Towards High-Assurance Cryptographic Software: the F* Proof Assistant

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Outline

- Previously: Proving the security of cryptographic protocols

- Today:
  - Verifying **implementations** of cryptographic protocols
  - The F* proof assistant
    - The functional core of F*
    - Exercises
    - Try it online at https://fstar-lang.org/tutorial/
    - Or install it locally: https://github.com/FStarLang/FStar

What can go wrong?

Protocol model:

secret s, key k

```
r <- sample()
m <- encrypt(k, concat(r, s))
send m
```

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```

Protocol implementation:

```
let r = random() in
let m = encrypt(k, r . s) in
send m
```

What can go wrong?

Protocol model:

secret s, key k

```
  r <- sample()
  m <- encrypt(k, concat(r, s))
  send m
```

Protocol implementation:

```
let random () = 0

let r = random() in
let m = encrypt(k, r . s) in
send m
```

What can go wrong?

Protocol model:

secret s, key k

```
  r <- sample()
  m <- encrypt(k, concat(r, s))
  send m
```

Protocol implementation:

```
print(k)
let r = random() in
let m = encrypt(k, r . s) in
send m
```

What can go wrong?

Protocol model:

secret s, key k

```
  r <- sample()
  m <- encrypt(k, concat(r, s))
  send m
```

Protocol implementation:

```
let r = random() in
let m = encrypt(k, r . s) in
send (r . s)
```

A Concrete Example: Modular Arithmetic

- Modular arithmetic is frequently used in cryptographic primitives

$$g^{xy} \ mod \ p$$

0 < x,y < p,
g fixed

p is frequently a large prime number
(e.g., $2^{255} - 19$)

Implementing Modular Multiplication

$$a * b \; mod \; n$$

- a is a big integer (e.g., $2^{255} - 19$)
- Multiplication is even bigger
- Machine integers are (at most) 64 bits
- How to implement this? Need a bignum library



Textbook Multiplication

```
            1101        13
          * 1010       *10
            - - - -   = 130
      carry 0000
   carry + 1101
 carry + 0000
     + 1101
    - - - - - - - -
    10000010
```

256-bit Modular Multiplication



256-bit Modular Multiplication

What can go wrong?

- Integer overflow (undefined output)
- Buffer overflow/underflow (memory error)
- Missing carry steps (wrong answer)
- Side-Channel attacks (leaks secrets)

Modular Arithmetic Optimizations

- For many primitives, modular arithmetic dominates the crypto overhead
  - n^2 64-bit multiplications
  - Long intermediate arrays
  - Many carry steps
- Many specific optimizations
  - Use only 51 out of 64 bits to reduce carries
  - Precompute reusable intermediate values
  - Use alternative modular reductions (Montgomery, Barrett)
  - Parallelize (vectorize) multiplication and squaring
- Complex optimizations imply more chances of bugs!

Many Bugs in Optimized Bignum Code

[2013] Bug in amd-64-64-24k Curve25519

“Partial audits have revealed a bug in this software (r1 += 0 + carry should be r2 += 0 + carry in amd-64-64-24k) that would not be caught by random tests”
– D.J. Bernstein, W.Janssen, T.Lange, and P.Schwabe

[2014] Arithmetic bug in TweetNaCl’s Curve25519

[2014] Carry bug in Langley’s Donna-32 Curve25519

[2016] Arithmetic bug in OpenSSL Poly1305

[2017] Arithmetic bug in Mozilla NSS GF128

…

TweetNaCL Arithmetic Bug

```c
sv pack25519(u8 *o, const gf n)
{
  int i,j,b;
  gf m,t;
  FOR(i,16) t[i]=n[i];
  car25519(t);
  car25519(t);
  car25519(t);
  FOR(j,2) {
    m[0]=t[0]-0xffed;
    for(i=1;i<15;i++) {
      m[i]=t[i]-0xffff-((m[i-1]>>16)&1);
      m[i-1]&=0xffff;
    }
    m[15]=t[15]-0x7fff-((m[14]>>16)&1);
    b=(m[15]>>16)&1;
    m[15]&=0xffff;
    sel25519(t,m,1-b);
  }
  FOR(i,16) {
    o[2*i]=t[i]&0xff;
    o[2*i+1]=t[i]>>8;
  }
}
```

seb.dbzteam.org

This bug is triggered when the last limb `n[15]` of the input argument `n` of this function is greater or equal than `0xffff`. In these cases the result of the scalar multiplication is not reduced as expected resulting in a wrong packed value. This code can be fixed simply by replacing `m[15]&=0xffff;` by `m[14]&=0xffff;`.

