

# Introduction to Categorical Logic

[DRAFT: FEBRUARY 23, 2022]

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# Chapter 2

## Propositional Logic

Propositional logic is the logic of propositional connectives like  $p \wedge q$  and  $p \Rightarrow q$ . As was the case for algebraic theories, the general approach will be to determine suitable categorical structures to model the logical operations, and then use categories with such structure to represent (abstract) propositional theories. Adjoints will play a special role, as we will describe the basic logical operations as such. We again show that the semantics is “functorial”, meaning that the models of a theory are functors that preserve the categorical structure. We will show that there are classifying categories for all propositional theories, as was the case for the algebraic theories that we have already met.

A more abstract, algebraic perspective will then relate the propositional case of syntax-semantics duality with classical Stone duality for Boolean algebras, and related results from lattice theory will provide an algebraic treatment of Kripke semantics for intuitionistic (and modal) propositional logic.

### 2.1 Propositional calculus

Before going into the details of the categorical approach, we first briefly review the propositional calculus from a conventional point of view, as we did for algebraic theories. We focus first on the *classical* propositional logic, before considering the intuitionistic case in section ??.

In the style of Section A.1, we have the following (abstract) syntax for (propositional) formulas:

Propositional variable  $p ::= p_1 \mid p_2 \mid p_3 \mid \dots$

Propositional formula  $\phi ::= p \mid \top \mid \perp \mid \neg\phi \mid \phi_1 \wedge \phi_2 \mid \phi_1 \vee \phi_2 \mid \phi_1 \Rightarrow \phi_2 \mid \phi_1 \Leftrightarrow \phi_2$

An example of a formula is therefore  $(p_3 \Leftrightarrow (((\neg p_1) \vee (p_2 \wedge \perp)) \vee p_1) \Rightarrow p_3)$ . We will make use of the usual conventions for parenthesis, with binding order  $\neg, \wedge, \vee, \Rightarrow, \Leftrightarrow$ . Thus e.g. the foregoing may also be written unambiguously as  $p_3 \Leftrightarrow \neg p_1 \vee p_2 \wedge \perp \vee p_1 \Rightarrow p_3$ .

## Natural deduction

The system of *natural deduction* for propositional logic has one form of judgement

$$\mathbf{p}_1, \dots, \mathbf{p}_n \mid \phi_1, \dots, \phi_m \vdash \phi$$

where  $\mathbf{p}_1, \dots, \mathbf{p}_n$  is a *context* consisting of distinct propositional variables, the formulas  $\phi_1, \dots, \phi_m$  are the *hypotheses* and  $\phi$  is the *conclusion*. The variables in the hypotheses and the conclusion must occur among those listed in the context. The hypotheses are regarded as a (finite) set; so they are unordered, have no repetitions, and may be empty. We may abbreviate the context of variables by  $\Gamma$ , and we often omit it.

*Deductive entailment* (or *derivability*)  $\Phi \vdash \phi$  is thus a relation between finite sets of formulas  $\Phi$  and single formulas  $\phi$ . It is defined as the smallest such relation satisfying the following rules:

1. Hypothesis:

$$\frac{}{\Phi \vdash \phi} \text{ if } \phi \text{ occurs in } \Phi$$

2. Truth:

$$\frac{}{\Phi \vdash \top}$$

3. Falsehood:

$$\frac{\Phi \vdash \perp}{\Phi \vdash \phi}$$

4. Conjunction:

$$\frac{\Phi \vdash \phi \quad \Phi \vdash \psi}{\Phi \vdash \phi \wedge \psi} \quad \frac{\Phi \vdash \phi \wedge \psi}{\Phi \vdash \phi} \quad \frac{\Phi \vdash \phi \wedge \psi}{\Phi \vdash \psi}$$

5. Disjunction:

$$\frac{\Phi \vdash \phi}{\Phi \vdash \phi \vee \psi} \quad \frac{\Phi \vdash \psi}{\Phi \vdash \phi \vee \psi} \quad \frac{\Phi \vdash \phi \vee \psi \quad \Phi, \phi \vdash \theta \quad \Phi, \psi \vdash \theta}{\Phi \vdash \theta}$$

6. Implication:

$$\frac{\Phi, \phi \vdash \psi}{\Phi \vdash \phi \Rightarrow \psi} \quad \frac{\Phi \vdash \phi \Rightarrow \psi \quad \Phi \vdash \phi}{\Phi \vdash \psi}$$

For the purpose of deduction, we define  $\neg\phi := \phi \Rightarrow \perp$  and  $\phi \Leftrightarrow \psi := (\phi \Rightarrow \psi) \wedge (\psi \Rightarrow \phi)$ . To obtain *classical* logic we need only include one of the following additional rules.

