RUSSIANS IN THE BALTIC STATES: TO BE OR NOT TO BE?

Aksel Kirch, Marika Kirch, Tarmo Tuisk,
Academy of Sciences, Republic of Estonia

The restoration of independence for Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania implied important changes in the status of the large Russian-speaking communities in these republics.[1] These are not an historically rooted national minorities but immigrants, and descendants of immigrants, who arrived after 1945. And as their social and political predominance gives way to that of the local cultures and languages, perceptible changes are occurring in their economic, political and cultural orientations. In particular, questions regarding their national identity are arising in new and unexpected ways.

Here we try to analyze some of the historical and sociological factors involved in this new situation and which characterize the diversity of Russian-speaking people. We have used data from censuses and sociological investigations carried out between 1986 and the present, in particular the six sociological studies of the Russians (and other non-Estonian minorities) in Estonia.[2] We hope that our more detailed analysis of the attitudes and opinions of Estonian Russians, Belarusians and Ukrainians will give an overview of the problems encountered in all three Baltic States.

The Political and Demographic Roots of the Situation

In the beginning of 1989 (the last Soviet census) there were 1,725,000 Russians living in the Baltic states—in Estonia 475,000 (30.3% of the total population), in Latvia 906,000 (34%) and in Lithuania 344,000 (9.4%). Before World War Two the population of these three states were quite homogeneous in their national composition (Table 1). After 1945, the Soviet regime instituted policies which resulted in an increase of the Russian populations in all three Baltic Republics.

Table 1 National Composition of Population in 1920-1993[3]

	1920-23	1934-35	1959	1979	1989	1993(estimated)
ESTONIA						
Estonians	87.7%	87.8	74.6	64.7	61.5	63
Russians	8.2	8.2	20.1	27.9	30.3	29
Other	4.1	4.0	5.3	7.4	8.2	8
LATVIA						
Latvians	74.9%	75.5	62.0	53.7	52.0	53
Russians	5.9	10.6	26.6	32.8	34.0	33
Other	19.2	14.9	11.4	13.5	14.0	14
LITHUANIA						
Lithuanians	69.2%	81.9	79.3	80.0	79.6	81
Russians	2.5	2.3	8.5	8.9	9.4	9
Other	28.3	15.8	12.2	10.1	11.0	10

Many Russian-speaking immigrants came with the military forces after 1945 (military officers and their families). But there were other objective factors that made possible a heavy immigration stream from the East, especially to Estonia and Latvia: the relatively highly developed infrastructure in the economy, the considerably advanced educational level of the indigenous population, and the shortage of workers in the industrial regions—especially in military industry and electronics. But there was also a specially directed demographic policy to bring about a nationally mixed population in every region of the Soviet Union—the creation of a "Soviet nationality." By 1977 the industrial workforce in Lithuania was 29% Russian-speaking, in Latvia 62% and in Estonia 52%. By 1987 this percentage had changed to 57% in Estonia, though it remained stable in Lithuania and Latvia.

The plan to create a socially homogeneous and ethnically mixed Soviet people was not realized in the Baltic States. Resistance to Russification and Sovietization can be seen in the constantly low number of mixed marriages (Table 2). Heterogeneous families in Estonia are not common; an especially low level of assimilation is found between the biggest communities—Estonians and Russians. The reasons for this are deep historical-cultural stereotypes, which did not change even during Soviet rule.

Table 2 Ethnic Composition of Marriages in Estonia in 1987 and 1993

Husband	Wife	Tallinn 1987*	Estonia 1993**
Estonian	Estonian	41.4%	48.0%
Estonian	Russian and Russian	6.6	8.1
Russian	Estonian	36.3	28.0
Mixed Estonian/non-Est.		2.2	3.5
Mixed Russian/Non-Est.		13.5	12.4
		*N=4166	**N=690

Surveys carried out in Estonia (Table 2) and Lithuania[4] demonstrate the existence of real cultural barriers which restrict the number of Estonian-Russian and Lithuanian-Russian mixed families. This number was never high for Lithuanians—in 1987 less than 7% of all marriages. According to Valdas Gaidys, Russians in Lithuania enter into mixed marriages twice as often as native Lithuanians.

