tm*). The demand for security is always a call for such *Führers*. Planning is a matter of ensuring the smooth and "frictionless" circulation of resources along channels and pipelines of order and delivery. The plan's success is assured from the outset, because beings are now in essence planable. The mathematical tracking of stock and supplies becomes a total tracking when things have become completely available. Nothing is concealed from this taking of inventory, with the effect that the mathematical model of the thing is no different from the thing itself. The mathematical modeling of things, an operation that Heidegger traces back to Ockham and the nominalist split between word and thing (see *VS*, 30-31/13-14), is paradigmatic for the disappearance of identifiably discrete beings under the rule of technology. The model is no longer a representation of what is modeled but, in a paradoxical manner, the thing itself. Nothing beyond the thing's mathematical model is recognized. Everything essential to the thing is contained in the model, without remainder. Such is the truth of the standing-reserve; it is a collapse of the distances that made possible representation. Without that spacing, there is only the suffocating rush of the standing-reserve along the circuitry of the plan.

The plan makes manifest the self-willing nature of technology, in that the plan has no purpose other than to assure its own expansion and increase. For the plan to function, it is therefore necessary that beings be consumed and their replacements follow right upon them. The plan plans for consumption, outlining the paths and channels that the standing-reserve will occupy in its compelled obedience to order. The world wars have pointed towards this end, according to Heidegger, for "They press toward a securing of resources [*Bestandsicherung*] for a constant form of consumption" (*GA* 7: 88; *EP*, 103-4;

Links – Security

tm). This consumption is synonymous with replacement, since there is nothing lost in consumption that is not immediately replaced. The plan is to protect itself from loss by completely insulating itself from uncertainty.

The plan seeks "the 'all-inclusive' /restlose/ securing of the ordering of order" (GA 7: 92; EP, 107; tm). Order is only secured when there is nothing that resists it, nothing that remains in "disorder." Any remainder would stand outside of the prevailing order, as would any difference, in complete disorder. There is another Nietzschean intimation in this, as Heidegger reads the will to power as a drive to secure and order all chaos. Without remainder (*restlose*), without rest, the standing-reserve threatens to encompass everything in a monotonous, swirling *sameness*. The more secure the world becomes, the greater is the abandonment of being as it is further enframed within the plan. Homeland security is thus an oxymoron, since one of the most prominent effects of planning is the elimination of national differences and "homelands." Security itself is precisely the planned elimination of differences, and as for "homeland," it is ever more difficult to conceive of a homeland that would be nationally distinct from another.

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The drive to secure the state results in an eradication of difference that makes everything a standing reserve

Mitchell 5 [Andrew J. Mitchell, Post-Doctoral Fellow in the Humanities at Stanford University, "Heidegger and Terrorism," Research in Phenomenology, Volume 35, Number 1, 2005, pp. 181-218]

This is not to be understood as a complaint against internationalism either, for 'Just as the distinction between war and peace has become untenable, the distinction between 'national' and 'international' has also collapsed" (*GA* 7: 92; *EP*, 107). We have already seen that Heidegger attributes a will to the annihilation of homeland to Americanism; what needs to be added to this view is that there is not one form of government any different; each is run by leaders: The uniformity of beings arising from the emptiness of the abandonment of Being, in which it is only a matter of the calculable security of its order, an order which it subjugates to the will to will, this uniformity also conditions everywhere in advance of all national differences the uniformity of leadership [*Führerschaft*], for which all forms of government are only one instrument of leadership among others. (*GA* 7: 93; *EP*, 108; tm) Government and politics are simply further means of directing ways of life according to plan; and no one, neither terrorist nor politician, should be able to alter these carefully constructed ways of life. Ways of life are themselves effects of the plan, and the predominant way of life today is that of an all-consuming Americanism. National differences fall to the wayside. The homeland, when not completely outmoded, can only appear as commodified quaintness. All governments participate in the eradication of national differences. Insofar as Americanism represents the attempt to annihilate the "homeland," then under the aegis of the abandonment of being, all governments and forms of leadership become Americanism. The loss of national differences is accordant with the advent of terrorism, since terrorism knows no national bounds but, rather, threatens difference and boundaries as such. Terrorism is everywhere, where "everywhere" no longer refers to a collection of distinct places and locations but instead to a "here" that is the same as there, as every "there." The threat of terrorism is not international, but antinational or, to strain a Heideggerian formulation, unnational. Homeland security, insofar as it destroys the very thing that it claims to protect, is nothing opposed to terrorism, but rather the consummation of its threat. Our leaders, in their attempt to secure the world against terrorism, only serve to further drive the world towards its homogenized state. The elimination of difference in the standing-reserve along with the elimination of national differences serve to identify the threat of terrorism with the quest for security. The absence of this threat would be the absence of being, and its consummation would be the absence of being as well. Security is only needed where there is a threat. If a threat is not perceived, if one believes oneself invulnerable, then there is no need for security. Security is for those who know they can be injured, for those who can be damaged. Does America know that it can be damaged? If security requires a recognition of one's own vulnerability, then security can only be found in the acknowledgment of one's threatened condition, and this means that it can only be found in a recognition of being as threat. To be secure, there must be the threat. For this reason, all of the planned securities that attempt to abolish the threat can never achieve the security they seek. Security requires that we preserve the threat, and this means that we must act in the office of preservers. As preservers, what we are charged to preserve is not so much the present being as the concealment that inhabits it. Preserving a thing means to not challenge it forth into technological availability, to let it maintain an essential concealment. That we participate in this essencing of being does not make of it a subjective matter, for there is no isolated subject in preservation, but an opening of being. Heidegger will name this the clearing of the truth (*Wahrheit*) of being, and it is this clearing that Dasein preserves (*bewahrt*). When a thing *truthfully* is, when it is what it is *in truth*, then it is preserved. In preserving beings, Dasein participates in the truth (preservation) of being. The truth of being is being as threat, and this threat only threatens when Dasein preserves it in terror. Dasein is not innocent in the terrorization of being. On the contrary, Dasein is complicit in it. Dasein refuses to abolish terrorism. For this reason, a Heideggerian thinking of terrorism must remain skeptical of all the various measures taken to oppose terrorism, to root it out or to circumvent it. These are so many attempts to do away with what threatens, measures that are themselves in the highest degree willful. This will can only impose itself upon being, can only draw out more and more of its wrath, and this inward wrath of being maintains itself in a never-ending supply. The will can only devastate the earth. Rather than approaching the world in terms of resources to be secured, true security can only be found in the preservation of the threat of being. It is precisely when we are busy with security measures and the frantic organization of resources that we directly assault the things we would preserve. The threat of being goes unheeded when things are restlessly shuttled back and forth, harried, monitored, and surveilled. The threat of being is only preserved when things are allowed to rest. In the notes to the "Evening Conversation," security is thought in just such terms: *Securi-ty* (what one understands by this) arises not from securing and the measures taken for this; security resides in rest [*in der Ruhe*] and is itself made superfluous by this. (*MA* 77: 244)23 The rest in question is a rest from the economic cycling and circulating of the standing reserve. The technological unworld, the situation of total war, is precisely the era of restlessness ("The term 'totality' says nothing more; it names only the spread of the hitherto known into the 'restless'" [*GA* 69: 181]). Security is superfluous here, which is only to say that it is unnecessary or useless. It is not found in utility, but in the preserved state of the useless. Utility and function are precisely the dangers of a c'vil that has turned antagonistic towards nature. In rest, they no longer determine the being of the thing. In resting, things are free of security measures, but not for all that rendered insecure. Instead, they are preserved. There is no security; this is what we have to preserve. Heideggerian thinking is a thinking that thinks away from simple presence and absence. It thinks what Heidegger calls "the between" (*das Zwischen*). This between is a world of nonpresence and nonabsence. Annihilation is impossible for this world and so is security. The terror experienced today is a clue to the withdrawal of being. The world is denatured, drained of reality. Everything is threatened and the danger only ever increases. Dasein flees to a metaphysics of presence to escape the threatened world, hoping there to find security. But security

Links – Security

cannot do away with the threat, rather it must guard it. Dasein guards the truth of being in the experience of terror. What is perhaps repugnant to consider in all this is that being calls for terrorism *and for terrorists*. With the enframing of being and the circulation of standing-reserve, what *is* has already been destroyed. Terrorism is merely the ugly confirmation of this point. As we have seen, being does not linger behind the scenes but is found in the staging itself. If being is to terrorize-if, in other words, this is an age of terrorism-then being must call for terrorists. They are simply more "slaves of the history of beyng" (GA 69: 209) and, in Heidegger's eyes, no different from the politicians of the day in service to the cause of Americanism. But someone might object, the terrorists are murderers and the politicians are not. Granting this objection despite its obvious naiveté, we can nonetheless see that both politicians and terrorists are called for by the standing-reserve, the one to ensure its nonabsence, that the plan will reach everyone everywhere, and the other to ensure its nonpresence, that all beings will now be put into circulation by the threat of destruction. In this regard, "human resources" are no different from "livestock," and with this, an evil worse than death has already taken place. Human resources do not die, they perish.

Links – War Claims

The very act of war depends on technological thought- it translates the use of force into the preservation of existence

Burke ‘7 (Anthony Burke, Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at UNSW, Sydney, “Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence, and Reason”, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007, Project Muse)

Thus war and existence are intertwined. However within such existential imperatives to war lies a more technical, performative (and thus rationalistic) discourse: that once it is deemed necessary to use force in defence of one's right to exist it is possible to do so, to translate military means into political ends in a controlled and rational way. This is the second, rationalist form of state reason that most commonly takes the name of 'strategy'. Its fundamental tenet was most famously expressed in Carl Von Clausewitz's argument that war 'is a mere continuation of policy by other means...a pulsation of violent force...subject to the will of a guiding intelligence'.¹⁰ That this is a textbook model of instrumental reason, one that imports Newtonian physics into human relations, is clear in Clausewitz's influential definition: 'War is an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will'.¹¹

Links – Space

Viewing the world as something to be escaped reduces it to mere “planetary matter”, turning life into an abyss and destroying ontological security

Turnbull, 2006- Nottingham Trent University (Neil, “The Ontological Consequences of Copernicus: Global Being in the Planetary World”, SAGEJournals Online, REQ) JRC—no change

In the ‘parable of the madman’, Nietzsche addressed what he believed to be the consequences of Copernican astronomy and Darwinian evolutionary theory for Western culture’s most cherished and deeply held moral and metaphysical convictions (Nietzsche, 1977: 202–3). In his view, rather than producing ‘Enlightenment’ and liberating humanity from the dead hand of religious dogma and superstition, these theories threatened to undermine the moral and intellectual foundations of life in the West. According to Nietzsche, Copernicanism and Darwinism endangered the ancient, residual, yet still ubiquitous, metaphysical idea that there is an ultimate foundation or ‘ground’ to the universe, capable of cognizance, and of ‘rationally supporting’ judgement in all its forms. Nietzsche encapsulated the theological dimensions of these anxieties in his claim that ‘God is Dead’. However, as many have pointed out, this was no simple counter-theological statement, but a warning about the bottomless void – what might be termed the ‘spatial nihilism’ – implicit within the ‘new cosmology’. For in Nietzsche’s view, with the quest for greater epistemological self-assuredness, modern humanity is in danger of not only sacrificing its traditional bases of meaning, but of losing the very idea that the world exists as something fixed, stable and significant. Thus the madman asks the crowd: ‘[w]hither are we moving now? Away from all suns? Are we not perpetually falling? Backward forward, sideward in all directions? Is there any up or down left? Are we not straying as if through an infinite nothing?’ (Nietzsche, 1977: 203). Essentially, Nietzsche’s claim is that Copernicanism and Darwinism force us to question the significance of both the Greek Humanist and the Judeo-Christian conceptions of humanity and its world (that is, to think beyond the territorialization of Western philosophy as somewhere between ‘Athens’ and ‘Jerusalem’). In Nietzsche’s view, modern metaphysics is both ‘groundless’ and ‘simian’ because, after Copernicus and Darwin, ‘the earth does not stand fast’ (Nietzsche, 1998: 2) and ‘man is more of an ape than any ape’ (Nietzsche, 1969: 42). In such a context Nietzsche’s madman is not a prophet of lost archaic theological certainties, but a new voice of sanity, castigating, warning and exhorting his ‘metaphysically somnambulant’ audience to wake up to the truly frightening placelessness of modernity’s Copernican and Darwinian forms of life. And many who have followed Nietzsche in this regard have noted that the key to understanding the significance of modernity’s *unheimlich* ontology resides within a broader appreciation of the way in which the new cosmology has undermined traditional conceptions of earth. As Nietzsche’s heir Martin Heidegger famously claimed, when seen in Copernican planetary-cosmological terms, the earth is no longer the earth in any vital or lived sense but simply an object comprised of ‘purely technological relationships’ and an object, moreover, that is subjectivized into a representation, a *vorstellung*, that ‘stands before us’ rather than as something in ‘our midst’ (Heidegger, 1993: 105–6). For Heidegger, once perceived and conceived as a visual representation of a planetary bounded whole, the earth becomes ‘deworled’: appearing as just one more casual system within a much wider cosmological causal order. And this is why for Heidegger – in his much-cited reflections on this matter – the interplanetary images of the earth from space are not simply the end product of a rather complex and powerful set of technological process that enframe the earth as a mass industrialized object, but are images that radically diminish the meaning of the earth, rendering humanity without a world within which to dwell (a theme that I return to later). When seen in Heideggerian terms, Copernicanism reduces the earth to mere ‘planetary matter’: an absurd and inhuman cosmic accident devoid of any ultimate sense or significance. In such a context we can no longer speak of a meaningful world at all, because when the earth is ‘reduced’ to a visual representation, it ceases to be a context of significance but stands as something that ‘transcends all tacitly shared assumptions’. As such, it is ‘beyond all frameworks – an abyss’ (Wood, 2002: 15). It becomes a ‘spectral earth’ – a mere flicker of light in the cosmological void. As Lyotard claimed, as a Copernican technologized object the earth ‘isn’t at all originary’ but merely a ‘spasmodic state of energy, an instant of established order, a smile on the surface of matter in a remote corner of the cosmos’ (Lyotard, 1991: 10).

Thus the modern astronaut is seen as one of the primary agents of modern worldlessness in Heideggerian philosophy (and one is immediately struck by the phenomenological similarities between the spatial nihilism of Nietzsche’s madman and the free-floating placeless experience of the modern astronaut). For when the earth is seen from an astronautic point of view, all traditional human concerns are deterritorialized and strangely diminished to the extent that interplanetary representations of the earth threaten to sever the connection between humanity and its traditional ontological supports. Heideggerian scholars such as Robert Romanyshyn have developed this idea and used it as the basis for an existential critique of ‘the mad astronaut’: the quintessentially modern avatar that stands as the highest expression of modernity’s *unheimlich* rootlessness. Romanyshyn’s is a critique of what might be termed ‘the astronautic condition of modernity’ (1989; 200), as, in Romanyshyn’s view, the modern astronaut – what so many modern Western children want to ‘grow up to be’ – is a metaphor for a hypermodern cultural-psychological dream of distance, departure and escape from matter that reveals a world of pure ‘spectacular wonder’, and that disguises and perhaps even obliterates those deep and emotional connections to the earth that maintain a sense of ontological security and lived reality.

Links – Space

Defining existence through technology in space rids the world of it's ontological status as a place of being, reducing it to a technological subject

Turnbull, 2006- Nottingham Trent University (Neil, “The Ontological Consequences of Copernicus: Global Being in the Planetary World”, SAGEJournals Online, REQ//JRC

As is well known, in *Being and Time*, the early Heidegger conceived of the world as a phenomenological space that conditions ‘the totality of our involvement with things’ (1961: 415). For him, the world is constituted by a tacit set of basic existential attitudes to the world – care, understanding, mood and so on – and is related to ‘what lies before’ in the sense of being handy or readily available. In later works such as *The Origin of the Work of Art*, the world continues to be viewed in a similar way as the ‘governing expanse’, which ‘gives things their measure’, ‘an open space’ within which things ‘receive protection’ (1978b: 160). Thus, in the early Heidegger’s view, it is the world that provides the conditions of possibility for the basic shape and character of phenomenological experience as such. As one commentator has put it:

the world . . . gives its rule or law to things as that which directs the way they come to stand such that the opening of a world measures the relations between existent things, giving them proximity or distance, their peculiar temporal status and their scope and limits. (Fynsk, 1993: 141)

However, the question of the significance of the earth and its relationship to both technology and world in the context of ‘dwelling’ – as a key element of the ‘fourfold’ of Earth, Sky, Gods and Mortals – is the more prominent feature of his later work (and it is for this reason that many Heideggerians read him as a proto-ecological philosopher [see Foltz, 1995; Zimmerman, 1994]). Some Heidegger scholars recognize that the new emphasis given to earth in Heidegger’s later philosophy is an ‘attempt to think the essence of things in a new way’ (Mulhall, 1990: 169) and that, for the late Heidegger, ‘authentic dwelling’ is no longer a matter of a temporalized ‘being-in-the-world’ – as it was in *Being and Time* – but is reconceived as a dwelling ‘poetically on the earth’ and ‘under the sky’ (Heidegger, 1978a: 351). Thus, for the later Heidegger, authentic ways of living stand radically opposed to what might be termed ‘Copernican modes of existence’ for to live authentically on the earth is to ‘receive the sky as sky’ and to ‘leave the sun and moon to their journey, the stars to their courses’ (1978a: 352). As the earth is transformed into a cosmological representation, the earth loses its ontological status as a site of dwelling and is reduced to an object of possible knowledge for modernity’s technological subject. The later Heidegger thus strives to defend an earthbound notion of the world and this, in his view, requires that we reject Copernican ideas of the primacy of space in that, for him, ‘spaces receive their essential being from locales and not from “space”’ (1978a: 356). In Heidegger’s view, the earth is the ontological basis for our localized sense of place. It is what he terms ‘the serving bearer’ – an idea related to the pagan conception of the earth as the giver of life – and as such a primordial ground ‘blossoming and fruiting, spreading out in rock and water, rising up in plant and animal’ (1971: 149–50).

Thus, for the later Heidegger worlds are only conceivable as such – such that the world is attained as world – only when they framed by the sky above and the earth beneath (see Malpas, 2000: 227). Clearly, for the later Heidegger, the idea of ‘the world’ is conceptually inseparable from that of ‘the earth’ (and in many ways, for the later Heidegger, the idea of the world within which ‘Dasein is’ is replaced by the idea of the fourfold within which ‘man dwells’). The close relationship between earth and world for Heidegger can again be seen in the *Origins of the Work of Art*, where Heidegger recognizes that ‘[w]orld and earth are essentially different from one another and yet never separated. The world grounds itself in the earth and the earth juts through the world’ (1978b: 174).² When seen in this way, the earth is viewed as forming the ontological basis for what Heidegger terms ‘the work’ – of both artist and artisan – and its corollary the ‘thingly character of the world’ (1978b: 180). More generally, Heidegger conceives the earth as the ground of all appearance and the phvsys out of which the world emerges (a ground that supports the *nomos* of the world). For, in Heidegger’s view, only a world supported by the earth can give things their proper measure; and without this relation, things have no ‘true’ measure (and in such a case, the measurement of the world in terms of an abstract mathematicized facticity – required for the efficient maintenance of purely technological relationships – becomes the anthropocentric measure of all things).

Links – Space (Capitalist)

The concept of a planetary earth provides for the limitless extension of capitalist exploitation

Turnbull, 2006- Nottingham Trent University (Neil, “The Ontological Consequences of Copernicus: Global Being in the Planetary World”, SAGEJournals Online, REQ//JRC—no change

These Heideggerian concerns are echoed in the claim that the ‘planetary earth’ is a symbol of Western capitalism’s domination of nature and global exploitation of cultural life. Seen thus, the image of the earth from space can be seen as the aesthetic core of the ideology of the expansionary – neo-liberal – phase of global capitalism and the sublime object of the post-ideological West. It is an object that conveys a new ‘satellite geography’ (see Redfield, 1996) and a placeless map that is the representational condition of possibility for the establishment of global surveillance and communication systems (Western capital’s command-and-control system). This placeless space of the planet is seen as challenging traditional notions of space and perhaps even traditional conceptions of the real itself. And according to Paul Virilio, the interplanetary idea of the earth is not only internally related to the idea of limitless capitalist expansion (see Virilio, 2002: 63) because, in his view, planetary technologies are bringing about an ‘exotic reorganisation of sight enabling perception to escape from the “real space of our planet”’ into what he terms ‘a horizonless perception under a vanished sky’ (see Virilio, 1997: 2, 2000: 63). Here, as with more orthodox Heideggerian analyses, the representation of the earth as planet is seen as a symbol of the deterritorializing technological power of global capitalism: a power that renders the ‘sphere of experience’ as ‘a synthesis of home and non-place, a nowhere place’ (Beck, 2002: 30).

Links – AT: We do something good (K Aff Link)

Engaging one facet of inequality or oppression only replicates the harm- only the re-examination of Dasein can prevent spirit murder and extinction

Spanos, (Professor of English at SUNY–Binghamton) **2k** (The Question of Philosophy and Poiesis in the Posthistorical Age: Thinking/ Imagining the Shadow of Metaphysics, William V. Spanos, *boundary 2*, 27.1 (2000) 169)/JRC

And in thus focusing this indissoluble relay, which could be collectively subsumed under the silence that belongs to the totalized saying privileged by a metaphysical representation of being as Being, this reconstellation also points the way that the rethinking or retrieval of thinking (and poiesis) must take when history has come to its end in the age of the world picture, which is to say, in the “posthistorical” age of transnational capitalism. In the interregnum, which bears witness to the massive displacement of human lives precipitated by the globalization of the idea of liberal capitalist democracy—and the utter inadequacy of the Western interpretation of human rights—it is not enough to engage capitalist economics or politics, or patriarchy, or racism, or classism, and so on. All these pursued independently remain trapped within the strategic disciplinarity of the dominant discourse. In the interregnum, rather, the thinker and the poet must think the polyvalent manifestations of the spectrality released by the consummation of the *Pax Metaphysica* if they are to prepare the way for a politics that is adequate to the task of resisting the impending *Pax Americana* and, beyond that, of establishing a *polis* that, in its always open-ended agonistics, precludes what Arendt, far more clearly than Heidegger and all those postmodern critics of the city of modernity, recognized as the banality of evil incumbent on the reduction of being at large to a territory, planetary in scope, to be conquered, compartmentalized, and administered. Which is to say on all self-righteous proclamations of universal peace that justify the physical and spiritual slaughter and maiming of human life.

Links – K/Anthro Affs

All life is not equally valuable--certain species are inherently more important

DeLuca 5 – Associate Professor of Speech Communication and adjunct in the Institute of Ecology at the University of Georgia – [Kevin Michael DeLuca, Ethics & the Environment, "Thinking with Heidegger: Rethinking Environmental Theory and Practice," Issue 10.1, p 67-87, Muse]

<<The first stasis point revolves around humanity's relation to nature. To put it plainly, in environmental circles it is still a Cartesian world, wherein the founding act is human thinking (cogito ergo sum) and the [End Page 71] earth is object to humanity's subject. This position is clear in mainstream environmentalism, where humans act to save the object earth and, fundamentally, this action is motivated by the subject's self-interest. So, we must save the rain forests because they contain potential medical resources and because they alleviate global warming.

Now certainly this base anthropocentrism has come under attack from various radical environmentalisms that posit biocentrism or ecocentrism. I would argue, however, that these anti-anthropocentric positions have not escaped the gravity of Cartesianism. This is evident at both theoretical and practical levels. Theoretically, in the effort to avoid the stain of anthropocentrism all beings are posited as having equal intrinsic worth/value and difference is leveled. The banana slug is equal to homo sapiens. There are problems with this. Most obviously, **the concept of intrinsic worth/value is philosophically incoherent—worth/value by definition is always relational.** More significantly for this discussion, to posit intrinsic worth/value is to deny the ecological insight that all beings are constituted in relation to other beings and their environment. Further, to deny difference is to blunt analysis of our current situation and to deny the differential levels of effects different species have. Homo sapiens is not another type of slug and must be analyzed with that awareness.>>

Links – Moral Discourse

Moral discourse is a link – it reaffirms power over nature and endangers all life

McWhorter, 92 – Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Northeast Missouri State University
(Ladelle, Heidegger and the Earth, ed. by Ladelle McWhorter)JRC—no change

<The first essay, "Guilt as Management Technology: A Call to Heideggerian Reflection," gives an overview of Heidegger's thinking on technology and discusses Heidegger's call for reflection as opposed to instrumental or calculative thinking about the earth. It carefully distinguishes reflection, in Heidegger's sense, from moral stock-taking or ethical judgment. In fact, it suggests that moral discourse and practice are themselves forms of technology, sets of techniques for maintaining control over self and other. As such, morality shows itself as a danger, as part of the technological, calculative, managerial thinking that currently endangers the earth itself. The essay closes with a kind of warning. If it is the case that morality is part of technological discourse and practice rather than a separable discourse whose purpose is critique, then moral condemnation and moral guilt are reinstantiations of the calculative. Thus, our tendency to feel guilty about our treatment of the earth is not a change of heart but is rather a perpetuation of human domination.'>

Links – Human/Nature Dichotomy (Hippies)

Attempts to save the world from environmental destruction create a human/nature dichotomy that is the root cause of the environmental crisis

DeLuca '5 (Kevin Michael DeLuca, Associate Professor of Speech Communication and adjunct in the Institute of Ecology at the University of Georgia, "Thinking With Heidegger: Rethinking Environmental Theory and Practice", Ethics & the Environment 10.1 (2005) 67-87, Project Muse)JRC

The first stasis point revolves around humanity's relation to nature. To put it plainly, in environmental circles it is still a Cartesian world, wherein the founding act is human thinking (cogito ergo sum) and the [End Page 71] earth is object to humanity's subject. This position is clear in mainstream environmentalism, where humans act to save the object earth and, fundamentally, this action is motivated by the subject's self-interest. So, we must save the rain forests because they contain potential medical resources and because they alleviate global warming. Now certainly this base anthropocentrism has come under attack from various radical environmentalisms that posit biocentrism or ecocentrism. I would argue, however, that these anti-anthropocentric positions have not escaped the gravity of Cartesianism. This is evident at both theoretical and practical levels. Theoretically, in the effort to avoid the stain of anthropocentrism all beings are posited as having equal intrinsic worth/value and difference is leveled. The banana slug is equal to homo sapiens. There are problems with this. Most obviously, the concept of intrinsic worth/value is philosophically incoherent—worth/value by definition is always relational. More significantly for this discussion, to posit intrinsic worth/value is to deny the ecological insight that all beings are constituted in relation to other beings and their environment. Further, to deny difference is to blunt analysis of our current situation and to deny the differential levels of effects different species have. Homo sapiens is not another type of slug and must be analyzed with that awareness. In practice, radical groups, most notably Earth First!, often demonize humans as a cancer on the planet. As the metaphor suggests, humans are seen as somehow different from all other forms of life, an alien other, not a part but apart. Even more significantly, the metaphor of cancer suggests humans to be active subjects preying on the object earth. Indeed, the problem with humanity, as with the cancer cell, is that it is too active. Although radical groups offer a different valuation, note that this position does not trouble the terms of Cartesianism. The dichotomies subject-object, human-animal, culture-nature, civilization-wilderness, remain intact. The active subject humanity threatens the object earth. The stasis point in actual environmental debates revolves around reform and radical environmental groups dismissing each other's seemingly oppositional positions as, respectively, anthropocentric and compromised versus misanthropic and unrealistic, while remaining oblivious to the underlying Cartesian presuppositions they both share. In other words, reform environmentalists privilege humanity while radical environmentalists demonize humanity. In this morality play on the fate of the [End Page 72]planet, humanity, whether hero or villain, is the actor. Heidegger's thinking on the subject-object dichotomy, Descartes, and the phenomenology of the structure of reality offer a useful lever with which to displace these dichotomies and challenge the traditional ontology that undergirds and girdles environmental thinking. Citing the Cartesian ontology of the world as dominant, Heidegger in Being and Time works to "demonstrate explicitly not only that Descartes' conception of the world is ontologically defective, but that his Interpretation and the foundations on which it is based have led him to pass over both the phenomenon of the world and the Being of those entities within-the-world which are proximally ready-to-hand" (1962, 128). Briefly, Heidegger critiques Descartes for positing a "bare subject without a world" (1962, 192) and for relying on mathematics, which produces the sort of Reality it can grasp, thus "the kind of Being which belongs to sensuous perception is obliterated, and so is any possibility that the entities encountered in such perception should be grasped in their Being" (1962, 130). Descartes' ontology presumes the dynamic of an isolated subject grasping mathematically world as object. Arguably, it is this perspective that is at the root of the environmental crisis, for the world is reduced to an object laid out before me and I am reduced to a detached subject that has only a use-relation to a dead world.

Links – Guilt/Morals

Appeals to guilt/lifestyle change or morality are the link – they seek to accomplish the perfect life and are the ultimate form of managerial control

McWhorter, 92 – Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Northeast Missouri State University
(Ladelle, Heidegger and the Earth, ed. by Ladelle McWhorter)JRC

<Some men feel guilty about sexism; many white people feel guilty about racism; most of us feel guilty about all sorts of habits and idiosyncracies that we tell ourselves we firmly believe should be changed. For many of us guilt is a constant constraint upon our lives, a seemingly permanent state. As a result, guilt is familiar, and, though somewhat uncomfortable at times, it comes to feel almost safe. It is no surprise, then, that whenever caring people think hard about how to live with/in/on the earth, we find ourselves growing anxious and, usually, feeling guilty about the way we conduct ourselves in relation to the natural world. Guilt is a standard defense against the call for change as it takes root within us. But, if we are to think with Heidegger, if we are to heed his call to reflect, we must not respond to it simply by deploring our decadent life-styles and indulging ourselves in a fit of remorse. Heidegger's call is not a moral condemnation, nor is it a call to take up some politically correct position or some privileged ethical stance.

When we respond to Heidegger's call as if it were a moral condemnation, we reinstate a discourse in which active agency and its projects and responsibilities take precedence over any other way of being with the earth. In other words, we insist on remaining within the discourses, the power configurations, of the modern managerial self. Guilt is a concept whose heritage and meaning occur within the ethical tradition of the Western world. But the history of ethical theory in the West (and it could be argued that ethical theory only occurs in the West) is one with the history of technological thought. The revelation of things as to-be-managed and the imperative to be in control work themselves out in the history of ethics just as surely as they work themselves out in the history of the natural and human sciences.

It is probably quite true that in many different cultures, times, and places human beings have asked the question: How shall I best live my life? But in the West, and in relatively modern times, we have reformulated that question so as to ask: How shall I conduct myself? How shall I behave? How shall I manage my actions, my relationships, my desires? And how shall I make sure my neighbors do the same? Alongside technologies of the earth have grown up technologies of the soul, theories of human behavioral control of which current ethical theories are a significant subset. Ethics in the modern world at least very frequently functions as just another field of scientific study yielding just another set of engineering goals.

Therefore, when we react to problems like ecological crises by retreating into the familiar discomfort of our Western sense of guilt, we are not placing ourselves in opposition to technological thinking and its ugly consequences. On the contrary, we are simply reasserting our technological dream of perfect managerial control. How so? Our guilt professes our enduring faith in the managerial dream by insisting that problems - problems like oil spills, acid rain, groundwater pollution, the extinction of whales, the destruction of the ozone, the rain forests, the wetlands - lie simply in mismanagement or in a failure to manage (to manage ourselves in this case) and by reaffirming to ourselves that if we had used our power to manage our behavior better in the first place we could have avoided this mess. In other words, when we respond to Heidegger's call by indulging in feelings of guilt about how we have been treating the object earth, we are really just telling ourselves how truly powerful we, as agents, are. We are telling ourselves that we really could have done differently; we had the power to make things work, if only we had stuck closer to the principles of good management. And in so saying we are in yet a new and more stubborn way refusing to hear the real message, the message that human beings are not, never have been, and never can be in complete control, that the dream of that sort of managerial omnipotence is itself the very danger of which Heidegger warns.

Thus guilt - as affirmation of human agential power over against passive matter - is just another way of covering over the mystery. Thus guilt is just another way of refusing to face the fact that we human beings are finite and that we must begin to live *with* the earth instead of trying to maintain total control. Guilt is part and parcel of a managerial approach to the world.

Thinking along Heidegger's paths means resisting the power of guilt, resisting the desire to close ourselves off from the possibility of being with our own finitude. It means finding "the courage to make the truth of our own presuppositions and the realm of our own goals into the things that most deserve to be called in question." It means holding ourselves resolutely open for the shattering power of the event of thinking, even if what is shattered eventually is ourselves.>

Links – Overcoming Growth

The idea of overcoming limits is precisely the problem that turns the case.

Thiele 95 – Professor of Political Science at University of Florida (Leslie Paul, Timely Meditations, p.191)

Ecological concerns have erupted in postmodern times largely as a result of the increasingly apparent limits to human growth. The more these limits are ignored - or worse, viewed as obstacles to be overcome - the graver the crisis becomes. Heidegger develops a philosophy of limits. More to the point, Heidegger describes our freedom as **dependent on rather than curtailed** by our worldly boundaries. Once the boundaries of human being are experienced neither as a threat to human freedom nor as an affront to human dignity, the tragic attempt to conquer the earth might be abated and the opportunity for its caretaking approached.

Impacts – Laundry List

Technological thought transforms the world into a standing reserve that voids meaning of life, destroying potentiality, and setting the conditions necessary for concentration camps and war

Weinberger 92 (Jerry Weinberger, Professor of Political Science at Michigan State University, “Politics and the Problem of Technology: An Essay on Heidegger and the Tradition of Political Philosophy”, *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 86, No. 1 (Mar. 1992), pp. 112-127, JSTOR)KR/JRC

Under the sway of metaphysics, the domains of being are so conceived as ultimately to produce the domination of all by one-by objective manipulability. Thus, metaphysics comes to a peak in modern technology, for whose conception of being-which Heidegger calls the enframing (Gestell)-every entity, whether theoretical object, human being, earth, sky, or god, is taken as the manipulable stuff-the standing reserve (Bestand)-of an endless industrial business transaction (Heidegger 1977, 17-28). 1 In the full-blown age of technology, the phenomena of art, politics, and the gods are flattened in being understood as the objects of scientific knowledge, in the light of which they become merely useful. In such an age genuine creativity, reverence, loyalty, rootedness, and the full possibilities of astonishment and estrangement are obliterated in a cybernetic swirl that spares nothing, that annihilates everything. The age of technology is the age of the last man, for whom the whole of nature and every human being is the standing reserve of a plethora of industries: publishing, war, travel, entertainment, agriculture, concentration camps, education, and so on. And in this age there are no differences among the great competing social and political systems, all of which are bound together in the embrace of global technology.

Impacts – Zimmerman

The loss of Being is worse than nuclear war.

Zimmerman – Professor of Philosophy at Tulane University – **94** (Michael, Contesting Earth's Future, p. 119-120)

Heidegger asserted that human self-assertion, combined with the eclipse of being, threatens the relation between being and human Dasein. **Loss of this relation would be even more dangerous than a nuclear war that might "bring about the complete annihilation of humanity** and the destruction of the earth." This controversial claim is comparable to the Christian teaching that it is better to forfeit the world than to lose one's soul by losing one's relation to God. Heidegger apparently thought along these lines: it is possible that after a nuclear war, life might once again emerge, but it is far less likely that there will ever again occur an ontological clearing through which such life could manifest itself. Further, since modernity's one-dimensional disclosure of entities virtually denies them any "being" at all, the loss of humanity's openness for being is already occurring. Modernity's background mood is horror in the face of nihilism, which is consistent with the aim of providing material "happiness" for everyone by reducing nature to pure energy. The unleashing of vast quantities of energy in nuclear war would be equivalent to modernity's slow-motion destruction of nature: unbounded destruction would equal limitless consumption. If humanity avoided nuclear war only to survive as contented clever animals, Heidegger believed we would exist in a state of ontological damnation: hell on earth, masquerading as material paradise. Deep ecologists might agree that a world of material human comfort purchased at the price of everything wild would not be a world worth living in, for in killing wild nature, people would be as good as dead. But most of them could not agree that the loss of humanity's relation to being would be worse than nuclear omnicide, for it is wrong to suppose that the lives of millions of extinct and unknown species are somehow lessened because they were never "disclosed" by humanity.

Impacts – Standing Reserve

Calculative thought incorporates all surroundings into a homogenous standing reserve. Even human beings become objectified and replaceable.

Mitchell 5 [Andrew J. Mitchell, Post-Doctoral Fellow in the Humanities at Stanford University, "Heidegger and Terrorism," [Research in Phenomenology](#), Volume 35, Number 1, 2005, pp. 181-218]

Opposition is no longer an operative concept for Heidegger, since technology has served to eradicate the distance that would separate the supposedly opposed parties _____. The analysis of technology in Heidegger's work is guided by the (phenomenological) insight that "All distances in time and space are shrinking" (GA 79: 3; cf. GA 7: 157/PLT, 165).¹³ Airplanes, microwaves, e-mail, these serve to abbreviate the world, to be sure, but there is a metaphysical distance that has likewise been reduced, that between subject and object. This modern dualism has been surpassed by what Heidegger terms the standing-reserve (*Bestand*), the eerie companion of technological dominance and "enframing." Insofar as an object (*Gegenstand*) would stand over against (*Gegen*) a subject, objects can no longer be found. "What stands by in the sense of standing-reserve, no longer stands over against us as object" (GA 7: 20/QCT, 17). A present object could stand over against another; the standing-reserve, however, precisely does not stand; instead, it circulates, and in this circulation it eludes the modern determination of thinghood. It is simply not present to be cast as a thing.

With enframing, which names the dominance of position, positing, and posing (*stellen*) in all of its modes, things are no longer what they were. Everything becomes an item for ordering (*bestellen*) and delivering (*zustellen*); everything is "ready in place" (*auf der Stelle zur Stelle*), constantly available and replaceable (GA 79: 28). The standing-reserve "exists" within this cycle of order and delivery, exchange and replacement._____ This is not merely a development external to modern objects, but a change in their being. The standing-reserve is found only in its circulation

along these supply channels, where one item is just as good as any other, where, in fact, one item is identical to any other. Replaceability is the being of things today. "Today being is being-replaceable" (VS, 107/62), Heidegger claims in 1969. The transformation is such that what is here now is not really here now, since there is an item identical to it somewhere else ready for delivery. This cycle of ordering and delivery does not operate serially, since we are no longer dealing with discrete, individual objects. Instead, there is only a steady circulation of the standing-reserve, which is here now just as much as it is there in storage. The standing-reserve spreads itself throughout the entirety of its replacement cycle, without being fully present at any point along the circuit. But it is not merely a matter of mass produced products being replaceable. To complete Heidegger's view of the enframed standingreserve, we have to take into consideration the global role of value, a complementary determination of being: "Being has become value" (GA 5: 258/192). The

Nietzschean legacy for the era of technology (Nietzsche

as a thinker of values) is evident here. But the preponderance of value is so far from preserving differences and establishing order of rank, that it only serves to further level the ranks and establish the identity of everything with its replacement. When everything has a value, an exchangeability and replaceability operates laterally across continents, languages, and difference, with great homogenizing and globalizing effect. The standing-reserve collapses opposition.

The will that dominates the modern era is personal, even if, as is the case with Leibniz, the ends of that will are not completely known by the self at any particular time. Nonetheless, the will still expresses the individuality of the person and one's perspective. In the era of technology, the will that comes to the fore is no longer the will of an individual, but a will without a restricted human agenda. In fact, the will in question no longer wills an object outside of itself, but only wills itself; it is a will to will. In this way, the will need never leave itself. This self-affirming character of the will allows the will an independence from the human. Manifest in the very workings of technology is a will to power, which for Heidegger is always a will to will. Because the will to will has no goal outside of it, its willing is goalless and endless. The human is just another piece of a standing-reserve that circulates without purpose.

Actually, things have not yet gone so far; the human still retains a distinction, however illusive, as "the most important raw material" (GA 7: 88/EP, 104). This importance has nothing to do with the personal willing of conditional goals, as Heidegger immediately makes clear, "The human is the 'most important raw material' because he remains the subject of all consumption, so much so that he lets his will go forth unconditionally in this process and simultaneously becomes the 'object' of the abandonment of being" (GA 7: 88/EP, 104). Unconditioned willing transcends the merely human will, which satisfies itself with restricted goals and accomplishments. Unconditioned willing makes of the subject an agent of the abandonment of being, one whose task it is to objectify everything. The more the world comes to stand at

the will's disposal, the more that being retreats from it. The human will is allied with the technological will to will _____. For this reason-and the following is something often overlooked in considering Heidegger's political position between the wars-Heidegger is critical of the very notion of a Führer, or leader, who would direct the

circulation of the standing-reserve according to his own personal will. The leaders of today are merely the necessary accompaniment of a standing-reserve that, in its abstraction, is susceptible to planning. The leaders' seeming position of "subjectivity," that they are the ones who decide, is again another working of "objectification," where neither of these terms quite fits, given that beings are no longer objective.

The willfulness of the leaders is not due to a personal will: One believes that the leaders had presumed everything of their own accord in the blind rage of a selfish egotism and arranged everything in accordance with their own will [*Eigensinn*]. In truth, however, leaders are the necessary consequence of the fact that beings have gone over to a way of errancy, in which an emptiness expands that requires a single ordering and securing of beings. (GA 7: 89/EP, 105; **tin**) The leaders do not stand above or control the proceedings, the proceedings in question affect beings as a whole, including the leaders. Leaders are simply points of convergence or conduits for the channels of circulation; they are needed for circulation, but are nowhere outside of it. No leader is the sole authority; instead, there are numerous "sectors" to which each leader is assigned. The demands of these sectors will be similar of course, organized around efficiency and productivity in distribution and circulation. In short, leaders serve the standing-reserve.

Impacts – Standing Reserve

The drive to simplify thought into problems and solutions reduces life to standing reserve

Spanos, 2k – Distinguished Professor of English at Binghamton

(William V, America's Shadow: An Anatomy of Empire, pg. 19)//markoff

The reductive ontological drive to settle or fix by simplifying what in essence is unsettlable, unfixable, and irreducible is, of course, the metaphysical prerequisite to transform that which defies naming into manageable and exploitable objects. It is, as Heidegger puts the end of modern technological thinking, to reduce the recalcitrant and threatening Other to "standing [disposable] reserve" (Bestand), or, as Foucault represents the effects of the great disciplinary technology of the Enlightenment, to transform the force of alterity to "useful and docile body."²⁵ This reduction and assignment of the Other to its "proper place" - within the identical whole - this colonization of *physis*, in other words, could be said to be "its" "destiny" under the regime of metaphysical truth. This complicity between knowledge and power has its provenance far earlier than the period of the Enlightenment, where Foucault's or, rather, his followers' genealogy locates it: namely, in late Greek (Hellenistic) and, above all, imperial Roman antiquity.

Impacts – Standing Reserve (Detailed)

The technological age places humans and nature in standing reserve- Standing reserve is to be objectified, counted and calculated- the impact is you are assigned no value to your life

Mitchell 5 [Andrew J. Mitchell, Post-Doctoral Fellow in the Humanities at Stanford University, "Heidegger and Terrorism," Research in Phenomenology, Volume 35, Number 1, 2005, pp. 181-218]/jrc

Opposition is no longer an operative concept for Heidegger, since technology has served to eradicate the distance that would separate the supposedly opposed parties. The analysis of technology in Heidegger's work is guided by the (phenomenological) insight that "All distances in time and space are shrinking" (GA 79: 3; cf. GA 7: 157/PLT, 165).¹³ Airplanes, microwaves, e-mail, these serve to abbreviate the world, to be sure, but there is a metaphysical distance that has likewise been reduced, that between subject and object. This modern dualism has been surpassed by what Heidegger terms the standing-reserve (Bestand), the eerie companion of technological dominance and "enframing." Insofar as an object (*Gegenstand*) would stand over against (*Gegen*) a subject, objects can no longer be found. "What stands by in the sense of standing-reserve, no longer stands over against us as object" (GA 7: 20/QCT, 17). A present object could stand over against another; the standing-reserve, however, precisely does not stand; instead, it circulates, and in this circulation it eludes the modern determination of thinghood. It is simply not present to be cast as a thing. With enframing, which names the dominance of position, positing, and posing (*stellen*) in all of its modes, things are no longer what they were. Everything becomes an item for ordering (bestellen) and delivering (zustellen); everything is "ready in place" (auf der Stelle zur Stelle), constantly available and replaceable (GA 79: 28). The standing-reserve "exists" within this cycle of order and delivery, exchange and replacement.

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But it is not merely a matter of mass produced products being replaceable. To complete Heidegger's view of the enframed standingreserve, we have to take into consideration the global role of value, a complementary determination of being: "Being has become value" (GA 5: 258/192). The Nietzschean legacy for the era of technology (Nietzsche as a thinker of values) is evident here. But the preponderance of value is so far from preserving differences and establishing order of rank, that it only serves to further level the ranks and establish the identity of everything with its replacement. When everything has a value, an exchangeability and replaceability operates laterally across continents, languages, and difference, with great homogenizing and globalizing effect. The standing-reserve collapses opposition. The will that dominates the modern era is personal, even if, as is the case with Leibniz, the ends of that will are not completely known by the self at any particular time. Nonetheless, the will still expresses the individuality of the person and one's perspective. In the era of technology, the will that comes to the fore is no longer the will of an individual, but a will without a restricted human agenda. In fact, the will in question no longer wills an object outside of itself, but only wills itself; it is a will to will. In this way, the will need never leave itself. This self-affirming character of the will allows the will an independence from the human. Manifest in the very workings of technology is a will to power, which for Heidegger is always a will to will. Because the will to will has no goal outside of it, its willing is goalless and endless. The human is just another piece of a standing-reserve that circulates without purpose. Actually, things have not yet gone so far; the human still retains a distinction, however illusive, as "the most important raw material" (GA 7: 88/EP, 104). This importance has nothing to do with the personal willing of conditional goals, as Heidegger immediately makes clear. "The human is the 'most important raw material' because he remains the subject of all consumption, so much so that he lets his will go forth unconditionally in this process and simultaneously becomes the 'object' of the abandonment of being" (GA 7: 88/EP, 104). Unconditioned willing transcends the merely human will, which satisfies itself with restricted goals and accomplishments. Unconditioned willing makes of the subject an agent of the abandonment of being, one whose task it is to objectify everything. The more the world comes to stand at the will's disposal, the more that being retreats from it. The human will is allied with the technological will to will. For this reason-and the following is something often overlooked in considering Heidegger's political position between the wars-Heidegger is critical of the very notion of a Führer, or leader, who would direct the circulation of the standing-reserve according to his own personal will. The leaders of today are merely the necessary accompaniment of a standing-reserve that, in its abstraction, is susceptible to planning. The leaders' seeming position of "subjectivity," that they are the ones who decide, is again another working of "objectification," where neither of these terms quite fits, given that beings are no longer objective. The willfulness of the leaders is not due to a personal will: One believes that the leaders had presumed everything of their own accord in the blind rage of a selfish egotism and arranged everything in accordance with their own will [*Eigensinn*]. 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Impacts – Value to Life/Extinction (1NC?)

Environmental management causes loss of being and makes extinction through nuclear war and environmental destruction inevitable

McWhorter, 92 – Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Northeast Missouri State University
(Ladelle, Heidegger and the Earth, ed. by Ladelle McWhorter)JRC—no change

<What is most illustrative is often also what is most common. Today, on all sides of ecological debate we hear, with greater and greater frequency, the word *management*. On the one hand, business people want to manage natural resources so as to keep up profits. On the other hand, conservationists want to manage natural resources so that there will be plenty of coal and oil and recreational facilities for future generations. These groups and factions within them debate vociferously over which management policies are the best, that is, the most efficient and manageable. Radical environmentalists damn both groups and claim it is human population growth and rising expectations that are in need of management. But wherever we look, wherever we listen, we see and hear the term *management*. We are living in a veritable age of management. Before a middle class child graduates from high school she or he is already preliminarily trained in the arts of weight management, stress management, and time management, to name just a few. As we approach middle age we continue to practice these essential arts, refining and adapting our regulatory regimes as the pressures of life increase and the body begins to break down. We have become a society of managers - of our homes, careers, portfolios, estates, even of our own bodies - so is it surprising that we set ourselves up as the managers of the earth itself? And yet, as thoughtful earth-dwellers we must ask, what does this signify?

In numerous essays - in particular the beautiful 1953 essay, "The Question Concerning Technology" - Heidegger speaks of what he sees as the danger of dangers in this, our age. This danger is a kind of forgetfulness, a forgetfulness that Heidegger thought could result not only in nuclear disaster or environmental catastrophe, but in the loss of what makes us the kind of beings we are, beings who can think and who can stand in thoughtful relationship to things. This forgetfulness is not a forgetting of facts and their relationships; it is a forgetfulness of something far more important and far more fundamental than that. He called it forgetfulness of 'the mystery'. >

Impacts – Value to Life

Faith and reliance in technology destroys the primal value of life

Heidegger, 77 (Martin, *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*, translated by William Lovitt, p14, ASG/JRC)

In contrast, a tract of land is challenged into the putting out of coal and ore. The earth now reveals itself as a coal mining district, the soil as a mineral deposit. The field that the peasant formerly cultivated and set into order [*bestellte*] appears differently than it did when to set in order still meant to take care of and to maintain. The work of the peasant does not challenge the soil of the field. In the sowing of the grain it places the seed in the keeping of the forces of growth and watches over its increase. But meanwhile even the cultivation of the field has come under the grip of another kind of setting-in-order, which sets upon nature. It sets upon it in the sense of challenging it. Agriculture is now the mechanized food industry. Air is now set upon to yield nitrogen, the earth to yield ore, ore to yield uranium, for example; uranium is set upon to yield atomic energy, which can be released either for destruction or for peaceful use. This setting-upon that challenges forth the energies of nature is an expediting, and in two ways. It expedites in that it unlocks and exposes. Yet that expediting is always itself directed from the beginning toward furthering something else, i.e., toward driving on to the maximum yield at the minimum expense. The coal that has been hauled out in some mining district has not been supplied in order that it may simply be present somewhere or other. It is stockpiled; that is, it is in call, ready to deliver the sun's warmth that is stored in it. The sun's warmth is challenged forth for the heat, which in turn is ordered to deliver steam whose pressure turns the wheels that keep a factory running.

No Value to life in their framework- Embracing technology prevents ones ability to reveal themselves in the world, and thus cannot experience a more primal truth

Heidegger, 77 (Martin, *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*, translated by William Lovitt, p28, ASG/JRC)

Enframing blocks the shining-forth and holding-sway of truth. The destining that sends into ordering is consequently the extreme danger. What is dangerous is not technology. There is no demonry of technology but rather there is the mystery of its essence. The essence of technology, as a destining of revealing, is the danger. The transformed meaning of the word "Enframing" will perhaps become somewhat more familiar to us now if we thing Enframing in the sense of destining and danger. The threat to man does not come in the first instance from the potentially lethal machines and apparatus of technology. The actual threat has already affected man in his essence. The rule of Enframing threatens man with the possibility that it could be denied to him to enter into a more original revealing and hence to experience the call of a more primal truth.

Enframing the world as a standing reserve of resources eliminates its value

Sofia 2K (Zoe Sofia, Senior Lecturer in feminist studies and cultural studies and Chair of the School of Cultural Histories and Futures at the University of Western Sydney, "Container Technologies", *Hypatia* 15.2 (2000) 181-201, Project Muse)

The outcome of this challenging-forth is a macro-technology of re-sourcing that Heidegger calls the Bestand. This "standing-reserve" is a mobilizable stockpile of resources available for instant supply: "Everywhere everything is ordered to stand by, to be immediately at hand, indeed to stand there just so that it may be on call for a further ordering" (1977b, 17). The plane on the runway, ready for take-off, epitomizes this on-call orderability of resources: the plane might look like an autonomous machine, but it only exists "to ensure the possibility of transportation" (1977b, 17). Another image might be rows of stacked large containers ready equally for transport by road, rail, or sea. In this modern formation, making resources available predominates over appreciating the unique qualities of the thing. The object loses its qualities as the Gegenstand--that which resists and stands against--and the machine loses its standing as an autonomous tool, dissolved into the Bestand, where it is just another "completely unautonomous" element in the abstract and global grid of the resourced world (1977b, 17).

Impacts – Value to Life

Modern technology creates a paradox- while simultaneously stripping humans of their potential of establishing value to life, it also crowns them rulers of the earth which creates the greatest danger ever known in history

Beckman - Emeritus Professor of Philosophy Humanities and Social Sciences Harvey Mudd College - 00 (Tad, "Martin Heidegger and Environmental Ethics," 2000, <http://www2.hmc.edu/~tbeckman/personal/Heidart.html>) //JRC

To see the essence of technology in this way delivers us into the final phase of Heidegger's analysis, the great danger to humanity that technology represents. Just as enframing organizes our lives progressively into a disposition of challenging and ordering the things around us into standing reserve, its progress as a development of human destiny challenges and orders us into standing reserve for its own ends. "The destining of revealing is in itself not just any danger, but danger as such. Yet when destining reigns in the mode of Enframing, it is the supreme danger. This danger attests itself to us in two ways. As soon as what is unconcealed no longer concerns man even as object, but does so, rather, exclusively as standing-reserve, and man in the midst of objectlessness is nothing but the orderer of standing-reserve, then he comes to the very brink of a precipitous fall; that is, he comes to the point where he himself will have to be taken as standing-reserve. Meanwhile, man, precisely as the one so threatened, exalts himself to the posture of lord of the earth. In this way the impression comes to prevail that everything man encounters exists only insofar as it is his construct. This illusion gives rise in turn to one final delusion: It seems as though man everywhere and always encounters only himself." { [7], pp. 26-7; emphasis added}

Just as humans have progressively limited the being of the natural objects around them, Heidegger observed, they too have acquired a progressively limited character or being. While we have come to think that we encounter only ourselves in the world, "in truth, however, precisely nowhere does man today any longer encounter himself, i.e., in his essence." { [7], p. 27} While all epochs of human evolution contain danger, the epoch of modern technology possesses the gravest danger because it is the epoch whose characteristic is to conduct humanity out of its own essence. Modern technology, in Heidegger's view, is the highest stage of misrepresentation of the essence of being human. (9) In order to understand this danger completely and, certainly, in order to come to accept it as a correct analysis, will require a more extensive review of Heidegger's theory of human nature and its essence. But this will be easier and also more appropriate in the final section of this essay, after we have reviewed Heidegger's understanding of art. For art, in its essence and not as we presently conceive of it, from the disposition of enframing, is a wholly separate path of human development.

Calculative thought kills value to life – turns nature and humanity into standing reserve

McWhorter, 92 – Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Northeast Missouri State University
(Ladelle, Heidegger and the Earth, ed. by Ladelle McWhorter)//JRC

<The danger of a managerial approach to the world lies not, then, in what it knows - not in its penetration into the secrets of galactic emergence or nuclear fission - but in what it forgets, what it itself conceals. It forgets that any other truths are possible, and it forgets that the belonging together of revealing with concealing is forever beyond the power of human management. We can never have, or know, it all: we can never manage everything.

What is now especially dangerous about this sense of our own managerial power, born of forgetfulness, is that it results in our viewing the world as mere resources to be stored or consumed. Managerial or technological thinkers, Heidegger says, view the earth, the world, all things as mere Bestand, standing-reserve.

All is here simply for human use. No plant, no animal, no ecosystem has a life of its own, has any significance, apart from human desire and need. Nothing, we say, other than human beings, has any intrinsic value. All things are instruments for the working out of human will. Whether we believe that God gave Man dominion or simply that human might (sometimes called intelligence or rationality) in the face of ecological fragility makes us always right, we managerial, technological thinkers tend to believe that the earth is only a stockpile or a set of commodities to be managed, bought, and sold. The forest is timber; the river, a power source. Even people have become resources, human resources, personnel to be managed, or populations to be controlled. >

Impacts – Value to Life/Machination

Machination renders all being in standing reserve- that are set aside as commodities and destroy any relation to value that one can achieve for themselves

de Beistegui, 97 – Professor of Philosophy at the University of Warwick (Miguel, Heidegger and the Political, ed. by K. Ansell-Pearson and S. Critchely, p.71, ASG)

This essence, which Heidegger will eventually identify as “en-framing” (*Ge-stell*), is first thematized as “machination” (*Machenschaft*) in the *Contributions to Philosophy*. By “machination,” Heidegger understands the way in which the truth of beingness comes to be interpreted on the basis of the ever more radical abandonment of being, and which culminates in a metaphysics of “lived experiences” (*Erlebnisse*) and “worldviews” (*Weltanschauungen*), with man standing as the ultimate standpoint and center of all interpretation concerning beings in their beingness. Through the gradual forgottenness of his essence (his relation to the truth of being, or to presence in its presencing), which for the first time he is in danger of losing, man has become the grand manipulator of beings as a whole. Machination is the historical-metaphysical process whereby the whole of being becomes a domain for scientific investigation, technological manipulation and the proliferation of “ideas” “values,” and “views” about the “world.” But for the earth to become a region submitted to the scientific gaze and the willful power of man, the whole of being must first be revealed and envisaged in a certain way. In other words, if beings as a whole are envisaged today as that which can be interrogated with a view to an ever more precise and pressing process of manipulation, transformation and reproduction, such beings must first be *posited* as such. Beings as a whole have indeed become a *positum*, and “science” “positive” science. In that respect, it matters little whether science be understood in the sense of a “cultural value” (*Kulturwert*), as in most liberal democracies, of a “service to the people” (*Dienst am Volke*), as in a communist regime, or of a “national science” (*völkische Wissenschaft*), as in the biological ideology of Nazism. In other words, it makes no difference whether science be seen from the perspective of Capital and of its logic of accumulation, whether it be considered from the standpoint of the systematic and technical organization of the earth through five-year planning, or indeed from the viewpoint of the preservation and the perpetuation of the master race. In every case, the whole of being must be posited as standing reserve (*Bestand*), as that which can be endlessly manipulated, transformed, processed or disposed of according to the various needs and idiosyncracies of the many forms in which machination manifests itself. Not only the earth, but man himself—whether as the entrepreneur of Capital, the Worker of the Socialist State (Stakhanov) or the disposable non-Aryan—has become subjected to this process of machination: a commodity like any other commodity, an instrument of global planning, disposable waste (industrial, biological, political). In every case the earth and man himself have become this stuff under the yoke of the will to power. “Science” is nothing other than the “setting-up of the correctness for a domain of explanation.” The only relevant question, with respect to the relation between the various sciences and the kind of worldviews, ideologies and politics they serve is to know which one, amongst the latter, will be able to mobilize the greatest means and forces so as to provide science with its most extreme and final condition, a task which might indeed very well take several hundreds of years to be completed. After the collapse of the so-called totalitarian states, the advantage, in this struggle for power, seems to be on the side of Capital. But who can be sure that a more systematic, technical and global form of organization of the whole of being will not appear some day, thus rendering democracy as a form of technological organization redundant?

