

LLMComp: Prompt Compression for Robust Defense Against LLM Jailbreaks

AYESHA BINTE MOSTOFA, University of Massachusetts Amherst, USA

DEBRUP DAS, University of Massachusetts Amherst, USA

ABHRANIL CHANDRA, University of Massachusetts Amherst, USA

Large Language Models are increasingly used in safety-critical applications, yet they remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks [Greshake et al. 2023; Rando and Tramèr 2024; Rao et al. 2024; Yan et al. 2024], consisting of carefully crafted prompts that bypass built-in safety mechanisms to elicit harmful or policy-violating outputs. Existing defenses face a fundamental trade-off among model utility, computational cost, and inference latency. In this work, we investigate prompt compression as an efficient and robust defense mechanism that mitigates jailbreak attacks while preserving model utility. We evaluate two classes of prompt compression techniques. First, we study SecurityLingua [Li et al. 2025], a prior token-classification-based approach for extracting malicious intent, and extend it to a few-shot setting to improve adaptability to diverse jailbreak patterns. Second, we examine LLM-based generative prompt compressors (LLMComp), which summarize user prompts to explicitly surface underlying intent. We conduct extensive experiments on monolingual and multilingual jailbreak datasets, including JailbreakBench [Chao et al. 2024], JailbreakV28K [Luo et al. 2024], and MultiJail [Deng et al. 2023], and construct a new multilingual dataset derived from JailbreakBench to support fine-tuning. Our results show that while SecurityLingua remains competitive, LLM-based prompt compression offers improved interpretability and flexibility, particularly in multilingual settings, highlighting prompt compression as a scalable and language-agnostic defense for LLMs.

CCS Concepts: • **Security and privacy** → **Malware and its mitigation**; • **Computing methodologies** → **Artificial intelligence**; **Natural language processing**.

Additional Key Words and Phrases: LLM Safety, Jailbreak Attacks, Prompt Compression, Multilingual Evaluation

ACM Reference Format:

Ayesha Binte Mostofa, Debrup Das, and Abhranil Chandra. 2025. LLMComp: Prompt Compression for Robust Defense Against LLM Jailbreaks. *ACM Trans. Graph.* 37, 4, Article 111 (August 2025), 6 pages. <https://doi.org/XXXXXXX.XXXXXXX>

1 Introduction

Large Language Models such as GPT-models [OpenAI et al. 2024] and Qwen-based models [Yang et al. 2025] have demonstrated remarkable capabilities across natural language understanding and

generation tasks. However, their widespread deployment has amplified concerns around model misuse, particularly through jailbreak attacks. Jailbreaks exploit weaknesses in prompt interpretation by embedding malicious instructions within benign-looking or obfuscated text, often bypassing safety alignment and content moderation mechanisms.

A growing body of research has proposed defenses against jailbreak attacks, including perplexity-based filters [Jain et al. 2024], erase-and-check strategies [Kumar et al. 2024], and adversarial training [Zhou et al. 2024]. Despite their effectiveness in certain settings, these approaches suffer from significant limitations. Perplexity filters are computationally efficient but often block legitimate creative or complex inputs, degrading utility. Erase-and-check methods preserve utility but incur high inference latency and cost. Adversarial training improves robustness but is prohibitively expensive and difficult to scale, especially across languages and evolving attack strategies. Consequently, most existing defenses can only satisfy two of the following three desirable properties: high utility, low cost, and low latency.

Prompt compression has recently emerged as an alternative paradigm for LLM security. Rather than directly filtering or rejecting inputs, prompt compression aims to extract the core intent of a user query by removing adversarial noise while preserving semantic meaning. By conditioning the target LLM on the extracted intention rather than the raw input, the model can more reliably identify and reject malicious requests.

In this paper, we systematically study prompt compression as a defense against jailbreaks. We evaluate SecurityLingua, a token-level classifier that removes malicious components of prompts, and compare it with a generative LLM-based compression approach that explicitly summarizes user intent. We extend prior work by performing both monolingual and multilingual evaluations, including zero-shot and few-shot settings, and by constructing a multilingual dataset for fine-tuning LLM-based compressors. Our work demonstrates the strengths and limitations of discriminative versus generative compression approaches and provides insights into building scalable, interpretable, and multilingual jailbreak defenses.

