Online Appendix for

More stress, less voice?

**The gender gap in political participation
during the Covid-19 pandemic**

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Contents

Appendix 1. Survey weights

In this appendix, we provide a detailed discussion about the survey weights design and use.

We constructed two different types of weights: socio-demographic (both waves) and nonresponse (second wave only). The socio-demographic weight is applied for age, gender, education, and region and are based on official statistics from Eurostat for 2020. These weights are calculated using entropy balancing as implemented by the 'ebal' package in R (Hainmueller and Xu, 2013). Nonresponse weight is calculated as described by Lohr (2019, p. 340-346), in three steps.

First, using a dichotomized version of all variables in the first wave of the survey, we set up a logistic regression model that predicts being included in the second wave. From these 381 independent variables in a stepwise fashion all are excluded that at a $p < 0.05$ threshold have no identifiable effect. The procedure leaves 32 dichotomized variables that have an identifiable effect on being included in the second wave.

Second, these are used to construct a logistic regression model, with the results presented in table 1. As the table shows, the model only explains 6 percent of the variation, confirming that at least in terms of their observable characteristics, individuals are by and large randomly included/ missing at random in the second wave of the survey. The two largest effects are for: 1. often contacting a politician in the year prior to the Covid-19 crisis (odds ratio= 1.72); and 2. having a centrist position on the question of being someone who can forgive (odds ratio= 0.56).

Third, we use the model to predict the inverse probability of being included in the second wave of data collection for each individual in the first wave. The inverse probability is then multiplied with the socio-demographic weight calculated for the first wave. The product of the two weights becomes the nonresponse weight for the second wave.

Table 2 shows the final set of weights that are used in the paper. As the table shows, with the quotas having been by and large met during both waves of the data collection, the two types of weights only implement minimal correction. The two largest corrections are implemented for education and region. The first wave of the data collection included roughly seven percent more highly educated individuals, and about five percent less eastern German respondents than Eurostat recorded. These two are the only deviations that are statistically significant at the $p < 0.05$ level.

References

Jens Hainmueller and Yiqing Xu. (2013). ebalance: A stata package for entropy balancing. *Journal of Statistical Software*, 54(7):1–18. https://web.stanford.edu/jhain/Paper/JSS2013.pdf

Sharon L. Lohr. (2019) *Sampling Design and Analysis (Second Edition)*. CRC Press, Taylor & Francis Group, Boca Raton, London, New York.

Table A1.1: Logistic regression model: Predicting inclusion in the second wave

	Model 1
Intercept	0.41 (0.22)***
During corona: How often financial support for others? Sometimes	0.76 (0.09)**
Most state institutions can be trusted in country? Quite/ completely true	1.46 (0.10)***
Which best describes the area you live in? Big or middle size town	1.26 (0.08)**
Which emotions did you feel in relation others' behaviour? Grief	0.60 (0.15)***
Age category? <35 years	0.78 (0.09)**
I am someone who can forgive? <= 3 (7 points)	0.65 (0.11)***
Social differences in country are broadly fair? Is not/ a little true	0.68 (0.14)**
Worries about medical care? No worries	0.83 (0.08)*
What sensations do you associate with government? >= 7 (10 points)	0.77 (0.12)*
I am someone who can go out of himself, is sociable == 4 (7 points)	0.81 (0.10)*
How large is your circle of people you could count on? Rather/very large	1.26 (0.11)*
Self-placement left/right scale? 5-8 center-right	1.21 (0.09)*
Worries about social cohesion? No worries	1.29 (0.11)*
Gay/lesbians free to live life as they wish? Disagree	1.49 (0.11)***
Education High	0.69 (0.09)***
Before Corona: How often contacted a politician? Often/ very often	1.72 (0.24)*
I am someone who has a vivid? imagination/ideas ==4 (7 points)	1.40 (0.12)**
I am someone who can forgive? ==4 (7 points)	0.56 (0.14)***
I am someone who is communicative/talkative? >= 5 (7 points)	0.78 (0.09)**
I am someone who is often worried? ==4 (7 points)	1.34 (0.10)**
I am someone who has a vivid imagination/ideas? >= 5 (7 points)	1.25 (0.11)*
None applies: home office/ children at home/ cared for relatives at home	1.20 (0.09)*
Berlin	1.50 (0.14)**
Hamburg	0.69 (0.18)*
What sensations do you associate with family? >= 7 (10 points)	1.22 (0.09)*
What sensations do you associate with government? 4, 5, 6 (10 points)	0.80 (0.10)*
How do you feel during corona? 4, 5 Determined	1.31 (0.10)**
Membership sports club	1.38 (0.13)*
No organisation membership	1.37 (0.11)**
Did your emotions target family and friends? Yes, pride	0.81 (0.09)*
Did your emotions target other groups? Yes, joy	0.65 (0.16)**
Support of relatives or friends	1.28 (0.10)*
Support of neighbours	0.83 (0.10)*
Support of unknown people	0.76 (0.14)*
How satisfied are you? >= 8 (11 points)	0.84 (0.09)*
Received support from neighbours	1.32 (0.11)*
Interested in politics? Not at all/ hardly interested	0.78 (0.09)**
McFadden Sq(R)	0.06
AIC	3858.74
BIC	4090.96
Num. obs.	3331

***$p < 0.001$; **$p < 0.01$; *$p < 0.05$. Coefficients are included as odds ratios.

Table A1.2: Weights overview

	First wave Observed	Second wave Observed	First wave SocDem weight	Second wave SocDem (W1) + nonresponse weight
Age				
18-29	21.20	22.03	20.16	21.06
30-39	18.89	17.48	19.17	17.95
40-49	16.61	19.03	18.12	18.37
50-59	24.98	24.92	23.92	24.71
60-69	18.32	16.44	18.63	17.76
Gender				
Men	50.42	49.84	50.46	49.89
Women	49.58	50.05	49.54	49.97
Education				
High	36.94	31.64	29.37	28.59
Low/Middle	63.06	68.25	70.63	71.27
Region				
West	79.97	80.04	84.96	84.96
East	20.03	19.86	15.04	14.90

Note: The values show percentage points.

Appendix 2. Survey question wordings for the dependent variables

In the survey, a series of questions were asked to measure respondents' political participation before and during the coronavirus pandemic. The questions were originally asked in German, but the tables below present a translated version of them.

Table A2.1 Civic Engagement

Since the beginning of the corona crisis until today: How often did you undertake the following activities for people living outside your household?					
	1: Never	2: Rarely	3: Sometimes	4: Often	5: Very often
Shopping (1)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Child care (2)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Other everyday support (i.e. housekeeping, crew duties, care work) (3)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Emotional support (i.e. listening to sb, consoling sb) (4)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Symbolic support (i.e. making music, applaud, balcony activities) (5)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Financial support of family or friends (6)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Donations for aid organizations or individuals in need (i.e. for homeless people) (7)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Voluntary activities for initiatives, aid organizations or clubs (8)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Other forms of support (9)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Table A2.2 Political Engagement

There are other possibilities to engage socially or politically. Since the beginning of the corona crisis until today: How often did you...					
	1: Never	2: Rarely	3: Sometimes	4: Often	5: Very often
... taken part in a lawful public protest activity (i.e. demonstration, human chain)? (1)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
... taken part in an illegal public protest activity (i.e. demonstration, blockade)? (2)[1]	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
... taken part in a protest activity on the Internet (i.e. digital protest)? (3)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
... posted or shared anything about politics online, for example on blogs, via email or on social media such as Facebook or Twitter? (4)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
... signed a petition? (6)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
... contacted a politician, government or local government official? (5)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
... taken part in activities of political parties? (7)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
…other forms of political participation? (8)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

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[1] Unauthorized or illegal protest actions are protests that are not officially authorized by the state or police. This depends on the local legal situation, which has developed dynamically in many countries, especially since the beginning of the Corona crisis.

Appendix 4. Descriptive statistics

The following tables present a series of descriptive statistics, means, standard deviations, minimums, and maximums for all the main variables included in the models provided in the main text.

Table A3.1. Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Variables

Variable	Mean	SD	Min	Max
General Political Participation	0.51	0.50	0	1
Civic engagement	0.37	0.48	0	1
Protest	0.13	0.34	0	1
Institutional participation	0.17	0.37	0	1
Online activity	0.30	0.46	0	1
Past General Political Participation	0.51	0.50	0	1
Past Civic engagement	0.39	0.49	0	1
Past Protest	0.18	0.38	0	1
Past Institutional participation	0.17	0.38	0	1
Past Online activity	0.28	0.45	0	1

Note: N=3342

Table A3.2. Descriptive Statistics for Independent Variables

Variable	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Grievances				
outside childcare	0.25	0.43	0	1
inside childcare	0.17	0.38	0	1
outside support	0.55	0.50	0	1
inside support	0.05	0.23	0	1
Policy evaluations				
economic measures	0.70	0.66	0	2
health measures	0.71	0.78	0	2

Note: N=3342

Appendix 4. Dichotomizing the dependent variables

As explained in the main text, we decided to dichotomize the dependent variables for conceptual and empirical reasons. One of the reasons we decided to do so is the skewness of all dependent variable to the left. Figure A3.1 graphicly represents the distribution of all modes of participation, proving that creating dummies for the dependent variables seems statistically reasonable.

