Partisanship, Polarization, and Anti-Globalization Bias: Evidence from a Conjoint Experiment in Turkey

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Abstract

Does foreign direct investment (FDI) policy matter for elections? The debate in the globalization literature centers around material versus non-material determinants of globalization attitudes. Surprisingly, little is known about whether these preferences translate into voting behavior. We conduct a vignette and a conjoint experiment to examine the effect of protectionist FDI positions on candidate choice by conducting a large-scale conjoint experiment in Turkey. We find that 1) FDI attitudes are shaped by partisan cues 2) Voters with high levels of partisan animus are not sensitive to their candidates' policy preferences 3) Voters who value their partisan identity less punish their candidates when they deviate from protectionist policy positions. Our findings advance our understanding of the electoral salience of globalization policies and politicization of the backlash against globalization.

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Introduction

Does globalization policy matter for domestic elections? The recent electoral salience of protectionist politicians around the world prompted political economists to understand the reason behind public support for protectionism, despite the economists' claim that economic integration increases general welfare. A foundational theory in the literature explains this phenomenon by emphasizing the distributive consequences of foreign economic inflows. These studies argue that societal actors whose incomes have been adversely affected by globalization, in other words, losers of globalization, elect protectionist politicians to represent them. This argument is consistent with our understanding of a representative democracy, a competitive political system in which voters participate in the policymaking process by choosing leaders with compatible policy preferences (Schattschnedier, 1975). Yet, the stylized facts established in the globalization attitudes literature cast doubts on whether and to what extent voters are responsive to their candidates' globalization policy. Global economic integration has become a complex and multifaceted phenomenon that is removed from most people's daily lives. Most voters do not understand the distributive effects of globalization enough to draw conclusions about how globalization affects their incomes (Rho and Tomz, 2017; Guisinger, 2009). Consequently, these studies are skeptical about voter accountability with regard to globalization policies. However, other researchers portray trade policy as an important electoral issue. These studies argue that voters learn about the economic consequences of trade policy before the policy is enacted and thus vote in sync with egocentric preferences (Kim and Cha, 2022; Margalit, 2011; Jensen, Quinn, et al., 2017).

We provide an alternative explanation that centers on how partisanship mediates the salience of globalization policy. We build on the literature that emphasizes the role of information in determining globalization policy preferences, but question their conclusion that these preferences will reflect personal economic interests for every voter. Our argument states that voters' electoral responsiveness to the change in the candidates' trade policy positions depends on the strength of their partisan identity. Partisan identity may influence this accountability process in two steps. First, partisan identity influences the formation of globalization attitudes. Following the literature on elite cues, we predict that globalization attitudes are shaped by cues voters receive from their own party leaders. Similarly, the strength of partisan attachment also determines

how much weight voters place on globalization policy in vote choice. Second, partisan identity interferes with the translation of globalization attitudes into globalization policy considerations during elections. For a group of voters with heightened partisan identity, partisanship trumps policy-motivated voting. Our argument departs from egocentric theories because winners and losers of globalization may appear in both groups.

There exists a rich literature investigating the link between partisanship and globalization policy, but these studies focus mainly on how the ideological divide between parties determines the type of globalization policies they offer (Milner and Judkins, 2004). Our paper focuses on partisanship at the individual level. As Graham and Svolik (2020) notes "at the level of individual voters, polarization may characterize voters who hold either extreme or intense preference." Our measure of partisanship is affective polarization at the individual level. Affective polarization, defined as the dislike citizens feel toward their out-parties, is the defining factor in contemporary politics in the 21st century (Iyengar, Lelkes, et al., 2019). Our claim is that high partisan animosity shapes voters' incentives to support their copartisans, which, in turn, deters them from holding the candidates accountable for globalization policy. Only voters who value their partisan identity less are motivated to cross party lines and vote according to their policy interests. Protectionism is thus a useful electoral tool for parties, regardless of their original party agenda. This argument helps explain why we see party realignments on globalization policy, like the Republican party in the US, Modi's BJP in India, and Erdogan's AKP in Turkey.

We conduct a large-scale, face-to-face survey in Turkey with 2,500 participants. Isolating the effect of anti-globalization policies on voting is challenging because vote choice is a multidimensional task where voters have many considerations and make trade-offs between policies depending on the electoral context. To overcome these challenges, we conduct a vignette and conjoint experiment. The vignette experiment is a classic one in which we ask respondents to rate their globalization attitudes on a 5-point scale after being exposed to a debate in the Turkish parliament on whether barriers should be increased or reduced toward foreign investors. The treatment groups see their co-partisans as endorsing a protectionist or liberal policy, whereas the control group is given no partisan cues.

Our next experiment is a candidate-choice conjoint experiment. The experiment investigates the effect of policy positions toward foreign direct investment (FDI) by asking Turkish respondents to rate hypothetical

candidates in 10 scenarios each in which we vary positions on FDI alongside other candidate attributes across three levels: liberal/protectionist, foreign company opening up a subsidiary/taking over a Turkish company, country-of-origin not specified/the West/the Middle East. Conjoint experiments are ideal for studying multidimensional decision-making because they allow researchers to calculate the marginal effect of a candidate attribute while taking into account other attributes (Bansak, Hainmueller, Hopkins, et al., 2019). We are inherently interested in both the effect of candidate policy positions and the interaction of respondents' attitudes and candidate attributes, which we can identify from the experiment. Moreover, given the large number of cases provided by the conjoint experiment, we can test the effect of multiple real-world like treatments of interest simultaneously. Hainmueller, Hangartner, et al. (2015) have shown that the results of the conjoint experiment approximate the dynamics of the real world, increasing the external validity of the conjoint experiment compared to the few-treatment vignette experiments. This method is especially useful for us in conducting surveys in developing countries and authoritarian settings. Conjoint experiments, by testing multiple conditions, also attenuate the social desirability bias we may encounter in authoritarian countries. Even though we would not expect respondents to lie about their preferences for globalization policy since it is not a combative issue in Turkish politics, their responses may nevertheless be affected by the interaction of responses they give to partisan support, where they may be motivated to lie and say that they vote for the ruling party. Our conjoint experiment attenuates that bias by allowing us to measure latent preferences through a multitude of candidate attributes given to respondents (Hainmueller, Hopkins, et al., 2014). Political economy scholars are increasingly using conjoint experiments to study attitudes toward or the effect of foreign economic policies such as immigration and climate change (Bechtel and Scheve, 2013; Bansak, Hainmueller, and Hangartner, 2016; Bansak, Bechtel, et al., 2021; Ballard-Rosa et al., 2017).

We examine the electoral incentives behind promising protectionist policies in the context of Turkey. Turkey provides an ideal case study to investigate the reasons behind the electorate's popular support for nativist, anti-globalization policy promises for several reasons. Turkey's liberalization history dates back to the 1980s. Following a severe debt crisis in 1979, Turkish officials have adopted a series of economic reforms that aimed to open the Turkish market to the world economy with the primary goal of becoming a member of the European Community eventually. These reforms have included "structural changes, new

infrastructure, economic liberalization, and trade reforms" (Müftüler, 1995). The Turkish case is a good illustration of the puzzle we are tackling in this paper. The Turkish economy has immensely benefited from economic liberalization efforts. The radical market-oriented reforms adapted by the Turkish governments in the aftermath of both the 1979 debt crisis and the 2001 banking crisis paved the way for rapid economic recovery that received support from all sects of the Turkish society (Öniş, 2004). The current ruling party, AKP (Justice and Development Party), owes its success and 21-year long consolidated political rule to the International Monetary Fund's stabilization program that consists of three pillars of the Washington consensus, stabilize, privatize, liberalize, implemented by a World Bank bureaucrat, Kemal Dervis, in 2001. A core group of AKP supporters comprises a group of *nouveau-riche* businessmen in the close circle of Recep Tayyip Erdogan and a middle class who benefited from Turkey's economic integration. Despite an increasingly authoritarian AKP rule in recent years, Turkey still holds competitive elections.

In our experiments, we take affective polarization levels as exogenous and randomly assign globalization positions between candidates. This allows us to hold partisan animus constant while revealing whether and which voters punish their party leaders for shifting positions. We have three main findings. First, we find that partisan cues matter in globalization attitude formation, but this effect is conditional on partisanship. Second, we show that globalization policy has a significant and substantial effect on candidate choice even after accounting for candidate partisanship, ethnicity, gender, age, occupation, democratic actions, and refugee policy. This finding is striking in a highly polarized country like Turkey where only a small number of electorate are open for persuasion, although the prominence of protectionist policies is not surprising given the current crisis environment. Third, we find that only voters with low partisan animus punish their in-party candidates that switch from endorsing protectionist policies to endorsing liberal policies, especially among the ruling party, the AKP supporters. In contrast, highly affectively polarized individuals are not responsive to globalization policy. Our examination of potential mechanisms reveal that lowly affectively polarized respondents' pre-experiment globalization preferences and conjoint-revealed preferences match, meaning that these voters base their voting decisions regarding globalization on egocentric preferences.

