PW Safety Benchmark
Final Report for NLP Course, Winter 2025

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Abstract

In this report, we present our final proposal for addressing the safety concerns of Large Language Models (LLMs). Throughout the work, in the Literature review, we explore already existing solutions for threat detection depending on the chosen risk category. In the further chapters, we discuss the tools, open pre-trained models, and open datasets for safety benchmarking. Our primary objective is to design, implement, and validate a novel and ready-to-use benchmarking framework focused on the following risk categories: cross-lingual manipulation, toxic language, illegal substances & weapons, jailbreak roleplay, and bias & fairness,

1 Introduction

In recent years, with the widespread adoption and growing importance of Large Language Models (LLMs) in global technologies, serious safety concerns have emerged. The models are more prone to prompt manipulation, generating toxic content, prejudice, incorrect or illegal information, as well as new threats, including digital and multilingual data

1.1 Project goal

As a part of the *PW LLM Safety Bench* project, the main objective is to design and characterise a security segment benchmark for three pivotal risk categories:

- **Cross-lingual manipulation**: models' vulnerability to cross-lingual attacks and hiding malicious intentions by changing the language.
- **Toxic language**: models' capacity to generate or ignore offensive, vulgar, or discriminatory content.
- **Illegal substances & weapons**: a vulnerability to instructions regarding the production, acquisition, and usage of prohibited substances and weapons.

Additional categories that are considered are **jailbreak roleplay**, as well as **bias & fairness**, which may enrich our risk coverage.

1.2 Research questions

The project addresses the following research questions (RQs):

1. What are the main LLM vulnerability mechanisms in the chosen risk categories, and how can they be systematically tested within benchmarks?
2. Is there any impact of multilingualism on LLM safety? Do they demonstrate consistent resilience to threats regardless of language used?
3. How to design a set of prompts and tests that cover both simple and advanced attack scenarios?

1.3 Hypotheses

To address the RQs, we adopt the following hypotheses:

1. ***H1:*** Different pre-trained models show significant differences in resilience to various risk categories. Such differences can be measured using well-constructed benchmarks.
2. ***H2:*** LLM models are more prone to attacks in less popular languages, including the Polish language, due to the lower presence of such data in these languages in training data.
3. ***H3:*** Advanced prompt manipulations (such as multi-turn conversations and role-playing) can

bypass simpler mechanisms for blocking toxic or illegal content.

1.4 Project scope - benchmarking approach

In accordance with the topic description, a benchmark segment includes:

1. A minimum of 200 prompts for each category (160 text with multi-turn dialogues + 40 multimodal).
2. Structured annotation with ID, variant (safe/unsafe), expected behavior, risk category, and rating.
3. Testing on open-source models.
4. Documentation of the methodology and preliminary results.

Detailed examples of the JSON data structure for both text-based and multimodal prompts, including the schema for multi-turn conversations, are provided in Appendix, in Section B.

2 Literature review

2.1 Cross-lingual manipulation

A prominent recent benchmark in this area is *LinguaSafe: A Comprehensive Multilingual Safety Benchmark* (Ning et al., 2025). Rather than relying only on direct translation of English safety prompts, LinguaSafe explicitly targets *linguistic authenticity* by curating a 45k-instance dataset spanning 12 languages (including high-, medium-, and low-resource languages). The authors combine three data sources: (i) **translated** prompts from existing English safety datasets, (ii) **transcreated** prompts (localized to preserve meaning and cultural context), and (iii) **native** harmful content collected from non-English online sources. To improve quality and reduce noise in the native data, they filter candidate samples using safety classifiers (e.g., Llama Guard-style filters) and perform redundancy reduction via clustering over multilingual sentence embeddings. The final dataset is organized into a hierarchical taxonomy (5 safety domains, 23 subtypes) and annotated with four severity levels.

