

audit / code review report

November 08, 2024

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
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# APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY

### **PURPOSE**

- 1. Determine the correct operation of the protocol, according to the design specification.
- 2. Identify possible vulnerabilities that could be exploited by an attacker.
- 3. Detect errors in the smart contract that could lead to unexpected behavior.
- 4. Analyze whether best practices were followed during development.
- 5. Make recommendations to improve security and code readability.

#### CODEBASE

| Repository  | https://basescan.org/address/0xbdf317f9c153246c429f23f4093087164b145390#code |
|-------------|--|
| Branch      |  |
| Commit hash |  |
|             |  |

#### METHODOLOGY

- 1. Reading the available documentation and understanding the code.
- 2. Doing automated code analysis and reviewing dependencies.
- 3. Checking manually source code line by line for security vulnerabilities.
- 4. Following guildlines and recommendations.
- 5. Preparing this report.



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### **DFSCRIPTION**

### Issues Categories:

| <u>Severity</u> | <u>Description</u>   |
|-----------------|--|
| CRITICAL        | vulnerability that can lead to loss of funds, failure to recover blocked funds, or catastrophic denial of service. |
| HIGH            | vulnerability that can lead to incorrect contract state or unpredictable operation of the contract.                |
| MEDIUM          | failure to adhere to best practices, incorrect usage of primitives, without major impact on security.              |
| LOW             | recommendations or potential optimizations which can lead to better user experience or readability.                |
|                 |  |

### Each issue can be in the following state:

| <u>State</u> | <u>Description</u>                               |
|--------------|--|
| PENDING      | still waiting for resolving                      |
| ACKNOWLEDGED | know but not planned to resolve for some reasons |
| RESOLVED     | fixed and deployed                               |
|              |  |



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# AUDIT SCOPE

| 1. getting to know the project              |  |
|---|--|
| 2.research into architecture                |  |
| 3.manual code read                          |  |
| 4. permissions of state changing functions  |  |
| 5. identify common Solidity vulnerabilities |  |
| 6.test coverage                             |  |
| 7. static analysis                          |  |
| 8. storage key overlaps                     |  |
| 9.DOS possibilities by malicious attacker   |  |
| 10. steal funds possibilities               |  |



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### FINDINGS

| <u>Finding</u>                                      | <u>Severity</u> | <u>Status</u> |
|---|-----------------|---------------|
| #1 - Initial Token Distribution Centralization Risk | LOW             | ACKNOWLEDGED  |
| #2 - Front-Running Vulnerability in EIP-2612 Permit | LOW             | ACKNOWLEDGED  |
| #3 - Missing Token Recovery Mechanism               | LOW             | ACKNOWLEDGED  |

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# #1 - INITIAL TOKEN DISTRIBUTION CENTRALIZATION RISK

Severity Status

LOW ACKNOWLEDGED

All tokens are minted to a single address (contract deployer) in the constructor. If this address is compromised, it could lead to market manipulation or token dumping.

```
constructor() {
    _mint(msg.sender, 500_000_000_00000000000000);
}
```

#### RECOMMENDATION

- Implement a vesting schedule for initial token distribution
- Use a time-lock contract for team/founder allocations
- Consider splitting initial allocation between multiple secure addresses
- Add maximum transfer limits per transaction/time period



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# #2 - FRONT-RUNNING VULNERABILITY IN EIP-2612 PERMIT

The inherited ERC20 implementation includes EIP-2612 permit functionality. This implementation could be vulnerable to front-running attacks where an attacker could extract MEV (Maximal Extractable Value) by manipulating transaction ordering.

| <u>Severity</u> | <u>Status</u> |
|-----------------|---------------|
| LOW             | ACKNOWLEDGED  |
|                 |               |

#### RECOMMENDATION

- Implement deadline checks for permit operations
- Consider adding min/max validity periods for permits
- Add nonce tracking per token approval
- Consider implementing permit2 from Uniswap for improved security



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#### #3 - MISSING TOKEN RECOVERY MECHANISM

If other ERC20 tokens are accidentally sent to this token contract address, they will be permanently locked as there's no mechanism to recover them. This is a common issue that has led to the loss of funds in many DeFi projects.

| <u>Severity</u> | <u>Status</u> |
|-----------------|---------------|
| LOW             | ACKNOWLEDGED  |
|                 |               |

#### Impact:

- Permanent loss of any ERC20 tokens accidentally sent to the contract
- No way to recover funds in emergency situations
- Could affect both users and protocol treasury management

#### RECOMMENDATION

One of the possible approach is to use safeTransfer from OpenZeppelin's SafeERC20 library. Here's why:

- 1.Some tokens (like USDT) don't follow the ERC20 standard strictly and may return false instead of reverting on failure
- 2. Some tokens might not return any value at all
- 3.Low-level transfer calls might fail silently

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