

NIF – Heidegger Neg Updates

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Hei-deterrance – 1NC

A. The Affirmative engages in the drive for perfect security. They Reconstruct the threat of the Soviet Union, and nuclear deterrence uses those constructed threats as Hostages, standing in reserve, which necessitates endless warfare and perpetuates the imperialist drive.

Mitchell 5 [Andrew J. Mitchell, Post-Doctoral Fellow in the Humanities at Stanford University, "Heidegger and Terrorism," *Research in Phenomenology*, Volume 35, Number 1, 2005 , pp. 181-218]

There can be no security. If being is what threatens then security as the absence of terror would be the absence of being. But the absence of being is precisely the threat. Obviously, security is just as little to be found in the absence of danger as it is in the consummation of the danger, total annihilation. Instead, security is to be found within the danger and threat of being. But how? Heidegger likewise provides us endangered ones with a way of thinking security and preservation. This is his fourth contribution to a thinking of terrorism. Security and assurance, both equally apt translations of the German Sicherung, are indissociable from certainty (Gew it) for Heidegger. In the course of the 1968 seminar in Le Thor, Heidegger provides a brief history of this relation between security and certainty: "the quest for certainty appears first in the domain of faith, as the search for the certainty of salvation (Luther), then in the domain of physics as the search for the mathematical certainty of nature (Galileo)" (VS, 30/13). Heidegger unites these two concerns for certainty within a single concept: assurance (*Sicherung*), "In the quest for mathematical certainty, what is sought is the assurance of man in nature, in the sensible, in the quest for the certainty of salvation, what is sought is the assurance of man in the supra-sensible world" (VS, 30/14).²² Certainty is in the service of assurance or security and is only the epistemological aspect of a greater ontological condition of security. Security is freedom from uncertainty in all of its forms, sensible, super-sensible, and ontological. Salvation and the mathematical certainty of nature are themselves to be understood as instances of an ontological assurance against uncertainty. Ontological uncertainty would be found in conceptions of singularity, where the uniqueness of a thing renders it irreplaceable and thus opens us to the possibility of loss, or in conceptions of alterity, where the other is not anticipated and confined in advance to the strictures of categorical thought. Uncertainty in this broader sense is eliminated in security. One is securely insulated against these differences of the world. For modern thought, the securing of representations for representational thinking provided the backdrop for the arrival of certainty (see GA 7: 82; EP, 98). Modern metaphysics itself, according to Heidegger, "means the securing of the human being by itself and for itself" (GA 67: 167). Such a policy must be abandoned as the human becomes more and more a piece of the standing-reserve like everything else. This postmodern security is accomplished through bestowal and appraisal of value, "Securement, as the obtaining of security, is grounding in valuation" (GA 5: 262/195; tm). What is valued can be replaced by something of equal value, and this fact lies at the center of our conception of security today. Securement, as a giving of value, assures us against loss by making the world replaceable. In this respect, security is nothing other than total availability, imagined as a world of utter transparency where all resources, human and otherwise, are constantly surveilled and traced through their paths of circulation. The transformation in being coincident with the end of modern warfare likewise puts an end to modern politics and establishes in its place an impersonal commitment to the furthering of planned replacement. Security is only possible when everything works according to these plans, and this requires "leaders," whose true function now becomes evident. For the plan, "the necessity of 'leadership', that is, the planned calculation of the securing of the whole of beings, is required" (GA 7: 89-90/EP, 105; tm). The demand for security is always a call for such Führers. Planning is a matter of ensuring the smooth and "frictionless" circulation of resources along channels and pipelines of order and delivery. The plan's success is assured from the outset, because beings are now in essence planable. The mathematical tracking of stock and supplies becomes a total tracking when things have become completely available. Nothing is concealed from this taking of inventory, with the effect that the mathematical model of the thing is no different from the thing itself. The mathematical modeling of things, an operation that Heidegger traces back to Ockham and the nominalist split between word and thing (see VS, 30-31/13-14), is paradigmatic for the disappearance of identifiably discrete beings under the rule of technology. The model is no longer a representation of what is modeled but, in a paradoxical manner, the thing itself. Nothing beyond the thing's mathematical model is recognized. Everything essential to the thing is contained in the model, without remainder. Such is the truth of the standing-reserve; it is a collapse of the distances that made possible representation. Without that spacing, there is only the suffocating rush of the standing-reserve along the circuitry of the plan. The plan makes manifest the self-willing nature of technology, in that the plan has no purpose other than to assure its own expansion and increase. For the plan to function, it is therefore necessary that beings be consumed and their replacements follow right upon them. The plan plans for consumption, outlining the paths and channels that the standing-reserve will occupy in its compelled obedience to order. The world wars have pointed towards this end, according to Heidegger, for "They press toward a securing of resources [*Bestandsicherung*] for a constant form of consumption" (GA 7: 88; EP, 103-4; tm). This consumption is synonymous with replacement, since there is nothing lost in consumption that is not immediately replaced. The plan is to protect itself from loss by completely insulating itself from uncertainty. The plan seeks "the all-inclusive" [*restlose*] securing of the ordering of order (GA 7: 92; EP, 107; tm). Order is only secured when there is nothing that resists it, nothing that remains in "disorder." Any remainder would stand outside of the prevailing order, as would any difference, in complete disorder. There is another Nietzschean intimation in this, as Heidegger reads the will to power as a drive to secure and order all chaos. Without remainder (*restlose*), without rest, the standing-reserve threatens to encompass everything in a monotonous, swirling sameness. The more secure the world becomes, the greater is the abandonment of being as it is further enframed within the plan. Homeland security is thus an oxymoron, since one of the most prominent effects of planning is the elimination of national differences and

