

CPSC 418 / MATH 318 — Introduction to Cryptography

ASSIGNMENT 3

Name: Artem Golovin

Student ID: 30018900

Problem 1 — A modified man-in-the-middle attack on Diffie-Hellman, 12 marks

(a) Let $y_a \equiv (g^a)^q \pmod{p}$, $y_b \equiv (g^b)^q \pmod{p}$ and key K :

- i. *Alice* receives malicious y_a and sends it to *Bob*.
- ii. *Bob* receives malicious y_b and sends it to *Alice*.
- iii. *Alice* computes $K \equiv y_b^a \equiv ((g^b)^q)^a \equiv g^{abq} \pmod{p}$
- iv. *Bob* computes $K \equiv y_a^b \equiv ((g^a)^q)^b \equiv g^{abq} \pmod{p}$
- v. *Alice* and *Bob* get the same key K , because:

$$y_b^a \equiv ((g^b)^q)^a \equiv g^{bqa} \equiv g^{aqb} \equiv ((g^a)^q)^b \equiv y_a^b \pmod{p}$$

(b) ???

(c) In this version, *Mallory* sends g^{aq} or g^{bq} , and since *Mallory* knows $g^a \pmod{p}$ and $g^b \pmod{p}$, she is able to compute $g^{abq} \pmod{p}$ which is the same key that *Alice* and *Bob* use. In the example, discussed in class *Eve* has no knowledge of shared key that *Alice* and *Bob* use and therefore *Eve* would need to handle decryption and encryption separately.

Problem 2 — RSA and binary exponentiation, 24 marks

- (a) i. Given $M = 17$, public key $(e, n) = (11, 77)$:

$$\begin{aligned}C &\equiv M^e \pmod{n} \\C &\equiv 17^{11} \pmod{77}\end{aligned}$$

Binary exponentiation:

$$\begin{aligned}e &= 11 = 1011_2 \\b_0 &= 1, b_1 = 0, b_2 = 1, b_3 = 1 \\r_0 &\equiv 17 \pmod{77} \\r_1 &\equiv 17^2 \equiv 58 \pmod{77} \\r_2 &\equiv 58^2 \times 17 \equiv 54 \pmod{77} \\r_3 &\equiv 54^2 \times 17 \pmod{77} \equiv 61 \pmod{77}\end{aligned}$$

Therefore:

$$C \equiv 17^{11} \equiv 61 \pmod{77}$$

- ii. Given that $n = pq$ and $\phi(n) = (p-1)(q-1)$ and $n = 77$, we can say that $p = 11$, $q = 7$.

To find d , we need to solve the following congruence:

$$\begin{aligned}de &\equiv 1 \pmod{\phi(n)} \\ \text{Where } \phi(n) &= (11-1)(7-1) = 60 \\ d \times 11 &\equiv 1 \pmod{60}\end{aligned}$$

Solving $\gcd(e, \phi(n)) = \gcd(11, 60) = 1$ to confirm that inverse of e exists:

$$\begin{aligned}60 &= 11 \times 5 + 5 \\ 11 &= 10 \times 1 + 1 \\ 10 &= 2 \times 5 + 0\end{aligned}$$

Applying Extended Euclidean Algorithm to find d :

$$\begin{aligned}1 &= 11 - 10 = 11 - ((2 \times 5) + 0) = 11 - (2 \times 5) - 0 \\ &= 11 - 2 \times (60 - 11 \times 5) = 11 - 2 \times 60 + 10 \times 11 \\ &= 11 \times 11 + (-2) \times 60\end{aligned}$$

Therefore $\gcd(60, 11) = 11 \times 11 + (-2) \times 60$ and $d = 11$:

$$11 \times 11 \equiv 1 \pmod{60}$$

iii. Given $C = 21$ and $(d, n) = (11, 77)$:

$$M \equiv C^d \pmod{n}$$

$$M \equiv 32^{11} \pmod{77}$$

Binary exponentiation:

$$11 = 1011_2$$

$$b_0 = 1, b_1 = 0, b_2 = 1, b_3 = 1$$

$$r_0 \equiv 32 \pmod{77}$$

$$r_1 \equiv 32^2 \equiv 23 \pmod{77}$$

$$r_2 \equiv 23^2 \times 32 \equiv 16928 \equiv 65 \pmod{77}$$

$$r_3 \equiv 65^2 \times 32 \equiv 135200 \equiv 65 \pmod{77}$$

Therefore, $M = 65$

(b) i. Given $s_0 = b_0$, $s_{i+1} = 2s_i + b_{i+1}$ for $0 \leq i \leq k-1$

Proof. Base case. Let $i = 0$

$$s_i = \sum_{j=0}^i b_j 2^{i-j}$$

$$s_0 = \sum_{j=0}^0 b_j 2^{0-0}$$

$$= b_0$$

Induction hypothesis. Assume $i = m$, where $m \in \mathbb{Z}$ and $0 \leq m \leq k$:

