"SHUT THE DAMN THING DOWN!" MASS TRANSIT SHUTDOWNS AND THE EMERGENCE OF A NOVEL PROTEST TACTIC IN BOGOTÁ, COLOMBIA.

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Abstract

Using a mixed methods approach, I show how a novel protest tactic, mass transit shutdowns, emerged in Bogotá following the development of a bus-bused metropolitan transit system, *Transmilenio* (TM). Specifically, the physical infrastructure of TM was the objective source of a social psychological process of opportunity attribution, where the establishment of a novel protest tactic led to greater mobilization among those who perceived this tactical opportunity. Using data from a new representative survey of Bogotá's adult population conducted in 2011, I show that perceiving TM shutdowns as an effective tactic increases the likelihood of respondents' own mobilization. A set of 31 semi-structured interviews conducted, amongst others, with rickshaw driver activists in Bogotá provide further evidence of the link between the perceived effectiveness of protest tactics and mobilization. This investigation also illuminates the interplay of mobilizing structures, tactical innovation, and mobilization.

Key Words:

Protest tactics, attribution of opportunity, tactical innovation, Latin America, repertoires of contention.

Introduction

On January 29th 2011, a group of individuals from the Marsella neighborhood in Bogotá shut down a special lane on the main highway that links Bogotá's southwestern region to the center of the city.[1] This is a special lane because it is designed to be the reserved track through which Bogotá's bus-based massive transportation system, *Transmilenio* (TM), operates. Protestors shut down this particular TM line or *busway* for almost three hours to express their opposition to the construction of a brothel in their neighborhood,[2] thus preventing almost half a million people from reaching their destinations on time.[3] This was not an isolated event, however. A previous protest had taken place in exactly the same location two months before. In this instance, dozens of truck drivers shut TM down for four days, using their trucks as a blockade to dispute newly proposed national freight-related regulations.[4]As the two examples above suggest, a wide range of groups have used TM shutdowns to voice their particular demands. In this paper, I draw from original evidence to show how TM's particular infrastructure has in fact been conceptualized and used by activists in Bogotá to develop a tactical innovation: TM shutdowns.

I address the emergence of TM shut downs as the result of a social psychological process through which activists continuously *attribute opportunity* (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001) to TM's infrastructure because of the perceived effectiveness of TM shutdowns to disrupt the happenings of the city. In this context, I seek to answer the following research question: Does the attribution of opportunity spurred by TM's infrastructure facilitate mobilization in Bogotá? In a nutshell, I study the emergence of an objective opportunity (the implementation of TM), the individual-level perception of that

opportunity (the process of opportunity attribution), and the use of a novel tactic perceived as effective and related to that same opportunity (TM shutdowns).

From a theoretical point of view, I situate the study of TM shutdowns in the context of the literature that finds effective tactics devised by activists and social movement organizations (SMOs) to be a powerful incentive for mobilization in general, and the diffusion of tactics in particular (Lichbach 1998; Oberschall 1989; Soule 1997, 2004; Francisco 2010; McAdam and Rucht 1993; Tilly 1995; Andrews and Biggs 2006; Biggs 2013; Meyer and Whittier 1994). I assume that activists' bounded-rationality is one of the key elements that drives their tactical choices (Walker, Martin, and McCarthy 2008), thus explaining why activists purposively seek to capitalize on protest tactics they perceive as effective.[5] (Meyer and Staggenborg 2012; Taylor, Kimport, Van Dyke, and Andersen 2009; Ganz 2010).

In the literature, the relationship between effective tactics and mobilization has been theorized (Lichbach 1998), and tested at different levels of aggregation (Soule 1997; Wang and Soule 2012; Francisco 2010). This investigation constitutes a novel extension of that work to explore this relationship at the *individual level*, based on newly available data and a unique case study. More precisely, I provide a valuable view of how activists in Bogotá attribute opportunity to, and evaluate the effectiveness of, a concrete protest tactic. I document this as a social psychological process that ultimately affects the likelihood of activists' own mobilization. This analysis is important because even though tactics' effectiveness is known to be critical to understand tactical innovation and diffusion, as well as mobilization in general (Biggs 2013, Soule 1997, Lichbach 1998),

assessing the perceived effectiveness of a particular tactic tends to be intrinsically difficult for both activists and academics (Soule 1999; Biggs 2013). I seek to provide new information based on individual-level data and a concrete case to start filling this gap.

The paper is organized as follows. First, I provide a detailed account as to why TM's infrastructure is particularly vulnerable to shutdowns, thus making this a feasible tactic in the first place. Next, based on the idea of perceived tactics' effectiveness, I develop a theoretical framework that connects the literatures on opportunity attribution, tactical innovation, and mobilization. I then outline the methodology and research design of the paper. In the quantitative analysis, I use logistic regression to investigate the attribution of opportunity spurred by TM's infrastructure and its positive impact on mobilization after controlling for the broad (social, physical, and personal) context of the decision to mobilize. This context, I argue, is shaped by the determinants of protest in general (e.g. biographical availability, resources, political engagement). I next present qualitative analysis of a case study focused on the accounts of rickshaw drivers that have historically shut down TM based on their perceptions of the relative effectiveness of this particular tactic. Finally, I conclude the paper with a discussion about how the case of TM shutdowns can illuminate key connections between micro-level behaviors and attitudes (i.e. opportunity attribution) on the one hand, and macro-level outcomes related to the diffusion of tactics and mobilization on the other. I also discuss how the substantial expansion of TM-like massive transportation systems throughout Colombia, Latin America, and the developing world (Campo 2010) could significantly increase the modularity of TM shutdowns as a protest tactic.

TM Shutdowns as a Feasible Protest Tactic.

TM has operated in Bogotá since 2001 and is by far the most complex transportation system of its type in the world (Campo 2010). It belongs to a special family of transportation solutions called Bus Rapid Transport Systems (BRTS). The distinctive feature of these transportation systems is that they operate "through the provision of segregated right-of-way infrastructure" (Wright and Hook 2007: 11; Danaher, Blume, Levinson, and Zimmerman 2007). In short, BRTS are bus-based systems in which public buses transit passengers through reserved lanes of existing highways.

Since its inception TM's infrastructure has become an effective platform for protesting, enabling even small numbers of activists to cause massive levels of disruption. This is possible because TM lines are bound by yellow cement blocks that are 15 centimeters high (see figure 1). While these cement blocks allow civilians to easily distinguish between regular lanes and TM lanes on a given highway, they also create a transportation system that is particularly easy to block. In other words, shutting down TM is relatively straightforward because, by design, TM is subject to all the constraints associated with regular avenues (e.g. direct accessibility or pedestrian crossings).

[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]

TM shutdowns allow protestors to attain unprecedented levels of visibility and cause massive disruption. In fact, on an average day, TM transports over 2.6 million customers throughout Bogotá.[6] Furthermore, TM buses are unable to circumvent protest blockades by using secondary avenues, further increasing the effectiveness of TM shutdowns. Indeed, as noted by numerous stories in the Colombian press, the fact that

TM lines are designed to have only one —or at a maximum, two— lanes with no access to secondary corridors, enables small groups of activists to stand up in front of a TM bus and block the system (see figure 2).[7] All these features make TM a likely platform for disrupting the regular happenings of the city, and therefore, an ideal resource.

In the next section, I contextualize TM shutdowns in the literature on tactical innovation. I argue that the key features of TM's infrastructure described above are the objective basis of a social psychological process that has allowed activists to attribute opportunity to TM's infrastructure. This process of opportunity attribution, I argue, has affected mobilization.

