ScienceDirect

Current Opinion in Psychology

Volume 56, April 2024, 101787

Review

Updating the identity-based model of belief: From false belief to the spread of misinformation

Jay J. Van Bavel [a d], Steve Rathje [b], Madalina Vlasceanu [b], Clara Pretus [c]

Show more

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2023.101787

Get rights and content

Full text access

Abstract

The spread of misinformation threatens democratic societies, hampering informed decision-making. Partisan identity biases perceptions of reality, promoting false beliefs. The Identity-based Model of Political Belief explains how social identity shapes information processing and contributes to misinformation. According to this model, social identity goals can override accuracy goals, leading to belief alignment with party members rather than facts. We propose an extended version of this model that incorporates the role of informational context in misinformation belief and sharing. Partisanship involves cognitive and motivational aspects that shape party members' beliefs and actions. This includes whether they seek further evidence, where they seek that evidence, and which sources they trust. Understanding the interplay between social identity and accuracy is crucial in addressing misinformation.

Previous Next

Keywords

Beliefs; Social identity; Partisanship; Misinformation; Conspiracy theories

Introduction

"The human mind serves evolutionary success, not truth. To think otherwise is to resurrect the pre-Darwinian error that humans are different from all other animals".

–John Gray, 2002 (pg 26) [1].

The spread of misinformation and political polarization pose a grave threat to democratic societies, as citizens have trouble making informed choices without access to accurate information. Partisan identity–a set of beliefs and feelings that culminate in a sense of psychological attachment to a political party [2]–often distorts interpretations of factual information, leading to the spread of false beliefs within groups [3,4]. Here, we explain how identities shape information processing and contribute to the belief and dissemination of (mis)information.

Partisanship stems from multiple psychological sources [5]: while instrumental preferences for political parties and leaders are usually grounded in policy preferences and ideological beliefs, partisanship also reflects identification with a party [6,7]. This aspect of partisan identity is consistent with the *Social Identity Approach,* where one's self-concept is derived from their membership in a social group [8, 9, 10]. As such, partisan identities, like all identities, include cognitive elements (e.g., self-perceptions, beliefs about the group, collective experiences, social norms, and informational exposure) as well as motivational factors (e.g., the need for belonging, distinctiveness, and status) that shape the beliefs and actions of party members.

According to the *Identity-based Model of Political Belief* [11], identity goals–like the need to belong–compete with accuracy goals to determine the value of a belief. When partisan identity goals supersede accuracy goals, group members are more likely to align their beliefs with party members rather than facts. Moreover, in-group norms influence whether it is appropriate (or not) to spread dubious or clearly false information. These dynamics can help people fit in and bind groups together, but it can also lead partisans to believe and spread misinformation. If enough partisans spread false content it can be difficult for citizens to develop accurate beliefs and undercut a shared sense of reality and consensus.

Partisanship can generate biases in reasoning, memory, implicit evaluations, and possibly perception of political issues and events [11]. For instance, supporters of President Trump were more likely to falsely believe that he won the 2020 Presidential Election [12], which helped satisfy their needs to belong and retain a superior sense of social status even as it fostered violence and threatened democracy. These false beliefs were amplified and validated by Republican elites and media sources (e.g., Fox News) [13,14]. Partisans who heard these false stories may have ignored or forgotten contradictory evidence and rationalized partisan positions. This helps explain why corrections are often ineffective for highly polarized issues–where identity needs outweigh accuracy goals [15,16].

Here, we present a more comprehensive account of *The Identity-based Model of Belief* [11; see Figure 1]. We incorporate the role of informational context in believing and sharing (mis)information. We then discuss the relationship between accuracy goals and social identity, and how the psychological processes underlying believing and sharing (mis)information are differentially affected by social identity. Finally, we outline future research on misinformation belief and sharing from the perspective of the Identity-Based Model of Belief (including extending the model to other social identities).