Figure A4. Frequency Distributions of Dependent Variables

Appendix 5. Additive indices as DV for main models

In these models, the dependent variables are constructed on a 10-point scale by adding their components as described in the methods' section (for example, to create the institutional participation variable, we added up the two five-point answer scales from contacting politicians and party membership). We then run simple OLS regressions, which provided the same results as negative binomial regressions.

Tables A5.1. Regression Table for Social Stratification Model (OLS)

		Institutional	Online	Protest	Civic
Past Participation		0.834***	0.825***	0.790***	0.741***
		(0.0197)	(0.0175)	(0.0215)	(0.0186)
Gender (ref.=man)					
	women	-0.0699**	-0.0198	-0.0647**	-0.181***
		(0.0323)	(0.0351)	(0.0298)	(0.0454)
Education (ref.=low)					
	Middle	0.0387	0.00395	-0.0157	-0.0811
		(0.0389)	(0.0420)	(0.0346)	(0.0521)
	High	-0.0493	0.0267	-0.0710**	0.0166
		(0.0406)	(0.0435)	(0.0354)	(0.0583)
Age (ref.=18-29)					
	30-39	0.105*	0.0626	0.112**	0.0133
		(0.0596)	(0.0614)	(0.0570)	(0.0747)
	40-49	-0.0172	-0.0259	0.0103	-0.0591
		(0.0551)	(0.0614)	(0.0490)	(0.0755)
	50-59	-0.146***	-0.0906*	-0.0610	-0.124*
		(0.0484)	(0.0489)	(0.0420)	(0.0663)
	60-69	-0.165***	-0.113**	-0.113***	-0.274***
		(0.0528)	(0.0535)	(0.0421)	(0.0712)
Migration Background=1		-0.0315	-0.0331	-0.0107	-0.0396
		(0.0427)	(0.0532)	(0.0394)	(0.0681)
East Germany=1		-0.0788**	-0.0397	-0.00542	0.0464
		(0.0386)	(0.0423)	(0.0371)	(0.0516)
Income change: (very) negative = 1		-0.0195	-0.0167	0.0245	-0.0272
		(0.0295)	(0.0361)	(0.0293)	(0.0457)
Constant		0.532***	0.590***	0.550***	0.973***
		(0.0716)	(0.0718)	(0.0688)	(0.0887)
N		3,289	3,290	3,280	3,289
R-squared		0.678	0.659	0.684	0.555

Notes: Numbers represent regression coefficients. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table A5b. Regression Table for Resources and Incentives Model (OLS)

		Institutional	Online	Protest	Civic
Past Behaviour		0.813***	0.802***	0.767***	0.686***
		(0.0206)	(0.0183)	(0.0221)	(0.0193)
Gender (ref.=man)					
	women	-0.0782**	-0.0312	-0.0700**	-0.207***
		(0.0326)	(0.0353)	(0.0301)	(0.0447)
Education (ref.=low)					
	Middle	0.0337	-0.00115	-0.0163	-0.113**
		(0.0387)	(0.0420)	(0.0345)	(0.0512)
	High	-0.0510	0.0257	-0.0706**	0.0110
		(0.0407)	(0.0435)	(0.0356)	(0.0567)
Age (ref.=18-29)					
	30-39	0.0751	0.0121	0.0767	0.00823
		(0.0591)	(0.0597)	(0.0568)	(0.0734)
	40-49	-0.0188	-0.0303	0.00813	-0.0183
		(0.0541)	(0.0606)	(0.0484)	(0.0742)
	50-59	-0.133***	-0.0665	-0.0495	-0.0962
		(0.0478)	(0.0486)	(0.0416)	(0.0646)
	60-69	-0.158***	-0.0835	-0.109***	-0.239***
		(0.0526)	(0.0535)	(0.0422)	(0.0698)
Migration Background=1			-0.0357	-0.00570	-0.0428
		(0.0426)	(0.0522)	(0.0392)	(0.0656)
East Germany=1		-0.0855**	-0.0617	-0.0149	0.0371
		(0.0387)	(0.0419)	(0.0371)	(0.0505)
Income change: (very) negative=1		-0.0280	-0.0246	0.00484	-0.0402
		(0.0303)	(0.0359)	(0.0292)	(0.0447)
Health measures (ref.=appropriate)					
	insufficient	0.0306	-0.0169	0.0161	-0.0205
		(0.0310)	(0.0356)	(0.0300)	(0.0486)
	too strict	0.0698	0.306***	0.169***	-0.00863
		(0.0528)	(0.0592)	(0.0486)	(0.0633)
Economic measures (ref.=appropriate)					
	insufficient	-0.0721**	0.00962	-0.0696**	0.0204
		(0.0312)	(0.0359)	(0.0295)	(0.0466)
	too strict	0.0697	0.104	0.0273	0.243***
		(0.0726)	(0.0776)	(0.0702)	(0.0817)
Childcare at home		0.108**	0.154***	0.0843	-0.0344
		(0.0512)	(0.0572)	(0.0512)	(0.0642)
Care work at home		0.0999	0.0923	0.206**	0.225**
		(0.0976)	(0.0936)	(0.0947)	(0.103)
Childcare at family/friends		0.0312	0.0908**	0.0375	0.0927**
		(0.0403)	(0.0457)	(0.0385)	(0.0620)
Care work family/friends		0.00409	-0.00242	0.0309	-0.0378
		(0.0279)	(0.0318)	(0.0250)	(0.0404)
Constant		0.553***	0.540***	0.582***	0.867***
		(0.0749)	(0.0730)	(0.0716)	(0.0892)
N		3,286	3,287	3,277	3,286
R-squared		0.681	0.669	0.690	0.580

Notes: Numbers represent regression coefficients. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** $p<0.001$, ** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$

Appendix 6. Main models with ages as a continuous variable

In the main text, we use age as a categorical variable, to be in line with our sampling strategy, as well as to report differences across different age groups and not only the linear effect. In this appendix, we provide a robustness check for the main models measuring age as a continuous variable.

Table A6.1. Regression Table for Social Stratification Model

	General	Institutional	Online	Protest	Civic
Past Participation	0.623***	0.702***	0.757***	0.511***	0.599***
	(0.0143)	(0.0203)	(0.0142)	(0.0238)	(0.0153)
Gender (ref.=man)					
women	-0.0444**	-0.0282**	-0.0111	-0.0180*	-0.0445**
	(0.0143)	(0.00956)	(0.0112)	(0.00912)	(0.0139)
Education (ref.=low)					
Middle	0.0151	0.000458	0.0170	-0.00770	0.0129
	(0.0177)	(0.0120)	(0.0140)	(0.0123)	(0.0178)
High	0.0258	-0.0137	0.0176	-0.0322**	0.0372*
	(0.0183)	(0.0118)	(0.0140)	(0.0118)	(0.0177)
Age	-0.00134*	-0.00182***	-0.00166***	-0.00252***	-0.000931
	(0.000511)	(0.000343)	(0.000379)	(0.000329)	(0.000488)
Migration Background=1	0.0147	-0.00426	0.0104	-0.00122	0.0145
	(0.0214)	(0.0126)	(0.0165)	(0.0118)	(0.0200)
East Germany=1	-0.00618	-0.00336	-0.0189	0.0203	0.00796
	(0.0174)	(0.0110)	(0.0132)	(0.0112)	(0.0175)
Income Change: (very negative) = 1	0.0222	0.00506	0.0261*	-0.0130	0.00851
	(0.0152)	(0.0100)	(0.0121)	(0.0101)	(0.0147)
N	3,302	3,302	3,302	3,301	3,302

Notes: Numbers represent average marginal effects. Standard errors in parentheses
*** $p<0.001$, ** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$

