Deconstructing Japan's Military Globalism

The March to "Normal" Nationhood

Benjamin S. Knight

ABSTRACT

In this paper I argue that the turn of the millennium saw an acceleration of Japanese military engagement with the world, as Japan, Australia, South Korea, and India, all sought to expand and diversify their military relations. The common objective of these three countries produced a synergistic effect, facilitating an increase in the depth and breath of Japan's military relations. Far from being a hedge against the U.S., this movement shows how Japan is acting more "normally"- exercising greater initiative in the pursuit of its own security interests vis-à-vis the rise of China. Moreover, this transformation continues to unfold irrespective of the DPJ's 2009 usurpation of the LDP as majority party.

INTRODUCTION

Two decades after the passage of the 1992 Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) Law, Japan has since progressed from repairing roads and bridges under United Nations (UN) mandate in Cambodia, to semi-permanently basing Japanese Self-Defense Force (JSDF) assets in Djibouti. This increased willingness to deploy farther from home, and in the process, forge working military relations with new security partners outside of the traditional U.S.-Japan alliance, particularly with Australia, South Korea, and India, I refer to as Japanese *military globalism*.

This military globalism can be construed as a manifestation of Richard Samuels' prediction of Japanese "hedging."[1] Samuels notes that alliances, while conferring benefits, also present states with the twin dangers of entrapment within another state's policies, or abandonment by the partner state. Contrary to Samuels, I argue that this hedging behavior is not geared towards the U.S. In fact, the U.S. has in many instances facilitated in laying the groundwork for Japan's newly diversified military relations. As David Kang writes, "Japan is also *deepening its alliance with the United States* [italics mine] while beginning to create the domestic and international institutional and political linkages that would allow that relationship to become more of a choice than an obligation."[2] It is the rapidly improving military capabilities of a rising China, rather than the U.S., which today serve as the ongoing impetus for Japan's expanding military globalism. Here I show that Japan is indeed widening its network of military relations and that this military globalism has undergone both qualitative and quantitative change since the late 1990s – changes that the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) has largely supported.

Qualitatively speaking, the governing impetus of Japanese military globalism has taken three distinct forms in the past two decades; from that of U.N. enforcer during the 1990s (Cambodia (1992-1993), Somalia (1993), Rwanda (1994-1995), Bougainville (1994), and East Timor (1999-2002), to bulwark against terrorism during the early 2000s (exemplified by the 2002 Japan-Australia Joint Statement on Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism), to balancer against a rising China today.

A quantitative examination reveals that during the years leading up to and following the turn of the millennium, Japanese military globalism accelerated rapidly as a series of exogenous

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1 Richard J. Samuels, Securing Japan: Tokyo's Grand Strategy and the Future of Asia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007), p. 198.

2 David C. Kang, China Rising: Peace, Power, and Order in East Asia (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2007), p. 199.

shocks provided first Australia, then South Korea and India each with the incentive to either initiate or accelerate the movement towards a multilateral security framework. This movement provided the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) (later the DPJ) with an ideal environment to expand Japan's military relations – relations that up until that time, were hardly extant outside of the U.S.-Japanese alliance.

Using news and journal articles informed by interviews with U.S. and Japanese government officials, military personnel, and policy experts, I explore the basis of the JSDF's evolution into a globally engaged military force – one that is in the process of seeking out new security partners. I then present evidence that the newly empowered Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) is effectively continuing this policy of hedging by way of diversifying Japan's military relations. While Prime Minister Koizumi is rightfully credited with having reinvigorated the U.S.-Japan alliance, it is under the DPJ that Japan has seen the most substantive achievements yet in Japan's efforts to broaden its range of strategic partners.

THE JSDF: THE WORLD'S BEST-FUNDED HUMANITARIAN AID ORGANIZATION

Japanese globalism began upon the cessation of the Cold War. Once deprived of the Soviet threat as leverage, Japan became less able to resist U.S. calls for a greater reciprocity in the alliance. In 1992, President Bush and Prime Minister Miyazawa moved to incorporate Japan into a "Global Partnership" wherein Japan would enjoy a much freer hand in establishing its own independent security framework. In the wake of the Gulf War, Japan was not only red-faced over its "checkbook diplomacy," but was beginning to feel the peer-pressure emanating from Germany's own military liberalization. These events conspired to force Japan to move beyond the parochial workings of the Yoshida Doctrine, and make tangible contributions to regional security.

With the experimental, but popular post-Gulf War dispatch of minesweepers to the Persian Gulf serving as justification for passing the 1992 Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) Law, the JSDF would henceforth be imbued with the authority to deploy abroad on a regular basis. The first opportunity to utilize this new authority came in the form of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). Yasushi Akashi, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General, referencing the unprecedented size of the UN deployment, remarked that UNTAC presented the UN with a spectacular testing ground for determining what form post-Cold War peacekeeping operations should take, a comment that was equally applicable to Japan's situation.[3] As Aurelia George writes, "By a process of piecemeal but steady consensual evolution, it has been possible for the Japanese government to extend the range of SDF functions and capabilities in the postwar period" – a statement that has remained accurate in the face of the JSDF deployment to Iraq, refueling operations in the Indian Ocean, or anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden today.[4]

The 40 million USD facility that the JSDF opened in Djibouti this year epitomizes the policy shift wherein Japan's military is no longer exclusively performing UN missions for the purpose of accruing international prestige, but is rather looking to Japan's own strategic interests

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[3] Takashi Watanabe, "Nontraditional Roles of the Military and Security in East Asia," The National Institute for Defense Studies: International Symposium on Security Affairs, 2003, January 21-22, [accessed September 25, 2011], <http://www.nids.go.jp/english/event/symposium/pdf/2002/sympo_e2002_09.pdf>.

[4] Aurelia George, "Japan's Participation in U.N. Peacekeeping Operations: Radical Departure or Predictable Response?" Asian Survey: Japan: Redefining Its International Role 33:6 (1993), pp. 560-575.