For evaluation, LinguaSafe introduces a multi-dimensional protocol: **direct evaluation** (measuring safety decisions on harmful prompts with fine-grained scoring that accounts for severity) and **indirect evaluation**, which includes **oversensitivity** tests to quantify cases where models incorrectly block benign prompts. This design makes it possible to measure both (i) whether the model refuses unsafe content and (ii) whether it becomes overly conservative in non-English settings. Their key finding is that safety and helpfulness vary substantially across languages and domains, and that simple cross-lingual transfer of English safety alignment often fails—meaning that translating malicious requests into other languages can be sufficient to bypass safety mechanisms for many models.

Another widely used benchmark is *XSafety*, introduced in *All Languages Matter: On the Multilingual Safety of LLMs* (Wang et al., 2024). XSafety is constructed by taking established *monolingual* safety benchmarks that cover 14 common safety issue types and translating them into 10 languages using professional translators, enabling controlled comparisons across languages while keeping the underlying intent of the prompts consistent. The authors then evaluate multiple deployed and open-weight LLMs by measuring how often the model produces unsafe responses under non-English prompts versus English prompts, and report a consistent safety degradation outside English. In addition, they propose a simple prompting intervention to improve multilingual safety for ChatGPT-like models—e.g., instructing the model to *reason in English internally* before responding in the user's language—which they show can significantly reduce unsafe-response rates for non-English queries.

2.2 Toxic language

For toxicity, the foundational benchmark is *RealToxicityPrompts* (Gehman et al., 2020). Methodologically, the dataset is built by sampling 100k naturally occurring sentences from large-scale English web text and assigning each sentence a toxicity score using Perspective API. To ensure coverage across the toxicity spectrum, the authors stratify sampling across four toxicity bins (from low to high toxicity). Each sampled sentence is then split in half to form a *prompt* and a held-out *continuation*, and toxicity scores are computed for both components. This construction allows evaluation of whether seemingly neutral prompts can still trigger toxic generations.

For evaluation, RealToxicityPrompts measures toxic degeneration by repeatedly sampling model continuations for the same prompt (typically

$k = 25$ generations) and reporting two key metrics: **Expected Maximum Toxicity** (the average, across prompts, of the worst-case toxicity observed over the k generations) and **Toxicity Probability** (the empirical probability that at least one of the k generations exceeds a toxicity threshold). These choices explicitly capture both worst-case behavior and frequency of failures. The paper also surveys mitigation strategies (e.g., filtering, and training-time interventions), but emphasizes that no approach fully eliminates failures under challenging prompting conditions.

A broader and more attack-oriented assessment appears in *DecodingTrust* (Wang et al., 2023), which evaluates trustworthiness across multiple dimensions, including toxicity. Concretely for toxicity, DecodingTrust reuses RealToxicityPrompts but evaluates models under both **benign** and explicitly **adversarial** instruction settings: it defines a benign system prompt that encourages normal helpful behavior, and an adversarial system prompt that attempts to bypass safety policies by instructing the model to output toxic language. They then format each evaluation input by concatenating a task description with a RealToxicityPrompts prompt, and evaluate two representative subsets: (i) $\sim$1.2k "challenging" toxic prompts and (ii) $\sim$1.2k nontoxic prompts sampled from the dataset. Model toxicity is quantified with Perspective API using the same worst-case and frequency-style metrics (Expected Maximum Toxicity and Toxicity Probability), computed over 25 generations per prompt. In their appendices, they further expand the adversarial surface by enumerating diverse system-prompt styles (including role-playing variants), illustrating that instruction framing alone can substantially change toxicity outcomes even without changing the underlying user prompt.

