Aurélien Salas

aurelien.salas@sciencespo.fr • aureliensalas.github.io

Department of Economics, Sciences Po — Paris, France

Education

Sciences Po Sep 2021 — 2026 (expected)
Ph.D. in Economics

Sciences Po Aug 2019 — Jun 2021
M.Res in Economics — *Summa Cum Laude*

Cornell University Aug 2018 — Jun 2019
Exchange Year — *Computer Science & Economics*

Sciences Po Aug 2016 — Jun 2019
B.A. in Social Sciences (Collège Universitaire)

References

Jeanne Hagenbach
Associate Professor of Economics;
Research Director at CNRS
Sciences Po Paris
jeanne.hagenbach@sciencespo.fr

Emeric Henry
Professor of Economics
Sciences Po Paris
emeric.henry@sciencespo.fr

Eduardo Perez-Richet
Professor of Economics
Sciences Po Paris
eduardo.perez-richet@sciencespo.fr

Fields

Primary Microeconomics; Behavioral and Experimental Economics

Secondary Digital Platforms; Human–AI interaction; Privacy

Job Market Paper

The Limits of Price Discrimination with Endogenous Participation.

To what extent should platforms enable price discrimination by sellers when buyers can vote with their feet? I assume that buyers are endowed with an outside option and receive a signal about their value before they decide whether to enter the platform or not. For the platform, endogenous participation creates a trade-off between surplus extraction and participation. It also imposes a constraint: when participation increases with valuations, the segmentations that deliver the highest buyer surplus under full participation cannot be implemented. I characterize the feasible welfare frontier and derive the platform's optimal segmentation under three alternative assumptions about buyer information. Overall, while endogenous participation can push platforms to give more surplus to buyers, it can also limit their ability to implement the most buyer-friendly segmentations.

Publications

Strategic Information Disclosure to Classification Algorithms: An Experiment
with Jeanne Hagenbach. *Experimental Economics*, Forthcoming

We experimentally study how individuals strategically disclose multidimensional information to a Naive Bayes algorithm trained to guess their characteristics. Subjects' objective is to minimize the algorithm's accuracy in guessing a target characteristic. We vary what participants know about the algorithm's functioning and how obvious are the correlations between the target and other characteristics. Optimal disclosure strategies rely on subjects identifying whether the combination of their characteristics is common or not. Information about the algorithm functioning makes subjects identify correlations they otherwise do not see but also overthink. Overall, this information decreases the frequency of optimal disclosure strategies

Work in Progress

Disclosing Proxies (with Paula Onuchic)

Teaching

Math Camp — Real Analysis Fall 2023
Graduate course — Lecturer

Microeconomics I Fall 2021–2023
Graduate course — TA for Sidartha Gordon and Eduardo Perez-Richet

Microeconomics: Information, Design and Institutions Fall 2021–2023
Undergraduate course — TA for Jean-Marc Robin and Emeric Henry

Research Assistance

Spring 2019 Research Assistant for Marleen Marra, Sciences Po Paris

Seminars & Conferences

2025 3EN Conference of AFREN (Nanterre); Sciences Po PhD Alumni Conferences; Sciences Po (Friday Lunch Seminar); Sciences Po Theory Reading Group; Sciences Po Behavioral Economics Reading Group
2024 Sciences Po Theory Reading Group; Sciences Po Behavioral Economics Reading Group; Sciences Po (Friday Lunch Seminar)
2023 Sciences Po (Friday Lunch Seminar)
2022 TransNum seminar (Sciences Po)
2021 Sciences Po–PSE Theory Reading Group

Languages

Human French, Spanish (native); English (fluent); Portuguese (intermediate)
Programming Python, R, Stata, Julia (proficient); Java (familiar)

Last updated: November 5, 2025