seb.dbzteam.org

Heartbleed (CVE-2014-0160)

- Major vulnerability in OpenSSL TLS implementation
- Affected 17% of all SSL servers
- “Compromises the secret keys used to identify the service providers and to encrypt the traffic, the names and passwords of the users, and the actual content”
- “Allows attackers to eavesdrop on communications, steal data […] and impersonate services and users.”
- Attacks do not leave a trace

Heartbleed (CVE-2014-0160)



wikipedia.org

- Missing bound check during a memcpy

```
response = malloc(length);
memcpy(response, recv.heartbeat, length);
```

```
response = malloc(length);
if length > ssl_state.heartbeat {return 0;}
memcpy(response, recv.heartbeat, length);
```

GotoFail (CVE-2014-1266)

```
status SSLVerifyExchange (…) { …
  if ((err = update(&hashCtx, &signedParams)) != 0)
      goto fail;
      goto fail;
   if ((err = final(&hashCtx, &hashOut)) != 0)
      goto fail;
   …
fail:
   SSLFreeBuffer(&signedHashes);
   SSLFreeBuffer(&hashCtx);
   return err;
}
```

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   …
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   SSLFreeBuffer(&signedHashes);
   SSLFreeBuffer(&hashCtx);
   return err;
}
```

GotoFail (CVE-2014-1266)

- Duplicated goto statement in Apple's TLS implementation
- Bad copy/paste? Faulty merge?
- Impact:
  - Many invalid certificates were accepted
  - Allows using an arbitrary private key for signing or skipping the signing step
  - Enables Man-in-the-Middle attacks

- Many other vulnerabilities: SKIP, FREAK, many memory bugs, correctness issues, infinite loops, …

Formally Verifying Implementations

- Cryptographic implementations must be correct and secure, but also **fast**
- Cryptographic implementations are notoriously complex
  - Many tricky optimizations
  - Written in low-level, unsafe languages (C, Assembly)
  - Multiplicity of parameters and variants
- We need strong, formal guarantees about the **safety, correctness,** and **security** of cryptographic implementations

The F* Proof Assistant

- A functional programming language
  (like OCaml, Haskell, F#, …)
- With support for dependent types (like Coq, Agda), refinement types, …
- Semi-automated verification by relying on SMT solving
  (like Dafny, Why3, LiquidHaskell, …)
- Also offers a metaprogramming and tactic framework (Meta-F*)
- Extraction to OCaml, F#, C (under certain conditions)

- Try it online at https://fstar-lang.org/tutorial/
- Or install it locally: https://github.com/FStarLang/FStar

F* Applications

- Wide range of applications, mostly security-critical
  - **HACL*:** High-Assurance cryptographic library
  - **miTLS:** Verified reference implementation of TLS (1.2 and 1.3)
  - **Noise*:** End-to-end verified Implementations of 59 protocols in the Noise family
  - **EverParse:** Verified binary parsers and serializers
  - **StarMalloc:** Verified, concurrent, security-oriented memory allocator

The Functional Core of F*

- Recursive Functions

```
val factorial : nat -> nat

let rec factorial n =
    if n = 0 then 1 else n * (factorial (n-1))
```

The Functional Core of F*

- Inductive types and pattern-matching

```
type list (a:Type) =
  | Nil : list a
  | Cons : hd: a -> tl: list a -> list a

let rec map (f: a -> b) (l:list a) : list a = match l with
  | [] -> []
  | hd :: tl -> f hd :: map f tl

map (fun x -> x + 3) [1; 2; 3]
```

Dependent Types in F*

- Types can be indexed by values, or other types