$$s_m = \sum_{j=0}^m b_j 2^{m-j}$$

$$= b_0 + \sum_{j=0}^{m+1} b_j 2^{(m+1)-j}$$

Inductive case. Assume $i = m+1$:

$$s_{m+1} = \sum_{j=0}^{m+1} b_j 2^{(m+1)-j}$$

Left hand side:

$$s_{m+1} = 2s_m + b_{m+1}$$

Right hand side:

$$\sum_{j=0}^{m+1} b_j 2^{(m+1)-j} = 2 \times \sum_{j=0}^m b_j 2^{(m-j)} + b_{m+1}$$

$$= 2s_m + b_{m+1}$$

$$\text{Therefore, } s_i = \sum_{j=0}^i b_j 2^{i-j}$$

□

ii. Let r_i , $0 \leq i \leq k$, $k = \lfloor \log_2 n \rfloor$.

Proof. Base case. Let $i = 0$:

$$\begin{aligned} r_i &\equiv a^{s_i} \pmod{m} \\ r_0 &\equiv a^{s_0} \pmod{m} \\ &\equiv a^{b_0} \equiv a \pmod{m} \end{aligned}$$

Where $s_0 = b_0$ is shown in part (i)

Induction hypothesis. Let $p = i$, $p \in \mathbb{Z}$, $0 \leq p \leq k$,

$$r_p \equiv a^{s_p} \pmod{m}$$

Inductive case. Show $r_{p+1} \equiv a^{s_{p+1}} \pmod{m}$.

Case $b_{i+1} = 0$

$$r_{p+1} \equiv r_p^2 \pmod{m}$$

Therefore:

$$\begin{aligned} a^{s_{p+1}} &\equiv a^{2s_p + b_{p+1}} \\ &\equiv a^{2s_p} \\ &\equiv a^{s_p} \times a^{s_p} \\ &\equiv r_p \times r_p \\ &\equiv r_p^2 \pmod{m} \end{aligned}$$

Case $b_{i+1} = 1$

$$\begin{aligned} a^{s_{p+1}} &\equiv a^{2s_p + b_{p+1}} \\ &\equiv a^{s_p} \times a^{s_p} \times a^{b_{p+1}} \\ &\equiv r_p^2 \times a^{b_{p+1}} \\ &\equiv r_p^2 \times a \pmod{m} \end{aligned}$$

Therefore, $r_{p+1} \equiv a^{s_{p+1}} \pmod{m}$ and $r_i \equiv a^{s_i} \pmod{m}$ □

iii. *Proof.* Given proof of (ii), we can say that $a^n \equiv r_k \pmod{m}$, where $n = s_k$. Therefore,

$$\begin{aligned} a^{s_k} &\equiv a^{2s_{k-1} + b_k} \\ &\equiv (a^{s_{k-1}})^2 \times a^{b_k} \\ &\equiv (r_{k-1})^2 \times a^{b_k} \\ &\equiv r_k \pmod{m} \end{aligned}$$

□

Problem 3 — Fast RSA decryption using Chinese remaindering, 8 marks

Let p and q be distinct large primes and (e, n) be RSA public key with corresponding private key d . Given $d_p \equiv d \pmod{p-1}$ and $d_q \equiv d \pmod{q-1}$

$$\begin{aligned} M_p &\equiv C^{dp} \equiv C^d (C^{p-1})^k \\ &\equiv C^d \\ &\equiv M^{ed} \pmod{p} \\ M_q &\equiv C^{dq} \equiv C^d (C^{q-1})^k \\ &\equiv C^d \\ &\equiv M^{ed} \pmod{q} \end{aligned}$$

Therefore,

$$\begin{aligned} M_p &\equiv M^{ed} \pmod{p} \\ M_q &\equiv M^{ed} \pmod{q} \\ M_p &= M^{ed} + qt \\ M_q &= M^{ed} + pk \end{aligned}$$

For some $t \in \mathbb{Z}$ and $k \in \mathbb{Z}$.