"homelands." Security itself is precisely the planned elimination of differences, and as for "homeland," it is ever more difficult to conceive of a homeland that would be nationally distinct from another.

Hei-deterrance – 1NC

B. This imperialist mindset perpetuates militarism and justifies the endless domination of perceived “threats” resulting in nuclear war and extinction

Boggs, 5 (Carl, Imperial Delusions: American Militarism and Endless Wars, pg33)

Of course these images and discourses turned out to be highly misleading, ephemeral, in many ways false as U.S. preparation for war against Iraq was in full swing by fall 20(C. U.S. ambitions for a global Pax Americana had become more transparent, increasingly freed by the 9/11 aftermath, which licensed an aggressive militarized war on terrorism. Yet 9/11 performed another function: it reinforced the idea, long held in elite circles, of a Hobbesian universe filled with manifestations of evil and danger. This nightmarish image benefits the militaristic impulses of U.S. leaders increasingly prepared to combat those threats with maximum force. Indeed the imperialist strategy, bent on establishing and maintaining a New World Order under us neobberal auspices, thrives on perceptions of a chaotic jungle in which international relations are turned into a *Blade Runner* culture devoid of moral or political cohesion aside from what can be provided by the all-inclusive Leviathan (read: the military-industrial complex). As the one remaining superpower with unrivalled military power, and with an elite seemingly anxious to use that power, it would presumably fall on the United States as an indispensable nation to carry out the burdensome task of imposing the requisite global "order." Any challenge to that order, to the self-appointed rights and powers of the hegemon, are sure to be met with awesome displays of military force, as in Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, and Iraq—carried out, to be sure, in the name of various benevolent ideals. In such a Hobbesian world, it is much easier to frame conflict, diversity, and challenge in Manichaeistic terms, as expressions of a historic struggle between forces of good and evil, between a benign status quo and the diabolical terrorists and dictators who challenge it. Seen thusly, we have a replay of familiar World War II scenarios in which virtuous and triumphant allies, fighting the good war, were able to defeat the wicked Fascists and Nazis, punishing them for their monstrous aggressions and crimes. It is out of such mythology that present-day American moral narcissism and political arrogance mixed with a might-is-right sense of Machiavellianism, have been nurtured, reinforced by the (surely temporary) victim status conferred by the events of 9/11. It is precisely here that the United States seeks to extend, possibly reinvent, traditional forms of imperial domination by means of unsurpassed military force, including the threat and conceivable use of nuclear weapons.

Hei-deterrance – 1NC

C. Our alternative is to Reject the Affirmative: to examine the affirmative ontology in order incorporate our discursive representations of deterrence militarism --- only an examination of ontology can effectively break down imperialist justifications for actions

Spanos, 2k – Distinguished Professor of English at Binghamton (William V, America's Shadow: An Anatomy of Empire, pgs. 56-57)//markoff

The end of the pursuit of knowledge, according to this developed – postcolonial – form of imperial practice, is to produce peace, but this peace will be achieved only by the **total colonization and pacification of the Other**. Theory (understood as a mode of inquiry that privileges seeing, *theoria*) and practice are conterminous. The *Pax Metaphysica* and the *Pax Romana*. My intention in invoking Heidegger's ontological genealogy of imperialism has not been to offer an alternative to that of Foucault, Said, and most postcolonial critics who would interrogate imperialism as an economic and/or political practice or as economic-political practice to which cultural texts contribute in a fundamental way. As Heidegger's entanglement with the German National Socialist project testifies, his restricted ontological focus is hardly adequate to the complex actualities of modern imperial practice. My purpose, rather, has been to demonstrate that the contemporary – postcolonial – critique of imperialism is disabled by a significant lack or, perhaps more accurately, by a resonant unthought in its discourse. What I have tried to make explicit by reconstellating Heidegger's destruction of the metaphysical thinking of the ontotheological tradition (and by thematizing the affiliative system of sedimented tropes inscribed in it) into the context of more "practical" postcolonial critiques of imperialism is that these oppositional discourses, whether Foucauldian or New Historicist or Marxist or nationalist, tend to be blind to (or refuse to take seriously) the enabling degree to which Western imperialism is not simply a practice as such, but a deeply inscribed ideological state of mind produced by a "truth" endemic to a metaphysical ontology. More specifically, they overlook the fact that the modern imperial project is informed by a representational or a "visual" problematic that has its constructed origins in the origins of the very idea of the West. These oppositional discourses, in short, are blinded by their overdetermination of "practice" to the reality that the idea of the West and imperialism are synonymous. To wring a turn on Enrique Dussel's resonant insight into Descartes's "I think; therefore I am," the identity of the collective Western subject is epitomized by the statement: "I think; therefore I conquer."