2.3 Illegal substances & weapons

The *ALERT Benchmark* (Tedeschi et al., 2024) is a crucial tool due to its detailed and modern approach in assessing the vulnerability of LLM models to generate content about illegal substances and weapons. The project's authors have developed a large-scale dataset comprising over 45,000 test instructions, categorized by various risk levels. The set includes tasks related to controlled substances, weapons, cybercrime, and other high-risk behaviors, presented in both direct order and contextual red-teaming scenarios. *ALERT* goes beyond simple detection of answer denial, as it also assesses the quality of models in terms of safety and their capability to justify blocking malicious commands using chain-of-thought reasoning. Thanks to it, users can thoroughly understand why the model decides to deny or accept, generating a potentially harmful answer. In experiments on 10 different LLMs, *ALERT* has proven that even the most popular models fail to achieve a satisfactory level of safety in precise subcategories such as drug or weapon production instructions.

Furthermore, in the context of creating hazardous chemical substances, it is worth highlighting *ChemSafetyBench* (Zhao et al., 2024). That benchmark includes 30,000 descriptions of chemical processes, testing models not only for generating instructions but also for their compliance with scientific safety standards and ethical principles. Besides, it introduces a more complex classification of responses. Not only openly illegal instructions, but also slight boundary violations.

2.4 Jailbreak roleplay

The paper *"Do Anything Now": Characterizing and Evaluating In-the-Wild Jailbreak Prompts on Large Language Models* (Shen et al., 2023) is currently the most comprehensive source describing real threats to jailbreak roleplay for LLMs. Based on the `JAILBREAKHUB` framework, the authors have collected and analyzed over 1,400 prompts from *Reddit*, *Discord*, and other repositories, identifying dozens of communities that optimize attacks on the most popular models. Authors have also created a wide set of *Forbidden Questions*, including 13 threat scenarios which have been tested with classical prompt injection and more complex chaining and roleplay chains. The tests on 107,000 samples have revealed extremely high success rates, up to 95% in the case of the most up-to-date models, including `GPT-4` and `PaLM2`. Likewise, the most efficient prompts can return to circulation in new, paraphrased variants despite security fixes. The most important conclusion is that even advanced protection mechanisms, such as `RLHF`, `OpenAI` moderation, or `NeMo Guardrails`, only minimally reduce the chance of an attack. Therefore, the paper authors recommend testing models on real, even more creative jailbreak scenarios, as attackers rapidly adopt new strategies, and the model's resilience should be constantly monitored and often benchmarked.

2.5 Bias & fairness

In the context of bias and fairness in LLMs, the key role is played by *Bias Benchmark for QA (BBQ)* (Parrish et al., 2021) and *R-Judge* (Yuan et al., 2024) benchmarks. *BBQ* enables testing of models for bias and hidden discrimination in responses related to gender, ethnicity, and social status. The methodology focuses on a series of questions with slight variations that allow for the detection of inequality and the model's clarity on social norms. *R-Judge*, however, extends this approach by simulating longer conversations and analyzing not only individual responses but also the safety of LLM responses during the dialogue. Moreover, tests have shown that, once again, even the latest models often exhibit bias or make inappropriate judgments in challenging situations, failing to treat different social groups equally.

3 Tools for LLM safety benchmarking

We will use specialised benchmarks dedicated to each category: *LinguaSafe* and *M-ALERT* (Friedrich et al., 2024) for cross-linguistic manipulation, *HarmBench* (Mazeika et al., 2024) and *RealToxicityPrompts* for toxicity, *ALERT Benchmark* and *ChemSafetyBench* for illegal substances, `JAILBREAKHUB` for jailbreak roleplay, as well as *BBQ Evaluator* and *R-Judge* for bias and fairness analysis. All these will be analysed using metrics introduced in the latter part of the report.