Date, Distance, and Number of Personnel Mobilized for JSDF Deployments Following Enaction of 1992 PKO Law
DISTANCE FROM TOKYO (In Kilometers)
14,000-15,000
13,000-13,999
12,000-12,999
11,000-11,999
10,000-10,999
9,000-9,999
8,000-8,999
7,000-7,999
6,000-6,999
5,000-5,999
4,000-4,999
3,000-3,999
2,000-2,999
1,000-1,999
0-999
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
YEAR
Mozambique
68
Honduras
150
Haiti
350
Sudan
2
Gulf of Aden
150
Djibouti
170
Golan Heights
43
Iraq
550
Indonesia
950
East Timor
680
Timor-Leste
2
Nepal
6
Cambodia
724
UN Endorsed JSDF Mission
Non-UN Endorsed JSDF Mission
1-99 Personnel Deployed
100-499 Personnel Deployed
Location of Deployment
500-1000 Personnel Deployed
Number of Personnel Deployed

Figure 1


The Evolving Impetus of Japanese Military Globalism
UN MANDATE
MOZAMBIQUE
6/30/92
12/16/92
CAMBODIA
ANTI-NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION MOVEMENT
Taepodong-1 Launch by DPRK
8/31/98
Pokhran II Nuclear Tests & Diplomatic Fallout
5/11/98
"WAR ON TERROR"
Iraq War
3/20/03
Bali Bombing
10/12/02
Afghanistan War
10/7/01
9/11 Attacks
9/11/01
ECONOMIC AND MILITARY "RISE OF CHINA"
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Figure 2

and is engaging in bolder action farther away from the Japanese islands to do so. There is no question that securing the waters through which 90% of Japan's exports pass is a truer reflection of Japanese national interest then the altruistic UNTAC deployment. Servicing two destroyers, a detachment of P-3C surveillance aircraft, and 180 permanently stationed personnel, the *Deployment Air Force for Counter-Piracy Enforcement* facility is a genuine first for Japan, and while the JSDF used comparable facilities as part of UNTAC, the deployment was in support of a UN Security Council resolution, and lasted no more than two years. In contrast, there is no UN mandate providing legal cover for the Djibouti facilities - facilities that the JSDF plans to use for at least ten years.[5] During this twenty-year long journey from UNTAC to Djibouti, the JSDF has unquestionably expanded in scope and has established itself as an independent actor in the sphere of global security. From 1991 to 2000, the JSDF deployed approximately 985 personnel abroad, 84% of who were serving under UN mandate. During the decade from 2001 to 2010, the JSDF deployed almost triple the number, some 2720 personnel. Of those deployed, a mere 39% were assisting in UN missions (see Figure 1).

This phenomenon is unremarkable, as it represents the continuation of a trend first identified in the early 1990s. However, what *is* remarkable is the near absence of any impact on the part of Japan's tumultuous politics. As figure 2 shows, Japanese military globalism, while accelerating significantly at the turn of the century, has achieved its most tangible accomplishments in the past few years with the DPJ presiding. This is the same DPJ that refused to renew the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law in 2010, thus bringing Japanese refueling operations in the Indian Ocean to a sudden halt, and leading Defense Minister Kitazawa to remark about the "costs of democracy."[6] Tsuneo Watanabe of the Tokyo Foundation interprets this kind of intransigence as symptomatic of a "permanent opposition" mentality that until recently, allowed the DPJ to give free reign to its ideologues (i.e. former members of the Japanese Socialist Party (JSP)).

However, coming into power the DPJ incurred political constraints, and no longer faced with having to define itself against the opposition, the JSDF ceased to be a "political football." Moreover, the geopolitical realties now confronting DPJ have largely resulted in the implicit adoption of policies initiated by the LDP. The first tangible indication of this is Hatoyama's response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake. Japan mobilized approximately 350 personnel to support reconstruction following the earthquake, despite the widespread looting and lawlessness that pervaded the country in the wake of the catastrophe. Because of the dangerous conditions on the ground, the MOD had to take care to explain to the public that the danger did not constitute a violation of one of the five preconditions of the PKO Law (that the country must be stable with a ceasefire in place). Ironically enough, Naoto Kan had used an identical line of reasoning seven years prior in an attempt to prevent the JSDF deployment to Iraq.

The extent to which the DPJ has reversed itself since entering office is readily observable within the context of U.S.-Japan relations, specifically the ongoing dilemma of the Futenma base issue, and calls for revising the current U.S.-Japan Status of Forces Agreement. In 2005, party president Katsuya Okada called for the complete removal of Futenma Air Station from Okinawa in the DPJ party manifesto. Prime Minister Hatoyama's handling of that exact issue was sufficient to bring down his administration in 2010. Since then, Prime Minister Naoto Kan, and

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5 Emmanuel Goujon, "Piracy Rattles Japan to Open First Foreign Military Base," Agence France-Presse, April 23, 2010, [accessed September 24, 2011], < http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5jvlyKeSUEy8lsdNPRIFVIz_6b5OA>.

6 Personal discussion with Japanese Ministry of Defense official, June 03, 2011.

now Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda, have both taken pains to "explain" the government's position to the people of Okinawa regarding the necessity of continuing to base U.S. troops there.[7] Talk of revising the status of forces agreement has likewise been shelved for the time being.

Geopolitical realities have confounded attempts by elements within the DPJ to deviate from the security framework laid down by their LDP predecessors. The result of this is a political party that has discretely reneged on its platform of renegotiating key aspects of the U.S.-Japan alliance.[8] These geopolitical realities include the Senkaku fishing trawler incident, instability on the Korean peninsula, as well as the intensified probing of Japan's claimed territorial waters and airspace by Chinese submarines and aircraft.

Largely due to events such as these, the expanding Japanese military relations that I subsequently explore are taking place not so much as a hedge against the U.S., but rather should be construed as a hedge *with* the U.S. – primarily against a rising China. Daniel Sneider makes the caveat that "it would be wrong to conclude that DPJ policies, shaped during the party's formative years by key leaders who remain largely in place, have been simply thrown aside."[9] Rather, I argue that the DPJ's policy of "Asianism" remains largely intact, but with notions of diversifying Japan's security relations *away* from the U.S. now largely discarded. Sneider goes on to argue that Japan's increasingly multilateral security framework should be seen "as an opportunity to jointly, and in concert with South Korea, reshape the security order in Northeast Asia."[10] I propose that if one takes into account Australia and India as well, then this is precisely what is now taking place. It is to these nascent military partners and their complementary motivations to which we now turn.