Framework – 2NC

[] Our framework is that the affirmative should be examined through the Lens of Nuclear Rhetoric - Representations are uniquely appropriate to nuclear issues because nuclear deterrence and war are only discursive fictions – language is the critical internal links to their harms

Derrida, late great philosopher and linguist, 1984 (Jacques. *Diacritics* vol 14 no 2. p.23-24)

Third Reason. In our techno-scientifico-militaro-diplomatic incompetence, we may consider ourselves, however, as competent as others to deal with a phenomenon whose essential feature is that of being fabulously textual through and through. Nuclear weaponry depends, more than any other weaponry in the past, it seems, upon structures of information and communication, structures of language, including non-vocalizable language, structures of codes and graphic decoding. But the phenomenon is fabulously textual also to the extent that, for the moment, nuclear war has not taken place, once can only talk and write about it. You will say, perhaps: but it is not the first time: the other wars, too, so long as they hadn't taken place, were only talked about and written about. And so as to the fright of imaginary anticipation, what might prove that a European in the period following the war of 1870 might not have been more terrified by the technological image of the bombings and exterminations of the Second World War (even supposing he had been able to form such an image) than we are by the image we can construct for ourselves of a nuclear war? The logic of this argument is not devoid of value, especially if one is thinking about a limited and "clean" nuclear war. But it loses its value in the face of the hypothesis of total nuclear war, which, as a hypothesis, or, if you prefer, as a fantasy or phantasm conditions every discourse and all strategies. Unlike the other war, which have all been preceded by wars of more or less the same type in human memory (and gunpowder did not mark a radical break in this respect), nuclear war has no precedent. It has never occurred, itself, it is a non-event. The explosion of American bombs in 1945 ended a classical conventional war, it did not set off a nuclear war. The terrifying reality of the nuclear conflict can only be the signified referent, never the real referent (present or past) of a discourse or a text. At least today apparently. And that sets us to thinking about today, our day, the presence of this present in and through the fabulous textuality. Better than ever and more than ever. The growing multiplication of the discourse—indeed, of the literature—on this subject may constitute a process of fearful domestication, the anticipatory assimilation of that unanticipatable entirely other. For the moment, today, one may say that a non-localizable nuclear war has not occurred; it has existed only through what is said of it, only where it is talked about. Some might call it a fable, then, a pure invention: in the sense in which it is said that a myth, an image, a fiction, a utopia, a rhetorical figure, a fantasy, a phantasm, are inventions. It may also be called a speculation, even a fabulous specularization. The breaking of the mirror would be, finally, through an act of language, the very occurrence of nuclear war. Who can swear that our unconscious is not expecting this dreaming of it desiring it. You will perhaps find it shocking to find the nuclear issue reduced to a fable. But then I haven't said simply that. I have recalled that a nuclear war is for the time being a fable, that is, something one can only talk about. But who can fail to recognize the massive "Reality" of nuclear weaponry and of the terrifying forces of destruction that are being stockpiled and capitalized everywhere, that are coming to constitute the very movement of capitalization. One has to distinguish between this "reality" of the nuclear age and the fiction of war. But, and this would perhaps be the imperative of nuclear criticism, one must also be careful to interpret critically this critical or diacritical distinction. For the "reality" of the nuclear age and the fable of nuclear war are perhaps distinct, but they are not two separate things. It is the war (in other words, the fable) that triggers this fabulous war effort, this senseless capitalization of sophisticated weaponry, this speed race in search of speed, this crazy precipitation which, through techno-science, through all the techno-scientific inventiveness that it motivates, structures not only the army, diplomacy, politics, but the whole of the human *socius* today, everything that is named by the old words culture, civilization, *Bildung, schole, paideia*. "Reality," let's say the encompassing institution of the nuclear age, is constructed by the fable on the basis of an event that has never happened except in fantasy (and that is not nothing at all), an event of which one can only speak, an event whose advent remains an invention by men in all the senses of the word "invention") or which, rather, remains to be invented. An invention because it depends upon new technical mechanisms, to be sure, but an invention also because it does not exist and especially because, at whatever point it should come into existence, it would be a grand premiere appearance.

Framework – 2NC

[] Within our framework, you don't look at their case harms – weapons may exist, but the Threats are constructed scenarios. The act of Construction is what is harmful – deterrence is an act of violence that traumatizes people and makes extinction inevitable. The Affirmative performs this act.

Coviello, English Professor, 2k (Peter. "Apocalypse from Now On", *Queer Frontiers*.)