[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]

Theoretical Framework

Broadly speaking, research on mobilization tends to follow two tracks: on the one hand, scholars interested in individual mobilization have focused on micro-level explanatory factors, including the role of biographical availability (Wiltfang and McAdam 1991; Corrigall-Brown 2012), personal networks (Snow, Zurcher and Ekland-Olson 1980; McAdam and Paulsen 1993), or political attitudes and behaviors (Finkel and Muller 1998; Machado, Scartascini and Tommasi 2011). On the other hand, scholars interested in meso-level explanatory factors tend to focus on the role of political opportunities (Meyer 2004; Meyer and Minkoff 2004), organizational networks (McAdam and Fernandez 1990; Kitts 2000), or resources (McCarthy and Zald 1977; Brady, Verba, and Schlozman 1995). Rarely do scholars attempt to integrate these two levels of analysis, despite theoretical calls to do so (McAdam et al. 2001).

In this paper, my data allow me to bridge these two research streams by paying particular attention to activists' subjective attribution of opportunity vis-à-vis TM's infrastructure. This analysis, therefore, is in line with the literature that seeks to link activists' perceptions and protest behavior to externally-generated changes in the environment in general, and to changes in the structure of political opportunities in particular (Gamson and Meyer 1996; Karapin 2011; Kriesi 2004; Koopmans 2005).

The concept of political opportunities refers to the structural features of the larger environment that constrain or facilitate the emergence and development of social movements (Tarrow 1994; Eisinger 1973; Meyer 2004; Meyer and Minkoff 2004; for a general critique see Goodwin and Jaspers 1999). Some scholars suggest that objective opportunities cannot affect mobilization without individuals attributing importance to those opportunities (Gamson and Meyer 1996; McAdam et al. 2001; Boutcher 2011; Alimi 2006). In this regard, the concept of *attribution of opportunity* denotes a social psychological mechanism that allows activists to perceive, through their various individual and collective identities (as neighbors, workers, students, etc.), the objective changes that take place in the environment (McAdam et al. 2001).

This paper echoes McAdam and colleagues' theoretical contributions. In particular, I show how activists' conceptualization of TM's infrastructure as an opportunity, based on their perceptions of TM shutdowns as an effective protest tactic, increases the likelihood of their own mobilization. There is not, however, a linear causal path between tactics' perceived effectiveness, political opportunities, and mobilization: "Protesters stumble upon new tactics, just as they stumble upon political opportunities

(Koopmans 2005: 26). Only in retrospect, after the success of a novel tactic, can protesters –and sociologists– fully understand the changing circumstances that made it feasible, legitimate and effective." (Biggs 2013: 409).

In fact, the use and development of protest tactics entails a continuous, non-linear social learning process, which by definition does not occur in a social vacuum (Ganz 2000, Koopmans 2005). Indeed, not only political opportunities, but also cultural contexts, targets, countermovements, networks of collaboration among SMOs, tactical overlap,[8] repression, news media, effectiveness, and even bystanders, exert and impact on tactical innovation and the diffusion of tactics (Meyer and Staggenborg 2012; Wood 2007; Larson and Soule 2009; Wang and Soule 2012; Olzak and Uhrig 2001; Moss 2014; Biggs 2013; Meyer and Boutcher 2007).

Protest tactics are not only determined by political opportunities in particular, or by the broad set of factors described in the previous paragraph, however. Tactics can indeed change the larger environment in which they emerge (Rojas 2006). For example, Taylor et al. (2009) show that the set of limited tactics that comprise a specific *repertoire of contention*[9] (Tilly 1995) can have a "movement-building function" because they help develop collective identity. In this regard, an excellent historic example is related to the development of the barricade as a tactical innovation that also reinforced collective identity and bonds of solidarity amongst rebels in the Paris Commune (Traugott 1995). Importantly, Traugott reminds us that repertoires of contention are "circumscribed both by prior experience and by material, organizational, and *conceptual* resources they [activists] find readily at hand" (Traugott 1995: 43, emphasis is mine).

In order to bring together the notions of political opportunities and opportunity attribution on the one hand, and the processes of diffusion and use of tactics on the other, I focus on a key individual-level (*conceptual*) mobilization resource*:* the perceived effectiveness of protest tactics, understood as a powerful incentive for mobilization in general, and the use and diffusion of tactics in particular.

In the following paragraphs, I review several other individual-level factors that have been used to explain activists' mobilization. I do this in order to place the individual-level perceived effectiveness of protest tactics as an important explanatory factor that weighs into the individuals' decision to mobilize. More precisely, I will argue that the process of opportunity attribution *vis-à-vis* TM's infrastructure, which is driven by the perceived effectives of TM shutdowns, occurs in a broad (physical, social, and personal) context described by key factors traditionally studied in the literature (e.g. biographical availability, mobilizing structures, political engagement). I, therefore, argue that this broad context should be systematically taken into account in order to properly specify the individual-level connections between attribution of opportunity, perceptions of tactics' effectiveness, and mobilization.

Incorporating the Broad Context of the Decision to Mobilize.

Mobilizing Structures and Community Infrastructure

Social movement scholars have shown that activists mobilize in a social context populated by networks, groups, and organizations that can facilitate collective action (Snow, Zurcher and Ekland-Olson 1980; McAdam 1986; McAdam and Paulsen 1993; Dixon and Roscigno 2003; DiGrazia 2014; for a critique see Kitts 2000). Activists'

attribution of opportunity is no exception. In fact, protestors attribute opportunity in the context of *mobilizing structures* such as SMOs and interpersonal networks (McAdam et al. 2001; McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1999). Similarly, McAdam (1983) argues that tactical innovation requires a community, and its mobilizing structures, to emerge and diffuse (see also Morris 1981; McCammon 2003; Ganz 2002). I expect both opportunity attribution and the use and diffusion of novel tactics to be affected by the mobilizing structures present in a given space. Recognizing this, my analysis will rely on the concept of *community infrastructure*, which refers to the set of mobilizing structures that can eventually be activated by a group of activists in a concrete locality (Almeida 2012).

Physical Infrastructure

As suggested by Smelser (1963), the physical infrastructure(s) existing in a given society (e.g. transportation systems, communication systems) influence the pace of insurgency because they serve "as constraints on, or facilitators of, the use of resources for social movement purposes." (McCarthy and Zald 1977: 1225). Therefore, analysis of the processes of opportunity attribution and the use and diffusion of novel tactics should consider, not only the community infrastructure of a given locality, but also its physical infrastructure.

The role played by physical infrastructure, and particularly by transportation infrastructure, is said to be especially important for understanding mobilization in the global South (Boudreau 1996). For example, Almeida's (2012) conceptualization of transportation infrastructure as a resource for collective action proves critical for understanding social movement campaigns in Central America. In general, the literature

on Latin American social movements consistently suggests that transportation infrastructure is a vital asset for collective contention (Archila 2003; Auyero 2006; Silva 2009). Therefore, the fact that activists in a Latin American metropolis like Bogotá perceive TM shutdowns as a feasible and effective tactic seems particularly plausible. Importantly, my analyses will distinguish between the objective availability of TM's infrastructure (e.g. the existence of TM stations in a given district) and the subjective attribution of opportunity spurred by TM's infrastructure.

Biographical Availability

Potential activists face constraints associated with their daily lives and personal characteristics (i.e. biographical availability) that can make them more or less available for protesting (Wiltfang and McAdam 1991). For example, Corrigall-Brown (2012) finds that biographical availability is an important predictor of activists' trajectories of participation through their life course. In general, scholars have found that individuals who do not have children, are young, single, unemployed, or have flexible schedules – like students–, are more prone to protest (Beyerlein and Hipp 2006; McAdam 1986; DiGrazia 2014; for a critique see Nepstand and Smith 1999).

Given that the attribution of opportunity vis-à-vis TM's infrastructure and the perception of TM shutdowns as a relatively effective tactic are, to an important extent, subjective processes, they could be greatly affected by the biographical availability of each individual. In general, I expect that the chances of attributing an opportunity as important decrease as a given potential activists' personal constraints increase. For instance, a potential activist with children should, *ceteris paribus*, be less willing to

attribute opportunity to TM's infrastructure when compared to a similar potential activist with no children.

