Introduction to Categorical Logic

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Chapter 3

First-Order Logic

Having considered equational and propositional logic, we now move on to first-order logic, which is the usual predicate logic with propositional connectives like $\wedge$ and $\Rightarrow$ and the quantifiers $\forall$ and $\exists$. This logic can be seen as propositional logic indexed over an equational theory, in a sense that will become clear; quantification will then be seen to result from completeness with respect to the indexing.

We pursue the same general approach to studying logic via category theory as in the previous chapters, determining categorical structures that model the logical operations, and regarding (certain) categories with these structures as theories, and functors that preserve them as models. We again construct the classifying category for a theory from the syntax of a deductive system and establish its universal property, leading again to functorial semantics. We then establish basic completeness theorems by embedding such classifying categories in particular semantic categories of interest, such as presheaves.

3.1 Predicate logic

Let us first demonstrate our general approach informally with an example. In Chapter **??** we considered models of algebraic theories in categories with finite products. Recall that e.g. a group is a structure of the form:

$$m : G \times G \to G , \qquad\qquad i : G \to G , \qquad\qquad e : 1 \to G ,$$

for which, moreover, certain diagrams built from these basic arrows must commute. We can express some properties of groups in terms of further equations, for example commutativity

$$x \cdot y = y \cdot x ,$$

which is expressed by the diagram

$$
\begin{array}{ccc}
G \times G & \xrightarrow{\ \sim\ } & G \times G \\
\downarrow{\scriptstyle m} & & \downarrow{\scriptstyle m} \\
G & =\!=\!=\!= & G
\end{array}
$$

where the iso on top is the familiar "twist" map permuting the factors.

As we saw, such equations can be interpreted in any category with finite products, providing a large scope for categorical semantics of algebraic theories. However, there are also many significant properties of algebraic structures which cannot be expressed merely with equations. Consider the statement that a group (G, m, i, e) has no non-trivial square roots of unity,

$$\forall\, x : G \,.\, (x \cdot x = e \;\Rightarrow\; x = e)\ . \tag{3.1}$$

This is a simple first-order logical statement which cannot be rewritten as a system of equations (how would one prove that?). To see what its categorical interpretation ought to be, let us look at its usual set-theoretic interpretation. Each of subformulas $x \cdot x = e$ and $x = e$ determines a subset of G,

$$
\begin{array}{ccc}
\big\{x \in G \mid x \cdot x = e\big\} & \lhook\dashrightarrow & \big\{x \in G \mid x = e\big\} \\[4pt]
{\scriptstyle i}\big\uparrow & & {\scriptstyle j}\big\downarrow \\[4pt]
G & =\!=\!=\!=\!=\!=\!= & G.
\end{array}
$$

The implication $x \cdot x = e \Rightarrow x = e$ holds just when $\big\{x \in G \mid x \cdot x = e\big\}$ is contained in $\big\{x \in G \mid x = e\big\}$. In categorical language, the inclusion i *factors through* the inclusion j. Observe that such a factorization is unique, if it exists. The defining formulas of the subsets $\big\{x \in G \mid x \cdot x = e\big\}$ and $\big\{x \in G \mid x = e\big\}$ are equations, and so the subsets themselves can be constructed as equalizers (interpreting $\cdot$ as m as above):

$$
\big\{x \in G \mid x \cdot x = e\big\} \lhook\joinrel\longrightarrow G \underset{e\,!_G}{\overset{\langle 1_G, 1_G\rangle}{\rightrightarrows}} G \times G \xrightarrow{\;m\;} G
$$

$$
\big\{x \in G \mid x = e\big\} \lhook\joinrel\longrightarrow G \underset{e\,!_G}{\overset{1_G}{\rightrightarrows}} G
$$

In sum, we can interpret condition (3.1) in any category with products and equalizers, i.e. in any category with all finite limits.[1] This allows us to define the notion of a group without square roots of unity in any category $\mathcal{C}$ with finite limits as an object G with morphisms $m : G \times G \to G$ and $i : G \to G$ and $e : 1 \to G$, such that (G, m, i, e) is a group in $\mathcal{C}$, *and* the equalizer of $m \circ \langle 1_G, 1_G\rangle$ and $e\,!_G$ factors through that of 1_G and $e\,!_G$.

The aim of this chapter is to analyze how such examples can be treated systematically. We will relate (various fragments of) first-order logic to categorical structures that are suitable for the interpretation of the logic. The general outline will be as follows:

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[1] We are *not* saying that finite limits suffice to interpret arbitrary formulas built from universal quantifiers and implications. The formula at hand has the special form $\forall\, x \,.\, (\varphi(x) \Longrightarrow \psi(x))$, where $\varphi(x)$ and $\psi(x)$ do not contain any further $\forall$ or $\Longrightarrow$.

1. A language $\mathcal{L}$ for a first-order theory consists, as usual, of some basic relation, function, and constant symbols, say $\mathcal{L} = (R, f, c)$.

2. An $\mathcal{L}$-structure in a category $\mathcal{C}$ with finite limits is an interpretation of $\mathcal{L}$ in $\mathcal{C}$ as an object M equipped with corresponding relations (subobjects) and operations (morphisms) of appropriate arities,

$$R^M \rightarrowtail M \times \cdots \times M$$
$$f^M : M \times \cdots \times M \longrightarrow M$$
$$c^M : 1 \to M.$$

3. Formulas φ in first-order logic will be interpreted as subobjects,

$$[\![\varphi]\!] \rightarrowtail M \times \cdots \times M.$$

The interpretation makes use of categorical operations in $\mathcal{C}$ corresponding to the logical ones appearing in the formula φ.

4. A theory $\mathbb{T}$ in first-order logic consists of a set of (binary) sequents,

$$\varphi \vdash \psi.$$

5. A model of $\mathbb{T}$ is then an interpretation M in which the corresponding subobjects "satisfy" all the sequents of $\mathbb{T}$, in the sense that

$$[\![\varphi]\!] \leq [\![\psi]\!] \qquad \text{in } \mathsf{Sub}(M^n).$$

6. We shall give a deductive calculus for such sequents $\varphi \vdash \psi$, prove that it is sound with respect to categorical models, and then use it to construct a classifying category $\mathcal{C}_\mathbb{T}$ with the expected universal property: models of $\mathbb{T}$ in any suitably-structured category $\mathcal{C}$ correspond uniquely to structure-preserving functors $\mathcal{C}_\mathbb{T} \to \mathcal{C}$.

7. Completeness of the calculus with respect to general models follows from classification, while completeness with respect to special models, such as "Kripke-models" Set^K, follows from embedding $\mathcal{C}_\mathbb{T}$ in such special categories.

Not only does having such categorical semantics permit us to prove things about different systems of logic (such as consistency of formal systems and independence of axioms), it also allows us to *use* the systems of logic to reason formally about logical structures in categories of various kinds.

3.1.1   Theories

A *first-order theory* $\mathbb{T}$ consists of an underlying *type theory* and a set of formulas in a *fragment of first-order logic*. Anticipating Chapter **??**, the type theory is given by a set of basic types, a set of basic constants together with their types, rules for forming types, and rules and axioms for deriving typing judgments,

$$x_1 : A_1, \ldots, x_n : A_n \mid t : B \,,$$

expressing that term t has type B in typing context $x_1 : A_1, \ldots, x_n : A_n$. There is also a set of axioms and rules of inference which tell us which equations between terms,

$$x_1 : A_1, \ldots, x_n : A_n \mid t = u : B \,,$$

are assumed to hold. This part of the theory $\mathbb{T}$ may be regarded as providing the underlying structure, on top of which the logical formulas are defined. For first-order logic, the underlying type theory is essentially the same as the equational logic that we already met in Chapter **??**.

A fragment of first-order logic is then given by a set of *basic relation symbols*, together with a specification of which first-order operations are to be used in building formulas. Each basic relation symbol has a *signature* $(A_1, \ldots, A_n)$, which specifies the types of its arguments. The *arity* of a relation symbol is the number of arguments it takes. The judgment[2]

$$x_1 : A_1, \ldots, x_n : A_n \mid \phi \; \texttt{pred}$$

states that ϕ is a well-formed formula in typing context $x_1 : A_1, \ldots, x_n : A_n$. For each basic relation symbol R with signature $(A_1, \ldots, A_n)$ there is an inference rule

$$\frac{\Gamma \mid t_1 : A_1 \qquad \cdots \qquad \Gamma \mid t_n : A_n}{\Gamma \mid R(t_1, \ldots, t_n) \; \texttt{pred}}$$

which says that the atomic formula $R(t_1, \ldots, t_n)$ is well formed in context Γ. Depending on what fragment of first-order logic is involved, there may be other rules for forming logical formulas. For example, if equality is present as a formula, then for each type A there is a rule:

$$\frac{\Gamma \mid t : A \qquad \Gamma \mid u : A}{\Gamma \mid t =_A u \; \texttt{pred}}$$

And if conjunction is present, then there is a rule:

$$\frac{\Gamma \mid \varphi \; \texttt{pred} \qquad \Gamma \mid \psi \; \texttt{pred}}{\Gamma \mid \varphi \wedge \psi \; \texttt{pred}}$$

Other such rules will be given when we come to the study of particular logical operations.

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[2]We follow type-theoretic practice here by adding the tag `pred` to turn what would otherwise be an exhibited formula in context into a judgement concerning the formula.

The basic logical judgment of a first-order theory is *entailment* between formulas,

$$x_1 : A_1, \ldots, x_n : A_n \mid \varphi_1, \ldots, \varphi_m \vdash \psi \,,$$

which states that in the typing context $x_1 : A_1, \ldots, x_n : A_n$, the assumptions φ_1, ..., φ_m entail ψ. It is understood that the terms appearing in the formulas are well-typed in the typing context, and that the formulas $\varphi_1, \ldots, \varphi_m, \psi$ are part of the fragment of the logic of $\mathbb{T}$. When the fragment contains conjunction $\wedge$ it is convenient to restrict attention to *binary* sequents,

$$x_1 : A_1, \ldots, x_n : A_n \mid \varphi \vdash \psi,$$

by replacing $\varphi_1, \ldots, \varphi_m$ with $\varphi_1 \wedge \ldots \wedge \varphi_m$. When the fragment contains equality, we may replace the type-theoretic equality judgments

$$x_1 : A_1, \ldots, x_n : A_n \mid t = u : B$$

with the entailments

$$x_1 : A_1, \ldots, x_n : A_n \mid \cdot \vdash t =_B u \,.$$

The subscript at the equality sign indicates the type at which the equality is taken. In a theory $\mathbb{T}$ there are basic entailments, or axioms, which together with the inference rules for the opertations involved can be used for deriving judgments, as usual.

We shall consider several standard fragments of first-order logic, determined by selecting a subset of logical connectives and quantifiers. These are as follows:

1. *Full first-order logic* consists of formulas built from the logical operations

$$= \quad \top \quad \bot \quad \neg \quad \wedge \quad \vee \quad \Rightarrow \quad \forall \quad \exists \,.$$

2. *Cartesian logic* is the fragment

$$= \quad \top \quad \wedge \,.$$

3. *Regular logic* is the fragment

$$= \quad \top \quad \wedge \quad \exists \,.$$

4. *Coherent logic* is the fragment built from

$$= \quad \top \quad \wedge \quad \exists \quad \bot \quad \vee \,.$$

5. *Geometric logic* consists of formulas of the form

$$\forall\, x : A \,.\, (\varphi \Rightarrow \psi) \,,$$

where φ and ψ are coherent formulas.[3]

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[3]There is also *infinitary geometric logic*, in which φ and ψ may contain disjunctions $\bigvee_i \vartheta_i$ of infinitely many formulas ϑ_i.

The names for these fragments come from the names of the various kinds of categories in which they are interpreted. We shall also consider both *Heyting* and *Boolean* theories in full first-order logic, which differ according to their assumed rules of inference and their intended interpretations.

The well-formed terms and formulas of a first-order theory $\mathbb{T}$ constitute its *language*. It may seem that we are doing things backwards, because we should have spoken of first-order languages before we spoke of first-order theories. While this is possible for simple theories, it becomes difficult to do when we consider more complicated theories in which types and logical formulas are intertwined. In such cases the typing judgments and entailments may be given by a mutual recursive definition. In order to find out whether a given term is well-formed, we might have to prove a logical statement. In everyday mathematics this occurs all the time, for example, to show that the term $\int_0^\infty f$ denotes a real number, it may be necessary to prove that $f : \mathbb{R} \to \mathbb{R}$ is an integrable function and that the integral has a finite value. This is why it does not always make sense to strictly differentiate a language from a theory.[4]

In order to focus on the logical part of first-order theories, we will limit attention to only two very simple kinds of type theory. A *single-sorted* first-order theory has as its underlying type theory a single type A, and for each $k \in \mathbb{N}$ a set of basic k-ary function symbols. The rules for typing judgments are:

1. Variables in contexts:
$$\overline{x_1 : A, \ldots, x_n : A \mid x_i : A}$$

2. For each basic function symbol f of arity k, there is an inference rule
$$\frac{\Gamma \mid t_1 : A \qquad \cdots \qquad \Gamma \mid t_n : A}{\Gamma \mid f(t_1, \ldots, t_n) : A}$$

This much is essentially an algebraic theory. In addition, however, a single-sorted first-order theory may contain relation symbols, formulas, axioms, and rules of inference which an algebraic theory does not.

A slight generalization of a single-sorted theory is a *many-sorted* one. Its underlying type theory is given by a set of types, and a set of basic function symbols. Each function symbol f has a *signature* $(A_1, \ldots, A_n; B)$, where n is the arity of f and $A_1, \ldots, A_n, B$ are types. The rules for typing judgments are:

1. Variables in contexts:
$$\overline{x_1 : A_1, \ldots, x_n : A_n \mid x_i : A_i}$$

2. For each basic function symbol f with signature $(A_1, \ldots, A_n; B)$, there is an inference rule
$$\frac{\Gamma \mid t_1 : A_1 \qquad \cdots \qquad \Gamma \mid t_n : A_n}{\Gamma \mid f(t_1, \ldots, t_n) : B}$$

---

[4]However, it *does* make sense to distinguish *syntax* from theories. Rules of substitution and the behaviour of free and bound variables are syntactic considerations, for example.

We may write suggestively $f : A_1 \times \cdots \times A_n \to B$ to indicate that $(A_1, \ldots, A_n; B)$ is the signature of f. However, this does not mean that $A_1 \times \cdots \times A_n \to B$ is a type! A many-sorted first-order theory does *not* have any type forming operations, such as $\times$ and $\to$. We shall consider type theories with such operations in Chapter **??**.

3.1.2   Subobjects

Formulas of first-order logic will be interpreted as "generalized subsets", i.e. subobjects. We therefore need to review some of the basic theory of these.

Let A be an object in a category $\mathcal{C}$. If $i : I \rightarrowtail A$ and $j : J \rightarrowtail A$ are monos into A, we say that i is smaller than j, and write $i \leq j$, when there exists a morphism $k : I \to J$ such that the following diagram commutes:

$$
\begin{array}{ccc}
I & \xrightarrow{\quad k \quad} & J \\
 & {\scriptstyle i}\searrow \quad \swarrow {\scriptstyle j} & \\
 & A &
\end{array}
$$

If such a k exists then it, too, is monic, since i is, and it is unique, since j is monic. The class $\mathsf{Mono}(A)$ of all monos into A is thus preordered by the relation $\leq$. It is the same as the slice category $\mathsf{Mono}(\mathcal{C})/A$ consisting of all monos with codomain A and commutative triangles between them. Let $\mathsf{Sub}(A)$ be the poset reflection of the preorder $\mathsf{Mono}(A)$. Thus the elements of $\mathsf{Sub}(A)$ are equivalence classes of monos into A, where $i : I \rightarrowtail A$ and $j : J \rightarrowtail A$ are equivalent when $i \leq j$ and $j \leq i$ (note that then $I \cong J$). The induced relation $\leq$ on $\mathsf{Sub}(A)$ is then a partial order.

We have to be a bit careful with the formation of $\mathsf{Sub}(A)$, since it is defined as a quotient of a *class* $\mathsf{Mono}(A)$. In many particular cases the general construction by quotients can be avoided. If we can demonstrate that the preorder $\mathsf{Mono}(A)$ is equivalent, as a category, to a poset P then we can simply take $\mathsf{Sub}(A) = P$. We will usually simply require that $\mathsf{Sub}(A)$ is small.

Definition 3.1.1. A category $\mathcal{C}$ is *well-powered* when, for all $A \in \mathcal{C}$, there is at most a *set* of subobjects of A, so that the category $\mathsf{Mono}(A)$ is equivalent to a (small) poset. In other words, $\mathsf{Sub}(A)$ is a small category for every $A \in \mathcal{C}$.

We shall often speak of subobjects as if they were monos rather than equivalence classes of monos. It is then understood that we mean the subobjects represented by monos and not the monos themselves. Sometimes we refer to a mono $i : I \rightarrowtail A$ by its domain I only, even though the object I itself does not determine the morphism i. Hopefully this will not cause confusion, as it is always going to be clear which mono is meant to go along with the object I.

In a category $\mathcal{C}$ with finite limits the assignment $A \mapsto \mathsf{Sub}(A)$ is the object part of the contravariant *subobject functor*,

$$\mathsf{Sub} : \mathcal{C}^{\mathsf{op}} \to \mathsf{Poset} \; .$$

The morphism part of Sub is given by pullback; in detail, given any $f : A \to B$, let $\mathsf{Sub}(f) = f^* : \mathsf{Sub}(B) \to \mathsf{Sub}(A)$ be the monotone map that takes the subobject (represented by) $i : I \rightarrowtail B$ to the subobject (represented by) $f^*i : f^*I \rightarrowtail A$, where $f^*i : f^*I \rightarrowtail A$ is a pullback of i along f:

$$
\begin{array}{ccc}
f^*I & \longrightarrow & I \\
\downarrow{\scriptstyle f^*i} & & \downarrow{\scriptstyle i} \\
A & \underset{f}{\longrightarrow} & B
\end{array}
$$

Recall that a pullback of a mono is again mono, so this definition makes sense. We need to verify (1) that if two monos $i : I \rightarrowtail A$ and $j : J \rightarrowtail A$ are equivalent, then their pullbacks are so as well; and (2) that $\mathsf{Sub}(1_A) = 1_{\mathsf{Sub}(A)}$ and $\mathsf{Sub}(g \circ f) = \mathsf{Sub}(f) \circ \mathsf{Sub}(g)$. These all follow easily from the fact that pullback is a functor $\mathcal{C}/B \to \mathcal{C}/A$, which reduces to the familiar "2-pullbacks" lemma:

Lemma 3.1.2. *Suppose both squares in the following diagram are pullbacks:*

$$
\begin{array}{ccccc}
\cdot & \longrightarrow & \cdot & \longrightarrow & \cdot \\
\downarrow & & \downarrow & & \downarrow \\
\cdot & \longrightarrow & \cdot & \longrightarrow & \cdot
\end{array}
$$

Then the outer rectangle is a pullback diagram as well. Moreover, if the outer rectangle and the right square are pullbacks, then so is the left square.

Proof. This is left as an exercise in diagram chasing. $\qquad\square$

Of course, pullbacks are really only determined up to isomorphism, but this does not cause any problems because isomorphic monos represent the same subobject.

In the semantics to be given below, a formula

$$x : A \mid \varphi \ \mathtt{pred}$$

will be interpreted as a subobject

$$\llbracket x : A \mid \varphi \rrbracket \rightarrowtail \llbracket A \rrbracket.$$

Thus $\mathsf{Sub}(A)$ can be regarded as the poset of "predicates" on A, generalizing the powerset of a set A. Logical operations on formulas then correspond to operations on $\mathsf{Sub}(A)$. The structure of $\mathsf{Sub}(A)$ therefore determines which logical connectives can be interpreted. If $\mathsf{Sub}(A)$ is a Heyting algebra, then we can interpret the (propositional part of) the full intuitionistic propositional calculus (cf. Subsection **??**), but if $\mathsf{Sub}(A)$ only has binary meets, then all that can be interpreted are $\top$ and $\wedge$. We will work out details of different operations in the following sections, but one common aspect that we require is the "stability" of the interpretation of the logical operations, in a sense that we now make clear.

Substitution and stability

Let us consider the interpretation of substitution of terms for variables. There are two kinds of substitution, into a term, and into a formula. We may substitute a term $x : A \mid t : B$ for a variable y in a term $y : B \mid u : C$ to obtain a new term $x : A \mid u[t/y] : C$. If t and u are interpreted as morphisms

$$\llbracket A \rrbracket \xrightarrow{\;\llbracket t \rrbracket\;} \llbracket B \rrbracket \xrightarrow{\;\llbracket u \rrbracket\;} \llbracket C \rrbracket$$

then $u[t/y]$ is interpreted as their composition:

$$\llbracket x : A \mid u[t/y] : C \rrbracket = \llbracket y : B \mid u : C \rrbracket \circ \llbracket x : A \mid t : B \rrbracket .$$

Thus, *substitution into a term is composition.*

The second kind of substitution occurs when we substitute a term $x : A \mid t : B$ for a variable y in a formula $y : B \mid \varphi$ to obtain a new formula $x : A \mid \varphi[t/y]$. If t is interpreted as a morphism $\llbracket t \rrbracket : \llbracket A \rrbracket \to \llbracket B \rrbracket$ and φ is interpreted as a subobject $\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket \rightarrowtail \llbracket B \rrbracket$ then the interpretation of $\varphi[t/y]$ is the pullback of $\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket$ along $\llbracket t \rrbracket$:

$$
\begin{array}{ccc}
\llbracket \varphi[t/y] \rrbracket = \llbracket t \rrbracket^* \llbracket \varphi \rrbracket & \longrightarrow & \llbracket \varphi \rrbracket \\
\big\downarrow & & \big\downarrow \\
\llbracket A \rrbracket & \xrightarrow{\;\;\llbracket t \rrbracket\;\;} & \llbracket B \rrbracket
\end{array}
$$

Thus, *substitution into a formula is pullback,*

$$\llbracket x : A \mid \varphi[t/y] \rrbracket = \llbracket x : A \mid t : B \rrbracket^* \llbracket y : B \mid \varphi \rrbracket.$$

Now, because substitution respects the syntactical, logical operations, e.g.

$$(\varphi \wedge \psi)[t/x] = \varphi[t/x] \wedge \psi[t/x],$$

the categorical structures used to interpret the various logical operations such as $\wedge$ must also behave well with respect to the interpretation of substitution, i.e. pullback. We say that a categorical property or structure is *stable (under pullbacks)* if it is preserved by pullbacks, so that e.g.

$$\llbracket t \rrbracket^* \llbracket (\varphi \wedge \psi) \rrbracket = \llbracket (\varphi \wedge \psi)[t/x] \rrbracket = \llbracket \varphi[t/x] \wedge \psi[t/x] \rrbracket$$
$$= \llbracket \varphi[t/x] \rrbracket \wedge \llbracket \psi[t/x] \rrbracket = \llbracket t \rrbracket^* \llbracket \varphi \rrbracket \wedge \llbracket t \rrbracket^* \llbracket \psi \rrbracket .$$

In more detail, say that a category $\mathcal{C}$ has *stable meets* if each poset $\mathsf{Sub}(A)$ has binary meets, and the pullback of a meet $I \wedge J \rightarrowtail A$ along any map $f : B \to A$ is the meet $f^*I \wedge f^*J \rightarrowtail A$ of the respective pullbacks,

$$f^*(I \wedge J) = f^*I \wedge f^*J.$$

This means that the meet operation,

$$\wedge : \mathsf{Sub}(A) \times \mathsf{Sub}(A) \longrightarrow \mathsf{Sub}(A)$$

is natural in A, in the sense that for any map $f : B \to A$ the following diagram commutes.

$$
\begin{array}{ccc}
\mathsf{Sub}(A) \times \mathsf{Sub}(A) & \xrightarrow{\ \wedge_A\ } & \mathsf{Sub}(A) \\
{\scriptstyle f^* \times f^*}\Big\downarrow & & \Big\downarrow{\scriptstyle f^*} \\
\mathsf{Sub}(B) \times \mathsf{Sub}(B) & \xrightarrow[\ \wedge_B\ ]{} & \mathsf{Sub}(B)
\end{array}
$$

Exercise 3.1.3. Show that any category $\mathcal{C}$ with finite limits has stable meets in the foregoing sense: each poset $\mathsf{Sub}(A)$ has all finite meets (i.e. including the "empty meet" $\mathbf{1}$), and these are stable under pullbacks. Conclude that for any finite limit category $\mathcal{C}$, the subobject functor $\mathsf{Sub} : \mathcal{C}^{\mathsf{op}} \to \mathsf{Pos}$ therefore factors through the subcategory of $\wedge$-semilattices.

Generalized elements

In any category, we can regard arbitrary arrows $x : X \to C$ as *generalized elements* of C, thinking thereby of variable elements or parameters. With respect to a subobject $S \rightarrowtail C$, such an element is said to be *in the subobject*, writtten

$$x \in_C S,$$

if it factors through (any mono representing) the subobject,

$$
\begin{array}{ccc}
& & S \\
& \nearrow & \big\downarrow \\
X & \xrightarrow[\ x\ ]{} & C
\end{array}
$$

which, observe, it then does uniquely. The following "generalized element semantics" can be a useful technique for "externalizing" the operations on subobjects into statements about generalized elements.

Proposition 3.1.4. *Let C be any object in a category $\mathcal{C}$ with finite limits.*

    1. for the top element $\mathbf{1} \in \mathsf{Sub}(C)$, and for all $x : X \to C$,

$$x \in_C \mathbf{1}.$$

    2. for any $S, T \in \mathsf{Sub}(C)$,

$$S \leq T \iff x \in_C S \text{ implies } x \in_C T, \text{ for all } x : X \to C.$$

3. *for any $S, T \in \mathsf{Sub}(C)$, and for all $x : X \to C$,*

$$x \in_C S \wedge T \iff x \in_C S \text{ and } x \in_C T.$$

4. *for the subobject $\Delta = [\langle 1_C, 1_C \rangle] \in \mathsf{Sub}(C \times C)$, and for all $x, y : X \to C$,*

$$\langle x, y \rangle \in \Delta \iff x = y.$$

5. *for the equalizer $E_{(f,g)} \rightarrowtail A$ of a pair of arrows $f, g : A \rightrightarrows B$, and for all $x : X \to A$,*

$$x \in_A E_{(f,g)} \iff fx = gx.$$

6. *for the pullback $f^*S \rightarrowtail A$ of a subobject $S \rightarrowtail B$ along any arrow $f : A \to B$, and for all $x : X \to A$,*

$$x \in_A f^*S \iff fx \in_B S.$$

Exercise 3.1.5. Prove the proposition.

3.1.3 Cartesian logic

We begin with a basic system of logic for categories with finite limits, also called *cartesian categories*, which we therefore call *cartesian logic*. This is a logic of formulas built from the logical operations $=$, $\top$, and $\wedge$, over a multi-sorted type theory with unit type $\mathbf{1}$. (See section **??** for multi-sorted type theories and the axioms for the unit type. In a dependently-typed formulation as in Chapter **??** one would also include equality types.).