Machinism reduces the values of humans and the environment to utility and productivity

Dallmayr, 04 (PhD, Professor, Department of Government and International Studies, Notre Dame, Constellations Volume 11, No 1, 2004
The Underside of Modernity: Adorno, Heidegger, and Dussel Fred Dallmayr)//JRC

The critique of totalizing and domineering *Machenschaft* was further sharpened in the book titled *Besinnung*. As in the case of *Beiträge*, the text can be read both on a recessed, philosophical and a more mundane, political level—although the two levels are closely interlaced. Philosophically, *Besinnung* urges a more reflective re-thinking of human being-in-the-world, a re-thinking opening human hearts and minds again to the “call of being” (which guides them into a more careful and caring mode of living). As before, Heidegger dwells on the meaning of *Machenschaft* and its relation to *Macht* and *Gewalt*. “Machenschaft,” he reiterates, “means the all-pervasive and totalizing ‘makeability’ of everything” and the general routine acceptance of this process in such a way that “the unconditional calculability of everything is assured.” In pursuing its leveling and domineering path, Machenschaft employs violence (Gewalt) and the latter is stabilized through the “secure possession of power (Macht)” aiming at universal or total subjugation. In modernity, the text continues, the aims of Machenschaft are promoted and abetted by technology (Technik) which reduces human beings to mere empirical resources whose value is assessed purely in terms of utility or productivity. It is in this context that Heidegger launches an attack on the Führer himself who, in address to the Reichstag in 1939 had made this statement: “There is no stance or attitude (*Haltung*) which would not receive its ultimate justification from its utility for the totality (of the nation).” Reacting angrily to this statement, Heidegger raises a number of acerbic questions, such as the following: What is the “totality” that is postulated here? What is the “utility” of an attitude or outlook, and by what standard is it to be judged? Does the entire statement not signify “the denial of the basic questionability (*Fraglichkeit*) of human *Dasein* with regard to its hidden relation to being” (and its care)?¹⁴

Impacts – Value to Life Outweighs Nuclear War

Our evidence is comparative- Loss of essence outweighs extinction and makes extinction from nihilism inevitable- Recapturing the essence of being is a prerequisite to reestablishing a proper form of ethics and politics (INC?)

de Beistegui, 97 – Professor of Philosophy at the University of Warwick (Miguel, Heidegger and the Political, ed. by K. Ansell-Pearson and S. Critchely, p.71, ASG)JRC

Yet, at this point, everything happens as if our postmodern condition were nothing but the experience of the unlimited acceleration of time, an acceleration that results in the “spatialisation” of the planet (and of the universe as a whole), that is, in the absolute domination of space in the form of total and readily available presence. The need of being is no longer needed. The essential unfolding of presence has withdrawn, and we are left with beings in the form of standing-reserve. As a result, man is for the first time confronted with the greatest of all dangers, a danger far greater than that of the total and destructive unleashing of power over the earth, and that is the danger of the threat of the annihilation of his essence. The essence of man consists in being needed by being. So long as we do not envisage the destination of man according to his essence, so long as we do not think of man together with being, but solely with the unrelentless releasing of beings, nihilism will continue to prevail, both in essence and in actuality. In essence, as the most extreme manifestation of the *Seinsvergessenheit*; in actuality, as the politics of world domination, which our “democracies” seem to carry out with particular effectiveness. Thus, a politics that concerns itself only with “man,” and not with the *essence* of man is bound to nihilism as to its most intimate fate. Does this mean that Heidegger promotes something like a politics of being? No, insofar as politics is always and irreducibly ontic: it concerns man’s relation to man. Yet this relation is itself made subject to the way in which being claims man. There can be no politics of being, whether in the sense of a politics inspired by being or with being as its object, because being cannot be the stake of a political program or will. A politics of being is as meaningless as an ethics of being. Yet neither ethics nor politics can be without the prior disclosure of the epochal configuration within which they emerge. In this sense, ethics and politics are always of being. Both ethics as dwelling and politics as place point to man’s necessity to find an abode on this earth and to dwell amongst beings. And if Heidegger is so weary of ethics and politics, it is precisely insofar as these modes of dwelling no longer satisfy man’s essence, no longer provide man with an abode that is adequate to his essence, in other words, no longer constitute the space of his freedom understood as freedom for his essence (for his relation to the default of being), but are entirely summoned by the power of machination. Unless we come to think of ethics and of politics as the site of a conversion toward the essence of being, a site in which man would find his proper place.

Impacts – Value to Life Outweighs Nuclear War

Technological thinking causes the brutalization of humanity and a establish a false sense of value to life- this outweighs nuclear destruction our alternative is mutually exclusive

Weinberger 92 (Jerry Weinberger, Professor of Political Science at Michigan State University, "Politics and the Problem of Technology: An Essay on Heidegger and the Tradition of Political Philosophy", The American Political Science Review, Vol. 86, No. 1 (Mar. 1992), pp. 112-127, JSTOR) KR/JRC

Recent thinking about technology and its implications for politics has taken a postmodern turn. In its modern formulation, the danger of technology is the possibility that in the scientific age we will succumb to the consequences of our most impressive intellectual achievements. First, we were poised on the brink of nuclear destruction. Now, as that threat fades, we and the world face new dangers, this time springing from technology used with the best of intentions. Disaster looms because technology enhances our powers of control and because modern science, the theoretical ground of technology, under- stands human nature to be as manipulable as matter in motion. Under the spell of these forces we risk self-inflicted deformation and brutalization, all in the name of human comfort, freedom from pain, and variety of choice. From this modern point of view technology compels us to remember our essential humanity lest we fail to control the technical means that threaten fundamental values (e.g., Jonas 1984; Kass 1985). The modern age is not just the age of science; it is the age of the potentially beneficent tension between science and humanism. If we under- stand how science and humanism contend within the progress of reason, it will be possible to exercise responsible political choice today. The postmodern view is perhaps best expressed by Heidegger's comment that "the essence of technology is by no means anything technological" (Heidegger 1977, 4; 1967, vol. 1, 5). Technology is not the sum of machines and techniques that we must learn to master and use as a neutral set of means lest we forsake our humanity. Technology is not even something we need to "do" anything about. Rather, it is just what we have now become. And although it opens our eyes, it does not compel us to seek out a reinvigorated humanism. On the contrary, technology discloses to us that humanism is the proximate source of technology. Technology is indeed a fateful danger; but it shows us that within the tradition of rationalism, the essences of technology and humanism are the same. As the result of that tradition, our world is now stamped by technology. But the problem of technology has nothing to do with recovering humane standards for political (and technical) choice. That problem is less a challenge to be met and overcome than a sign that we are on the verge of an age in which all of our categories of political choice and evaluation have become exhausted. Whatever it might be that technology compels us to do (especially as regards politics), it will not be to recur to the contending elements of modern rationalism.

Impacts – Limitless War

This form of Calculability causes limitless wars

Dallmayr, 04 (PhD, Professor, Department of Government and International Studies, Notre Dame, Constellations Volume 11, No 1, 2004
The Underside of Modernity: Adorno, Heidegger, and Dussel Fred Dallmayr).//JRC

Themes and insights of this kind are carried forward in *Die Geschichte des Seyns*, a series of texts dating from the onset of World War II. Politically, the texts are still more nonconformist and rebellious than preceding writings—an aspect largely attributable to their grim context. Central to the volume is again the critique of *Machenschaft* defined as a made of being that “pushes everything into the mold of ‘makeability’.” As before, *Machenschaft* is intimately linked with the glorification of power (*Macht*), and the latter is anchored ultimately in “will” to power and in “unconditional subjectivity” (a chief trait of modern metaphysics). To effectuate its rule, power relies on violence (*Gewalt*) as its chief instrument. When violence or brutality becomes predominant, matters are starkly simplified: everything is geared toward the “unconditional annihilation” (*Vernichtung*) of opposing forces by unconditional means. The unleashing of brutal violence carries in its train the “devastation” (*Verwüstung*) of everything with the result that a “desert” (*Wüste*) spreads where nothing can grow any longer—especially not thoughtfulness and care for being. A particularly vivid and harrowing sign of this devastation is the hankering for warfare—a warfare that, due to the totalizing ambitions of *Machenschaft*, now turns into “total war” (*totaler Krieg*). Given the steadily widening range of modern technology and weaponry, Heidegger adds somberly, the relentless struggle for power and more power necessarily leads to “unbounded or limitless wars” (*grenzenlose Kriege*) furthering the empowerment of power. Unsurprisingly, such wars ultimately take the form of “world wars” in the service of a globally unleashed *Machenschaft*. 16

Impacts – War/Terrorism

With everything in the standing reserve, consumption can go on forever and the distinction between war and peace is blurred – the result is endless war and terrorism.

Mitchell 5 [Andrew J. Mitchell, Post-Doctoral Fellow in the Humanities at Stanford University, "Heidegger and Terrorism," [Research in Phenomenology](#), Volume 35, Number 1, 2005, pp. 181-218]

Strategy's demise is the ascendancy of planning. What this means is that war can now go on interminably, subject to no other logic or obligation than its own. Nothing can resist it. But without resistance, war must end. Peace can now go on interminably as well, subject to no other logic or obligation than its own. The logic in question for both war and peace is the logic of replacement, the obligation for each is the obligation to consume. There is no law that would supervene or subtend consumption; there is no order outside of it that could contain it. Clausewitz's ideal is realized in a manner that collapses the very distinctions that gave it birth. "War" is no longer a duel; it recognizes no authority outside of itself. The name for this new amalgam of war and peace is terrorism. Terrorism is Clausewitz's absolute war in the mirror of technology. War and peace come to complete agreement and lose their oppositional identity in the age of value and the ersatz. Without concern for resources, consumption continues untroubled, since war is a kind of "consumption of beings" no different from peace: "War no longer battles against a state of peace, rather it newly establishes the essence of peace" (GA 69: 180). The essence of peace so established is a peace that defines itself in regards to war, which binds itself inseparably to war, and which functions equivalently to war. In either case, it is simply a matter of resource consumption and replenishment. In Clausewitzian terms, there is perhaps too much continuity or "continuation" between war and peace, "War has become a distortion of the consumption of beings which is continued in peace" (GA 7: 89/EP, 104). The peace that technology brings is nothing restful; instead it is the peace of unhindered circulation. We cannot even ask when there will be peace or when the war will end. Such a question, Heidegger specifies, cannot be answered, "not because the length of the war cannot be foreseen, but because the question itself asks for something which no longer is, since already there is no longer a war that would be able to come to a peace" (GA 7: 89/EP, 104; tm). The basic oppositions of Clausewitzian warfare are undone at this point, an undoing that includes the distinction between ideal and real. It also includes the distinction between soldier and civilian. Since such distinctions depend upon a difference between war and peace, they too can no longer apply. Everyone is now a civilian-soldier, or neither a civilian nor a soldier-a "worker," one might say, or otherwise put, a target. With everyone involved in the same processes of consumption and delivery, everyone is already enlisted in advance. There are no longer any "innocent" victims or bystanders in this, and the same holds true of terrorism. Terrorism is not the use of warfare against civilians (pace Carr), for the simple reason that there no longer are any civilians.¹⁴ It is equally not war against soldiers, and for this reason we go wrong to even consider it war. Terrorism is the only conflict available and the only conflict that is in essence available and applicable. It can have everything as its target. Terrorism follows from the transformation in beings indicative of the technological age. This transformation remains important at each point of a Heideggerian thinking of terrorism and is the ultimate consequence of the abolition of war and peace; beings have become uncommon. What was common to the beings of the modern era, their objectivity, is lost. In place of the constant presencing of things, we are surrounded by the steady circulation of resources. It is in the complete availability of these resources that we might encounter the uncommon: The disappearance of the distinction between war and peace compels beings as such into the uncommon; the reverberation [Erschütterung] of this compulsion through everything common becomes all the more uncommon, the more exclusively that the common persists and is further pursued. What were once common, the beings to which we were accustomed, are now made uncommon. But the common endures nonetheless. Beings are made uncommon, and this is overlooked so that they may continue to be regarded as the same beings to which we were accustomed. What is uncommon is that this alteration in the nature of being goes unremarked. There is a dissembling here (and we will return to this as decisive for the mood of terror), but the dissemblance is not to be thought as solely on the part of the human. A few pages later, Heidegger comes to specify what it is that is truly uncommon in all of this, "that beyng veils itself" (GA 69: 187). The veiling of being describes the same movement that compels beings into the uncommon. This uncommon situation grows ever more uncommon the more that it is ignored and unacknowledged, i.e., the more common that it becomes. In effect, the veil is the veil of the common, beyng veils itself in commonality. That beings have become uncommon is ignored. The transformations that Heidegger sees operative in contemporary warfare ultimately signal a change in the nature of being. Taking the above three points as transfiguratively inaugurating the Clausewitzian ideal of absolute war, it is not difficult to guess where this ideal is most perfectly realized. If we wished to name that "country" where the Clausewitzian ideal of absolute war is most demonstrably visible-where terrorism is almost celebrated-then it could be no other than America. In the 1969 Le Thor seminar, Heidegger seems to imply an inability for America to think "the question of being" and couches this inability in the current reality of the American situation: As to the interest of America for the "question of being," the reality of that country is veiled from the view of those interested: the collusion between industry and the military (the economic development and the armament that it requires). (IVS, 97/56) America is the place where the identification of peace and war is fully realized in the collusion of industry and the military. Industry increasingly determines the options available for the everyday life of the populace. That same industry now has at its disposal the military power of society. Where free trade is hindered, where natural

Impacts – War/Terrorism

resources are not completely available to the market for "political" reasons, military intervention is called for. Democracy is another name for free trade, it is solely an economic term, and democracy must be spread across the globe, not due to any respect for "human rights," but in order to allow industry to exceed its own expectations and expand its trade routes. Resistance to free trade is met with "liberating" martial force. Conversely, military spending is a driving force in the economy. Due to sheer size alone, economic effects attend the military as employer and as contributor to local economies. The military provides access to higher education for many who would otherwise have to make do without it. It likewise allows citizens to learn employable skills for work in society. The presence of the military in a community is valued as a sign of prosperity. We might also add that military vehicles (the Hummer) and military clothing ("camouflage") have penetrated mainstream American fashion. Nowhere is the abolishment of the distinction between war and peace more evident than in today's America. But if we attend closer to Heidegger's words, it may be possible to hear in them a hope for America in the thinking of being. Those who are interested in the question of being do not see the reality of their country. Without this situated awareness of one's "homeland," the question of being cannot be posed. The question remains an abstract and academic matter, something for quotation marks, the "question of being." Would a proper understanding of American reality make possible an asking of this question, or is the question simply impossible for America? Is America, as the epitome of all Americanism, still a homeland or has technology completely ravished the country of all specificity and uniqueness? These are the questions that the age of technological machination raises for America. Heidegger names the fundamental attunement of this age "terror" (Erschrecken).

The technological age is the root cause of war and terrorism- war has become increasingly dangerous and necessary because of technology

Mitchell 5 [Andrew J. Mitchell, Post-Doctoral Fellow in the Humanities at Stanford University, "Heidegger and Terrorism," Research in Phenomenology, Volume 35, Number 1, 2005 , pp. 181-218]//JRC

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Impacts – Terrorism

Terrorism the result of technological domination of the world – it is an attempt to break free from the standing reserve.

Mitchell 5 [Andrew J. Mitchell, Post-Doctoral Fellow in the Humanities at Stanford University, "Heidegger and Terrorism," [Research in Phenomenology](#), Volume 35, Number 1, 2005 , pp. 181-218]

Nothing stable, this juncture in being itself must be followed and traced. It trembles. Terror takes a situation that looks hopelessly doomed and finds the essential within it, but terror contains its own demise, too. We flee from it. We respond to it with a hardening of our own ways; we reaffirm the identity of being instead of opening ourselves to others. The American response to terror has been one of Americanism, there can be no doubt about that. Terror ends in this, and there is no commemoration, just a forgetting. The commemorative aspect of terror allows us to remember the fallen and understand how they can still be with us today in our American way of being. Terrorism will take place in the withdrawal of being, in the unworld of machination. The modern configuration of war is surpassed by the technological plan of homogenized circulation, and the distinction between war and peace falls away in their mutual commitment to furthering the cycle of production and consumption. The abandonment of being that forms this unworld by draining the world of its being does not occur without a trace, however, and terror in its trembling corresponds to that trace. Terrorism necessarily results from such a devastation-or, "becoming-desert," *Vendiistung*-of the world; terrorism is always born in the desert. Terrorism is metaphysical because it touches everything, every particular being, all of which may be attacked and annihilated. The circulation of the standing-reserve sets an equivalence of value among things with a resulting worldlessness where existence is another name for exchangeability. The exchanged and replaceable things are already replaced and exchanged, not serially, but essentially. They are not fully present when here. Terrorism names this absence, or rather is the effect of this absence, which is to say it is that absence itself, since here we are not dealing with an absence that could be the effect of any loss of presence. The absence in question is not an absence of presence, but an absence in and through presence. It would be ridiculous to think that such a change in being would lack a corresponding change in beings. This change in the nature of being shows itself in the fact that all beings today are terrorized. They all stand under a very real threat of destruction via -terrorist acts. There would be no terrorist threat were it not for these terrorists, yet there would be no possibility of a threat were it not for being. Certainly terrorism is not the only "effect" of this absence in presence; Heidegger frequently refers to the atomic bomb in precisely this regard. Terrorism's claim, however, is distinct from that of atomic war. Like the atomic bomb, terrorism operates at the level of threat. Insofar as it calls into question all beings, terrorism is itself a metaphysical determination of being. Terrorism makes everything a possible object of terrorist attack, and this is the very terror of it. Everything is a possible target, and this now means that all beings exist as possible targets, as possibly destroyed. But this should not be taken to mean that there are discrete beings, fully present, now threatened with destruction. The ineradicable threat of destruction transforms the nature of the being itself. The being can no longer exist as indifferent to its destruction; this destruction does not reside outside of the being. Instead, destruction inhabits the being and does so, not as something superadded to the being, but as the essence of the being itself. Beings are henceforth as though destroyed. Terror brings about an alteration in the very mode of being of reality, the real is now the terrorized. Reality is already terrorized; the change has already taken place, -and this regardless of whether an attack comes or not. Beings exist as endangered, as terrorized, and this means as no longer purely self-present. It means that, in terms of pure presence, beings exist as already destroyed. Destruction is not something that comes at a later date, nor is it something that may or may not already have taken place. Destruction exists now as threat. The effectiveness of terror lies in the threat, not the attack.

Impacts – Terrorism

The technological age is the root cause of terror

Mitchell 5 [Andrew J. Mitchell, Post-Doctoral Fellow in the Humanities at Stanford University, "Heidegger and Terrorism," *Research in Phenomenology*, Volume 35, Number 1, 2005, pp. 181-218]

Everyone is now a civilian-soldier, or neither a civilian nor a soldier-a "worker," one might say, or otherwise put, a target. With everyone involved in the same processes of consumption and delivery, everyone is already enlisted in advance. There are no longer any "innocent" victims or bystanders in this, and the same holds true of terrorism. Terrorism is not the use of warfare against civilians (pace Carr), for the simple reason that there no longer are any civilians.¹⁴ It is equally not war against soldiers, and for this reason we go wrong to even consider it war. Terrorism is the only conflict available and the only conflict that is in essence available and applicable. It can have everything as its target. Terrorism follows from the transformation in beings indicative of the technological age. This transformation remains important at each point of a Heideggerian thinking of terrorism and is the ultimate consequence of the abolition of war and peace; beings have become uncommon. What was common to the beings of the modern era, their objectivity, is lost. In place of the constant presencing of things, we are surrounded by the steady circulation of resources. It is in the complete availability of these resources that we might encounter the uncommon: The disappearance of the distinction between war and peace compels beings as such into the uncommon; the reverberation [*Erschütterung*] of this compulsion through everything common becomes all the more uncommon, the more exclusively that the common persists and is further pursued. What were once common, the beings to which we were accustomed, are now made uncommon. But the common endures nonetheless. Beings are made uncommon, and this is overlooked so that they may continue to be regarded as the same beings to which we were accustomed. What is uncommon is that this alteration in the nature of being goes unremarked. There is a dissembling here (and we will return to this as decisive for the mood of terror), but the dissemblance is not to be thought as solely on the part of the human. A few pages later, Heidegger comes to specify what it is that is truly uncommon in all of this, "that beyng veils itself" (*GA* 69: 187). The veiling of being describes the same movement that compels beings into the uncommon. This uncommon situation grows ever more uncommon the more that it is ignored and unacknowledged, i.e., the more common that it becomes. In effect, the veil is the veil of the common, beyng veils itself in commonality. That beings have become uncommon is ignored. The transformations that Heidegger sees operative in contemporary warfare ultimately signal a change in the nature of being. Taking the above three points as transfiguratively inaugurating the Clausewitzian ideal of absolute war, it is not difficult to guess where this ideal is most perfectly realized. If we wished to name that "country" where the Clausewitzian ideal of absolute war is most demonstrably visible-where terrorism is almost celebrated-then it could be no other than America. In the 1969 Le Thor seminar, Heidegger seems to imply an inability for America to think "the question of being" and couches this inability in the current reality of the American situation: As to the interest of America for the "question of being," the reality of that country is veiled from the view of those interested: the collusion between industry and the military (the economic development and the armament that it requires). (IVS, 97/56) America is the place where the identification of peace and war is fully realized in the collusion of industry and the military. Industry increasingly determines the options available for the everyday life of the populace. That same industry now has at its disposal the military power of society. Where free trade is hindered, where natural resources are not completely available to the market for "political" reasons, military intervention is called for. Democracy is another name for free trade, it is solely an economic term, and democracy must be spread across the globe, not due to any respect for "human rights," but in order to allow industry to exceed its own expectations and expand its trade routes. Resistance to free trade is met with "liberating" martial force. Conversely, military spending is a driving force in the economy. Due to sheer size alone, economic effects attend the military as employer and as contributor to local economies. The military provides access to higher education for many who would otherwise have to make do without it. It likewise allows citizens to learn employable skills for work in society. The presence of the military in a community is valued as a sign of prosperity. We might also add that military vehicles (the Hummer) and military clothing ("camouflage") have penetrated mainstream. American fashion. Nowhere is the abolishment of the distinction between war and peace more evident than in today's America. But if we attend closer to Heidegger's words, it may be possible to hear in them a hope for America in the thinking of being. Those who are interested in the question of being do not see the reality of their country. Without this situated awareness of one's "homeland," the question of being cannot be posed. The question remains an abstract and academic matter, something for quotation marks, the "question of being." Would a proper understanding of American reality make possible an asking of this question, or is the question simply impossible for America? Is America, as the epitome of all Americanism, still a homeland or has technology completely ravished the country of all specificity and uniqueness? These are the questions that the age of technological machination raises for America. Heidegger names the fundamental attunement of this age "terror" (*Erschrecken*).

Impacts – Terrorism

Machination lies at the root of terrorism- The ills of the world are preceded by shifts in ontology caused by the technological age- Separation of essence outweighs nuclear war

Mitchell 5 [Andrew J. Mitchell, Post-Doctoral Fellow in the Humanities at Stanford University, "Heidegger and

Terrorism," Research in Phenomenology, Volume 35, Number 1, 2005 , pp. 181-218]//JRC

Nothing stable, this juncture in being itself must be followed and traced. It trembles. Terror takes a situation that looks hopelessly doomed and finds the essential within it, but terror contains its own demise, too. We flee from it. We respond to it with a hardening of our own ways; we reaffirm the identity of being instead of opening ourselves to others. The American response to terror has been one of Americanism, there can be no doubt about that. Terror ends in this, and there is no commemoration, just a forgetting. The commemorative aspect of terror allows us to remember the fallen and understand how they can still be with us today in our American way of being. Terrorism will take place in the withdrawal of being, in the unworld of machination. The modern configuration of war is surpassed by the technological plan of homogenized circulation, and the distinction between war and peace falls away in their mutual commitment to furthering the cycle of production and consumption. The abandonment of being that forms this unworld by draining the world of its being does not occur without a trace, however, and terror in its trembling corresponds to that trace. Terrorism necessarily results from such a devastation-or, "becoming-desert," *Vendüstung*-of the world; terrorism is always born in the desert. Terrorism is metaphysical because it touches everything, every particular being, all of which may be attacked and annihilated. The circulation of the standing-reserve sets an equivalence of value among things with a resulting worldlessness where existence is another name for exchangeability. The exchanged and replaceable things are already replaced and exchanged, not serially, but essentially. They are not fully present when here. Terrorism names this absence, or rather is the effect of this absence, which is to say it is that absence itself, since here we are not dealing with an absence that could be the effect of any loss of presence. The absence in question is not an absence of presence, but an absence in and through presence. It would be ridiculous to think that such a change in being would lack a corresponding change in beings. This change in the nature of being shows itself in the fact that all beings today are terrorized. They all stand under a very real threat of destruction via -terrorist acts. There would be no terrorist threat were it not for these terrorists, yet there would be no possibility of a threat were it not for being. Certainly terrorism is not the only "effect" of this absence in presence; Heidegger frequently refers to the atomic bomb in precisely this regard. Terrorism's claim, however, is distinct from that of atomic war. Like the atomic bomb, terrorism operates at the level of threat. Insofar as it calls into question all beings, terrorism is itself a metaphysical determination of being. Terrorism makes everything a possible object of terrorist attack, and this is the very terror of it. Everything is a possible target, and this now means that all beings exist as possible targets, as possibly destroyed. But this should not be taken to mean that there are discrete beings, fully present, now threatened with destruction. The ineradicable threat of destruction transforms the nature of the being itself. The being can no longer exist as indifferent to its destruction; this destruction does not reside outside of the being. Instead, destruction inhabits the being and does so, not as something superadded to the being, but as the essence of the being itself. Beings are henceforth as though destroyed. Terror brings about an alteration in the very mode of being of reality, the real is now the terrorized. Reality is already terrorized; the change has already taken place, -and this regardless of whether an attack comes or not. Beings exist as endangered, as terrorized, and this means as no longer purely self-present. It means that, in terms of pure presence, beings exist as already destroyed. Destruction is not something that comes at a later date, nor is it something that may or may not already have taken place. Destruction exists now as threat. The effectiveness of terror lies in the threat, not the attack. Like the threat of nuclear war, the threat of terrorism targets everything, with no chance of distinguishing potential from nonpotential targets. This means that there is nothing we can do to avoid it. Since there are no marks that would betray a place, person, or thing as possible location or victim of terrorist assault, there is no way that we can be prepared for it. This means that terrorism is able to threaten us where we are most unsuspecting. Terrorism attacks precisely where we would not expect an attack because it targets the basis for our sense of security, the commonness of the everyday. Terrorism is a threat to the ordinary and the common. It comes from within our safest regions, from no outside source. An outside terrorist power would either annihilate beings or not annihilate beings. In the first case, the beings would be nothing; in the second, they would remain extant. This manner of thinking, in terms of presences and absences, of something and nothing, actually has nothing terrifying about it. The point is almost Epicurean; annihilation is nothing to us. The terror of terrorism is not located in the fear of an external power, but in the terror that the enemy is already here with us, "inside" our walls, threatening the homogeneity of the home. This terrorism is nothing that blows up beings into nothingness, but rather one that places them in danger and only threatens to destroy them. But this threat is stronger than any terrorist attack ever could be. Heidegger provides us with a further way of conceptualizing the threat of terrorism, a way that is likewise attentive to the conjunction of interiority and terror. His remarks are found in a posthumously published dialogue between an older man and a younger man, dated 8 May 1945, the day of Germany's capitulation in World War II, and entitled "Evening Conversation in a Prisoner of War Camp in Russia between a Younger and an Older Man."⁸ What threatens here is not the world war, as Heidegger makes painfully clear in the dialogue's dated postlude: "On a day that the world celebrates its victory / and does not yet realize that / for centuries already, it is the victim / of its own upsurge" (GA 77: 240). The world wars, as we have seen, are only the result of more "global" changes, of transmutations of ontology, if even that name still holds. The threat in the camp is that the devastation of the earth will continue without end and that there will be an annihilation of the human essence in the process. For the older man, this is the epitome of evil, "the devastation of the earth and the annihilation of the human essence that goes along with it are somehow evil itself [*das BUse selbst*]" (GA 77: 207). The consideration of evil that follows will slowly unfold the logic behind the -terrorist threat and reveal the error in the older man's concern with annihilation.

Impacts – Extinction

Changing perceptions of being towards a more flexible ideology is key to avert extinction

McWhorter, 92 – Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Northeast Missouri State University
(Ladelle, Heidegger and the Earth, ed. by Ladelle McWhorter)//JRC—no change

<In "Earth-Thinking and Transformation," Kenneth Maly shows us ways in which Heideggerian reflection upon the fact of our being as earth-dwellers can be transformative of our thinking at its very core and therefore transformative of our world. Maly believes that our culture's insistence upon a divorce between rationality and other ways of thinking and knowing has resulted in an impoverishment of our being and a destructive distancing from the earth that gives rise to, shelters, and sustains us. When we take ourselves and the earth as fixed entities to be comprehended by rational observation and theoretical constructs we lose sight of earth and being-human as process, as forever unfixed, as changing, growing, outgrowing, as living and therefore dying. It is only when we begin to think human being and earth as unfixed, as always undergoing transformation in a living unfolding of our/its being that a new, less destructive understanding of humanity-in/on-earth can come into being. And such understanding, Maly would argue, is absolutely necessary if we are to avoid destroying the earth.>

Technological thought makes extinction inevitable – try or die for the neg

Thiele 95 – Professor of Political Science at University of Florida (Leslie Paul, Timely Meditations, pg. 203)//markoff

The age of planetary mastery, technological dominance, and the end of metaphysics, Heidegger speculates, will likely endure for a long time (EP 95). Indeed, there is no certainty that, from humanity's point of view, a succession to some other mode of revealing truth is ordained. The technological quest may reach its climax, as it were, without us. In the absence of an ontological reorientation, humanity would then be "left to the giddy whirl of its products so that it may tear itself to pieces and annihilate itself in empty nothingness" (EP 87). Estimating the likelihood of this apocalyptic conclusion is not Heidegger's concern. In any case, it is fair to say that the physical annihilation of humanity is not Heidegger's most proximate worry. Foremost in his mind is the ontological meaning of this potential self-annihilation.

If, as Heidegger put it, "the will to action, which here means the will to make and be effective, has overrun and crushed thought," then our chances of escaping the catastrophic whirlwind of enframing are slim indeed (WCT 25). The danger is that intensive technological production may simply overpower human being's capacity for manifold modes of disclosure, displacing the freedom inherent in philosophic thought, artistic creativity, and political action. Undeniably technology fosters thinking, creating, and acting of sorts. Calculation, cognition, innovation, and engineering are highly valued within technological society, though even here it is not clear that computers and robots might not eventually displace more of these capacities than their production demands. The real menace, however, is that social engineering would obviate political action, endlessly innovative production would leave artistic creativity to atrophy, and utilitarian cognition would fully displace philosophic questioning.'

Impacts – Biopower

The technological mindset manifests itself in the form of biopower that renders all life to standing reserve

Dean, 2k- Sociologist at Macquarie University (Mitchell, "Always Look on the Dark Side: Politics and the Meaning of Life", <http://apsa2000.anu.edu.au/confpapers/dean.rtf>).JRC

Aristotle said that while the *polis* 'comes into existence for the sake of life, its exists for the good life' (1967, 9, I.i.8). Today the good life has come to require a politics 'for the sake of life'. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, we appear to be crossing ever-new thresholds towards learning the secrets of the creation of life itself. Rarely a week goes by when there is not a new biotechnological discovery or application which allows us to use and manipulate the processes of life itself for any number of ends. Post-menopausal women can now bear children. Infertile women and men can become parents. The genes from an animal can be implanted into a vegetable. Sheep and other animals can be cloned. Evidence of criminality or innocence can be discovered through DNA testing. With the Human Genome Project – in competition with private companies – engaged in completing the map of the human genome, we are issued with extraordinary promises in disease detection, prevention and eradication. We are also issued with warnings concerning 'designer babies', the new eugenics, and the uses of genetic information by governments, private companies and employers. The possibilities for the manipulation of the very biological processes life are not limited to what has been called the 'genetic age' made possible by molecular biology and human genetics. There are advances in organ transplantation and in our medical capacities to sustain life. All of these processes of the manipulation of life contain what we like to think of as 'ethical' questions. Notions of 'brain death' and the ensuing 'futility' of further attempts to restore normal life functioning redefine problems of euthanasia. Various forms of prenatal testing and screening of pregnant women redefine the conditions of acceptability of abortions. Other such ethical questions concern the harvesting of organs for transplantation, or of the maintenance of the integrity and diversity of biological species in the face of genetically modified crops and seeds, etc. The capacity to manipulate our mere biological life, rather than simply to govern aspects of forms of life, implies a bio-politics that contests how and when we use these technologies and for what purposes. It also implies a redrawing of the relations between life and death, and a new thanato-politics, a new politics of death. At some distance from these advances in biomedicine and biotechnology are the issues of life and death that are played in various arenas of international politics and human rights. These concern the effects of the break-ups of nation-states from Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union to Indonesia, the subsequent movement, detention and mass death of refugees and illegal immigrants, and the conditions and forms under which military action, 'peacekeeping' and 'humanitarian intervention' are acceptable. Detention camps are becoming a feature of modern liberal-democratic states. On the one hand, the twentieth century gave us a name for the death of a whole people or 'race', genocide. On the other, it sought to promote the universal rights of individuals by virtue of their mere existence as human beings. Bio-politics and thanato-politics are played out in war, in torture, and in biological, chemical and atomic weapons of mass destruction as much as in declarations of human rights and United Nations' peacekeeping operations. The potentialities for the care and the manipulation of the biological processes of life and of the powers of death have never appeared greater than they do today. But how do we consider this problem as a political problem? How are issues of life and death related to our conceptions of politics and to the way in which we think about states and societies, and their futures? Are the ideas of powers of life and death peculiarly modern, or do they lie at a deeper strata?

Impacts – Biopower

The age of technology gives the state sovereignty over the body and renders it the right to slaughter it

Dean, 2k- Sociologist at Macquarie University (Mitchell, "Always Look on the Dark Side: Politics and the Meaning of Life", <http://apsa2000.anu.edu.au/confpapers/dean.rtf>).

According to this first thesis, however, the salient threshold is a temporal one. Politics for centuries entailed the exercise of a form of power, sovereign power. Sovereign power is characterized by a particular right, the right to decide life and death. Sovereign power has a definite history and takes on many forms, including the ceremonial one characteristic of absolutism, but at its core lies the right of sovereign to put his internal and external enemies to death – a right, as Foucault puts it, to take life and to let live (1979, 138).

We know that in his historical studies Foucault focused on other forms of power, such as those of discipline, bio-power, and government. He often suggested these are more characteristic of 'modern man'. Indeed, it is bio-power, or the power over life, which is alluded to in the above passage. We also know that Foucault sought a post-sovereignist and non-juridical conception of power. Neither of these points, however, undermine the centrality and complexity of his conception of sovereign power. If anything, they reinforce and define his distinctive contribution. In developing his own account of peculiarly modern powers, and in offering a conception of power outside the antinomies of what he called the 'juridical theory of sovereignty', Foucault, perhaps paradoxically, provided quite a full characterization of sovereign power. The risk of course is that in its identification with what temporally went before modernity and intellectually needs to be abandoned, sovereign conceptions of power would tend to be forgotten, or, at least, displaced.

The elaboration of the concept of sovereignty – and its relation to modern powers – provokes Foucault to make his most sustained reflections on some of the most deeply devastating events and themes of the twentieth century, including National Socialism, the Holocaust, genocide, atomic weaponry and state racism (e.g. 1997b). It also provides some of the darkest passages in his lectures and prose. In both these respects it connects with a rich vein of twentieth-century critical and legal theory: the critique of violence by Walter Benjamin (1978), the definitions of sovereignty of Carl Schmitt (1985), and the notions of sovereign life found in Georges Bataille (1991).

For these thinkers, sovereignty is far more interesting than Jean Bodin's definition as 'absolute and perpetual power of the republic' would appear to suggest. It is the most ancient of powers, the most mysterious, the darkest, the most allied with the sacred, the mythical, the divine and the demonic. It is the power of powers. Its symbols are blood, the sword and the executioner. Its mechanisms are the ceremonials of public execution and rituals of torture, with their motifs of confrontation, revenge, terror and what Foucault called 'atrocities' (1977, 55-6). Sovereignty for Foucault is connected to a 'juridico-discursive' conception of power, that is, a power which operates as a command embodied in law. As Carl Schmitt has shown, however, no matter how closely law is associated with sovereignty it never completely exhausts it.

Foucault's peculiar contribution to the theory of sovereignty is the focus on the right of death. His genealogy here echoes Bataille's theme of sovereignty as linked to the denial of the sentiments that death controls. 'Life beyond utility is the domain of sovereignty' states Bataille (1991, 198). The implication of this is that sovereign existence is the capacity to live in the present moment beyond the concern for the needs to sustain life. The moral corollary is that 'sovereignty requires the strength to violate the prohibition against killing' (Bataille, 1991, 221). Although Bataille claims his definition of sovereignty has little to do with the sovereignty of states, this amoral right to take life could be considered an application of sovereign existence to the political realm.

For Foucault, at least in the *History of Sexuality* and related texts, modern powers are more closely aligned to a bio-politics, a politics of life. This bio-politics emerges in the eighteenth century with the concerns for the health, housing, habitation, welfare and living conditions of the population. Such an observation leads him to place his concerns with health, discipline, the body, and sexuality within a more general horizon. Again the notion of bio-politics is quite complex. The idea of the population as a kind of 'species body' subject to bio-political knowledge and power operating in concert with the individual body subject to disciplinary powers would appear central (Foucault, 1979, 139). No matter how bloody things were under the exercise of sovereign power with its atrocious crimes and retributions, it is only with the advent of this modern form of the politics of life that the same logic and technology applied to the care and development of human life is applied to the destruction of entire populations. The link between social welfare and mass slaughters can at times appear to be a fairly direct one. Of one of its first manifestations in German police science, Foucault argues, 'it wields its power over living beings as living beings, and its politics, therefore has to be a bio-politics. Since the population is nothing more than what the state takes care of for its own sake, of course, the state is entitled to slaughter it.' So the reverse of bio-politics is thanato-politics' (Foucault, 1988, 160).

Impacts – Bare Life

Technology reduces all creatures to bare life to be exterminated

Athanasios 3 [Athena Athanasiou, Professor of social anthropology at the University of Thessaly, "Technologies of Humanness, Aporias of Biopolitics, and the Cut Body of Humanity," *Differences: Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies*, 14.1, p.125-162, Muse]

In Heidegger's questioning (understood as a will to essence), edibility and extermination are interlaced, and as such, are inscribed—or emplaced—within the regime of industrial planning and technology. The mass annihilation of human bodies and the mass production of the means of human subsistence together usher in the era of technological Enframing, articulated—through Heidegger's framing device of analogy—as instances of the modern technologies of amassing, clearing, crashing, and becoming-waste. 10 Man, plant, and, most crucially, the animal—the other of man in Western metaphysics—emerge as essential categories whose ontological distinctions are blurred and collapsed at the horizon of modern technology. With the obsolescence of the (nostalgic) aletheic essence of "handling" 11 in favor of mechanical means, bodies (human and non-human) are figured as final products, mere effects, of a technological inevitability, vestigial (or skeletal) residues of *physis* in the topos, or better, in the *thesis*, of the factory and the camp, the wastelands of modernity. The emphasis on this essential operational affinity occludes—or brings to light precisely by "writing out" of the self-aware tropological space—the singularities and temporalities of the human/non-human spectrum: those whose labor and time are consumed and exploited in the automated assembly-line of human food agriculture; those who feed their human living mortality by consuming the industrially produced agricultural commodities; those who, by virtue of their assigned biogenetic and [End Page 135] morphological status as non-human animals—are susceptible to being confined to motorized frameworks of human "handling"; and those, naked and anonymous, who were not only forced into slave labor but reduced to "life that does not deserve to live" by the biopolitical technology of the Nazi extermination camp. These disparate singularities remain unacknowledged—bound to dissolve in the crucible of Enframing—not only precluding certain kinds of questions and foreclosing the possibility of a different kind of questioning but also absolving the philosopher from the "task" of responding differently to the paradigm of extermination.

In the Heideggerian text, the agricultural factory and the concentration camp thus become the exemplary delimited spaces of modern Enframing, where the spectrum of technomediated "mere life" is delineated in all its limits, continuities, and discontinuities. In the exchange of typical instances, "examples," "para-deigma-ta," the regime of Enframing, where "man is nothing but the orderer of the standing-reserve," is fused with technological execution whereby the naked body is left bare of any subjective content, standing before the sovereign power that constitutes and obliterates it as such. Heidegger's reference to the concentration camp gives an example as much as it sets an example: it brings to light the naked body of the technologies of modernity as indistinguishable from its intimate limit, and the word *s oma* thus resumes its Homeric Greek limit-designation of a fallen or thrown nonliving body, a "corpse." But it does so, however, in a way that obliterates the eponymous subjectivity of those nonliving bodies, reducing them to a faceless and nameless mass of "by-products." It does so in a way that undermines any involvement with response-ability for the Nazi realm of Enframing, a regime of decimating Jews, homosexuals, Gypsies, and communists, all precluded from the realm of humanness and, as such, put to death. The subjugation of human life and death to biopolitical sovereignty comes to be what is at stake in modern technology; it also returns to haunt Heidegger's questioning of technology. In a certain sense, the force of substitution encapsulated in Heidegger's use of the correspondence between industrial agricultural production and the industrial production of corpses here resonates uncannily with the scene of sacrificial offering (in its particular instantiation in the scene of the "holocaust," which signifies "burnt offering"). And thus, absolved from the form of political execution sanctioned as the racial purgation of "the human," the systematic obliteration of the crematoria becomes redolent with the innocuous expiation of the sacrificial pyre. In the illuminating ritual flames of [End Page 136] symbolic exchange and fusion, the forces of displacement and replacement take the upper hand; boundaries bleed and limits are tested between the living and the dead, subject and object, the natural and the social, the sacred and the profane, inclusion and exclusion, humanity and divinity, human form and animal form, animate and inanimate matter, the saved and the lost, the edible and the discarded, killing and purifying, and killing and eating.

Impacts – Causes the Holocaust

Technological thought, that renders nature and humans in standing reserve, was the root cause of Holocaust- Heidegger's analysis himself

Athanasios 3 [Athena Athanasiou, Professor of social anthropology at the University of Thessaly, "Technologies of Humanness, Aporias of Biopolitics, and the Cut Body of Humanity," *Differences: Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies*, 14.1, p.125-162, Muse]//JRC

Heidegger's essential questioning of technology can give us an interesting cue, however. Technology for Heidegger is not just a means to an end and an assemblage of equipment—as the "uncannily correct" instrumental definition of technology maintains, according to him ("Question" 5)—but also truth and a mode of revealing, a destining of Being, the very mode of Being's manifesting of itself. In the Heideggerian idiom, modern technology is in force in the vanishing figures of an aesthetico-material arsenal of artifacts: the chalice, the ancient temple, the peasant shoes. How does the extermination camp enter this enchanted semiotic phantasmagoria? Is there a way to refocus our attention and move beyond Heidegger's intentions and disavowals, and recognize in his philosophical thinking "on the grounds of technology" the conditions of intelligibility by which the biopolitical technology of modernity seeks to mark off unthinkable/unlivable life from possible/recognizable configurations of human life? The operation of this technology cannot be captured, as the following remarks attempt to show, in a construal of language as authorizing and authenticating self-identity. One would need a more shaded and oblique poetics of language as difference, political as much as psychic, in order to start thinking the question of how the body of the effaced Other—ultimately disposable and transposable—emerges, albeit obscurely and uninvited, in Heidegger's language. Let us consider the question of taking up a sign—in particular, the injurious possibilities of iterability—in Heidegger's writings on technology. Heidegger delivered a cycle of four lectures on the subject of technology at Bremen in 1949. In the only one that remains unpublished, he wrote. Agriculture is now a motorized food industry, the same thing in its essence as the production of corpses in the gas chambers and the extermination camps, the same thing as blockades and the reduction of countries to famine, the same thing as the manufacture of hydrogen bombs. (*qtd. in Lacoue-Labarthe 34*) ⁶ Several things deserve notice in this gesture of repudiation, wherein Nazi death emerges in the consciousness of the Heideggerian text as a *paradeigma* (etymologically associated with what is *para-* [beside or amiss], what is subsidiary to diction [pointing out in words], *-deiknynai* [to show, to prove]). This oblique reference to the extermination camp—as an example, an instance, and a paradigm—relates mass annihilation to industrial agricultural production, and both to a certain indirect sense of Enframing that underlies the essence of modern technology for Heidegger. The "now" that serves to connect temporally the two realms of the formulation signals a point in time that heralds the Other of human finitude's time, the "brink of a precipitous fall," the advent and event of the regime of calculative-representational thinking: in a word, the time of Technik. What concerns me in this scene of being-in-technology is precisely this: that Heidegger's language manifests the camp in the context of calculative and objectifying technology and in its ambiguous proximity with technologies of agricultural production; at the same time, as Heidegger turns his attention to the problem of technology his text comes to be haunted by a force arguably exceeding its author's writerly intention and control, namely, the historical specificity of the dead other. Heidegger's fugitive illustration of the bodies of the camp *à propos* of his meditation on the loss of "the human" and its originary authenticity in the time of modern technology may be seen as a hint but also as a symptom or signal as well as a symbolic lapse. Is Heidegger putting into play his own notion of the hint? "A hint can give its hint so simply," he writes, "[. . .] that we release ourselves in its direction without equivocation. But it can also give its hint in such a manner that it refers [End Page 132] us [. . .] back to the dubiousness against which it warns us" ("The Nature of Language" 96). Heidegger's "hint" (*der Wink*) emerges as a shadowy *trace* that inscribes itself in the precarious flickering between presence and nonpresence, evidence and nonevidence, and above all, revelation and dissimulation in the topos of textual representation. This opening up of present phenomenal actuality by and to proliferating suggestion alludes to the very spectral nature of referential representation, its incomplete and dismembered texture and structure. Perhaps the most valuable aspect of Heidegger's writings on technology is the conviction that the question concerning technology cannot be posed or thought apart from the question concerning the tradition of Western metaphysics. Heidegger's questioning of technology should be seen within the context of his critique of the way in which metaphysics has construed—or not—the problematic relation between Being and beings, between Being and time. And yet, Heidegger's questioning appears to be indelibly marked by a residual investment in a particular metaphysics whereby the determination of essence is knotted together with authorial disengagement; the disarticulation of the thematized "production of corpses" from any authorial or political response becomes the very condition under which the extermination becomes posable and nameable in the Heideggerian textual body. In a text that asserts the preeminence of the *question*, the camp and the author's relation to it remain unarticulated, unasked, unaddressed, and unquestionable, the very limit to (Heidegger's own) questioning. Questioning, then, the piety of thinking in Heidegger's terms ("Question" 3–35) becomes not only a master modality but also an authoritative means of avoiding the politics of address. ⁷ In a similar vein, it is instructive to read Heidegger's deployment of the trope of analogy through the lens of his special relation to metaphoric language (which he mixes with technical language), a relation consisting both in identifying metaphor with metaphysics *and* in putting metaphor into play. On the one hand, there is an experience in language and with language that entails the tropological reinscription and disinscription of metaphor; on the other is Heidegger's ambivalent elaboration on the divestiture and overcoming of metaphysics as an alternative mode of conceiving the real, beyond the calculative-representational frame incited by modern *Technik*. The role of metaphor in envisaging or creating a novel reality through redescription signals the point at which motorized agricultural production and the mass obliteration of lives in gas chambers and concentration camps are posed in tandem

Impacts – Root Cause

Enframing reduces nature's value to raw materials – this is the root cause of the environmental crisis.

Rohkrämer, 05 – History and Philosophy professor at Lancaster University (Thomas, How Green Were the Nazis: Martin Heidegger, National Socialism, and Environmentalism, p. 189)

Why did Heidegger see "enframing" as the greatest danger? Heidegger's main concern was not environmental pollution or degradation, and he did not mention material limits of growth, although these worries were already being voiced throughout his lifetime. Instead, he was primarily concerned about the reductionist relationship between human, and their world. Within the constellation of "enframing," the world reveals itself to us as nothing but raw material. Consequently, humans lack appreciation and respect for the world, which in turn makes an unscrupulous use of the environment appear legitimate and appropriate. We see everything without respect, as "stuff," and thus treat it as such – to the point, even, that we kill humans who do not seem to fit into our design. However, the practical consequences are secondary for Heidegger: the real damage is already done, once humans are alienated from their world. It is all the worse, for Heidegger, if the technical world functions well, because then we do not even feel the degradation and fail to see the problem. "Everything is functioning. This is exactly what is so uncanny, that everything is functioning and that the functioning drives us more and more to even further functioning, and that technology tears men loose from the earth and uproots them. I do not know whether you were frightened, but I at any rate was frightened when I saw pictures coming from the moon to the earth. We don't need any atom bomb. The uprooting of man has already taken place. The only thing we have left is purely technological relationships. This is no longer the earth on which man lives."

Impacts – Root Cause (Enviro/Nuke War)

We control root cause- Engaging in the technological mindset make nuclear war and environmental destruction possible- only the alt can solve

Beckman - Emeritus Professor of Philosophy Humanities and Social Sciences Harvey Mudd College - 00 (Tad, "Martin Heidegger and Environmental Ethics," 2000, <http://www2.hmc.edu/~tbeckman/personal/Heidart.html>) //JRC

Human Life and Its Environment

The threat of nuclear annihilation is, currently, the most dramatic and ironic sign of technology's "success" and of its overwhelming power; mass itself has been grasped as a standing-reserve of enormous energy. On the one hand we consider ourselves, rightfully, the most advanced humans that have peopled the earth but, on the other hand, we can see, when we care to, that our way of life has also become the most profound threat to life that the earth has yet witnessed. (14) Medical science and technology have even begun to suggest that we may learn enough about disease and the processes of aging in the human body that we might extend individual human lives indefinitely. In this respect, we have not only usurped the gods' rights of creation and destruction of species, but we may even usurp the most sacred and terrifying of the gods' rights, the determination of mortality or immortality. The gods, it is true, have been set aside in our time; they are merely antiquated conceptions.

The "withdrawal of the gods" is a sign of our pervasive power and our progressive "ego-centrism." The human ego stands at the center of everything and, indeed, sees no other thing or object with which it must reckon on an equal footing. We have become alone in the universe in the most profound sense. Looking outward, we see only ourselves in so far as we see only objects standing-in-reserve for our dispositions. It is no wonder that we have "ethical problems" with our environment because the whole concept of the environment has been profoundly transformed. A major portion of the environment in which modern Westerners live, today, is the product of human fabrication and this makes it ever more difficult for us to discover a correct relationship with that portion of the environment that is still given to us. It is all there to be taken, to be manipulated, to be used and consumed, it seems. But what in that conception limits us or hinders us from using it in any way that we wish? There is nothing that we can see today that really hinders us from doing anything with the environment, including if we wish destroying it completely and for all time. This, I take it is the challenge of environmental ethics, the challenge of finding a way to convince ourselves that there are limits of acceptable human action where the environment is involved. But where can we look for the concepts that we need to fabricate convincing arguments?

Impacts – Turns Case (War)

Technological thought turns your consumption arguments and makes wars inevitable

Thiele 95 – Professor of Political Science at University of Florida (Leslie Paul, *Timely Meditations*, pg. 197)//markoff

Technology has the Midas touch, and a particularly contagious one at that. Everything with which it comes in contact becomes uniformly subsumed into a framework of efficiently exploited resources. Indeed, tech-no reconfigures human society itself to accommodate the exigencies of its furthest extensions and intrusions. What is essential to modern technology is its refusal of limits, its rejection of boundaries and difference. In the end, humanity itself becomes part and parcel, indeed a most crucial element, of technological ordering. This is true in a number of respects. First, humankind is, by and large, the only producer of technology. Second, the efficient and endless production of technological artifacts requires their equally efficient and endless consumption. Once again, humankind is, by and large, technology's only consumer. 'But the circle is only fully completed when humanity becomes not simply the primary producer and consumer of technology, but that which technology primarily produces and consumes. The novelty of the postmodern world, in this light, is not that we live in a consumer society, but that society itself has become the consumed. Heidegger lays out in detail the ramifications of this total ordering:

The "world wars" and their character of "totality" are already a consequence of the abandonment of Being. They press toward a guarantee of the stability of a constant form of using things up. Man, who no longer conceals his character of being the most important raw material, is also drawn into this process. Man is the "most important raw material" because he remains the subject of all consumption. He does this in such a way that he lets his will be unconditionally equated with this process, and thus at the same time become the "object" of the abandonment of Being. The world wars are the antecedent form of the removal of the difference between war and peace.... War has become a distortion of the consumption of beings which is continued in peace. Contending with a long war is only the already outdated form in which what is new about the age of consumption is acknowledged.... Since man is the most important raw material, one can reckon with the fact that some day factories will be built for the artificial breeding of human material based on present-day chemical research. (EP 103-6)

The technological age is responsible for wars and world wars

Mitchell 5 [Andrew J. Mitchell, Post-Doctoral Fellow in the Humanities at Stanford University, "Heidegger and Terrorism," *Research in Phenomenology*, Volume 35, Number 1, 2005, pp. 181-218]//jrc

If terrorism is anything, then it is nothing like war. While Heidegger does not directly speak of terrorism by name, he nonetheless affirms an end to the era of modern warfare. With the passing of this era of high representation, Heidegger sees a dramatic change in what constitutes a theater of war. The World Wars point to an era beyond modern warfare as Clausewitz had definitively formulated it, an era where wars are fought without goal or end, where soldiers are considered the same as supplies, and technology keeps such supplies in steady circulation for instant availability. This is a postmodern era that Heidegger thinks with the name of "enframing" (*Ge-stell*). Without naming terrorism, Heidegger does offer a thought of conflict beyond the representational modernism of Clausewitzian warfare. Under the aegis of enframing, this beyond is terrorism, an epoch in the history of being coincident with that of modern technology and, as we shall see, the American project. In approaching these issues, the Clausewitzian conception of warfare provides a frame for appreciating the solutions of contemporary technology to the questions of conflict and peace. To this end, three points in Clausewitz's conception of warfare, each serving to demonstrate its modern nature, shall be posed.

In preparing a definition of war, Clausewitz claims that war is "nothing but a duel on a larger scale." With such pride of place given to the duel, we are here immediately introduced to a thinking that will be guided by the idea of opposition and, in Clausewitz's own terms, "polarity."² This oppositional thinking is determinative of the modern era and its fidelity to rational-subjectivist thought. A duel, however, is a particular form of opposition, where two parties are clearly identifiable and stand opposed to one another mediated by a ruling law. There is a ruling law between them that specifies the contract of the duel; there are certain assumptions that make up the etiquette of the duel; and there is the aberrant exigency of the duel itself. In short, the duel is part of an *agreement*: "There can be no engagement unless both sides are willing to fight."³ War is thought by Clausewitz in terms of opposition and agreement, both understood by the terms of policy. War is logically understood, in other words, within an oppositional structure that includes not only the opposition between friend and foe, but that of political theory and military practice. Clausewitz's greatness lies in thinking the modern rationalist categories of warfare directly, with a force at times capable of exposing their boundaries. But for all this, Clausewitz remains a great modern rationalist. His oppositional rationalism, the "logical" character of his thought, is the first characteristic to consider in Clausewitz's modernism.

