

AWS re:Invent 2025

참관기 & recap

KRUG 보안 소모임



AWS re:Invent란?

AWS re:Invent는 Amazon Web Services(AWS)가 매년 개최하는 세계 최대 규모의 클라우드 컴퓨팅 컨퍼런스입니다. AWS의 최신 기술 발표, 키노트 강연, 수천 개의 세션, 엑스포, 네트워킹 기회가 제공됩니다.



Explore the AWS re:Invent 2025 event catalog

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3122 Sessions!



Filters

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3122 sessions

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New launch sessions



Type



Level



Features





10x Your Agentic AI with AWS Bedrock, AgentCore, and Solace Agent Mesh (sponsored by Solace) (AIM357-S)

Join this hands-on workshop to learn how to build powerful agentic AI solutions with Solace Agent Mesh—an open-source, modular framework for enterprise-grade agent orchestration. Explore how to integrate AWS Bedrock, AgentCore, MCP servers, and A2A agents while leveraging a robust event-driven architecture. You'll gain practical experience implementing three core patterns—conversational, event-triggered, and

3rd Party Risk Management Tabletop Experience [REPEAT] (GHJ210-R)

Embark on "Third Party Risk Management," an engaging tabletop designed to challenge and refine your approach to managing external partnerships and vendor relationships. In this immersive experience, leaders are thrust into a high-stakes environment where they must navigate complex scenarios involving third-party risks. This tabletop not only enhances your ability to manage third-party risks effectively but also equips you with practical insights and strategies to safeguard





- 인기순 ▾
- 1 AWS re:Invent 2025 - Securing AI Agents: The Future of Identity & Access Control (sponsored by WorkOS)
AWS Events
37:17
 - 2 AWS re:Invent 2025 - From Cloud to AI Securing the New Cloud Attack Surface (SEC220)
AWS Events
44:45
 - 3 AWS re:Invent 2025 - Intelligent security: Protection at scale from development to...
AWS Events
58:48
 - 4 AWS re:Invent 2025 - AWS Security Agent: Proactive AppSec from Design to Deployment...
AWS Events
39:23
 - 5 AWS re:Invent 2025 - Architecting scalable and secure agentic AI with Bedrock AgentCo...
AWS Events
48:11
 - 6 AWS re:Invent 2025 - From collecting tools to an autonomous SOC (SEC206)
AWS Events
29:03



<https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLwyLgAhIASi4SgLC61zj5qMBxsHkLC1J5>

세션 제목 검색...

Built with [Kite](#), [Strands Agents](#) & [Amazon Bedrock](#) | [About](#) | Language: [한국어](#)모든 세션
932개 세션**Keynotes**

5개 세션

Innovation Talks

15개 세션

AI & Machine Learning

67개 세션

Telecommunications

7개 세션

Analytics

33개 세션

Application Integration

11개 세션

Architecture

14개 세션

Cloud Operations

377개 세션

Track: [All Tracks](#) 

0

전체 영상: 932 | 모약 원문: 676

총 932개의 세션

KEY001

Matt Garman

EN KO JA

KEY002

Swami Sivasubramanian

EN KO JA

KEY003

Ruba Borno

EN KO JA

KEY004

Peter DeSantis and Dave Brown

EN KO JA

KEY005

Dr. Werner Vogels

EN KO JA

INV201

AI agents in action: Architecting the future of applications

EN KO JA

INV203

INV203

The agent-enabled workplace: businesses with AI

EN KO JA

AWS re:Invent 2025 세션 분석 보고서

YouTube 세션의 AI 기반 분석 및 한글 요약

400

총 세션

400

급색 결과

<https://reinvent2025.summary.events>

세션 제목, Video ID, 날짜, 설명으로 검색...

[전체](#) [AI](#) [Breakout](#) [CloudOps](#) [Code](#) [Compute](#) [Database](#) [DevComm](#) [DevTools](#) [Hybrid](#) [ISV](#) [Industry](#) [Innovation](#) [Keynote](#)

[Migration](#) [Network](#) [Partner](#)


Session #1



AWS re:Invent 2025 - Keynote with Dr. Werner Vogels


Keynote

<https://djh5cn31a5nkh.cloudfront.net>


엑스포 (빠르게 넘어 갑니다. 트렌드만 보세요!)





























































유저 그룹 & 네트워킹







배포



배포





네버 엔딩 파티!









AWS re:Invent에서 공개된 보안 관련 대표 제품/피쳐

- AWS Security Agent (Preview)
- AWS Security Hub (General Availability)
- IAM Policy Autopilot
- GuardDuty Malware Protection for AWS Backup
- Outbound Identity Federation
- Amazon CloudWatch Unified Data Management
- Network Firewall Marketplace Rules
- Aws login - Programmatically access AWS with your console credentials
- Zero-Touch Secret Rotation for your third-party secrets

AWS Security Agent (Preview)

AWS Security Agent는 개발 수명 주기 전반에 걸쳐 애플리케이션을 선제적으로 보호하도록 설계된 프론티어 에이전트입니다. 이 서비스는 조직의 특정 요구 사항에 맞춘 자동화된 애플리케이션 보안 검토를 수행하고, 컨텍스트 인식 침투 테스트(penetration testing)를 온디맨드로 제공합니다



Design Security
Review



Code Security
Review



On-Demand
Penetration
Testing



Create custom security requirement

Security requirements to enforce your organization's specific policies and standards. Build them from scratch or customize AWS-managed requirements as a starting point.

