

# Operation COVID

A Cure for the Maduro Virus

# Presentation Structure

## 1- introduction:

- 1.1 who we are
- 1.2 why are we doing this
- 1.3 what are we trying to accomplish

## 2.- SWOT

## 3- how are we doing this?

- 3.1) identify stakeholders by influence and importance
- 3.2) Use the most important scenarios to determine what the best decision is and course of action:
  - 3.2.1) decision tree
  - 3.2.2) SB
  - 3.3.3) Game Theory

## 4.- Results

- 4.1) COA Matrix
- 4.1) What is the best COA to accomplish our goal based on analysis

## 5.- Policy recommendation

# Failed attempt against Maduro

12 arrested US citizens

Reaction of opponents not in the US favor



# The Opportunity

## Who We Are

### The National Security Council

- Founded alongside CIA to Counteract Russian Influence, 1947
- Key Foreign policy forum of President Donald Trump
- Work Closely with the CIA and Joint Chiefs of Staff to advance US Interests



# Venezuelan Crisis – A problem or an Opportunity?

One Country Two Presidents?! Maduro elected after death of Pseudo-Dictator Hugo Chavez.


- An Economic Catastrophe, Black Gold, Price Control, and Fracking
- Voter Suppression, Starvation, Violence and Torture
- 2019, Maduro Re-Elected? Challenge by Juan Guaido

Two presidents, No economy

# Venezuelan Crisis – A problem or an Opportunity?

- COVID-19
- Humanitarian Crisis in Venezuela
- USA charges Maduro with drug trafficking
- Majority of countries support US efforts of ending the dictatorship in Venezuela
- Senate acquits Trump of impeachment charges
- 2020 Presidential elections
- Falling oil prices

# Venezuela Crisis Timeline



## STRENGTHS

- Maduro Regime economically weak
  - Oil Price drop exacerbated the crisis
- COVID and humanitarian crises render Venezuelan Government ineffective
- Rival Powers looking inward
- Regional support from allies

## OPPORTUNITIES

- Pandemic provides a smokescreen for political maneuvering and coups d'état
- Opportunity to boost image of President Trump
- Bring Stability to an unstable region
- Political control and increased influence in the region
- Elimination of RUS, CHN and Iranian influence
- Potential for expansion of Lima Group
- Economic opportunity – access to largest oil reserves
- Mineral and Agriculture Market access
- Potential control over drug trafficking
- Support by other countries in the region

## WEAKNESSES

- US Assets in Venezuela susceptible to COVID
- Possible lack of political support if plans go awry
- Impending election, Operation COVID must be brief
- Increased costs of an operation
- US domestic economic crisis
- Recent failed coup attempt


## THREATS

- Chinese/Russian/Iranian/Cuban military support
- Chinese/Russian/Iranian/Cuban economic support
- Non-cooperation of Generals
- Political retaliation of rivals
- Damaging of US reputation
- Failed attempt of an operation
- Increased Humanitarian Losses
- End of future diplomatic actions
- US economy recession

What is the timeline, what are the resource constraints?



# Risk Assessment



# STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS

High

PROTECT

This group will require special initiative to protect their interests

GOOD RELATION

A closed and good working relationship must be established with this group

IMPORTANCE

LOW PRIORITY

May have some involvement but relatively lower priority

MONITOR

This group may be source of risks, and will require careful monitoring and management