```
val vec (a:Type) : nat -> Type

type vec (a:Type) =
  | Nil : vec a 0
  | Cons : #n: nat -> hd: a -> tl: vec a n -> vec a (n+1)


let rec append #a #n #m (v1: vec a n) (v2: vec a m) : vec a (n + m) =
  match v1 with
  | Nil -> v2
  | Cons hd tl -> Cons hd (append tl v2)
```

Dependent Typechecking

```
let rec append #a #n #m (v1: vec a n) (v2: vec a m) : vec a (n + m) =
 match v1 with
 | Nil -> v2
 | Cons hd tl -> Cons hd (append tl v2)
```

- Two typechecking goals:
  - v1 = Nil |- v2 : vec a (n + m)
  - v1 = Cons hd tl |- Cons hd (append tl v2) : vec a (n + m)
- Case 1: Goal is vec a m = vec a (n + m)
  - v1 = Nil => n = 0. Goal is 0 + m = m.
    Ok by SMT, using F* extensional type theory

Refinement Types

- A *refinement type* is a base type qualified with a logical formula; the formula can express invariants, preconditions, postconditions

- Refinement types are types of the form **x : T {** $\boldsymbol{\varphi}$ **}** where
  - **T** is the base type
  - **x** refers to the result of the expression, and
  - $\boldsymbol{\varphi}$ is a logical formula

- The values of this type are the values M of type T such that $\varphi\{M/x\}$ holds

Refinement Types in F*

```
type nat = n : int { n >= 0 }

type pos = n : int { n > 0 }
type neg = n : int { n < 0 }
type empty = n : int { False }

type empty_list (a:Type) = l : list a { l == [] }
type nonempty_list (a:Type) = l : list a { l != [] }

let nonempty_hd (l : nonempty_list a) = match l with
  | hd :: _ -> hd

nonempty_hd [1; 2; 3]        // Returns 1
nonempty_hd []               // Typing error returned by F*
```

Refinement Subtyping

```
type nat = n : int { n >= 0 }
type pos = n : int { n > 0 }
```

- How to ensure that a given integer can be typed as a nat?
  - Ex: 0:int <: nat
- When given an n : pos, how to use it as a n : nat ?
  - Ex: 2 : pos <: nat

- We need rules for *Refinement Subtyping*

Refinement Subtyping: Elimination

- The type **x : t {** $\boldsymbol{\varphi}$ **}** is a subtype of **t**

  For any expression e : (x : t { φ }), it is always safe to eliminate the refinement φ

- Examples:
  - x : nat (= int { x $\geq$ 0}) <: x : int
  - f : list a -> list a, l : nonempty_list a,

    => f l : list a

Refinement Subtyping: Introduction

- For a term **e : t**, t is a subtype of the refinement type **x : t {** $\boldsymbol{\varphi}$ **}** if $\varphi[e/x]$
- Examples:
  - [x] : nonempty_list a
  - If x : even, then x + 1 : odd

Refinement Subtyping

```
let incr_even (x : even) : odd = x + 1
let incr_odd (x :odd) : even = x + 1
```

```
let f (x: int) : int =
  if x % 2 = 0 then incr_even x
  else incr_odd x
```

If branch, two goals:

- x % 2 = 0 |= x : int <: x : even
- x % 2 = 0 |= incr_even x <: int

Else branch, two goals:

- not (x % 2 = 0) |= x : int <: x : odd
- not (x % 2 = 0) |= incr_odd x <: int

Combining Refinement and Dependent Types

```
val incr (x:int) : (y:int{y = x + 1})

let incr x = x + 1          // Correctly typechecks

let incr x = x + 2          // Subtyping check failed, expected type y:int{y = x + 1}

val append (#a:Type) (l1 l2:list a) : (l:list a{length l == length l1 + length l2})

val seq_map (#a:Type) (f: a -> a) (s:seq a) : (s’: seq a{
        length s’ == length s ∧
        ∀ (i: nat). i < length s ⇒ s’.[i] == f s.[i]})
```

Combining Refinement and Dependent Types