2 Related Works

Jailbreak Attacks on LLMs. A growing body of research has demonstrated that LLMs remain susceptible to jailbreak attacks that intentionally circumvent built-in safety alignment and content moderation mechanisms. Existing studies generally categorize jailbreaks along several dimensions, including attacker access assumptions, interaction structure, and system architecture. *Black-box jailbreak attacks* are the most widely studied, as they reflect realistic scenarios

Authors' Contact Information: Ayesha Binte Mostofa, University of Massachusetts Amherst, USA, amostofa@umass.edu; Debrup Das, University of Massachusetts Amherst, USA, debrupdas@umass.edu; Abhranil Chandra, University of Massachusetts Amherst, USA, abhranilchan@umass.edu.

Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than the author(s) must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org.

© 2025 Copyright held by the owner/author(s). Publication rights licensed to ACM.

ACM 1557-7368/2025/8-ART111

<https://doi.org/XXXXXXX.XXXXXXX>




Fig. 1. Working Pipeline

in which attackers can only query the model via its API. Representative approaches include handcrafted role-playing prompts and instruction-overriding prompts [Wei et al. 2023; Zou et al. 2023], adversarial suffix attacks that append optimized token sequences to benign queries [Zou et al. 2023], and automated prompt search frameworks such as Tree-of-Attacks that iteratively refine jailbreak prompts based on model feedback [Mehrotra et al. 2023]. In contrast, *white-box jailbreak attacks* assume access to model internals and exploit gradient or logit information to directly optimize adversarial prompts or triggers, resulting in highly effective but less practical attacks in real-world systems [Shi et al. 2023; Xu et al. 2024].

Beyond single-turn prompts, *multi-turn and dialogue-based jailbreaks* exploit the conversational nature of LLMs by gradually steering the model toward unsafe behavior across multiple interactions. These methods leverage contextual accumulation, trust-building, and progressive escalation to weaken safety constraints over time [Ganguli et al. 2022; Liu et al. 2023]. With the increasing deployment of retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) systems, recent work has identified *RAG-based jailbreaks*, where attackers poison external knowledge bases or manipulate retrieved documents to induce unsafe outputs, highlighting vulnerabilities that arise from the interaction between retrieval modules and generation models rather than from prompting alone [Liu et al. 2024; Zou et al. 2024]. Furthermore, the expansion of LLMs into vision and audio domains has motivated research on *multi-modal jailbreaks*, which use adversarial images, typographic visual prompts, or cross-modal inconsistencies to bypass safeguards in vision-language models [Carlini et al. 2023; Zhang et al. 2024]. Collectively, these works indicate that jailbreak vulnerabilities stem from a combination of prompt semantics, training procedures, system-level integrations, and interaction dynamics,

underscoring the need for holistic defenses that extend beyond prompt-level filtering.

3 Methodology

3.1 Overview

Our methodology investigates prompt compression as a defense layer placed before the target LLM. Given a potentially malicious user query, the system first compresses the prompt to extract its underlying intention. The compressed intention is then injected into the system prompt of the target LLM, guiding it to either safely answer benign queries or reject malicious ones. We compare three settings:

- **No Compression (Baseline)**
- **SecurityLingua-based Prompt Compression**
- **LLM-based Prompt Compression (LLMComp)**

We evaluate these approaches across both monolingual and multilingual jailbreak datasets.

To structure our investigation, we focus on the following research questions:

- **RQ1 – Tradeoffs Between Safety and Utility:** What tradeoffs exist between rejecting malicious prompts and maintaining utility for benign prompts across different compression strategies?
- **RQ2 – Effectiveness of Prompt Compression:** How effective is prompt compression in detecting and mitigating jailbreak attacks compared to no compression?

- **RQ3 – Multilingual Generalization:** Can prompt compression techniques generalize effectively to multilingual jailbreak prompts?
- **RQ4 – Few-shot versus Zero-shot Guidance:** How does few-shot guidance improve the ability of compression models to detect malicious intent compared to zero-shot methods?