AUSTRALIA & JAPAN: SIDE-BY-SIDE FROM CAMBODIA TO IRAQ

Just as Japan's deployment to Cambodia was the JSDF's first experience of deploying abroad with "boots on the ground," coincidentally UNTAC constituted the first genuine instance of Japanese-Australian military cooperation. Under UNTAC, Australian Lieutenant General John Sanderson presided over Japan's first ever post-PKO Law dispatch - a 600-member engineering contingent. However, the deployment proved to be a tumultuous one. The death of a Japanese interpreter in April of 1992, followed by that of a Japanese policeman in May, sparked a massive outcry from the Japanese public. First the Japanese Defense Minister, and then Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa threatened to withdraw the JSDF should further causalities occur.[11] While

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7 Hiroyuki Ishida, "Noda to Urge Acceptance of Futenma Plan / Pledges Effort to Persuade Okinawans," The Daily Yomiuri, September 25, 2011, [accessed September 25, 2011], <http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T110924003035.htm>.

8 The DPJ is not unique in its politicization of the JSDF. As Minister of Posts and Telecommunications, Junichiro Koizumi himself objected stridently to the deployment of the JSDF to Cambodia in 1993, a stance largely in agreement with public opinion at the time. However, during his tenure as prime minister, Koizumi authorized the deployment of the JSDF to Iraq, despite the mission's widespread unpopularity, and the fact that Japanese fatalities would ultimately be double of those incurred in Cambodia (4 versus 2). Los Angeles Times, "Japanese Deaths in Cambodia Spur Call to Get Out," May 15, 1993, [accessed September 30, 2011], <http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1993-05-15/news/1993135015_1_cambodia-japan-peacekeeping>.

9 Daniel Sneider, "The New Asianism: Japanese Foreign Policy under the Democratic Party of Japan," The National Bureau of Asian Research, Seattle, Washington: Asia Policy, Number 12 (July 2011), 99-129, [accessed September 30, 2011], <http://www.nbr.org/publications/asia_policy/Preview/AP12_E_Japan_preview.pdf>.

10 Ibid.

11 Edward F. Mickolus, and Susan L. Simmons, Terrorism 1992-1995: A Chronology of Events and a Selectively Annotated Bibliography (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1997), p. 179.

UNTAC ultimately achieved some measure of success, the Japanese casualties incurred later informed all future decisions regarding use of the JSDF abroad, lending credibility to the DPJ's objections against future dispatches – most notably Iraq.

Following UNTAC, the Australian-Japanese defense relationship continued to deepen. On the administrative side, in 1995 the two countries upgraded the 1976 "Basic Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation" to a "Joint Declaration on Australia-Japan Partnership," paving the way for annual ministerial level dialogue, beginning with Prime Minister Hashimoto's visit to Canberra in 1997. In 2002 the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue was created to supplement this agreement, thus incorporating the U.S. into the discussions. Back on the ground, the International Forces in East Timor (INTERFET) presented the two militaries in 1999 with a near identical organizational structure as UNTAC had almost a decade prior, with Australian and Japanese troops working side by side in road construction under the command of Australian Major General Peter Cosgrove. Two years later, Australia reprised its role of protector of Japanese forces, as the two militaries engaged in reconstruction efforts in Samawah, Iraq.

Within the context of the U.S. "War on Terror," we see a deepening of Japanese-Australian military relations, but more significantly, one can also perceive a qualitative change in the relationship's focus from an emphasis on regional humanitarian intervention, to combating terrorism. In policy circles in Tokyo, Canberra, and Washington, the effect of the terrorist attacks was a forfeiture of influence by liberal camps supporting UN involvement in favor of more traditionally realist, or in the case of the U.S., neo-conservative worldviews. The chance alignment of three conservative administrations, and the bitter loss of life experienced by the U.S. and Australia during the 9/11 attacks and Bali bombings, all coalesced into a multilateral consensus in favor of military force as applied to the extirpation of terrorist networks, and the autocratic regimes perceived as backing them. Moreover, both Howard and Koizumi sought to use the war as an opportunity to achieve force transformation. Koizumi sought a JSDF that could more readily serve Japanese versus UN prerogatives,[12] while Howard envisioned as early as 1996 an Australian Defense Force (ADF) less focused on independently defending Australia from attack, and instead one that placed greater emphasis on cooperation with regional allies on defense. During an interview, one Japanese defense official opined that, so far as Prime Minister Howard was able to bolster defense relations with the U.S., U.K., and Japan simultaneously, his decision to dispatch the ADF to Iraq represented a diplomatically brilliant move.[13] That he was able to achieve defense budget increases to the tune of 3% per annum represents yet another domestic victory.[14]

While the Bush-Koizumi-Howard consensus changed the tone of Japanese-Australian military cooperation, the most significant milestones in the deepening military-to-military relationship were not put into place until after Koizumi was out of office and the Japanese Iraq Reconstruction and Support Group had been disbanded. For instance, in 2007 the ADF agreed for the first time to host JSDF observers during the U.S. - Australian joint exercise TALISMAN SABER– a biennial exercise primarily centered around amphibious assault and ship defense exercises. Furthermore, 2007 also saw the enactment of the Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on

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12 This change in *modus operandi* is readily discernable if one takes into account the number of JSDF personnel who deployed for reasons other than a UN mandate. 91% of such dispatches took place *after* the 9/11 attacks.

13 Interview with Japanese Ministry of Defense official, June 27, 2011.

14 Mark Thomson. The Cost of Defence: ASPI Defence Budget Brief 2005–06 (Section II: Defence Budget 2005–06 PBS Explained). Barton, Australia: Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), 2005), p. 17. [accessed September 30, 2011], <http://www.aspi.org.au/publications/publication_details.aspx?ContentID=73>.

Security Cooperation, as well as annualized defense minister "2+2" talks (making Australia only the second nation after the U.S. to institutionalize such dialogue with Japan).

