CS1632: Security Testing

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Writing Secure Software Is Difficult; So Is Testing It!

- Heartbleed: A defect in OpenSSL
 - Caused ~ 66% of servers connected to the Internet to be vulnerable
 - Allowed for untraceable eavesdropping on data in memory
 - Discovered in 2014, vulnerability introduced in 2012



- Shellshock: A defect in bash (default shell for OS X and most Linux)
 - Millions of attacks recorded in the days following discovery
 - Allowed arbitrary code execution stored in environment variables
 - Discovered in 2014, vulnerability introduced in 1989

Even Security Testing *Hardware* is Difficult

- Spectre / Meltdown: A vulnerability in CPU design
 - Impacts all CPUs in wide-use today (Intel, AMD, ARM, IBM ...)
 - Allows arbitrary access to private data in a process (Spectre)
 - Allows arbitrary access to private data in an OS (Meltdown)
 - Discovered in 2017, vulnerability introduced in 1995
 - OS / Web Browser patches issued but some Spectre vulnerabilities still open






A Slide from a 2018 Hardware Design Conference

Risk in context

Because of software bugs, computer security was in a dire situation



Spectre doesn't change the magnitude of the risk, but adds to the mess

Poor mitigation options (fixes -> new risks)

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Why is it so Difficult?

- 1. Adversaries are actively seeking to defeat security.
- 2. Information about security vulnerabilities spreads quickly.
- 3. You need to protect all doors. They only need to open one.
- 4. Important open source software is not properly funded.
 - OpenSSL defect caused an estimated \$500 million in damages
 - Only one fulltime volunteer was maintaining it on \$2000 yearly donations
 - Aftermath: Core Infrastructure Initiative formed to fund open source software https://www.coreinfrastructure.org/

History

- Security was not a big deal in the early computing world
 - Usually required physical access to a system to do anything
 - Few people had necessary skills even if they did have access (So called "security through obscurity")
- Hacker culture 1960-80s exemplified in ITS Operating System
 - OS did not use passwords; anyone could use it and do anything
 - There was a flaw where clever users could crash the OS. Solution?
 - A "crash" command was created that could be run by anyone
 - Crashing the OS was not challenging or fun anymore → nobody did it

History

- Now the stakes are much higher
 - "Estimating the Global Cost of Cyber Risk", RAND Corp., 2018 https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2299.html
 - Global cost of cyber crime: \$799 billion to \$22.5 trillion (1.1% to 32.4% of global GDP)
- And there are many more actors, not all with good intentions ...

Actors in the Security Sphere

- White hat hackers (Ethical hackers)
 - Performs *penetration testing* (or *pen testing*) for a client to report vulnerabilities
 - Employees of a security firm or in-house security teams of organizations
- Black hat hackers (Crackers)
 - Violates system security for personal gain or other malicious purpose
- Red hat hackers (Hacktivists)
 - Violates system security to spread a political / ideological / religious message
- Organized crime (works in conjunction with black hat hackers)
- Nation states (e.g. Stuxnet, Equation Group)

The InfoSec Triad: CIA

- InfoSec Triad (Information Security Triad)
 - Three attributes that define a system that provides information security
 - It's summarized by the three letters: CIA
 - No, it has nothing to do with the Central Intelligence Agency
- CIA as in:
 - Confidentiality No unauthorized users may read data
 - Integrity No unauthorized users may write data
 - Availability System is available for reading or writing
- A security attack compromises one (or more) of these attributes

Security Attack Categorization

- 1. Attacks on Confidentiality: Interception
 - Eavesdropping: Monitoring messages on an unsecured network
 - **Keylogging**: Monitoring key strokes on a computer using a surreptitious software
 - **Phishing**: Forging a legit company email or website to extract info
- 2. Attacks on Integrity: Modification / Fabrication
 - Malware that formats hard disk of computer, or fills it with garbage data
 - Digital signature forgery:
 - Electronic messages are "signed" using a digital signature to prove authenticity and integrity.
 - In this attack, the message is modified or fabricated and then the signature is forged.
- 3. Attacks on **A**vailability: **Interruption**
 - **DoS** (Denial of Service): Sending a flood of messages to a server, shutting it down
 - Power grid attack: Attacking power source of a server, shutting it down

Security Attack Goals: Passive vs Active

- Passive: To extract info, not to modify system operation
 - All interception attacks on confidentiality
- Active: To alter data or system operation
 - All modification / fabrication attacks on integrity
 - All interruption attacks on availability