Our findings and negative partisanship help explain recent public reactions and AKP's electoral strategy regarding foreign capital inflows. As a party that has benefited from openness to foreign investment since

coming to power, AKP encourages foreign investors to invest in Turkey. The opposition media and leaders oppose this policy and argue that Turkey is "being sold to foreigners."[1] In contrast, the AKP media and leaders celebrate foreign investors and call the opposition party "foreign capital racists."[2] During election periods, however, AKP campaigns to protect Turkey from the influence of the "interest lobby," an imaginary group of foreign capital owners who AKP claims to prevent Turkish economic growth. From our theoretical framework, AKP's protectionist campaign promises make sense. AKP supporters with high partisan attachment, like AKP's core group of business owners who benefit from investment openness, continue to support AKP regardless of the protectionist messages. AKP is also able to keep the votes of low-polarized individuals by appealing to their economic grievances or ethnocentrism, who would otherwise switch parties to support protectionist candidates. In this way, Erdogan builds a broad winning coalition, including his supporters who both win and lose from globalization. Flip-flopping on globalization policies is possible due to the technical and nativist nature of globalization policies and the lack of accountability by highly polarized individuals.

The popularity of protectionist positions among Turkish voters is possibly due to the economic crisis Turkey is going through since the end of 2021. The presence of an economic crisis determines the scope conditions of our analysis. However, the context is important to study. We would expect the economic crisis to diminish in-party loyalty to the incumbent party, meaning that more voters will fall under the category of low affective polarization. Combined with increased protectionism during an economic crisis, we predict that campaigning for protectionism will become more appealing to the AKP as the party tries to hold onto power. Although we focus on Turkey in our paper, we believe that our findings are generalizable to other polarized countries that go under an economic downturn, like India and the United States.

Our paper is one of the first to examine the role of affective polarization in the globalization policy context. While researchers have paid great attention to the nature and origins of affective polarization (Abramowitz and Saunders, 2008; Fiorina et al., 2008; Iyengar and Krupenkin, 2018; McCarthy et al., 2008), studies on the political consequences of affective polarization have been surprisingly lacking. Feigenbaum and Hall (2015) found that political leaders can avoid punishment of voters adversely affected by trade by taking a protectionist position on foreign trade bills. In a similar vein, we propose affective polarization as an

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[1] Newspaper *Sozcu.*

[2] Newspaper *Sabah.*

institution that allows politicians to dodge responsibility on policy positions,

Our experiments reveal that a direct questioning of support for globalization in public opinion surveys may not be informative because for a subset of individuals these attitudes are electorally inconsequential. We should interpret the attitudes of globalization expressed with caution. We should also consider a respondent's political information environment and the strength of her partisan identity if we want to understand how her policy preferences will translate into electoral behavior because of voters' differing willingness to trade off globalization policy preferences for partisan interests.

Our paper specifies the microfoundations of the right-wing populist politicians who enjoy a broad-base coalition of seemingly unrelated sects of the population. Our paper provides a domestic political explanation for populist protectionist politicians. Polarization presents politicians a valuable opportunity to exploit their supporters' strength of partisan loyalty by endorsing a variety of policy positions that may help them build a winning coalition. The findings also help explain the rise of protectionist politicians in developing countries. Economic theories have argued that support for globalization should be higher in labor-intensive developing economies because the majority of the population gains from economic integration. However, we still observe that incumbent parties who have achieved electoral success through implementing liberal reforms, such as Erdogan and Modi, campaign on protectionism in recent years. Our article suggests that deep ethnic and religious cleavages that coincide with partisan identity in Turkey and India allow these leaders to go against their party agendas by endorsing protectionist policies that capture the attention of the poor and nationalist voters. Globalization policy is an ideal tool for such electoral manipulation because it is a comprehensive package that encompasses economic and cultural grievances (Margalit, 2012).

The Turkish Context

Although Turkey is an OECD country, it is classified as a middle-income economy both by the World Bank and the UN, with a $720 billion GDP, and $8,500 GDP per capita.[3] Although Turkey is currently on the brink of economic crises, the country was once considered the epitome of the IMF neoliberal policies. Turkey

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[3]World Bank Turkey Profile.

opened up to the world economy after the 1980s, and FDI played a big role in its economic growth.[4]

The Varieties of Democracy project classified Turkey as an electoral autocracy since 2014 (Alizada et al., 2021). The country is under the rule of AKP (Justice and Development Party) since the 2002s, after the impressive electoral successes of the AKP. In contrast to the first few years of AKP rule, the last decade has been characterized by a rise in authoritarian tendencies and macroeconomic balances. These trends led to a currency crisis in 2018 during which the Turkish lira devalued by a third against the US dollar (Aytaç, 2021). Currently, Turkey is struggling with high inflation, food insecurity, and rising unemployment, especially among youth. Although the economic meltdown decreased loyalty to AKP, the ruling party still enjoys majority support among Turkish citizens. In the most recent 2018 elections, AKP received 42% of the votes, while the main opposition party CHP, the Kurdish party HDP, the ultranationalist party MHP, and an alternative party to the ultranationalists IYI Parti received 22%, 11%, 11%, and 9% respectively [5]. Turkish political parties are polarized along two camps. The ruling party coalition consists of AKP and MHP and the opposition coalition consists of CHP and Iyi Parti. As the minority party, HDP situates itself separately from these coalitions. Kurdish voters have historically sided with AKP, but HDP can be classified as a challenger party to AKP's authoritarian rule in recent years.

Partisan Identity and Globalization Policy Preferences

We argue that the strength of partisan identity influences the extent to which globalization attitudes are reflected in candidate choice during elections. Our theory proposes a middle ground between those who argue that voters pick parties that align with their policy views and those who argue that partisanship determines policy beliefs. We assert that while some voters defect their parties to vote for candidates in line with their foreign economic policy choices, other voters vote in party lines regardless. What differentiates these voters is the strength of their party attachments. Our theory focuses on two distinct deviations which impede the process of translating globalization attitudes to policy-oriented voting behavior. First, we claim that

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[4]Most FDI occurred through the sale of Turkish public companies to foreigners under a privatization spree.

[5]An important cleavage in Turkish politics occur across religion and race lines, with the separation of Ismalists voters versus secular voters, as well as Turkish voters versus Kurdish voters

globalization attitudes are endogenous to partisan cues. Second, we present a theory on how the strength of partisan identity shapes a respondent's motivation to vote for candidates that share their policy preferences.

Does the electorate have meaningful opinions on globalization issues? The first part of our theory considers how voters form an opinion toward globalization. Recent research has disputed the idea that the distributive effects of trade and investment determine how citizens feel about globalization on the grounds that global economic integration is a complex issue.[6] Rho and Tomz (2017) maintain that most voters do not understand (or are motivated to understand) the consequences of trade and investment inflows into their daily lives because trade is a technical, far-fetched thing that most individuals do not have to deal with in their day-to-day livings. This disconnect is exacerbated by the fact that global trade has become complex and multifaceted, affecting the lives of voters from many dimensions (Guisinger, 2017). Thus, recent years have observed an explosion of studies that advance other, non-material explanations to globalization attitudes. Previous studies have found that individual attitudes are influenced by elite cues (Guisinger, 2009; Guisinger and Saunders, 2017; Guisinger, 2017), the individual's position at their workplace (Lee and Liou, 2022), sociotropic and ethnocentric considerations (Mansfield and Mutz, 2009) and structural discrimination (Brutger and Guisinger, 2022).

