FIVE STEPS TO IMPROVE INTERNAL NETWORK SECURITY

Chattanooga ISSA

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WHY?

The methodical workflow honed by many state-affiliated actors of setting up a backdoor to gain initial access, and then using shell services to move laterally through the organization, has proven to be successful against victims of all types and sizes.

2013 Data Breach Investigations Report p.36

WHAT?

- 1. Eliminate LanMan Hashes
- 2. Remove Shared Local Admin Passwords
- 3. Lockdown Open File Shares
- 4. Replace Default/Blank Passwords
- 5. Lockdown Remote Desktop Protocol

ELIMINATE LANMAN PASSWORD HASHES

ELIMINATE LANMAN HASHES

LanMan is a weak hashing algorithm, which only works on passwords of 14 characters or less. The password is converted to upper case and split into two easily cracked 7 character chunks.

Tools such as Ophcrack, Rcracki_mt, John the Ripper, and Hashcat can crack LM hashes very quickly.

AD*7499&az hex:41442a3734393926617a hex: hex: Admin4synegi hex:41646d696e3473796e656769 hex: 200Nbon hex:3230304e626f6e 271356Sp hex:3237313335365370 machineshop1 hex:6d616368696e6573686f7031 m0r3m0n3v hex:6d3072336d306e3379 Lucksim1 hex:4c75636b73696d31 QW*3112&az hex:51572a3331313226617a Audrey823r hex:41756472657938323372 JEja109mar hex:4a456a613130396d6172 Riven007 hex:526976656e303037 2828Jic hex:323832384a6a63 <notfound> hex:<notfound> cobra351 hex:636f627261333531 uDKQn2])2&TN90 | hex:75444b516e325d293226544e3930 `j]{YH1=z<;t/Y | hex:606a5d7b5948313d7a3c3b742f59 Cp@ss567 hex:4370407373353637 MCp@ss567 hex:4d4370407373353637 Bp@ss567 hex:4270407373353637 Mollv9 hex:4d6f6c6c7939 Angel2010 hex:416e67656c32303130 Kevin14 hex:4b6576696e3134 vma97XT hex:766d6139375854 Student#1 hex:53747564656e742331 Dixie55 hex:44697869653535 Chris123 hex:4368726973313233 11----100 E---- ADCEC1 C- CT010000

ELIMINATE LANMAN HASHES

Group Policy

- Open Computer Configuration ->
 Windows Settings -> Security Settings ->
 Local Policies -> Security Options
- Network security: Do not store LAN
 Manager hash value on next password
 change.

ELIMINATE LANMAN HASHES

Local Machine

- 1. HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM \CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa
- 2. Add DWORD NoLMHash
- 3. Set the value to 1

ELIMINATE LANMAN HASHES

Unfortunately, these changes only mean LM hashes are not saved to disk. Windows still calculates the LM hashes and stores them in memory, which means they can still be extracted and cracked using tools like Windows Credential Editor (WCE). The only way to completely remove LM hashes is to use passwords of 15 characters or more.

SIDE NOTE: MIMIKATZ

Authentication algorithms such as HTTP Digest and Kerberos require knowledge of the plaintext password so **Windows stores it in memory** in encrypted form. The password can be **easily decrypted to recover the plaintext password**.

Mimikatz finds and decrypts these passwords.

SIDE NOTE: MIMIKATZ

The only way to protect against Mimikatz is to not logon interactively with privileged accounts. When interacting with a compromised machine, use WMIC, PSExec, or Net commands.

REMOVE SHARED LOCAL ADMIN PASSWORDS

REMOVE SHARED LOCAL ADMIN PASSWORDS

It is very common for the same local administrator password to be used throughout an organization. Once an attacker has the shared password he has control of a large portion of the organization.