Vulnerability vs Exploit vs Attack

- Vulnerability: Weakness of a system
- Exploit: Mechanism for compromising a system
- Attack: Actual compromising of the system (one of the CIA attributes)
- In a nutshell: An exploit *enables* an attack *using* a vulnerability. E.g.:
 - Vulnerability: Array bounds not checked when accessing a C array
 - Exploit: Buffer overflow to access beyond the bounds of the array
 - Attack: Could be interception (read confidential information)
 Could be modification (write to unauthorized data)
 Could be interruption (crash the server)

Kinds of Malicious Code

• Malware: general term for malicious code (includes all kinds below)

- Terminology that mainly refers to type of attack:
 - **Spyware**: surreptitiously *monitors* your actions (eavesdroppers, keyloggers, ...)
 - Adware: shows you more ads when browsing to a webpage
 - Ransomware: threatens to *publish* data or *block* access until ransom is payed
 - Bacteria: program that consumes system resources (e.g. fork bomb)
 - **DoS**: a program that floods a server with messages to *shut it down*


Kinds of Malicious Code

- Terminology that mainly refers to type of *exploit*:
 - Logic bomb hidden code within program that sets off attack when triggered
 - Trapdoor secret undocumented access to a system or app
 - **Trojan horse** program that *pretends* to be another program
 - Virus replicates itself WITH human intervention
 - Worm replicates itself WITHOUT human intervention
 - **Zombie** a computer or program being run by an *unauthorized controller*
 - Bot network collection of zombies controlled by master
- A malware can be many different things at once
 - E.g. A bot network that has a logic bomb that triggers a DoS attack
 - E.g. A virus that is a trojan horse but is really spyware


Kinds of Exploits


- Injection Attacks
- Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
- Insecure Object Reference Exploit
- Buffer overflow
- Broken Authentication Exploit
- Security Misconfiguration Exploit
- Insecure Storage Exploit
- Social Engineering

Injection Attacks









Injection Attacks: Solution


- Yes, sanitizing any user input is a good idea
- Sanitization: scrubbing user input to prevent it from injecting code
 - E.g. Only allowing alphabets in a name field to prevent SQL code injection
 - E.g. Not allowing <script> ... </script> tags to prevent JavaScript code injection

- Even better, use SQL parameterization
 - Telling database engine that a string should be treated as parameter not code
 - https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Query Parameterization Cheat Sheet.html

Cross-Site Scripting

- 2019 CWE (Common Weakness Enumeration) Top 25: 2nd place
 - The most popular exploit for web apps for over a decade
- To fully understand, need to first understand Same Origin Policy
- Same Origin Policy (SOP): Web browser sandboxing architecture
 - A webpage can access data in another webpage only if from same URL origin
 - Your reddit.com webpage cannot access your onlinebanking.com webpage
 - Same rule applies for frames even if on same webpage (e.g. an advertisement in a frame cannot access data in rest of webpage)


Browser Sandboxing – Same Origin Policy



Cross-Site Scripting

- Allows malicious website to execute (Java)script code
 - Across site boundaries
 - Ignoring SOP protections

Cross-Site Scripting



Cross-Site Scripting: Solution

 You need to properly sanitize user input: <u>https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Cross_Site_Scripting_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet.html</u>

- Some sanitization libraries that can help you:
 - DOMPurify (for Node.js): https://github.com/cure53/DOMPurify
 - Python Bleach: https://pypi.org/project/bleach/
 - PHP HTML Purifier: http://htmlpurifier.org/

Insecure Object Reference Exploit

- Someone can access something by knowing where it is, despite not having proper security credentials
 - http://bank.com/?account=9844
 - http://bank.com/?account=9845
- Solution: check for credentials on every access!
 - E.g. Check session ID cookie to verify access is part of authenticated session

Buffer Overflow

- 2019 CWE (Common Weakness Enumeration) Top 25: Winner
 - Consistently within the top 3 for all years since 2009
- Reading or writing past the end of memory allocated for a buffer
 - Doesn't happen in Java (results in a IndexOutofbounds exception)
 - Doesn't happen in JavaScript or Python (results in silent expansion of buffer)
 - Only happens in C / C++ / Assembly allows direct access to memory
 - But a lot of critical system code is written in C / C++, unfortunately
- What Heartbleed was see heartbleed.c in sample_code directory

heartbleed.c

```
void bad(int len) {
  char* notSecret = "open data";
  char* secret = "SECRET DATA HERE! NOBODY SHOULD SEE THIS!";
  printf("Sending data:\n");
  for (int j=0; j < len; j++) {
    printf("%c", notSecret[j]);
                                     -bash-4.1$ gcc heartbleed.c -o heartbleed
                                     -bash-4.1$ ./heartbleed
int main() {
                                     Enter length of data:
  int 1;
                                     100
  puts("Enter length of data:");
                                     Sending data:
  scanf("%d", &1);
                                     open dataSECRET DATA HERE! NOBODY SHOULD SEE THIS!
  bad(1);
                                     Sending data:Enter length of data:%d
```

heartbleed.c --- Why?

