BITCOIN
(A BASIC TUTORIAL)

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In this tutorial:

- What is Bitcoin and how does is work?
- What are the main challenges?
- The surrounding ecosystem
- Pointers to related research & additional sources of information

Money isn’t perfect

Currently slower and more expensive than:

A decentralized digital currency

Invented by Satoshi Nakamoto in 2008
Launched in 2009

Built for the age of the internet

Features of Bitcoin

Pseudonymous

Fixed amount

Irreversible Transfers

Cannot be seized

Can not be frozen

Escrow

Joint accounts



coinbase

bitpay

CIRCLE

Last Price:	Daily Change:	Day's Range:	Today's Open:	24h Volume
$655.38	$8.22 1.27%	$635.88 - $656.84	$647.16	8646 BTC

Market Cap: $8,432,610,615.00 Total BTC: 12,866,750 BTC



*From Bitstamp.net



- Bypass regulation & censorship
- Increase competition
- Disrupt


Blue: 2
Red: 1
Blue: 2
Red: 1
Blue: 2
Red: 1
Blue: 2
Red: 1
Blue: 2
Red: 1
Blue: 2
Red: 1
Blue: 2
Red: 1
Blue: 2
Red: 1

Transactions are thus public, addresses are (free) pseudonyms



BLOCKCHAIN

Home Charts Stats Markets Developers Wallet

DPR Seized Coins Addresses are identifiers which you use to send bitcoins to another person.

Summary	
Address	1FfmbHfnpaZjKFvyi1okTjJJusN455paPH
Hash 160	a0e6ca5444e4d8b7c80f70237f332320387f18c7
Tools	Taint Analysis - Related Tags - Unspent Outputs

Transactions	
No. Transactions	573
Total Received	144,341.5244317 BTC
Final Balance	144,341.5244317 BTC

Request Payment | Donation Button

The Double-spend problem



A variant of the Byzantine general's problem (Byzantine consensus in asynchronous dist. systems)



- Blocks aggregate transactions in batches
- Each block contains a cryptographic hash of the prev one, “proving” it is created afterwards.
- Can Read ledger from start to finish to “follow the money”
- Each node tries to grow the chain with recent transactions:
  - Create a block with recent consistent transactions
  - Send to peers



Inconsistency may occur if blocks are created simultaneously by different nodes

(double spend problem)





Solution:

1. Make block creation hard.
2. Adopt conflicting blocks if they make up a longer chain.

Must be a small number for valid block
(under some target value)

If not, change Nonce & try again

~ one block per 10 min. in the entire network
(Difficulty scales automatically to maintain this)
Current traget has ~65 zeros in most significant digits

1. Make block creation hard (once every 10 minutes)

2. Adopt (conflicting) blocks iff they make up a longer chain.





The Double-Spend Attack

- A payment can be reversed!
- Easy if attacker has >50% of compute power
- Possible with less than 50%



Bitcoin's Guarantee [Satoshi]:
If attacker controls < 50% of compute power, probability of block replacement decreases exponentially with time.

To encourage nodes to authorize transactions:



Reward the authorizer with fees from each transaction (+ newly minted money)

Block creation is known as “Mining”

Block size is limited (currently to 1MB)
Transactions will compete to enter – highest fee first.
(An auction!)


Total Bitcoins over time
Total Coins (millions)
0
3
6
9
12
15
18
21
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
2030
2031
2032
2033
Year


Hash Rate
Source: blockchain.info
125,000,000
100,000,000
75,000,000
50,000,000
25,000,000
0
Hash Rate GH/s
Jul '13
Sep '13
Nov '13
Jan '14
Mar '14
May '14



Attacks

Analysis of the Double Spend Attack

The recipient has an acceptance strategy:

- # of “confirmations” (blocks) it waits for before transaction is considered “accepted”.
- Assumption: attacker has hashrate q. Yields distribution over the # of blocks in its chain.



Analysis of the Attack

- Consider a Markov Process representing the difference in length between the chains



n blocks built by honest nodes, attacker has strength $q \rightarrow$ probability distribution over initial states $\in \{n, n-1, n-2, \ldots\}$.