10.100.16.102	445	administrator	password	true
10.100.16.103	445	administrator	password	true
10.100.16.204	445	administrator	password	true
10.100.16.212	445	administrator	password	true
10.100.16.214	445	administrator	password	true
10.100.16.229	445	administrator	password	true
10.100.17.1	445	administrator	password	true
10.100.17.2	445	administrator	password	true
10.100.17.3	445	administrator	password	true
10.100.17.4	445	administrator	password	true
10.100.17.5	445	administrator	password	true
10.100.17.6	445	administrator	password	true
10.100.17.7	445	administrator	password	true
10.100.17.8	445	administrator	password	true
10.100.17.14	445	administrator	password	true
10.100.17.21	445	administrator	password	true
10.100.17.23	445	administrator	password	true
10.100.17.40	445	administrator	password	true
10.100.17.42	445	administrator	password	true
10.100.17.43	445	administrator	password	true
10.100.17.44	445	administrator	password	true
10.100.17.45	445	administrator	password	true
10.100.17.46	445	administrator	password	true
10.100.17.47	445	administrator	password	true
10.100.17.48	445	administrator	password	true
10.100.17.49	445	administrator	password	true
10.100.17.50	445	administrator	password	true
10.100.17.51	445	administrator	password	true
10.100.17.52	445	administrator	password	true
10.100.17.54	445	administrator	password	true
10.100.17.55	445	administrator	password	true
10.100.17.56	445	administrator	•	true
10.100.17.57	445	administrator	password	
10.100.17.58	445	administrator	password	true
10.100.17.61	445	administrator	•	
10.100.17.62	445	administrator	password	
10.100.17.63	445	administrator	password	true
10.100.17.74	445	administrator	•	true
10.100.17.75	445	administrator	•	true
10.100.17.76	445	administrator	password	
10.100.17.77	445	administrator	password	
10.100.17.78	445	administrator	password	true

REMOVE SHARED LOCAL ADMIN PASSWORDS

Make sure the **local administrator** account and the **domain administrator** account use **unique passwords**.

REMOVE SHARED LOCAL ADMIN PASSWORDS

Use a unique password for each local administrator account.

Deny network logons for the local administrator account.

LOCKDOWN OPEN FILE SHARES

LOCK DOWN OPEN FILE SHARES

Open file shares are an excellent source of sensitive data. Windows shared folders, NFS shared folders, and anonymous FTP servers are the most common source of open file shares.


Tools like Nmap, Nessus, or Metasploit can be used to find open shares.


LOCK DOWN OPEN FILE SHARES


At one client the primary file server had many open shares, some of which contained protected health information. Other shares contained the source code to the client's web site, including database credentials.

LOCK DOWN OPEN FILE SHARES

At another client, a user shared files with Windows Simple File Sharing in Windows XP. The shared folder contained a document that included passwords for the company Facebook account and donor mailing list.







```
× root@bt: /mnt/135-126/smbguest/sels
File Edit View Terminal Help
drwx----- 129
                    502
                           500
                                       8192 2012-01-23 16:17 whitf
                                      8192 2011-12-16 19:52 wlowry
                           500
drwxr-xr-x 44
                    684
                                      8192 2010-11-23 14:55 yucao
drwxr-x---
                    667
                           518
 coot@bt:/mnt/135-126# cd smbguest/
    @bt:/mnt/135-126/smbguest# cd sels
root@bt:/mnt/135-126/smbquest/sels# ls -l
total 32144
-rwxr--r-- 1 505 501 1478346 2008-02-21 09:39 DSC02627.JPG
-rwxr--r-- 1 505 501 1398564 2008-02-21 09:39 DSC02628.JPG
drwxrwxrwx 38 root root
                            8192 2007-01-03 13:16
                           8192 2007-01-03 13:16
drwxrwxrwx 43 root root
drwxrwxrwx 43 root root
                           8192 2007-01-03 13:16
drwxrwxrwx 38 root root
                           8192 2007-01-03 13:16
drwxrwxrwx 38 root root
                           8192 2007-01-03 13:16
                            8192 2007-01-03 13:16
drwxrwxrwx 62 root root
drwxrwxrwx 52 root root
                            8192 2007-01-03 13:16
                           7128 2007-01-29 14:19 selbot
-rwxrwxrwx 1 root root
                           6941 2007-01-29 14:20 selbot headnode
-rwxrwxrwx 1 root root
-rwxrwxrwx 1 root root 27833910 2007-03-07 10:44 selbot output
                          1304 2007-01-03 13:16 spawndirs
rwxrwxrwx 1 root root
 rw-r--r-- 1 505 501
                           5632 2009-06-06 10:59 Thumbs.db
                          22120 2007-03-05 05:00 warninglog
 rwxrwxrwx 1 root root
 rwxrwxrwx 1 root root 2037209 2007-03-07 10:44 writelog
    bt:/mnt/135-126/smbquest/sels#
```