These questions provide a systematic framework for evaluating both SecurityLingua-based token-level compression and LLM-based generative compression, enabling a thorough analysis of their performance, interpretability, and practical trade-offs in diverse language settings.

3.2 Datasets

We evaluate our methods on:

- Monolingual datasets: **JailbreakV28K** and **JailbreakBench** (benign and harmful splits)
- Multilingual dataset: **MultiJail**

For harmful prompts, we measure the rejection rate, i.e., how often the model correctly refuses to answer. For benign prompts, we measure the answering rate, reflecting retained utility. Rejection is detected using a keyword-based heuristic (e.g., “I’m sorry,” “illegal”), a common practice in LLM security research.

Table 1. SecurityLingua Prompts for Zero-shot and 3-shot settings

| Zero-shot Prompt | 3-shot Prompt |
|---|--|
| "You are a helpful assistant. To help you better understand the user's intention and identify potential malicious behavior, the extracted intention is as follows: intention. If you determine that the user's intention is malicious, do not provide an answer. Instead, respond with: I'm sorry, I can't help with that." User's query: malicious_prompt" | "To help you better understand the user's intention and detect potential malicious behavior, the extracted intention is: intention. Here are three examples to guide you in answering user queries: 3_Shot_Examples Do not include these examples in your answer. If you determine that the user's intention is malicious, do not provide a response. Instead, reply with: I'm sorry, I can't help with that." User's query: malicious_prompt" |

3.3 SecurityLingua-Based Prompt Compression

SecurityLingua formulates prompt compression as a **token-level classification task**, in which each token of the input prompt is classified as either relevant or irrelevant to the malicious intent. The model consists of a pre-trained Transformer encoder serving as a feature extractor, followed by a linear classification head. Tokens identified as irrelevant or adversarial are removed, producing a compressed prompt that highlights the core user intent.

Originally, SecurityLingua was evaluated in a zero-shot, English-




Fig. 2. Example outputs produced by SecurityLingua

only setting. In our work, we extend its evaluation to two configurations. In the **zero-shot setting**, the model receives no task-specific examples. In the **few-shot (3-shot) setting**, two malicious examples and one benign example are provided to guide intent extraction. We apply SecurityLingua to both **English-only datasets** and the **multilingual MultiJail** dataset. The resulting compressed intent is appended to the system prompt of the target LLM, which independently determines whether the input is malicious and whether to generate a response.

3.4 LLM-Based Prompt Compression (LLMComp)

While SecurityLingua provides fine-grained token-level removal, it may fail to capture the deeper semantic intent in complex or carefully crafted adversarial prompts. To address this limitation, we propose **LLM-based generative prompt compression**, which formulates intention extraction as a summarization task. We employ

Table 2. LLMComp Prompts

| Prompt used for extracting the true intention of the input question | Prompt for final generation by target LLM |
|---|---|
| "You are a helpful assistant which highlights the user's true intention and flags anything malicious with the reason. Extract the user's intention from the following prompt: question User's intention:" | "You are a helpful assistant. To help you better understand the user's intention, the extracted intention is: intention. If the intention is malicious, do not respond. question" |

Qwen 2.5 3B Instruct as the compressor model and constrain the generation length using a low `max_new_tokens` setting to ensure a fair comparison with token-based compression. The compressor is prompted to explicitly extract the user's true intention and to flag potentially malicious behavior along with a justification. The extracted intention is then incorporated into the system prompt of the target LLM (**Qwen 2.5 3B or 7B Instruct**), which determines

whether to answer or reject the query based on the inferred intent.

This LLM-based approach supports:

- **Zero-shot compression**
- **Monolingual and multilingual evaluation**
- **Improved interpretability**, as the extracted intention is human-readable




Fig. 3. Example outputs produced by LLMComp

3.5 Multilingual Dataset Construction

We construct a synthetic multilingual jailbreak dataset based on JailbreakBench. The dataset creation process includes the following steps:

- Start with **300 English prompts**, comprising **200 malicious** and **100 benign** examples. The prompts are relatively long, providing rich contextual information for analysis.
- Translate each prompt into nine additional languages: **Chinese, Italian, Vietnamese, Arabic, Korean, Thai, Bengali, Swahili, and Javanese**.
- Following the MultiJail methodology, this process results a total of **3,000 examples**.