Resources

Potential activists not only face constraints related to their biographical availability, they also differ in terms of the resources at their disposal. From an individual-level perspective, resources in the form of education, money, skill or time make mobilization more likely (Brady, Verba, Schlozman 1995). From a macro-level perspective, group (e.g. class or race) heterogeneity in resources can also explain differences in protest participation amongst segments of a given society (Verba, Scholzman, Brady, Nie 1993; Scholzman, Burns, Verba 1999). I argue that adjudicating a tactic as effective, as well as the process of opportunity attribution more broadly, are affected by the resources of a given individual. For example, skill in the form of past experience in collective contention may help explain why some individuals attribute opportunities and adopt innovative protest tactics when others do not.

Political Engagement: Political Attitudes and Behaviors.

The literature on the relationships between mobilization on the one hand, and political attitudes and behaviors on the other, is rich and broad (Finkel and Muller 1998; Seligson 1980; Smith 2009; Verba, Burns, and Scholzman 1997; Suchssman and Soule 2005). On the attitudinal side, political awareness (Zaller 1992) and the level of trust in institutions (Benson and Ronchon 2004; Machado, Scartascini and Tommasi 2011) are examples of factors that have been found to be correlated with mobilization. Similarly, Beyerlein and Andrews (2008) show how perceptions of threat and opportunity in the early stages of the

civil rights movement encouraged political participation among black Southerners. As with resources and biographical availability, I expect political engagement (both attitudinal and behavioral) to be part of the context in which attribution of opportunity and the use of tactics perceived as effective operate. My analyses will therefore include factors related to political engagement to capture the likely interdependence between potential activists' political attitudes and behaviors on the one hand, and their readiness to attribute opportunity to innovative and effective tactics on the other.

In summary, both opportunity attribution and the subjective perception of tactics' effectiveness occur in a broad (physical/spatial, social, and personal) context that should be considered in order to understand why they are associated with mobilization. In this paper, therefore, several factors will represent the broad context of the individual-level decision to mobilize; a context composed by factors typically encountered in the social movement literature (e.g. biographical availability, resources, and political engagement). As a result, I expect the attribution of opportunity associated with TM's infrastructure to be an important factor for explaining mobilization in Bogotá insofar as the previously mentioned context of the decision to mobilize is systematically taken into account.

Data and Methods: Quantitative Section.

In order to analyze the role of TM on mobilization, I draw from Bogotá's *Public Opinion Panel Survey* (POPS). This panel survey, the first of its type conducted in the city, consists of a statistically representative sample of Bogotá's non-institutionalized adult population.[10] It was conducted in 2011 and its unit of analysis is the individual (N = 520). For the purpose of this paper, the dependent variable is an individual's response to the

question: "*In the past twelve months, have you participated in a public demonstration or protest?"* Possible answers include "*Yes, I did*" and "*No, I did not.*" (See table 1).

A crucial and unique feature of this data is that it incorporates a variable that I designed to gauge the opportunity attribution triggered by TM's infrastructure in terms of the perceived effectiveness of TM shutdowns. This variable, which I call *TM opportunity attribution*, is based on the following question: *"Thinking about the possibility of those who live in your neighborhood carrying out a public protest to solve a given problem in your community, how likely do you think it would be for these people to block a TM bus station to make their voices heard?* Possible answers included "*very likely*", "*somewhat likely*", "*not very likely*", and "*unlikely*."

I recoded this variable using an ordinal scale ranging from 0 to 3, moving from less to more likely (see table 1). "Unlikely" was chosen as the reference category. Respondents that recognize TM shutdowns as a mechanism to solve a problem in their community and make their voices heard are expected to be the same as those who report having joined a protest event. A positive association between this variable and the dependent variable would indicate that respondents' attribution of opportunity vis-à-vis TM's infrastructure, based on the perceived effectiveness of TM shutdowns, positively affects the likelihood of their own mobilization.[11]

All statistical models include a control for the frequency of TM shutdowns in each respondent's district during the year prior to the survey. This variable is based on information from the *Social Struggles Data Set* (SSDS) (Archila 2002; 2003).[12] The inclusion of this control, in addition to the fact that the question associated with TM

opportunity attribution explicitly asks about the perceived effectiveness of TM shutdowns to *solve* a community problem, gives me confidence that the TM opportunity attribution variable is not a mere proxy for residing in a locality where TM shutdowns recently occurred a lot.

All models include a binary control variable to distinguish between districts with at least one TM station and districts with none of them (TM = 1; No TM = 0).[13] This covariate allows me to reduce the chances of reporting the existence of a TM-triggered opportunity attribution process when, in actuality, the mere availability of TM's infrastructure might operate as the real mechanism shaping mobilization.

[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]

I also generated a dummy variable for central districts (central = 1; non-central = 0) that is included in all statistical models. This variable groups together the four districts historically associated with high frequencies of protest in Bogotá (see figure 3). From a theoretical standpoint, taking into account Bogotá's central districts is a way to control for what Almeida (2012) designates as administrative infrastructure and higher educational infrastructure because central districts in Bogotá contain both the campuses of the main Colombian universities, as well as the main city and national government buildings. This is critical for empirical analysis of collective contention in the global South, where administrative (Boudreau 1996, Inclán 2008) and higher educational infrastructure (Altbatch 1984) are correlated with protest.

[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE]

To account for the community infrastructure in which opportunity attribution and tactical innovation emerge, I selected four control variables. Three of these variables are related to the level of participation in three different potential mobilizing structures. I conceptualize these variables as proxies for respondents' level of engagement in their community infrastructure: attending community-improvement committee meetings, attending religious services, and attending local political party rallies.[14] I expect that attending the meetings held by these organizations will be associated with respondents' level of collective action. In the Colombian context, however, I anticipate that attending religious services will be negatively associated with protest behavior, while I expect the opposite to be true for those attending community-improvement committee meetings and political party rallies (Sudarsky 2001; 2007).[15] The fourth proxy is a respondent's level of interpersonal trust regarding people living in his/her own locality. It is a standard practice to control for interpersonal trust based on the assumption that it facilitates collective contention (Benson and Rochon 2004), an assumption that is also considered plausible in the Latin American context (Smith 2009).

To capture biographical availability, I employed a set of five controls: gender (man = 1), age,[16] student status (student = 1), number of children,[17] and marital status (married/unmarried cohabitation = 1). In general, I expect personal constraints related to biographical availability to discourage mobilization. Regarding age, for example, some studies suggest that youth in Latin America tend to participate more in street protests than the elderly (Seligson, Smith, and Zechmeister 2012). Similarly, the significant leverage of the student movement in Latin American (Almeida 2007) and Colombian is widely

documented (Archila 2011; Velasco 2006). Therefore, I expect students to be more likely to participate in protest events, partially because of the flexibility of their schedules (i.e. time availability) and also because their personal networks are more likely to include some student-activists.

To control for respondent's resources, I included two variables: years of formal schooling[18] and an individual-level wealth index based on four different questions.[19] Although the literature is not conclusive, some scholars find that the richest and educated individuals in Latin America tend to protest more than their less wealthy and less educated counterparts (Booth and Seligson 2008).

A set of covariates associated with political attitudes and behaviors are also part of the controls. Here I included seven covariates: level of political awareness (Zaller 1992)[20] and level of affinity to the politically conservative Social Party of National Unity, the latter being treated as a proxy for political ideology in the Colombian context (Rodríguez-Raga and Seligson 2012).[21] Politically aware and left-leaning individuals are consistently associated with higher levels of participation in protest events in Colombia (Rodríguez-Raga and Seligson 2012). I use two dummy variables to control for having voted in the previous elections for President and Mayor, respectively. Controlling for formal political participation is important since some studies point to an association between formal and informal forms of political participation such as voting and protesting (Brady, Verba, and Lehman 1995). I also incorporated a variable to control for respondents' perception of how fair and free they think the mayoral elections are in Bogotá. I did this based on the assumption that the perceived level of openness of

Bogotá's political system may affect individuals' willingness to protest, a rationale closely related to the theory of political opportunities (Marien and Christensen 2013; Karapin 2011). An individual-level index that measures the level of trust in the main city's political institutions was also included in the analyses.[22] This variable is incorporated because recent evidence shows that institutional strength and institutional legitimacy tend to be correlated with lower levels of participation in street protests in Latin America (Machado, Scartascini and Tommasi 2011; Booth and Seligson 2009).