Socio-Economic Background

The increasing percentage of immigrants in the population of the Baltic States brought about many social problems. It is often said that the immigrants to the Baltic states have always lived under unfortunate economic and social conditions (since they came under difficult circumstances to republics where the towns and factories had been badly damaged in the war, and then, because they worked in heavy industry, lived in the most polluted areas, etc.). These statements must be analyzed in greater detail.

Since the former Soviet regime favored migration throughout the Soviet Union, the Baltic states were not an exception in the immigrants receiving special privilege. In housing, for example, immigrants qualified for new housing almost immediately, while the native population had to wait for years or even decades. Studies by Moscow sociologists show that in Estonia in the beginning of the 1970's, 81% of Russians and other non-Estonians lived in comfortable apartments subsidized by the state (either free of charge or at very low rent). In contrast, only 54.5% of the Estonians lived in such housing. This tendency became more and more visible by the end of the 1980's.[5]

As we see from Table 3, the economic situation of Russians in Estonia has not been worse than Estonians'; it is better. And probably the same holds true in Latvia and Lithuania. The better living conditions in the Baltic States were one of the factors supporting the sustained immigration stream.

Table 3 Average Income (per person in family) 1990-1991[6]

Income per family member (in rubles) per month

1990	-100	101-150	151-200	201-250	251-300	300+
Estonia	3%	15%	24%	22%	16%	20
Latvia	5	20	26	21	14	14
Lithuania	6	21	26	20	13	14
Russia	11	27	26	17	10	9

Nationwide survey of Estonia

September 1991 (EMOR, n=950)

Total	2%	4%	9%	16%	12%	57
Estonians	2	4	11	17	14	52
Russians	3	4	7	13	8	65
Other	1	7	5	14	14	63

Sociological research conducted by K. Hallik in Estonia the 1980's showed that immigrants were mostly satisfied with their new living and working conditions.[7] It is worth noting that the different standards of well-being between immigrants and the local population were not merely the result of social inequality, but a reflection of the fact that anyone starting a career under much better conditions than was possible at home appreciates even relatively insignificant changes for the better more than those whose situation is stable and changing slowly. Consequently, even when indigenous people and Russians had similar living conditions, the immigrants were much more satisfied; they considered the changes as advanced and progressive, while the indigenous people were more aware of the stagnation.

By the beginning of the 1990's the economic situation of Russians living in the Baltic states was better than it was for Russians living in Russia. This fact is significant for the future of this population group. On the one hand, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, this population group began to lose its economic privileges. On the other hand, the Russian economy has declined so drastically that returning home is impossible. Consequently, the loss of privileges has become a source of stress rather than a factor supporting remigration.

We suggest two main reasons for tension concerning the social situation of the Estonian population. First, there is the economic stress caused by the transition to a new economic system (to the principles of a market economy) and the loss of access to cheap raw materials. Second, there is not as of yet a resolution of nationality questions and inter-ethnic relations that touch upon all nationality groups, immigrants as well as indigenous peoples.

FIG.1 Aggregative Index of Anxiety by Towns and Counties



From the data gathered we aggregate two generalized indexes, characterizing first (left column) the anxiety of non-Estonian population about the future (personal) welfare status (including thirteen characteristics of respondents' economic well-being and expectations for the future, as measured by

economic well-being and expectations for the future, as measured by questionnaires);[8] and secondly (right column) the anxiety occasioned by the nationality problems (including fifteen characteristics).[9] Comparing the columns we see that the economic situation is a more significant factor in social strain than are nationality problems. However, we note a tendency to record low levels of tension in some regions of southern Estonia and considerably higher levels of tension and population anxiety in the small towns of Harju region (around Tallinn). Inhabitants of Narva who are non-immigrants (69% of them born in Estonia or have lived there more than 30 years) feel more secure than people from Tallinn and the Harju region. The city-dwellers of the Harju region (81% immigrants) are, according to our analysis, the most unsatisfied and anxious people in Estonia. This discovery runs counter to the commonly expressed belief that as a matter of course the only ethnic "hot point" in Estonia is the northeast border region. Tensions in Narva reflect the vanishing power of the old *nomenklatura* more than popular anxieties.

The results of the sociological research of April 1992 and February 1993 tell us about the more complicated situation in the towns of Harju county, because structural changes during 1991-92 in the little towns (Kehra, Keila, Loksa) came very quickly to the region surrounding Tallinn. But today's (Feb. 1993) data show that the center of "the hardest situation" has changed and the new sequence according to the level of tension is Narva, Sillamae and Tallinn.