Let $M' \equiv pxM_q + qyM_p \pmod{n}$ be the plaintext obtained using Chinese remainder theorem and $M \equiv C^d \pmod{n}$ be the message obtained using normal RSA way.

$$M \equiv C^d \equiv (M^e)^d \equiv M^{ed}$$

$$\text{Where } ed \equiv 1 \pmod{\phi(n)}$$

$$\text{Therefore } ed = 1 + m\phi(n) \text{ for some } m \in \mathbb{Z}$$

$$M \equiv M^{1+m\phi(n)} \equiv MM^{m\phi(n)} \equiv M(M^{\phi(n)})^m \pmod{n}$$

by Euler's theorem:

$$M^{\phi(n)} \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$$

which gives us:

$$M \equiv M(M^{\phi(n)})^m \equiv M \pmod{n}$$

Plaintext M' , obtained using Chinese remainder theorem:

$$\begin{aligned} M' &\equiv pxM_q + qyM_p \\ &\equiv px(M^{ed} + qt) + qy(M^{ed} + pk) \\ &\equiv pxM^{ed} + pxqt + qyM^{ed} + qypk \\ &\equiv pxM^{ed} + qyM^{ed} \\ &\equiv M^{ed}(px + qy) \\ &\text{where } (px + qy) = 1 \text{ because } \gcd(p, q) = 1 \\ &\equiv M^{ed} \pmod{n} \\ &\equiv M \pmod{n} \end{aligned}$$

Therefore $M = M'$

□

Problem 4 — The ElGamal public key cryptosystem is not semantically secure, 10 marks

Proof. By definition, a PKC is polynomially secure if no passive attacker can in expected polynomial time select two plaintexts M_1 and M_2 and then correctly distinguish between $E(M_1)$ and $E(M_2)$, where $E(M_1)$ and $E(M_2)$ are encryptions of M_1 and M_2 respectively with probability $p > \frac{1}{2}$.

However, it is given that *Mallory* can assert whether $C = E(M_1)$ or $C = E(M_2)$ in polynomial time using modular exponentiation by Euler's Criterion with probability $p' = 1$, $p' > p$. It contradicts the definition of polynomially secure PKC, and therefore shows that ElGamal is not semantically secure.

To further prove that statement, using the fact that $y \equiv g^x \pmod{p}$ and g is a primitive root of p , we can show that:

$$\begin{aligned} \left(\frac{y}{p}\right) &\equiv (y)^{\frac{p-1}{2}} \equiv (g^x)^{\frac{p-1}{2}} \\ &\equiv (g^{x(p-1)})^{\frac{1}{2}} \\ &\equiv ((g^{p-1})^x)^{\frac{1}{2}} \\ &\equiv 1 \pmod{p} \end{aligned}$$

We can see that *Mallory* only needs to compute $\left(\frac{y}{p}\right)$ and $\left(\frac{C_2}{p}\right)$ to find $E(M_1)$ and $E(M_2)$. \square

Problem 5 — An IND-CPA, but not IND-CCA secure version of RSA, 10 marks

Proof. Given encryption of message M , $C = (s||t)$, where $s \equiv r^e \pmod{n}$, $t = H(r) \oplus M$ and $H : \{0, 1\}^k \mapsto \{0, 1\}^m$, and decryption of C , $M \equiv H(s^d \pmod{n}) \oplus t$, we can consider two plaintexts M_1 and M_2 with following encryption process: $C = (s||t) = (r^e \pmod{n}) || H(r) \oplus M_i$, where $i = 1$ or 2 .

We can mount CCA using $C' = (s||t \oplus M_1)$:

$$\begin{aligned} C' &= (s||t \oplus M_1) \\ &= (r^e \pmod{n}) || H(r) \oplus M_i \oplus M_1 \end{aligned}$$

Decryption of M_i :

$$\begin{aligned} M_i &\equiv H(s^d \pmod{n}) \oplus t \\ &\equiv H(r^{ed} \pmod{n}) \oplus H(r) \oplus M_i \oplus M_1 \\ &\equiv H(r \pmod{n}) \oplus H(r) \oplus M_i \oplus M_1 \\ &= M_i \oplus M_1 \end{aligned}$$

Where $ed \equiv 1 \pmod{\phi(n)}$

Therefore, $M_i = 0$, C is an encryption of M_1 , because $M_1 \oplus M_1 = 0$, otherwise $M_i = M_2$ \square