Adversarial defense suggestion

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Reminder on attack and defense [1]:

- original and modified images (x; x')
- given noise distance ε
- infinity norm $||u||_{\infty} = \max_{i}(|u_i|)$

$$\mathcal{D}(x; x') = ||x - x'||_{\infty} \leqslant \varepsilon \qquad (1)$$

- classifier $f(\cdot)$
- true and targeted classes (y; z)

$$f(x') \neq y$$
 or $f(x') = z$ (2)

Example [2]:








• defensive transform $t(\cdot)$

$$f(t(x')) = f(t(x)) = f(x) = y$$
 (3)

Overview of the defense [3]:

• transformation before both training and testing



Shuffling block-wise pixels:

- size M, number of pixels $n = M^2$, number of possibilities n!
- random permutation vector α




Interest for aidkit.ai

Attacks deployed, settings and results:

- "first order": projected gradient descent [4]
- adaptive: ~ backward pass differentiable approximation [5]



• {20; 40} iterations, with[out] random initialization



Good points:

- method seems to be robust
- $M = 4 \implies 2.09 \cdot 10^{13}$ possibilities
- · good accuracy on test images
- recent publication
- easy principle and implementation

Axes for improvement:

- trying other M values $\in [5; 7]$
- using rectangles or other shapes
- shuffling independently RGB colours with different α values, trying >8 bit colour images
- using other norms and with grey/black boxes
- trying other databases than CIFAR-10 [6]



References

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