Formation rules for cartesian logic

Given a basic language consisting of a stock of relation and function symbols (with arities), the terms are built up as explained in Section 3.1.1 from the basic function symbols and variables (we take "constants" to be 0-ary function symbols). The rules for constructing formulas are as follows:

1. The 0-ary relation symbol $\top$ is a formula:

$$\frac{}{\Gamma \mid \top \ \mathtt{pred}}$$

2. For each basic relation symbol R with signature $(A_1, \ldots, A_n)$ there is a rule

$$\frac{\Gamma \mid t_1 : A_1 \quad \cdots \quad \Gamma \mid t_n : A_n}{\Gamma \mid R(t_1, \ldots, t_n) \ \mathtt{pred}}$$

3. For each type A, there is a rule

$$\frac{\Gamma \mid s : A \quad \Gamma \mid t : A}{\Gamma \mid s =_A t \ \mathtt{pred}}$$

4. Conjunction:
$$\frac{\Gamma \mid \varphi \ \texttt{pred} \qquad \Gamma \mid \psi \ \texttt{pred}}{\Gamma \mid \varphi \wedge \psi \ \texttt{pred}}$$

5. Weakening:
$$\frac{\Gamma \mid \varphi \ \texttt{pred}}{\Gamma, x : A \mid \varphi \ \texttt{pred}}$$

Observe that, as usual, there is then a derived operation of substitution of terms for variables into formulas, defined by structural recursion on the above specification of formulas:

Substitution:
$$\frac{\Gamma \mid t : A \qquad \Gamma, x : A \mid \varphi \ \texttt{pred}}{\Gamma \mid \varphi[t/x] \ \texttt{pred}}$$

Inference rules for cartesian logic

Although we do not yet need them, we state the rules of inference here, too, for the convenience of having the entire specification of cartesian logic in one place. As already mentioned, we can conveniently state this deductive calculus using only *binary* sequents,

$$\Gamma \mid \psi \vdash \varphi.$$

We omit mention of the context Γ when it is the same in the premises and conclusion of a rule.

1. Weakening:
$$\frac{\Gamma \mid \psi \vdash \varphi}{\Gamma, x : A \mid \psi \vdash \varphi}$$

2. Substitution:
$$\frac{\Gamma \mid t : A \qquad \Gamma, x : A \mid \psi \vdash \varphi}{\Gamma \mid \psi[t/x] \vdash \varphi[t/x]}$$

3. Identity:
$$\frac{}{\varphi \vdash \varphi}$$

4. Cut:
$$\frac{\psi \vdash \theta \qquad \theta \vdash \varphi}{\psi \vdash \varphi}$$

5. Equality:
$$\frac{}{\psi \vdash t =_A t} \qquad \frac{\psi \vdash t =_A u \qquad \psi \vdash \varphi[t/z]}{\psi \vdash \varphi[u/z]}$$

6. Truth:
$$\frac{}{\psi \vdash \top}$$

7. Conjunction:
$$\frac{\vartheta \vdash \varphi \qquad \vartheta \vdash \psi}{\vartheta \vdash \varphi \wedge \psi} \qquad \frac{\vartheta \vdash \varphi \wedge \psi}{\vartheta \vdash \psi} \qquad \frac{\vartheta \vdash \varphi \wedge \psi}{\vartheta \vdash \varphi}$$

Exercise 3.1.6. Derive symmetry and transitivity of equality:
$$\frac{\Gamma \mid \psi \vdash t =_A u}{\Gamma \mid \psi \vdash u =_A t} \qquad \frac{\Gamma \mid \psi \vdash t =_A u \qquad \Gamma \mid \psi \vdash u =_A v}{\Gamma \mid \psi \vdash t =_A v}$$

Example 3.1.7. The theory of a poset is a cartesian theory. There is one basic sort P and one binary relation symbol $\leq$ with signature (P, P). The axioms are the familiar axioms for reflexivity, transitivity, and antisymmetry:

$$x : \mathsf{P} \mid \cdot \vdash x \leq x$$
$$x : \mathsf{P}, y : \mathsf{P}, z : \mathsf{P} \mid x \leq y \wedge y \leq z \vdash x \leq z$$
$$x : \mathsf{P}, y : \mathsf{P} \mid x \leq y \wedge y \leq x \vdash x =_{\mathsf{P}} y$$

There are also many examples, such as ordered groups, ordered fields, etc., that extend the theory of posets with further algebraic operations and equations.

Example 3.1.8. An *equivalence relation* in a cartesian category is a model of the corresponding theory with one basic sort A and one binary relation symbol $\sim$ with signature (A, A). The axioms are the familiar axioms for reflexivity, symmetry, and transitivity:

$$x : \mathsf{A} \mid \cdot \vdash x \sim x$$
$$x : \mathsf{A}, y : \mathsf{A} \mid x \sim y \vdash y \sim x$$
$$x : \mathsf{A}, y : \mathsf{A}, z : \mathsf{A} \mid x \sim y \wedge y \sim z \vdash x \sim z$$

Semantics of cartesian logic

In order to give the semantics of cartesian logic, we require a couple of useful propositions regarding cartesian categories.

Proposition 3.1.9. *If a category $\mathcal{C}$ has pullbacks then, for every $A \in \mathcal{C}$, the poset $\mathsf{Sub}(A)$ has finite limits. Moreover, these are stable under pullback.*

Proof. The poset $\mathsf{Sub}(A)$ has finite limits if it has a top object and binary meets. The top object of $\mathsf{Sub}(A)$ is the subobject $[\mathbf{1}_A : A \to A]$. The meet of subobjects $i : I \rightarrowtail A$ and $j : J \rightarrowtail A$ is the subobject $i \wedge j = i \circ (i^*j) = j \circ (j^*i) : I \wedge J \rightarrowtail A$ obtained by pullback, as in the following diagram:

$$
\begin{array}{ccc}
I \wedge J & \overset{j^*i}{\rightarrowtail} & J \\
{\scriptstyle i^*j}\downarrow & \lrcorner & \downarrow{\scriptstyle j} \\
I & \underset{i}{\rightarrowtail} & A
\end{array}
$$

It is easy to verify that $I \wedge J$ is the infimum of I and J. Finally, stability follows from a familiar diagram chase on a cube of pullbacks. $\qquad \square$

Proposition 3.1.10. *A category has has all finite limits just if it has all finite products and pullbacks of monos along monos.*

Proof. It is sufficient to show that the category has equalizers. To construct the equalizer of parallel arrows $f : A \to B$ and $g : A \to B$, first observe that the arrows

$$A \xrightarrow{\langle 1_A, f \rangle} A \times B \qquad\qquad A \xrightarrow{\langle 1_A, g \rangle} A \times B$$

are monos because the projection $\pi_0 : A \times B \to A$ is their left inverse. Therefore, we may construct the pullback

$$
\begin{array}{ccc}
P & \xrightarrow{\ \ p\ \ } & A \\
{\scriptstyle q}\downarrow & \lrcorner & \downarrow{\scriptstyle \langle 1_A, f \rangle} \\
A & \xrightarrow[\langle 1_A, g \rangle]{} & A \times B
\end{array}
$$

The morphisms p and q coincide because $\langle 1_A, f \rangle$ and $\langle 1_A, g \rangle$ have a common left inverse π_0:

$$p = 1_A \circ p = \pi_0 \circ \langle 1_A, f \rangle \circ p = \pi_0 \circ \langle 1_A, f \rangle \circ q = 1_A \circ q = q \,.$$

Let us show that $p : P \to A$ is the equalizer of f and g. First, p equalizes f and g,

$$f \circ p = \pi_1 \circ \langle 1_A, f \rangle \circ p = \pi_1 \circ \langle 1_A, g \rangle \circ q = g \circ q = g \circ p \,.$$

If $k : K \to A$ also equalizes f and g then

$$\langle 1_A, f \rangle \circ k = \langle k, f \circ k \rangle = \langle k, g \circ k \rangle = \langle 1_A, g \rangle \circ k \,,$$

therefore by the universal property of the constructed pullback there exists a unique factorization $\overline{k} : K \to P$ such that $k = p \circ \overline{k}$, as required. $\qquad\square$

We now explain how cartesian logic is interpreted in a cartesian category $\mathcal{C}$ (i.e. $\mathcal{C}$ is finitely complete). Let $\mathbb{T}$ be a multi-sorted cartesian theory. Recall that the type theory of $\mathbb{T}$ is specified by a set of sorts (types) $A, \dots$ and a set of basic function symbols $f, \dots$ together with their signatures, while the logic is given by a set of basic relation symbols $R, \dots$ with their signatures, and a set of axioms in the form of logical entailments between formulas in context,

$$\Gamma \mid \psi \vdash \varphi.$$

Definition 3.1.11. An *interpretation* of $\mathbb{T}$ in $\mathcal{C}$ is given by the following data, where Γ stands for a typing context $x_1 : A_1, \dots, x_n : A_n$, and ψ and φ are formulas:

1. Each sort A is interpreted as an object $[\![A]\!]$, with the unit sort 1 being interpreted as the terminal object 1.

2. A typing context $x_1 : A_1, \ldots, x_n : A_n$ is interpreted as the product $[\![A_1]\!] \times \cdots \times [\![A_n]\!]$. The empty context is interpreted as the terminal object $\mathbf{1}$.

3. A basic function symbol f with signature $(A_1, \ldots, A_m; B)$ is interpreted as a morphism $[\![f]\!] : [\![A_1]\!] \times \cdots [\![A_m]\!] \to [\![B]\!]$.

4. A basic relation symbol R with signature $(A_1, \ldots, A_n)$ is interpreted as a subobject $[\![R]\!] \in \mathsf{Sub}([\![A_1]\!] \times \cdots \times [\![A_n]\!])$.

We then extend the interpretation to all terms and formulas as follows:

1. A term in context $\Gamma \mid t : B$ is interpreted as a morphism

$$[\![\Gamma \mid t : B]\!] : [\![\Gamma]\!] \to [\![B]\!]$$

according to the following specification.

- A variable $x_0 : A_1, \ldots, x_n : A_n \mid x_i : A_i$ is interpreted as the i-th projection $\pi_i : [\![A_1]\!] \times \cdots \times [\![A_n]\!] \to [\![A_i]\!]$.

- The interpretation of $\Gamma \mid * : \mathbf{1}$ is the unique morphism $!_{[\![\Gamma]\!]} : [\![\Gamma]\!] \to \mathbf{1}$.

- A composite term $\Gamma \mid f(t_1, \ldots, t_m) : B$, where f is a basic function symbol with signature $(A_1, \ldots, A_m; B)$, is interpreted as the composition

$$[\![\Gamma]\!] \xrightarrow{\langle [\![t_1]\!], \ldots, [\![t_m]\!] \rangle} [\![A_1]\!] \times \cdots \times [\![A_m]\!] \xrightarrow{[\![f]\!]} [\![B]\!]$$

Here $[\![t_i]\!]$ is shorthand for $[\![\Gamma \mid t_i : A_i]\!]$.

2. A formula in a context $\Gamma \mid \varphi$ is interpreted as a subobject $[\![\Gamma \mid \varphi]\!] \in \mathsf{Sub}([\![\Gamma]\!])$ according to the following specification.

- The logical constant $\top$ is interpreted as the maximal subobject, represented by the identity arrow:
$$[\![\Gamma \mid \top]\!] = [\, \mathbf{1}_{[\![\Gamma]\!]} : [\![\Gamma]\!] \to [\![\Gamma]\!] \,]$$

- An atomic formula $\Gamma \mid R(t_1, \ldots, t_m)$, where R is a basic relation symbol with signature $(A_1, \ldots, A_m)$ is interpreted as the left vertical arrow in the following pullback square:

$$
\begin{array}{ccc}
[\![\Gamma \mid R(t_1, \ldots, t_m)]\!] & \longrightarrow & [\![R]\!] \\
\downarrow & & \downarrow \\
[\![\Gamma]\!] & \xrightarrow{\langle [\![t_1]\!], \ldots, [\![t_m]\!] \rangle} & [\![A_1]\!] \times \cdots \times [\![A_m]\!]
\end{array}
$$

- An equation $\Gamma \mid t =_A u \ \mathtt{pred}$ is interpreted as the subobject represented by the equalizer of $[\![\Gamma \mid t : A]\!]$ and $[\![\Gamma \mid u : A]\!]$:

$$[\![\Gamma \mid t =_A u]\!] \rightarrowtail [\![\Gamma]\!] \xrightarrow[\ [\![u]\!]\ ]{\ [\![t]\!]\ } [\![A]\!]$$

- By Proposition 3.1.9, each $\mathsf{Sub}(A)$ is a poset with binary meets. Thus we interpret a conjunction $\Gamma \mid \varphi \wedge \psi \ \mathtt{pred}$ as the meet of subobjects

$$[\![\Gamma \mid \varphi \wedge \psi]\!] = [\![\Gamma \mid \varphi]\!] \wedge [\![\Gamma \mid \psi]\!] \,.$$

- A formula formed by weakening is interpreted as pullback along a projection:

$$
\begin{array}{ccc}
[\![\Gamma, x : A \mid \varphi]\!] & \longrightarrow & [\![\Gamma \mid \varphi]\!] \\
\downarrow & & \downarrow{\scriptstyle i} \\
[\![\Gamma]\!] \times [\![A]\!] & \xrightarrow{\ \pi\ } & [\![\Gamma]\!]
\end{array}
$$

Computing this pullback one sees that the interpretation of $[\![\Gamma, x : A \mid \varphi]\!]$ turns out to be the subobject

$$[\![\Gamma \mid \varphi]\!] \times [\![A]\!] \xrightarrow{\ i \times 1_A\ } [\![\Gamma]\!] \times [\![A]\!]$$

This concludes the definition of an interpretation of a cartesian theory $\mathbb{T}$ in a cartesian category $\mathcal{C}$.

As was explained in the previous section, the operation of substitution of terms into formulas is interpreted as pullback:

Lemma 3.1.12. *Let the formula $\Gamma, x : A \mid \varphi$ and the term $\Gamma \mid t : A$ be given. Then the substituted formula $\Gamma \mid \varphi[t/x]$ is interpreted as the pullback indicated in the following diagram:*

$$
\begin{array}{ccc}
[\![\Gamma \mid \varphi[t/x]]\!] & \longrightarrow & [\![\Gamma, x : A \mid \varphi]\!] \\
\downarrow & & \downarrow \\
[\![\Gamma]\!] & \xrightarrow{\ \langle 1_{[\![\Gamma]\!]}, [\![t]\!] \rangle\ } & [\![\Gamma]\!] \times [\![A]\!]
\end{array}
$$

Proof. A simple induction on the structure of φ. We do the case where φ is an atomic formula $R(t_1, \ldots, t_m)$. Let $\Gamma = x_1 : A_1, \ldots, x_n : A_n$ and $\Gamma, x : A \mid t_i : B_i$ for $i = 1, \ldots, m$,

where $(B_1, \ldots, B_m)$ is the signature of R. For the interpretation of $\Gamma, x : A \mid R(t_1, \ldots, t_m)$, by Definition 3.1.11 we have a pullback diagram:

$$\begin{array}{ccc} [\![\Gamma \mid R(t_1, \ldots, t_m)]\!] & \longrightarrow & [\![R]\!] \\ \downarrow & & \downarrow \\ [\![\Gamma, x : A]\!] & \xrightarrow{\langle [\![t_1]\!], \ldots, [\![t_m]\!] \rangle} & [\![B_1]\!] \times \cdots \times [\![B_m]\!] \end{array}$$

Now suppose $\Gamma \mid t : A$, and consider the substitution

$$\Gamma \mid R(t_1, \ldots, t_m)[t/x] = \Gamma \mid R(t_1[t/x], \ldots, t_m[t/x])$$

For the interpretations of the substituted terms $t_i[t/x]$ we have the composites

$$[\![t_i[t/x]]\!] = [\![t_i]\!] \circ \langle 1_{[\![\Gamma]\!]}, [\![t]\!] \rangle : [\![\Gamma]\!] \longrightarrow [\![\Gamma, x : A]\!] \longrightarrow [\![B_i]\!]$$

by (associativity of composition and) the definition of the interpretation of terms. Thus for the interpretation of $\Gamma \mid R(t_1, \ldots, t_m)[t/x]$ we have the outer pullback rectangle below.

$$\begin{array}{ccccc} [\![\Gamma \mid R(t_1, \ldots, t_m)[t/x]]\!] & \dashrightarrow & [\![\Gamma, x : A \mid R(t_1, \ldots, t_m)]\!] & \longrightarrow & [\![R]\!] \\ \downarrow & & \downarrow & & \downarrow \\ [\![\Gamma]\!] & \xrightarrow{\langle 1_{[\![\Gamma]\!]}, [\![t]\!] \rangle} & [\![\Gamma, x : A]\!] & \xrightarrow{\langle [\![t_1]\!], \ldots, [\![t_m]\!] \rangle} & [\![B_1]\!] \times \cdots \times [\![B_m]\!] \end{array}$$
$$\langle [\![t_1[t/x]]\!], \ldots, [\![t_m[t/x]]\!] \rangle$$

But since the righthand square is a pullback, there is a unique dotted arrow as indicated. By the 2-pullbacks lemma, the lefthand square is then also a pullback, as required.   □

Exercise 3.1.13. Complete the proof.

When we deal with several different interpretations at once we may name them M, N, …, and superscript the semantic brackets accordingly, $[\![\Gamma]\!]^M$, $[\![\Gamma]\!]^N$, …

Definition 3.1.14. If $\Gamma \mid \psi \vdash \psi$ is one of the logical entailment axioms of $\mathbb{T}$ and

$$[\![\Gamma \mid \psi]\!]^M \leq [\![\Gamma \mid \varphi]\!]^M$$

holds in an interpretation M, then we say that M *satisfies* or *models* $\Gamma \mid \psi \vdash \varphi$, which we may write as

$$M \models (\Gamma \mid \psi \vdash \varphi).$$

An interpretation M is a *model* of $\mathbb{T}$ if it satisfies all the axioms of $\mathbb{T}$.

Theorem 3.1.15 (Soundness of cartesian logic)**.** *If a cartesian theory $\mathbb{T}$ proves an entailment*

$$\Gamma \mid \psi \vdash \varphi$$

then every model M of $\mathbb{T}$ satisfies the entailment:

$$M \models (\Gamma \mid \psi \vdash \varphi) .$$

Proof. The proof proceeds by induction on the proof of the entailment. In the following we often omit the typing context Γ to simplify the notation, and all inequalities are interpreted in $\mathsf{Sub}([\![\Gamma]\!])$. We consider all possible last steps in the proof of the entailment:

1. Weakening: if $[\![\Gamma \mid \psi]\!] \leq [\![\Gamma \mid \varphi]\!]$ in $\mathsf{Sub}([\![\Gamma]\!])$ then

    $$[\![\Gamma, x : A \mid \psi]\!] = [\![\Gamma \mid \psi]\!] \times A \leq [\![\Gamma \mid \varphi]\!] \times A = [\![\Gamma, x : A \mid \varphi]\!] \quad \text{in } \mathsf{Sub}([\![\Gamma, x : A]\!]).$$

2. Substitution: by lemma 3.1.12, substitution is interpreted by pullback so that $[\![\varphi[t/x]]\!] = \langle 1_{[\![\psi]\!]}, [\![t]\!]\rangle^*[\![\varphi]\!]$ and $[\![\psi[t/x]]\!] = \langle 1_{[\![\psi]\!]}, [\![t]\!]\rangle^*[\![\psi]\!]$. Because

    $$\langle 1_{[\![\psi]\!]}, [\![t]\!]\rangle^* : \mathsf{Sub}([\![\psi]\!]) \to \mathsf{Sub}([\![\psi]\!] \times [\![A]\!])$$

    is a functor it is a monotone map, therefore $[\![\psi]\!] \leq [\![\varphi]\!]$ implies

    $$\langle 1_{[\![\psi]\!]}, [\![t]\!]\rangle^*[\![\psi]\!] \leq \langle 1_{[\![\psi]\!]}, [\![t]\!]\rangle^*[\![\varphi]\!] .$$

3. Identity: trivially
    $$[\![\varphi]\!] \leq [\![\varphi]\!] .$$

4. Cut: if $[\![\psi]\!] \leq [\![\theta]\!]$ and $[\![\theta]\!] \leq [\![\varphi]\!]$ then clearly $[\![\psi]\!] \leq [\![\varphi]\!]$, since $\mathsf{Sub}([\![\Gamma, x : A]\!])$ is a poset.

5. Truth: trivially $[\![\psi]\!] \leq [\![\top]\!]$.

6. The rules for conjunction clearly hold because by the definition of infimum $[\![\vartheta]\!] \leq [\![\varphi \wedge \psi]\!]$ if, and only if, $[\![\vartheta]\!] \leq [\![\varphi]\!]$ and $[\![\vartheta]\!] \leq [\![\psi]\!]$.

7. Equality: the axiom $t =_A t$ is satisfied because an equalizer of $[\![t]\!]$ with itself is the maximal subobject:
    $$[\![\psi]\!] \leq [1_{[\![\Gamma]\!]} : [\![\Gamma]\!] \to [\![\Gamma]\!]] = [\![t =_A t]\!] .$$

    For the other axiom, suppose $[\![\psi]\!] \leq [\![t =_A u]\!]$ and $[\![\psi]\!] \leq [\![\varphi[t/z]]\!]$. It suffices to show $[\![t =_A u]\!] \wedge [\![\varphi[t/z]]\!] \leq [\![\varphi[u/z]]\!]$ for then

    $$[\![\psi]\!] \leq [\![t =_A u]\!] \wedge [\![\varphi[t/z]]\!] \leq [\![\varphi[u/z]]\!] .$$

The interpretation of $P = [\![t =_A u]\!] \wedge [\![\varphi[t/z]]\!]$ is obtained by two successive pullbacks, as in the following diagram:

$$
\begin{array}{ccccc}
P & \longrightarrow & [\![\varphi[t/z]]\!] & \longrightarrow & [\![\varphi]\!] \\
\downarrow & & \downarrow & & \downarrow \\
[\![t =_A u]\!] & \xrightarrow{\ e\ } & [\![\Gamma]\!] & \xrightarrow{\langle 1_\Gamma, [\![t]\!]\rangle} & [\![\Gamma]\!] \times [\![A]\!]
\end{array}
$$

Here e is the equalizer of $[\![u]\!]$ and $[\![t]\!]$. Observe that e equalizes $\langle 1_{[\![\Gamma]\!]}, [\![t]\!]\rangle$ and $\langle 1_{[\![\Gamma]\!]}, [\![u]\!]\rangle$ as well:

$$\langle 1_{[\![\Gamma]\!]}, [\![t]\!]\rangle \circ e = \langle e, [\![t]\!] \circ e\rangle = \langle e, [\![u]\!] \circ e\rangle = \langle 1_{[\![\Gamma]\!]}, [\![u]\!]\rangle \circ e \ .$$

Therefore, if we replace $\langle 1_{[\![\Gamma]\!]}, [\![t]\!]\rangle$ with $\langle 1_{[\![\Gamma]\!]}, [\![u]\!]\rangle$ in the above diagram, the outer rectangle still commutes. By the universal property of the pullback

$$
\begin{array}{ccc}
[\![\varphi[u/z]]\!] & \longrightarrow & [\![\varphi]\!] \\
\downarrow & & \downarrow \\
[\![\Gamma]\!] & \xrightarrow{\langle 1_\Gamma, [\![u]\!]\rangle} & [\![\Gamma]\!] \times [\![A]\!]
\end{array}
$$

it follows that P also factors through $[\![\varphi[u/z]]\!]$, as required.

$\square$

Example 3.1.16. Recall the cartesian theory of posets (example 3.1.7). There is one basic sort P and one binary relation symbol $\leq$ with signature (P, P) and the axioms of reflexivity, transitivity, and antisymmetry. A poset in a cartesian category $\mathcal{C}$ is thus given by an object P, which is the interpretation of the sort P, and a subobject $r : R \rightarrowtail P \times P$, which the interpretation of $\leq$, such that the axioms are satisfied. As an example we spell out when the reflexivity axiom is satisfied. The interpretation of $x : P \mid x \leq x$ is obtained by the following pullback:

$$
\begin{array}{ccc}
[\![x \leq x]\!] & \longrightarrow & R \\
\downarrow & \rho \nearrow & \downarrow r \\
P & \xrightarrow{\ \Delta\ } & P \times P
\end{array}
$$

where $\Delta = \langle 1_P, 1_P\rangle$ is the diagonal. The first axiom is satisfied when $[\![x \leq x]\!] = 1_P$, which happens if, and only if, Δ factors through r, as indicated. Therefore, reflexivity can be expressed as follows: there exists a "reflexivity" morphism $\rho : P \to R$ such that $r \circ \rho = \Delta$. Equivalently, the morphisms $\pi_0 \circ r$ and $\pi_1 \circ r$ have a common right inverse ρ.

As an example, of a poset in a cartesian category other than Set, observe that since the definition is stated entirely in terms of finite limits, and these are computed pointwise

in functor categories $\mathsf{Set}^{\mathbb{C}}$, it follows that a poset P in $\mathsf{Set}^{\mathbb{C}}$ is the same thing as a functor $P : \mathbb{C} \to \mathsf{Poset}$. Indeed, as was the case for algebraic theories, we have an equivalence (an isomorphism, actually) of categories,

$$\mathsf{Poset}(\mathsf{Set}^{\mathbb{C}}) \; \cong \; \mathsf{Poset}(\mathsf{Set})^{\mathbb{C}} \; \cong \; \mathsf{Poset}^{\mathbb{C}}.$$

Exercise 3.1.17. An *ordered group* is a group $(G, \cdot, i, e)$ equipped with a partial ordering $x \leq y$ that is compatible with the group multiplication, in the sense that $x \leq y$ implies $x \cdot z \leq y \cdot z$ and $z \cdot x \leq z \cdot y$. Is this the same thing as a group in the category of posets? A poset in the category of groups?

Subtypes

Let us consider whether the theory of a category is a cartesian theory. We begin by expressing the definition of a category so that it can be interpreted in any cartesian category $\mathcal{C}$. An *internal category* in $\mathcal{C}$ consists of an *object of morphisms* C_1, an *object of objects* C_0, and *domain*, *codomain*, and *identity* morphisms,

$$\mathsf{dom} : C_1 \to C_0 , \qquad\qquad \mathsf{cod} : C_1 \to C_0 , \qquad\qquad \mathsf{id} : C_0 \to C_1 .$$

There is also a *composition* morphism $c : C_2 \to C_1$, where C_2 is obtained by the pullback

$$
\begin{array}{ccc}
C_2 & \xrightarrow{\ p_1\ } & C_1 \\
{\scriptstyle p_0}\downarrow & & \downarrow{\scriptstyle \mathsf{dom}} \\
C_1 & \xrightarrow[\ \mathsf{cod}\ ]{} & C_0
\end{array}
$$

The following equations must hold:

$$\mathsf{dom} \circ i = 1_{C_0} = \mathsf{cod} \circ i ,$$
$$\mathsf{cod} \circ p_1 = \mathsf{cod} \circ c , \qquad \mathsf{dom} \circ p_0 = \mathsf{dom} \circ c .$$
$$c \circ \langle 1_{C_1}, i \circ \mathsf{dom} \rangle = 1_{C_1} = c \circ \langle i \circ \mathsf{cod}, 1_{C_1} \rangle ,$$

The first two equations state that the domain and codomain of an identity morphism 1_A are both A. The second equation states that $\mathsf{cod}\,(f \circ g) = \mathsf{cod}\,f$ and the third one that $\mathsf{dom}\,(f \circ g) = \mathsf{dom}\,g$. The fourth equation states that $f \circ 1_{\mathsf{dom}\,f} = f = 1_{\mathsf{cod}\,f} \circ f$. It remains to express associativity of composition. For this purpose we construct the pullback

$$
\begin{array}{ccc}
C_3 & \xrightarrow{\ q_2\ } & C_1 \\
{\scriptstyle q_{01}}\downarrow & & \downarrow{\scriptstyle \mathsf{dom}} \\
C_2 & \xrightarrow[\ \mathsf{cod} \circ p_1\ ]{} & C_0
\end{array}
$$

The object C_3 can be thought of as the set of triples of morphisms (f, g, h) such that $\mathsf{cod}\, f = \mathsf{dom}\, g$ and $\mathsf{cod}\, g = \mathsf{dom}\, h$. We denote $q_0 = p_0 \circ q_{01}$ and $q_1 = p_1 \circ q_{01}$. The morphisms $q_0, q_1, q_2 : C_3 \to C_1$ are like three projections which select the first, second, and third element of a triple, respectively. With this notation we can write $q_{01} = \langle q_0, q_1 \rangle_{C_2}$ because q_{01} is the unique morphism such that $p_0 \circ q_{01} = q_0$ and $p_1 \circ q_{01} = q_1$. The subscript C_2 reminds us that the "pair" $\langle q_0, q_1 \rangle_{C_2}$ is obtained by the universal property of the pullback C_2.