 Assembly code generated from heartbleed.c: .LCO: notSecret[0] .string "open data" .LC1: .string "SECRET DATA HERE! NOBODY SHOULD SEE THIS!" .LC2: .string "Sending data:" .LC3: .string "Enter length of data:" .LC4: .string "%d" bad(int):

Broken Authentication Exploit

- One user pretends to be another
- How?
 - Brute force guess or crack passwords
 - Do "Password reset" using personal info
 - Intercept unencrypted session IDs
- Apple iCloud leak was suspected of being this
 - iCloud API allowed unlimited attempts allowing a brute force attack
- Sarah Palin email hack was definitely this
 - All he needed to know, he learned from Wikipedia
 - Answered security questions, reset password

Security Misconfiguration Exploit

• Proper security is available, it's just not set up correctly!

- Examples
 - Default passwords
 - Firewalls with dangerous exceptions
 - File system directory listing in web server not disabled
 - Web server error log display left on (showing Java exception stack trace)

Insecure Storage Exploit

Private data is stored in an unsecure way

- Examples
 - Credit card numbers stored in /tmp as part of logging all transactions
 - DB file with incorrect permissions, allowing DB file to be copied wholesale
 - Passwords in database not encrypted, or encrypted without salting

Social Engineering



For a More Comprehensive List ...

- CWE (Common Weakness Enumeration) Top 25:
 - https://cwe.mitre.org/top25/archive/2019/2019 cwe top25.html
 - By MITRE Corp. which maintains CVE (Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures) DB
- OWASP (Open Web Applications Security Project) Top 10 Project:
 - https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten/
 - Top 10 security vulnerabilities for web applications over the years
- OWASP attacks page:
 - https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/
 - Contains guides on how to test and mitigate for those vulnerabilities

Some Protections

- Firewalls: a barrier between trusted intranet and untrusted internet
 - Can prevent access to network services such as FTP by untrusted party
 - Can prevent many types of DoS attacks on services by external party
- CDNs (Content Delivery Networks) e.g. Akamai
 - Delivers content using many distributed servers around the world
 - Prevents even DDoS (Distributed DoS) attacks
- Cryptography e.g. HTTPS protocol
 - Prevents unauthorized read or modification of data (e.g. HTTP packets)
- Operating system file permissions / Database table permissions
- Well-written code
- User training

Some Penetration Testing Tools

- Nmap Network Mapper
 - Audits the network for open ports and open services
 - Audits version numbers for all OSes and services
- Wireshark A packet sniffer that displays all network traffic
- Metasploit A penetration testing tool for system vulnerabilities
 - Over 900 exploits for various OSes
 - Includes fuzzing technology to look for unknown software vulnerabilities
- Incidentally, these are the same tools attackers use
 - You might as well use them yourselves to test your systems

Pittsburgh – A Great City To Learn About Security!

- Many security researchers here at Pitt and CMU
 - LERSAIS at Pitt SCI: http://www.sis.pitt.edu/lersais/
 - Pitt Cyber Institute: https://www.cyber.pitt.edu/home
 - CyLab at CMU: https://www.cylab.cmu.edu/
- SEI (Software Engineering Institute): https://www.sei.cmu.edu/
- CERT (Computer Emergency Response Team): https://www.sei.cmu.edu/about/divisions/cert/

Now Please Read Textbook Chapter 20

... and this ends all official lectures.

Are you sad? Here are some bonus slides for you

Note: Slides following will not appear in the exam
 (But I'll upload a recording of them, if there is demand :)

Bonus Security Slides


How far are exploits willing to go?