Impacts – Turns Case (Environment)

Managing the environment through quick fixes and technical solutions turn the case – calculative thought is the root cause of years of damage

McWhorter, 92 – Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Northeast Missouri State University
(Ladelle, Heidegger and the Earth, ed. by Ladelle McWhorter)

<Thinking today must concern itself with the earth. Wherever we turn on newsstands, on the airwaves, and in even the most casual of conversations everywhere - we are inundated by predictions of ecological catastrophe and omnicidal doom. And many of these predictions bear themselves out in our own experience. We now live with the ugly, painful, and impoverishing consequences of decades of technological innovation and expansion without restraint. of at least a century of disastrous "natural resource management" policies, and of more than two centuries of virtually unchecked industrial pollution - consequences that include the fact that millions of us on any given day are suffering, many of us dying of diseases and malnutrition that are the results of humanly produced ecological devastation; the fact that thousands of species now in existence will no longer exist on this planet by the turn of the century; the fact that our planet's climate has been altered, probably irreversibly, by the carbon dioxide and chlorofluorocarbons we have heedlessly poured into our atmosphere; and the mind-boggling fact that it may now be within humanity's power to destroy all life on this globe. Our usual response to such prophecies of doom is to ignore them or, when we cannot do that, to scramble to find some way to manage our problems, some quick solution, some technological fix. But over and over again new resource management techniques, new solutions, new technologies disrupt delicate systems even further, doing still more damage to a planet already dangerously out of ecological balance. Our ceaseless interventions seem only to make things worse, to perpetuate a cycle of human activity followed by ecological disaster followed by human intervention followed by a new disaster of another kind. In fact, it would appear that our trying to do things, change things, fix things cannot be the solution, because it is part of the problem itself. But, if we cannot act to solve our problems, what should we do? >

Impacts – Enframing

The technical control that enframes humans control our existence and devalues are lives- only the alt can solve

Best and Nocella, 06 – animal rights activist, author, talk-show host, and associate professor of philosophy at the University of Texas at El Paso and Social Science doctoral student at the Maxwell School at Syracuse University
(Igniting a Revolution: Voices in Defense of the Earth, p. 82-84, google books)

Both Heidegger and revolutionary environmentalists share a deep foreboding about the extent of the crisis period posed by our utter separation from Being. Heidegger writes of humans as the beings who, early on, hearkened to Being, but who emerge, in the end, as “the laboring animal who is left to the giddy whirl of its products so that it may tear itself to pieces and annihilate itself in empty nothingness.” It is not merely the physical devastation of thermonuclear war (or, in our day, global warming) that Heidegger has in mind here. It is the philosophical and spiritual poverty wrought by Enframing whereby humans are incapable of grasping the extent to which technical control has excluded a sense of interrelatedness with others as part of a unified, awe-inspiring, and fragile process of Being. Confident talk of values is part of “the armament mechanism of the plan,” and that which is esteemed as progress is really an “anarchy of catastrophes” confirming “the extreme blindness to the oblivion of Being.” Direct action strikes similarly reflect “the rage of a dying planet.” Activists are motivated by a commitment to divert us from a “path towards annihilation,” recognizing that the ultimate effect of destroying biotic diversity is “suicide.” It is morally impossible for ELF activists to “allow the rich to parade around in their armored existence, leaving a wasteland behind in their tire tracks.” Blindness to oblivion, annihilation, and the socio-ecological wasteland is the tragic condition of the current epoch of Enframing. The essence of technology can only continue as long as its destructiveness is concealed. The revolutionary nature of the ELF lies in bringing the onto-historical conditions of technological culture and the capitalist exploitation of nature directly into the foreground of social consciousness.

Impacts – Enframing

Technological age controls enframing of the limit on human freedom- The lack of autonomy of humans to reveal and find the concealed reduces humanity to standing reserve. This alienates us from our Being.

Xuanmeng 2003 – Professor @ Shanghai Academy for Social Sciences

(Yu. "Heidegger on Technology, Alienation and Destiny." http://www.crvp.org/book/Series03/III-11/chapter_ii.htm.)

In these terms in the age of modern technology man obviously is in the situation of alienation for he does not decide the goal of modern technology. Superficially, man conceives, designs and expedites the development of modern technology, but more basically the essence of modern technology lies in a mode of revealing as Enframing: modern technology develops according to its own ordering or challenging. As Heidegger writes: "Man can indeed conceive, fashion, and carry through this or that in one way or another. But man does not control the unconcealment itself in which at any given time the real shows itself or withdraws."²¹ As we will see later this "unconcealment" is destiny.

More importantly one not only can one not control the way of revealing, but is oneself the standing in reserve in the context of interlocking modern technology. It seems that the human begins the process of technology, but actually he is challenged or ordered to exploit the energies of nature from the very beginning. "If man is challenged, ordered to do this, then does not man himself belong even more originally than nature to the standing in reserve?"²² Heidegger points out that the current talk about human resources or the supply of patients for a clinic is evidence of this. Another example is that while the forester who measures a field of timber to all appearances walks the same forest path in the same way as did his grandfather, today he is driven by the profit-making of the lumber industry. He is subordinated to the necessity for cellulose, which in turn is challenged by the need for paper to be delivered to newspapers and magazines. The latter set public opinion, so that a set configuration of opinion becomes available on demand.²³ This case shows how today even people in a traditional way of life are put into the context of modern technology, not to mention people now entering new professions of modern technology.

Of course, there is some difference between man and other entities in this interlocking context. Man is standing in reserve, but not sheerly so, for man is the first to be challenged in the ordering of technology and indeed is also "a way of revealing". But again, "The unconcealment itself within which the order unfolds is never a human handwork."²⁴

As we have mentioned, according to Heidegger's Being and Time alienation is a situation in which man forgets his own possibility to be, but tarries and dwells in his inauthenticity. And, since in modern technology man is standing in reserve he must be in a situation of alienation.

It is no exaggeration to say that in modern technology man is in a situation of alienation. In modern technology, man does find many advantages. It is a means to improve the living standard; it strengthens the power to control nature; and it is taken even as a way to freedom. But as Heidegger indicates, as man behaves according to the way which modern technology reveals, he blocks other possible ways of existence. Before man grasps technology, he already has been grasped by it. Can man be said to be fully free when he enters the essence of modern technology? Indeed the more modern technology develops, the more difficult it becomes for individuals to live an average life without technological means for lack of the necessary training. Is not then the individual's existence threatened in an age when modern technology holds sway? The average age when individuals begin their technological training is moved ever earlier, due to the ever more complex context of technology. Even the creating of fine arts could be substituted by the technological practice; the slogan that the school should let the students develop in all dimensions reflects some degree of awareness of the prevalence of technology in modern society. However, when technology holds sway and the other possible ways of revealing are concealed we can hardly conceive what the other ways are.

Ontology Comes First

Only ontological examination can lead to true understanding of our world – their affirmative is a blind leap of faith which is doomed to failure

Thiele, 1995 –Ph.D. from Princeton, professor of political science at the University of Florida, has published books from Princeton and Oxford (Leslie Paul, "Timely Meditations: Martin Heidegger and Postmodern Politics", Princeton University Press, Chapter two, pg 45-47)

With the exchange of subjectivity for worldliness the problem of empathy is en route to being solved. But doubts persist. How does one really know that the disclosed world actually exists, that anything is what it seems to be and is not merely the product of one's imagination?

In other words, how does one overcome recurring Cartesian doubts about the reality of the world? Heidegger's answer is that one does not try. An unassailable demonstration of the world's existence is impossible. "A skeptic can no more be refuted," Heidegger straightforwardly admits, "than the Being of truth can be 'proved'" (BT 271). But refutation is unnecessary and unwarranted. Indeed, it is illegitimate, for implicit in any attempt to prove the existence of the world is the unfounded premise of an isolated subject engaged in the effort of proving. The skeptic's problem of worldly reality is effectively dissolved by Heidegger's refusal to entertain this premise. Heidegger refuses to posit the primacy of an isolated "I" or "ego" that subsequently comes to doubt the reality of its world, for any such doubting exposes its precondition, namely, an already-in-the-world doubter. Heidegger writes: "To wish to prove that the world exists is a misunderstanding of the very questioning. For such a questioning makes sense only on the basis of a being whose constitution is Being-in-the-world World in its most proper sense is just that which is already on hand for any questioning" (HCT 215). Faced with the impossibility and illegitimacy of proof of an external reality, we are not to assume that the only available alternative is a leap of faith. Any leap of faith would necessarily be grounded in the supposed preexistence of a leaper. Again, the (potentially faithful) subject is already illegitimately posited in distinction to its world. "With such presuppositions," Heidegger explains, "Dasein always comes 'too late'; for in so far as it does this presupposing as an entity (and otherwise this would be impossible), it is, as an entity, already in a world. 'Earlier' than any presupposition which Dasein makes, or any of its ways of behaving, is the 'a priori' character of its state of Being" (BT 249). The metaphysical tradition, as Heidegger summarizes the problem, must always first "bury the 'external world' in nullity 'epistemologically' before going on to prove it" (BT 250). Heidegger wants to be done with this metaphysical sleight of hand.

The metaphysical trick works only because it has been carefully prepared. First, Being is reduced to beings. Subsequently, beings are reduced to things defined only by their exactness, their "presence-at-hand" (Vorhandenheit). With Being fully encompassed by presence-at-hand, and this presence verifiable only by the perceiving subject, reality appears to the individual as a subjective experience, as being "merely 'inner'" (BT 250). Having first created the conditions for this subjectivist doubt, metaphysics then presents us with the impossible task of welding together subjective experience with objective reality. Rather than take on this task, Heidegger begins with a relation of Being-in-the-world. He rejects the metaphysical supposition, first articulated by Plato, that "man is, in the first instance, a spiritual Thing which subsequently gets misplaced 'into' a space" (BT 83). It is a grave mistake to separate epistemologically the perceiving and knowing subject from its concrete worldliness and it is a vain effort to try to bridge this chasm once it is formed. Hence Heidegger insists that we do not have bodies. Rather, "we 'are' bodily" (WPA 99). Likewise, we do not have a world. Rather, we "are" worldly. Our concrete, spatial existence is not separate from our perceiving, mental existence. A structural unity exists (BP 164). Knowledge, therefore, is not something gleaned by mind from a separate, external reality, but something absorbed in the midst of worldly existence. In Heidegger's words, "the Dasein is not also extant among things with the difference merely that it apprehends them. Instead, the Dasein exists in the manner of Being-in-the-world, and this basic determination of its existence is the presupposition for being able to apprehend anything at all" (BP 164). The upshot is that "every act of knowing always already takes place on the basis of the mode of being of Dasein which we call Being-in, that is, Being-always-already-involved-with-a-world" (HCT 161). To know or to question is already to have evidence of one's situated, worldly being and to undercut any prerogative to a more radical doubt. Heidegger's understanding of Being-in-the-world allows him to reject both radical (Nietzschean) individualism and Cartesian dualism. Rethinking the nature of knowledge and perception is called for.

Ontology Comes First

Ontology comes first- only by knowing oneself can we engage in action without destroying the authenticity of others

Thiele, 1995 –Ph.D. from Princeton, professor of political science at the University of Florida, has published books from Princeton and Oxford (Leslie Paul, "Timely Meditations: Martin Heidegger and Postmodern Politics", Princeton University Press, Chapter two, pg 56-57)

To become authentic, not only must we reject radical solitude but we must come to feel at home in a shared world. "Being-with-one-another is not a tenacious intrusion of the I upon the thou," Heidegger insists; "instead, existence as together and with one another is founded on the genuine individuation of the individual.... Individuation does not mean clinging obstinately to one's own private wishes but being free for the factual possibilities of current existence" (BP 288). Authenticity entails an acknowledgment of the with-world, not as a constraint on individuality but as the chief medium of its expression. Heidegger explicitly states that "only in its Dasein with others can Dasein surrender its individuality in order to win itself as an authentic self." In other words, only through Being-with-others do we come to know ourselves as individuals. "Knowing oneself [Sichkennen]," Heidegger insists, "is grounded in Being-with" (BT 161). Because our social being is the ground for self-knowledge, it is also the ground for self-reflective activity. Whether this activity is cooperative, competitive, or individualistic, it is carried out in authenticity (and I might add here in freedom, though this will be explained and justified later) when it is self-consciously embedded in human plurality.

Resistance to the full ramifications of our thrownness in the with world is inherent in everyday life. Such resistance is the normal means we have of coping with daily affairs. Ontological concerns force us disruptively to interrogate rather than pragmatically to engage our agency, to underline its contingency rather than establish its viability. They must be placed in abeyance while we cope. However, any self-conscious denial or rejection of our Being-with constitutes a delusive, or even (" pathological, inauthenticity. It marks the destructive attempt to gain one's autonomy at the expense of one's worldly contextuality. When Nietzsche engaged in exposing the illusion of community, he occasionally lapsed into this pathology. As Albert Camus observes, Nietzsche "confused freedom and solitude, as do all proud spirits."! In one of his most-important and least-recognized confrontations with Nietzsche, Heidegger offers ontological therapy for this pathological confusion.

The human mind and body evolved together in a world of codiscovered meaning. To exist humanly is to exist socially and culturally, in both a phenomenological and a historical sense. Thought, speech, and action, even when riddled with doubt and uncertainty, remain embedded in a shared world. In defending these statements, Heidegger exposes the illusion of solitude and deconstructs its sovereign freedom. The politics that I claim lies submerged in Heidegger's philosophy emerges from this deconstruction.

Ontology Comes First- AT: Ontic Focus/ Truth Claims

Ontological examination forms the foundation for all ontic truth- our knowledge shapes the objects around us, not the other way around

Elden, 2003- BSc (Hons) in Politics and Modern History (1994) and a PhD in Political Theory (1999), both from Brunel University, Professor in the department of Geography at Durham University (Stuart, "Foucault and Heidegger Critical Encounters", Reading Genealogy as Historical Ontology, University of Minnesota Press Minneapolis London, Questia, REQ)

It is worth drawing out some of the potential implications of *Being and Time*. From the discussion of Newton, it is clear that Dasein and truth are fundamentally linked, that truth is context dependent.²² This does not mean that truth is only what an individual thinks, but that truth only has a context dependent on the existence of Dasein.²³ Any eternal truths must rest on an eternal immutability to Dasein. It clearly follows from this that if being changes or is historicized, so, too, is truth. It has been remarked by some critics that Heidegger does indeed, in *Being and Time*, suggest such an immutability to Dasein, examining it and its structures as if they were true eternally. Such critics sometimes point to a shift in the later Heidegger toward an understanding of the historical nature of being, of Dasein, which leads to a historicizing of truth.²⁴

Immediately after *Being and Time*, Heidegger turned his attention to Kant. In terms of the issues at stake here, the crucial part of this reading is the suggestion that Kant recognizes the ontic/ontological distinction. Heidegger suggests that ontic knowledge is knowledge pertaining to the distinctive nature of beings as such, whereas ontological knowledge is the basis on which any such theory (of ontic knowledge) could be constructed, the a priori conditions for the possibility of such sciences. Heidegger's own exercise as fundamental ontology deals with the conditions of possibility not just of the ontic sciences, but of the ontologies that precede and found them. Ontological knowledge provides the a priori conditions for ontic knowledge; it concerns being rather than beings.²⁵ The predominant strain of Kant interpretation in Heidegger's time was the neo-Kantianism of the Marburg school, which argued that the *Critique of Pure Reason* was a work of epistemology. This view, put forward by Hermann Cohen, Heinrich Rickert, and Paul Natorp, among others, held sway in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Heidegger, lecturing at Marburg, tackles this interpretation head on: the *Critique of Pure Reason* is a theory of knowledge, but it is not a theory of ontic knowledge (i.e., experience) but rather of ontological knowledge—transcendental philosophy, ontology.²⁶ Ontic knowledge (of beings) must conform to ontological foundations (being). This is the real meaning of Kant's Copernican revolution: that instead of our knowledge conforming to objects, objects must conform to our knowledge.²⁷

Ontology Before Ethics

Ethics can not itself be determined before ontological examination- our alternative is the ONLY ethical action

Thiele, 1995 –Ph.D. from Princeton, professor of political science at the University of Florida, has published books from Princeton and Oxford (Leslie Paul, “Timely Meditations: Martin Heidegger and Postmodern Politics”, Princeton University Press, Chapter two, pg 54-55)

Heidegger does not suggest that we abandon our moral predispositions in order to engage in ontological questioning. But neither should we attempt to escape ontological investigation behind the supposed security and stability of ethical concepts and formulas. "Should we not safeguard and secure the existing [ethical] bonds, even if they hold human beings together ever so tenuously and merely for the present?" Heidegger asks. "Certainly," he responds, and then adds: "But does this need ever release thought from the task of thinking what still remains principally to be thought, as Being prior to all beings, is their guarantor and their truth?" (BW 232). We should not abandon morality. But neither should we subordinate ontology to it-for practical as much as for philosophic reasons. Before we determine the principles and rules by which we ought to live with others, we need to understand who we are, as questioners of Being, and what our Being-in-the-world-with-others means. Heidegger believed that "ethics as a mere doctrine and imperative is helpless unless man first comes to have a different fundamental relation to Being" (WeT 89). Establishing this fundamental relation is a type of ethics itself. Expanding the etymology of "ethics" (ethos) to include not solely a customary way of being with others but a characteristic way of being in the world, Heidegger considers his work an "original ethics" (BW 234-35). Human being finds its abode in the world as a sharer of meaning, which is to say, as a discloser of Being Heidegger's ontology might then be construed as a form of ethics-if ethics pertains not simply to the customs of the human collective but to the character of the human condition.

Ontology Outweighs Terrorism

The Terror of being is a much worse form of terrorism described by the affirmative

Mitchell 5 [Andrew J. Mitchell, Post-Doctoral Fellow in the Humanities at Stanford University, "Heidegger and Terrorism," *Research in Phenomenology*, Volume 35, Number 1, 2005, pp. 181-218]/JRC

This same reasoning explains why the older man's original conception of evil had to be rethought. Evil is the "devastation of the earth and the annihilation of the human essence that goes along with it" (GA 77: 207), he said, but this annihilation is simply too easy, too much of an "Americanism." The human essence is not annihilated in evil—who could care about that? Instead it is destroyed and devastated by evil. Devastation does not annihilate, but brings about something worse, the unworld. Without limit, the desert of the unworld spreads, ever worsening and incessantly urging itself to new expressions of malevolence. Annihilation would bring respite and, in a perverse sense, relief. There would be nothing left to protect and guard, nothing left to concern ourselves with—nothing left to terrorize. Devastation is also irreparable; no salvation can arrive for it. The younger man is able to voice the monstrous conclusion of this thinking of devastation: "Then malevolence, as which devastation occurs [*sich ereignet*], would indeed remain a *-basic characteristic of being itself*" (GA 77: 213, 215; em). The older man agrees, "being would be in the ground of its essence malevolent" (GA 77: 215). Being is not evil; it is something much worse; being is malevolent. Malevolent being is a being that threatens. It threatens itself with annihilation, with both total absence and total presence, for they are the same; it places itself in danger.²¹ This is so much as to say that all of the supposed enemies of being—technology, metaphysics, the ontic, even being itself in regards to beyng—these are so many ways of being's self-showing, where being's "self-showing" is not to be understood as though beyng somehow remained behind all of these surrogates and was imaged in them. Being is found only in these situations, a point Heidegger makes in the *Contributions to Philosophy*, "Here, in the unavoidable ordinariness of beings, beyng is the most non-ordinary; and this estranging of beyng is not a *manner* of its appearing but rather it itself" (GA 65: 230/163; tm). Being is endangered and withdrawn in essence. Just as we saw that there is no sense in talking about evil in itself, so too is there no sense in talking about being by itself: there is only malevolent beyng. If beings exist in the shadow of a threatened annihilation, and if such an existence is an existence in terror, then, as reprehensible as this might sound, being itself is what terrorizes. Terror is the threat of being.

Enframing Comes First

The way the world is 'enframed' in the technological age is a prior question to the impact of the affirmative- We must first examine how the world is being defined in relation to humans before making any knowledge claims things that will happen in the world- The impact is calculability leading to humans as standard reserve

Xuanmeng 2003 – Professor @ Shanghai Academy for Social Sciences

(Yu. "Heidegger on Technology, Alienation and Destiny." http://www.crvp.org/book/Series03/III-11/chapter_ii.htm.)

Further, since the essence of modern technology is from destiny, Heidegger sees not first of all alienated man, but a danger within the destiny itself. Man's situation can be uncovered only by working out the above danger. Unfortunately, destiny, like revealing as such, is not something revealed, but conceals itself even while unconcealing. We cannot describe destiny as easily as we describe something revealed, for it is rather mystical. However, destiny reveals itself in various ways, as does Being. When the essence of modern technology holds sway, it blocks other ways of revealing as challenging to ordering; it even conceals technology as a way of revealing, because here everything seems to be revealed not by some mystic power, but in being challenged-forth by a certain order. Thus, "Where Enframing holds sway, the regulating and securing of standing in reserve marks all. They no longer even allow their own fundamental characteristic of revealing to appear." "Thus the challenging Enframing conceals not only a former way of revealing or bringing-forth, but it conceals itself and with it that wherein unconcealment, e.g., truth, comes to pass."26 One might question this as we are getting more and more knowledge by means of technology, but Heidegger distinguishes correct from true, maintaining that in technology "nature presents itself as a calculable complex of the effects of forces" which "can indeed permit correct determinations", but "in the midst of all that is correct the true will withdraw."27

Based on the above consideration, Heidegger concludes "The destiny of revealing is in itself not just any danger, but danger as such."28 "Thus, where Enframing reigns, there is danger in the highest sense."29

Since technology has a relation with destiny, we must consider the situation of man in the age of technology. First of all, regarding the relationship between man and destiny Heidegger says that "Man is rather 'thrown' from Being itself into the truth of Being, so that existing in this fashion he might guard the truth of Being, in order that beings might appear in the light of Being as the beings they are. . . . Man is the shepherd of Being."30 Further, he maintains that "Man becomes truly free only insofar as he belongs to the realm of destiny and so becomes one who listens and hears (Horender), and not one who is simply constrained to obey."31 Freedom means openness in which the unconcealing happens; when man listens and hears in the realm of destiny, he is in openness.

Because Enframing, which is the essence of modern technology, lies in destiny, everything seems to be all right for man in the age of modern technology, for there man is in destiny. However, as challenging and ordering, Enframing blocks the other possible ways of revealing, especially when it holds sway; otherwise, as the guard of destiny, "man might be admitted more, sooner and ever more primally to the essence of that which is unconcealed and to its unconcealment, in order to experience as his essence his need of belonging to revealing."32 Furthermore, when Enframing reigns, it blocks revealing as such, and hence does serious harm to man's freedom.

In the light of the relationship between man and destiny, Heidegger points out another phenomenon which is also a danger to man, namely, that it is of the essence of modern technology that man seems to become the lord of the earth because here the revealing as such is blocked. As a result, man no longer holds that destiny is the source of the beings being unconcealed, but on the contrary the impression prevails that everything man encounters exists only as his own construct. This leads to a final delusion: "It seems as though man everywhere and always encounters only himself."33 This is taken as a disadvantage by Heidegger for the true "advent of beings lies in the destiny of Being."34

Epistemology Comes First

Epistemology comes first—the way we think about nature prefigures action

DeLuca 5 – Associate Professor of Speech Communication and adjunct in the Institute of Ecology at the University of Georgia – [Kevin Michael DeLuca, Ethics & the Environment, "Thinking with Heidegger: Rethinking Environmental Theory and Practice," Issue 10.1, p 67-87, Muse]

<<On the intellectual front, a confusing array of reform environmentalists, deep ecologists, social ecologists, ecofeminists, wilderness advocates, social justice activists, social constructionists, and Christian ecologists offer a cacophony of competing paradigms and programs while exchanging charges and countercharges of wrong-headedness and infidelity. If on the level of practice an exhausted environmentalism has achieved both institutionalism and irrelevance, intellectually environmentalism has reached several stasis points. This is crucial, for at a level that is unusual for social movements, environmentalism has always highlighted the importance of how we think about the environment, that ideas of nature are powerful because practices follow from ideas. In other words, how we think about nature guides how we act toward nature. In the midst of this melee I want to suggest we reconsider the work of Martin Heidegger.>>

AT: Extinction Outweighs

Loss of being is worse than extinction – it is better to die than to go on living in the world of technological domination which expands without purpose.

Mitchell 5 [Andrew J. Mitchell, Post-Doctoral Fellow in the Humanities at Stanford University, "Heidegger and Terrorism," [Research in Phenomenology](#), Volume 35, Number 1, 2005, pp. 181-218]

Devastation (Verwüstung) is the process by which the world becomes a desert (Wüste), a sandy expanse that seemingly extends without end, without landmarks or direction, and is devoid of all life.²⁰ If we follow the dialogue in thinking an ancient Greek notion of "life" as another name for "being," then the lifeless desert is the being-less desert. The world that becomes a lifeless desert is consequently an unworld from which being has withdrawn. The older prisoner makes this connection explicit, "The being of an age of devastation would then consist in the abandonment of being" (GA 77: 213). As we have seen, this is a process that befalls the world, slowly dissolving it of worldliness and rendering it an "unworld" (cf. GA 7: 88, 92f./EP, 104, 107f., etc.). Yet this unworld is not simply the opposite of world; it remains a world, but a world made desert. The desert is not the complete absence of world. Such an absence would not be reached by devastation (Verwüstung), but rather by annihilation (Vernichtung); and for Heidegger, annihilation is far less of a concern than devastation. "Devastation is more uncanny than mere annihilation [bloße Vernichtung]. Mere annihilation sweeps aside all things including even nothingness, while devastation on the contrary orders [bestellt] and spreads everything that blocks and prevents" (WHD, 11/29-30; tin). Annihilation as a thought of total absence is a thought from metaphysics. It is one with a thinking of pure presence: pure presence, pure absence, and, purely no contact between them. During another lecture course on Hölderlin, this time in 1942 on the hymn "The Ister," Heidegger claims that annihilation is precisely the agenda of America in regards to the "homeland," which is here equated with Europe: "We know today that the Anglo-Saxon world of Americanism has resolved to annihilate [zu vernichten] Europe, that is, the homeland, and that means: the inception of the Western world. The inceptual is indestructible [unzerstörbar]" (GA 53: 68/54; tm). America is the agent of technological devastation, and it operates under the assumptions of presence and absence that it itself is so expert at disassembling. America resolves to annihilate and condemns itself to failure in so doing, for the origin is "indestructible." We could take this a step further and claim that only because the origin cannot be annihilated is it possible to destroy it. This possibility of destruction is its indestructible character. It can always be further destroyed, but you will never annihilate it. Americanism names the endeavor or resolution to drive the destruction of the world ever further into the unworld. America is the agent of a malevolent being. This same reasoning explains why the older man's original conception of evil had to be rethought. Evil is the "devastation of the earth and the annihilation of the human essence that goes along with it" (GA 77: 207), he said, but this annihilation is simply too easy, too much of an "Americanism." The human essence is not annihilated in evil—who could care about that? Instead it is destroyed and devastated by evil. Devastation does not annihilate, but brings about something worse, the unworld. Without limit, the desert of the unworld spreads, ever worsening and incessantly urging itself to new expressions of malevolence. Annihilation would bring respite and, in a perverse sense, relief. There would be nothing left to protect and guard, nothing left to concern ourselves with—nothing left to terrorize. Devastation is also irreparable; no salvation can arrive for it. The younger man is able to voice the monstrous conclusion of this thinking of devastation: "Then malevolence, as which devastation occurs [sich ereignet], would indeed remain a -basic characteristic of being itself" (GA 77: 213, 215; em). The older man agrees, "being would be in the ground of its essence malevolent" (GA 77: 215). Being is not evil; it is something much worse; being is malevolent.

Alternative – Long 1NC Card

Our Alternative represents a radical break from the technological age through the mechanism of examination of being- This break can reconnect humans with their nature and remove themselves and nature from standing reserve, now is the key time Best and Nocella, 06—associate professor of philosophy at the University of Texas at El Paso (Igniting a Revolution: Voices in Defense of the Earth, p. 82-84, google books)//JRC

Yet, for both Heidegger and revolutionary environmentalists, there exist possibilities for transformation despite the destructiveness of Enframing. In the midst of technological peril – indeed, precisely because the peril strikes at and thus awakens us to the bond between human and nonhuman life – there emerges a sense of solidarity of human with nonhuman beings. Looking at the well-heeled, bureaucratic discourse of “human resource management” and “personnel resources,” the challenging forth of human beings into standing reserve is fairly evident. Factory-farmed cows, pigs, and chickens obviously have it far worse than people, but in both cases the purpose is to harness resources for maximum efficiency and profit. Ultimately human and nonhuman beings are similarly enframed within one giant “gasoline station.” It is precisely the experience of this solidarity which must be constantly rearticulated – in arts, poetry, ceremony, music, and especially in socioeconomic and political action – in order to provide a historically and ontologically authentic break with the metaphysics of technical control and capitalist exploitation. Action will only be truly revolutionary if it revolves around engagement in solidarity with nature, where liberation is always seen both as human liberation from the confines of Enframing and simultaneously as liberation of animal nations and eco-regions from human technics. Anything less will always lapse back into the false and oppressive hierarchy of “man” over “nature” and “man” over animals with attendant effects of technological, disciplinary control over humans, nonhumans, and the Earth. Using a familiar title from the anarchist Crimethinc collective, revolutionary environmentalism is truly an instance of “fighting for our lives,” where the pronoun refers to all life not just human life. Heidegger describes the possibility of transformation through a return of Being as a re-figured humanism. It is the possibility of suspending the will and attaining a lucid sense of the free play of Being within which all of life emerges and is sustained. A human being, like any entity, *is* – s/he stands forth as present. But “his distinctive feature lies in [the fact] that he, as the being who thinks, is open to Being....Man is essentially this relationship of responding to Being. Such experience is the clearing of a space (symbolically represented, for example, in the building of an arbor for a ceremony or in the awesome silence created by the space within a cathedral or a grove of old-growth Redwoods), and the patient readiness for Being to be brought to language. Given the appropriate bearing and evocation through language, human beings can become aware of dwelling, along with all other existent beings, within Being – the open realm within which entities are “released” into presence (Gelassenheit – or “releasement”). What comes to the fore in suspension of willed manipulation is an embrace of other beings and the enduring process of evolution within which all beings emerge and develop. By reflecting on or experiencing oneself within the dimension of freedom that is the domain through which all beings pass, human beings can repair the willed manipulation inherent in calculative thinking and realize a patient equanimity toward Life. It is only in the context of this reawakened sense of the unity of life that revolutionary action gains an authentic basis. It is the engagement with “the Other” that shows the ELF actions are truly about defense of plant and animal life, and they demonstrate genuine liberation concerns that typically are trapped within Enframing. That is to say, ELF (and similar) actions, show themselves as part of a dynamic and necessary historical evolution and transformation process, not merely a gesture of opposition and negation, because of their profound solidarity with animals and the Earth. Such guidance solidarity thus serves as a general basis for a post-Enframing, post-capitalist order, an ecological, not a capitalist society. What will change is, first, the pre-eminence of Enframing as that which animates the epoch and, correspondingly, our relationship to technology. No longer will technical solutions be sought after in realms of activity where technique is not applicable. No longer will everyday activities be pervaded by the standardization and frenzied pace of technology. No longer will nature be looked upon as a homogenous field of resources to be extracted and exploited. No longer will resource-intensive and polluting technologies be utilized simply because they serve the blind interests of corporations over the needs of the Earth. No longer will human beings take from the Earth without thought of the far-reaching consequences of such actions on all present and future forms of life. Critics would wrongly denounce this position as atavistic, primitivist, or anti-science/technology. But as the turning toward the re-emergence of Being unfolds, both through revolutionary action rooted in solidarity with nature and through new, non-exploitative modes of acting in the world, technics will not disappear; instead, the limits of technology as a mode of revealing will begin to be discerned so that new forms and uses of technology can emerge. Questions about technology will center on whether a given technology can be developed and used so that plant and animal life can appear as it is and not be reduced to standing reserve. The question, for Heidegger, is not whether technology, in the sense of a set of tools, is done away with, but whether Enframing is surmounted. It is in this sense of releasement Heidegger writes,

Alternative – Long 1NC Card

“Mortals dwell in that they save the earth....Saving does not only snatch something from a danger. To save really means to set something free into its own presencing. I take this as the literal equivalent of the masked ALF activist reclaiming a puppy from a research lab so that it can become a dog rather than a unit of research, or an ELF activist who stops the destruction of an aquifer or forest so that it can remain an aquifer or forest rather than become a water or wood resource. It is just this new ethos which must guide a revolutionary reconstruction of society on grounds that preserve the openness to Being and the ability of each kind of being to become what it is in its essence. For those who charge Heidegger with merely recycling, and not transcending, Western anthropocentrism, it is important to note that there are possibilities here for an emerging post-humanism – a new orientation to nature beyond egocentric forms of human agency and towards interrelation with other beings and Being itself. Heidegger’s philosophy allows for multiple modes of engagement with others and nature as equals, all of them rooted in a relationship of solidarity, respect, and concern. I call this kind of pluralistic, egalitarian, and ecological outlook ontological anarchism. It begins with the rejection of illegitimate “rule” of metaphysical constructs that have served to justify unlimited technological appropriation of the world. In place of Enframing with its subjectivist metaphysical underpinnings, ontological anarchism proclaims a multiplicity of forms of experience in which a sense of revealing comes to the fore – such as in art, music, religion, and philosophy. One such experience, a pre-dominant theme of spiritual re-awakening in the ELF communiques, is found in Native American philosophy and practice.

Alternative – Solvency

The alternative is to find a better balance between technology and agriculture.

Rohkrämer, 05 – History and Philosophy professor at Lancaster University (Thomas, How Green Were the Nazis: Martin Heidegger, National Socialism, and Environmentalism, p. 178)

This interpretation goes too far and ignores the historical context. While the pan-German wish for all Germans to be part of the Reich was undoubtedly dangerously revisionist (although Heidegger did not say how such a greater German Reich could be achieved), it should not be confused with the quest for living space in the East: Heidegger did not call for the occupation and ethnic cleansing of space for the settlement of Germans, but shared the widespread belief that all ethnic Germans should be part of the Third Reich. His speeches on the German decision to leave the League of Nations further confirm that he wanted a strong Germany, whose allegedly legitimate claims had been satisfied, to live in harmony with its neighbors. Also, the idea of a certain decentralization within Germany through rural settlements was not an idea peculiar to the Nazis; it was shared, for example, by the Brüning government, by the German engineers' association, and by members of the conservative resistance to Hitler. It did not necessarily imply the will to retreat into a rural past, but was usually aimed at finding a "better" balance between agriculture and industry and improving the living quality of workers. At the time, different groups and experts still believed that the land for this could be gained within Germany, through breaking up big estates in the eastern provinces and through cultivating wasteland.

The alternative is to recognize that technology is not a goal and to integrate it with nature.

Rohkrämer, 05 – History and Philosophy professor at Lancaster University (Thomas, How Green Were the Nazis: Martin Heidegger, National Socialism, and Environmentalism, p. 177)

Also, an idealization of the past does not necessarily imply an intention to turn back the clock. Contrary to the claims of many historians, most voices seriously engaged in a critique of modernity in Germany since the 1880s were not those of the Luddites. Many were nostalgic or tried to save aspects of the past, but their concepts for the future aimed at an alternative modernity as they tried to integrate positive features of the past into the framework of an industrially and technically advanced society. Likewise, in a later publication, Heidegger explicitly states that the use of a farmhouse as an exemplary building does not imply that all houses should be built that way, but should show how another time had a superior sense of dwelling and architecture. His later work explicitly faced the difficult (and, I believe, necessary) balancing act between criticizing technology and realizing that there is no escape from it. In the early years of the Third Reich, however, he had not thought deeply about these questions: as a consequence, he probably adopted an ideal of the time without thinking through all its implications. A rather conventional romanticism, combined with his skepticism of modern society, probably made the "blood and soil" propaganda attractive to him, though he never made this a central point. Like the early environmental movement and related life-reform movements at the turn of the century, he favored a more natural lifestyle in harmony with the regional landscape for all Germans, supported at one point the ideal of a "German technology" in harmony with nature, and hinted that technology should not be a goal in itself, but incorporated within the vision of a destiny of the German Volk. But all this remained peripheral and superficial in the early 1930s.

We must transition from a world of will-to-power to a world of respect for the environment.

Rohkrämer, 05 – History and Philosophy professor at Lancaster University (Thomas, How Green Were the Nazis: Martin Heidegger, National Socialism, and Environmentalism, p. 183)

His engagement with topics relevant to environmental thought started with a critique of what he regarded as problematic aspects of our contemporary world: the world-forming dynamics of modern science and technology. His general unease about the modern world became more specific and thoughtful through the study of Ernst Junger's essay "Total Mobilization" (1930) and *The Worker: Mastery and Form* (1932) in the early thirties and during the winter of 1939-40. While we do not know exactly what Heidegger thought at the first encounter, we have a quotation from 1939-40 in which he accepts the concept of "total mobilization" as a true analysis of the contemporary world. For him, Junger described the essence of modern existence accurately as a Nietzschean will to power under the conditions of a technological world: modern humans use all technical means to achieve power and force their will upon the human and nonhuman world. But Heidegger also saw a fundamental disagreement. While the early Junger celebrated total mobilization, this vision became a dystopia for Heidegger. In contrast to Junger's opinion in the early 1930s, Heidegger criticized and deconstructed this mobilization as the act of a godless and nihilistic historical epoch. He was not prepared to accept what he took as the workings of a will to will, with no ulterior motive or purpose, an emptiness which concealed itself through a meaningless hyperactivity of arbitrary willing. While Heidegger valued the early Ernst Junger as an astute observer of his age, his later orientation, especially his rejection of the will to power, is closer to that of Ludwig Klages, the sharp critic of an unchecked human will and the destructiveness of modern technology.

Alternative – Solvency

We must abandon the futile search for a perfect technique, only allowing the thing to unconceal itself solves.

Roddey, '2 – Engineering Programs Manager at the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station

(Martin Heidegger: “technique and the turn”) // CP

3. What remedy does the author suggest to improve the unsatisfactory status quo?

First, Heidegger proposes that “when we open ourselves properly to the essence of technique, we find ourselves unexpectedly under a claim that frees.” [433] We are freed from wondering into the cause-effect relationship of all being, and can now appreciate the thingness of a thing. This freedom is not related to the unboundedness of human will (vis-à-vis the Cartesian cogito ergo sum), nor to the freedom accorded to men through Kantian and Marxist ideals of finding universal law through reason. [432] Rather, man is free to live in the freeness of “destiny, which in no way shuts us into a dull compulsion blindly to carry on with technique, or, what is the same, helplessly to rebel against it and to condemn it as the devil’s work.” [433]

Second, Heidegger suggests that we abandon the futility of trying to dissect the thing. He suggests that the resulting “nearness” prevents man from unconcealing. “To save is: to pull something back into its essence, in order first to bring that essence to its proper shining. ...then the domination of Ge-stell cannot exhaust itself in misplacing (verstellen) all lighting of every unconcealing, all shining of truth.” [436] In addition, Heidegger asserts that man will never reach the end of science, the knowing of all things, because the search for a cause of a particular effect yields only another search for that cause. He states, “Technique, whose essence is being itself, will never let itself be overcome by man. If this were so, man would be the lord of being. Rather the essence of technique is gotten-over (verwunden) in its still concealed truth.” Man must seek the truth through unconcealing, which in turn stems from understanding the essence of technique. “But in order that the essence of man become heedful of the essence of technique, in order that an essential relation found itself between technique and man with respect to the essence of technique, modern man must first of all beforehand find the way back to the breadth of his essential space.” [446]

Most importantly, Heidegger suggests that we are to be responsible to our bringing-forth. He provides four means of demonstrating this responsibility that together “bring something into appearance. They let it come-forth in presence. They release it therein and leave it in so, namely in its completed advent.” [419]

Alternative – Solvency

The Alt. Loves a thing as a Thing whereas Modern Strategies of utilizing technique solely as the means by which we manipulate Nature as it is to serve our needs, kill the potential for love of the thing.

Roddey, '2 – Engineering Programs Manager at the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station

(Martin Heidegger: “technique and the turn”) // CP

Heidegger is somewhat regressive (in the sense of “back to the future”) in his view of human history. To him, modern technology is making a “sorcerer’s apprentice” of man, an actual slave, with the search for knowledge and technological advances becoming the master of humanity. Earlier technologies, on the other hand, did not enslave man. Rather, Heidegger suggests, man had the will and capability to master them. Today, this will to master technology “becomes all the more urgent, as technique threatens more to slip out of the domination of man.” [415-416] Man needs to go back to the future, Heidegger concludes, in an effort to re-establish the old relation of mastery over modern technology [compare with final Heidegger slide].

As seen above, Heidegger differentiates between ancient and modern technique. Ancient technique was operated by man in accordance to the ancient teaching that “the essence of something is what something is.” [415] Arguably, Heidegger implies, there was at one point in time (i.e., “Golden Age”) an appreciation of the thing as a thing. Modern man has lost this appreciation. No longer is the thing approached as a thing, but rather as a means to an end. Accordingly, modern technique is viewed by man as a powerful tool to adapt things/nature to suit his ends.

The modern use of technique – Heidegger calls it “the instrumental and anthropological determination of technique” [415] – harbors a serious peril, in fact the peril [434]. This peril, as is further illustrated below, consists of being (i.e., what is) turning itself away from its essence into concealedness (i.e., forgottenness), that is, turning itself against the truth (i.e., unconcealedness) of its essence [447].

Interestingly, however, Heidegger observes that “where peril is, grows what saves also” (quoting the German poet Hölderlin) [448, emphasis added]. Saving means “keeping-in-trust,” in German be-wahr-en. Note that “wahr” means “true.” Keeping-in-trust therefore means “keeping-in-truth.” This, according to Heidegger, is what happens with things when they are forgotten, locked away in Bestand. Contrary to the things that are dissected, things in Bestand are saved in concealedness, and may well return into unconcealedness one day. “Therefore,” Heidegger concludes, “in the essence of the peril, conceals itself the possibility of a turn....” [447, emphasis added].

The concept of “turn” (Kehre) suggests that Heidegger also saw in history a circular element – history as the perpetual cycle of things moving from concealedness back into unconcealedness, and vice versa. In this history, man’s role “as the shepherd of being” [447] is to wait “for the essence of being, in that he thoughtfully guards it.” [ibid.] The essence of being, namely truth (unconcealedness) cannot be known by act of will. It happens when being is unconcealed, when the thing shows itself to the shepherd of being in its thingness. Man cannot force his way to the thingness of a thing by act of will (dissection, or keeping things in storage). Rather, the thingness of a thing will unconceal itself to man in a moment of revelation, which can only occur if man – thoughtfully – allows being to be, the world to world, the thing to thing. This thoughtfully allowing being to be etc., according to Heidegger, happens in the glance (Ein-blick), that is, when man looks at the thing in contemplation. It is in this moment (Augen-blick) that the essence of the thing steps in its own light, and truth discloses itself in the worlding of world as the mirror-play of the fourfold of heaven and earth, mortals and godly [see 450].

Alternative – Language Solves Being

Our alternative is an examination of the technology of the 1ac through it's linguistic make up- This examination of language is key to the primal dimension of being

Lovitt, 77 (Willaim, Introduction to The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, translated by William Lovitt, page: xix, ASG/JRC)

Access to the way to which Heidegger wishes to introduce us, the way to thinking and to a free relationship with Being, lies through language. For thinking is man's according with and responding to Being, and "language is the primal dimension" in which that corresponding takes place (T 41).

Heidegger has a poet's ear for language and often writes in a poetic way. For him the proper function of words is not to stand for, to signify. Rather, words point to something beyond themselves. They are translucent bearers of meaning. To name a thing is to summon it, to call it toward one. Heidegger's words are rich in connotation. Once inclined to invent words to carry needed meanings, he has more recently become concerned with the rehabilitation of language, with the restoring of its original, now obliterated force. Repeatedly he tells us of the ancient and fundamental meanings of words, carefully setting forth nuances or tracing historical changes that took place as though passed from one language to another. Our word "technology," we learn, rests back upon the Greek techne. Our "cause," from latin causa, translates the Greek aition, which has a very different meaning. "Essence," "theory," "reflection," the "real" – word after word is searched out to its roots and defined and used according to its latent meanings. In all this Heidegger is of course no mean antiquarian. He has said that language is the house of Being. The reciprocal relation between Being and man is fulfilled through language. Hence to seek out what language is, through discovering what was spoken in it when it first arose and what has been and can be heard in it thereafter, is in fact to seek out that relationship. It is to endeavor to place oneself where the utterance of Being may be heard and expressed.

Alternative – Understanding Being

An understanding of being is necessary to restructure our relationship with technology- and to avoid environmental destruction and nuclear war

Dreyfus, 93 – Professor of Philosophy at the University of California at Berkeley
(Charles B., “Heidegger on the connection between nihilism, art, technology, and politics” – chapter of “The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger,” ed. By Charles B. Guignon, p. 304-5) JRC

Heidegger’s view is both darker and more hopeful. He thinks there is a more dangerous situation facing modern man than the technological destruction of nature and civilization, yet this is a situation about which something can be done – at least indirectly. Heidegger’s concern is the human distress caused by the technological understandings of being, rather than the destruction caused by specific technologies. Consequently, he distinguishes the current problems caused by technology – ecological destruction, nuclear danger, consumerism, and so on-from the devastation that would result should technology solve all out problems: “What threatens man in his very nature is... that man, by the peaceful release, transformation, storage, and channeling of the energies of physical nature, could render the human condition... tolerable for everybody and happy in all respects. (PLT 116; GA 294)” The “greatest danger” is that “the approaching tide of technological revolution in the atomic age could so captivate, bewitch, dazzle and beguile man that calculative thinking may someday come to be accepted and practiced as the only way of thinking. (DT 56; G 27)” The danger, then is not the destruction of nature or culture but certain totalizing kinds of practices-a leveling of our understanding of being. **This threat is not a problem for which we must find a solution, but an ontological condition that requires a transformation of our understanding of being.**

Alternative – Examining Technology

A rejection of the ideology of homeless ness as the act of examining ontology is key to sustainability of human life on earth

Thiele 95 – Professor of Political Science at University of Florida (Leslie Paul, *Timely Meditations*, p.192-3, JRC)

WE LIVE in a world of furious technological growth. Human beings modify as never before the world in which they live. Increasingly, they attempt to create this world anew. Yet the question remains whether this world, frantically produced under the law of exponential growth, provides a home. Despite our power to fashion our habitat—indeed, largely because of this increasing power—we are left without an abiding sense of place. This alienation is evident whenever the earth is treated less as a place of dwelling than as a quarry from which resources are to be extracted and refuse deposited. Having accumulated the power to pitch the planet into an irreversible ecological "coma," as a recent news report indicated in an extreme illustration of the point, we are already fantasizing about our escape to its celestial neighbors, which would be prepared for human habitation through massive "terraforming" techniques. As Heidegger foresaw, "The partly conceded, partly denied homelessness of man with regard to his essence is replaced by the organized global conquest of the earth, and the thrust into outer space" (N 248). Our profound sense of homelessness, more than a description of the cosmopolitan, transient, and accelerated pace of contemporary life, also marks our status as nomads in the realm of thought and spirit. As our nomadic conquests wax, our capacity to dwell on earth wanes. In the last address given before his death, Heidegger would ask his hometown friends at Messkirch to "reflect whether and how in the age of the technologized, uniform world civilization home can still exist" (G 13:243).

Complacency in homelessness threatens to become the postmodern condition. The defining feature of this complacency, however, is not lassitude. To the contrary: it fosters an acceleration of technological

growth. In the wake of this growth, the remedy for our homelessness, if we may speak in such terms, remains elusive. But a solution will not arise from the willful attempt to fabricate an abode for ourselves. Technological attempts to create a world are ill fated, for our technological capacity to build a home remains improperly channeled so long as our capacity to find a home in this world remains dormant. Heidegger warns:

Only if we are capable of dwelling, only then can we build. . . . The real plight of dwelling does not lie merely in a lack of houses. The real plight of dwelling is indeed older than the world wars and their destruction, older also than the increase of the earth's population and the condition of the industrial workers. The real dwelling plight lies in this, that mortals ever search anew for the nature of dwelling, that they must ever learn to dwell. What if man's homelessness consisted in this, that man still does not even think of the real plight of dwelling as the plight? Yet **as soon as man gives thought to his homelessness, it is a misery no longer.** Rightly considered and kept well in mind, it is the sole summons that calls mortals into their dwelling. But how else can mortals answer this summons than by trying on their part, on their own, to bring dwelling to the fullness of its nature? This they accomplish when they build out of dwelling, and think for the sake of dwelling. (PIT 160-61)

Building, Heidegger indicates, must arise out of the spirit of dwelling, not as its substitute. To dwell (Aufenthalt) is to find one's place. The assumption is that this place presents one with the ongoing task of its discovery and preservation. To find one's place is not to forge it through the power of technological will. It is to receive and care for an abode. Our capacity to maintain this caring reception in the face of inevitable technological growth will determine our future as worldly dwellers.

Alternative – “Clearing”/Indeterminacy

Change to the flaws of democracy will come to pass through Heidegger’s clearing, precisely because it does not promise to bring about a new event in history

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(“ IJŽS Vol 1.4 Žižek and Heidegger Reply to Žižek ”)//cp/JRC

Žižek wishes to find a politics that would be ontic, and would be in touch with its ontic situation, and which would open up genuinely emancipatory, non-democratic possibilities from within its current situation. So one which would refuse the alternative of either a passive awaiting of the new or a violent attempt simply to bring it about. Rather it would be an attempt to attack the fragility of the current system at its ‘symptomatic moment’ and thus make room for the new. To attack the site at which an event which would revolutionise the current order might take place, without precipitating the event itself.

The question is that of the act and of a politics that would be ontic but would open up space for an ontological event, which is to say a radical turning in Western history, which is of course tied up with the democracy to which Žižek seeks an alternative. My worry is that this still seems to distinguish between the opening up of space for the event and the event itself, as if that would be an ontological politics, one which actually brought the event into reality: is Žižek not still stuck within a deconstructionist’s opposition? In other words, there still comes the incalculable moment of madness or decision or the moment after the preparation’s end in which mere awaiting is all that is left. And here we are back at precisely Heidegger’s position. As we shall now establish. For Heidegger, the site for the event, which he calls a ‘clearing’, is precisely that which man is to foster and watch over, without presuming to have the power to bring about a new event in history.

Alternative – Ontic Occurrence

Specific cites for resistance via specific ontical politics are key to including our reevaluation of ontology in politics.

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("IJŽS Vol 1.4 Žižek and Heidegger Reply to Žižek")//cp/JRC—no change

Žižek's politics

Žižek believes his own vision of politics to remain true to one element of Heidegger's thought of which — here at least — he believes Heidegger to have fallen short. It follows from Žižek's own elaboration of the ontological difference which here he believes eludes Heidegger, but which elsewhere Žižek himself attributes to Heidegger. First let us determine the nature of this politics, and then the nature of Žižek's understanding of the ontological difference. Žižek see politics as spanning the ontico-ontological divide, by acting among beings in a way that opens up space for a radically new revelation of the same, an event in being-history, a new event of being. Later Žižek speaks of a 'trauma' as an ontic occurrence which necessitates an entirely new understanding of the whole of beings, a new set of 'ontological coordinates' (23). It is as if ontic politics would seek out the trauma, the real which the current system has disavowed in order to constitute itself, which is nevertheless present in the 'symptom', the return (to consciousness) of the repressed. Elsewhere he speaks of this politics as attacking the current system precisely at the place of its 'symptomal knot'. We have struggled in the past to define just what kind of politics Žižek wants in the Ticklish Subject (Heidegger Beyond Deconstruction:105–27), and it seems to us that here Žižek is more clear. It is one that prises and holds open a space for the new. This was already signalled at the end of For They Know Not What They Do: here the leftist project was defined as looking out for signs of the new, and always with respect to missed encounters, failures, lost causes, whose revolutionary potential must be revived in the name of the future (For They Know Not What They Do:272–3). But crucially, this politics is not 'ontological' in attempting to itself bring about the new. It merely makes clear the incompleteness or inconsistency of the current regime and thus destroys its ideological appearance of necessity and ahistoricity. Thus it opens up a history once again and the possibility of the future.

Politics is ontic, but it has the grand ambition of preparing for an ontological event, a fundamental alteration in the way in which the whole is viewed, the way in which it appears to us, the very scope of the possibilities belonging to contemporary existence. It must focus on the void in the whole, the clearing as the place in which it might be possible for an alternative to present itself, since it is here that the inconsistency of the current regime cryptically reveals itself. 'The true courage of an act is always the courage to accept the in-existence of the big Other, i.e. to attack the existing order at the point of its symptomal knot' (40). This attempt to open up, to reveal to view the contingent suturing of a symbolic world is contingent upon a recognition of the ontological difference as merely a void in beings as a whole, the 'inexistence of the big Other', and since Heidegger lacked the former courage we may attribute this ultimately perhaps to the perceived theoretical deficiency of his understanding of the ontological difference. An act attacks order at the place of its symptom, the void wherein its incompleteness appears or 'is'.

Alternative – Žižek (Turn Away from Fascism)

We can't will a specific alteration in history's path, only by creating an unambiguous space for ontological change via ontic politics can escape current flawed ontologies and escape Heidegger's fascist turn

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("IJŽS Vol 1.4 Žižek and Heidegger Reply to Žižek")/cp/JRC

Heidegger was 'almost right', and with his 'decisionist' attempt to wilfully change the course of being's history, to bring being out of its abeyance by means of a political gesture (if indeed he had such grander ambitions beyond the university, which is — for him — nevertheless central to the spiritual life of a nation), he discovered the structure of the revolutionary act, in the sense that he believed here in a livable political project that was not democratic, the third of the three options with which we and Žižek began. Although Žižek does not quite say it, what is problematic for him, and what is perhaps the reason why Heidegger could in Foucauldian fashion fall for Nazism rather than Stalinism, is the notion that politics can bring about ontological change, world-historical change, a change in destiny (a prevalent word for Heidegger at the time). For Žižek this would be 'ontological politics', while, in a way that avoids both this and the 'ontic politics' of pragmatic compromise which characterises the deconstructive tradition and which allows one to produce (contra Laclau, for instance) a non-democratic theory which nevertheless takes into account deconstructive insights, Žižek is seeking a politics which can open up the space for ontological change without willing it or believing it can bring it about. This is necessary in order to allow the future to present itself as New. If one moulds the future after one's own image, if one expects anything, the future will not really be the future, so one can in no way will the future or bring it about by force, one can only make room for it. If one attempts to mould the future, one closes out the other. If, on the other hand, one partakes of an ontic politics that opens up space for the new, one allows the event to come. Again, does this not seem reminiscent of the later Heidegger's position, in which one cannot bring about a turn in the unwinding of destiny by will alone? Here, man does not have the power to do such a thing, but one can prepare for such an eventuality, make it possible. In this context, Derrida speaks of this as making the impossible possible, the impossible, which cannot be conditioned by the present. One can only prepare for a turn in being's history. In any case, for Žižek, Heidegger was right with regard to the form of revolutionary action, but gave it fascist content. But was he, by Žižek's own lights, if the ontological form of politics is not acceptable? In what sense did Heidegger get it right save in his opposition to democracy? Žižek seems to want more. Perhaps his notion that humans can affect *something* with respect to the ontological.¹⁰ 'Our task thus is to repeat Heidegger and retrieve this lost dimension or potential of his thought' (31). For Žižek, this lost potential is a far Leftist form of revolution. He consistently states that Heidegger had no time for communism. But let us examine Heidegger's thoughts on communism.

Alternative – Act as if the Catastrophe has already Happened

Rather than acting through technological thought, as if we can still take preventative measures to escape ecological catastrophe, we must act retroactively, as if that catastrophe is already here and we can only proceed to play clean-up.