```
// Sample cryptographic library interface in F*
module AES

type key  // Abstract type for secrets
type block = b: bytes{length b == 16}

val encrypt: k: key -> p:block -> c:block {c == AES(k, p)}
val decrypt: k: key -> c:block -> p:block {c == AES(k, p)}
```

Type Safety

- Safety means that all logical refinements hold at runtime

- **Theorem (safety):**

  For a program A and a type T, if $\emptyset \vdash A : T$, then A is safe

Interfaces and Modular Typing

Seq.fsti

```
val seq (a: Type) : Type

val index (#a:Type) (s: seq a)
      (i:nat{i < length s}) : a

val upd (#a:Type) (s: seq a)
      (i:nat{i < length s}) (v: a) : seq a
```

Seq.fst

```
let seq (a: Type) = list a

let rec index #a s i =
   if i = 0 then List.hd s else index (List.tl s) (i – 1)

let rec upd #a s i v =
   if i = 0 then v :: List.tl s
   else (List.hd s) :: upd (List.tl s) (i-1) v
```

- Interfaces abstract the underlying implementation and definitions
- Interfaces are optional

Modular Typing, Taming Proof Complexity



- Implementation details are not available for verification
- Replacing, e.g., SHA2 by another algorithm does not impact other modules
- Interfaces can be used as abstractions

Modular Typing, Formally

- We write $I_0 \vdash A \rightsquigarrow I$ when, in the typing environment I_0, the module A is well-typed and exports the interface I

- **Theorem (Modular Typing):**

  For programs A_0, A, interface I_0 and type T,

  If $\emptyset \vdash A_0 \rightsquigarrow I_0$ and $I_0 \vdash A : T$, then $\emptyset \vdash A_0 \,.\, A : T$

- This gives us safety of the program $A_0 \,.\, A$ based on the previous theorem

Assertions and Assumptions

Like many other languages, F* supports assertions and assumptions.

- assert (P) : Introduce a proof obligation for predicate P
- assume (P) : Adds predicate P to the current context.

Examples:

```
let f (x: int) : unit =
  assume (x % 2 == 0);
  assert ((x + 1) % 2 == 1)
```

```
let f (x: int) : unit =
  assume (False);
  assert (x == x + 1)
```

One can also use admit () to introduce False in the context and admit the remaining of a proof

Intrinsic vs Extrinsic Verification

- Intrinsic Proof: The type of a term includes properties of interest

```
val list (a:Type) : Type
val length (#a:Type) (l: list a) : nat

val append (#a:Type) (l1 l2: list a) : (l: list a{length l == length l1 + length l2})
```

- Pros:
  - The proof easily follows the program
  - The property is directly available when calling the function
- Cons:
  - Proving while programming can be tedious
  - The type signature becomes harder to read
  - What about many different properties?

Extrinsic Verification: Lemmas

- F* supports built-in syntax for stating theorems.

```
val list (a:Type) : Type
val length (#a:Type) (l: list a) : nat
val append (#a:Type) (l1 l2: list a) : list a

val append_length (#a:Type) (l1 l2: list a) :
        Lemma (length l1 + length l2 == length (append l1 l2))
```

Exercises

- Write the length and append functions, and prove the append_length theorem

- Write a list reverse function, and prove that reverse is involutive

- Write a recursive sum function that sums integers from 1 to n, and prove that it is equal to $\frac{n*(n+1)}{2}$

(You will need the command *open FStar.Mul* to use the * operator)

F*’s Effect System

- By default, F* functions are **total**

```
let rec factorial (n:nat) : nat =
        if n = 0 then 1 else n * (factorial (n-1))
```

F*'s Effect System

- By default, F* functions are **total**

```
let rec factorial (n:nat) : Tot nat =
        if n = 0 then 1 else n * (factorial (n-1))
```

- Tot is an **effect,** capturing that functions always terminate, and that they have no side-effects.

- What happens if we try to give this weaker type to factorial?

