Foundations of Cybersecurity C/C++ Secure Coding Basics Laboratory Exercises

Michele La Manna Dept. of Information Engineering University of Pisa

michele.lamanna@phd.unipi.it

Version: 2021-03-18

The fool, lazy colleague



In your company there is this dude, super funny but lazy and a fool.

He knows how to put together some lines of code, however, he completely neglects the danger of cyber attacks, malicious users, or monkey users.

{Edit. monkey users: the kind of person who puts a metal spoon in a microwave because he/she saw a lifehack on twitter}

Your colleague wrote some terrible functions, and you need to understand:

- 1. What he wanted to do (total absence of comments);
- 2. Analyze the code and detect vulnerabilities;
- 3. Patch the vulnerability

For some reasons, you can't change some lines, and you also MUST NOT change the main()!

Requests, tips&tricks



The moment after I will give you an exercise, I will write in chat something like "Ready" "I got it" "Done" etc...

Please react to that message **only when you solved the exercise**. In this way I can learn how much time most of the class needs on those kind of assignments.

In these first laboratories I suggest you use https://www.onlinegdb.com/online c++ compiler to test the "lazy colleague's code" and patch it.

Sometimes I will ask questions to some of you, please don't panic! It is only a way to create engagement in the subject, not to humiliate you. If you prefer not to speak out loud, you will not be forced to.



TUTORIAL

DoStuff



```
35
    main() {
36
          string str;
37
          size t offset;
3.8
39
          cout << "Welcome to do stuff() invoker." << endl;</pre>
40
          cout << endl:
41
42
          for(;;) {
43
              cout << "str = ";
44
              cin >> str;
45
              if(!cin) return 0;
4.6
              cout << "offset = ":
47
              cin >> offset:
48
              if(!cin) return 0:
              cin.ignore(numeric limits<streamsize>::max(), '\n'); // clear cin buffer
4.9
              cout << "Invoking do stuff(" << str << "," << offset << ")..." << endl;
50
51
             do stuff(str.c str(), offset);
52
              cout << endi:
5.3
54
          return 0:
55
```



In this function, the parameter (str) must be considered as tainted. For simplicity, we say that the tainted string is also well-formed (it has a terminator, it does not contain problematic characters etc...).

Your dear colleague wanted to make a copy of the string str. However, this operation can lead to a buffer overflow! Indeed, if the size of the parameter str is greater than 100, the strcopy goes beyond the buffer until it reaches the terminator (1 0).

DoStuff Solution#1



We cannot change the buffer dimension, therefore we have to use the function (str**n**copy). In this way, you can force a limit on the number of character to copy inside the buffer.

CAREFUL! The function «strncopy» DOES NOT put a terminator at the last position.

You must remember to manually insert it at the last possible position. https://www.cplusplus.com/reference/cstring/strncpy/?kw=strncpy

DO STUFF#2



What is the objective of the following code? Figure it out!

```
// PART #2
char result2[50]; // UNCHANGEABLE!
memset(result2, 'a', offset);
printf("[do_stuff()] Please type the second part of result2: ");
if (gets(result2 + offset) == NULL) return;
```

10 minutes!



What is the objective of the following code? Figure it out!

```
// PART #2
char result2[50]; // UNCHANGEABLE!
memset(result2, 'a', offset);
printf("[do_stuff()] Please type the second part of result2: ");
if (gets(result2 + offset) == NULL) return;
```

The lazy programmer wants to write the character "a" on the first "offset" bytes of result2.

Then, the user fills the string with some more data from the keyboard.

You have 15 minutes to find and patch the vulnerabilities.

DoStuff Solution#2



First of all, what if the tainted parameter "offset" is greater than 50? We can either make the function return an error code or we can sanitize the offset. https://www.cplusplus.com/reference/cstdio/fgets/

```
// PART #2
char result2[50]; // UNCHANGEABLE!

if (offset > 49) offset = 49;
memset(result2, 'a', offset);
printf("[do_stuff()] Please type the second part of result2: ");
if (fgets(result2 + offset, 50 - offset, stdin) == NULL) return;
char* p = strchr(result2 + offset, '\n');
if (p) { *p = '\0'; }
```

Moreover, remember that the function «fgets» stops reading at either « \n » or « \n ».

The fgets, however, automatically appends the "\0" terminator at the end of the string. Lines 21-22 are **recommended** if you are working with strings acquired from different sources and you want to uniform them (which means all strings must be terminated with only '\0' and have no special characters in them).