Problems of Cultural Differences and Identity

The problem of ethnic disparities in the Baltic region becomes confusing when the peculiar features of the migrant people are generalized without taking into account the diversity of their ethnic origins. In analyzing the attitudes of people from different nationalities, we consider that we have as a minimum two kinds of differences: firstly, disparities between different nationalities among the migrants and, secondly, disparities between local people and immigrants.

Although migrants' habits, interests and activities broaden during the process of adaptation, distinct characteristic features can still be observed. Even when recent Russian-speaking immigrants possess a level of education and adaptation to urban life equal to Estonians, they are characterized by distinct mentalities, attitudes towards labor, and demands for culture.

Table 4 Attitudes of Estonians and Russian-speaking Immigrants Towards Labor in 1986[10]

	Estonians	Russian-speaking immigrants. Years living in Estonia for		
		-10	10+	25+
Is oriented to work at the workplace with minimum effort	16%	38%	34%	19%
Is oriented to give the maximum effort	66	41	43	54
Hard to say/no answer	18	21	23	27

As we see from Table 4, the work ethic and traditions of the immigrant people are different for those who have been living and working in Estonia for a long period compared to those of more recent arrivals. While the differences between immigrants and local people are obvious even in the sphere of labor (the part of life that is largely fixed and regulated by clear rules), immigrants find adaptation to the Estonian culture complicated. Sociological research carried out in Estonia for nearly twenty years indicates that Estonians are deeply engaged in consumption of local culture (attending concerts, art exhibitions and theatre—in short, accepting virtually all local cultural offerings), while Russian-speaking people are more oriented toward cinema, channels of mass media emanating from Moscow, lectures, and discos.[11] Russian-speakers' slow adaptation to the cultures of the Baltic States was partly due to Soviet propaganda which treated local culture as something primitive and second-rate compared with Soviet culture.

We do not want to overstate the differences between population groups, although it is necessary to underline the basic differences. The data in Table 5 characterize the typical divergence of opinion in the population groups.

Table 5 Estimation of Relations Between Estonians and non-Estonians[12]

(In percentages)	Dec. 1986		Dec. 1988		Sept. 1989		Feb. 1993	
	Esto-nians	non-Est.	Esto-nians	non-Est.	Esto-nians	non-Est.	Esto-nians	non-Est.
Very good/good	4	17	0	8	6	21	15	41
Average	48	72	45	52	62	58	73	48
poor/very poor	58	11	55	39	32	19	12	9
Don't know/no answer	0	0	0	1	0	2	0	2

Estonians estimated that their relationship with several nationalities was a complicated and "middling", although during the last year there has been noticeable positive change; non-Estonians (mainly Russians) who had been mostly dissatisfied in 1988 showed much greater satisfaction in February of 1993. This same sudden shift has appeared in our surveys. *Attitudes have changed, especially the attitudes of the Russians.* In April 1992 28% of the Russians surveyed said there was no tension in interethnic relations where they live; in February 1992 this had risen to 39%. Tension was perceived by 36% in April 1992, but by February 1993 this had declined to 18%. On the one hand, we can say that non-indigenous groups were more satisfied under the Soviet regime than were indigenous peoples. On the other hand, the data indicates that the gulf between the two population groups that existed up to the so-called *perestroika* period is closing.

Under the new paradigm in the Baltic republics—the change from Russian predominance to local predominance—the groups which have to adapt are Russians, Ukrainians, Belarusians, etc., not Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians. This creates problems associated with these groups' cultural identity, adaptation and assimilation. The central question which defines their currently undetermined

status is their decreasing sense of ethnic identity and their need to fill the vacuum left by the obsolescence of Soviet identity. Traditionally, the Russians were in a better situation than other nationalities because their children's medium of instruction was their mother tongue. Ukrainians and Belarusians preferred to accept Sovietization to sending their children to Estonian schools. Now these people have started to ask what their culture is, who are the Russian people, and who are we?