Table A6.2. Regression Table for Resources and incentives model

	General	Institutional	Online	Protest	Civic
Gender (ref.=man)					
women	-0.0624**	-0.104***	-0.0715***	-0.0741***	-0.0503**
	(0.0174)	(0.0131)	(0.0163)	(0.0118)	(0.0164)
Education (ref.=low)					
Middle	0.0371	-0.00166	-0.00287	-0.00397	0.0263
	(0.0220)	(0.0166)	(0.0204)	(0.0155)	(0.0205)
High	0.123***	0.0251	0.0428*	-0.00335	0.128***
	(0.0223)	(0.0170)	(0.0209)	(0.0149)	(0.0213)
Age	-0.00180*	-0.00340***	-0.00409***	-0.00497***	-0.00120
	(0.000638)	(0.000454)	(0.000583)	(0.000404)	(0.000597)
Migration Background=1	0.0435	-0.00431	0.0682**	0.0205	0.0453
	(0.0247)	(0.0181)	(0.0232)	(0.0162)	(0.0234)
East Germany=1	-0.0595**	-0.0195	-0.0408*	0.0143	-0.0256
	(0.0216)	(0.0153)	(0.0193)	(0.0146)	(0.0204)
Income Change: (very) negative	0.0270	-0.0244	0.00996	-0.0351**	0.00499
	(0.0183)	(0.0133)	(0.0167)	(0.0116)	(0.0172)
Health Measures (ref.=appropriate)					
insufficient	-0.0177	0.000986	-0.0142	-0.0279*	-0.00916
	(0.0209)	(0.0155)	(0.0188)	(0.0129)	(0.0198)
too strong	0.0999***	0.0312	0.135***	0.0413*	0.0113
	(0.0253)	(0.0189)	(0.0246)	(0.0173)	(0.0235)
Economic measures (ref.=appropriate)					
insufficient	-0.000159	-0.0343*	0.0212	-0.0310*	-0.0347
	(0.0196)	(0.0146)	(0.0183)	(0.0127)	(0.0187)
too strong	0.0113	0.0615**	0.0463	0.0728**	0.0303
	(0.0321)	(0.0244)	(0.0283)	(0.0223)	(0.0300)
Childcare at home	0.0415	0.0667***	0.0519*	0.0395**	0.00985
	(0.0242)	(0.0153)	(0.0208)	(0.0132)	(0.0221)
Care work at home	0.170***	0.119***	0.141***	0.0952***	0.157***
	(0.0411)	(0.0207)	(0.0310)	(0.0179)	(0.0341)
Childcare family/friends	0.149***	0.0972***	0.102***	0.109***	0.176***
	(0.0212)	(0.0137)	(0.0183)	(0.0121)	(0.0178)
Care work family/friends	0.167***	0.0357*	0.0738***	0.00470	0.190***
	(0.0172)	(0.0143)	(0.0172)	(0.0127)	(0.0163)
N	3,299	3,299	3,299	3,299	3,299

Notes: Numbers represent average marginal effects. Standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix 7. Being active for the first time during the pandemic

To investigate if men are more likely to become active for the first time during the pandemic, we run a regression model for each mode of participation, controlling for gender, age, education, income, and whether the participant lives in Eastern Germany. The data we can use for this analysis were collected in the second wave of the survey. The dependent variables are dummies considering the question if the respondent engaged in the specific activity for the first time during the pandemic or not. The following regression table present the result of the analysis.

Table A7. Regression Table for First Time Participation During Pandemic Model

	Civic	Institutional	Protest	Online
Gender (ref.=men)				
women	-0.0328*	-0.0305	-0.0383*	-0.00293
	(0.0147)	(0.0187)	(0.0154)	(0.0124)
Education (ref.=low)				
middle	-0.00498	-0.0328	-0.0279	-0.0365
	(0.0164)	(0.0211)	(0.0182)	(0.0226)
high	0.000335	0.00285	-0.00489	-0.0336
	(0.0160)	(0.0242)	(0.0250)	(0.0245)
Age (ref.=18-29)				
30-39	-0.00290	0.0345	0.00609	-0.0854*
	(0.0310)	(0.0240)	(0.0316)	(0.0386)
40-49	-0.0403	0.0244	-0.00159	-0.104**
	(0.0261)	(0.0286)	(0.0371)	(0.0390)
50-59	-0.0717**	-0.0122	-0.0450	-0.121**
	(0.0211)	(0.0162)	(0.0276)	(0.0361)
60-69	-0.0607**	°	-0.0480	-0.108**
	(0.0223)		(0.0259)	(0.0383)
Income: (very) bad = 1	-0.0138	-0.0276	-0.0121	-0.00259
	(0.0166)	(0.0167)	(0.0154)	(0.0153)
East Germany	0.00237	-0.0168	0.0296	0.00395
	(0.0167)	(0.0166)	(0.0226)	(0.0158)
N	967	802	967	967

Notes: Numbers represent average marginal effects. Standard errors in parentheses.
*** $p<0.001$, ** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$; ° means no people over 60 engaged in institutional participation for the first time during the pandemic

Appendix 8. The impact of gender and other social-structural variables on changes in participation during the pandemic

Figure 2 in the main text is based on the following table. It presents the results of the logistic regression investigating the effect of socio-structural variables on participation changes before and after the pandemic.

Table A8.1. Regression Table for Social-Structural Model

		Institutional	Online	Protest	Civic
Past Behaviour		0.698***	0.757***	0.518***	0.599***
		(0.0205)	(0.0142)	(0.0230)	(0.0153)
Gender (ref.= men)					
	women	-0.0329**	-0.00847	-0.0310**	-0.0399**
		(0.00980)	(0.0115)	(0.00942)	(0.0143)
Education (ref.=low)					
	middle	0.00285	0.0181	-0.00317	0.0118
		(0.0121)	(0.0139)	(0.0121)	(0.0178)
	high	-0.00918	0.0201	-0.0275*	0.0348
		(0.0119)	(0.0141)	(0.0116)	(0.0179)
Age (ref=18-29)					
	30-39	0.0135	-0.0169	0.0189	-0.0271
		(0.0151)	(0.0183)	(0.0152)	(0.0218)
	40-49	-0.00816	-0.0402*	-0.0231	-0.0408
		(0.0167)	(0.0194)	(0.0150)	(0.0228)
	50-59	-0.0497**	-0.0442*	-0.0774***	-0.0218
		(0.0151)	(0.0171)	(0.0146)	(0.0207)
	60-69	-0.0591***	-0.0622**	-0.0995***	-0.0524*
		(0.0168)	(0.0182)	(0.0152)	(0.0230)
Migration Background=1		-0.00302	0.0115	0.00774	0.0139
		(0.0126)	(0.0166)	(0.0118)	(0.0201)
East Germany=1		-0.00995	-0.0185	0.0110	0.0104
		(0.0109)	(0.0135)	(0.0112)	(0.0177)
Income change: (very) negative=1		0.00648	0.0272*	-0.00470	0.00891
		(0.0101)	(0.0122)	(0.0100)	(0.0148)

Notes: Numbers represent average marginal effects. Standard errors in parentheses.
N=3290. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Similarly, Figure 2 in the main text is a simplification of the full model, presented in Figure A6.2. For illustrative reasons, we dropped past participation and the control variables from the figure provided in the main text.

Figure A8.2. Full Coefficient Plot for Social-Structural Model

Appendix 9. Aggregate levels of care work and policy evaluations by gender

Appendix 9 provides details about the aggregate distribution of care work and support in and outside one's household during the pandemic based on gender in our sample. The results indicate that women have been more likely to take care of children both in their household and outside of it than men during the pandemic. A similar but less pronounced pattern emerges for other care duties within and outside one's household. Importantly, these differing care duties are also reflected in women being less satisfied with the economic measures adopted by the German government to fight the crisis. In contrast, we can hardly discern significant gender differences in the evaluations of the state's measures adopted to cope with the health crisis.

Table A9.1. The distribution (in %) of care work by gender

Child-care	men	women
no childcare	69.7	58.2
childcare inside household	4.3	10.4
childcare outside household	18.4	18.5
childcare in- and outside household	7.6	13.0
Other care	men	women
no care	45.8	41.8
care outside household	48.8	52.1
care inside household	0.9	0.7
care in- and outside household	4.5	5.4

Table A9.2. The distribution (in %) of policy evaluation by gender

	Appropriate	Insufficient	Too strong
Economic measures			
Men	45.6	41.8	12.7
Women	37.8	51.5	10.7
Health measures			
Men	47.4	33.4	19.2
Women	49.9	29.8	20.3

Appendix 10. The impact of changes in resources and incentives on participation in the pandemic

Figure 3 in the main text presents the coefficient plot for the logistic regression that takes into consideration the effect of resources and incentives on changes in participation before and during the pandemic. Table A10.1. presents the regression table associated with Figure 3.