Low

INFLUENCE

High

# STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS

High

PROTECT

GOOD RELATION

DOJ



DOS

PDSVA



Padrino



Cabello

Brazil



Colombia



Russia



China



DoD



Guaido



5 top generals

Military low rank

Generals pro Guaido

POTUS



LOW PRIORITY

MONITOR

Pro-Guaido civilians

EU

Canada


Cuba



Iran



Maduro



Lima Group



OAS



Low generals pro Maduro





Pro-Maduro civilians


Low


INFLUENCE


High





































# Spatial Bargaining Analysis Baseline

# Trade off between two issues




# Baseline

Respective Share of PDVSA Oil Extraction Rights



- No deal will satisfy all stakeholders
- Colombia/Guaido could strike a deal with Maduro/Generals without US approval
- Do nothing option is not in the US interest
- Diplomacy is compromised b/w US, Canada, Brazil, EU
- USA could attempt a coup with Brazil, Colombia, Canada and Guaido, possible, but alienates important stakeholders such as EU, China, and Russia.
- Such a Coup pushes the EU toward China
- USA has winset with Russia and EU, winset with China/Colombia/Brazil, but no winset with BOTH Russia and China
- Coup Satisfies 5 stakeholders, compared to Diplomacy's 4, Coup also Does not require Chinese or Russian consent
- SQ satisfies 6 stakeholders

# Baseline, COA | Tactic | SQ



-SQ will satisfy 5 allies, however no trade off is available between all stakeholders

-US dominated alliance has a potential trade off with Russia near Sanctions and closer to an Even Distribution of Oil Extraction Rights

-Small winset exists with the Generals

-Russia, China, Maduro, Cuba, Iran and Generals can unify against the US allied coalition near diplomacy and Russia-China-Allied Domination

Baseline

Respective Share of PDVSA Oil Extraction Rights

Complete US-  
Allied Control

US-Allied  
Domination

Even  
Distribution of  
Oil Extraction  
Rights

RUS

Russia/China-Allied Domination

Maduro/  
Cuba/  
Iran

Russia/China-  
Allied Control

USA/Canada

EU

Brazil

CHINA

Colombia/Guaido

Generals

Do Nothing

Diplomacy


Sanctions

Coup


Invasion

Support for US Action

# Baseline, COA II Tactic I - coup attempt, US/Canada/Colombia/Guaido/Brazil



# Baseline, COA II Tactic 2, an Appeal to the Generalissimo



-US Pulls The Generals toward the Coup Coalition in exchange for Venezuelan Oil rights.

-Coup is attempted without support of other great powers

-China, Russia, and the EU are ostracized

-Will the coup be successful?

# Scenario I COVID Virulence

# Scenario I, High COVID Virulence

In this Scenario, rather than plateauing or slowing, the virulence of COVID 19 has intensified.

- The global economy has sunk further; nations are too sick and too constrained to focus attention on matters outside their borders.
- Maduro's control over Venezuela is at its weakest, and Venezuelan destitution at its highest.
- Risk of US assets contracting COVID is severe.
- Venezuelan Generals have little to lose
- US public support of foreign affairs is very low, preferring focus on domestic COVID embattlement.

## STRENGTHS

- Venezuelan society and economy not recovering
- Ambitious Generals have little to lose
- Maduro's hold on power weakened
- Rivals preoccupied

## OPPORTUNITIES

- Stakeholder flexibility in uncertain times
- Opportunity to strike when the opposition is weakest
- Operation to collaborate with historical rivals during unprecedented time when all are trying to recover


## WEAKNESSES

- American citizens lack support for foreign affairs
- American resources needed on the Homefront
- American assets at heightened risk of contracting COVID

## THREATS


- COVID outbreak in the American ranks jeopardizes entire Operation
- Key operatives and Generals infected with COVID eliminates our advantage
- Time-sensitive operation

# Scenario I COVID Virulence



- United States takes a softer position, at sanctions, as Country reels from the pandemic
- Generals see an opportunity
- Distinct winset between US/Canada/Brazil/Colombia/Guaido/Generals
- Large overlap between Generals and Colombia indicate possible deal
- USA can act first and attempt Coup while rivals are hampered by still-high COVID virulence.

# Coronageddon Tactic I, Go Hard




-USA finds a compromise with Colombia, Guaido, Canada, Brazil and Generals conducting a coup and Evenly Distributing Oil Extraction Rights

-Cuba, Iran and Maduro are willing to tradeoff RUS-CNH domination

-EU, Russia and China do not support a hard stance


# Scenario I COVID Virulence – Soft stance

## Scenario I COVID Virulence



- USA is correspondingly taking a middle-of-the-road position at Sanctions, and towards US-Allied Domination
- No winset that satisfies all stakeholders
- Distinct winset between USA/Canada/China/Russia/E U.
- This Diplomatic action provides favorable oil rights to the United States, and Russian, European, and Chinese Diplomatic support.