In line with studies that emphasize the role of elite cues on globalization attitudes, we argue that globalization attitudes are malleable to framing effects. Framing occurs when how politicians' messages on an issue change the voters' attitudes and given relative importance regarding that issue (Druckman, 2001). Contrary to existing explanations in the political economy literature that focus on individual predispositions, our claim fits a top-down approach in determining globalization preferences (Balcazar, 2021; Rodrik, 2020). We base our argument on the findings of previous studies that indicate the changing nature of globalization attitudes conditional on the information voters receive about globalization (Hiscox, 2006; Guisinger and Saunders, 2017; Mansfield and Mutz, 2009; Casler and Clark, 2021). The significant affect of information on mass attitudes implies that how voters think about globalization is open to framing effects. The next question is who voters listen to regarding globalization. Partisan identity plays a key role. Partisanship, understood

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[6]For previous research arguing that material self-interest informs globalization attitudes, see (Mayda and Rodrik, 2005; Scheve and Slaughter, 2001; Pandya, 2014).

through the framework of social identity theory, encourages a world view of us vs. them among voters. High levels of animus toward the other party drive individuals to distinguish themselves from the other party and align their views more with their own parties (Tajfel and Turner, 1982). Studies have established that party identification is a major determinant of political attitudes and behavior (Campbell et al., 1960). More specifically, party identity shapes judgments about the economy, voter choice, and policy preferences (Bartels, 2002). It is thus reasonable to think that foreign economic policy choices will also be shaped by one's party. Following the theoretical expectations of the political communications literature, we claim that voters are more likely to change their opinions depending on what they hear about the globalization policy from their own party leaders. Hence, we hypothesize that copartisan cues on globalization policy will influence how the party supporters feel about international trade.

The second part of our theory concerns the link between policy attitudes and voting behavior. We argue that this link is governed by affective polarization. The conventional theoretical expectations suggest that in representative democracies elections are a tool for voters to identify policymakers that represent their policy views. However, we observe that the majority of voters vote within their party lines. Regarding the globalization policy, there are no established theoretical predictions on how voters consider this policy in their voting behavior. On one hand, low salience of globalization issues and the ambiguity of preexisting attitudes point to an ignorance of such issues when deciding on their leaders. On the other hand, the politicians' ability to appeal to ethnocentric voters who have grievances toward globalization increases the chance that voters may be swayed by protectionist policies during elections.

We build a theory on whether voters punish their party leaders for inconsistent globalization policy by formulating how voters' responsiveness to policy positions is conditioned by affective polarization. Affective polarization differs from ideological polarization in the sense that affectively polarized individuals are motivated by dislike and distrust toward the other party rather than differences in policy opinions (Lelkes, 2018; Iyengar, Lelkes, et al., 2019). Although extensive research has been conducted on the causes of affective polarization, our understanding of the political consequences of affective polarization remains weak. Studies have established that increased out-party animus influences behavior toward COVID (Druckman, Klar, et al., 2021; Druckman and Levy, 2021), fuels political activity (Iyengar and Krupenkin, 2018), decreases trust

toward other parties (Hetherington and Rudolph, 2015), and reduces democratic accountability (Graham and Svolik, 2020).

This paper is one of the first to examine how affective polarization mediates the extent to which voters punish their leaders for deviations from policy positions. We deliberate on potential mechanisms through which out-party animus may shape how voters' globalization interests are represented in elections. The first is the willingness to differentiate oneself from the supporters of the other parties. Heightened negative feelings for the other party can drive an individual to ignore how they feel about economic integration with other countries during elections. Thus, for these individuals, policy positions come second to their willingness to differentiate themselves in terms of political beliefs from the other party.(Mason, 2015; Druckman and Levy, 2021).

Similarly, dislike toward the other party may make individuals commit to voting for their own party, regardless of the proposed policy positions. Previous research has established that negative partisanship matters for vote choice in multiparty systems in North America and Europe (Abramowitz and Webster, 2016; Rose and Mishler, 1998). Negative partisanship results in higher levels of loyalty to one's own party (Lelkes, 2018; McConnell et al., 2018). Dislike toward the other parties motivates people to engage more in politics (Caruana et al., 2015) and become "never out-party" voters (Medeiros and Noël, 2014).

Finally, affective polarization may increase partisan motivated reasoning. Voters who have directional motivation to form opinions believe that it is a good policy when their party says so and a bad policy when the other party supports it (Leeper and Slothuus, 2014). This kind of reasoning decreases the importance of policy content and increases the importance of opinion sponsorship (Bartels, 2002; Goren et al., 2009; Lavine et al., 2012). The most important thing for these voters is to remain consistent with their partisan identities, adjusting or completely ignoring policy positions if needed to maximize differences with other parties (Lavine et al., 2012; Druckman, Peterson, et al., 2013).

To summarize, affectively polarized individuals may not hold their party leaders accountable for globalization policy because of an inherent desire to differentiate their political beliefs from the other parties, be loyal and consistent to their own parties, and behave differently than what other party leaders recommend. The strength of partisan identity conditions this relationship. Voters with the highest out-party animus are more

likely to engage in such behaviors compared to the low out-party animus voters (Tajfel and Wilkes, 1963). Thus, we predict that highly affectively polarized individuals will not choose their party leaders according to their own globalization policy positions. On the contrary, voters who do not value partisan identity much will hold their leaders accountable when the leaders move their policy positions away from them.

Despite the fact that we derive our theoretical expectations from the literature on American politics, we expect similar dynamics to pan out in Turkish elections. Recent trends in American politics such as partisan and social sorting, increasingly homogeneous parties, and polarization of the political elite and media can also be found in Turkish politics. The Turkish context provides us with additional opportunities to test our predictions. The Turkish parties are not as programmatic as the American parties. Turkey has a relatively immature democracy and party discipline compared to western democracies. The chance of observing the effect of affective polarization is high in Turkey because the parties do not hold clear and consistent policy positions.

An argument that may be raised against our paper is that we will not find any polarization effects due to the low salience of globalization policies, especially in a country like Turkey with deep religious and ethnic identity cleavages. Our answer to this legitimate concern is two-fold. First, this concern urges us to think carefully about the globalization policy that we test in our experiments. We decide on FDI policy because FDI has the potential to be more salient than trade. Although we still do not fully understand how FDI policy matters in elections, we have reasons to believe that FDI policy will matter for two reasons. First, unlike trade, voters are much more likely to encounter foreign investors in their daily lives because they may live and work in the vicinity of foreign investment. Second, FDI is an ideal candidate for manipulation of globalization policies because it has a country of origin. In this way, politicians may appeal to voters' nationalistic sentiments by exploiting feelings toward foreign countries. The second dimension of our answer is based on the findings of the previous literature. Studies have shown that politicians manipulate globalization issues for their electoral purposes. (Feigenbaum and Hall, 2015) demonstrated that politicians were able to escape accountability for economic downturns due to economic integration in their districts by changing their voting portfolio to be more protectionist. (Conconi et al., 2014) found that politicians become more protectionist as elections approach. Thus, we claim that appeals to protectionism may engage a small group

of voters with low partisan attachment who were left behind by globalization or highly nationalistic.

Empirical Evidence

To understand how policy positions and partisanship influence voting behavior, we conducted a face-to-face survey in Turkey. We employ two experiments in the survey. The first is a vignette experiment. The second is a choice-based conjoint experiment that is used in several studies focusing on voting behavior (e.g., (Bakker et al., 2021; Graham and Svolik, 2020; Carey et al., 2022; Becher and Brouard, 2022; Gidengil et al., 2021). The nationally represented survey is fielded by MetroPOLL Strategic and Social Research[7] between February and March 2022 and included 2,500 eligible respondents.[8] In the sections below, we provide detailed descriptions of the experiments.

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[7]MetroPOLL is one of Turkey's leading non-partisan survey research firms with significant 16-years experience conducting opinion polling, demographic research, content analysis, and other data-driven social science research. They do not take any policy positions. They are committed to meeting the highest methodological standards.

[8]The survey was conducted face-to-face, and probability proportionate to size (PPS) stratified sampling method was used by administrative units as per census (district, neighborhood).