7. Classical logic:

$$\frac{}{\Phi \vdash \phi \vee \neg\phi} \quad \frac{\Phi \vdash \neg\neg\phi}{\Phi \vdash \phi}$$

A *proof* of  $\Phi \vdash \phi$  is a *finite* tree built from the above inference rules whose root is  $\Phi \vdash \phi$ . For example, here is a proof of  $\phi \vee \psi \vdash \psi \vee \phi$  using the disjunction rules:

$$\frac{\overline{\phi \vee \psi \vdash \phi \vee \psi} \quad \overline{\phi \vee \psi, \phi \vdash \phi} \quad \overline{\phi \vee \psi, \psi \vdash \psi}}{\phi \vee \psi \vdash \psi \vee \phi}$$

A judgment  $\Phi \vdash \phi$  is *provable* if there exists a proof of it. Observe that every proof has at its leaves either the rule for  $\top$  or a hypothesis.

**Exercise 2.1.1.** Derive each of the two classical rules (2.1), called *excluded middle* and *double negation*, from the other.

## 2.2 Truth values

The idea of an axiomatic system of deductive, logical reasoning goes back to Frege, who gave the first such system for propositional calculus (and more) in his *Begriffsschrift* of 1879. The question soon arose whether Frege's rules (or rather, their derivable consequences – it was clear that one could choose the primitive basis in different but equivalent ways) were correct, and if so, whether they were *all* the correct ones. An ingenious solution was proposed by Russell's student Wittgenstein, who came up with an entirely different way of singling out a set of “valid” propositional formulas in terms of assignments of truth values to the variables occurring in them. He interpreted this as showing that logical validity was really a matter of the logical structure of a proposition, and not dependent on any particular system of derivations. The same idea seems to have been had independently by Post, who proved that the valid propositional formulas coincide with the ones derivable in Whitehead and Russell's *Principia Mathematica* (which is propositionally equivalent to Frege's system), a fact that we now refer to as the *soundness* and *completeness* of propositional logic.

In more detail, let a *valuation*  $v$  be an assignment of a “truth-value” 0, 1 to each propositional variable,  $v(\mathbf{p}_n) \in \{0, 1\}$ . We can then extend the valuation to all propositional formulas  $\llbracket \phi \rrbracket^v$  by the recursion,

$$\begin{aligned} \llbracket \mathbf{p}_n \rrbracket^v &= v(\mathbf{p}_n) \\ \llbracket \top \rrbracket^v &= 1 \\ \llbracket \perp \rrbracket^v &= 0 \\ \llbracket \neg \phi \rrbracket^v &= 1 - \llbracket \phi \rrbracket^v \\ \llbracket \phi \wedge \psi \rrbracket^v &= \min(\llbracket \phi \rrbracket^v, \llbracket \psi \rrbracket^v) \\ \llbracket \phi \vee \psi \rrbracket^v &= \max(\llbracket \phi \rrbracket^v, \llbracket \psi \rrbracket^v) \\ \llbracket \phi \Rightarrow \psi \rrbracket^v &= 1 \text{ iff } \llbracket \phi \rrbracket^v \leq \llbracket \psi \rrbracket^v \\ \llbracket \phi \Leftrightarrow \psi \rrbracket^v &= 1 \text{ iff } \llbracket \phi \rrbracket^v = \llbracket \psi \rrbracket^v \end{aligned}$$

This is sometimes expressed using the “semantic consequence” notation  $v \models \phi$  to mean that  $\llbracket \phi \rrbracket^v = 1$ . Then the above specification takes the form:

$$\begin{aligned}
 v \models \top & \quad \text{always} \\
 v \models \perp & \quad \text{never} \\
 v \models \neg \phi & \quad \text{iff } v \not\models \phi \\
 v \models \phi \wedge \psi & \quad \text{iff } v \models \phi \text{ and } v \models \psi \\
 v \models \phi \vee \psi & \quad \text{iff } v \models \phi \text{ or } v \models \psi \\
 v \models \phi \Rightarrow \psi & \quad \text{iff } v \models \phi \text{ implies } v \models \psi \\
 v \models \phi \Leftrightarrow \psi & \quad \text{iff } v \models \phi \text{ iff } v \models \psi
 \end{aligned}$$

Finally,  $\phi$  is *valid*, written  $\models \phi$ , is defined by,

$$\models \phi \quad \text{iff } v \models \phi \text{ for all } v.$$

And, more generally, we define  $\phi_1, \dots, \phi_n$  *semantically entails*  $\phi$ , written

$$\phi_1, \dots, \phi_n \models \phi, \tag{2.1}$$

to mean that for all valuations  $v$  such that  $v \models \phi_k$  for all  $k$ , also  $v \models \phi$ .

