# Asymmetric Cryptography Part 2 RPISEC

```
/M If bits is so small that it fits into a single word then we will tenulny don't want to exceed that wany bits, */
if (is single word) {
    IRLLUNE size limit;
    IF (bits == BR.BITS2) {
        /* Novid undefined behavior, */
    }
```

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```
**RULDNG red_word = get_word(red):

/* In the came that the condidate prime is a single set the detailed that the condidate prime is a single set offect that red the respect to the prime of it because we show a set of the detailed that red the condition of a boson prime.

**2 That that red the condition of a boson prime. The set of the condition of the conditio
```

#### RSA Recap

```
from codecs import encode
from gmpy import invert, next_prime
import os
d = 0
while d == 0:
    p = next_prime(int(encode(os.urandom(1024/8), 'hex'), 16))
     = next_prime(int(encode(os.urandom(1024/8), 'hex'), 16))
     = p * q
    phi = (p - 1) * (q - 1)
     = 65537
       invert(e, phi)
message = int(encode('hello', 'hex'), 16)
ciphertext = pow(message, e, n)
assert pow(ciphertext, d, n) == message
```

## Example RSA encryption/decryption

```
n = p * q
                                   ▶ Public: (n, e) = (667, 3)
\triangleright \varphi(n) =
   (p-1)*(q-1)
                                      Message "hi", encoded as 7 * 26 + 8 = 190

ightharpoonup e*d \equiv 1 \pmod{\varphi(n)}
                                   \triangleright pow(190, 3, 667) == 239

ightharpoonup encrypt(x) = x^e \% n

ightharpoonup decrypt(x) = x^d \% n
\triangleright pow(x, k, n) =
   x^{k0/n}
```

# Example RSA encryption/decryption

```
\triangleright n = p * q
                                 ▶ Public: (n, e) = (667, 3)^{\frac{1}{2}}
\triangleright \varphi(n) =
   (p-1)*(q-1)
                                 ▶ Message "hi", encoded as 7 * 26 + 8 = 190

ightharpoonup e*d \equiv 1 \pmod{\varphi(n)}
                                 \triangleright pow(190, 3, 667) == 239

ightharpoonup encrypt(x) = x^e \% n
                                ▶ Private: (p, q, d) = (23, 29, 411)
                                ► (3 * 411) % (22 * 28) == 1 on 3 ( on 1)

ightharpoonup decrypt(x) = x^d%n
\triangleright pow(x, k, n) =
                                 ▶ pow(239, 411, 23*29) == 190
  x^k%n
```

## Why to use e = 65537

- $2^{16+1} = 65537_{10} = 10000000000000001_2$
- ightharpoonup It's prime, so invert(65537, arphi(n)) is more likely to exist
- It mitigates multiple attacks:
  - Cube root
  - Hastad's broadcast
  - Coppersmith's short pad

- /M Rooid usdefined behavior. M/ size\_limit = "((DN\_ULONG)0) - get\_word(rnd); else { size\_limit = (((DN\_ULONG)1) << bits) - get\_word(rnd) - 1: f(size\_limit < movdelta) { size\_limit < movdelta) {
- oop: if (is\_single\_word) {

BN\_ULONG rnd\_word = get\_word(rnd);

Since it only has 2 bits set, it's efficient to compute via repeated squaring:  $m^{2^{16}+1}=m^{2^{16}}*m=(m^{2^8}*m^{2^8})*m=((m^{2^4}*m^{2^4})*(m^{2^4}*m^{2^4}))*m=(m^{2^8}*m^{2^8})*m=((m^{2^4}*m^{2^4}))*m=(m^{2^4}*m^{2^4}))*m=(m^{2^8}*m^{2^8})*m=(m^{2^8}*m^{2^8})*m=((m^{2^4}*m^{2^4}))*m=(m^{2^4}*m^{2^4}))*m=(m^{2^8}*m^{2^8})*m=(m^{2^8}*m^{2$ 

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## Extended Euclidean Algorithm