Respondents were recruited through a process that ensured random selection and national representativeness. The survey was advertised as a survey on "Voting Behavior and Elections in Turkey," where participants are asked to answer a short survey on what people think about their lives, whether they voted in the recent municipal elections and how they make up their minds about which party and candidate to vote. The approximate duration of the survey was 20 minutes, taken on a tablet. Potential participants were informed about the survey and their responsibilities and told that they could leave the survey at any time. Respondents were also asked for explicit, verbal consent for participation in the survey.[9] A random selection of sampling points was made from each stratum (no more than ten interviews per sampling point). Random route household selection within each sampling point (no more than one household per building). The provinces were determined according to the classification of regional statistical units (statistiki Bölge Birimleri Snflandrmas - IBBS) established by the Turkish Statistical Institute (Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu - TUIK). This nomenclature, which was put into effect in 2002, was defined according to the NUTS criteria, the

Vignette Experiment

The vignette experiment is designed to assess the likelihood that respondents receiving copartisan protectionist (liberal) cues should support protectionism more (less). Respondents will be randomly assigned to one of the six conditions as shown in Figure 1. Each respondent will see the following question:

> *In Turkish Parliament's sessions on "Global Economy and Unemployment," different views emerge.* **[Manipulation 1A here]** *think that* **[Manipulation 2A here]. [Manipulation 1B here]** *think that* **[Manipulation 2B here].**

Figure 1: The Control and Treatment Conditions in the Vignette Experiment

	Manipulation 1A	Manipulation 2A	Manipulation 1B	Manipulation 2B
Cond. 1 (p=16.6%)	Some	Barriers should be increased for goods coming from abroad	Others	Barriers should be reduced for goods coming from abroad
Cond. 2 (p=16.6%)	Some	Barriers to foreign investors need to be increased	Others	Barriers to foreign investors need to be reduced
Cond. 3 (p=16.7%)	$PARTY_A	Barriers should be increased for goods coming from abroad	PARTY_B	Barriers should be reduced for goods coming from abroad
Cond. 4 (p=16.7%)	$PARTY_A	Barriers to foreign investors need to be increased	PARTY_B	Barriers to foreign investors need to be reduced
Cond. 5 (p=16.7%)	$PARTY_B	Barriers should be reduced for goods coming from abroad	PARTY_A	Barriers should be increased for goods coming from abroad
Cond. 6 (p=16.7%)	$PARTY_B	Barriers to foreign investors need to be reduced	PARTY_A	Barriers to foreign investors need to be increased

Conditions vary on multiple levels. Half of the respondents have been randomly assigned to manipulation on international trade, and the other half on FDI. In this paper, we are concerned with the half that have
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territorial nomenclature of the EU, to produce data comparable to that of the European Union (EU) and to create possible solutions for the developmental differences between the various regions of the country.

received manipulation on foreign investors (1,250 respondents). The aim of the vignette experiment is to measure the causal effect of partisan cues on FDI attitudes. Thus, we keep our treatment conditions simple to not lose power. Half of respondents will receive either a protectionist cue, indicating that the politician thinks barriers to foreign investors should be increased, or a liberal, indicating that the politician believes barriers to foreign investors should be reduced. Finally, we vary the partisan source of the information, conditional on the respondents' partisan identity. One-third of respondents will receive a neutral (Some/Others), another third will receive a co-partisan, and the final one-third will receive an out-partisan cue. The display logic is presented below:

- Display Logic

    - if the party ID of the respondent is "AKP" or "MHP"

        * $PARTY_A = Respondent's Party

        * $PARTY_B = CHP

    - if the party ID of the respondent is "CHP" or "HDP" or "IYI PARTY"

        * $PARTY_A = Respondent's Party

        * $PARTY_B = AKP

    - if we don't know the party ID of the respondent

        * $PARTY_A = AKP

        * $PARTY_B = CHP

The outcome variable is the protectionist policy position of the respondents measured on a 5-point scale. The respondents are asked about their position in the debate presented above. The responses range from (1) "It (trade/foreign direct investment) should definitely be reduced" to (5) "It should definitely be increased." We rescale the responses so that higher values indicate a more protectionist position and lower values indicate a more liberal position on FDI.

Conjoint Experiment

We conducted a conjoint experiment to further examine how FDI attitudes and partisanship influence the effect of candidates' FDI policy positions on voting behavior. The respondents saw two candidate profiles on their screens, as shown in Figure 2. We asked them to indicate which candidate they preferred[10] Each respondent evaluated ten comparisons between pairs of hypothetical candidates running in the Turkish municipal elections of 2022. Each candidate-pair was displayed on a new screen. Therefore, the total number of observations is 50,000.[11]

Figure 2: A Sample Profile from the Conjoint Experiment

We measure our dependent variable using both forced choice outcomes and individual ratings. To construct our primary outcome of interest, we ask respondents to make a choice between the two candidates presented.

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[10]Prior research shows that (Hainmueller, Hangartner, et al., 2015; Graham and Svolik, 2020) the results are not sensitive to this particular context of the task.

[11]See Appendix A for more detail.

This binary variable is coded as *ForcedChoice*, which takes the value 1 if the candidate is chosen and 0 otherwise. We argue that this outcome is superior because it forces respondents to calculate the trade-offs between the candidates and eventually reward one candidate over the other. Our second outcome of interest is constructed by asking respondents to rate each candidate on a 5-point scale. We code this outcome as a binary variable *BinaryRating*, which is 1 if the rating is greater than three and 0 otherwise. Finally, our third outcome is *ScaledRatings* for which we scale the 5-point index ratings to vary between 0 and 1.[12]

We present the respondents with 10 scenarios, each scenario containing 2 candidates. In total, the respondents evaluated 20 hypothetical candidates with 8 candidate varying attributes. Table 1 lists all the potential candidate globalization policy positions.[13] Since our main interest lies in the globalization positions, we explain them below in a detailed way.

Each candidate in the experiment was assigned a position that either supported or opposed FDI liberalization. We look at two categories of FDI depending on the foreign company mode of entry. Our first category is greenfield FDI, which is when foreign multinational corporations (MNC) open up a subsidiary in Turkey. Our second category is M&A, which is when foreign MNC takeover a Turkish company. In each FDI type, we also vary the country-of-origin of the investment by three categories: all foreign investment, investment from the West, and investment from the Middle East. All positions are listed in Appendix A.

It was challenging to decide on one FDI policy position for a realistic scenario that would apply to both greenfield FDI and M&A given our limited budget. We wanted it to be something that local politicians have power over, but this is a difficult task given that Turkey is a unitary state and all powers are consolidated at the national level. We considered two policy positions, property tax and allocation of cheap/free land, because these are the only policies that local politicians seemed to have considerable power over. We decided on the latter for two reasons. First, while property tax taken from corporations may be complicated and abstract in Turkish citizens' minds, allocation of cheap/free land creates an easy-to-understand and concrete image, which makes it easier for respondents to calculate the trade-offs between policy positions. Second, our informal interviews with local officials revealed that allocation of land is a perk negotiated

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[12]Throughout this paper, we only report our primary outcome of interest. Estimating models with different outcome variables does not change the results

[13]All other attributes can be found in Appendix A.

between the foreign companies and local officials, independent of the national government. In the greenfield context, this means allocation of land to foreign investors by local officials to build a new factor. We argue that even though in the M&A context readers might find the scenario unrealistic, we could still imagine a foreign investor negotiating to not pay for the land the Turkish company was renting from the government once acquisition finalizes. Future research should replicate the experiment varying the benefits local government provides and see if the effects change. The justifications of our policy positions are listed below.

Table 1: Positions Endorsed by Candidates Assigned to the Undemocratic Condition

No	Pro-Globalization	Anti-Globalization
1	Will allocate cheap/free land to all foreign investors who will establish factories	Will make it difficult to allocate land to all foreign investors who will establish factories
2	Will allocate cheap/free land to Western investors who will establish factories	Will make it difficult to allocate land to Western investors who will establish factories
3	Will allocate cheap/free land to Middle Eastern investors who will establish factories	Will make it difficult to allocate land to Middle Eastern investors who will establish factories
4	Will allocate cheap/free land to all foreign investors who will buy Turkish companies	Will make it difficult to allocate land to all foreign investors who will buy Turkish companies
5	Will allocate cheap/free land to Western investors who will buy Turkish companies	Will make it difficult to allocate land to Western investors who will buy Turkish companies
6	Will allocate cheap/free land to Middle Eastern investors who will buy Turkish companies	Will make it difficult to allocate land to Middle Eastern investors who will buy Turkish companies

Type of FDI: Treatments capture policies aimed at two types of FDI that can receive different reactions from the domestic public. Not all FDI is welcomed by citizens. Voters typically like greenfield FDI because new subsidiaries of foreign companies create good, well-paying jobs for the local economy. They also have other positive externalities, such as contributing to economic growth, creating backward-forward linkages with foreign companies, and engaging in corporate social responsibility. However, the economic benefits M&A bring are debatable at best. Even if the foreign acquisition of a Turkish company is not predatory, companies buy other companies to benefit from economies of scale[14], leading to the shutdown of certain units and layoffs.