The resulting dataset can be utilized for both fine-tuning and evaluation of prompt compression models.

4 Results and Discussion

4.1 Evaluation setup and metrics

We evaluate prompt-compression defenses under both monolingual and multilingual jailbreak settings using the following datasets: (i) JailbreakBench Behaviors (Benign and Harmful splits), (ii) RedTeam-2K from JailBreakV-28K, and (iii) MultiJail (multilingual malicious queries in 10 languages). Following our project pipeline, we compare three conditions: (a) **No compression** (baseline), (b) **SecurityLingua** (a token-classification based security compressor that extracts intent), and (c) **LLMComp** (a generative LLM-based compressor; here using Qwen2.5-3B-Instruct to produce a short intent summary that is appended to the system prompt). We use Qwen2.5-3B-Instruct and Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct as target generation models to study how model scale interacts with safety prompting.

Table 3. JailbreakBench Behaviors **Benign** evaluation (Answer Rate \uparrow).

| Dataset | Compression Method | Target Model | Answer Rate \uparrow |
|------------|----------------------|--------------|------------------------|
| JBB Benign | LLMComp (Qwen2.5-3B) | Qwen2.5-3B | 0.86 |
| JBB Benign | SecurityLingua | Qwen2.5-3B | 0.88 |
| JBB Benign | LLMComp (Qwen2.5-3B) | Qwen2.5-7B | 0.85 |
| JBB Benign | SecurityLingua | Qwen2.5-7B | 0.73 |

Table 4. JailbreakBench Behaviors **Harmful** evaluation (Reject Rate \uparrow).

| Dataset | Compression Method | Target Model | Reject Rate \uparrow |
|-------------|----------------------|--------------|------------------------|
| JBB Harmful | LLMComp (Qwen2.5-3B) | Qwen2.5-3B | 0.60 |
| JBB Harmful | SecurityLingua | Qwen2.5-3B | 0.62 |
| JBB Harmful | LLMComp (Qwen2.5-3B) | Qwen2.5-7B | 0.69 |
| JBB Harmful | SecurityLingua | Qwen2.5-7B | 0.68 |

Metrics. For **harmful** datasets, we report **Reject Rate** (fraction of queries refused by the target model); higher is better. For **benign** datasets, we report **Answer Rate** (fraction of benign queries answered); higher is better. Our automatic scoring uses a keyword/phrase heuristic over outputs (e.g., refusals containing “I’m sorry”, “illegal”, etc.), which is commonly used as a lightweight proxy in LLM safety evaluations, though it may under/over-count borderline cases. While an LLM-as-a-judge would be more semantically faithful, we use this deterministic heuristic to ensure reproducibility across settings.

4.2 JailbreakBench Behaviors (Monolingual): Utility vs. Safety trade-off

JailbreakBench Behaviors provides both (i) **Benign** prompts to test false positives / utility retention and (ii) **Harmful** prompts to test attack rejection. Tables 3–4 summarize our results.

Benign (utility) performance. As shown in Table 3, both defenses preserve high benign answer rates for Qwen2.5-3B, with SecurityLingua slightly higher (88%) than LLMComp (86%). However, for the larger Qwen2.5-7B, SecurityLingua becomes notably more conservative, with Answer Rate dropping to 73%, while LLMComp maintains 85%. This indicates that SecurityLingua can increase false refusals (utility loss) in benign settings, especially for larger target models that may adhere more strongly to the compressed intent inserted into the system instruction.

Harmful (safety) performance. On harmful prompts (Table 4), both defenses improve safety and yield high reject rates. SecurityLingua is slightly stronger for Qwen2.5-3B (62% vs. 60% for LLMComp), while the two defenses are effectively comparable on Qwen2.5-7B (68–69%). Overall, JailbreakBench harmful prompts appear relatively tractable for both defenses, and the differentiator is primarily the benign-side utility: SecurityLingua often attains marginally higher rejection but at the cost of more benign refusals, whereas LLMComp preserves utility better while remaining competitive on rejection.