Morphisms $c \circ q_{01} : C_3 \to C_1$ and $q_2 : C_3 \to C_1$ factor through the pullback C_2 because

$$\mathsf{cod} \circ c \circ q_{01} = \mathsf{cod} \circ p_1 \circ q_0 = \mathsf{dom} \circ q_2 \ .$$

Thus let $r : C_3 \to C_2$ be the unique factorization for which $p_0 \circ r = c \circ q_{01}$ and $p_1 \circ r = q_2$. Because p_0 and p_1 are like projections from C_2 to C_1, morphism r can be thought of as a pair of morphisms, so we write $r = \langle c \circ q_{01}, q_2 \rangle_{C_2}$. Morphism $c \circ \langle c \circ q_{01}, q_2 \rangle_{C_2} : C_3 \to C_1$ corresponds to the operations $\langle f, g, h \rangle \mapsto (f, g) \circ h$, whereas the morphism corresponding to $\langle f, g, h \rangle \mapsto f \circ (g \circ h)$ is obtained in a similar way and is equal to

$$c \circ \langle q_0, c \circ \langle q_1, q_2 \rangle_{C_2} \rangle_{C_2} : C_3 \to C_1 \ .$$

Thus associativity is expressed by the equation

$$c \circ \langle c \circ \langle q_0, q_1 \rangle_{C_2}, q_2 \rangle_{C_2} = c \circ \langle q_0, c \circ \langle q_1, q_2 \rangle_{C_2} \rangle_{C_2} \ .$$

Example 3.1.18. An internal category in Set is a small category.

Example 3.1.19. An internal category in $\mathsf{Set}^{\mathbb{C}}$ is a functor $\mathbb{C} \to \mathsf{Cat}$. Indeed, as in previous examples of cartesian theories we have an equivalence of categories,

$$\mathsf{Cat}(\mathsf{Set}^{\mathbb{C}}) \ \cong \ \mathsf{Cat}(\mathsf{Set})^{\mathbb{C}} \ \cong \ \mathsf{Cat}^{\mathbb{C}}.$$

We have successfully formulated the theory of a category so that it makes sense in any cartesian category. In fact, the definition of an internal category refers only to certain pullbacks, hence the notion of an internal category makes sense in any category with pullbacks. However, if we try to formulate it as a multi-sorted cartesian theory, there is a problem. Obviously, there ought to be a basic sort of objects C_0 and a basic sort of morphisms C_1. There are also basic function symbols with signatures

$$\mathtt{dom} : (\mathsf{C}_1; \mathsf{C}_0) \qquad\qquad \mathtt{cod} : (\mathsf{C}_1; \mathsf{C}_0) \qquad\qquad \mathtt{id} : (\mathsf{C}_0, \mathsf{C}_1) \ .$$

However, it is not clear what the signature for composition should be. It is not $(\mathsf{C}_1, \mathsf{C}_1; \mathsf{C}_1)$ because composition is undefined for non-composable pairs of morphisms. We might be tempted to postulate another basic sort C_2 but then we would have no way of stating that C_2 is the pullback of $\mathtt{dom}$ and $\mathtt{cod}$. And even if we somehow axiomatized the fact that C_2 is a pullback, we would then still have to formalize the object C_3 of composable triples, C_4

of composable quadruples, and so on. What we lack is the ability to define the type C_2 as a *subtype* of $C_1 \times C_1$.

One way to remedy the situation is to use a richer underlying type theory; in Chapter **??** we will consider the system of *dependent type theory*, which provides the means to capture such notions as the theory of categories (and much more). Here we consider a small step in that direction, namely *simple subtypes*. The formation rule for simple subtypes is

$$\frac{x : A \mid \varphi \ \texttt{pred}}{\{x : A \mid \varphi\} \ \texttt{type}}$$

We can think of $\{x : A \mid \varphi\}$ as the subobject of all those $x : A$ that satisfy φ. Note that we did not allow an arbitrary context Γ to be present. This means that we cannot define subtypes that depend on parameters, which why they are called "simple".

Inference rules for subtypes are as follows:

$$\frac{\Gamma \mid t : \{x : A \mid \varphi\}}{\Gamma \mid \texttt{in}_\varphi\, t : A} \qquad \frac{\Gamma \mid t : \{x : A \mid \varphi\}}{\Gamma \mid \cdot \vdash \varphi[\texttt{in}_\varphi\, t/x]} \qquad \frac{\Gamma \mid t : A \qquad \Gamma \mid \cdot \vdash \varphi[t/x]}{\Gamma \mid \texttt{rs}_\varphi\, t : \{x : A \mid \varphi\}}$$

$$\frac{\Gamma, x : A \mid \varphi, \psi \vdash \theta}{\Gamma, y : \{x : A \mid \varphi\} \mid \psi[\texttt{in}_\varphi\, y/x] \vdash \theta[\texttt{in}_\varphi\, y/x]}$$

The first rule states that a term t of subtype $\{x : A \mid \varphi\}$ can be converted to a term $\texttt{in}_\varphi\, t$ of type A. We can think of the constant $\texttt{in}_\varphi$ as the *inclusion* $\texttt{in}_\varphi : \{x : A \mid \varphi\} \to A$. The second rule states that every term of a subtype $\{x : A \mid \varphi\}$ satisfies the defining predicate φ. The third rule states that a term t of type A which satisfies φ can be converted to a term $\texttt{rs}_\varphi\, t$ of type $\{x : A \mid \varphi\}$. A good way to think of the constant $\texttt{rs}_\varphi$ is as a partially defined *restriction*, or a type-casting operations, $\texttt{rs}_\varphi : A \rightharpoonup \{x : A \mid \varphi\}$.[5] The last rule tells us how to replace a variable x of type A and an assumption φ about it with a variable y of type $\{x : A \mid \varphi\}$ and remove the assumption. Note that this is a two-way rule.

There are two more axioms that relate inclusions and restrictions:

$$\frac{\Gamma \mid t : \{x : A \mid \varphi\}}{\Gamma \mid \cdot \vdash \texttt{rs}_\varphi\,(\texttt{in}_\varphi\, t) = t} \qquad\qquad \frac{\Gamma \mid t : A \qquad \Gamma \mid \cdot \vdash \varphi[t/x]}{\Gamma \mid \cdot \vdash \texttt{in}_\varphi\,(\texttt{rs}_\varphi\, t) = t\,.}$$

In an informal discussion it is customary for the inclusions and restrictions to be omitted, or at least for the subscript φ to be missing.[6]

Exercise 3.1.20. Suppose $x : A \mid \psi$ and $x : A \mid \varphi$ are formulas. Show that

$$x : A \mid \psi \vdash \varphi$$

---

[5]Inclusions and restrictions are like type-casting operations in some programming languages. For example in Java, an inclusion corresponds to an (implicit) type cast from a class to its superclass, whereas a restriction corresponds to a type cast from a class to a subclass. Must I write that Java is a registered trademark of Sun Microsystems?

[6]Strictly speaking, even the notation $\texttt{in}_\varphi\, t$ is imprecise because it does not indiciate that ϕ stands in the context $x : A$. The correct notation would be $\texttt{in}_{(x:A\mid\varphi)}\, t$, where x is bound in the subscript. A similar remark holds for $\texttt{rs}_\varphi\, t$.

is provable if, and only if, $\{x : A \mid \psi\}$ factors through $\{x : A \mid \varphi\}$, which means that there exists a term k,

$$y : \{x : A \mid \psi\} \mid k : \{x : A \mid \varphi\} \,,$$

such that

$$y : \{x : A \mid \psi\} \mid \cdot \vdash \mathtt{in}_\psi \, y =_A \mathtt{in}_\varphi \, k$$

is provable. Show also that k is determined uniquely up to provable equality.

Example 3.1.21. We are now able to formulate the theory of a category as a cartesian theory whose underlying type theory has product types and subset types. The basic types are the type of objects $\mathtt{C}_0$ and the type of morphisms $\mathtt{C}_1$. We define the type $\mathtt{C}_2$ to be

$$\mathtt{C}_2 \equiv \{p : C_1 \times C_1 \mid \mathtt{cod}(\mathtt{fst}\,p) = \mathtt{dom}(\mathtt{snd}\,p)\} \,.$$

The basic function symbols and their signatures are:

$$\mathtt{dom} : \mathtt{C}_1 \to \mathtt{C}_0 \,, \qquad \mathtt{cod} : \mathtt{C}_1 \to \mathtt{C}_0 \,, \qquad \mathtt{id} : \mathtt{C}_0 \to \mathtt{C}_1 \,, \qquad \mathtt{c} : \mathtt{C}_2 \to \mathtt{C}_1 \,.$$

The axioms are:

$$a : \mathtt{C}_0 \mid \cdot \vdash \mathtt{dom}(\mathtt{id}(a)) = a$$
$$a : \mathtt{C}_0 \mid \cdot \vdash \mathtt{cod}(\mathtt{id}(a)) = a$$
$$f : \mathtt{C}_1, g : \mathtt{C}_1 \mid \mathtt{cod}(f) = \mathtt{dom}(g) \vdash \mathtt{dom}(\mathtt{c}(\mathtt{rs}\,\langle f, g \rangle)) = f$$
$$f : \mathtt{C}_1, g : \mathtt{C}_1 \mid \mathtt{cod}(f) = \mathtt{dom}(g) \vdash \mathtt{cod}(\mathtt{c}(\mathtt{rs}\,\langle f, g \rangle)) = g$$
$$f : \mathtt{C}_1 \mid \cdot \vdash \mathtt{c}(\mathtt{rs}\,\langle \mathtt{id}(\mathtt{dom}(f)), f \rangle) = f$$
$$f : \mathtt{C}_1 \mid \cdot \vdash \mathtt{c}(\mathtt{rs}\,\langle f, \mathtt{id}(\mathtt{cod}(f)) \rangle) = f$$

Lastly, the associativity axiom is

$$f : \mathtt{C}_1, g : \mathtt{C}_1, h : \mathtt{C}_1 \mid \mathtt{cod}(f) = \mathtt{dom}(g), \mathtt{cod}(g) = \mathtt{dom}(h) \vdash$$
$$\mathtt{c}(\mathtt{rs}\,\langle \mathtt{c}(\mathtt{rs}\,\langle f, g \rangle), h \rangle) = \mathtt{c}(\mathtt{rs}\,\langle f, \mathtt{c}(\mathtt{rs}\,\langle g, h \rangle) \rangle) \,.$$

This notation is quite unreadable. If we write $g \circ f$ instead of $\mathtt{c}(\mathtt{rs}\,\langle f, g \rangle)$ then the axioms take on a more familiar form. For example, associativity is just $h \circ (g \circ f) = (h \circ g) \circ f$. However, we need to remember that we may form the term $g \circ f$ only if we first prove $\mathtt{dom}(g) = \mathtt{cod}(f)$.

A subtype $\{x : A \mid \varphi\}$ is interpreted as the domain of a monomorphism representing $x : A \mid \varphi$:

$$[\![\{x : A \mid \varphi\}]\!] \xrightarrow{\;[\![x : A \mid \varphi]\!]\;} [\![A]\!]$$

Some care must be taken here because monos representing a given subobject are only determined up to isomorphism. We assume that a suitable canonical choice of monos can be made.

An inclusion $\Gamma \mid \mathtt{in}_\varphi\, t : A$ is interpreted as the composition

$$[\![\Gamma]\!] \xrightarrow{\ \ [\![t]\!]\ \ } [\![\{x : A \mid \varphi\}]\!] \rightarrowtail^{[\![x : A \mid \varphi]\!]} [\![A]\!]$$

A restriction $\Gamma \mid \mathtt{rs}_\varphi\, t : \{x : A \mid \varphi\}$ is interpreted as the unique $\overline{[\![t]\!]}$ which makes the following diagram commute:

$$
\begin{array}{ccc}
[\![\Gamma]\!] & \xrightarrow{\ \overline{[\![t]\!]}\ } & [\![x : A \mid \varphi]\!] \\
& {\scriptstyle[\![t]\!]}\searrow & \downarrow \\
& & [\![A]\!]
\end{array}
$$

Exercise 3.1.22. Formulate and prove a soundness theorem for subtypes. Pay attention to the interpretation of restrictions, where you need to show unique existence of $\overline{[\![t]\!]}$.

Remark 3.1.23. Another approach to the logic of cartesian categories that captures the theory of categories and related notions involving partial operations is that of *essentially algebraic theories*, due to P. Freyd; see [Fre72, PV07]. A third approach is that of *dependent type theory* to be developed in **??** below. Finally, we will see in Section 3.2.3 that the theory of categories can be formulated as a *regular theory*.

3.1.4   Quantifiers as adjoints

The categorical semantics of quantification is one of the central features of the subject, and quite possibly one of the nicest contributions of categorical logic to the field of logic. You might expect that the quantifiers $\forall$ and $\exists$ are "just a big conjunction and disjunction", respectively. In fact the Polish school of algebraic logic worked to realize this point of view—but categorical logic shows how quantifiers can be treated algebraically as adjoint functors, giving a more satisfactory theory that generalizes to categories in which the subobject lattices are not (co)complete. The original treatment can be found in the classic paper [Law69].

Let us first recall the rules of inference for quantifiers. The formation rules are:

$$\frac{\Gamma, x : A \mid \varphi \ \mathtt{pred}}{\Gamma \mid (\exists\, x : A\,.\,\varphi) \ \mathtt{pred}} \qquad\qquad \frac{\Gamma, x : A \mid \varphi \ \mathtt{pred}}{\Gamma \mid (\forall\, x : A\,.\,\varphi) \ \mathtt{pred}}$$

The variable x is bound in $\forall\, x : A\,.\,\varphi$ and $\exists\, x : A\,.\,\varphi$. If x and y are distinct variables and x does not occur freely in the term t then substitution of t for y commutes with quantification over x:

$$
\begin{aligned}
(\exists\, x : A\,.\,\varphi)[t/y] &= \exists\, x : A\,.\,(\varphi[t/y]) \ , \\
(\forall\, x : A\,.\,\varphi)[t/y] &= \forall\, x : A\,.\,(\varphi[t/y]) \ .
\end{aligned}
\tag{3.2}
$$

For each quantifier we have a two-way rule of inference:

$$\frac{\Gamma, x : A \mid \varphi \vdash \vartheta}{\Gamma \mid (\exists\, x : A \,.\, \varphi) \vdash \vartheta} \qquad\qquad \frac{\Gamma, x : A \mid \psi \vdash \varphi}{\Gamma \mid \psi \vdash \forall\, x : A \,.\, \varphi}$$

Note that these rules implicitly impose the usual condition that x must not occur freely in ψ and ϑ, because ψ and ϑ are supposed to be well formed in context Γ, which does not contain x.

Exercise 3.1.24. A common way of stating the inference rules for quantifiers is as follows. For the universal quantifier, the introduction and elimination rules are

$$\frac{\Gamma, x : A \mid \psi \vdash \varphi}{\Gamma \mid \psi \vdash \forall\, x : A \,.\, \varphi} \qquad\qquad \frac{\Gamma \mid t : A \qquad \Gamma \mid \psi \vdash \forall\, x : A \,.\, \varphi}{\Gamma \mid \psi \vdash \varphi[t/x]}$$

The introduction rule for existential quantifier is

$$\frac{\Gamma \mid t : A \qquad \Gamma \mid \psi \vdash \varphi[t/x]}{\Gamma \mid \psi \vdash \exists\, x : A \,.\, \varphi}$$

and the elimination rule is

$$\frac{\Gamma \mid \psi \vdash \exists\, x : A \,.\, \varphi \qquad \Gamma, x : A \mid \varphi \vdash \vartheta}{\Gamma \mid \psi \vdash \vartheta}$$

Note that these rules implicitly impose a requirement that x does not occur in Γ and that it does not occur freely in ψ because the context $\Gamma, x : A$ must be well formed and the hypotheses ψ must be well formed in context Γ. Show that these rules can be derived from the ones above, and vice versa. Of course, you may also use the inference rules for cartesian logic, cf. page 16.

In order to discover what the semantics of existential quantifier ought to be, we look at the following instance of the two-way rule for quantifiers:

$$\frac{y : B, x : A \mid \varphi \vdash \vartheta}{y : B \mid \exists\, x : A \,.\, \varphi \vdash \vartheta} \tag{3.3}$$

First observe that this rule implicitly requires

$$y : B, x : A \mid \varphi \;\texttt{pred} \qquad y : B \mid \vartheta \;\texttt{pred} \qquad y : B \mid (\exists\, x : A \,.\, \varphi) \;\texttt{pred}$$

This is required for the entailments to be well-formed. The fourth judgement

$$y : B, x : A \mid \vartheta \;\texttt{pred}$$

follows from the second one above by weakening,

$$\frac{y : B \mid \vartheta \;\texttt{pred}}{y : B, x : A \mid \vartheta \;\texttt{pred}}$$

The interpretations of φ, ϑ, and $\exists\, x : A\,.\,\varphi$ are therefore subobjects

$$[\![y : B, x : A \mid \varphi]\!] \in \mathsf{Sub}([\![B]\!] \times [\![A]\!])\,,$$
$$[\![y : B \mid \vartheta]\!] \in \mathsf{Sub}([\![B]\!])\,,$$
$$[\![y : B \mid \exists\, x : A\,.\,\varphi]\!] \in \mathsf{Sub}([\![B]\!])\,.$$

And the weakened instance of ϑ in the context $y : B, x : A$ is interpreted by pullback along a projection, cf. page 20, as in the following pullback diagram:

Thus we have

$$[\![y : B, x : A \mid \vartheta]\!] = \pi^*[\![y : B \mid \vartheta]\!]\,,$$

with weakening interpreted as the pullback functor

$$\pi^* : \mathsf{Sub}([\![B]\!]) \to \mathsf{Sub}([\![B]\!] \times [\![A]\!])\,.$$

We will interpret existential quantification $\exists x : A$ as a suitable functor

$$\exists_A : \mathsf{Sub}([\![B]\!] \times [\![A]\!]) \to \mathsf{Sub}([\![B]\!])$$

so that

$$[\![y : B \mid \exists\, x : A\,.\,\varphi]\!] = \exists_A[\![y : B, x : A \mid \varphi]\!]\,.$$

The interpretation of the two-way rule (3.3) then becomes a two-way inequality rule

$$\frac{[\![y : B, x : A \mid \varphi]\!] \le \pi^*[\![y : B \mid \vartheta]\!]}{\exists_A[\![y : B, x : A \mid \varphi]\!] \le [\![y : B \mid \vartheta]\!]}$$

Replacing the interpretations of φ and ϑ by general subobjects $S \in \mathsf{Sub}([\![B]\!] \times [\![A]\!])$ and $T \in \mathsf{Sub}([\![B]\!])$, we obtain the more suggestive formulation

$$\frac{S \le \pi^*T}{\exists_A S \le T} \tag{3.4}$$

This is of course nothing but an adjunction between $\exists_A$ and π^*. Indeed, the operations $\exists_A$ and π^* are functors on the posets of subjects $\mathsf{Sub}([\![B]\!] \times [\![A]\!])$ and $\mathsf{Sub}([\![B]\!])$, and the bijection of hom-sets (3.4) is exactly the statement of an adjunction between them. Thus *existential quantification is left-adjoint to weakening*:

$$\exists_A \dashv \pi^*$$

An exactly dual argument shows that *universal quantification is right-adjoint to weakening*:

$$\pi^* \dashv \forall_A$$

Thus, in sum, we have that the rules of inference require that the quantifiers be interpreted as operations adjoint to the interpretation of weakening, i.e. pullback π^* along the projection $\pi : [\![B]\!] \times [\![A]\!] \to [\![B]\!]$.

$$\mathsf{Sub}([\![B]\!] \times [\![A]\!])$$

$$\exists \quad \dashv \quad \pi^* \quad \dashv \quad \forall$$

$$\mathsf{Sub}([\![B]\!])$$

Note that the familiar side-conditions on the conventional rules for the quantifiers, to the effect that "x cannot occur freely in ψ", etc., which may seem like tiresome book-keeping, are actually of the essence, since they actually express the weakening operation to which the quantifiers themselves are adjoints.

Let us see how this works for the usual interpretation in Set. A predicate $y : B, x : A \mid \varphi$ corresponds to a subset $\Phi \subseteq B \times A$, and $y : B \mid \vartheta$ corresponds to a subset $\Theta \subseteq B$. Weakening of Θ is the subset $\pi^*\Theta = \Theta \times A \subseteq B \times A$. Then we have

$$\exists_A \Phi = \big\{ y \in B \mid \exists\, x : A \, . \, \langle x, y \rangle \in \Phi \big\} \subseteq B \ ,$$
$$\forall_A \Phi = \big\{ y \in B \mid \forall\, x : A \, . \, \langle x, y \rangle \in \Phi \big\} \subseteq B \ .$$

A moment's thought convinces us that with this interpretation we do indeed have

$$\frac{\Phi \subseteq \Theta \times A}{\exists_A \Phi \subseteq \Theta} \qquad\qquad\qquad \frac{\Theta \times A \subseteq \Phi}{\Theta \subseteq \forall_A \Phi}$$

The unit of the adjunction $\exists_A \dashv \pi^*$ amounts to the inequality

$$\Phi \subseteq (\exists_A \Phi) \times A \ , \tag{3.5}$$

and the universal property of the unit says that $\exists_A \Phi$ is the smallest set satisfying (3.5). Similarly, the counit of the adjunction $\pi^* \dashv \forall_A$ is just the inequality

$$(\forall_A \Phi) \times A \subseteq \Phi \ , \tag{3.6}$$

and the universal property of the counit says that $\forall_A \Phi$ is the largest set satisfying (3.6). Figure 3.1 shows the geometric meaning of existential and universal quantification.

Figure 3.1: $\exists \varphi$ and $\forall \varphi$

Exercise 3.1.25. What do the universal properties of the counit of $\exists_A \dashv \pi^*$ and the unit of $\pi^* \dashv \forall_A$ say?

The weakening functor π^* is a special case of a pullback functor $f^* : \mathsf{Sub}(B) \to \mathsf{Sub}(A)$ for a morphism $f : B \to A$. This suggests that we may regard the left and the right adjoint to f^* as a kind of generalized existential and universal quantifier. We may indeed be tempted to simply *define* the quantifiers as left and right adjoints to general pullback functors. However there is a bit more to quantifiers than that—we are still missing the important *Beck-Chevalley condition*.

The Beck-Chevalley condition

Recall from (3.2) that quantification commutes with substitution, as long as no variables are captured by the quantifier. Thus if $\Gamma \mid t : B$ and $\Gamma, y : B, x : A \mid \varphi$ `pred` then

$$
\begin{aligned}
(\exists\, x : A \,.\, \varphi)[t/y] &= \exists\, x : A \,.\, (\varphi[t/y]) \ , \\
(\forall\, x : A \,.\, \varphi)[t/y] &= \forall\, x : A \,.\, (\varphi[t/y]) \ .
\end{aligned}
$$

If the semantics of quantification is to be sound, the interpretation of these equations must be valid. Because substitution of a term in a formula is interpreted as pullback, this means exactly that quantifiers must be *stable* under pullbacks. This is known as the *Beck-Chevalley condition*.

Definition 3.1.26. A family of functors $F_f : \mathsf{Sub}(A) \to \mathsf{Sub}(B)$ parametrized by morphisms $f : A \to B$ is said to satisfy the *Beck-Chevalley condition* when for every pullback

as on the left-hand side, the right-hand square commutes:

$$
\begin{array}{ccc}
C & \xrightarrow{\ h\ } & A \\
k \downarrow & \lrcorner & \downarrow f \\
D & \xrightarrow{\ g\ } & B
\end{array}
\qquad\qquad
\begin{array}{ccc}
\mathsf{Sub}(C) & \xleftarrow{\ h^*\ } & \mathsf{Sub}(A) \\
F_k \downarrow & & \downarrow F_f \\
\mathsf{Sub}(D) & \xleftarrow{\ g^*\ } & \mathsf{Sub}(B)
\end{array}
$$

To convince ourselves that Beck-Chevalley condition is what we want, we spell it out explicitly in the case of a substitution into an existentially quantified formula. In order to keep the notation simple we omit the semantic brackets $[\![-]\!]$. Suppose we have a term $\Gamma \mid t : B$ and a formula $\Gamma, y : B, x : A \mid \varphi$ pred. The diagram

$$
\begin{array}{ccc}
\Gamma \times A & \xrightarrow{\langle \pi_0, t \circ \pi_0, \pi_1 \rangle} & \Gamma \times B \times A \\
\pi_0^{\Gamma, A} \downarrow & \lrcorner & \downarrow \pi_0^{\Gamma, B, A} \\
\Gamma & \xrightarrow{\langle 1_\Gamma, t \rangle} & \Gamma \times B
\end{array}
$$

is a pullback. By the Beck-Chevalley condition for $\exists$, the following square commutes:

$$
\begin{array}{ccc}
\mathsf{Sub}(\Gamma \times A) & \xleftarrow{\langle \pi_0, t \circ \pi_0, \pi_1 \rangle^*} & \mathsf{Sub}(\Gamma \times B \times A) \\
\exists_A^{\Gamma, A} \downarrow & & \downarrow \exists_A^{\Gamma, B, A} \\
\mathsf{Sub}(\Gamma) & \xleftarrow{\langle 1_\Gamma, t \rangle^*} & \mathsf{Sub}(\Gamma \times B)
\end{array}
$$

Therefore, for $\Gamma, y : B, x : A \mid \varphi$ pred, we have

$$
[\![(\exists x : A . \varphi)[t/y]]\!] = \langle 1_\Gamma, t \rangle^* (\exists_A^{\Gamma, B, A}[\![\varphi]\!]) =
$$

$$
\exists_A^{\Gamma, A}(\langle \pi_0, t \circ \pi_0, \pi_1 \rangle^*[\![\varphi]\!]) = [\![\exists x : A . (\varphi[t/y])]\!] \ .
$$

This is indeed precisely the equation we wanted. The Beck-Chevalley condition says that (the interpretations of) the quantifiers commute with pullbacks, in just the way that the syntactic operations of applying quantifiers to formulas commute with substitutions of terms (which are interpreted as pullbacks).

Definition 3.1.27. A cartesian category $\mathcal{C}$ has *existential quantifiers* if, for every $f : A \to B$, the left adjoint $\exists_f \dashv f^*$ exists and it satisfies the Beck-Chevalley condition. Similarly, $\mathcal{C}$ has *universal quantifiers* if the right adjoints $f^* \dashv \forall_f$ exist and they satisfy the Beck-Chevalley condition.

It is convenient to know that, if we have both adjoints $\exists_f \dashv f^* \dashv \forall_f$, it actually suffices to have the Beck-Chevalley condition for either one in order to infer it for both:

Proposition 3.1.28. *If for every $f : A \to B$, both the left and right adjoints exist*

$$\exists_f \dashv f^* \dashv \forall_f$$

then the left adjoint satisfies the Beck-Chevalley condition iff the right adjoint does.