Perhaps. But to claim that American culture is at present decisively postnuclear is not to say that the world we inhabit is in any way post-apocalyptic. Apocalypse, as I began by saying, *changed*—it did not go away. And here I want to hazard my second assertion: if, in the nuclear age of yesteryear, apocalypse signified an event threatening everyone and everything with (in Jacques Derrida's suitably menacing phrase) "remainderles and a-symbolic destruction," then in the postnuclear world apocalypse is an affair whose parameters are definitively local. In shape and in substance, apocalypse is defined now by the affliction it brings somewhere else, always to an "other" people whose very presence might then be written as a kind of dangerous contagion, threatening the safety and prosperity of a cherished "general population." This fact seems to me to stand behind Susan Sontag's incisive observation, from 1989, that "Apocalypse is now a long-running serial: not Apocalypse Now but Apocalypse from now on. The decisive point here in the perpetuation of the threat of apocalypse (the point Sontag goes on, at length, to miss) is that apocalypse is ever present because, as an element in the vast economy of power, it is ever useful. That is, through the perpetual threat of destruction—through the constant reproduction of the figure of apocalypse—agencies of power ensure their authority to act on and through the bodies of a particular population. No one turns this point more persuasively than Michel Foucault, who in the final chapter of his first volume of *The History of Sexuality* addresses himself to the problem of a power that is less repressive than productive, less life-threatening than, in his words, "life administering."" Power, he contends, "exerts a positive influence on life...and endeavors to administer, optimize, and multiply it, subjecting it to precise controls and comprehensive regulations." In his brief comments on what he calls "the atomic situation," however, Foucault insists as well that the productiveness of modern power must not be mistaken for a uniform repudiation of violent or even lethal means. For as "managers of life and survival, of bodies and the race," agencies of modern power presume to act "on the behalf of the existence of everyone." Whatsoever might be constructed as a threat to life and survival in this way serves to authorize any expression of force, no matter how invasive or, indeed, potentially annihilating. If genocide is indeed the dream of modern power," Foucault writes, "this is not because of a recent return to the ancient right to kill; it is because power is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population." For a state that would arm itself is not with the power to kill its population, but with a more comprehensive power over the patterns and functioning of its collective life, the threat of an apocalyptic demise, nuclear or otherwise, seems a civic initiative that can scarcely be done without.

They Say “Deterrence is Good”

Deterrence makes extinction inevitable—we have to find alternatives to escalatory violence.

Pegueros, 04 (Rosa Maria, associate professor of Latin American History and Women's Studies at the University of Rhode Island, August 6, <http://www.commondreams.org/views04/0806-01.htm>)

In the 59 years since the bombing of Hiroshima, the threat of nuclear arms has led us to build greater and more destructive nuclear weapons. If, in October of 1962, the Soviet missiles aimed at the United States from Cuba were capable of destroying all our cities except Seattle, how much worse is it now when we don't know who has them, who is developing them, who might have so little invested in living that they would think nothing of blowing themselves up with one of our cities. And how much worse is it for the world when the United States, the only country to use nuclear weapons against another country, once again has the overwhelming preponderance of them. We are doing it again. The United States has always believed in the “controlled burn” and we think that we are strong enough to be the controller. We thought that we could drop those bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki and Japan would surrender. It did. We believed that the terror would be so great that no one would ever threaten us again but instead of creating infinite safety for America, we spawned endless horror on the world. Had anyone considered the aftermath? Not the reconstruction of Japan itself but the ramifications of loosing the capability of such destruction on the world? The half-life of plutonium? The slow deaths from radiation poisoning for those not lucky enough to be vaporized on the spot? The radiation-damaged fetuses who were born deformed? The envy and competitiveness of the wannabe nuclear powers? What it would mean to have nuclear missiles pointed at our cities? Our government was focused on the possibility that Hitler's Germany would succeed in creating an atomic bomb before we did. We won the war in Germany yet we continued to work on the bomb. Acutely conscious of the role he had played in the development of the bomb, Albert Einstein, who had been a pacifist his entire life, took on a more active and muscular role in the anti-nuclear weapon movement after World War II than he had before the war. One can only imagine the guilt this gentle scholar must have felt: To be lauded for one the most important scientific discoveries in history, and to see that great discovery used to create the greatest horror in history. “For me,” he wrote, “the problem is a purely political one. As long as nations demand unrestricted sovereignty we shall undoubtedly be faced with still bigger wars, fought with bigger and technologically more advanced weapons. . . They must advocate the abolition of armaments and of military secrecy by individual nations.”* It was ironic that on June 26, 1945, only a few weeks before the bombings, the United Nations charter had been signed in San Francisco. The hopes for an era of peace had ended when the League of Nations collapsed in 1943. They were revitalized for a moment with the signing of the Charter and then were smashed on the streets of Hiroshima. In a statement coauthored with a number of prominent people including Supreme Court Justice Owen J. Roberts and author Thomas Mann, he wrote, “The first atomic bomb destroyed more than the city of Hiroshima. It also exploded our inherited, outdated political ideas.”* Instead of the old imperial powers like Britain and Spain that had used conventional weapons to subjugate less-powerful peoples, in 1945, the world gained a singular superpower, the United States. Soon, it would meet its match in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and then the arms race would begin in earnest, with China and India in hot pursuit and many others scrambling to obtain the resources to built their own nuclear bombs. Why is it that every great human invention is perverted into a use for war? Not only nuclear power but airplanes into bombers. Iron into crossbows, armor, swords, firearms and ammunition. The taming of horses into cavalry. The list is endless. It is as if nothing exists in life but the pursuit of power over ones neighbors, the world, and perhaps even the universe. Some may hope wistfully for a world where children could be raised for peace and cooperation, and where love could overwhelm the power of hate. But Einstein and his generation had learned the sad truth that for the first time in history, people had the power to destroy all life in an instant and he took a more hard-headed view, “For thousands of years, men have learned that whenever there is government by law there can be peace, and where there is no law and no government human conflicts have been sure. We must aim at a federal constitution of the world, a working world-wide legal order, if we hope to prevent an atomic war.” In his final address (which he did not live long enough to deliver), President Franklin Delano Roosevelt echoed Einstein’s sentiments: “Unless by common struggle we are capable of new ways of thinking, mankind is doomed.”* Our government survived the demise of the Soviet Union leaving it the sole superpower. Once again, it has loosed the monster of hatred in the belief that our supremacy would impose itself on the world and establish a sustained era of peace. Yet we stubbornly refuse to submit to the authority of a world court or to United Nations decisions with which we disagree. How many times must we make the same mistake before we learn the lesson? Before the clock runs out?