DO STUFF#3



What is the objective of the following code? Figure it out!

```
// PART #3
char result3[60]; // UNCHANGEABLE!
strcpy(result3, "abcdefghij");
printf("[do_stuff()] Please type the second part of result3: ");
scanf("%s", result3 + 10); // for esoteric reasons, nothing except scanf() can be used here
```

10 minutes!



What is the objective of the following code? Figure it out!

```
// PART #3
char result3[60]; // UNCHANGEABLE!
strcpy(result3, "abcdefghij");
printf("[do_stuff()] Please type the second part of result3: ");
scanf("%s", result3 + 10); // for esoteric reasons, nothing except scanf() can be used here
```

The lazy programmer wants to prepend the string "abcdefghij" to an input string given by the user.

You have 5 minutes to find and patch the vulnerabilities.

DoStuff Solution#3



This time, the first part of the string is hard-coded and therefore of fixed length.

However, there still is some risk of buffer overflow.

For example, if at line 30 the user would have inserted a 50+ character long string, the scanf could have written out of the "result3" bounds.

```
// PART #3
char result3[60]; // UNCHANGEABLE!
strcpy(result3, "abcdefghij");
printf("[do stuff()] Please type the second part of result3: ");
scanf("%49s", result3 + 10); // for esoteric reasons, nothing except scanf() can be used here
```

To mitigate this problem, we fix the maximum number of characters that the "scanf" can read, through the use of the **sub-specifier** "width".

https://www.cplusplus.com/reference/cstdio/scanf/?kw=scanf

DO STUFF#4



What is the objective of the following code? Figure it out!

```
// PART #4
char result4[40]; // UNCHANGEABLE!
strcpy(result4, "ABCDEFGHIJ");
sprintf(result4 + 10, "--%s--", str); // for esoteric reasons, nothing except sprintf() can be used here
```

10 minutes!



What is the objective of the following code? Figure it out!

```
// PART #4
char result4[40]; // UNCHANGEABLE!
strcpy(result4, "ABCDEFGHIJ");
sprintf(result4 + 10, "--%s--", str); // for esoteric reasons, nothing except sprintf() can be used here
```

The lazy programmer wants to prepend the string "ABCDEFGHIJ" to the input string given by the user at the beginning of the main() function.

You have 10 minutes to find and patch the vulnerabilities.



How many of you applied this solution?

```
// PART #4
char result4[40]; // UNCHANGEABLE!
strcpy(result4, "ABCDEFGHIJ");
sprintf(result4 + 10, "--%25s--", str);
```



DoStuff Solution#4



The solution seems identical to the DoStuff#3 problem, right? **WRONG!**

Although the problem is technically the same, the used functions are different!

```
// PART #4
char result4[40]; // UNCHANGEABLE!
strcpy(result4, "ABCDEFGHIJ");
sprintf(result4 + 10, "--%.25s--") str);
```

The "sprintf" function follows the format string rules of the "printf" family. The width sub-specifier, to the "sprintf" indicates the minimum number of characters to be printed.

To fix the **maximum number of string's character** to be printed, you have to use the **precision sub-specifier**.



width	description
(number)	Minimum number of characters to be printed. If the value to be printed is shorter than this number, the result is padded with blank spaces. The value is not truncated even if the result is larger.
-	The width is not specified in the format string, but as an additional integer value argument preceding the argument that has to be formatted.

.precision	description
.number	For integer specifiers (d, i, o, u, x, X): precision specifies the minimum number of digits to be written. If the value to be written is shorter than this number, the result is padded with leading zeros. The value is not truncated even if the result is longer. A precision of 0 means that no character is written for the value 0. For a, A, e, E, f and F specifiers: this is the number of digits to be printed after the decimal point (by default, this is 6). For g and G specifiers: This is the maximum number of significant digits to be printed. For s: this is the maximum number of characters to be printed. By default all characters are printed until the ending null character is encountered. If the period is specified without an explicit value for precision, 0 is assumed.
	The <i>precision</i> is not specified in the <i>format</i> string, but as an additional integer value argument preceding the argument that has to be formatted.

From: https://www.cplusplus.com/reference/cstdio/printf/

Laboratory Material



Shortly after each laboratory, the slides and the solutions will be uploaded to the "Files" Tab of our MS Teams "General" channel.

See you next week!