# Scenario I COVID Virulence, Tactic I, Diplomatic Action



-USA cedes some control of extraction rights in exchange


-Generals ostracized as Great Powers work for a peaceful end to the Maduro regime

-Favorable oil rights to the United States, and Russian, European, and Chinese Diplomatic Support.

-Brazil, Colombia, Guaido, Cuba, Iran, Maduro share significant overlap over Russia-China Oil Domination

-Small winset between Iran/Maduro/Cuba and Diplomatic Coalition

# Scenario I COVID Virulence, Tactic II, Gather Support



# Scenario II Oil Price Hike

# Scenario II Oil Price Hike

In this scenario, the price of one barrel of oil has risen dramatically.

-The Maduro regime is much better suited to make good on its economic promises

-Generals are well payed

-Key stakeholders are being satisfied, have more to lose in the case of a rebellion

-Foreign Powers are attracted to PDVSA oil, and thus more invested in the status quo of the Maduro Regime

## STRENGTHS

- American economy is recovering
- American allies invested in procuring PDVSA oil

## WEAKNESSES

- Rosneft could be enticed to invest in PDVSA
- Venezuelan industry is on the rise, enemy stakeholders have more to lose
- Venezuelans and Cubans have more money to spend on counter-intelligence

## OPPORTUNITIES

- Recovering American economy provides stronger Invasion forces
- Opportunity to renegotiate oil rights
- Large economic oil opportunity

## THREATS

- Chinese/Russian military support
- Chinese/Russian economic support
- Non-cooperation of Generals
- Maduro Regime increase in popularity with increase in oil revenues

## Scenario II - Oil Price Hike

Respective Share of PDVSA Oil Extraction Rights

Complete US-  
Allied Control

US-Allied  
Domination

Even  
Distribution of  
Oil Extraction  
Rights

Russia/China-  
Allied Domination

Russia/China-  
Allied Control

**Iran**

**Russia**

**Cuba**

**EU**

**Guaido**

**Canada**

**Brazil**

**Colombia**

**China**

Diplomacy

Sanctions


Coup

Invasion

Support for US Action


- No agreement between all exists
- US takes a hard stance
- Maduro and Generals could find a potential compromise with US and its allies near Diplomatic Action and 50/50 Oil Extraction
- SQ yields agreement between 6 stakeholders
- Colombia can potentially find an agreement with China and Russia near Sanctions and RUS-China control
- No agreement between US and Russia
- China and US could find a compromise near sanctions and RUS-CHN domination

## Scenario II - Oil Price Hike, COA I - Sanctions




- No agreement between all stakeholders
- US Alliance has a potential trade off with Maduro/Generals and Russia
- US coalition has a potential trade off with China
- Target stakeholders can unify against US alliance in favor of Russia-China Allied Control


## Scenario II - Oil Price Hike, COA II - Coup



- No other stakeholders support a coup
- Small potential compromise is available between the US Alliance and China near Russia Inclined Oil domination

## Scenario II - Oil Price Hike, COA III- Invasion







# Game with the Generals – Instigating a Coup

## Game with the Generals - Instigating a coup

US conducts talks with the top generals and offers them to cooperate




Game with the Generals -  
Instigating a coup



Baseline  
Scenario I COVID Virulence  
Scenario II Oil Price Hike

Payoff Order  
US, Padrino, Cabello


Game with the Generals -  
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Baseline  
Scenario I COVID Virulence  
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
Game with the Generals -  
Instigating a coup




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
Game with the Generals -  
Instigating a coup




Game with the Generals -  
Instigating a coup



## Game with the Generals - Instigating a coup



## Game with the Generals - Instigating a coup



Under **Baseline**, Padrino will accept the US offer and both stakeholders receive the highest payoff of 5