Given that Shinzo Abe was dedicated to continuing Koizumi's foreign policies, such consistency should not be surprising. However, what is surprising is the fact that military cooperation between Japan and Australia reached an unprecedented depth *after* the Japanese National Diet and Australian Parliament came under new management by the DPJ and Labor Party respectively. The 2010 signing of the Japan-Australia Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) represents a level of defense integration with Japan hereto only attained by the United States. Enabling "the provision of supplies and services between the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and the Australian Defence Force," the 2010 ACSA paves the way for "operations to cope with large scale disasters in the territory of either Party or a third country."[15]

The DPJ would soon oversee a further deepening of Japanese-Australian military cooperation. The day immediately after Japan and Australia signed the ACSA, the Republic of Korea (ROK)-led group investigating the March 2010 sinking of the ROKS CHEONAN released a summary of its final report, concluding that the evidence overwhelmingly supported the theory that the CHEONAN was sunk by a North Korean torpedo attack. A week later, the media unveiled leaked UN reports accusing the DPRK of violating UN sanctions by exporting nuclear and missile technology to Iran, Syria and Burma.

Seoul's resolve to convey a message to Pyongyang, coupled with revelations of North Korean weapons proliferation, allowed the U.S. to finally bring South Korea into the U.S.-led Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) that President George Bush established in 2003. Specifically, South Korea's entrance into the PSI framework took the form of the ROK-led international anti-proliferation naval exercise EAST ENDEAVOR 10, in October 2010. While the exercise comprised a total of 15 states (so much the better for showing global solidarity against weapons proliferation), Japan, Australia, South Korea, and the United States were clearly the major players.

Aside from the DPJ's own policy of engagement with Asia, two drivers of deepening Japanese-Australian military relations are readily observable: (A) Instability on the Korean peninsula, and (B) *U.S. guidance*. The Proliferation Security Initiative that had held so little appeal for South Korea upon its inception was invigorated after relations between North and South Korea soured. The U.S. was able to use its influence to secure broad participation in the exercise, obtaining greater international legitimacy while partially obscuring the strengthening military relations between Japan, Australia, and South Korea. Moreover, EAST ENDEAVOR 10 represents only the latest manifestation of this pattern, with Japan and Australia having participated in another U.S.-led naval exercise with India – MALABAR 2007 (see figure 3).

The fact that it was under the auspices of the DPJ that Japan signed the the ACSA with Australia suggests that Japan's military relations will continue to broaden, irrespective of whatever party is ascendant in the Japanese Diet. Furthermore, the U.S.'s role as chief architect of exercises such as EAST ENDEAVOR 10 and MALABAR 2007, and the fact that the U.S. regularly urges Japan to expand its military cooperation with other countries, lends credence to the notion that Japan's expanding military globalism, rather than constituting a hedge against the U.S., represents a new stage of strategic cooperation largely in accordance with the spirit of the U.S.-Japan alliance.

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[15] Agreement Between the Government of Japan and the Government of Australia Concerning Reciprocal Provision of Supplies and Services Between the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and the Australian Defence Force, May 19, 2010, [accessed October 1, 2011], <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/australia/pdfs/agree1005.pdf>.


Administration
Year
Australia
South Korea
India
Toshiki Kaifu (LDP)
Kiichi Miyazawa (LDP)
Morihiro Hosokawa (Japan New Party)
Tsutomu Hata (Renewal Party)
Tomiichi Murayama (Socialist Party)
Ryutaro Hashimoto (LDP)
Keizō Obuchi (LDP)
Yoshirō Mori (LDP)
Junichiro Koizumi (LDP)
Shinzō Abe (LDP)
Yasuo Fukuda (LDP)
Taro Aso (LDP)
Yukio Hatoyama (DPJ)
Naoto Kan (DPJ)
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2011
Japanese Defense Minister, Yozo Ishikawa, Visits Australia
UNTAC
UNTAC
Korean Defense Minister Byong-tae Lee, Visits Japan
1+1 Dialogue
Japan-Korea Joint Partnership Declaration
Japan, ROK Annual Vice Foreign Ministers' Strategic Dialogue
Japanese Prime Minister Mori Yoshiro, Visits India
Joint Coast Guard Training & Exchange (Anti-Piracy, Search & Rescue, Etc.)
UNTAET
SAREX
Japan/India Security Dialogue
Japan-Australia Joint Statement on Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism
IRAQ
IRAQ
Six Party Talks
UNMISET
UNMISET
Japan, ROK Annual Counter-Terrorism Consultation
Japan, China, ROK Annual Trilateral Summit
2+2 Dialogue
Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation
MALABAR 2007
MALABAR 2007
Joint Statement on Security Cooperation Between Japan and India
MALABAR 2009
EASTERN ENDEAVOR 10
EASTERN ENDEAVOR 10
2+2 Dialogue
ACSA
ACSA?
GSOMIA?

Figure 3

While Japanese-Australian military cooperation has most recently been premised on combating terrorism and nuclear proliferation, this relationship is beginning to encompass traditional security threats, i.e. the shift in the regional balance of power precipitated by a rising China. As T.J. Pempel writes “expansion of military exercises such as Cobra Gold, support for Australian-Japanese military cooperation, and the inclusion of India, New Zealand and Australia in the East Asia Summit were at best thinly veiled efforts to counterbalance China’s influence within the region.”[16] It is ironic that it was during the administration of Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, who in 2004 had delivered a speech in Beijing entitled "Australia and China: A Strong and Stable Partnership for the 21st Century," that Australian-Sino relations fell to their lowest point in decades. The 2009 arrest of Australian mining executive Stern Hu and the Rio Tinto espionage case stoked anti-Chinese sentiment among the Australian public, turning Rudd’s fluent Mandarin and pro-Beijing record into a political liability.