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[14]Economies of scale means the acquiring company will decrease its costs by the increased level of production

Moreover, some citizens may not agree with the sale of a national company to foreign investor[15]. (Tingley et al., 2015) The empirical evidence supports our predictions. In the Pew Global Attitudes survey conducted in 2014, while 47% of Turkish citizens agreed with foreign companies building factories in the country, only 30% thought that foreign companies buying Turkish companies was good (Pew Research Center, 2014).[16]

Country of Origin: Public reactions to FDI may also vary depending on the nationality of the investor. Marketing literature shows that consumer ethnocentrism, the tendency to see other country products as inferior, influences buying decisions (Shimp and Sharma, 1987). Jensen and Lindstadt (2013) show that American and British survey respondents discriminated between foreign companies with different origins and formed their FDI preferences accordingly. We expect western investors to be negatively viewed due to the elite rhetoric around "West is trying to stop us from growing." The opposition parties do not have a contradictory rhetoric to the ruling party in this way, criticizing the foreign influence over Turkish economy. We expect Middle Eastern investors to be received more positively, given the cultural similarities. However, the Syrian refugee crisis and the rising anti-Arab nationalism as a result might influence voters' decisions.

Partisan Identity

The strength of partisan identity, as we interchangeably define as affective polarization, is our main mediating variable in the conjoint experiment. Here, we detail how we operationalize and measure affective polarization.

Extant research defines polarization at three levels.[17] The first is at the individual level. Studies have debated whether the division between voters' policy preferences has become increasingly deepened. The second

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resulting from the merger of the two companies.

[15][Turkey has gone through a period of privatization when the government-owned utility companies were sold to foreign investors. AKP has accelerated these sales during its tenure. Sales of Turkish companies are especially a sensitive issue for Turkish citizens.

[16]Turkey was by far the most negative country regarding FDI inflows and an outlier among emerging economies that were surveyed by Pew. Turkey was closely followed by China (51%), Japan (58%), Pakistan (61%), Palestine (61%), and Russia (63%).

[17]See (Graham and Svolik, 2020) for a more detailed discussion.

is at the electorate level. Polarization at the electorate level can be described as the level of correspondence between issue areas and partisan affiliation. The third level concerns political elites and focuses primarily on the ideological scale, describing the extent to which policy preferences differ between parties.(Webster and Abramowitz, 2017).

We focus on affective polarization at the individual level (Iyengar, Lelkes, et al., 2019). We define affective polarization as a respondent's in-party group attachment and out-party dislike. Thus, it has more to do with respondents' *feelings* toward party groups than with their ideological proximity. Our definition drives our measurement of the concept. Although researchers have proposed many ways to measure affective polarization (Druckman and Levy, 2021), we choose to construct our measure with feeling thermometers.

One innovation we introduce is to measure affective polarization dyadically in our conjoint experiment. Existing affective polarization measures are derived mostly from the US context where researchers measure affective polarization as the Democrat/Republican party supporters' like/dislike toward the two parties. This method does not translate one-to-one to the Turkish context, where there are five major parties in the political system. Thus, a respondent's average dislike toward the other four parties may not capture the role of partisan identity in voting behavior, since the respondent is presented with two candidates in the conjoint scenarios. For example, a general affective polarization measure that computes an AKP supporter's in-party sympathy and dislike for other four parties may not be applicable when the supporter is presented with a choice between AKP and CHP candidates in the conjoint experiment. The general measure may underestimate the polarization level if the AKP supporter feels very warm toward MHP and very cold toward CHP. The coalitions among parties that emerged in Turkey in recent years along the AKP-MHP vs. CHP-IYI Party lines increase the probability of underestimation.

We construct our dyadic affective polarization measure by using our pre-experiment feeling thermometer questions. We asked respondents to rate how cold or warm they feel toward the five prominent political parties (i.e., AKP, CHP, MHP, IYI Parti, and HDP) on the standard 100-point thermometer. We then considered the two-party scenarios that included the respondent's party the respondent had received during the conjoint experiment. In each scenario, we calculated the absolute value of the difference between the respondent's own party and the other candidate's party. For example, if an AKP supporter rated AKP

as 95 and CHP as 20, the dyadic affective polarization score of that respondent for an AKP candidate vs. CHP candidate scenario is 75. We then calculated the overall sample's dyadic affective polarization score quartiles and divided respondents into low, medium, and high affective polarization categories. The first quartile corresponds to a 40 point difference, while the third quantile corresponds to a 91 point difference. Respondents whose scores fall into the first quartile range were categorized as low, in between the first and third quartiles were categorized as medium, and into third quartile and above were categorized as highly affectively polarized. Thus, we obtain a measure that varies by each scenario an individual receives.

Causal Identification

Conjoint experiments provide causal estimates of the quantities of interest based on the methodology of potential outcomes and randomized experiments.[18] The research question asked is "What attribute causally increases or decreases the appeal of a candidate, on average, when varied independently of the other candidate attributes." Our estimand as a response to this question is *average marginal component effect* (AMCE). It is "the effect of a particular attribute value of interest against another value of the same attribute while keeping the joint distribution of the other attributes in the design equal, averaged over this distribution, as well as the sampling distribution from the population" (Bansak, Hainmueller, Hopkins, et al., 2019). In our election-related conjoint experiment, we can interpret AMCE as the causal effect of any candidate-level attribute on that candidate's expected vote share. We are also interested in estimating how the characteristics of the respondents interact with the attributes of the candidates to inform the choice of vote. To observe how the effects of the attributed vary depending on respondent characteristics, we study *the conditional AMCE* which is the average of the attribute's marginal effect conditional on the respondent's characteristics. Additionally, to facilitate causal interpretation, we frequently estimate the differences in means between the subgroups we compare. Therefore, properly implemented conjoint experiments can obtain reliable measures of multidimensional preferences in hypothetical choices or evaluations.

To ensure that potential outcomes are statistically independent of profiles, we randomly vary the profiles

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[18]For a thorough explanation of the logic behind conjoint experiments see (Imbens and Rubin, 2015; Hainmueller, Hopkins, et al., 2014).

of two candidates on eight attributes that previous inquiries identify as potentially important (Graham and Svolik, 2020). Attributes include age, sex, profession, ethnicity, political party, globalization, refugee policy positions, and undemocratic / generic actions of each candidate. Each attribute consists of multiple categories. Although the attributes are independently randomized from each other, we set the distribution of the treatment components to plausible, real-world probabilities. For example, men's probability of running in Turkish elections is higher than women's. This would lead to unrealistic distributions if we code the experiment so that both men and women candidates show 50% in candidate profiles. Therefore, we decide the probabilities of the appearance of certain attributes in the experiment.[19] We adjust our analyses to reflect the imperfect randomization for inference. Our AMCEs are defined over these specific distributions and they might differ in size and significance as a function of different attribute distributions. Finally, we set conditional restrictions on the partisanship of the candidate to certain scenarios to increase the power in our analyses. If we know the partisanship of the respondent, we show them 2 in-party candidates 2 times and 1 in-party/1 out-party candidates 8 times. If we do not know the partisanship, we show them AKP-random party 3 times and 2 random parties 7 times. This method facilitates our analyses later on when we consider the role of protectionist policy positions on the probability of switching parties.

There are three assumptions that we make for a conjoint experiment to give us the proper estimands. To avoid the *primacy effect* and ensure a smooth survey-taking experience, we held fixed the order in which the attributes were presented across all ten tables for each respondent, although the order was randomized across respondents.[20] In conjoint experiments, we also assume *stability* and no *carry-over effects* for the potential outcomes. This means that the potential outcomes remain stable across the choice tasks (i.e., no period effect) and that treatments given to a respondent in her other choice tasks do not affect her response in the current task. This assumption allows us to increase the efficiency of a given study by pooling information across choice tasks when estimating the average causal effects of interest.[21]. The third and final assumption

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[19]Gender: Man-Woman(0.3-0.7). Race: Turkish-Kurdish(0.8-0.2). Occupation: Business Executive/Lawyer/Small Business Owner-Farmer/Teacher/Retired Soldier/Academic(0.2-0.1)

[20]Attribute ordering is randomized at the respondent level to prevent excessive cognitive burden on respondents (Hainmueller, Hopkins, et al., 2014)

[21]This assumption may not be plausible if respondents use the information given in earlier choice tasks as

is no *profile-order effects*; a simple shuffle of the order in which profiles are presented on the questionnaire or computer screen must not alter the choice of the respondents, as long as all attributes are kept the same. This assumption makes it possible to ignore the order in which profiles are presented and pool information across profiles when estimating causal quantities of interest.[22]

In our conjoint experimental setting, we are first interested in recovering the AMCE of anti-globalization candidate policy position on voting preferences. Our main quantity of interest is the overall effect of anti-globalization positions averaged across all other candidate attributes that may shape candidate preference. We run a simple regression where candidate attributes enter as dummies with their baseline category and other category effects relative to this baseline. We cluster the standard errors by respondents to achieve correct inference because our data includes repeated respondent observations. Our next analyses investigate respondents' level of defection from their own party leaders when leaders promise liberal FDI policies. We follow this analysis by estimating the conditional AMCEs through subgroup analyses where we divide respondents into three groups depending on their affective polarization levels: low, medium, and high. We supplement these descriptive results with causal estimates by calculating the marginal means of these groups and comparing the levels of support by taking the difference in means (Leeper, Hobolt, et al., 2020).[23]

Do Elite Cues Influence Attitudes toward FDI?