They Say “Deterrence is Good”

[] Deterrence through force perpetuates the cycle of violence

Stephen Wink, 1993-**1994** Associate at Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, **and** Walter Wink, Professor of Biblical Interpretation, Auburn Theological Seminary; Saint Louis University Law Journal, Winter,

The distinctive structure of the myth is the victory of order over chaos by means of violence. This myth served as the basic ideology of a system of [*353] domination in which the gods favored the conquerors. The lower castes existed to perpetuate that power and privilege which the gods conferred upon the king and, in turn, on the aristocracy and priesthood. Religion was at the service of the King, as the god's representative, to legitimate power and privilege. According to the myth, any form of order is preferable to chaos. Ours is neither a perfect nor a perfectible world; it is a theater of perpetual conflict in which the prize goes to the strong. "Peace through war" and "security through strength" are the core convictions that arise from the myth of redemptive violence. This primordial myth is far from finished. It is as universally present and earnestly believed today as at any time in its long and bloody history. It is the dominant myth of the contemporary world. It undergirds popular culture (e.g. video games, comics, cartoons, westerns, spy thrillers, cop shows, combat movies), foreign policy, militarism, televangelism and nationalism. n46 It enshrines a cult of violence at the very heart of the state.

They Say “Militarism Good”

[] Now is the Critical Time to Resist Militarism - The current unilateralist approach of the Bush administration and totalitarian regimes makes human survival only possible when movements confront militarist tendencies of the state

Kellner '03 (Douglas, George F. Kneller Philosophy of Education Chair, Graduate School of Education, UCLA, An Orwellian Nightmare: Critical Reflections on the Bush Administration, <http://www.gseis.ucla.edu/faculty/kellner/essays/orwellianightmare.pdf>)

There is indeed a danger that Terror War will be a force of historical regression, and the motor of destruction of the global economy, liberal polity, and democracy itself, all to be replaced by an aggressive militarism and totalitarian police state. It could well be that Orwell will be the prophet of a coming New Barbarism with endless war, state repression, and enforced control of thought and discourse, and that George W. Bush and his minions are the architects of an Orwellian future. It could also be the case, however, that the Taliban, bin Laden, Al Qaeda, Saddam Hussein, and the Bush administration represent obsolete and reactionary forces that will be swept away by the inexorable forces of globalization and liberal democracy. The opposing sides in the current Terror War of the Bush administration reactionaries and Al Qaeda could be perceived as representing complementary poles of an atavistic and premodern version of Islam and nihilistic terrorism confronted by reactionary rightwing conservatism and militarism.^[12] In this scenario, both poles can be perceived as disruptive and regressive forces in a global world that need to be overcome to create genuine historical progress. If this is the case, Terror War would be a momentary interlude in which two obsolete historical forces battle it out, ultimately to be replaced by more sane and democratic globalizing forces. This is, of course, an optimistic scenario and probably, for the foreseeable future, progressive forces will be forced to confront intense battles between the opposing forces of Islamic terrorism and rightwing militarism. Yet if democracy and the human species are to survive, global movements against militarism and for social justice, ecology, and peace must emerge to combat and replace the atavistic forces of the present. As a new millennium unfolds, the human race has regressed into a New Barbarism unforeseeable prior to September 11. If civilization is to survive, individuals must perceive their enemies and organize to fight for a better future. And now is the time for liberals, conservatives and those who believe in truth in politics to demand straight talk from the Bush administration and other politicians, and for the media and critics of the politics of lying to take the Bush administration to task for its Big Lies. As the history of recent totalitarian regimes demonstrates, systematic deception and lying rots the very fabric of a political society, and if U.S. democracy is to find new life and a vigorous future there must be public commitments to truth and public rejection of the politics of lying. To conclude: as a response to the September 11 terror attacks, the Bush administration has answered with an intensified militarism that threatens to generate an era of Terror War, a new arms race, accelerated military violence, U.S. support of authoritarian regimes, an assault on human rights, constant threats to democracy, and destabilizing of the world economy. The Bush regime also provides political favors to its largest corporate and other supporters, unleashing unrestrained Wild West capitalism, exemplified in the Enron scandals, and a form of capitalist cronyism whereby Bush administration family and friends are provided with government favors, while social welfare programs, environmental legislation, and protection of rights and freedoms are curtailed. Consequently, I would argue that Bush administration unilateralist militarism is not the way to fight international terrorism, but is rather the road to an Orwellian nightmare in which democracy and freedom will be in dire peril and the future of the human species will be in question. These are frightening times and it is essential that all citizens become informed about the fateful conflicts of the present, gain clear understanding of what is at stake, and realize that they must oppose at once international terrorism, Bushian militarism, and an Orwellian police-state in order to preserve democracy and a life worthy of a human being.