PLUS	MINUS	IMPLICATION
Time efficient (+10)	Might be costly to negotiate (-5)	Worth trying as very time efficient (+5)
Direct access to top leaders (+10)	Might be not trustworthy (-7)	Large gains as directly access military forces yet exercise caution (+3)
Appropriate time for such an operation due to COVID and Economic crises (+7)	Large operation costs (-5)	Worth conducting an operation (+5)
+27	-17	+10

## Game with the Generals - Instigating a coup




Under **Scenario I COVID Virulence**, Padrino will accept the US offer, US receives the highest payoff of 5 and Padrino receives the payoff of 4

PLUS	MINUS	IMPLICATION
Time efficient (+10)	Might be costly to negotiate (-5)	Worth trying as very time efficient (+5)
Direct access to top leaders (+10)	Might be not trustworthy (-7)	Large gains as directly access military forces yet exercise caution (+3)
Appropriate time for such an operation due to COVID and Economic crises (+10)	Large operation costs (-5)	Worth conducting an operation (+5)
+30	-17	+13

## Game with the Generals - Instigating a coup

Under **Scenario II Oil Price Hike**, no successful coup attempt is expected as stakeholders are better off declining US offer



	COA	Plus	Minus	Implication
Baseline	Diplomacy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Satisfy EU/Russia/USA</li> <li>-Non-violent</li> <li>-Inexpensive</li> <li>-Lower risk of infection</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Cannot satisfy Russia/China/Latam together</li> <li>-Time-Sensitive</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Limited achievable winsets</li> <li>-Partial great-power cooperation</li> <li>-Affordable, but time-sensitive</li> </ul>
Baseline	Coup	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Satisfy Colombia/Brazil</li> <li>-Shorter than Diplomatic Action</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-No Multilateral Support</li> <li>-More costly than diplomacy</li> <li>-Require 2 iterative tactics</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Unilateral Coup Achievable</li> <li>-Time efficient to win over generals</li> <li>-Higher operating costs</li> </ul>
Scenario I, High COVID Virulence	Diplomacy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Satisfy All Great Powers</li> <li>-Non-violent</li> <li>-Comparatively Inexpensive</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Requires comprehensive and proactive diplomatic coordination on an election year!</li> <li>-High Operating Costs in terms of infection</li> <li>-Time-sensitive</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Win-win, Great Power cooperation</li> <li>-Affordable, Requires coordination.</li> <li>-High Risk of Infection</li> <li>-Satisfied Power Transitioning</li> </ul>
Scenario I High COVID Virulence	Coup	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Satisfy Brazil and Colombia and Generals</li> <li>-Shorter than diplomatic initiative</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-No Multilateral support</li> <li>-More costly than diplomacy</li> <li>-High COVID exposure</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Achievable before 9/3</li> <li>-LatAm support</li> <li>-More costly, financially and medically</li> <li>-No Great-power support</li> </ul>
Scenario 2 Oil	Coup	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Satisfy Brazil/Colombia</li> <li>-Shorter than Invasion</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Extremely unpopular internationally</li> <li>-Opposition made stronger by Higher oil price</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Diplomatically Polarizing</li> <li>-Risks health of Operatives</li> <li>-Unlikely to succeed unilaterally</li> </ul>
Scenario 2 Oil	Sanctions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Maintain SQ, no costs</li> <li>Reputation Preserved</li> </ul>	No results	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Optimal under this scenario as no support is achieved</li> </ul>
Scenario 2 Oil	Invasion	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Requires only unilateral Support</li> <li>-Satisfies Colombia</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Unpopular Internationally</li> <li>-Time-sensitive</li> <li>-Extremely economically and Medically costly</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Diplomatically Polarizing</li> <li>-Risks Health of Americans and Venezuelans</li> <li>-Time Sensitive</li> <li>-Risk of Troops catchin COVID</li> <li>-Unlikely to succeed before 9/3</li> </ul>