Given a formula in context  $\Gamma \mid \phi$  and a valuation  $v$  for the variables in  $\Gamma$ , one can check whether  $v \models \phi$  using a *truth table*, which is a systematic way of calculating the value of  $\llbracket \phi \rrbracket^v$ . For example, under the assignment  $v(\mathbf{p}_1) = 1, v(\mathbf{p}_2) = 0, v(\mathbf{p}_3) = 1$  we can calculate  $\llbracket \phi \rrbracket^v$  for  $\phi = (\mathbf{p}_3 \Leftrightarrow (((\neg \mathbf{p}_1) \vee (\mathbf{p}_2 \wedge \perp)) \vee \mathbf{p}_1) \Rightarrow \mathbf{p}_3)$  as follows.

$\mathbf{p}_1$	$\mathbf{p}_2$	$\mathbf{p}_3$	$\mathbf{p}_3 \Leftrightarrow \neg \mathbf{p}_1 \vee \mathbf{p}_2 \wedge \perp \vee \mathbf{p}_1 \Rightarrow \mathbf{p}_3$										
1	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	1

The value of the formula  $\phi$  under the valuation  $v$  is then the value in the column under the main connective, in this case  $\Leftrightarrow$ , and thus  $\llbracket \phi \rrbracket^v = 1$ .

Displaying all  $2^3$  valuations for the context  $\Gamma = \mathbf{p}_1, \mathbf{p}_2, \mathbf{p}_3$ , therefore results in a table that checks for validity of  $\phi$ ,

$\mathbf{p}_1$	$\mathbf{p}_2$	$\mathbf{p}_3$	$\mathbf{p}_3$	$\Leftrightarrow$	$\neg$	$\mathbf{p}_1$	$\vee$	$\mathbf{p}_2$	$\wedge$	$\perp$	$\vee$	$\mathbf{p}_1$	$\Rightarrow$	$\mathbf{p}_3$
1	1	1	.	1	...									
1	1	0	.	1		...								
1	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1
1	0	0	.	1				...						
0	1	1	.	1					...					
0	1	0	.	1						...				
0	0	1	.	1							...			
0	0	0	.	1								...		

In this case, working out the other rows shows that  $\phi$  is indeed valid, thus  $\models \phi$ .



**Proposition 2.2.1** (Soundness and Completeness of Propositional Calculus). *Let  $\Phi$  be any set of formulas and  $\psi$  any formula, then*

$$\Phi \vdash \psi \iff \Phi \models \psi.$$

*In particular, for any propositional formula  $\phi$  we have*

$$\vdash \phi \iff \models \phi.$$

*Thus derivability and validity coincide.*

*Proof.* Let us sketch the usual proof, for later reference.

(*Soundness:*) First assume  $\Phi \vdash \psi$ , meaning there is a finite derivation of  $\psi$ , all of the hypotheses of which are in the set  $\Phi$ . Take a valuation  $v$  such that  $v \models \Phi$ , meaning that  $v \models \phi$  for all  $\phi \in \Phi$ . Observe that for each rule of inference, for any valuation  $v$ , if  $v \models \vartheta$  for all the hypotheses of the rule, then  $v \models \gamma$  for the conclusion. By induction on the derivations therefore  $v \models \psi$ .

(*Completeness:*) Suppose that  $\Phi \not\vdash \psi$ , then  $\Phi, \neg\psi \not\vdash \perp$  (using double negation elimination). By Lemma 2.2.2 below, there is a valuation  $v$  such that  $v \models \{\Phi, \neg\psi\}$ . Thus in particular  $v \models \Phi$  and  $v \not\models \psi$ , therefore  $\Phi \not\models \psi$ .  $\square$

The key lemma is this:

**Lemma 2.2.2** (Model Existence). *A set  $\Phi$  of formulas is consistent,  $\Phi \not\vdash \perp$ , just if it has a model, i.e. a valuation  $v$  such that  $v \models \Phi$ .*