We estimate the average treatment affect (ATT) by comparing the outcome means across the two treatment conditions (co-partisan protectionist cue/out-partisan protectionist cue) to the means of the control condition (no partisan cue) in the vignette experiment. Table 2 presents the differences in means between the treatment

a reference point in evaluating candidates later in the experiment. After receiving the data, we tested this assumption by controlling for effect heterogeneity between different candidate scenarios. The p-value of the F-Test for this analysis is 0.2209, indicating that there are no carryover effects (Appendix B)

[22]Given the randomized design, we expect each profile in a given scenario to have a 50% chance of being preferred. The ideological position of a candidate should not provide any advantage. We could not find a significant bias in this context. Although the candidate on the left was selected 50.31% of the time, the ratio for the candidate on the right was 49.69%. This distribution indicates that there was no profile-order-effect.

[23]Marginal means of all attributes can be found in Appendix Figure A4.

Table 2: Difference in Means Between the Control and Two Treatment Groups

(a)

	No Partisan Cue (N=406)		Co-Partisan Cue (N=343)			
	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Diff. in Means	p
Protectionism	3.2305	1.2269	3.6040	1.2375	0.3734	0.0001

(b)

	No Partisan Cue (N=406)		Out-Partisan Cue (N=354)			
	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Diff. in Means	p
Protectionism	3.2305	1.2269	2.6046	1.4063	-0.6260	0.0000

and control groups for the opposition of the respondents to the FDI policy. Recall that protectionism is a 5-point index which takes the value of 1 if a respondent says barriers toward foreign investors should definitely be reduced and 5 if a respondent indicates barriers should definitely be increased. Panel a in the table compares the mean FDI attitude in the control group (no partisan cue) to our first treatment group (co-partisan protectionist/out-partisan liberal cue). In the control group, a mean attitude of 3.23 indicates that Turkish respondents in the survey lean more toward protectionism, but still hold modest opinions on the barriers toward foreign investors. This is in line with our expectations from citizens who are currently undergoing a severe financial crisis. Interestingly, the mean of the treatment group is 3.60, which is noticeably higher than that of the control group. The 0.34 point difference in means is statistically significant at the 95% confidence level. This finding suggests that respondents' attitudes toward FDI are influenced by cues from their own parties.

Panel b in Table 2 reveals a mean of 2.60 for respondents who are exposed to a liberal co-party/protectionist out-party cue. Compared to the control group, a liberal cue from the respondents' own parties decreased protectionist attitudes from 3.23 to 2.60, an economically and statistically significant difference of 0.62. This result shows that, on average, partisan supporters may become almost indifferent to globalization policies if they believe their party leaders support liberal policies.

The results from Table 2 paint a general picture of how survey takers respond to elite cues about globalization. Since we obtain the group means by randomization, we can be more confident that they are not biased. As a robustness check, we run an OLS regression and include several socio-demographic respondent controls to estimate the effect of partisan cues on protectionist attitudes. We construct a categorical variable

that indicates the control and treatment groups, defining the control group as the baseline. We include the respondents' gender, age, ethnicity (baseline Arab), educational level (baseline No Schooling), approval of President Erdogan, religion (baseline Shia), and income levels.[24] We also include city-fixed effects to account for the economic context of respondents and varying levels of exposure to foreign companies.

We are interested in estimating the coefficients of the two treatment groups - co-partisan protectionist cue and out-partisan protectionist cue. The first column in Table 3 presents the results. In line with the results from Table 2, we see that a co-partisan protectionist cue increases protectionism by 0.31 points, on average, accounting for all other respondent characteristics. When we look at respondents who were assigned to receive protectionist cues from their out-parties (hence receiving liberal cues from their co-partisans), we find a 0.67 points decline on a 5-point index in their protectionist attitudes. The effects of both cues are statistically significant at the 95% confidence level.

The findings indicate the average affect of partisan cues on how Turkish citizens feel about protectionism. We further examine how this affect varies across different parties by estimating the regressions separately among the supporters of the five main parties. The second column in Table 3 shows that partisan cues are effective among supporters of the ruling party. A co-partisan protectionist cue increases support for protectionism by 0.42, whereas a liberal partisan cue decreases support for protectionism by 0.57 points. These significant differences indicate that the opinions of the AKP supporters are highly malleable to the policy opinions voiced by the AKP politicians, with little regard to the content. We also find that the main opposition party, the CHP, supporters decrease their support for barriers toward foreign investors on average by 0.65 points when faced with a liberal CHP leader and a protectionist AKP leader, as shown in column 3. Columns 3 to 5 show that respondents who belong to the two other opposition parties and one AKP coalition member party do not alter their opinion when presented with partisan cues, though the insignificant coefficients must be interpreted with caution because of the small sample sizes. None of the respondent characteristics is consistently significant across different models.

Table 3 demonstrates a polarizing effect of partisan cues on globalization among supporters of the ruling

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[24]We have created the income variable to include five categories that divides the Turkish citizens into income bins ranging from the lowest to highest income.

	All Respondents	Partisans				
	OLS	OLS (AKP)	OLS (CHP)	OLS (HDP)	OLS (IYI)	OLS (MHP)
Out-Partisan Cue	-0.67***	-0.57**	-0.65**	-0.77+	-0.10	
	(0.12)	(0.17)	(0.22)	(0.45)	(0.43)	
Co-Partisan Cue	0.31**	0.42*	0.30	0.51	0.04	-0.41
	(0.11)	(0.18)	(0.23)	(0.49)	(0.39)	(0.45)
CHP Supporter	-0.15					
	(0.16)					
HDP Supporter	-0.33					
	(0.24)					
MHP Supporter	-0.19					
	(0.22)					
IYI Party Supporter	-0.01					
	(0.19)					
Male	-0.21*	0.01	-0.49**	0.14	-0.42	-0.46
	(0.10)	(0.15)	(0.19)	(0.47)	(0.36)	(0.42)
Age	-0.18	-0.21	-0.43	-0.17	0.74	-0.07
	(0.20)	(0.31)	(0.38)	(0.72)	(1.06)	(1.08)
Turkish	-0.09	-1.42+	-0.16	0.85	-0.10	-3.11+
	(0.47)	(0.79)	(0.71)	(1.83)	(1.44)	(1.50)
Kurdish	0.38	-1.29	-0.04	1.66		
	(0.50)	(0.84)	(0.77)	(1.84)		
Less Than High School	-0.07	0.38	-1.20	1.12		
	(0.46)	(0.72)	(0.81)	(1.25)		
High School	-0.13	0.31	-1.60+	0.75	0.27	0.49
	(0.47)	(0.75)	(0.81)	(1.30)	(0.59)	(0.60)
Bachelor and Up	-0.13	0.30	-1.62*	0.10	0.53	1.16
	(0.47)	(0.76)	(0.80)	(1.35)	(0.66)	(0.72)
Erdogan Approval	0.21	0.21	0.26	-0.62	-0.11	1.30
	(0.19)	(0.31)	(0.41)	(0.85)	(0.74)	(1.10)
Sunni	-0.29	-0.03	-0.38	-0.37	-1.81+	0.65
	(0.19)	(0.49)	(0.27)	(0.87)	(1.00)	(0.93)
Income - Low	0.26	0.18	-0.19	1.05	2.21*	0.82
	(0.23)	(0.37)	(0.47)	(0.72)	(0.86)	(2.04)
Income - Mid	0.26	0.35	0.65+	0.29	0.57	-0.02
	(0.19)	(0.34)	(0.38)	(0.65)	(0.66)	(1.75)
Income - High	0.25	0.09	0.84*	0.97	0.77	-0.53
	(0.22)	(0.39)	(0.42)	(0.86)	(0.87)	(2.09)
Income - Highest	-0.57	-1.08+	0.09	0.39	0.44	
	(0.36)	(0.59)	(0.60)	(1.78)	(1.44)	
Num.Obs.	767	326	231	93	76	41
R2	0.202	0.285	0.317	0.388	0.540	0.760
R2 Adj.	0.149	0.176	0.177	0.077	0.234	0.262

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

and opposition parties. For example, in the case that AKP campaigns on protectionism, our findings indicate that AKP supporters will become more protectionist, while CHP supporters will become more liberal. This finding is in line with the dynamics we observe in Turkish politics, as we mention in the introduction.