# COA Ranking

	Baseline	Scenario I COVID Virulence	Scenario II Oil Price Hike
Do Nothing	2	2	2
Diplomacy	3	5	3
Increase Sanctions	4	3	5
Instigate Coup	5	4	4
Invade	1	1	1

Ranking is based on an ordinal scale from 1 to 5, with 5 being the highest rank. The analysis is derived from Spatial Bargaining Game with the Generals and Stakeholder Analysis. The rank is based on the number of stakeholders reaching the agreement under each state of nature and their relative influence and importance. E.g. under Baseline, Instigating a Coup yields higher Stakeholder Consensus with 2 tactic COA

## COA Evaluation – MAXIMIN Approach

	Baseline	Scenario I COVID Virulence	Scenario II Oil Price Hike	Minimum
Do Nothing	2	2	2	2
Diplomacy	3	5	3	3
Increase Sanctions	4	3	5	3
Instigate Coup	5	4	4	4
Invade				

MAXIMIN, Hedging

## COA Evaluation – No Regret Minimax Approach


No Regret Table	Baseline	Scenario I COVID Virulence	Scenario II Oil Price Hike	Maximum
Do Nothing	3	3	3	3
Diplomacy	2	0	2	2
Increase Sanctions	1	2	0	2
Instigate Coup	0	1	1	1
Invade	4	4	4	4

MINIMAX

# Insights


- Instigate Coup is a COA with the least regret that performs well across different states of nature (hedging)
  - Under Scenario I COVID Virulence, Instigate Coup has a support of generals
  - Overall, this COA is more costly than Diplomacy
  - This strategy gathers the majority of key stakeholders

# Implementation and Timeline



No Regret/MAXIMIN COA Implementation

# BONUS




# APPENDIX

# The Opportunity

Where are we going?

**Figure 2. Venezuela's Economy: Collapsing GDP**



**Source:** IMF, *World Economic Outlook*, October 2019.

**Note:** 2019 data are forecasts. GDP = gross domestic product.

# Opportunity

A win for Venezuela, a win for US.

Immense economic incentive in liberated Venezuelan Industry

## I. Petro Chemicals and the future of PdVSA

- a. The United States formerly largest client
- b. Russian and Indian aid to the Lemon company
- c. Money talks! Chinese interests Non-military?

## 2. Mineral and Agriculture Extraction

- a. Venezuelan Fertile Soil at just 25% Capacity, potential future partnerships
- b. Venezuelans are starving. Food Aid needed
- c. Largest gold reserves? Mineral Bargaining Chip?

# Traction and Opportunity

## Learning from the Past, Looking to the Future



Panama 1989;

- I. Operation JUST CAUSE
  - a. Manuel Noriega, (Maduro 1.0)
  - b. CIA Payroll and the CONTRAs
  - c. Drug Trafficking and Cuban Double Agent
  - d. Panama Canal returned, little to show
2. President Bush (Sr.) Authorizes Invasion, 1989
  - a. Though Internationally criticized, Operation successful
  - b. Brief Conflict, <500 casualties
  - c. Endara Democratically elected thereafter
  - d. The Target and Procedure, Venezuela 1.0



“History Never Repeats Itself, but it sometimes rhymes” — Mark (Twain)

# Coping with Uncertainty



# Operation Overthrow: Logistics of invasion

## Operation COVID, if we must invade, here are some logistics:

An invasion of Venezuela during the Covid-19 pandemic is theoretically feasible, but the possibility for error is extraordinary and includes many factors beyond US control. I have outlined a rough plan for an invasion including the planning, execution, operational hazards, and likely points of failure. Outside of a pandemic, invading Venezuela would be a comparatively simple task (from a military perspective, global politics notwithstanding), but Covid-19 threatens US forces and makes establishing a pro-US government in the aftermath of invasion exceptionally difficult.

Exact numbers would be generated further into the planning process. But for need rough estimates:

- 1 Marine Division
- 1 Army Division (in reserve)
- 1 Carrier battle group
- USAF and cruise missile support as needed.
- Various commando support as needed.

Expensive, but similar to Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama.