Zizek '8 – Lady killing suave machine

("In defense of lost causes" p.456-460)//Collin//JRC

Dupuy refers to the theory of complex systems which accounts for the two opposite features of such systems: their robust and stable character and their extreme vulnerability. These systems can accommodate themselves to great disturbances, integrate them and find a new balance and stability-up to a certain threshold (a "tipping point"), beyond which a small disturbance can cause a total disaster and lead to the establishment of a totally different order. For many centuries, humanity did not have to worry about the impact on the environment of its productive activity nature was able to accommodate itself to deforestation, to the use of coal and oil, and so on. However, one cannot be sure whether today we are not approaching a tipping point-one really cannot be sure, since the point at which certainty would be possible is when it is already too late. We touch here the paradoxical nerve of morality christened "moral luck" by Bernard Williams. 56 Williams evokes the case of a painter ironically named "Gauguin" who left his wife and children and moved to Tahiti in order to fully develop his artistic genius -was he morally justified in doing this or not? Williams's answer is that we can only answer this question in retrospect, after we learn the final outcome of his risky decision: did he develop into an artistic genius or not? As Dupuy has pointed out, 57 we encounter the same dilemma apropos the urgency of doing something about the contemporary threat of various ecological catastrophes: either we take this threat seriously and decide today to do things which, if the catastrophe does not occur, will appear ridiculous, or we do nothing and lose everything in the case of a catastrophe, the worst choice being that of a middle position, taking a limited number of measures-in which case, we fail whatever should happen (that is to say, there is no middle ground when it comes to an ecological catastrophe: either it will occur or it won't). In such a situation, the talk about anticipation, precaution, and risk control tends to become meaningless, since we are dealing with what, in the terms of Rumsfeldian epistemology, one should call the "unknown unknowns": we not only do not know where the tipping point is, we do not even know exactly what we do not know. The most unsettling aspect of the ecological crisis concerns the so-called "knowledge in the real" which can run amok: when the winter is too warm, plants and animals misread the hot weather in February as the signal that spring has already begun and start to behave accordingly, thus not only rendering themselves vulnerable to late onslaughts of cold weather, but also perturbing the entire rhythm of natural reproduction. In May 2007, it was reported that a mysterious disease, which is wiping out America's bees, could have a devastating effect on the country's food supply: about one-third of the human diet comes from insect-pollinated plants, and the bee is responsible for 80 percent of that pollination; even cattle, which feed on alfalfa, depend on bees. While not all scientists foresee a food crisis, noting that large-scale bee deaths have happened before, this one seems particularly baffling and alarming. This is how one should imagine a possible catastrophe: a small-level interruption with devastating global consequences. One can learn even more from Rumsfeldian epistemology-the expression, of course, refers to the well-known incident in March 2003, when Donald Rumsfeld engaged in a little amateur philosophizing about the relationship between the known and the unknown: "There are known knowns. These are things we know that we know. There are known unknowns. That is to say, there are things that we know we don't know. But there are also unknown unknowns. There are things we don't know we don't know." What he forgot to add was the crucial fourth term: "unknown knowns," things we do not know that we know-which is precisely the Freudian unconscious, the "knowledge which does not know itself," as Lacan used to say. If Rumsfeld thought that the main dangers in the confrontation with Iraq were the "unknown unknowns," the threats from Saddam the nature of which we did not even suspect, what we should reply is that the main dangers are, on the contrary, the "unknown knowns," the disavowed beliefs and suppositions we are not even aware of adhering to ourselves. In the case of ecology, these disavowed beliefs and suppositions are the ones which prevent us from really believing in the possibility of a disaster, and they combine with the "unknown unknowns." The situation is like that of the blind spot in our visual field: we do not see the gap, the picture appears continuous. Our blindness to the results of "systemic evil" is perhaps most clearly perceptible apropos debates about Communist crimes: there, responsibility is easy to allocate, we are dealing with subjective evil, with agents who committed them, and we can even identify the ideological sources (totalitarian ideology, the Communist Manifesto, Rousseau ...). When one draws attention to the millions who died as the result of capitalist globalization, from the tragedy of Mexico in the sixteenth century through the Belgian Congo holocaust a century ago, responsibility is denied: this just happened as the result of an "objective"

Alternative – Act as if the Catastrophe has already Happened

process, nobody planned and executed it, there was no Capitalist Manifesto ... (Ayn Rand came closest to writing it). And therein also resides the limitation of the "ethical committees" which pop up everywhere to counteract the dangers of unbridled scientific-technological development: with all their good intentions, ethical considerations, and so forth, they ignore the more basic "systemic" violence. The fact that the Belgian king Leopold who presided over the Congolese genocide was a great humanitarian, proclaimed a saint by the pope, cannot be dismissed as a mere case of ideological hypocrisy and cynicism: one can argue that, subjectively, he probably really was a sincere humanitarian, even modestly counteracting the catastrophic consequences of the vast economic project of ruthless exploitation of the natural resources of Congo over which he presided (Congo was his personal fiefdom!) -the ultimate irony is that most of the profits from this endeavor were directed for the benefit of the Belgian people, for public works, museums, and so on. In the early seventeenth century, after the establishment of the shogun regime, Japan made a unique collective decision to isolate itself from foreign culture and to pursue its own path of a contained life of balanced reproduction, focused on cultural refinement, avoiding any tendencies towards wild expansion. Was the ensuing period which lasted till the middle of the nineteenth century really just an isolationist dream from which Japan was cruelly awakened by Commodore Perry on the American warship? What if the dream is that we can go on indefinitely in our expansionism? What if we all need to repeat, mutatis mutandi, the Japanese decision, and collectively decide to intervene in our pseudonatural development, to change its direction? The tragedy is that the very idea of such a collective decision is discredited today. Apropos the disintegration of state socialism two decades ago, one should not forget that, at approximately the same time, the ideology of the Western socialdemocratic welfare state was also dealt a crucial blow, it also ceased to function as the imaginary able to arouse a collective passionate commitment. The notion that "the time of the welfare state has past" is today a piece of commonly accepted wisdom. What these two defeated ideologies shared is the notion that humanity as a collective subject has the capacity to somehow limit impersonal and anonymous socio-historical development, to steer it in a desired direction. Today, such a notion is quickly dismissed as "ideological" and/or "totalitarian": the social process is once again perceived as dominated by an anonymous Fate beyond social control. The rise of global capitalism is presented to us as such a Fate, against which one cannot fight- one either adapts oneself to it, or one falls out of step with history and is crushed. The only thing one can do is to make global capitalism as human as possible, to fight for "global capitalism with a human face" (this is what, ultimately, the Third Way is-or, rather, Wad-about). The sound barrier will have to be broken here, the risk will have to be taken to endorse once more large collective decisions. If we are effectively to reconceptualize the notion of revolution in the Benjaminian sense of stopping the "train of history" which runs towards a catastrophe, it is not enough just to submit the standard notion of historical progress to critical analysis; one should also focus on the limitation of the ordinary "historical" notion of time: at each moment of time, there are multiple possibilities waiting to be realized; once one of them actualizes itself, others are canceled. The supreme case of such an agent of historical time is the Leibnizean God who created the best possible of worlds: before creation, He had in his mind the entire panoply of possible worlds, and His decision consisted in choosing the best one among these options. Here, the possibility precedes choice: the choice is a choice among possibilities. What is unthinkable within this horizon of linear historical evolution is the notion of a choice/act which retroactively opens up its own possibility: the idea that the emergence of something radically New retroactively changes the past-of course, not the actual past (we are not in science fiction), but the past possibilities, or, to put it in more formal terms, the value of the modal propositions about the past. Dupuy's point is that, if we are to confront properly the threat of a (cosmic or environmental) disaster, we need to break out of this "historical" notion of temporality: we have to introduce a new notion of time. Dupuy calls this time the "time of a project," of a closed circuit between the past and the future: the future is causally produced by our acts in the past, while the way we act is determined by our anticipation of the future and our reaction to this anticipation. This, then, is how Dupuy proposes to confront the forthcoming catastrophe: we should first perceive it as our fate, as unavoidable, and then, projecting ourselves into it, adopting its standpoint, we should retroactively insert into its past (the past of the future) counterfactual possibilities ("If we had done this and that, the catastrophe we are in now would not have occurred! ") upon which we then act today. 58 Therein resides Dupuy's paradoxical formula: we have to accept that, at the level of possibilities, our future is doomed, that the catastrophe will take place, it is our destiny-and, then, against the background of this acceptance, we should mobilize ourselves to perform the act which will change destiny itself and thereby insert a new possibility into the past. For Badiou, the time of the fidelity to an event is the futur anterieur: overtaking oneself towards the future, one acts now as if the future one wants to bring about is already here. The same circular strategy of the future anterior is also the only truly effective one in the face of a calamity (say, of an ecological disaster): instead of saying "the future is still open, we still have the time to act and prevent the worst," one should accept the catastrophe as inevitable, and then act to retroactively undo what is already "written in the stars" as our destiny.

Alternative: Embrace broad international climate change

Alt solvency; The alt. is empirically proven successful by the Cold War, only a certain type of egalitarian politic concerning the environment can achieve a reinvigoration of egalitarian terror.

Zizek '8 – Lady killing suave machine

("In defense of lost causes" p.460-461)//Collin

And is not a supreme case of the reversal of positive into negative destiny the shift from classical historical materialism into the attitude of Adorno's and Horkheimer's "dialectic of Enlightenment"? While traditional Marxism enjoined us to engage and act in order to bring about the necessity (of communism), Adorno and Horkheimer projected themselves into the final catastrophic outcome perceived as fixed (the advent of the "administered society" of total manipulation and the end of subjectivity) in order to stimulate us to act against this outcome in our present. And, ironically, does the same not hold for the very defeat of Communism in 1990? It is easy, from today's perspective, to mock the "pessimists," from the Right to the Left, from Solzhenitsyn to Castoriadis, who deplored the blindness and compromises of the democratic West, its lack of ethico-political strength and courage in dealing with the Communist threat, and who predicted that the Cold War had already been lost by the West, that the Communist bloc had already won, that the collapse of the West was imminent - but it is precisely their attitude which was the most effective in bringing about the collapse of Communism. In Dupuy's terms, their very "pessimistic" prediction at the level of possibilities, of linear historical evolution, mobilized them to counteract it. We should thus ruthlessly abandon the prejudice that the linear time of evolution is "on our side," that History is "working for us" in the guise of the famous mole digging under the earth, doing the work of the Cunning of Reason.⁵⁹ But how, then, are we to counter the threat of ecological catastrophe? It is here that we should return to the four moments of what Badiou calls the "eternal Idea" of revolutionary-egalitarian Justice. What is demanded is:

1. Strict egalitarian justice (all people should pay the same price in eventual renunciations, namely, one should impose the same worldwide norms of per capita energy consumption, carbon dioxide emissions, and so on; the developed nations should not be allowed to poison the environment at the present rate, blaming the developing Third World countries, from Brazil to China, for ruining our shared environment with their rapid development);
2. Terror (ruthless punishment of all who violate the imposed protective measures, inclusive of severe limitations on liberal "freedoms," technological control of prospective law-breakers);
3. Voluntarism (the only way to confront the threat of ecological catastrophe is by means of large-scale collective decisions which run counter to the "spontaneous" immanent logic of capitalist development);
4. And, last but not least, all this combined with trust in the people (the wager that a large majority of the people supports these severe measures, sees them as its own, and is ready to participate in their enforcement). One should not be afraid to assert, as a combination of terror and trust in the people, the reactivation of one of the figures of all egalitarian-revolutionary terrors, the "informer" who denounces the culprits to the authorities. (In the case of the Enron scandal, Time magazine rightly celebrated the insiders who tipped off the financial authorities as true public heroes.)⁶⁰

Does, then, the ecological challenge not offer a unique chance to reinvent the "eternal Idea" of egalitarian terror?

Alternative – Solves Hegemony Flaws

The alternative solves the imbalances of power that are experience in hegemony

Dallmayr, 04 (PhD, Professor, Department of Government and International Studies, Notre Dame, Constellations Volume 11, No 1, 2004
The Underside of Modernity: Adorno, Heidegger, and Dussel Fred Dallmayr).//JRC

Moving beyond the critique of Machenschaft, Besinnung offers glimpses of a radically “other” possibility: namely, the reflective recovery of the question of and care for being, a care completely immune to managerial manipulation. As before, Heidegger distinguishes between power and violence, on the one hand, and genuine “authority” (Herrschaft), on the other. “Apart from exuding intrinsic dignity or worth,” he writes, “Herrschaft means the free potency or capacity for an original respect for being” (rather than merely empirical things). To characterize this dignity, Besinnung introduces a new vocabulary, by presenting being (Seyn) as a basically “power-free domain (das Machtlose) beyond power and non-power or impotence (jenseits von Macht und Unmacht).” As Heidegger emphasizes, “power-free” does not mean powerless or impotent, because the latter remains fixated on power, now experienced as a lack. From an everyday “realist” angle, being’s realm may appear powerless or impotent; but this is only a semblance or illusion resulting from its reticent inobtrusiveness. Due to its reticence, being’s realm can never be dragged into human machinations, into the struggles between the powerful and the powerless (as long as the latter merely seek power); but precisely in this manner it reveals its Herrschaft, a reign that “cannot be matched by any power or superpower because they necessarily ignore the nature of the basically power-free possibility.” To be sure, access to this reign is difficult and radically obstructed by the Machenschaft of our age. Yet, an important pathway through and beyond these obstructions is offered by meditative thinking (Besinnung) which opens a glimpse into the “time-space-play” (Zeit-Spiel-Raum) of being as Ereignis, that is, into the interplay and differential entwinement of being and beings, of humans, nature, and the divine.¹⁵

Alternative – Technology Through Caution

Vote negative to engage in an examination of technology through causation separate and a rejection of the neutrality of technology that the affirmative presents. Only this type of examination will reveal to us the true essence of technology, stopping it from controlling us.

Beckman - Emeritus Professor of Philosophy Humanities and Social Sciences Harvey Mudd College - 00 (Tad, "Martin Heidegger and Environmental Ethics," 2000, <http://www2.hmc.edu/~tbeckman/personal/Heidart.html>) //JRC

In our present point of view, we see technology as a complex of contrivances and technical skills, put forth by human activity and developed as means to our ends. Technology, in this view, is an object, or a complex of objects and techniques, that seems passive itself; indeed, we conceive of it as activated by us only. According to Heidegger, however, we are fundamentally mistaken in this; "we are delivered over to it in the worst possible way when we regard it as something neutral." {[7], p. 4} On the contrary, the essence of technology reveals it as something far from neutral or merely an instrument of human control; it is an autonomous organizing activity within which humans themselves are organized. Viewing technology as a means to an end, "everything depends on our manipulating technology in the proper manner... We will, as we say, 'get' technology 'spiritually in hand.'... But suppose now that technology were no mere means, how would it stand with the will to master it?" {[7], p. 5} How, indeed, can we cope with it if it encompasses us in its organizational activity?

In summary, the problem with our critique of technology lies at two levels. First, while we argue and take sides on the issue of technology, none of us is really free to deal with it constructively because none of us really understands it in its essence, i.e., in its entirety and in its central sense. Second, our limited understanding of technology is so misguided that little of value can be salvaged from it. This is because all discussions are prefaced on the view that technology is an object which we manipulate as a means to our own ends. In fact, the essence of technology reveals it as a vast system of organization which encompasses us rather than standing objectively and passively ready for our direction and control.

If our discussion of technology is so far off its mark, then, how can we anticipate discovering its essence? Heidegger's method is to assume that the instrumental view of technology has a basic correctness even though it is not true. That basic correctness explains why we have dealt successfully with it at a practical level as long as we have. For Heidegger, this basic correctness offers a pathway for investigative thinking by pursuing the concept of "instrument" and the roots of the word 'technology.' These are the only correct clues that we have.

To view something as an instrument is to place it in a context of ends for which it is presumed to be a means and this is the context of "causation." {[7], p. 6} Thus, one promising path to the essence of technology is through an examination of causation. Heidegger was guided in this examination by Aristotle's classic account of the four factors in all causation -- causa materialis, causa formalis, causa finalis, and causa efficiens. While the traditional reading of Aristotle tends to understand each of these factors in isolation and ignores their cooperative relationship, Heidegger asserted that the essence of causation must lie in what unifies the four. "The four causes are the ways, all belonging at once to each other, of being responsible for something else." {[7], p. 7; emphasis added} A singular thing, or event, is caused and the four factors are cooperatively responsible for that in some way. The thing caused is something that "comes into presence;" thus, the factors are cooperatively responsible for bringing it forth. In this way, Heidegger discovered the very essence of causation in the Greek word 'aitia,' or "to occasion," and as Plato expressed it in Symposium, "Every occasion for whatever passes over and goes forward into presencing from that which is not presencing is poesis, is bringing-forth." {[7], p. 10}

Alternative – Essence of technology

A reevaluation of the essence of technology is key to establishing a connection with being and solving the environment

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Our mistaken assessment of the life of technology is really caused by our failure to understand its essence. Technology must be understood in its essence and not merely as industrial machinery, space-age refrigerators, and computer-directed guidance systems. If we understand technology in its essence, Heidegger claimed, we will see that all of the West's historical development has been built out of it: technology is the central theme of our civilization. To move out of the dangers that technology presents, then, requires more than retrenching ourselves in "traditional values;" it requires a transformation of values, a process of placing Western civilization on a whole new course. This is clearly similar to what Nietzsche recognized and called the "transvaluation of all values," though Heidegger asserted that Nietzsche himself was never able to make the transformation or to recognize the whole extent to which it is necessary. The problem of technology is not merely its obvious physical dangers to us nor is it merely these confusions of time and scope. Technology is more than just a name for Western thinking, Western dispositions, and Western inventiveness. Technology is also a mode of self-consciousness, a mode of seeing ourselves and, hence, of letting ourselves enter into the world. Heidegger's analysis demands a new calling-forth of human consciousness. It demands that humans come to presence in the world in a new way more fitting to their essential nature. It is the object of this final section to interpret this last portion of the argument and its relevance to environmental ethics.

By discovering the essence of the relationship between ourselves and technology we can reconnect with our essence and stave off the harms of the status quo

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When we explore beings, things that exist, we discover that most beings are simply in existence with no relationship to one another, no consciousness. Human beings are unique, so far as we can tell, because human beings do observe. Humans are aware of other beings; they witness them. This is why Heidegger referred to the human being with the German word 'Dasein' or "being-there." The human is the only being we know for which the "there" and the "when" make sense because the human's awareness defines a "there" and a "when" among all other beings. For non-aware beings, beings that are merely "ready-to-hand," there is no sense of taking a place within a historical time. It is in this respect, then, that our central concern regarding the human essence must be to consider who we are as beings among beings and, in particular, as beings who witness other beings. All profound thinking about human life must be founded on the question of who we are as aware beings among other beings. The essence of human life is, indeed, founded in the facticity, or objectivity, of dasein; not only do we humans come into relationship with other beings through our characteristic consciousness but they come into their own beings as objects through us. They are witnessed by us. This is why Heidegger insisted that, from the position of our own essence, "we can never encounter only [ourselves]." {1}, p. 27} Any conception of our environment that perceives only ourselves and our dispositions is necessarily flawed from the point of view of essential human nature. The human presence is crucial to other beings coming-to-presence, to truth happening. This concept should sound familiar now; what it claims is that the human essence is fundamentally involved in all revealing, in all objects coming into unconcealment. Technology, as a mode of revealing, is one path within many possible paths that open up within the essential nature of that human role: each of these paths develops a specific aspect of our relations to beings. That relationship is always reciprocated in the sense that, in so far as being-there is our essential nature, the way that we are there, the way that we relate, is the way that we ourselves come into being during that period. This is the key to Heidegger's insight that the way we treat other things is the determinant of the way we ourselves will be treated. The danger of technology is that it treats other beings in an aggressive, utilitarian way so that, ultimately, we ourselves are carried away within the overarching themes of aggression and utility. In the epoch of technology, we come to see ourselves exclusively within the limited sense of agency within this unfolding structure of being. What is this revealing in which we participate? The process is understood as something coming out of "concealedness" into "unconcealedness." To understand what Heidegger meant requires us to reflect as deeply as possible upon the nature of human experience as it happens to us (within what we are) and not merely life as the West has traditionally interpreted it. Heidegger conceived of this through the concept of the "Open."

"In the midst of beings as a whole an open place occurs. There is a clearing, a lighting... That which is can only be, as a being, if it stands within and stands out within what is lighted in this clearing. Only this clearing grants and guarantees to us humans a passage to those beings that we ourselves are not, and access to the being that we ourselves are. Thanks to this clearing, beings are unconcealed in certain changing degrees." {6}, p. 53}

Alternative – Reevaluation

Scientific thought can only go so far – only re-evaluating our relationship to the world can solve environmental destruction
Ridling 1 [Zaine Ridling, Ph.D., Columbus University, Access Foundation, "THE LIGHTNESS OF BEING: A COMPREHENSIVE STUDY OF HEIDEGGER'S THOUGHT," <http://hudsoncress.org/html/library/western-philosophy/Heidegger%20-%20Lightness%20of%20Being%20Zaine%20Riddling.pdf>] // LDK/JRC

But if Heidegger's aim is neither to decry nor to promote the actual world of technology but simply to ask us to reflect critically on the limits of technology by considering its essence, does it follow that his strategy has no relation to the concrete, no practical significance or application?

One way of answering this question would be to acknowledge that Heidegger was no more of a practical environmentalist than he was a Christian preacher or a teacher of Buddhist meditation. He will not give us concrete answers to concrete problems (although which modern philosopher has given us any real help in the face of the environmental crisis?), and the one occasion when he tried to do so, in 1933, simply demonstrated the gulf separating his way of essential thinking from everyday reality. Nevertheless, the nature of the crisis confronting us today is so all-encompassing, that permeates every level of society and culture. Its solution cannot be left to the scientists and technologists alone. For science and technology will necessarily direct their best efforts to particular problems, but, over and above the question of how to maximize renewable energy sources or how to take countermeasures against ozone depletion, we also need to be considering the kind of life-style, the kind of society we want to be living in. No matter how sophisticated our science, it will never be able to achieve more than crisis management so long as we go on living in an acquisitive, self-assertive society of individuals pursuing the maximization of their personal autonomy, in moral, financial, and political terms, and for whom the earth itself is nothing but a resource for human self-realization. So long as this is how we choose to live, we will continue to degrade our environment in a cycle of ever more total crises. Unless we change at the fundamental level of values and of vision we will find ourselves, later if not sooner, passing the point of no return and rendering our planet humanly uninhabitable.

On this line of reasoning, we not only need technical solutions, we also need the vision thing. Alongside ecology we need "deep ecology," a spiritual re-orientation that will make us fit custodians of planetary good.

Alternative – Personal Action/Freedom

The Alternative is to embrace personal freedom and responsibility for inaction on the environment, there is no big Other or definitive scientific proof that precludes solvency. We are free to solve.

Zizek '8 – Lady killing suave machine

("In defense of lost causes" p.454-455)//Collin //JRC

So what is the problem today? The problem is that, although our (sometimes even individual) acts can have catastrophic (ecological and so forth) consequences, we continue to perceive such consequences as anonymous/systemic, as something for which we are not responsible, for which there is no clear agent. More precisely-and here we are back to the logic of the madman who knows that he is not a grain of corn, but is worried that the chickens have not realized this fact-we know we are responsible, but the chicken (the big Other) has not caught on. Or, insofar as knowledge is the function of the I, and belief the function of the Other, we know the real state of affairs very well, but we do not believe it-the big Other prevents us from believing in it, from assuming this knowledge and responsibility: "Contrary to what the promoters of the principle of precaution think, the cause of our non-action is not scientific uncertainty. We know it, but we cannot make ourselves believe in what we know."⁵⁴ Take global warming, as already noted: with all the data regarding its nature, the problem is not the uncertainty about facts (as those who caution us against panic claim), but our inability to believe that it can really happen: look through the window, the green grass and blue sky are still there, life carries on, nature follows its rhythm ... And therein resides the horror of the Chernobyl accident: when one visits the site, with the exception of the sarcophagus, things look exactly the same as before, life seems to have deserted the site, leaving everything the way it was, and nonetheless we are aware that something is terribly wrong. The change is not at the level of the visible reality itself; it is more fundamental, it affects the very texture of reality. No wonder that there are some lone farmers around the Chernobyl site who continue to lead their lives as before-they simply ignore all the incomprehensible talk about radiation. This situation confronts us with the deadlock of the contemporary "choice society" in its most radical form. In the standard situation of the forced choice I am free to choose on condition that I make the right choice, so that the only thing left for me to do is the empty gesture of pretending to accomplish freely what is in any case imposed on me. Here, on the contrary, the choice really is free and is, for this very reason, experienced as even more frustrating: we find ourselves constantly in the position of having to decide about matters that will fundamentally affect our lives, but without a proper foundation in knowledge: we have been thrown into a time in which everything is provisional. New technologies alter our lives daily. The traditions of the past cannot be retrieved. At the same time we have little idea of what the future will bring. We are forced to Live as if we were free.

Alternative – Reflection

The alternative is not a rejection of technology, but a call to ‘Reflect’ upon its underlying motives – taking technology for granted causes our impacts

McWhorter, 92 – Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Northeast Missouri State University
(Ladelle, Heidegger and the Earth, ed. by Ladelle McWhorter)JRC

<Heidegger often refers in his writings to the dramatic changes to which he was witness - the loss of rootedness to place that came with the Invention of the automobile, then the airplane, and now our various vehicles t-or travel in interplanetary space; the conquering of distances that has accompanied the development of communications technologies such as radio, television, and film, and of course, the changes in our thinking of and with the natural world that have come as we have become seemingly more and more independent of the earth's forces, more and more capable "of outwitting them and even of harnessing them and forcing them to conform to our wills. These changes - but more especially human beings' unreflective incorporation of these changes into our daily lives - struck Heidegger as strange and very dangerous. It may well be that there is nothing really wrong with using a tractor to plow one's land or with using a computer to write one's book, but there is something ominous, Heidegger believed, about our not giving any thought to what is happening to ourselves and to the world when we do those things, or our not noticing or at least not caring about the disruptions these changes bring about in the fabric of things.

Heidegger calls us to give thought to - or give ourselves over to the thought of - the strangeness of our technological being within the world. HIS works resound with calls for human beings to grow more thoughtful, take heed, to notice and reflect upon where we are and what we are doing, lest human possibility and the most beautiful of possibilities for thought be lost irretrievably in forces we do not understand and only pretend we can control.

- Heidegger's admonitions are sometimes somewhat harsh. "Let us not :01 ourselves," he wrote in 1955. "All of us, including those who think professionally, as it were, are often enough thought-poor; we all are far too easily thought-less. Thoughtlessness is an uncanny visitor who comes and goes everywhere in today's world. For nowadays we take in everything in the quickest and cheapest way, only to forget it just as quickly, instantly."!

Some might find this unnecessarily harsh. We academicians may wish to contest the accusation. Surely, in the universities of all places, thinking is going on. But Heidegger had no respect for that or any other kind of complacency. The thinking he saw as essential is no more likely, perhaps unfortunately, to be found in universities or among philosophers than anywhere else. For the thinking he saw as essential is not the simple amassing and digesting of facts or even the mastering of complex relationships or the producing of ever more powerful and inclusive theories. The thinking Heidegger saw as essential, the thinking his works call us to, is not a thinking that seeks to master anything, not a thinking that results from a drive to grasp and know and shape the world; it is a thinking that disciplines itself to allow the world - the earth, things - to show themselves on their own terms. Heidegger called this kind of thinking 'reflection'. In 1936 he wrote, "Reflection is the courage to make the truth of our own presuppositions and the realm of our own goals into the things that most deserve to be called in question. Reflection is thinking that never rests complacently in the conclusions reached yesterday; it is thinking that continues to think, that never stops with a satisfied smile and announces: We can cease; we have the right answer now. On the contrary, it is thinking that loves its own life, its own occurring, that does not quickly put a stop to itself, as thinking intent on a quick solution always tries to do." >

Alternative – Dasein (Political Imperative)

Now is the time to prevent technology from taking over human thought by proclaiming the dasein. Our evidence cites a political imperative, which is key to solvency.

Spanos, (Professor of English at SUNY–Binghamton) **2k** (The Question of Philosophy and Poiesis in the Posthistorical Age: Thinking/Imagining the Shadow of Metaphysics, William V. Spanos, *boundary 2*, 27.1 (2000) 167-9)//JRC—no change

The fulfillment—the coming to its end—of the logical economy of metaphysical thought in the planetary triumph of technology means, as well, as I have suggested by referring to this arrival as its consummation, the coming to its end not simply in the sense of fulfillment but also of demise. The completion of the metaphysical imperial problematic, that is, has rendered *visible* and active—as radical contradiction—the difference that finally, because it is temporal/differential, cannot be accommodated by—and therefore is not answerable to—its imperial spatializing/reifying/circular/enlightening/colonizing logic. As Heidegger says in “What Is Metaphysics?” concerning the question of the nothing (*das Nichts*) as it pertains to the discourse of science prevailing in the age of the world picture: “What is remarkable is that, precisely in the way scientific man secures to himself what is most properly his, he speaks of *something different*. What [according to science] should be examined are beings only, and besides that—nothing; beings alone, and further—nothing; solely beings and beyond that [End Page 167] —nothing. What about this nothing? . . . The nothing—what else can it be for science but an outrage and a phantasm? If science is right, then only one thing is sure: science wishes to know nothing of the nothing.”²² In the context of the interregnum, this “in between time,” which Heidegger called “a time of dearth,” and which Arendt, more radically, called a time that has disclosed the terrible “banality of evil,” the thinker/poet who would think/imagine the contradiction—the “something different” that belongs essentially to the saying of instrumentalist reason—becomes the *Abgeschiedene*, the stranger, the one who has parted from the homeland, or, rather, is a-part from/of it. According to the deadly imperial measure of the routinized technological thought of the age of the world picture, this de-centered and estranged thinker—the *Dasein* who has been unhomed by the total colonization of thinking by instrumental reason—must be proclaimed “the madman,” because the (non)“object” of his or her ec-centric thinking/*poiesis* in the domain of the uncanny (*die Unheimlichkeit*) is “an outrage and a phantasm.” This, Heidegger implies, was the fate not only of the thinker Nietzsche, but also of the poets Friedrich Hölderlin and Georg Trakl. Though still to be adequately thought in this constellation, it was, *mutatis mutandi*, also the fate of many other modern and even postmodern writers, both in Europe and America (Arthur Rimbaud, Antonin Artaud, Kafka, Virginia Woolf, Genet, Hart Crane, Kerouac, Ginsberg, to name but a few of the most “notorious”), who, each in their own way, were *symptomatically* searching for a way of saying that could resist the deadly banality of the leveling imperatives of the triumphant instrumental saying of the age of the world picture. This, above all, I suggest, explains why the enabling thinkers of the postmodern occasion were profoundly attracted to poets, writers, dramatists, painters, sculptors, and musicians who were “mad,” or, as in the case of Foucault, were profoundly engaged by the phenomenon of madness as it has been represented in and by Enlightenment modernity: It was one of the essential purposes of early postmodern literature and theory to disclose the symbiotic binarist relationship between the vaporous silence of the alien and vagrant “madman” and the solid saying of the “sane” and sedentary citizen of the homeland. But this disclosive initiative as such did not fulfill the possibilities for thinking inhering in the eruption of the phantasmic other of instrumental reason into invisible visibility. And this is because this early initiative overdetermined the negative (repressive) effects of instrumental reason and thus precluded the possibility of thinking [End Page 168] the phantasmic in an other than merely symptomatic way.”²³ It is, despite his disastrous political blindness, precisely because Heidegger inaugurated the process of thinking the positive potentialities of the shadow cast by the light of instrumental reason that the retrieval of his project to rethink thinking is rendered a political imperative of the opposition in the age of the world picture, the age that has borne witness to the planetary triumph of technological thinking and the utter reduction of its “object” to disposable reserve.

Alternative – Discussion Spurs Communal Coalescence

The alt. solves; discussion as a focal point can bring together difference and spur the necessary communal transformation.

Zizek '8 – Lady killing suave machine

("In defense of lost causes" p.450)//Collin //JRC

Heidegger explores a kind of gathering that would enable us to resist postmodern technological practices. [...] [H]e turns from the cultural gathering he explored in "The Origin of the Work of Art" (that sets up shared meaningful differences and thereby unifies an entire culture) to local gatherings that set up local worlds. Such local worlds occur around some everyday thing that temporarily brings into their own both the thing itself and those involved in the typical activity concerning the use of the thing. Heidegger calls this event a *thing thinging* and the tendency in the practices to bring things and people into their own, *appropriation*. [...] Heidegger's examples of things that focus such local gathering are a wine jug and an old stone bridge. Such things gather Black Forest peasant practices [...] the family meal acts as a focal thing when it draws on the culinary and social skills of family members and solicits fathers, mothers, husbands, wives, children, familiar warmth, good humor, and loyalty to come to the fore in their excellence, or in, as Heidegger would say, their ownmost.

Alternative – Changes Thought

Dominant discourses obscure deeper thought like the alternative – only we open up space to replace these dominant ways of thinking

Spanos, 2k – Distinguished Professor of English at Binghamton

(William V, America's Shadow: An Anatomy of Empire, pgs. 10-11)//markoff

Metaphysics is thus a circular mode of inquiry that, in beginning from the end, has as its end the (finally futile) total reification and determination of the essential anxiety-activating indeterminacy of the nothing, of temporality, of the differences that temporality disseminates: of a phantasmic alterity, as it were. To use the rhetoric in Heidegger's discourse that points to the essential imperialism of metaphysical ontology, it is an end-oriented mode of inquiry intended to level or at-home or domesticate or pacify - that is, to "civilize" - the "threatening" not-at-home (die Unheimliche) that being as such "is" for Dasein. The function of metaphysical thinking is not simply to annul the anxiety - the dislocating uncanniness (die Unheimlichkeit) - precipitated by being-in-the-not-at-home. By an easy extension inhering in Heidegger's ironic invocation of the metaphor of "grasping" - one of the essential and determining white metaphors of the truth discourse of the Occident, to which I will return when I take up the spatial metaphors informing the word "metaphysics" - it can be said that the function of this "after" in the logical economy of metaphysics is also to transform the indeterminate realm of the uncanny to a condition that enables its management. The function of metaphysical thinking, in short, is "ideological." It serves to reduce the ineffable being of being to what Heidegger will later call exploitable "standing reserve" (Bestand) and Foucault, "docile and useful body."

It is not, however, simply the Other of metaphysics - the nothing, the temporal, the accidental, the contradictory, the differential, or, to evoke the connotation of the ontological Other I want to underscore, the spectral- that metaphysical objectification and naming would domesticate and pacify. As the metaphors released by the solicitation of the sedimented and innocuous (indeed, benign) names referring to the domestication (at-homing) of being suggest, it is also - and in a determined way - the "unknown," the "primitive," the "wild" or "savage," the an-archie, the dis-orderly, in their ecological and human (subjective, sexual, racial, ethnic, and sociopolitical) manifestations. It is, in short, the entire relay of being that haunts or threatens the authority of the received (hegemonic) discourse of the dominant, that is, Western, order.

This systematic metaphorization of being constitutes the origin of (and is obscured by) the naturalized and enabling principle of the logic - the truth discourse - of Occidental metaphysics: that Identity is the condition for the possibility of difference. And it is to the specificity of this constructed polyvalent metaphorical ("white") system that we must, above all, turn if we are to plumb the historical past of modern Western imperialism and, more important, the depth of its inscription as ideology in the modern Western subject and its language. But before undertaking that task of denaturalization directly, we need to elaborate the economy of the logic enabled by this principle of metaphysical principles.

This grave will to certainty in the face of alterity that informs the language of conceptualization explains the inordinate degree to which the discourse of simplification - of clarity, of cogency, of economy (and manliness) - is privileged in the discourses, the institutions of learning, and the information media of the Occident. Conversely, it also explains the utter contempt for the complex, nuanced, and generative ambiguities of the originary thinking of a Heidegger or a Derrida" or an Adorno, for example, the thinking-represented by the dominant "realistic" culture as obscurity, errancy, exorbitance, obesity, and, not least, waste²⁴ that would respect the differential dynamics of being.

Alternative – Changes Thought

The alternative creates a new form of thinking that creates authentic existence- This outweighs short-term setbacks

Hicks and Rosenberg, 03 - chair and assistant professor of philosophy at Queens College of the City University of New York
(Nietzsche and Untimeliness: The "Philosopher of the Future" as the Figure of Disruptive Wisdom, *The Journal of Nietzsche Studies* 25 (2003) 1-34, muse)//markoff

Nietzsche was acutely aware of the fact that humans cannot step outside their cultural horizon at will. To deflect the dangers implicit in, for example, the advent of nihilism, Nietzsche evokes the untimely disruptive figure of the philosopher of the future who, as the "comedian" and "musical-Socrates," makes us laugh at what we take to be so serious about life: our "regimes of truth," our ascetic devaluations of the natural world, etc. As untimely *atopic* figures who make us laugh at our "holiest of holies," the philosophers of the future disrupt our commonplaces, and by disrupting, teach us how to open up spaces for rethinking our ways of being and acting in the world, and to reevaluate our basic aspirations and sensibilities. Paraphrasing Diogenes, Nietzsche asks, "How can any [philosopher] be considered great who has not yet disrupted and disturbed anyone?" And indeed, this ought to be the epitaph of our current university philosophy: it disrupted no one" (*UM* III, § 8). By disrupting us, these untimely *atopic* philosophers of the future evoke the promise of alternate forms of humanity, new ways of valuing the earth and one's life on it, thus drawing us "out and up" toward becoming who we are.

Why should anyone voluntarily wish for their life to be so disrupted? What exactly is to be gained by accepting the "disruptive wisdom" that Nietzsche's untimely *atopic* philosophers of the future dispense? Why is this disruption valuable or desirable? Nietzsche's answer: we need disruptive wisdom because we are all "in danger of being cheated out of [ourselves]," cheated out of our authenticity (*UM* III, § 4). Nietzsche believes that the vast majority of human beings are all too caught up in the common, everyday deployment of things: those "human arrangements" that "distract our thoughts" so that we "cease to be aware of life" (*UM* III, § 4). Thus if I am to "remain my own," and fashion an authentic life for myself, then according to Nietzsche I must first "renounce everything I once revered," renouncing even "reverence itself" (*HAH*, "Preface," § 6). I must be disrupted from my unthinking commitment to those human, all too human "arrangements" that distract and distance me from myself. Only by being disrupted can I eventually transform those "taken for granted" structures that previously determined me; and only then can I become, in Nietzsche's words, "master over [myself], master also over [my] virtues." "Formerly *they* were your masters; but they must become only your instruments" (*HAH*, "Preface," § 6).

Nietzsche recognizes that, as well as great promise, there is also great danger in this disruptive education. The great danger is that of being "wounded" in the "deepest and most sacred part of [one's] being" by having taken away those vital "commonplaces" that heretofore gave one's life meaning (*UM* III, § 3). And if one cannot deal with this loss (and the subsequent anxiety it [**End Page 28**] engenders) by finding creative antidotes and alternatives, then one may wind up in the position Nietzsche attributes to the poet Heinrich von Kleist following his encounter with Kant's critical philosophy: namely, it disrupted his feelings of certainty about the world, disturbed his sense of belonging, his commitment to transcendent truths, etc.—thus generating a "crisis situation," which culminated in his suicidal nihilism (*UM* III, § 3). (Perhaps this is why in those two key disruptive sections of the *Gay Science* where the "death of God" and the "greatest weight" of the eternal return are discussed, Nietzsche employs the negative and even dangerous figures of the "Madman" and the "Demon" to express these untimely ideas.) On the other hand, the great promise of these untimely figures (and the disruptions they cause) is that they generate a kind of wisdom by awakening us from our dogmatic slumber in the commonplace, and by making available to us new ways of thinking about ourselves and the world: that they reeducate our aspirations and sensibilities by asking such questions as "What is it like to think about the world and oneself without God?" or "What is it like to think about the world and oneself within the framework of the demon's message?" In forcing us to encounter such disturbing questions, the untimely figures disrupt our inherited "first nature" (the way of life we were previously deployed in) for the purpose of overcoming it—giving us "insight into [our] wants and miseries, into [our] limitedness, so as then to learn the nature of the antidotes and consolations" (*UM* III, § 3). Being forced to face up to one's own misery and limitedness is always disturbing and untimely, but it is also the beginning of the process of the creation of a new way of life and self. Disruptive figures and the wisdom they impart help liberate, stimulate, and inspire us to experiment with new ways of thinking and valuing, all of which contribute, Nietzsche says, to the reconstituting of oneself as a transformed "second nature." The philosophers of the future, as untimely figures of disruption, educate us (in the sense of "*paideia*," or *Bildung*) in the possibility of transforming our character, and thus generating a new way of life. They are positive figures of education for late modern humanity, figurative exemplars with admirable traits to be emulated (as Nietzsche claims Goethe, Schopenhauer, and even Wagner were for him). Or better still, like Socrates and even Nietzsche himself, they are the ones who, in the process of disrupting commonplaces and experimenting with generating an untimely life of their own, constitute themselves as self-styled figurative exemplars of disruptive wisdom for others—exemplars from whom others are eventually led to question their lives and urged "to learn the meaning of [their] own lives . . . and to comprehend from [them] the hieroglyphics of a more universal life" (*UM* III, § 3).

Alternative – Examining Ontology Key

All other forms of critique fail – only questioning ontology accesses deeper questions

Spanos, 2k – Distinguished Professor of English at Binghamton

(William V, *America's Shadow: An Anatomy of Empire*, pgs. 56-57)//markoff

The end of the pursuit of knowledge, according to this developed – postcolonial – form of imperial practice, is to produce peace, but this peace will be achieved only by the total colonization and pacification of the Other. Theory (understood as a mode of inquiry that privileges seeing, *theoria*) and practice are conterminous. The *Pax Metaphysica* and the *Pax Romana*.

My intention in invoking Heidegger's ontological genealogy of imperialism has not been to offer an alternative to that of Foucault, Said, and most postcolonial critics who would interrogate imperialism as an economic and/or political practice or as economic-political practice to which cultural texts contribute in a fundamental way. As Heidegger's entanglement with the German National Socialist project testifies, his restricted ontological focus is hardly adequate to the complex actualities of modern imperial practice. My purpose, rather, has been to demonstrate that the contemporary – postcolonial – critique of imperialism is disabled by a significant lack or, perhaps more accurately, by a resonant unthought in its discourse. What I have tried to make explicit by reconstellating Heidegger's destruction of the metaphysical thinking of the ontotheological tradition (and by thematizing the affiliative system of sedimented tropes inscribed in it) into the context of more "practical" postcolonial critiques of imperialism is that these oppositional discourses, whether Foucauldian or New Historicist or Marxist or nationalist, tend to be blind to (or refuse to take seriously) the enabling degree to which Western imperialism is not simply a practice as such, but a deeply inscribed ideological state of mind produced by a "truth" endemic to a metaphysical ontology. More specifically, they overlook the fact that the modern imperial project is informed by a representational or a "visual" problematic that has its constructed origins in the origins of the very idea of the West. These oppositional discourses, in short, are blinded by their overdetermination of "practice" to the reality that the idea of the West and imperialism are synonymous. To wring a turn on Enrique Dussel's resonant insight into Descartes's "I think; therefore I am," the identity of the collective Western subject is epitomized by the statement: "I think; therefore I conquer."

Alternative – Environment

The alternative is to question our ontological relationship to the environment- this is prerequisite to all other environmental theory and politics

DeLuca '5 (Kevin Michael DeLuca, Associate Professor of Speech Communication and adjunct in the Institute of Ecology at the University of Georgia, "Thinking With Heidegger: Rethinking Environmental Theory and Practice", *Ethics & the Environment* 10.1 (2005) 67-87, Project Muse)

"Questioning builds a way. We would be advised, therefore, above all to pay heed to the way. . . . The way is one of thinking" (1993, 311). This essay has been an attempt to embark on the path of questioning in order to begin again the thinking of humanity-nature relations, to offer a clearing for environmental theory. The questions are many and are meant to distress: What would it mean to approach all environmental issues from a fundamental understanding of Being- in-the-world on earth? Do certain environmentalist's strategies contribute to machination? If public relations, along with advertising, is the discourse of machination, a discourse of empty words in service of gigantism (bigger is better) and progress (newer is better), what are the consequences when radical environmental groups deploy that very discourse in efforts to reach the public through mass media? Is it possible to fundamentally challenge machination while using the techniques of machination? What sort of revealing does a particular regime of technology make possible? What sort of relationships to the earth and world does a technology enable? Can humans even think outside of the regime of modern technology? Has modern technology foreclosed the possibilities of thinking the way of Being-in-the-world on earth? Does or does not a particular technological device promote modern technology's enframing of earth and world? Does a strategy of wilderness pictures promote or prevent an engagement with the earth? The questioning hopes to provoke a distress that starts us on the way of thinking. The way of thinking that Heidegger is after marks a new beginning [End Page 85]for philosophy (if it is even important to retain that old name). It is a thinking that is necessary for social theory and politics. More to the point, Heidegger is imagining a thinking that is the very condition for Being-in-the-world on earth. A thinking that will enable us to engage the earth and answer the question: "Must nature be surrendered and abandoned to machination? Are we still capable of seeking earth anew? Who enkindles that strife in which the earth finds its open, in which the earth encloses itself and is earth?" (1999, 195).

Alternative – Space between thought and action

The space between action and ontological examination allows us to reconceptualize control.

Schurmann 1987 – Professor of Philosophy @ The New School for Social Research in New York
(Reiner. “Heidegger on Being and Acting: From Principles to Anarchy.” P.277-278)

But what can such a removal mean if it is to hamstring the assault? How could the specific mode of interdependence between words, things, and actions, which was born from logic and today dominates us through the most enslaving epochal principle our history has known, be at all avoided? To call for a removal can hardly mean to recommend some program calculated to neutralize the offensive of the will: such calculus would only enforce the offensive. To engage in the possible other play and to begin removing the remnants of the ultimate representations that are already preserved from the onslaught and can be so preserved. For Heidegger, a single attitude is within our reach that allows us to prepare for crossing the closure and withdrawing public exchanges from the will’s offensive: “Releasement does not belong to the domain of the will.” Releasement is the preparatory play that allows the true to come truly toward us and our descendants as the only destiny. It literally preludes the transgression. The violence Heidegger espouses before the institutionalized assault is the non-violence of thinking. Indeed, what is thinking’s “nonviolent power”? It is to do what presencing does: to let be. Heidegger opposes *lassen*, “letting,” to *uberfallen*, “assailing,” as he opposes the “entry into the event” to the obstacles that “place themselves between the thing and us.” Releasement is neither a benign attitude nor a spiritual comfort. It is the sole viable path that may lead from action as mapped by calculative reason to a praxis not conceivable in terms of calculative reason, neither as its negation nor as its dupe. Letting-be is the only possible way out from under the principles and into the even because (1) it displaces the conflict, (2) it is essentially a-teleocratic, and (3) it prepares an anarchic economy. The first of these points locates releasement on the level of the originary; the second identifies it as the practical a priori; and the third shows it to be the economic alterant needed for distorting and getting over (both senses of *verwinden*) metaphysics. For these three reasons – which must be examined individually – Heidegger can continue, in the lines cited as the epigraph above: “Can such an assault perhaps be avoided, and how? This would probably succeed only if we grant the thing an open field.”

Alternative – Solves Space Affs

Examining the world as open and expansive and rejecting the idea of the world as resources put at human disposal, is key to reexamination of being and solving the aff

Turnbull, 2006- Nottingham Trent University (Neil, “The Ontological Consequences of Copernicus: Global Being in the Planetary World”, SAGEJournals Online, REQ//JRC

However, what Nietzsche and Heidegger – and their followers – could not foresee is the extent to which planetary representations of the earth have been mass produced and redeployed as a symbolic resource bearing a different – more critical, that is aesthetic, ethical and political – sense and significance. When seen from space, the earth appears as much more than mere cosmological detritus or icon of global capitalism. As many have commented, it strikes us as a rather remarkable planet: redolent with ethical and aesthetic significance and more like a ‘planetary home’ than a substellar geological object (see Russell, 1982). As humanity reconceives itself through its movement across ‘another sky’,¹ representations of the earth become suggestive of a new cosmopolitan ontology of worldly co-presence and integral to what has become known as ‘banal globalism’ (Szserzynski and Urry, 2002: 467). The satellite representation of the earth as the ‘blue globe’ connotes a world with potentially no formal political boundaries, revealing itself as a rhizome of meteorological, oceanic and technoscientific flows whose indeterminate geometry coordinates a new symbol to rival the religious and political symbols of the past by exposing the futility of nationalistic strife (see Blumenberg, 1987; Hoyle, 1960: 19).

Thus in this article my aim is to interrogate the Nietzschean– Heideggerian style of philosophical critique of what might be termed ‘cosmological hypermodernity’ and its heliocentric conception of a ‘mobile earth’, and to show the extent to which visual representations of the earth as planet support a different, ‘less grounded’ but ‘more worlded’ conception of the earth (and a conception of the earth that in many ways requires Western philosophy re-engage with its classical philosophical heritage, as well as strive for new dialogic openings with non-Western philosophical traditions). As the experience of the earth becomes representational – and virtual – the earth is not deworled as such but is ‘reworled’ along a new planetary dimension – as a new unbounded planetary space that itself becomes a privileged place for a new *theoria* of ‘earth-in-the-cosmos’ (Harries, 2001: 328–30). For, with the astronaut’s technological representation of the earth *sub speciae techne*, and its emergence as a new quasispiritual and highly aesthetic percept, the earth has moved back to centre of political consciousness, not in the traditional sense of the ‘earth as Garden’, but as new technologically worlded and neo-stoic cosmopolitical percept of the ‘earth-as-planet’ (see Ihde, 1990). My main claim in what follows is that when earth is no longer simply a fixed ground but something more dynamic, expansive and virtual, contemporary Western philosophy is forced into a new revisionary phase. Western philosophy, I suggest, needs to begin the task of finding a new conceptual lexicon through which ‘cosmopolitan planetariness’ can be articulated (a new conceptual a priori that ‘speaks for’ a new planetary sense of worldhood). The article concludes with a discussion of the kind of revisions required and I go on to suggest that as the earth becomes a virtualized symbolic resource, the very idea of ‘inhabiting’ the earth needs to be rethought, and that Deleuzian attempts to rethink the earth as an ‘open and expansive plane without territory’ offer some important insights into the a priori of our post-astronautic planetary condition and the philosophical ‘meaning of the planet’.

Alternative – Solves Empathy/Community

Only by first accepting that ontological examination exists for the self can feelings of altruism and community grow

Thiele, 1995 –Ph.D. from Princeton, professor of political science at the University of Florida, has published books from Princeton and Oxford (Leslie Paul, “Timely Meditations: Martin Heidegger and Postmodern Politics”, Princeton University Press, Chapter two, pg 52-54)

This is not to say that empathy is synonymous with Being-with. Empathy is an emotional and ethical disposition. Heidegger calls it ontic, signifying that which does not directly address the ontological fundamentals of human being but rather pertains to its concrete possibilities. Being-with, on the other hand, is an ontological category. Nevertheless, empathy, as an ontic capacity, is made possible only on the basis of the ontological structure of Being-with. Just as solitude is a mode of Being-with that is asocial, so empathy is a mode of Being-with that is, as it were, hypersocial. To be empathetic is to extend a self already embedded in a social world in such a way that emotional and ethical connections to others come to the fore and achieve prominence. Empathy reflects the emotional and ethical extension of a self beyond the ontological sharing of worldly life that defines human being. The stimulus for empathy may often be the desire to offset the egoistic or immoral dispositions frequently encountered in social life. As Heidegger notes, "Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, already is with Others. 'Empathy' does not first constitute Being-with: only on the basis of Being-with does 'empathy' become possible: it gets its motivation from the unsociability of the dominant modes of Being-with" (BT 162). Empathy and egoism, in other words, are two possible ways that human being may experience its Being-with-others. The prominence of one or the other, historically or phenomenologically, constitutes neither a confirmation nor a refutation of the more fundamental nature of Being-with.

Heidegger defines human being's shared Being-in-the-world as care (Sorge). Human being cares to the extent that it concerns itself with its worldly nature. This entails a concern for its Being-with-others as well as a concern for the meaning of this ontological structure." By care Heidegger means the always-already-interpretive comportment of human being. Human beings care because they are involved with the world and its meanings, including the meaning of their own worldly existence. Heidegger offers this concise definition: "Care is the term for the Being of Dasein pure and simple. It has the formal structure, a being for which, intimately involved in its Being-in-the-world, this very Being is at issue" (HCT 294). To have one's Being as an issue is constantly to be involved with the meaning of one's Being. As such, human being can be said to live "for the sake of its own self ... so far as it is, it is occupied with its own capacity to be" (BP 170). But being occupied with one's own capacity to be, like being self-interpreting, is not the same as being self-absorbed. Rather, to care is to be concerned with the meaning of oneself in the world. The focus of human being's self-interpretation and self-articulation is not a detached self, but a situated one. To be for the sake of the self is to care about worldly existence as a whole.

Heidegger states that care is the "primary totality of the constitution of Dasein, which as this totality always adopts this or that particular way of its can-be" (HCT 306). The particular "can-be" of an individual Dasein refers to its ontic possibilities, which, though always founded on the ontological structure of care, remain distinct from it. Thus Heidegger attempts to distinguish between ontological descriptions and ethical dictates. "Being towards oneself constitutes the Being of Dasein and is not something like an additional capacity to observe oneself over and above just existing. Existing is precisely this being towards oneself," Heidegger writes. "Only because Dasein, constituted by for-the sake-of, exists in selfhood, only for this reason is anything like human community possible. These are primary existential-ontological statements of essence, and not ethical claims about the relative hierarchy of egoism and altruism" (MFL 190). Being for the sake of the self, then, is the only possible foundation out of which anything like ethical obligation within human community might grow. Human being always already exists as an embodied, social, worldly relation, and this ontological description is neither more nor less valid simply because particular human beings deny or obscure their social and worldly nature or repudiate its practical extension to an explicitly moral realm. To be altruistic is to choose to channel one's thoughts, feelings, and actions into one's capacities for empathy. To be egoistic means to redirect this energy elsewhere. Neither activity changes the fundamental structure of human being as care, a Being-in-the-world-with-others fundamentally concerned with the meaning of its Being.

Alternative – Solves Freedom

Freedom demands a releasement towards things.

Thiele 95 – Professor of Political Science at University of Florida (Leslie Paul, Timely Meditations, p.75)

Summing up Schelling's thesis, Heidegger remarks that freedom demands pantheism (ST 85). That is, freedom demands openness to the impenetrable immanence of Being in beings. It also demands what Heidegger calls "releasement toward things" (Gelassenheit zu den Dingen). Heidegger borrows the term Gelassenheit from Meister Eckhardt. It literally means a letting-be. The dispositions that best prepare human being for the visitations of freedom, then, are an ontological openness to no-thingness (Being) combined with a receptive releasement toward things (beings). Human freedom for Heidegger, particularly after his "turning" of the mid-1930s, is fundamentally and foremost an openness and letting-be.

Releasement leads to disclosive freedom.

Thiele 95 – Professor of Political Science at University of Florida (Leslie Paul, Timely Meditations, p.94)

Disclosive freedom is facilitated by releasement toward things and openness to the mystery of Being. But this is not to say that freedom is achieved without effort and enjoyed in passivity. Heidegger insists that "releasement toward things and openness to the mystery never happen of themselves. They do not befall us accidentally. Both flourish only through persistent, courageous thinking" (DT 56). Persistent, courageous thinking provides the foundation on which disclosive freedom gains its foothold in the world. Indeed, there is a unique and original freedom to be practiced in thought itself.

Rejection of subjectivism is key to human freedom.

Thiele 95 – Professor of Political Science at University of Florida (Leslie Paul, Timely Meditations, p. 186)

Zimmerman hedges his praise of Heidegger's ecological credentials at this point, citing the above passage as indication that Heidegger "overestimated our importance" compared to that of the rest of nature. But Zimmerman overlooks Heidegger's earlier statement that humankind's fundamental questioning is "far removed from any noisy self-importance concerning the life of one's own soul or that of others" (MFL 16-17). Moreover, Heidegger was clear that giving ontological priority to human being in no way suggests that the natural world, or the material world at large, exists (solely) for our benefit. Indeed, disclosive freedom appears only in the absence of the possessive mastery that underlies such an assumption. Human being is the highest being (as opposed to the most powerful being) only to the extent that human being gains release from all self-aggrandizing subjectivism. If there is any claim to greatness in our being, it arises not from the human capacity to dominate and exploit but from the unique human capacity to dwell and disclose in a way that preserves.

Alternative – Solves Environment

The criticism solves for the environment even though its focus is on anthropocentrism.

Thiele 95 – Professor of Political Science at University of Florida (Leslie Paul, Timely Meditations, p.186)

Heidegger's unwillingness to exchange anthropocentrism for biocentrism, however, does not weaken his contribution to an ecological politics. Arguably, it makes his contribution more significant. Celebrating the unique capacities of human being to disclose in a way that preserves best ensures humanity's caretaking of the earth and the world. The fostering of human freedom, understood as a disclosive letting-be rather than a sovereign control, is precisely the measure that will best safeguard the earth's ecological diversity and health. One of Heidegger's favorite Heraclitean fragments is "Nature loves to hide." Nature loves to hide, one might say, because it resists becoming an open book. However we disclose the natural world, something else remains hidden yet beckoning: relationships of interdependence, evolutionary legacies, biological and aesthetic properties. The vast diversity of nature solicits the manifold modes of disclosure to which humans are heir because of their capacity for freedom. Hence our disclosive guardianship of nature marks, at the same time, the preservation of the greatness and uniqueness of human being.

The only way to solve for the environment is to view it as our home.

Thiele 95 – Professor of Political Science at University of Florida (Leslie Paul, Timely Meditations, p. 183)

The word ecology derives from the Greek oikos, meaning a house, home, or dwelling. Ecological practice, it follows, is about the caretaking of our earthly dwelling place. Heidegger's philosophy of freedom, which promotes the caretaking of home, corresponds to an ecological practice. Commenting on this linkage, Michael Zimmerman writes that "Heidegger's critique of anthropocentric humanism, his call for humanity to learn to 'let things be,' his notion that humanity is involved in a 'play' or 'dance' with earth, sky, and gods, his meditation of the possibility of an authentic mode of 'dwelling' on the earth, his complaint that industrial technology is laying waste to the earth, his emphasis on the importance of local place and 'homeland,' his claim that humanity should guard and preserve things, instead of dominating them - all these aspects of Heidegger's thought help to support the claim that he is a major deep ecological theorist." There is much to what Zimmerman says here, and one might add to his list Heidegger's understanding of Dasein as care, and Heidegger's definition of human being as the "shepherd of Being."

To solve for the environmental problems, we must not try to conquer it more but to step back and identify oneself first.

Thiele 95 – Professor of Political Science at University of Florida (Leslie Paul, Timely Meditations, p.185)

The ontology of dwelling engages the meaning of human being in a way that buttresses practical environmental concerns. Heidegger writes, "Mortals dwell in that they save the earth.... To save really means to set something free into its own presencing. To save the earth is more than to exploit it or even wear it out. Saving the earth does not master the earth and does not subjugate it, which is merely one step from spoliation" (PLT 150). The identification of human being as an ontologically care-full, worldly dweller facilitates an actual (ontic) earthly caretaking. Identifying oneself, and one's dignity, by the exercise of disclosive freedom precludes wholesale efforts at control and subjugation. To be free, we remember, is to set free, is to let be. The exercise of freedom coalesces our who and our how, our sense of self and our way of being in the world. To understand human freedom as a disclosure that preserves is to be well on the way to an ecological practice.