Whether coincidental or not, it was during this breakdown in Australia and China’s formally amicable relations that, in 2009, the AFD published the most ostensibly anti-China Defense White Paper yet, referencing China as “the strongest Asian military power,” and declaring that “the pace, scope, and structure of China’s military modernization have the potential to give its neighbors cause for concern if not carefully explained.”[17] Admiral Wu Shengli’s April 2009 statement that the People’s Liberation Army Navy would “move faster in researching and building new-generation weapons to boost the ability to fight regional sea wars” did nothing to allay such fears.[18]

Desmond Ball and Richard Tanter of the Nautilus Institute diagnose the current climate of Japanese-Australian defense cooperation as being symptomatic of a classic balance-of-power politics vis-à-vis China, with Tanter predicting that for better or worse, the bilateral Australia-Japan security relationship will most likely continue to deepen for the foreseeable future:

> Australia can expect to see more Japanese bases such as the intelligence satellite ground station at Landsdale in the Perth International Telecommunications Centre. We can expect more and closer cooperation between the ADF and the SDF in maritime interdiction for both border security and the US-led Proliferation Security Initiative. We can expect more joint exercises and training with the SDF in Australia. We can expect more testing of Japanese space vehicles from Australian test ranges.[19]

Australia is not just increasing military collaboration with Japan, but also with the U.S. Australia’s consideration of whether or not to host U.S. forces, despite the inevitably negative response such a move would elicit from China, effectively highlights the extent to which Australia’s security concerns have evolved in response to China’s rise. It is this perceived

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16 T.J. Pempel, “How Bush Bungled Asia: Militarism, Economic Indifference and Unilateralism Have Weakened the United States Across Asia,” The Pacific Review 21:5 (2008), pp.547-581.

17 Australian Department of Defense, “Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century,” Canberra, Commonwealth of Australia, 2009, [accessed October 1, 2011], <http://apo.org.au/sites/default/files/defence_white_paper_2009.pdf>.

18 Takashi Terada, “Evolution of the Australia-Japan Security Partnership: Toward a Softer Triangle Alliance With the United States?” Institut Francais des Relations Internationals, Center for Asian Studies, 35. (2010, October), pp.22-23, [accessed October 1, 2011], <.http://www.ifri.org/?page=contribution-detail&id=6233&id_provenance=97>.

19 Richard Tanter, “The New Security Architecture: Binding Japan and Australia, Containing China.” Nautilus Institute at Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology, Austral Peace and Security Network. (2007, March 15), [accessed October 1, 2011], <http://www.nautilus.org/publications/essays/apsnet/policy-forum/2007/0707a-tanter.html>.

shortage of security “goods” that continues to provide greater opportunities for Japanese military globalism today.

SOUTH KOREA: HEDGING IN SPITE OF HISTORY

Today South Korea is considering whether to enter into an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) with Japan just as Australia has. Along these same lines, a General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) with Japan is also under debate. This debate is taking place a mere quarter century after (now) former South Korean Vice Minister of National Defense, Yong-ok Park, pronounced in 1986 that direct military ties between Japan and South Korea were neither “possible nor desirable” (Park, 1986). Yet, as early as 1999, there has been talk of a “virtual alliance” between the U.S., South Korea, and Japan – virtual due to the fact that strong nationalist sentiment on both sides of the Sea of Japan precludes a public declaration of any defense commitment.[20]

As a consequence of DPRK developments in missile technology and plutonium enrichment, Japanese-South Korean military relations deepened rapidly at the turn of the century from the nascent 2+2 level dialogue first begun in 1994, to a mature defense relationship encompassing counter-terrorism consultations, joint military deployments, and strategic dialogue. Specifically, the exogenous shock of revelations concerning the DPRK’s abilities to threaten Japan (and by extension, U.S. forces stationed there) forced South Korea to reevaluate their security interests, providing a window for Japanese military globalism to incorporate the Korean peninsula into its increasingly multilateral framework. Like Australia, the U.S.-led “War on Terror” provided additional impetus for this transformation, but unlike Australia, it is the DPRK rather than the PRC that is sustaining this newly forged Japan-ROK bilateral defense relationship following the “War on Terror’s” unceremonious conclusion, and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future.

While Japanese and Australian forces were working side-by-side as early as 1992, Jason Manosevitz holds that Japan-ROK military relations are a more recent phenomenon, noting, “Simply put, until 1995, one could not distinguish a military-military dimension for analysis”[21] [in the bilateral ROK-Japan relationship]. However, this changed after the South Korean Minister of National Defense Byong-tae Lee, met with Japan Defense Agency (JDA) Director-General Kazuo Aichi in April of 1994. During this exchange, both Japan and South Korea agreed to hold annual defense policy meetings. These meetings in turn brought about the first naval port calls, information exchange protocols, personnel exchanges, and so forth, laying the groundwork for the 1998 Partnership Declaration. This agreement represented the first attempt at codifying the Japan-ROK relationship, and effectively upgraded the informal defense exchanges into annual “security policy dialogues.”

However, this joint declaration did not emerge in a vacuum. Rather, it was the DPRK that provoked Japan and South Korea into upgrading a previously informal exchange into a framework capable of supporting cooperation in matters of defense. North Korean catalyzation of Japan-ROK military relations began in 1998, as indications mounted that the DPRK was not adhering to the criteria of the 1994 Agreed Framework. Two years prior, Hans Blix had cautioned the Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) Board of Governors that the DPRK was prevaricating regarding its current stockpile of plutonium. To worsen matters, in 1998 the DPRK launched a

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[20] Ralph A. Cossa (Ed.), U.S.-Korea-Japan Relations: Building toward a "Virtual Alliance," CSIS Significant Issues Series (Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic & International Studies, 1999), pp. xvii- xxix.