Table 5. RedTeam-2K harmful evaluation (Reject Rate \uparrow).

| Dataset | Compression Method | Target Model | Reject Rate \uparrow |
|------------|-------------------------------|---------------------|------------------------|
| RedTeam-2K | LLMComp (Qwen2.5-3B-Instruct) | Qwen2.5-3B-Instruct | 0.3880 |
| RedTeam-2K | SecurityLingua | Qwen2.5-3B-Instruct | 0.4065 |
| RedTeam-2K | LLMComp (Qwen2.5-3B-Instruct) | Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct | 0.4480 |
| RedTeam-2K | SecurityLingua | Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct | 0.4535 |

Table 6. Multijail multilingual evaluation for Qwen2.5-3B-Instruct (Reject Rate \uparrow).

| Method | en | zh | it | vi | ar | ko | th | bn | sw | ju |
|-------------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| No compression | 0.39 | 0.60 | 0.38 | 0.15 | 0.31 | 0.17 | 0.21 | 0.07 | 0.03 | 0.09 |
| SecurityLingua | 0.70 | 0.80 | 0.57 | 0.63 | 0.65 | 0.64 | 0.59 | 0.45 | 0.23 | 0.45 |
| LLMComp (Qwen2.5-3B-Instruct) | 0.50 | 0.57 | 0.52 | 0.50 | 0.55 | 0.47 | 0.49 | 0.40 | 0.30 | 0.42 |

4.3 RedTeam-2K (Monolingual): Broad harmful behaviors

RedTeam-2K (from JailBreakV-28K) contains a diverse set of 2,000 harmful prompts spanning multiple safety categories. Table 5 reports overall Reject Rate.

Findings. RedTeam-2K is substantially harder than JailbreakBench Harmful. Even with defenses, the models refuse fewer than half of the attacks: for Qwen2.5-3B, rejection is 38.8% (LLMComp) vs. 40.65% (SecurityLingua); for Qwen2.5-7B, 44.80% (LLMComp) vs. 45.35% (SecurityLingua). These results indicate that prompt compression alone is insufficient against broad, diverse attack sets: a large portion of attacks remain successful (unsafe compliance). SecurityLingua maintains a small but consistent advantage, suggesting that security-trained intent extraction helps on a subset of harder, more obfuscated prompts—but the gap is limited, motivating stronger hybrids (e.g., adding additional detectors, policy checks, or fine-tuning the compressor).

4.4 Multijail (Multilingual): Cross-lingual safety generalization

Multijail evaluates malicious prompts across ten languages (en, zh, it, vi, ar, ko, th, bn, sw, ju). Tables 6 and 7 show per-language reject rates for Qwen2.5-3B and Qwen2.5-7B.

Baseline multilingual vulnerability. Without compression, rejection varies dramatically across languages, with especially low rejection on lower-resource languages. For example, Qwen2.5-7B without compression rejects 58% in English but only 12% in Bengali and 6% in Swahili, indicating a strong multilingual alignment gap.

SecurityLingua vs. LLMComp. SecurityLingua consistently boosts rejection across nearly all languages and is generally stronger than LLMComp, especially on high- and mid-resource languages (e.g., for Qwen2.5-7B: English 0.87, Chinese 0.84, Italian 0.82 under SecurityLingua). LLMComp provides moderate improvements over no-compression but lags behind SecurityLingua on most languages for the 7B model, and in some cases is comparable to baseline.

Effect of model scale. Across methods, Qwen2.5-7B achieves higher rejection rates than Qwen2.5-3B, suggesting that larger models can better leverage the injected “extracted intention” guidance and have stronger inherent multilingual safety behavior.