The vignette experiment demonstrates that globalization attitudes are malleable to partisan elite cues, especially among AKP voters. In the next sections, we will examine whether the Turkish voters' support for

candidates, especially AKP voters', are affected by the globalization policy positions candidates raise during elections.

The Effect of Candidates' Protectionist Policy Positions on Vote Choice

What is the average causal effect of a candidate holding a protectionist policy position as opposed to a liberal one on candidate preference, when they also receive information about other candidate attributes?[25] Figure 3 plots the causal effect of all candidate attributes on candidate preferences defined by our two outcome measures. The left panel of the figure plots the effect on the binary candidate choice, whereas the right panel shows the effect on candidate ratings. The y-axis displays AMCE estimates, while the x-axis depicts the attributes and their respective levels.[26] We use ordinary least squares regressions with standard errors clustered by the respondents to estimate the AMCE for each attribute (Hainmueller, Hopkins, et al., 2014). Note that the AMCE displays the marginal impact of an attribute averaged over the joint distribution of the remaining ones. *ForcedChoice* and *ScaledRatings* outcome variables are regressed on the candidate attributes that enter the regression as categorical variables. Each categorical level is then compared to a baseline category, giving us the average causal effect of the change in candidate attributes and policy positions. Each dot is the AMCE on the likelihood that a candidate will be chosen or on ratings, and the horizontal lines provide the 95% confidence interval. Dots in the dashed line without confidence intervals represent baseline categories.

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[25]Appendix Figure A5 shows attribute frequencies.

[26]The axis are rotated for ease of interpretation.

Figure 3: Effects of Candidate Attributes on the Probability of Candidate Choice

Dots with horizontal lines indicate point estimates with cluster-robust 95% confidence intervals form linear (weighted) least squares regression. The dots on the zero line denote the reference category for each candidate attribute.

Figure 3 illustrates the substantial and significant effect of globalization policies on candidate choice. a

candidate as protectionist as opposed to liberal increased the probability of the respondent choosing the

candidate by 3.3 percentage points on average when presented with all other attributes. Other policy positions also have a significant effect on candidate choice. Regarding refugee policy, protectionist candidates are 6 percentage points more likely to be chosen than otherwise similar liberal candidates. This indicates a preference for protectionist candidates, on average, among Turkish respondents regarding immigration and foreign investment policy, although somewhat unsurprisingly candidates get rewarded more for being anti-refugee. Finally, undemocratic candidates are 2.7 percentage points less likely to be preferred by respondents over generic ones. This suggests that the effect of anti-globalization positions on candidate support is larger than the effect of undemocratic positions among these respondents.

The conjoint experiment also reveals interesting insights about the effect of candidates' socio-demographic characteristics on election prospects. Figure 3 shows that the respondents were less likely to prefer Kurdish candidates compared to Turkish candidates, unsurprising results in a nationalist country that is predominantly Turkish. The candidate's age, gender, and occupation did not significantly inform vote preferences. Partisanship stands out as the main driver of vote choice. Compared to the AKP candidates, the CHP candidates were 5 percentage points less likely to be chosen. This partisanship penalty was much higher for the candidates from the Iyi Party (-19 percentage points), MHP (-23 percentage points), and HDP (-25 percentage points). These results reflect the true dynamics that we tend to observe in Turkish elections.

Do Voters Electorally Punish Candidates When They Adopt Liberal Positions?

Figure 3 demonstrates an economically and statistically significant effect of candidate globalization positions on voter's leader choice. This finding goes against the conventional wisdom that globalization policy does not matter in voting behavior. To examine the policy's influence, we ask whether respondents have crossed party lines in the experiment based on their candidate's changed views on FDI liberalization. Our setup is similar to Graham and Svolik (2020)'s methodology. We first calculate the difference in the support of the candidate in the party for the respondents who received their own party candidate in the two-candidate scenario where both candidates are protectionist. We treat this group of respondents as our control group. Then, we calculate the difference in support for in-party candidates for respondents who received a liberal in-party candidate versus a protectionist out-party candidate. The estimates we obtain represent the marginal effect of partisan

voting when a respondent's in-party candidate moves from a protectionist to a liberal position. This signifies the party supporters' willingness to defect from their own party when their candidate becomes liberal.

Figure 4 demonstrates that a fraction of respondents are willing to defect from their parties when their candidates switch from protectionist to liberal. The left panel estimates the AMCEs for all respondents, whereas in the right panel, we focus solely on AKP respondents. Both panels show that the marginal effect of in-party support goes down in the event of a globalization policy switch toward liberalism.

Figure 4: Average Marginal Component Effect of In-Party Candidates Switching from Protectionist to Liberal


Dots with vertical lines indicate point estimates with cluster-robust 95% confidence intervals form linear (weighted) least squares regression.

Our hypothesis states that the decrease in partisan support should come from individuals who hold low partisan animus. To test this prediction, we divide respondents into three categories (low,medium,high) depending on their levels of polarization. Figure 5 illustrates the behavioral differences between respondents with varying levels of partisan animus for both the general and AKP-only samples. Our predictions are confirmed by the evidence presented in the second row, AKP-only sample. At high levels of affective polarization, the ruling party respondents are not sensitive to changes in their candidate's globalization policy position. In contrast, at low levels of affective polarization, the ruling party respondents punish AKP candidates who move from a protectionist toward a liberal policy. fig:fig5 focuses on the AKP sample. The figure presents the calculated difference in means for in-party support between the control (both candidates are protectionist) and treatment (AKP liberal, out-party protectionist) conditions. Here, we can make causal interpretations. Once again, we see that AKP supporters with low partisan animus punish the AKP candidate

by 11 percentage points when the candidate becomes liberal. In the following sections, we focus on the

AKP-only sample to investigate potential mechanisms behind this finding.

Figure 5: Average Marginal Component Effect of In-Party Candidates Switching from Protectionist to Liberal, by Affective Polarization

Dots with vertical lines indicate point estimates with cluster-robust 95% confidence intervals form linear (weighted) least squares regression.

Figure 6: The Marginal Effect of In-Party Support For an AKP Candidate Promising Liberal Policies, by Affective Polarization

Dots with horizontal lines indicate point estimates with cluster-robust 95% confidence intervals form linear (weighted) least squares regression.

Potential Mechanisms

Why do partisans with low levels of partisan animus punish their liberal party leaders? Here, we examine two potential explanations, policy conflict at the candidate level and attitude translation at the individual level.

The first possibility is that lowly affectively polarized respondents may be more likely to hold their party candidates accountable when candidates promise policies in conflict with the party agenda. We think that this explanation has a low probability because the AKPs have been engaged in liberal policies since they came to power in 2001. Nevertheless, we test this prediction by combining data from the vignette and the conjoint experiments. We categorize the AKP supporters into six groups depending on their partisan animus levels and the kind of cues they have received from AKP in the vignette experiment (protectionist cue, liberal cue, no cue). We then calculate the difference in means between the fraction of AKP supporters voting for the AKP candidate versus the other candidate when the AKP candidate goes from protectionist to liberal in each subgroup by re-estimating our linear regression. Figure 7 plots the differences in means of partisan support. The upper panel plots the estimates for AKP supporters with high levels of affective polarization. The lower panel plots the estimates for AKP supporters with low levels of affective polarization. As expected, the policy change does not affect the in-party support of AKP supporters with high partisan animus. If the policy conflict hypothesis were correct, then we would see AKP supporters who received a protectionist cue from AKP to punish the AKP candidate who defied partisan agenda. We find support for this hypothesis in the figure. Looking at the lower-level panel, we observe that support for AKP declines by around 12 percentage points, on average, after accounting for other candidate attributes when the liberal AKP candidate is compared to the protectionist one. This is the only difference in the figure that is significant at the 95% level.

The other possible mechanism is that only lowly polarized respondents vote according to their pre-existing globalization attitudes. This means that only the respondents who are not motivated by negative partisanship in elections would judge candidates according to their preferences toward globalization. To test this, we divide respondents into four categories again, this time depending on their polarization level and pre-existing globalization attitudes.

Figure 7: The Marginal Effect of In-Party Support For an AKP Candidate Promising Liberal Policies, by Affective Polarization and Vignette Conditions


Dots with horizontal lines indicate point estimates with cluster-robust 95% confidence intervals form linear (weighted) least squares regression.