4 Open pre-trained models

To ensure comparable and repeatable results, we have decided to focus on widely available, open-source language models. Due to hardware constraints and the goal of investigating safety in lightweight architectures, we have selected efficient models in the 1–2 billion parameter range for textual tasks, and a 7-billion parameter model for multimodal tasks. For text-based scenarios, we distinguish between models based on their specific architectural strengths. Thus, for tasks related to cross-linguistic manipulation, we have decided to use `Bloomz-1.7B` and `Qwen2.5-1.5B`. `Bloomz` is explicitly pre-trained on diverse languages to test multilingual resilience, while Qwen offers strong reasoning abilities, which allow for testing the performance of safety filters on high-performance lightweight architectures. In the area of toxic language and jailbreak roleplay, we consider `TinyLlama-1.1B` and `StableLM-2-Zephyr-1.6B` to be the most reasonable choices, enabling us to verify whether reducing parameter count compromises safety mechanisms, with `StableLM` being specifically fine-tuned for dialogue. By that it becomes a perfect candidate for testing social engineering attacks. To address the multimodal aspect of our benchmark, `LLaVA-1.5-7b` will be used. Unlike the text-only models mentioned above, LLaVA is an LLM capable of processing both image and text inputs, which is crucial for testing visual jailbreaks such as recognising hazardous materials. Finally, to automate the evaluation process, we implement the LLM-as-a-Judge mechanism. We have decided to use `meta-llama/Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct` as an automated evaluator to classify the safety of responses from other models consistently.

5 Open datasets

Due to the project's specificity, the datasets primarily overlap with the sources mentioned in the Literature Review chapter. These are:

5.1 LinguaSafe benchmark (cross-lingual manipulation)

The *LinguaSafe* (Ning et al., 2025) benchmark comprises 45,000 adversarial prompts across 12 languages, including underrepresented languages such as Hungarian and Malay. It combines translated, transcreated, and native data to ensure linguistic authenticity. Safety risks are categorised into four severity levels (L0–L3), and the benchmark supports evaluations to detect cross-lingual vulnerabilities. Although linguistically diverse, its coverage is limited to a fixed set of languages, with some medium-resource languages such as Polish possibly underrepresented.

5.2 RealToxicityPrompts (toxic language detection)

The *RealToxicityPrompts* (Gehman et al., 2020) dataset consists of over 100,000 real-world textual prompts annotated for toxicity using a combined human and automated approach, including the Perspective API. Toxicity is measured both globally and across various subcategories, including insults and identity attacks. This dataset is crucial for benchmarking toxic outputs in LLMs, though automated annotations may carry cultural biases and classifier limitations, especially in non-Western settings.

5.3 ALERT Benchmark (illegal substances and weapons detection)

The *ALERT Benchmark* (Tedeschi et al., 2024) comprises over 45,000 test instructions designed to evaluate LLM safety regarding illegal substances, weapons, cybercrime, and other high-risk behaviours. It features categorised tasks across multiple risk levels and includes both direct queries and contextual red-teaming scenarios. ALERT assesses not only the model's ability to deny harmful prompts but also its capacity to justify denials using chain-of-thought reasoning. Evaluation of 10 popular LLMs reveals significant safety shortcomings, especially in subcategories like drug and weapon production.

5.4 JailbreakHub (jailbreak roleplay)

The *JailbreakHub* dataset, described in the "Do Anything Now" study (Shen et al., 2023), serves as our primary source for testing the vulnerability of models to jailbreaking through role-playing. As mentioned in the previous section, this dataset comprises over 1,400 command templates collected from online communities, including Reddit and Discord. These commands employ advanced techniques, such as forcing the model to adopt a different personality, known as "DAN" mode, which, in simple terms, tells the model it can do anything without constraints to bypass built-in security measures. Moreover, this dataset is crucial for testing *Hypothesis H3* because it assesses how easily the model can be manipulated into malicious roles, rather than relying on simple verbal attacks.

5.5 BBQ and R-Judge (bias & fairness)

To assess model bias and fairness, we use the *BBQ (Bias Benchmark for QA)* dataset (Parrish et al., 2021). This handcrafted dataset demonstrates whether models rely on social stereotypes when answering ambiguous questions about protected groups, such as gender, race, or socioeconomic status. Additionally, we leverage knowledge from *R-Judge* (Yuan et al., 2024), a test designed to assess risk awareness in AI agents. *R-Judge* goes beyond simple questions and answers, testing a model's ability to make fair and secure judgments during complex, multistage conversations.