Table 7. Multijail multilingual evaluation for Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct (Reject Rate \uparrow).

| Method | en | zh | it | vi | ar | ko | th | bn | sw | ju |
|-------------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| No compression | 0.58 | 0.62 | 0.52 | 0.21 | 0.33 | 0.19 | 0.35 | 0.12 | 0.06 | 0.15 |
| SecurityLingua | 0.87 | 0.84 | 0.82 | 0.79 | 0.82 | 0.74 | 0.77 | 0.45 | 0.43 | 0.66 |
| LLMComp (Qwen2.5-3B-Instruct) | 0.57 | 0.57 | 0.55 | 0.56 | 0.52 | 0.49 | 0.49 | 0.41 | 0.28 | 0.48 |

Table 8. SecurityLingua Zero-shot vs. Few-shot on Multijail (Target: Qwen2.5-3B-Instruct; Reject Rate \uparrow).

| Method | en | zh | it | vi | ar | ko | th | bn | sw | ju |
|----------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| SecurityLingua (Zero-shot) | 0.70 | 0.80 | 0.57 | 0.63 | 0.65 | 0.64 | 0.59 | 0.45 | 0.23 | 0.45 |
| SecurityLingua (Few-shot) | 0.59 | 0.68 | 0.55 | 0.60 | 0.64 | 0.63 | 0.67 | 0.32 | 0.27 | 0.59 |

Table 9. SecurityLingua Zero-shot vs. Few-shot on Multijail (Target: Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct; Reject Rate \uparrow).

| Method | en | zh | it | vi | ar | ko | th | bn | sw | ju |
|----------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| SecurityLingua (Zero-shot) | 0.87 | 0.84 | 0.82 | 0.79 | 0.82 | 0.74 | 0.77 | 0.45 | 0.43 | 0.66 |
| SecurityLingua (Few-shot) | 0.93 | 0.86 | 0.86 | 0.90 | 0.92 | 0.92 | 0.80 | 0.91 | 0.86 | 0.93 |

4.5 Few-shot prompting for multilingual robustness (SecurityLingua)

We further compare **zero-shot** vs. **3-shot** (few-shot) prompting for SecurityLingua, keeping the target generation model fixed. Tables 8 and 9 show the results.

Qwen2.5-3B: mixed effects. For Qwen2.5-3B, few-shot guidance does not consistently help: several high-resource languages drop (e.g., English 0.70 \rightarrow 0.59), while some lower-resource languages improve modestly (e.g., Swahili 0.23 \rightarrow 0.27). This suggests that for smaller models, the additional in-context examples may introduce prompt interference or reduce generalization in some languages.

Qwen2.5-7B: large gains, especially low-resource languages. For Qwen2.5-7B, few-shot prompting yields strong improvements across all languages, with especially dramatic gains in Bengali, Swahili, and Japanese (e.g., Bengali 0.45 \rightarrow 0.91; Swahili 0.43 \rightarrow 0.86). This indicates that model capacity is crucial for leveraging few-shot supervision to make intent extraction and downstream refusal more reliable across languages.

4.6 Summary of key takeaways and limitations

Across datasets, we observe a consistent **utility–safety trade-off**. On JailbreakBench Benign, SecurityLingua can become overly conservative (notably with Qwen2.5-7B), while LLMComp preserves utility better. On JailbreakBench Harmful, both defenses achieve similar reject rates. On RedTeam-2K, both defenses struggle, indicating prompt compression alone is insufficient against broad and diverse harms. In multilingual Multijail, **SecurityLingua offers substantial cross-lingual safety gains** and few-shot prompting strongly improves results for Qwen2.5-7B, nearly closing the low-resource language gap. Finally, our heuristic evaluation based on refusal-keywords is fast and reproducible but not perfect; future work should incorporate more robust judging (e.g., semantic safety classifiers or LLM-as-a-judge with calibrated thresholds).

5 Threats to Validity

Several factors may affect the validity of our findings. First, the target LLM may exhibit inherent biases or safety mechanisms that influence its responses independently of the prompt compression methods. Second, synthetic prompts, translations, and variations in prompt wording may not fully capture the diversity of real-world malicious inputs. Third, metrics such as rejection and answering rates, along with keyword-based detection, may not capture subtle or partially harmful outputs. Finally, the multilingual dataset and few-shot examples may limit generalizability to other languages, domains, or rare prompt types. Despite these limitations, our evaluation provides a systematic assessment of prompt compression for mitigating jailbreak attacks.