Relations with others and nature would solve for technological exploitation.

Thiele 95 – Professor of Political Science at University of Florida (Leslie Paul, Timely Meditations, p. 184-5)

Relations with others and nature would develop in a less technologically exploitative and more preservative, ecological direction, Heidegger suggests, once the understanding of human being as care displaces the subjectivism that grounds out metaphysical self-understandings. In writing that "man is not the lord of beings. Man is the shepherd of Being," Heidegger gestures at the changes to our concrete, worldly relationships that might ensue from changes in our ontological relationships.

Alternative – Solves Environment

Bioregionalism is the critical method for solving for the environment.

Thiele 95 – Professor of Political Science at University of Florida (Leslie Paul, Timely Meditations, p. 187)

In advocating a disclosive, caretaking orientation toward nature, Heidegger supports what in ecological circles is called bioregionalism. Bioregionalism is an orientation toward environmental care that advocates human guardianship of nature organized around relatively small communities sustainably integrated into local ecosystems. Likewise, Heidegger stresses that intimate ties to soil and locality are the antidote for the destructive exploitation of the earth and the technological manipulation and extortion of nature. Heidegger envisions living and working with, rather than against, natural processes. In contrast to high-tech agribusiness, for example, Heidegger affirms that "the work of the peasant does not challenge the soil of the field. In the sowing of the grain [the peasant] places the seed in the keeping of the forces of growth and watches over its increase" (QT 15). The remedy for our earthly homelessness, Heidegger maintains, "remains most readily possible and most enduringly effective there where the powers of encompassing nature and the echo of historical tradition abide together side by side.... Only the rural regions and the small country towns are today still adequate to this decisive task."

The only way to solve for the environment is not with technology but a basic mindset change.

Thiele 95 – Professor of Political Science at University of Florida (Leslie Paul, Timely Meditations, p.189)

Hardin's conclusion follows: "Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all." Hardin admits that restrictions on breeding and ecologically destructive ways of living will precipitate vociferous denouncements of unjustified curtailments to "freedom." "But what does 'freedom' mean?" he asks. On the horns of our ecological dilemma, Hardin answers, following Hegel, that freedom can only mean "the recognition of necessity." Heidegger would agree with Hardin that many problems, including that of the caretaking of our earthly home, are without technical solutions. Only a change in the way we think and feel-in the way we "are"-will allow their redress. Heidegger would also support Hardin's critical challenge to the traditional understanding of freedom. Nevertheless, Heidegger would disagree with Hardin, and Hegel, about the meaning of freedom.

Alternative – Solves War

Ontological interrogation solves the root cause of war- it's the only path to truly rational action

Burke '7 (Anthony Burke, Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at UNSW, Sydney, "Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence, and Reason", The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007, Project Muse)

The danger obviously raised here is that these dual ontologies of war link being, means, events and decisions into a single, unbroken chain whose very process of construction cannot be examined. As is clear in the work of Carl Schmitt, being implies action, the action that is war. This chain is also obviously at work in the U.S. neoconservative doctrine that argues, as Bush did in his 2002 West Point speech, that 'the only path to safety is the path of action', which begs the question of whether strategic practice and theory can be detached from strong ontologies of the insecure nation-state.²³ This is the direction taken by much realist analysis critical of Israel and the Bush administration's 'war on terror'.²⁴ Reframing such concerns in Foucauldian terms, we could argue that obsessive ontological commitments have led to especially disturbing 'problematizations' of truth.²⁵ However such rationalist critiques rely on a one-sided interpretation of Clausewitz that seeks to disentangle strategic from existential reason, and to open up choice in that way. However without interrogating more deeply how they form a conceptual harmony in Clausewitz's thought -- and thus in our dominant understandings of politics and war -- tragically violent 'choices' will continue to be made.

Alternative – Solves Terrorism

Terrorism is an issue of ontology- The alternative can solve where the affirmative will always fail

Mitchell 5 [Andrew J. Mitchell, Post-Doctoral Fellow in the Humanities at Stanford University, "Heidegger and Terrorism," Research in Phenomenology, Volume 35, Number 1, 2005 , pp. 181-218]//JRC

This does not mean that being exists unperturbed somewhere behind or beyond these beings. The withdrawal of being is found in these abandoned beings themselves and is determinative for the way they exist. Heideggerian thinking, then, allows us to ask the question of our times and *to think terrorism*. My contention in the following is that the withdrawal of being shows itself today in terrorism, where beings exist as terrorized. **Terrorism**, in other words, **is not simply the sum total of activities carried out by terrorist groups, but a challenge directed at beings as a whole**. Terrorism is consequently a metaphysical issue, and it names the way in which beings show themselves today, i.e., as terrorized. This "ontological" point demands that there be the "ontic" threat of real terrorists. Further, this metaphysical aspect of terrorism also indicates that a purely political response to terrorism is destined to fail. Political reactions to terrorism, which depict terrorism from the outset as a political problem, miss the fact that terrorism itself, qua metaphysical issue, is coincident with a transformation in politics. That is to say, **political responses to terrorism fail to think terrorism**. In what follows I will elaborate some of the consequences of thinking terrorism as a question of being and sketch a few characteristics of the politico-technological landscape against which terrorism takes place.

A disengagement from the world can interrupt the technological age that lives with and under the constant hovering of terror within our being

Mitchell 5 [Andrew J. Mitchell, Post-Doctoral Fellow in the Humanities at Stanford University, "Heidegger and Terrorism," Research in Phenomenology, Volume 35, Number 1, 2005 , pp. 181-218]

The resonance that Heidegger describes is such that there are no resonating poles to support it. This is another way in which modern or Clausewitzian opposition is overcome for Heidegger. Because the presence of withdrawal in beings can only be experienced as a trembling, terror is the fundamental mood of the age. Terror is the feeling of a bond with being, one that persists in the face of a withdrawn being and participates in that same withdrawal. Terror, in a sense, would be a memory of being, not of something that ever took place, but of taking-place as such. This remarking of being is terror, and for Heidegger it provides a retreat from the onrush of the standing-reserve: "Terror lets the human retreat before this, that the being is, while at first the being was just a being to him: that the being is and that this--beyng-has abandoned and withdrawn from all 'beings' and what appears as such" (GA 65: 15/11; **tin**). Seizing upon terror in this manner, one sees that there is no being behind beings and that what befalls beings befalls being as well, due to their strong intimacy. Terror puts being into beings, in some sense, and this alerts it to the responsibility of guarding and preserving this withdrawal of being. To preserve it is to insist upon a moment of concealment in technological circulation, a blind spot before its infinite eye. The terrified one accords with being and this means that, for the American, the "reality of that country" may be seen and the "question of being" finally posed as the question of being. This bond of terror is at the same time the bond of the citizenry, the bond of the citizens of the homeland America. What is terrifying is that America withstands the onslaught of Americanism; terror can teach us this. Terrorism is always *"Erschreckenismus"*. In the 1941/42 lecture course devoted to Hölderlin's hymn to memory and commemoration, *"Andenken"*, Heidegger returns to terror in a context that stresses its non-operative or extra-economic character. Here the concern is with the festival and the holiday as an interruption of the everyday, the latter understood as the reign of utility and useful work. But Heidegger will not find the essence of the holiday to depend upon the presence of the workday; holidays are not "days off" for him. Rather, the festival begins through a measured reserve and keeping to oneself (Heidegger's terms are *Innehalten* and *Ansichthalten*). This "coming-to-oneself" is a freeing of one's essence which brings one before the appearance of the uncommon (cf. GA 52: 74-75). Just as wonder distinguished itself from amazement, admiration, etc. by the fact that it experienced beings as uncommon without recourse to a previously understood horizon of conventional commonality, so too does terror need no recourse to the common. Terror is a transformation of the everyday that nevertheless exceeds the everyday. It bears witness to an ever more thickly veiled withdrawal. At the moment where one collects oneself for the holiday, "Wonder begins, or else even terror" (GA 52: 75). In either case there is a belonging to the uncommon. And what is it that is uncommon? "The uncommon concentrates itself in this: that beings exist at all, and not, far rather, nothing". (GA 52: 75). For wonder, the being of beings was uncommon, for terror, the uncommon is the veiling of being. This veiling institutes a situation of terror and trembling, wherein uncommon being wears the robes of commonality. The uncommon can only be found in the common, and to find it there is to retreat from the all too common theatrics of presence. Terror is an interruption of the play of presence. The covering of the uncommon is a ruse that Heidegger identifies with his own version of the "as if." In the abandonment of *Scyn*, particular beings appear "as objects and as present-at-hand, as if being did not essence [als ob *Scyn nicht wese*]," a locution Heidegger repeats in the 1937/38 lecture course: "It is almost as if beings have been abandoned by beyng, and we are heedless of it," and "beings are not taken for all that is, as if beyng and the truth of beyng were nothing" (GA 65: 115/81; tm, erm, GA 45: 185/159; tm, em, 196/169; **tin**, em). Such present-at-hand objects have nothing wondrous about them, they are simply there at our disposal to be distributed and

Alternative – Solves Terrorism

employed as we see fit. But beyng *does* essence and beings only *appear* as objects. The essencing of beyng means that beings are not completely given over to unconcealment, at least not yet. Not yet because complete unconcealment is what endangers beings and being. Such a chiaroscuro of presence and withdrawal is represented as pure presence, as though beyng did not essence. Since terror attends to the withdrawal of being via an experience of the unconcealment of beings, terror is an interruption in the ordinary and everyday state of affairs wherein what comes to presence is unquestionably taken for pure presence. The first draft of a lecture from the *Basic Questions* course is quite clear on this: "The wonder of being can no longer be encountered, that a being is. Such a thing has become obvious" (GA 45: 197/169; **tin**). Terror breaks the commonality of things, puts a halt to our everyday manner of taking beings for granted as present and at our disposal: "Terror is a retreat from the routine [Geldufigkeit] of dealings with the familiar [Vertrauten], back into the openness of the rush of self-concealment, in which openness the hitherto routine [Geldufige] proves itself to be at once estranging [das Befremdliche] and confining" (GA 65: 15/11; tm). Terror retreats before the common in order to view it as uncommon and self-concealing. Where wonder gazed upon being, terror retreats before withdrawal. With the abandonment of beyng, an abandonment that sets us firmly within the fully machinational unworld of technology, beyng only seems to have left without a trace. We are left with our terror, but this terror is now the trace of beyng. At the end of the *Basic Questions* lecture course, Heidegger wonders whether withdrawal does not belong to the essence of beyng, and for a thinking of terrorism this question is key (see GA 45: 189/163). What if terror belonged to being? Terror would testify to the withdrawal of being and between the testimony of terror and the withdrawn being to which it testifies, there would be a span of distance, the very distance marking withdrawal. If terror belongs to being, then terror is not separated from being nor without relation to it. If terror did not belong to being, then being would truly be gone. We would be wrong even to speak here of an "abandonment" of being, if terror did not belong to being, for "abandonment" implies a separation from what was once bound, a disbanding. If the terror of beings did not belong to being, there would be neither testament to being nor even being. There would be only oblivion, the impossible. Instead, there is an aping of presence through technology. This posturing of beings, the affectation, is what terror discovers, the lie of full presence. Beings exist "as if" beyng did not essence. Terror is an indignation at the posturing of being. The posturing in question here should likewise be heard as yet another modification of *stellen*. Terror is sensitive to the difference between the real and the "as if," or rather, terror knows that the real is ever only as if real, and sensitivity to this slender fissure in the bulk of presence is enough to transpose the world.

Alternative – Solves Democracy

Only by challenging the tenants and practices of democracy can one achieve true democracy.

Zizek '8 – Lady killing suave machine

("In defense of lost causes" p.102-104)//Collin//JRC

However, Brown takes here a crucial step further and pushes all the paradoxes of democracy to the end, more radically than Chantal Mouffe did with her "democratic paradox." Already with Spinoza and Tocqueville, it became clear that democracy is in itself inchoate empty, lacking a firm principle -it needs anti-democratic content to fill in its form; as such, it really is constitutively "formal." This anti-democratic content is provided by philosophy, ideology, theory - no wonder that most of the great philosophers, from Plato to Heidegger, were mistrustful of democracy, if not directly anti-democratic: What if democratic politics, the most untheoretical of all political forms, paradoxically requires theory, requires an antithesis to itself in both the form and substance of theory, if it is to satisfy its ambition to produce a free and egalitarian order? Brown deploys all the paradoxes from this fact that "democracy requires for its health a nondemocratic element": a democracy needs a permanent influx of anti-democratic self-questioning in order to remain a Living democracy-the cure for democracy's ills is homoeopathic in form: If, as the musings of Spinoza and Tocqueville suggest, democracies tend towards cathexis onto principles antithetical to democracy, then critical scrutiny of these principles and of the political formations animated by them is crucial to the project of refounding or recovering Democracy Brown defines the tension between politics and theory as the tension between the political necessity to fix meaning, to "suture" textual drift in a formal principle which can only guide us in action, and theory's permanent "deconstruction" which cannot ever be recuperated in a new positive program: Among human practices, politics is peculiarly untheoretical because the bids for power that constitute it are necessarily at odds with the theoretical project of opening up meaning, of "making meaning slide," in Stuart Hall's words. Discursive power functions by concealing the terms of its fabrication and hence its malleability and contingency; discourse fixes meaning by naturalizing it, or else ceases to have sway in a discourse. This fixing or naturalizing of meanings is the necessary idiom in which politics takes place. Even the politics of deconstructive displacement implicates such normativity. at least provisionally. Theoretical analyses which unearth the contingent and inconsistent nature and lack of ultimate foundation of all normative constructs and political projects, "are anti-political endeavors insofar as each destabilizes meaning without proposing alternative codes or institutions. Yet each may also be essential in sustaining an existing democratic regime by rejuvenating it.,¹³ It is thus as if Brown is proposing a kind of Kantian "critique of deconstructive (anti-democratic) reason," distinguishing between its legitimate and illegitimate use: it is legitimate to use it as a negatively regulative corrective, a provocation, and so on, but it is illegitimate to use it as a constitutive principle to be directly applied to reality as a political program or project. Brown discerns the same ambiguous link in the relationship between state and people: in the same way that democracy needs anti-democracy to rejuvenate itself, the state needs the people's resistance to rejuvenate itself. Only through the state are the people constituted as a people; only in resistance to the state do the people remain a people. Thus, just as democracy requires antidemocratic critique in order to remain democratic, so too the democratic state may require democratic resistance rather than fealty if it is not to become the death of democracy. Similarly, democracy may require theory's provision of unlivable critiques and unreachable ideals. ¹⁴

Alternative – Solves Bare Life/Is Political

Heidegger claimed that technological thought and standing reserve were responsible for the devalue of life in the death camps
Athanasiou 3 [Athena Athanasiou, Professor of social anthropology at the University of Thessaly, "Technologies of Humanness, Aporias of Biopolitics, and the Cut Body of Humanity," *Differences: Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies*, 14.1, p.125-162, MuseJ/JRC

In tracing the affinity of Heideggerian ontology with Nazism, Agamben suggests that Heidegger's involvement with National Socialism be read through the prism of his understanding of "life" as an actual determination and essential experience and task (*Aufgabe*) of facticity. Following Levinas ("Reflections"), he traces the analogies between this ontology of life's indistinguishability from its actual situation and the philosophy of Hitlerism. Indeed, in Heideggerian ontology, human life is always already politics; life and politics form an immediate and indissoluble unity (taking politics in a very broad sense: more as a bodily exposure to a certain materiality of human historicity and sociality than a reflective engagement in processes of accountable appropriation and disappropriation). Science and knowledge belong to the life of the polis. For Heidegger, the "purest form of thinking" is "the highest doing," according to the ancient Greek experience of *bios theoretikos*, where *bios* receives its determination from *theoria*, the "consummate form of human existence" ("Question" 164). Human essence always already contains immediately the force that constitutes "man" as Dasein, as a political and historical Being-there but also Being-open, emplaced in and enframed by the polis, taking into consideration that the camp—or the camp's exclusion from the polis—is also included in the polis; it is, indeed, a constitutive part of the political sphere. As Agamben puts it: *For both Heidegger and National Socialism, life has no need to assume "values" external to it in order to become politics: life is immediately political in its very facticity. Man is not a living being who must abolish or transcend himself in order to become human—man is not a duality of spirit and body, nature and politics, life and logos, but is instead resolutely situated at the point of their indistinction.* (*Homo Sacer* 153, *original emphasis*) [17](#) [End Page 140]

The camp makes its appearance in Heidegger's philosophical text as the "hidden paradigm" of modern technology, echoing Agamben's words: "[T]he camp—as the pure, absolute, and impassable biopolitical space (insofar as it is founded solely on the state of exception)—will appear as the hidden paradigm of the political space of modernity, whose metamorphoses and disguises we will have to learn to recognize" (*Homo Sacer* 123). The representational use to which Heidegger's text subjects the "production of corpses" bespeaks a textual coming to light of the body as incarcerated and slain *à propos* of modern technology. The textual subjection of disintegrated corporeality takes form in the figure of the *soma* of the Shoah, the body that is entirely exhausted in perished bare life, "life that is unworthy of being lived." And all this despite the fact that, as Nancy reminds us, Heidegger considers the body as "extraneous to his project" (qtd. in Nancy 232). It is through the prism of Heidegger's technological "production of corpses" that we should then read Nancy's disclaimer: "There has never been any body in philosophy" (20).

****{This card is in the file twice...once in the AT: Heidegger legitimizes the Holocaust section}**

Alternative – Solves Totalitarianism

Only the alternative's pluralism bring down authoritarianism, status quo metaphysics ensure that difference is ignored

Vattimo, 03 (Gianni Vattimo, Philosophy Professor, University of Turin, and member of the EU Parliament, *Nihilism & Emancipation*, Edited Santiago Zabala, Translated William McCuaig, pg. 65-69)

"Compelle intrare" - the slogan that justified Christian missionaries in using force to convert the pagans they encountered in the new lands that became colonies of Christian powers "for their own good" - is one of the well-known consequences of the assurance that one possesses the truth. And it accurately portrays the linkage between metaphysics, essentialism, Eurocentrism, and authoritarianism. It is the same authoritarianism that we see today in the claim advanced by churches and other "moral" authorities that they may ignore even decisions taken by legitimate parliamentary majorities when values deriving from "natural law" are at stake. (Let me state in passing that I do not mean by this that the natural-law theorists who legitimized the modern revolutions, starting with the French Revolution, were wrong. I maintain only that the claim to incarnate a law of nature is always a violent position; sometimes, as in the case of the revolutions against the ancien regime, it is justifiable as a reaction against prior violence. But no more than that.)

The reasons for preferring the "post metaphysical" reading of current ethical discourse are more or less the same as the ones advanced in favor of a postmetaphysical reading of modernity and the situation to which it has brought us. They are "historical" reasons in many senses of the term: they have the force of "ad hominem" arguments and hence are situated within the very situation they claim to interpret (which is the nature of interpretation in any case), and they are historical in the sense that they survey the history through which we have lived and are living. Their practical-theoretical background is the end of colonialism and the discovery of the existence of other cultures that resist being assigned a backward and primitive place on an evolutionary line leading to western civilization.

They are not "absolute" reasons, they flow from no essence: it would after all be a contradiction to claim to demonstrate in absolute terms the positive significance of a process that has dissolved all absolutes. Yet despite all, the historical reasons to which I refer are persuasive to this extent: it is hard to find anyone who denies that the recognition of the plurality of cultures and the rejection of a Eurocentric historicist model are positive steps toward achieving a "better" form of rationality. Even admitting that there is nothing absolute about these last arguments, a shared criterion does appear to emerge. At the least it seems undeniable that the emancipatory significance of the dissolution of metaphysical absoluteness understood in this way is widely shared, is a matter of common sense-so that the burden of proof falls on whoever defends the opposite view, and it is hard to find anyone fitting that description.

Alternative – Key to Ethics

The alternative's recognition of our metaphysical displacement is key to reinvigorate ethical systems

Vattimo, 03 (Gianni Vattimo, Philosophy Professor, University of Turin, and member of the EU Parliament, *Nihilism & Emancipation*, Edited Satiago Zabala, Translated William McCuaig, pg. 38-48)

If philosophy is still able to speak about ethics rationally, meaning in a way responsible to the *only* referents that *still* count-the epoch, our heritage, our provenance-it can do so **only** by taking as its explicit point of departure (and not as its foundation) the condition of nonfoundedness in which we find ourselves thrown today. The aspect of our provenance and heritage that emerges as dominant or that deserves (but in preference to what others?) to be considered dominant is precisely the dissolution of first principles, the spread of an irreducible plurality. Is it *possible* to work out an *ethical* discourse-"principles" from which flow guidelines for action, counsels for behavior, and hierarchies of "values"-on the basis of a "provenance," or specific place on a timeline, characterized as the *dissolution* of foundations? Is this dissolution not perhaps a mere factual condition, the circumstance in which we find *ourselves* doing our thinking? Or, being the condition in which foundations have become *obsolete*, does it not rather become the *sole* "foundation," however sui generis and *verwunden*, that we can use to argue about ethics? Metaphysics has not deserted us completely: its very dissolution (the death of God of which Nietzsche spoke, if you like) takes on the contour of a process endowed with its own logic, on which we can draw for the basic materials needed to start rebuilding. (I am *talking* here about what Nietzsche *called nihilism*: not just the nihilism that acts as a solvent of all principles and values but also an "active" nihilism, the chance to begin a different *history*.) But what can we take, in terms of ethics (maxims of action, recommendations for behavior, hierarchies of "*value*") from the recognition (interpretive, dense already with responsible choices) that we belong to a tradition characterized as the dissolution of principles? The main feature of an ethics of this kind is that it takes a "step backward," takes its distance from the choices and concrete options that are directly imposed by the situation. It might be objected that if there are no universal supreme first principles, then the only things that would seem to count are the imperatives dictated by specific situations. But it is precisely here that a postmetaphysical ethics diverges from relativism pure and simple (assuming that such a thing could ever exist): the realization that the credibility of first principles has melted away does not transmute into the assumption that the only absolutes left are our historical condition and our membership in a community. If the real world (the first principles) has become a myth, Nietzsche writes, then the myth too has been destroyed (and so cannot in turn be absolutized).

AT: Everyone Doesn't Do the Alt

We don't need to win that everyone does the alternative – the mere call to resist calculations forces critical reflection

McWhorter, 92 – Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Northeast Missouri State University
(Ladelle, Heidegger and the Earth, ed. by Ladelle McWhorter)JRC—no change

<Heidegger frustrates us. At a time when the stakes are so very high and decisive action is so loudly and urgently called for, Heidegger apparently calls us to do - nothing. If we get beyond the revulsion and anger that such a call initially inspires and actually examine the feasibility of response, we begin to undergo the frustration attendant upon paradox; how is it possible, we ask, to choose, to will, to do nothing? The call itself places in question the bimodal logic of activity and passivity; it points up the paradoxical nature of our passion for action, of our passion for maintaining control. The call itself suggests that our drive for acting decisively and forcefully is part of what must be thought through, that the narrow option of will versus surrender is one of the power configurations of current thinking that must be allowed to dissipate.>

AT: No Action

Examination of Ontology includes action- This action solves for discovery of being

Thiele, 1995 –Ph.D. from Princeton, professor of political science at the University of Florida, has published books from Princeton and Oxford (Leslie Paul, “Timely Meditations: Martin Heidegger and Postmodern Politics”, Princeton University Press, Chapter two, pg 50-51)

To understand Dasein as self-interpreting is not to suggest that human being is defined by a solely inward-looking comportment. Self-interpretation is as much a reaching outward as a turning inward. Human being exists as human being only by participating in a shared world. The horizon of the individual Dasein is always in fusion with the horizons of others. Communication among self-interpreting beings, therefore, is not the transference of information or knowledge from one formerly isolated subject to another. Rather, it is the codiscovery of meaning. To disclose the Being of beings is to discover meaning. But meaning is always discovered in the context of a world. Indeed, meaning is the bringing to light of a worldly context.

For Heidegger "the basic structure of worldhood, the Being of the entity which we call world, lies in meaningfulness Meaningfulness is first of all a mode of presence in virtue of which every entity of the world is discovered what is primary is Being in the world, that is, concerned understanding and Being in the context of meanings" (HCT 203, 210). What is crucial to communication is the shared meanings that emerge from a common world. Heidegger explains that "communications are not a store of heaped up propositions but should be seen as possibilities by which one Dasein enters with the other into the same fundamental comportment toward the entity asserted about, which is unveiled in the same way For 'thou' means 'you who are with me in a world'" (BP 210, 298). Communication, interpretation, and discovery of meaning originate from and continually evidence the embeddedness of human being in a shared world. This remains true regardless of the particular arrangements of speakers and listeners. Whether we are talking to friends, to ourselves, or to a wall, the social nature of language and meaning remains. A soliloquy no less exposes this nature than does an open debate. Whether the audience is imagined or actual, whether the words are spoken or silent, language discloses a shared world.

To discover meaning is to uncover an aspect of one's Being-in-the-world and implicitly, if not explicitly, to communicate this to others. Heidegger writes: "Discourse as a mode of being of Dasein qua Being with is essentially communication The understanding of communication is the participation in what is manifest It is not a matter of transporting information and experiences from the interior of one subject to the interior of the other one. It is rather a matter of Being-with one-another becoming manifest in the world, specifically by way of the discovered world, which itself becomes manifest in speaking with one another" (HCT 263). As an interpretive being, human being is always involved with language and communication. Human being, it follows, is inherently a social being. Whatever its concrete situation, human being remains embedded in a common world of meanings.

The social nature of human being may be summarily derived from Heidegger's ontology. In its interpretive occupation with its own capacity to be, Heidegger states, human being is necessarily occupied with its world. But this world is populated. In its occupation with worldliness, therefore, human being is necessarily occupied with others. "Dasein is with equal originality," Heidegger concludes, "Being-with others and Being-among intraworldly beings" (BP 297). Put most succinctly, "The world of Dasein is a with-world [Mitwelt]. Being-in is Being-with Others" (BT 155). Our world is a world co revealed with other human beings, and this is true not only when individuals actually congregate. Rather, human being itself exists structurally as a Being-with-others, even in the midst of physical solitude. Heidegger is firm on this point:

“Letting be” is the opposite of a retreat from action.

Thiele 95 – Professor of Political Science at University of Florida (Leslie Paul, Timely Meditations, p.83)

Disclosive freedom is always the freedom resolutely to will openness to Being and releasement to beings. Openness and releasement do not preclude, but rather invite, activity and thought. In turn, letting-be is not tantamount to a retreat from the world. Quite the opposite: it entails the formation of worldly relationships made all the more dynamic because they are no longer constrained by the habits of possessive mastery. Heidegger writes: "The freedom to reveal something overt lets whatever 'is' at the moment be what it is. Freedom reveals itself as the 'letting-be' of what-is.... The phrase we are now using, namely the 'letting-be' of what-is, does not, however, refer to indifference and neglect, but to the very opposite of them. To let something be is in fact to have something to do with it.... To let what-is be what it is means participating in something overt and its overtness in which everything that 'is' takes up its position."

AT: No Action

Releasement leads to a more active Being-in-world.

Thiele 95 – Professor of Political Science at University of Florida (Leslie Paul, Timely Meditations, p.245)

Releasement does not signal passivity, a lack of power to act, or a denial of the will to live (DT 80). Releasement fosters an active Being-in-the-world, one whose dynamism arises out of the absence of attachment to specific models of the future. Taoists have a similar perspective. Chuang Tzu asserts that "he who practices the Tao, daily diminishes his doing. He diminishes it and again diminishes it, till he arrives at doing nothing. Having arrived at this non-inaction, there is nothing that he does not do." Similarly, Buddhist practitioners seek releasement from will or craving so as to be free from karma.

AT: Action Solves

Examining ontology in the context of solitude solves better- it sharpens our senses of the world so we can resist worldly temptations

Thiele, 1995 –Ph.D. from Princeton, professor of political science at the University of Florida, has published books from Princeton and Oxford (Leslie Paul, “Timely Meditations: Martin Heidegger and Postmodern Politics”, Princeton University Press, Chapter two, pg 51-52)

"Being-with is an existential characteristic of Dasein even when no Other is present-at-hand or perceived. Even Dasein's Being-alone is Being-with in the world" (BT 156-57). Solitude constitutes a removing of oneself from the physical presence of others. Indeed, solitude may often also constitute a removing of oneself from the emotional, moral, or cognitive presence of others. These retreats, however, are always carried out in the context of an initial and continuing relation to the with world. Just as soliloquy, no less than debate, is rooted in shared meaning, so solitude, no less than association, is rooted in Being-with.

What is achieved in solitude is not the nullification of the ontologically social nature of human being, but the counteracting of some of its "factual" features. For the solitary, a certain aspect of human being, its Being with, is intentionally brought to the fore so that certain of its ramifications, say the tendency to converse, play, or empathize, might be counteracted or placed in abeyance. But the world of the solitary remains populated and shared to the extent that the solitary continues to exist in a world of meaning. If anything, solitude sharpens our sense of the with-world so we may better distance ourselves from its effects or resist certain of its temptations.

Opposed to the principles of methodological individualism, Heidegger denies that Dasein first exists as a solitary individual that subsequently bridges the chasm between itself and others through social involvement. Being-with is primordial. Heidegger responds to the metaphysical quandary of the isolated subject seeking communicative and moral access to other human beings in the same way that he responds to the metaphysical quandary of the isolated subject seeking epistemological access to an external world. He simply denies the atomistic presuppositions: "It is assumed that a subject is encapsulated within itself and now has the task of empathizing with another subject. This way of formulating the question is absurd, since there never is such a subject in the sense it is assumed here. If the constitution of what is Dasein is instead regarded without presuppositions as Being-in and Being-with in the presuppositionless immediacy of everydayness, it then becomes clear that the problem of empathy is just as absurd as the question of the reality of the external world" (HCT 243).¹

AT: Permutation

Our alternative is mutually exclusive from the affirmatives embracement of modern rationalism

Weinberger 92 (Jerry Weinberger, Professor of Political Science at Michigan State University, "Politics and the Problem of Technology: An Essay on Heidegger and the Tradition of Political Philosophy", The American Political Science Review, Vol. 86, No. 1 (Mar. 1992), pp. 112-127, JSTOR) KR/JRC

Recent thinking about technology and its implications for politics has taken a postmodern turn. In its modern formulation, the danger of technology is the possibility that in the scientific age we will succumb to the consequences of our most impressive intellectual achievements. First, we were poised on the brink of nuclear destruction. Now, as that threat fades, we and the world face new dangers, this time springing from technology used with the best of intentions. Disaster looms because technology enhances our powers of control and because modern science, the theoretical ground of technology, understands human nature to be as manipulable as matter in motion. Under the spell of these forces we risk self-inflicted deformation and brutalization, all in the name of human comfort, freedom from pain, and variety of choice. From this modern point of view technology compels us to remember our essential humanity lest we fail to control the technical means that threaten fundamental values (e.g., Jonas 1984; Kass 1985). The modern age is not just the age of science; it is the age of the potentially beneficent tension between science and humanism. If we understand how science and humanism contend within the progress of reason, it will be possible to exercise responsible political choice today. The postmodern view is perhaps best expressed by Heidegger's comment that "the essence of technology is by no means anything technological" (Heidegger 1977, 4; 1967, vol. 1, 5). Technology is not the sum of machines and techniques that we must learn to master and use as a neutral set of means lest we forsake our humanity. Technology is not even something we need to "do" anything about. Rather, it is just what we have now become. And although it opens our eyes, it does not compel us to seek out a reinvigorated humanism. On the contrary, technology discloses to us that humanism is the proximate source of technology. Technology is indeed a fateful danger; but it shows us that within the tradition of rationalism, the essences of technology and humanism are the same. As the result of that tradition, our world is now stamped by technology. But the problem of technology has nothing to do with recovering humane standards for political (and technical) choice. That problem is less a challenge to be met and overcome than a sign that we are on the verge of an age in which all of our categories of political choice and evaluation have become exhausted. Whatever it might be that technology compels us to do (especially as regards politics), it will not be to recur to the contending elements of modern rationalism.

The alternative and the affirmative are mutually exclusive- We cannot engage with preoccupations with technical objects and discover an authentic way of living

Rubin 90- Associate Professor of Political Science at Duquesne University (Charles T., 1990, "Review: Heidegger's Ecology of Modernity", The Review of Politics, Vol. 52, No. 4, pp. 640-1 //VR)//JRC

A recent book by a world leader in artificial intelligence extols an evolutionary replacement of human beings by smarter, faster, more adaptable machines. As a leading popularizer of evolutionary theory has noted, DNA is simply a way of passing on information, and that might be done more readily by silicon-based electronic means. Besides, as an engineer points out, from the perspective of manufacturing, humans are "walking filth factories. Environmentalist speculation that "the world has cancer, and that the cancer cell is man" has long been around, but recently there are calls for drastic surgery. Arno Naess, philosophical father of the "Deep Ecology" movement, suggests a global population goal of 100 million (about the size of Pakistan today). Another deep ecologist would not be satisfied with 100 million human beings, but looks forward to the development of another being, that can live with nature with the ease of the mythical Sasquatch. These misanthropic visions of the future are all responses to dilemmas posed by modern technology. Common sense may revolt against them, but the frequency with which yesterday's extreme becomes today's common sense should give us pause before we dismiss them. How is it that modern technology calls them forth? Michael Zimmerman thinks a good place to begin to raise such questions is Martin Heidegger's "meditation" on modern technology. Heidegger can lead us to the discussion necessary if we are to have "any hope of discovering authentic ways of living within the dangerous and wondrous possibilities opened up" by the technological age (p. xxii). What does Heidegger teach about technology? In the second half of his book, Zimmerman presents an often told story in a thorough and lucid, if not highly original, way. Technology cannot be understood if we are preoccupied with technical objects and their problems, since it is a way of seeing the world through which everything comes to view as an exploitable re-source. Thus, a personnel director speaks of his company's "human re-source assets" held in Iraq. This way of thinking is the working out of an impulse to mastery immanent in the history of philosophy at least since Plato. That we assume we can master nature is not a product of human creativity, reason, wishing or willing, but rather a mysterious, fateful dispensation that is, like any way of revealing, beyond our power to change. The calculative thinking of technology conceals this mystery, hence distorting man's understanding of himself. The best we can hope for is that, thus aware of it, we may be prepared for the coming of some new dispensation.

AT: Permutation

Technological thought shuts out all other modes of thinking

McWhorter, 92 – Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Northeast Missouri State University
(Ladelle, Heidegger and the Earth, ed. by Ladelle McWhorter)JRC

<This managerial, technological mode of revealing, Heidegger says, is embedded in and constitutive of Western culture and has been gathering strength for centuries. Now it is well on its way to extinguishing all other modes of revealing, all other ways of being human and being earth. It will take tremendous effort to think through this danger, to think past it and beyond, tremendous courage and resolve to allow thought of the mystery to come forth; thought of the inevitability, along with revealing, of concealment, of loss, of ignorance; thought of the occurring of things and their passage as events not ultimately under human control. And of course even the call to allow this thinking - couched as it so often must be in a grammatical imperative appealing to an agent - is itself a paradox, the first that must be faced and allowed to speak to us and to shatter us as it scatters thinking in new directions, directions of which we have not yet dreamed, directions of which we may never dream.

And shattered we may be, for our self-understanding is at stake; in fact, our very selves - selves engineered by the technologies of power that shaped, that are, modernity - are at stake. Any thinking that threatens the notion of human being as modernity has posited it - as rationally self-interested individual, as self-possessed bearer of rights and obligations, as active mental and moral agent - is thinking that threatens our very being, the configurations of subjective existence in our age. >

The perm's inclusion of calculative thought still reduces the world to utility.

Schurmann 1987 – Professor of Philosophy @ The New School for Social Research in New York
(Reiner. "Heidegger on Being and Acting: From Principles to Anarchy." P.279-280)

2. To grant the thing an open field means furthermore to free thinking from representations of an end. If technology is the triumph of telic rationality and if thinking that triumph requires a step back to its conditions, then thinking has no identifiable goal. It does not enter the telic network, either to enforce or negate it. The constitution, retention, possession and master of objects is not its task. In its essence and its activity it remains free from teleocratic dominion. Its essence is far too poor, and the task is accomplishes far too modest, to weigh on technology since to think is to follow things as they emerge into their world. It is to follow the emerging from absence into presence, i.e., presencing. Its poverty is nevertheless instructive. It instructs us about an origin without a telos; an origin that is always other and always new; on which one cannot count and which thereby defies the technico-scientific complex born from telic rationality. Heidegger's counsel to grant the thing an open field, then, also yields an imperative. Things that enter their world are other than products that enter a planning scheme. Products have a use. That operational purpose constitutes their very being. To speak of things instead of objects given for handling or subsistent as stock is to disengage entities from the frame of finality. How can such disengagement or dis-enframing be carried out? With the imperative contained in this question: "Are we in our existence historically at the origin?" To be at the origin would be to follow in thinking and acting the phenomena's *oriri*, their emergence 'without why'. Concerning the "open field" into which things emerge Heidegger cites Goethe: "Seek nothing behind the phenomena would be the noumena, and only divine intelligence would know the role I has assigned them among the marvels of creation. In conversation, Heidegger also quoted Rene Char: "Look only once at the wave casting anchor in the sea." "Of call clear waters, poetry is the one that dallies least in the reflections of its bridges." Thinking and poetry corrode teleocracy as rust from a gentle rain corrodes iron. Again, it is Meister Eckhart who dared translate such corrosion into a discourse on action: "The just man seeks nothing in his works. Those are serfs and hirelings who seek anything in their works and who act for the sake of some 'why.'"

AT: Permutation

The permutation still links to the criticism- An embracement of the technological mindset is mutually exclusive from examination of ontology

Thiele 95 – Professor of Political Science at University of Florida (Leslie Paul, Timely Meditations, p.193-4, JRC)

Technology is one of Heidegger's enduring and foremost concerns. Though Heidegger only explicitly formalized this concern in his later work, he expressed his worry about the systematic rationalization of the world early on. In 1919, Heidegger clearly described in a personal letter what over two decades later would become a preoccupation of his published work. He writes: "The unbridled, basically Enlightenment directive to nail life and everything living onto a board, like things, orderly and flat, so that everything becomes overseeable, controllable, definable, connectable, and explicable, where only many pure and unrestrained (sit venia verbo)—'ables' exist—this directive underlies all the many quasi-memories of life, which are being attempted today in every sphere of experience." For Heidegger, the "Enlightenment directive" to control and standardize life ensues from the metaphysical drive to objectify the world. Modern technology and metaphysics, it follows, are largely equivalent terms (EP 93). Both arise from and evidence a refusal to think Being in their systematic (conceptual and practical) effort to possess and master being. Modern technology and metaphysics stand entwined. As such, neither allows a proper perspective from which to evaluate or overcome the other (OGS 59). **Technology entices us into a productive process that precludes questioning thought,** yet only such questioning could adequately reveal the nature of metaphysics. In turn, metaphysical humankind, engaged as a subject in the reductive objectification of being, is left little alternative but a technological apprehension and manipulation of the world.

Calculative thought is zero-sum with the alternative – it is a totalizing approach to being

Thiele 95 – Professor of Political Science at University of Florida (Leslie Paul, Timely Meditations, pgs. 200-201)//markoff

The Midas touch of technology is ontologically devastating. Its defining characteristic is not simply that it reveals the world in a particular way, but that **it usurps all other modes of revelation.** In the most fundamental event of the contemporary age, the world becomes totally enframed as a picture. Worldly life becomes the analogue of film production, a celluloid reality whose boundaries depend only on our own imaginations and technological skills.

With everything standing in reserve for our use, "distance" disappears. Heidegger is speaking here not of distance as a literal extension in space, but as an existential sense of our proximity to horizons: chiefly those between earth and sky, mortals and immortals. Indeed, as our relation to the world becomes technologized, we gradually cease to differentiate distance and nearness. With everything awaiting production or made ready for consumption, we find ourselves without the means to discriminate between what sits within our court and what remains beyond our ken. This blurring and transgression of borders is the chief indicator of an unconditioned anthropomorphism. Heidegger writes: "In the absence of distance, everything becomes equal and indifferent in consequence of the one will intent upon the uniformly calculated availability of the whole earth. This is why the battle for the dominion of the earth has now entered its decisive phase. **The all-out challenge to secure dominion over the earth can be met only by occupying an ultimate position beyond the earth from which to establish control over the earth.** The battle for this position, however, is the thoroughgoing calculative conversion of all connections among all things into the calculable absence of distance. This is making a desert of the encounter of the world's fourfold—it is the refusal of nearness" (WL 105-6). In other words, enframing brings the world completely within our grasp. Like a closely held picture, Heidegger foresaw early on, everything becomes "overseeable, controllable, definable, connectable, and explicable." The refusal of nearness marks a lost sense of relatedness to the world as a place of boundaries.

AT: Permutation

There's only a risk that the perm is a net dis-ad to the alt. in a void, science as it exists and operates in the status quo can never be included in the solution.

Roddey, '2 – Engineering Programs Manager at the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station

(Martin Heidegger: "technique and the turn") // CP

4. Does the author consider science and technology to be a part of the solution or rather of the problem?

It is apparent that Heidegger sees modern science and technology as part of the problem. Modern science is ever more involved in the search for solutions to every aim of humankind. From spaceflight to nanotechnology, the aim has been to discover all the mysteries of nature, to discern the underlying laws that govern the natural world. This amounts, according to Heidegger, to a misunderstanding of the essence of technique. As a result, the very essence of being, and with it the thingness of things, is also misunderstood.

As previously indicated, Heidegger is chiefly concerned about the effects of modern technique. He states that modern technique, though it unconceals what is, does so in a way that differs very much from ancient technique. "The unconcealing that sways in modern technique is a summoning .. that puts .. to nature the demand to deliver energy, that can be furthered .. and stored up as energy." He cites coalmines and mechanized agriculture as other examples of this "perversion" of unconcealment.

AT: Permutation (Reveal/Conceal)

Permutation fails – calculative thought precludes critical reflection- We must conceal in order to reveal

McWhorter, 92 – Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Northeast Missouri State University
(Ladelle, Heidegger and the Earth, ed. by Ladelle McWhorter)JRC

Now, what does this mean? We know that in order to pay attention to one thing, we must stop paying close attention to something else. In order to read philosophy we must stop reading cereal boxes. In order to attend to the needs of students we must sacrifice some of our research time. Allowing for one thing to reveal itself means allowing for the concealing of something else. All revealing comes at the price of concomitant concealment. But this is more than just a kind of Kantian acknowledgment of human limitation. Heidegger is not simply dressing up the obvious, that is, the fact that no individual can undergo two different experiences simultaneously. His is not a point about human subjectivity at all. Rather, it is a point about revealing itself. When revealing reveals itself as temporally linear and causally ordered, for example, it cannot simultaneously reveal itself as ordered by song and unfolding in dream. Furthermore, in revealing, revealing itself is concealed in order for what is revealed to come forth. Thus, when revealing occurs concealing occurs as well. The two events are one and cannot be separated."

AT: Technology Good

The alternative can solve the case- we can embrace the inevitability of technology and still challenge the 1ac's description of a technological understanding of being- Japan is our example

Dreyfus, 93 – Professor of Philosophy at the University of California at Berkeley

(Charles B., “Heidegger on the connection between nihilism, art, technology, and politics” – chapter of “The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger,” ed. By Charles B. Guignon, p. 306-7)JRC

Heidegger, however, sees that “it would be foolish to attack technology blindly. It would be shortsighted to condemn it as the work of the devil. We depend on technological devices; they even challenge us to even greater advances” (DT 53, G 24). Instead, Heidegger suggests that there is a way we can keep our technological devices and yet remain true to ourselves as receivers of clearings: “We can affirm the unavoidable use of technological devices, and also deny them the right to dominate us, and so to warp, confuse and lay waste nature” (DT 54; G 24-5). To understand how this might be possible, we need an illustration of Heidegger’s important distinction between technology and the technological understanding of being. Again we can turn to Japan. In contemporary Japan traditional, nontechnological practices still exist alongside the most advanced high-tech production and consumption. The television set and the household gods share the same shelf- the Styrofoam cup coexists with the porcelain teacup. We thus see that the Japanese, at least, can enjoy technology without taking over the technological understanding of being.

The alternative solves the case- Rejecting technologies control over being can be synonymous with accepting the benefits of some forms of technology while questioning it's necessity

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(Charles B., “Heidegger on the connection between nihilism, art, technology, and politics” – chapter of “The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger,” ed. By Charles B. Guignon, p. 308)

“Modern man must first and above all find his way back into the full breadth of the space proper to his essence. That essential space of man’s essential being receives the dimension that unites it to something beyond itself...that is the way in which the safekeeping of being itself is given to belong to the essence of man as the one who is needed and used by being. (QCT 39; TK 39)”

This transformation in our understanding of being, unlike the slow process of cleaning up the environment, which is, of course, also necessary, would take place in a sudden gestalt switch: “The turning of the danger comes to pass suddenly. In this turning, the clearing belonging to the essence of being suddenly clears itself and lights up” (QCT 44; TK 39). The danger-namely that we have a leveled and concealed understanding of being-when grasped as the danger, becomes that which saves us. “The selfsame danger is, when it is as the danger, the saving power” (QCT39; TK 39).

This remarkable claim gives rise to two opposed ways of understanding Heidegger’s response to technology. Both interpretations agree that once one recognizes the technological understanding of being for what it is-a historical understanding-once gains a free relation to it. We neither push forward technological efficiency as our sole goal, nor always resist it. If we are free of the technological imperative we can, in each case, discuss the pros and cons. As Heidegger puts it: “We let technological devices enter our daily life, and at the same time leave them outside...as things which are nothing absolute but remain dependent upon something higher. I would call this comportment toward technology which expresses “yes” and at the same time “no,” by an old work, releasement towards things” (DT 54; G25).

AT: Technology Good

Heidegger's argument isn't that all technology is bad, it's a question of how the technology is framed and what grid is use
DeLuca '5 (Kevin Michael DeLuca, Associate Professor of Speech Communication and adjunct in the Institute of Ecology at the University of Georgia, "Thinking With Heidegger: Rethinking Environmental Theory and Practice", *Ethics & the Environment* 10.1 (2005) 67-87, Project Muse)JRC

Conversely, then, Heidegger's trajectory prompts a fundamental questioning of technology and the regime of modern technology, but neither in the sense of a particular device being good or bad nor in the sense of abandoning technology (as if that is ever an option). Rather, the questioning for environmentalists is two-fold. Most basic and troubling, can humans even think outside of the regime of modern technology? Has modern technology foreclosed the possibilities of thinking of the way of Being-in-the-world on earth? Second, the question to every manifestation of technology is: Does it or does it not promote modern technology's enframing of earth and world? For example, does the computer promote the regime of modern technology and further enmesh environmentalists in that regime or does the computer enable other ways of revealing and other ways of Being-in-the-world on earth? Arguably, different computer practices would lead to different answers to these questions. That is, one should never analyze a technological device outside of its context, that is, what technology grid it is hooked into. The same device hooked into different technology regimes becomes a different technological device.

Our argument isn't that technology is bad, the way calculative thought structures the earth is what allows for misappropriation of actual technology

Thiele 95 – Professor of Political Science at University of Florida (Leslie Paul, *Timely Meditations*, pgs. 196-197)//markoff

In the technological drive for efficiency, the earth, its creatures, and our fellow human beings are reduced to the status of raw material Heidegger's word is "standing-reserve" (Bestand). Technologically conceived, **the world as a whole becomes standing-reserve. It exists in the mode of awaiting our use, of its being put to most efficient use.** In a technological world, Heidegger writes, "everywhere everything is ordered to stand by, to be immediately at hand, indeed to stand there just so that it may be on call for a further ordering" (QT 17).¹ Heidegger suggests the term "enframing" (Gestell) for the mode of disclosure that displays everything as standing-reserve. Enframing, then, is the essence of modern technology, being that ordering which challenges everything forth as standing-reserve. Technology, in this sense, is totalizing. The development of any particular machine, artifact, or set of procedures is not the point. Heidegger's concern is that such developments are merely the symptoms of an expansive technological drive that recognizes no boundaries and makes no (ontological) distinctions in its effort to en- frame the entire experiential field of human being. Machines, techniques, and elaborate artifacts—what we generally understand as technology—remain of secondary concern to Heidegger. Foremost in his mind is the totalizing reach of enframing as a particular mode of human being. It follows that enframing, as the "way of revealing which holds sway in the essence of modern technology . . . is itself nothing technological" (QT 19-20). Machines are only the most patent examples of that which awaits use as standing-reserve and integrates the world as standing-reserve. The essence of modern technology is itself nothing technological because technology is grounded not in the production of machines (its most apparent effect), but in the ontological disclosure of the Being of being as standing-reserve. Technology is no mere means but a way of revealing, Heidegger says, because from a

I A Sierra Club newsletter describes the modern attitude toward forests as a standing reserve: "The truth is, we've been managing our national forests as though they were outdoor warehouses of living trees, held in inventory until the lumber companies are ready to take delivery." technological viewpoint all _disclosure is reduced to a mere means. In other words, technology cannot be neutrally applied within manifold modes of disclosure because technology imposes a single mode of disclosure: everything, everywhere, uniformly, is revealed as standing- reserve.

AT: Technology Good

The alternative doesn't link to your tech good disads, it only changes our relationship towards technology – claims that we break down technology are just another link

Thiele 95 – Professor of Political Science at University of Florida (Leslie Paul, *Timely Meditations*, pgs. 213-215)//markoff

Recollecting our worldly habitat not only fosters resistance to en-framing, but also provides guidance in negotiating relations with the products of technology, namely machines and techniques. Heidegger acknowledges that we should neither reject nor do without technological artifacts or skills as a whole. He neither advocates nor accepts a retreat to a pretechnological state of being. Nor, despite much misinterpretation by his commentators, does he suggest that we fatalistically resign ourselves to the victory of enframing. Its victory, he emphatically states, is not inevitable (OGS 61). "We cannot, of course, reject today's technological world as devil's work, nor may we destroy it—assuming it does not destroy itself," Heidegger maintains. "Still less may we cling to the view that the world of technology is such that it will absolutely prevent a spring out of it" (ID 40-41). To confuse our destined relation to Being as if it were a fate, particularly one that leads to the inevitable decline of our civilization because of technological rule, is itself a historically determinist, and therefore metaphysical and technological, understanding. According to Heidegger, "All attempts to reckon existing reality morphologically, psychologically, in terms of decline and loss, in terms of fate, catastrophe, and destruction, are merely technological behavior" (QT 48)." Fatalism is no answer because fatalism reflects the same absence of thought that is evidenced in a naive complacency with technological "progress." Heidegger's admonition to think the nature of technology, though far from a resigned musing, is not the devising of a counteroffensive. We are asked to respond first to the question "What shall we think?" rather than the question "What is to be done?" But the point is not simply that we must think before we act. The needed thinking of what we are doing and how we are being is not solely a strategic 214 CHAPTER EIGHT RECEIVING THE SKY 215 preparation for more informed and effective behavior. Thought must first save us from our typical modes of behaving, namely those oriented to possessive mastery.

Heidegger warns that "so long as we represent technology as an instrument, we remain held fast in the will to master it" (QT 32). The more we fail to experience the essence of technology as enframing, persevering in the mistaken notion that complex machinery is the danger, the more we will believe that salvation lies in our mastering technology before it masters us. With this in mind, Heidegger explicitly states that he is "not against technology," nor does he suggest any "resistance against, or condemnation of, technology" (MHC 43-44). Indeed, the development of complex machines and techniques—technology as it is commonly understood—has enormous benefits that must not be depreciated. It would be shortsighted to condemn such technology out of hand. Apart from our obvious dependence on technical devices, their development also often "challenges us to ever greater advances" (DT 53). From political, social, cultural, and environmental standpoints, technology demonstrates many virtues. Indeed, given the unrelenting extension of human power and population, technological developments that buffer the earth from our predaceousness seem both urgent and indispensable. A good bit of the destruction humanity presently visits on the earth and itself makes sophisticated technological remedies necessary. Having machines efficiently serve our needs is neither evil nor regrettable. But this service must be grounded on our discovery of what needs we truly have. More importantly, it must be grounded on our discovery of what transcends human need." These, decidedly, are not technological questions, and our capacity to answer them largely rests on our recovery of the capacity to think beyond the criterion of instrumental service.

Technology is not inherently bad but the way it is used now kills the value of nature.

Rohrkämmer, 05 – History and Philosophy professor at Lancaster University (Thomas, *How Green Were the Nazis: Martin Heidegger, National Socialism, and Environmentalism*, p. 185-6)

In contrast to the bleak picture drawn by Ludwig Klages and Friedrich Georg Junger, Heidegger argued against a demonization of technology. He stressed that all technology was essentially a justified way of understanding and relating to the world. Technology is not just all arbitrary human activity; it "is a mode of revealing." On the most fundamental level it belongs to the "realm where revealing and un concealment take place, where ... truth happens" (QCT, 295). This, however, does not mean that Heidegger saw no danger in modern technology. On the contrary, the truth which modern, scientifically based technology reveals is, he claims, largely determined by human demands: while traditional technology lets things be, "modern technology is a challenging" (*herausfordern*). While the work of the traditional peasant lets the soil reveal something about itself and bring forth its inherent qualities without interfering too much, the earth is now challenged to reveal "itself as a coal-mining district, the soil as a mineral deposit" (QCT, 296-97).

AT: Democracy Solves

Only by challenging democracy can we sustain it. Criticism of Democracy is a prerequisite to the prevention of a totalitarian shift
Lewis '7 - Department of Philosophy, University of Sussex.
(“ IJŽS Vol 1.4 Žižek and Heidegger Reply to Žižek ”)//cp/JRC

1) Democratic.

The notion of the empty signifier renders Lacan the ultimate theorist of democratic politics since it represents the necessarily ‘empty place of power’, the non-natural and non-permanent occupant of the place of power. If one allows this occupancy to be contingent and thus the topic of ‘politics’ (in Laclau’s sense of the contestation for hegemony by a plurality of struggling interests), one remains at the most basic level ‘radically democratic’.

2) Anti-democratic supplement to democracy.

Lacan’s theory is a provocation of democracy: anti-democratic, but in a way that supplements democracy in what we can infer is a Derridean sense. The provocative opposition is necessary to the very maintenance of democracy as such. Without an anti-democratic goad democracy hardens into totalitarian rule. It can present itself to itself and understand itself only by reflecting itself in its opposite, an opposite whose existence it must allow in order to be democratic. This is akin to the first option, except this deconstruction does not propose itself at a politics but rather as a critic of politics itself, a critic of ideology, the illusion of the natural permanence of the ruling order. This is the traditional Platonic model of the philosopher as opposed to the rabble of democracy, Socrates as the gadfly to Athenian democracy.

On this view, theory remains impotent and presents an ideal which cannot be realised politically and ultimately bolsters democracy itself. “a democracy needs a permanent influx of anti-democratic self-questioning in order to remain a living democracy” (6). Thus the anti-democratic necessity is ‘grounded’ (8) in the need for more democracy, which is to say that the place of power be open to ever renewed usurpation and hence criticism of its current occupant. In this perspective of the relation between theory and practice, theory deconstructs the appearance of stable meaning, which is to say the apparent completeness of any symbolic system, lacking any inconsistency or emptiness, while politics pragmatically reasserts such significance. However, Žižek indicates that today this relationship has been reversed to the extent that it is politics as ‘ideological supplement’ to capitalism that threatens meaning.