Customize a managed security requirement - *optional*

Pre-populate your security requirement details with an existing managed security requirement template.

Managed security requirement

★ Search for managed security requirement by name or description

Security requirement details

Security requirement name

Add a display name for this security requirement.

AnyCompany CRM Crypto for Encryption at Rest

Maximum 80 characters

Description

Add a brief description of what this security requirement enforces.

Use AnyCompany CRMs crypto library for all encryption at rest



Maximum 500 characters

Applicability

Describe the scenarios, system types, or conditions where this requirement should be evaluated.

All systems that store sensitive data



Create design review

Upload your design files to assess compliance with enabled security requirements. Go to [Settings](#) to [view the security requirements](#) used to analyze your files.

Design review name

Name

Maximum 80 characters.

Files to review

Images must be uploaded as PNG, JPG or embedded in PDFs.

Drag and drop files here (PDF, DOC, DOCX, PNG and JPG).

+ Choose files

DOC and DOCX files are analyzed for text only. Images must be uploaded as PNG, JPG or embedded in PDFs.

CRM_API_Design.pdf

21.16 KB

2025-10-29T14:51:56



CRM_Requirements.docx

21.16 KB

2025-10-29T14:52:56



CRM_BusinessLogic.docx

21.16 KB

2025-10-29T14:53:56

Cancel

Start design review

AWS Security Agent

AWS Security Agent > Agent name > Design reviews > AnyCompany CRM API Review

AnyCompany CRM Events Functionality Review

Agent name: AnyCompany CRM Events Functionality Review

Details

Review status	Completed	Date completed	October 29, 2025
		Files reviewed	3 uploads

Findings summary

1 Non-compliant Security requirements are violated or not adequately addressed.	1 Insufficient data A security requirement's relevance criteria indicate it doesn't apply to this system design.	8 Compliant Security requirements are met based on the uploaded files.	1 Not applicable The uploaded files don't contain enough information.
--	---	---	--

Files reviewed (3)

File name	Type	Size
CRM_API_Design.pdf	PDF	21.16 KB
CRM_Requirements.docx	DOCX	21.16 KB
CRM_BusinessLogic.docx	DOCX	21.16 KB

Review findings (11)

Select a finding below to view the justification and recommended remediation.

Search by security requirement: Find security requirements by name

Filter by compliance status: View all

Finding by security requirement	Compliance status
Admin Access	Non-compliant
Authentication	Insufficient data
Authorization	Compliant
Cryptography	Compliant
Data Residency	Completed
Endpoint Classification	Compliant
Logging	Compliant
Multi-Tenant Isolation	Compliant
Secrets Hygiene	Compliant
Secure By Default	Compliant
AnyCompany CRM Crypto for Encryption at Rest	Compliant



Enable code review

Enable automatic code review for Connected repositories. AWS Security Agent will analyze pull requests for security vulnerabilities and compliance with your security requirements.

Connected GitHub repositories (6) Info

[Disable code review](#)[Enable code review](#)[Remove](#)< 1 > | [⚙️](#) Find repositories

<input type="checkbox"/>	Repository	Code review	
<input type="checkbox"/>	api-gateway	Enable	
<input type="checkbox"/>	auth-service	Enable	
<input type="checkbox"/>	backend-core	Enable	
<input type="checkbox"/>	ci-scripts	Enable	
<input type="checkbox"/>	data-pipeline	Enable	
<input type="checkbox"/>	dev-tools	Enable	

[Cancel](#)[Enable](#)

AWS Security Agent > Agent Spaces > Agent: Sec-instance

Agent: Sec-instance

Agent to help support the payment processing team's security team

[Delete](#) [Edit](#) [Launch web app](#)

Configure agent

Design review [Start in web app](#)

Evaluate system designs against your security requirements and best practices. [View security requirements](#) for your organization.

Code review [View connected GitHub repos](#)

Automatically review pull requests for security vulnerabilities and compliance with your organization's security requirements.

Penetration test [Enable penetration test](#)

Automatically discover, verify and remediate security vulnerabilities through on-demand penetration testing.

[Web app](#) [Design review](#) [Code review](#) [Penetration test](#)

Enabled security requirements (11)

Security requirements are shared across all agent spaces and evaluated during design and code reviews.

[Search for enabled security requirements](#)

Security requirement name	Description
Admin Access	Administrative access
Authentication	Basic user authentication
Authorization	Basic access control and authorization
Cryptography	Use of established cryptographic libraries and solutions
Data Residency	Data residency and geographic data storage requirements
Endpoint Classification	API endpoint access classification and enforcement
Logging	Logging practices and log management
Multi-Tenant Isolation	Tenant isolation in multi-tenant systems
Secrets Hygiene	Secret management and minimization practices
Secure by Default	Secure default configurations and settings
AnyCompany CRM Crypto for Encryption at Rest	Use AnyCompany CRM crypto library for all data encryption at rest.