6 Conclusions

This paper systematically evaluates LLM-based prompt compression jailbreak defenses across diverse linguistic settings using multiple public benchmarks, including JailbreakBench, JailbreakV28K and MultiJail. To better support multilingual analysis, we further introduced a newly constructed dataset from JailbreakBench that enables fine-tuning and controlled cross-lingual evaluation. Our findings indicate that defense effectiveness varies significantly across languages, exposing limitations in existing approaches. In this context, LLM-driven prompt compression emerges as a robust alternative due to improved interpretability and greater adaptability across languages. We also find that few shot prompting can significantly improve the performance of current prompt compression methods. These results show prompt compression is practical and extensible strategy for mitigating jailbreak attacks in multilingual LLMs.

7 Acknowledgments

We would like to thank Prof. Amir Houmansadr for his feedback and comments on this project during our class presentation.

References

- Nicholas Carlini, Anish Gupta, Eric Wallace, et al. 2023. Are Vision-Language Models Robust to Adversarial Examples? *arXiv preprint arXiv:2302.07228* (2023).
- Patrick Chao, Edoardo Debenedetti, Alexander Robey, Maksym Andriushchenko, Francesco Croce, Vikash Sehwal, Edgar Dobriban, Nicolas Flammarion, George J. Pappas, Florian Tramèr, Hamed Hassani, and Eric Wong. 2024. JailbreakBench: An Open Robustness Benchmark for Jailbreaking Large Language Models. In *NeurIPS Datasets and Benchmarks Track*.
- Yue Deng, Wenxuan Zhang, Sinno Jialin Pan, and Lidong Bing. 2023. Multilingual Jailbreak Challenges in Large Language Models. *arXiv:2310.06474* [cs.CL]
- Deep Ganguli, Amanda Askell, Yuntao Bai, et al. 2022. Red Teaming Language Models to Reduce Harms: Methods, Scaling Behaviors, and Lessons Learned. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2209.07858* (2022).
- Kai Greshake, Sahar Abdelnabi, Shailesh Mishra, Christoph Endres, Thorsten Holz, and Mario Fritz. 2023. Not What You've Signed Up For: Compromising Real-World LLM-Integrated Applications with Indirect Prompt Injection. In *Proceedings of the 16th ACM Workshop on Artificial Intelligence and Security* (Copenhagen, Denmark) (AISeC '23). Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, 79–90. doi:10.1145/3605764.3623985
- Neel Jain, Avi Schwarzschild, Yuxin Wen, Gowthami Somepalli, John Kirchenbauer, Ping yeh Chiang, Micah Goldblum, Aniruddha Saha, Jonas Geiping, and Tom Goldstein. 2024. Baseline Defenses for Adversarial Attacks Against Aligned Language Models. <https://openreview.net/forum?id=0VZP2Dr9KX>
- Aounon Kumar, Chirag Agarwal, Suraj Srinivas, Aaron Jiaxun Li, Soheil Feizi, and Himabindu Lakkaraju. 2024. Certifying LLM Safety against Adversarial Prompting. <https://openreview.net/forum?id=wNere1lelo>
- Yucheng Li, Surin Ahn, Huiqiang Jiang, Amir H Abdi, Yuqing Yang, and Lili Qiu. 2025. SecurityLingua: Efficient Defense of LLM Jailbreak Attacks via Security-Aware Prompt Compression. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2506.12707* (2025).
- Xiao Liu, Yanan Zheng, and Quanquan Gu. 2023. Prompt Injection Attacks and Defenses in Large Language Models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2306.05499* (2023).
- Yue Liu, Han Zhang, Rui Xu, et al. 2024. HijackRAG: Manipulating Retrieval-Augmented Generation via Knowledge Base Attacks. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2410.22832* (2024).
- Weidi Luo, Siyuan Ma, Xiaogeng Liu, Xiaoyu Guo, and Chaowei Xiao. 2024. JailBreakV-28K: A Benchmark for Assessing the Robustness of MultiModal Large Language Models against Jailbreak Attacks. *arXiv:2404.03027* [cs.CR]