AT: Politics Solve

Government can't solve- rooted in technological metaphysics, means critiquing our foundations of being is a prerequisite to political action

Weinberger 92- Professor of Political Science at Michigan State University (Jerry, March 1992, "Politics and the Problem of Technology: An Essay on Heidegger and the Tradition of Political Philosophy", The American Political Science Review, Vol. 86, No. 1, pp. 113, Jstor //VR)JRC—no change

Nihilism, which in its forgetting says only "It is not" (as in positivism and relativism), actually discloses the negative character of being, the fact that being is not an entity or category of entities. It thus discloses that being is the temporal configuration of the separate domains of being-requiring their nearness and farness-and that, as such, being is finite and singular. It discloses that the essence of being is the arbitrary occurrence or happening of one or another utterly unique configuration. Metaphysics, itself an occurrence of being and rooted in everyday experience, hides the essence of being as occurrence. It thus represents the withdrawal of being, which nevertheless always has the power of disclosing itself and thus upsetting our everyday and theoretical understanding of the world and orientations within the world. Technology is the metaphysical appearing of being that ultimately discloses the radical finitude of metaphysics itself. Technology forces us to see that metaphysics and technology are themselves finite being-dispensations. As such, they are not eternal; but neither are they under our control. Modern technology, the Gestell, is but one way that being is unconcealed; and while it is necessary as a dispensation of being, its necessity is not that of a species' relation to an unchanging genus. This fact lets us account for the uniqueness of modern technology (for the fact that the Baconian-Cartesian project for the mastery of nature is not essentially akin to, say, ancient techne), despite the rootedness of technology in the meta-physical tradition running all the way back to Plato. The heterogeneous epochs within the metaphysical tradition are each of them new withdrawals of being that undermine the previous metaphysical ontology. But when grasped in the glare of nihilistic technology, the several metaphysical epochs point not to some common ground of human history but to the radical finitude and singularity of every "tradition," including technology and metaphysics. Modern technology is metaphysical and is for that reason a species, or kind, of metaphysics. But the essence of modern technology is to disclose the historical finitude of the very categories of essence, genus, and species (or kind). When the finitude of being announces itself out of technological nihilism and the exhaustion of metaphysics, we can prepare ourselves for a new relationship to being. This will be one of expecting altogether unpredictable and indeterminate configurations or play of the domains of being. As we are now in the technological release from metaphysics, we can ready ourselves for wholly new occurrences of the human and the divine, the public and the private, the natural and the artificial. These occurrences (the play of being) will be serious, however, because they will always announce the finitude of being and thus shatter an everyday way of thinking that for the most part convinces us that being is not finite and that the world is a three-dimensional, scientifically knowable whole that surrounds us. Such readiness for the new is the saving gift of technology over which we have no power. For Heidegger, the challenge posed by technology is not to rediscover our values or invent new ones. Whatever the politics of the future life will be (it will be neither democracy nor communism, which are technocratic), our genuine stance for now is one of expectation, a readiness that holds itself open for new configurations of being whose character we cannot know or force or control.² Now to speak rather generally, Heidegger's account of technology has had influence far beyond those who would identify themselves as Heideggerians. The most powerful recent (and explicitly Heideggerian) version of this argument is expressed in Reiner Schürmann's deconstructive anarchism; but it certainly influenced Arendt's account of modern democracy and liberalism and could be said to have made its mark on the contemporary critics of "foundationalism," for whom getting a bead on politics requires seeing the tradition's search for metaphysical grounds as it has now revealed itself-as the last repository of vain and disfiguring illusion. But setting aside the important question of Heidegger's contemporary legacy, the political implications of his account of technology are clear and familiar enough. They tell us that modern politics, both liberal and socialist, are in the grip of metaphysics. This grip began with Plato and received its decisive technological form in the seventeenth century, which saw the explicit linking of philosophy and politics to the scientific project for the conquest of nature. Modern life, whose roots reach back to classical antiquity, is thus stamped by the technological frame of mind, which so forms modern politics as to distort and truncate the possibilities of human experience. The result is the totalitarian disaster of modernity, in which labor, citizenship, statesmanship, art, and thought-the essential elements of any possible world-are impoverished, if not obliterated, by the very forces we pursue to cure our telltale malaise. Clear thinking shows that we can only hope for the advent of something altogether new and that with the technological self-destruction of the metaphysical tradition we can experience a liberating transformation of political life.³

AT: Heidegger = Nazi

One bad application of Ontic politics should not result in divorcing being from politics- We must embrace the positive aspects of his philosophy

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("IJŽS Vol 1.4 Žižek and Heidegger Reply to Žižek")/cp/JRC

Heidegger

Žižek criticises those who dismiss Heidegger's thought for its supposed complicity with politics, since in this way they can miss those actualised elements of it which are actually positive, its good questions about the 'basic tenets of modernity', which include its notions of humanism, democracy and progress. They endorse Heidegger with an 'ambiguous conditional' (Conversations with Žižek:28), as if they want him stripped of his inconveniently strident (anti-democratic, illiberal) elements. But for Žižek these are what should be retained and indeed exacerbated, this is the best of Heidegger, but it is 'still not radical enough'.

Heidegger without Nazism, or Heidegger understood later to renounce all politics, including Nazism, in his later work, reduces him to a mere humanitarian: in other words, to Hannah Arendt, whom Žižek identifies as the first 'liberal Heideggerian' (19, italicised). Elsewhere, Žižek has identified one of the three dogmas of contemporary thought as 'everything Hannah Arendt says is right'!

Somewhat akin to Derrida's Of Spirit, which does not allow itself the simple condemnation of Nazism as if with a clean conscience, as if an opposition would not operate on the same terrain or in the same terms as that which it opposed, Žižek implies that if one accepts the Heideggerian critique of humanism (or the human, perhaps the individual atomistic subject as subject of 'human rights') one cannot simply repudiate Nazism on humanitarian grounds, and thus oppose it abstractly in this way. And to oppose it on democratic grounds would miss the point too, which is precisely to find an alternative to technological democracy. In many ways, one might read Žižek's whole piece as an attempt to find the correct way in which to determine where Nazism went wrong. And when one is attempting, as Heidegger was, to find an alternative to humanism (in the metaphysical sense) and democracy, this is not at all easy. Indeed, by 1969, it is clear that even Heidegger himself, among the greatest thinkers of the twentieth century, still had not found another way out. This struggle to exit in his wake might be said to characterise the entire trajectory of Žižek's thought.

For Žižek, the failure of Nazism as an application of Heideggerianism does indeed mean that one should renounce 'ontological politics', which is to say one that would be adequate to the current sending of being, and thus one that would be able to bring about by sheer force of will a new sending, a new relation between man and the whole of beings. Staging an 'encounter between global technology and modern humanity' was what constituted the 'inner truth and greatness' of Nazism for Heidegger which is to say its ontological import (cf. Introduction to Metaphysics:213/152). This would be grand politics, capable of changing the face of the globe, the very way in which beings appeared to man, as technological energy resource.

AT: Heidegger = Nazi

Heidegger did not support the practices of Nazism- he viewed Nationalism Socialism as a gateway to bring back the foundation of Western civilization and connect us back to ourselves

Desmond, 1997 (David, "Martin Heidegger: What Kind of Nazi?", <http://evans-experientialism.freewebspace.com/desmond.htm>, REQ) JRC

...a culture is fighting for its existence, a culture that involves thousands of years of development and that embraces Greece and Germany together. 9 Heidegger opposed the modernist trend in Catholicism, which caused him to distance himself from his religion. According to Heidegger, Christianity and technology had steered science away from the greatness of its Greek beginnings. Heidegger's earlier writings also demonstrate a disdain for modernity: [O]ur totally superficial culture of today [shows a] rage for innovation that collapses foundations...[T]his modern concept of life as a rapid sequence of instant pleasures [exhibits] so many signs of decadence. 10 Heidegger believed the salvation for Western Civilization from technology and a hapless existence was a determined Germany, who was besieged on the east and west by Russia and America. Those two nations were predominant, both of them suffering from "the same dreary technological frenzy, the same unrestricted organization of the average man." 11 Germany was at the center, caught between the nihilism of Bolshevism and the gadgetry and positivism of capitalism/democracy. Heidegger believed the major force in the rejuvenation of Germany and the West was the German university. Becoming rector at Freiburg was the first step for Heidegger in his effort to bring the National Socialist revolution to the universities. Heidegger made his rector's address on 27 May 1933, entitled "The Self-Determination of the German University." Farias states "the speech clearly expressed National Socialist opinions about the reformation of the universities." 12 Heidegger hoped to reform the universities, but I do not believe the Nazis cared about reform. The NSDAP simply wanted the support of students, faculty, and administration, which they received: "Student organizations fell into the hands of the Nazis long before the government institutions did." 13 As stated previously, the SA was a popular organization for the students. The rate of faculty and administrative support differed depending on the region and strength of NSDAP influence. Notably, the province of Baden, and Freiburg University, were at the vanguard of National Socialist reforms. In his speech, Heidegger points to the "historical spiritual mission of the German people," stating that the pursuits of science must be influenced by that mission. 14 Heidegger promotes the Nazi ideals of work service and military duty, and announces that "[t]he spiritual world of a people...is the force of the deepest preservation of its powers of earth and blood." 15 The speech was "a call for Germany to move itself into the primordial realm of the powers of Being, with the Nazi party in the vanguard." 16

As rector, Heidegger's actions certainly implicate him as a Nazi. Heidegger renounced his mentor, Husserl, because he was Jewish. Some Jewish professors were expelled, but Heidegger prevented the expulsion of two Jewish professors. Examination of Heidegger's actions suggests he valued competency before religious affiliation, but some Jews were expelled. In June of 1933, Heidegger spoke at Heidelberg, saying the course for German universities to follow was "a tough struggle to the end in the spirit of National Socialism, which will not be drowned by Christian and humanist notions." 17 Some scholars believe Heidegger was taken in by the "Hitler Myth," as an October 1933 speech may indicate:

To be among those who follow [our Führer] means in fact: to want untiringly and unshakably that the German people find again their native unity, their simple dignity and their true strength, and how as a worker's state Germany can recover its life and grandeur. 18 An article he wrote for the student newspaper in November 1933 stated: "The Führer himself, and he alone, is the German reality of today, and of the future, and of its law." 19 The Nazi salute was required at the beginning and end of all classes at Freiburg while Heidegger was rector. There is ample proof of Heidegger's association with Nazism, it is the nature and depth of his conviction which is debated. It has never been doubted that Heidegger was active, at least in 1933-1934, in the National Socialist movement. The issue continues to resurface because Heidegger was the most prominent, though not the only, philosopher to opt for National Socialism. What adds to the debate is the inadequacy of Heidegger's explanation of his association. Some scholars want to discount his thought because of his involvement while others say it is necessary to separate the man from his work. Some scholars believe those who want to disregard his work want to do so not because of his Nazism, but simply because they disagree with Heidegger's philosophy. Hans Sluga in particular believes most opinions of Heidegger are based on defending or attacking one's own philosophy rather than examining the implications of Heidegger's thoughts and actions.

Regarding Heidegger's philosophy, it was not a Nazi philosophy. Much of Heidegger's work is unintelligible. Even Heidegger's peers at German universities noted that his students flocked to his classes, but they couldn't understand a bit of what he was saying. 20 Basically, Heidegger feared the collapse of Western Civilization as a result of the human race losing touch with itself. He began by looking at this from an individual perspective (a person losing touch with his Being), and by 1933 had seen it on a more national and European level. "Heidegger had turned from a philosophy of struggle to a philosophy of danger." 21 He had started with a religious/philosophical approach to the individual struggle and gone to a philosophical/political approach to the cultural danger. Heidegger believed in the groundedness and the ability of the German spirit and mind. Heidegger thought National Socialism, with him eventually at the helm of the universities (under the Führerprinzip), could lead the world towards its salvation. When the SA was purged in June 1934, Heidegger saw the reality of the situation. He had wanted sweeping reforms of all the universities and believed student involvement in the SA was a strong component of that reform. He encountered opposition from his colleagues in Berlin when the Education Ministry offered him the chair of philosophy there. With the purge of the SA, political reality, which had been sneaking around him, smacked him right in the face. Within a month after the purge, Heidegger resigned as rector. He lectured until 1944, and made some fervent speeches about patriotism and continuing the fight even as German forces faced the reality of defeat. He still retained some hope that if Germany won, there was a chance Western Civilization could be saved, in spite of the broken dream of the Third Reich. He still believed there was "an inward truth and greatness to the movement." 22 It would just have to be found again. Heidegger lost his ardor for National Socialism as it had become, but he believed that if the Nazis won the war, at least Germany would dominate Europe and the West. If he could steer the course of German universities, he could educate the coming generation of the true path National Socialism should follow. Heidegger had little interest in the methods of the Nazis or the conduct of the Reich, but he seemed to cling to the hope that with a victory, the German people could bring Western Civilization back to its true course. That true course was charted by the Greeks many centuries before-the path to the understanding of Being. This road had been abandoned by the West because of the intrusion of rationalism and technology.

There are two crimes Heidegger has been charged with by certain members of academia. First, association with Nazism, of which it could firmly be said he is guilty. Secondly, dereliction of duty (as a thinker and a writer), so to speak. Different scholars approach this crime from varying perspectives. Some, like Hans Sluga, would consider Heidegger wrong for being involved in politics in the first place, at least the manner in which he was involved, because that is not the realm of the philosopher. Sluga defends Heidegger somewhat by describing the state of German philosophy at the time. German philosophy was lacking direction, much like Germany at the time, and Heidegger was not the only philosopher to join the NSDAP. German philosophy, like Germany itself (and the world) was in a time of crisis. The real problem with Heidegger and the other philosophers

AT: Heidegger = Nazi

was that they "forgot the questions, forgot to ask about the assumed rightness of their own positions."²³ Ernest Gellner makes a different charge, stating:

[Heidegger's] involvement with Nazism lacked depth, and his withdrawal from it was so muted as to be imperceptible. There was evasion perhaps, followed by amnesia...we learn precious little from his thought about the dilemmas of his time. That is the real case against him. ²⁴ Perhaps the most interesting pursuit of this crime of dereliction of duty is offered by Jean-François Lyotard in his book "Heidegger and 'the jews.'" Lyotard put "the jews" in lower case because they represent more than just the Jewish people, he used the term "jews" because the Jews are the most prominent or identifiable of the group. "The jews" are the Jews, the blacks, the homeless, the gypsies, the Arabs and all those who are supranational. These people never really assimilate into the national character. They hold allegiance to no particular country. By attempting to eliminate "the jews" (particularly the Jews and gypsies), the Nazis attempted to eliminate the unrepresentable which "the jews" represent, argues Lyotard. The Jews and other non-conformists remind the West that we are "obligated before being free, other before being the same."²⁵ Lyotard seems to be saying that the West wants so badly to build on scientific, rational, secular philosophical ground that it wants to be rid of its failures and its competition. Those peoples who cannot be brought into the fold of a nation, those who have a way of life predicated on an unseeable, untouchable Other, are a reminder of the failure of the West. Or worse, they are a threat. "The jews"...testify [to the] misery [and] servitude...which remains unfinished."²⁶ The Nazis wanted no such reminder. Just as Yahweh had demanded the Hebrews discard their idols for Him, now the West wanted "the jews" to discard their "Other" for the Law of the West. The Nazis considered the Jews the biggest threat because they witnessed the first terror of the Occident (Yahweh's domination). The Nazis were initiating the second terror of the Occident (the Third Reich) and had to rid the world of the witnesses to the first. Lyotard's approach is an amazing expansion of Sluga's charge of forgetting. Lyotard believes "any deduction...of Heidegger's Nazism from the text of Sein und Zeit is impossible."²⁷ He bases his condemnation of Heidegger not on his degree of support for Hitler or Nazism, but on his silence on the Holocaust. Heidegger espoused the thinker, the writer as "the guardian of the memory of forgetting."²⁸ But Heidegger forgot the Holocaust. Heidegger appreciated the artist or poet who attempted to represent the unrepresentable, while at the same time acknowledging his inability to accomplish the task. The thinker and writer has the same responsibility and the same humility. The Holocaust is something which is unrepresentable. Words cannot do the event justice. But it is the thinker/writer's duty to try, and acknowledge his inadequacy at the same time. Survivors of the Holocaust often shy away from discussing it because they know the only ones who can do the event justice are the ones who are not here to discuss it. Thinkers/writers attempt to relate what cannot be related because it is their lot in life to ensure the forgotten is remembered. Heidegger believed this, yet he was silent on the Holocaust. This, Lyotard asserts, was Heidegger's crime. Heidegger "lent to extermination not his hand and not even his thought but his silence and nontought...he 'forgot' the extermination."²⁹ What is amazing is that Heidegger's thought seems to parallel the Judeo-Christian tradition. In his philosophy, Heidegger speaks of a "deep fall" (fall from grace) when people turn away from the authentic life (Garden of Eden). A life of inauthenticity (sin) results, creating angst (guilt). Angst results in thinking of Being (pursuing God's wisdom/forgiveness), which creates the possibility of an authentic life (redemption). Heidegger believed the key to authenticity was asking the question "What is Being?" Lyotard related a story about Weisel as a child asking the beadle of Sighet why he prays to God, since he knows God's answers are incomprehensible. Moshe replies he prays so that God will give him the "strength to ask the right questions."³⁰ Even Heidegger's denunciation of technology and the search for the authentic life calls to mind Jesus telling prospective disciples that they must drop worldly concerns immediately to follow Him on his authentic road. Heidegger made only one statement, in 1949, relating to the Holocaust. It seems he is bemoaning technology, not the extermination of people: Agriculture is now a mechanized food industry; in essence it is no different than the production of corpses in the gas chambers and death camps, the embargoes and food reductions to starving countries, the making of hydrogen bombs. ³¹ "The Nazi Volksgemeinschaft promised...a society free of the contradictions and irritations of everyday life in the industrial age."³² This must have appealed to Heidegger. Nazism offered something to his vision of German supremacy and his vision of an authentic life. Though he became disillusioned with the NSDAP, he still longed for the simple life and a volksgemeinschaft. Heidegger had higher hopes for National Socialism than they could live up to, but he never seemed to completely let go. Great thinker or Nazi or a some of each? Certainly some of each, and scholars seem to want to know which part of him was one and which the other. Not even modern science can figure that out. It seems that, although Heidegger was definitely a Nazi, the fact that the NSDAP never became exactly what he wanted keeps us from knowing what kind of Nazi he was. The question could only have been answered with authority if the party had become what Heidegger wanted, or if Heidegger had done his duty as a writer and a thinker.

Heidegger rejected the Nazis, they were the target of his criticism

Thiele 95 – Professor of Political Science at University of Florida (Leslie Paul, Timely Meditations, pg. 198)//markoff

Written after Hitler's rise to power and before the war had revealed its final devastations, Heidegger indicates in the above passage, though only backhandedly and without assuming personal responsibility, that he has glimpsed the terrible error in his support for Nazism. Once in power, the Nazis quickly displayed their technological demon. No more horrific and ruthless example of the total ordering of humanity as standing-reserve has ever been constructed than that of the Nazi concentration camps. Here technology's limitless scope and capacity for summoning horror was made evident in the unbridled exploitation of and experimentation with human raw material, the literal using-up of human bodies and minds. In the Nazis' "final solution," technology, understood not as a neutral tool or technique but as an overpowering ontological condition, came most dangerously to the fore. Yet present-day genetic research, which bears out Heidegger's prediction of the artificial breeding of human material, is ultimately no less dangerous for all its humanistic appeal. And present-day politics generously pays its dues to the technological demon. The success of contemporary political candidates largely rests on their ability to promote themselves as efficient managers of the growth of the forces of production and consumption. Wars are won and lost because of this same proficiency, and in large part with the singular purpose of deciding which state is to control what share of the global market. Yet amidst intense and occasionally bloody competition, the significance of national boundaries actually diminishes as states become equally subject to the same technological forces. Heidegger concludes that the distinction between national and international is becoming increasingly untenable (EP 107).

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Heidegger did not support the Nazi movement, but used it as a pedestal for fame.

Rohkrämer, 05 – History and Philosophy professor at Lancaster University (Thomas, How Green Were the Nazis: Martin Heidegger, National Socialism, and Environmentalism, p. 171)

<Over the last decade, researchers have discovered all increasing amount of evidence for the important role that academic professions played in the Third Reich. Many experts did not wait to be approached by the Nazis, but saw the new regime as an opportunity to realize their own goals. A large majority were attracted to Nazism or viewed it from a pragmatic career perspective. They approached the new power-holders to push competitors to the side, to gain access to more financial support, and to use a ruthless regime to overcome any hindrance to their own professional goals.

Association with National Socialism was also widespread among philosophers. While twenty philosophy professors were forced out of their positions, about thirty joined the Nazi Party in 1933 and almost half became party members by 1940. Moreover, it was not only, as many have assumed, "life philosophers" or radical Nietzscheans who supported the Nazis; the rival schools of neo-Kantians or "value philosophers" also had adherents who made the same political decision for very different reasons. Hans Sluga rightly draws our attention to the fact that "Heidegger's action was not unique.... We discover that other philosophers were involved for a longer time; that others were involved more deeply; that, unlike Heidegger, others had worked on philosophical ideas during the Weimar period that clearly foreshadowed the new political ideology; and that others, unlike Heidegger, were willing after 1933 to adjust their philosophical thinking to political exigencies." The variety of often incompatible reasons, Sluga argues, "undermines the idea that there was a specific link between Heidegger particular philosophy and National Socialism." >

Heidegger's experience with Nazism led him to greater conclusions about the harms of the technological age and the height of liberalism . His later work criticized Nazi Germany and the identification of his goal being correct, but the method having been technological

Zizek '8 – Lady killing suave machine

("In defense of lost causes" p.117-121)//Collin

How, then, do things stand with Heidegger's engagement? Was it, in contrast to Foucault's, not just a mistake, but a mistake grounded in his philosophy? There is something profoundly symptomatic in the compulsion of many liberal-democratic critics of Heidegger to demonstrate that Heidegger's Nazi affiliation was not a mere temporary blunder, but in consonance with the very fundamentals of his thought" it is as if this consonance allows us to dismiss Heidegger as theoretically irrelevant and thus to avoid the effort to think with and through Heidegger, to confront the uneasy questions he raised against such basic tenets of modernity as "humanism," "democracy," "progress," etc. Once Heidegger disappears from the picture, we can safely carry on with our common concerns about the ethical problems opened up by biogenetics, about how to accommodate capitalist globalization within a meaningful communal life -in short, we can safely avoid confronting what is really new in globalization and biogenetic discoveries, and continue to measure these phenomena with old standards, in the wild hope of a synthesis that will allow us to keep the best of both worlds. But this, of course, in no way means that we should rehabilitate the standard defense of Heidegger's Nazi episode, which, unsurprisingly, follows yet again the borrowed-kettle formula: (1) Heidegger was never really a Nazi, he just made some superficial compromises in order to save whatever could have been saved for the autonomy of the university; when he realized that this tactic would not work, he consequently stepped down and withdrew from public life. (2) Heidegger was, for a limited period, a sincerely committed Nazi; however, not only did he withdraw once he become aware of his blunder, but the acquaintance with Nazi power precisely enabled him to gain an insight into the nihilism modern technology as the deployment of the unconditional will-to; power. (3) Heidegger was a Nazi, and there is nothing to reproach him with for this choice: in the early 1930s, it was a perfectly legitimate and understandable choice. This final position is Ernst Nolte's, and it is worth recalling here his book on Heidegger, which brought fresh wind to the sails of the endless debate on "Heidegger and politics" -far from excusing Heidegger's infamous political choice in 1933, it justifies it, at least, de-demonizes it, rendering it a viable and meaningful choice. Against the standard defenders of Heidegger whose mantra is that Heidegger's Nazi engagement was a personal mistake of no fundamental consequence for his thought, Nolte accepts the basic claim of Heidegger's critics that his Nazi choice is inscribed into his thought-but with a twist: instead of problematizing his thought, Nolte justifies his political choice as a justifiable option in the late 1920s and early 1930s, given the economic chaos and the threat of Communism: Insofar as Heidegger resisted the attempt at the [Communist] solution, he, like countless others, was historically right . . . In committing himself to the [National Socialist] solution perhaps he became a "fascist." But in no way did that make him historically wrong from the outset. And here is Mark Wrathall's model formulation of the second position: Heidegger's work after the war did go some way towards overcoming the political naivete that led to his disastrous involvement with National Socialism. He did this by, first, getting much clearer than he had been about the dangers of the modern world-the dangers which led him to think we need a new world disclosure. Once he was able to articulate the danger of modernity in terms of technology, it became clear that National Socialism was just another modern technological movement (even if it employed technology for reactionary goals). This passage tells much more than may appear at first glance-the key words in it are the innocuous "just another": is the underlying premise not "even the best of political projects, the most radical attempt to oppose nihilism, remained just another nihilistic movement caught in technology"? There is no horror of Nazism here. Nazism is "just another" in the series, the difference is ontologically insignificant (which is why, for Heidegger, the Allied victory in World War II really decided nothing). Here Heidegger's reference to Holderlin's famous lines enters: "where the danger is rising, that which can

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save us - das Rettende-also grows ...” - in order to overcome the danger, one has to push it to the extreme-in short, in order to arrive at the ontological truth, Heidegger had to err ontically. So when Wrathall writes apropos Heidegger's Nazi engagement: "It is disconcerting, to say the least, that Heidegger, who purported to have a unique insight into the movement of world history, proved to be so terribly blind to the significance of the events that played out before his eyes" a Heideggerian could easily turn this argument around: the "ontic" blindness to the truth of the Nazi regime was a positive condition of his "ontological" insight. However, when defenders of Heidegger claim that his acquaintance with the Nazi exercise of power precisely enabled him to gain an insight into the nihilism of modern technology as the deployment of the unconditional will-to-power, does this line of defense not sound a little bit like the attitude of the proverbial prostitute-turned-preacher who, after her conversion, ferociously attacks carnal sins, claiming that she knows from her own experience how destructive they are? Steve Fuller writes: Ironically, Heidegger's intellectual stature may even have been helped by the time-honored practice of "learning from the opponent" in which victors indulge after a war. In this respect, Heidegger's political "genius" may lie in having stuck with the Nazis long enough for the Americans to discover him during de-Nazification without ending up being judged an untouchable war criminal whose works had to be banned. As committed anti-Nazis ensconced in Allied countries, Heidegger's existentialist rivals never underwent such intense scrutiny nor subsequently acquired such a mystique for depth and danger. There is truth in these lines, but it is more complex than Heidegger's mere luck in striking the right balance in the depth of his Nazi engagement: the difficult truth to admit is that Heidegger is "great" not in spite of, but because of his Nazi engagement, that this commitment is a key constituent of his "greatness." Imagine a Heidegger without this passage, or a Heidegger who, after World War II, had done what many colleagues expected of him: namely, publicly renounce his Nazi engagement and apologize for it. Would this not somehow have occluded the radicality of his insight? Would it not have constrained him to humanitarian political concerns which he so bitterly despised? Miguel de Beistegui makes a perspicuous observation on the fundamental ambiguity of Heidegger's disillusionment with Nazism: it was his "resignation and his disillusionment with what, until the end of his life, and with a touch of regret at not having seen, develop its potential, he referred to as 'the movement'." Is, however this not the reason why Heidegger's later withdrawal from political commitment also cannot be conceived only in the terms of his insight into the nihilism of contemporary politics? De Beistegui concludes his book with the statement that Heidegger will not be caught out in a belief in the redemptive power of political engagement twice: having burned his fingers in politics, and lost his illusions in the failure of Nazism to carry out a project of onto-destinal significance, his hopes will turn to the hidden resources of thought, art and poetry, all deemed to carry a historical and destinal power far greater than that of politics. But is Heidegger's refusal to be caught twice in the act of political engagement and thus burning his fingers again not a negative mode of his continuing melancholic attachment to the Nazi "movement"? (His refusal to engage again in politics was thus similar to a disappointed lover who, after the failure of his relationship, rejects love as such and avoids all further relationships, thereby confirming in a negative way his lasting attachment to the failed relationship.) Is the premise of this refusal not that, to the end of his life, Nazism remained for Heidegger the only political commitment which at least tried to address the right problem, so that the failure of Nazism is the failure of the political as such? It never entered Heidegger's mind to propose-say, in a liberal mode-that the failure of the Nazi movement was merely the failure of a certain kind of engagement which conferred on the political the task of carrying out project of onto-destinal significance," so that the lesson to draw was simply a more modest political engagement. In other words, what if one concludes from the failure of Heidegger's political experience that what one should renounce is the expectation that a political engagement will have destinal ontological consequences and that one should participate in "merely ontic" politics which, far from obfuscating the need for a deeper ontological reflection, precisely open up a space for it? What if even the very last Heidegger, when he expressed his doubts as to whether democracy was the political order which best fitted the essence of modern technology, had still not learnt the ultimate lesson of his Nazi period, since he continued to cling to the hope of finding an (ontic) political engagement which would fit (be at the level of) the ontological project of modern technology? (Our premise, of course, is that the liberal engagement is not the only alternative: Heidegger was right in his doubt about liberal democracy; what he refused to consider was a radical leftist engagement.)

AT: Heidegger = Nazi – Reappropriation

Heidegger's Nazism was a wrong step in the right direction rooted in his thought, our task is to repeat Heidegger and to retake the right steps, in the right direction

Zizek '8 – Lady killing suave machine

("In defense of lost causes" p.139-140)//Collin//jrc

To return to Heidegger, in his Nazi engagement, he was not "totally wrong" -the tragedy is that he was almost right, deploying the structure of a revolutionary act and then distorting it by giving it a fascist twist. Heidegger was closest to truth precisely where he erred most, in his writings from the late 1920s to the mid-1930s. Our task thus is to repeat Heidegger and retrieve this lost dimension/potential of his thought. In 1937-38, Heidegger wrote: What is conservative remains bogged down in the historiographical; only what is revolutionary attains the depth of history. Revolution does not mean here mere subversion and destruction but an upheaval and recreating of the customary so that the beginning might be restructured. And because the original belongs to the beginning, the restructuring of the beginning is never the poor imitation of what was earlier; it is entirely other and nevertheless the same.⁷¹ In itself, is this not a wholly pertinent description of the revolution along Benjaminian lines? Recall the example provided by Walter Benjamin: the October Revolution repeated the French Revolution, redeeming its failure, unearthing and repeating the same impulse. Already for Kierkegaard, repetition is "inverted memory," a movement forward, the production of the New, and not the reproduction of the Old. "There is nothing new under the sun" is the strongest contrast to the movement of repetition. So, it is not only that repetition is (one of the modes of) the emergence of the New can only emerge through repetition. The key to this paradox is, of course, what Deleuze designates as the difference between the virtual and the actual (and which-why not? -one can also determine as the difference between the Spirit and the Letter). Let us take a great philosopher such as Kant-there are two modes of repeating him: either one sticks to the letter and further elaborates or changes his system, in the spirit of the neo-Kantians (up to and including Habermas and Luc Ferry); or, one tries to regain the creative impulse that Kant himself betrayed in the actualization of his system (that is, to connect to what was already "in Kant more than Kant himself," more than his explicit system, its excessive core). There are, accordingly, two modes of betraying the past. The true betrayal is an ethico-theoretical act of the highest fidelity: one has to betray the letter of Kant in order to remain faithful to (and repeat) the "spirit" of his thought. It is precisely when one remains faithful to the letter of Kant that one really betrays the core of his thought, the creative impulse underlying it. One should bring this paradox to its conclusion: it is not only that one can remain really faithful to an author by way of betraying him (the actual letter of his thought); at a more radical level, the inverse statement holds even more-one can only truly betray an author by way of repeating him, by remaining faithful to the core of his thought. If one does not repeat an author (in the authentic Kierkegaardian sense of the term), but merely "criticizes" him, moves elsewhere, turns him around, and so forth, this effectively means that one unknowingly remains within his horizon, his conceptual field. ⁷² When G.K. Chesterton describes his conversion to Christianity, he claims that he "tried to be some ten minutes in advance of the truth. And I found that I was eighteen years behind it. „⁷³ Does the same not hold even more for those who, today, desperately try to catch up with the New by way of following the latest "post-" fashion, and are thus condemned to remain forever eighteen years behind the truly New?

AT: Heidegger = Nazi – Embrace Violent Passage

Only fidelity to the violent *passage* that led Heidegger to Nazism can challenge existing ontological order- We must see Hitler as a racist act, rather than a revolutionary one—still having remained ontic in nature, which the aff solves for

Zizek '8 – Lady killing suave machine

("In defense of lost causes" p.148-153)//Collin //jrc

As such, the Creator is "hupsipolus apolis" (Antigone, line 370): he stands outside and above polis and its ethos, he is unbound by any rules of "morality" (which are only a degenerative form of ethos; only as such can he ground a new form of ethos, of communal Being in a polis ... of course, what reverberates here is the topic of an "illegal" violence that founds the rule of the law itself, deployed at the same time in different forms by Walter Benjamin and Carl Schmitt.⁹⁶ What accounts for the chilling character of these passages is that, here, Heidegger does not merely provide a new variation on his standard rhetorical figure of inversion of The essence of violence has nothing to do with ontic violence, suffering, war, destruction, etc.; the essence of violence resides in the violent character of the very imposition/founding of the new mode of the Essence-disclosure of communal Being-itself"); here, Heidegger (implicitly, but clearly) reads this essential violence as something that grounds-or, at least, opens up the space for-the explosions of ontic violence themselves ... Liberal critics of Heidegger like to dwell on these lines, emphasizing how, in suspending even minimal moral criteria, Heidegger legitimizes the most brutal "ontic" violence of the statesman-creator, and thus paves the way for his own Nazi engagement and support for Hitler as such a statesman-creator who, standing outside and above the communal space of the moribund Weimar Republic, fearlessly shattered its coordinates and thus violently grounded a new communal Being, that of the Germany reawakened in the National Socialist revolution ... However, what one is tempted to add here is that, in the case of Nazism (and fascism in general), the constellation of violence is rather the opposite: crazy, tasteless even, as it may sound, the problem with Hitler was that he was not violent enough, that his violence was not "essential" enough. Nazism was not radical enough, it did not dare to disturb the basic structure of the modern capitalist social space (which is why it had to focus on destroying an invented external enemy, Jews) This is why one should oppose the fascination with Hitler which claims that, of course, he was an evil man, responsible for the death of millions – but that he definitely had courage, that he pursued what he wanted with an iron will ... The point is that this is not only ethically repulsive, but simply wrong: no, Hitler did not "have the courage" to really change things; he did not really act, all his actions were fundamentally reactions, that is, he acted so that nothing would really change, he staged a great spectacle of Revolution so that the capitalist order could survive. If one really wants to come up with an act which was truly daring, for which one truly had to "have the courage" to try the impossible, but which was simultaneously a horrific act, an act which caused suffering beyond comprehension, one could nominate Stalin's forced collectivization at the end of 1920s in the Soviet Union -but even here, the same reproach holds: the paradox of the 1928 "Stalinist revolution" was rather that, in all its brutal radicality, it was not radical enough in effectively transforming the social substance. Its brutal destructiveness has to be read as an impotent' passage a l'acte. Far from simply standing for a total forcing of the unnamable Real on behalf of the Truth, Stalinist "totalitarianism" rather designates the attitude of absolutely ruthless "pragmatism," of manipulating and sacrificing all "principles" on behalf of maintaining power. From this perspective, the irony of Hitler was that his grand gestures of despising bourgeois self-complacency and so on were ultimately in the service of enabling this complacency to continue: far from effectively disturbing the much disparaged "decadent" bourgeois order, far from awakening the Germans from immersion in its degeneracy, Nazism was a dream which enabled them to continue wallowing in it and to postpone an awakening – Germany really awakened only in the defeat of 1945. The worry that Badiou's notion of "courage" (which one needs in order to practice the fidelity to the Event) raises in liberal minds is: but how are we to distinguish "good" (properly eventual) courage from "bad" courage say, were the Nazis who defended Berlin in the winter of 1944-45 or the Muslim terrorists who blow themselves up when they perform suicidal attacks also not truly courageous? One should nonetheless insist that there is no "bad courage": bad courage is always a form of cowardice. The "courage" of the Nazis was sustained by their cowardice concerning attacking the key feature of their society, the capitalist relations of production; the "courage" of the terrorists relies on the "big Other" whose instruments they perceive themselves to be. The true courage of an act is always the courage to accept the inexistence of the big Other, that is, to attack the existing order at the point of its symptomal knot. Back once more to Heidegger: what this means is that Hitler's violence, even at its most terrifying (the murder of millions of Jews), was all too "ontic," that is, it too was an impotent passage a l'acte that revealed the inability of the Nazi movement to be really "apolis," to question-confront-shatter the basic coordinates of bourgeois communal being. And what if Heidegger's own Nazi engagement is also to be read as a passage a l'acte: a violent outburst that bears witness to Heidegger's inability to resolve the theoretical deadlock he found himself in? The question of how Heidegger's Nazi commitment as it relates to his philosophy should thus be recast: it is no longer a question of adequatio (correspondence) between Heidegger's thought and his political acts, but of an inherent theoretical deadlock (which, in itself, has nothing to do with Nazism), and the violent passage as the only way of escaping it. This is how one should also reframe the old dilemma, which was in the beginning the Word or the Act? Logically, it all began with the Word; the Act that followed was a flailing outburst that bore witness to the deadlock of the Word. And the same goes for the Act par excellence, the divine act of Creation: it also signals the impasse of God's ratiocinations. In short, here too, the negative aspect of ontological proof holds: the fact that God created the world does not display His omnipotence and excess of goodness, but rather His debilitating limitations.

AT: Heidegger Legitimizes the Holocaust

Heidegger attributed concentration camps to the loss of being, stemming from the technological separation of humans from being
Athanasios 3 [Athena Athanasiou, Professor of social anthropology at the University of Thessaly, "Technologies of Humanness, Aporias of Biopolitics, and the Cut Body of Humanity," *Differences: Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies*, 14.1, p.125-162, Muse] JRC

Metaphors of animality as morbidity played a central role in the construction and representation of the Jew as Other in late-nineteenth-century Europe. Suffice it to consider the Nazi tropes of Jews as mice, icons of contamination, or as lice, icons of parasitic living—both connoting, in popular imagination, unbridled proliferation. Hitler used the metaphor of "lice" to dehumanize Jews—not just *any* figure of non-human animal, but that of lice, the insect-figure of the abject: insidious, faceless, imperceptible, inappropriate(d), almost unnoticeable but all-pervading. The lice-figure also maintains a special connection to the "hosting" body by virtue of its vampiric quality of living parasitically on other bodies and sucking their blood, indeed a figuration of living death that served as a crucial trope for the nineteenth- and twentieth-century association of Jews and vampirism that, as Sander Gilman reminds us, attained its literary culmination in Friedrich Wilhelm Murnau's *Nosferatu* in 1922 (138). The Nazi concentration camp as such remains in the penumbra of Heidegger's text; it emerges only as a mere instance of modern technodystopia, as one more representation of the loss of the human, rather than as the biopolitical nomos of modern Western humanistic logos.

But is it not impossible to pose the question concerning modern technology without also posing the question concerning biopolitical technology in modernity, or the biopolitical turn of modern technology? By virtue of the very iterability of the sign of annihilation, Heidegger inadvertently addresses the Nazi extermination as an "emplacement" of factual life and death, a biopolitical and thanatopolitical technology that seeks to put humans and non-humans in their proper place—allowed to live or put to death. [16](#)
Heidegger's emphasis on "facticity" denotes precisely the "thrownness" of the material being-there-and-then that is proper to Dasein; the aprioricity, the "alreadiness" of Being's bodily advent and appropriation to the primal "fact" of language. Implying what in Being is [End Page 139] both already given and brought to experience and thought, "facticity" is the "destiny" of Being in a world inhabited by beings that are involved with and revealed—albeit in a veiled way—to "Dasein" (openness-for-Being). Self-presence and self-inquiry are bound together in Dasein's essential facticity. In *Being and Time*, facticity implies Dasein's understanding of its existence as present at hand, as a fact; it implies that "an entity 'within the world' has Being-in-the-world in such a way that it can understand itself as bound up in its 'destiny' with the Being of those entities which it encounters within its own world" (82). Being a questioner in the modern *Technik* is a destiny of facticity.

AT: Heidegger Legitimizes the Holocaust

Heidegger claimed that technological thought and standing reserve were responsible for the devalue of life in the death camps
Athanasios 3 [Athena Athanasiou, Professor of social anthropology at the University of Thessaly, "Technologies of Humanness, Aporias of Biopolitics, and the Cut Body of Humanity," *Differences: Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies*, 14.1, p.125-162, Muse]

In tracing the affinity of Heideggerian ontology with Nazism, Agamben suggests that Heidegger's involvement with National Socialism be read through the prism of his understanding of "life" as an actual determination and essential experience and task (*Aufgabe*) of facticity. Following Levinas ("Reflections"), he traces the analogies between this ontology of life's indistinguishability from its actual situation and the philosophy of Hitlerism. Indeed, in Heideggerian ontology, human life is always already politics; life and politics form an immediate and indissoluble unity (taking politics in a very broad sense: more as a bodily exposure to a certain materiality of human historicity and sociality than a reflective engagement in processes of accountable appropriation and disappropriation). Science and knowledge belong to the life of the polis. For Heidegger, the "purest form of thinking" is "the highest doing," according to the ancient Greek experience of *bios theoretikos*, where *bios* receives its determination from *theoria*, the "consummate form of human existence" ("Question" 164). Human essence always already contains immediately the force that constitutes "man" as Dasein, as a political and historical Being-there but also Being-open, emplaced in and enframed by the polis, taking into consideration that the camp—or the camp's exclusion from the polis—is also included in the polis; it is, indeed, a constitutive part of the political sphere. As Agamben puts it: *For both Heidegger and National Socialism, life has no need to assume "values" external to it in order to become politics: life is immediately political in its very facticity. Man is not a living being who must abolish or transcend himself in order to become human—man is not a duality of spirit and body, nature and politics, life and logos, but is instead resolutely situated at the point of their indistinction.* (*Homo Sacer* 153, *original emphasis*) [17](#) [End Page 140] The camp makes its appearance in Heidegger's philosophical text as the "hidden paradigm" of modern technology, echoing Agamben's words: "[T]he camp—as the pure, absolute, and impassable biopolitical space (insofar as it is founded solely on the state of exception)—will appear as the hidden paradigm of the political space of modernity, whose metamorphoses and disguises we will have to learn to recognize" (*Homo Sacer* 123). The representational use to which Heidegger's text subjects the "production of corpses" bespeaks a textual coming to light of the body as incarcerated and slain à propos of modern technology. The textual subjection of disintegrated corporeality takes form in the figure of the *soma* of the Shoah, the body that is entirely exhausted in perished bare life, "life that is unworthy of being lived." And all this despite the fact that, as Nancy reminds us, Heidegger considers the body as "extraneous to his project" (qtd. in Nancy 232). It is through the prism of Heidegger's technological "production of corpses" that we should then read Nancy's disclaimer: "There has never been any body in philosophy" (20).

AT: Framework (Standing Reserve)

Their framework arguments serve as another justification for their belief that reality is an object for human control, reducing all thinking to a technological level and ensuring the “standing reserve” mentality

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Who accomplishes the challenging setting upon through which what we call the real is revealed as standing-reserve? Obviously, man. To what extent is man capable of such a revealing? Man can, indeed, conceive, fashion, and carry through this or that in one way or another ... but man does not have control over unconcealment itself, in which at any given time the real shows itself or withdraws ... the unconcealment itself, within which ordering unfolds, is never a human handiwork, anymore than is the realm man traverses every time he as a subject relates to an object. (QT, 18)

Here Heidegger asserts that the idea that the mark of the human is the rational ordering and controlling of reality is itself not something that anyone or any group has consciously chosen. The ideas that reality is an object for human control and technology merely a human instrument are themselves examples of the technological thinking that dominates the modern age. Although we do decide whether any given representation of reality is true or false, or how any particular thing is to be used, which representations come up as candidates for truth or falsity, which questions are taken seriously, and the very fact that beings are revealed as things for use, are not themselves up for choice.⁹ The background against which objects appear is neither wholly graspable nor intentionally constituted. It is, instead, a forgotten horizon of historically transmitted practices and beliefs that we take for granted.

In the *Discourse on Thinking* Heidegger addresses this unchosen, autonomous feature of technology when he says: “Whenever we plan, research, and organize, we always reckon with conditions that are given.” In “The Question Concerning Technology” he uses the term “enframing” (*Gestell*) to describe the essence of modern technology; it is “the way in which the real reveals itself as standing reserve” (QT, 2, 3). Moreover, “enframing” represents a “destining” of revealing insofar as it “pushes” us in a certain direction. Heidegger does not regard destining as determination (he says it is not a “fate which compels”), but rather as the implicit project within the field of modern practices to subject all aspects of reality to the principles of order and efficiency, and to pursue reality down to the finest detail. Thus, insofar as modern technology aims to order and render calculable, the objectification of reality tends to take the form of an increasing classification, differentiation, and fragmentation of reality. The possibilities for how things appear are increasingly reduced to those that enhance calculative activities.

Heidegger perceives the real danger in the modern age to be that human beings will continue to regard technology as a mere instrument and fail to inquire into its essence. He fears that all revealing will become calculative and all relations technical, that the unthought horizon of revealing, namely the “concealed” background practices that make technological thinking possible, will be forgotten. He remarks:

The coming to presence of technology threatens revealing, threatens it with the possibility that all revealing will be consumed in ordering and that everything will present itself only in the unconcealedness of standing-reserve. (QT, 33)¹⁰

Therefore, it is not technology, or science, but rather the essence of technology as a way of revealing that constitutes the danger: for the essence of technology is existential, not technological.¹¹ It is a matter of how human beings are fundamentally oriented toward their world vis a vis their practices, skills, habits, customs, and so forth. Humanism contributes to this danger insofar as it fosters the illusion that technology is the result of a collective human choice and therefore subject to human control.¹²

AT: Heidegger = Nihilist

Heidegger's concept of releasement serves as an escape from nihilism – the notion of ontological difference leads to other possibilities of self understanding and hence an escape from calculative thought

Sawicki, 2003- Ph.D. Columbia University, Professor of Philosophy and Women's Studies, Chair of Women's And Gender Studies, Williams College (Jana, "Foucault and Heidegger Critical Encounters", *Heidegger and Foucault: Escaping Technological Nihilism*, University of Minnesota Press Minneapolis London, Questia, REQ)

"Where danger is, grows/The saving power also." Thus Heidegger enigmatically indicates there is hope that all thinking in the modern age will not be reduced to technological thinking, or human beings reduced to "standing reserve." Heidegger bases his hope on two ways of responding to modern technology. First, he calls for "releasement toward things" (*Gelassenheit*). "Releasement" connotes a serene disposition toward the real, a suspension of calculative thinking that enables one to direct attention to the concealed background of practices that ground the modern way of revealing, and that have significance that is neither recognized nor realized in the present. It issues in the cultivation of an egolessness, a sense of both the richness and the limits of the project to master nature that reigns in modern science. Finally, releasement involves a "meditative thinking" that does not counsel direct intervention, but rather, having directed attention to the concealed ground of the technological way of revealing, waits for the emergence of an alternative to the prevailing configurations of practices that compose modern technology. In other words, if the essence of modern technology is not technological but existential, that is, a matter of how human beings in their social practices are primarily oriented to their world (e.g., as knowing subjects), then, if the technological way of revealing is understood as merely one way of taking up a range of possibilities that are themselves not chosen but received, they may hope that by slowing down and reflecting on the process of calculative thinking, they will prepare the way for the emergence of other possible relationships to Being (QT, 33). Hence, attaining this new self-understanding requires a historical thinking that frees us from the sense that our current practices are necessary and opens up new ways of understanding, new ways of living.

Heidegger also responds to the danger of technology by reviving the premodern understanding of technology as craft or art (*techne*). His reference to the Greek definition of *techne* as a form of *poiesis* (bringing forth) may be interpreted in several ways. An interpretation that links his method to Foucault's would suggest that Heidegger refers to premodern technology simply to highlight and circumscribe modern technology and thereby release us from its grasp. But there is also a basis in Heidegger's writings for interpreting the revival of *techne* as a call for us to supplement and enrich modern technological ways of revealing with those of an artful praxis that is both technical and contemplative. As Don Ihde has pointed out, artistic technologies reveal objects without reducing them to serviceability. They defamiliarize the real and utilize imagination to proliferate the possibilities for how things can appear.¹⁹ Hubert Dreyfus offers an interesting variation on the above interpretations in order to rescue Heidegger from nihilism. He calls it Heidegger's "religious form of resistance to nihilism." 20 Dreyfus claims that the later Heidegger appeals to the remnants of a premodern understanding of Being that persist in the concealed and inarticulable background of practices in the modern age. He states: Nontechnological micro-practices, if they still exist at all, are hard to discern, not because they are so pervasive as to be ineffable, or so numinous as to be unreachable—they were once palpably present in cultural exemplars such as the Greek Temple—but because they are dispersed by the objectifying practices which have had such success since the Enlightenment.²¹ According to Dreyfus, the fact that we resist modern technology at all can be explained only if we assume that such remnants persist. What makes this appeal religious is the fact that all we can do is "hope that the micro-practices excluded by technology will find a new focus in a new paradigm." 22 This paradigm (the postmodern equivalent of the Greek temple) presumably will be grounded in some authentic view of humanity, i.e., something "specific that we are."²³

Although there is much in Dreyfus's rather forced reading of Heidegger with which I agree, I have strong reservations about this account of Heidegger's hope. First, it opens him (and Heidegger) to the charge of romanticism. What is the basis for the claim that premodern technology is ontologically distinct from modern technology? That our hopes lie only in the premodern practices of contemporary Western society?²⁴ It is noteworthy that Heidegger himself never addressed the present in such a way as to make a case for the persistence in our background practices of a premodern way of revealing. Indeed, some Heidegger scholars would rejoice at this lacuna in his corpus since it could be interpreted as promoting the sort of humanism and subjectivism that Heidegger rejects. Heidegger repeatedly emphasized our inability to will the appearance of a new epoch of Being and regarded combative efforts to resist technology as just further examples of it.

Dreyfus makes much of Heidegger's reference in "The Question Concerning Technology" to the saving power in "little things." "Little things" may indeed refer to ways of thinking and doing that are not technological. Yet, I find no basis for the interpretation of these ways of thinking and doing as more authentically human. When Heidegger invokes authenticity, he usually is referring to our role as questioners of Being. What makes us human appears to be nothing more specific than being the kinds of beings who put Being into question. Over and above this, we are the practices that constitute us and our world. Heidegger questions technology to achieve a clearer understanding of what we are doing, to focus our practices in a different way. If more people were to question and to live with their questions, technological thinking might be slowed down and the saving power fostered. Thus the aims of Heidegger's critical project are rather modest—more modest than even Dreyfus's interpretation suggests.

Left without an appeal to anything specific that we are, does Heidegger succumb to nihilism? I think not. Charging Heidegger with nihilism begs the question; for, after all, he is attempting to dissolve the problem of nihilism altogether. (He is also trying to reveal the danger of nihilism that is harbored in our current situation.) It is Heidegger's contention that the Cartesian search for an absolute foundation in the subject of knowledge is itself at the root of the relentless quest for certainty and for mastery that characterizes modernity and culminates in a nihilism in which all of our options increasingly become technological and all of our values instrumental. Heidegger's notion of the "ontological difference," i.e., the difference between the clearing and what shows up in it, guarantees his escaping nihilism, for it guarantees that there are other possibilities for self-understanding (and for understanding nature) to be attained through meditative thinking.

The fact is that we cannot master Being, nor can we know in advance which relationships to Being are salvific. Understanding this does not lead to nihilism, but rather to the commitment to cease the project of mastering Being and experiment with alternative modes of questioning, knowing, and living that are made possible through the disposition of releasement.

AT: Free Market Environmentalism

Free Market environmentalism fails – it caters to the interests of certain groups.

DeLuca 5 – Associate Professor of Speech Communication and adjunct in the Institute of Ecology at the University of Georgia – [Kevin Michael DeLuca, Ethics & the Environment, "Thinking with Heidegger: Rethinking Environmental Theory and Practice," Issue 10.1, p 67-87, Muse]

<<Environmentalism is tired. It is a movement both institutionalized and insipid. The vast majority of Americans claim to be environmentalists while buying ever more SUVs, leaf-blowers, and uncountable plastic consumer goods. Indeed, environmentalism itself has become just another practice of consumerism, a matter of buying Audubon memberships, Ansel Adams calendars, and 'biodegradable' plastic bags with one's Sierra Club credit card. As a practice of everyday life, environmentalism has devolved into another lifestyle choice.

On the political front, carbon-copy blow-dried presidential candidates proclaim their allegiance to the environment, an allegiance that is more a sign of fealty to opinion polls than a concern with environmental issues. In the world of real-politic, environmental regulations are gutted as corporations write legislation for the politicians they have bought. Outspent and outmaneuvered, mainstream environmental groups preach at the altar of broken promises about the potential of lobbying and insider access while awaiting the blandishments of the next candidate. As [End Page 67] a political practice, mainstream environmentalism has degenerated into a marginal special-interest group.>>

AT: Heidegger likes Renewables

The way we treat the earth defines who we are: mastery and respect for earth are distinct.

Thiele 95 – Professor of Political Science at University of Florida (Leslie Paul, *Timely Meditations*, p. 184)

Despite such caveats, Heidegger's ecological credentials can be supported on a number of grounds. Our sense of self, always in part philosophically derived, impinges on our political, social, and cultural lives. The way we act in the world depends on who we think we are - that is, on how and what we think (of) ourselves. To define human being as care, while not stipulating any particular ethical or environmental attitude or comportment, indicates that human being is not to be defined by its possessive mastery of the world. "It is one thing just to use the earth." Heidegger writes, "another to receive the blessing of the earth and to become at home in the law of this reception in order to shepherd the mystery of Being and watch over the inviolability of the possible."

AT: We can live correctly though renewable energy

Alternative energy engages in the same tenants of the technological age that perpetuate the harms- a reexamination of the age is imperative to prevent technology as a solution

Thiele 95 – Professor of Political Science at University of Florida (Leslie Paul, Timely Meditations, p.194, JRC)

Heidegger denies that insight into the nature of technology lies implicit in our ability to build and maintain machines. Technical knowledge—know-how about machines and techniques—does not constitute an understanding of the essence of technology. Essentially, technology is not even about machines, complex techniques, or the fabrication of artifacts. These are indeed the products of a technologically oriented world, but they are not the foundation of that world. As Heidegger neatly formulates the issue: "Our age is not a technological age because it is the age of the machine; it is an age of the machine because it is the technological age" (WCT 24). He pursues this point, saying that "the essence of technology is by no means anything technological" (QT 4). Unwrapping this perplexing statement will bring us to an understanding of the threat, and promise, of technology.

AT: Defense of Science/Truth Claims

Focus on science for truth undermines the actual truth that involves nature. This occurs because of the human desire of security.

Rohkrämer, 05 – History and Philosophy professor at Lancaster University (Thomas, How Green Were the Nazis: Martin Heidegger, National Socialism, and Environmentalism, p. 184)

The metaphysical essence of modernity, Heidegger argued, was scientific and mechanical thought. While art was sidelined into aesthetic, that is, to personal taste and pleasure, and religion to a private attitude without relevance to the public sphere, a new form of science and technology had come to determine the realm of the real. Modern man approaches reality with the assumption that it can be understood in mathematical and mechanical ways, with the corollary being that only those phenomena which can be explained mathematically and mechanically are accepted as real. The experiment determines reality, and a successful experiment is potentially a technical application.

Why did this modern world picture emerge? It is, Heidegger argued, motivated by the search for security. Reality is understood in a way that implies certainty. This was already the case with metaphysical or theological systems of thought, ranging from Plato's ideas to dogmatic Catholicism, which abandoned the being-exposed to the mystery of existence for the security of a firm belief. Modern science, however, is seen to go further. It puts humans at the center of the world; they now define what should be regarded as truth. Instead of realizing that science operates out of one of many possible truth-disclosing horizons, the modern age believes that science is the only producer of truth. With Heidegger's concept of truth horizons, this claim of science to universality is, however, undermined. While scientific discoveries are right as they grasp some aspects of truth, they cease to be true if they take their own partial truth as the whole truth. The inexhaustibly multifaceted nature of reality is marginalized, repressed, or ignored in order to gain a sense of security and control.

Modernism through modern science and technology makes nature into a standing reserve and makes environmental collapse inevitable.

Rohkrämer, 05 – History and Philosophy professor at Lancaster University (Thomas, How Green Were the Nazis: Martin Heidegger, National Socialism, and Environmentalism, p. 188)

Most environmentalists and conservationists past and present would be primarily concerned about the ecological and aesthetic impact of the power station on the surrounding landscape, but for Heidegger the main problem was, as the comment on the tourist industry shows, the lack of respect and arrogance implicit in such a usage. Nature, he argues, is challenged to provide what humans demand, it is regarded as *Bestand*, that is, as a "standing-reserve" or "raw material." Whether nature is material for energy or aesthetic pleasure or any other usage is ultimately irrelevant for Heidegger, as the frame of mind is decisive.

As explained earlier, Heidegger rejected the idea that *homo faber* can be or should be in the driver's seat. Not only does he become degraded into being seen as just another standing reserve, or "human resource," he also does not choose his own technical attitude. "When man, investigating, observing, pursues nature as an area of his own conceiving, he has already been claimed by a way of revealing that challenges him to approach nature as an object of research, until even the object disappears into the objectlessness of standing-reserve" (QCT, 300). This whole constellation of scientific, and technological perspectives of humans on their environment Heidegger named *Gestell*, which is usually translated as "enframing." The fact that in modernity humans reveal the world as standing reserve is not something chosen, but destined. Modern science and technology are expressions of this essential horizon of truth, a purely instrumental perspective on reality.

AT: Humanism Good

Humanism destroys the inherent value of all things and makes them tools of human exploitation.

Rohkrämer, 05 – History and Philosophy professor at Lancaster University (Thomas, How Green Were the Nazis: Martin Heidegger, National Socialism, and Environmentalism, p. 184-5)

The way of thinking by which humans put themselves in the center, define reality according to their own standards, and reduce phenomenon, to their usefulness, Heidegger named "humanism" in 1947. He came to regard this attitude as the key reason for the nihilistic crisis of modernity. Earlier perceptions of reality, he argued, accepted to a greater extent that we are thrown into a world view which is not of our own making: a historical tradition and a language which largely determine our perspective on the world. He also believed that earlier perceptions had a stronger sense that every horizon of truth makes clear some aspects of the world, but simultaneously conceals others, so that the world as a whole and everything within it must always remain, in large part, a mystery. The pre-Socratic philosophers came to embody his ideal, as they, in his judgment, were still openly facing and reflecting on the mysteries of Being. Since then humanism had gradually expanded its powers, until Descartes even came to see the human mind as the very center of all existence. Heidegger not only regarded the Cartesian idea of an autonomous subject as naive, because it ignored that subjects only emerge within a language community which largely shapes all its members (which made him a central initiator of the so-called linguistic turn), he even regarded this attitude as positively dangerous: if the world and everything within it are seen only in relationship to an autonomous subject, then these objects tend to be regarded mainly as a resource for the subject's will to power. In this way, Heidegger came to regard Nazism as an extreme form of humanism—but, equally so, all other modern societies. Heidegger regarded the political differences between democratic, socialist, and Fascist states as surface phenomena; essentially they were the same, as they were all based on modern science and its powerful twin, modern technology.

