Asymmetric Cryptography Part 2 RPISEC

```
/M If bits is so small that it fits into a single word then we will tenulny don't want to exceed that wany bits, */
if (is single word) {
    IRLLUNE size limit:
    IF (bits == BR.BITS2) {
        /* Novid undefined behavior, */
    }
```

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November 1, 2019

```
**RULDNG red_word = get_word(red):

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```

RSA Recap

```
from codecs import encode
from gmpy import invert, next_prime
import os
d = 0
while d == 0:
    p = next_prime(int(encode(os.urandom(1024/8), 'hex'), 16))
     = next_prime(int(encode(os.urandom(1024/8), 'hex'), 16))
     = p * q
    phi = (p - 1) * (q - 1)
     = 65537
       invert(e, phi)
message = int(encode('hello', 'hex'), 16)
ciphertext = pow(message, e, n)
assert pow(ciphertext, d, n) == message
```

Example RSA encryption/decryption

```
n = p * q
                                   ▶ Public: (n, e) = (667, 3)
\triangleright \varphi(n) =
   (p-1)*(q-1)
                                      Message "hi", encoded as 7 * 26 + 8 = 190

ightharpoonup e*d \equiv 1 \pmod{\varphi(n)}
                                   \triangleright pow(190, 3, 667) == 239

ightharpoonup encrypt(x) = x^e%n

ightharpoonup decrypt(x) = x^d \% n
\triangleright pow(x, k, n) =
   x^{k0/n}
```

Example RSA encryption/decryption

```
\triangleright n = p * q
                                ▶ Public: (n, e) = (667, 3)^{\frac{1}{2}}
\triangleright \varphi(n) =
   (p-1)*(q-1)
                                 Message "hi", encoded as 7 * 26 + 8 = 190

ightharpoonup e*d \equiv 1 \pmod{\varphi(n)}
                                \triangleright pow(190, 3, 667) == 239

ightharpoonup encrypt(x) = x^e \% n
                                ▶ Private: (p, q, d) = (23, 29, 411)
                                ► (3 * 411) % (22 * 28) == 1 on 3 ( on 1)

ightharpoonup decrypt(x) = x^d%n
\triangleright pow(x, k, n) =
                                ▶ pow(239, 411, 23*29) == 190
  x^k%n
```

Why to use e = 65537

- ▶ It's prime, so invert(65537, $\varphi(n)$) is more likely to exist
- It mitigates multiple attacks:
 - Cube root
 - Hastad's broadcast
 - Coppersmith's short pad

- size_limit = "((EN_ULONG)0) get_word(rnd);
 else {
 size_limit = (((EN_ULONG)1) << bits) get_word(rnd) 1;
 f (size_limit < maxdelta) {
 maxdelta = size_limit;
 }
 }</pre>
- maxdelta = size_limit;
 }
- if (is_single_word) {
 BN_ULONG rnd_word = get_word(rnd);

Since it only has 2 bits set, it's efficient to compute via repeated squaring: $m^{2^{16}+1} = m^{2^{16}} * m = (m^{2^8} * m^{2^8}) * m = ((m^{2^4} * m^{2^4}) * (m^{2^4} * m^{2^4})) * m = ...$

```
* III * ( NUMPRINES; i++) ( now clear in a law clear that make it is also exprise to all the k prime became there aren't many mall prime if if ( now clear) dotto) % primes[i] = 0) (( now clear) dotto) % primes[i] = 0) (( now clear) make it is if ( delta > nowdelta) ( ) gotto again; gotto loop; ) clear ( now clear in it is not a prime and also the clear in it is not a prime and also the clear in it is not a prime and also the clear in it is not a prime and also the clear in it is not a prime and also the clear in it is not a prime and also the clear in it is not a prime and also the clear in it is not a prime and also the clear in it is not a prime and also the clear in it is not a prime and also the clear in it is not a prime and also the clear in it is not a prime and also the clear in it is not a prime and also the clear in it is not a prime and also the clear in it is not a prime and also the clear in it is not a prime and also the clear in it is not a prime and also the clear in it is not a prime and also the clear in it is not a prime and also the clear in it is not a prime and also the clear in it is not a prime and also the clear in it is not a prime and also the clear in it is not a prime and also the clear in it is not a prime and also the clear in it is not a prime and also the clear in it is not a prime and also the clear in it is not a prime and it is
```

Extended Euclidean Algorithm