Download: Download high-res image (144KB)

Download: Download full-size image

Figure 1. **Updated Identity-based Model of Political Belief** (Mis)information belief is influenced both by accuracy goals, social identity goals, within an informational context. As in the original *Identity-Based Model of Political Belief*, accuracy goals compete with social identity goals to determine the value of belief. However, this updated model illustrates the key role one's informational context can play in shaping beliefs (as well as activating accuracy or identity goals or conveying social norms). Accuracy goals can influence informational context by leading people to seek accurate information, and social identity goals can influence informational context by leading people to seek out partisan media that affirms their identities. Further, social identities can shape accuracy goals, since some identity groups (e.g., scientists, journalists) may have stronger accuracy goals than others (e.g., partisans). Likewise, accuracy goals can also shape people's choice to join certain social identity groups.

Belief updating: the role of social identity and accuracy goals with an informational context

Classic models of belief change relied on a purely rational agent model, assuming that beliefs are updated as a function of new information in a Bayesian fashion [17]. However, people's beliefs may not update in a fully rational fashion [18, 19, 20, 21, 22]. While people are often motivated to be accurate, they also have directional motivations that shape their beliefs [23,24]. Unfortunately, it is often difficult to isolate the causal role motivation plays in shaping people's beliefs due to differences in the informational context.

While partisans are less likely to update their beliefs in response to fact-checks by an out-group member [25], this does not have to be explained through the lens of motivated cognition. Instead, people, operating from a rational "Bayesian" perspective [26], could simply believe out-group sources are less credible and refuse to update their beliefs. Alternatively, they may have been exposed to far more information that aligned with their party identity–leading to strong priors that are resistant to updating in the face of contradictory information (see BOX 1 for debate).

BOX 1

While partisan differences in belief are often attributed to motivated reasoning, these differences may arise because people are exposed to different information sources [27,28]. For example, a Fox News viewer might have very different beliefs about the world than a CNN viewer because they have a strong partisan identity, but also because they are exposed to different information about the world [13]. Indeed, partisan differences in false beliefs about COVID-19, the 2020 Election, and climate change may stem, in part, because Republicans are often exposed to much higher volumes of misinformation [13,29,30]. Thus, it is critical to test the causal role of identity and accuracy goals on beliefs.

New research has found that manipulating accuracy and identity-based motives does indeed shape belief [30]. For instance, giving people a small amount of money to correctly identify true versus false news headlines made people more accurate, and also reduced partisan bias in belief by 31% relative to a non-incentivized control condition. Further, incentivizing people to identify news that would be liked by their political in-group made them *less* accurate at identifying true versus false news [30]. A similar pattern was observed in India using a simulated social media platform [31]. These experiments, as well as other research that manipulate accuracy [32,33] versus social [34] goals, illustrate that motives can–and do–have a causal impact on belief and (mis)information sharing.

We do *not* assume that motivation fully explains partisan differences in belief (see Ref.[35] for a list of other factors). For instance, incentives reduce–but do not fully eliminate–partisan differences in (mis)information belief or sharing [30]. Moreover, shifting information exposure can also shift people's beliefs, underscoring the role of informational context [13]. Disentangling the role of motivation versus prior beliefs is also difficult because identity-based motivations likely shape the information people choose to expose themselves to Ref.[36]. Indeed, people often find it aversive to expose themselves to identity-incongruent information [37]. Thus, identity-based motives shape information exposure, as well as the motivation to be accurate and the salience of social identity [10]. Accuracy and social goals directly influence our beliefs, and indirectly influence our beliefs through selective information exposure (see Figure 1).

The relationship between social identity and accuracy goals

Our model explains why cognitive reflection and accuracy nudges—which makes accuracy goals more salient [38]—are associated with the reduced spread of misinformation. However, the effect size for accuracy interventions appears to be much larger when it directly increases accuracy *goals* (e.g., by directly incentivizing accuracy [30]). Moreover, cognitive reflection is associated with a reduced likelihood of sharing political misinformation on non-polarizing issues only (where partisan motives are relatively weak). Conversely, cognitive reflection does not override social identity demands in the face of politically polarizing messages (although cognitive reflection is associated with sharing fewer false neutral political messages [16]). Therefore, when identity goals are low, accuracy goals play a larger role in (mis)information belief and sharing by motivating people to seek accurate information and respond to accuracy cues (see Fig. 1).