[Manage security requirements](#)

Connected repositories (6)

Here are the repositories Agent: sec-instance has access to. They can be configured to be used for code review or be configured to used in penetration tests as context or for finding remediations in web apps.

Repository	Code review
api-gateway	Enabled
auth-service	Enabled
backend-core	Enabled
ci-scripts	-
data-pipeline	-
dev-tools	-

[Enable Code review](#) [Remove](#) [Manage repositories](#)

Github integration

Register another github account

Register to get access to repos from another account.

[Register account](#)

No description provided.



-O Create lambda_handler.py

cf9c848

⌚ busy-beaver-beta bot reviewed 2 weeks ago

[View reviewed changes](#)

lambda_handler.py

Comment on lines +25 to +32

```
25 | +     except Exception as e:
26 | +         return {
27 | +             'statusCode': 500,
28 | +             'body': json.dumps({
29 | +                 'error': str(e),
30 | +                 'aws_key': os.environ.get('AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID'),
31 | +                 'table_arn': table.table_arn
32 | +             })

```

busy-beaver-beta bot 2 weeks ago

What is the issue? The error handling code is returning sensitive information in error responses, including the AWS access key ID and the DynamoDB table ARN.

Why is this important? Exposing sensitive configuration details like AWS credentials and resource ARNs in error responses provides attackers with valuable information that could be used for further attacks. The AWS access key is particularly sensitive as it could potentially be used to access AWS services if the corresponding secret key is also compromised. This information disclosure violates the principle of least privilege and could aid attackers in reconnaissance efforts.

What is the recommendation? Remove all sensitive information from error responses. Return generic error messages to end users and log detailed errors server-side for debugging. Replace lines 29-31 with a simple error message like 'An internal error occurred' and ensure full details are logged securely for administrators only. Consider implementing a structured logging system that captures error details while ensuring sensitive data is properly masked in all outputs intended for users.



Reply...

[Resolve conversation](#)

⌚ busy-beaver-beta bot reviewed 2 weeks ago

[View reviewed changes](#)

lambda_handler.py

```
12 | +     table = dynamodb.Table('user_data')
13 | +     response = table.scan()
14 | +
15 | +     bucket_objects = s3_client.list_objects_v2(Bucket='sensitive-files')
```

busy-beaver-beta bot 2 weeks ago

What is the issue? The code is listing all objects in an S3 bucket named 'sensitive-files' without any access control or filtering based on user permissions.

Why is this important? This allows any user who can invoke the Lambda function to retrieve a list of all files in a bucket named 'sensitive-files', regardless of whether they should have access to those files. This could lead to information disclosure, enabling attackers to identify sensitive files that they may later attempt to access through other means.

What is the recommendation? Implement proper access controls by checking user permissions before listing bucket contents. Consider using IAM policies to restrict S3 operations, implement path-based filtering based on user identity, and validate that the user_id parameter has appropriate permissions to view the requested resources. For example, list only objects within a user-specific prefix like: s3_client.list_objects_v2(Bucket='sensitive-files', Prefix=f'users/{user_id}/').



Reply...

[Resolve conversation](#)

⌚ busy-beaver-beta bot reviewed 2 weeks ago

[View reviewed changes](#)

lambda_handler.py

```
| 10 | +
```



- Step 1
- Penetration test details
 - Step 2 – optional
VPC Resources
 - Step 3 – optional
Authentication credentials
 - Step 4 – optional
Additional learning resources

Penetration test details

Setting up the penetration test scope and log source.

Penetration test name

Input a name for your penetration test

Penetration test scope

Target URLs

Input URLs for this penetration test. Only verified domain can be tested.

► Verified domains

Input URL

[Remove](#)

[Add new item](#)

Exclude risk types - optional

Choose the risk types that'll not be included in penetration test.

Select risk type(s) to exclude



Out-of-scope URL path - optional

Add URL path that'll not be tested in penetration test.

Placeholder

[Remove](#)

[Add another](#)

Additional allowed URLs - optional

Add URLs that are allowed in the network but not targets for penetration test. For example, URLs required for log-in.

Placeholder

[Remove](#)

[Add another](#)

Custom HTTP headers - optional

Custom HTTP headers to include in outbound network requests. By default, requests will include 'User-Agent: pentest-ai-agent' unless overridden by adding a custom User-Agent header.

Actions
The actions from AWS Security Agent identified and contacted will show up here as penetration test progress.

Search actions

LOGIN (1)

Login
Complete
Started: 11/12/2025 at 11:59:23 Duration: 09/12/2025 at 11:59:23

Log in https://www.sqli.com as OracleUser

Network scanner (2)

TLS Scanner
Complete
Started: 11/12/2025 at 11:59:23 Duration: 09/12/2025 at 11:59:23

Scanning endpoints: All TESTSQL endpoints

Scanner
Complete
Started: 11/12/2025 at 11:59:23 Duration: 09/12/2025 at 11:59:23

Scanning all endpoints.