```
from gmpy import gcd
  def eea(x, y):
      r, s, t = x, 1, 0
      R, S, T = y, 0, 1
      while R > 0:
          q = r/R
          new = r-a*R. s-a*S. t-a*T
          r, s, t = R, S, T
          R. S. T = new
      assert gcd(x, y) == r # gcd from euclidean algorithm
      assert r == x*s + v*t # s and t are the bezout coefficients
      xinvy = s + y*(s < 0) # modular inverse from bezout coefficients
      vinvx = t + x*(t < 0)
      if r == 1:
          assert (x * xinvy) % y == 1
          assert (y * yinvx) % x == 1
      return (r, s, t, xinvy, yinvx)
```

#### Chinese Remainder Theorem - Statement

- $\forall \vec{a}, \vec{n}((\forall i, j (i \neq j \rightarrow \gcd(n_i, n_i) = 1)) \rightarrow \exists x \forall i (x \equiv a_i \pmod{n_i}))$ For a system of equations of the form  $x \equiv a_i \pmod{n_i}$
- ightharpoonup if each  $(n_i, n_i)$  pair are relatively prime
- ▶ there is a (unique) solution x for the system of equations

#### Chinese Remainder Theorem - Code

```
 \forall \vec{a}, \vec{n}((\forall i, j (i \neq j \rightarrow \gcd(n_i, n_j) = 1)) \rightarrow \exists x \forall i (x \equiv \overrightarrow{a_i} \pmod{n_i}))) \ \text{ for the tests, where } 
   from eea import eea
   from gmpv import gcd
   from itertools import combinations
   def crt(eqns):
        assert len(eqns) >= 2
        assert [gcd(eqns[i][1], eqns[i][1]) == 1 for (i, j) in combinations(range(len(eqns)), 2)]
        a0, n0 = eqns[0]
        a1, n1 = eqns[1]
        _{-}, _{0}, _{1}, _{-}, _{-} = eea(_{10}, _{11})
        assert m0*n0 + m1*n1 == 1
        x = a0*m1*n1 + a1*m0*n0
        if len(eans) > 2:
             x = crt([(x, n0*n1)] + eqns[2:])
        for (a, n) in eqns:
             assert x % n == a % n
        return v
```

## Chinese Remainder Theorem - Example

```
\forall \vec{a}, \vec{n}((\forall i, j (i \neq j \rightarrow \gcd(n_i, n_i) = 1)) \rightarrow \exists x \forall i (x \equiv a_i \pmod{n_i}))
```

- $\triangleright x \equiv 3 \pmod{5} \land x \equiv 4 \pmod{7}$
- $\triangleright$  eea(5,7) gives us (3, -2) as the Bezout coefficients
- ▶ This tells us that 3\*5+(-2)\*7=1
- CRT gives us that x = 3 \* (-2) \* 7 + 5 \* 3 \* 5 solves the equation

### Saltstack 2013 e=1 bug

int 1;
uinti6 t mode[NUMPRIMES];
BN\_ULONG delta;
BN\_ULONG maxdelta = BN\_MASK2 - primes[NUMPRIMES -



#### Resources

```
int 1:

intio, in ods(NUMPRIMES);
BN_ULONs delta;
BN_ULONs maxdelta = BN_MASK2 - primes[NUMPRIMES - 1];
chem is_single_word = bits <= BN_BITS2;

grain:

if (!BN_rand(rnd, bits, BN_RAND_TOP_TMO, BN_RAND_BOTTOM_ODD)) (
    return 0;
}

/* we ruse home a readom number 'run' to test. */
for (! = 1; i < NUMPRIMES: !+) (
    BN_ULONs mod = BN_mad_word(rnd, (BN_ULONG)primes[i]);
    if (mod == CBN_ULONG)-1) (
    return 0;
```

- ▶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RSA\_(cryptosystem) and the term of the second that seem to exceed that many bits.
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese\_remainder\_theorem
- ▶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Modular\_arithmetic
- https://crypto.stanford.edu/~dabo/papers/RSA-survey.pdf
- https://cryptopals.com/, Sets 5 and 6

```
iF (is_single_word) {
   BN_ULONG rnd_word = get_word(rnd);
```

https://docs.saltstack.com/en/latest/topics/releases/0.15.1.html#rsa-key-generation-fault to the principle because we shouldn't rejoint the same of th

```
## The notation of a multiple of a boson prince, be a check that red-1 is also coprise to all the known prince, be check that red-1 is also coprise to all the known prince, because there are red that a true, so for (1 = 13 1 c NMPRIMES && prince[i] < red_words !++ if (delta > nadelta) {
    poto again;
    } goto loop;
} else (
for (i = 13 1 < NMMPRIMES; !++) {
    Cleck that red is not a prise and also a tellor prince and a tellor
```