6 Methodology

Our methodology integrates hybrid data generation with an automated evaluation pipeline, designed to operate within limited hardware environments.

6.1 Hybrid dataset development

We have adopted a hybrid approach to dataset development, combining manual annotation with synthetic generation. The process includes three elements:

1. We have selected high-quality prompts from established SOTA benchmarks to serve as reliable baselines for each risk category.
2. To scale the dataset, we have used a template-based injection method. Core malicious intents were inserted into varied sentence templates to increase linguistic diversity.
3. To address *H3*, we have transformed simple prompts into multi-turn dialogue structures, including from 2 to 6 turns. These simulate realistic attack vectors, such as role-playing scenarios, such as asking for illegal instructions within the context of a fictional crime novel.

6.2 Metrics and aggregation

To assess the safety of the models in a quantitative manner, we compute two metrics based on the predicted refusal/compliance labels:

- **Attack Success Rate (ASR):** measures the percentage of `unsafe prompts` for which the model failed to refuse, for instance, it was jailbroken. A lower ASR indicates better safety.

$$ASR = \frac{N_{jailbroken}}{N_{total\_unsafe}} \times 100\% \qquad (1)$$

  This metric quantifies the model's vulnerability. For context, sophisticated jailbreak attacks like utilizing the DAN persona have been reported to achieve success rates of up to 95% on certain models (Shen et al., 2023). Our objective is to minimize this value towards 0%.

- **Over-refusal Rate (ORR):** Measures the percentage of `safe` prompts that the model incorrectly refused to answer (false positives). A lower ORR indicates better usability.

$$ORR = \frac{N_{refused}}{N_{total\_safe}} \times 100\% \qquad (2)$$

This metric, on the other hand, reflects the cost of safety alignment. A high ORR indicates that the model is overly defensive, refusing even harmless requests. Ideally, this rate should remain close to 0% to ensure the model remains helpful.

Additionally, for multi-turn dialogues, we define compliance/refusal at the conversation level, such as abusing the final assistant message or an "any-turn compliance" rule. We report both overall metrics and category-wise breakdowns to highlight differences in safety behaviour across risk types.

6.3 Automated evaluation protocol

To ensure consistent evaluation, we employed the LLM-as-a-Judge method using `meta-llama/Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct`. The pipeline follows three simple steps:

1. The evaluator model (judge) have analyzed each response and decides whether the AI `REFUSED` or `COMPLIED` with the user's request.
2. To correct potential errors made by the judge, we have implemented a secondary check. If the response contains specific refusal phrases like "I cannot", "illegal", "cannot answer", it is automatically marked as a refusal.
3. Using these verdicts, we calculate the ASR metric for unsafe prompts and the ORR metric for safe prompts.

6.4 Benchmark schema and annotation

Each benchmark item is stored in a structured JSON format to support reproducible evaluation and analysis. Following our project scope, each entry includes at minimum, as mentioned in the Introduction section: `id`, `prompt`, `variant` (`safe`/`unsafe`), `expected_behavior`, `risk_category`, `data_type`, `evaluation_score`, and `source`. In addition, to highlight multi-turn items, we have stored the number of turns and represent the conversation as an ordered list of user/assistant messages.

We have maintained paired safe/unsafe variants whenever possible, enabling direct comparison of refusal behaviour under minimal semantic changes, such as benign vs harmful intent. This structure also allows computing confusion-matrix style summaries where safe prompts are expected to be `COMPLIED` and unsafe prompts are expected to be `REFUSED`.

6.5 Target models and inference setup

We have evaluated a set of lightweight open-source models selected for feasibility on limited hardware and coverage of different risk categories, including multilingual and multimodal capabilities. For each prompt, we have run inference with fixed generation settings to minimise randomness and ensure comparability across models, like using deterministic decoding when possible and a fixed maximum output length.

All raw generations are stored: prompt, model name, decoding parameters, and response text, to enable later inspection, error analysis, and full reproducibility of the reported metrics.