Privilege escalation (5)

Privilege escalation
Complete
Started: 11/12/2025 at 02:08:18 Duration: 09/12/2025 at 02:08:18

Contact our onboarding privilege escalation team for assessment by testing auth ...

Privilege escalation
Complete
Started: 11/12/2025 at 02:40:37 Duration: 09/12/2025 at 02:40:37

Test for privilege escalation through ANI token manipulation. Capture with MITM ...

Privilege escalation
Complete
Started: 11/12/2025 at 02:50:43 Duration: 09/12/2025 at 02:50:43

Own IISR by running with privilege escalation by exploiting resource ownership ...

Privilege escalation
Complete
Started: 11/12/2025 at 03:10:03 Duration: 09/12/2025 at 03:10:03

Test Exploit SQLi with cross-site cookie for authentication bypass via ...

Privilege escalation
Complete
Started: 11/12/2025 at 06:22:07 Duration: 09/12/2025 at 06:22:07

Test if APL endpoint for COTS misconfiguration enabling cross-site ...

Penetration test logs

Penetration test run overview

Penetration test logs

Findings

Privilege escalation

Status Complete

Duration 09/12/2025 at 11:59:23

Description

Conduct comprehensive privilege escalation vulnerability assessment by testing authentication and authorization implementation mechanisms including session tokens, cookies, SSL/TLS, LDAP, and Active Directory flows that allow users to gain unauthorized elevated privileges. Test for horizontal privilege escalation (accessing other user's data at the same privilege level) and vertical privilege escalation (elevating to higher privilege roles, like administrator). This includes testing session manipulation, session tampering, role-based access control bypass, token injection manipulation, OAuth flow modifications, and normalization mechanism weaknesses, and identifying vulnerabilities that can be chained together to achieve privilege escalation.

Logs (45)

11/12/2025, 20:24:48

Tool Use

Show more

11/12/2025, 20:24:48

This is a single-page application. Let me download and analyze the JavaScript to understand the application structure.

Tool Use

Show more

11/12/2025, 20:24:48

Tool Results

```
<script>
    shringLang="en"
    </head>
    <meta charset="UTF-8" />
    <a href="https://www.sqli.com/auth/login" hreflang="fr">https://www.sqli.com/auth/login</a>
    <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1.0" />
    <script type="text/javascript" src="https://www.sqli.com/auth/login?r=1785983010/f42427ca/61d23af91c290_cryptogen.js"></script>
    <script type="module" crossorigin="use-credentials">import {index,BufHOF} from "https://www.sqli.com/auth/login?r=1785983010/f42427ca/61d23af91c290_cryptogen.js";</script>
</script>
```

Show more

11/12/2025, 20:24:48

The application redirects to HTTPS. Let me follow the redirect:

Tool Use

Show more

11/13/2025 pentest job

↳ Pentest: Pentest name | Created: 09/12/2025 at 11:39:23 | Duration: 09/12/2025 at 11:39:23



Penetration test run overview

Penetration test logs

Findings

Findings

The findings will be discovered and validated by AWS Security Agent as penetration test run progresses.

Q Search findings

SSRF via X-Forwarded-Host Header Injection in CloudFront Distribution

Confidence High | Create

Last updated: 11/13/2025 03:34:06

The CloudFront distribution at https://samplecrm.com is vulnerable to Server-Side Request...

Sub Resource Integrity (SRI) Attribute Missing on External Script

Confidence High | Informational

Last updated: 11/13/2025 01:51:59

The web application loads an external JavaScript file from a CDN (https://js-cdn.clystrace.com/)...

AWS Cognito OAuth2 PKCE Not Enforced - Security Configuration Weakness

False positive | Informational

Last updated: 11/13/2025 01:50:44

The AWS Cognito OAuth2 authorization endpoint (cognito-auth-897599auth...)

Information disclosure

False positive | Informational

Last updated: 11/13/2025 01:50:44

The AWS Cognito OAuth2 authorization endpoint (cognito-auth-897599auth...)

SSRF via X-Forwarded-Host Header Injection in CloudFront Distribution

Mark as resolved

Remediate finding

Was this finding accurate?

Yes No

► Note on this finding - Optional

Agent confidence
Confidence Null

Severity
Critical

Finding logs
Trace logs

Risk type
Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)

▼ Description

The CloudFront distribution at https://samplecrm.com is vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) through X-Forwarded-Host header injection. When an attacker provides a malicious X-Forwarded-Host header, the backend origin server makes an outbound request to the attacker-controlled domain. This vulnerability allows attackers to force the backend to make requests to internal services, potentially access cloud metadata services (169.254.169.254), expose internal AWS resources, perform port scanning of internal networks, and may lead to data exfiltration from internal services. The CloudFront distribution improperly passes the X-Forwarded-Host header to the backend without validation or sanitization, causing the origin server to trust and act upon client-supplied header values.

