

Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)

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AES history



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- **1997:** NIST publishes request for proposal
- **1998:** Fifteen proposals
- **1999:** NIST chooses five finalists
 - Mars, RC6, Rijndel, Serpent, Twofish
- **2000:** NIST chooses Rijndael as AES
 - Key sizes: 128, 192, 256
 - the longer, the more secure but the slower
 - Block size: 128 bits
- **2003:** NSA allows AES in classified documents
 - Level SECRET: all key lengths
 - Level TOP SECRET: $k = 256, 512$
 - Never happened before for a public algorithm

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
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Overview



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Key lenght	#rounds
128	10
192	12
256	14

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Introduction



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- AES
 - Has rounds
 - Does not have a Feistel network structure
 - Encrypts an entire block in each round
 - DES encrypts half a block => $\text{#round}_{\text{AES}} < \text{#round}_{\text{DES}}$
 - Data path is called «state»

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Round and layers



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- Each round but the first has three layers
- Layers
 - Key addition layer
 - Byte substitution layer (S-box) - Confusion, Non-linear
 - Diffusion layer - Diffusion
 - Two (linear) sublayers:
 - *ShiftRows* – permute data byte-wise
 - *MixColumn* – Mix blocks of four bytes (matrix operation)
 - Galois fields mathematical setting
 - S-box, MixColumn

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Mathematical setting



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- Galois field $GF(2^8)$
 - Operations in S-box and MixColumn are performed in this field
 - Elements of $GF(2^m)$ can be represented as a polynomials of degree $m - 1$ with parameters in $GF(2)$
 - An A element of $GF(2^8)$ represents one byte
 - $A = a_7x^7 + \dots + a_1x + a_0$ with $a_i \in GF(2) = \{0, 1\}$
 - $A = (a_7, a_6, a_5, a_4, a_3, a_2, a_1, a_0)$
 - We cannot use integer arithmetic
 - We must use polynomial arithmetic

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Mathematical setting



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- Polynomial arithmetic
 - Addition, subtraction
 - Multiplication
 - Core operation of MixColumn
 - Reduction, irreducible polynomial (rough equivalent of prime number)
 - $A(x) \times B(x) \equiv C(x) \pmod{P(x)}$, with $P(x)$ irreducible polynomial of degree m
 - AES: $P(x) = x^8 + x^4 + x^3 + x^1 + 1$

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Mathematical setting



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- Polynomial arithmetic
 - Division
 - Core operation of Byte Substitution (S-boxes)
 - $A(x) \cdot A(x)^{-1} \equiv 1 \pmod{P(x)}$
 - In small fields (smaller than 2^{16} elements), inverse can be precomputed by lookup tables

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
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AES encryption block diagram



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
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AES is a Subs-Perms network

(not a Feistel network)



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
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AES-128 schematics



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
The round function




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- **ByteSub:** a 1-byte S-box (256 byte table)
 - Easily computable

- **ShiftRows:**



- **MixColumns:**
(linear transformations)



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AES Security



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- There is currently no analytical attack against AES known to be more efficient than brute force attack
- For more information about AES security see AES Lounge
 - ECRYPT Network of Excellence (FP6)
 - <https://www.iaik.tugraz.at/content/research/krypto/aes/>

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AES security - best known attacks



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- Best key recovery attack
 - Four times better than exhaustive key search
 - 128-bit key => 126-bit key
- “Related key” attack in AES-256
 - Given 2^{99} pt-ct pairs from four related keys in AES-256, we can recover keys in 2^{99} ($\ll 2^{256}$)
 - Very large data-/time-complexity
 - Randomly generated keys cannot be related

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
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AES Performance (1/2)



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- Software implementation
 - Direct implementation is well-suited for 8-bit processors (e.g., smartcard)
 - Processing 1-byte per instruction
 - For 32-/64-bit architecture, T-box optimization
 - Merge all the round functions into one look-up table (but key addition)
 - 4 tables (1 per byte) of 256 entries; each entry is 32 bit
 - 1 round, 16 lookups
 - Few hundreds Mbit/s



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AES Implementation (2/2)



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- Hardware implementation
 - AES requires more HW resources than DES
 - High throughput implementation in ASIC/FPGA
 - Ten Gigabit/s
 - Block cipher is extremely fast compared to
 - Asymmetric algorithms
 - Compression algorithms
 - Signal processing algorithms
 - For more information see AES Lounge

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Code size/performance tradeoff



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	Code size	Performance
Pre-compute round functions (24KB or 4 KB)	Largest	Fastest (table lookups and xors)
Pre-compute S-box only (256 bytes)	Smaller	Slower
No pre-computation	Smallest	Slowest

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Example: Javascript AES

(Stanford Javascript Crypto Library)



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AES in the browser:



AES library (6.4KB)
no pre-computed tables



Prior to encryption:
pre-compute tables

Then encrypt using tables

<http://crypto.stanford.edu/sjcl/>

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AES in hardware



- AES instructions in Intel Westmere
 - aesenc, aesenclast: do one round of AES
 - 128-bit registers: xmm1 = state, xmm2 = round key
 - aesenc xmm1, xmm2 puts result in xmm1
 - aeskeygenassist performs key expansion
 - Implement AES in ten instructions
 - 9x aesenc + aesenclast
 - Claim 14x speed-up over OpenSSL on the same hw
- Similar instructions for AMD Bulldozer