```
let rec factorial (n:int) : Tot int =
        if n = 0 then 1 else n * (factorial (n-1))
```

F* Termination Checker

```
let rec factorial (n:int) : Tot int =
        if n = 0 then 1 else n * (factorial (n-1))
```

Subtyping check failed, expected type (x:int{x << n}), got type int

factorial (-1) loops!

Arguments in recursive calls must decrease according to a well-founded ordering <<

Definition: An ordering is well-founded is it does not admit any infinite descending chain

Semantic Termination Checking

- Natural numbers related by <   (e.g., 1 << 2 since 1 < 2)
- Inductives related by subterm ordering   (e.g., tl << Cons hd tl)
- By default, a recursive function with several arguments uses a lexicographical order on the arguments

Termination Checking, Examples

```
let rec factorial (n:nat) : Tot nat =
        if n = 0 then 1 else n * (factorial (n-1))
```

- Goal: n – 1 << n.
  - Ordering on naturals is <, SMT can prove automatically n – 1 < n

```
let rec append #a (l1 l2: list a) : list a =
  match v1 with
  | Nil -> v2
  | Cons hd tl -> Cons hd (append tl v2)
```

- Goal: %[tl; l2] << %[l1; l2].
  - tl << l1 or (tl == l1 ∧ l2 << l2)
  - Subterm ordering on l1 gives tl << l1.

Termination Checking, Examples

```
let rec ackermann (n m:nat) : Tot nat =
  if m=0 then n + 1
  else if n = 0 then ackermann 1 (m - 1)
  else ackermann (ackermann (n - 1) m) (m - 1)
```

Does this function pass termination checking?

Termination Checking, Examples

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let rec ackermann (n m:nat) : Tot nat =
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Termination Checking, Examples

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  else ackermann (ackermann (n - 1) m) (m - 1)
```

Does this function pass termination checking?

```
let rec ackermann (n m:nat) : Tot nat (decreases %[m; n]) =
  if m=0 then n + 1
  else if n = 0 then ackermann 1 (m - 1)
  else ackermann (ackermann (n - 1) m) (m - 1)
```

F* Effect System: Divergence

- We might want to write non-terminating code:
  - Web servers, operating systems, TLS protocol implementation, …

- F* provides a built-in *effect* for divergence

```
let rec factorial (n:int) : Dv int =
  if n = 0 then 1 else n * (factorial (n-1))
```

- Code must still typecheck, but termination checker is disabled

Divergence: Avoiding inconsistencies

- Termination is required for consistency in proof assistants

```
let rec loop () : Dv False = loop ()          // This typechecks!

let f (x : int) : Tot (y:int{y == x + 1}) = let _ = loop () in x      // What prevents this?
```

- F* effect system encapsulates effectful code: By default, different effects cannot interact

```
let f (x : int) : Tot (y:int{y == x + 1}) = let _ = loop () in x
```

Computed type "int" and effect "DIV" is not compatible with the annotated type "int" effect "Tot"

Subeffecting

- Pure code cannot call potentially divergent code, and only pure code can appear in specifications and proofs.

- But including pure code in divergent code can be useful

```
let rec factorial (n:int) : Dv int = if n = 0 then 1 else n * (factorial (n-1))
```

We do not want to redefine each basic operator

- F* supports sub-effecting: Tot t <: Dv t

Intrinsic Divergence Verification

```
let rec factorial (n:int) : Dv int = if n = 0 then 1 else n * (factorial (n-1))
```

```
val factorial_lemma (n:int) : Lemma (n ≥ 0 => factorial n ≥ 0)
```

- Only pure code can appear in specifications

```
let rec factorial (n:int) : Dv (y:int{n ≥ 0 => y ≥ 0}) =
  if n = 0 then 1 else n * (factorial (n-1))
```

The GTot effect

- F* also allows writing Ghost code for specifications, proofs, … which will be erased during extraction.

```
// Specification of factorial, using natural numbers
val factorial_spec: nat -> GTot nat

// Implementation, using machine integers
val factorial: n:uint64 -> Tot (y:uint64{to_nat y == factorial_spec (to_nat n)})
```

GTot Subeffecting

- Total code can be used in Ghost functions: Tot t <: GTot t

- Ghost code **cannot** be used in total functions

```
val f: nat -> GTot nat

let g (n: nat) : Tot nat =
    let x = f n in
    x + 1
```

f is ghost, hence erased at runtime.

How to compile this statement?