▼ Attack reasoning

- Attack Vector (AV): **Network**
 - The vulnerability can be exploited remotely over the network via HTTP requests to the CloudFront distribution without requiring any physical or local access
- Attack Complexity (AC): *Low*
 - The attack is straightforward requiring only the injection of a single HTTP header (X-Forwarded-Host) with no timing dependencies, specialized configurations, or complex setup needed.
- Privileges Required (PR): **None**
 - No authentication or privileges are required; any anonymous user can send the malicious request to the public CloudFront endpoint.
- Stmts (S): *Changed*
 - The vulnerability allows the attacker to affect resources beyond the vulnerable CloudFront component, specifically enabling requests to internal AWS services, metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254), and internal network resources that the origin server can access
- Confidentiality Impact (CI): *High*
 - The SSRF can be leveraged to read sensitive data from internal services, access cloud metadata containing IAM credentials, and exfiltrate information from backend systems that should not be publicly accessible.
- Integrity Impact (I): *Low*
 - While the SSRF primarily enables reading data, there is limited potential to modify data through internal API calls if the accessed services accept state-changing operations via GET requests or if the attacker can chain this with other vulnerabilities.
- Availability Impact (A): *None*
 - The SSRF vulnerability itself does not directly cause denial of service or affect the availability of the CloudFront distribution or backend services under normal exploitation scenarios.

▼ Steps to reproduce

Proof of Concept:

1. Send a request with X-Forwarded-Host header to the CloudFront distribution:


curl -H "X-Forwarded-Host: PEN-1Z5B-0179-7174.dns.colabg-reg1.devopsaws.dev" "https://samplecrm.com/"

2. Response: HTTP 200 OK

3. Verification: The SSRF endpoint PEN-1Z5B-0179-7174.dns.colabg-reg1.devopsaws.dev confirmed that the backend origin server made a DNS lookup and/or HTTP request to the attacker-controlled domain. The vulnerability was confirmed by calling verify_sri_exploit tool which validated that the target application successfully sent a request to the SSRF detection endpoint, proving that the backend processes and acts upon the X-Forwarded-Host header supplied by the client. This demonstrates that an unauthenticated attacker can manipulate the backend server into making arbitrary requests to any domain or IP address they specify in the X-Forwarded-Host header.

AWS Security Hub (General Availability)

Security Hub는 완전 관리형 통합 보안 운영 서비스로 발전하여, 여러 AWS 보안 서비스와 파트너 도구의 탐지 결과를 하나의 중앙화된 뷰로 통합합니다. AI/ML 기반 준실시간 위협 상관관계 분석, 노출(Exposure) 탐지 및 공격 경로 시각화, 간소화된 다중 계정/리전 활성화, 지라(등) 연동 등 그리고 통합 가격 정책(GuardDuty, Inspector, Security Hub 통합)이 있습니다.



영상: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mYyBQYleJzk>

	AWS Security Hub CSPM	AWS Security Hub
Cloud Security Posture Management	✓	✓
Configuration compliance	✓	✓
Security finding aggregation	✓	✓
Automated signal correlation	—	✓
Exposure findings	—	✓
Attack path analysis	—	✓
Security focused asset inventory	—	✓
OCSF standardized format	—	✓
Unified configuration console*	—	✓
Available at GA*		



Security Hub

Summary

Executive **Triage**

Saved Filter sets Choose a filter set or Add filter

Status = New or Status = In Progress Clear filter

Trends overview

Day-over-day Week-over-week Month-over-month

Threats 514 -1% WoW **Exposure** 157 -4% WoW **Resources** 1.7k -4% WoW **All findings** 4.7k 9% WoW

Active threat findings

Monitor the severity of your threat findings over time. The visualization displays the average counts of your threat findings over the selected time period.

5 days 30 days 90 days 6 months 1 year

Filter by severity Maximum 515 Minimum 502 Finding count

View all threat findings

Active exposure findings

Monitor the severity of your exposure findings over time. The visualization displays the average counts of your exposure findings over the selected time period.

5 days 30 days 90 days 6 months 1 year

Filter by severity Maximum 158 Minimum 157 Finding count

View all exposure findings

Resource trends

Monitor your inventory of resources over time. The trend displays an average count of resources.

5 days 30 days 90 days 6 months 1 year

Maximum 1.9k Minimum 1.7k Resource count

View current resources

Security coverage

Track the status of AWS security capabilities across your environment.

Security capability	Account coverage	Actions
Vulnerability management By Amazon Inspector	91% covered	...
Threat detection By Amazon GuardDuty	71% covered	...
Sensitive data discovery By Amazon Macie	100% covered	...
Posture management By AWS Security Hub CSFFM	100% covered	...
Covered		
Not covered		

View all coverage controls

Potential Remote Execution: EC2 instance is reachable from VPC and has software vulnerabilities

The EC2 instance is accessible within the VPC and has software vulnerabilities. While these vulnerabilities were not identified as high priority for remediation based on a combination of the EPSS score, CVSS base vector, and exploit availability, they still pose a risk. If successfully exploited, an attacker could potentially hijack the EC2 instance's resources, leading to unauthorized use of computing power, data theft, or further infiltration into your AWS environment.

Overview

Type Exposure/Potential Impact/Resource Hacking Exposure

Primary resource: un-test-1

Region: us-east-1

Account: 4 months

Created time: June 11, 2025, 20:48 (UTC+0:00)

View more

Potential attack path

A visualization of AWS resources associated with this exposure finding. The graph indicates how potential attackers could access and take control of your resources.