*Proof.* Let  $\Phi$  be any consistent set of formulas. We extend  $\Phi \subseteq \Psi$  to one that is *maximally consistent*, meaning that for every formula  $\psi$ , either  $\psi \in \Psi$  or  $\neg\psi \in \Psi$  and not both. Enumerate the formulas  $\phi_0, \phi_1, \dots$ , and let,

$$\begin{aligned} \Phi_0 &= \Phi, \\ \Phi_{n+1} &= \Phi_n \cup \phi_n \text{ if consistent, else } \Phi_n, \\ \Psi &= \bigcup_n \Phi_n. \end{aligned}$$

Now for each propositional variable  $p$ , define  $v(p) = 1$  just if  $p \in \Psi$ .  $\square$

## 2.3 Boolean algebra

There is of course another approach to propositional logic, which also goes back to the 19th century, namely that of Boolean algebra, which draws on the analogy between the propositional operations and the arithmetical ones.

**Definition 2.3.1.** A *Boolean algebra* is a set  $B$  equipped with the operations:

$$\begin{aligned} 0, 1 &: 1 \rightarrow B \\ \neg &: B \rightarrow B \\ \wedge, \vee &: B \times B \rightarrow B \end{aligned}$$

satisfying the following equations:

$$\begin{array}{ll}
x \vee x = x & x \wedge x = x \\
x \vee y = y \vee x & x \wedge y = y \wedge x \\
x \vee (y \vee z) = (x \vee y) \vee z & x \wedge (y \wedge z) = (x \wedge y) \wedge z \\
x \wedge (y \vee z) = (x \wedge y) \vee (x \wedge z) & x \vee (y \wedge z) = (x \vee y) \wedge (x \vee z) \\
0 \vee x = x & 1 \wedge x = x \\
1 \vee x = 1 & 0 \wedge x = 0 \\
\neg(x \vee y) = \neg x \wedge \neg y & \neg(x \wedge y) = \neg x \vee \neg y \\
x \vee \neg x = 1 & x \wedge \neg x = 0
\end{array}$$

This is of course an algebraic theory, like those considered in the previous chapter. Familiar examples of Boolean algebras are  $2 = \{0, 1\}$ , with the usual operations, and more generally, any powerset  $\mathcal{P}X$ , with the set-theoretic operations  $A \vee B = A \cup B$ , etc. (indeed,  $2 = \mathcal{P}1$  is a special case.).

**Exercise 2.3.2.** The free Boolean algebra  $B(n)$  on  $n$ -many generators is the double powerset  $\mathcal{P}\mathcal{P}(n)$ .

One can use equational reasoning in Boolean algebra as an alternative to the deductive propositional calculus as follows. For a propositional formula in context  $\Gamma \mid \phi$ , let us say that  $\phi$  is *equationally provable* if we can show that  $\phi = 1$  by equational reasoning (Section A.5), from the laws of Boolean algebras above. More generally, for a set of formulas  $\Phi$  and a formula  $\psi$  we define  $\Phi \vdash_{=} \psi$  to mean that  $\psi = 1$  can be proven equationally from the set of all equations  $\phi = 1$ , for  $\phi \in \Phi$ . Since we don't have any laws for the connectives  $\Rightarrow$  or  $\Leftrightarrow$ , we replace them with their Boolean equivalents  $\phi \Rightarrow \psi := \neg\phi \vee \psi$  and  $\phi \Leftrightarrow \psi := (\neg\phi \vee \psi) \wedge (\neg\psi \vee \phi)$ . For example, here is an equational proof of  $(\phi \Rightarrow \psi) \vee (\psi \Rightarrow \phi)$ .

$$\begin{aligned}
(\phi \Rightarrow \psi) \vee (\psi \Rightarrow \phi) &= (\neg\phi \vee \psi) \vee (\neg\psi \vee \phi) \\
&= \neg\phi \vee (\psi \vee (\neg\psi \vee \phi)) \\
&= \neg\phi \vee ((\psi \vee \neg\psi) \vee \phi) \\
&= \neg\phi \vee (1 \vee \phi) \\
&= \neg\phi \vee 1 \\
&= 1 \vee \neg\phi \\
&= 1
\end{aligned}$$

Now we may reasonably ask: *What is the relationship between equational provability  $\Phi \vdash_{=} \phi$  and deductive entailment  $\Phi \vdash \phi$ ?*

**Exercise 2.3.3.** Using equational reasoning, show that every propositional formula  $\phi$  has both a *conjunctive*  $\phi^\wedge$  and a *disjunctive*  $\phi^\vee$  *Boolean normal form* such that:

1. The formula  $\phi^\vee$  is an  $n$ -fold disjunction of  $m$ -fold conjunctions of *positive*  $\mathbf{p}_i$  or *negative*  $\neg \mathbf{p}_j$  propositional variables,

$$\phi^\vee = (\mathbf{q}_{11} \wedge \dots \wedge \mathbf{q}_{1m_1}) \vee \dots \vee (\mathbf{q}_{n1} \wedge \dots \wedge \mathbf{q}_{nm_n}), \quad \mathbf{q}_{ij} \in \{\mathbf{p}_{ij}, \neg \mathbf{p}_{ij}\},$$

and  $\phi^\wedge$  is the same, but with the roles of  $\vee$  and  $\wedge$  reversed.