Proof. Suppose we have the Beck-Chevalley condition for the left adjoints $\exists$, and that we are given a pullback square as on the left below. We want to check the Beck-Chevalley square for the right adjoints $\forall$, as indicated on the right below.

$$
\begin{array}{ccc}
C & \xrightarrow{\ h\ } & A \\
{\scriptstyle k}\downarrow & \lrcorner & \downarrow{\scriptstyle f} \\
D & \xrightarrow{\ g\ } & B
\end{array}
\qquad\qquad
\begin{array}{ccc}
\mathsf{Sub}(C) & \xleftarrow{\ h^*\ } & \mathsf{Sub}(A) \\
{\scriptstyle \forall_k}\downarrow & & \downarrow{\scriptstyle \forall_f} \\
\mathsf{Sub}(D) & \xleftarrow{\ g^*\ } & \mathsf{Sub}(B)
\end{array}
$$

Swapping all the functors in the righthand diagram for their left adjoints we obtain the following.

$$
\begin{array}{ccc}
\mathsf{Sub}(C) & \xrightarrow{\ \exists_h\ } & \mathsf{Sub}(A) \\
{\scriptstyle k^*}\uparrow & & \uparrow{\scriptstyle f^*} \\
\mathsf{Sub}(D) & \xrightarrow{\ \exists_g\ } & \mathsf{Sub}(B)
\end{array}
$$

But this is a Beck-Chevalley square for (the "transpose" of) the original pullback diagram, and therefore commutes by the Beck-Chevalley condition for the left adjoints $\exists$. The original diagram of right adjoints therefore also commutes, by uniqueness of adjoints.

The argument for the dual case is, well, dual. $\qquad\qquad\square$

Remark 3.1.29. The counit of the adjunction for $\forall$ is $x : A \mid \forall x : A.\,\varphi \vdash \varphi$, while the unit of the $\exists$ adjunction is $x : A \mid \varphi \vdash \exists x : A.\,\varphi$. From the transitivity of $\vdash$ in any context, we therefore obtain:

$$x : A \mid \forall x : A.\,\varphi \vdash \exists x : A.\,\varphi. \tag{3.7}$$

If there is a term $a : 1 \to A$, we can infer $\forall x : A.\,\varphi \vdash \exists x : A.\,\varphi$ (in the empty context) by substituting it (vacuously) for $x : A$ in (3.7). The inference from $\forall$ to $\exists$, which is valid in classical predicate logic, presumes the domain of quantification is non-empty. By keeping track of the relevant contexts, our system of rules for quantifiers is also sound for domains of quantification that may not have any "global points" $a : 1 \to A$.

Exercise 3.1.30. In Set we can identify $\mathsf{Sub}(-)$ with powersets because $\mathsf{Sub}(X) \cong \mathcal{P}X$. Then quantifiers along a function $f : A \to B$ are functions

$$\exists_f : \mathcal{P}A \to \mathcal{P}B\,, \qquad\qquad \forall_f : \mathcal{P}A \to \mathcal{P}B\,.$$

Verify that

$$\exists_f U = \big\{ b \in B \mid \exists\, a : A\,.\,(fa = b \wedge a \in U) \big\}\,,$$
$$\forall_f U = \big\{ b \in B \mid \forall\, a : A\,.\,(fa = b \Rightarrow a \in U) \big\}\,.$$

Thus $\exists_f U$ is just the usual direct image of U by f, sometimes written $f_!(U)$, or simply $f(U)$. But have you seen $\forall_f U$ before? It can also be written as $\forall_f U = \big\{ b \in B \mid f^*\{b\} \subseteq U \big\}$. What is the meaning of $\exists_q$ and $\forall_q$ when $q : A \to A/\!\!\sim$ is a canonical quotient map that maps an element $x \in A$ to its equivalence class $qx = [x]$ under an equivalence relation $\sim$ on A?

3.2 Regular and coherent logic

We next consider the question of when a cartesian category has existential quantifiers. It turns out that this is closely related to the notion of a *regular category*, a concept which first arose in the context of abelian categories and axiomatic homology theory, quite independently of categorical logic. We will see for instance that all algebraic categories, in the sense of Chapter **??**, are regular.

3.2.1 Regular categories

Throughout this section we work in a cartesian category $\mathcal{C}$. We begin with some general definitions. The *kernel pair* of a morphism $f : A \to B$ is the pair of morphisms $k_1, k_2 : K \rightrightarrows A$ obtained as in the following pullback

$$
\begin{array}{ccc}
K & \xrightarrow{\ k_2\ } & A \\
{\scriptstyle k_1}\downarrow & & \downarrow{\scriptstyle f} \\
A & \xrightarrow{\ f\ } & B
\end{array}
$$

Note that a kernel pair determines an equivalence relation $\langle k_1, k_2 \rangle : K \rightarrowtail A \times A$, in the sense that the map $\langle k_1, k_2 \rangle$ is a mono that satisfies the reflexivity, symmetry and transitivity conditions. In Set the mono $\langle k_1, k_2 \rangle : K \rightarrowtail A \times A$ is the equivalence relation $\sim$ on A defined by

$$x \sim y \iff fx = fy\,.$$

Indeed, a kernel pair in a general cartesian category is a model of the cartesian theory of an equivalence relation, in the sense of example 3.1.8.

Exercise 3.2.1. Prove this.

In general, the *quotient* by the equivalence relation determined by the kernel pair k_1, k_2 is their coequalizer $q : A \to Q$, if it exists,

$$K \underset{k_2}{\overset{k_1}{\rightrightarrows}} A \xrightarrow{\ q\ } Q$$

Such a coequalizer is called a *kernel quotient.*

Because $f \circ k_1 = f \circ k_2$, we see that f factors through q by a unique morphism $m : Q \to A$,

$$K \underset{k_2}{\overset{k_1}{\rightrightarrows}} A \xrightarrow{\ f\ } B \tag{3.8}$$

with $q \searrow$ and $m \nearrow$ through Q.

As a coequalizer, $q : A \to Q$ is always epic; indeed, epis that are coequalizers will be called *regular epimorphisms* and will be denoted by arrows with triangular heads:

$$e : A \longrightarrow\!\!\!\!\triangleright B$$

It is of some interest to know when the second factor $m : Q \to B$ in (3.8) is guaranteed to be a mono. For example, in Set the function $m : Q \to B$ is defined by $m[x] = fx$, where $Q = A/\sim$ as above. In this case m is indeed injective, because $m[x] = m[y]$ implies $fx = fy$, hence $x \sim y$ and $[x] = [y]$.

Definition 3.2.2. A category with finite limits is *regular* when it has kernel quotients, and regular epis are stable under pullback. Thus, in detail:

1. the kernel pair of any map has a coequalizer, and

2. any pullback of a regular epi is a regular epi.

Exercise 3.2.3. Suppose $e : A \longrightarrow\!\!\!\!\triangleright B$ is a regular epi. Prove that it is the coequalizer of its own kernel pair.

Let us return to (3.8) and show that m is monic in any regular category. Consider the following diagram, in which h_1, h_2 are constructed as the kernel pair of m, and the other three squares are constructed as pullbacks:

Because all the smaller squares are pullbacks the large square is a pullback as well, therefore the left-hand vertical morphism is $k_1 : K \to A$, and the morphism across the top is $k_2 : K \to A$, and we have the kernel pair $k_1, k_2 : K \rightrightarrows A$ of $f = m \circ q$. The morphisms s_1, s_2, p_1, and p_2 are all regular epis because they are pullbacks of the regular epi q. The morphism $r = s_2 \circ p_2 = s_1 \circ p_1$ is epic because it is a composition of regular epis. Observe that

$$h_1 \circ r = q \circ k_1 = q \circ k_2 = h_2 \circ r \ ,$$

and so, because r is epic, $h_1 = h_2$. But this means that m is monic, since the maps in its kernel pair are equal; indeed, given any $u, v : U \to Q$ with $m \circ u = m \circ v$, there exists a $w : U \to H$ such that $u = w \circ h_1 = w \circ h_2 = v$.

Proposition 3.2.4. *In a regular category every morphism $f : A \to B$ factors as a composition of a regular epi q followed by a mono m,*

$$A \xrightarrow{\ \ q\ \ } Q \xrightarrow{\ \ m\ \ } B \quad\text{with}\quad f$$

The factorization is unique up to isomorphism.

Proof. By uniqueness of the factorization we mean that if

$$A \xrightarrow{\ \ q'\ \ } Q' \xrightarrow{\ \ m'\ \ } B \quad\text{with}\quad f$$

is another such factorization, then there exists an isomorphism $i : Q \to Q'$ such that $q' = i \circ q$ and $m = m' \circ i$.

$$\begin{array}{ccc} A & \xrightarrow{\ q'\ } & Q' \\ {\scriptstyle q}\big\downarrow & {\scriptstyle i}\nearrow & \big\downarrow{\scriptstyle m'} \\ Q & \xrightarrow{\ m\ } & B \end{array}$$

As the factorization of f we take the one constructed in (3.8). Then q is a regular epi by construction, and we have just shown that m is monic. So it only remains to show that the factorization is unique. Suppose f also factors as $f = m' \circ q'$ where q' is a regular epi and m' is monic. Consider the following diagram, in which k_1, k_2 is the kernel pair of f, q is the coequalizer of k_1 and k_2, and h_1, h_2 is the kernel pair of q' so that q' is the coequalizer

of h_1 and h_2:

$$
\begin{array}{c}
H \\
\Big\downarrow{\scriptstyle h_1}\Big\downarrow{\scriptstyle h_2} \\
K \underset{k_2}{\overset{k_1}{\rightrightarrows}} A \xrightarrow{q} Q \\
q' \Big\downarrow \quad {\scriptstyle i} \quad \Big\downarrow m \\
Q' \underset{m'}{\rightarrowtail} B
\end{array}
$$

Because $m' \circ q' \circ k_1 = m \circ q \circ k_1 = m \circ q \circ k_2 = m' \circ q' \circ k_2$ and m' is monic, $q' \circ k_1 = q' \circ k_2$. So there exists a unique $i : Q \to Q'$ such that $q' = i \circ q$. But then $m' \circ i \circ q = m' \circ q' = f = m \circ q$ and because q is epi, $m' \circ i = m$.

We prove that i is iso by constructing its inverse j. Because $m \circ q \circ h_1 = m' \circ q \circ h_1 = m' \circ q \circ h_2 = m \circ q \circ h_2$ and m is monic, $q \circ h_1 = q \circ h_2$. So there exists a unique $j : Q' \to Q$ such that $q = j \circ q'$. Now we have $i \circ j \circ q' = i \circ q = 1_{Q'} \circ q'$, from which we conclude that $i \circ j = 1_{Q'}$ because q' is epi. Similarly, $j \circ i \circ q = j \circ q' = 1_Q \circ q$, therefore $j \circ i = 1_Q$. $\qquad\square$

Corollary 3.2.5. *A map $f : A \to B$ that is both a regular epi and a mono is an iso.*

Proof. Consider the following outer square, regarded as two different reg-epi/mono factorizations.

$$
\begin{array}{ccc}
A & \xrightarrow{1_A} & A \\
f \Big\downarrow & {\scriptstyle d} & \Big\downarrow f \\
B & \xrightarrow{1_B} & B
\end{array}
$$

A diagonal d is then an inverse of f. $\qquad\square$

A factorization $f = m \circ q$ as in Proposition 3.2.4 determines a subobject

$$
\mathsf{im}(f) = [m : Q \rightarrowtail B] \in \mathsf{Sub}(B) \, ,
$$

called the *image of f*. It is characterized as the least subobject of B through which f factors.

Proposition 3.2.6. *For a morphism $f : A \to B$ in a regular category $\mathcal{C}$, the image $\mathsf{im}(f) \rightarrowtail B$ is the least subobject $U \rightarrowtail B$ of B through which f factors.*

Proof. Suppose f factors through $v : V \rightarrowtail B$ as

$$
\begin{array}{c}
f \\
A \xrightarrow{g} V \underset{v}{\rightarrowtail} B
\end{array}
$$

and consider the factorization of f, as in (3.8). Since $v \circ g \circ k_1 = f \circ k_1 = f \circ k_2 = v \circ g \circ k_2$ and v is mono, $g \circ k_1 = g \circ k_2$, therefore there exists a unique $\overline{g} : Q \to V$ such that $g = \overline{g} \circ q$. Now $v \circ \overline{g} \circ q = v \circ g = f = m \circ q$ and because q is epic, $v \circ \overline{g} = m$ as required. (The reader should draw the corresponding diagram.) $\qquad\square$

Definition 3.2.7. A functor $F : \mathcal{C} \to \mathcal{D}$ is *regular* if it preserves finite limits and regular epis. It follows that F preserves image factorizations. The category of regular functors $\mathcal{C} \to \mathcal{D}$ and natural transformations is denoted by $\mathsf{Reg}(\mathcal{C}, \mathcal{D})$.

Examples of regular categories

Let us consider some examples of regular categories.

1. The category Set is regular. It is complete and cocomplete, so it has in particular all finite limits and coequalizers. To show that the pullback of a regular epi is again a regular epi, note that in Set the epis are exactly the surjections, and a surjection is a quotient of its kernel pair, and thus a regular epi. It therefore it suffices to show that the pullback of a surjection is a surjection, which is easy.

2. More generally, any presheaf category $\widehat{\mathcal{C}}$ is also regular, because it is complete and cocomplete, with (co)limits computed pointwise. Thus, again, every epi is regular, and epis are stable under pullbacks.

3. ("Fuzzy logic") Let H be a complete Heyting algebra; thus H is a cartesian closed poset with all small joins $\bigvee_i p_i$. The category of H-*presets* has as objects all pairs $(X, e_X : X \to H)$ where X is a set and e_X is a function, called the *existence predicate of X*. For $x \in X$, $e_X(x)$ can be thought of as "the amount by which x exists". A *morphism of presets* is a function $f : X \to Y$ satisfying, for all $x \in X$,

$$e_X(x) \le e_Y(fx).$$

This is a regular category, with the following structure.

- the terminal object is $\top : 1 \to H$,
- the product of $e_A : A \to H$ and $e_B : B \to H$ is

$$e_A \wedge e_B : A \times B \to H,$$

  where $(e_a \wedge e_B)(a, b) = e_A(a) \wedge e_B(b)$,

- the equalizer of two maps $f, g : A \to B$ is their equalizer as functions, $A' = \{a \mid f(a) = g(a)\} \hookrightarrow A$, with the restriction of $e_A : A \to H$ to $A' \subseteq A$.
- a map $f : A \to B$ is a regular epi if and only if it is a surjective function and for all $b \in B$:

$$e_B(b) = \bigvee_{f(a)=b} e_A(a)$$

Exercise 3.2.8. Verify that H-presets form a regular category, and compute the regular epi-mono factorization of a map.

The next example deserves to be a proposition.

Proposition 3.2.9. *The category* $\mathsf{Mod}(\mathbb{A}, \mathsf{Set})$ *of set-theoretic models of an algebraic theory* $\mathbb{A}$ *is regular.*

Proof. We sketch a proof, for details see [Bor94, Theorem 3.5.4]. Recall that the objects of $\mathsf{Mod}(\mathbb{A}) = \mathsf{Mod}(\mathbb{A}, \mathsf{Set})$ are $\mathbb{A}$-algebras, which are structures $A = (|A|, f_1, f_2, \ldots)$ where $|A|$ is the underlying set and $f_1, f_2, \ldots$ are the basic operations on $|A|$. Every such $\mathbb{A}$-algebra is also required to satisfy the equational axioms of $\mathbb{A}$. A morphism $h : A \to B$ is a function $h : |A| \to |B|$ that preserves the basic operations.

The category $\mathsf{Mod}(\mathbb{A})$ of $\mathbb{A}$-algebras has small limits, which are created by the forgetful functor $U : \mathsf{Mod}(\mathbb{A}) \to \mathsf{Set}$. Thus the product of $\mathbb{A}$-algebras A and B has as its underlying set $|A \times B| = |A| \times |B|$, and the basic operations of $A \times B$ are computed separately on each factor, and similarly for products of arbitrary (small) families $\prod_i A_i$. An equalizer of morphisms $g, h : A \to B$ has as its underlying set the equalizer of $g, h : |A| \to |B|$, and the basic operations inherited from A.

To see that coequalizers of kernel pairs exist, consider a morphism $h : A \to B$. We can form the quotient $\mathbb{A}$-algebra Q whose underlying set is $|Q| = |A|/\sim$, where $\sim$ is the relation defined by

$$x \sim y \iff hx = hy,$$

which is just the kernel quotient of the underlying function h. A basic operation $f_Q : |Q|^k \to |Q|$ is induced by the basic operation $f_A : |A|^k \to |A|$ by

$$f_Q\langle [x_1], \ldots, [x_k] \rangle = [f_A\langle x_1, \ldots, x_k\rangle].$$

It is easily verified that this is well-defined, that Q is an $\mathbb{A}$-algebra, and that the canonical quotient map $q : A \to Q$ is the coequalizer of the kernel pair of h.

Lastly regular epis in $\mathsf{Mod}(\mathbb{A})$ are stable because pullbacks and kernel pairs are computed as in Set, and a morphism $h : A \to B$ is a regular epi in $\mathsf{Mod}(\mathbb{A})$ if, and only if, the underlying function $h : |A| \to |B|$ is a regular epi in Set, which is therefore stable under pullback. $\qquad\square$

We now know that categories of groups, rings, modules, $\mathcal{C}^\infty$-rings and other algebraic categories are regular. The preceding proposition is useful also for showing that certain structures can*not* be axiomatized by algebraic theories. The category of posets is an example of a category that is not regular; therefore the theory of partial orders cannot be axiomatized solely by equations.

Exercise 3.2.10. Show that Poset is not regular. (Hint: find a regular epi that is not stable under pullback.) Conclude that there is no purely equational reformulation of the cartesian theory of posets.

Exercise* 3.2.11. Is Top regular? Hint: is there is a topological quotient map $q : X \twoheadrightarrow X'$ and a space Y such that $q \times 1_Z : X \times Y \twoheadrightarrow X' \times Y$ is not a quotient map?

Remark 3.2.12 (Exactness). A regular category $\mathcal{C}$ is said to be *exact* [**?**] if *every* equivalence relation (not just those arising as kernel pairs) has a quotient. It can be shown fairly easily that categories of algebras are not just regular but also exact: an equivalence relation in such a category is a congruence relation with respect to the algebraic operations, and its (underlying set) quotient is then necessarily also a homomorphism, and thus a coequalizer of algebras.

Exercise 3.2.13. Prove that the regular epis and monos in a regular category $\mathcal{C}$ form the two classes $(\mathcal{L}, \mathcal{R})$, respectively, of an *orthogonal factorization system* in the following sense:

1. every arrow $f : A \to B$ factors as $f = r \circ l$ with $l \in \mathcal{L}$ and $r \in \mathcal{R}$,

2. $\mathcal{L}$ is the class of all arrows left-orthogonal to all maps in $\mathcal{R}$, and $\mathcal{R}$ is the class of all arrows right-orthogonal to all maps in $\mathcal{L}$, where $l : A \to B$ is said to be *left-orthogonal* to $r : X \to Y$, and r is said to be *right-orthogonal* to l, if for every commutative square as on the outside below,

$$
\begin{array}{ccc}
A & \longrightarrow & X \\
l \downarrow & \overset{d}{\nearrow} & \downarrow r \\
B & \longrightarrow & Y,
\end{array}
$$

   there is a unique diagonal arrow d as indicated making both triangles commute.

3.2.2 Images and existential quantifiers

Recall that the poset $\mathsf{Sub}(A)$ is equivalent to the preordered category $\mathsf{Mono}(A)$ of monos into A. If we compose an equivalence functor $\mathsf{Sub}(A) \to \mathsf{Mono}(A)$ with the inclusion $\mathsf{Mono}(A) \to \mathcal{C}/A$ we obtain a (full and faithful) inclusion functor

$$I : \mathsf{Sub}(A) \hookrightarrow \mathcal{C}/A . \tag{3.9}$$

In the other direction we have the "image functor" $\mathsf{im} : \mathcal{C}/A \to \mathsf{Sub}(A)$, which maps an object $f : B \to A$ in $\mathcal{C}/A$ to the subobject $\mathsf{im}(f) \rightarrowtail A$.

Exercise 3.2.14. In order to show that im is in fact a functor, prove that $f = g \circ h$ implies $\mathsf{im}(f) \leq \mathsf{im}(g)$.

Proposition 3.2.6 says that the image functor is left adjoint to the inclusion functor (3.9),

$$\mathsf{im} \dashv I .$$

Furthermore, images are stable in the sense that the following diagram commutes for all $f : A \to B$ (as does the corresponding one with the inclusion I in place of im).

$$
\begin{array}{ccc}
\mathcal{C}/A & \xleftarrow{\;\;f^*\;\;} & \mathcal{C}/B \\
\Big\downarrow {\scriptstyle \mathsf{im}_A} & & \Big\downarrow {\scriptstyle \mathsf{im}_B} \\
\mathsf{Sub}(A) & \xleftarrow[f^*]{} & \mathsf{Sub}(B)
\end{array}
\qquad\qquad (3.10)
$$

The functor f^* on the top is the "change of base" functor given by pullback of an arbitrary map, and the functor f^* on the bottom is the pullback functor acting on subjects. To see that (3.10) commutes, consider $g : C \to B$ and the following diagram:

On the right-hand side we have the factorization of g, which is then pulled back along f. Because monos and regular epis are both stable, this gives a factorization of the pullback f^*g, hence (by the uniqueness of factorizations, Proposition 3.2.4) the claimed equality

$$
\mathsf{im}(f^*g) = f^*(\mathsf{im}(g)) \; .
$$

Proposition 3.2.15. *A regular category has existential quantifiers. The existential quantifier along $f : A \to B$,*

$$
\exists_f : \mathsf{Sub}(A) \longrightarrow \mathsf{Sub}(B),
$$

is given by

$$
\exists_f[m : M \rightarrowtail A] = \mathsf{im}(f \circ m) \; ,
$$

as indicated below.

Proof. Recall that composition

$$\Sigma_f : \mathcal{C}/A \longrightarrow \mathcal{C}/B$$

by a map $f : A \to B$ is left adjoint to pullback f^* along f. Thus we are defining $\exists_f = \mathsf{im} \circ \Sigma_f \circ I$ as shown below.

$$
\begin{array}{ccc}
\mathsf{Sub}(A) & \xdashrightarrow{\exists_f} & \mathsf{Sub}(B) \\
{\scriptstyle I}\big\uparrow\big\downarrow & & \big\uparrow{\scriptstyle \mathsf{im}} \\
\mathcal{C}/A & \xrightarrow{\Sigma_f} & \mathcal{C}/B
\end{array}
$$

First we verify that $\exists_f \dashv f^*$ on subobjects. For $U \rightarrowtail A$ and $V \rightarrowtail B$:

$$
\begin{array}{ll}
\exists_f U \leq V & \text{in } \mathsf{Sub}(B) \\
\hline
\mathsf{im} \circ \Sigma_f \circ I(U) \leq V & \text{in } \mathsf{Sub}(B) \\
\hline
\Sigma_f \circ I(U) \leq I(V) & \text{in } \mathcal{C}/B \\
\hline
I(U) \to f^* I(V) & \text{in } \mathcal{C}/A \\
\hline
I(U) \to I(f^* V) & \text{in } \mathcal{C}/A \\
\hline
U \leq f^* V & \text{in } \mathsf{Sub}(A)
\end{array}
$$

In the second step in the above derivation we used the adjunction between $\mathsf{im} : \mathcal{C}/B \to \mathsf{Sub}(B)$ and the inclusion $\mathsf{Sub}(B) \to \mathcal{C}/B$.

The Beck-Chevalley condition follows from stability of image factorizations. Indeed, given a pullback

$$
\begin{array}{ccc}
D & \xrightarrow{\ h\ } & C \\
{\scriptstyle k}\big\downarrow & \lrcorner & \big\downarrow{\scriptstyle g} \\
A & \xrightarrow[\ f\ ]{} & B
\end{array}
$$

and a subobject $U \rightarrowtail C$, (3.10) gives

$$f^*(\exists_g U) = f^* \circ \mathsf{im} \circ \Sigma_g \circ I(U) = \mathsf{im} \circ f^* \circ \Sigma_g \circ I(U) = \mathsf{im} \circ \Sigma_k \circ h^* \circ I(U)$$
$$= \mathsf{im} \circ \Sigma_k \circ I \circ h^*(U) = \exists_k(h^* U)$$

$$\begin{array}{ccc}
f^*U & \longrightarrow & U \\
\end{array}$$

as required.   □

Summarizing the results of this section, we have the following.

Proposition 3.2.16. *In any regular category, for every map* $f : A \to B$ *we have the following situation, where* f^* *is pullback:*

$$\begin{array}{ccc}
\mathsf{Sub}(A) & \xleftarrow{\ \ f^*\ \ } & \mathsf{Sub}(B) \\
\text{im} \uparrow\, \downarrow I & \xrightarrow[\exists_f]{} & \text{im} \uparrow\, \downarrow I \\
\mathcal{C}/A & \xleftarrow{\ \ f^*\ \ } & \mathcal{C}/B \\
& \xrightarrow[\Sigma_f]{} &
\end{array}$$

with adjunctions

$$\exists_f \dashv f^*, \quad \text{im} \dashv I, \quad \Sigma_f \dashv f^*$$

and natural isos

$$f^* \circ \text{im} \cong \text{im} \circ f^*, \quad f^* \circ I \cong I \circ f^*.$$

Note, moreover, that

$$\exists_f \circ \text{im} \cong \text{im} \circ \Sigma_f$$

then follows.

Finally, we call attention to the following special fact.

Proposition 3.2.17 (Frobenius Reciprocity)**.** *Given a map* $f : A \to B$ *and subobjects* $U \le A$ *and* $V \le B$, *the following equation holds in* $\mathsf{Sub}(B)$.

$$\exists_f(U \wedge f^*V) = \exists_f U \wedge V$$

Exercise 3.2.18. Prove Frobenius reciprocity, using the following diagram.

3.2.3   Regular theories

A regular category has finite limits and image factorizations, therefore it allows us to interpret a type theory with the terminal type and binary products, and a logic with equality, conjunction, and existential quantifiers. This system is called *regular logic*.

Definition 3.2.19. A (many-sorted) *regular theory* $\mathbb{T}$ is a (many-sorted) type theory together with a set of axioms expressed in the fragment of logic built from $=$, $\top$, $\wedge$, and $\exists$.

In more detail, a regular theory consists of the following data, extending the notion of cartesian theory from section **??**.

- basic type symbols $A_1, \ldots, A_k$,

- basic function symbols $f, \ldots$ (with signature) $(A_1, \cdots, A_m; B)$,

- basic relation symbols $R, \ldots$ (with signature) $(A_1, \cdots, A_n)$.

We then define by induction the set of terms in context,

$$\Gamma \mid t : A \,,$$

as well as the formulas in context,

$$\Gamma \mid \varphi \ \texttt{pred} \,.$$

Here is the first place where things differ from cartesian logic; we extend the formation rules for cartesian formulas (section 3.1.3) by the further clause:

6. Existential Quantifier:
$$\frac{\Gamma, x : A \mid \varphi \ \texttt{pred}}{\Gamma \mid \exists x : A.\, \varphi \ \texttt{pred}}$$

(We also add the evident additional clause for sustitution of terms into existentially quantified formulas, namely $(\exists x : A.\,\varphi)[t/y] = \exists x : A.\,(\varphi[t/y])$.) This defines the notion of a *regular formula*, i.e. ones built from the atomic formulas $s = t$ and $R(t_1, \ldots, t_n)$ using the logical operations $\top$, $\wedge$, and $\exists$.

A regular theory then includes, finally, a set of axioms of the form

$$\Gamma \mid \varphi \vdash \psi$$

where φ, ψ are *regular formulas*.

