

# CPSC 418 / MATH 318 — Introduction to Cryptography

## ASSIGNMENT 1

**Name:** Artem Golovin

**Student ID:** 30018900

**Problem 1** — Superencipherment for substitution ciphers, 12 marks

1. (a) *Proof.* Encryption using Shift cipher is given by  $E_K(M) \equiv (M + K) \pmod{26}$ . Given  $\mathcal{M} = \mathcal{C} = \mathcal{K} = \mathbb{Z}_{26}$ ,  $K_1, K_2 \in \mathcal{K}$  and  $M \in \mathcal{M}$ :

Let  $C_1 \in \mathcal{C}$  be a ciphertext that results from encrypting plaintext  $M$  with a key  $K_1$ :

- i.  $E_{K_1}(M) \equiv (M + K_1) \pmod{26}$
- ii.  $C_1 \equiv E_{K_1}(M)$
- iii.  $C_1 \equiv (M + K_1) \pmod{26}$
- iv. Let  $C_2 = E_{K_2}(C_1)$ , where  $E_{K_2}(C_1) \equiv (C_1 + K_2) \pmod{26}$
- v. Therefore, by substituting  $C_1$ ,

$$\begin{aligned} C_2 &= C_1 + K_2 && \pmod{26} \\ &= M + (K_1 + K_2) && \pmod{26} \\ &= M + K_3 && \pmod{26} \end{aligned}$$

Where  $K_3 \in \mathcal{K}$  and  $K_3 = K_1 + K_2$ . Therefore, resulting key of multiple encipherment is  $K_3$ .

□

- (b) *Proof.* Based on previous proof, superencipherment using shift cipher can be defined as follows

$$E_{K_i}(M) = (M + \sum_{\substack{k_i \in \mathcal{K} \\ i=1}}^n k_i) \pmod{26}$$

Where  $M \in \mathcal{M}$ ,  $K_i \in \mathcal{K}$ ,  $n \in \mathbb{Z}$ , and  $i \geq 1, i \in \mathbb{Z}$ .

- i. Base Case: let  $n = 1$ ,

$$\begin{aligned} C &= M + \sum_{\substack{K_i \in \mathcal{K} \\ i=1}}^1 K_i && \pmod{26} \\ &= M + K_1 && \pmod{26} \end{aligned} \tag{1}$$

- ii. Induction hypothesis: Assume  $n = m$ , where  $m \in \mathbb{Z}$ . Therefore:

$$C = M + \sum_{\substack{K_i \in \mathcal{K} \\ i=1}}^m K_i \pmod{26}$$

Let:

$$K' = \sum_{\substack{K_i \in \mathcal{K} \\ i=1}}^m K_i \quad (2)$$

$$C = M + K' \pmod{26}$$

Still results in a shift cipher, according to definition.

- iii. Inductive case: According to induction hypothesis, we can show that  $m + 1$  holds true as well:

$$\begin{aligned} C &= (M + \sum_{\substack{K_i \in \mathcal{K} \\ i=1}}^{m+1} K_i) && \pmod{26} \\ &= (M + (\sum_{\substack{K_i \in \mathcal{K} \\ i=1}}^m K_i + \sum_{\substack{K_i \in \mathcal{K} \\ i=1}}^1 K_i)) && \pmod{26} \\ &= (M + (\sum_{\substack{K_i \in \mathcal{K} \\ i=1}}^m K_i + K_1)) && \pmod{26} \\ &= (M + (K' + K_1)) && \pmod{26} \\ &= (M + K'') && \pmod{26} \end{aligned}$$

where  $K_1$  is our base case (1) and  $K'$  is our induction hypothesis (2). Since  $K_1 \in \mathcal{K}$  and  $K' \in \mathcal{K}$ , therefore  $K'' = K_1 + K'$ ,  $K'' \in \mathcal{K}$ . Hence, the key of multiple encipherment is sum of all given keys.

□

2. *Proof.* Assume there exist two keys  $w_1$  of length  $m$  and  $w_2$  of length  $n$ .

Since we know lengths of given keys, to find the length of new keyword  $w$ , find the least common multiple of  $m$  and  $n$ , that is  $x = LCM(m, n)$ , where  $x$  is the length of the key  $w$ .