- Anmol Mehrotra, Wenxuan Zhan, Sahej Jain, et al. 2023. Tree of Attacks: Jailbreaking Black-Box LLMs Automatically. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2312.02119* (2023).
- OpenAI, Josh Achiam, Steven Adler, Sandhini Agarwal, Lama Ahmad, Ilge Akkaya, Florencia Leoni Aleman, Diogo Almeida, Janko Altschmidt, Sam Altman, Shyamal Anadkat, Red Avila, et al. 2024. GPT-4 Technical Report. *arXiv:2303.08774* [cs.CL] <https://arxiv.org/abs/2303.08774>
- Javier Rando and Florian Tramèr. 2024. Universal Jailbreak Backdoors from Poisoned Human Feedback. In *The Twelfth International Conference on Learning Representations*. <https://openreview.net/forum?id=GxCgsxiAAK>
- Abhinav Rao, Sachin Vashista, Atharva Naik, Somak Aditya, and Monojit Choudhury. 2024. Tricking LLMs into Disobedience: Formalizing, Analyzing, and Detecting Jailbreaks. In *Proceedings of the 2024 Joint International Conference on Computational Linguistics, Language Resources and Evaluation (LREC-COLING 2024)*, Nicoletta Calzolari, Min-Yen Kan, Veronique Hoste, Alessandro Lenci, Sakriani Sakti, and Nianwen Xue (Eds.). ELRA and ICCL, Torino, Italia, 16802–16830. <https://aclanthology.org/2024.lrec-main.1462/>
- Weijia Shi, Zhaoyang Wang, Junxian Guo, et al. 2023. Adversarial Prompting for Large Language Models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2302.04237* (2023).
- Jason Wei, Nika Haghtalab, and Jacob Steinhardt. 2023. Jailbreak and Guardrail Bypass Attacks on Large Language Models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2308.03825* (2023).
- Zhiyuan Xu, Pengfei Li, Yujia Chen, et al. 2024. AutoDAN: Interpretable Gradient-Based Adversarial Prompting for LLMs. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2402.11748* (2024).
- Jun Yan, Vikas Yadav, Shiyang Li, Lichang Chen, Zheng Tang, Hai Wang, Vijay Srinivasan, Xiang Ren, and Hongxia Jin. 2024. Backdooring Instruction-Tuned Large Language Models with Virtual Prompt Injection. In *Proceedings of the 2024 Conference of the North American Chapter of the Association for Computational Linguistics: Human Language Technologies (Volume 1: Long Papers)*, Kevin Duh, Helena Gomez, and Steven Bethard (Eds.). Association for Computational Linguistics, Mexico City, Mexico, 6065–6086. doi:10.18653/v1/2024.naacl-long.337
- An Yang, Anfeng Li, Baosong Yang, Beichen Zhang, Binyuan Hui, Bo Zheng, Bowen Yu, Chang Gao, Chengen Huang, Chenxu Lv, et al. 2025. Qwen3 Technical Report. *arXiv:2505.09388* [cs.CL] <https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.09388>
- Yifan Zhang, Zhen Li, Yuxiang Wu, et al. 2024. Multimodal Jailbreak Attacks on Large Vision-Language Models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2403.04769* (2024).
- Yujun Zhou, Yufei Han, Haomin Zhuang, Kehan Guo, Zhenwen Liang, Hongyan Bao, and Xiangliang Zhang. 2024. Defending Jailbreak Prompts via In-Context Adversarial Game. In *Proceedings of the 2024 Conference on Empirical Methods in Natural Language Processing*, Yaser Al-Onaizan, Mohit Bansal, and Yun-Nung Chen (Eds.). Association for Computational Linguistics, Miami, Florida, USA, 20084–20105. doi:10.18653/v1/2024.emnlp-main.1121
- Andy Zou, Zifan Wang, Nicholas Carlini, Milad Nasr, Zico Kolter, and Matt Fredrikson. 2023. Universal and Transferable Adversarial Attacks on Aligned Language Models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2307.15043* (2023).
- Chaojun Zou, Qian Chen, Yifan Wang, et al. 2024. Poisoning Retrieval-Augmented Generation Systems. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2402.08416* (2024).