```
from gmpy import gcd
  def eea(x, y):
      r, s, t = x, 1, 0
      R, S, T = y, 0, 1
      while R > 0:
          q = r/R
          new = r-a*R. s-a*S. t-a*T
          r, s, t = R, S, T
          R. S. T = new
      assert gcd(x, y) == r # gcd from euclidean algorithm
      assert r == x*s + v*t # s and t are the bezout coefficients
      xinvy = s + y*(s < 0) # modular inverse from bezout coefficients
      vinvx = t + x*(t < 0)
      if r == 1:
          assert (x * xinvy) % y == 1
          assert (y * yinvx) % x == 1
      return (r, s, t, xinvy, yinvx)
```

Chinese Remainder Theorem - Statement

- $\forall \vec{a}, \vec{n}((\forall i, j (i \neq j \rightarrow \gcd(n_i, n_i) = 1)) \rightarrow \exists x \forall i (x \equiv a_i \pmod{n_i}))$ For a system of equations of the form $x \equiv a_i \pmod{n_i}$
- ightharpoonup if each (n_i, n_i) pair are relatively prime
- ▶ there is a (unique) solution x for the system of equations

Chinese Remainder Theorem - Code

```
 \forall \vec{a}, \vec{n}((\forall i, j (i \neq j \rightarrow \gcd(n_i, n_j) = 1)) \rightarrow \exists x \forall i (x \equiv \overrightarrow{a_i} \pmod{n_i}))) \ \text{ for the tests, where } 
   from eea import eea
   from gmpv import gcd
   from itertools import combinations
   def crt(eqns):
        assert len(eqns) >= 2
        assert [gcd(eqns[i][1], eqns[i][1]) == 1 for (i, j) in combinations(range(len(eqns)), 2)]
        a0, n0 = eqns[0]
        a1, n1 = eqns[1]
        _{-}, _{0}, _{1}, _{-}, _{-} = eea(_{10}, _{11})
        assert m0*n0 + m1*n1 == 1
        x = (a0*m1*n1 + a1*m0*n0) \% (n0 * n1)
        if len(eans) > 2:
             x = crt([(x, n0*n1)] + eqns[2:])
        for (a, n) in eqns:
             assert x % n == a % n
        return v
```

Chinese Remainder Theorem - Example

```
\forall \vec{a}, \vec{n}((\forall i, j (i \neq j \rightarrow \gcd(n_i, n_i) = 1)) \rightarrow \exists x \forall i (x \equiv a_i \pmod{n_i}))
```

- $\triangleright x \equiv 3 \pmod{5} \land x \equiv 4 \pmod{7}$
- \triangleright eea(5,7) gives us (3, -2) as the Bezout coefficients
- ▶ This tells us that 3*5+(-2)*7=1
- CRT gives us that x = 3 * (-2) * 7 + 5 * 3 * 5 solves the equation

```
if (IBN_rend(rnd, bits, BN_REND_TOP_TNO, BN_REND_BOTTOH_ODD))

** we now have a random number 'rnd' to test, */
for (i = 1; i < NUMPRIMES; i**) (
BN_ULONG nod = BN_mad_werd(rnd, (BN_ULONG)primes[i]);
if (mod == (BN_ULONG)=1) (
return ();
if (mod == (BN_ULONG)=1) (
return ();
if (int is so small that it fits into a single word then we
will transl by dept's went to exceed that mong bits, */
if (its isple word);</pre>
```

- Suppose we have $c_1 \equiv m^3 \pmod{n_1}$, $c_2 \equiv m^3 \pmod{n_2}$, and $c_3 \equiv m^3 \pmod{n_3}$.
- ho crt $([(c_1,n_1),(c_2,n_2),(c_3,n_3)])\equiv m^3\ ({
 m mod}\ n_1*n_2*n_3)$ in the condition of the conditio
- Since $n_1 * n_2 * n_3 > \max(n_1, n_2, n_3)$, even if m^3 wrapped on each of the moduli, it is likely cube-rootable mod the product of the moduli

```
NN_NULUMG rnd_word = get_word(rnd);