The key is obtained by adding each letters of given keys:  $b_c = k_i + l_j \pmod{26}$ , where  $b_c$  is a letter of key  $w$ , that is  $b_c \in \{b_0, b_1, \dots, b_{x-1}\}$ ,  $k_i \in \{k_1, k_2, \dots, k_m\}$ , and  $l_j \in \{l_1, l_2, \dots, l_n\}$ . The position of key is obtained by doing following:

$$\begin{aligned} i &= c \pmod{m} \\ j &= c \pmod{n} \end{aligned}$$

Where  $i$ ,  $j$ , and  $c$  are positions of letters in  $w_1$ ,  $w_2$ , and  $w$ . That ensures that key wraps around and matches the size of  $w$ . Therefore, the length of key  $w$  is  $LCM(m, n)$  and key is obtained by adding each letter of  $w_1$  and  $w_2$ . □

**Problem 2** — Key size versus password size, 21 marks

1.  $256^8$

2. (a)  $94^8$

(b)  $\frac{94^8}{256^8} \times 100 \approx 0.033\%$

3. Assuming that all characters are chosen equally likely, then  $p(X_i) = \frac{1}{94}$ . Therefore, entropy of the key space will be:

$$\begin{aligned} H(X) &= 8 \times \frac{1}{94} \log_2 94 \\ &\approx 0.56 \end{aligned}$$

4.

$$\begin{aligned} H(X) &= 8 \times \frac{1}{26} \log_2 \frac{1}{26} \\ &\approx 1.45 \end{aligned}$$

5. Given  $H(X) = 128$ , let  $n \in \mathbb{Z}$  be a password length.

(a)  $p(X) = \frac{1}{94}$

$$\begin{aligned} n \times \frac{1}{94} \log_2(94) &= 128 \\ n &= \frac{128 \times 94}{\log_2(94)} \\ n &\approx 1836 \end{aligned}$$

(b)  $p(X) = \frac{1}{26}$

$$\begin{aligned} n \times \frac{1}{26} \log_2(26) &= 128 \\ n &= \frac{128 \times 26}{\log_2(26)} \\ n &\approx 709 \end{aligned}$$

**Problem 3** — Equiprobability maximizes entropy for two outcomes, 12 marks

1.

$$\begin{aligned} H(X) &= \frac{1}{4} \log_2 4 + \frac{3}{4} \log_2 \frac{4}{3} \\ &\approx 0.811 \end{aligned}$$

2.  $H(X)$  is maximized if and only if all outcomes are equally likely. For any  $n$ ,  $H(X) = \log_2 n$  is maximal if and only if  $p(X_i) = \frac{1}{n}$  for  $1 \leq i \leq n$ .

*Proof.* Let's consider function  $H(X) = p \log_2(\frac{1}{p}) + (1-p) \log_2(\frac{1}{1-p}) = -p \log_2 p - (1-p) \log_2(1-p)$  as a function of  $p$ :

$$\begin{aligned} H(p) &= p \log_2\left(\frac{1}{p}\right) + (1-p) \log_2\left(\frac{1}{1-p}\right) \\ &= -p \log_2 p - (1-p) \log_2(1-p) \end{aligned}$$

By taking the derivative of  $H(p)$ , we can determine maximum of the function

$$\begin{aligned} H'(p) &= (-p \log_2 p)' - ((1-p) \log_2(1-p))' \\ &= -\frac{\ln(p) + 1}{\ln(2)} + \frac{\ln(1-p) + 1}{\ln(2)} \\ &= \frac{\ln(1-p) - \ln(p)}{\ln(2)} \\ &= \log_2(1-p) - \log_2(p) \end{aligned}$$

Maximum of  $H'(p) = \log_2(1-p) - \log_2(p)$ :

$$\begin{aligned} \log_2(1-p) - \log_2(p) &= 0 \\ \log_2\left(\frac{1-p}{p}\right) &= 0 \\ 1 &= \frac{(1-p)}{p} \\ p &= 1-p \\ p &= \frac{1}{2} \end{aligned}$$

□

3. Maximal value of  $H(X)$ , given  $p = \frac{1}{2}$ :

$$\begin{aligned} H(X) &= -\frac{1}{2} \log_2\left(\frac{1}{2}\right) - \left(1 - \frac{1}{2}\right) \log_2\left(1 - \frac{1}{2}\right) \\ &= \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2} \\ &= 1 \end{aligned}$$