2. Both

$$\vdash_{=} \phi \Leftrightarrow \phi^\vee \quad \text{and} \quad \vdash_{=} \phi \Leftrightarrow \phi^\wedge.$$

**Exercise 2.3.4.** Using Exercise 2.3.3, show that for every propositional formula  $\phi$ , equational provability is equivalent to semantic validity,

$$\vdash_{=} \phi \iff \models \phi.$$

*Hint:* Put  $\phi$  into conjunctive normal form and read off a truth valuation that falsifies it, if there is one.




# Appendix A

## Logic

### A.1 Concrete and abstract syntax

By *syntax* we generally mean manipulation of finite strings of symbols according to given *grammatical rules*. For instance, the strings “ $7)6 + /(8$ ” and “ $(6 + 8)/7$ ” both consist of the same symbols but you will recognize one as junk and the other as *well formed* because you have (implicitly) applied the grammatical rules for arithmetical expressions.

Grammatical rules are usually quite complicated, as they need to prescribe associativity of operators (does “ $5 + 6 + 7$ ” mean “ $(5 + 6) + 7$ ” or “ $5 + (6 + 7)$ ”?) and their precedence (does “ $6 + 8/7$ ” mean “ $(6 + 8)/7$ ” or “ $6 + (8/7)$ ”?), the role of *white space* (empty space between symbols and line breaks), rules for nesting and balancing parentheses, etc. It is not our intention to dwell on such details, but rather to focus on the mathematical nature of well-formed expressions, namely that they represent inductively generated finite trees.<sup>1</sup> Under this view the string “ $(6 + 8)/7$ ” is just a concrete representation of the tree depicted in Figure A.1.



**Figure A.1:** The tree represented by  $(6 + 8)/7$

Concrete representation of expressions as finite strings of symbols is called *concrete syntax*, while in *abstract syntax* we view expressions as finite trees. The passage from the

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<sup>1</sup>We are limiting attention to the so-called *context-free* grammar, which are sufficient for our purposes. More complicated grammars are rarely used to describe formal languages in logic and computer science.

former to the latter is called *parsing* and is beyond the scope of this book. We will always specify only abstract syntax and assume that the corresponding concrete syntax follows the customary rules for parentheses, associativity and precedence of operators.

As an illustration we give rules for the (abstract) syntax of propositional calculus in *Backus-Naur* form:

Propositional variable  $p ::= p_1 \mid p_2 \mid p_3 \mid \dots$


Propositional formula  $\phi ::= p \mid \perp \mid \top \mid \phi_1 \wedge \phi_2 \mid \phi_1 \vee \phi_2 \mid \phi_1 \Rightarrow \phi_2 \mid \neg\phi$

The vertical bars should be read as “or”. The first rule says that a propositional variable is the constant  $p_1$ , or the constant  $p_2$ , or the constant  $p_3$ , etc.<sup>2</sup> The second rule tells us that there are seven inductive rules for building a propositional formula:

- a propositional variable is a formula,
- the constants  $\perp$  and  $\top$  are formulas,
- if  $\phi_1$ ,  $\phi_2$ , and  $\phi$  are formulas, then so are  $\phi_1 \wedge \phi_2$ ,  $\phi_1 \vee \phi_2$ ,  $\phi_1 \Rightarrow \phi_2$ , and  $\neg\phi$ .

Even though abstract syntax rules say nothing about parentheses or operator associativity and precedence, we shall rely on established conventions for mathematical notation and write down concrete representations of propositional formulas, e.g.,  $p_4 \wedge (p_1 \vee \neg p_1) \wedge p_4 \vee p_2$ .

A word of warning: operator associativity in syntax is not to be confused with the usual notion of associativity in mathematics. We say that an operator  $\star$  is *left associative* when an expression  $x \star y \star z$  represents the left-hand tree in Figure A.2, and *right associative* when it represents the right-hand tree. Thus the usual operation of subtraction  $-$  is left



**Figure A.2:** Left and right associativity of  $x \star y \star z$

associative, but is not associative in the usual mathematical sense.

