

Layer Cake 1 challenge

Challenge

0 Solves

×

Layer Cake - 1 200

One of Castelia's sensor hub controllers, based on the STM32F407VET microcontroller, is producing anomalous results and the engineering team thinks this may be caused by the device calibration having drifted.

They believe that they can trigger a recalibration of the device from a debug serial/UART console exposed on one of the AUX headers on the board. One of the engineers is confident they need to use **UART4**.

The team has taken images of the front and back of a blank board, as well as a picture of the top of an assembled board for you.

What connector is the serial console exposed on?

Flag format: *<Connector>,TX:<pin number>,RX:<pin number>*. Example: *J14,TX:1,RX:2*

mainboard-back.png

mainboard-back-two.png

mainboard-front.png

mainboard-front-components....



mainboard-front-two.png



0/10 attempts

Flag

Submit

In the Layer Cake 1 challenge, I located the datasheet for the main controller and found that it uses an LQFP100 package. While the microcontroller features multiple UART channels, our focus is on UART4. According to the datasheet, the TX and RX pins for UART4 are assigned to pins 23 and 24, respectively. I traced these pins on the multi-layer PCB and found that the traces lead to connector J20. Specifically, the RX pin is connected to pin 11, and the TX pin is connected to pin 9.





Layer Cake 2 challenge

Challenge

5 Solves



Layer Cake - 2 200

Due to the previous hardware design team suddenly quitting, Castelia's engineers have been unable to find the schematics for the new revision of their control board, codenamed 'Lythos'. The IT team was able to pull a zip file of the production Gerber files from one of the designer's emails for the prototype version. These files are located in the attached zip file (lythos_processor.zip).

Castelia engineers would like your assistance determining how to debug the main processor.

Their first request for you is to determine the name of the debug protocol this processor uses.

Can you figure out how to debug the main processor?

Flag format: debug protocol name



 lythos_processor.zip

0/10 attempts

Flag

Submit

The lythos_processor-F_Silkscreen.gto file appears to be a Gerber file, commonly used in PCB design to define the graphical elements of printed circuit boards. This file specifically contains details about the PCB's layers, apertures, and drawing instructions for the silkscreen (the top legend layer in this case). I used the Online Gerber Viewer tool from PCBWay to identify the processor name. The microcontroller is labeled MCF5213 - QFP100. After searching for the name online, I found its datasheet, which revealed the debug protocol used: BDM (Background Debug Mode).



Spy By Wire 1

Challenge

0 Solves

×


Spy-By-Wire - 1 200

Castelia's engineering team thinks that something funky is going on with this device. They plugged a logic analyzer into a header on the board and they saw a lot of unexpected traffic. The attached `memory.sal` file contains traces from their logic analyzer.

They know that there is an 24LC001 I2C EEPROM on the board, as well as some SPI-attached memory. From their initial triage of the situation, the engineering team thinks that the EEPROM might hold a 16-byte encryption key that the code is using later to decrypt some blobs of code.

What is this encryption key?

Flag format: `0x<contents>`. Example: `0x000102030405060708090a0b0c0d`

 `memory.sal`




0/5 attempts

Flag

Submit

We analyzed the `memory.sal` file using Saleae's Logic Analyzer software. The 24LC001 EEPROM communicates via the I2C protocol, a widely used communication standard, particularly for microcontrollers interfacing with peripheral ICs on the same PCB. I2C operates with two lines: the SDA (data) line and the SCL (clock) line. The SCL provides a periodic clock signal, while the SDA transmits data, which should only change when SCL is low. Given this, we deduced that SCL is likely mapped to Channel 1 and SDA to Channel 0. Using the Logic Analyzer, we applied an I2C protocol filter to extract all relevant data in .csv format. We then sorted the data into read and write operations. During the sorting process, we observed that the data repeats in 16-byte sections.