**Problem 4** — Conditional entropy, 12 marks

Given conditional entropy

$$H(X|Y) = \sum_{y \in Y} \sum_{x \in X} p(x, y) \log_2 \left( \frac{1}{p(x|y)} \right)$$

1. Before computing  $H(\mathcal{M}|\mathcal{C})$ , let's compute  $p(M_i|C_j)$

$$\begin{array}{llll} p(M_1|C_1) = \frac{1}{2} & p(M_1|C_2) = 0 & p(M_1|C_3) = 0 & p(M_1|C_4) = \frac{1}{2} \\ p(M_2|C_1) = \frac{1}{2} & p(M_2|C_2) = 0 & p(M_2|C_3) = \frac{1}{2} & p(M_2|C_4) = 0 \\ p(M_3|C_1) = 0 & p(M_3|C_2) = \frac{1}{2} & p(M_3|C_3) = \frac{1}{2} & p(M_3|C_4) = 0 \\ p(M_4|C_1) = 0 & p(M_4|C_2) = \frac{1}{2} & p(M_4|C_3) = 0 & p(M_4|C_4) = \frac{1}{2} \end{array}$$

$H(\mathcal{M}|\mathcal{C})$  results in:

$$H(\mathcal{M}|\mathcal{C}) = 4 \times \frac{1}{4} \times (8 \times \frac{1}{2} \times \log_2(2)) = \frac{8}{2} = 4$$

2. Assuming that the system provides perfect secrecy  $p(M|C) = p(M)$  and  $p(M) > 0$  for all  $M \in \mathcal{M}$ . Given that  $H(\mathcal{M}|\mathcal{C}) = \sum_{C \in \mathcal{C}} \sum_{M \in \mathcal{M}} p(M, C) \log_2 \left( \frac{1}{p(M|C)} \right)$  and  $H(\mathcal{M}) = \sum_{M \in \mathcal{M}} p(M) \log_2 \left( \frac{1}{p(M)} \right)$ , show that  $H(\mathcal{M}|\mathcal{C}) = H(\mathcal{M})$ . Assume that  $H(\mathcal{M}|\mathcal{C}) = H(\mathcal{M})$ :

*Proof.*

$$H(\mathcal{M}|\mathcal{C}) = H(\mathcal{M})$$

$$\sum_{C \in \mathcal{C}} p(C) \sum_{M \in \mathcal{M}} p(M|C) \log_2 \left( \frac{1}{p(M|C)} \right) = H(\mathcal{M})$$

Given that the system provides perfect secrecy, we get

$$\sum_{C \in \mathcal{C}} p(C) \sum_{M \in \mathcal{M}} p(M) \log_2 \left( \frac{1}{p(M)} \right) = H(\mathcal{M})$$

$$\sum_{C \in \mathcal{C}} p(C) H(\mathcal{M}) = H(\mathcal{M})$$

Dividing both sides by  $H(\mathcal{M})$ , we get

$$\sum_{C \in \mathcal{C}} p(C) = 1$$

Therefore, as shown above  $\sum_{C \in \mathcal{C}} p(C) = 1$ . Using that, we can now show that  $H(\mathcal{M}|\mathcal{C}) = H(\mathcal{M})$ :

$$\begin{aligned} H(\mathcal{M}|\mathcal{C}) &= \sum_{C \in \mathcal{C}} p(C) \sum_{M \in \mathcal{M}} p(M|C) \log_2 \left( \frac{1}{p(M|C)} \right) \\ &= \sum_{M \in \mathcal{M}} p(M|C) \log_2 \left( \frac{1}{p(M|C)} \right) \\ &= H(\mathcal{M}) \end{aligned}$$

□

3. *Proof.* Assume the system provides perfect secrecy. Therefore, the following condition should be met  $p(M|C) = p(M)$  for  $M \in \mathcal{M}$  and  $C \in \mathcal{C}$ . Let's calculate  $p(M_1|C_1)$ , if the system provides perfect secrecy,  $p(M_1|C_1) = p(M_1) = \frac{1}{4}$

$$p(M_1|C_1) = p(M_1) + p(M_2) = \frac{1}{4} + \frac{1}{4} = \frac{1}{2}$$

Therefore, the system does not provide perfect secrecy.

□