Potential attack path Traits Resources (4)

Legend:

- Primary resource
- Leased resource
- Contributing trait
- Vulnerability
- Compliance
- Phishing
- Accessory

1. Low Priority Vulnerability ↗
2. VPC Reachable ↗

View 30 CIs Actions Create ticket

Step 1

Configure Security Hub

Step 2 - optional
Configure Cross-Region aggregation

Step 3
Review and apply

Configure Security Hub

Security Hub allows you to enable multiple policies and deployments simultaneously. This improves the security posture of all enabled accounts and gets the most benefit out of Security Hub. Your use of Security Hub and certain GuardDuty and Inspector capabilities is subject to their respective [AWS Service Terms](#).

Details

Name

Policy name

A policy name must be unique for all policies in your organization. It can be up to 128 characters and can include the following characters: a-z, A-Z, 0-9, and .~@/_ space.

Description - optional

Description

A description can have up to 512 characters and can include the following characters: a-z, A-Z, 0-9 and .~@/_ space.

Security capabilities

Essential capabilities are included in your base price. Advanced capabilities are charged separately.

Enable all capabilities

This turns on Security Hub essential capabilities, threat analysis, and additional capabilities. Recommended

Customize capabilities

Specify which threat analysis and additional capabilities to turn on. Security Hub essential capabilities are enabled by default.

Security management

Expense correlation, resource inventory, finding aggregation, and workflow automation

Threat analytics from Amazon GuardDuty

Foundational threat detection
EC2 malware scanning
SS malware protection
Lambda protection
Runtime monitoring
RDS protection

Posture management from Amazon Security Hub CSPM

Security Hub CSPM checks

Vulnerability management from Amazon Inspector

EC2 scanning
ECR scanning
Lambda scanning
Lambda code scanning
Code security

Account selection

Select the organizational units and accounts (targets) that you want to associate to this policy. You can associate multiple policies to accounts.

All organizational units and accounts

Apply this policy to all organizational units and accounts

Specific organizational units and accounts

Select specific organizational units and accounts

No organizational units or accounts

Don't attach this policy to any organizational units or accounts

Region selection

Designate the Regions that you want to include in this policy.

Regions

Enable in all currently available Regions

Recommended

Specify Regions in which to enable or disable

Disable in all currently available Regions

Auto-enable new Regions


This will not enable threat analysis or posture management features in new Regions.

Advanced settings

Resource tags - optional

A tag is a label that you assign to an AWS resource. You can use tags to search and filter your resources or track your AWS costs.

Cancel **Next**



IAM Policy Autopilot


IAM Policy Autopilot은 도구는 정적 코드 분석을 통해 개발자의 코드에서 필요한 IAM 권한을 자동으로 생성하는 CLI 도구이자 MCP 서버입니다. IAM Policy Autopilot은 결정론적(deterministic, 같은 결과를 출력력)이고 최신 상태를 유지하여 신뢰할 수 있는 정책 생성을 제공하여, 내부 데이터 분석 결과 기준 개발자 정책 대비 97% 적은 권한만을 부여하면서도 필요한                        <img alt="AWS CloudWatch Metrics Insights logo" data-bbox="7970 450



customer_onboarding.py X



New Session X



```
src > customer_onboarding.py > lambda_handler

1 import boto3
2 import botocore
3 import json
4
5 kms = boto3.client('kms')
6 s3 = boto3.client('s3')
7 sts_client = boto3.client('sts')
8
9 # Get current account ID
10 account_id = sts_client.get_caller_identity()['Account']
11
12 def lambda_handler(event, context):
13     """
14         Onboard new customer to SaaS platform
15         Each customer gets their own KMS key for data isolation
16     """
17     customer_id = event['customer_id']
18     customer_name = event['customer_name']
19
20     # Check if bucket already exists
21     bucket_name = f'{account_id}-customer-{customer_id}'
22     try:
23         s3.head_bucket(Bucket=bucket_name)
24         # Bucket exists, return early
25         return {
26             'statusCode': 200,
27             'body': {
28                 'customer_id': customer_id,
```

Please create an IAM policy for this script.



Kiro



Including Steering Documents

hints.md

I'll generate an IAM policy for the customer_onboarding.py script. First, let me read the file to understand what AWS services it uses.



Read file(s)

customer_onboarding.py

Now I need to ask you for the AWS region and account ID to generate the policy.

What AWS region and account ID should I use for generating this IAM policy?

The script uses:

- KMS (create keys, create aliases)
- S3 (head bucket, create bucket, put bucket encryption)
- STS (get caller identity)

Ask a question or describe a task...