They Say “Militarism Good”

[] Militarism leads to genocide as entire populations are marginalized and exterminated in the name of the nation

Santos '03 [Boaventura de Sousa, Prof. of Anthropology @ Johns Hopkins University, Bad Subjects, Issue #63, April 2003, <http://bad.eserver.org/issues/2003/63/santos.html>]

According to Franz Hinkelammert, the West has repeatedly been under the illusion that it should try to save humanity by destroying part of it. This is a salvific and sacrificial destruction, committed in the name of the need to radically materialize all the possibilities opened up by a given social and political reality over which it is supposed to have total power. This is how it was in colonialism, with the genocide of indigenous peoples, and the African slaves. This is how it was in the period of imperialist struggles, which caused millions of deaths in two world wars and many other colonial wars. This is how it was under Stalinism, with the Gulag, and under Nazism, with the Holocaust. And now today, this is how it is in neoliberalism, with the collective sacrifice of the periphery and even the semiperiphery of the world system. With the war against Iraq, it is fitting to ask whether what is in progress is a new genocidal and sacrificial illusion, and what its scope might be. It is above all appropriate to ask if the new illusion will not herald the radicalization and the ultimate perversion of the Western illusion: destroying all of humanity in the illusion of saving it. Sacrificial genocide arises from a totalitarian illusion manifested in the belief that there are no alternatives to the present-day reality, and that the problems and difficulties confronting it arise from failing to take its logic of development to ultimate consequences. If there is unemployment, hunger and death in the Third World, this is not the result of market failures; instead, it is the outcome of market laws not having been fully applied. If there is terrorism, this is not due to the violence of the conditions that generate it; it is due, rather, to the fact that total violence has not been employed to physically eradicate all terrorists and potential terrorists. This political logic is based on the supposition of total power and knowledge, and on the radical rejection of alternatives; it is ultra-conservative in that it aims to reproduce infinitely the status quo. Inherent to it is the notion of the end of history. During the last hundred years, the West has experienced three versions of this logic, and, therefore, seen three versions of the end of history: Stalinism, with its logic of insuperable efficiency of the plan; Nazism, with its logic of racial superiority; and neoliberalism, with its logic of insuperable efficiency of the market. The first two periods involved the destruction of democracy. The last one trivializes democracy, disarming it in the face of social actors sufficiently powerful to be able to privatize the state and international institutions in their favor. I have described this situation as a combination of political democracy and social fascism. One current manifestation of this combination resides in the fact that intensely strong public opinion, worldwide, against the war is found to be incapable of halting the war machine set in motion by supposedly democratic rulers. At all these moments, a death drive, a catastrophic heroism, predominates, the idea of a looming collective suicide, only preventable by the massive destruction of the other. Paradoxically, the broader the definition of the other and the efficacy of its destruction, the more likely collective suicide becomes. In its sacrificial genocide version, neoliberalism is a mixture of market radicalization, neoconservatism and Christian fundamentalism. Its death drive takes a number of forms, from the idea of "discardable populations", referring to citizens of the Third World not capable of being exploited as workers and consumers, to the concept of "collateral damage", to refer to the deaths, as a result of war, of thousands of innocent civilians. The last, catastrophic heroism, is quite clear on two facts: according to reliable calculations by the Non-Governmental Organization MEDACT, in London, between 48 and 260 thousand civilians will die during the war and in the three months after (this is without there being civil war or a nuclear attack); the war will cost 100 billion dollars, enough to pay the health costs of the world's poorest countries for four years. Is it possible to fight this death drive? We must bear in mind that, historically, sacrificial destruction has always been linked to the economic pillage of natural resources and the labor force, to the imperial design of radically changing the terms of economic, social, political and cultural exchanges in the face of falling efficiency rates postulated by the maximalist logic of the totalitarian illusion in operation. It is as though hegemonic powers, both when they are on the rise and when they are in decline, repeatedly go through times of primitive accumulation, legitimizing the most shameful violence in the name of futures where, by definition, there is no room for what must be destroyed. In today's version, the period of primitive accumulation consists of combining neoliberal economic globalization with the globalization of war. The machine of democracy and liberty turns into a machine of horror and destruction. In opposition to this, there is the ongoing movement of globalization from below, the global struggle for social justice, led by social movements and NGOs, of which the World Social Forum (WSF) has been an eloquent manifestation. The WSF has been a remarkable affirmation of life, in its widest and most inclusive sense, embracing human beings and nature. What challenges does it face before the increasingly intimate interpenetration of the globalization of the economy and that of war? I am convinced that this new situation forces the globalization from below to re-think itself, and to reshape its priorities. It is well-known that the WSF, at its second meeting, in 2002, identified the relationship between economic neoliberalism and imperial warmongering, which is why it organized the World Peace Forum, the second edition of which took place in 2003. But this is not enough. A strategic shift is required. Social movements, no matter what their spheres of struggle, must give priority to the fight for peace, as a necessary condition for the success of all the other struggles. This means that they must be in the frontline of the fight for peace, and not simply leave this space to be occupied solely by peace movements. All the movements against neoliberal globalization are, from now on, peace movements. We are now in the midst of the fourth world war (the third being the Cold War) and the spiral of war will go on and on. The principle of non-violence that is contained in the WSF Charter of Principles must no longer be a demand made on the movements; now it must be a global demand made by the movements. This emphasis is necessary so that, in current circumstances, the celebration of life can be set against this vertiginous collective suicide. The peace to be fought for is not a mere absence of war or of terrorism. It is rather a peace based upon the elimination of the conditions that foster war and terrorism: global injustice, social exclusion, cultural and political discrimination and oppression and imperialist greed.