Table A10.1. Regression Table for Resources and Incentives Model

	Institutional	Online	Protest	Civic
Gender (ref.=man)				
women	-0.109***	-0.0713***	-0.0813***	-0.0452***
	(0.0132)	(0.0165)	(0.0119)	(0.0167)
Education (ref.=low)				
middle	0.000612	-0.00195	-0.00165	0.0275
	(0.0166)	(0.0205)	(0.0155)	(0.0207)
high	0.0286	0.0459**	0.00146	0.128***
	(0.0171)	(0.0210)	(0.0149)	(0.0215)
Age (ref.=18-29)				
30-39	-0.0143	-0.0586**	-0.0317	-0.0190
	(0.0220)	(0.0268)	(0.0217)	(0.0260)
40-49	-0.0392	-0.0978***	-0.0704***	-0.0503*
	(0.0234)	(0.0273)	(0.0223)	(0.0269)
50-59	-0.108***	-0.135***	-0.155***	-0.0365
	(0.0199)	(0.0248)	(0.0185)	(0.0245)
60-69	-0.126***	-0.164***	-0.185***	-0.0496*
	(0.0210)	(0.0273)	(0.0181)	(0.0280)
Migration background=1	-0.00290	0.0692***	0.0236	0.0444*
	(0.0181)	(0.0234)	(0.0164)	(0.0235)
East Germany=1	-0.0266	-0.0433**	0.00668	-0.0257
	(0.0152)	(0.0194)	(0.0146)	(0.0208)
Income change: (very) negative=1	-0.0228	0.0114	-0.0342***	0.00720
	(0.0134)	(0.0169)	(0.0116)	(0.0174)
Health Measures (ref.=adequate)				
insufficient	0.00187	-0.0131	-0.0276**	-0.00738
	(0.0156)	(0.0189)	(0.0130)	(0.0198)
too strict	0.0314	0.136***	0.0412**	0.0128
	(0.0188)	(0.0246)	(0.0171)	(0.0235)
Economic Measures (ref.=adequate)				
insufficient	-0.0324*	0.0222	-0.0283**	-0.0350*
	(0.0147)	(0.0184)	(0.0128)	(0.0187)
too strict	0.0635**	0.0488*	0.0766***	0.0299
	(0.0243)	(0.0284)	(0.0223)	(0.0300)
Childcare at home	0.0578***	0.0486**	0.0285**	0.0114
	(0.0157)	(0.0211)	(0.0136)	(0.0228)
Care work at home	0.119***	0.142***	0.0951***	0.156***
	(0.0207)	(0.0311)	(0.0178)	(0.0343)
Childcare family/friends	0.0985***	0.105***	0.111***	0.176***
	(0.0138)	(0.0184)	(0.0122)	(0.0179)
Care work family/friends	0.0354*	0.0722***	0.00459	0.189***
	(0.0144)	(0.0173)	(0.0128)	(0.0164)

Notes: N=3287; Numbers represent average marginal effects. Standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Appendix 11. Mediation analysis

To determine the effect of gender on participation based on resources and incentives, we ran a series of mediation analyses. In the following tables, we present the direct effect of gender, the indirect effect of gender that goes through the resource and incentives variables, as well as the total effect. For the variables measuring incentives, we recoded them in dummies that differentiate between those who evaluated the measures as "too strict" and those who did not. We use this dummy as the mediator. The decision to do so is motivated by the logistic regression that show that only evaluating the measures as "too strict" shows a statistically significant association with political participation. In the mediation model, we control for past participation levels.

Table A11.1. Direct and Indirect effects of gender on participation

Childcare at home	Institutional	Online	Protest	Civic
Total effect	-0.0200*	-0.0002	-0.0120	-0.0358**
Indirect effect	***0.0063****	***0.0065****	***0.0066****	***0.0049****
Direct effect	-0.0263**	-0.0062	-0.0186*	-0.0407**
Childcare for family and friends				
Total effect	-0.0206*	-0.0003	-0.0130	-0.0350**
Indirect effect	***0.0033****	***0.0036****	***0.0047****	***0.0094****
Direct effect	-0.0239**	-0.0036	-0.0174	-0.0444**
Care work at home				
Total effect	-0.0199*	0.0002	-0.0120	-0.0357**
Indirect effect	***0.0005***	***0.0005***	***0.0007***	***0.0008***
Direct effect	-0.0204*	-0.0002	-0.0127	-0.0365**
Care work for family and friends				
Total effect	-0.0198*	0.0001	-0.0118	-0.0350
Indirect effect	***0.0012***	***0.0022****	***0.0006***	***0.0063****
Direct effect	-0.0211*	-0.0020	-0.0124	-0.0414**
Economic Measures: Too Strong				
Total effect	-0.0198*	0.0003	-0.0121	-0.0358**
Indirect effect	***-0.0008***	***-0.0012***	***-0.0019***	***-0.0011***
Direct effect	-0.0189*	-0.0016	-0.0102	-0.0348*
Health Measures: Too Strong				
Total effect	-0.0196*	0.0001	-0.0119	-0.0359**
Indirect effect	***0.0001***	***0.0004***	***0.0004***	***0.0001***
Direct effect	-0.0197*	-0.0003	-0.0123	-0.0359**

Notes: The direct effect refers to the effect of gender on participation, the indirect effect is the effect of gender on participation explained through the mediator. The total effect estimates both.

Appendix 12. The impact of changes in resources and incentives on participation in the pandemic – split regressions for men and women

This appendix presents the full regression tables for the split-sample models as used to produced Figure 4 in the main text.

Table A12.1. Regression Table for Split-Sample Model

		Institutional		Protest		Online		Civic	
		Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
Education (ref.=low)									
	middle	0.0269	-0.0222	0.0256	-0.0265	-0.00401	-0.00187	0.0146	0.0426
		(0.0252)	(0.0233)	(0.0220)	(0.0215)	(0.0288)	(0.0303)	(0.0290)	(0.0313)
	high	0.0355	0.0262	0.00874	-0.00319	0.0354	0.0490	0.102***	0.147***
		(0.0251)	(0.0214)	(0.0220)	(0.0197)	(0.0290)	(0.0293)	(0.0289)	(0.0302)
Age (ref.=18-29)									
	30-39	-0.0321	0.0212	-0.0281	-0.00417	-0.0817*	-0.0188	-0.0814*	0.0284
		(0.0271)	(0.0236)	(0.0220)	(0.0203)	(0.0366)	(0.0321)	(0.0383)	(0.0349)
	40-49	-0.110**	0.0222	-0.0881**	-0.0252	-0.106*	-0.0742*	-0.128**	0.00114
		(0.0325)	(0.0244)	(0.0261)	(0.0214)	(0.0410)	(0.0325)	(0.0439)	(0.0351)
	50-59	-0.157***	-0.0294	-0.159***	-0.133***	-0.130***	-0.137***	-0.0829**	0.000849
		(0.0255)	(0.0286)	(0.0223)	(0.0319)	(0.0306)	(0.0369)	(0.0318)	(0.0370)
	60-69	-0.150***	-0.117**	-0.213***	-0.220***	-0.165***	-0.144**	-0.121**	0.0441
		(0.0291)	(0.0432)	(0.0282)	(0.0565)	(0.0347)	(0.0455)	(0.0354)	(0.0449)
Migration background=1		-0.0310	0.0285	0.00871	0.0415*	-0.00115	0.121***	0.0358	0.0541
		(0.0272)	(0.0227)	(0.0212)	(0.0195)	(0.0315)	(0.0286)	(0.0320)	(0.0322)
East Germany=1		-0.0286	-0.0317	0.0187	-0.00309	-0.0447	-0.0482	-0.0627*	-0.0145
		(0.0258)	(0.0218)	(0.0215)	(0.0196)	(0.0302)	(0.0288)	(0.0314)	(0.0300)
Income change: (very) negative=1		-0.00901	-0.0357*	-0.0387*	-0.0322*	0.0346	-0.0123	0.0220	-0.00807
		(0.0211)	(0.0179)	(0.0187)	(0.0163)	(0.0241)	(0.0229)	(0.0247)	(0.0242)
Childcare at home		0.118***	0.0194	0.0836***	-0.0101	0.115**	0.00599	0.0171	0.00956
		(0.0246)	(0.0195)	(0.0197)	(0.0183)	(0.0335)	(0.0276)	(0.0363)	(0.0294)
Care work at home		0.137***	0.102***	0.107***	0.0858***	0.173***	0.123**	0.171**	0.138**
		(0.0327)	(0.0259)	(0.0259)	(0.0241)	(0.0460)	(0.0427)	(0.0526)	(0.0474)
Childcare family/friends		0.110***	0.0819***	0.107***	0.108***	0.106***	0.0970***	0.209***	0.153***
		(0.0216)	(0.0173)	(0.0182)	(0.0161)	(0.0274)	(0.0251)	(0.0261)	(0.0250)

(Continued)

Care work family/friends	0.0559*	0.0123	0.0149	-0.00412	0.0916***	0.0481	0.193***	0.177***
	(0.0219)	(0.0181)	(0.0189)	(0.0168)	(0.0241)	(0.0245)	(0.0225)	(0.0237)
Health Measures (ref.=adequate)								
insufficient	0.00925	-0.00464	-0.0283	-0.0292	0.00104	-0.0294	0.0161	-0.0319
	(0.0226)	(0.0229)	(0.0196)	(0.0217)	(0.0264)	(0.0293)	(0.0271)	(0.0293)
too strict	0.0369	0.0164	0.0416*	0.0326	0.146***	0.107**	0.0307	-0.0146
	(0.0259)	(0.0248)	(0.0209)	(0.0213)	(0.0300)	(0.0317)	(0.0313)	(0.0353)
Economic Measures (ref.=adequate)								
insufficient	-0.0245	-0.0345	-0.0151	-0.0418*	0.0185	0.0282	-0.0374	-0.0198
	(0.0218)	(0.0211)	(0.0185)	(0.0189)	(0.0253)	(0.0273)	(0.0258)	(0.0275)
too strict	0.0525	0.0620*	0.0710**	0.0537*	0.0540	0.0451	-0.0105	0.0811
	(0.0271)	(0.0290)	(0.0222)	(0.0260)	(0.0354)	(0.0428)	(0.0365)	(0.0465)

Notes: N(men) =1661; N (women) = 1626; Numbers represent average marginal effects. Standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Appendix 13. Interaction analysis

In Appendix 13 we provide regression tables for all interaction analyses we performed on gender and our resource variables (childcare at home, childcare for family and friends, care work at home, and care work for family and friends), as well as the effects of the interaction between gender and the policy evaluations.