Example 3.2.20.　　1. A ring A (with unit 1) is called *von Neumann regular* if for every element a there is at least one element x for which $a = a \cdot x \cdot a$. Such an x may be thought of as a "weak inverse" of a. The theory of *von Neumann regular rings* is thus an extension of the usual theory of rings with unit by adding the single axiom

$$a : A \mid \top \vdash \exists x : A.\, a = a \cdot x \cdot a$$

　　2. A perhaps more familiar example is the theory of categories, with two basic types A, O for arrows and objects, 3 basic function symbols $\mathrm{dom}, \mathrm{cod} : (A; O)$ and $\mathrm{id} : (O; A)$ and one basic relation symbol $C : (A, A, A)$, where the latter is for the relation $C(x, y, z) = $ "z is the composite of x and y". The axioms for C are as follows (with abbreviated notation for the context):

$$x, y, z : A \mid C(x, y, z) \vdash \mathrm{cod}(x) = \mathrm{dom}(y) \wedge \mathrm{dom}(z) = \mathrm{dom}(x) \wedge \mathrm{cod}(z) = \mathrm{cod}(y)$$
$$x, y : A \mid \mathrm{cod}(x) = \mathrm{dom}(y) \vdash \exists z.\, C(x, y, z)$$
$$x, y, z, z' : A \mid C(x, y, z) \wedge C(x, y, z') \vdash z = z'$$

Recall the previous versions of the theory of categories as cartesian theories in 3.1.23. Are the homomorphisms of categories, as models of a regular theory, the same thing as functors?

　　3. The theory of an *inhabited object* has a single type A, no function or relation symbols, and the single axiom:
$$\cdot \mid \top \vdash \exists x : A.\, x = x$$

A model is an object that is "inhabited" by at least one (unnamed) element, but the homomorphisms need not preserve anything – in this sense being inhabited is a *property*, not a *structure*.

The *rules of inference* of regular logic are those of cartesian logic (section 3.1.3), with an additional rule for the existential quantifier:

　　8. Existential Quantifier:
$$\frac{y : B, x : A \mid \varphi \vdash \vartheta}{y : B \mid \exists x : A.\, \varphi \vdash \vartheta}$$

Note that the lower judgement is well-formed only if $x : A$ does not occur freely in ϑ.

We also add a rule coresponding to Frobenius reciprocity, Proposition 3.2.17, in the form

9. Frobenius:

$$x : A \mid (\exists y : B.\varphi) \wedge \psi \ \vdash \ \exists y : B.(\varphi \wedge \psi)$$

provided the variable $y : B$ does not occur freely in ψ.

Note that the converse of Frobenius is easily derivable, so we have the interderivability of $(\exists y : B.\varphi) \wedge \psi$ and $\exists y : B.(\varphi \wedge \psi)$ when $y : B$ is not free in ψ. The Frobenius rule will be derivable in the extended system of Heyting logic (see Proposition 3.3.15), and could be made derivable in a suitably formulated system of regular logic using multi-sequents $\Gamma \mid \varphi_1, \ldots, \varphi_n \vdash \psi$.

Semantics of regular theories

Turning to semantics, an *interpretation* of a regular theory $\mathbb{T}$ in a regular category $\mathcal{C}$ extends the notion for cartesian logic (section 3.1.3), and is given by the following data:

1. Each basic sort A is interpreted as an object $[\![A]\!]$.

2. Each basic constant f with signature $(A_1, \ldots, A_n; B)$ is interpreted as a morphism $[\![f]\!] : [\![A_1]\!] \times \cdots \times [\![A_n]\!] \to [\![B]\!]$.

3. Each basic relation symbol R with signature $(A_1, \ldots, A_n)$ is interpreted as a subobject $[\![R]\!] \in \mathsf{Sub}([\![A_1]\!] \times \cdots \times [\![A_1]\!])$.

This is the same as for cartesian logic, as is the extension of the interpretation to all terms,

$$[\![\Gamma \mid t : A]\!] : [\![\Gamma]\!] \longrightarrow [\![A]\!]$$

For the formulas, we extended the interpretation to cartesian formulas as before (section **??**),

$$[\![\Gamma \mid \varphi]\!] \rightarrowtail [\![\Gamma]\!] \, .$$

Finally, existential formulas $\exists x : A \, . \, \varphi$ are interpreted by the existential quantifiers in the regular category,

$$[\![\Gamma \mid \exists x : A \, . \, \varphi]\!] = \exists_A [\![\Gamma, x : A \mid \varphi]\!] \, ,$$

where

$$\exists_A = \exists_\pi : \mathsf{Sub}([\![\Gamma]\!] \times [\![A]\!]) \to \mathsf{Sub}([\![\Gamma]\!])$$

is the existential quantifier along the projection $\pi : [\![\Gamma]\!] \times [\![A]\!] \to [\![\Gamma]\!]$.

The following is immediate from these definitions, and the considerations in section **??**.

Proposition 3.2.21. *The rules of regular logic are sound with respect to the interpretation in regular categories.*

Exercise 3.2.22. Prove this.

If all the axioms of $\mathbb{T}$ hold in a given interpretation, then we again say that the interpretation is a *model* of the theory $\mathbb{T}$. Morphisms of models are just morphisms of the underlying cartesian structures. Thus for any regular theory $\mathbb{T}$ and regular category $\mathcal{C}$, there is a *category of models*,

$$\mathsf{Mod}(\mathbb{T}, \mathcal{C}).$$

Moreover, this semantic category is functorial in $\mathcal{C}$ with respect to regular functors $\mathcal{C} \to \mathcal{D}$, which, recall, preserve finite limits and regular epis. Indeed, if $F : \mathcal{C} \to \mathcal{D}$ is regular then given a model M in $\mathcal{C}$ with underlying cartesian structure $[\![A]\!]_M, [\![f]\!]_M, [\![R]\!]_M$, etc., we can determine an interpretation FM in $\mathcal{D}$ by setting:

$$[\![A]\!]_{FM} = F([\![A]\!]_M), \ [\![f]\!]_{FM} = F([\![f]\!]_M), \ [\![R]\!]_{FM} = F([\![f]\!]_M)$$

etc., and these will have the correct types (up to isomorphism). To show that FM is a $\mathbb{T}$-model, if M is one and F is regular, consider an axiom of $\mathbb{T}$ of the form $\Gamma \mid \varphi \vdash \psi$. Satisfaction by M means that $[\![\Gamma \mid \varphi]\!]_M \leq [\![\Gamma \mid \psi]\!]_M$ in $\mathsf{Sub}([\![\Gamma]\!]_M)$, which in turn means that there is a (necessarily unique) factorization,

Applying the cartesian functor F will result in an inclusion of subobjects $F[\![\Gamma \mid \varphi]\!]_M \leq F[\![\Gamma \mid \psi]\!]_M$ in $\mathsf{Sub}(F[\![\Gamma]\!]_M) = \mathsf{Sub}([\![\Gamma]\!]_{FM})$. Thus is clearly suffices to show that for any regular formula φ,

$$F[\![\Gamma \mid \varphi]\!]_M = [\![\Gamma \mid \varphi]\!]_{FM}.$$

This is an easy induction on φ, using the regularity of F.

Proposition 3.2.23. *Given a regular functor* $F : \mathcal{C} \to \mathcal{D}$, *taking images determines a functor*

$$F_* : \mathsf{Mod}(\mathbb{T}, \mathcal{C}) \longrightarrow \mathsf{Mod}(\mathbb{T}, \mathcal{D}).$$

Proof. It only remains show the effect of F_* on morphisms of models. But these are just homomorphisms of the underlying cartesian structure, so they are clearly preserved by the cartesian functor F. $\qquad\square$

An associated result, which we will need, is the following.

Proposition 3.2.24. *Given regular categories* $\mathcal{C}$ *and* $\mathcal{D}$ *and a model* M *in* $\mathcal{C}$, *evaluation at* M *determines a functor*

$$\mathsf{eval}_M : \mathsf{Reg}(\mathcal{C}, \mathcal{D}) \longrightarrow \mathsf{Mod}(\mathbb{T}, \mathcal{D}),$$

which is natural in $\mathcal{D}$.

The proof is straightforward and can be left as an exercise. The naturality means that for any a regular functor $G : \mathcal{D} \longrightarrow \mathcal{D}'$, the following commutes (up to natural isomorphism, as usual):

$$
\begin{array}{ccc}
\mathsf{Reg}(\mathcal{C}, \mathcal{D}) & \xrightarrow{\;\mathsf{eval}_M\;} & \mathsf{Mod}(\mathbb{T}, \mathcal{D}) \\
{\scriptstyle \mathsf{Reg}(\mathcal{C}, G)}\Big\downarrow & & \Big\downarrow{\scriptstyle G_*} \\
\mathsf{Reg}(\mathcal{C}, \mathcal{D}') & \xrightarrow[\;\mathsf{eval}_M\;]{} & \mathsf{Mod}(\mathbb{T}, \mathcal{D}')
\end{array}
$$

Exercise 3.2.25. Prove this.

Exercise 3.2.26. Show that for any small category $\mathbb{C}$ and regular theory $\mathbb{T}$, there is an equivalence between models in the functor category and functors into the category of models,

$$
\mathsf{Mod}(\mathbb{T}, \mathsf{Set}^{\mathbb{C}}) \;\simeq\; \mathsf{Mod}(\mathbb{T})^{\mathbb{C}} \,.
$$

Hint: this is just as for the algebraic and cartesian cases.

3.2.4 The classifying category of a regular theory

We will next show that the framework of *functorial semantics* applies to regular logic and regular categories: there is a *classifying category* $\mathcal{C}_{\mathbb{T}}$ for $\mathbb{T}$-models, for which there is an equivalence, natural in $\mathcal{C}$,

$$
\mathsf{Reg}(\mathcal{C}_{\mathbb{T}}, \mathcal{C}) \;\simeq\; \mathsf{Mod}(\mathbb{T}, \mathcal{C}) \,,
$$

where $\mathsf{Reg}(-, -)$ is the category of regular functors and natural transformations.

Remark 3.2.27. The construction of $\mathcal{C}_{\mathbb{T}}$, and the corollary completeness theorem, are analogous to the way of proving the completeness theorem for (say, classical) propositional logic that we used in Chapter **??**: one first constructs the *Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra* of propositional logic with respect to a propositional theory $\mathbb{T}$ (a set of formulas) as the set $\mathsf{PL} = \{\varphi \mid \varphi \text{ a propositional formula}\}$, quotiented by $\mathbb{T}$-provable logical equivalence, $\varphi \sim_{\mathbb{T}} \psi$ iff $\mathbb{T} \vdash \varphi \leftrightarrow \psi$,

$$
\mathcal{B}_{\mathbb{T}} = \mathsf{PL}/\!\sim_{\mathbb{T}} \,.
$$

The quotient set $\mathcal{B}_{\mathbb{T}}$ becomes a Boolean algebra by defining the Boolean operations in terms of the expected propositional logical analogues,

$$
[\varphi] \wedge [\psi] = [\varphi \wedge \psi] \,, \quad \neg[\varphi] = [\neg\varphi] \,, \quad [\top] = 1 \,, \quad \text{etc.}.
$$

One then has a Boolean-valuation of PL in $\mathcal{B}_{\mathbb{T}}$, namely $[-]$, for which

$$
[\varphi] = [\psi] \quad \text{iff} \quad \mathbb{T} \vdash \varphi \leftrightarrow \psi \,.
$$

In particular, we have $[\varphi] = 1$ in $\mathcal{B}_{\mathbb{T}}$ iff $\mathbb{T} \vdash \varphi$. Classical completeness with respect to valuations in the Boolean algebra $\mathbf{2} = \{1, 0\}$ then follows e.g. from Stone's representation

theorem, which embeds the Boolean algebra $\mathcal{B}_{\mathbb{T}}$ into a powerset $\mathcal{P}(X) \cong \mathbf{2}^X$, where X is the set of prime ideals in $\mathcal{B}_{\mathbb{T}}$, corresponding to Boolean homomorphisms $\mathcal{B}_{\mathbb{T}} \to \mathbf{2}$, which in turn correspond to Boolean valuations of the language PL, i.e. "rows of a truth table".

Our syntactic construction of the classifying category $\mathcal{C}_{\mathbb{T}}$ can be regarded as a generalization of this method, with $\mathcal{C}_{\mathbb{T}}$ as the "Lindenbaum-Tarski category" of the (regular) theory $\mathbb{T}$. This will give a completeness theorem with respect to models in regular categories, which can in turn be specialized to Set-valued completeness by embedding $\mathcal{C}_{\mathbb{T}}$ into a "power of Set", i.e. Set^X for a set X. The elements of X will be regular functors $\mathcal{C}_{\mathbb{T}} \to \mathsf{Set}$, corrresponding to "classical" models of $\mathbb{T}$ in Set. See Section 3.2.6 below for the second step.

We first sketch the construction of the classifying category $\mathcal{C}_{\mathbb{T}}$ of an arbitrary regular theory $\mathbb{T}$ (a more detailed account can be found in [But98, Joh03]). An object of $\mathcal{C}_{\mathbb{T}}$ is represented by a formula in context,

$$[\Gamma \mid \varphi],$$

where $\Gamma \mid \varphi$ `pred`. Two such objects $[\Gamma \mid \varphi]$ and $[\Gamma \mid \psi]$ are equal if $\mathbb{T}$ proves both

$$\Gamma \mid \varphi \vdash \psi , \qquad\qquad\qquad\qquad \Gamma \mid \psi \vdash \varphi .$$

Objects which differ only in the names of free variables are also considered equal:

$$[x : A \mid \varphi] = [y : A \mid \varphi[y/x]] \qquad (\text{no } y \text{ in } \varphi)$$

A morphism

$$[x : A \mid \varphi] \xrightarrow{\ \rho\ } [y : B \mid \psi]$$

is represented by a formula $x : A, y : B \mid \rho$ such that $\mathbb{T}$ proves that ρ is a *functional relation* from φ to ψ:

$$
\begin{aligned}
x : A \mid \varphi &\vdash \exists y : B . \rho & \text{(total)} \\
x : A, y : B, z : B \mid \rho \wedge \rho[z/y] &\vdash y = z & \text{(single-valued)} \\
x : A, y : B \mid \rho &\vdash \varphi \wedge \psi & \text{(well-typed)}
\end{aligned}
$$

Two functional relations ρ and σ represent the same morphism if $\mathbb{T}$ proves both

$$x : A, y : B \mid \rho \vdash \sigma , \qquad\qquad x : A, y : B \mid \sigma \vdash \rho .$$

Relations which only differ in the names of free variables are also considered equal.

(Strictly speaking, a morphism

$$[x : A, y : B \mid \rho] : [x : A \mid \varphi] \to [y : B \mid \psi]$$

should be taken to be the triple

$$\big([x : A, y : B \mid \rho], \ [x : A \mid \varphi], \ [y : B \mid \psi]\big)$$

so that one knows what the domain and codomain are, but we shall often write simply

$$\rho : [x : A \mid \varphi] \to [y : B \mid \psi]$$

since the rest can be recovered from that much data.)

The identity morphism on $[x : A \mid \varphi]$ is

$$1_{[x:A\mid\varphi]} = [x : A, x' : A \mid (x = x') \wedge \varphi] : [x : A \mid \varphi] \to [x' : A \mid \varphi[x'/x]] .$$

Note that we used the variable substitution $\varphi[x'/x]$ and the identification $[x : A \mid \varphi] = [x' : A \mid \varphi[x'/x]]$ in order to make this definition.

Composition of morphisms

$$[x : A \mid \varphi] \xrightarrow{\rho} [y : B \mid \psi] \xrightarrow{\tau} [z : C \mid \theta]$$

is given by the relational product,

$$\tau \circ \rho = (\exists y : B . (\rho \wedge \tau)) .$$

Of course, one needs to check that this *is* a morphism from φ to ϑ, i.e. that it is total, single-valued, and well-typed. We leave the detailed proof that $\mathcal{C}_{\mathbb{T}}$ is a category as an exercise; let us just show how to prove that composition of morphisms is associative. Given morphisms

$$[x : A \mid \varphi] \xrightarrow{\rho} [y : B \mid \psi] \xrightarrow{\tau} [z : C \mid \theta] \xrightarrow{\sigma} [u : D \mid \zeta]$$

we need to derive in context $x : A, u : D$

$$\exists z : C . ((\exists y : B . (\rho \wedge \tau)) \wedge \sigma) \;\dashv\vdash\; \exists y : B . (\rho \wedge (\exists z : C . (\tau \wedge \sigma)))$$

This follows easily with repeated application of the Frobenius rule (Section 3.2.3).

Exercise 3.2.28. Extend the definition of $\mathcal{C}_{\mathbb{T}}$ to morphisms between objects with arbitrary contexts,

$$[\Gamma \mid \varphi] \xrightarrow{\rho} [\Delta \mid \psi]$$

(use relations $\Gamma, \Delta \mid \rho$), and provide a proof that $\mathcal{C}_{\mathbb{T}}$ is a category.

Proposition 3.2.29. *The category $\mathcal{C}_{\mathbb{T}}$ is regular.*

Proof. We sketch the constructions required for regularity.

- The terminal object is $[\cdot \mid \top]$.

- The product of $[x : A \mid \varphi]$ and $[y : B \mid \psi]$, where x and y are distinct variables, is the object

$$[x : A, y : B \mid \varphi \wedge \psi] .$$

The first projection from the product is

$$x : A, y : B, x' : A \mid x = x' \wedge \varphi \wedge \psi \,,$$

and the second projection is

$$x : A, y : B, y' : B \mid y = y' \wedge \varphi \wedge \psi \,,$$

where we rename the codomains of the projections $[x : A \mid \varphi] = [x' : A \mid \varphi[x'/x]]$, etc., to make the context variables distinct.

- An equalizer of morphisms

$$[x : A \mid \varphi] \underset{\tau}{\overset{\rho}{\rightrightarrows}} [y : B \mid \psi]$$

 is

$$[x : A \mid \exists y : B \,.\, (\rho \wedge \tau)] \xrightarrow{\;\;\varepsilon\;\;} [x' : A \mid \varphi[x'/x]]$$

 where ε is the morphism

$$x : A, x' : A \mid (x = x') \wedge \exists y : B \,.\, (\rho \wedge \tau) \ .$$

- Finally, let us consider coequalizers of kernel pairs. The kernel pair of a map

$$\rho : [x : A \mid \varphi] \longrightarrow [y : B \mid \psi]$$

 is

$$K \underset{\kappa_2}{\overset{\kappa_1}{\rightrightarrows}} [x : A \mid \varphi]$$

 where K is the object

$$[u : A, v : A \mid \exists y : B \,.\, (\rho[u/x] \wedge \rho[v/x])] \,,$$

 the morphism κ_1 is

$$u : A, v : A, x : A \mid (u = x) \wedge \exists y : B \,.\, (\rho[u/x] \wedge \rho[v/x]) \,,$$

 and κ_2 is

$$u : A, v : A, x : A \mid (v = x) \wedge \exists y : B \,.\, (\rho[u/x] \wedge \rho[v/x]) \ .$$

 Now the coequalizer of κ_1 and κ_2 can be shown to be the morphism

$$[x : A \mid \varphi] \xrightarrow{\;\;\rho\;\;} [y : B \mid \exists x : A. \rho] \,,$$

 where $[y : B \mid \exists x : A \,.\, \rho]$ is the image of ρ, as a subobject of $[y : B \mid \psi]$.

The following lemma shows that regular epis are stable under pullback. $\square$

Lemma 3.2.30.   *1. A map $\rho : [x : A \mid \varphi] \longrightarrow [y : B \mid \psi]$ is a regular epi if and only if*

$$y : B \mid \psi \vdash \exists x : A. \, \rho$$

2. Regular epis are stable under pullback in $\mathcal{C}_{\mathbb{T}}$.

Proof. For (1), suppose $\rho : [x : A \mid \varphi] \to [y : B \mid \psi]$ is a regular epi. We claim first that if ρ factors through some subobject $U \rightarrowtail [y : B \mid \psi]$ then $U = [y : B \mid \psi]$ is the maximal subobject. Indeed, since ρ is regular epi it is a coequalizer of its kernel pair. But if ρ factors through a subobject $U \rightarrowtail [y : B \mid \psi]$, say by $r : [x : A \mid \varphi] \to U$, then r is also a coequalizer of the kernel pair of ρ, as one can easily check. Thus $U \rightarrowtail [y : B \mid \psi]$ must be iso.

Now, up to iso, every $U \rightarrowtail [y : B \mid \psi]$ is of the form $U = [y : B \mid \vartheta]$ with $y \mid \vartheta \vdash \psi$, and ρ factors through $[y : B \mid \vartheta]$ iff

$$y : B \mid \exists x : A . \rho \vdash \vartheta \,.$$

Thus for all ϑ we have that:

$$(y : B \mid \exists x : A . \rho \vdash \vartheta) \;\Rightarrow\; (y : B \mid \psi \vdash \vartheta) \,.$$

Whence $y : B \mid \psi \vdash \exists x : A . \rho$. The convere is immediate from the specification of the kernel quotient above.

For (2), suppose we have a pullback diagram, which has the form indicated below.

$$
\begin{array}{ccc}
[x : A, y : B \mid \varphi \wedge \psi \wedge \exists z : C. (\sigma \wedge \rho)] & \xrightarrow{\;\rho^*\sigma\;} & [y : B \mid \psi] \\[2pt]
{\scriptstyle \sigma^*\rho}\big\downarrow & & \big\downarrow{\scriptstyle \rho} \\[2pt]
[x : A \mid \varphi] & \xrightarrow[\;\;\sigma\;\;]{} & [z : C \mid \vartheta]
\end{array}
$$

The maps $\sigma^*\rho$ and $\rho^*\sigma$ are represented by the relations:

$$\sigma^*\rho = \big(x : A, \, y : B, \, x' : A \mid x = x' \wedge \varphi \wedge \psi \wedge \exists z : C. (\sigma \wedge \rho)\big)$$
$$\rho^*\sigma = \big(x : A, \, y : B, \, y' : B \mid y = y' \wedge \varphi \wedge \psi \wedge \exists z : C. (\sigma \wedge \rho)\big)$$

If ρ is regular epi, then by (1) we have

$$z : C \mid \vartheta \vdash \exists y : B. \, \rho \,. \tag{3.11}$$

To show that the pullback $\sigma^*\rho$ is regular epi, again by (1) we need to show

$$x' : A \mid \varphi[x'/x] \vdash \exists x : A \, \exists y : B. \, \big(x = x' \wedge \varphi \wedge \psi \wedge \exists z : C. (\sigma \wedge \rho)\big) \,. \tag{3.12}$$

We can make use thereby of the functionality of σ and ρ, specifically we have

$$x : A, \, z : C \mid \sigma \vdash \varphi \wedge \vartheta \qquad \text{and} \qquad x : A \mid \varphi \vdash \exists z : C. \, \sigma \,. \tag{3.13}$$

The result now follows by a simple deduction. $\square$

Exercise 3.2.31. Show that in $\mathcal{C}_{\mathbb{T}}$ the regular-epi mono factorization of a morphism $\rho : [x : A \mid \varphi] \to [y : B \mid \psi]$ is given by

$$[x : A \mid \varphi] \xrightarrow{\ \rho\ } [y : B \mid \exists\, x : A \,.\, \rho] \xrightarrow{\ \iota\ } [z : B \mid \psi[z/y]]$$

where ι is the morphism

$$y : B, z : B \mid (y = z) \wedge (\exists\, x : A \,.\, \rho) \,.$$

Theorem 3.2.32 (Functorial semantics for regular logic)**.** *For any regular theory $\mathbb{T}$, the syntactic category $\mathcal{C}_{\mathbb{T}}$ classifies $\mathbb{T}$-models in regular categories. Specifically, for any regular category $\mathcal{C}$, there is an equivalence of categories*

$$\mathsf{Reg}(\mathcal{C}_{\mathbb{T}}, \mathcal{C}) \simeq \mathsf{Mod}(\mathbb{T}, \mathcal{C}) \tag{3.14}$$

which is natural in $\mathcal{C}$. In particular, there is a universal model U in $\mathcal{C}_{\mathbb{T}}$.

Proof. We have just constructed $\mathcal{C}_{\mathbb{T}}$ and shown that it is regular.

The universal model U, corresponding to the identity functor $\mathcal{C}_{\mathbb{T}} \to \mathcal{C}_{\mathbb{T}}$ under (3.14), is determined as follows:

- Each sort A is interpreted by the object $[x : A \mid \top]$

- A basic constant f with signature $(A_1, \ldots, A_n; B)$ is interpreted by the formula

$$x_1 : A_1, \ldots, x_n : A_n, y : B \mid f(x_1, \ldots, x_n) = y \,.$$

  which is plainly a functional relation and thus a morphism $\llbracket A_1 \rrbracket \times \cdots \times \llbracket A_n \rrbracket \longrightarrow \llbracket B \rrbracket$.

- A relation symbol R with signature $(A_1, \ldots, A_n)$ is interpreted by the subobject represented by the morphism

$$\rho : [x_1 : A_1, \ldots, x_n : A_n \mid R(x_1, \ldots, x_n)] \longrightarrow [y_1 : A_1, \ldots, y_n : A_n \mid \top]$$

  where ρ is the formula

$$x_1 : A_1, \ldots, x_n : A_n, y_1 : A_1, \ldots, y_n : A_n \mid R(x_1, \ldots, x_n) \wedge x_1 = y_1 \wedge \cdots \wedge x_n = y_n \,,$$

  which is easily shown to be monic.

It is now straightforward to show that with respect to this structure, a formula $\Gamma \mid \varphi$ is interpreted as (the subobject determined by) the map

$$\iota : [\Gamma \mid \varphi] \longrightarrow [\Gamma \mid \top]$$

where ι is the formula

$$\Gamma, \Gamma' \mid \Gamma = \Gamma' \wedge \varphi \,,$$

(with obvious abbreviations) which, again, is easily shown to be monic. Moreover, for any formulas $\Gamma \mid \varphi$ and $\Gamma \mid \psi$ we then have

$$U \models \ \Gamma \mid \varphi \vdash \psi \quad \Longleftrightarrow \quad \mathbb{T} \text{ proves } \Gamma \mid \varphi \vdash \psi \,.$$

Thus in particular U is indeed a $\mathbb{T}$-model.

We next construct a functor $\mathsf{Reg}(\mathcal{C}_{\mathbb{T}}, \mathcal{C}) \to \mathsf{Mod}(\mathbb{T}, \mathcal{C})$. Suppose $\mathcal{C}$ is regular and $F : \mathcal{C}_{\mathbb{T}} \longrightarrow \mathcal{C}$ a regular functor, then by Proposition 3.2.24, applying F to U determines a model FU in $\mathcal{C}$ with

$$[\![A]\!]_{FU} = F([\![A]\!]_U) \,,$$

and similarly for the other parts of the structure f, R, etc. Satisfaction of an entailment $\Gamma \mid \varphi \vdash \psi$ is preserved, because the interpretation of the logical operations is determined by the regular structure: pullbacks, images, etc., so that $[\![\varphi]\!]_U \leq [\![\psi]\!]_U$ in $\mathsf{Sub}([\![\Gamma]\!])$ implies

$$[\![\varphi]\!]_{FU} = F([\![\varphi]\!]_U) \leq F([\![\psi]\!]_U) = [\![\psi]\!]_{FU}$$

in $\mathsf{Sub}([\![\Gamma]\!]_{FU})$.

Moreover, just as for algebraic structures, every natural transformation between regular functors $\vartheta : F \Rightarrow G$ determines a homomorphism of the evaluated models by taking components $\vartheta_U : FU \to GU$. In this way, as in Proposition 3.2.24, evaluation at U is a functor

$$\mathsf{eval}_U : \mathsf{Reg}(\mathcal{C}_{\mathbb{T}}, \mathcal{C}) \longrightarrow \mathsf{Mod}(\mathbb{T}, \mathcal{C}) \,.$$

We claim that this functor, which is the one mentioned in (3.14), is full and faithful and essentially surjective. The naturality in $\mathcal{C}$ of the equivalence then follows directly from its determination by evaluation at U and Proposition 3.2.24.