In terms of the statistical modeling, the relationships between a binary dependent variable, like the one I am using in this study, and a given set of explanatory variables should be performed using nonlinear regression models (Long 1997; Long and Freese 2001). Given the cross-sectional nature of the data, all statistical models employed to predict respondents' protest behavior are binary logistic regression equations estimated by maximum-likelihood. I use robust standard errors adjusted for clusters representing Bogotá's districts in all models.

Data and Methods: Qualitative Section.

I designed a case study to bring me as close as possible to an understanding of why and how activists in Bogotá attribute opportunity to TM and perceive TM shutdowns as an effective tactic. Protest event data from the *Social Struggles Data Base* (SSDS) show that between 1991 and 2010 Barrios Unidos and Kennedy were the two districts in which the use of TM shutdowns was most frequent.

The SSDS data also show that about 60% of the TM shutdowns in Kennedy district took place between two contiguous TM stations, namely Biblioteca Tintal station

and Patio Bonito station. Given that the distance between these two TM stations is approximately 600 meters, this particular neighborhood, usually referred to as Carimagua, was an ideal site.

From July to September 2012 I conducted fieldwork in Carimagua three days per week. Guided by the principle of saturation (Small 2009), I conducted 31 semi-structured interviews. Eight interviews were conducted in three different residential complexes to gain basic insight into the happenings of Carimagua. In fact, I quickly learnt from these interviews that rickshaw drivers in this neighborhood had shut down TM several times. I therefore chose to focus on rickshaw drivers, conducting interviews with 22 of them. Interviews were conducted while rickshaw drivers were working and were therefore relatively short on average (19.3 minutes). I was also able to interview an activist while she participated in a TM shutdown in protest of the poor quality of the housing in Carimagua. All the interviews were conducted in Spanish and were fully recorded with respondents' consent. While I replaced respondent's identifying information with pseudonyms, I did not alter the name of the neighborhood.

Results.

The Attribution of Opportunity Associated with TM's Infrastructure and the Likelihood of Protest.

Table 2 shows the bivariate regression of protest behavior on the attribution of opportunity related to TM. As expected, after only controlling for a) the presence of TM in a given district; b) the frequency of TM shutdowns per district; c) and central districts,[23] the association between mobilization and the attribution of opportunity is not

significant, most likely because the broad (social, political, and personal) context of the decision to mobilize is left out of the regression equation. Indeed, the subsequent analyses are devoted to: a) reflecting the inclusion of the broad context in which the decision to protest is made; and b) evaluating the specific association between the attribution of opportunity and the predicted probabilities of protesting after taking this broad context into account.

[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]

Table 3 presents the results of the regression models that include different specifications of the context in which the attribution of opportunity occurs. Model 1 tests for the association between protesting and opportunity attribution in the context of the proxies for community infrastructure. Model 2 tests for the association between mobilization and opportunity attribution in the context of respondents' biographical availability and resources. Model 3 test for the association between protesting and opportunity attribution in the context of respondents' political engagement. Finally, I develop an unrestricted model that combines all the variables included in the three previously mentioned models. Three covariates are included in all regression equations: the dummy variable for central districts, the dummy variable for TM availability by district, and the continuous variable for the number of TM shutdowns by district in 2010.

As shown in Table 3, the attribution of opportunity spurred by TM's infrastructure has a large, positive, consistent, and significant association with the odds of having participated in a protest event in Bogotá across all models. More precisely, after controlling for respondents' level of engagement in their community infrastructure

(model 1), an individual's odds of joining a protest are 3.6 times ($e^{1.276}$) greater when she thinks it is *very likely* that her neighbors will shut down TM to solve a problem in their community, than when she thinks such a scenario is *unlikely*.

Likewise, after controlling for biographical availability and resources (model 2), a respondent's odds of participating in a protest event are 2.7 times ($e^{1.010}$) greater when she thinks it is *very likely* a TM shutdown will be employed by her neighbors to solve a collective problem, than when she thinks the use of such a protest tactic is *unlikely*.

Similarly, Model 3 controls for political engagement. In this context, an individual's odds of participating in a protest event are 3.7 times ($e^{1.296}$) greater when she thinks it is *very likely* to see people shutting down TM in order to solve a common problem, then when she think it is unlikely.

Model 4 controls for all variables in a single equation. Here a respondent's odds of joining a protest event are 5.9 times ($e^{1.769}$) greater if she thinks it is *very likely* that people in her community will use TM to make their voices heard than if she believes it is *unlikely*. In sum, the evidence supports the main intuition of this paper: the perceived effectiveness of TM shutdowns facilitates the process of opportunity attribution associated with TM's infrastructure, thus contributing to respondents' own mobilization. As preempted in the theoretical framework, however, this intuition should be qualified: the opportunity attribution emerges as a strong predictor of respondents' protest behavior only after the context of the decision to mobilize is explicitly modeled.

[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]

Given that that both goodness-of-fit measures I employ suggest that model 4 has the best fit (see Table 3), the results discussed next are based on that particular model. As expected, the influence of community infrastructure modeled via respondent's engagement in local activities of potential mobilizing structures such as local political parties and community-improvement committees is significantly associated with respondents' mobilization. While respondents that report being relatively involved in political parties and community-improvement committees are also more likely to protest, religious respondents show the opposite inclination. This finding is compatible with existing empirical evidence regarding civic and political engagement in Colombia (Sudarsky 2001; 2007). Similarly, respondents' with high levels of trust in people living in the same neighborhood as they do are more likely to be activists. Even though these results are, at best, indirect evidence of the importance of community infrastructure for mobilization, in the qualitative analysis I find more data that support this intuition.

In terms of political engagement, respondents who are politically aware, left-leaning, and those who voted in the most recent mayoral (i.e. city-level) elections are more likely to protest. These results are in line with the existing literature on street protests in Latin America (Machado, Scartascini, and Tommasi 2011; Rodríguez-Raga and Seligson 2012). In terms of biographical availability, respondents who are young are more likely to mobilize. Even though education and number of children did not reach the canons of statistical significance, both variables have the expected sign and are significant at the $\alpha = 0.1$ level (education= 0.090, p. = 0.092; number of children = -0.794, p. = 0.065).