[21] Jason U. Manosevitz, “Japan and South Korea,” Asian Survey, Vol. 43, No. 5 (2003), pp. 801-825.

modified Taepodong-1 missile over Japanese airspace. In response, Japan cut one billion USD from the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), further undermining commitments made during the 1994 Agreed Framework. U.S. allegations that the DPRK was possibly constructing undisclosed nuclear facilities at Kumchang-ri, reinforced perceptions of North Korea as an unpredictable security threat.[22]

It was in this environment that the 1998 Partnership Declaration was signed; a mere two months after the remnants of the DPRK's first Taepodong-1 fell into the Sea of Japan. As such, the document was unambiguous in citing the DPRK as a primary reason for deepening the two countries' defense relationship. Japan and South Korea reached this point out of sheer strategic necessity. From the perspective of South Korea, the DPRK's ability to strike Japan could interfere with U.S. assistance should a second Korean War break out. Moreover, Japan might be prodded to increase defense spending, thus threatening South Korea. Defense coordination had become increasingly necessary, or as one ROK Foreign Ministry official put it, "It is inappropriate for us to shun security talks with Japan, when Tokyo is talking with Washington on security cooperation on the Korean peninsula."[23]

A year after the declaration's signing, the closer defense relationship began to take a more concrete form via the holding of military exercises. During the first set of exercises in 1999, the two countries mobilized some 1,130 personnel over the course of three days - an impressive dedication of resources given that the entire mobilization was in service of a search and rescue (SAREX) exercise. Japan and South Korea conducted the SAREX again in 2002 – the same year that the "virtual alliance" submitted the Joint U.S.-Japan-ROK Trilateral Statement, condemning the DPRK for violating the 1994 Agreed Framework. A mere five months later, the Republic of Korea Armed Forces (ROKAF), having already sent over 3,400 troops to pacify Afghanistan, would be called upon again, this time to assist with the war in Iraq. South Korea, trapped within the obligations of alliance in the same manner as Japan, became enmeshed in the U.S. "War on Terror."

While the ROKAF and JSDF were separated during their time in Iraq (being deployed to the northern and southern provinces respectively), the two deployed forces were united in their *raison d'être* courtesy of the DPRK. It was the necessity of maintaining a *quid pro quo* security relationship with their U.S. ally in the face of possible North Korean aggression that in the case of ROK President Roh Moo-hyun, forced the ROKAF to deploy to Iraq. Hoon Jaung notes "[The Iraq deployment] was a vital test for President Roh Moo Hyun, whose election in 2002 was evidently helped by the rising tide of anti-Americanism among the young generation, but who nevertheless needed American cooperation in resolving the second North Korean nuclear crisis."[24] Similarly, Christopher Hughes argues that in the case of Japan, the same threat of abandonment to the DPRK by the U.S. served as Koizumi's justification for the JSDF's

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[22] After several rounds of negotiations, U.S. inspectors were eventually granted access to the site in May 1999. The final report stated that Kumchang-ri contained no plutonium-production or reprocessing facilities, although the U.S. maintains that the site could have been intended for other nuclear-related uses. Brooke Milton and Gaurav Kampani, "Uncovering The Truth About North Korea's Alleged Underground Nuclear Facility: The Kumchang-ri Controversy," Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies (July 1999), [accessed October 2, 2011], <http://cns.miis.edu/archive/country_north_korea/uncover.htm >.

[23] Korea Herald, April 15, 1997 as cited in Hahnkyu Park, "Between Caution and Cooperation: The ROK-Japan Security Relationship in the Post-Cold War Period," Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol. 10, No. 1 (1998), p. 102.

[24] Hoon Jaung, "Foreign Policy and South Korean Democracy: The Failure of Party Politics," Taiwan Journal of Democracy, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2005), pp. 49-68.

deployment.[25] The "War on Terror" coupled with the perceived threat north of the 38th parallel, produced other byproducts to include annual Japan-ROK counter-terrorism consultations beginning in 2007, and the aforementioned anti-proliferation joint exercise EAST ENDEAVOR 10.

As successfully as Japanese military globalism may have incorporated South Korea, there are two important caveats. First, even if a "virtual alliance" exists, it is still a long way off from becoming formalized. Ongoing disputes over the Liancourt Rocks and Japanese textbooks continue to complicate relations across the Sea of Japan (or East Sea – the name of the body of water itself being a flashpoint of Japanese and Korean nationalism). Secondly, while Korean and Japanese military cooperation may deepen further in order to deter North Korea, such cooperation is likely to quickly plateau should Japan or the U.S. attempt to involve South Korea in any attempt to balance or contain China.

South Korea has no more interest in attempting to contain China than it does in becoming a Chinese satellite state. Forgetting for the moment that China is South Korea's number one trading partner, a quick glance at the ROK's own military globalism shows that wherever Japan has attempted foster deeper defense relations, China has not been far behind. Annual trilateral summits between South Korea, Japan, and China have been in effect since 2000 - a full two years before the Joint U.S.-Japan-ROK Trilateral Statement. As of July 2011, South Korea and China have agreed to hold strategic defense talks annually. Policy-makers desirous of applying Japan-ROK military relations toward the containment of China, particular in regards to Taiwan, are likely to face an uphill battle.

INDIA: EMERGENCE FROM NEUTRALITY

Not strategically engaging with Japan to any substantive degree until the administration of Japanese Prime Minister Mori in 2000, India is a relative latecomer to Japanese military globalism. The international condemnation and isolation that India incurred from its Pokhran-II nuclear tests, taken within the context of China's growing military capabilities, ensured that once the U.S. initiated a warming of relations in 2001, India would seek new strategic partners while deepening relations with old ones at an unprecedented rate - leading many commentators to speculate that India is abandoning its penchant for Nehruvian neutrality. This foreign policy shift resonated with those of Australia, South Korea, and Japan, producing a rapid increase in Japanese military globalism.

Prior to the end of the Cold War, India's commitment to neutrality meant that relations with Japan were inevitably limited due to Japan being integrally tied to the Western Bloc. However, this obstacle vanished following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. With the fall of the Iron Curtain, Japan found itself as one of the major beneficiaries of India's heightened drive to engage in multilateral security dialogue and exchange. The first manifestation of this came in 1992, when Prime Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao visited Japan. While a handful of ministerial level visits did follow, the bilateral relationship remained sporadic throughout the 1990s.

Part of the problem invariably stemmed from India's Pokhran-II nuclear tests. In May of 1998, India successfully detonated a series of nuclear devices, drawing formal condemnation from the United Nations, and infuriating the U.S., China, and Pakistan. Aside from provoking Pakistan to demonstrate its own nuclear deterrent, the Pokhran-II nuclear tests caught the U.S. red-faced over the obvious failure of its intelligence services, as well as India's explicit violation

[25] Paul Midford, Japanese Public Opinion and the War on Terrorism: Implications for Japan's Security Strategy (Washington, D.C.: East-West Center, 2006), p. 32.

of the U.S. 1994 anti-proliferation law. The U.S. responded with economic sanctions, ending the exportation to India of defense-related materials and technologies. Leveraging the U.S.-Japanese alliance, Washington compelled Tokyo to respond in kind. Following the Pokhran-II tests, Japan ceased all loans and grants except for humanitarian aid. All political and defense exchanges between Japan and India likewise came to a standstill.