AT: Heg Good

US heg and the alternative are not mutually exclusive

Mitchell 5 [Andrew J. Mitchell, Post-Doctoral Fellow in the Humanities at Stanford University, "Heidegger and Terrorism," Research in Phenomenology, Volume 35, Number 1, 2005 , pp. 181-218]

In order to do so, I will address the role of America in Heidegger's work, for it is in "America" that politics and technology are driven the furthest toward interdependency. "Americanism" names the project of technological domination and the will to world homogenization. This is not a reason to dismiss Heidegger as "anti-American," however, regardless of how strong the grounds for such an assessment might appear.

If we hold Heidegger to his own insights, then even he would have to admit that there remains a crucial role for America in the face of "Americanism," a role which itself might constitute an American "privilege" for the thinking of our times (and thus, perhaps, for the thinking of beyng today). The logic of this privilege in the midst of extreme denigration is perhaps the most important point for a proper understanding of Heidegger's views on technology. In the pages that follow, an attempt is made to pose the question of this privilege in' regard to both technology and the land of America.

AT: Util Good – Species Extinction

Environmental utilitarianism causes species extinction

Weber 93 [Darren Weber, post-doctoral fellow at UCSF, Environmental Ethics and Species "To be or not to be?" November 1993
http://dnl.ucsf.edu/users/dweber/essays/env_tp2.pdf] // LDK/JRC--no change

A problem with utilitarian ethics is that the principle of the greatest good for the greatest number could entail that some species are disadvantaged or actively exterminated. Firstly, the utilitarian calculus of the greatest good for the greatest number is very difficult when it is restricted to humanity. The present satisfaction of a portion of humanity, let alone all of humanity, is very difficult to evaluate and the different degrees of satisfaction to be had by various people from various sources of satisfaction is very difficult to predict, so the determination of the greatest good for the greatest number after the distribution of limited resources is very, very difficult to evaluate. As applied to all sentient species, it is virtually impossible to evaluate, since it is very difficult to know the feelings of sentient animals other than people. Secondly, utilitarianism can lead to significant inequalities in the distribution of limited resources. For example, among a group of people with 50 units of satisfaction there could be a small group with about 80 units of satisfaction and another larger group with about 40 units of satisfaction, since the small group have exclusive control of some equipment. According to utilitarianism, another 10 units of satisfaction should be distributed to the small group when it can use its equipment to transform 10 units of simple satisfaction into 20 units of added value satisfaction. Assuming that it is possible to know the feelings of sentient animals, a sentient species (e.g., a predator) that inflicts pain on another sentient species should be disadvantaged or extinguished when the satisfaction of that species is less than the satisfaction of the species that suffer pain. Thus, although the utilitarian principle may apply to all sentient species, the difficulties of utilitarianism are insurmountable or the inequalities implied by utilitarianism are likely to promote the extinction of species.

AT: Deep-Ecology/Nature-Human dichotomy

There is no nature any longer, humanist interventions into the geosphere have barred nature from ideological progress, ceasing intervention into ecology now would be the worst thing to do.

Zizek '8 – Lady killing suave machine

("In defense of lost causes" p.442)//Collin//JRC

Along these lines, "terror" means accepting the fact of the utter groundlessness of our existence: there is no firm foundation, place of retreat, on which one can safely count. It means fully accepting that "nature does not exist," in other words, fully consummating the gap that separates the life-world notion of nature and the scientific notion of natural reality: "nature" qua the domain of balanced reproduction, of organic deployment into which humanity intervenes with its hubris, brutally throwing its circular motion off the rails, is man's fantasy: nature is already in itself "second nature," its balance is always secondary, an attempt to bring into existence a "habit" that would restore some order after catastrophic interruptions. The lesson to be fully endorsed is thus that of an environmental scientist who comes to the conclusion that, while one cannot be sure what the ultimate result of humanity's interventions in the geosphere will be, one thing is sure: if humanity were to abruptly stop its immense industrial activity and let nature on Earth take its balanced course, the result would be a total breakdown, an unimaginable catastrophe. "Nature" on Earth is already so "adapted" to human interventions, human "pollution" is already so completely included in the shaky and fragile balance of "natural" reproduction on Earth, that its cessation would cause a catastrophic imbalance. This is what it means to say that humanity has nowhere to retreat to: not only is there no "big Other" (self-contained symbolic order as the ultimate guarantee of Meaning); there is also no Nature qua balanced order of self-reproduction whose homeostasis is disturbed, nudged off course, by unbalanced human interventions. Not only is the big Other "barred," but Nature too is barred. One should thus become aware not only of the limitation of the ideology of progress, but also of the limitation of the Benjaminian notion of the revolution as applying the emergency brake on the runaway train of progress: it is too late for that too.

AFF: Heidegger Likes Tech

Heidegger does not reject technology and he is not ecologically minded

Dreyfus, 93 – Professor of Philosophy at the University of California at Berkeley

(Charles B., “Heidegger on the connection between nihilism, art, technology, and politics” – chapter of “The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger,” ed. By Charles B. Guignon, p. 303)JRC

In order to combat modern nihilism Heidegger attempts to point out to us the peculiar and dangerous aspects of our technological understanding of being. But Heidegger does not oppose technology. In “The Question Concerning Technology” he hopes to reveal the essence of technology in a way that “in no way confines us to a stultified compulsion to push on blindly with technology or, what comes to the same thing, to rebel helplessly against it.” Instead, he promises that “when we once open ourselves expressly to the essence of technology, we find ourselves unexpectedly taken into a freeing claim” (QCT 25-6; VA 33).

We will need to explain opening, essence and freeing before we can understand Heidegger here. But already Heidegger’s project should alert us to the fact that he is not announcing one more reactionary rebellion against technology, although many take him to be doing just that. Nor is he doing what progressive thinkers would like to do: proposing a way to get technology under control that that it can serve our rationally chosen ends. The difficulty in locating just where Heidegger stands on technology is no accident. Heidegger has not always been clear about what distinguishes his approach from a romantic reaction to the domination of nature, and when he does finally arrive at a clear formulation of his original view, it is so strange that in order to understand it we are tempted to translate it into conventional platitudes. Thus, Heidegger’s ontological concerns are mistakenly assimilated to ecologically minded worries about the devastation of nature.

AFF: Concept of Being is Wrong

The fundamental premise of the alternative is false: There are not different types of being – only different properties of the same being. It is possible to make assertions about objects that have no being, meaning our case impacts are real

Grossmann, 84 – Professor of Philosophy at the University of Indiana (Reinhardt, Phenomenology and Existentialism, p. 176-7)JRC-no change

The crucial assumption of the second argument for the Being of nonexistent objects is that if an assertion is about A, then A must have (at least) Being. Consider the statement: Hamlet does not exist. It is clearly not a meaningless jumble of words. To the contrary, we believe that this is a perfectly good assertion which, moreover, is true. We believe that it is a true assertion about Hamlet. But if so, then it follows presumably that Hamlet must have Being. Given our philosophical way of thinking, it is assumed that the *aboutness relation*, which holds between an assertion and its subject, is not abnormal! But this *aboutness relation* is nothing else but the intentional nexus in disguise. When there occurs a mental act of asserting that Hamlet does not exist, this act stands in the intentional nexus to a certain state of affairs involving Hamlet. But we have insisted before and shall now emphasize anew that in this clear sense, an assertion can be about something that has no being whatsoever. The crucial assumption of the second argument, from our point of view, is simply false: an assertion can be about what has no being at all. (And, consequently, a sentence can be about something which has no being at all.)

I conclude then that these two arguments do not prove that nonexistent objects must have a kind of being different from Modes of being existence. But if this is true, then we have succeeded in turning back all three attempts to justify the view that being has modes, that there are kinds of it, that it is a genus with several species. We have successfully defended our position that all there is, is existence. An object either exists or it does not exist. It cannot have some sort of existence and lack another. And if this view is correct, then Heidegger must be mistaken. There is no special kind of being, 'Existence' spelled with a capital fe', which only human beings have. As far as existence is concerned, Caesar exists in precisely the same manner in which Mt Everest exists. Nor are there different kinds of human Existence. Caesar does not exist any differently from Hitler; Mozart does not exist any differently from Heidegger. Whatever differences there are between human beings, on the one hand, and dogs, sticks, and stones, on the other, are a matter of quality, of properties. And whatever differences there are among people, they too are a matter of quality, of properties. We confront Heidegger's thesis of modes of being with a fundamental metaphysical principle of our own: whatever differences and similarities there are in the world, they are all due to properties and relations.

The alternative replicates the status quo- Heidegger's description of multiple modes of being collapses on itself because of his refusal to define existence of non-human entities

Grossmann, 84 – Professor of Philosophy at the University of Indiana (Reinhardt, Phenomenology and Existentialism, p. 196-8)JRC

We shall now return to the very beginning of our discussion of Heidegger's view. Heidegger, we saw, starts out with the question of all questions: what is being? But he turns almost immediately to a much narrower question: what is human being? And he never again returns to the first question; the promised answer is never given. But since he raised the question of being in the first place, since he made such a monumental to-do about it, this silence must appear to him and us as an admission that he has failed, not only in the task which he has set for himself, but in his very conception of the task of philosophy. With so much at stake, why does Heidegger never return to the question of being? I think there is a very good reason for his silence, and I shall conclude our discussion of Heidegger with an explanation of this reason.

In a nutshell, the reason is this: Heidegger's conception of Existence as the substance of man is incompatible with his belief that there are many modes of Existence. More generally, the view that existence is the substance of the world is incompatible with the view that there are modes of existence. Let me make out the general case. Assume that we adopt the view that each category of things has its distinct kind of existence. Individuals have one kind of existence, properties have a different kind of existence, relations have a third kind of existence, and so on. Assume also that we locate existence, in the spirit of my explication, in the entity *entity*. This means, more precisely, that we need a number of variables corresponding to the various modes of existence. One kind of variable-the various '*e1*', '*e2*', '*e3*'-will no longer suffice. The existence of individual things, for example, will occur in the form of the variable, '*i1*', '*i2*', '*i3*' etc.; the existence of properties will occur in the form of the variable '*p1*', '*p2*', '*p3*' etc.; the existence of relations will occur in the form of the variable '*r1*', '*r2*', '*r3*' etc. and so on. To say that Caesar exists is now to say that Caesar is identical with some *i*; to say that the property of being midnight blue exists is to say that this color is identical with some *p*; to say the intentional nexus exists is to say that it is identical with some *r*. And so on.

AFF: Concept of Being is Wrong

A Heideggerian ontological approach is doomed to failure. The notion of existence as ultimate substance destroys the possibility of their being different kinds of existence

Grossmann, 84 – Professor of Philosophy at the University of Indiana (Reinhardt, Phenomenology and Existentialism, p. 196-8)

Here the 'I' no longer stands just for 'entity' or 'existent'. Rather, it must be read to mean 'entity of the kind of being I'. As soon as we spell out what (8) means, we have to distinguish between existence, on the one hand, and various kinds or modes of existence, on the other. But if we hold that existence forms the substance of the world, then modes of existence become inevitably properties and features of one and the same substance, namely, of existence. There simply cannot be different kinds of existence in a sense of 'kinds' which does not amount to there being different features, characteristics, or properties of existence. To put it differently, the very notion of existence as the ultimate substance precludes the possibility of there being different kinds of existence. For, existence so conceived allows for no qualitative difference. All the qualitative similarity and difference there is in the world, traces back to properties and relations. If existence is conceived of as the substance of the world, then there can be many existents, but there can be no varieties of existence. . If this assessment is correct, then it becomes clear why Heidegger's project is doomed to failure. Heidegger wishes to hold two incompatible views. But if he persists in his view that existence is the substance of the world, then he must give up the view that there is a variety of existence. And if he retains the latter view, then he must reject the former. This lesson goes beyond the confines of Heidegger's version of Existentialism. It holds for all existentialistic ontologies. An Existentialist has no choice. He must either reject the notion that there are modes of being, or else he must give up the view that being is a substance rather than a property. But he cannot do the former, for this would mean giving up his most distinct and cherished thesis, the thesis of the privileged status of human Existence. Existentialism without this thesis is as interesting as macaroni is without cheese. And he is loath to do the latter, for this implies that man is not free. This part of the story is best told in connection with Sartre's philosophy.

Heidegger's examination of being is flawed- 3 reasons

Schatzki, 90 – PhD in philosophy California Berkely

(Theodore R. Heidegger and the Philosophy of Mind (review) Journal of the History of Philosophy - Volume 28, Number 3, July 1990, pp. 466-468)//CP/JRC

One of Olafson's central conclusions about Heidegger's early thought is that there are three problems or unclarities attending Heidegger's idea that human beings, qua *Dasein*, are "clearings," or openings of being, in which entities can show themselves, or be. These three problems are: (1) the question whether, if there were suddenly no more or had never been any instances of *Dasein*, entities would still exist; (2) the apparent incompatibility between the presumed singularity of being and the plurality of instances of *Dasein*; and (3) the unclear relations of independence and dependence between being and *Dasein*. Olafson claims that "the central paradox in Heidegger's philosophy" (2~6) arises, in part, from Heidegger's inability to resolve issue (2). He is right that Heidegger, in this context, should have said more about that aspect of human existence called "being-with." But Olafson goes too far in denying that any general picture of being-with emerges from Heidegger's remarks about tradition and, especially, *das Man*. Heidegger's position on issue (2), in *Being and Time*, is that there are numerically as many clearings as there are instances of *Dasein*, but that being is singular (i.e., these clearings are identical) insofar as (a) these clearings share certain universal features, (b) they exhibit commonalities established by tradition and *das Man*, and (c) one and the same realm of present-at-hand entities show themselves in each of them (cf. issue [I]). In Part Two, Olafson concentrates on those of Heidegger's post-1930 writings and lectures that bear on the third of the above three issues. In contrast to interpretations that construe the later works as a radical departure from the earlier ones, Olafson argues for continuity. He shows that Heidegger's perennial concern is the relation between being and *Dasein*. He also contends, more controversially, that 'being' means presence not only in Heidegger's later works but also in the earlier ones. At the same time, Olafson maintains, clearly correctly, that Heidegger in his later writings reverses his earlier position that human existence grounds being and claims, instead, that being grounds existence. Despite these insights, Part Two is not as satisfying as Part One. This is in part because the somewhat tortuous path Olafson takes through Heidegger's later views creates the false impression that they are fraught with confusion and vacillation. In the final chapter, Olafson proposes to amend Heidegger's philosophy by combining elements of the earlier and later periods in a way that preserves not only the dependence and independence of being in relation to *Dasein* but also the unitary and, moreover, shared character of the former. In this amended view, being is the unitary happening of truth, which, instead of being created by men, addresses them, though not "in their capacity as separate, but as existing in the mode of [being-with]" (240). Determining the extent to which this position goes beyond Heidegger's later views requires a more detailed examination than Olafson provides of the socio-historical anchoring of being in the later works. Further, it remains an open question whether this position is preferable to the ontologically more individualist one found in *Being and Time*. Nonetheless, Olafson's book, because it offers a superb analysis of *Being and Time*, identifies key questions about Heidegger's thought in general, gives an illuminating discussion of the earlier and later texts pertinent to these questions, and attempts an original resolution of them, is an important, first-rate contribution to the literature on Heidegger.

AFF: AT: Value to Life

We internal link turn your value to life claims- Heidegger claimed that the Jewish deaths in the concentration camps were not important because they were not connected to being, justifying have them killed- Your no value to life claims are all a reinstallation of concentration camps where Heidegger decides whose life counts and whose doesn't

Faye 6 -- Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Paris X-Nanterre [Emmanuel Faye, South Central Review, "Nazi Foundations in Heidegger's Work," Issue 21.3, p 55-56, Muse] // LDK//JRC

Now, the texts from the beginning of the 1940s that are published and analyzed in chapter 9 show that "essence" for Heidegger, as for his disciple and interlocutor Oskar Becker, has a racial significance. This can easily be seen in texts dating from 1940 and dealing with the question of "racial Being" (Rassesein) and of "the not-yet-purified German essence." It is in the context of these 1940s texts that the Bremen Lectures become unbearable. What Heidegger wants to say is that the victims of the concentration camps could not be dead because they were not, in their essence, mortal: they did not sufficiently love death, they were not "in custody of Being." Behind this, there is the entire Nazi conception of death as Opfer, as sacrifice of the individual for the community, that we find already stated in Being and Time, with the notion of self-sacrifice, and celebrated by Heidegger on 26 May 1933, in his speech praising Albert-Leo Schlageter, gunned down in 1926 and designated as a hero by the Nazis. "To die for the German people and for one's Reich," for Heidegger, is the strongest and most noble death (GA 16, 759–760). But those who perished in the concentration camps, they are, he says, grausig ungestorben: "horribly un-dead" (GA 79, 56). They are not dead, they cannot even die, they were not mortal. This is why I spoke of an ontological negationism, which calls into question the very being of the victims. This judgment coincides with the profoundly pertinent analyses of Adorno on the so-called "authentic" conception of death in Being and Time, and **the way in which he shows that with Heidegger, death itself took on a racial meaning**.⁴ In conclusion, recall that philosophy has as its vocation to serve the fulfillment of man and not his destruction. But Heidegger, through the völkisch and racist principle which is explicitly his starting point, **destroys man in his very being**. And in a profoundly perverse manner, he [End Page 65] imputes to philosophy itself the responsibility for the totalitarian aberrations of the modern age. The radically discriminatory and racist principles upon which Heidegger's work rests demand a complete re-evaluation of the status of that work. It is not, in its foundations, a philosophy, but rather an attempt to destroy philosophy. Therefore, it is the role of philosophy to explore, through further research, the real significance of his writings. This is an essential task for contemporary thought.

AFF: Heidegger = Nazi

Heidegger's Nazism is intrinsically linked to his philosophy- Nazism is the very essence of his philosophy

Sheehan '88 - Professor, Department of Religious Studies Stanford University
(Thomas, "Heidegger and the Nazis", pp. 38-47) CP/JRC

Some philosophers answer in the absolute affirmative: Professor Jurgen Habermas of the Goethe University, Frankfurt, for example, and the late Theodor Adorno of the Frankfurt school. Many more answer in the absolute negative and either treat Heidegger's philosophy as a pure act of thought that developed in a political vacuum, or explain his political "error" as a misguided but well-intentioned effort to "overcome metaphysics," but in any case as having nothing to do with his philosophy. Still others (I include myself) would argue that despite the magnitude of Heidegger's intellectual achievement, major elements of his philosophy are deeply flawed by his notions of politics and history—and that this is so quite apart from the fact that he joined the Nazi party and, for whatever period of time, ardently supported Hitler. Heidegger's engagement with Nazism was a public enactment of some of his deepest, and most questionable, philosophical convictions. And those convictions did not change when, in the mid-Thirties, he became disappointed with the direction the party was taking. In fact, Heidegger admitted as much. In 1936, when his former student Karl Lowith suggested to Heidegger that his support for Nazism seemed to come from the very essence of his philosophy. "Heidegger agreed with me without reservations and spelled out for me that his concept of "historicity" was the basis for his political 'engagement.'

Technology and humanism lay as the root cause of the holocaust- The very thing that Heidegger criticizes

Dean, 2k- Sociologist at Macquarie University (Mitchell, "Always Look on the Dark Side: Politics and the Meaning of Life", <http://apsa2000.anu.edu.au/confpapers/dean.rtf>).JRC

Despite such statements, there is a hesitation, a point of indeterminacy, in this relation between bio-politics and thanato-politics. Foucault seems to identify a puzzle or an *aporia* of contemporary politics, which he cannot resolve or which may itself be irresolvable. 'The coexistence in political structures of large destructive mechanisms and institutions oriented to the care of individual life is something puzzling', he states (Foucault, 1988, 147). But he immediately adds 'I don't mean that mass slaughters are the effect, the result, the logical consequence of our rationality, nor do I mean that the state has the obligation of taking care of individuals since it has the right to kill millions of people'. After proceeding through this set of inconclusive negatives he avers, as if trying to defer the answer to the questions he poses: 'It is this rationality, and the death and life game which takes place in it, that I'd like to investigate from a historical point of view' (Foucault, 1988, 148).

One aspect of this historical investigation occurred in Foucault's 1976 lectures (1997b). These lectures cover such concerns as the seventeenth-century historical-political narrative of the 'war of the races', and the biological and social class re-inscriptions of racial discourse in the nineteenth century. (Foucault, 1997b; 1997a, 60-5). He concludes with the development of the biological state racism and the genocidal politics of the twentieth century, including a radical analysis of the Nazi state and of socialism. From this perspective, there is a certain potentiality within the human sciences which, when alloyed to notions such as race, can help make intelligible the catastrophes of the twentieth century. Such lectures seem to make totalitarian rule of the twentieth century a capstone on the histories of confinement, internment and punishment that had made up his genealogical work.

This thesis is perhaps close to the work of the first generation of the Frankfurt School and a certain reading of Weber. Here the one-sided development of rationality and application of reason to 'man' in the human sciences has the consequence of converting instrumental rationality into forms of domination. Bio-politics in this reading is the application of instrumental rationality to life. The dreadful outcomes of the twentieth century then result from this kind of scientization and technologization of earlier notions of race. There is also a similarity in this reading of Foucault and the work of Zygmunt Bauman (1989). The latter presents the Holocaust as something that must be understood as endogenous to Western civilization and its processes of rationalization rather than as an aberrant psychological, social or political pathology.

AFF: Heidegger = Nazi

Heidegger was a major supporter of the Nazi movement, associating himself with it and endorsing ethnic cleansing.

Rohkrämer, 05 – History and Philosophy professor at Lancaster University (Thomas, How Green Were the Nazis: Martin Heidegger, National Socialism, and Environmentalism, p. 172-3)

<Heidegger and National Socialism

"Martin Heidegger? A Nazi, of course a Nazi!" On a purely factual, this exclamation by Jürgen Habermas is fully correct. Contrary to what Heidegger and Heideggerians have long maintained, historical research has demonstrated beyond doubt Heidegger's early enthusiasm for National Socialism. Heidegger sympathized with the Nazis before 1933, he actively maneuvered to become rector, he publicly joined the Nazi Party on May Day, and the ceremony around his Rectoral Address included Nazi flags and the singing of the "Horst Wessel Song." While Jews and political opponents were removed from the university (like his teacher Edmund Husserl) or even forced to flee the country (like his intimate friend Hannah Arendt), Heidegger showed his enthusiastic support for the destruction of the Weimar Republic and for the new regime. He praised the Führer principle for the university sector, while striving to attain such a position for himself. In speeches and newspaper articles he identified himself with Hitler's rule, going so far as to state in autumn 1933 that "the Führer himself and alone is and will be Germany's only reality and its law." He not only approved in principle of the Nazi cleansing, but also tried to use the new regime to destroy the academic careers of colleagues, for example by initiating a Gestapo investigation.>

Claims that Heidegger reformed are false: his support waned but he was always a Nazi.

Rohkrämer, 05 – History and Philosophy professor at Lancaster University (Thomas, How Green Were the Nazis: Martin Heidegger, National Socialism, and Environmentalism, p. 173)

<Heidegger's initial enthusiasm soon waned. He decided to end his rectorship in spring 1934 and withdrew from all political involvement. Already in the lecture "An Introduction to Metaphysics," delivered in the summer term 1935, he voiced his critique of the bureaucratic management of the race of a Volk and in his Nietzsche lectures (1936-40) he became increasingly critical of a modern will to power that, he believed, was behind the actions of all leading nations including Germany. Despite this, Heidegger's claim that he had opposed the regime since 1914 is not correct. He never left the Nazi Party, and his lectures were always accompanied by a Nazi salute. When he met his former student Karl Löwith, who (as a Jew) had fled Germany in 1936, he wore his party badge, reaffirmed his conviction that "National Socialism was the proper course for Germany," and agreed with Löwith's suggestion that his political conviction was based on his philosophy. Passages from his war lectures show that, while seeing the whole war as a tragedy, he still sided with Germany. While it is true that party spies listened in on his lectures and that attempts were made to stop the publication of one of his articles, this does not mean that the regime regarded him as an opponent. Rather, the Nazi movement was characterized by endless infighting: the philosophers Ernst Krieck (Heidegger's former ally in university politics) and Arthur Rosenberg tried to gather material to weaken the influence of a philosopher who was still regarded as a major player. >

Although his support of the movement waned, he supported the beliefs of it.

Rohkrämer, 05 – History and Philosophy professor at Lancaster University (Thomas, How Green Were the Nazis: Martin Heidegger, National Socialism, and Environmentalism, p. 173-4)

<Heidegger was an enthusiastic Nazi, at first. While his version of Nazism was not the ideology that won out in the Third Reich, the regime was well served by the initial support of a leading philosopher, from 1934 on, however, Heidegger's distance from the regime began to grow. It is difficult to put dates to this gradual process, but Löwith's report strongly suggests that he still saw himself as a Nazi in 1936, despite disagreements on fundamental policy issues. By the time he delivered the Nietzsche lectures, the distance had grown to the extent that Heidegger should no longer be regarded as a Nazi, although to the end of his life he continued to hold two opinions which suggest that he never quite realized the unique dimension of the Nazi atrocities: he always failed to differentiate between Nazism and other forms of modern society in his sharp critique of the modern world; and he never questioned his chauvinistic belief that Germany was the most metaphysical nation, from which a positive historical turn was most likely to emerge. Lastly, Heidegger was typical of the widespread German reluctance to acknowledge personal responsibility for Nazism: in his statement immediately after the Third Reich about his rectorship, he still maintained that it had been better to try to exert a positive influence on National Socialism rather than stand aside. He continued to play down the historical significance of his actions, and he tried to excuse his political error by pointing at the misjudgments of others. >

AFF: Heidegger = Nazi (Kills Solvency)

Heidegger's turn to Nazism demonstrates his failure to distinguish an actual event from a pseudo-event, his search for an alternative politics leads to an inability to distinguish truly 'open' events from non-events.

Lewis '7 - Department of Philosophy, University of Sussex.

("IJZS Vol 1.4 Žižek and Heidegger Reply to Žižek")//cp/JRC—no change

In both cases what occurs is an apparent realisation of theory in reality, an actual liveable alternative to democracy was seen in an actual political event to which support was then given, the Nazi's conservative revolution and the Iranian revolution. Žižek refuses the usual reading of the engagements as demonstrating a limitation of their previous position whose becoming-visible precipitated a 'turn', and a turn away from politics. Even if this was how the thinkers themselves saw it. Once again, as in *The Ticklish Subject*, Žižek retrieves something valuable in the actual engagement itself. However, the manner in which this is done here differs. Here Žižek allows himself a distinction which he did not allow himself before, believing it to be a statement characteristic of ideology itself, and one which is all too deconstructive, envisioning practice as a 'fall' away from the level of theory. The distinction is one between form and content, or, more frequently between virtuality and its actualisation (these terms have proliferated in Žižek's discourse since his engagement with Deleuze in *Organs Without Bodies*). This distinction allows him to sympathise with Heidegger's reference to the 'inner truth and greatness' of the Nazi movement (Introduction to *Metaphysics*:213/152). The reason why this distinction has become acceptable to Žižek is perhaps his growing belief in the Benjaminian notion the arising of the new from the lost potentials or 'Lost Causes' of the past, although this is slightly undercut by the remarkable peroration to *For They Know Not What They Do*, which speaks of the Leftist project as precisely a seizing on the lost causes of the past (*For They Know Not What They Do*:272–3). Thus Žižek can say of Heidegger's engagement, that formally it contained promise, but was mistaken in terms of its content.

To nuance this, in the subsequent section on Foucault, Žižek refuses the simple opposition of the event and its compromise, on the grounds that this does not give us the means to distinguish between true and false Events. Perhaps this is also to be applied to Heidegger, who in Žižek (and Badiou's) eyes did indeed mistake an event for a pseudo-event, and although Žižek does not say this, perhaps we are to infer that his distinction between actuality and virtuality ('inner greatness') is rather (at least in Heidegger's case) an attempt to redeem something which should not be redeemed, and did not allow him to distinguish true and false events. The question raised by the deconstruction of Foucault is: 'given we can identify a virtual core that is respectable in no matter what actualisation, how are we to avoid the Heideggerian mistake of attempting to redeem the irredeemable, a pseudo- or non-event?' This would seem to be the purpose of Žižek's section on Foucault, for Žižek here asserts that the Iranian revolution, unlike the conservative revolution was indeed a true event. The Iranian revolution produced an alternative to liberal democracy that did not (have to) regress to pre-modern tradition, it revealed a possible future. Žižek therefore does not criticise Foucault's enthusiasm for the event, but merely the way he interpreted it (or rather, interpreted its interpretation): 'Foucault was right in engaging himself, he correctly detected the emancipatory potential in the events' (15). This way leaves one open to an engagement such as Heidegger's, where enthusiasm is placed behind a pseudo-event. 'This, also, compels us to qualify and limit the homology between Foucault's Iranian engagement and Heidegger's Nazi engagement' (15).

Foucault distinguishes, in a way that Žižek has come to identify with deconstructive politics, between the pure event, the 'revolt' and the political interests which later come to appropriate and compromise its absoluteness, as if it were a pure event of novelty without content which only then was assimilated to intelligible interests and the aims of various groups actually existing in Iran at the time. A genuine emancipatory outburst followed by a pragmatic compromise. Žižek is quite explicit that the problem with this is that it does not let one distinguish different modalities of enthusiasm (15), event and pseudo-event. Žižek however recognises that, at least at one level, Foucault exceeds this opposition between the absolutely novel, virtual event, and its conservative actuality, in the following terms: "chauvinism", "virulent xenophobia", the socio-political reality, they are an inherent support of the Event itself, i.e., their mobilisation gave the Event the strength to oppose itself to the oppressive political regime and to avoid getting caught in the game of political calculations" (13). Relying on such things 'gave the Iranian revolution the strength to move beyond a mere pragmatic power-struggle'. It is here however that we return to the original problem, that "Event turns into a purely formal feature, indifferent towards its specific historical content" (13), and this leads us back to the impossibility of distinguishing the Nazi event from a true event, which the Iranian revolution was: 'it was an authentic Event, a momentary opening that unleashed unheard-of forces of social transformation' (14). 'The Nazi "revolution" was never "open" in this authentic sense' (14).

AFF: Heidegger = Nazi (Supported the Holocaust)

Heidegger silently supported the Holocaust, both during and after

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(Thomas, "Heidegger and the Nazis", pp. 38-47) CP/JRC

Finally, there is Heidegger's stunning silence about the Holocaust. For the hundreds of pages that he published on the dehumanizing powers of modern civilization, for all the ink he spilled decrying the triumph of a spiritless technology, Heidegger never saw fit, as far as I know, to publish a single word on the death camps. Instead, he pleaded ignorance of the fate of the Jews during the war—even though the Jewish population of Baden, where Heidegger lived, dropped dramatically from 20,600 in 1933 to 6400 in 1940, and even though virtually all of the 6400 who remained were deported to France on October 22, 1940, and thence to Izbica, the death camp near Lublin. As Heidegger was lecturing on Nietzsche in the Forties, there were only 820 Jews left in all of Baden. We have his statements about the six million unemployed at the beginning of the Nazi regime, but not a word about the six million who were dead at the end of it.¹⁹

Heidegger used to enjoy telling a humorous story about the rarified philosophy of his teacher Husserl, who, when asked why he had omitted the topic of history from a series of lectures he was preparing for London, told Heidegger, "I forgot it!" Did Heidegger, who had so much to say about the "recollection of Being," suffer from a far deeper forgetfulness? But even though he did not publish anything on the Holocaust, he did mention it in two unpublished lectures and in at least one letter. All three texts are characterized by a rhetoric, a cadence, a point of view that are damning beyond commentary.

Heidegger was very anti-Semitic and was considered the head philosopher of the Nazi movement and Hitler's greatest supporter. Heidegger Never distanced himself from Nazi ideals.

Sheehan '88 - Professor, Department of Religious Studies Stanford University
(Thomas, "Heidegger and the Nazis", pp. 38-47) CP/JRC

In outline, the story of Heidegger and the Nazis concerns (1) a provincial, ultra conservative German nationalist and, at least from 1932 on, a Nazi sympathizer (2) who, three months after Hitler took power, became rector of Freiburg University, joined the NSDAP, and tried unsuccessfully to become the philosophical Führer of the Nazi movement, (3) who quit the rectorate in 1934 and quietly disassociated himself from some aspects of the Nazi party while remaining an enthusiastic supporter of its ideals, (4) who was dismissed from teaching in 1945, only to be reintegrated into the university in 1951, and who even after his death in 1976 continues to have an immense following in Europe and America. Whatever the value of his philosophy, the picture we now have of Heidegger's activities during the Third Reich is deeply disturbing and frequently disgusting. For example: Heidegger's inaugural address as Rector Magnificus of Freiburg University (May 27, 1933) purported to assert the autonomy of the university against Nazi attempts at politicizing the sciences. However, it ominously celebrated the banishing of academic freedom and ended up as a dithyramb to "the greatness and glory" of the Hitler revolution ("the march our people has begun into its future history"), which Heidegger tried to combine with the goals of his own philosophy. The essence of the university, he says, is the "will to knowledge," which requires returning to the pre-Socratic origins of thought. But concretely that means unifying Öscience and German fate and willing "the historical mission of the German Volk, a Volk that knows itself in its State"—all this within a spirituality "that is the power to preserve, in the deepest way, the strengths [of the Volk] which are rooted in soil and blood."⁷ Three months later, as if to fulfill the promise of his inaugural address, Heidegger rushed to establish the Führer-principle at Freiburg University (August 21, 1933).⁸ His first big step toward becoming the intellectual high priest of Nazism. According to the *Führerprinzip* the rector would no longer be elected by the academic senate but would be appointed by the Nazi minister of education and made the virtual dictator of the university, with authority to impose his own deans on the departments. (On August 22, the vice rector, Joseph Sauer, wrote in his diary: "*Finis Universitatum!*" And that idiot Heidegger has gotten us into this mess, after we elected him rector to bring us a new spiritual vision for the universities. What irony!") Heidegger prepared the ground with a public telegram to Hitler on May 20, 1933, and on October 1, 1933, got himself officially appointed *Führer* of Freiburg University, thereby ending its autonomy. On December 20 he wrote a colleague that "from the very first day of my assumption of the office" his goal had been "the fundamental change of scientific education in accordance with the strengths and the demands of the National Socialist State"" (his emphasis).⁸ On September 4, 1933, in response to an offer to take the chair at the University of Munich, Heidegger said: "For me it is clear that, putting aside all personal motives, I must decide to accomplish the task that will allow me to best serve the work of Adolf Hitler."⁹ [p. 39] On November 3, 1933, *Führer*-rector Heidegger issued a decree applying the Nazi "cleansing" laws to the student body of Freiburg University. He announced that economic aid would henceforth be awarded to students who belonged to the SS, the SA, or other military groups but would be denied to Jewish or Marxist students or anyone who fit the description of a "non-Aryan" in Nazi law.¹⁰ On December 13, 1933, Heidegger sent a letter to a group of German academics, requesting financial support for a book of pro-Hitler speeches by professors that was to be circulated to intellectuals around the world. At the bottom of his letter he added the editor's assurance that "Needless to say, non-Aryans shall not appear on the signature page."¹¹

AFF: Heidegger = Nazi (Supported the Holocaust)

Ott confirms Heidegger's inclination to anti-semitism.

Sheehan '88 - Professor, Department of Religious Studies Stanford University

(Thomas, "Heidegger and the Nazis", pp. 38-47) CP/JRC

The question of whether—or to what degree—Heidegger was an anti-Semite is much debated. On the one hand, Heidegger claimed after the war that his defense of certain Jewish professors and his support for certain of his Jewish students during the Thirties proved that he was not anti-Semitic; this was before the Baumgarten letter became known publicly. On the other hand, as we have seen, Farías and Ott have documented despicable conduct concerning Jews. And from other sources we now know that after 1933 Heidegger declined to direct the doctoral dissertations of Jewish students: he sent all those students to his Catholic colleague Professor Martin Honecker. Toni Cassirer, the widow of Ernst Cassirer, claimed that she had heard of Heidegger's "inclination to anti-Semitism" by 1929. Nonetheless, for all his opposition to Heidegger from 1936 on, Karl Jaspers, whose wife was Jewish, never took Heidegger for an anti-Semitic, even though in June of 1933, when Jaspers ridiculed the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, Heidegger replied, But there is a dangerous international alliance of Jews. In 1983 Heidegger's close friend Heinrich Petzet wrote, as if no explanations were needed, that Heidegger felt ill at ease with big-city life, "and this was especially true of that mundane spirit of Jewish circles, which is at home in the metropolitan centers of the West. But this attitude of his should not be misunderstood as anti-Semitism, although it has often been interpreted that way."

Heidegger NEVER rejected the holocaust, continuing his Nazi beliefs

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The possible confusion of the two appearances of the Jewish Question in this thesis (once as the "Jewish Question," once as the Jewish Question) will, I hope, be soon cleared up. Certainly the first appearance-the Jewish Question seen retrospectively, framed by quotation marks-can be rephrased in terms that are well-known; these are the terms of Heidegger's post-Holocaust silence or, on the few occasions when he broke that silence, what was arguably still more evasive and in this sense no less "silent," the combination of what he omitted to say and of what, even in speaking, he formulated in unreachable abstraction-the refuge, in sum, that he found in the obliqueness and avoidance. I shall elaborate on this representation mainly by reassembling here the now familiar evidence of those few overt expressions of Heidegger's post-Holocaust response to the Holocaust as they serve to underscore his more overt, louder silence. The conclusion at which this evidence points is, at any rate, clear and concise: Even after the Holocaust was over and its consequences known, fully in the public domain, Heidegger, who had met certain manifestations of the Holocaust remained silent. There was for him no "Jewish Questions," no issue of what it was that had happened to the Jews among the nations (not even within or at the hands of his nation), of why what happened to them happened or how to assess that occurrence in moral terms or of what any of these implied for future conduct (including his own). In the thirty post-Holocaust and otherwise prolific years of his life, about these matters there was silence.

AFF: Heidegger = Nazi (Justifies the Holocaust)

Heidegger's philosophy placed Hitler and the Nazi's it's most important cornerstone —embracing said philosophy will replicate all the harms of Nazi germany

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<<For many years I have been interested in the work of Martin Heidegger and the effects of his hermeneutics on our concept of the history of philosophy, notably in Cartesian studies. Five years ago, I became aware of particularly odious texts that had just been published in the sixteenth volume of Heidegger's so-called Collected Works, or Gesamtausgabe (GA). These texts exceed in their radicalism what one had been able to read up until then in the earlier editions of Guido Schneeberger. As a result, I began reexamining the essence of Heidegger's work. I was surprised to see that his **Hitlerism was not only the subject of speeches and conferences, but it constituted an explicit thread in a considerable number of his lectures.** It was not only as Rector of the University of Freiburg, but also as a professor of philosophy, that **Heidegger put body and soul to the service of spreading Nazism.** The importance of my work on Heidegger can only be understood, then, if we take into account the current state of his entire oeuvre. Dealing simply with works and translations, most of which are sugar-coated, published in France and abroad over the past fifty years, is inadequate. One must deal with the sixty-six volumes which today appear in German in Gesamtausgabe. There we discover that under apparently philosophical titles—"The Fundamental Question of Philosophy," "Of the Essence of Truth," "Logic"—**Heidegger taught his philosophy students the very doctrine of Hitlerism, with its racist concepts and** völkisch **supremacy of the "German essence,"** its praise of the Weltanschauung (or world vision) of the Führer, and its reference to the "blood voice" and the blood heredity (das Geblüt). **Heidegger's Nazism is thus not limited to a few speeches of the moment. It can be found at the heart of his teachings** from 1933 to 1944. Equally important, far from having distanced himself from these lectures, he planned to include their publication in his collected work: the lectures of 1933 to 1944 today represent, in effect, twenty volumes of the Gesamtausgabe. In my own work, I have attempted to gauge just how deeply this Nazi indoctrination penetrated. I have discovered, along with the volumes recently published, a certain number of unpublished texts, especially [End Page 55] two seminars from the years 1933–1935 which shed an even more radical light on the question of his Nazism. The most radical text—the seminar that is strictly speaking Hitlerian—is entitled "On the Essence and the Concepts of Nature, History, and State," which I analyze and edit in part in chapter 5 of my book. But the second unedited seminar, the one on "Hegel and the State," also brings entirely new elements to light. I have brought these unedited texts to the public eye, so as to make us fully aware of the necessity of a re-examination of the ensemble of Heidegger's work and its very foundations. I want to stress that the guiding thread of my research was not initially that of Heidegger's Nazism, but his conception of man. It was while I was in the process of explaining the very substructure of his work that I was able to gauge the extent to which Nazism was inscribed therein. Since then, **it is apparent to me that it is absolutely impossible to separate ideology from philosophy in Heidegger's work.** Can we, in effect, seriously endeavor to take the sixty-six volumes in Gesamtausgabe one by one and form two piles: to the right, the works that are pure Nazi ideology, to the left, those which might be considered relevant to philosophy? **Heidegger himself conceived of his Gesamtausgabe as a whole. He organized its publication chronologically so that the most overtly Hitlerian and pro-Nazi lectures would appear after his death, so that they should take their place at the heart of the work itself, with no reservation or repentance. It is this whole, this ensemble, which he bequeathed as his legacy, as his complete work, for generations to come.** My research on National Socialism itself convinced me that it constitutes, strictly speaking, less an ideology than a movement (Bewegung). Of course, **Nazism encompasses a certain number of constants: racism, anti-Semitism, the radical affirmation of the superiority of the German essence and spirit, the desire to expand Germany's "vital space" for colonization, the expulsion and even total extermination of peoples said to be inferior as well as those identified as the enemy.** But these invariants were only affirmed one at a time, or they were softened or placed on the back burner according to the circumstances on power relations of the moment. We know, for example, of the speeches in favor of peace by the Führer in the first years that followed the political coup, even as he was thinking of nothing but the rearmament of Germany. The "movement's" extraordinary capacity to adapt is something we must always keep in mind. Nevertheless, it is as "movement" that Heidegger sings the praises of National Socialism in his 1935 seminars, where he exalts "the internal truth and grandeur of this movement" (die innere Wahrheit und Größe dieser Bewegung). Moreover, this point is crucial [End Page 56] to understanding the evolution of the relationship between Heidegger's work and the National Socialist movement. It also helps us to understand euphemistic strategies which he incorporated into his work, first of all in the 1920s, and then after the Nazi defeat of 1945. Thus for example, at the end of the 1940s, in an unedited letter to Ernst Jünger archived at Marbach, Heidegger affirmed, with regard to an aphorism by Rivarol, that the "movement" continued in a state of "stillness."?>>

AFF: Heidegger = Nazi (Justifies the Holocaust)

We should not base our conception of being around the studies of a fascist- it justifies the Holocaust

Jones 1998- (Michael, "Heidegger the Fox: Hannah Arendt's Hidden Dialogue", New German Critique, No. 73, Special Issue on Heiner Muller, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/488654>, JStor, REQ)

This "reasoning" boggles the mind. First, Heidegger projects what he has since learned through his study of Nietzsche (and Jinger, about whose work he had conducted study groups), that the metaphysical principle truly operative in world-historical events is the will to power, back to the rectorate period, when he "understood even then what is." This deepest level of metaphysical understanding, however, did not equip him with a crystal ball - "I was not so wise" - that he now claims should have been the property of the "capable forces."²¹ The self-exculpatory strategy is evident: no blame can fall on the writer for the "threatening disaster." (Why was the disaster threatening?) A second private comment that pretends to historical analysis was made in a 1948 letter to a former student, Herbert Marcuse; "To the serious charges that you express 'about a regime that murdered millions of Jews' ... I can merely add that if instead of 'Jews' you had written 'East Germans' [i.e., Germans of the eastern territories], then the same holds true for one of the allies ..." Marcuse, to his credit, will have none of this nonsense:

How is it possible to equate the torture, the maiming, and the annihilation of millions of men with the forcible relocation of population groups who suffered none of these outrages (apart perhaps from several exceptional instances)? From a contemporary perspective, there seems already to be a night and day difference in humanity and inhumanity in the difference between Nazi concentration camps and the deportations and internments of the postwar years. On the basis of your argument, if the Allies had reserved Auschwitz and Buchenwald - and everything that transpired there- for the 'East Germans' and the Nazis, then the account would be in order!

Heidegger will simply not admit (indeed, he never will) the catastrophe wrought upon humanity by the movement he supported and the nation to which he believed Being had entrusted the future of the West. The dangers are too great, not only to his self-image as the most trenchant philosophical observer of "what is," but also to his philosophy of Being itself, because he is its chosen vessel.

The examination of being is fundamentally flawed due to its justification of Hitler's policies – including the holocaust.

Zimmerman - Professor of philosophy at Tulane – 1996 (Michael E., "The Death of God at Auschwitz?" - article in Martin Heidegger and the Holocaust, ed. By Alan Milchman and Alan Rosenberg, p.246)

Reading Heidegger's reflections of the 1930s on Holderlin's poetry, I am often struck by the discrepancy between his lofty abstractions and the brutal reality of National Socialism. How could he have possibly imagined, even in the early stages of Hitler's regime, that there existed some inner relation between Holderlin's "holy wilderness" and National Socialism? Why, long after the end of World War II, did he continue to harbor such an ambiguous attitude toward National Socialism? Why did he express a reluctance, bordering on defiance, to condemn the Holocaust, or to grapple seriously with the historical and cultural antisemitic issues (not merely the metaphysical ones) that were obviously so central to National Socialism? More broadly, how are we given such self-damning silence to evaluate his extraordinary yet idiosyncratic reading of Western history as the unpredictable "play" of being? May we not question the historical judgment of a man who engaged in what Hugo Ott has described as extravagant "self-mythification" regarding his own place in the scheme of Western history? There are no easy answer to these questions.

AFF: Heidegger = Nazi (Justifies the Holocaust)

Heidegger concludes that only a return to Nazism can save the world from the technological order- this thinking justifies genocide
Rabinbach, 1994- Professor of History. Director, Program in European Cultural Studies at Princeton, (Anson, "Heidegger's Letter on Humanism as Text and Event", New German Critique, No. 62, (Spring - Summer, 1994), pp. 3-38, JStor, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/488507>, REQ) JRC—no change

Nietzsche too is reconsidered in this light, since his evocation of the polis in Roman terms (like spirit and culture), confuses the modern "power state" with the Greek "site" of tragedy (GA 54, 133). Before 1942 Heidegger saw democracy, socialism, and communism as variants of half-hearted nihilism, as opposed to metaphysical, e.g., active German nihilism. Now, after the German defeat was at least "thinkable," the latter option faded, replaced by the passivity of the philosopher who must wait patiently for Being to disclose itself. This disclosure occurs cataclysmically, through the tragic events of history: "the terror, horror, and calamity [Unheil]" that befall the polis. Heidegger's interpretation of the polis as a site of tragedy explains some of the most puzzling passages of the Letter. The unambiguous tilt towards Marxism, which Jaspers called "lethal," can be interpreted as Heidegger's concession to the new reality that the "West", e.g., Germany (but also England and France) had been decisively defeated, that Stalin's victory (and America's) signals the collapse of the weak European democracies, and their domination by the new technological order. In the summer of 1942, during his course on Holderlin, Heidegger noted that "Bolshevism is only a variety of Americanism. The latter is the genuinely dangerous form of the measureless, because it arises in the form of bourgeois democracy and is mixed with Christendom, and all of this in an atmosphere of decisive historylessness" (GA 53, 86-87). Germans, Heidegger averred in 1943, would now be "tested" by those who "know nothing," who represent "mere modernity." There is possibly a more justifiable opportunism at work here, insofar as Heidegger's sons were still in prisoner of war camps, and he feared that Georg Lukacs's attacks on him were potentially a threat to them. Ironically, Lukacs's review of the Letter, entitled "Heidegger Redivivus," acknowledged Heidegger's affirmation of Marxism, noting that he understood the inner connection between the private and public spheres of modern life and their respective alienation from the essential being of humanity, but that he had turned real history into the mythical pseudohistory of Being.⁶¹ Nonetheless, Heidegger does not hide his contempt for the victorious nihilisms: "Whoever takes 'communism' only as a 'party' or a 'Weltanschauung' is thinking too shallowly, just as those who by the term 'Americanism' mean, and mean derogatorily, nothing more than a particular lifestyle" (LH 220). Similarly, Heidegger condemns both "nationalism" and "internationalism" as mirror-forms of anthropologism, equally nihilistic humanisms, with the inescapable conclusion that to conceive of National Socialism as a "worldview" is equally shallow. Viewed from the Olympian perspective of their essential, that is metaphysical truths, the defeat of Germany is a catastrophe - and not only for Germany - for its historical mission. The "worldview" of the movement is one thing, he noted, the metaphysical heroism of young poets in uniform quite another. How else can we interpret the lines: "When confronted with death therefore, those young Germans who knew about Holderlin lived and thought something other than what the public held to be the typical German attitude" (LH 2 19)? Heidegger, who had stated unequivocally in 1942/1943 that the Germans alone could deliver the West into its beginning, that this historical "Volk" had already "triumphed and cannot be triumphed over," feared in 1946 that the "danger" that Germany's defeat poses for "Europe" is its "falling behind" in its "provenance" to announce the new dawn. Unavoidably delayed by catastrophic defeat, the advent is postponed. At this juncture, Heidegger quotes from the penultimate page of Sein und Zeit: "The conflict with respect to the interpretation of Being (that is, therefore, not the interpretation of beings, or of the Being of man) cannot be settled, because it has not yet been kindled" (LH, 223 [italics in original]).⁶² The catastrophe is not the collapse of National Socialism, which itself had become a nihilism, or of Nietzscheanism, which deserved what it got, but of Heidegger's conception of National Socialism. National Socialism and the war was not a catastrophe for its victims, only a catastrophe for the advent of Being. What the outcome of the war decided was only the "postponement of the crisis and conflict" that leads to its "unconcealment." It is hardly accidental then that the Letter concludes with an appeal to Being's guardians and shepherds to an "open resistance to humanism" (LH 2 25). Heidegger expressed his ultimate judgment on the outcome of World War II even more clearly in 1951/52: What did the Second World War decide, if we do not mention its terrible consequences for our Fatherland, in particular the tear through its Center? The World War and decided nothing, if we use 'decision' here in so high and broad a sense that it pertains solely to the destiny of the essence of humanity point here. ⁶³ The Letter is a gesture of defiance in the cloak of humility. Heidegger's complaints about the "peculiar dictatorship of the public sphere," the conflict of "isms," and his tilt toward Marxism, reveal his barely disguised contempt for the occupation. It is also a direct answer to the call for a reckoning with the Nazi past and an opening to democracy, that Jaspers issued in The Question of German Guilt, and which he and the University committee found so utterly lacking in Heidegger. The comment Heidegger sent to his former student, Elisabeth Blochmann, in March 1947 is indicative of just how defiant his posture was at that juncture: But we are now, as we have been for a long time, in the center of Europe, and as a result, the fatal consequence [Verhängnis] has a wholly different power over us. The 'West' of course already collapsed at a time when no one spoke about it. Other 'powers' have long since become real. But the question remains nevertheless: whether this reality is the beginning or only the end of the process that has already occurred? Not merely the collapse of the Third Reich, or of Hitler who, in Heideggerian terms only functioned as a "Myrmidon" [Scherge]. Rather, the victory of the American and Soviet armies constituted a descent into a metaphysics of the machine, or "in Marxist terms," the "power of the technical," whose first victim is Germany. The Letter expresses this tragedy in these terms: "German is not spoken to the world so that the world might be reformed through the German essence: rather it is spoken to the Germans so that from a fateful belongingness to the nations they might become world-historical along with them" (LH 218). In other words, the German catastrophe is globalized, insofar as "homelessness is coming to be the destiny of the world" (LH 219). From this point of view, it is not surprising that a philosopher whose thought centers on the "forgetting of Being," and who is frequently concerned with remembrance [Andenken], never publicly remarked on or even alluded to the killing of the Jews, except to coldly compare it to "motorized agriculture."⁶⁵ Heidegger's notorious remarks in a letter to his former student Herbert Marcuse which arrogantly refused to distinguish between the fate of the Jews and the fate of East Germans are entirely consistent ⁶⁶ The collapse of the one true nihilism capable of carrying metaphysics to its completion was the only true catastrophe of 1945, compared to which a few million victims was a mere side-show.⁶⁷

AFF: Heidegger = Nazi (Justifies the Holocaust)

The world of the ontology alternative is one of Hitler – of ruthlessness and death

Zimmerman - Professor of philosophy at Tulane – 1996 (Michael E., “The Death of God at Auschwitz?” - article in Martin Heidegger and the Holocaust, ed. By Alan Milchman and Alan Rosenberg, p.247-8)

In the 1930s, Heidegger believed that Hitler represented the leader who was divinely inspired to lead Germany and the West out of the ontological desert, which has resulted from the tragic caesura, and into a new historical beginning, which would restore meaning and ontological “weight” to history, human existence, and entities. Emphasizing the role played by the ancient Greeks in Western history, Heidegger either ignored the role played by the Jews in that history or maintained that Judaism’s offshoot, Christianity, impeded Germany’s attempt at radical ontological renewal. Presumably influenced by Nietzsche’s critique of Jewish-Christian “slave morality,” including its concern for the weak and oppressed, Heidegger adopted the Nazi attitude that only ruthlessness, martial courage, and hardness could save Germany in its hour of need. Renouncing the moral constraints imposed by a decadent “Christendom,” he continued to support the Nazis long after the first concentration camps sprang up around Freiburg in 1933, and long after his own Jewish students had been forced out of their academic posts. To be sure, he could not have predicted in the 1930s that the Nazis would resort to a “final solution” for the “problem” posed by European Jewry, but his fascination with the Greek tradition and his desperate longing for the “complete transformation of the German Dasein,” prevented him from acknowledging the extent to which anti-Semitism was not an incidental dimension of Nazi Germany. Even with the advantage of hindsight, Heidegger was either unwilling or unable to concede that the attempted extermination of the Jews manifested a dark and unreconciled dimension of Germany in particular and the West in general.

Heidegger’s Naziism can’t be separated from his philosophy, his thinking ensures continued genocide

Ross, 2k - philosophy at Los Angeles Valley College

(Kelley R, <http://www.friesian.com/rockmore.htm>)/markoff/JRC-- no change

<Frege's well-known, vicious anti-Semitism seems unrelated to his fundamental contributions to modern logic. [p.40] But Heidegger's moral and political views were not unrelated to the whole rest of his philosophy, including most of the conclusions of *Being and Time*. Peter Gay's anecdote, that many German soldiers in Russia and North Africa died with *Being and Time* in their backpacks, is intuitively revealing in a way that many pages of analysis in Rockmore's book are not. Heidegger's thought makes a small contribution to metaphysics; otherwise it is bad, false, dangerous, and even horrifying. Why it continues to appeal is frightening, but illuminating about the corrupt foundations of much of popular modern opinion. What it was that was ever *personally* appealing about Heidegger to people who actually knew him, but who despised his politics, is even more mysterious.

But both Jaspers and the commission sought to preserve Heidegger's philosophical achievement, which they regarded as untarnished by his turning to Nazism. [p.83]

This is senseless and impossible. Heidegger's "philosophical achievement" is indistinguishable from his "turning" to Naziism. He could literally look out his window in 1932-1933, see Brown Shirts beating up Jews and others, and from this he knew that the Nazis were "uncovering" Being. This bespeaks a moral perversity or blindness that would falsify any philosophical system intended to be a description or guide of proper action.

Arendt locates a turn against Nazism between the first and second volume of the Nietzsche lectures... [p.172]

Why Arendt, a Jew who had to flee Germany for her life, and a life long enemy of totalitarianism, should strain at gnats to derive comfort from Heidegger's feeble condemnation of Naziism as bad metaphysics, can only be explained by a personal attraction which is now inexplicable.