Contrary to my expectations, however, the dummy variable for central districts is not significantly correlated with the odds of having joined a protest. This might be explained by the fact that all surveys were conducted at respondents' houses. This is important since people tend to demonstrate in central districts not because they live there, but because the main government buildings and universities are located there. Similarly, the control variable for the number of TM shutdowns by district in the year prior to the survey is not significant. I interpret this finding in light of the result associated with the key independent variable. In this regard, evidence suggests that respondents, and especially activists, are able to distinguish between TM shutdowns as an effective tactic to solve a problem in their community on the one hand, and the mere frequency of TM shutdowns on the other.[24] Finally, the fact that the availability of TM stations in a given respondent's district is significantly associated with protesting suggests that both the (objective) availability of TM's infrastructure and its subjective conceptualization as an opportunity are critical for mobilization in Bogotá.[25]

Table 4 presents the predicted probabilities of joining a protest after controlling for all variables in the unrestricted model (model 4). This approach is recommended for interpreting the impact that the change in an explanatory variable has on a binary outcome variable (Long and Freese 2001). These predicted probabilities were computed based on two main types of profiles. I labeled the first type of individual as an *activist*. A person fitting this profile attends political rallies and community-improvement committee meetings once a week, he/she is 22 years old, has an affinity of 0 points out of 100 to the Social Party of National Unity (i.e. is to the left of the political spectrum), has a score of

75 out of 100 points in terms of political awareness, and voted in the previous mayoral elections.[26] I conceptualize the second profile as the mirror image of the activist profile. A respondent that fits the *non-activist profile* does not attend political rallies or community-improvement committee meetings, he/she is 67 years old, has an affinity of 75 points out of 100 to the Social Party of National Unity (i.e. is to the right of the political spectrum), has a score of 0 out of 100 points in terms of political awareness, and did not vote in the previous mayoral elections.[27]

In addition, I use the same mirror image logic (*activist* vs. *non-activist*) to calculate predicted probabilities of joining a protest after including information related to the attribution of opportunity associated with TM's infrastructure. More precisely, predicted probabilities of joining a protest were also computed for *non-activists* who think it is *unlikely* to observe a TM shutdown in their community versus *activists* who think it is *very likely*. In order to compare these predicted probabilities across profiles, all remaining continuous and categorical control variables included in model 4 were held constant at their mean and mode, respectively.

As Table 4 indicates, there are stark differences in the predicted probabilities of having joined a protest event for activists versus non-activists. As can be seen in Table 4 panel B, an activist who believes TM shutdowns are very likely to happen in her/his community has a predicted probability of 0.962 of joining a protest, while a non-activist who believes TM shutdowns are unlikely to happen has a predicted probability of 0.001 of joining a protest. It is important to notice, however, that the bulk of this difference can be explained by the baseline profile (activist/non-activist), which directly corresponds

with what I called the broader context of mobilization. In fact, as evident in Table 4 panel A, when the attribution of opportunity associated with TM's infrastructure is held constant, an activist has a predicted probability of 0.883 of joining a protest event, while a non-activist has a predicted probability of 0.001.

In sum, the opportunity attribution associated with TM's infrastructure does help explain changes in the probability of joining a protest event in Bogotá but it should not be reified as *the* main explanatory factor. On the contrary, resources, biographical availability, community infrastructure, the availability of TM's infrastructure, as well as political attitudes and behaviors also weigh into an individual's decision. These factors provide the necessary context for the attribution of opportunity to emerge as important.

[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]

Robustness Checks: Time-order, Endogeneity, and Rare Events.

One plausible argument against the results discussed above is related to endogeneity and time-order. In other words, since the dependent variable refers to a specific behavior (having joined a protest), whereas the main independent variable refers to an attitude (opportunity attribution), endogeneity might be present in the analysis because protestors' experience in past protest events (behavior) could influence the extent to which they attribute opportunity to TM's infrastructure (attitude). To account for this possibility, in analyses not shown here, I used all variables included in the unrestricted model (model 4) to develop three new regression equations.

In these three new models, the dependent variable was respondents' opportunity attribution *vis-á-vis* TM's infrastructure, whereas having joined a protest event was

included as one of the explanatory variables. Given that the new dependent variable was ordinal (perceived likelihood of witnessing a TM shutdown: unlikely = 0; not very likely = 1; somewhat likely = 2; very likely = 3), I first estimated an ordered logistic regression by maximum likelihood.[28] In addition, the second regression equation I specified was a binary logistic model in which the categories of the new dependent variable were collapsed into two broad groups (perceived likelihood of witnessing a TM shutdown: unlikely/very likely = 0; somewhat likely/very likely = 1). Finally, I also specified a binary logistic regression in which the categories of the new binary dependent variable discriminate between respondents who believe that seeing a TM shutdown is very likely from all other respondents (perceived likelihood of witnessing a TM shutdown: unlikely/very likely/likely = 0; very likely = 1). The three models show that having joined a protest is not statistically associated with the attribution of opportunity triggered by TM's infrastructure. In the context of the cross-sectional nature of my data, these results provide inconclusive, albeit compelling, evidence about the possible causal direction of the association between the key variables of this study; which appears to move from attributing opportunity to joining a protest, not in the opposite direction.[29] The qualitative evidence I will present in the next section also supports this reasoning.

A second argument against the results of the regression analyses pertains to the fact that only 5.2% of the respondents reported having protested in the year prior to the survey. Even though such a figure is indeed what one should expect (Lichbach 1995, 1998; Rodríguez-Raga and Seligson 2012), a legitimate question about the robustness of the results remain. As recommended in the literature on logistic regression for rare event

data (Firth 1993; King and Zeng 2001; Leitgöb 2015; Gao and Shen 2007), I fitted the unrestricted model (model 4) using penalized maximum likelihood estimation. After doing so, the attribution of opportunity spurred by TM's infrastructure retains its statistical significant.

TM Shutdowns in Kennedy District. The Case of Carimagua.

As discussed earlier, I developed a case study based on interview data in order to contextualize my quantitative findings, which is a distinctive practice of the mixed methods literature (Small 2011). The initial interviews made clear that the main shared problem for the inhabitants of this area was related to public transportation. Nevertheless, TM itself was not the problem. In fact, participants frequently mentioned that their main concern was the lack of public transportation to go from TM stations to their houses and vice versa. According to all the residents of Carimagua I interviewed, the only public and legal transportation solution, the so-called yellow buses, were expensive and usually unable to take them from the nearest TM station to their homes. In this context, hundreds of pedal-powered rickshaws and dozens of small white vans emerged as informal, flexible, and cheap transportation solutions to the inhabitants of Carimagua. In the words of GT and BV:

> **GT**: Public transportation here is very bad! In my case, every day I need to go to 26 street [downtown], so to take the [yellow] bus in the morning I must cross the canal, which is extremely dangerous (…) When I am not able to take the bus I take a white van to get to Cali Avenue. In the afternoons it is exactly the same story. (GT, inhabitant of Carimagua in Kennedy district).

BV: Well, the white vans and the rickshaw drivers help one a lot. Is one supposed to walk between here and Cali Avenue? One would need to walk like 20 blocks… So, one would spend 20 or 30 minutes walking. (BV, inhabitant of Carimagua).

This situation forged a highly contentious environment, which is part of the reason why rickshaw drivers often carried out TM shutdowns. More specifically, three different, albeit highly intertwined, conflict layers comprise the aforementioned contentious environment. In the first layer, yellow bus drivers and white van drivers are protagonists. Bus drivers believe they are entitled to block the free transit of white vans in Carimagua because buses are legal while vans are not. CB, a white van driver, succinctly refers to this situation:

Interviewer: How is your relationship with yellow bus drivers?

CB: Well, it is problematic, there are problems here and there because they block us [*nos cierran*]… and because of the way they treat us… and all of that.

Interviewer: What do you mean by blocking you [*cerradas*]?

CB: I mean when they block you because of passengers…when they block you… like to prevent you from picking-up new passengers. (CB, white van driver in Carimagua)

[FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE]

The second layer of conflict is characterized by white van drivers as victimizers and rickshaw drivers as victims. Given that both actors operate informally, their fights are more personal and violent. A participant even mentioned that some rickshaw drivers have been killed as a result of this rivalry. The third conflict layer is defined by organized and unorganized rickshaw drivers as main actors. In this context, rickshaw drivers that are

members of rickshaw associations constantly intimidate non-members. The latter do so by taking advantage of the informal nature of this business, serving the patrons of established rickshaw drivers. Struggles in this layer are also highly personal and violent. BT1 and BT2, both rickshaw drivers, commented on these two layers of conflict:

Interviewer: How is your relationship with white van drivers?

BT1: White van drivers no… I mean, one is just working here, one is not involved with them.

Interviewer: But, what do they do to you guys?

BT1: They block us, they are always doing the same… (BT1, former ex vice president of a rickshaw organization)

Interviewer: Is this rickshaw affiliated with an organization?