## Objective:

Removal of the Maduro regime and installation of pro-US government.

## Execution:

Summary: Decapitate Venezuelan political/military leadership. Seize government installations, ports, airfields to establish US control over the country. Prevent regime loyalists from fleeing south to lead insurgency. Establish pro-American government and extract US ground forces as quickly as possible.

## Preparation:

- Establish Venezuelan opposition government in exile before invasion commences. Ideally led by local leader with pre-existing base of support and legitimacy, such as Juan Guaidó.
- Declare no-fly zone over Venezuela to clear region of civilian air traffic.
- Issue ultimatum demanding elements of Venezuelan regime and military either swear allegiance to the new government or be destroyed.

## Invasion: Time-Table 6 weeks or less

- Cruise missiles and Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD) air strikes destroy Venezuelan surface-to-air missile network and air force on the ground.
- Precision air strikes debilitate key regime leaders, disable military communications networks, and attack army units/depts to paralyze defenders.
- USMC forces amphibiously seize major port, government, and airport facilities in coastal cities to secure US supply lines and bring in ground reinforcements as needed.
- Helicopter mobile and airborne US commandos identify, raid, and destroy regime outposts or known Narco camps in southern Venezuela to prevent the creation of safe havens for insurgents.

- US forces rapidly occupy country, disarm or destroy regime loyalists, capture or kill regime leadership who attempt to flee.

## Post War Planning and US Force Extraction:

- Seal Venezuelan national borders, preferably using local forces monitored by US troops.
- Flood the country with humanitarian assistance, food, medical supplies, hospital ships (if any are available). Establishing a viable pro-US government requires rapidly improving the standards of living for the average Venezuelan to secure their loyalty, or at least apathy, to the new government.
- Purge Venezuelan military/civil bureaucracy of senior officials/officers who supported Maduro. But crucially, do NOT dismiss the entire military/civil bureaucracy or they will become insurgents immediately (this mistake was made in Iraq).
- Hand over control of country to new pro-US government as quickly as possible.
- Transfer day-to-day ground humanitarian/relief operations to US-funded and supplied, international/private organizations as quickly as possible to reduce exposure of US military personnel in theater.
- Significant US ground presence must be withdrawn from the country as soon as is realistically possible to minimize Covid-19 exposure to US forces. To achieve this, a functioning pro-US government *must* be assembled with haste. This requires significant pre-invasion planning.

## Operational Hazards:

Summary: Invading a third world country during a pandemic imposes novel security risks on US personnel and to post-war planning. *Uncertainty Level 4*

### Covid-19 Threats to US forces:

- Due to threat of Covid-19 infection, US personnel in theater will require higher levels of protective equipment, medical, and logistical support than usual.
- Abnormally large medical/humanitarian footprint creates numerous targets for insurgents.
- Due to Chavez/Maduro regime mismanagement, basic amenities, food, and medical supplies required to underpin a pro-US government cannot be locally sourced. These resources will have to be brought in by the US.

## Likely Points of Failure: Key Uncertainties

- Due to the poor health infrastructure and 3<sup>rd</sup> world conditions in Venezuela, the health and safety of US personnel cannot be guaranteed. *Level 2-3 Uncertainty*
- Successful execution of this invasion require seizing most of the Venezuelan government intact and repurposing its bureaucracies and military/police forces as agents of a pro-American government. Due to years of anti-American indoctrination, this may prove difficult. *Level 2 Uncertainty*
- The emergence of significant insurgent resistance may paralyze efforts to transfer civilian/security operations to a pro-US government. The jungle/mountainous geography of Venezuela's interior combined with the regime's ties to Narcos enhances the likelihood of insurgent activity. *Level 2 Uncertainty*
- Even if the transfer of power to pro-American authorities can be accomplished, the new government may be unable to administer the country during a pandemic. The scope of the country's humanitarian crisis, now exacerbated by Covid-19, may render Venezuela ungovernable without US assistance. *Uncertainty Level 3*