The Result:

Attacker's strength: $q < 0.5$

Receiver's policy: wait for n confirmations

Probability of successful attack:

$$r = 1 - \sum_{m=0}^{n} \binom{m+n-1}{m} \cdot ((1-\mathrm{q})^{\mathrm{n}}\mathrm{q}^{\mathrm{m}} - (1-\mathrm{q})^{\mathrm{m}}\mathrm{q}^{\mathrm{n}})$$

Result due to Meni Rosenfeld: "Analysis of hashrate-based double-spending"

q	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
2%	4%	0.237%	0.016%	0.001%	≈ 0	≈ 0	≈ 0	≈ 0	≈ 0	≈ 0
4%	8%	0.934%	0.120%	0.016%	0.002%	≈ 0	≈ 0	≈ 0	≈ 0	≈ 0
6%	12%	2.074%	0.394%	0.078%	0.016%	0.003%	0.001%	≈ 0	≈ 0	≈ 0
8%	16%	3.635%	0.905%	0.235%	0.063%	0.017%	0.005%	0.001%	≈ 0	≈ 0
10%	20%	5.600%	1.712%	0.546%	0.178%	0.059%	0.020%	0.007%	0.002%	0.001%
12%	24%	7.949%	2.864%	1.074%	0.412%	0.161%	0.063%	0.025%	0.010%	0.004%
14%	28%	10.662%	4.400%	1.887%	0.828%	0.369%	0.166%	0.075%	0.034%	0.016%
16%	32%	13.722%	6.352%	3.050%	1.497%	0.745%	0.375%	0.190%	0.097%	0.050%
18%	36%	17.107%	8.741%	4.626%	2.499%	1.369%	0.758%	0.423%	0.237%	0.134%
20%	40%	20.800%	11.584%	6.669%	3.916%	2.331%	1.401%	0.848%	0.516%	0.316%
22%	44%	24.781%	14.887%	9.227%	5.828%	3.729%	2.407%	1.565%	1.023%	0.672%
24%	48%	29.030%	18.650%	12.339%	8.310%	5.664%	3.895%	2.696%	1.876%	1.311%
26%	52%	33.530%	22.868%	16.031%	11.427%	8.238%	5.988%	4.380%	3.220%	2.377%
28%	56%	38.259%	27.530%	20.319%	15.232%	11.539%	8.810%	6.766%	5.221%	4.044%
30%	60%	43.200%	32.616%	25.207%	19.762%	15.645%	12.475%	10.003%	8.055%	6.511%
32%	64%	48.333%	38.105%	30.687%	25.037%	20.611%	17.080%	14.226%	11.897%	9.983%
34%	68%	53.638%	43.970%	36.738%	31.058%	26.470%	22.695%	19.548%	16.900%	14.655%
36%	72%	59.098%	50.179%	43.330%	37.807%	33.226%	29.356%	26.044%	23.182%	20.692%
38%	76%	64.691%	56.698%	50.421%	45.245%	40.854%	37.062%	33.743%	30.811%	28.201%
40%	80%	70.400%	63.488%	57.958%	53.314%	49.300%	45.769%	42.621%	39.787%	37.218%
42%	84%	76.205%	70.508%	65.882%	61.938%	58.480%	55.390%	52.595%	50.042%	47.692%
44%	88%	82.086%	77.715%	74.125%	71.028%	68.282%	65.801%	63.530%	61.431%	59.478%
46%	92%	88.026%	85.064%	82.612%	80.480%	78.573%	76.836%	75.234%	73.742%	72.342%
48%	96%	94.003%	92.508%	91.264%	90.177%	89.201%	88.307%	87.478%	86.703%	85.972%
50%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Table 1: The probability of a successful double spend, as a function of the attacker's hashrate q and the number of confirmations n.

From Meni Rosenfeld's paper "Analysis of hash-rate based double spending".

Implications

- To get final approval for a transaction one has to wait several blocks (confirmations).
- Each block takes 10 minutes in expectation.

Risk of an attack should take transaction size into account.

<F9><BE><B4><D9>^]^A^@^@^A^@
^@^@^@^@^@^@^@^@^@^@^@;<A3><ED><FD>z{^R<B2>z<C7>,>gv<8F>a^?<C8>ESC<C3><88>
<8A>Q2:<9F><B8><AA>K^^^J)<AB>_I<FF><FF>^@^]^]<AC>+|^A^A^@^@^@^A^@^@^@^@^@
^@<FF><FF><FF><FF>M^D
<FF><FF>^@^]^A^DEThe Times 03/Jan/2009 Chancellor on brink of second bailo
ut for banks<FF><FF><FF><FF>^A^@<F2>^E*^A^@^@^@CA^Dg<8A><FD><B0><FE>UH'^Yg
<F1><A6>q0<B7>^P\<D6><A8>(<E0>9   <A6>yb<E0><EA>^_a<DE><B6>I<F6><BC>?L
<EF>8<C4><F3>U^D<E5>^^<C1>^R<DE>\8M<F7><BA>^K<8D>W<8A>Lp+k<F1>^] <AC>^@^@

The Finney attack

Some Vendors cannot afford to wait.
Accept 0-confirmation transactions.