BT2: Yes, it is.

Interviewer: What is the name of the organization?

BT2: ASOTRICCOL, *Asociación de Tricimóviles Comunitarios de Colombia.*

Interviewer: What are the advantages of being a member of this association?

BT2: The good thing about it is that no one messes up with you. I mean, no one messes up with you on the route that you are working on, you just come and work and that is it. If you are not a member it is complicated because then the other [i.e. organized] rickshaw drivers just come and beat you up and also puncture your tires. (BT2, organized rickshaw driver)

All organized and unorganized rickshaw drivers I interviewed were fully aware of the importance of accessing legal licenses to operate in Carimagua. This was an outcome

of their fights with white van drivers and also because the Police were especially inflexible with them. In fact, several inhabitants of Carimagua also mentioned Police actions towards rickshaw drivers as a reason driving them to protest. It is in this context that narratives of TM shutdowns emerged. According to DT, an inhabitant of Carimagua:

> **Interviewer**: Do you remember people in this neighborhood having joined a public protest?
>
> **DT**: Yes, they recently have done that… more than two times.
>
> **Interviewer**: Do you remember what happened?
>
> **DT**: Last time the protest was related to a three day strike carried out by truck drivers in Cali Avenue. Later on the rickshaw drivers of this area decided to join the strike.
>
> **Interviewer**: The rickshaw drivers?
>
> **DT**: Yes, the rickshaw drivers, and before that, like two months before, the rickshaw drivers also shut down Transmilenio, right there in Cali Avenue across from Biblioteca el Tintal. They blocked the TM busway for an entire day. Actually, they have blocked it several times because the Police do not let them work, they have not been able to obtain a license to work. (DT, inhabitant of Carimagua).

As expected, when I interviewed rickshaw drivers they were not willing to acknowledge their participation in TM shutdowns. This was the case because TM shutdowns are an illegal protest tactic and rickshaw drivers' primary shared goal is to obtain a city government granted license to work. They, however, acknowledge their participation in legal protest events.

BT3 described a legal protest that rickshaw drivers participated in during April 2009. The demonstration was called for by a city-wide confederation of rickshaw drivers, an organization that brings together local associations such as the previously mentioned ASOTRICCOL. This information was corroborated by the national press. According to a note in Colombia's second most prominent newspaper, at least 1,000 rickshaw drivers participated in this demonstration, which took place in Plaza de Bolívar, where the city hall is located.[30] The purpose of this march was to pressure the city government to grant rickshaw drivers a license to work. In this account, community infrastructure in the form of mobilization structures such as ASOTRICCOL emerges as an important resource for mobilization:

> **Interviewer**: How was the march possible?
>
> **BT3**: The confederation assigned a specific time in which every rickshaw driver working in a given route had to join the march. We [ASOTRICCOL] joined the march at 9:00 a.m. By that time, 8 different associations were already marching. We were marching right after them. (BT3, rickshaw driver leader)

Much later in the conversation, BT3 mentioned that rickshaw drivers have also shut down TM. BT3's words show that rickshaw drivers decided to shut down TM not only because of the availability of this particular infrastructure, but because the perceived effectiveness of the tactic:

> **Interviewer**: Why is that rickshaw drivers shut down Transmilenio?
>
> **BT3**: It is said that to gain government's attention, people have to go there directly to Transmilenio, to shut down Transmilenio, so that the government finally listens to people. When the neighborhood needs something, when the rickshaw drivers need

something, or at least to be heard, Transmilenio is the most effective method. (BT3, rickshaw driver leader)

From this statement it is clear that rickshaw drivers do attribute opportunity to TM's infrastructure because of the perceived effectiveness associated with TM shutdowns. BT3's account suggest a tension between the legitimacy of TM shutdowns as a protest tactic and its effectiveness. In other words, although BT3's choice of language indicates a desire to disassociate from the practice of shutting down TM, his words do show how the perceived effectiveness of TM shutdowns, and the consequent attribution of opportunity, was greater than the perceived illegitimacy of partaking in such an illegal action.

In the conversation with BT3 it was also clear that while the legal demonstration he initially mentioned was indeed covered by the media, TM shutdowns also tend to be covered even when only a reduced number of rickshaw drivers carry out the protest event. It is partially for this reason that rickshaw drivers consider TM shutdowns a highly effective tactic. This statement is supported by DR, a Carimigua inhabitant I interviewed in the field during a TM shutdown organized in protest of city government policies on urban planning:

DR: The media is going to arrive here, this kind of highways [TM busways] are always very crowded. Here we can cause a traffic jam and get media coverage. We hope our actions get public authorities' attention and even the President's attention. We have to shut the damn thing down! (DR, activist protesting in Carimagua)

BT3 and DR's accounts support the main conclusion derived from this case study: When facing collective problems, protestors in Carimagua do conceptualize and use TM

shutdowns as an effective tactic to make their voices heard, thus attributing opportunity to TM's infrastructure. The qualitative data also show that activists attribute opportunity to this particular infrastructure because of its relative effectiveness when compared to traditional tactics. The evidence also shows the importance of activists' community infrastructure which materializes in the form of concrete mobilizing structures such as ASOTRICCOL to facilitate mobilization in general, and TM shutdowns in particular. This case study therefore constitutes the second piece of evidence that supports the hypothesized relationship between the attribution of opportunity spurred by TM's infrastructure, the perceived effectiveness of TM shutdowns, and mobilization in Bogotá.

Conclusions

In this paper, I demonstrate that the infrastructure of Bogotá's massive transportation system is not just a means to transport millions of people, but also the material source for a tactical innovation used by activists in the city. More precisely, my analysis of data from a representative sample of Bogotá's adult population suggests that TM's infrastructure triggers a process of opportunity attribution because of the perceived effectiveness of TM shutdowns as a tool to voice and solve collective problems. As regression analyses show, however, the subjective attribution of the opportunity vis-à-vis TM operates insofar as the broad context of the decision to mobilize is taken in account. This context includes five different factors: community and physical infrastructure, resources, biographical availability, and political engagement. Furthermore, the qualitative evidence I present shows that protestors do conceptualize TM shutdowns as highly effective, thus explaining why they ultimately use this tactic. Taken together, both

the quantitative and qualitative analyses provide substantial support for the critical role of the perceived effectiveness of a novel tactic to explain the emergence of a successful process of opportunity attribution, and, ultimately, individual's own mobilization.

Community infrastructure, which refers to the set of mobilizing structures that can eventually be activated by a group of activists in a given locality (Almeida 2012), also emerged as an important element in explaining protest behavior and the use of TM shutdowns as a novel tactic. Survey data suggest that the frequency with which individuals are involved in activities related to potential mobilizing structures such as local political parties or community-improvement committees significantly impacts the likelihood of respondent's own mobilization. In the same vein, the qualitative evidence exemplifies the critical role that particular mobilization structures, in the form of rickshaw drivers' associations, play in enabling the emergence of collective contention in general, and in the use of TM shutdowns in particular. This finding is a reminder that opportunity attribution and individual-level perceptions of tactics' effectiveness is a social psychological process in which individual's community should be taken into count.

Future research should address the expansion of massive transportation systems similar to TM and their relationship to mobilization in other latitudes. This is important because the extraordinary expansion of such transportation system throughout Colombia, and across Latin America, and the global South (Campo 2010), increases the potential modularity (Tarrow 1994) of TM shutdowns. For reasons outlined in this paper, however, each particular case should be carefully analyzed since the interactions between physical

infrastructure, community infrastructure, individual and social characteristics, and mobilization are complex and context-specific.