<sup>2</sup>In an actual computer implementation we would allow arbitrary finite strings of letters as propositional variables. In logic we only care about the fact that we can never run out of fresh variables, i.e., that there are countably infinitely many of them.

## A.2 Free and bound variables

Variables appearing in an expression may be *free* or *bound*. For example, in expressions

$$\int_0^1 \sin(a \cdot x) dx, \quad x \mapsto ax^2 + bx + c, \quad \forall x. (x < a \vee x > b)$$

the variables  $a$ ,  $b$  and  $c$  are free, while  $x$  is bound by the integral operator  $\int$ , the function formation  $\mapsto$ , and the universal quantifier  $\forall$ , respectively. To be quite precise, it is an *occurrence* of a variable that is free or bound. For example, in expression  $\phi(x) \vee \exists x. A\psi(x, x)$  the first occurrence of  $x$  is free and the remaining ones are bound.

In this book the following operators bind variables:

- quantifiers  $\exists$  and  $\forall$ , cf. ??,
- $\lambda$ -abstraction, cf. ??,
- search for others ??.

When a variable is bound we may always rename it, provided the renaming does not confuse it with another variable. In the integral above we could rename  $x$  to  $y$ , but not to  $a$  because the binding operation would *capture* the free variable  $a$  to produce the unintended  $\int_0^1 \sin(a^2) da$ . Renaming of bound variables is called  *$\alpha$ -renaming*.

We consider two expressions *equal* if they only differ in the names of bound variables, i.e., if one can be obtained from the other by  $\alpha$ -renaming. Furthermore, we adhere to *Barendregt's variable convention* [?, p. 2], which says that bound variables are always chosen so as to differ from free variables. Thus we would never write  $\phi(x) \vee \exists x. A\psi(x, x)$  but rather  $\phi(x) \vee \exists y. A\psi(y, y)$ . By doing so we need not worry about capturing or otherwise confusing free and bound variables.

In logic we need to be more careful about variables than is customary in traditional mathematics. Specifically, we always specify which free variables may appear in an expression.<sup>3</sup> We write

$$x_1 : A_1, \dots, x_n : A_n \mid t$$

to indicate that expression  $t$  may contain only free variables  $x_1, \dots, x_n$  of types  $A_1, \dots, A_n$ . The list

$$x_1 : A_1, \dots, x_n : A_n$$

is called a *context* in which  $t$  appears. To see why this is important consider the different meaning that the expression  $x^2 + y^2 \leq 1$  receives in different contexts:

- $x : \mathbb{Z}, y : \mathbb{Z} \mid x^2 + y^2 \leq 1$  denotes the set of tuples  $\{(-1, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (0, -1)\}$ ,
- $x : \mathbb{R}, y : \mathbb{R} \mid x^2 + y^2 \leq 1$  denotes the closed unit disc in the plane, and

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<sup>3</sup>This is akin to one of the guiding principles of good programming language design, namely, that all variables should be *declared* before they are used.

- $x : \mathbb{R}, y : \mathbb{R}, z : \mathbb{R} \mid x^2 + y^2 \leq 1$  denotes the infinite cylinder in space whose base is the closed unit disc.

In single-sorted theories there is only one type or sort  $A$ . In this case we abbreviate a context by listing just the variables,  $x_1, \dots, x_n$ .

### A.3 Substitution

Substitution is a basic syntactic operation which replaces (free occurrences of) distinct variables  $x_1, \dots, x_n$  in an expression  $t$  with expressions  $t_1, \dots, t_n$ , which is written as

$$t[t_1/x_1, \dots, t_n/x_n].$$

We sometimes abbreviate this as  $t[\vec{t}/\vec{x}]$  where  $\vec{x} = (x_1, \dots, x_n)$  and  $\vec{t} = (t_1, \dots, t_n)$ . Here are several examples:

$$\begin{aligned} (x^2 + x + y)[(2 + 3)/x] &= (2 + 3)^2 + (2 + 3) + y \\ (x^2 + y)[y/x, x/y] &= y^2 + x \\ (\forall x. (x^2 < y + x^3)) [x + y/y] &= \forall z. (z^2 < (x + y) + z^3). \end{aligned}$$

Notice that in the third example we first renamed the bound variable  $x$  to  $z$  in order to avoid a capture by  $\forall$ .

