

Tensions between Safety Cases and STAMP

Where do they disagree and who is right?

Safety Science Innovation Lab



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 Novel, patent pending, level crossing solutions using common off the shelf components.





Dr. Drew Rae

- Sincere thanks to my supervisor Dr.
 - Drew Rae from the Safety Science
 - Innovation Lab who provided support.



Safety Engineering

Reducing Harm



Ensuring Risk is Acceptable






Ways of achieving this?

Safety Case







Safety Case

Good

- Structured approach supports safety claims
- Performance based = Flexibility
- Through evidence safety is achieved

Bad

- Retrospectively
- Cognitive bias
- Well publicised catastrophic failures



STAMP

Good

- Safety in design
- Continual improvement
- Feedback & Control

Bad

- Brand new
- Limited validation
- Limited guidance




Safety Case

- It's a story
- Clear comprehensible & defensible argument
- Safe operate within context
- In some cases legal requirement
- But No single safety case format





Safety Case Evolution





Safety Cases - Benefits

- Companies
 - Understand safety risk exposure
- Public
 - Provide insight into organisations
- Regulators
 - Use safety case to assist organisations understand and meet safety requirements



Safety Case - Criticisms





Safety Case - Criticisms

...some industries that have adopted a Safety Case and goal-based approaches have experienced much higher accident rates, such as offshore oil exploration and production

Leveson



Safety Case – Cognitive Bias

- Safety Case
 - "Safe already"
- EN 50126
 - Structured Safety Case based on the issued standard




Safety Case – Lack of argument

Gerund



- Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes
- Feedback and Control
 - Constraints
 - Hierarchical Control
 - Accurate process model
- Used in design not retrospective





STAMP Evolution

1942

•Systems
Engineering

1997

•Systems approach to safety

2003

•STAMP Paper

2013

•STAMP in Security















1961

•Minuteman Missile 1998

•Intent specifications

2011

 Engineering a safer world



STAMP - Benefits

- Companies
 - Helps companies appreciate that single events are not the cause of accidents
- Public
 - STAMP method includes the public
- Regulators
 - Provides regulators with a methodology to understand safety



STAMP - Criticisms

- STAMP is an idea without evidence
- Little guidance in its use
- Unreliable?
- Immature



Debates

Safety Case

- Long history mature idea
- Process driven welcoming of new ideas
- Spectacular failures

- Launched with fanfare
- Directly attacked STAMP
- Still unknown less unknown than fault tress which is also attacks
- Difficult to implement?



Safety Case Failures?





Debates

Safety Case

- Legislated
- Quantitative
- Qualitative

- Does not create safety
- Qualitative (exclusively)



Debates – Partial Truce?

Safety Case

- Create Safety
- Uses a narrative
- Safety case What and Why

- Create Safety
- Uses a narrative
- Intent specifications (What and Why requirements)



Future Considerations

- Improper application of Safety Cases have cased failure
- Safety Cases generally go right
- STAMP is a systems based model
- Safety Cases are processes
- Safety cases structured to meet legislative requirements
- Safety Cases develop late to ensure application
- STAMP is created early but has not argument



Future Considerations

- STAMP was created
- Safety Cases evolved
- STAMP was marketed by an engineer
- Safety Cases sell themselves

 "Does not imply what previously done is wrong and new approach correct"



Conclusion

- No evidence that Safety Cases are not meeting intended requirements
- Investigate papers that use STAMP
- Extract the safety argument from these papers
- See if these papers present a strong argument or are there areas that are lacking
- Is STAMP an improvement on Safety Cases?