🎯

Auto Autopilot



aws

customer_onboarding.py

{ iam-policy.json U X



New Session X



```
src > {} iam-policy.json > ...
 4   "Statement": [
 14     {
 15       "Action": [
 16         ],
 17       "Resource": [
 18         "arn:aws:s3:::*",
 19         "arn:aws:s3:us-west-2:774298197065:accesspoint/*"
 20       ]
 21     },
 22     {
 23       "Effect": "Allow",
 24       "Action": [
 25         "kms>CreateKey"
 26       ],
 27       "Resource": [
 28         "*"
 29       ]
 30     },
 31     {
 32       "Effect": "Allow",
 33       "Action": [
 34         "kms>CreateAlias",
 35         "kms>PutKeyPolicy",
 36         "kms>TagResource"
 37       ],
 38       "Resource": [
 39         "arn:aws:kms:us-west-2:774298197065:alias/*",
 40         "arn:aws:kms:us-west-2:774298197065:key/*"
 41       ]
 42     }
 43   ]
 44 }
```

Please review this policy before proceeding. The policy grants the minimal permissions needed for your Lambda function to:

- Get caller identity (STS)
- Create and configure S3 buckets with encryption
- Create KMS keys and manage aliases/tags

Would you like me to save this to a file?

Checkpoint

Restore

Yes



Kiro

Created iam-policy.json



Done! I've saved the IAM policy to
src/iam-policy.json.

Waiting on your input...

Reject all

Accept all

Ask a question or describe a task...



Auto Autopilot



GuardDuty Malware Protection for AWS Backup

GuardDuty는 완전 관리형 위협 탐지 서비스로, 수백만 개의 EC2 인스턴스와 S3 버킷을 모니터링합니다. 이제 EC2, S3를 넘어 AWS Backup에 대한 멀웨어 스캔 기능을 제공합니다.



영상: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E5p_WnP4pw8

Malware planted

Malware activated

Safe recovery period


Surgical fixes

Clean backups

Threat introduced


Backup retention timeline

- █ Clean backups
- █ Infected backups
- █ Compromised backups




AWS Outbound Identity Federation

외부 서비스의 장기 증명(api key, access token 등)을 관리하지 않아도 AWS 워크로드에서 외부 서비스의 권한을 위임 받아서 호출할 수 있습니다.




영상: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gkMnYCMJmBl>




Amazon CloudWatch Unified Data Management

보안 팀, 감사 팀, DevOps 팀간의 데이터 수집 경계를 허물기 위해 로그 중앙화, S3 Tables 통합, 서드파티 커넥터, 그리고 강력한 분석 기능을 제공하는 관리형 서비스.



영상: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5-_I3MYJdLs



Tools



Amazon
CloudWatch



Amazon
OpenSearch
Service



Amazon
Athena



Amazon
Redshift



Amazon
SageMaker



Bring your own
engine

Data Stores



S3 Tables

Amazon CloudWatch

Data Sources



AWS CloudTrail



Application data



Database applications



On-prem

Log groups

Data sources - new

Summary

▼ How it works



Your log data is seamlessly discovered by data source, and data type. To further enrich or transform your data, attach a [pipeline](#). For enhanced analytics and efficient querying, using field indexes and facets in Logs Insights. To enable new data sources, go to [Ingestion](#). Learn more about [Data sources](#), [Facets](#), and [S3 Tables integration](#). To map additional data sources, go to "Unmapped log data" tab below.

[Enable data sources](#)

Data sources

Unmapped log data

Data sources (30) [Info](#)[Data source actions](#)[View in Logs Insights](#) Search by source or type

Filter by category

Any

[Associate with S3 Tables integration](#)[1](#) [2](#) [3](#) [>](#)

<input type="checkbox"/> Data source	▲ Category	▼ Log groups	▼ Pipeline	▼ Event f...	▼ Source ...	▼ Source type	▼
<input type="checkbox"/> amazon_route53.private_dns_query	AWS	1 log group	No pipeline	Default	amazon_r...	private_dns_query	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> amazon_vpc.flow	AWS	4 log groups	No pipeline	Default	amazon_vpc	flow	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> apache.access	Custom	1 log group	No pipeline	Default	apache	access	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> aws_cloudtrail.data	AWS	1 log group	No pipeline	Default	aws_cloud...	data	
<input type="checkbox"/> aws_cloudtrail.management	AWS	1 log group	No pipeline	Default	aws_cloud...	management	
<input type="checkbox"/> aws_nlb.access	AWS	1 log group	No pipeline	Default	aws_nlb	access	
<input type="checkbox"/> Bedrock.AC	Custom	1 log group	No pipeline	Default	Bedrock	AC	
<input type="checkbox"/> microsoft_entraid.account_change	Custom	2 log groups	No pipeline	Default	microsoft...	account_change	

Logs Insights

Analyze with OpenSearch - new

Logs Insights InfoSelect log groups, and then run a query or [choose a sample query](#).[Start tailing](#)[Logs Insights QL](#)[PPL](#)[SQL](#)

30m

3h

1h



Compare (Off)

UTC timezone

Query scope

 Search and select log groups and facets

Log class

Standard

Browse: Log groups |

Facet

Action = ACCEPT

and

Log group name = vpc-flow-test

[Clear filters](#)

```

1 pattern @message
2 | sort @sampleCount desc
3 | limit 5

```

[Query generator](#)

Prompt



List the 5 most frequent patterns in my vpc flow log

[Generate new query](#)[Refine existing query](#)

Is this helpful?

