Asymmetric Cryptography Part 2 RPISEC

```
/M If bits is so small that it fits into a single word then we will tenulny don't want to exceed that wany bits, */
if (is single word) {
    IRLLUNE size limit;
    IF (bits == BL.BITS2) {
        /* Novid undefined behavior, */
    }
```

Avi Weinstock (aweinstock), (size limit < mandelto) 4

Jacques Becker (off_by_1_error), Ethan Wright (eth4)

November 1, 2019

```
**RULDNG red_word = get_word(red):

/* In the came that the condidate prime is a single set the detailed that the condidate prime is a single set offect that red the respect to the prime of it because we show a set of the detailed that red the condition of a boson prime.

**2 That that red the condition of a boson prime. The set of the condition of the conditio
```

RSA Recap

```
from codecs import encode
from gmpy import invert, next_prime
import os
d = 0
while d == 0:
    p = next_prime(int(encode(os.urandom(1024/8), 'hex'), 16))
     = next_prime(int(encode(os.urandom(1024/8), 'hex'), 16))
     = p * q
    phi = (p - 1) * (q - 1)
     = 65537
       invert(e, phi)
message = int(encode('hello', 'hex'), 16)
ciphertext = pow(message, e, n)
assert pow(ciphertext, d, n) == message
```

Example RSA encryption/decryption

```
n = p * q
                                   ▶ Public: (n, e) = (667, 3)
\triangleright \varphi(n) =
   (p-1)*(q-1)
                                      Message "hi", encoded as 7 * 26 + 8 = 190

ightharpoonup e*d \equiv 1 \pmod{\varphi(n)}
                                   \triangleright pow(190, 3, 667) == 239

ightharpoonup encrypt(x) = x^e \% n

ightharpoonup decrypt(x) = x^d \% n
\triangleright pow(x, k, n) =
   x^{k0/n}
```

Example RSA encryption/decryption

```
\triangleright n = p * q
                                 ▶ Public: (n, e) = (667, 3)^{\frac{1}{2}}
\triangleright \varphi(n) =
   (p-1)*(q-1)
                                 ▶ Message "hi", encoded as 7 * 26 + 8 = 190

ightharpoonup e*d \equiv 1 \pmod{\varphi(n)}
                                 \triangleright pow(190, 3, 667) == 239

ightharpoonup encrypt(x) = x^e \% n
                                ▶ Private: (p, q, d) = (23, 29, 411)
                                ► (3 * 411) % (22 * 28) == 1 on 3 ( on 1)

ightharpoonup decrypt(x) = x^d%n
\triangleright pow(x, k, n) =
                                 ▶ pow(239, 411, 23*29) == 190
  x^k%n
```

Why to use e = 65537

- ▶ It's prime, so invert(65537, $\varphi(n)$) is more likely to exist
- It mitigates multiple attacks:
 - Cube root
 - Hastad's broadcast
 - Coppersmith's short pad

- size_limit = "((EN_ULONG)0) get_word(rnd);
 else {
 size_limit = (((EN_ULONG)1) << bits) get_word(rnd) 1;
 f (size_limit < maxdelta) {
 maxdelta = size_limit;
 }
 }</pre>
- maxdelta = size_limit;
 }
- if (is_single_word) {
 BN_ULONG rnd_word = get_word(rnd);

Since it only has 2 bits set, it's efficient to compute via repeated squaring: $m^{2^{16}+1} = m^{2^{16}} * m = (m^{2^8} * m^{2^8}) * m = ((m^{2^4} * m^{2^4}) * (m^{2^4} * m^{2^4})) * m = ...$

```
* III * ( NUMPRINES; i++) ( now clear in a law clear that make it is also exprise to all the k prime became there aren't many mall prime if if ( now clear) dotto) % primes[i] = 0) (( now clear) dotto) % primes[i] = 0) (( now clear) make it is if ( delta > nowdelta) ( ) gotto again; gotto loop; ) clear ( now clear in it is not a prime and also the clear in it is not a prime and also the clear in it is not a prime and also the clear in it is not a prime and also the clear in it is not a prime and also the clear in it is not a prime and also the clear in it is not a prime and also the clear in it is not a prime and also the clear in it is not a prime and also the clear in it is not a prime and also the clear in it is not a prime and also the clear in it is not a prime and also the clear in it is not a prime and also the clear in it is not a prime and also the clear in it is not a prime and also the clear in it is not a prime and also the clear in it is not a prime and also the clear in it is not a prime and also the clear in it is not a prime and also the clear in it is not a prime and also the clear in it is not a prime and also the clear in it is not a prime and also the clear in it is not a prime and also the clear in it is not a prime and also the clear in it is not a prime and also the clear in it is not a prime and also the clear in it is not a prime and it is
```