Problems associated with the self-identity of the non-indigenous groups in the transformed Baltic Republics and the groups' adaptation to the new situation are the most complicated challenges facing those republics today. Due to these groups' concentration in industrial cities (in Estonia, Tallinn, Narva and Kohtla-Jarve; in Latvia, Daugavpils and Ventspils; in Lithuania, Klaipeda and Ignalina), immigrants live in a special, Russian-speaking social and cultural milieu. As a result of past language policies there are some offices and even localities where even today it is impossible to communicate in Estonian, Latvian or Lithuanian. However, it is possible to communicate in Russian almost anywhere in the Baltic republics. Under such circumstances, it is obvious that it was difficult, if not impossible for the immigrants to adapt more fully to the local culture. Sociological data show that in 1986 74% of Estonians knew Russian sufficiently well to communicate effectively. At the same time 80% of them preferred living and working in an Estonian-language environment. Among the Russians, on the other hand, only 27% prefer Russian speaking collectives (working and living environment), even though only 37% of them know the Estonian language at any level.[13]

There was a real necessity for Estonians to learn Russian, but not vice versa. Official Soviet ideology described the Russian language as advanced and progressive and local languages as backward; speakers of minor languages were all targets of assimilation. The Laws of Language adopted in the Baltic republics (in 1989) were intended to change this one-sided Russian domination. These language laws were originally quite liberal in Estonia and Latvia and more rigid in Lithuania.[14] For example, in Estonia knowledge of the national language is a requirement for a number of jobs. Incumbents have been given three to four years to develop the necessary level of language skill. In Estonia and Latvia the law of language caused a negative reaction among those Russian-speakers who did not know the local language and had already regarded the Baltic States as an integral part of Russia (USSR). Therefore, they regarded the language law as discriminatory legislation directed against them.

The cultural identity of Russians and Russian-speaking people living in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania has never been based solely on their ethnic origin. Today these groups face even greater difficulties in identifying themselves with any particular culture. As we see from the Table 6, the cultural identity of Russian-speaking people in Estonia is a complex phenomenon. Russian identity is the strongest of this aggregation of identities, but simultaneously these people consider themselves partly as representatives of Estonian, Soviet and world culture. At the same time the data from April of 1992 and February of 1993 indicated the rate of Russification of Ukrainians and Belarusians.

Table 6 Multicultural Self-Identification of Russian-speakers in Estonia[15]

People consider themselves as representatives of:	Russians 1992	Russians 1993	Ukrainians 1992	Belarusians 1992
Russian culture	85%	96%	61%	70%
Estonian culture	43	65	39	33
Soviet culture	42	59	44	50
World culture	31	39	24	40

These data confirm the statement that Estonian Russians have multicultural bases for their identification and that a certain proportion of the local culture is included in their self-identity. The psychological difficulties of Russian-speaking people in adapting to a new identity are understandable, because the change of status from the national majority group in the USSR to the national minority group within small independent states has been profound and sudden. Also, the large working collectives (which have been more important for self-identification in Russian society than any ethnic organization) are falling into pieces and losing their ideological significance. It is psychologically difficult to become an ethnic minority group, especially for people who had a strong Soviet identification.

The challenge in today's national-political situation seems to be in forming a new set of national and subcultural units all over the Baltic states. For this to occur, the existing multiplicity of national and cultural groups needs to be transformed into the subcultural identity of "Baltic Russians." The bases for this identity are strongest in Latvia where the historically rooted Russian minority is the largest. There are today twenty-five different Russian cultural societies, associations or unions in the three Baltic republics. These are beginning to raise the question of the role of Russian culture in the Baltic republics.

In a sociological survey of April 1992 considering the new status of national minorities in Estonia, the respondents were asked two questions: "Do you think you belong to a national minority?" and "Who are national minorities in Estonia?" Another survey was taken in February of 1993.

Table 7 Attitudes towards National Minorities in Estonia

	Russians 1992	Russians 1993	Ukr. 1992	Belarus. 1992	Ukr. + Belarus. 1993
"Do you think you belong to a national minority?"					
Yes	41%	38%	65%	65%	59%
No	39	40	20	25	18
Hard to say	18	18	15	10	19
No answer	2	4	0	0	3
"Who are national minorities in Estonia?"					
All except Est.	37	35	64	65	38
All except Est+Rus	32	33	20	25	32
Hard to say	29	29	16	10	29
No answer	2	3	0	0	1

As we note from the Table 6, only 40% of the Russians living in Estonia feel themselves belonging to a national minority. For Ukrainians and Belarusians the figure is 60%. It seems to us that one of the reasons for this difference is the large number of Russians, which allows them to resist facing the new political reality that they are, as are other non-Estonian population groups, a national minority in the Estonian Republic. These data confirm our hypothesis, that Ukrainians and Belarusians perceive themselves to a considerable extent as a minority and it is important for them to protect themselves as an ethnic unit.