# Full List of Stakeholders


STAKEHOLDER TABLE						
	STAKEHOLDER	SOCIAL ANALYSIS		ASSESSING INFLUENCE & IMPORTANCE		STAKEHOLDER IDENTIFICATION
	NAME	GROUP	CATEGORY	IMPORTANCE	INFLUENCE	TYPE
1	MADUROooooooooooooooo	POV	Primary	High	High	Oponent
2	National Guard Pro-Maduro	Venezuela-military	Primary	High	High	Oponent
3	PADRINO	Venezuela-military	Primary	High	High	Oponent
4	CABELLO	Venezuela-military	Primary	High	High	Oponent
5	5 top generals	Venezuela-military	Primary	High	High	Supporters
6	Low Generals pro Guaido	Venezuela-military	secondary	High	Low	Oponent
7	Low generals pro Maduro	Venezuela-military	Primary	High	Low	Oponent
8	Intel Security DGCIM(Counterintelligence)	Venezuela-military	Primary	High	High	Oponent
9	Military low rank	Venezuela-military	secondary	High	Low	Oponent
10	Guaido	Venezuela-opposition	Primary	High	High	Supporters
11	National Assembly	Venezuela-opposition	Primary	High	High	Supporters
12	Pro-Guaido civ	Venezuela-opposition	secondary	Low	Low	Supporters
13	Activists (Julio Reyes)	Venezuela-opposition	secondary	Low	Low	Supporters
14	Pro-Maduro civ	Venezuela-civilians	secondary	Low	Low	Oponent
15	POTUS (President of the USA)	USA actors	Primary	High	High	Supporters
16	DoS (US Department of State)	USA actors	secondary	High	High	Supporters
17	DoD (US Department of Defense)	USA actors	secondary	High	High	Supporters
18	DoJ (US Department of Justice)	USA actors	Primary	High	High	Supporters
19	US Oil (CITGO/PSDVA Delaware/Virg Island)	USA actors	Primary	High	Low	Supporters
20	US Congress	USA actors	secondary	High	Low	Supporters
21	Russia Putin	Russia	secondary	High	High	Oponent
22	Peru	Regional actors	secondary	High	Low	Supporters
23	Colombia	Regional actors	secondary	Low	High	Supporters
24	Brazil	Regional actors	secondary	Low	High	Supporters
25	Cuba	Cuba	secondary	Low	High	Oponent
26	Lima group	Regional actors	secondary	High	Low	Supporters
27	EU	International actors	secondary	High	Low	Supporters
28	China Oil	China	secondary	High	Low	Oponent
29	China leadership	China	secondary	High	High	Supporters
30	United Nations	Organizations	secondary	High	Low	Supporters
31	Iran	Iran	secondary	Low	Low	Oponent
32	OAS	Organizations	secondary	High	Low	Supporters
33	India	India	secondary	Low	Low	Supporters
34	World Bank	Organizations	secondary	High	Low	Supporters

Political Authority in Venezuela


	Key Stakeholders	Power in Venezuelan Army	Access to Maduro
	 	USA	-
	 	Vladimir Padrino. Minister Of Defense	+++
		Diosdado Cabello. Head of Constituent Assembly	+++
		Cliver Alcala. General	+
		Maikel Moreno. Chief Supreme Court Justice	+++
		Juan Guaido. Recognized President	-

# Alternate Games

# Coup game with the generals or how to lose your mind



# INSTIGATING A COUP



Implementation and Timeline under each state of nature





Present

July,2020

### Tactic I

COA I

Peace Talks and  
Diplomacy

Russia, China, EU, Canada and US hold diplomatic talks over Maduro's removal and find a compromise near Even Distribution of Oil Extraction

Highest Rank

Operation  
COVID  
Cast  
Out  
Venezuela's  
Illegitimate  
Dictator

COA II

Instigate Coup

### Tactic I


US, Canada, Colombia, Guaido, Brazil and Padrino agree to instigate a coup and agree over Even Distribution of Oil Extraction

Scenario I COVID Virulence



Present

July,2020



## Scenario II Oil Price Hike

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