Extended Euclidean Algorithm

```
from gmpy import gcd
  def eea(x, y):
      r, s, t = x, 1, 0
      R, S, T = y, 0, 1
      while R > 0:
          q = r/R
          new = r-a*R. s-a*S. t-a*T
          r, s, t = R, S, T
          R. S. T = new
      assert gcd(x, y) == r # gcd from euclidean algorithm
      assert r == x*s + v*t # s and t are the bezout coefficients
      xinvy = s + y*(s < 0) # modular inverse from bezout coefficients
      vinvx = t + x*(t < 0)
      if r == 1:
          assert (x * xinvy) % y == 1
          assert (y * yinvx) % x == 1
      return (r, s, t, xinvy, yinvx)
```

Chinese Remainder Theorem - Statement

- $\forall \vec{a}, \vec{n}((\forall i, j (i \neq j \rightarrow \gcd(n_i, n_i) = 1)) \rightarrow \exists x \forall i (x \equiv a_i \pmod{n_i}))$ For a system of equations of the form $x \equiv a_i \pmod{n_i}$
- ightharpoonup if each (n_i, n_i) pair are relatively prime
- ▶ there is a (unique) solution x for the system of equations

Chinese Remainder Theorem - Code

```
 \forall \vec{a}, \vec{n}((\forall i, j (i \neq j \rightarrow \gcd(n_i, n_j) = 1)) \rightarrow \exists x \forall i (x \equiv \overrightarrow{a_i} \pmod{n_i}))) \ \text{ for the tests, where } 
   from eea import eea
   from gmpv import gcd
   from itertools import combinations
   def crt(eqns):
        assert len(eqns) >= 2
        assert [gcd(eqns[i][1], eqns[i][1]) == 1 for (i, j) in combinations(range(len(eqns)), 2)]
        a0, n0 = eqns[0]
        a1, n1 = eqns[1]
        _{-}, _{0}, _{1}, _{-}, _{-} = eea(_{10}, _{11})
        assert m0*n0 + m1*n1 == 1
        x = (a0*m1*n1 + a1*m0*n0) \% (n0 * n1)
        if len(eans) > 2:
             x = crt([(x, n0*n1)] + eqns[2:])
        for (a, n) in eqns:
             assert x % n == a % n
        return v
```

Chinese Remainder Theorem - Example

```
\forall \vec{a}, \vec{n}((\forall i, j (i \neq j \rightarrow \gcd(n_i, n_i) = 1)) \rightarrow \exists x \forall i (x \equiv a_i \pmod{n_i}))
```

- $\triangleright x \equiv 3 \pmod{5} \land x \equiv 4 \pmod{7}$
- \triangleright eea(5,7) gives us (3, -2) as the Bezout coefficients
- ▶ This tells us that 3*5+(-2)*7=1
- CRT gives us that x = 3 * (-2) * 7 + 5 * 3 * 5 solves the equation

- Suppose we have $c_1 \equiv m^3 \pmod{n_1}$, $c_2 \equiv m^3 \pmod{n_2}$, and $c_3 \equiv m^3 \pmod{n_3}$.
- ho crt $([(c_1,n_1),(c_2,n_2),(c_3,n_3)])\equiv m^3\ ({
 m mod}\ n_1*n_2*n_3)$ in the condition of the conditio
- Since $n_1 * n_2 * n_3 > \max(n_1, n_2, n_3)$, even if m^3 wrapped on each of the moduli, it is likely cube-rootable mod the product of the moduli

```
NN_NULUMG rnd_word = get_word(rnd);

** In the case that the condidate prime is a single word then

** to be case that the condidate prime is a single word then

** to be case that the replace of the coase we shouldn't reject

** to be case the coase of the analytic of a town prime. We don't

** there is not a multiple of a town prime. We don't

** there is not a multiple of a town prime. We don't

** that's true, **/

** for (i = 1; i < NUMPRIMES as primes[i] < rnd_word; i++) {

** of the coase of the coas
```

```
ightharpoonup \operatorname{crt}([(c_1, n_1), (c_2, n_2), (c_3, n_3)]) \equiv m^3 \pmod{n_1 * n_2 * n_3}
  (c_1, n_1) = (239, 667), (c_2, n_2) = (95, 589), (c_3, n_3) = (643, 1517)
   crt([(239, 667), (95, 589), (643, 1517)]) == 6859000
   \sqrt[3]{6859000} = 190
```