Flag: `0x691E5E4219581B44190C1F421E471B58`



write	to	0x54	ack	data:	0x01	0x69	0x00
read	to	0x54	ack	data:	0x1E	0x1E	0x01
write	to	0x54	ack	data:	0x0E	0x5E	0x02
read	to	0x54	ack	data:	0x1B	0x42	0x03
write	to	0x53	ack	data:	0x02	0x19	0x04
read	to	0x53	ack	data:	0x5E	0x58	0x05
write	to	0x52	ack	data:	0x05	0x1B	0x06
read	to	0x52	ack	data:	0x58	0x44	0x07
write	to	0x57	ack	data:	0x03	0x19	0x08
read	to	0x57	ack	data:	0x42	0x0C	0x09
write	to	0x56	ack	data:	0x07	0x1F	0x0A
read	to	0x56	ack	data:	0x44	0x42	0x0B
write	to	0x51	ack	data:	0x08	0x1E	0x0C
read	to	0x51	ack	data:	0x19	0x47	0x0D
write	to	0x51	ack	data:	0x0A	0x1B	0x0E
read	to	0x51	ack	data:	0x1F	0x58	0x0F
write	to	0x54	ack	data:	0x00		
read	to	0x54	ack	data:	0x69		
write	to	0x50	ack	data:	0x0B		
read	to	0x50	ack	data:	0x42		
write	to	0x54	ack	data:	0x0C		
read	to	0x54	ack	data:	0x1E		
write	to	0x51	ack	data:	0x0F		
read	to	0x51	ack	data:	0x58		
write	to	0x53	ack	data:	0x0D		
read	to	0x53	ack	data:	0x47		
write	to	0x50	ack	data:	0x04		
read	to	0x50	ack	data:	0x19		
write	to	0x56	ack	data:	0x06		
read	to	0x56	ack	data:	0x1B		
write	to	0x56	ack	data:	0x00		

Spy By Wire 2

Challenge

16 Solves



Spy-By-Wire - 2A 300

During further analysis of the traffic captured here from that header (same `memory.sal` file as `Spy-By-Wire - 1`), the team noticed that there are some strange blobs of data being pulled off of the SPI memory. From some output from the system, at least one of these contains a secret value (flag) encrypted using AES with the key you recovered (691e5e4219581b44190c1f421e471b58) and an IV of all 0x00.

What is the decrypted secret flag?

Flag format: `flag{...}`, with no zero padding bytes. Example: `flag{this-is-not-actually-a-flag}`

 `memory.sal`

0/5 attempts

Flag

Submit

SPI typically uses four signals: a Clock signal, two data lines (MISO and MOSI), and an Enable signal. While this is the most common SPI configuration, other variants exist. We filtered the MOSI, MISO, Enable, and Clock channels based on the signal sources. After reviewing the filtered data, we exported it to a .csv file. Upon inspection, we observed that MOSI and MISO alternate communication, though MOSI transmits more data than MISO. There were six exchanges between them, but only one contains the output we need. To proceed, we first need to convert the hex data from the first exchange—after cleaning it of "0x" prefixes and spaces—into bytes using CyberChef. Finally, we will decrypt the bytes using AES.

Key: 691e5e4219581b44190c1f421e471b58



Mode: CBC

IV: 00000000000000000000000000000000

Clean Hex Data:

D9F8520E73DE46E72783BD2A7F8EF86CC34FEB63AE0A100A264CDBB33B41B59C

Flag: flag{my_dr34ms_4nd_pr1d3_l0st}



Time [s]	Time [s]	MOSI	MISO
1.806671504	0	0x00	0x03
1.806683432	0	0x00	0x0A
1.806693008	0	0x00	0x2F
1.80684196	0	0xD9	0x00
1.806851536	0	0xF8	0x00
1.806861112	0	0x52	0x00
1.806870688	0	0x0E	0x00
1.806880264	0	0x73	0x00
1.80688984	0	0xDE	0x00
1.806899416	0	0x46	0x00
1.806908992	0	0xE7	0x00
1.806918568	0	0x27	0x00
1.806928144	0	0x83	0x00
1.80693772	0	0xBD	0x00
1.806947296	0	0x2A	0x00
1.806956872	0	0x7F	0x00
1.806966448	0	0x8E	0x00
1.806976024	0	0xF8	0x00
1.8069856	0	0x6C	0x00
1.806995176	0	0xC3	0x00
1.807004752	0	0x4F	0x00
1.807014328	0	0xEB	0x00
1.807023904	0	0x63	0x00
1.80703348	0	0xAE	0x00
1.807043056	0	0x0A	0x00
1.807052632	0	0x10	0x00
1.807062208	0	0x0A	0x00
1.807071784	0	0x26	0x00
1.80708136	0	0x4C	0x00
1.807090936	0	0x0B	0x00

	First	Second	Third	Fourth	Fifth	Sixth	
	0xD9	0xE0	0xD9	0x62	0x8B	0xE0	
	0xF8	0x2C	0xF8	0x3D	0xE2	0x2C	
	0x52	0x94	0x52	0x62	0xD8	0x94	
	0x0E	0x0E	0x0E	0x79	0x1F	0x0E	
	0x73	0x45	0x73	0x74	0x52	0x45	
	0xDE	0x59	0xDE	0x65	0xEC	0x59	
	0x46	0x96	0x46	0x73	0x08	0x96	
	0xE7	0xE7	0xE7	0x0A	0xC6	0xE7	
	0x27	0x1B	0x27	0x73	0x2C	0x1B	
	0x83	0x8B	0x83	0x68	0xD3	0x8B	
	0xBD	0x6A	0xBD	0x61	0x42	0x6A	
	0x2A	0x43	0x2A	0x2E	0x13	0x43	
	0x7F	0xFD	0x7F	0x75	0x6B	0xFD	
	0x8E	0x76	0x8E	0x70	0x1C	0x76	
	0xF8	0x44	0xF8	0x64	0x7D	0x44	
	0x6C	0x9F	0x6C	0x61	0x59	0x9F	
	0xC3	0xB2	0xC3	0x74	0xED	0xB2	
	0x4F	0xEB	0x4F	0x65	0xDD	0xEB	
	0xEB	0x1C	0xEB	0x28	0x1E	0x1C	
	0x63	0x7B	0x63	0x6B	0xC0	0x7B	
	0xAE	0x1D	0xAE	0x2B	0xFD	0x1D	
	0x0A	0x17	0x0A	0x62	0xF9	0x17	
	0x10	0x74	0x10	0x27	0x07	0x74	
	0x0A	0xAE	0x0A	0x62	0x18	0xAE	
	0x26	0xDE	0x26	0x6C	0xFB	0xDE	
	0x4C	0x84	0x4C	0x75	0x69	0x84	
	0xDB	0x53	0xDB	0x65	0x85	0x53	
	0xB3	0x71	0xB3	0x73	0x78	0x71	
	0x3B	0x70	0x3B	0x6B	0x4A	0x70	
	0x41	0xA1	0x41	0x79	0x37	0xA1	
	0xB5	0x1E	0xB5	0x73	0xD9	0x1E	
	0x9C	0xDB	0x9C	0x61	0x5F	0xDB	
				0x6E	0xFA		
				0x64	0xB3		
				0x61	0xE2		
				0x62	0xBD		

Recipe

AES Decrypt

Key

1f421e471b58

HEX

IV

000000000000

HEX

Mode

CBC/NoPadd...

Input

Hex

Output

Raw

STEP

BAKE!

Auto Bake

Input

D9F8520E73DE46E72783BD2A7F8EF86CC34FEB63AE0A100A264CDBB33B41B59C

Output

flag(my_dr34ms_4nd_pr1d3_l0st)}\n