

2/23/2026

Challenge-01

Solving CTF Labs on ThunderCipher

YUVARAJ M

ThunderGym – DeleteMe Challenge Writeup


Difficulty: Easy

Category: Web Exploitation

Vulnerability: IDOR (Insecure Direct Object Reference)

Target IP: 192.168.5.5

Port: 5000



Challenge Description

DeleteMe is an easy web challenge where ThunderGym is running on port 5000. Access the application directly through your browser and start exploring its features. Users can register, log in, and manage their profile — including deleting their account. But is the delete functionality properly secured? Analyze how the application handles user actions and see if you can exploit a flaw.

The application allows users to register, login, manage their profile, and delete their account. The goal was to analyze whether the delete functionality was properly secured.

Enumeration Phase

Step 1 – Port Scanning

Performed a nmap scan: **nmap 192.168.5.5 -A**

Open ports found:

- 22 (SSH)

- 5000 (HTTP – Werkzeug Flask server)

The web application was running on port 5000, so I accessed: <http://192.168.5.5:5000>

Application Analysis

Step 2 – Application Functionality

The application allowed:

- User Registration
- Login
- Profile Management
- Account Deletion


Account Registration & Login




I registered a test account:

Username: user1

Password: *****

After logging in, I navigated to the profile section where the Delete Account option was available.





ThunderGym 💪

Dashboard Logout

user1's Profile 🚩

Manage your ThunderGym account

User ID: 7
Username: user1
Role: Member

Danger Zone
Deleting your account is permanent and cannot be undone.
Delete Account

While deleting the account, I monitored the request in Firefox DevTools.

Manage your ThunderGym account

User ID: 7
Username: user1
Role: Member

192.168.5.5:5000
["message": "User 7 deleted successfully."]

Danger Zone
Deleting your account is permanent and cannot be undone.
Delete Account

OK

Status	Method	Domain	File	Initiator	Type	Transferred	Size	Time	WS	Other
200	GET	192.168.5.5:5000	profile	document	html	3.46 kB	3.27 kB	90 ms	3.26 kB	530 ms
404	GET	192.168.5.5:5000	style.css	stylesheet	html	389 B	207 B	307 ms		
404	GET	192.168.5.5:5000	favicon.ico	Favicon-1x1px_175 (img)	html	cached	207 B	0 ms		
200	POST	192.168.5.5:5000	delete_account	profile-272 (fetch)	json	209 B	43 B	29 ms		

Request Analysis

Step 3 – Inspecting Delete Request

The delete action triggered the following request:

POST /delete_account

The screenshot shows a browser window with a green header bar containing the text "Manage your ThunderGym account". Below it is a dark card with account details: User ID: 7, Username: user1, Role: Member. A red box highlights a "Danger Zone" section with the warning "Deleting your account is permanent and cannot be undone." and a red "Delete Account" button. At the bottom of the card, there is some small text about cached files. Below the card, the browser's Network tab is open, showing a list of requests. The last entry is a POST request to "192.168.5.5:5000/delete_account" with a status of 200 OK, a response size of 43 B, and a timestamp of 418 ms. The "Request" tab in the Network tab is selected.

Request Body:

user_id=7

The screenshot shows a browser window with a green header bar containing the text "Manage your ThunderGym account". Below it is a dark card with account details: User ID: 7, Username: user1, Role: Member. A red box highlights a "Danger Zone" section with the warning "Deleting your account is permanent and cannot be undone." and a red "Delete Account" button. At the bottom of the card, there is some small text about cached files. Below the card, the browser's Network tab is open, showing a list of requests. The last entry is a POST request to "192.168.5.5:5000/delete_account" with a status of 200 OK, a response size of 43 B, and a timestamp of 418 ms. The "Request" tab in the Network tab is selected. A blue circle highlights the "user_id" parameter in the JSON request body, which has a value of "7".

The application was trusting the client-side user_id parameter.

This suggested a possible IDOR vulnerability

Exploitation

Step 4 – Exploiting IDOR

I modified the request using "Edit and Resend" in Firefox DevTools.

The screenshot shows the Firefox DevTools Network tab. A POST request to `http://192.168.5.5:5000/delete_account` is selected. The request parameters show `user_id=7`. The response status is 200 OK, with a size of 43 B. The response body contains JSON: `{"profile":722}`. The Network tab also lists other resources like the document, stylesheet, and favicon.

Original:

`user_id=7`

The screenshot shows the Firefox DevTools Network tab. A POST request to `http://192.168.5.5:5000/delete_account` is selected. The request parameters show `user_id=7`. The response status is 200 OK, with a size of 43 B. The response body contains JSON: `{"profile":722}`. The Network tab also lists other resources like the document, stylesheet, and favicon.

Modified:

user_id=1

The screenshot shows a browser window with multiple tabs open. The active tab displays a user profile for 'user1' with the following details:

- User ID: 7
- Username: user1
- Role: Member

A red box highlights a 'Danger Zone' section containing the text: "Deleting your account is permanent and cannot be undone." Below this is a red button labeled "Delete Account".

Below the browser window is a screenshot of the Network tab in a developer tools interface. It shows several requests, including a POST request to '192.168.5.5:5000/delete_account' with the parameter 'user_id=1'. The response status is 200 OK.

Response:

The screenshot shows a browser window displaying a JSON response. The response contains the following fields:

- flag: "ThunderCipher{idOr_4cc0unt_t4k30v3r_2k26}"
- message: "Admin account deleted!"

{

"flag": "ThunderCipher{idOr_4cc0unt_t4k30v3r_2k26}",

"message": "Admin account deleted!"

}

Vulnerability Explanation

Vulnerability – IDOR (Insecure Direct Object Reference)

The server did not verify whether the logged-in user was authorized to delete the specified user_id.

The application trusted client-controlled input, allowing deletion of arbitrary users including the admin account.

This is categorized under:

Broken Access Control

OWASP Top 10 – A01

Impact

- Any user could delete any other user
- Admin account deletion was possible
- Complete compromise of application integrity

In a real-world scenario, this could lead to:

- Account takeover
- Data loss
- Privilege escalation

How to Fix

Mitigation

The correct implementation should:

Option 1 – Ignore client input

```
user_id = session['user_id']
delete_user(user_id)
```

Option 2 – Verify ownership

```
if session['user_id'] != request.form['user_id']:
    return "Unauthorized"
```

Never trust client-controlled object identifiers.


Lessons Learned

- Always inspect HTTP requests using DevTools
- If you see IDs in requests → try modifying them
- Broken Access Control is extremely common
- IDOR is one of the most frequent real-world web vulnerabilities

Attack Flow Summary

- Scanned target → Found port 5000
- Registered test account
- Monitored delete request
- Identified client-controlled user_id
- Modified user_id=7 → user_id=1
- Deleted admin account
- Retrieved flag

Final Flag



ThunderCipher{id0r_4cc0unt_t4k30v3r_2k26}