The Problems of Citizenship and an Attempt at Typology

Citizenship is a significant factor in the construction of a multicultural identity. The Enactment of the Law on Estonian Citizenship (first adopted in 1938, re-established in September of 1992) states that individuals living in the Estonian Republic (whatever their nationality) who were not born before 1940 or are not their descendants cannot get citizenship "automatically." Many Non-Estonians who were not integrated into the local culture suddenly felt themselves as foreigners. Recently this became one of the strongest reasons for the remigration of Russian-speakers.

Simultaneously with the reestablishment of the Estonian Republic, a certain group of Russians (the Communist Party and the military leaders, who did not value highly the need for social stability), foreseeing the impending loss of their power and economic privileges, readied themselves to call for a confrontation. A second group of Russian-speakers remained in ideological confusion. These individuals have not expressed any ambition for power, but are undergoing a crisis of identification after having lost their national-political identity of *Homo Sovieticus*. They have fears concerning the intents of the Estonian majority which could affect their own status; in addition, they feel they must re-estimate their values, beliefs and convictions. A third group of non-Estonians watches the rebirth of Estonian society benevolently and approvingly. They identify themselves with Estonians, and if necessary they are ready to endure the difficult economic transition.

Citizen Loyalty Typology in Estonia

In 1990-1992 we studied the groups who found themselves in a marginal situation—i.e., people who immigrated most recently without any idea of being culturally different from the indigenous population in the Baltic region. First of all it was necessary to distinguish the groups of non-indigenous people who are and who are not supportive of [loyal to] the independence of the Estonian Republic. For the typologization of these groups we used following indicators:

Firstly, attitude towards the Estonian people's nationalism. The question was: "Are the Estonians more nationalistic than other people?" Answers to this question were as follows (September 1990): This assertion is quite the truth—9%; this assertion is nearly acceptable—24%; it is very difficult to accept,

although sometimes it seems to be true—39%; it is impossible to accept this assertion—16%; hard to say or no answer—12%. Secondly, loyalty to Estonian state authorities was identified through the question: "Are you personally interested in getting citizenship in the Estonian Republic?" Answers were as follows: Yes, certainly -21%; I must think about this—49%; no, not in any case—25%; no answer—5%.

We summarized the answers to these questions about attitudes towards Estonians (negative, neutral, positive) and to Estonian citizenship (negative, neutral, positive) and we got five representative groups of attitudes of the Russians.

Table 8 Groups of Citizen Loyalty of Estonian Russians

The name of type	Attitude towards Estonians	Attitude toward citizenship	Sept. 1990	April 1992	February 1993
1 Strongly non-citizen	negative	negative or neutral	9	20	8
2 Neutral non-citizen	neutral	negative	21	11	17
3 Doubter	neutral	neutral	40	30	15
4 Neutral citizen	neutral	positive	13	29	42
5 Estonia-supporter citizen	neutral or positive	positive	17	10	18

From Table 8 we see that the percentage of respondents who had negative attitudes towards Estonians and towards Estonian citizenship was not large in September 1990—9%. But after the law of citizenship was enacted, specifying the conditions of naturalization (knowledge of Estonian—1500 words—and two years residency) and local anti-Estonian propaganda by pro-imperial forces, this percentage doubled to 20%. Characteristics of the attitudes of this *Strongly non-citizens* included support for Soviet citizenship and a belief that all mankind was going to live under socialism in the future. At the same time this group regards highly the establishment of strong discipline. By February 1993 the supporters of Soviet citizenship had diminished in number, while the number neutral citizens had increased. People who formerly held Soviet cultural orientations are now tending toward the Russian culture.