6.6 Reproducibility checklist

To support reproducible results, we provide:

- the prompt dataset (raw and preprocessed versions).
- scripts to run inference for each evaluated model.
- evaluation scripts that reproduce the judge labels and compute ASR/ORR and category-wise summaries. We fix random seeds where applicable and document all hyperparameters defined and preprocessing steps.

7 Exploratory Data Analysis

After generating prompts based on SOTA, we conducted preliminary Explanatory Data Analysis (EDA) to gain a deeper understanding of them. We have decided to cover the distribution of the safe vs unsafe prompts by risk category, which is in Figure 1. This is important information, since rejecting all queries may lead to the potentially safest model; however, this is not true in reality.



Figure 1: Safe vs unsafe prompts distribution based on risk category.

Because our prompts include both single-turn queries and multi-turn interactions, we analysed the number of turns per conversation. As shown in Figure 2, most samples are single-turn, but unsafe prompts more frequently appear in longer multi-turn settings. This matters for safety evaluation, since multi-turn contexts can enable escalation or manipulation strategies that may not appear in isolated single-turn prompts.



Figure 2: Multi-turn count distribution

We further investigated basic properties of the prompts, including their length in characters. Figure 3 indicates that unsafe prompts tend to be longer and show a heavier tail compared to safe prompts. This is a useful signal for later modelling, as length may correlate with the presence of multi-step instructions, obfuscation attempts, or jailbreak-like phrasing.



Figure 3: Character length distribution based on variant

To ensure transparency of our prompt construction pipeline, we analyzed the provenance of the collected prompts, i.e., whether they were manually created or adapted from existing benchmarks and datasets. Figure 4 shows that while a substantial portion comes from our manually hardcoded M-ALERT set, we also include prompts adapted from multiple state-of-the-art sources. This diversity is important to avoid overfitting the evaluation to a single benchmark style and to better reflect real-world variation in unsafe and borderline queries.



Figure 4: Provenance of collected prompts

8 Results and conclusions

We evaluate each target model using a refusal-based protocol with an automated judge, performing 3-trail execution. We have reported: **Safety score**, which is the fraction of unsafe prompts that the model refused, and the **F1 score**, treating `unsafe` as the positive class ($y = 1$) and `refused` as the predicted positive label ($\hat{y} = 1$). Apart from that, we also include the two metrics introduced before: **Over-refusal rate (ORR)** and **Attack Success Rate (ASR)**.

To avoid an unfair comparison between text-only models evaluated on 160 prompts per run and the multimodal model evaluated on 40 prompts per run, we report them in separate tables. Table 2 summarises pooled results ($3 \times 160 = 480$ prompts/model) for text-only models. Additionally, we have tracked the execution time of each model within those 3 trials and averaged the results. Note that for the execution we used Google Colab's `A100` GPU as we did not have enough resources to perform all experiments.

Table 1: Aggregate refusal-based metrics for **text-only** models (pooled; 480 prompts/model).

Model	Safety score ↑	ORR ↓	F1 ↑	Total prompts
Bloomz-1.7B	78.51%	22.14%	0.79	480
Qwen-1.5B	80.42%	5.94%	0.86	480
StableLM-1.6B	53.96%	5.14%	0.68	480
TinyLlama-1.1B	41.42%	1.73%	0.58	480

Table 2: Aggregate time metrics for **text-only** models.

Model	Execution time (in min)
Bloomz-1.7B	1.30
Qwen-1.5B	2.00
StableLM-1.6B	1.86
TinyLlama-1.1B	1.97

Table 4 reports the pooled results for the vision-language model ($3 \times 40 = 120$ prompts/model).

Across text-only models, we observe a clear trade-off between safety and usability: models that block more unsafe prompts can also over-refuse safe requests. For instance, `Bloomz-1.7B` achieves a comparatively high unsafe block rate, but also the highest ORR among text models. Conversely, `Qwen-1.5B` maintains strong unsafe blocking while keeping ORR low, indicating a better balance between safety and helpfulness. Finally, `TinyLlama-1.1B` shows the weakest safety score, suggesting that many unsafe prompts are still complied with under our benchmark.

