Part 1: Decompose Traffic Light System

1. What are the actuators?

The actuators are the LEDs. This includes the three thar are on the breadboard as well as the other three.

2. What are the sensors?

N/A

3. What addressable variables are implemented in the ladder logic?

| Name | Туре | Location |
|----------------|------|----------|
| red_ns | BOOL | %QX100.0 |
| yellow_ns | BOOL | %QX100.1 |
| green_ns | BOOL | %QX100.2 |
| red_ew | BOOL | %QX0.0 |
| yellow_ew | BOOL | %QX0.1 |
| green_ew | BOOL | %QX0.1 |
| time_red_ns | INT | %MW0 |
| time_green_ns | INT | %MW2 |
| time_yellow_ns | INT | %MW1 |
| time_red_ew | INT | %MW3 |
| time_green_ew | INT | %MW5 |
| time_yellow_ew | INT | %MW4 |

4. What data sources are in the HMI?


| Name | Туре | Offset |
|-----------|-------------|--------|
| red_ns | Coil Status | 800 |
| yellow_ns | Coil Status | 801 |

| green_ns | Coil Status | 802 |
|----------------|------------------|------|
| red_ew | Coil Status | 0 |
| yellow_ew | Coil Status | 1 |
| green_ew | Coil Status | 2 |
| time_red_ns | Holding Register | 1024 |
| time_green_ns | Holding Register | 1026 |
| time_yellow_ns | Holding Register | 1025 |
| time_red_ew | Holding Register | 1027 |
| time_green_ew | Holding Register | 1029 |
| time_yellow_ew | Holding Register | 1028 |

5. What are the wired connections in the network module? (e.g.: PLC to Actuator XYZ)

The PLC connects to the HMI via Modbus. The PLC connects to red_ns, green_ns, and yellow_ns via a cyber physical link. This is connecting to the Arduino which connects to the breadboard.

Part 2: Plot the Data Flow Diagram (DFD)



Part 3: List the Threat Consequences (TC)

| Code | Description | Hazard |
|------|----------------------------------|----------------|
| TC-1 | Delay in LED changing | H1, H3, H4 |
| TC-2 | Delay in HMI updating | H4 |
| TC-3 | LEDs on when they shouldn't be | H1, H3, H4 |
| TC-4 | PLC and Arduino lose connection | H1, H2, H3, H4 |
| TC-5 | HMI and PLC lose connection | H4 |
| TC-6 | No LEDs on at all | H1, H4 |
| TC-7 | Arduino and LEDs lose connection | H1, H2, H3, H4 |
| TC-8 | False values displayed on HMI | H4 |

Part 4: STRIDE Modeling

| STRIDE | Data Flow Element | Threat Consequences |
|--------|-------------------|---|
| S | DF-1 | TC-5, TC-1, TC-3, TC-6 |
| S | DF-2 | TC-7, TC-4 |
| S | DF-3 | TC-7, TC-4 |
| S | DF-4 | TC-7, TC-4 |
| T | EE-1 | TC-5, TC-8, TC-2 |
| Т | P-1 | TC-4, TC-5, TC-6, TC-7, TC-8 |
| Т | P-2 | TC-4, TC-5, TC-6, TC-7, TC-8 |
| T | P-3 | TC-4, TC-5, TC-6, TC-7, TC-8 |
| T | P-4 | TC-4, TC-5, TC-6, TC-7, TC-8 |
| Т | DF-1 | TC-5, TC-2, TC-8 |
| Т | DF-2 | TC-5, TC-6 |
| T | DF-3 | TC-5, TC-6 |
| T | DF-4 | TC-5, TC-6 |
| T | DS-1 | TC-4, TC-5, TC-6, TC-7, TC-8 |
| R | EE-1 | TC-5, TC-8 |
| R | P-1 | TC-4, TC-5, TC-6, TC-7, TC-8 |
| 1 | EE-1 | TC-5, TC-8 |
| I | P-1 | TC-4, TC-1, TC-2, TC-9, TC-10 |
| D | DF-1 | TC-5, TC-1, TC-8, TC-2 |
| D | DF-2 | TC-5, TC-1, TC-8, TC-2 |
| D | DF-3 | TC-5, TC-1, TC-8, TC-2 |
| D | DF-4 | TC-5, TC-1, TC-8, TC-2 |
| E | EE-1 | TC-4 |
| E | P-1 | TC-1, TC-2, TC-3,TC-4, TC-5, TC-6, TC-7 |

Part 5: Define Intrusion Scenario

One scenario is the attacker gaining access by trying to find the server with a scanner. They could then try to login with the default credentials. The server is running on port 502, so it should be easy to find.

Part 6: List Known Exploits

| Compromised | Exploit | STRIDE | Description |
|-------------|---------------------|--------|---------------------|
| Component | | | |
| DF-1, EE-1 | MiTM | S, E | Spoof values of |
| | | | the counter |
| EE-1 | Default credentials | E, T | Login using the |
| | | | default credentials |
| DF-1, EE-1 | DoS | D | Flood the server |
| | | | with packets |
| | | | causing loss of |
| | | | service |
| DF-1, EE-1 | MiTM | E, D | Packets could be |
| | | | dropped |

Part 7: List Attackers' Goals

Goal 1: Cause financial loss by burning out the LEDs.

Goal 2: Cause an accident to occur by causing the LEDs to be on at the wrong time.

Goal 3: Cause an accident by making a delay.

Part 8: Construct Attack Tree