Karl Popper's characterization of Hegelianism and Marxism as the "high tide of prophecy" (in *The Open Society and Its Enemies*) echoes a remark by Rockmore about Heidegger's apparently privileged epistemological status:

Even were it the case that Being had withdrawn, it is unclear how, otherwise than through the prophetic powers he now attributes to himself, Heidegger could possibly be aware of this occurrence. [p.95]

Prophetic powers indeed. But Popper did not consider in that context a Heidegger who did not even maintain the pretense of rationality, as Hegel and Marx did. Instead, Heidegger's word play and oracular powers are more like what have become popular among recent academics who have no respect for logic or evidence, let alone science, technology, or commercial culture -- just as Heidegger's exaltation of the Nietzschean will to power leads to the typical theory of human life as nothing but "power relationships" manipulated by a Marxist demonology of corporate and class or race ("dead white male") enemies. As long as this continues to dominate intellectual life, as it does in American universities, Heidegger lives. And the Third Reich lives, however much its principles have been transferred to self-described "oppressed peoples." >\

AFF: Heidegger = Nazi (Justifies the Holocaust)

Heidegger isolated Hitler and Mussolini as men who were to be admired for launching movements to overcome nihilism

Faye 6 -- Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Paris X-Nanterre [Emmanuel Faye, South Central Review, "Nazi Foundations in Heidegger's Work," Issue 21.3, p 55-56, Muse] // LDK//JRC

Therefore, the fact of the suppression of the teaching of philosophy is secondary to him! What constitutes a metaphysical act for him, implicating the determination of the totality of being as unconditional power and as will for planetary domination, is that the mobilization of the Wehrmacht permitted the clear victory of June 1940. The use of the word "metaphysics" with regard to the Wehrmacht and racial politics is not then a philosophical usage, but rather a politically militant one and—in a word—a Nazi usage. [End Page 60] Heidegger's strategy, which succeeded well for him most notably in the French reception of his work, consisted of reversing his discourse on nihilism and metaphysics after the defeat of Nazism, which after Stalingrad was a quasi-certainty, and accomplished historically in 1945. This was the only real "turning" (Kehre) in his work, and it was strategic. Indeed, in his 1936 lectures on Schelling, he voiced an explicit tribute to Mussolini and Hitler, whom he presented as "the two men who launched counter-movements [against nihilism] in Europe, undertaken through the political organization of the nation, that is to say of the people" (GA 42, 40–41). So it is clear that Nazism, for him, in no way coincides with nihilism, but constitutes on the contrary a counter-movement to European nihilism. Moreover, as we have seen, at the outset of the 1940s, the adjective "metaphysical" still had a largely positive significance for him. In his texts on Jünger from the same period, very recently published in volume 90 of the Gesamtausgabe, it is not so much nihilism that preoccupies Heidegger, as it is what he calls "the next zone of decision," where "the struggle concerns exclusively the question of world power." And he specifies that "the decision consists above all in determining if the democratic empires (England, the United States) will prevail or if imperial dictatorships of absolute military power for its own sake [which is for him the characteristic of the Third Reich] will prevail" (GA 90, 221). What is at stake in this war of the Third Reich for world domination? What Heidegger labels "the force of the not-yet-purified essence of the Germans" (GA 90, 222), which is to be joined with a "new truth of Being." Hence, it is a question not only of assuring the domination of the Hitlerian Reich, but equally one of advancing toward the purification of the essence of the Germans themselves. It is in this context that, from 1940 to 1942, Heidegger sprinkles in his writings declarations legitimizing racial selection and exalting what he calls "racial thought" and "racial Being" (Rasse-sein). At this stage, metaphysics is not yet corrupted in ways that it will become for him, once Heidegger realizes that the defeat of the Reich is imminent.>>

AFF: Heidegger = Nazi (Ott = Qualified)

Ott's analysis is widely viewed as the definitive study of Heidegger's association with Nazism.

Sheehan '88 - Professor, Department of Religious Studies Stanford University

(Thomas, "Heidegger and the Nazis", pp. 38-47) CP

The merit of Fariás's book is that it draws our attention anew to an important issue that deserves more careful treatment than Fariás has been able to give it. (I say this without having seen the forthcoming German edition of the work, which will add three new chapters and correct the numerous errors that mar the French edition.⁵) The relation of Heidegger and Nazism has been thoroughly [p. 39] investigated by the historian Hugo Ott of Freiburg University—whose book, to be published in Germany in September, will be the definitive study of the topic—and by philosophers like Otto Pöggeler of the Ruhr University, Bochum, and Karsten Harries of Yale. In what follows I use Professor Ott's work to supplement, and sometimes to correct, Fariás's account.

AFF: Heidegger = Nazi (AT: Philosophy Separate from Politics)

Heidegger prevents us from separating his politics from his philosophy

Ryerson '01 – senior editor of legal affairs

("HEIDEGGER'S CHILDREN Hannah Arendt, Karl Löwith, Hans Jonas, and Herbert Marcuse." By Richard Wolin. december 16, 2001)//cp/JRC

After the late 1980's, when archival research first exposed the depths of Heidegger's longstanding faith in what he called the "inner truth and greatness" of National Socialism, many observers assumed nonetheless that his philosophy, like that of the great logician and anti-Semite Gottlob Frege, would remain untarnished. But the situation with Heidegger, Wolin argues, was not so cut and dried. Heidegger believed that Western philosophy was hopelessly preoccupied with unworldly abstractions like those of logic -- Descartes, for instance, had singled out disembodied thought as the defining feature of our existence. For Heidegger, the most primal aspect of our existence was the practical business of caring for ourselves in the world, the timebound particulars of our life-and-death decisions. This is why Marcuse, in a stern letter to Heidegger about his Nazism, wrote that "we cannot make the separation between Heidegger the philosopher and Heidegger the man, for it contradicts your own philosophy."

Heidegger believed in the superiority of a German Race and their place in history as the ones to shift ontology- This can't be separated from his philosophy because his philosophy was wrote to support these ideas

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<<Can we seriously believe that for Heidegger these pro-Nazi views are only a fleeting political aberration that can be ignored in assessing the value of Being and Time? This would run counter to the most explicit affirmations of Heidegger himself. In effect in 1934, he explained [End Page 57] to his students that "care—the most central term of Being and Time—is the condition in which it is possible for man to be political in essence" (GA 36/37, 218). Heidegger declares at this time—one year after the National Socialist movement came to power—that "we ourselves," that is to say the German people, united under the Hitlerian Führung, are faced with an "even greater decision" than that which served as the origin of Greek philosophy! This decision, he specifies, "was articulated in my book, Being and Time." It concerns, he added, "a belief which must manifest itself through history" and concerns "the spiritual history of our people" (GA 36/37, 255). At the foundation of Heidegger's work, one thus finds not a philosophical idea, but rather a völkisch belief in the ontological superiority of a people and a race; moreover, the term völkisch designates in its Nazi usage the conception of a people as a marriage of blood and race, with "a strong anti-Semitic connotation," according to the Grimm dictionary. Frankly, an attentive reading of key paragraphs in Being and Time on death and historicity, with their celebration of sacrifice, of the choice of heroes and of the authentic destiny of Dasein in the community of the people, shows that this belief was already in place as of 1927.>>

AFF: Heidegger = Nazi (AT: Philosophy Separate from Politics)

Heidegger competed with Schmitt to be the spiritual leader of Hitler's movement- His ontological relationship with being is what justified his support of Nazism.

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<<In fact, it is the entirety of Heideggerian doctrine that is implicated in this teaching of Nazi politics: in the lecture he equates, in effect, the ontological relationship between Being and beings with the political relationship between the State and the people! He declares, in fact, that "the State is to its people what Being is to beings." It is a question, he says, introducing the eros of Führer State into the souls of the people. As in State, Movement, People—the most radically Nazi of Carl Schmitt's books—one must bring everything back to "the living bond" of racial essence that unites the Führer and his people. Heideggerian identification of Being with the völkisch State, with the Führer State, is total. He affirms, in effect, in the conclusion of his seminar, that "the State is the most substantive reality that must give a new sense, an original sense, to the totality of Being." Moreover, it would be difficult to find a more radical exaltation of the total domination of Hitlerism over the minds of the people. After having made the tribute to "völkisch destiny" and to the eros of the people for the Führer State, Heidegger describes how "the essence and the superiority of the Führer have inscribed themselves in the Being and souls of the people in order to bind them primordially and passionately to the task." The faith Heidegger manifests in his lectures leads, in fact, to a total possession of the human being, subjugated body and soul, by the Hitlerian Führung. In the other unedited seminar published in partial form in chapter 8 of my book, Heidegger affirms in 1935, that the Nazi State will last longer than 100 years. So the goal of his lectures in this instance is to reinforce the notion of the Reich's duration over the long-term. In these two seminars as well, he explicitly refers to Carl Schmitt and his concept of the political. According to Heidegger, Schmitt's distinction between friend and foe is not close enough to the source. Like Alfred Baeumler, Heidegger identifies the political with the self-preservation, (Selbstbehauptung) the people and the race. Thus, he can affirm that his concept of the political is "original" while Schmitt's is simply derivative. This does not mean that Heidegger completely rejects Schmitt's doctrine, since he embraces Schmitt's friend/foe distinction. Nor is it possible to speak of breaking new philosophical ground in this instance, because the concept of self-preservation, taken from Spengler, Baeumler and from Heidegger's own rectorate speech, is trivial. Heidegger's comments on Schmitt are, in reality, the expression of an effort on his part to affirm his supremacy over Schmitt, to claim for himself the role of the true spiritual Führer of the movement. [End Page 59]>>

Heidegger explicitly incorporated his philosophy to support racism and Nazism- Your alternative is an example of this

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As discussed, my study of Heidegger is not restricted to the years 1933–1935. Previously, I had assumed that this period (1933–1935) represented the culminating moment of Heidegger's Nazism. In fact, the period from 1939–1942 was blacker still. During the latter period, "racial selection" and "racial thought" would become guiding themes in the lectures on Nietzsche as they are reedited in the so-called definitive edition, in a text from 1939–1940 entitled Koinon (GA 69), and in his writings on Junger that have recently been published (Zu Ernst Junger, GA 90). Heidegger goes so far as to affirm that "racial selection is metaphysically necessary," that "racial thought springs from the experience of the Being as subjectivity." Within this context, Heidegger does not hesitate to speak of "the not-yet-purified German essence." In some of the ways in which he uses the word metaphysics, it is impossible to deny that he intends not a moral approval of Nazism—like Nietzsche, Heidegger situates himself outside all moral judgements—but an ontological and historical legitimization of Nazi racism. Furthermore, the word Legitimization is also at the heart of his meditation on Junger's Nietzscheanism (cf. for example GA 90, 170).

AFF: Work Within the System

The way to criticize the undemocratic powers that make democracies un-democratic is to insert more democracy through criticism of undemocratic principles

Zizek '8 – Lady killing suave machine

("In defense of lost causes" p.104-106)//Collin //jrc

Here, however, in this parallel between the two couples of democracy/ anti-democracy and state/people, Brown's argumentation becomes caught up in a strange symptomatic dynamic of reversals: while democracy needs anti-democratic critique to remain alive, to shake its false certainties, the democratic state needs the democratic resistance of the people, not anti-democratic resistance. Does Brown not confound here two (or, rather, a whole series of) resistances to the democratic state: the anti-democratic "elitist" theoreticians' resistance (Plato-Nietzsche-Heidegger), and popular-democratic resistance against the insufficiently democratic character of the state? Furthermore, is not each of these two kinds of resistance accompanied by its dark shadowy double: brutal cynical elitism that justifies those in power; the violent outbursts of the rabble? And what if the two join hands, what if we have anti-democratic resistance of the people themselves» ("authoritarian populism")? Furthermore, does Brown not dismiss all too lightly anti-democratic theorists such as Nietzsche as proposing "unliveable" critiques of democracy? How do we respond to the coming-about of a regime that endeavors to "live" them, such as Nazism? Is it not too simple to relieve Nietzsche of responsibility by claiming that the Nazis distorted his thought? Of course they did, but so did Stalinism distort Marx, for every theory changes (is "betrayed") in its practico-political application, and the Hegelian point to be made here is that, in such cases, the "truth" is not simply on the side of theory -what if the attempt to actualize a theory renders visible the objective content of this theory, concealed from the gaze of the theorist itself? . The weakness of Brown's description is perhaps that she locates the undemocratic ingredient that keeps democracy alive only in the "crazy" theoreticians questioning its foundations from "unliveable" premises - but what about the very real undemocratic elements that sustain democracy? Does therein not reside the major premise of Foucault's (Brown's major reference) analyses of modern power: democratic power has to be sustained by a complex network of controlling and regulating mechanisms? In his Note Towards a Definition of Culture, T. S. Eliot, that archetypal "noble conservative," convincingly argued that a strong aristocratic class is a necessary ingredient of a feasible democracy: the highest cultural values can only thrive if they are transmitted through a complex and continuous familial and group background. So when Brown claims that "democracy requires antidemocratic critique in order to remain democratic," a liberal conservative would deeply agree in their warnings against "deMOREcracy": there should be a tension in the opposition between the state and democracy, a state should not simply be dissolved in democracy, it should retain the excess of unconditional power over the people, the firm rule of law, to prevent its own dissolution. If the state, democratic though it may be, is not sustained by this specter of the unconditional exercise of power, it does not have the authority to function: power is, by definition, in excess, or else it is not power. The question here is: who is supplementing whom? Is democracy a supplement to fundamentally non-democratic state power, or is undemocratic theory a supplement to democracy? At what point is the predicate inverted with the subject? Furthermore, apropos "stopping the sliding of meaning," does non-democratic theory as a rule not articulate its horror at democracy precisely because it perceives it as too "sophistic" (for Plato ...), too involved in the sliding of meaning, so that theory, far from reproaching democracy for the fixity of meaning, desperately wants to impose a stable order on social life? And, furthermore, is this "incessant sliding of meaning" not something that is already a feature of the capitalist economy itself which, in its contemporary dynamic, raises to new heights Marx's old description of its dissolvent power on all fixed identities? The "homoeopathic" logic evoked by Brown is thus ambiguous. On the one hand, the remedy against an ossified democracy is theoretical anti-democratic critique which shatters its certainties and rejuvenates it. But, at the same time, there is the opposite homoeopathy: as the saying goes, the only true remedy against the obvious democratic ills is more democracy. This defense of democracy is a variation of Churchill's famous quip that it is the worst of all systems, the only qualification being that there is none better: the democratic project is inconsistent, in its very notion an "unfinished project," but its very "paradox" is its strength, a guarantee against totalitarian temptation. Democracy includes its imperfection in its very notion, which is why the only cure against democratic deficiencies is more democracy. Thus all the dangers that lurk in democracy can be understood as grounded in these constitutive inconsistencies of the democratic project, as ways of dealing with these inconsistencies, but with the price that, in trying to get rid of the imperfections of democracy, of its non-democratic ingredients, we inadvertently lose democracy itself-recall simply how the populist appeal to a direct expression of the people's General Will, bypassing all particular interests and petty conflicts, ends up stifling democratic life itself. In a Hegelian mode, one is thus tempted to classify Brown's version as the extreme aggravation of the "democratic paradox" to the point of direct self-inconsistency. What, then, would be the (re)solution of this opposition between "thesis" (Lacan as a theorist of democracy) and "antithesis" (Lacan as its internal critic)? We suggest that it is the risky but necessary gesture of rendering problematic the very notion of "democracy," of moving elsewhere-of having the courage to elaborate a positive Liveable project "beyond democracy."

AFF: Alt → Genocide

Heideggers goals for the structure of a Western society can only be achieved through genocide- those who do not subscribe to the law of the West are a threat and must be eliminated

Desmond, 1997 (David, "Martin Heidegger: What Kind of Nazi?", <http://evans-experientialism.freewebspace.com/desmond.htm>, REQ)

[Heidegger's] involvement with Nazism lacked depth, and his withdrawal from it was so muted as to be imperceptible. There was evasion perhaps, followed by amnesia... we learn precious little from his thought about the dilemmas of his time. That is the real case against him. 24 Perhaps the most interesting pursuit of this crime of dereliction of duty is offered by Jean-François Lyotard in his book "Heidegger and 'the jews.'" Lyotard put "the jews" in lower case because they represent more than just the Jewish people, he used the term "jews" because the Jews are the most prominent or identifiable of the group. "The jews" are the Jews, the blacks, the homeless, the gypsies, the Arabs and all those who are supranational. These people never really assimilate into the national character. They hold allegiance to no particular country. By attempting to eliminate "the jews" (particularly the Jews and gypsies), the Nazis attempted to eliminate the unrepresentable which "the jews" represent, argues Lyotard. The Jews and other non-conformists remind the West that we are "obligated before being free, other before being the same."25 Lyotard seems to be saying that the West wants so badly to build on scientific, rational, secular philosophical ground that it wants to be rid of its failures and its competition. Those peoples who cannot be brought into the fold of a nation, those who have a way of life predicated on an unseeable, untouchable Other, are a reminder of the failure of the West. Or worse, they are a threat. "The jews'...testify [to the] misery [and] servitude... which remains unfinished."26 The Nazis wanted no such reminder. Just as Yahweh had demanded the Hebrews discard their idols for Him, now the West wanted "the jews" to discard their "Other" for the Law of the West. The Nazis considered the Jews the biggest threat because they witnessed the first terror of the Occident (Yahweh's domination). The Nazis were initiating the second terror of the Occident (the Third Reich) and had to rid the world of the witnesses to the first. Lyotard's approach is an amazing expansion of Sluga's charge of forgetting. Lyotard believes "any deduction...of Heidegger's Nazism from the text of Sein und Zeit is impossible."27 He bases his condemnation of Heidegger not on his degree of support for Hitler or Nazism, but on his silence on the Holocaust. Heidegger espoused the thinker, the writer as "the guardian of the memory of forgetting."28 But Heidegger forgot the Holocaust. Heidegger appreciated the artist or poet who attempted to represent the unrepresentable, while at the same time acknowledging his inability to accomplish the task. The thinker and writer has the same responsibility and the same humility. The Holocaust is something which is unrepresentable. Words cannot do the event justice. But it is the thinker/writer's duty to try, and acknowledge his inadequacy at the same time. Survivors of the Holocaust often shy away from discussing it because they know the only ones who can do the event justice are the ones who are not here to discuss it. Thinkers/writers attempt to relate what cannot be related because it is their lot in life to ensure the forgotten is remembered. Heidegger believed this, yet he was silent on the Holocaust. This, Lyotard asserts, was Heidegger's crime. Heidegger "lent to extermination" not his hand and not even his thought but his silence and nonthought...he 'forgot' the extermination."29

AFF: Alt → Extinction/Kills Value to Life

The alternative causes human extinction and destroys our value to life --- using nature as a resource is critical to survival and exercising our moral right to live for our own sake

Berliner, 8 (Michael S., P.h.D in philosophy from Boston University cochairman of the board of directors of the Ayn Rand Institute, The Danger of Environmentalism, 4/18, Ayn Rand Institute,

http://www.aynrand.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=8403&news_iv_ctrl=2457) **we disagree with any gendered language used

Earth Day approaches, and with it **a grave danger faces mankind**. The danger is not from acid rain, global warming, smog, or the logging of rain forests, as environmentalists would have us believe. **The danger to mankind is from environmentalism**. The fundamental goal of environmentalism is not clean air and clean water; rather, it is the demolition of technological/industrial civilization. Environmentalism's goal is not the advancement of human health, human happiness, and human life; rather, it is a subhuman world where **"nature" is worshipped like the totem of some primitive religion**. In a nation founded on the pioneer spirit, environmentalists have made "development" an evil word. They inhibit or prohibit the development of Alaskan oil, offshore drilling, nuclear power--and every other practical form of energy. Housing, commerce, and jobs are sacrificed to spotted owls and snail darters. Medical research is sacrificed to the "rights" of mice. Logging is sacrificed to the "rights" of trees. No instance of the progress that brought man out of the cave is safe from the onslaught of those "protecting" the environment from man, whom they consider a rapist and despoiler by his very essence. **Nature, they insist, has "intrinsic value," to be revered for its own sake, irrespective of any benefit to man**. As a consequence, **man is to be prohibited from using nature for his own ends**. Since nature supposedly has value and goodness in itself, any human action that changes the environment is necessarily immoral. Of course, environmentalists invoke the doctrine of intrinsic value not against wolves that eat sheep or beavers that gnaw trees; they invoke it only against man, only when man wants something. The ideal world of environmentalism is not twenty-first-century Western civilization; it is the Garden of Eden, a world with no human intervention in nature, a world without innovation or change, a world without effort, a world where survival is somehow guaranteed, a world where man has mystically merged with the "environment". Had the environmentalist mentality prevailed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, we would have had no Industrial Revolution, a situation that consistent environmentalists would cheer--at least those few who might have managed to survive without the life-saving benefits of modern science and technology. The expressed goal of environmentalism is to prevent man from changing his environment, from intruding on nature. That is why environmentalism is fundamentally anti-man. **Intrusion is necessary for human survival. Only by intrusion can man avoid pestilence and famine. Only by intrusion can man control his life and project long-range goals. Intrusion improves the environment, if by "environment" one means the surroundings of man--the external material conditions of human life**. Intrusion is a requirement of human nature. But in the environmentalists' paean to "Nature," **human nature is omitted**. For environmentalism, the "natural" world is a world without man. Man has no legitimate needs, but trees, ponds, and bacteria somehow do. They don't mean it? Heed the words of the consistent environmentalists. "The ending of the human epoch on Earth," writes philosopher Paul Taylor in *Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics*, "would most likely be greeted with a hearty 'Good riddance!'" In a glowing review of Bill McKibben's *The End of Nature*, biologist David M. Graber writes (Los Angeles Times, October 29, 1989): "Human happiness [is] not as important as a wild and healthy planet Until such time as Homo sapiens should decide to rejoin nature, some of us can only hope for the right virus to come along." Such is the naked essence of environmentalism: it mourns the death of one whale or tree but actually **welcomes the death of billions of people**. A more malevolent, man-hating philosophy is unimaginable. The guiding principle of environmentalism is self-sacrifice, the sacrifice of longer lives, healthier lives, more prosperous lives, more enjoyable lives, i.e., the sacrifice of human lives. But an individual is not born in servitude. He has a moral right to live his own life for his own sake. He has no duty to sacrifice it to the needs of others and certainly not to the "needs" of the nonhuman. To save mankind from environmentalism, what's needed is not the appeasing, compromising approach of those who urge a "balance" between the needs of man and the "needs" of the environment. To save mankind requires the wholesale rejection of environmentalism as hatred of science, technology, progress, and human life. To save mankind requires the return to a philosophy of reason and individualism, a philosophy that makes life on earth possible.

AFF: Democratic Liberalism Solves Biopower

Democratic liberal systems can check back biopolitical imperatives

Dean, 2k- Sociologist at Macquarie University (Mitchell, "Always Look on the Dark Side: Politics and the Meaning of Life", <http://apsa2000.anu.edu.au/confpapers/dean.rtf>).JRC

In a passage from the latter, Foucault shows that the genocidal character of National Socialism did not simply arise from its extension of bio-power (1979, 149-50). Nazism was concerned with the total administration of the life, of the family, of marriage, procreation, education and with the intensification of disciplinary micro-powers. But it articulated this with another set of features concerned with 'the oneiric exaltation of a superior blood', of fatherland, and of the triumph of the race. In other words, if we are to understand how the most dramatic forces of life and death were unleashed in the twentieth century, we have to understand how bio-power was articulated with elements of sovereignty and its symbolics. *Pace* Bauman, it is not simply the development of instrumental rationality in the form of modern bio-power, or a bureaucratic power applied to life that makes the Holocaust possible. It is the system of linkages, re-codings and re-inscriptions of sovereign notions of fatherland, territory, and blood within the new bio-political discourses of eugenics and racial hygiene that makes the unthinkable thinkable.

The fact that all modern states must articulate elements of sovereignty with bio-politics also allows for a virtuous combination. The virtue of liberal and democratic forms of government is that they deploy two instruments to check the unfettered imperatives of bio-power, one drawn from political economy and the other from sovereignty itself (cf. Foucault, 1997a, 73-9). Liberalism seeks to review the imperative to govern too much by pointing to the quasi-natural processes of the market or of the exchanges of commercial society that are external to government. To govern economically means to govern through economic and other social processes external to government and also to govern in an efficient, cost-effective way. Liberalism also invokes the freedom and rights of a new subject – the sovereign individual. By 'governing through freedom' and in relation to freedom, advanced liberal democracies are able to differentiate their bio-politics from that of modern totalitarian states and older police states. This view is found in certain of the 'governmentality' writers. According to Nikolas Rose (1999: 23), for example, 'without the controls exercised by liberal concerns with limited government and individual freedoms, the despotism of the state that is always an immanent presence in all governmentalities is manifest in all its bloody rationality'.

AFF: Alt Can't Solve Alt Energy

Heidegger's alternative is intellectual stupidity – advancing environmentally friendly technologies is the best solution.

Ridling 1 [Zaine Ridling, Ph.D., Columbus University, Access Foundation, "THE LIGHTNESS OF BEING: A COMPREHENSIVE STUDY OF HEIDEGGER'S THOUGHT," <http://hudsoncress.org/html/library/western-philosophy/Heidegger%20-%20Lightness%20of%20Being%20Zaine%20Riddling.pdf>] // LDK/JRC

One of the dominant themes of the later Heidegger is the critique of technology. Tracing the danger of contemporary technology back to its essence in the enframing mind-set of metaphysics, his figuration of the Foulfold of earth, sky, mortals and gods might seem to offer away of envisaging the world that could break the grip of technological thinking and prepare us for a post- technological era. Yet although Heidegger's rhetoric clearly invokes many of the anxieties aroused by the contemporary environmental crisis, his concern with the essence rather than with the fact of technology might seem to result in a situation parallel to that of his relation to religion – i.e., that his is a policy of deliberate non-involvement in the "merely" ontic, the level on which the day-to- day decisions of societies as well as individuals operate. Even if there are passages that suggest that his preoccupation with the essence of technology was in the cause of preparing humanity to face the challenge of assuming responsibility for technology, the very fact that many of his reflections on technology come from the period of his inner emigration and his retreat from the public world of political decision-making makes it all the more difficult to see how what he has to say might help us in the face of environmental degradation and devastation. There is a real difficulty here, both in understanding the exact thrust of Heidegger's argument and in relating his insights to what we might regard as the needs of the present. If one of his complaints against Nazism was that it finally failed to confront the issue of technology, does not his own refusal to engage with the practicalities of technology also amount to failure? Heidegger himself liked to quote Hölderlin's line "Where danger is, grows also that which saves," and is it not the case that, if technology itself is creating a danger for humanity and for the whole biosphere, only science and technology can save us? Indeed, is not it geographers, biologists, chemists, botanists and other scientists who have done most to alert us to the catastrophic potential of many current industrial practices? And is not it precisely a better scientific understanding of what is going on that will best prepare us for the most appropriate technological response? Solar panels, wind farms, insulation systems, cleaner cars, and other "green" initiatives all depend on the application of science, rather than its abandonment. Surely the further development of such technologies is more important than musing about the metaphysical foundations of enframing?

Looking at it like this, we might conclude that Heidegger's strategy is, bluntly, one of intellectual surrender, a failure to engage with what is most existentially pressing in the concrete reality of our contemporary destiny. Do we not, as in the case of religion, have to say that actual life is lived on the plane of the ontic, and involves wrestling with particular decisions and accepting particular responsibilities? It might be objected that, whether we are talking about religion, politics, or technology, the distinction between the ontic and the ontological does not of itself involve neglecting the former. It does not have to be a matter of either/or.

We do not have to stop being religious in order to reflect on the ontological structures disclosed by the religious life, and many theologians have chosen to follow Heidegger in, as they see it, seeking an ontological anchor for the exigencies of the religious life as it is lived. Similarly, it would not seem necessary to suspend our efforts to solve particular environmental problems until we have succeeded in refiguring the world in a post-technological way. So, Heidegger need not be construed as saying that there is no point in doing what we can while we can to improve things in the here and now. Is not his position rather one of giving unto Caesar's that which is Caesar's – i.e., of warning against assuming that the immediate problems of today and tomorrow are the only things that should concern us?

AFF: Alt Can't Solve – Metaphysics

The alternative returns to totalizing metaphysics, only the perm solves by using modernity to bring itself down, a risk of a link is outweighed by superior solvency

Vattimo, 03 (Gianni Vattimo, Philosophy Professor, University of Turin, and member of the EU Parliament, *Nihilism & Emancipation*, Edited Satiago Zabala, Translated William McCuaig, pg. 10-12)

The ambiguity of the very notion of the postmodern is linked to this fact. Postmodernity is both a normative ideals and a descriptive or interpretive notion. We have already seen that from the perspective of the epochal essence of Being, thought has no source of legitimation beyond the effective aperture of being within which it finds itself thrown (the awareness that many epochs have preceded this one, i.e., of the Ge-Schick, also belongs to this aperture). Here lies the peculiar nature, and also the specific risk, of Heidegger's philosophy: having recognized for modern rationalization, its violence, and its fragmentizing effect on the significance of existence, **it is no longer possible to think that escape from this condition of "alienation" might be achieved through some kind of "critical" thought, which could only arise through reliance upon another first principle, another arche, and thus a foundation.** In that case **we would still be imprisoned within metaphysics and so within modernity and its violence.** If thought and existence of a postmodern (postmetaphysical) kind are to be possible at all, then this possibility must in some fashion arise as an outcome of modernity itself, since we cannot get there by clasp onto some novel principle still legitimated in essential, structural, metaphysical terms. **Thought prepares the overcoming of metaphysics only by responding to a call from within the very situation that must be overcome.** For philosophy, **this entails the risk of becoming the apology** for whatever is (the radical objection made against Heidegger by Adorno in the chapter on "ontological need" in *The Negative Dialectic*) **but it is a risk that has to be run, otherwise the overcoming remains an empty word.** **At this point, our "ontology of actuality" assumes the status of a mission,** that of revealing, within the aperture of Being typical of modernity, the traits of a new aperture **which would have among its constitutive characteristics the possibility of a reconstruction of the unitary sense of existence beyond the specialization and fragmentation proper to modernity.**

AFF: Alt → Violence

The alternative breaks down moral systems and justifies widespread violence

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(Kelley R, <http://www.friesian.com/rockmore.htm>)/markoff

<The problem with the Nazis, according to Heidegger, was not that they terrorized and murdered people, and started World War II, but that they had the wrong attitude towards metaphysics. Whether they would have still been murderers if they had the right metaphysics is a good question. One of the most disturbing things about Heidegger's thought is that the murders -- or even the public thuggery that he could have seen in the earliest days of the Third Reich -- don't really seem to have disturbed him all that much. It was not the murders or the public mayhem that discredited "existing" Naziism but simply the wrong attitude towards philosophy, i.e. Heidegger himself. The most damning accusation, however, is just that Naziism was a form of **liberalism**!

We are already familiar with Heidegger's frequent assertions, common in claims of orthodoxy, with respect to the views of Kant, Nietzsche, and Jünger, that only he, Heidegger, has understood them. Here [in the *Introduction to Metaphysics*], he makes a similar claim with respect to Nazism. For Heidegger evidently thought of himself as the only "orthodox" Nazi, as the only one able to understand the essence of National Socialism... To the best of my knowledge there is nothing in the public record to suggest that Heidegger was at all sensitive to the human suffering wreaked by Nazism, in fact sensitive to human beings in more than an abstract sense. [p.240] Heidegger is not a moralist and does not have anything like a theory or system of moral principles. It is not clear how a prohibition of murder would even be grounded in his system. A "resolute" and "authentic" murderer actually sounds pretty good. >

Heidegger's philosophy justifies totalitarianism and racism – even good intentions are coopted by the modern left

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<Heidegger's Germanism, then, is the functional equivalent of, and not so different from, **Nazi racism**. But what is the positive connection between this and his philosophical thought? That is the key question. There are at least four ways in which there is a connection: (1) the here and now of **Dasein**, (2) the revolutionary "uncovering" of Being in Time, (3) the conservatism of the idea that his "uncovering" is a return to a purer past, and (4) the collectivist authoritarianism of Heidegger's notions of freedom and authenticity. Heidegger's original approach to Being was as being is manifest in the "here and now" -- Dasein, being (*sein*) here (*da*). This introduces a positivistic, Hegelian ("the real is rational") aspect to any possible moral guidance from this system. The here and now in 1933 meant Adolf Hitler. The truth and greatness of National Socialism was an authentic "uncovering" of Being. When this didn't seem to work out, Being "withdrew" itself, according to Heidegger.

"The *Führer* himself and alone is today and in the future German reality and its law." [from the Rectoral Address, p.65]

The relative optimism present when he became rector was later transformed into a bleak pessimism about the possibility of surpassing what Heidegger, in the rectoral address, describes as "the forsakenness of modern man in the midst of what is." [p.216] Everything is now dominated by the will to power that holds sway in the space left through the withdrawal of Being, now present only in the mode of absence. [p.95]

If Hitler wasn't bad enough, the "withdrawal" of Being leaves the Nietzschean "might makes right" ethic of the Will to Power. Heidegger now argues that the suggestion that God is dead and the reduction of value to will, or nihilism, can be understood only in terms of the will to power, in his view the central concept of Nietzsche's philosophy. [p.93]

The "uncovering" of Being is a violent, irrational, revolutionary process. As this appealed to the irrationalism of fascists in the 30's, it appealed to the nihilists and irrationalists of the left from the 50's to the present. It is intensely romanticist in both groups.

Berlin's account of the antirationalistic, romantic approach to human life and action, including the problem of alienation, in the writings of Joseph de Maistre, an early forerunning of fascism, is an accurate description of the Volk-ideological approach to modern life which influenced Heidegger's own Nazi turning.... [p.38]

The entire effort [the Nietzsche lectures, "Letter on Humanism," *Beiträge zur Philosophie*, Hölderlin lectures, etc.] represents a strengthening of the antirationalist, even gnostic side of Heidegger's thought.... The incipient antirationalist side of his position is already evident in *Being and Time* in various ways, for instance in his insistence on the analysis of Dasein as prior to and apart from the various sciences (§ 10), in the antiscientific perspective of the work in general which Jaspers, for example, found objectionable, in the abandonment of the Husserlian conception of transcendental truth, on which

AFF: Alt → Violence

Heidegger insisted early in the book (§ 7) in favor of the view of truth as disclosure (§§ 44,68) and in the idea of resoluteness (§ 74). The conceptions of truth as disclosure and resoluteness are basically antirational since there are no criteria to discern the correctness of either one. [pp.126-127]

The irrationality of the "uncovering" of Being is an artifact of the unknowability of just what we are going to *get* from it. To find out what we are getting we have to *look* (at the Brown Shirts in the street), and to participate we have to be taken up into the *furor* of Being (in Heidegger's case, the *furor Teutonicus*). In the following quote we get a classic expression of "existence over essence" [Existentialism](#), later echoed by Sartre, with the "here and now" of Dasein, and the revolutionary characteristic of being *future* oriented.

Heidegger identifies two basic characteristics of Dasein: "the priority of *existentia* over *essentia* and the fact that Dasein is in each case mine." Unlike entities, or mere things, Dasein is intrinsically directed toward the future. It is essentially characterized by the fact that its "essence" lies in its 'to be' [Zu-sein.]." [p.44]

Since most people, especially leftists, like to think of fascism as essentially conservative, the revolutionary aspect of it tends to be overlooked. But fascism, especially Naziism, was something new. It used as much from Marxism as from traditional culture. This is why the artists of the Italian "Futurism" movement could end up as Fascists. A similar phenomenon could later be seen in [Irân](#), where the Islâmîc Revolution was intensely reactionary but also a novel event, with all the trappings of other 20th century revolutionary, "people's liberation" struggles. The Ayatollâh Khomeini certainly had much more in common with Fidel Castro than with [Jimmy Carter](#), despite the atheism of the former and the Born Again piety of the latter.

Besides the revolutionary aspect to fascism, there is also the conservative side. If the "here and now" means Germany and the German language, this is a history, a tradition:

Clearly, a heritage is what is transmitted from the past to later generations. For Heidegger, who here anticipates Gadamer's notion of the tradition as itself valuable, what is "good" is a heritage, since goodness makes authenticity possible, and goodness is transmitted in resoluteness. It follows, since authenticity is understood as the realization of the possibility that most intimately belong to the individual person, that such possibilities are by their nature traditional in character. There is, then, a fiercely conservative strain in Heidegger's view of self-realization as the free choice of oneself, since to realize oneself, to resolutely seize the most intimate possibility available to one in choosing oneself, is finally to extend past tradition; for tradition itself is the vehicle of the "good." In a fundamental sense, the authenticity made possible by resoluteness is not innovative but repetitive in character; it is not the realization of what is new and unprecedented, but rather the repetition of a prior tradition which as such embodies "goodness." In a deep sense, for Heidegger to be authentic is to embrace or to repeat the past in one's own life through a reinstantiation of the tradition. Since Nazism claimed to embody the values of the authentic German, of the German Volk as German, there is, then, a profound parallel, providing for an easy transition without any compromise of basic philosophical principles, between Heidegger's conception of authenticity through resoluteness and National Socialism. [p.47]

The "good" as tradition not only fits into the positivist, Hegelian "here and now" as intrinsically valuable, but it also reflects a characteristic of the "uncovering" of Being. That is, Is the Being that is "uncovered" something new all the time, or is it the same Being that has always been? There appears, indeed, to be a primordial and authoritative Being. Each "uncovering" reveals the same, original Truth. That is the lesson of Heidegger's own investigation of the Presocratics. To him, the Greeks knew something and were more authentic than we moderns know or are now. Our own revolutionary activity, however radical, is thus essentially *revivalist* in character, a revival that is, however, independently inspired since it involves return to the same ontological point of origin. Past and future come together in a Dasein that is at once traditional and ancient but also revolutionary and futurist. This is why someone observed, after reading the Rectoral Address, that he didn't know whether it meant he was supposed to read the Presocratics or start goose-stepping.

Heidegger's conservatism is also reflected in his hostility to modernity, not just in the form of liberal democracy, but in the form of science and technology and commercial culture. This is another area where he appeals to modern leftists, who not only want a socialist mandarinism, run by themselves, rather than liberal democracy, but who are also constitutionally hostile to science, which depends on criteria far harder than their own self-persuasive rhetorical sophistries, and to technology and commerce, which are not only similarly hard edged but have done far more to improve the life of most people than the chatter of Marxist dialectics ever has. >

AFF: Alt → Violence

The world of the alternative is one in which violent and hubristic forces take over, perpetuating the violence the alternative seeks to solve.

Zimmerman - Professor of philosophy at Tulane – 1996 (Michael E., “The Death of God at Auschwitz?” - article in Martin Heidegger and the Holocaust, ed. By Alan Milchman and Alan Rosenberg, p.255-56)

Heidegger himself, by refusing to speak of the horrors to which National Socialism led, by refusing to acknowledge any moral responsibility for having helped to consolidate Nazi power at a crucial historical juncture, and by refusing to renounce unequivocally his support for Nazism, invited a skeptical response to his notion that genuine freedom involves submitting to the call of being. For Jews and Christians, such submission is appropriate not in respect to impersonal “being,” but only in respect to the personal biblical God, who commands people to love their neighbors as themselves. Submitting oneself to being, so Jews and Christians would argue, amounts to surrendering to merely temporal-historical forces, whose hubristic and violent record is all too clear. For those who retain a commitment to modernity’s emancipatory ideals, moreover, the idea of submitting to “the call of being” is all too consistent with anti-democratic, reactionary movements led by elites who-supposedly “inspired” by mysterious revelations-seek to save the world by re-mythologizing it.

AFF: Alt → Totalitarianism

Heidegger's belief in authenticity is totalitarian and expunges individualism

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(Kelley R, <http://www.friesian.com/rockmore.htm>) //markoff//JRC--no change

<In sum, Heidegger's pursuit of Being, as he understood it, led to Nazism, and could in fact **only** lead either to this or another form of antidemocratic, authoritarian political practice. [p.72]

In his remarks [in the *Beträge*] on "The essence of the people and Da-sein," Heidegger returns to his conviction that only the few can provide a people with its identity. For Heidegger, who here makes use of a notion of plural authenticity originally mentioned in *Being and Time*, a people only is one when it receives its unifying idea and so returns to Being. [p.197]

The idea of the *Volk* as an authentic community, which Heidegger takes over from German *Volksideologie* and grounds philosophically in *Being and Time* in his conception of plural authenticity, remains a permanent part of his position throughout its later development. Beginning with the rectoral address, Heidegger continues to hold one or more versions of the venerable Platonic view that philosophy can found politics as the necessary condition of the good life, as the real presupposition of the radiant future. Heidegger never abandoned the familiar philosophical conviction in the cognitive privilege of philosophy, what after the turning in his position became new thought, with its familiar link to antidemocratic, totalitarian politics. [p.285]

Consider, for example, the following passage from an article by Ernst Krieck, a leading philosophical theoretician of the Nazi *Weltanschauung*:

The revolutionary upheaval made itself known in a displacement of emphasis. Instead of the individual person, the *völkische* whole is central, as a result of which the basic reality of life comes into view.... The individual does not arrive at his worldview through reason according to his individual situation and inclination to arbitrariness and choice. Rather, we are subject to the movement of forces over us and directed in common. We do not seize, but we are seized and driven.

...and if the only metaphysical people is the German people which alone can know Being as the true heirs of the Greeks, then there is an easy, obvious transition from Heidegger's ontology to the concern with the German *Volk*. [pp.286-287]

For Heidegger, who now distantly echoes his conception of freedom as submission to authority in the rectoral address, freedom is unrelated to will in any way. He insists that one becomes free in belonging to the area of destiny as someone who listens (*ein Hörender*) not as someone who obeys (*ein Höriger*). [p.227]

For Heidegger as for Nietzsche, the essence of the people is grounded in the few exceptional human beings. Like Kant, who held that the philosopher is the lawgiver of human reason [?!], Heidegger apparently believed that only a "philosopher" could provide a new sense of direction in the age of nihilism. [p.199]

Rockmore makes a mistake here. For Kant, a philosopher is the lawgiver of human reason only because *everyone* is. Reason, which is available to all rational beings, enables them all to be morally autonomous. Heidegger, like Hegel, is not in this tradition. He is elitist and authoritarian, like Hegel, not liberal and individualist, like Kant. To Hegel, this made Kant "irrational." To Heidegger, it would make Kant merely an inauthentic "liberal."

At present [the *Der Spiegel* interview, 1966], he is unconvinced that democracy is adequate as a political system in a technological age. Heidegger here draws the political consequence of his later conception of Being as the real historical agent. [p.205]

This is one of the most revealing admissions ever by Heidegger. His illiberal, authoritarian principles simply never changed. The only reason that there is no Führer in 1966 is that Being has "withdrawn" itself. >

AFF: PoMo → Police State

Postmodern criticism's are repackaged communist K's that will lead to police states

Ross, 2k - philosophy at Los Angeles Valley College

(Kelley R, <http://www.friesian.com/rockmore.htm>)//markoff//JRC

<Nothing is so trendy today as "post-modernism," which is largely a repackaging of nihilism and Marxism, a Nietzschean will to power which is hostile to almost everything characteristic of modern commercial culture. This is now folded together with an extreme environmentalism which sees the miserable poverty of say, Castro's Cuba, as a noble and virtuous "ecotopia." That such regimes are now demonstrably worse for the environment than free market development cannot dent the stubborn vision that using "natural resources" freely is bad for the future and for the planet. This general hostility to technology, wealth, and development is one of the key areas where everything that Heidegger hoped for from the Nazis is all but indistinguishable from what contemporary "progressive" academics and intellectuals want from the totalitarian, thought controlling police state that they constantly promote. "Modernity," meaning all the trappings of science, wealth, and freedom, is a dirty word among the modern leftist anointed. >

AFF: Democracy Impact Turn

Weak ontology key to democracy

Vattimo, 03 (Gianni Vattimo, Philosophy Professor, University of Turin, and member of the EU Parliament, *Nihilism & Emancipation*, Edited Santiago Zabala, Translated William McCuaig, pg. 18-20)

In very general terms, the answer is that a weak ontology, or better an ontology of the weakening of Being, supplies philosophical reasons for preferring a liberal, tolerant, and democratic society rather than an authoritarian and totalitarian one. This is not a negligible result, at least in the sense that it may help to strip away the theoretical attractiveness of the authoritarian and "decisionist" impulses that periodically recur (one thinks of the popularity of a thinker like Carl Schmitt in recent European culture, even among liberals and socialists) and that react with impatience and indifference to any philosophy that is trying to "found" tolerance and democracy. I do not believe that pragmatism and neopragmatism supply sufficiently "strong" reasons to justify the choice of democracy, nonviolence, and tolerance. This observation, I note in passing, may not apply to a thinker like Richard Rorty, who would never expect philosophy to furnish good reasons for choosing democracy and tolerance. On the contrary, he would expect that the fact that we do prefer to live in a tolerant and democratic society is reason enough for us finally to abandon metaphysics and maybe even philosophy itself. It might, however, be objected against Rorty that the kind of self-psychoanalysis of philosophy that he offers in *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, with the aim of ridding current philosophy of its metaphysical heritage, is never fully accomplished; it is an interminable analysis. We still require an ontology, if for no other purpose than to demonstrate that ontology is headed toward disintegration.

AFF: Permutation Solvency

Perm solves – nobody can master ontological questioning, only integrating carefully thought-out forms of technology into the alternative opens up space for change

Thiele 95 – Professor of Political Science at University of Florida (Leslie Paul, *Timely Meditations*, pgs. 211-212)//markoff

Heidegger summarizes the problem and intimates its resolution: "The coming to presence of technology threatens revealing, threatens it with the possibility that all revealing will be consumed in ordering and that everything will present itself only in the unconcealedness of standing-reserve. Human activity can never directly counter this danger. Human achievement alone can never banish it. But human reflection can ponder the fact that all saving power must be of a higher essence than what is endangered, though at the same time kindred to it" (QT 33-34). Here Heidegger observes that **we cannot simply ransom our escape from en-framing with a hefty tribute of coins bearing our own image.** Enframing cannot be brought under control through willfulness. Certainly machines and techniques, their production and use, can and should be harnessed. But the essence of technology, unlike technical devices, is not susceptible to willful mastery. Like the attempt to reduce one's level of intolerance by liquidating those individuals found overly objectionable, the attempt to master enframing is self-defeating. The problem of technology is one of willfulness itself. In other words, technology is symptomatic of a subjectivist and anthropomorphic enframing of the world. Retouching the picture is not an adequate response.

E. F. Schumacher insightfully compared "people of the forward stampede" with the "home-comers." The former believe that technological fixes exist for each and every problem. Theirs is a world wherein the solution to the problems that human mastery confronts or creates is always more mastery. The latter, in contrast, seek to care for an earthly habitat and its boundaries without recourse to technological panaceas. Theirs is a world of waiting that is active and watchful but not willful. Despite Heidegger's characterization of this activity as a waiting for gods, religion does not come into the picture. It is therefore mistaken, I believe, to characterize homecoming, as Schumacher does, in religious terms—as a product of "deep convictions" and a "return to certain basic truths about man and his world" that may be unearthed from gospel." Homecoming, as Heidegger understands it, is most fundamentally a returning not to basic truths but to basic questions, not to religious faith but to ontological interrogation.

Neither heroic action nor religious faith can overcome enframing and deliver us from our technological addictions. Only a nonwillful doing grounded in reflective thinking will avail. Thought, however, **is not in the business of overcoming.** It only summons. Although the technological world is full of quandaries and challenges, thought can provide no answers. But it does keep questioning alive. And once the nature of modern technology is brought into question, its hold is loosened.

Permutation solves – we can utilize technology in a less dangerous way

Thiele 95 – Professor of Political Science at University of Florida (Leslie Paul, *Timely Meditations*, pg. 216)//markoff

Heidegger's description of the "wonderfully simple and relaxed" way we may come to abide with technology recalls, and reverses, Max Weber's gloomy assessment. We may, pace Weber, learn to wear technology "like a light cloak, which can be thrown aside at any moment." Learning this comportment allows us to escape fate's decree that "the cloak should become an iron cage." Many theorists of technology, such as Jacques Ellul, follow Weber's lead in yielding to pessimism and cynicism. This attitude follows necessarily from their philosophic assumptions. Not unlike Heidegger, Ellul defines technology (or rather technique) as the pursuit of "absolute efficiency." Ellul also proposes that the only hope of escape from the clutches of technology comes from "an increasing number of people" who are determined to "assert their freedom." However, for Ellul, as for Weber, freedom remains a metaphysical concept tied to subjectivity and control. Hence the hopelessness of Ellul's and Weber's prognosis. Neither the pessimism or cynicism of the naysayers nor the heroic self-assertion or complacency of the yea-sayers is called for. **We may say both "yes" and "no" to technology.**

AFF: Permutation Solvency

Perm Solves: working within the system is critical to solve the alt. Total rejection is impossible.

Rohkrämer, 05 – History and Philosophy professor at Lancaster University (Thomas, How Green Were the Nazis: Martin Heidegger, National Socialism, and Environmentalism, p. 184-5)

Heidegger's topic was, then, rather common, but the grounding within the framework of Heidegger's philosophy made it highly original. Whereas previous cultural critics saw technology either as a tool that humans have to learn to use properly for the right purposes or as a demonic force that threatens to enslave humankind, Heidegger broke with them over the idea of regarding either humans or technology as autonomous agents. Humans are not transcendent subjects who use technology freely as a tool, but have been born into and shaped by the technical world. On the other hand, technology cannot be an autonomous agent either: this view, a misplaced personification, ignores the fact that humans created the technical world, that they are part of it and have developed a "technological mentality" within the process of technological modernization.

If all this is the case, then we cannot study technology from the outside or step out of the technological world, because its logic is part of our fundamental thought structure. Heidegger thus maintained his argument from "The Age of the World Picture" that our whole horizon of truth is scientific and technological; consequently, we cannot "unchoose" technology, as this would involve stepping out of the life-world that is historically given to us. Our horizon of truth makes us think and act technologically; we may work on realizing the limitations of this perspective, which Heidegger came to regard as imposing a partial blindness, and on altering this way of seeing the world, but we cannot simply step out of it.

Their author flows aff. Science should not be all together eliminated, rather it should simply refine and confine itself.

Roddey, '2 – Engineering Programs Manager at the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station

(Martin Heidegger: "technique and the turn") // CP

5. Where do you agree with the author? Where do you disagree?

Heidegger makes several salient points to which one can easily agree. He also finds agency in the poet Robert Frost who wrote, "The world is too much with us late and soon." Man has adapted technology in seemingly infinite ways as a means to his ends: making life easier, more comfortable, more leisured and making work hours more productive. In the wake of this mad rush to solve our "problems" we have created toxic waste dumps in school playgrounds, polluted the rivers and streams that supply our drinking water, created nuclear waste that requires tens of thousands of years to decay to harmless levels, and developed enough nuclear weapons to destroy the planet several thousand times again.

Conversely, without scientific investigation the cures for such crippling ailments as Polio, Tetanus, Small Pox, Diphtheria, and Rubella – diseases rarely contracted in modern society – would surely have escaped discovery. It is hard to argue against the utility of instant communication anywhere in the world via cell phones or internet, although the fact that they are a necessity in the lives of most of us is the very problem Heidegger addresses.

Heidegger states, "...the beginning of the modern science of nature lies in the seventeenth century." [430] However, there is broad agreement within the scientific community that the ancient Egyptians were a technological society. In constructing the pyramids, their mathematics derived pi (π) to within five decimal places. Archeological surveys revealed that they constructed electrical "cells" (batteries) employing metal strands as electrodes and using berry juice as the electrolytic solution. In addition, skulls retrieved from some of these digs have yielded skulls that were "surgically altered", leading to the conclusion that there was an interest in determining the inner workings of the human brain or that the scientific technology of brain surgery existed at the time. In another example, sociological investigations revealed that some African tribes charted stars in our galaxy that were not even visible in Galileo's telescope. Is not their interest in extraterrestrial knowledge considered modern science? In any event, the view that modern science began in the 17th century is purely Eurocentric and baseless.

AFF: Permutation (Paradox)

Permutation – mix of critical reflection and calculative thought opens a paradox that solves the alternative

McWhorter, 92 – Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Northeast Missouri State University
(Ladelle, Heidegger and the Earth, ed. by Ladelle McWhorter)//JRC—no change

<Heidegger's work is a call to reflect, to think in some way other than calculatively, technologically, pragmatically. Once we begin to move with and into Heidegger's call and begin to see our trying to seize control and solve problems as itself a problematic approach, if we still believe that thinking's only real purpose is to function as a prelude to action, we who attempt to think will twist within the agonizing grip of paradox, feeling nothing but frustration, unable to conceive of ourselves as anything but paralyzed. However, as so many peoples before us have known, paradox IS not only a trap; it is also a scattering point and passageway. Paradox invites examination of its own constitution (hence of the patterns of thinking within which it occurs) and thereby breaks a way of thinking open, revealing the configurations of power that propel it and hold it on track. And thus it makes possible the dissipation of that power and the deflection of thinking into new paths and new possibilities.>

Cap Unsustainable

Capitalism is unsustainable- 4 reasons

Zizek '8 – Lady killing suave machine

("In defense of lost causes" p.421-424)//Collin Poirot//jrc

It is easy to make fun of Fukuyama's notion of the End of History, but the dominant ethos today is "Fukuyamaian": liberal-democratic capitalism is accepted as the finally found formula of the best possible society, all that one can do is render it more just, tolerant, and so forth. The only true question today is: do we endorse this "naturalization" of capitalism, or does contemporary global capitalism contain antagonisms which are sufficiently strong to prevent its indefinite reproduction? Let us cite four such antagonisms:

1. Ecology: in spite of the infinite adaptability of capitalism which, in the case of an acute ecological catastrophe or crisis, can easily turn ecology into a new field of capitalist investment and competition, the very nature of the risk involved fundamentally precludes a market solution-why? Capitalism only works in precise social conditions: it implies trust in the objectivized/"reified" mechanism of the market's "invisible hand" which, as a kind of Cunning of Reason, guarantees that the competition of individual egotisms works for the common good. However, we are currently experiencing a radical change. Up until now, historical Substance-history as an objective process obeying certain laws-played out its role as the medium and foundation of all subjective interventions: whatever social and political subjects did, it was mediated and ultimately dominated, over determined, by the historical Substance. What looms on the horizon today is the unprecedented possibility that a subjective intervention will intervene directly into the historical Substance, catastrophically disturbing its course by triggering an ecological catastrophe, a fateful biogenetic mutation, a nuclear or similar military-social catastrophe, and so on. No longer can we rely on the safeguarding role of the limited scope of our acts: it no longer holds that, whatever we do, history will carry on. For the first time in human history, the act of a single socio-political agent can really alter and even interrupt the global historical process, so that, ironically, it is only today that we can say that the historical process should effectively be conceived "not only as Substance, but also as Subject." This is why, when confronted with singular catastrophic prospects (say, a political group which intends to attack its enemy with nuclear or biological weapons), we can no longer rely on the standard logic of the "Cunning of Reason" which, precisely, presupposes the primacy of the historical Substance over acting subjects: we can no longer adopt the stance of "let us call the bluff of the enemy who threatens us for he will thereby self-destruct" -the price for letting historical Reason do its work is too high since, in the meantime, we may all perish together with the enemy.

Recall a frightening detail from-the Cuban missile crisis: only later did we, learn how close to nuclear war we were during a naval, skirmish between an American destroyer and a Soviet B-59 submarine off Cuba on October 27, 1962. The destroyer dropped depth charges near the submarine to try to force it to the surface, not knowing it had a nuclear-tipped torpedo.' Vadim Orlov.: a member of the submarine crew, told the conference in Havana that the submarine had been authorized to fire it if three officers agreed. The officers began a fierce shouting. match over whether to sink the ship. Two of them said yes and the other said no. "A guy named Arkhipov saved the world," was the bitter comment of a historian on this incident.

2. The inadequacy of private property for so-called "intellectual property." The key antagonism of the new (digital) industries is thus: how to maintain the form of (private) property, within which the logic of profit can be maintained (see also the Napster problem, the free-circulation of music)? And do the legal complications in biogenetics not point in the same direction? A key element of the new international trade agreements is the "protection of intellectual property": whenever, in a merger, a big First World company takes over a Third World company, the first thing they do is close down the research department. Phenomena emerge here which push the notion of property towards extraordinary dialectical paradoxes: in India, the local communities suddenly discover that medical practices and materials they have been using for centuries are now owned by American companies, so they should be bought from the latter; with the biogenetic companies patenting genes, we are all discovering that parts of ourselves, our genetic components, are already copyrighted, owned, by others . . . , The crucial date in the history of cyberspace was February 3, 1976, the day when Bill Gates published his (in)famous "Open Letter to Hobbyists," the assertion of private property in the software domain: "As the majority of hobbyists must be aware, most of you steal your software. [...] Most directly, the thing you do is theft." Bill Gates has built his entire empire and reputation on his extreme views about knowledge being treated as-if it were tangible property. This was a decisive signal which triggered the battle for the "enclosure" of the common domain of software,

3. The socio-ethical implications of new techno-scientific developments (especially in biogenetics) - Fukuyama himself was compelled to admit that biogenetic interventions into human nature are the most serious threat to his vision of the End of History. What is false about today's discussion concerning the "ethical consequences of biogenetics" (along with similar matters) is that it is rapidly turning into what Germans call Bindendtrich-Etbik, the ethics of the hyphen-technology-ethics,

Cap Unsustainable

environment-ethics, and so on. This ethics does have a role to play, a role homologous to that of the "provisional ethic" Descartes mentions at the beginning of his Discourse on Method: when we engage on a new path, full of dangers and shattering new insights, we need to stick to old established rules as a practical guide for our daily lives, although we are well aware that the new insights will compel us to provide a fresh foundation for our entire ethical edifice (in Descartes's case, this new foundation was provided by Kant, in his ethics of subjective autonomy). Today, we are in the same predicament: "provisional ethics" cannot replace the need for a profound reflection regarding the emerging New;

In short, what gets lost here, in this hyphen-ethics, is simply ethics as such. The problem is not that universal ethics gets dissolved into particular topics, but, quite the contrary, that particular scientific breakthroughs are directly confronted with old humanist "values" (say, that biogenetics affects our sense of dignity and autonomy). This, then, is the choice we confront today: either we choose the typically postmodern stance of reticence (let's not go to the end -let's keep a proper distance towards the scientific Thing so that this Thing will not draw us into its black hole, destroying all our moral and human notions), or we dare to "tarry with the negative (das Verweilen. beim Negativen)," that is, we dare to fully assume the consequences of scientific modernity, with the wager that "our Mind is a genome" will also function as an infinite judgment.

4. And, last but not least, new forms of apartheid, new walls and slums.

On September 11, 2001, the Twin Towers were hit; twelve years earlier, on November 9, 1989, the Berlin Wall fell. November 9 announced the "happy nineties," the Fukuyama dream that liberal democracy had won; that the search was over" that the advent of a global, liberal world community was lurking just around the corner,' that the obstacles to this ultra-Holly Wood-esque happy ending were merely empirical and contingent (local pockets of resistance where the leaders had not yet grasped that their time was over). In contrast, 9/11 is the key symbol of the end of the Clintonite happy nineties, of the era in which new walls are emerging everywhere, between Israel and the West Bank, around the European Union, along the US-Mexico border.