


# Net Zero = Zero Value Power?

Manuel Köhler, Managing Director Germany



### Markets across Europe will move towards Net Zero...






<sup>1)</sup> Includes all EU countries as well as Switzerland, Norway, UK, and Iceland

# Reaching Net Zero requires 1.7 trillion EUR of investments in wind and solar

AUR 😂 RA

Investments in renewables, Europe, cumulative<sup>1</sup>


EUR bn (real 2020)



<sup>1)</sup> Includes EU, UK, Norway, Switzerland, Iceland, Balkans, Ukraine, Turkey

# More than 45% of the investments by 2030 will have merchant exposure






1) Includes EU, UK, Norway, Switzerland, Iceland, Balkans, Ukraine, Turkey

### Does push for Net Zero mean power prices will collapse?










Nuclear Hard coal Gas

GW

## Does push for Net Zero mean power prices will collapse?



#### Merit order effect




Capacity GW

RES Nuclear Gas

### Does push for Net Zero mean power prices will collapse?






### Also, a Net Zero power market requires firm capacity...




#### Half-hourly generation over a tight week in winter in 2050, GB Net Zero example



# ...and low carbon dispatchable thermal is by far the most economic solution


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Plant CAPEX required to fill production gap in 2050, GB Net Zero example EUR bn (real 2020)



#### The last tonnes of carbon are costly to abate, raising questions on fully decarbonising power






<sup>1)</sup> New build CCS assumed to have 30-year lifetime, retrofit CCS 20-year lifetime, H2 CCGT 30-year lifetime and H2 peaker 25-year lifetime. 2) Cost of abated emissions calculated by dividing the total abated emissions over the lifetime (from 2035 onwards) with difference in LCOE to the alternative technology (excluding carbon costs), for example moving from new build CCGT to new build CCS Source: Aurora Energy Research

# What the most economic dispatchable solution is depends on load factor...




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<sup>1)</sup> Assuming lifetime of 30 years for new build CCGTs and CCS, 20 years for CCS retrofit and 25 years for peakers. 2) Analysis done without assuming any policy support and including carbon prices. 3) Assumes carbon price of 83.2 in 2050

### ... but all come with significant marginal cost






<sup>1)</sup> Assuming lifetime of 30 years for new build CCGTs and CCS, 20 years for CCS retrofit and 25 years for peakers. 2) Analysis done without assuming any policy support and including carbon prices. 3) Assumes carbon price of 141 EUR in 2050 4) Uses LCOH of blue and green hydrogen in GB as proxy for fuel costs. Green hydrogen LCOH assumed to be collocated with onshore wind.

Source: Aurora Energy Research


# ...and even with a 10% generation share, will set the price more than half of the time





1) Includes CCGT and peakers 2) Mainly CHP 3) Includes wind, solar and other renewables 4) Includes batteries and pump storage 5) Grouped into periods of 25 hours

### As a result, we don't expect prices to collapse, not even in a net zero market AUR RA



<sup>1)</sup> Generation-weighted average price, uncurtailed as of April 2021 2) Central Case - in bright blue bars - reflects ambitious decarbonisation, Net Zero Case - in dark blue diamonds - a complete decarbonisation of power sector. 3) Refers to South price zone

### What could go wrong where? Applying a simple framework suggests...




Risk		Indicator to watch	Exemplary market to watch
Renew- ables	<ul><li>Over-procurement</li></ul>	<ul> <li>Planned tendered capacity<sup>1</sup></li> </ul>	(Offshore)
	<ul><li>Pork cycles</li></ul>	<ul> <li>Project pipeline<sup>1</sup></li> </ul>	(Solar)
	<ul><li>Rapid cost decline</li></ul>	<ul> <li>CAPEX of new projects</li> </ul>	<ul><li>Solar</li></ul>
Other low-carbon	<ul> <li>Limited interconnection</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Existing and planned capacity<sup>1</sup></li> </ul>	· illia
	<ul> <li>Over-supply of nuclear</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Support for new capacity/lifetime extensions<sup>1</sup></li> </ul>	
	<ul> <li>High hydro availability</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Existing capacities<sup>1</sup>, potential for new capacity<sup>1</sup></li> </ul>	(NO 3, NO4)
	<ul> <li>New low marginal cost dispatchable tech's</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Economics of technologies exiting R&amp;D phase</li> <li>Availability of support to achieve economics of scale</li> </ul>	
Policy	<ul> <li>Regulated dispatch</li> </ul>	Policy proposals in discussion	(DPA <sup>2</sup> )
	<ul> <li>Grid/locational pricing</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Grid cost components not (yet) borne by renewables</li> <li>Policy proposals in discussion</li> </ul>	

<sup>1.</sup> In relation to Net Zero Power Demand in respective market 2 Dispatchable power agreement

# Italy, Iberia and Finland are medium risk markets while Germany, UK, Netherlands and Denmark are more resilient





#### Comment



- Risk of solar overinvest
- Limited interconnection to France



- Risk of solar overinvest
- Limited connection between price zones



- Risk of wind overinvest
- Relatively high availability of hydro



- Heavily interconnected
- Limited alternatives for low carbon dispatchable



#### Any further questions?

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