LOCK DOWN OPEN FILE SHARES

- 1. Open Folder Options
- 2. Go to the View tab
- 3. Uncheck "Use Simple File Sharing"
- 4. View the Properties for a Folder
- 5. Go to the Sharing tab and set the permissions to Everyone Full Control
- 6. Go to the Security tab and set appropriate NTFS permissions.

LOCK DOWN OPEN FILE SHARES

- Edit /etc/exports to ensure only appropriate directories are listed.
- 2. For each directory, grant access to only the appropriate IP addresses.
- 3. For each IP address, ensure read/write permissions are set correctly.
- 4. Ensure root is squashed.


REPLACE DEFAULT/BLANK PASSWORDS


REPLACE DEFAULT/BLANK PASSWORDS

Blank sa passwords in MSSQL can lead to full machine compromise.

Blank local administrator passwords allow full machine compromise.

Default/blank passwords on web-based management interfaces lead to various levels of compromise.





Launch the Oracle Enterprise Manager Console Information Documentation The Enterprise Manager Console allows you to centrally manage and administer Release Notes your environment. To launch the Console, enter the machine name on which your Quick Tours Oracle Management Server runs and then click the button labeled "Launch Console". Oracle Management Server: **Useful Links** Launch Console Oracle Home Page Enterprise Manager Home Page Support Home Page **Access Oracle Enterprise Manager Reports** Download Plug-in Accessibility Setup Enterprise Manager reports allow users to quickly view and analyze information about their managed systems. To view reports that have been published to the web, enter the machine name on which your Enterprise Manager reporting web server runs and the port on which it listens and then click the button labeled


Copyright@ 2000, Oracle Corporation. All Rights Reserved.

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Access Reports

"Access Reports".

Reporting Web Server: Port:



<u>≰</u> root::PowerEdge 2950 LogMeIn - Remote Session *	_
File View Macros Tools Help	
N SUSE Linux Enterprise Server	
Setting up network interfaces: lo	
lo IP address: 127.0.0.1/8 Checking for network time protocol daemon (NTPD): eth0 device: Broadcom Corporation NetXtreme II BCM5708 Gigabit Ethernet (rev 12)	doneed
ethO IP address: 10.100.66.181/24 Checking for network time protocol daemon (NTPD): eth1 device: Broadcom Corporation NetXtreme II BCM5708 Gigabit Ethernet (rev 12)	doneed
eth1 IP address: 10.10.1.10/24 Checking for network time protocol daemon (NTPD): eth2 device: Intel Corporation 82571EB Gigabit Ethernet Controller (rev 06)	doneed
Checking for network time protocol daemon (NTPD): eth3 device: Intel Corporation 82571EB Gigabit Ethernet Controller (rev 06)	doneed
Checking for network time protocol daemon (NTPD): eth4 device: Intel Corporation 82571EB Gigabit Ethernet Controller (rev 06) Checking for network time protocol daemon (NTPD):	doneed doneed
eth5 device: Intel Corporation 82571EB Gigabit Ethernet Controller (rev 06) Checking for network time protocol daemon (NTPD):	doneed
Setting up service network	done done
Re-Starting syslog services Starting CRON daemon Starting Name Service Cache Daemon	done done done
Starting DSM SA Connection Service:	done
Starting powersaved: Starting Systems Management Device Drivers:	done
Starting dell_rbu: Starting ipmi driver: Already started	done done
Starting snmpd	done

```
∨ × root@bt: ~
File Edit View Terminal Help
root@bt:~# ftp 10.0.1.248
Connected to 10.0.1.248.
220-QTCP at
220 Connection will close if idle more than 5 minutes.
Name (10.0.1.248:root): QSRV
331 Enter password.
Password:
230 QSRV logged on.
Remote system type is .
ftp> ls
200 PORT subcommand request successful.
125 List started.
                                                    QOpenSys/
               114688 05/06/11 11:27:55
0SYS
                65536 12/31/69 19:00:00 *FLR
ODOC
                                                    QDLS/
                                                    QSYS.LIB/
0SYS
             17317888 03/07/12 15:29:07 *LIB
                 4096 12/31/69 19:00:00 *DDIR
IODFTOWN
                                                    QOPT/
QSYS
                                                    QFileSvr.400/
                 2272 02/25/12 19:39:51 *DDIR
ODFTOWN
                 1200 02/25/12 19:39:51 *DDIR
                                                    QNTC/
0SYS
                40960 04/30/07 15:24:44 *DIR
                                                    dev/
                 8192 06/15/11 10:46:51 *DIR
0SYS
                                                    home/
              2072576 03/07/12 15:48:17 *DIR
QSYS
                                                    tmp/
                 8192 01/06/12 15:00:29 *DIR
QSYS
                                                    etc/
```