We measure pre-existing globalization attitudes by asking respondents how much they agreed or disagreed with the following statement: "The Turkish economy suffers a great deal when it opens to the global economy (via foreign trade and investment)" The answer was a 5-point index ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree. We classified respondents who answered "strongly agree" and "agree" as protectionist and "strongly disagree" and "disagree" as liberal. The distribution of responses for strongly disagree, disagree, neutral, agree, strongly agree was 14%, 14%, 30%, 22%, and 21% respectively. This distribution tells us that most of the respondents did not have strong opinions about the effects of globalization on the Turkish economy. As expected, there are slightly more respondents who expressed protectionist (43%) than liberal (28%) preferences after combining agree and disagree, but more than half of the respondents were warm toward globalization at worst or disinterested at best.

For liberal AKP supporters, we calculate the extent to which they punish the AKP candidate when they move from a liberal toward a protectionist position, compared to the control group that received both

liberal in and out-party candidates. For protectionist AKP supporters, we calculate the fraction that defects when the AKP candidate switches to a more liberal stance, compared to the control group that received both in and out-party protectionist candidates. The differences in the means plotted in Figure 8 partially corroborate this mechanism. We find no significant differences in partisan support for liberal candidates when the AKP candidate becomes protectionist, even among individuals with low partisan animus. In the lower panel, we see that protectionist AKP supporters defect from the party when faced with a liberal compared to protectionist AKP candidate if they have low partisan animus. This defection is around 8 percentage points and statistically significant at the 95% confidence level. This graph illustrates an asymmetric effect of FDI policy preferences on leader choice. Among the AKP respondents with low partisan animus, while liberals do not consider their globalization preferences when voting, protectionists do.

Figure 8: The Marginal Effect of In-Party Support For an AKP Candidate Promising Liberal Policies, by Respondent Affective Polarization and Globalization Attitudes


Dots with horizontal lines indicate point estimates with cluster-robust 95% confidence intervals form linear (weighted) least squares regression.

Finally, we investigate whether the type of FDI policy of the country of origin influences the defection rate of AKP supporters with low partisan animus. Figure 9 shows that a AKP candidate's liberal attitudes

toward all types of FDI - greenfield vs M&A - and all types of investors - Neutral, Middle East, West - drives

defection, although low-polarized individuals tolerate openness toward the Western investors who buy Turkish

companies the least, in line with the predictions of the FDI literature.

Figure 9: The Marginal Effect of In-Party Support For an AKP Candidate Promising Liberal Policies, by Respondent Affective Polarization and FDI Policy Type

Dots with horizontal lines indicate point estimates with cluster-robust 95% confidence intervals form linear (weighted) least squares regression.

Discussion and Conclusion

Our findings empirically support the predictions we derived from our theory. The vignette experiment shows that respondents are open to cues from their party leaders when forming an opinion toward FDI. This builds on the burgeoning literature that establishes the role of elite cues on American opinion on trade, suggesting that the finding generalizes beyond the American context (Guisinger, 2009; Guisinger and Saunders, 2017). The malleability of FDI attitudes once again calls into question the theories of preference aggregation in determining foreign economic policy. Our findings also caution against research that takes globalization attitudes as fixed and given. Researchers should think more about the political context in which respondents form globalization attitudes. We also find that liberal cues have a larger effect on globalization attitudes than protectionist cues. Liberal cues turned the average public opinion on FDI from slightly protectionist to nearly indifferent. This supports the conclusion that positive information on globalization may ameliorate protectionist tendencies among the electorate (Guisinger, 2009).

We also find evidence for partisan motivated reasoning, demonstrating how strong partisans ignore the content of policy to vote in line with the party. These individuals are more inclined to base their assessments of frames not on facts but entirely on their partisan priors. By contrast, weaker partisans' judgments are less clouded by their partisan identities and more responsive to the content of the policy Lavine et al. (2012). The fact that we see the strongest partisan effects among the AKP supporters is not surprising given the Turkish context. Research shows that having strong partisan identities is often correlated with less political sophistication, weaker opinions, and less motivation to search for information (Taber and Lodge, 2006; Bullock, 2011). Compared to the average voter, the AKP voters are less educated, poorer, and more religious, characteristics that enhance partisan motivated reasoning.

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<center>Appendix</center>

Table of Contents

<center>## A   Conjoint Experiment Design</center>

Figure A1: Complete List of Candidate Attributes in the Conjoint Experiment

Attribute	Randomization	Levels
Party **Note:** A coin flip will determine which candidate appear on the left and which appear on the right.	Each candidate will take one party affiliation.	**Levels:** AKP, CHP, MHP, IYI, HDP **Matchups (if we know PARTY ID)** * 2 in-party (2 times) * 1 in-party 1 out-party (8 times) **Matchups (if we don't know PARTY ID)** * AKP-Random (3 times) * Random 2 Party (7 times)
Age	Draw a random integer	**Levels:** Between 35 and 65.
Race	Randomly assigned	**Levels:** Turkish (p = 0.8), Kurdish (p = 0.2)
Gender	Randomly assigned	**Levels:** Men (p = 0.7), Women (p = 0.3)
Profession	Randomly assigned	**Levels:** Business executive (p = 0.2), Lawyer (p = 0.2), Farmer (p = 0.1), Teacher = (p = 0.1), Retired Soldier = (0.1), Academic = (0.1), Small Business Owner (p = 0.2)
Undemocratic Actions	Fully randomized	***Undemocratic Actions*** (1) Supported a redistricting plan that gives his/her party 2 extra seats in the provincial administrative council (2) Hand out charcoal to voters for giving vote for himself (3) Will cut government spending in districts that did not vote for them (4) Will fire municipal employees who don't vote for him (5) Will start a campaign on banning Youtube (6) Will pressure Turkish police forces to detain journalists who accuse the municipality of fraud without revealing sources (7) Will not allow any oppositional group to organize protests after elections ***Generic Actions*** (1) Served on a city committee that establishes the committee`s schedule for each session (2) Participated in a working group on helping people with disabilities (3) Worked on a plan to change the city`s spending on sports (4) Served on the city`s Board of Elections (5) Served on a subcommittee preparing the annual reports of the municipal services. (6) He chaired various associations

Dots with horizontal lines indicate point estimates with cluster-robust 95% confidence intervals form linear (weighted) least squares regression. The dots on the zero line denote the reference category for each candidate attribute.

Figure A2: Complete List of Candidate Refugee and Globalization Policy Positions in the Conjoint Experiment

Refugee Positions	Fully randomized	**Refugee Positions (Pro)**
		(1) Will support the cultural activities of Syrians.
		(2) Will increase municipal visits to Syrian NGOs
		(3) Will increase financial aid to Syrian refugees.
		(4) Will start a campaign to grant citizenship to Syrians.
		Refugee Positions (Anti)
		(1) Will remove Arabic signs of Syrian businesses (2) Will not invite Syrian NGOs to municipal events
		(3) Will cut financial aid to Syrian refugees.
		(4) Will start a campaign not to grant citizenship to Syrians.
Globalization Positions	Full randomized	**Globalization Positions (Pro)**
		(1) Will allocate cheap/free land to all foreign investors who will establish factories. (2) Will allocate cheap/free land to Western investors who will establish factories.
		(3) Will allocate cheap/free land to Arab investors who will establish factories.
		(4) Will allocate cheap/free land to all foreign investors who will buy Turkish companies.
		(5) Will allocate cheap/free land to Western investors who will buy Turkish companies.
		(6) Will allocate cheap/free land to Arab investors who will buy Turkish companies.
		Globalization Positions (Anti)
		(1) Will make it difficult to allocate land to all foreign investors who will establish factories.
		(2) Will make it difficult to allocate land to Western investors who will establish factories.
		(3) Will make it difficult to allocate land to Western investors who will establish factories.
		(4) Will make it difficult to allocate land to all foreign investors who will buy Turkish companies. (5) Will make it difficult to allocate land to Western investors who will buy Turkish companies.
		(6) Will make it difficult to allocate land to Arab investors who will buy Turkish companies.

B Carryover Effects

Carryover effects implies that respondents may evaluate candidates differently depending on which profiles they have faced earlier in the conjoint experiment. Figure below visualizes evidence of the validity. Note that estimates here are marginal means conditional on the scenario number in the conjoint experiment. Horizontal lines represent 95% confidence intervals based on respondent-clustered standard errors. All attributes' range relatively similar to my estimates in the pooled analysis. To go further, I tested this assumption by controlling for effect heterogeneity between different candidate scenarios. The p-value of the F-Test for this analysis is 0.39, indicating no carry over effects. Therefore, I cannot reject the null.

Figure A3: Effects of Different Types of FDI Policy Positions on The Probability of Choosing a Candidate

C Figures

Figure A4: Marginal Means of Candidate Attributes

Figure A5: Candidate Attribute Frequencies