Substitution is simple to explain in terms of trees. Assuming Barendregt's convention, the substitution  $t[u/x]$  means that in the tree  $t$  we replace the leaves labeled  $x$  by copies of the tree  $u$ . Thus a substitution never changes the structure of the tree—it only “grows” new subtrees in places where the substituted variables occur as leaves.

Substitution satisfies the distributive law

$$(t[u/x])[v/y] = (t[v/y])[u[v/y]/x],$$

provided  $x$  and  $y$  are distinct variables. There is also a corresponding multivariate version which is written the same way with a slight abuse of vector notation:

$$(t[\vec{u}/\vec{x}])[\vec{v}/\vec{y}] = (t[\vec{v}/\vec{y}])[\vec{u}[\vec{v}/\vec{y}]/\vec{x}].$$

### A.4 Judgments and deductive systems

A formal system, such as first-order logic or type theory, concerns itself with *judgments*. There are many kinds of judgments, such as:

- The most common judgments are equations and other logical statements. We distinguish a formula  $\phi$  and the judgment “ $\phi$  holds” by writing the latter as

$$\vdash \phi.$$

The symbol  $\vdash$  is generally used to indicate judgments.



- Typing judgments

$$\vdash t : A$$

expressing the fact that a term  $t$  has type  $A$ . This is not to be confused with the set-theoretic statement  $t \in u$  which says that individuals  $t$  and  $u$  (of type “set”) are in relation “element of”  $\in$ .

- Judgments expressing the fact that a certain entity is well formed. A typical example is a judgment

$$\vdash x_1 : A_1, \dots, x_n : A_n \quad \text{ctx}$$

which states that  $x_1 : A_1, \dots, x_n : A_n$  is a well-formed context. This means that  $x_1, \dots, x_n$  are distinct variables and that  $A_1, \dots, A_n$  are well-formed types. This kind of judgement is often omitted and it is tacitly assumed that whatever entities we deal with are in fact well-formed.

A *hypothetical judgement* has the form

$$H_1, \dots, H_n \vdash C$$

and means that hypotheses  $H_1, \dots, H_n$  entail consequence  $C$  (with respect to a given deductive system). We may also add a typing context to get a general form of judgment

$$x_1 : A_1, \dots, x_n : A_n \mid H_1, \dots, H_m \vdash C.$$

This should be read as: “if  $x_1, \dots, x_n$  are variables of types  $A_1, \dots, A_n$ , respectively, then hypotheses  $H_1, \dots, H_m$  entail conclusion  $C$ .” For our purposes such contexts will suffice, but you should not be surprised to see other kinds of judgments in logic.

A *deductive system* is a set of inference rules for deriving judgments. A typical inference rule has the form

$$\frac{J_1 \quad J_2 \quad \dots \quad J_n}{J} C$$

This means that we can infer judgment  $J$  if we have already derived judgments  $J_1, \dots, J_n$ , provided that the optional side-condition  $C$  is satisfied. An *axiom* is an inference rule of the form

$$\overline{J}$$

A *two-way rule*

$$\frac{J_1 \quad J_2 \quad \dots \quad J_n}{K_1 \quad K_2 \quad \dots \quad K_m}$$

is a combination of  $n + m$  inference rules stating that we may infer each  $K_i$  from  $J_1, \dots, J_n$  and each  $J_i$  from  $K_1, \dots, K_m$ .

A *derivation* of a judgment  $J$  is a finite tree whose root is  $J$ , the nodes are inference rules, and the leaves are axioms. An example is presented in the next subsection.

The set of all judgments that hold in a given deductive system is generated inductively by starting with the axioms and applying inference rules.

## A.5 Example: Equational reasoning

Equational reasoning is so straightforward that one almost doesn't notice it, consisting mainly, as it does, of “substituting equals for equals”. The only judgements are equations between terms,  $s = t$ , which consist of function symbols, constants, and variables. The inference rules are just the usual ones making  $s = t$  a congruence relation on the terms. More formally, we have the following specification of what may be called the *equational calculus*.

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Variable } v &::= x \mid y \mid z \mid \dots \\ \text{Constant symbol } c &::= c_1 \mid c_2 \mid \dots \\ \text{Function symbol } f^k &::= f_1^{k_1} \mid f_2^{k_2} \mid \dots \\ \text{Term } t &::= v \mid c \mid f^k(t_1, \dots, t_k) \end{aligned}$$

The superscript on the function symbol  $f^k$  indicates the arity.