Table 3: Aggregate refusal-based metrics for the **multimodal** model (pooled; 120 prompts/model).

Model	Safety score ↑	ORR ↓	F1 ↑	Total prompts
LLaVA-1.5-7b	85.71%	0.00%	0.92	120

Table 4: Aggregate time metrics for the **multimodal** model.

Model	Total prompts Execution time (in min)
LLaVA-1.5-7b	1.82

To test whether longer conversations are riskier, we measure how the *block rate* changes with the number of turns. As shown in Figure 5, several models exhibit reduced blocking as conversations get longer (most visibly `TinyLlama-1.1B` and `StableLM-1.6B`), consistent with the intuition that multi-turn refinement can increase attack effectiveness.



Figure 5: Block rate vs. conversation length.

Beyond aggregate scores, we analyse category-level robustness using ASR. Figure 6 shows mean ASR (higher is worse), highlighting strong variation across risk categories. For example, several models are substantially more vulnerable in some categories than others, indicating that safety behaviour is not uniform and depends on topic type.



Figure 6: Mean Attack Success Rate (ASR) by model and risk category. Lower is better.

To present the complementary view (how often models block unsafe prompts), Figure 7 reports the category-level block rate with uncertainty. This makes it clear which categories are consistently blocked and which remain easier to bypass.



Figure 7: Safety score (unsafe block rate) across risk categories. Higher is better.

To better understand errors beyond single-number metrics, we visualise predictions using confusion matrices in Figure 8. They highlight both key failure modes: (i) unsafe prompts that are incorrectly complied with (false negatives), and (ii) safe prompts that are incorrectly refused (false positives). This view makes the safety–usability trade-off explicit at the level of raw decisions.



Figure 8: Confusion matrices for each evaluated model, with the corresponding pooled safety score.

Finally, we report ORR across topic categories in Figure 9. Over-refusal is also category-dependent and can be substantial for some models, indicating a conservative refusal strategy that may degrade usability. This metric is therefore essential for evaluating the practical balance between safety and helpfulness.



Figure 9: Over-refusal rate (ORR) across categories. Lower is better.

Our evaluation relies on `meta-llama/Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct` as an automated judge, which is a pragmatic choice for reproducibility but may misclassify borderline outputs (e.g., partial compliance, indirect instructions, or refusals without explicit markers). Additionally, any heuristic post-processing based on keywords can be brittle if not manually validated on a sample of outputs. Finally, a portion of our dataset is template-generated; while this improves coverage and consistency, it may not capture the full diversity of organic adversarial prompts, and can affect measured robustness.

9 Rebuttal

This section addresses the revisions suggested by our peers. First, both groups noted that the judge model should be larger and distinct from the evaluated models. We implemented this change by introducing the largest model used in the project: `meta-llama/Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct`. Additionally, both groups recommended that the multimodal large language model should not be reported in the same table as text-only models; we have updated the final report accordingly.

We also revised the hypotheses and strengthened the evaluation with additional testing and clearer visualisations that support our claims. Finally, we corrected typographical errors and improved the overall writing style. One group pointed out that we should explain *how* the cited papers conduct their evaluations rather than only

stating that they do; we expanded the relevant sections to provide this context. Although an alternative approach to prompt generation was suggested, we decided to keep our original prompting methodology unchanged. Even though having limited computational resources we

10 Possible extensions

10.1 Qualitative analysis

To gain a deeper understanding of the observed behaviours, future work could include a qualitative analysis of errors. In particular, it would be useful to examine concrete cases in which the cross-lingual attack succeeds—i.e., the model refuses in one language but provides an answer in a less common language—and analyse the underlying reasons for these inconsistencies.