- Small subtelty: Ghost code for non-informative types (e.g., ghost values) is allowed (useful for proof purposes)

Refined Computation Types

- So far, refinement in value types:

```
val incr (n:int) : Tot (y:int{even n => odd y})
```

- F* also allows refined computation types:

```
val factorial (n:int) : Pure int (requires n ≥ 0) (ensures fun y -> y ≥ 0)
```

- Three elements:
  - Effect (here, Pure), result type (here, int), specification (e.g., pre and post)
- Tot t is defined as an *abbreviation* of

```
Pure t (requires True) (ensures fun _ -> True)
```

Refined Computation Types

- Other effects are defined in a similar fashion

```
let rec loop (_:unit) : Div unit (requires True) (ensures fun _ -> False) = loop ()

Dv t == Div t (requires True) (ensures fun _ -> True)

val append_length (#a:Type) (l1 l2: list a) : Ghost unit
        (requires True)
        (ensures fun _ -> length l1 + length l2 == length (append l1 l2))

GTot t == Ghost t (requires True) (ensures fun _ -> True)

Lemma  (requires P) (ensures Q) = Ghost unit (requires P) (ensures fun _ -> Q)
```

Working around the SMT solver

- So far, all F* proofs were discharged by SMT.

- Convenient, automated, but:
  - Cannot reason about induction (manual inductive proofs)
  - Struggles with some theories (e.g., complex modular arithmetic)
  - Performance degrades as the context grows (requires clever abstractions/interfaces for large programs)

- F* provides other reasoning facilities: normalization, the calc statement, and tactics

Proof by Normalization

- Dependently typed proof assistants include a *normalizer* which reduces computations during typechecking.

- F* provides access to the normalizer for proof purposes.

```
let rec length #a (l: list a) = match l with
  | [] -> 0  | hd :: tl -> 1 + length tl

assert (length [1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7; 8; 9; 10] == 10)
```



```
assert_norm (length [1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7; 8; 9; 10] == 10)
```

Proof by Normalization, Example

```
let rec length #a (l: list a) = match l with
  | [] -> 0  | hd :: tl -> 1 + length tl

assert_norm (length [1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7; 8; 9; 10] == 10)
```

match [1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7; 8; 9; 10] with | [] -> 0 | hd :: tl -> 1 + length tl == 10 $\rightsquigarrow$

1 + match [2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7; 8; 9; 10] with | [] -> 0 | hd :: tl -> 1 + length tl == 10 $\rightsquigarrow$

…

10 == 10 $\rightsquigarrow$

True

- Extremely useful for proofs involving recursive functions and **concrete** terms

Proof by Normalization

- The normalizer only performs reductions, it does not use logical facts in the context

```
assert_norm (length [1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7; 8; 9; 10] == 10)

let f (l:list a { length l == 10}) = assert_norm (length l == 10)
```

- The normalizer cannot reduce symbolic terms

- The normalizer can be fine-tuned (only include certain reduction steps, only unfold some definitions, definitions with a given attribute, …)

Calc Statement

- Many (mathematical) proofs consist of a succession of equalities/comparisons:

$$(a + b \ * 2^c) \ * 2^d == a * 2^d + b \ * 2^c \ * 2^d == a * 2^d + b \ * 2^{c+d}$$

- F* provides a construct to emulate this:

```
calc (==) {
  e1;
  (==) { // proof of e1 == e2 }
  e2;
  (==) { // proof of e2 == e3 }
  e3;
}
```

```
calc (≥) {
  e1;
  (==) { // proof of e1 == e2 }
  e2;
  (≥) { // proof of e2 ≥ e3 }
  e3;
}
```

F* Tactics

- F* provides a metaprogramming and tactics framework, called Meta-F*

```
assert (pow2 19 == 524288) by (compute (); dump "after compute")
```

- Works well for:
  - Small rewritings/goal manipulation
  - Specific types of goals (separation logic, ring normalization)
  - F* goal inspection
- Not recommended as the main proof technique, better to use as a help to SMT

Exercises

- Stack, StackClient
- QuickSort: https://fstar-lang.org/tutorial/book/part1/part1_quicksort.html#exercises
- Arithmetic proofs using calc