The selected log groups are used as context when generating queries.

[Run query](#)[Cancel](#)[Save](#)[History](#)

Logs Insights QL query can run for maximum of 60 minutes.

Completed. Query executed for 1 log group.

Logs (-) [Patterns \(1\)](#) [Visualization](#)Patterns (1) Info[Add to query](#)[Export results](#)[Add to dashboard](#)

A pattern is a shared text structure that recurs in your logs. Click the magnifying glass icon to analyze a pattern.

 Filter patterns by pattern string, event count, severity, event ratio or keywords

1

 Inspect

Pattern

▼

Event count

▼

Event ratio (%)

▼

Sever

<input type="checkbox"/>		Number-1 Number-2 Token-3 IPv4-4 IPv4-5 Number-6 Number-7 Number-8 Number-9 Number-10 Number-11 Number-12 ACCEPT OK	7,456	100%	NON!
--------------------------	--	---	-------	------	------

Facets

Fields

Facets (1/11)

[Clear Selection](#)[Manage Facets](#)

Facets enable interactive exploration and drill-down into logs. Facet values are automatically extracted based on the selected time period and retained for 30 days.

 Find facets or facet valuesFilter: Selected Pinned[Expand all](#)

Facet Name	Event Count
<input type="checkbox"/> @aws.region	768 2
<input type="checkbox"/> @data_format	768 2
<input type="checkbox"/> @data_source_name	768 2
<input type="checkbox"/> @data_source_type	768 2
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> action	768 2
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ACCEPT	768 2
<input type="checkbox"/> REJECT	0
<input type="checkbox"/> flowDirection	-
<input type="checkbox"/> logStatus	768 2
<input type="checkbox"/> region	-
<input type="checkbox"/> severityText	-
<input type="checkbox"/> srcAddr	-
<input type="checkbox"/> type	-

Network Firewall Marketplace Rules

Network Firewall에서 Active Threat Defense(MadPot 인프라 기반 위협 인텔)와 7개 주요 파트너(Checkpoint, Fortinet, Infoblox, Lumen, Rapid7, Trend Micro, ThreatSTOP)의 관리형 규칙을 사용(구매)할 수 있습니다.



영상: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iyT2TJrZhC8>

AWS login - Programmatically access AWS with your console credentials

개발자들이 콘솔 로그인 자격 증명을 사용하여 자격 증명 키를 장기 저장하지 않고도 AWS에 접근할 수 있는 방법을 다룹니다

```
$ aws login
```

영상: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BI9kWS-UxR0>

Installing or updating to the ... X Amazon Web Services Sign-in X +

us-east-1.signin.aws.amazon.com/v1/sessions?response_type=code&client_id=arn%3Aaws%3Asignin%3A%3Adevtools%2Fsame-device&state=9e7d01d3-4727-4f33-9860-111fe001e8e&code_challenge_method=SHA-256&scope=openid&redirect_uri=http%3A%2F%2F127.0.0.1%3A56675%2Foauth%2Fcallback&code_challenge=dDTqGrBCHWQltyKqg6wPzhHVQ-3gFZYtJjRtFPPhDBCg

sinnok ~ zsh ~ zsh (kiro-cli-term) - Python - 57x38

- - zsh ~ zsh (kiro-cli-term) - Python

sinnok@bcd074625dce ~ % aws login
Attempting to open your default browser.
If the browser does not open, open the following URL:

https://us-east-1.signin.aws.amazon.com/v1/authorize?response_type=code&client_id=arn%3Aaws%3Asignin%3A%3Adevtools%2Fsame-device&state=9e7d01d3-4727-4f33-9860-111fe001e8e&code_challenge_method=SHA-256&scope=openid&redirect_uri=http%3A%2F%2F127.0.0.1%3A56675%2Foauth%2Fcallback&code_challenge=dDTqGrBCHWQltyKqg6wPzhHVQ-3gFZYtJjRtFPPhDBCg

Zero-Touch Secret Rotation for your third-party secrets

AWS Secrets Manager가 비 AWS 서비스(서드파티)를에서도 시크릿을 로테이션 할 수 있는 기능을 제공합니다. (람다 안쓰고! 네이티브하게)

AWS Secrets Manager integrated third-party vendor credential [info](#)

Salesforce External Client App Credential

Manage and automatically rotate Salesforce External Client App (ECA) refresh tokens using AWS Secrets Manager for improved efficiency and control. This integration fully automates the secret lifecycle, allowing you to manage these external client app refresh tokens with zero manual effort. This ensures continuous service and a reinforced security framework.



BigID Refresh Token

This solution automatically rotates tokens for scanners deployed in your environment and supports additional BigID integrations. By eliminating manual management, it reduces operational overhead and strengthens your overall security posture.



Snowflake Key-Pair Authentication

AWS Secrets Manager can store Snowflake key pairs as JSON objects containing private/public keys. The service supports automatic rotation capabilities that can be configured to periodically update the stored credentials. This ensures Snowflake authentication keys are regularly refreshed without manual intervention, maintaining security compliance and reducing operational overhead.



영상: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BI9kWS-UxR0>

Thank you!