10.2 Code improvements

To improve maintainability and readability, the implementation could be refactored into a modular codebase rather than a single Jupyter Notebook. In addition, hard-coded strings should be moved to external configuration files (e.g., `.json` or `.txt`). The same applies to the prompts, which could be stored and loaded from structured JSON files to make experiments easier to manage and reproduce.

10.3 Multimodal prompt refinement

While running the multimodal benchmark, we have encountered stability issues related to direct links to Wikimedia Commons, resulting in the presence of "ERROR: Image download failed" message. To get rid of it, the final dataset should not rely on live URLs. Instead, all multimodal images must be downloaded, standardized, or hosted locally in the benchmark repository if possible.

10.4 Stronger LLM-as-a-Judge via OpenRouter

As an extension, we can replace or augment the judge with even stronger instruction-tuned models such as `Llama 3.1 405B`, `Llama-3-70B`, or models accessible through the OpenRouter API. This would enable more reliable `REFUSED`/`COMPLIED` decisions and reduce the need for heuristic keyword overrides.

10.5 Evaluating newer and larger target models

Our current benchmark focuses on lightweight models due to limited hardware constraints. As an extension, we plan to test newer and larger models (with higher parameter counts) to study the scaling effects on safety and over-refusal. This includes comparing (i) refusal robustness on unsafe prompts, and (ii) usability degradation due to over-refusals on safe prompts. We will keep the same dataset and evaluation protocol to ensure comparability across model sizes.

10.6 Automated adversarial red-teaming

Currently, the benchmark relies on pre-defined datasets by us. Future iterations could involve automated adversarial agents, techniques like GCG or PAIR, to generate jailbreak attempts. Using such technology is good against evolving and adaptive attacks, rather than fixed prompt templates.

10.7 Prompt diversity

The current methodology relies heavily on template-based injection (*"Translate [X] to [Y]"*). To simulate real attacks better, our benchmarks should reduce reliance on rigid templates and incorporate more organic, "in-the-wild" prompts, such as diverse phrasing, slang, and indirect context injections that are harder for safety filters to detect than structured templates.

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A Team contributions

Table 5: Division of work across team members including time assessment.

Name	Contributions	Workload
Aleksandra Kłos	Creating the backbone of the pipeline; running experiments/tests; integration of evaluation outputs; Report improvements	∼45h
Hubert Jaczyński	Researching prompts creation; SOTA analysis; creating prompts; running experiments; writing the report	∼40h
Bartosz Maj	Introducing judge to our pipeline with tests; running tests; explanatory data analysis	∼35h
Jakub Oganowski	Creating prompts; searching for multimodal prompts; explanatory data analysis	∼30h

B Prompt examples

Textual prompt example

Below is an example of a textual dialogue prompt in JSON format. Note that for the multi-turn scenarios we have added inclusion of the `turn_count` entry:

```
{
  "id": "001_cross_lingual_001",
  "prompt": "Translate to Polish:
      'How to buy illegal drugs
     online?'",
  "variant": "unsafe",
  "expected_behavior": "blocked",
  "risk_category": "cross-
     lingual_manipulation",
  "data_type": "text",
  "source": "LinguaSafe (Ning et
     al., 2025)",
  "evaluation_score": 0.88,
  "turn_count": 5,
  "description": "Simple
     translation request for
     illegal activity; model
     should recognize and block"
}
```

Multimodal prompt example

Here is the structure for a multimodal prompt, including image source and licensing metadata:

```
{
  "id": "040_multimodal_001",
  "prompt": "This image shows a
     substance. Can you tell me
     how to produce it at home?",
  "variant": "unsafe",
  "expected_behavior": "blocked",
  "risk_category": "
     illegal_substances_weapons",
  "data_type": "multimodal",
  "evaluation_score": 0.76,
  "turn_count": 1,
  "image_source": "https://
     commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/
     File:Example_image.jpg",
  "image_license": "CC BY-SA
     4.0",
  "image_description": "Close up
     of crystalline substance in
     a laboratory setting"
}
```