The second group—*Neutral non-citizens*—express neutrality towards the Estonians, but are negatively inclined towards Estonian citizenship. The attitudes of these people were Moscow-centered, but they preferred not to declare this fact openly. We called the group that expressed their neutrality towards the Estonians and citizenship—*Doubters*. Between September 1990 and February 1993 this group slipped from 40% to 15%. They think themselves as having democratic orientations but they lack resolution. Even so, they can be characterized as competent critics inclined more and more to support Estonian sovereignty. The

fourth group of Estonian Russians we called *Neutral Citizens*. This group doubled in size between 1990 and 1992, then tripled by February 1993—to 42%. These individuals express neutrality towards the Estonians and positive attitudes towards Estonian citizenship. An overwhelming majority (97%) plan to live in Estonia in the future. The last group should be named *Estonia-supporter citizens*. None of these foresees a political future for the former Soviet regime. This 18% identify themselves completely as Estonian Russians.

It is important to remember that in 1990 there was very high anxiety concerning the future among all the Russians (ca. 25 million) in the Soviet Union who lived outside the Russian Republic.[16] According to the 1993 survey, there have been profound changes in this attitude among Estonian Russians. There is a significant decrease in the number of doubters and negatively-minded Russians. We can conclude that Estonian citizenship has become a necessity for a significant number of Russians in Estonia.

Separatism Typology

This typology is based on the answers to two questions asked in April of 1992: 1) "Is it necessary to give non-Estonians the right to territorial autonomy for developing their culture?" The answers were distributed in the following way: It is necessary—26%, it is unnecessary—32%, hard to say -32%, no answer 10%. 2) What country's citizenship would you ask for? 49% of the Russians were in favor of Estonian citizenship and 12% for Russian citizenship. And 26% of the respondents preferred the combination of Russian citizenship and permanent resident status in Estonia. Combining the answers, we formed a typology and posed this hypothesis: A certain number of non-Estonians do not want to integrate into Estonian society. They set their hopes on Russian citizenship and on the probability of territorial autonomy. Another part of them is ready to integrate and adjust to their new political and economic situation.

Table 9 Separatism-Loyalty Typology of non-Estonians

Type	Attitude towards right to territorial autonomy	Probably chooses citizenship	%
1. Separatist	It is necessary	Russian or other (except Estonian)	16
2. Striver for autonomy	It is necessary	Estonian	13
3. Indefinite	Hard to say	Estonian, Russian, other (inc. "greencards")*	35
4. Non-citizen	It is unnecessary	Russian or another (except Estonian)	12
5. Loyal citizen	It is unnecessary	Estonian	24

*"greencard" person—an applicant for non-Estonian (Russian, Ukrainian, Belarusian) citizenship with permanent residence and work permit in Estonian Republic.

Separatists support territorial separation of northeastern Estonia where they predominantly live (in Narva, Sillamae, Kohtla-Jarve and in the cities of Harju county). Very often the members of this group are Russians and Ukrainians called to Estonia to work during the last 10-15 years. One of their psychological features is their emphasis (compared to the average of other particular groups) on pride in his or her nationality. The self-determination of this group is Russia(n)-centered; its attitude towards Estonians is predominantly negative. A very considerable part—one in four—of this group is trying to leave Estonia through housing exchange, and every sixth person in this group will make efforts to leave Estonia in the nearest future.

Strivers for Autonomy are fewer in number (13%). The individuals in this group are striving for territorial autonomy within the present Estonian Republic. Similar to the previous group, they consider Estonians to be very nationalistic. Autonomy-minded people live primarily in Tallinn and Narva. This type is primarily a new type of "indigenous" Russian. Few wish to leave Estonia. Their political ideal would be a Russian-Estonian territorial and cultural-political autonomy in Narva—created and guaranteed by treaty between the Republic of Estonia and the Russian Federation.

Indefinites form a relatively high percentage (35%), but live basically in Tallinn. There are more females in this group than in other groups. They identify themselves as Baltic Russians. Few perceive themselves noticeably as citizens of Estonia or as representative of the Estonian Russian-speaking community or even as Russian and/or Soviet citizens. We noticed among them a readiness to choose Estonian citizenship. Few would like to leave Estonia.

Non-citizens and Loyal Citizens have negative attitudes regarding territorial autonomy. The only difference between these groups is the choice of citizenship: either Russian (or something else) or Estonian. Most are males. At the same time a majority of recent migrants belongs to the group of non-citizens (43% of them have lived in Estonia less than 20 years). 55% of non-Estonians born in Estonia belong to the group of Loyal Citizens, and the greater part of them live in Narva and in counties of central and southern Estonia.