Table 13.1. Regression Table for Interaction Effects

Childcare at home		Institutional	Online	Protest	Civic
Women # childcare		-0.810***	-0.640***	-0.980***	-0.354
		(0.231)	(0.207)	(0.252)	(0.203)
Gender (ref.=men)					
	women	-0.682***	-0.226*	-0.577***	-0.117
		(0.120)	(0.0925)	(0.130)	(0.0874)
Childcare at home		1.206***	0.927***	1.182***	0.698***
		(0.163)	(0.161)	(0.179)	(0.161)
Education (ref.=low)					
	Middle	0.0494	0.0429	-0.0246	0.231*
		(0.137)	(0.106)	(0.155)	(0.100)
	High	0.209	0.241*	-0.0113	0.645***
		(0.136)	(0.105)	(0.152)	(0.0992)
Age (ref.= 18-29)					
	30-39	-0.0438	-0.235	-0.127	-0.144
		(0.142)	(0.123)	(0.147)	(0.121)
	40-49	-0.423**	-0.565***	-0.712***	-0.396**
		(0.158)	(0.131)	(0.169)	(0.127)
	50-59	-0.959***	-0.722***	-1.627***	-0.237*
		(0.158)	(0.122)	(0.185)	(0.115)
	60-69	-1.090***	-0.909***	-2.118***	-0.337*
		(0.183)	(0.140)	(0.247)	(0.131)
Migration Background=1		-0.0232	0.334**	0.168	0.217*
		(0.142)	(0.112)	(0.147)	(0.108)
East Germany=1		-0.228	-0.211*	0.0703	-0.134
		(0.133)	(0.105)	(0.142)	(0.0993)
Constant		-1.044***	-0.481***	-1.037***	-0.664***
		(0.165)	(0.132)	(0.177)	(0.129)
Observations		3,330	3,330	3,330	3,330

Notes: Numbers represent regression coefficients. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table A13.2. Marginal Effects of Interaction

Childcare at home	Institutional	Online	Protest	Civic
Men # no childcare	0.191***	0.303***	0.152***	0.360***
	(0.0111)	(0.0127)	(0.0104)	(0.0131)
Men # childcare	0.427***	0.514***	0.342***	0.526***
	(0.0336)	(0.0356)	(0.0308)	(0.0362)
Women # no childcare	0.108***	0.259***	0.0939***	0.334***
	(0.00871)	(0.0123)	(0.00794)	(0.0136)
Women # childcare	0.151***	0.315***	0.112***	0.412***
	(0.0175)	(0.0244)	(0.0141)	(0.0269)
Observations	3,330	3,330	3,330	3,330

Notes: Numbers represent average marginal effects. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table 13.3. Regression Table for Interaction Effects

Childcare for family and friends		Institutional	Online	Protest	Civic
Women # childcare		-0.476*	-0.335	-0.269	-0.476**
		(0.207)	(0.175)	(0.228)	(0.176)
Gender (ref.=men)					
	women	-0.711***	-0.255*	-0.755***	-0.0872
		(0.135)	(0.101)	(0.152)	(0.0965)
Childcare for family and friends		1.359***	1.035***	1.454***	1.603***
		(0.136)	(0.126)	(0.155)	(0.130)
Education (ref.=low)					
	Middle	0.0361	0.0247	-0.0526	0.203
		(0.139)	(0.108)	(0.159)	(0.105)
	High	0.226	0.247*	-0.00646	0.657***
		(0.137)	(0.106)	(0.153)	(0.103)
Age (ref.= 18-29)					
	30-39	0.0324	-0.190	-0.0880	-0.106
		(0.142)	(0.122)	(0.148)	(0.121)
	40-49	-0.247	-0.451**	-0.534**	-0.269*
		(0.158)	(0.131)	(0.168)	(0.131)
	50-59	-0.903***	-0.690***	-1.580***	-0.139
		(0.160)	(0.123)	(0.188)	(0.119)
	60-69	-1.153***	-0.947***	-2.209***	-0.336*
		(0.187)	(0.143)	(0.249)	(0.137)
Migration Background=1		-0.0120	0.347**	0.183	0.236*
		(0.146)	(0.113)	(0.152)	(0.112)
East Germany=1		-0.233	-0.212*	0.0712	-0.155
		(0.132)	(0.106)	(0.144)	(0.103)
Constant		-1.285***	-0.634***	-1.307***	-1.001***
		(0.169)	(0.134)	(0.184)	(0.136)
Observations		3,330	3,330	3,330	3,330

Notes: Numbers represent regression coefficients. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table A13.4. Marginal Effects of Interaction

Childcare for friends and family	Institutional	Online	Protest	Civic
Men # no childcare	0.165***	0.278***	0.126***	0.297***
	(0.0112)	(0.0132)	(0.0103)	(0.0132)
Men # childcare	0.419***	0.510***	0.351***	0.668***
	(0.0248)	(0.0257)	(0.0240)	(0.0246)
Women # no childcare	0.0896***	0.231***	0.0654***	0.280***
	(0.00821)	(0.0123)	(0.00682)	(0.0134)
Women # childcare	0.189***	0.371***	0.178***	0.538***
	(0.0176)	(0.0224)	(0.0163)	(0.0242)
Observations	3,330	3,330	3,330	3,330

Notes: Numbers represent average marginal effects. Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table 13.5. Regression Table for Interaction Effects

Care work at home		Institutional	Online	Protest	Civic
Women # care work		-0.179	-0.314	-0.0671	-0.378
		(0.328)	(0.312)	(0.349)	(0.328)
Gender (ref.=men)					
	women	-0.806***	-0.292**	-0.767***	-0.131
		(0.111)	(0.0872)	(0.120)	(0.0825)
Care work at home		1.293***	1.155***	1.235***	1.395***
		(0.224)	(0.231)	(0.241)	(0.245)
Education (ref.=low)					
	Middle	0.0742	0.0570	0.00985	0.242**
		(0.137)	(0.107)	(0.154)	(0.101)
	High	0.270*	0.277**	0.0626	0.677***
		(0.134)	(0.105)	(0.148)	(0.0997)
Age (ref.=18-29)					
	30-39	0.0428	-0.172	-0.0629	-0.0755
		(0.142)	(0.122)	(0.144)	(0.120)
	40-49	-0.318*	-0.504***	-0.612***	-0.345**
		(0.157)	(0.130)	(0.167)	(0.127)
	50-59	-1.008***	-0.756***	-1.672***	-0.258*
		(0.158)	(0.121)	(0.185)	(0.115)
	60-69	-1.153***	-0.952***	-2.176***	-0.361**
		(0.183)	(0.140)	(0.246)	(0.131)
Migration Background=1		-0.0245	0.331**	0.171	0.211
		(0.143)	(0.111)	(0.146)	(0.108)
East Germany=1		-0.161	-0.172	0.123	-0.0993
		(0.131)	(0.105)	(0.141)	(0.0991)
Constant		-0.989***	-0.448***	-0.981***	-0.677***
		(0.163)	(0.131)	(0.172)	(0.129)
Observations		3,330	3,330	3,330	3,330

Notes: Numbers represent regression coefficients. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table A13.6. Marginal Effects of Interaction

Care work at home	Institutional	Online	Protest	Civic
Men # no care work	0.209***	0.316***	0.169***	0.364***
	(0.0110)	(0.0124)	(0.0103)	(0.0126)
Men # care work	0.472***	0.583***	0.378***	0.690***
	(0.0496)	(0.0521)	(0.0458)	(0.0499)
Women # no care work	0.108***	0.259***	0.0896***	0.335***
	(0.00776)	(0.0112)	(0.00680)	(0.0124)
Women # care work	0.262***	0.439***	0.226***	0.575***
	(0.0412)	(0.0474)	(0.0373)	(0.0499)
Observations	3,330	3,330	3,330	3,330

Notes: Numbers represent average marginal effects. Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table 13.7. Regression Table for Interaction Effects