They Say “Realism Good”

[] Nuclear deterrence isn't Realist – that is a myopic view of realism

Shapiro, Professor of Political Science @ University of Hawaii, 1989 (Michael. International/Intertextual Relations, ed. James der derian and Shapiro.)

The preeminence of this mode of military intelligence amounts to a depoliticizing of international danger insofar as it deprives anything but a scientific/military standpoint as valid knowledge. Among the most prominent concepts that belong to this logistical mode of representing nuclear danger is that of deterrence. The age of deterrence, in which planning is skewed in the direction of reducing the threat of sudden nuclear annihilation, is characterized by the masking of other kinds of war or modes of violence between stance, that ironically, deterrence thinking encourages. Deterrence thinking is thus what Virilio calls “an intelligence of war that eludes politics”

[] Realism is totally inadequate, a-historical and politically naïve account of contemporary politics

Dillon, Politics Professor at the University of Lancaster, 2004 [Michael, “Correlating Sovereign and Biopower,” in *Sovereign Lives*, ed. Edkins & Pin-Fat, p.52]

Because it is no longer possible to write tragedies, because it is no longer a la mode to write trauerspiele either, the mood of late-modern sovereignty being nihilistic, if pugilistically optimistic, not mourning, it was the realist who first began to write the script of the knowledge play of contemporary sovereignty. However, the modern realist was a mutation of trauerspiele's plotter, substituting the hubris of universal 'reason' for the pathos of the universal church in dissolution. Deploying a stock of dramaturgical realia, including necessary invocations of classical and early modern figures, Sun Tzu to Machiavelli, Thucydides to Clausewitz and stock concepts derived from a political anthropologiy of interest-driven subjectivity the central problem for realism was that its anthropological naiveté and a core ideological contradiction increasingly amounted to a bum script for wired 'Princes' gone digital and molecular. The contradiction was not even subtle: a universalist claim made on behalf of sovereign self-making whose very historicism defined its sovereign political subject as modern. A system of generalized sentiments, widely disseminated via cliché and textbooks for the edification of a sovereign body politic comprising of thoroughly subjected onlookers, also proved an inadequate text for power relations gone global, gone networked, gone plural, gone 'soft' and above all gone strategic in ways that required a radical revision of the realia of the reason that realism proclaimed. In short, it was assailed by developments that began to offer entirely different narratives and plots for sovereign power, and opportunities for new power mongers.