An overlooked aspect of our model is that social identity can shape accuracy goals. First, people are motivated to be accurate but may only trust in-group sources to update their beliefs. For instance, people are less likely to spread misinformation when in-group members (vs. strangers) signal the content is misleading [39]. Social identity can thus influence which sources are credible when seeking accurate information. Second, different identities are linked to different norms about accuracy. For instance, scientists are expected to challenge their own beliefs and update them in the face of new evidence [40], while religious followers are expected to believe religious content on faith without requesting further evidence [41]. These epistemic norms have a signaling function, as people who pursue and forgo further inquiry are perceived as being more committed to science and religion, respectively [42]. Social groups thus provide norms about the appropriate level of inquiry and what sources to trust and may account for partisan differences in belief and (mis)information sharing.

Our model is distinct from other theories of identity-protective cognition, in which people with greater reasoning ability engage in greater motivated reasoning [43]. For example, an influential study found that people were bad at solving a math problem if the answer to that math problem did not correspond with their political beliefs–and this tendency was pronounced for those who *scored highest* on a measure of numeracy [44]. However, this surprising finding is difficult to replicate [45, 46, 47]. On average, numeracy and reasoning ability are correlated with greater

accuracy [48] and less conspiratorial beliefs [49]. Similarly, we argue that factors associated with accuracy goals (like the ability and willingness to engage in reasoning) tend to offset social identity goals and lead to more accurate beliefs and information sharing (see BOX 2 for details).

BOX 2

It remains an open question whether accuracy versus identity goals tend to dominate beliefs and sharing. A core element of survival requires people to accurately represent the world. Indeed, the vast majority of people across the political spectrum report that sharing accurate content is extremely important [50] and they express concern about misinformation and conspiracy theories going viral [30]. In contrast, only a very small percentage of people endorse purposely sharing misinformation online [50]. As such, we speculate that accuracy goals are more important–on average–in generating most beliefs.

The relative strength of accuracy versus identity goals depends on individual differences as well as the social context. Among committed partisans, identity goals can occasionally outweigh accuracy goals and lead them to believe and spread misinformation in some contexts [11]. Similarly, individuals high in the "Need for Chaos"–who wish to see the political order "burn down"–are more likely to purposely share hostile political rumors online, further illustrating how some personality traits might be correlated with reduced accuracy motivations [51].

Beyond these individual differences, aspects of the social context might trigger these motivations. Social media is a context where social identity is made highly salient [52], and where people frequently signal their social identity in their social media bios [53]. By contrast, some professions–such as journalism or science–might make accuracy goals more salient [54]. Thus, we believe it is fruitful to understand how individual differences and the social context lead people to care more about accuracy or social identity.

It is currently difficult to measure accuracy and identity goals. Directly asking people how much they care about sharing accurate content may be prone to social desirability biases or a lack of self-awareness. However, there are several measures that loosely capture the value people place on accurate responding (e.g., the Cognitive Reflection Task, Intellectual Humility, and Actively Open-Minded Thinking). Likewise, there are individual measures that capture strength of in-group identification (e.g. Ref.[55]) that include scale items such as "I feel a bond with [in-group]." But these measures do not capture the specific identity goals that drive identification.

In our opinion, a more promising approach to measuring the impact of accuracy and identity-based motivations is to experimentally manipulate them. This allows for a causal test of these different motives on the belief and dissemination of true and false information. It also allows researchers to explore how accuracy and identity motivations can be reinforced or made salient by aspects of the social context. For instance, we recently manipulated accuracy and social identity-based motivations via financial incentives and other means, finding that these manipulations impacted belief in (mis)information [30]. Likewise, threatening or frustrating identity motives might impact these motives. Another way to manipulate social identity motivations is via the "minimal group paradigm," whereby people are randomly assigned to new social groups [56]. Minimal groups may be useful for future work on identity and belief in (mis)information, since it allows researchers to isolate the effect of social identity from other variables (e.g., ideology, pre-existing beliefs about certain groups, etc.).