Care for friends and family		Institutional	Online	Protest	Civic
Women # care work		-0.407	-0.309	-0.286	-0.228
		(0.213)	(0.165)	(0.233)	(0.163)
Gender (ref.=men)					
	women	-0.579**	-0.149	-0.614**	-0.0647
		(0.175)	(0.133)	(0.191)	(0.134)
Care for friends and family		0.913***	0.805***	0.799***	1.419***
		(0.138)	(0.117)	(0.158)	(0.114)
Education (ref.=low)					
	Middle	0.00989	0.000	-0.0661	0.136
		(0.138)	(0.107)	(0.156)	(0.105)
	High	0.202	0.221*	-0.0126	0.609***
Age (ref.=18-25)		(0.135)	(0.105)	(0.150)	(0.103)
	30-39	0.0742	-0.146	-0.0369	-0.0205
		(0.142)	(0.122)	(0.144)	(0.124)
	40-49	-0.305	-0.491***	-0.599***	-0.321*
		(0.157)	(0.130)	(0.167)	(0.130)
	50-59	-1.055***	-0.798***	-1.716***	-0.324**
		(0.158)	(0.121)	(0.184)	(0.118)
	60-69	-1.120***	-0.920***	-2.155***	-0.284*
		(0.182)	(0.140)	(0.246)	(0.134)
Migration Background=1		0.0273	0.362**	0.221	0.261*
		(0.141)	(0.111)	(0.146)	(0.110)
East Germany=1		-0.157	-0.169	0.128	-0.0965
		(0.131)	(0.106)	(0.141)	(0.104)
Constant		-1.404***	-0.803***	-1.315***	-1.375***
		(0.184)	(0.144)	(0.195)	(0.150)
Observations		3,330	3,330	3,330	3,330

Notes: Numbers represent regression coefficients. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table A13.8. Marginal Effects of Interaction

Care work for friends and family	Institutional	Online	Protest	Civic
Men # no care work	0.147***	0.242***	0.125***	0.218***
	(0.0137)	(0.0163)	(0.0132)	(0.0153)
Men # care work	0.292***	0.409***	0.230***	0.525***
	(0.0159)	(0.0169)	(0.0148)	(0.0170)
Women # no care work	0.0891***	0.217***	0.0738***	0.207***
	(0.0106)	(0.0154)	(0.00927)	(0.0153)
Women # care work	0.138***	0.308***	0.115***	0.455***
	(0.0109)	(0.0149)	(0.00962)	(0.0168)
Observations	3,330	3,330	3,330	3,330

Notes: Numbers represent average marginal effects. Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Figure A13.1. Coefficient Plots for Interaction Effects with Resource Variables

Table 13.9. Regression Table for Interaction Effects

Policies on Economy		Institutional	Online	Protest	Civic
Women # insufficient		-0.0752	0.0947	-0.136	0.124
		(0.222)	(0.173)	(0.250)	(0.161)
Women # too strict		0.107	-0.0466	-0.0662	0.304
		(0.278)	(0.252)	(0.296)	(0.244)
Gender (ref.=man)					
	women	-0.760***	-0.347**	-0.650***	-0.218
		(0.159)	(0.131)	(0.172)	(0.119)
		-0.224	0.142	-0.315	-0.212
Economy: insufficient		(0.144)	(0.121)	(0.171)	(0.112)
		0.643***	0.740***	0.983***	0.171
Economy: too strict		(0.175)	(0.165)	(0.192)	(0.161)
Education (ref.=low)					
	Middle	0.103	0.0766	0.0409	0.257*
		(0.137)	(0.106)	(0.156)	(0.1000)
	High	0.292*	0.309**	0.0933	0.675***
		(0.135)	(0.105)	(0.151)	(0.0993)
Age (ref.=18-29)					
	30-39	0.0132	-0.186	-0.104	-0.0915
		(0.140)	(0.122)	(0.144)	(0.119)
	40-49	-0.295	-0.487***	-0.585**	-0.339**
		(0.157)	(0.131)	(0.171)	(0.126)
	50-59	-0.990***	-0.732***	-1.654***	-0.261*
		(0.157)	(0.122)	(0.184)	(0.115)
	60-69	-1.185***	-0.961***	-2.229***	-0.388**
		(0.184)	(0.141)	(0.251)	(0.131)
Migration Background=1		0.0160	0.355**	0.221	0.232*
		(0.142)	(0.112)	(0.148)	(0.107)
East Germany=1		-0.184	-0.197	0.0979	-0.112
		(0.131)	(0.104)	(0.143)	(0.0982)
Constant		-0.922***	-0.562***	-0.953***	-0.532***
		(0.178)	(0.145)	(0.191)	(0.139)
Observations		3,330	3,330	3,330	3,330

Notes: Numbers represent regression coefficients. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table A13.10. Marginal Effects of Interaction

Policies on Economy	Institutional	Online	Protest	Civic
Men # appropriate	0.223***	0.298***	0.175***	0.397***
	(0.0160)	(0.0170)	(0.0148)	(0.0182)
Men # insufficient	0.188***	0.327***	0.137***	0.349***
	(0.0158)	(0.0187)	(0.0144)	(0.0183)
Men # too strict	0.345***	0.462***	0.338***	0.438***
	(0.0313)	(0.0340)	(0.0306)	(0.0340)
Women # appropriate	0.121***	0.233***	0.104***	0.348***
	(0.0129)	(0.0168)	(0.0116)	(0.0194)
Women # insufficient	0.0933***	0.276***	0.0697***	0.329***
	(0.00969)	(0.0152)	(0.00804)	(0.0164)
Women # too strict	0.221***	0.371***	0.213***	0.458***
	(0.0295)	(0.0367)	(0.0281)	(0.0391)
Observations	3,330	3,330	3,330	3,330

Notes: Numbers represent average marginal effects. Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table 13.11. Regression Table for Interaction Effects

Policies on Health		Institutional	Online	Protest	Civic
Women # insufficient		-0.188	-0.129	-0.196	-0.186
		(0.240)	(0.187)	(0.283)	(0.171)
Women # too strict		-0.0318	-0.193	-0.0533	-0.0310
		(0.244)	(0.204)	(0.259)	(0.199)
Gender (ref.=man)					
	women	-0.754***	-0.220	-0.721***	-0.0838
		(0.150)	(0.120)	(0.162)	(0.110)
Economy: insufficient		0.0195	0.0623	-0.264	0.00852
		(0.148)	(0.129)	(0.181)	(0.118)
Economy: too strict		0.433**	0.882***	0.632***	0.123
		(0.162)	(0.145)	(0.178)	(0.139)
Education (ref.=low)					
	Middle	0.0754	0.0704	0.00186	0.248*
		(0.137)	(0.107)	(0.156)	(0.100)
	High	0.258	0.285**	0.0326	0.658***
		(0.135)	(0.106)	(0.151)	(0.0993)
Age (ref.=18-29)					
	30-39	-0.00490	-0.233	-0.131	-0.0953
		(0.141)	(0.123)	(0.146)	(0.119)
	40-49	-0.325*	-0.509***	-0.615***	-0.355**
		(0.156)	(0.133)	(0.169)	(0.126)
	50-59	-1.008***	-0.743***	-1.666***	-0.275*
		(0.157)	(0.122)	(0.183)	(0.115)
	60-69	-1.176***	-0.949***	-2.186***	-0.390**
		(0.183)	(0.142)	(0.248)	(0.131)
Migration Background=1		-0.00935	0.346***	0.195	0.220*
		(0.141)	(0.113)	(0.148)	(0.107)
East Germany=1		-0.193	-0.217*	0.0770	-0.120
		(0.131)	(0.106)	(0.142)	(0.0986)
Constant		-0.974***	-0.585***	-0.925***	-0.605***
		(0.179)	(0.146)	(0.191)	(0.138)
Observations		3329	3329	3329	3329

Notes: Numbers represent regression coefficients. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** $p<0.001$, ** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$

Table A13.12. Marginal Effects of Interaction

Policies on Health	Institutional	Online	Protest	Civic
Men # appropriate	0.208***	0.287***	0.171***	0.376***
	(0.0154)	(0.0167)	(0.0145)	(0.0176)
Men # insufficient	0.211***	0.299***	0.139***	0.378***
	(0.0183)	(0.0202)	(0.0164)	(0.0209)
Men # too strict	0.284***	0.484***	0.268***	0.404***
	(0.0252)	(0.0285)	(0.0247)	(0.0274)
Women # appropriate	0.112***	0.246***	0.0947***	0.357***
	(0.0109)	(0.0149)	(0.00953)	(0.0173)
Women # insufficient	0.0970***	0.234***	0.0629***	0.319***
	(0.0131)	(0.0188)	(0.0104)	(0.0208)
Women # too strict	0.158***	0.387***	0.153***	0.378***
	(0.0190)	(0.0272)	(0.0182)	(0.0278)
Observations	3,330	3,330	3,330	3,330

Notes: Numbers represent average marginal effects. Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Figure A13.13. Coefficient Plots for Interaction Effects with Incentives Variables

Appendix 14. Resource effects on the change in participation between waves 1 and 2

Tables A14.1 and A14.2. present the full regression table for the models investigating the effects of resources and incentives on changes in participation between the two waves of data collection. They show that, an increase in housework burdens significantly increases men's participation, while it has no effect on participation among women. Evaluating measures against the coronavirus as insufficient, which could be a sign of feeling the need for more governmental support makes women less likely to participate, but has no effect on men.