Row Hammer Exploit

Discovered by Google Project Zero, 2015


DRAM Organization

- Each square in matrix is a memory cell
 - Stores one bit of memory
 - Basically a capacitor holding a charge
- RAS (Row Address Strobe) selects row
 - Row is stored in row buffer (in red)
- CAS selects column, the specific bit
- Memory cell leaks charge over time
 - Needs refresh every 200 ms or so
 - Refresh recharges capacitors



Row Hammer Exploit

- Suppose purple line contains a password, the target of the exploit
- Keep hammering the neighboring yellow lines with reads
- Rapid voltage fluctuations of RAS lines cause purple line to lose charge faster
- Cells in purple line become zeroed out before getting a chance for refresh
- Password is now 00000000



Spectre & Its Root Causes

Paul Kocher (paul@paulkocher.com)

ISCA June 4, 2018



If the surgery proves unnecessary, we'll revert your architectural state at no charge.


Addicted to speed

Performance goal

Lowest time to reach the result same as running program <u>in-order</u>


Single-thread speed gains require getting more done per clock cycle

- Memory latency is slow and not improving much
- Clock rates are maxed out: Pentium 4 reached 3.8 GHz in 2004
- How to do more per clock?
 - Reducing memory delays → Caches
 - Working during delays → Speculative execution



Memory caches for dummies

Caches hold local (fast) copy of recently-accessed 64-byte chunks of memory



Address:
132E1340

Data:
AC 99178F4409.

MAIN
MEMORY

Big, slow
e.g. 16GB SDRAM

Reads <u>change</u> system state:

- Next read to <u>newly-</u> <u>cached</u> location is faster
- Next read to <u>evicted</u> location is slower

Speculative execution

Example of speculative execution:

```
if (uncached_value_usually_1 == 1)
  foo()
```

- Branch predictor: if() will probably be 'true' (based on prior history)
- CPU starts foo() speculatively -- but doesn't commit changes
- When value returns, changes committed only when value is actually '1'

Violates software security requirement that the CPUs runs instructions correctly.

Regular execution

Set up the conditions so the processor will make a desired mistake

Fetch the sensitive data from the covert channel

Erroneous speculative execution

Mistake leaks sensitive data into a covert channel (e.g. state of the cache)

Conditional branch (Variant 1) attack

```
int flag = 0;
int array[MAX_SIZE * 4096], x, y;
if (flag)
  y = array[kernel_array[x]*4096];
```

- Attacker wants to get the value of kernel array[x]. How?
- Attacker concocts and executes the above code.
- Note: the above code is completely legal
 - CPU will not read array[kernel_array1[x]*4096] unless flag != 0
- Uses speculative execution to furtively detect value of kernel array[x]

Conditional branch (Variant 1) attack

```
if (flag)

y = array[kernel_array[x]*4096];
```

Before attack:

- Train branch predictor to expect if() is true
- Evict flag and array[] from cache

Memory & Cache Status flag = 00000000Memory at kernel array base address: [... up to kernel array base+x...] **09** F1 98 CC 90... (something secret) array[0*4096] array[1*4096] array[2*4096] array[3*4096] array[4*4096] array[5*4096] Contents don't matter array[6*4096] only care about cache array[7*4096] **status**ncached array[8*4096] Cached array[9*4096] array[10*4096] array[11*4096]

Conditional branch (Variant 1) attack

```
if (flag)

y = array[kernel_array[x]*4096];
```

Attacker does covert channel attack

- Speculative exec while waiting for flag
 - Predict that if() is true
 - Read address (kernel array base + x)
 - Read returns secret byte = 09
 - Request memory at (array base + 09*4096)
 - Brings array [09*4096] into the cache
 - ▶ Realize if() is false: discard speculative work
- Finish operation & return to caller

Attacker measures read time for array [i*4096]

- Read for i=09 is fast (cached), revealing secret byte
- Repeat with many x (eg ~10KB/s)

Memory & Cache Status

```
flag = 000000000
```

```
Memory at kernel_array base address:
    [... up to kernel array base+x...]
```

```
09 F1 98 CC 90 . . . (something secret)
```

```
array[ 0*4096]
array[ 1*4096]
array[ 2*4096]
array[ 3*4096]
array[ 4*4096]
array[ 5*4096]
array[ 6*4096]
array[ 7*4096]
array[ 8*4096]
array[ 9*4096]
array[10*4096]
array[11*4096]
```

Contents don't matter only care about cache

statusncached


Cached

Indirect branches (Variant 2)

Can go anywhere instantly ("jmp [rax]")

• Poison predictor so victim speculative executes a 'gadget' that leaks memory

- Attack steps
 - <u>Poison</u> branch predictor/BTB so speculative execution will go to gadget
 - <u>Evict</u> from the cache or do other setup to encourage speculative execution
 - **Execute** victim so it runs gadget speculatively
 - Read sensitive data from covert channel
 - Repeat



yes