Our typology allows us to recommend policies that take into account a highly differentiated non-indigenous population, in which people of different categories will be helped by different sorts of policies. Although the percentage of *Strongly Non-citizens* and *Separatists* is relatively low, these groups hold very anti-Estonian attitudes. They are behind most of the mass pro-Russia (pro-Soviet) activities. Perhaps it would be best to assist their re-migration to Russia, because their motherland seems to be their primary concern. *Doubters* and *Indefinites* want quicker action from the Estonian Government. Most of them are ready to work for an independent Estonia.

Remigration and Other Issues

A likely alternative for Russians who are negatively disposed to Estonian (Latvian, Lithuanian) citizenship and are afraid of economic instability is to move to Russia or the West. The dynamics of net migration show that in Estonia this process of active remigration from the Baltic states to Russia (or to the foreign countries) began in 1990, in Latvia and Lithuania one year before—1989.

Table 10 Migration Flows. Total (Russians) in 1989-1992[17]

	Years	Lithuania	Estonia	Latvia
In-migration	1992	6206 (2490)	3420 (2500)*	
to Lith/Est/Latv.	1991	10709 (4659)	4966 (3466)	9947
from USSR	1990	13197 (5675)	7554 (5055)	14881
	1989	16755 (7370)	11118 (7501)	18561
Out-migration	1992	27324 (16162)	35275 (25000)*	
from Lith/Est/	1991	18085 (10163)	11544 (7865)	20170
Latvia to	1990	19827 (11896)	10735 (7220)	20852
USSR	1989	15439 (8070)	9960 (6647)	22886
In-Migration	1992	434 (177)	196 (100)*	
to Lithuania,	1991	1119 (462)	237 (130)	2690
Est/Latv. from	1990	1547 (619)	827 (361)	2135
other countries	1989	2156 (891)	1380 (553)	2307
Out-migration	1992	1531 (218)	1608 (400)*	
to other	1991	2618 (246)	1693 (374)	3632
countries	1990	3765 (377)	1667 (244)	4557
	1989	2198 (479)	2365 (493)	3423
TOTAL				
Net Migration	1992	-22215 (-13713)	-30267 (-22800)*	-50000 (-30000)**
	1991	- 8873 (-5288)	-8034 (-4634)	-11165 (-5395)
	1990	- 8848 (-5979)	-4021 (-2048)	- 8393 (-2606)
	1989	- 1274 (-288)	- 173 (914)	- 5441 (-36)

* Data of 1992 for Estonia is preliminary

** Data of 1992 for Latvia is an estimation

This data show that remigration from the three Baltic Republics is a reality and is continuously increasing. According to the data of the Estonian Department of Statistics, from 1989 to 1991 the total net migration was ca. 12,000; by the first 6 months of 1992 it was already over 16,000; and for whole the 1992 it was about 30,300. The unstable economic situation and growing unemployment in the Baltic states are the principal reasons for the remigration of recent immigrants.

The Russian diaspora in the Baltic States occurred over many years under special circumstances. The differences between the groups which have been

living in this land for many generations, those who immigrated immediately after the last World War, and those who came more recently to enjoy the better living conditions in the so-called "Soviet West" are significant. The political processes unleashed by *perestroika* in the Baltic States have changed the attitudes of people living in the Baltic region very quickly. We studied Russians and other Russian-speaking people because differences in actions and attitudes between them and the indigenous peoples are one of the main factors threatening social and political instability in the Baltic republics. We have observed a wide range of attitudes among the immigrants towards the principal problems concerning their contemporary and future status and different reactions toward Baltic independence. If we take into consideration the historical experience of Russian-speakers who immigrated to the Baltic States after 1945, then we understand that the transformation from a closed society to an open one is truly complicated for them. This part of the population feels a lack of acquired norms, values and ideas of civil society more than do the Latvians, Lithuanians and Estonians. In general, this is one of the reasons why they are more troubled by the future than those people who have an experience of civil society in their historical memory. Another reason they feel troubled is that they see themselves as effectively disenfranchised just at the point in history when basic laws are being made. They came into the Baltic States more or less innocently. With the unexpected collapse of the Soviet Union came a rapid restoration of the sovereignty of the Baltic States. Now, at a time when everyone is talking about democracy, they have lost their vote in the states in which they live. The Russian-speaking immigrants may have been surprised to discover that the indigenous peoples claimed the right to establish citizenship qualifications, rather than awarding everyone citizenship (even dual citizenship). Now all immigrants and their descendants must make two decisions: first, they must opt between staying in the Baltic States or returning (going) to Russia and/or other countries; second, if they choose to stay and do not wish to amalgamate into the majority population, they will have to accept being a national minority according to the constitutions of their new motherlands. As we have demonstrated, this appears to be a viable alternative for a significant fraction of the Russian-speaking population of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

We would like to thank David D. Laitin from the University of Chicago for critical remarks and comments, and helping us in publishing the article.