Another way to disentangle the influences of accuracy versus identity goals is to pit them against each other in a rational belief updating paradigm [57]. This involves measuring beliefs at pretest, providing participants with relevant evidence to each belief, either supporting or refuting the initial beliefs, and then

measuring the beliefs again at post-test. Importantly, the beliefs assessed are either neutral or ideologically charged. This paradigm allows the assessment of the degree of rational updating people engage in when their neutral beliefs are threatened (in which case an accuracy goal is likely at play) compared to when their ideological beliefs are threatened (in which case an identity goal is more likely active). One caveat with this approach is that the initial beliefs might reflect motivational factors (i.e., people report what they want to believe). As such, this approach is ill suited to rule out motivation per se.

How social identity influences (mis-)information belief versus sharing

We make a distinction between the psychological processes underlying information belief and information sharing. Although beliefs tend to be highly correlated with sharing decisions [4], beliefs are not always connected to sharing decisions [58]. While people accurately classify misinformation as false, actual information veracity does not always influence whether they are willing to share it or not. Sharing decisions have a strong social signaling function related to social identity goals and norms [16]. Thus, social identity not only affects sharing decisions indirectly via information belief but also directly through social identity goals (see Figure 1).

Future research

The Identity-Based Model of Political Belief [11] was born out of the desire to understand the growing partisan divide in the U.S. and other polarized nations. However, the model is not limited to politics–it is grounded in the social identity approach and should generalize to intergroup conflict outside partisan domains, including sports fans, religious groups, and nationalities. Indeed, the model should even hold in minimal group contexts where there are *no prior beliefs* about either group [59,60]. Studying the model in these domains is not only important to test generalizability, but it may help isolate the impact of motivational factors.

The model also suggests that certain identities can bolster accuracy, rather than undercutting it. For example, a scientist or journalist might have a strong motivation to be accurate (and build their reputation on accuracy) whereas a partisan might have stronger motives to conform to their in-group. Future work should explore how systemic forces, such as the incentive structures of social media [61, 62∗, 63] or the process of peer review for scientists [64], influence accuracy and identity motives. Relatedly, research should probe how norms and structures can increase the value people place on accuracy goals.

While partisanship influences beliefs, beliefs also influence partisanship. For instance, research has found that correcting false beliefs can decrease political and ethnic polarization [65, 66, 67, 68]. This may explain why misleading information–such as conspiracy theories–can lead to a vicious cycle of false beliefs and intergroup conflict [69]. As such, research should integrate the recursive role of beliefs in the spread of misinformation. Interventions that correct false group-based beliefs might, in turn, mitigate the spread of partisan misinformation.

Discussion

Partisanship can override accuracy concerns, resulting in politically biased beliefs and the spread of misinformation. However, this is only a partial picture of misinformation. A fuller accounting requires understanding numerous other factors [63,70], including the information ecosystem that is usually outside the scope of psychology (including historical, sociological, political, economic, and technological factors). Nevertheless, we believe that any complete analysis of misinformation should incorporate the role of social identity.

Funding

This paper was supported by a grant from the Templeton World Charity Foundation (TWCF-2022-30561; doi.org/10.54224/30561 ↗) to JVB, and a grant from the Russell Sage Foundation Awarded to JVB and SR (G-2110-33990).

Declaration of competing interest

The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper.

Special issue articles Recommended articles

Data availability

No data was used for the research described in the article.