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```
ightharpoonup \operatorname{crt}([(c_1, n_1), (c_2, n_2), (c_3, n_3)]) \equiv m^3 \pmod{n_1 * n_2 * n_3}
  (c_1, n_1) = (239, 667), (c_2, n_2) = (95, 589), (c_3, n_3) = (643, 1517)
   crt([(239, 667), (95, 589), (643, 1517)]) == 6859000
   \sqrt[3]{6859000} = 190
```

CRT Application - Speeding up RSA decryption - Theory

- $\text{encrypt}(m) = \text{pow}(m, e, n), \text{ decrypt}(c) = \text{pow}(c, d, n)^{-\frac{c}{2}}$
- If e = 65537, it's small and fast to compute with (around 16 bits), but d is around the size of n (2048 bits if p and q are each 1024 bits)
- ▶ fastdecrypt(c) = crt([(pow(c, d_p, p), p), (pow(c, d_q, q), q)]), where $e * d_p \equiv 1 \pmod{p-1}$ and $e * d_q \equiv 1 \pmod{q-1}$
- Works because $pow(c, d_p, p) \equiv m \pmod{p}$ (and likewise for q), so CRT reconstructs $x \equiv m \pmod{p * q}$
- ▶ Is faster because p and q are only 1024 bit, so computations mod those are cheaper

CRT Application - Speeding up RSA decryption - Code

```
from codecs import encode
  from gmpy import invert, next_prime
  from crt import crt
  from time import time
  import os
  p = next_prime(int(encode(os.urandom(4096/8), 'hex'), 16))
      next_prime(int(encode(os.urandom(4096/8), 'hex'), 16))
  n = p * a
    = 65537
    = invert(e, (p-1)*(q-1))
  dp = invert(e, p-1)
  da = invert(e, q-1)
  msg = int(encode('hello', 'hex'), 16)
  s0 = time(); ctxt = pow(msg, e, n); t0 = time()-s0
  s1 = time(); m1 = pow(ctxt, d, n); t1 = time()-s1
  s2 = time(); m2 = crt([(pow(ctxt, dp, p), p), (pow(ctxt, dq, q), q)]); t2 = time()-s2
  assert m1 == m2 == msg
```

Saltstack 2013 e=1 bug

int i; int i; uinti6 t mods[NUMPRIMES]; BN_ULONG delta; BN_ULONG maxdelta = BN_MASK2 - primes[NUMPRIMES -



Resources

```
int i;
imidi6.t mods[NUMPRIMES];
BN.ULONG delta;
BN.ULONG maxdelta = EN.MASK2 - primes[NUMPRIMES - 1];
chwr is_single_word = bits <= BN.BITS2;
gain;
if (IRN_rand(rnd, bits, EN.RAND_TOP_TWO, EN.RAND_BOTTOM_ODD)) (
return 0;
)

**Mar now home a random number 'rnd' to test, **/
for (i = i; | < NUMPRIMES; i++) (
BN.ULONG mod = BN.mod_word(rnd, (EN_ULONG)primes[i]);
if (mod == (EN_ULONG) - 1) (
return 0;</pre>
```

- ▶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RSA_(cryptosystem) and the to exceed that many bits.
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese_remainder_theorem.utuseriusstelessus.
- ▶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Modular_arithmetic
- https://crypto.stanford.edu/~dabo/papers/RSA-survey.pdf
- https://cryptopals.com/, Sets 5 and 6

```
if (is_single_word) {
   BN_ULONG rnd_word = get_word(rnd);
```

https://docs.saltstack.com/en/latest/topics/releases/0.15.1.html#rsa-key-generation-fault to the principle because we shouldn't rejoint the state of the principle because we shouldn't rejoint the state of the principle because we shouldn't rejoint the state of the principle because we shouldn't rejoint the state of the principle because we shouldn't rejoint the state of the principle because we shouldn't rejoint the state of the principle because we shouldn't rejoint the state of the principle because we shouldn't rejoint the state of the principle because we shouldn't rejoint the state of the principle because we shouldn't rejoint the state of the principle because we shouldn't rejoint the state of the principle because we shouldn't rejoint the state of the principle because we shouldn't rejoint the state of the principle because we shouldn't rejoint the state of the principle because we should be a state of the principle because the state of the state of the state of the principle because the state of the principle because the state of the sta

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