[] The Realist interpretation of the world is historically inaccurate and reductive reading of global politics that marginalizes or erases alternative modes of being – criticism is necessary to reveal these alternatives

Campbell and George, Professor of IR at Newcastle and Politics Professor at Australian National University, 1990 [David and Jim, “Patterns of Dissent and the Celebration of Difference,” International Studies Quarterly 34, p.285]

It is in this context that Walker (1989) has investigated the way that many realist questions and answers have been produced via a particular reading of Machiavelli. His conclusion is that the dominant tradition in International Relations has endorsed a caricature, a narrow ahistorical reading, of the “paradigmatic realist,” reduced to instant formulas on the “priority of power over ethics... the necessity of violence and intrigue... ends justifying the means and raison d'état” (Walker, 1989:32). This significance of this kind of analysis is underscored by Walker’s proposition that mainstream interpretations of Machiavelli are never “innocent” because, over the years, they have “identified the nature of the problem[s] to be addressed and {have} situated [them] within a discursive space that both defines and limits the legitimate response to the problems” (Walker, 1989:40).⁸⁶ Walker (1988a) has also been concerned with the broader implications of this kind of discursive practice for traditional emphasis on the construction of the world. Faced by the dangers and complexities of modern global life, suggests Walker, we must cast off the legacy of the uncritical judgement and “isolated privilege” characteristic of western modernist discourse and listen, seriously, to marginalized voices, to different histories and cultural experiences (Walker, 1988a:22). We must acknowledge *other* worlds. And in an interesting articulation of intellectual themes, Walker’s broadly-defined poststructuralist approach is wedded to a concern with “critical social movements” and their “emancipatory potential” (1988a:3).

They Say “Threats are Real”

[] There's no objective harms – elites use “threats” for their own political goals

Waever, Professor of International Relations at the University of Copenhagen, 1998 [Oli, Chapter 3 of *On Security*, ed. Ronnie Lipschutz]

Reading the theoretical literature on security, one is often left without a good answer to a simple question: What really makes something a security problem? As I have suggested above, security problems are developments that threaten the sovereignty or independence of a states in a particularly rapid or dramatic fashion, and deprive it of the capacity to manage itself. This, in turn, undercuts the political order. Such a threat must therefore be met with the mobilization of the maximum effort. Operationally, however, this means: *In naming a certain development a security problem, the “state” can claim a special right*, one that will, in the final instance, always be defined by the state and its elites. Trying to press the kind of unwanted fundamental political change on a ruling elite is similar to playing a game in which one's opponent can change the rules at any time s/he likes. Power holders can always try to use the instrument of *securitization* of an issue to gain control over it. By definition, something is a security problem when the elites declare it to be so: And because the End of this Institution [the Leviathan, the Sovereign], is the Peace and Defense of them all; and whoever has the right to the End, has the right to the Means; it belongeth of Right to whatsoever Man, or Assembly that hath the Sovereignty, to be Judge both of the meanes of Peace and Defense; and also of the hindrances, and disturbances of the same; and to do whatsoever he shall think necessary to be done, both before hand, for the preserving of Peace and Security, by the prevention of Discord at home and hostility from abroad; and. When Peace and Security are lost, for the recovery of the same.²²

[] They can't prove that it is a threat or just confabulated

Campbell, Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins University, 1998 [David, *Writing Security*, p.77]

So to this can be said of Foreign Policy,. Particularly in its late-modern form of ‘national security policy,’ Foreign Policy is a discourse of power that is global in scope yet national in its legitimization. Foreign Policy is only one of a number of discourses of danger circulating in the discursive economy of a nation-state at any given time: from weather reports to Central Intelligence Agency net threat assessments, modern life is disciplined by discourses which tell us what to fear.⁶⁹ But in the context of the modern nation-state, Foreign Policy has been granted a privileged position as the discourse to which we should turn as the source of the pre-eminent dangers to our society and ourselves. Operating as such, Foreign Policy creates the very dangers to which we are supposed to accommodate ourselves. Much like the create in Franz Kafka’s the *The Burrow*, - digs a complex maze of underground tunnels to provide security from predators thought ot exist on the outside, but cannot in the end distinguish between the noise thought to come from the predators and the noise created by its own digging on the inside⁷⁰ – Foreign Policy cannot distinguish the ‘perception of objects from the object effects of perceptual acts.’⁷¹

[] The threats identified are social constructions and only ensure that the advantage becomes a self-fufulfilling prophecy

Lipschutz, Director of Adlai Stevenson Propgram on Global SEecurity, 1995 [Ronnie, *On Security*, p.10]

Security is, to put Waever’s argument in other words, a *socially constructed* concept: It has a specific meaning only within a specific social context.¹⁸ It emerges and changes as a result of discourses and discursive actions intended to reproduce historical structures and subjects within states and among them.¹⁹ To be sure, policymakers define security on the basis of a set of assumptions regarding vital interests, plausible enemies, and possible scenarios, all of which grow, to a not-insignificant extent, out of the specific historical and social context of a particular country and some understanding of what is “out there.”²⁰ But, while these interests, enemies, and scenarios have a material existence and, presumably, a real import for state security, they cannot be regarded simply as having some sort of “objective” reality independent of these constructions.²¹ That security is a socially constructed does not mean that there are not to be found real, material conditions that help to create particular interpretations of threats, or that such conditions are irrelevant to either the creation or undermining the assumptions underlying security policy. Enemies, in part, “create” each other, via the projections of their worst fears onto the other; in this respect, their relationship is intersubjective. To the extent that they act on these projections, threats to each other acquire a material character. In other words, nuclear-tipped ICBMs are not mere figment s of our imagination, but their targeting is a function of what we imagine the possessors of other missiles might do to us with *theirs*.²²