Sino-Indian relations were similarly affected. Taken in conjunction with Indian Defense Minister George Fernandes' statement describing China as "India's enemy number one," the Pokhran-II nuclear tests brought Sino-Indian relations to one of their lowest points since the 1962 Sino-Indian War.[26] The reappearance of bellicosity between India and China ensured that India had every incentive to hedge against China through the formation of countervailing defense relations as soon as the political fallout from the Pokhran-II tests dissipated.

It was only when U.S.-Indian relations began to thaw during President Clinton's visit in March of 2000, that Japan was able to fully reciprocate Narasimha Rao's 1992 overture. Eight months after Clinton's visit, Japanese Prime Minister Mori Yoshiro visited Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, proposing that the emerging bilateral relationship be christened the "Global Partnership between Japan and India in the 21st Century." Although China was not publicly mentioned, the fact that George Fernandes spearheaded the ministerial level talks preceding Mori's visit, gives some indication as to the two countries' intent. More recently, I interviewed an official from the Indian Armed forces. He explained that even today, India's primary security threats center around Pakistan and China. While conceding "Truly speaking, Japan cannot do much" in regards to Pakistan, he did offer that being on the opposite side of China helped make Japan an attractive security partner.[27]

The same year as President Clinton's visit, Japan and India marked the institutionalization of defense exchanges by initiating joint Coast Guard training and exchange programs. Henceforth, a synergistic effect with South Korea's own military globalism came into play. At around the same time that Japanese Prime Minister Mori was visiting India in 2000, South Korean Foreign Minister Lee Joung-binn, who was also in New Delhi, opined "India and South Korea are now fully conscious of the new security linkages between the subcontinent and the Korean Peninsula. There have been disturbing reports, over recent years, of nuclear and missile cooperation between Pakistan and North Korea."[28] Such allegations were hardly misplaced. Four years later, Abdul Qadeer Khan, the Pakistani nuclear scientist and national hero who had enabled Pakistan's own nuclear tests in response to Pokhran-II, confessed to having assisted the DPRK's nuclear weapons program from 1991-2000.

Asian security scholars such as Rajeev Sharma (2002), Mohan Malik (2003), and more recently David Brewster (2010), argue that the common denominator of the nuclear crises across the Pakistani-Indian border and the 38th parallel is in fact, China. Brewster argues that as early as 1949, China has sought to check the power of both India and Japan, and that more recently "The Pakistan-North Korea transactions allowed China to create low-cost, local nuclear restraints on both India and Japan while concurrently maintaining some degree of deniability."[29]

While not specifically naming China, the December 2006 joint statement issued by Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo reaffirmed the

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26 BBC News, April 21, 2003.

27 Personal discussion with Indian Armed Forces official, June 30, 2011.

28 David Brewster, "India's Developing Relationship with South Korea: A Useful Friend in East Asia." Asian Survey 50:2 (2010), pp. 402-425.

29 Ibid., p. 409.

two countries commitment to combating terrorism and nuclear proliferation, and was subsequently reaffirmed in 2008 in the Joint Statement on the Advancement of the Strategic and Global Partnership between Japan and India. A year later, the intent behind these statements took concrete form in the 2009 Action Plan to Advance Security Cooperation, presided over by Prime Ministers Hatoyama and Singh. As much as Koizumi is associated with making unprecedented use of the JSDF, it was under Hatoyama that Japan has annualized defense policy dialogues, military exchanges, and joint exercises with India. Moreover, it was under DPJ leadership that Japan established logistical agreements with Australia while negotiating a similar agreement with South Korea. Taken together, these stand as strong evidence of the DPJ's continuation of Japanese military globalism initiated by the LDP.

The most tangible manifestation of Japanese-Indian defense cooperation to date is undoubtedly the MALABAR joint naval exercises between the two countries. Normally an annual joint naval exercise only held between the U.S. and India, in 2007 the Royal Australian Navy, Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force, and Singaporean Navy all participated in the exercises held in the Bay of Bengal. The significance of the event goes beyond the fact that MALABAR 07 marks the first time that the JSDF worked alongside the Indian Armed Forces as a full fledged participant rather than a mere observer. The cast of players in the Bay of Bengal exercises was (minus Singapore) identical to the strategic vision articulated by Shinzo Abe in his book, *Utsukushi Kuni e* (Toward a beautiful country).[30] Interpreting the exercises as the initial framework for an anti-China containment strategy, China submitted formal protests against the new "Quadrilateral Initiative."

Given the exercise's reiteration in 2009, Beijing's protests likely fell on deaf ears. Instead of merely participating in MALABAR 2009, Japan *hosted* the exercise in Sasebo and the waters off Okinawa. Like the ROK-hosted EASTERN ENDEAVOR 10 that took place the following year (in which Japan and Australia also participated), the various players trained for interdiction and anti-proliferation operations. The similarities of the Japan-hosted versus ROK-hosted exercises supports the notion that a similar threat environment has proved conducive to the Japanese military globalism that now links the two countries. Far from constituting mere symbolism, exercises like MALABAR represent the future of Japanese-Indian defense relations. According to one officer from the 7th Fleet flagship, USN BLUE RIDGE, the U.S. Navy looks forward to continuing such exercises, "and advancing into more complex operational and strategic areas that go beyond tactical exercises."[31] So long as Japan and India remain desirous of hedging against China, the U.S. will continue to present amble opportunity to do so.

CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF JAPANESE MILITARY GLOBALISM

Beginning in the late 1990s, Japanese military globalism has undergone both qualitative and quantitative change under the auspices of both the LDP and the DPJ. First cultivating military relations with Australia in 1992 during UNTAC, Japanese globalism subsequently expanded to encompass defense ties with South Korea and then India in 1994 and 2000 respectively. However, despite intensive groundwork laid during the 1990s, it was only at the turn of the century, when the threats of nuclear proliferation, terrorism, the DPRK, and a rising China simultaneously provoked all four nations to initiate, or deepen a multilateral security

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30 Madhuchanda Ghosh, "India and Japan's Growing Synergy: From a Political to a Strategic Focus." Asian Survey 48:2 (2008), pp. 282-302.