Susceptible to a simple attack:

- Alice pre-mines block with a transaction to self.
- Alice creates and sends transaction paying bob. Instantly receives goods from Bob.
- Alice release pre-mined block before the transaction to Bob is authorized.



Additional Attack Vectors

- Network-structure attacks
  - Isolating a node implies you can use its computational power to launch double spend attacks
  - Sybil attacks
- DDoS attacks with amplification
  - Blocks are secure by difficulty, blocks that are too old are not allowed
  - Transactions are secured by fee
- Clock Drift attacks (Timejacking)
- 0-Confirmation attacks & chain splits based on different versions

Transactions

Addresses

- Addresses are (essentially) public keys
- Allow sending Bitcoins even when recipient is offline
- Signatures are used to prove ownership (generated with private keys)
- Security matters! paper wallets / cold storage.

Brainwallet | Generator | Chains | Transactions | Converter | Sign

Passphrase

love

Secret Exponent

686f746a95b6f836d7d70567c302c3f9ebb5ee0def3d1220ee9d4e9f34f5e131

Point Conversion

Uncompressed | Compressed

Private Key

5JcHF3GtHTXHm2VVLYevaBYmp1MLEmrhQu4hL4gaPpXWxaQrJsa

Address

1Mm6ouhpHqbtahCRNYfTo7Art1fbmk7PcR

Transactions (Newest First)

Filter

56025d6d46cd4dd6b91be02498546ef90664c19c8687ec637c3e3ff53de7d568 **2012-08-30 09:12:42**

1Mm6ouhpHqbtahCRNYfTo7Art1fbmk7PcR → 1Gh861fxMLVbpfAichU1YKm55q2pSttDsP 0.0095 BTC

-0.01 BTC

9d7b0b3de24dd943d356c22b6871c5be109c7ac4e0b0032732d21c06ebcc1b55 **2012-08-30 08:52:26**

1GKRXCbfHhJa6buSye657toKaiafTREhja → 1Mm6ouhpHqbtahCRNYfTo7Art1fbmk7PcR 0.01 BTC

0.01 BTC

Transactions

- Each transaction is a transfer of money from inputs to outputs (many-to-many)

(the fee is the difference between outputs and inputs)

A transaction is valid if and only if

- It contains all required signatures,
- every input matches a previous unspent output



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Did Satoshi Nakamoto transfer 1,000 bitcoins to the Silk Road?

o Jeremy Kirk

25.11.2013 kl 03:26 | IDG News Service\Sydney Bureau

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Two computer scientists in Israel say a bitcoin transaction now worth more than US$1 million suggests a possible link between a creator of the virtual currency and Ross William Ulbricht, the 29-year-old accused of running the Silk Road underground online marketplace.

Transactions

- outputs specify amount and “script” for redeeming money.

```
OP_DUP OP_HASH160 5df3d323c10c8563e9086074c4bd94eab97b95a8
OP_EQUALVERIFY OP_CHECKSIG
```

- Inputs specify data for script to return “True”

- Some outputs cannot be redeemed.



Scripts allow for much more...

- k out of n signatures
- Delayed payments
- Savings accounts

- P2P bets
- Derivatives
- Distributed exchanges

- Implemented on top of Bitcoin

- or in alternative chains

Modifications of the protocol

Altcoins

- Many Bitcoin clones



Zerocoin / Zerocash

[Ben-Sasson, Chiesa, Garman, Green, Miers, Tromer, and Virza]

- Improved anonymity for Bitcoin using advanced cryptographic tools
  - zero-knowledge Succinct Non-interactive ARguments of Knowledge (zk-SNARKs)
- Hides transaction origin, destination & amount.
- Most importantly: efficient implementation makes otherwise heavy crypto practical

Can Bitcoin Be Faster?

Block rate: one every 10 minutes

2.5 minutes

12 seconds

What is the effect of this? Why not go even faster?