The equational calculus has just one form of judgement

$$x_1, \dots, x_n \mid t_1 = t_2$$

where  $x_1, \dots, x_n$  is a *context* consisting of distinct variables, and the variables in the equation must occur among the ones listed in the context.

There are four inference rules for the equational calculus. They may be assumed to leave the contexts unchanged, which may therefore be omitted.

$$\begin{array}{cccc} \frac{}{t = t} & \frac{t_1 = t_2}{t_2 = t_1} & \frac{t_1 = t_2, t_2 = t_3}{t_1 = t_3} & \frac{t_1 = t_2, t_3 = t_4}{t_1[t_3/x] = t_2[t_4/x]} \end{array}$$

An *equational theory*  $\mathbb{T}$  consists of a set of constant and function symbols (with arities), and a set of equations, called *axioms*.

## A.6 Example: Predicate calculus

We spell out the details of single-sorted predicate calculus and first-order theories. This is the most common deductive system taught in classical courses on logic.

The predicate calculus has the following syntax:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Variable } v &::= x \mid y \mid z \mid \dots \\ \text{Constant symbol } c &::= c_1 \mid c_2 \mid \dots \\ \text{Function symbol}^4 f^k &::= f_1^{k_1} \mid f_2^{k_2} \mid \dots \\ \text{Term } t &::= v \mid c \mid f^k(t_1, \dots, t_k) \\ \text{Relation symbol } R^m &::= R_1^{m_1} \mid R_2^{m_2} \mid \dots \\ \text{Formula } \phi &::= \perp \mid \top \mid R^m(t_1, \dots, t_m) \mid t_1 = t_2 \mid \\ &\quad \phi_1 \wedge \phi_2 \mid \phi_1 \vee \phi_2 \mid \phi_1 \Rightarrow \phi_2 \mid \neg \phi \mid \forall x. \phi \mid \exists x. \phi. \end{aligned}$$

The variable  $x$  is bound in  $\forall x . \phi$  and  $\exists x . \phi$ .

The predicate calculus has one form of judgement

$$x_1, \dots, x_n \mid \phi_1, \dots, \phi_m \vdash \phi$$

where  $x_1, \dots, x_n$  is a *context* consisting of distinct variables,  $\phi_1, \dots, \phi_m$  are *hypotheses* and  $\phi$  is the *conclusion*. The free variables in the hypotheses and the conclusion must occur among the ones listed in the context. We abbreviate the context with  $\Gamma$  and  $\Phi$  with hypotheses. Because most rules leave the context unchanged, we omit the context unless something interesting happens with it.

The following inference rules are given in the form of adjunctions. See Appendix ?? for the more usual formulation in terms of introduction and elimination rules.

$$\begin{array}{c}
\overline{\phi_1, \dots, \phi_m \vdash \phi_i} \qquad \overline{\Phi \vdash \top} \qquad \overline{\Phi, \perp \vdash \phi} \\
\\
\frac{\Phi \vdash \phi_1 \quad \Phi \vdash \phi_2}{\Phi \vdash \phi_1 \wedge \phi_2} \qquad \frac{\Phi, \phi_1 \vdash \psi \quad \Phi, \phi_2 \vdash \psi}{\Phi, \phi_1 \vee \phi_2 \vdash \psi} \qquad \frac{\Phi, \phi_1 \vdash \phi_2}{\Phi \vdash \phi_1 \Rightarrow \phi_2} \\
\\
\frac{\Gamma, x, y \mid \Phi, x = y \vdash \phi}{\Gamma, x \mid \Phi \vdash \phi[x/y]} \qquad \frac{\Gamma, x \mid \Phi, \phi \vdash \psi}{\Gamma \mid \Phi, \exists x . \phi \vdash \psi} \qquad \frac{\Gamma, x \mid \Phi \vdash \phi}{\Gamma \mid \Phi \vdash \forall x . \phi}
\end{array}$$

The equality rule implicitly requires that  $y$  does not appear in  $\Phi$ , and the quantifier rules implicitly require that  $x$  does not occur freely in  $\Phi$  and  $\psi$  because the judgments below the lines are supposed to be well formed.

Negation  $\neg\phi$  is defined to be  $\phi \Rightarrow \perp$ . To obtain *classical* logic we also need the law of excluded middle,

$$\overline{\Phi \vdash \phi \vee \neg\phi}$$

Comment on the fact that contraction and weakening are admissible.

Give an example of a derivation.

A *first-order theory*  $\mathbb{T}$  consists of a set of constant, function and relation symbols with corresponding arities, and a set of formulas, called *axioms*.

Give examples of a first-order theories.



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