



# Integration of Mixed-Criticality CPS with Criticality Layers

AVICPS 2012

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Electrical & Computer  
**ENGINEERING**

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
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
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
# Integration of Mixed-Criticality Tasks




Shared Hardware  
Can lead to cycle stealing




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
To avoid interference  
add temporal protection



# Integration of Mixed-Criticality Tasks



BUT  
Symmetric protection<sup>1</sup>  
leads to *criticality inversion*



<sup>1</sup>ARINC 653

# Zero-Slack Scheduling


Start with RM

Calculate the last instant before  $\tau_{HC}$  misses its deadline

- this is called the **zero-slack** instant

Switch to criticality-as-priority

- Splits the execution window into
  - Normal mode (RM)
  - Critical mode (CAPA)



# Guarantee

A task is guaranteed to execute for  $C^0$   
if no higher-criticality task overloads

## Layered guarantee

Engineer:

- No task overloads  $\Rightarrow$  all task meet their deadlines (Internal testing)


Certification authority

- A task is guarantee to execute for  $C^0$  at its criticality level (safety margin)
  - Disregarding lower-criticality tasks
  - Assuming no higher-criticality task overloads



# Mission


$$Value = (\wedge_i Safety\_Critical_i) * \sum_j Mission\_Critical_j$$







# Reclaiming Resources in Mixed-Criticality Systems

Task	Period	Criticality	WCET	NCET	Utility
$t_1$ Surveillance Cov.	4	Mission	2	2	{2,2.5}
$t_2$ Collision Avoid.	8	Safety	5	2.5	
$t_3$ Amount of Intelligence	4	Mission	2	2	{2,2.5}





# Using Reclaimed Resources to Maximized Utility

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
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


**ZS-QRAM:** More mission-critical utility from same resources

# Periods as allocation points




Initial allocation with nominal functions



On overload: period degradation with overloaded functions




# Compress-on-Overload Packing (COP)




# Compress-on-Overload Packing (COP)

Phase 1: Pack by criticality then size  
object size =  $\frac{C_i^o}{T_i}$




# Compress-on-Overload Packing (COP)

Phase 2: Pack by criticality then size  
object size =  $\frac{C_i}{T_i}$




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Phase 2: Pack by criticality then size  
object size =  $\frac{C_i}{T_i}$





# Shared Resources: Priority & Criticality Inversion



# Priority & Criticality Inheritance Protocols

## Priority and Criticality Inheritance Protocol (PCIP):

- A task **holding** a lock inherits the highest priority of all tasks **requesting** the lock AND inherits the highest criticality among all tasks that **request** the lock (could be different or the same)


## Priority and Criticality Ceiling Protocol (PCCP):

- Each lock is assigned both a:
  - Priority ceiling that is the highest priority among all tasks that can request the lock
  - Criticality ceiling that is the highest criticality among all tasks that can request the lock
- Both the priority ceiling and the criticality ceiling are inherited by the task that hold the lock


\* **PCCP prevents deadlocks**




# Integration with Criticality Layers



# Integration with Criticality Layers



# Integration with Criticality Layers



# Certification Standards

## DO-178-B/C

- Design Assurance Levels (A-E)
- Based on criticality of failure
- Higher-criticality => stringent validation / larger safety margin

## ISO-26262

- <sup>1</sup>Automotive Safety Integrity Levels (ASIL) : A-D
- Classification based on risk analysis
- Should protect higher-critical from lower ones

Certification at highest-level if temporal protection cannot avoid it

Incremental certification

- A criticality layer can be certified ignoring lower-criticality

1. Ficek, et al. "Applying the AUTOSAR timing protection to build safe and efficient ISO 26262 mixed-criticality systems". ERTS 2012



# Open Issues

## Input / Output

- Interrupts
- DMA transactions

## Network bandwidth

- Single hop
- Multiple hop

## Memory hierarchy

- Cache
- Memory banks
- Memory bus

## Shared resources (locking protocols)

- Extend protocols to multi-processor (multi-cores)



# Concluding Remarks

Asymmetric protection (ZS-QRAM)

- Efficient overbooking without compromising safety

Layered overbooking

- Efficient scheduling between critical and non-critical tasks

Sub-layers overbooking within criticality and utility layers increases adaptability of systems

- Zero-Slack Packing algorithms (COP) allows efficient overbooking in partitioned scheduling of multi-core/multi-processor systems
- Priority and Criticality Inheritance Protocols enable predictable locking protocols for resource sharing

Enables Layered Certification

- Incremental by layers
- Layered safety margins