To see that eval_U is essentially surjective, let M be a model in $\mathcal{C}$. We will define a regular functor

$$M^{\sharp} : \mathcal{C}_{\mathbb{T}} \longrightarrow \mathcal{C}$$

with $M^{\sharp}(U) \cong M$. Since M is a model, there are objects $[\![A]\!]_M$ interpreting each type A, as well as interpretations

$$[\![\Gamma \mid \varphi]\!] \rightarrowtail [\![\Gamma]\!]$$

for all formulas and

$$[\![\Gamma \mid t : B]\!] : [\![\Gamma]\!] \longrightarrow [\![B]\!]$$

for all terms. Using these, we determine the functor $M^{\sharp} : \mathcal{C}_{\mathbb{T}} \to \mathcal{C}$ by taking an object $[\Gamma \mid \varphi]$ to $[\![\Gamma \mid \varphi]\!]_M$, i.e. the domain of a mono representing the subobject $[\![\Gamma \mid \varphi]\!]_M \rightarrowtail [\![\Gamma]\!]_M$. Thus, for the record,

$$M^{\sharp}[\Gamma \mid \varphi] \ = \ [\![\Gamma \mid \varphi]\!]_M \,.$$

In the verification that those formulas in context $[\Gamma \mid \varphi]$ that are identified in $\mathcal{C}_{\mathbb{T}}$ are also identified in $\mathcal{C}$, we use the fact that the rules of inference for regular logic are sound in the regular category $\mathcal{C}$. Note in particular that for each basic type A, we then have

$$M^{\sharp}([\![A]\!]_U) = M^{\sharp}([x : A \mid \top]) \cong [\![x : A \mid \top]\!]_M \cong [\![A]\!]_M \,,$$

so that $M^\sharp(U) \cong M$ as required.

Functional relations in $\mathcal{C}_\mathbb{T}$ determine functional relations in $\mathcal{C}$, again by soundness, which determines the action of $M^\sharp$ on arrows, as well as the functoriality of these assignments.

Finally, to show that eval_U is full and faithful, let $F, G : \mathcal{C}_\mathbb{T} \longrightarrow \mathcal{C}$ be regular functors classifying models FU and GU, and let $h : FU \to GU$ be a model homomorphism. We then have maps

$$h_{[x:A|\top]} : F([x : A \mid \top]) \longrightarrow G([x : A \mid \top])$$

for all basic types A, and these commute with the interpretations of the function symbols f, and preserve the basic relations R, in the obvious sense, because h is a homomorphism. It only remains to determine the components

$$h_{[\Gamma|\varphi]} : F([\Gamma \mid \varphi]) \to G([\Gamma \mid \varphi]), \tag{3.15}$$

and to show that they commute with all maps $\rho : [\Gamma \mid \varphi] \to [\Delta \mid \psi]$. Define

$$h_{[\Gamma|\varphi]} : F[\Gamma \mid \varphi] = [\![\Gamma \mid \varphi]\!]_{FU} \longrightarrow [\![\Gamma \mid \varphi]\!]_{GU} = G[\Gamma \mid \varphi]$$

by induction on the structure of φ. The base cases involving the primitive relations $R, \ldots$ and equality of terms are given by the assumption that $h : FU \to GU$ is a model homomorphism, so we just need to check that for every definable subobject

$$[\![\Gamma \mid \varphi]\!]_{FU} \rightarrowtail [\![\Gamma \mid \top]\!]_{FU}$$

the following diagram can be filled in as indicated.

$$\begin{array}{ccc}
[\![\Gamma \mid \varphi]\!]_{FU} & \rightarrowtail & [\![\Gamma \mid \top]\!]_{FU} \\
h_{[\Gamma|\varphi]} \downarrow & & \downarrow h_{[\Gamma|\top]} \\
[\![\Gamma \mid \varphi]\!]_{GU} & \rightarrowtail & [\![\Gamma \mid \top]\!]_{GU}
\end{array} \tag{3.16}$$

Suppose we have e.g. $\varphi = \exists x : A.\, \psi$, and we have already determined

$$h_{[\Gamma,x:A|\psi]} : [\![\Gamma, x : A \mid \psi]\!]_{FU} \longrightarrow [\![\Gamma, x : A \mid \psi]\!]_{GU} \,.$$

An easy diagram chase shows that there is a unique $h_{[\Gamma|\exists x:A.\,\psi]}$ determined by the image factorizations indicated below.

$$\begin{array}{ccccc}
[\![\Gamma, x : A \mid \psi]\!]_{FU} & \longrightarrow\!\!\!\!\triangleright & [\![\Gamma \mid \varphi]\!]_{FU} & \rightarrowtail & [\![\Gamma \mid \top]\!]_{FU} \\
h_{[\Gamma,x:A|\psi]} \downarrow & & h_{[\Gamma|\exists x:A.\,\psi]} \downarrow & & \downarrow h_{[\Gamma|\top]} \\
[\![\Gamma, x : A \mid \psi]\!]_{GU} & \longrightarrow\!\!\!\!\triangleright & [\![\Gamma \mid \varphi]\!]_{GU} & \rightarrowtail & [\![\Gamma \mid \top]\!]_{GU}
\end{array}$$

The other cases are even more direct. Thus we have defined the components (3.15); we leave the required naturality with respect to all maps $\rho : [\Gamma \mid \varphi] \to [\Delta \mid \psi]$ as an exercise. $\square$

Exercise 3.2.33. Prove the naturality of the maps (3.15), using the following trick. In any category with finite products, suppose we have objects and arrows

$$
\begin{array}{ccc}
A & \xrightarrow{\ f\ } & B \\
\alpha \downarrow & & \downarrow \beta \\
C & \xrightarrow[\ g\ ]{} & D
\end{array}
\qquad (3.17)
$$

Let $\hat{f} = \langle 1_A, f \rangle : A \rightarrowtail A \times B$ be the graph of f, and similarly for $\hat{g} : C \rightarrowtail C \times D$. Then the diagram (3.17) commutes iff the following one does.

$$
\begin{array}{ccc}
A & \xrightarrow{\ \hat{f}\ } & A \times B \\
\alpha \downarrow & & \downarrow \alpha \times \beta \\
C & \xrightarrow[\ \hat{g}\ ]{} & C \times D
\end{array}
$$

Corollary 3.2.34. *The rules of regular logic are sound and complete with respect to semantics in regular categories: a regular theory $\mathbb{T}$ proves an entailment*

$$
\Gamma \mid \varphi \vdash \psi \qquad (3.18)
$$

if, and only if, every model of $\mathbb{T}$ satisfies it.

Proof. As for algebraic logic, soundness follows from classification (although we have of course already proved it separately in Proposition 3.3.7, and made use of it in the proof of the theorem!): if (3.18) is provable from $\mathbb{T}$, then it holds in the universal model U in $\mathcal{C}_{\mathbb{T}}$ by the construction of U,

$$
U \models \ \Gamma \mid \varphi \vdash \psi \,.
$$

But since regular functors preserve the interpretations of regular formulas $[\![\Gamma \mid \varphi]\!], [\![\Gamma \mid \psi]\!]$ (as well as entailments between them), the entailment (3.18) then holds also in any model M in any regular $\mathcal{C}$, since there is a classifying functor $M^{\sharp} : \mathcal{C}_{\mathbb{T}} \to \mathcal{C}$ taking U to M, for which

$$
M^{\sharp}([\![\Gamma \mid \varphi]\!]_U) \cong [\![\Gamma \mid \varphi]\!]_M \,.
$$

Completeness follows from the syntactic construction of the universal model U in $\mathcal{C}_{\mathbb{T}}$. The model U is logically generic, in the sense that

$$
U \models (\Gamma \mid \varphi \vdash \psi) \quad \text{iff} \quad \mathbb{T} \text{ proves } (\Gamma \mid \varphi \vdash \psi) \,.
$$

Thus if $\Gamma \mid \varphi \vdash \psi$ holds in all models, then it holds in particular in U, and is therefore provable. $\qquad \square$

3.2.5   Coherent logic

A regular category is coherent if all the subobject posets are distributive lattices, and that structure is stable under pullback. We add rules to regular logic to describe this further structure, show that the rules are sound in coherent categories, and extend the results on functorial semantics of the previous section to the coherent case, including the completeness theorem.

Definition 3.2.35. A cartesian category $\mathcal{C}$ is *coherent* if:

1. $\mathcal{C}$ is regular, i.e. it has coequalizers of kernel pairs, and regular epimorphisms are stable under pullback,

2. each subobject poset $\mathsf{Sub}(A)$ has all finite joins, in particular 0 and $U \vee V$,

3. for each map $f : A \to B$, the pullback functor $f^* : \mathsf{Sub}(B) \longrightarrow \mathsf{Sub}(A)$ preserves the joins:
$$f^* 0_B = 0_A, \qquad f^*(U \vee V) = f^*U \vee f^*V \,.$$

Note that since joins are stable under pullback in a coherent category, the meets distribute over the joins,
$$U \wedge (V \vee W) = (U \wedge V) \vee (U \wedge W) \,, \tag{3.19}$$
so that the posets $\mathsf{Sub}(A)$ are distributive lattices. Indeed, this follows from the fact that $U \wedge V$ may be written as
$$U \wedge V = \Sigma_U \circ U^*(V) \tag{3.20}$$
where $\Sigma_U : \mathsf{Sub}(U) \to \mathsf{Sub}(A)$ is the left adjoint (composition) of the pullback functor $U^* : \mathsf{Sub}(A) \to \mathsf{Sub}(U)$ along the inclusion $U \rightarrowtail A$. Since left adjoints preserve colimits, and thus joins, we therefore have
$$U \wedge (V \vee W) = \Sigma_U \circ U^*(V \vee W) = \Sigma_U \circ U^*(V) \vee \Sigma_U \circ U^*(W) = (U \wedge V) \vee (U \wedge W) \,.$$

A category is said to have have *stable sums* if it has all finite coproducts, in particular an initial object 0 and binary coproducts $A+B$, and these are stable under pullback, in the expected sense. The following simple observation provides plenty of examples of coherent categories.

Proposition 3.2.36. *Regular categories with stable sums are coherent.*

Proof. Given subobjects $U, V \rightarrowtail A$, let $U \vee V$ be the image of the canonical map $U+V \to A$ as indicated below.

This is easily seem to be the supremum of U and V in $\mathsf{Sub}(A)$. Since the unique map $0 \to A$ is always monic, it determines the subobject $0 \rightarrowtail A$. Thus $\mathsf{Sub}(A)$ has all finite joins, and they are stable by stability of the coproducts and image factorizations. $\qquad\square$

As examples of coherent categories we thus have Set and $\mathsf{Set}_{\mathrm{fin}}$, as well as all functor categories $\mathsf{Set}^{\mathbb{C}}$ since limits and colimits (and thus image factorizations) there are computed pointwise.

Exercise 3.2.37. Is the category of H-presets for a heyting algebra H from Section 3.2.1 coherent?

Coherent logic is the extension of regular logic by adding rules corresponding to joins.

Definition 3.2.38. A *coherent theory* $\mathbb{T}$ is (a type theory together with) a set of axioms expressed in the fragment of logic built from $=$, $\top$, $\bot$, $\wedge$, $\vee$, and $\exists$.

We thus extend the formation rules for formulas in context by two additional clauses:

7. The 0-ary relation symbol $\bot$ (pronounced "false") is a formula :

$$\frac{\cdot}{\Gamma \mid \bot \ \texttt{pred}}$$

8. Disjunction:

$$\frac{\Gamma \mid \varphi \ \texttt{pred} \qquad \Gamma \mid \psi \ \texttt{pred}}{\Gamma \mid \varphi \vee \psi \ \texttt{pred}}$$

(We also again add the evident additional clauses for substitution of terms into formulas.)

A *coherent theory* then consists of axioms of the form

$$\Gamma \mid \varphi \vdash \psi$$

where φ, ψ are *coherent formulas*. Coherent logic not only allows for disjunctions $\varphi \vee \psi$ on both side of the $\vdash$, but the presence of the symbol $\bot$ allows for a certain amount of negation, in the form $\varphi \vdash \bot$, as the following classical example illustrates.

Example 3.2.39. 1. A ring A (with unit 1) is called *local* if it has a unique maximal ideal. This can be captured with two coherent axioms of the form $0 = 1 \vdash \bot$ (to ensure that $0 \neq 1$), and

$$x : A, y : A \mid \exists z : A.\, z(x + y) = 1 \vdash (\exists z : A.\, zx = 1) \vee (\exists z : A.\, zy = 1)$$

2. Another example is the theory of *fields*, which can be axiomatized by again adding to the theory of rings the law $0 = 1 \vdash \bot$, together with the following:

$$x : A \mid \top \vdash x = 0 \vee (\exists y : A.\, xy = 1)$$

which is a clever way of saying that every non-zero element has a multiplicative inverse.

3. An order example is the notion of a *linear order*, which adds to the cartesian theory of posets the *totality* axiom:

$$x : P, y : P \mid x \le y \lor y \le q\,.$$

4. For another example of how we can make use of the constant *false* $\perp$ to get the effect of negation, at least for entire axioms, even though the coherent fragment does not include negation, consider the theory of graphs, with two basic sorts E for edges and V for verticies, and two operations $s, t : (E; V)$ for source and target. A graph $G = (E_G, V_G, s_G, t_G)$ is *acyclic* if it satisfies all the finitely many axioms

$$\exists e_1 \ldots e_n : E.\, \big(t(e_1) = s(e_2) \land \ldots \land t(e_n) = s(e_1)\big) \vdash \perp\,.$$

The *rules of inference of coherent logic* are those of regular logic (Section 3.2.3), with additional rules for falshood the disjunctions:

10. Falsehood:

$$\frac{}{\perp \vdash \psi}$$

11. Disjunction:

$$\frac{\varphi \vdash \vartheta \qquad \psi \vdash \vartheta}{\varphi \lor \psi \vdash \vartheta} \qquad \frac{\varphi \lor \psi \vdash \vartheta}{\varphi \vdash \vartheta} \qquad \frac{\varphi \lor \psi \vdash \vartheta}{\psi \vdash \vartheta}$$

12. Distributivity:

$$\varphi \land (\psi \lor \vartheta) \vdash\ (\varphi \land \psi) \lor (\varphi \land \vartheta)$$

The latter of course coresponds to the distributive law (3.19); note that the converse can be derived. Like the Frobenius rule, this will be derivable in the extended system of Heyting logic (see Proposition 3.3.14), and could also be made derivable in a suitably formulated system of coherent logic using multi-sequents $\Gamma \mid \varphi_1, \ldots, \varphi_n \vdash \psi$.

The *semantics for coherent logic* extends that for regular logic in the expected way: the disjunctive formulas are interpreted as the corresponding joins in the subobject lattices,

$$[\![\Gamma \mid \perp]\!] = 0\,, \qquad\qquad [\![\Gamma \mid \varphi \lor \psi]\!] = [\![\Gamma \mid \varphi]\!] \lor [\![\Gamma \mid \psi]\!]\,.$$

The additional clauses in the proof of soundness are routine. We can then extend the syntactic construction of the regular classifying category $\mathcal{C}_{\mathbb{T}}$ to include all coherent formulas and prove the following extended functorial semantics theorem for models in coherent categories and *coherent functors*, which are defined to be regular functors that preserve all finite joins of subobjects.

Theorem 3.2.40 (Functorial semantics for coherent logic)**.** *For any coherent theory $\mathbb{T}$, the syntactic category $\mathcal{C}_{\mathbb{T}}$ classifies $\mathbb{T}$-models in coherent categories. Specifically, for any coherent category $\mathcal{C}$, there is an equivalence of categories, natural in $\mathcal{C}$,*

$$\mathsf{Coh}(\mathcal{C}_{\mathbb{T}}, \mathcal{C}) \simeq \mathsf{Mod}(\mathbb{T}, \mathcal{C})\,, \tag{3.21}$$

where $\mathsf{Coh}(\mathcal{C}_{\mathbb{T}}, \mathcal{C})$ is the category of coherent functors and natural transformations. In particular, there is a universal model U in $\mathcal{C}_{\mathbb{T}}$.

The corresponding completeness theorem 3.2.34 then holds as well. We leave the routine details to the reader.

Exercise 3.2.41. Extend the functorial semantics theorem 3.2.32 from regular to coherent logic. Specifically, one must determine the components (3.15) of a natural transformation for the extended language of coherent logic.

3.2.6   Freyd embedding theorem

For a coherent theory $\mathbb{T}$, the syntactic construction of the classifying category $\mathcal{C}_{\mathbb{T}}$ means that it is logically generic in the sense that a sequent $(\Gamma \,|\, \varphi \vdash \psi)$ is $\mathbb{T}$-provable just in case it holds in the universal model U in $\mathcal{C}_{\mathbb{T}}$. The analogue of Corollary 3.2.34 then states the completeness of coherent logic with respect to models in coherent categories. But a stronger statement can also be shown, namely one that restricts the models required to infer provability. Indeed, for (regular and) coherent theories, it suffices to have validity with respect to just the single "standard" category Set, in order to infer provability *for all theories* $\mathbb{T}$. This is a consequence of the following embedding theorem, which can be seen as a categorical version of the Henkin completeness theorem for first-order logic. It plays roughly the same role as did Birkhoff's prime ideal theorem, Lemma **??**, for distributive lattices. And, as in that case, it will be used below to prove a stronger embedding theorem for Heyting categories.

Theorem 3.2.42 (Freyd)**.** *Let $\mathcal{C}$ be a small coherent category. Given any subobject $S \rightarrowtail X$, if $FS \cong FX$ for every coherent functor $F : \mathcal{C} \to \mathsf{Set}$, then $S \cong X$. It follows that every small coherent category $\mathcal{C}$ has a conservative, coherent embedding into a power of set, $\mathcal{C} \rightarrowtail \mathsf{Set}^X$, where for X one can take a (sufficient) set of "models", i.e., coherent functors $\mathcal{C} \to \mathsf{Set}$.*

Proof. To be added later; for now, see [Joh03, D1.5]. $\square$

The result can also be shown for regular categories, and the proof is somewhat easier for that case.

Corollary 3.2.43. *Coherent logic is sound and complete with respect to classical Set-valued semantics. Specifically, for every coherent theory $\mathbb{T}$ and every sequent $\Gamma \,|\, \varphi \vdash \psi$,*

$$\mathbb{T} \text{ proves } \Gamma \,|\, \varphi \vdash \psi \qquad \text{iff} \qquad M \models \Gamma \,|\, \varphi \vdash \psi \text{ for every model } M \text{ in } \mathsf{Set}.$$

3.3   Heyting and Boolean categories

In this section we consider coherent categories that also model the universal quantifier $\forall$, in the sense of Section 3.1.4 ; such categories will be seen to model full first-order logic. One could also consider *cartesian* categories modeling $\forall$, without being coherent, and thus modeling the fragment of logic consisting of $u = v, \top, \wedge, \Rightarrow, \forall$, but we will not do so separately.

Definition 3.3.1. A *Heyting category* is a coherent category with universal quantifiers in the sense of Section 3.1.4. Thus for every map $f : A \to B$, the pullback functor $f^* : \mathsf{Sub}(B) \to \mathsf{Sub}(A)$ has a right adjoint,

$$\forall_f : \mathsf{Sub}(A) \to \mathsf{Sub}(B) \,,$$

in addition to the left adjoint $\exists_f : \mathsf{Sub}(A) \to \mathsf{Sub}(B)$ given by taking images.

Note that in a Heyting category, one therefore has both adjoints to pullback along any map $f : A \to B$,

$$\mathsf{Sub}(A) \; \underset{\forall_f}{\overset{\exists_f}{\underset{\longleftarrow f^* \longrightarrow}{\rightrightarrows}}} \; \mathsf{Sub}(B) \qquad \exists_f \dashv f^* \dashv \forall_f \,. \tag{3.22}$$

Moreover, the Beck-Chevalley conditions from Section 3.1.4 are satisfied for both $\exists_f$ (by Proposition 3.2.15) and $\forall_f$ (by Proposition 3.1.28).

One way to get a Heyting structure on a category $\mathcal{C}$ is when the operations on the subobject lattices $\mathsf{Sub}(A)$ are inherited from related ones on the slice categories $\mathcal{C}/A$; this happens when $\mathcal{C}$ is *locally cartesian closed*. Recall that a cartesian closed category is a category that has products and exponentials. A category of locally cartesian closed when every slice is cartesian closed.

Definition 3.3.2. A category $\mathcal{C}$ is *locally cartesian closed (lccc)* when it has a terminal object and every slice $\mathcal{C}/A$ is cartesian closed.

Note that every slice category $\mathcal{C}/A$ has a terminal object, namely the identity morphism $1_A : A \to A$, and all $\mathcal{C}/A$ have binary products if, and only if, $\mathcal{C}$ has pullbacks. Thus a locally cartesian closed category has all finite limits because it has a terminal object and pullbacks. In addition, a locally cartesian closed category is cartesian closed because $\mathcal{C} \cong \mathcal{C}/1$. We describe how exponentials in a slice $\mathcal{C}/A$ can be computed in terms of *change of base functors* and *dependent products*. Given a morphism $f : A \to B$ in $\mathcal{C}$, the "change of base along f" is the pullback functor

$$f^* : \mathcal{C}/B \to \mathcal{C}/A \,.$$

A right adjoint to f^*, when it exists, is called a *dependent product along f*, denoted

$$\Pi_f : \mathcal{C}/A \to \mathcal{C}/B \,.$$

Now an exponential of $b : B \to A$ and $c : C \to A$ in $\mathcal{C}/A$ can be computed in terms of Π_b and b^*. For any $d : D \to A$, we have $b \times_A d = (b^*d) \circ b = \Sigma_b(b^*d)$, hence

$$\frac{\dfrac{\dfrac{b \times_A d \to c}{\Sigma_b(b^*d) \to c}}{b^*d \to b^*c}}{d \to \Pi_b(b^*c)}$$

Therefore, $c^b = \Pi_b(b^*c)$.

We have proved that if a cartesian category $\mathcal{C}$ has dependent product $\Pi_f : \mathcal{C}/A \to \mathcal{C}/B$ along every morphism $f : A \to B$ then it is locally cartesian closed. The converse holds as well, that is every lccc has dependent products. For a proof see Section **??** or [Awo10, 9.20].

Proposition 3.3.3. *A category $\mathcal{C}$ with a terminal object is locally cartesian closed if, and only if, for any $f : A \to B$ the change of base functor $f^* : \mathcal{C}/B \to \mathcal{C}/A$ has a right adjoint $\Pi_f : \mathcal{C}/A \to \mathcal{C}/B$.*

Proposition 3.3.4. *In an lccc $\mathcal{C}$, for any $f : A \to B$ the change of base functor $f^* : \mathcal{C}/B \to \mathcal{C}/A$ preserves the ccc structure.*

Proof. We need to show that f^* preserves terminal objects, binary products, and exponentials in slices. Because f^* is a right adjoint it preserves limits, hence it preserves terminal objects and binary products. To see that it preserves exponentials we first show that $f^* \circ \Pi_g \cong \Pi_{f^*g} \circ (g^*f)^*$ for $g : C \to B$. Given any $d : D \to C$, and $e : E \to A$:

$$
\begin{array}{c}
e \to f^*(\Pi_g d) \\
\hline
\Sigma_f e \to \Pi_g d \\
\hline
g^*(\Sigma_f e) \to d \\
\hline
g^*(f \circ e) \to d \\
\hline
(g^*f) \circ ((f^*g)^*e) \to d \\
\hline
(f^*g)^*e \to (g^*f)^*d \\
\hline
e \to \Pi_{f^*g}((g^*f)^*d)
\end{array}
$$

By the Yoneda Lemma it follows that $f^*(\Pi_g d) \cong \Pi_{f^*g}((g^*f)^*d)$. Now we have, for any $c : C \to B$ and $d : D \to B$,

$$f^*c^d = f^*(\Pi_d(d^*c)) = \Pi_{f^*d}((d^*f)^*(d^*c)) = \Pi_{f^*d}((f^*d)^*(f^*c)) = (f^*c)^{(f^*d)} \ .$$

$\square$

Exercise 3.3.5. In the preceding proof we used the fact that $(d^*f)^*(d^*c) \cong (f^*d)^*(f^*c)$ and $g^*(f \circ e) \cong (g^*f) \circ ((f^*g)^*e)$. Prove that this is really so.

Locally cartesian closed categories are an important example of categories with universal quantifiers.

Proposition 3.3.6. *A locally cartesian closed category has universal quantifiers.*

Proof. Suppose $\mathcal{C}$ is locally cartesian closed. First observe that a morphism $m : M \to A$ is mono if, and only if, the morphism

$$
\begin{array}{ccc}
M & \xrightarrow{\ \ m\ \ } & A \\
& {\scriptstyle m}\searrow \quad \swarrow{\scriptstyle 1_A} & \\
& A &
\end{array}
$$

is mono in $\mathcal{C}/A$. Because right adjoints preserve monos, $\Pi_f : \mathcal{C}/A \to \mathcal{C}/B$ preserve monos for any $f : A \to B$, that is, if $m : M \rightarrowtail A$ is mono then $\Pi_f m : \Pi_f M \to B$ is mono in $\mathcal{C}$. Therefore, we may define $\forall_f$ as the restriction of Π_f to $\mathsf{Sub}(A)$. To be more precise, a subobject $[m : M \rightarrowtail A]$ is mapped by $\forall_f$ to the subobject $[\Pi_f m : \Pi_f M \rightarrowtail B]$. This works because for any monos $m : M \rightarrowtail A$ and $n : N \rightarrowtail B$ we have

$$\frac{\dfrac{\dfrac{f^*[m : M \rightarrowtail A] \leq [n : N \rightarrowtail B] \quad \text{in } \mathsf{Sub}(B)}{f^*m \to n \qquad\qquad\qquad \text{in } \mathcal{C}/B}}{m \to \Pi_f n \qquad\qquad\qquad \text{in } \mathcal{C}/A}}{[m] \leq \forall_f[n] \qquad\qquad\quad \text{in } \mathsf{Sub}(A)}$$

The Beck-Chevalley condition for $\forall_f$ follows from Proposition 3.3.4. Indeed, if $g : C \to B$ and $m : M \rightarrowtail C$ then

$$f^*(\Pi_g m) \cong \Pi_{f^*g}((g^*f)^*m) \,,$$

therefore

$$f^*(\forall_g[m : M \rightarrowtail C]) = \forall_{f^*g}((g^*f)^*[m : M \rightarrowtail C]) \,,$$

as required. $\qquad\qquad\qquad\qquad\qquad\qquad\qquad\qquad\qquad\qquad\qquad\qquad\qquad\square$

Summarizing, diagram (3.23), which may be called *Lawvere's hyperdoctrine diagram*, displays the relation between the quantifiers and the change of base functors.

$$(3.23)$$

In Section 3.3.3 below we shall see that all presheaf categories $\mathsf{Set}^{\mathbb{C}^{\mathrm{op}}}$ are Heyting, and therefore have universal quantifiers, which we will compute explicitly (they are *not* pointwise!).

3.3.1   Heyting logic

We can now extend the *formation rules* for the logical language to include universally quantified formulas in the expected way:

$$\frac{\Gamma, x : A \mid \varphi \ \mathtt{pred}}{\Gamma \mid \forall x : A.\, \varphi \ \mathtt{pred}}$$

The corresponding additional *rule of inference* for the universal quantifier is:

$$\frac{y : B, x : A \mid \vartheta \vdash \varphi}{y : B \mid \vartheta \vdash \forall x : A.\, \varphi}$$

Note that the lower judgement is well-formed only if $x : A$ does not occur freely in ϑ.

Finally, we extend the *interpretation* from coherent formulas from (Section 3.2.5) to formulas including universal quantifiers by the additional clause for $\forall x : A.\, \varphi$ using the universal quantifiers in the Heyting category,

$$[\![\Gamma \mid \forall x : A.\, \varphi]\!] = \forall_A [\![\Gamma, x : A \mid \varphi]\!]\,,$$

where

$$\forall_A = \forall_\pi : \mathsf{Sub}([\![\Gamma]\!] \times [\![A]\!]) \to \mathsf{Sub}([\![\Gamma]\!])$$

is the universal quantifier along the projection $\pi : [\![\Gamma]\!] \times [\![A]\!] \to [\![\Gamma]\!]$.