Saltstack 2013 e=1 bug

int 1;
uinti6 t mode[NUMPRIMES];
BN_ULONG delta;
BN_ULONG maxdelta = BN_MASK2 - primes[NUMPRIMES -



Resources

```
Int 1: Building and the state of the state o
```

- ▶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RSA_(cryptosystem) and the lifts into a limit were lift to exceed that warp blue, w/
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese_remainder_theorem
- ▶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Modular_arithmetic
- https://crypto.stanford.edu/~dabo/papers/RSA-survey.pdf
- https://cryptopals.com/, Sets 5 and 6

```
if (is_single_word) {
   BN_ULONG rnd_word = get_word(rnd);
```

https://docs.saltstack.com/en/latest/topics/releases/0.15.1.html#rsa-key-generation-fault.com/en/latest/topics/releases/0.15.1.html#rsa-key-generation-fault.com/en/latest/topics/releases/0.15.1.html#rsa-key-generation-fault.com/en/latest/topics/releases/0.15.1.html#rsa-key-generation-fault.com/en/latest/topics/releases/0.15.1.html#rsa-key-generation-fault.com/en/latest/topics/releases/0.15.1.html#rsa-key-generation-fault.com/en/latest/topics/releases/0.15.1.html#rsa-key-generation-fault.com/en/latest/topics/releases/0.15.1.html#rsa-key-generation-fault.com/en/latest/topics/releases/0.15.1.html#rsa-key-generation-fault.com/en/latest/topics/releases/0.15.1.html#rsa-key-generation-fault.com/en/latest/topics/releases/0.15.1.html#rsa-key-generation-fault.com/en/latest/topics/releases/0.15.1.html#rsa-key-generation-fault.com/en/latest/topics/releases/0.15.1.html#rsa-key-generation-fault.com/en/latest/topics/releases/0.15.1.html#rsa-key-generation-fault.com/en/latest/topics/releases/0.15.1.html#rsa-key-generation-fault.com/en/latest/topics/releases/0.15.1.html#rsa-key-generation-fault.com/en/latest/topics/releases/0.15.1.html#rsa-key-generation-fault.com/en/latest/topics/releases/0.15.1.html#rsa-key-generation-fault.com/en/latest/topics/releases/0.15.1.html#rsa-key-generation-fault.com/en/latest/topics/releases/0.15.1.html#rsa-key-generation-fault.com/en/latest/topics/releases/0.15.1.html#rsa-key-generation-fault.com/en/latest/topics/releases/0.15.1.html#rsa-key-generation-fault.com/en/latest/topics/releases/0.15.1.html#rsa-key-generation-fault.com/en/latest/topics/releases/0.15.1.html#rsa-key-generation-fault.com/en/latest/topics/releases/0.15.1.html#rsa-key-generation-fault.com/en/latest/topics/releases/0.15.1.html#rsa-key-generation-fault.com/en/latest/topics/releases/0.15.1.html#rsa-key-generation-fault.com/en/latest/topics/releases/0.15.1.html#rsa-key-generation-fault.com/en/latest/topics/releases/0.15.1.html#rsa-key-generation-fault.com/en/latest/topics/releases/0.15.1.html#rsa-key-generation-fault.com/en/latest

```
## The control of the control of a locate to a a watch

## 2D Host it's not a subtiple of a locate prime. We

## dieck that rid-1 is also coprise to all the kn

## primes because there aren't many small primes.

## Unit's true, ##

for (1 = 13 i < NHPPRIMES && primes[i] < rnd_words i++

if (delta > nadelta) {
    goto again;
    }

    goto loop;

}

| clase (
    for (i = 13 i < NUMPRIMES; i++) {
        /* cleck that rid is not a prime and also
        /* they control of the cont
```