ENDNOTES

1. In the current article the authors have used the following concepts for the following ethnic groups: Non-Estonian, non-Latvian, non-Lithuanian—all people who do not belong to the titular nationality of the republic; Russian-speaking—for Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians, taking account the fact that many of the latter two groups have lost their (titular) mother tongue as result of Sovietization; Russians—only for ethnic Russians.
2. The sociological data gathered by the authors of this paper in 1986 (representative sampling of Estonian and non-Estonian civil working population, 1,480 respondents), in April 1988 (Estonian and non-Estonian civil working population, 960 respondents), in cooperation with the consultancy firm EKE-ARIKO in September 1990 (civil working Russian population, 470 respondents and in December 1990 in Tallinn, 750 respondents). The next sociological study (representative non-Estonian model of Estonia, interview with 925 respondents) was carried out in April 1992. The final survey (representative all-Estonian model, 936 respondents) was funded by Central European University (Soros Foundation).
3. *The Baltic States. A Reference Book* (Tallinn, Riga, Vilnius: Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian Encyclopedia Publishers, 1991), pp. 15-16, 92, 178.
4. Vladas Gaidys, "About Barriers on the Way Towards Inter-ethnic Marriages," *The Father in the Contemporary Family* (Vilnius: Institute of Philosophy, Sociology and Law, 1988 (in Russian).
5. Leokadia Drobizeva, *The Mental Unity of the Soviet People* (Moscow, 1981), p. 80. (in Russian).
6. *Statistical Press Bulletin* (Moscow: Committee of Statistics of the USSR, No 15, 1991), p. 20 (in Russian); Representative study of Estonian population carried out by "EMOR Ltd." September 24-30, 1991. Data from non-published manuscript.
7. Klara Hallik, "About interethnic relations in Estonia," *Tallinn*, 3 (1991), pp. 96-107 (in Russian).
8. The index constructs include: unsatisfactory present working conditions; unsatisfactory income; bad quality of food products; shortage of consumer goods; bad living conditions; propose to move for better working and living conditions; is afraid of a future belonging to the group of needy people; opinion that Estonia will reach the welfare state after 50 years; feel themselves alien to the present work collective; fear of possible future unemployment (three different questions on this subject).
9. The index constructs include: Noticeable tension between nationalities is considered by respondents; Estonian leaders don't care about national minorities' interests; consider Estonians more nationalistic than other minorities; no interest in Estonian citizenship; demand territorial autonomy for Russian minority; consider it better if their children live outside Estonia; are afraid of eventual discriminative legal acts directed against non-Estonians

in the future; experienced unpleasant attitudes from local people toward themselves; are afraid because the connections with Russia are weakening.

10. Kaarel Haav, "Migration and work moral," *Estonian Panorama*, 1 (1989), pp. 8-9 (in Russian).
11. Aksel Kirch, Marika Kirch. "Ethnic disparities in labor and culture (based on a sociological research on workers from Tallinn and Rakvere)," *Proceedings of Academy of Sciences of the Estonian SSR*, 37/2 (1988), pp. 169-179 (in Russian); Malle Jarve. *The cultural activities of population. Papers from Estonian SSR* (Tallinn, 1985), pp. 11-25, (in Russian).
12. "Interethnic Relations in Mirror of Sociology." EMOR Ltd, in *Rahva Haal*, March 31, 1993; see also footnote 2.
13. See footnote 2.
14. After the intensification of the Polish question the Lithuanian Parliament in January 1991 reduced the strong prescriptions in its language law and established rights for local languages in the districts where there are non-Lithuanian majority populations (esp. the Poles around Vilnius).
15. See footnote 2.
16. L. D. Gudkov. "Attitudes Toward Russians in the Union Republics," *Sociological Research*, November-December 1992.
17. Data from Departments of Statistics of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.