Finally, the fact that TM's infrastructure itself is a central piece of the analysis reminds us about the importance of space for collective action. In Gieryn's (2000: 466) words: "the place is not merely a setting or backdrop, but an agentic player in the game – a force with detectable and independent effects in social life." This is precisely why this paper advocates for the inclusion of the physical and transportation infrastructure of a given locality, and particularly of activists' interpretations of the opportunities spurred by this infrastructure, as a key component of the existing theories of mobilization. In particular, in this paper I show that the transformations that Bogotá's massive transportation infrastructure underwent over the last decades (i.e. the implementation of TM) are critical to developing understandings of protest behavior and tactical innovations in the Colombian capital city.

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Figure 1. Americas Line, Transmilenio.

Digital Image. *La República* (newspaper). 6 June, 2012. Accesed: 12 July, 2014. http://bit.ly/1tzqwvB

Figure 2. TM shutdown on Americas Line

Revista Semana's Twitter account. Digital Image. 13 February, 2104. Accessed: 12 July, 2014. http://bit.ly/1vuY1Et

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics, POPS 2011 (N=520).

Variables	Mean/Prop.	Std. Deviation	Range	% missing
Dependent Variable				
Protested (yes = 1)	0.052	0.222	0 – 1	0.00
Continuous Covariates				
Political awareness	44.183	24.802	0 – 100	0.00
Affinity to Social Party of National Unity (Ideology)	40.721	31.869	0 – 100	2.83
Individual-level trust in institutions index	33.571	24.362	0 – 100	0.17
Individual-level wealth index	42.989	35.209	0 – 100	0.00
Years of education	11.131	5.076	0 – 22	0.00
Age	43.288	17.413	18 – 89	0.00
Number of Children	1.975	1.831	0 – 12	0.00
Believe elections in Bogotá are open and fair	4.846	1.837	1 – 7	0.00
Frequency TM shutdowns in district	2.069	1.950	0 – 7	0.00
Dummy Covariates				
Presidential vote (voted = 1)	0.748	0.435	0 – 1	0.33
City-level vote (voted = 1)	0.644	0.479	0 – 1	0.17
Student (yes =1)	0.092	0.290	0 – 1	0.00
Live in central district (yes = 1)	0.090	0.287	0 – 1	0.00
TM infrastructure in district (yes = 1)	0.880	0.324	0 – 1	0.00
Sex (male =1)	0.490	0.490	0 – 1	0.00
Marial status (married/cohabitation = 1)	0.560	0.497	0 – 1	0.00
Ordinal Covariates				
TM shutdowns			0 – 3	2.50
Unlikely	0.312			
Not very likely	0.353			
Somewhat likely	0.162			
Very likely	0.175			
Attendance religious services			0 – 3	0.00
Never	0.322			
Once or twice per year	0.090			
Once or twice per month	0.175			
Once a week	0.412			
Attendance party rallies			0 – 3	0.00
Never	0.856			
Once or twice per year	0.087			
Once or twice per month	0.037			
Once a week	0.021			
Attendance community-improvement committees			0 – 3	0.00
Never	0.792			
Once or twice per year	0.140			
Once or twice per month	0.044			
Once a week	0.027			
Interpersonal trust in neighbors			0 – 3	2.53
Untrustworthy	0.114			
Not very trustworthy	0.248			
Somewhat trustworthy	0.464			
Very trustworthy	0.175			

Figure 3. Central and Non-Central Districts in Bogotá.



Source: Sketch Map from www.enda.atarraya.org

Table 2. Binary Logistic Regression Equation for Having Participated in a Protest Event in the Last Twelve Months in Bogotá, POPS 2011.

Variables	
Dependent variable (Participate in a protest = 1)	
TM shutdown (ref= unlikely)	
Not very likely	0.676
	(0.523)
Somewhat likely	-1.133
	(1.126)
Very likely	0.775
	(0.489)
Controls	
Live in central district (yes = 1)	0.484
	(0.563)
TM infrastructure in district (yes = 1)	-0.020
	(0.538)
Frequency TM shutdowns in district	0.007
	(0.104)
Constant	-3.311
	(0.533)
N	520
BIC	248.379

* <0.05; ** <0 .01; ***<0.001 (two-tailed tests); robust standard errors adjusted by district in parenthesis

Table 3. Binary Logistic Regression Equations for Having Participated in a Protest Event in the Last Twelve Months in Bogotá, POPS 2011.

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Dependent variable (participated in a protest event = 1)	Community Infrastructure	Resources & bio. availability	Political attitudes & behaviors	Unrestricted model
TM shutdown (ref= unlikely)				
Not very likely	1.138*	0.711	0.803	1.367
	(0.553)	(0. 584)	(0.515)	(0.851)
Somewhat likely	-0.720	-1.549	-0.769	-1.503
	(1.142)	(1.258)	(1.099)	(1.610)
Very likely	1.276*	1.010*	1.296**	1.769**
	(0.553)	(0.482)	(0 .479)	(0.656)
Control variables				
Interpersonal trust in neighbors (ref = never)				
Not very trustworthy	1.224			1.146
	(1.202)			(1.065)
Somewhat trustworthy	1.372			1.696
	(1.145)			(1.211)
Very trustworthy	1.319			2.496**
	(0.934)			(0.878)
Attendance religious services (ref = never)				
Once or twice per year	-1.739*			-1.113
	(0.877)			(0.885)
Once or twice per month	-1.976***			-2.533*
	(0.502)			(0.977)
Once a week	-1.729**			-1.813*
	(0.547)			(0 .812)
Attendance local party rallies (ref = never)				
Once or twice per year	0.973			2.003*
	(0.585)			(0. 979)
Once or twice per month	1.719*			1.116
	(0.788)			(0.823)
Once a week	2.187***			1.959
	(0.478)			(1.001)
Community-improvement committee (ref = never)				
Once or twice per year	-0.390			-0.003
	(0.938)			(0.893)
Once or twice per month	1.226			3.021
	(0.747)			(1.866)
Once a week	1.440			3.291***

	(0.877)			(0.600)
Education		0.106		0.090
		(0.055)		(0.053)
Age		-0.020		-0.045*
		(0.018)		(0.021)
Sex (men =1)		0.118		0.200
		(0.465)		(0.513)
Individual-level wealth index		0.001		-0.015
		(0.006)		(0 .015)
Student (yes =1)		0.876		1.235
		(0.685)		(0.759)
Number of children		-0.450*		-0.794
		(0.207)		(0.431)
Marial status (married/cohabitation = 1)		-0.479		-0.225
		0 .379		0.547
Political awareness			0.048***	0.052**
			(0.011)	(0.016)
Presidential vote (voted = 1)			-1.369*	-1.195
			(0.559)	(0.792)
City-level vote (voted = 1)			1.087**	1.718**
			(0.414)	(0.573)
Affinity Social Party of National Unity (ideology)			-0.013**	-0.019**
			(0.005)	(0.006)
Individual-level institutional trust index			0.013	0.005
			(0.007)	(0 .012)
Believe elections in Bogotá are open and fair			-0.360**	-0.394*
			(0. 118)	(0.163)
Live in central district (yes = 1)	0.717	0.843	-0.303	0.264
	(0.556)	(0.650)	(0.502)	(0.558)
TM infrastructure in district (yes = 1)	0.225	0.164	0.586	2.235*
	(0.466)	(0.650)	(0.681)	(1.129)
Frequency of TM shutdowns in district	-0.087	-0.065	0.014	-0.114
	(0.101)	(0.140)	(0.096)	(0.202)
Constant	-4.453***	-3.418**	-4.831***	-6.254**
	(1.028)	1.080	(0.817)	(1.555)
N	520	520	520	520
BIC	280.679	255.855	247.334	217.541
Likelihood-ratio test	M_1 vs M_4	M_2 vs M_4	M_3 vs M_4	
H_o: fit $M_i \geq$ fit M_4; H_a: fit $M_i <$ fit M_4	63.138***	63.330***	61.062***	

* <0.05; ** <0 .01; ***<0.001 (two-tailed tests); robust standard errors adjusted by district in parenthesis.