REPLACE DEFAULT/BLANK PASSWORDS

There is **no automated method for fixing this issue**.

Vulnerability scanners cannot identify all instances of default/blank passwords but can identify a number of them.

REPLACE DEFAULT/BLANK PASSWORDS

- 1. Scan the network for HTTP, FTP, Telnet, and SSH services.
- 2. Disable any services that are not needed.
- 3. Ensure a strong password is used on any services that are not disabled.

REPLACE DEFAULT/BLANK PASSWORDS

http://www.phenoelit.org/dpl/dpl.html

http://cirt.net/passwords

http://www.virus.org/default-password

LOCKDOWN REMOTE DESKTOP PROTOCOL

LOCKDOWN REMOTE DESKTOP PROTOCOL

RDP is used throughout many organizations to remotely administer internal machines and is typically configured with **no restrictions other than username and password**.

LOCKDOWN REMOTE DESKTOP PROTOCOL

The **Morto worm** scans a network for machines running RDP and attempts to login using the administrator account and a list of weak passwords. After it logs in, it copies itself to the new machine, searches for other vulnerable machines, and calls back to a C&C server to await commands.

LOCKDOWN REMOTE DESKTOP PROTOCOL

The update in **MS12-020** fixes a vulnerability in RDP, which is present in all versions of Windows. Newer versions of RDP use network level authentication (NLA), which requires an attacker to authenticate to the server before connecting to the RDP service, but this does not fix the underlying vulnerability. The only fix is to apply the update.

LOCKDOWN REMOTE DESKTOP PROTOCOL

Disable RDP with Group Policy (Server 2003)

- Open Computer Configuration ->
 Administrative Templates -> Windows
 Components -> Terminal Services
- 2. Set "Allow users to connect remotely using Terminal Services" to disabled.

LOCKDOWN REMOTE DESKTOP PROTOCOL

Disable RDP with Group Policy (Server 2008)

- Open Computer Configuration ->
 Administrative Templates -> Windows
 Components -> Remote Desktop Services ->
 Connections
- 2. Set "Allow users to connect remotely using Remote Desktop Services" to disabled.

LOCKDOWN REMOTE DESKTOP PROTOCOL

Additional Controls

- 1. Use Windows Firewall to restrict access by IP address.
- 2. Use Group Policy to restrict access to specific users.

RECAP

- 1. Eliminate LanMan Hashes
- 2. Remove Shared Local Admin Passwords
- 3. Lockdown Open File Shares
- 4. Replace Default/Blank Passwords
- 5. Lockdown Remote Desktop Protocol

ADDITIONAL RESOURCES

- http://computer-forensics.sans.org/blog/2012/03/09/protectingprivileged-domain-accounts-disabling-encrypted-passwords
- http://computer-forensics.sans.org/blog/2012/02/21/protectingprivileged-domain-account-safeguarding-password-hashes
- http://support.microsoft.com/kb/306300 (Disable RDP Server 2003)
- http://www.reborndigital.com/?p=88 (Disable RDP Server 2008)

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