Table A14.1 Regression Table for Resource Effect on Changes in Participation

		Institutional participation		Online		Protest		Civic	
		Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
Inside Household Childcare		0.0221	0.00631	0.0849	0.0153	0.106**	0.0326	0.00913	0.0161
		(0.0400)	(0.0283)	(0.0490)	(0.0390)	(0.0379)	(0.0248)	(0.0513)	(0.0465)
Participation Wave 1		0.308***	0.263***	0.394***	0.329***	0.238***	0.210***	0.414***	0.373***
		(0.0200)	(0.0198)	(0.0176)	(0.0193)	(0.0199)	(0.0151)	(0.0138)	(0.0256)
Age (ref.= 18-29)									
	30-39	-0.0273	-0.0832	0.0792	-0.0560	-0.124*	-0.0776	0.0944	-0.0397
		(0.0484)	(0.0424)	(0.0625)	(0.0621)	(0.0528)	(0.0434)	(0.0652)	(0.0674)
	40-49	-0.0230	-0.0383	-0.0803	-0.0728	-0.157**	-0.0385	-0.0729	0.0272
		(0.0722)	(0.0419)	(0.0657)	(0.0612)	(0.0586)	(0.0416)	(0.0568)	(0.0618)
	50-59	-0.0830	-0.0750	-0.0640	-0.0810	-0.160**	-0.113**	-0.00914	0.0543
		(0.0541)	(0.0519)	(0.0450)	(0.0634)	(0.0549)	(0.0431)	(0.0520)	(0.0715)
	60-69	-0.168**	o	-0.0568	-0.128	-0.242***	o	0.0291	0.00429
		(0.0573)		(0.0522)	(0.0840)	(0.0467)		(0.0589)	(0.0761)
Education (ref.=low)									
	middle	0.0416	-0.000108	0.0965*	-0.0452	-0.0147	-0.00109	0.105*	0.0261
		(0.0395)	(0.0358)	(0.0395)	(0.0458)	(0.0382)	(0.0289)	(0.0463)	(0.0532)
	high	-0.000713	0.0369	0.0638	-0.0307	-0.00427	-0.0190	0.172**	0.123*
(Continued)		(0.0421)	(0.0352)	(0.0444)	(0.0460)	(0.0351)	(0.0309)	(0.0584)	(0.0573)
Migration Background=1		0.0226	0.00281	0.0380	-0.0158	0.0449	-0.0409	-0.110*	-0.0388
		(0.0470)	(0.0399)	(0.0527)	(0.0466)	(0.0417)	(0.0318)	(0.0520)	(0.0592)
East Germany=1		0.0696	-0.0433	0.00577	-0.0402	0.0506	-0.0444*	-0.00584	-0.153**

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	(0.0466)	(0.0267)	(0.0446)	(0.0397)	(0.0362)	(0.0226)	(0.0466)	(0.0487)
Inside Household Care Work	0.0956*	0.0513	0.118	0.105	0.0367	0.0162	0.0969	0.114
	(0.0465)	(0.0510)	(0.0855)	(0.0872)	(0.0370)	(0.0442)	(0.0871)	(0.0867)
Participation Wave 1	0.304***	0.257***	0.403***	0.325***	0.244***	0.210***	0.408***	0.370***
	(0.0202)	(0.0208)	(0.0178)	(0.0200)	(0.0202)	(0.0162)	(0.0133)	(0.0254)
Age (ref.= 18-29)								
30-39	-0.0310	-0.0792	0.0915	-0.0475	-0.0878	-0.0608	0.0912	-0.0309
	(0.0480)	(0.0411)	(0.0586)	(0.0606)	(0.0493)	(0.0390)	(0.0627)	(0.0648)
40-49	-0.0140	-0.0377	-0.0564	-0.0715	-0.112*	-0.0216	-0.0646	0.0284
	(0.0675)	(0.0391)	(0.0637)	(0.0601)	(0.0549)	(0.0374)	(0.0552)	(0.0606)
50-59	-0.0859	-0.0711	-0.0621	-0.0763	-0.157**	-0.106*	-0.00691	0.0582
	(0.0550)	(0.0514)	(0.0454)	(0.0636)	(0.0557)	(0.0409)	(0.0522)	(0.0707)
60-69	-0.170**	°	-0.0608	-0.131	-0.249***	°	0.0282	0.00451
	(0.0563)		(0.0535)	(0.0850)	(0.0431)		(0.0590)	(0.0745)
Education (ref.=low)								
middle	0.0345	0.00463	0.0954*	-0.0385	-0.00399	0.00609	0.0958*	0.0319
	(0.0393)	(0.0362)	(0.0407)	(0.0449)	(0.0372)	(0.0297)	(0.0461)	(0.0531)
high	-0.00391	0.0405	0.0626	-0.0256	-0.00304	-0.0127	0.170**	0.128*
	(0.0420)	(0.0358)	(0.0438)	(0.0460)	(0.0341)	(0.0316)	(0.0583)	(0.0568)
Migration Background=1	0.0191	0.00460	0.0425	-0.0136	0.0466	-0.0431	-0.111*	-0.0362
	(0.0443)	(0.0409)	(0.0535)	(0.0476)	(0.0413)	(0.0310)	(0.0527)	(0.0598)
East Germany=1	0.0694	-0.0426	0.00920	-0.0413	0.0586	-0.0445	-0.00652	-0.151**
	(0.0470)	(0.0267)	(0.0450)	(0.0407)	(0.0385)	(0.0228)	(0.0469)	(0.0491)

	Institutional		Online		Protest		Civic	
(Continued)								
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
Outside Household Childcare	0.0988**	0.0199	0.103**	0.0364	0.0929**	0.0234	0.160**	0.117**
	(0.0339)	(0.0298)	(0.0347)	(0.0351)	(0.0325)	(0.0253)	(0.0496)	(0.0423)
Participation Wave 1	0.278***	0.259***	0.383***	0.322***	0.217***	0.204***	0.358***	0.350***
	(0.0201)	(0.0203)	(0.0176)	(0.0207)	(0.0197)	(0.0175)	(0.0215)	(0.0272)
Age (ref.= 18-29)								
30-39	-0.0262	-0.0810*	0.0978	-0.0511	-0.0899	-0.0626	0.0889	-0.0402
	(0.0496)	(0.0403)	(0.0605)	(0.0607)	(0.0488)	(0.0388)	(0.0653)	(0.0668)
40-49	-0.00860	-0.0356	-0.0498	-0.0680	-0.120*	-0.0220	-0.0622	0.0326
	(0.0755)	(0.0391)	(0.0660)	(0.0592)	(0.0577)	(0.0378)	(0.0538)	(0.0591)
50-59	-0.0692	-0.0731	-0.0470	-0.0813	-0.140*	-0.108**	0.0164	0.0537
	(0.0543)	(0.0511)	(0.0457)	(0.0632)	(0.0557)	(0.0413)	(0.0519)	(0.0678)
60-69	-0.167**	°	-0.0654	-0.129	-0.251***	°	0.0226	-0.00319
	(0.0546)		(0.0512)	(0.0826)	(0.0443)		(0.0552)	(0.0739)
Education (ref.=low)								
middle	0.0385	-0.000596	0.0938*	-0.0484	-0.00723	0.00228	0.0785	0.00899
	(0.0366)	(0.0362)	(0.0389)	(0.0453)	(0.0345)	(0.0299)	(0.0468)	(0.0521)
high	-0.00255	0.0356	0.0611	-0.0341	-0.00788	-0.0188	0.162**	0.112*
	(0.0406)	(0.0360)	(0.0431)	(0.0459)	(0.0340)	(0.0313)	(0.0591)	(0.0558)
Migration Background=1	0.0277	0.00166	0.0494	-0.0156	0.0486	-0.0453	-0.106*	-0.0364
	(0.0480)	(0.0402)	(0.0548)	(0.0465)	(0.0451)	(0.0315)	(0.0530)	(0.0593)
East Germany=1	0.0537	-0.0451	-0.00579	-0.0386	0.0441	-0.0459*	-0.0379	-0.146**
	(0.0450)	(0.0258)	(0.0429)	(0.0399)	(0.0383)	(0.0219)	(0.0470)	(0.0475)