The following is then immediate from the results of section **??**.

Proposition 3.3.7. *The rules for the universal quantifier are sound with respect to the interpretation in Heyting categories.*

Implication

Recall that the rules of inference for implication state that $\Rightarrow$ is right adjoint to $\wedge$:

$$\frac{\Gamma \mid \vartheta \ \mathtt{pred} \qquad \Gamma \mid \varphi \ \mathtt{pred}}{\Gamma \mid (\vartheta \Rightarrow \varphi) \ \mathtt{pred}} \qquad\qquad \frac{\Gamma \mid \psi \wedge \vartheta \vdash \varphi}{\Gamma \mid \psi \vdash \vartheta \Rightarrow \varphi}$$

Exercise 3.3.8. Show that the above two-way rule can be replaced by the following introduction and elimination rules:

$$\frac{\Gamma \mid \psi \wedge \vartheta \vdash \varphi}{\Gamma \mid \psi \vdash \vartheta \Rightarrow \varphi} \qquad\qquad \frac{\Gamma \mid \psi \vdash \vartheta \Rightarrow \varphi \qquad \Gamma \mid \psi \vdash \vartheta}{\Gamma \mid \psi \vdash \varphi}$$

If we want to interpret implication in a Heyting category $\mathcal{C}$ we therefore require $\mathsf{Sub}(A)$ to be Cartesian closed for every $A \in \mathcal{C}$. However, we must not forget that implication interacts with substitution by the rule

$$(\vartheta \Rightarrow \varphi)[t/x] \;=\; \vartheta[t/x] \Rightarrow \varphi[t/x]\,.$$

Semantically this means that implication is *stable* under pullbacks.

Definition 3.3.9. A cartesian category $\mathcal{C}$ has *implications* when, for every $A \in \mathcal{C}$, the poset $\mathsf{Sub}(A)$ is cartesian closed, with stable implication $\Rightarrow$. This means that for $U, V \in \mathsf{Sub}(A)$ and $f : B \to A$,

$$f^*(U \Rightarrow V) = (f^*U \Rightarrow f^*V)\,.$$

Proposition 3.3.10. *If a cartesian category has universal quantifiers then it has implications.*

Proof. Let $[u : U \rightarrowtail A]$ and $[v : V \rightarrowtail A]$ be subobjects of A. Define

$$([u] \Rightarrow [v]) = \forall_u(u^*[v]) \, ,$$

as indicated below

$$
\begin{array}{ccc}
u^*([v]) \rightarrowtail & V & \forall_u u^*([v]) \\
\downarrow & \downarrow v & \\
U \rightarrowtail & A & \\
 u &
\end{array}
$$

Then for any subobject $[w : W \rightarrowtail A]$ we have:

$$
\frac{\dfrac{\dfrac{\dfrac{[w] \leq [u] \Rightarrow [v] \quad \text{in } \mathsf{Sub}(A)}{[w] \leq \forall_u(u^*[v]) \quad \text{in } \mathsf{Sub}(A)}}{u^*[w] \leq u^*[v] \quad \text{in } \mathsf{Sub}(U)}}{\exists_u(u^*w) \leq v \quad \text{in } \mathsf{Sub}(A)}}{[u] \wedge [w] \leq [v] \quad \text{in } \mathsf{Sub}(A)}
$$

Note that we used the decomposition of $[u] \wedge [w]$ as $\exists_u(u^*w)$ from (3.20).
   Finally, stability of $\Rightarrow$ follows from Beck-Chevalley condition for $\forall$.   □

Exercise 3.3.11. Prove the last claim of the proof.

Corollary 3.3.12. *Any LCCC has universal quantifiers and implications.*

Negation

In any Heyting category, we have not only implications $U \Rightarrow V$ making each $\mathsf{Sub}(A)$ cartesian closed, but also 0 and $\vee$ coming from the coherent structure, so that $\mathsf{Sub}(A)$ is a Heyting algebra. Here 0 is the bottom element $[0 \rightarrowtail A]$, and $\vee$ is the join $[p \vee q \rightarrowtail A]$, in the poset $\mathsf{Sub}(A)$. We can therefore also define *negation* $\neg U$ as usual in a Heyting algebra, namely:

$$\neg U \;=\; (U \Rightarrow 0) \, , \tag{3.24}$$

These negations are stable under pullback because the Heyting implications and the bottom element 0 are stable.
   We can therefore add *formulas* with negation to the logical language, along with the evident two-way *rule of inference*:

$$
\frac{\Gamma \mid \varphi \; \texttt{pred}}{\Gamma \mid \neg\varphi \; \texttt{pred}}
\qquad\qquad
\frac{\Gamma \mid \vartheta \vdash \neg\varphi}{\Gamma \mid \vartheta \wedge \varphi \vdash \bot}
$$

We give negated formulas the obvious *interpretation*: given $[\![\varphi]\!]$ in $\mathsf{Sub}(A)$, we set

$$[\![\neg\varphi]\!] \;=\; \neg[\![\varphi]\!] \;=\; [\![\varphi]\!] \Rightarrow 0\,.$$

using the Heyting implication $\Rightarrow$ and bottom element 0 in $\mathsf{Sub}(A)$. The following is then immediate.

Proposition 3.3.13. *The rules for negation are sound in any Heyting category.*

Given Heyting implication, we can prove the distributivity rule from Section 3.2.5 for conjunction and disjunction.

Proposition 3.3.14. *The distributivity rule is provable in Heyting logic:*

$$\varphi \wedge (\psi \vee \vartheta) \;\vdash\; (\varphi \wedge \psi) \vee (\varphi \wedge \vartheta)$$

Proof.

$$
\frac{
\dfrac{
\dfrac{
\dfrac{(\varphi \wedge \psi) \vee (\varphi \wedge \vartheta) \vdash \zeta}{(\varphi \wedge \psi) \vdash \zeta \qquad (\varphi \wedge \vartheta) \vdash \zeta}
}{\psi \vdash \varphi \Rightarrow \zeta \qquad \vartheta \vdash \varphi \Rightarrow \zeta}
}{\psi \vee \vartheta \vdash \varphi \Rightarrow \zeta}
}{\varphi \wedge (\psi \vee \vartheta) \vdash \zeta}
$$

Thus, in fact,

$$\varphi \wedge (\psi \vee \vartheta) \;\dashv\vdash\; (\varphi \wedge \psi) \vee (\varphi \wedge \vartheta).$$

$\square$

Perhaps more surprisingly, given universal quantifiers, we can actually prove the Frobenius rule from Section 3.2.3 for existential quantifiers.

Proposition 3.3.15. *The Frobenius rule is provable in Heyting logic:*

$$(\exists y : B.\,\varphi) \wedge \psi \;\vdash\; \exists y : B.\,(\varphi \wedge \psi)$$

provided the variable $y : B$ does not occur freely in ψ.

Proof.

$$
\frac{
\dfrac{
\dfrac{
\dfrac{\exists y : B.\,(\varphi \wedge \psi) \vdash \zeta}{y : B \mid \varphi \wedge \psi \vdash \zeta}
}{y : B \mid \varphi \vdash \psi \Rightarrow \zeta}
}{(\exists y : B.\,\varphi) \vdash \psi \Rightarrow \zeta}
}{(\exists y : B.\,\varphi) \wedge \psi \;\vdash\; \zeta}
$$

Thus, in fact,

$$(\exists y : B.\varphi) \wedge \psi \;\dashv\vdash\; \exists y : B.(\varphi \wedge \psi).$$

$\square$

$$\overline{\bot \vdash \varphi} \qquad\qquad \overline{\varphi \vdash \top}$$

$$\frac{\varphi \vdash \vartheta \qquad \psi \vdash \vartheta}{\varphi \vee \psi \vdash \vartheta} \qquad\qquad \frac{\vartheta \vdash \varphi \qquad \vartheta \vdash \psi}{\vartheta \vdash \varphi \wedge \psi}$$

$$\frac{\vartheta \wedge \varphi \vdash \psi}{\vartheta \vdash \varphi \Rightarrow \psi}$$

$$\frac{x : A \mid \varphi \vdash \vartheta}{\exists\, x : A \,.\, \varphi \vdash \vartheta} \qquad\qquad \frac{x : A \mid \vartheta \vdash \varphi}{\vartheta \vdash \forall\, x : A \,.\, \varphi}$$

Figure 3.2: Adjoint rules of inference for Heyting logic

Exercise 3.3.16. In classical logic, one has the *de Morgen laws* for negation,

$$\neg(\varphi \wedge \psi) \dashv\vdash \neg\varphi \vee \neg\psi$$
$$\neg(\varphi \vee \psi) \dashv\vdash \neg\varphi \wedge \neg\psi$$

Which of these four entailments can you prove in Heyting logic?

Adjoint rules of Heyting logic

Figure 3.2 collects the rules of inference for Heyting logic. These are stated as two-way rules to emphasize the respective underlying adjunctions. The rules for disjunction and conjunction in the bottom-up direction are, of course, to be understood a two separate rules, left and right. The contexts are omitted where there is no change between the top and bottom, thus e.g. the rule for existential quantifier can be stated in full as:

$$\frac{\Gamma, x : A \mid \varphi \vdash \vartheta}{\Gamma \mid \exists\, x : A \,.\, \varphi \vdash \vartheta}$$

Negation $\neg\varphi$ is treated as a defined by

$$\neg\varphi \;:=\; \varphi \Rightarrow \bot\,.$$

It therefore satisfies the derived rule:

$$\frac{\vartheta \wedge \varphi \vdash \bot}{\vartheta \vdash \neg\varphi}$$

The rules for *equality*, recall from Section 3.1.3, were:

$$\frac{}{\psi \vdash t =_A t} \qquad \frac{\psi \vdash t =_A u \qquad \psi \vdash \varphi[t/z]}{\psi \vdash \varphi[u/z]} \tag{3.25}$$

Lawvere [Law70] observed that equality can also be seen as an adjoint, namely to the operation of pullback along the diagonal $\Delta : A \to A \times A$ in any cartesian category. Indeed, we have an adjunction

$$\mathsf{Sub}(A)$$

$$\exists_\Delta \Big\downarrow \Big\uparrow \Delta^* \qquad \frac{x : A \mid \vartheta(x) \vdash \varphi(x, x)}{x : A, y : A \mid (x = y) \wedge \vartheta(x) \vdash \varphi(x, y)} \tag{3.26}$$

$$\mathsf{Sub}(A \times A)$$

where we have displayed the variables in the style $\varphi(x, y)$ in order to emphasize the effect of Δ^* as a "contraction of variables",

$$\Delta^*(\varphi(x, y)) = \varphi(x, x).$$

The effect of the left adjoint $\exists_\Delta$ (which is simply composition with Δ, because it is monic) is given by

$$\exists_\Delta(\vartheta(x)) = \big(x = y \wedge \vartheta(x)\big).$$

The adjoint rule (3.26) may be called *Lawvere's Law*. It is equivalent to the standard rules (3.25).

Exercise 3.3.17. Prove the equivalence of (3.25) and (3.26).

We state the following for the record as a summary of the foregoing discussion.

Proposition 3.3.18 (Soundness). *The adjoint rules of inference for Heyting logic, as stated in Figure 3.2 and including Lawvere's Law* (3.26)*, are sound in any Heyting category.*

Theorem 3.3.22 implies that these rules are also complete with respect to models in Heyting categories.

3.3.2 First-order logic

Heyting logic with equality is often called *intuitionistic first-order logic* (IFOL). It lacks the classical laws of excluded middle $\varphi \vee \neg\varphi$ and double negation elimination $\neg\neg\varphi \Rightarrow \varphi$, but adding either one of these implies the other (proof!), and gives a system equivalent to standard first-order logic – with one exception: one still cannot prove the classical law

$$\forall x : A. \varphi \vdash \exists x : A. \varphi. \tag{3.27}$$

The latter law, which is satisfied only in non-empty domains, is considered by some to be a defect of the conventional formulation of first-order logic. It would follow if we were to forget about the contexts, essentially permitting inferences of the form

$$\frac{x : A \mid \varphi \vdash \psi}{\cdot \mid \varphi \vdash \psi} \tag{3.28}$$

when $x : A$ does not occur freely in φ or ψ (cf. Remark 3.1.29).

Exercise 3.3.19. Assume the rule (3.28) and prove the entailment (3.27).

Any conventional first-order theory can be formulated in IFOL, often in more than one way, since classical logic may collapse differences between concepts that are intuitionistically distinct (like, most simply, φ and $\neg\neg\varphi$). Our interest in intuitionistic logic does not arise from any philosophical scruples about the validity of the classical laws of excluded middle or double negation, but rather the fact that the logic of variable structures is naturally intuitionistic, as we will see in Section **??**.

Example 3.3.20. An example of a first-order theory that is not (immediately) coherent is the theory of dense linear orders. In addition to the poset axioms, and the totality axiom $x, y : P \mid \top \vdash (x \leq y \vee y \leq x)$, one adds density e.g. in the form

$$x, y : P \mid (x \leq y \wedge x \neq y) \vdash (\exists z : P.\, x \leq z \wedge x \neq z \wedge z \leq y \wedge z \neq y).$$

The classifying category of an intuitionistic first-order theory

Given a theory $\mathbb{T}$ in IFOL, we can build the syntactic category $\mathcal{C}_{\mathbb{T}}$ from the formulas over $\mathbb{T}$, as was done for coherent logic in Section 3.2.4. The objects again have the form $[\Gamma \mid \varphi]$, but now using the Heyting formulas φ, including the logical operations $\forall$, and $\Rightarrow$. The result will then be a coherent category with universal quantifiers, and thus a Heyting category in the sense of Definition 3.3.1. Given another Heyting category $\mathcal{C}$ with a $\mathbb{T}$-model $M \in \mathsf{Mod}(\mathbb{T}, \mathcal{C})$, the interpretation $[\![-]\!]_M$ associated to the model M determines a Heyting functor,

$$M^{\sharp} : \mathcal{C}_{\mathbb{T}} \longrightarrow \mathcal{C} \tag{3.29}$$

$$[\Gamma \mid \varphi] \longmapsto [\![\Gamma \mid \varphi]\!]_M \tag{3.30}$$

We would like to show that $\mathcal{C}_{\mathbb{T}}$ classifies $\mathbb{T}$-models, in the sense that this assignment determines an equivalence of categories, associating homomorphisms of $\mathbb{T}$-models $h : M \to N$ in the category $\mathsf{Mod}(\mathbb{T}, \mathcal{C})$, and natural transformations of the associated classifying Heyting functors $M^{\sharp} \to N^{\sharp}$ in $\mathcal{C}_{\mathbb{T}} \to \mathcal{C}$.

However, there is a problem. Reviewing the proof of Theorem 3.2.32, we needed to show that definable subobjects are natural in model homomorphisms, in the following sense: let $F, G : \mathcal{C}_{\mathbb{T}} \longrightarrow \mathcal{C}$ be functors classifying models FU and GU, and let $h : FU \to GU$ be a model homomorphism. We have maps $h_A : F(A) \longrightarrow G(A)$ for all basic types $A = [x : A \mid \top]$, commuting with the interpretations of the function symbols f and the basic relations R. For each object $[x : A \mid \varphi]$, say, the components

$$h_{[x:A|\varphi]} : F[x : A \mid \varphi] = [\![x : A \mid \varphi]\!]_{FU} \longrightarrow [\![x : A \mid \varphi]\!]_{GU} = G[x : A \mid \varphi]$$

were then defined on definable subobject $[\![x : A \mid \varphi]\!]_{FU} \rightarrowtail [\![A]\!]_{FU} = FA$, in such a way

that the following diagram commutes as indicated.

$$
\begin{array}{ccc}
[\![x : A \mid \varphi]\!]_{FU} & \rightarrowtail & [\![A]\!]_{FU} \\
h_{[x:A|\varphi]} \downarrow & & \downarrow h_A \\
[\![x : A \mid \varphi]\!]_{GU} & \rightarrowtail & [\![A]\!]_{GU}
\end{array}
\tag{3.31}
$$

This we could do for all *coherent* formulas φ, as was shown by induction on the structure of φ. However, this is no longer possible when φ is Heyting. Most simply, if $\varphi = \neg\psi$ for coherent ψ, there is no need for the following to commute on the left.

$$
\begin{array}{ccccc}
[\![x : A \mid \neg\psi]\!]_{FU} & \rightarrowtail & [\![A]\!]_{FU} & \leftarrowtail & [\![x : A \mid \psi]\!]_{FU} \\
h_{[x:A|\neg\psi]} \downarrow & & \downarrow h_A & & \downarrow h_{[x:A|\psi]} \\
[\![x : A \mid \neg\psi]\!]_{GU} & \rightarrowtail & [\![A]\!]_{GU} & \leftarrowtail & [\![x : A \mid \psi]\!]_{GU}
\end{array}
\tag{3.32}
$$

Very concretely, let $\mathbb{T}$ be the theory of groups, FU and GU groups in Set and $h_A : [\![A]\!]_{FU} \to [\![A]\!]_{GU}$ the trivial homomorphism that takes everything $a \in [\![A]\!]_{FU}$ to the unit $e_{GU} \in [\![A]\!]_{GU}$, and ψ the formula $x : A \mid x = e$. Then $[\![x : A \mid \psi]\!]_{GU} = \{e_{GU}\}$ and so $[\![x : A \mid \neg\psi]\!]_{GU} = \{y \in [\![A]\!]_{GU} \mid y \neq e_{GU}\}$, so there is a factorization $h_{[x:A|\neg\psi]} : [\![x : A \mid \neg\psi]\!]_{FU} \to [\![x : A \mid \neg\psi]\!]_{GU}$ only if FU is trivial.

The same holds, of course, for subobjects defined by the other Heyting operations, such as $[x : A \mid \vartheta \Rightarrow \psi]$ and $[x : A \mid \forall y : B.\psi]$; there need not be any factorizations $h_{[x:A|\varphi]}$ as indicted in (3.31).

Our solution (although not the only possible one) is to consider only *isomophisms of models* $h : M \cong N$ and *natural isomorphisms* between the classifying functors.

Lemma 3.3.21. *In the situation of diagram* (3.31), *if the model homomorphism* $h : FU \to GU$ *is an isomorphism, then for any Heyting formula* $[\Gamma \mid \varphi]$ *there is a unique factorization*

$$
h_{[\Gamma|\varphi]} : F[\Gamma \mid \varphi] = [\![x : A \mid \varphi]\!]_{FU} \longrightarrow [\![x : A \mid \varphi]\!]_{GU} = G[x : A \mid \varphi]
$$

making the corresponding diagram (3.31) *commute.*

Proof. Induction on φ. □

Now for every Heyting category $\mathcal{C}$, let us define $\mathsf{Mod}(\mathbb{T}, \mathcal{C})^i$ to be the category of $\mathbb{T}$-models in $\mathcal{C}$, and their isomorphisms; thus $\mathsf{Mod}(\mathbb{T}, \mathcal{C})^i$ is a groupoid. Accordingly we let $\mathsf{Heyt}(\mathcal{C}_{\mathbb{T}}, \mathcal{C})^i$ to be the category of all Heyting functors $\mathcal{C}_{\mathbb{T}} \to \mathcal{C}$ and natural *iso*morphisms between them – thus also a groupoid. Then just as in previous cases we can show:

Theorem 3.3.22 (Functorial semantics for intuitionistic first-order logic)**.** *For any theory* $\mathbb{T}$ *in (intuitionistic) first-order logic, the syntactic category* $\mathcal{C}_{\mathbb{T}}$ *classifies* $\mathbb{T}$-*models in*

Heyting categories. Specifically, for any Heyting category $\mathcal{C}$, there is an equivalence of categories, natural in $\mathcal{C}$,

$$\mathsf{Heyt}(\mathcal{C}_\mathbb{T}, \mathcal{C})^i \simeq \mathsf{Mod}(\mathbb{T}, \mathcal{C})^i, \tag{3.33}$$

where $\mathsf{Heyt}(\mathcal{C}_\mathbb{T}, \mathcal{C})^i$ is the groupoid of Heyting functors and natural isomorphisms, and $\mathsf{Mod}(\mathbb{T}, \mathcal{C})^i$ is the groupoid of $\mathbb{T}$-models in $\mathcal{C}$. In particular, there is a universal model U in $\mathcal{C}_\mathbb{T}$.

The corresponding completeness theorem 3.2.34 for intuitionistic first-order logic with respect to models in Heyting categories then holds as well. We leave the routine details to the reader.

Boolean categories

A Boolean category may be defined as a coherent category in which every subobject $U \rightarrowtail A$ is *complemented*, in the sense that it there is some (necessarily unique) $V \rightarrowtail A$ such that $U \wedge V \leq 0$ and $1 \leq U \vee V$ in $\mathsf{Sub}(A)$. One can then introduce the Boolean negation $\neg U = V$, and show that each $\mathsf{Sub}(A)$ is a Boolean algebra. Indeed one can then show that every Boolean category is Heyting, using the familiar definitions $\forall \varphi = \neg \exists \neg \varphi$ and $\varphi \Rightarrow \psi = \neg \varphi \vee \psi$.

This definition, however, leads to the wrong notion of a "Boolean classifying category", for the reasons just discussed with respect to Heyting categories: although every coherent functor between Boolean categories is Boollean, the natural transformations between classifying functors will not be simply the homomorphisms. (They will be something interesting, namely elementary embeddings, but we shall not pursue this further here; see [**?**].) Thus it seems preferable for our purposed to define a Boolean category to be a Heyting category with complemented subobjects:

Definition 3.3.23. A Heyting catgeory $\mathcal{C}$ is *Boolean* if every subobject lattice $\mathsf{Sub}(A)$ is a Booean algebra. Thus for all subobjects $U \rightarrowtail A$, the Heyting complement $\neg U$ satisfies $U \vee \neg U = 1$ in $\mathsf{Sub}(A)$.

Of course, the category Set is Boolean. A presheaf category $\mathsf{Set}^\mathbb{C}$ is in general *not* Boolean, but an important special case always is, namely when $\mathbb{C}$ is a groupoid. (Set^G is called the *category of G-sets.*)

Exercise 3.3.24. Regard a group G as a category with one object. Show that in the functor category Set^G, every subobject lattice $\mathsf{Sub}(A)$ is a Boolean algebra.

The classifying category theorem 3.3.22 for Heyting categories, and indeed the entire framework of functorial semantics, applies *mutatis mutandis* to classical first-order logic and Boolean categories. We will not spell out the details, which do not differ in any unexpected way from the more general Heyting case.

Exercise 3.3.25. Assume that $\mathcal{C}$ is coherent and has complemented subobjects in the sense just defined. Prove that then each $\mathsf{Sub}(A)$ is a Boolean algebra, and that $\mathcal{C}$ is a Heyting category.

Exercise 3.3.26. Show that a Heyting category $\mathcal{C}$ is Boolean if, and only if, in each $\mathsf{Sub}(A)$ the Heyting complement $\neg U$ always satisfies $\neg\neg U = U$.

3.3.3   Examples

Sets.   The category Set is of course complete and cocomplete. It is cartesian closed, with function sets $B^A = \{f : A \to B\}$ as exponentials. It is also locally cartesian closed, because the slice category Set/I is equivalent to the category Set^I of I-indexed families of sets $(A_i)_{i \in I}$, for which the exponentials can be computed pointwise: for $A = (A_i)_{i \in I}$ and $B = (B_i)_{i \in I}$ we can set $B^A = (B_i{}^{A_i})_{i \in I}$. Since pullback is therefore a left adjoint, regular epis are stable and so Set is coherent. It is then Heyting by Proposition 3.3.6.

In order to compute the Heyting structure explicitly, consider any map $f : A \to B$ and the resulting adjunctions from (3.22),

$$\mathsf{Sub}(A) \underset{\forall_f}{\overset{\exists_f}{\longleftarrow f^* \longrightarrow}} \mathsf{Sub}(B) \qquad \exists_f \dashv f^* \dashv \forall_f \,.$$

For $U \in \mathsf{Sub}(A)$ and $V \in \mathsf{Sub}(B)$ we then have:

$$f^*(V) = f^{-1}(V) = \{a \in A \mid f(a) \in V\} \tag{3.34}$$
$$\exists_f(U) = \{b \in B \mid \text{for some } a \in f^{-1}\{b\}, a \in U\}$$
$$\forall_f(U) = \{b \in B \mid \text{for all } a \in f^{-1}\{b\}, a \in U\}$$

It follows that in Set the implications $U \Rightarrow V$ for $U, V \in \mathsf{Sub}(A)$ have the form

$$\begin{aligned}(U \Rightarrow V) &= \{a \in A \mid a \in U \text{ implies } a \in V\} \\ &= (A \setminus U) \cup V \,.\end{aligned}$$

For negation, we then have

$$\begin{aligned}\neg U &= \{a \in A \mid a \notin U\} \\ &= (A \setminus U) \,,\end{aligned}$$

as expected. Of course, Set is Boolean.

Exercise 3.3.27. In Set consider the dependent sum and product along the unique function $I \to 1$. Show that for $a : A \to I$ the set $\Pi_I A$ is the set of right inverses of a:

$$\Pi_I A = \left\{ s : I \to A \mid a \circ s = 1_I \right\} \,.$$

If $(A_i)_{i \in I}$ is a family of sets indexed by I and we take

$$A = \coprod_{i \in I} A_i = \left\{ \langle i, x \rangle \in I \times \bigcup_{i \in I} A_i \mid i \in I \,\&\, x \in A_i \right\}$$

with $a = \pi_0 : \langle i, x \rangle \mapsto i$ then $\Pi_{!_I} A$ is precisely the cartesian product $\Pi_{i \in I} A_i$. Calculate what Π_f is in Set for a general $f : J \to I$, and conclude that Set is locally cartesian closed.

Presheaves. For a small category $\mathbb{C}$, the presheaf category $\widehat{\mathbb{C}} = \mathsf{Set}^{\mathbb{C}^{\mathsf{op}}}$ has pointwise limits and colimits and is cartesian closed with the exponential of presheaves P, Q calculated using Yoneda as,

$$Q^P(C) \cong \mathsf{Hom}(\mathsf{y}C, Q^P) \cong \mathsf{Hom}(\mathsf{y}C \times P, Q)\,, \qquad \text{for } C \in \mathbb{C}.$$

But then $\widehat{\mathbb{C}}$ is also LCC, because for any presheaf P, the slice category $\widehat{\mathbb{C}}/P$ is equivalent to presheaves on the *category of elements* $\int_{\mathbb{C}} P$,

$$\widehat{\mathbb{C}}/P \ = \ (\mathsf{Set}^{\mathbb{C}^{\mathsf{op}}})/P \ \simeq \ \mathsf{Set}^{(\int_{\mathbb{C}} P)^{\mathsf{op}}}\,.$$

See [Awo10, 9.23].

We first consider the poset $\mathsf{Sub}(P)$ for any presheaf P on $\mathbb{C}$. Let $U \rightarrowtail P$ be any subobject, then since monos in are pointwise in $\widehat{\mathbb{C}}$, and they are represented by subsets in Set, we can represent U by a family $UC \subseteq PC$ of subsets. If $f : P \to Q$ is a natural transformation, the inverse image of $V \rightarrowtail Q$ can then be calculated pointwise from $f_C : PC \to QC$ as

$$f^*(V)(C) = f_C^{-1}(VC) = \{x \in PC \mid f_C(x) \in VC\}\,.$$

The image $\exists_f(U)$, as a coequalizer, is also pointwise, therefore

$$\exists_f(U)(C) = \{y \in QC \mid \text{for some } x \in f_C^{-1}\{y\},\, x \in UC\}\,.$$

The direct image $\forall_f(U)$ is however *not pointwise*, so we must determine it directly. The problem with the obvious attempt

$$\forall_f(U)(C) \overset{?}{=} \{y \in QC \mid \text{for all } x \in f_C^{-1}\{y\},\, x \in UC\}\,.$$

is that it is not functorial in C! In order to correct this, have to modify it by taking instead

$$\forall_f(U)(C) = \{y \in QC \mid \text{for all } h : D \to C, \text{for all } x \in f_D^{-1}\{y.h\},\, x \in UD\}\,, \qquad (3.35)$$

where we have written $y.h$ for the action of Q on $y \in QC$, i.e. $Q(h)(y) \in QD$.