Two related problems

[Sompolinsky & Zohar]

A block every 10 minutes

- A Long wait for transaction confirmations

1MB per block (per 10 minutes)

- A limit on number of transactions per second (3.3 TPS)

Larger blocks

Higher block creation rates

More forks in chain



*Data generously shared by Decker & Wattenhofer



Larger blocks

Higher block creation rates

More forks in chain

Modest increase in TPS





Larger blocks

Higher block creation rates

More forks in chain

Modest increase in TPS

Lower security





50% attack with less than 50% of hash power

Greedy Heaviest Observed Sub-Tree (GHOST)

[Sompolinsky & Zohar]

An alternative chain selection rule
(instead of “longest chain”)

- Begin at the “Genesis Block”
- At every split, pick the heaviest sub-tree.

Outcome: 50% attack only works with 50% of compute power.



The Pull Towards Centralization

- Advantage of large miners:
  - Economies of scale (e.g. datacenters in Iceland)
  - Block distribution to self not needed.
  - Attractive connections for other miners

Outcome:

- Large miners gain more than proportional share.
- Drive small miners out of business.
- System becomes centralized.

- Gets worse at high block rates / large blocks

Incentives



Is the protocol
“incentive compatible”?

Two main issues found thus far:

1. Miners lack the incentive to flood transaction messages to others.
   On Bitcoin and Red Baloons [Babaioff, Dobzinsky, Oren & Zohar]
2. Miners do not necessarily want to mine on top of latest block or release their block instantly
   “Majority is not Enough“ [Eyal & Sirer]

Block Withholding

[Ittay Eyal & Emin Gün Sirer]

Miners do not necessarily want to mine on top of latest block.





From: Eyal, Ittay, and Emin Gün Sirer. "Majority is not enough: Bitcoin mining is vulnerable." *arXiv preprint arXiv:1311.0243* (2013).

MINING POOLS

Mining Pools

- Bitcoin mining is a high risk “lottery”
- Miners can join together to split profits and reduce risk





Hash rate distribution (from Blockchain.info)

How (not) to split rewards

- Miners that contribute more should get higher reward.

- Win: $\mathrm{Hash}(\mathrm{header}) < target$
- Get a share: $\mathrm{Hash}(\mathrm{header}) < k \cdot target$

Pay per share:

Split wins proportionately to # of shares contributed.



Pool Hopping



It is not known when a block will be created by the pool (a memoryless process).

- The first share may be worth a lot (if block found right after)
- The 50th share is already very “diluted”

- Miners are better off switching to another pool / solo mining after several shares have been found.

Hop-proof reward schemes exist.

Explore tradeoff between risk to pool, risk to player and time. [Meni Rosenfeld]

MORE ON STRUCTURE

More on Block Structure: Merkle Trees



Specifying the root, is equivalent to committing to all transactions in the tree (unless we can easily find hash collisions)

Root of the Merkle tree is thus included in the block header.



Light nodes

- Running a full Bitcoin node may be too expensive. (e.g. for smartphones)
- To prove that transaction occurred:
  - Download block headers and check nonce values, Merkle root
  - Request Merkle “branch” leading from some block to root



Saving space

- The same scheme allows full nodes to save space.



"Spent" transactions no longer needed



Unspent transaction outputs

- What about proving that money is in someone else's account? (Unspent output)
- Suggested modification: Include a Merkle root of unspent transactions in the header.
- Show a Merkle branch to the output.
- Allows for more space savings



Suggested Reading

- Bitcoin Wiki
- BitcoinTalk forums
- Bitcoin on Stack-Exchange

Some papers (in no particular order):

- Nakamoto, Satoshi. "Bitcoin: A peer-to-peer electronic cash system." (2008).
- Ben-Sasson, Eli, et al. "Zerocash: Decentralized anonymous payments from Bitcoin." *Security and Privacy (SP), 2014 IEEE Symposium on. IEEE*. 2014.
- Rosenfeld, Meni. "Analysis of hashrate-based double spending." (2012).
- Rosenfeld, Meni. "Analysis of Bitcoin Pooled Mining Reward Systems." *arXiv preprint arXiv:1112.4980* (2011).
- Babaioff, Moshe, et al. "On bitcoin and red balloons." *Proceedings of the EC* 2012.
- Eyal, Ittay, and Emin Gün Sirer. "Majority is not enough: Bitcoin mining is vulnerable." *FC 2014*.
- Decker, Christian, and Roger Wattenhofer. "Information propagation in the bitcoin network." *IEEE P2P 2013*.
- Sompolinsky, Yonatan, and Aviv Zohar. "Accelerating Bitcoin's Transaction Processing." IACR eprint archive.
- Ron, Dorit, and Adi Shamir. "Quantitative analysis of the full bitcoin transaction graph." *Financial Cryptography and Data Security*. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2013. 6-24.

Thank You!