31 Josh Cassatt, "India, Japan, U.S. Foster Relationships During MALABAR." Navy.Mil. May 5, 2009, [accessed October 8, 2011], <http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=45022>.

framework, did a synergistic effect take hold, accelerating Japanese globalism. This resonance between the defense policies of Japan, Australia, South Korea, and India produced the phenomena of Japan hosting a joint naval exercise typically held solely between India and the United States, and South Korea hosting an anti-nuclear proliferation exercise with Japanese and Australian participation.

Japan's increasingly sophisticated military globalism validates Samuels' prediction of a Japan that is strategically hedging. However, in contrast to Samuels' prediction, Japan's broadening defense relations are not intended to reduce Japanese dependence on the U.S.-Japan alliance, but are rather intended to complement it. Public attitudes of the threats facing Japan today have shifted markedly since the Bush Administration. Impressions of the U.S. bullying Japan into deploying to Iraq against have given way to images of U.S. service members assisting in reconstruction in the wake of the Tohoku Earthquake. The inept handling of the Futenma Base issue by Prime Minister Hatoyama has demonstrated the delicate nature of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Lastly, since 2009 the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force notes that it has had to triple the number of instances in which it has scrambled fighter jets in response to encroachment by Chinese aircraft. In light of these developments, the tone of Japan's evolving security policy has shifted to emphasize less the danger of U.S. abandonment or entrapment, and more the issue of China's annual double-digit defense budget increases.

The media has made much of the closer military relations between Japan, Australia, South Korea, and India, and has often attributed the construction of this multilateral framework to U.S. pressure. Certainly the U.S. has no uncertain interest in forming a coalition of states seeking to hedge against China's growing military might. As one Pentagon official disclosed, during the annual 2+2 U.S.-Japan defense talks, the U.S. frequently advocates that Japan continue widening its array of security relations.[32] However, there is a tendency to exaggerate the U.S. role in what is in actuality, a much wider trend.

Given the wide range of national interests at stake, U.S. pressure is an insufficient explanation for the rapid expansion of Japanese military globalism. As Japanese resistance to U.S. calls for increased defense expenditures clearly shows, policy areas as critical as defense are, short of the threat of armed conflict, notoriously difficult for outside actors to influence. Instead, the U.S. has played a facilitating role. Instead of forming defense relations from scratch, regional actors are able to utilize the preexisting bilateral relations of the U.S. "hub and spoke" model. Expressed in concrete terms, in many cases U.S.-led joint exercises have been widened to encompass more participants rather than the "new players" having to organize their own.

With Japanese military globalism progressing at such a rapid pace, and the JSDF being deployed farther and more frequently, one must ask to what extent this trend is sustainable in an increasingly stringent fiscal environment. Defense officials with whom I have spoken have expressed misgivings about how the JSDF is constantly being pressured by politicians and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) bureaucrats alike.[33] In a perfect world, the JSDF would be able to answer every call that issued forth from either the U.N. or the U.S., but after a certain point, constantly responding to requests for forces will prove corrosive to Japan's core capability to defend itself. All militaries are confronted with innumerable demands and finite resources, but Japan's unique situation exacerbates this problem.

The JSDF's history of solely working humanitarian and peacekeeping missions has produced a mindset wherein Japanese politicians and public alike far too easily conflate the

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32 Personal discussion with Pentagon official, June 3, 2011.

33 Interview with Japanese Self-Defense Force official, May 11, 2011.

JSDF and its work with that of the U.N., rather than properly conceiving of the military as a *defense* force existing to counter the tangible threats that face Japan today. Of course, the fact that civilians, rather than career military, ultimately decide on JSDF deployments, means that there is no guarantee that Japan's core defense capability *will not* be compromised while in the pursuit of international prestige, or perhaps while seeking to display the solidarity of an alliance. However, token JSDF contributions in Timor-Leste (2 personnel in 2006), Nepal (six personnel in 2007), and Sudan (2 personnel in 2008) may be representative of a JSDF that is driven by a cost/benefit analysis that increasingly favors endeavors of immediate strategic significance over U.N. objectives.

Another potential obstacle to Japan's expanding military globalism is Article Nine. As the author of Article Nine, the U.S.'s expectations of Japan's contribution to the alliance are for the most part, in tune with what Japan is willing and capable of delivering. However, future non-U.S. strategic partners are likely to demand a level of reciprocity that Japan is constitutionally unable to provide. As one Indian defense official explained, Indian-Japanese military relations are already experiencing the constraining influence of Article Nine (as a former F-18 pilot, he complained that he can land Indian military aircraft in U.S. bases in Kadena and Atsugi, but not on a Japanese military base).[34]

The legal barriers regarding foreign military cooperation struck a particularly bitter chord in the aftermath of the Tohoku Earthquake, during which even Indian IL-76 medium range military transport planes, tasked with providing critical lift capability as part of ongoing recovery efforts, were not authorized to land on Japanese airstrips. The fact that such legal barriers remain, despite the flurry of military-to-military exchange that has already taken place between Japan and India, shows the extent to which Japan's non-U.S. military relations have yet to mature to a level that genuinely enhances Japan's capability to defend itself.

[34] Interview with Indian Armed Forces official, June 30, 2011.

INTERVIEWS

NAME	DATE	ORGANIZATION
• • •	May 11, 2011	Japanese Self-Defense Force
• • •	June 03, 2011	U.S. Armed Forces (Regional Affairs)
Tsuneo Watanabe	June 24, 2011	Tokyo Foundation
Yoshinobu Yamamoto	June 24, 2011	Aoyama University
Masashi Nishihara	June 24, 2011	Research Institute for Peace and Security
• • •	June 27, 2011	Japanese Ministry of Defense
• • •	June 30, 2011	Indian Armed Forces
• • •	June 30, 2011	U.S. State Department

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