	Institutional		Online		Protest		Civic	
(Continued)								
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
Outside Household Care Work	0.0514	0.0220	0.0506	0.0275	0.0745**	0.0274	0.145***	0.0876*
	(0.0304)	(0.0295)	(0.0314)	(0.0362)	(0.0265)	(0.0238)	(0.0362)	(0.0406)
Participation Wave 1	0.298***	0.260***	0.397***	0.321***	0.228***	0.206***	0.375***	0.354***
	(0.0221)	(0.0198)	(0.0183)	(0.0212)	(0.0188)	(0.0164)	(0.0165)	(0.0268)
Age (ref.= 18-29)								
30-39	-0.0196	-0.0799*	0.101	-0.0489	-0.0870	-0.0612	0.103	-0.0320
	(0.0482)	(0.0401)	(0.0610)	(0.0606)	(0.0485)	(0.0385)	(0.0658)	(0.0656)
40-49	-0.0245	-0.0329	-0.0651	-0.0632	-0.135*	-0.0179	-0.0859	0.0434
	(0.0707)	(0.0395)	(0.0651)	(0.0588)	(0.0541)	(0.0371)	(0.0548)	(0.0586)
50-59	-0.0852	-0.0744	-0.0658	-0.0839	-0.175**	-0.109**	-0.0252	0.0488
	(0.0535)	(0.0503)	(0.0459)	(0.0633)	(0.0554)	(0.0397)	(0.0512)	(0.0705)
60-69	-0.174**	°	-0.0678	-0.128	-0.262***	°	-0.00116	0.0105
	(0.0571)		(0.0529)	(0.0833)	(0.0429)		(0.0558)	(0.0748)
Education (ref.=low)								
middle	0.0436	-0.00126	0.101*	-0.0443	0.000363	0.00294	0.0949*	0.0248
	(0.0388)	(0.0360)	(0.0399)	(0.0455)	(0.0361)	(0.0292)	(0.0437)	(0.0539)
high	0.00362	0.0335	0.0623	-0.0332	0.000419	-0.0208	0.163**	0.115*
	(0.0413)	(0.0352)	(0.0430)	(0.0465)	(0.0335)	(0.0301)	(0.0534)	(0.0575)
Migration Background=1	0.0233	0.00452	0.0410	-0.0149	0.0490	-0.0376	-0.111*	-0.0357
	(0.0444)	(0.0404)	(0.0539)	(0.0475)	(0.0382)	(0.0311)	(0.0525)	(0.0598)
East Germany=1	0.0682	-0.0452	0.00801	-0.0415	0.0555	-0.0447*	-0.0148	-0.157**
	(0.0450)	(0.0263)	(0.0435)	(0.0402)	(0.0376)	(0.0220)	(0.0446)	(0.0480)

Notes: N=483 (men); N=439 (women); Numbers represent average marginal effects. Standard errors in parentheses.

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05; ° means no women over 60 were engaged in the second wave of the survey collection.

Table A14.2. Regression Table for Incentive Effect on Changes in Participation

		Institutional		Online		Protest		Civic	
		Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
Health Measures (ref.= appropriate)									
	Insufficient	-0.0336	0.00615	-0.0968*	0.00761	-0.0569	-0.0693**	-0.0350	-0.0671
		(0.0375)	(0.0345)	(0.0384)	(0.0420)	(0.0332)	(0.0256)	(0.0392)	(0.0453)
	Too strict	-0.0310	0.0517	0.00636	0.0318	-0.0267	0.0313	0.0823	-0.00221
		(0.0386)	(0.0373)	(0.0419)	(0.0439)	(0.0371)	(0.0346)	(0.0522)	(0.0596)
Participation Wave 1		0.310***	0.263***	0.401***	0.327***	0.245***	0.204***	0.415***	0.371***
		(0.0202)	(0.0216)	(0.0184)	(0.0213)	(0.0191)	(0.0152)	(0.0127)	(0.0250)
Age (ref.= 18-29)									
	30-39	-0.0187	-0.0929*	0.0933	-0.0572	-0.0785	-0.0666	0.0852	-0.0352
		(0.0468)	(0.0422)	(0.0560)	(0.0615)	(0.0462)	(0.0374)	(0.0610)	(0.0643)
	40-49	-0.00725	-0.0410	-0.0419	-0.0702	-0.102	-0.0212	-0.0646	0.0327
		(0.0713)	(0.0400)	(0.0627)	(0.0594)	(0.0562)	(0.0365)	(0.0554)	(0.0586)
	50-59	-0.0751	-0.0818	-0.0461	-0.0861	-0.138**	-0.113**	-0.00341	0.0575
		(0.0543)	(0.0510)	(0.0434)	(0.0629)	(0.0533)	(0.0401)	(0.0512)	(0.0711)
	60-69	-0.157**	°	-0.0351	-0.134	-0.226***	°	0.0367	0.0147
		(0.0551)		(0.0504)	(0.0833)	(0.0416)		(0.0562)	(0.0768)
Education (ref.=low)									
	middle	0.0436	0.000454	0.111**	-0.0431	0.00264	0.00250	0.110*	0.0266
		(0.0384)	(0.0364)	(0.0394)	(0.0457)	(0.0357)	(0.0283)	(0.0462)	(0.0537)
	high	0.000174	0.0348	0.0652	-0.0288	0.000831	-0.0124	0.164**	0.123*
		(0.0414)	(0.0356)	(0.0429)	(0.0458)	(0.0335)	(0.0296)	(0.0548)	(0.0571)
Migration Background=1		0.0216	0.00142	0.0290	-0.0195	0.0442	-0.0270	-0.115*	-0.0360
		(0.0486)	(0.0405)	(0.0529)	(0.0468)	(0.0444)	(0.0297)	(0.0484)	(0.0574)
East Germany=1		0.0713	-0.0463	0.0102	-0.0450	0.0586	-0.0437*	-0.00825	-0.148**
		(0.0471)	(0.0265)	(0.0444)	(0.0411)	(0.0411)	(0.0213)	(0.0455)	(0.0488)

(Continued)		Institutional		Online		Protest		Civic	
		Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
Economic Measures (ref.= appropriate)									
	Insufficient	-0.0196	-0.0254	-0.0363	0.0169	-0.0345	-0.0719**	0.00252	-0.147**
		(0.0312)	(0.0325)	(0.0347)	(0.0386)	(0.0255)	(0.0255)	(0.0397)	(0.0436)
	Too strict	0.0963	0.0450	0.112	0.0732	0.115	0.0796	0.110	-0.0349
		(0.0592)	(0.0559)	(0.0728)	(0.0560)	(0.0614)	(0.0602)	(0.0650)	(0.0740)
Participation Wave 1		0.304***	0.249***	0.406***	0.325***	0.234***	0.186***	0.412***	0.371***
		(0.0211)	(0.0219)	(0.0176)	(0.0208)	(0.0202)	(0.0145)	(0.0128)	(0.0244)
Age (ref.= 18-29)									
	30-39	-0.0144	-0.0937*	0.111	-0.0669	-0.0655	-0.0912*	0.102	-0.0349
		(0.0475)	(0.0421)	(0.0605)	(0.0629)	(0.0467)	(0.0423)	(0.0645)	(0.0668)
	40-49	-0.00703	-0.0386	-0.0451	-0.0707	-0.0968	-0.0419	-0.0614	0.0195
		(0.0680)	(0.0399)	(0.0625)	(0.0594)	(0.0516)	(0.0389)	(0.0555)	(0.0579)
	50-59	-0.0660	-0.0792	-0.0421	-0.0867	-0.126*	-0.119**	0.00528	0.0485
		(0.0525)	(0.0538)	(0.0435)	(0.0635)	(0.0505)	(0.0429)	(0.0524)	(0.0686)
	60-69	-0.149**	°	-0.0379	-0.133	-0.214***	°	0.0404	0.0182
		(0.0544)		(0.0507)	(0.0841)	(0.0410)		(0.0585)	(0.0755)
Education (ref.=low)									
	middle	0.0502	-0.00127	0.115**	-0.0455	0.0151	-0.000223	0.108*	0.0301
		(0.0393)	(0.0365)	(0.0413)	(0.0460)	(0.0348)	(0.0294)	(0.0456)	(0.0521)
	high	0.00352	0.0374	0.0715	-0.0327	0.00858	-0.0142	0.178**	0.133*
		(0.0427)	(0.0350)	(0.0446)	(0.0458)	(0.0340)	(0.0300)	(0.0590)	(0.0556)
Migration Background=1		0.0186	0.00301	0.0355	-0.0163	0.0385	-0.0335	-0.112*	-0.0443
		(0.0459)	(0.0392)	(0.0507)	(0.0461)	(0.0393)	(0.0267)	(0.0503)	(0.0557)
East Germany=1		0.0706	-0.0380	0.00763	-0.0408	0.0575	-0.0361	-0.00832	-0.141**
		(0.0473)	(0.0279)	(0.0457)	(0.0409)	(0.0368)	(0.0231)	(0.0469)	(0.0471)

Notes: N=483 (men); N=439 (women); Numbers represent average marginal effects. Standard errors in parentheses.

*** $p<0.001$, ** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$; ° means no women over 60 were engaged in the second wave of the survey collection.