Lemma 3.3.28. *The specification* (3.35) *is the universal quantifier* $\forall_f$ *in presheaves.*

Proof. Consider the diagram

For all $y \in QC$, we have $y \in \forall_f U$ iff the pullback $y' = f^* y$ factors through $U \rightarrowtail P$, as indicated. Replacing the pullback $\mathsf{y}C \times_Q P$ by its generalized elements, the latter condition is equivalent to saying that for all $\mathsf{y}D$ and $\mathsf{y}h : \mathsf{y}D \to \mathsf{y}C$ and $x \in PD$, if $f \circ x = y \circ \mathsf{y}h$, then $x \in UD$, as shown below.

But the last condition is equivalent to saying for all D and all $h : D \to C$ and all $x \in PD$, if $x \in f_D^{-1}\{y.h\}$, then $x \in UD$, which is the righthand side of (3.35). $\qquad\square$

Proposition 3.3.29. *For any natural transformation $f : P \to Q$, there are adjoints*

$$\mathsf{Sub}(P) \overset{\exists_f}{\underset{\forall_f}{\xleftarrow{\;f^*\;}}} \mathsf{Sub}(Q) \qquad \exists_f \dashv f^* \dashv \forall_f \, .$$

These are determined by the following formulas, where $U \rightarrowtail P$ and $V \rightarrowtail Q$ and $C \in \mathbb{C}$:

$$f^*(V)(C) = \{x \in PC \mid f_C(x) \in VC\} \tag{3.36}$$
$$\exists_f(U)(C) = \{y \in QC \mid \text{for some } x \in PC, \ f_C(x) = y \ \& \ x \in UC\}$$
$$\forall_f(U)(C) = \{y \in QC \mid \text{for all } h : D \to C, \text{ for all } x \in PD, \ f_D(x) = y.h \text{ implies } x \in UD\}$$

$\qquad\square$

The implication $U \Rightarrow V$ for $U, V \in \mathsf{Sub}(P)$ therefore has the form, for each $C \in \mathbb{C}$,

$$(U \Rightarrow V)(C) \ = \ \{x \in PC \mid \text{for all } h : D \to C, \ x.h \in UD \text{ implies } x.h \in VD\}\,.$$

And the negation $\neg U \in \mathsf{Sub}(P)$ is then, for each $C \in \mathbb{C}$,

$$(\neg U)(C) \ = \ \{x \in PC \mid \text{for all } h : D \to C, \ x.h \notin UD\}\,.$$

Exercise 3.3.30. Prove the last two statements, computing $U \Rightarrow V$ and $\neg U$.

Sets through time. For presheaves on a poset K, the foregoing description of the Heyting structure becomes a bit simpler. Let us consider "covariant presheaves", i.e. functors $A : K \to \mathsf{Set}$. We can regard such a functor as a "set developing through (branching) time", with each later time $i \leq j$ giving rise to a transition map $A_i \to A_j$, which we may denote by

$$A_i \ni a \longmapsto a_j \in A_j \, .$$

For any map $f : A \to B$ (a family of functions $f_i : A_i \to B_i$ compatible with the development over time), we again have the adjunctions

$$\mathsf{Sub}(A) \underset{\forall_f}{\overset{\exists_f}{\longleftarrow f^* \longrightarrow}} \mathsf{Sub}(B) \qquad \exists_f \dashv f^* \dashv \forall_f \, .$$

These can now be described by the following formulas, where $U \in \mathsf{Sub}(A)$ and $V \in \mathsf{Sub}(B)$ and $i \in K$:

$$f^*(V)_i = \{x \in A_i \mid f_i(x) \in V_i\} \tag{3.37}$$
$$\exists_f(U)_i = \{y \in B_i \mid \text{for some } x \in A_i, \ f_i(x) = y \ \& \ x \in U_i\}$$
$$\forall_f(U)_i = \{y \in B_i \mid \text{for all } j \geq i, \text{ for all } x \in A_j, \ f_j(x) = y_j \text{ implies } x \in U_j\}$$

The implication $U \Rightarrow V$ for $U, V \in \mathsf{Sub}(A)$ then has the form, for each $i \in K$,

$$(U \Rightarrow V)_i \ = \ \{x \in A_i \mid \text{for all } j \geq i, \ x_j \in U_j \text{ implies } x_j \in V_j\} \, .$$

And the negation $\neg U \in \mathsf{Sub}(A)$ is then, for each $i \in K$,

$$(\neg U)_i \ = \ \{x \in A_i \mid \text{for all } j \geq i, \ x_j \notin U_j\} \, .$$

Exercise 3.3.31. Show that for the arrow category $\mathbf{2} = \cdot \to \cdot$ the functor category $\mathsf{Set}^{\to}$ is *not* Boolean.

Remark 3.3.32 (Bi-Heyting categories)**.** We know by Proposition 3.3.29 that in presheaf categories $\mathsf{Set}^{\mathbb{C}^{\mathrm{op}}}$, each subobject lattice $\mathsf{Sub}(P)$ is a Heyting algebra. Define a *bi-Heyting category* to be a Heyting category in which each $\mathsf{Sub}(P)$ is a *bi-Heyting algebra*, meaning that both $\mathsf{Sub}(P)$ and its opposite $\mathsf{Sub}(P)^{\mathrm{op}}$ are Heyting algebras. One can show that any presheaf category is also bi-Heyting (this follows from the fact that limits and colimits in presheaves are computed pointwise, but see also Exercise 3.3.33 below). See [Law91, MR95, GER96] for more on bi-Heyting categories.

Exercise 3.3.33. Complete the following sketch to show that any presheaf category $\mathsf{Set}^{\mathbb{C}^{\mathrm{op}}}$ is bi-Heyting.

1. Every presheaf P is covered by a coproduct of representables,

$$\coprod_{C \in \mathbb{C}, \, x \in PC} \mathsf{y}C \twoheadrightarrow P \, .$$

2. There is therefore an injective lattice homomorphism

$$\mathsf{Sub}(P) \rightarrowtail \prod_{C \in \mathbb{C}, x \in PC} \mathsf{Sub}(\mathsf{y}C) \,.$$

3. It thus suffices to show that all $\mathsf{Sub}(\mathsf{y}C)$ are bi-Heyting.

4. The poset $\mathsf{Sub}(\mathsf{y}C)$ is isomorphic to the poset of *sieves* on C in $\mathbb{C}$: sets S of arrows with codomain C, closed under precomposition by arbitrary arrows, i.e. $(s : C' \to C) \in S$ and $t : C'' \to C'$ implies $s \circ t \in S$.

5. Writing $|\mathbb{D}|$ for the poset reflection of an arbitrary category $\mathbb{D}$, the sieves on C are the same as lower sets in the poset reflection of the slice category $|\mathbb{C}/C|$, thus $\mathsf{Sub}(\mathsf{y}C) \cong \,\downarrow\!|\mathbb{C}/C|$.

6. For *any* poset P, the poset of lower sets $\downarrow\!P$, ordered by inclusion, form a Heyting algebra.

7. The opposite category of $\downarrow\!P$ is isomorphic to the upper sets $\uparrow\!P$.

8. But since $\uparrow\!P = \,\downarrow\!(P^{\mathsf{op}})$, by (6) the poset $(\downarrow\!P)^{\mathsf{op}}$ is also a Heyting algebra.

9. Thus $\mathsf{Sub}(\mathsf{y}C)$ is a bi-Heyting algebra.

Remark 3.3.34 (First-order logical duality)**.** The Stone duality for Boolean algebras was seen in Section **??** to have a logical interpretation, under which Boolean algebras represent theories in propositional logic, and Stone spaces represent their 2-valued semantics, with valuations as the points of the corresponding Stone space. There is an analogous duality theory for first-order logic, which extends and generalizes both that for propositional logic as well as that for algebraic theories (Lawvere duality **??**). Theories are represented by Boolean *categories* and their (Set-valued) semantics by topological *groupoids* of models. The interested reader may consult the sources ([Mak93, Mak], [AF13, Awo21]).

3.3.4   Kripke-Joyal semantics

In section 3.1.2, we introduced the idea of using "generalized elements" $z : Z \to C$ as a way of externalizing the interpretation of the logical language. With respect to a subobject $S \rightarrowtail C$, such an element is said to be *in the subobject*, writtten $z \in_C S$, if it factors through $S \rightarrowtail C$.

$$\begin{array}{ccc} & & S \\ & \nearrow & \downarrow \\ Z & \xrightarrow{\;\;z\;\;} & C \end{array}$$

Generalized elements provide a way of *testing for satisfaction* of a formula $(x : A \mid \varphi)$ by a model M, as follows. Let A_M be the interpretation of the type A in the model M, so that the formula determines a subobject $[\![x : A \mid \varphi]\!]_M \rightarrowtail A_M$. Note that in Heyting logic, with $\forall$ and $\Rightarrow$, we can consider satisfaction of individual formulas $(x : A \mid \varphi)$ rather than entailments $(x : A \mid \varphi \vdash \psi)$, by turning the latter into $(\top \vdash \forall x : A.\, \varphi \Rightarrow \psi)$.

Definition 3.3.35. For a theory $\mathbb{T}$ in first-order logic we say that a model M *satisfies* a formula $(x : A \mid \varphi)$, written $M \models (x : A \mid \varphi)$, if the subobject $[\![x : A \mid \varphi]\!]_M \rightarrowtail A_M$ is the maximal one 1_{A_M}.

Note that this notion of satisfaction of a formula agrees with our previous notion of satisfaction for the entailment $x : A \mid \top \vdash \varphi$,

$$
\begin{aligned}
M \models (x : A \mid \varphi) \quad &\text{iff} \quad [\![x : A \mid \varphi]\!]_M = 1_{A_M} \\
&\text{iff} \quad M \models (x : A \mid \top \vdash \varphi)\,.
\end{aligned}
\tag{3.38}
$$

Now observe that the condition $[\![x : A \mid \varphi]\!]_M = 1_{A_M}$ holds just in case every element $z : Z \to A_M$ factors through the subobject $[\![x : A \mid \varphi]\!]_M \rightarrowtail A_M$. It is convenient to use the *forcing* notation $\Vdash$ for this condition, writing

$$
Z \Vdash \varphi(z) \quad \text{for} \quad z \in_{A_M} [\![x : A \mid \varphi]\!]_M\,.
$$

We can then use forcing to test for satisfaction, by asking whether *all* generalized elements $z : Z \to A_M$ factor through $[\![x : A \mid \varphi]\!]_M \rightarrowtail A_M$, and thus "force" the formula $(x : A \mid \varphi)$:

$$
M \models (x : A \mid \varphi) \qquad \text{iff} \qquad \text{for all } z : Z \to A_M,\ Z \Vdash \varphi(z)\,.
$$

We summarize these conventions in the following Definition and Lemma.

Definition 3.3.36 (Kripke-Joyal Forcing)**.** In any Heyting category $\mathcal{C}$, define the *forcing relation* $\Vdash$ as follows: for a formula $(x : A \mid \varphi)$ in the langage of a theory $\mathbb{T}$, and a $\mathbb{T}$-model M, let A_M interpret the type symbol A; then for any $z : Z \to A_M$, we define the relation "z forces φ" by

$$
\begin{aligned}
Z \Vdash \varphi(z) \quad &\text{iff} \quad z \in_{A_M} [\![x : A \mid \varphi]\!]_M \\
&\text{iff} \quad z : Z \to A_M \text{ factors as} \qquad\qquad [\![x : A \mid \varphi]\!]_M\,.
\end{aligned}
\tag{3.39}
$$

Lemma 3.3.37. *For any model M, we have:*

$$
M \models (x : A \mid \varphi) \qquad \text{iff} \qquad \text{for all } z : Z \to A_M,\ Z \Vdash \varphi(z)\,.
\tag{3.40}
$$

$\square$

Of course, we also define forcing for formulas with a context of variables $\Gamma = x_1 : A_1, \ldots x_n : A_n$, and then we have

$$M \models (\Gamma \mid \varphi) \qquad \text{iff} \qquad \text{for all } z : Z \to \Gamma_M, \ Z \Vdash \varphi(z) \,.$$

where $\Gamma_M = (A_1)_M \times \ldots \times (A_1)_M$, and $\varphi(z) = \varphi(z_1, \ldots, z_n)$ where $z_i = \pi_i z : Z \to \Gamma_M \to (A_i)_M$. In the extremal case, we have a formula $\cdot \mid \varphi$ with no free variables (a *closed formula* or *sentence*), for which the interpretation $[\![\cdot \mid \varphi]\!] \rightarrowtail 1$ is in $\mathsf{Sub}(1)$. For such a closed formula, we have

$$M \models (\cdot \mid \varphi) \qquad \text{iff} \qquad \text{for all } z : Z \to 1, \ Z \Vdash \varphi \qquad\qquad (3.41)$$
$$\text{iff} \qquad [\![\cdot \mid \varphi]\!] = 1 \,.$$

In this sense, the Heyting algebra $\mathsf{Sub}(1)$ contains the *truth-values* of statements $(\cdot \mid \varphi)$ in the internal logic, which hold if and only if $[\![\cdot \mid \varphi]\!] = 1$.

The forcing relation $Z \Vdash \varphi(z)$ defined in (3.39) allows us to turn an internal statement $[\![x : A \mid \varphi]\!]_M$, i.e. a formula interpreted as an object of $\mathcal{C}$, into an external one, i.e. an ordinary statement that makes reference to objects an arrows of $\mathcal{C}$. We first restrict attention to categories of presheaves $\widehat{\mathbb{C}} = \mathsf{Set}^{\mathbb{C}^{\mathrm{op}}}$, for the sake of simplicity (but see Remark 3.3.39 below.) In this case, we can restrict to generalized elements $z : Z \to A_M$ of the special form $c : \mathsf{y}C \to A_M$, i.e. with representable domains, because Lemma 3.3.37 clearly still holds when so restricted: $M \models (x : A \mid \varphi)$ iff for all $c : \mathsf{y}C \to A_M$, we have $\mathsf{y}C \Vdash \varphi(c)$. Moreover, we then write simply $C \Vdash \varphi(c)$ for $\mathsf{y}C \Vdash \varphi(c)$. Observe that because (by Yoneda) $c : \mathsf{y}C \to A_M$ corresponds to $c \in A_M(C)$ in Set, with subset $([\![x : A \mid \varphi]\!]_M)(C) \subseteq A_M(C)$, we have, finally, the equivalence

$$C \Vdash \varphi(c) \quad \text{iff} \quad c \in [\![x : A \mid \varphi]\!]_M(C) \,. \qquad\qquad (3.42)$$

Theorem 3.3.38 (Kripke-Joyal Semantics)**.** *For any presheaf category $\widehat{\mathbb{C}}$ and model M of a theory $\mathbb{T}$ in first-order logic, let $(x : A \mid \varphi)$, $(x : A \mid \psi)$, and $(x : A, y : B \mid \vartheta)$ be formulas in the language of $\mathbb{T}$, and let $C \in \mathbb{C}$ and $c, c_1, c_2 : \mathsf{y}C \to A_M$ be any maps. Then we have*

1. *$C \Vdash \top(c)$ always.*

2. *$C \Vdash \bot(c)$ never.*

3. *$C \Vdash c_1 = c_2 \quad$ iff $\quad c_1 = c_2$ as arrows $\mathsf{y}C \to A_M$.*

4. *$C \Vdash \varphi(c) \wedge \psi(c) \quad$ iff $\quad C \Vdash \varphi(c)$ and $C \Vdash \psi(c)$.*

5. *$C \Vdash \varphi(c) \vee \psi(c) \quad$ iff $\quad C \Vdash \varphi(c)$ or $C \Vdash \psi(c)$.*

6. *$C \Vdash \varphi(c) \Rightarrow \psi(c) \quad$ iff $\quad$ for all $d : D \to C$, $D \Vdash \varphi(c.d)$ implies $D \Vdash \psi(c.d)$.*

7. *$C \Vdash \neg\varphi(c) \quad$ iff $\quad$ for no $d : D \to C$, $D \Vdash \varphi(c.d)$.*

8. $C \Vdash \exists y : B.\, \vartheta(c, y)$ *iff*   *for some $c' : C \to B_M$, $C \Vdash \vartheta(c, c')$.*

9. $C \Vdash \forall y : B.\, \vartheta(c, y)$ *iff*   *for all $d : D \to C$, for all $d' : D \to B_M$, $D \Vdash \vartheta(c.d, d')$.*

Proof. We just do a few cases and leave the rest to the reader.

...

Use (3.36) for the non-obvious cases.   □

Examples: LEM, DN, a map is epic, monic, iso. Constant domains.

Remark 3.3.39. There are several variations on Kripke-Joyal semantics for various special kinds of categories: presheaves on a poset P, sheaves on a topological space or a complete Heyting algebra, G-sets for a group or groupoid G, sheaves on a Grothendieck site (i.e. a Grothendieck topos), as well as a general case for arbitrary Heyting categories. Many of these are discussed in [MM92]. In the case of sheaves, the clauses for falsehood $\bot$, disjunction $\vee$, and the existential quantifier $\exists$ typically become more involved. The result is then akin to what is known in constructive logic as Beth semantics.

We next consider another case that is even simpler than presheaves, namely covariant Set-valued functors on a poset P, which may be called "Kripke models".

Exercise 3.3.40. Show that for a group G, regarded as a category with one object, the functor category Set^G is Boolean.

Exercise 3.3.41. Prove Lemma 3.3.37 in the restricted case of presheaves and generalized elements with representable domains, $a : \mathsf{y}C \to A_M$.

Kripke models

As already mentioned, we can regard covariant functors $A : K \to \mathsf{Set}$ on a *poset K* as "sets developing through time". A model in such a category Set^K is a parametrized family of models, $(M_i)_{i \in I}$, or a *variable model*, which can be thought of as changing through space or (non-linearly ordered) time, represented by K. The satisfaction of a formula by such a variable structure can be tested by forcing, as a special case of Theorem 3.3.38. The result becomes simplified somewhat in the clauses for $\forall$ and $\Rightarrow$, in a way that agrees with the original semantics of Kripke [**?**].

Theorem 3.3.42 (Kripke Semantics). *For any first-order theory $\mathbb{T}$ and poset K and model M in the functor category Set^K, let $(x : A \mid \varphi)$, $(x : A \mid \psi)$, and $(x : A, y : B \mid \vartheta)$ be formulas in the language of $\mathbb{T}$, and let $i \in K$ and $a, a_1, a_2 : \mathsf{y}i \to A_M$ be any maps (respectively elements $a, a_1, a_2 \in (A_M)_i$. Then for each $i \in K$ we write $i \Vdash \varphi(a)$ for the relation $a \in (\llbracket x : A \mid \varphi \rrbracket_M)_i$. We can then calculate:*

1. $i \Vdash \top(a)$ *always.*

2. $i \Vdash \bot(a)$ *never.*

3. $i \Vdash a_1 = a_2$ *iff* $a_1 = a_2$ *as elements of the set $(A_M)_i$.*

4. $i \Vdash \varphi(a) \wedge \psi(a)$ *iff* $i \Vdash \varphi(a)$ *and* $i \Vdash \psi(a)$.

5. $i \Vdash \varphi(a) \vee \psi(a)$ *iff* $i \Vdash \varphi(a)$ *or* $i \Vdash \psi(a)$.

6. $i \Vdash \varphi(a) \Rightarrow \psi(a)$ *iff*   *for all* $j \geq i$, $j \Vdash \varphi(a_j)$ *implies* $j \Vdash \psi(a_j)$.

7. $i \Vdash \neg\varphi(a)$ *iff*   *for no* $j \geq i$, $j \Vdash \varphi(a_j)$.

8. $i \Vdash \exists y : B. \vartheta(a, y)$ *iff*   *for some* $b : \mathsf{y}i \to B_M$, $i \Vdash \vartheta(a, b)$.

9. $i \Vdash \forall y : B. \vartheta(a, y)$ *iff*   *for all* $j \geq i$, *for all* $b : \mathsf{y}j \to B_M$, $j \Vdash \vartheta(a_j, b)$.

Proof. Use (3.37) for the non-obvious cases. $\square$

Examples: LEM, DN, a map is epic, monic, iso. Constant domain, increasing domain, individuals and trans-world identity. Presheaf of real-valued functions on a space is an ordered ring.

3.3.5   Joyal embedding theorem

We know by Theorem 3.3.22 that intuitionstic first-order logic is complete with respect to models in Heyting categories, and moreover, that for every theory $\mathbb{T}$, there is a *generic model*, namely the universal one U in the classifying category $\mathcal{C}_{\mathbb{T}}$. The model U is logically generic in the sense that, for any formula $(x : A \mid \varphi)$, there is an equivalence

$$U \models (x : A \mid \varphi) \quad \text{iff} \quad \mathbb{T} \vdash (x : A \mid \varphi).$$

(The symbol $\vdash$ is once again available for provability from a set of formulas, the axioms of $\mathbb{T}$, now that we can consider single formulas rather than entailments $\varphi \vdash \psi$; see Definition 3.3.35.)

Lemma 3.3.43. *A functor $F : \mathcal{C} \to \mathcal{D}$ is said to be* conservative *if it is faithful and reflects isomorphisms. A Heyting functor between Heyting categories is already conservative if it reflects isos; such a functor induces an injective homomorphism on the Heyting algebras* $\mathsf{Sub}(A)$ *for all* $A \in \mathcal{C}$.

Proof. Let $F : \mathcal{C} \to \mathcal{D}$ be Heyting and conservative. The induced functor $\mathsf{Sub}(F) : \mathsf{Sub}(A) \to \mathsf{Sub}(FA)$, taking $U \rightarrowtail A$ to $FU \rightarrowtail FA$, is easily seen to preserve the Heyting operations, because F is Heyting. As for groups, a homomorphism of Heyting algebras is injective iff it has a trivial kernel $\mathsf{Sub}(F)^{-1}(1)$. Let $U \rightarrowtail A$ be in the kernel, i.e. $FU \rightarrowtail FA$ is iso. Then $U \rightarrowtail A$ is iso since F is conservative. To see that F is faithful consider the equalizer of a parallel pair of maps. $\square$

By the foregoing lemma, in order to show completeness of first-order intuitionistic logic with respect to the Kripke-Joyal semantics of Theorem 3.3.38, it will suffice if we can

embed $\mathcal{C}_{\mathbb{T}}$ by a conservative Heyting functor into a functor category $\widehat{\mathbb{C}} = \mathsf{Set}^{\mathbb{C}^{\mathrm{op}}}$ for some suitable (small) category $\mathbb{C}$,

$$F : \mathcal{C}_{\mathbb{T}} \rightarrowtail \widehat{\mathbb{C}} \,.$$

For then, if $FU \models (x : A \mid \varphi)$ in $\widehat{\mathbb{C}}$, then $U \models (x : A \mid \varphi)$ in $\mathcal{C}_{\mathbb{T}}$, since

$$
\begin{aligned}
FU \models (x : A \mid \varphi) \text{ iff } & 1 = [\![x : A \mid \varphi]\!]_{FU} = F([\![x : A \mid \varphi]\!]_U) \\
\text{ iff } & 1 = [\![x : A \mid \varphi]\!]_U \\
\text{ iff } & U \models (x : A \mid \varphi) \,.
\end{aligned}
$$

Such an embedding suffices, therefore, to prove completeness with respect to models in categories of the form $\widehat{\mathbb{C}}$, for which we have Kripke-Joyal semantics. The following representation theorem from [MR95] is originally due to Joyal.

Theorem 3.3.44 (Joyal)**.** *For any small Heyting category $\mathcal{H}$ there is a small category $\mathbb{M}$ and a conservative Heyting functor*

$$\mathcal{H} \rightarrowtail \mathsf{Set}^{\mathbb{M}} \,. \tag{3.43}$$

The proof of Joyal's theorem is beyond the scope of these notes, but we will mention that the category $\mathbb{M}$ is itself a subcategory of a functor category,

$$\mathbb{M} = \mathsf{Reg}(\mathcal{H}, \mathsf{Set}) \hookrightarrow \mathsf{Set}^{\mathcal{H}},$$

where $\mathsf{Reg}(\mathcal{H}, \mathsf{Set})$ is the category of all *regular* (not Heyting!) functors $\mathcal{H} \to \mathsf{Set}$, and can therefore be regarded as a "category of models" of the "underlying regular theory" of the Heyting category $\mathcal{H}$. Here we have a glimpse of a generalization of Lawvere duality (as well as Stone duality, as emphasized in [MR95]) to regular categories, as developed by Makkai in [**?**]. The conservativity of the embedding (3.43) makes use of the Freyd embedding theorem for regular categories from Section 3.2.6, but the remarkable fact here is that the "double dual" embedding is not just regular, but Heyting. Compare the analogous result for the (special case) of propositional logic given in Chapter **??**.

Theorem 3.3.45. *Intuitionistic first-order logic is sound and complete with respect to the Kripke-Joyal semantics of 3.3.38. Specifically, for every theory $\mathbb{T}$, there is a model M in a presheaf category $\widehat{\mathbb{C}}$ with the property that, for every closed formula φ,*

$$\mathbb{T} \vdash \varphi \quad \textit{iff} \quad M \models \varphi \quad \textit{iff} \quad \mathbb{C} \Vdash \varphi \,,$$

where by $\mathbb{C} \Vdash \varphi$ we mean $C \Vdash \varphi$ for all $C \in \mathbb{C}$.

3.3.6   Kripke completeness

Finally, in order to specialize even further to the case of a Kripke model Set^K for a *poset* K, we can use the following "covering theorem".

Theorem 3.3.46 (Diaconescu)**.** *For any small category $\mathbb{C}$ there is a poset K and a conservative Heyting functor*

$$\mathsf{Set}^{\mathbb{C}} \rightarrowtail \mathsf{Set}^{K}. \tag{3.44}$$

For a sketch of the proof (see [MM92, IX.9] and [MR95, §3] for details), the poset K may be taken to be $\mathsf{String}(\mathbb{C})$, consisting of finite strings of arrows in $\mathbb{C}$,

$$s = (C_n \xrightarrow{s_n} C_{n-1} \longrightarrow \ldots \longrightarrow C_1 \xrightarrow{s_1} C_0)$$

ordered by $t \leq s$ iff t extends s to the left, i.e. $s_i = t_i$ for all s_i in the string s. There is an evident functor

$$\pi : \mathsf{String}(\mathbb{C}) \longrightarrow \mathbb{C}$$

taking $s = (s_0, \ldots, s_n)$ to the "first" object C_n and $t \leq s$ to the evident composite of the extra initial t's. The functor π induces one on the functor categories by precomposition

$$\pi^* : \mathsf{Set}^{\mathbb{C}} \longrightarrow \mathsf{Set}^{\mathsf{String}(\mathbb{C})}.$$

One can show by a direct calculation that π^* is Heyting and that it is conservative, using the fact that π is surjective on both arrows and objects.

Corollary 3.3.47. *Intuitionistic first-order logic is sound and complete with respect to the Kripke semantics of Theorem 3.3.42. Specifically, for every theory $\mathbb{T}$, there is a poset K and a model M in Set^K with the property that, for every closed formula φ,*

$$\mathbb{T} \vdash \varphi \quad \text{iff} \quad M \models \varphi \quad \text{iff} \quad K \Vdash \varphi,$$

where by $K \Vdash \varphi$ we mean $k \Vdash \varphi$ for all $k \in K$.

Remark 3.3.48 (Gödel completeness)**.**

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