Table 4. Predicted Probabilities of Joining a Protest as a Function of Respondent's Profile.

Panel	Profile	Attribution of Opportunity to TM	Pr (having joined a protest event = 1)	95% Confidence Interval
A	**Activist**	**Held constant**	0.883	0.538 – 1.000
	Non-Activist	**Held constant**	0.001	0.000 – 0.001
B	**Activist**	**Yes**	0.962	0.8196 – 1.000
	Non-Activist	**No**	0.001	0.0000 – 0.001

Figure 4. Transportation Solutions in Carimagua.

White Vans

Yellow Buses

Rickshaw

Patio Bonito TM Station

NOTES

[1] As a result of protests in Kennedy district there are two Transmilenio stations closed (Protestas en Kennedy tienen dos estaciones de Transmilenio cerradas). *El Tiempo* (newspaper), 29 January, 2011.
[2] TM "busways" (Chaparro 2002) are especially reserved lanes for TM buses. A TM busway, or troncal, is similar to the lines in a regular subway system. In the New York City subway, for example, the 7 flushing line connects the boroughs of Queens and Manhattan.
[3] According to official sources, on average, 153,478 people per hour use this particular TM line, see www.transmilenio.gov.co. See also, Ten bad things about Transmilenio (Los 10 lunares de Transmilenio). *Revista Semana* (news magazine), 14 February, 2014.
[4] Did truck drivers win? (¿Ganaron el pulso los camioneros?). *Revista Semana* (news magazine). (4 April, 2011).
[5] Invention, use, and diffusion of a given tactic not only depend on its effectiveness. In fact, feasibility and legitimacy also play an important role in these processes (Biggs 2013). A comprehensive analysis and discussion of legitimacy and feasibility in the context of TM shutdowns is outside of the scope of this paper, however. My focus is on the individual-level perception of the opportunity attribution spurred by TM's infrastructure.
[6] Ten bad things about Transmilenio (Los 10 lunares de Transmilenio). *Revista Semana* (news magazine), 14 February, 2014.
[7] Transmilenio: a protest resource. (Transmilenio: vehículo de protesta). *Revista Semana* (news magazine), 19 November, 2011.
[8] Tactical overlap refers to "the proportion of movement's protest events that fall in the same tactical niche as those of other movements." (Olzak and Uhrig 2001: 704).
[9] Repertoires of contention are a limited set of protest tactics "that are learned, shared, and acted out through a relatively deliberate process of choice" (Tilly 1995).
[10] This panel study was designed by Professor Miguel Garcia at Universidad de los Andes, Bogotá. I participated in the design of the questionnaire and its application.
[11] Methodological issues related with endogeneity and time order will be addressed in subsequent analyses.
[12] The data set is developed since 1975 by the Colombian nongovernmental organization CINEP or Centro de Investigación y Educación Popular. It is the best source for the study of protest dynamics over time in Colombia (Velasco 2006).
[13] I also used a continuous version of this variable: the number of TM stations per district per km^2. Goodness-of-fit measures associated with the binary version were always superior.
[14] Even though these variables can also be considered as proxies of *structural availability* (Schussman and Soule 2005), I prefer to use the *infrastructural* framework (Almeida 2012) to explain mobilization outcomes. I will expand on this discussion in the context of the qualitative results where I directly observe the influence of community *infrastructure* in the form of concrete mobilization structures. Similarly, the notion of transportation *infrastructure* allows me to theoretically capture the influence of TM in a comprehensive theoretical framework.
[15] In the context of an overwhelmingly catholic country like Colombia, Sudarsky (2001; 2007) finds support for the hypothesized relation between attendance to religious services and mobilization. Different results have been found in the context of protestant respondents in the United States, however (McVeigh and Sikkink 2001). In addition, sensitivity analyses shown that the results related to these three variables (attending: religious services, community-improvement committee meetings, and political party rallies) are robust even after transforming them to a continuous level of measurement. In order to do this transformation, random numbers were generated to fill in respondents' self-declared frequency of attendance. For example, for respondents who said they never attended community-improvement committees meetings, their frequency of attendance was coded as 0; for respondents who report attending once or twice per year, either 1 or 2 was randomly assigned as their frequency of attendance; for participants who said they tend to attend one or twice per month, a random integer between 12 and 24

(included) was assigned; finally, for those respondents who report attending once a week, the number assigned was 52, which is the number of weeks in a year.

[16] A squared version of this variable was not found to be significant.

[17] I also used a binary version of this variable (presence of children = 1). Goodness-of-fit measures associated with the continuous version were always superior.

[18] I also used a categorical version of this variable (high school diploma or less = 0; college education = 1; postgraduate education = 2). Goodness-of-fit measures associated with the continuous version were always superior.

[19] Wealth is measured on a scale of 0 to 100, ranging from lower to higher levels of wealth. This variable is based on a battery of questions that ask respondents whether their household has a number of goods or not. An iterated principal factor analysis with varimax rotation was performed on the 9 different items (having: refrigerator, car, washing machine, microwave, motorcycle, clean water, bathroom, flat screen t.v., and internet service). The index is based on items with factor loadings of 0.400 or higher on the main factor. The main factor explains 54% of the total variance of the 9 original items. The final index includes 4 items: having a car, a flat-screen television, a microwave oven, and internet at home. The Cronbach Alpha reliability for this index is 0.7043

[20] Following Zaller's advice (1992), political awareness was measured by asking interviewers a specific question after each interview: "Please rate the respondent's level of political awareness." Possible answers included "Very high", "High", "Neither high nor low", "Low", and "Very low." This variable was recodified from 0 to100, from lower to higher levels of political awareness.

[21] Rodríguez-Raga and Seligson (2012) show that respondents who identify with this party are, on average, the most ideologically conservative people in Colombia

[22] The index is measured on a scale of 0 to 100, going from lower to higher levels of trust. This index is based on a battery of 8 different questions that ask respondents their level of trust in several political institutions. An iterated principal factor analysis with varimax rotation was performed on the 8 original items (trust in: district-level councils, national government, national police, city mayor, city-level council, city-level elections, district-level mayor, and politicians). The index is based on items with factor loadings of 0 .400 or higher on the main factor. The main factor explains 75% of the total variance of the 8 original items. The final index includes 3 items, trust in: the district-level councils (*Juntas Administradoras Locales*), the city government, and the city council. The Cronbach Alpha reliability for this index is 0.793.

[23] These are the districts that concentrate the administrative and higher educational infrastructure of the city.

[24] In the next subsection I will address possible endogeneity problems related to this and other results.

[25] In analyses not shown here, several interaction terms between TM's infrastructure by district, the number of TM shutdown by district, and TM opportunity attribution were included in the unrestricted model. None of the interactions, however, were significant.

[26] The particular selected values affinity to the Social Party of National Unity corresponds to the 10th percentile of each distribution. Similarly, the selected value for the political awareness variable corresponds to the 90th percentile of this variable. Since the value associated with the 10th percentile of the age distribution corresponds to an individual that is 20.5 years old, I selected 22 instead because this value corresponds to the minimum age a respondent could be in order to have voted in the previous elections for Mayor.

[27] The particular selected values for age and affinity to the Social Party of National Unity are the 90th percentile of each distribution. Similarly, the selected value for the political awareness variable corresponds to the 10th percentile of this variable.

[28] This ordered logistic regression model did not violate the parallel regression assumption.

[29] In the particular context of TM shutdowns, this result supports the basic assumption according to which people's perceptions of reality determine their decisions. Even though a detailed analysis of how the relevant information vis-à-vis TM shutdowns becomes available to actors (Koopmans 2005) is not part of the quantitative analysis, I will discuss some relevant evidence in this regard in the context of the qualitative results.

[30] Rickshaw drivers protest because of poor work conditions (Bicitaxis protestan por falta de garantías para trabajar). *El Espectador* (newspaper), 27 April, 2009.