References

1 J. Gray
Straw dogs: thoughts on humans and other animals
Granta Books, London (2002)
Google Scholar ↗

2 A. Campbell, P.E. Converse, W.E. Miller, D.E. Stokes
The American voter
John Wiley & Sons, New York (1960)
Google Scholar ↗

3 M. Osmundsen, A. Bor, P. Vahlstrup, A. Bechmann, M. Petersen
Partisan polarization is the primary psychological motivation behind political fake news sharing on twitter
Am Polit Sci Rev, 115 (2021), pp. 999-1015
Crossref ↗ View in Scopus ↗ Google Scholar ↗

4∗∗ A. Pereira, E. Harris, J.J. Van Bavel
Identity concerns drive belief: the impact of partisan identity on the belief and dissemination of true and false news
Group Process Intergr Relat (2023), 10.1177/13684302211030004 ↗
Google Scholar ↗

Democrats and Republicans were both more likely to believe misinformation that was negative about their out-group or positive about their in-group. Republicans were more likely to believe in and share apolitical news.

5 L. Huddy, A. Bankert
Political partisanship as a social identity
Oxford research encyclopedia of politics, Oxford University Press (2017), 10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.250 ↗
Google Scholar ↗

6 S. Greene

Social identity theory and party identification

Soc Sci Q, 85 (2004), pp. 136-153

View in Scopus ↗ Google Scholar ↗

7 S. Iyengar, G. Sood, Y. Lelkes

Affect, not ideology: a social identity perspective on polarization

Publ Opin Q, 76 (2012), pp. 405-431

Crossref ↗ View in Scopus ↗ Google Scholar ↗

8 H. Tajfel

Human groups and social categories

Cambridge University Press (1981)

Google Scholar ↗

9 H. Tajfel, J. Turner

An integrative theory of intergroup conflict

W.G. Austin, S. Worchel (Eds.), The social psychology of intergroup relations, Brooks/Cole (1979), pp. 33-47

Google Scholar ↗

10 J.C. Turner, M.A. Hogg, P.J. Oakes, S.D. Reicher, M.S. Wetherell

Rediscovering the social group: a self-categorization theory

Basil Blackwell (1987)

Google Scholar ↗

11** J.J. Van Bavel, A. Pereira

The partisan brain: an identity-based model of political belief

Trends Cognit Sci, 22 (2018), pp. 213-224

View PDF View article View in Scopus ↗ Google Scholar ↗

This paper presented a model explaining how identity and accuracy goals shape beliefs. The current paper expands on this earlier paper by extending this analysis to the spread of misinformation and incorporating other psychology elements into the model (e.g., informational context).

12 G. Pennycook, D.G. Rand

Research note: examining false beliefs about voter fraud in the wake of the 2020 Presidential Election

HKS Misinfo Rev (2021), 10.37016/mr-2020-51 ↗

Google Scholar ↗

13 D. Broockman, J. Kalla

Consuming cross-cutting media causes learning and moderates attitudes: a field experiment with Fox News viewers

OSF (2022), 10.31219/osf.io/jrw26 ↗

Google Scholar ↗

14 V. Vellani, S. Zheng, D. Ercelik, T. Sharot

The illusory truth effect leads to the spread of misinformation

Cognition, 236 (2023), Article 105421

View PDF View article View in Scopus ↗ Google Scholar ↗

15** M.S. Chan, D. Albarracín
Ameta-analysis of correction effects in science-relevant misinformation
Nat Human Behav (2023), 10.1038/s41562-023-01623-8 ↗
Google Scholar ↗

This meta-analysis of 205 effect sizes showed that attempts to debunk science-relevance information were not effective on average (d=0.19, P=0.131, 95% confidence interval−0.06 to 0.43). Corrections were most effective when they were concerning issues that were not politically polarized.

16* C. Pretus, C. Servin-Barthet, E.A. Harris, W.J. Brady, O. Vilarroya, J.J. Van Bavel
The role of political devotion in sharing partisan misinformation and resistance to fact-checking
J Exp Psychol (2023), 10.1037/xge0001436 ↗
Google Scholar ↗

Accuracy nudges and fact-checks were ineffective in reducing people's likelihood of sharing partisan misinformation among conservatives and far-right supporters in Spain and the US. Extreme partisans were more likely to share misinformation, especially on polarizing issues.

17 A. Gerber, D. Green
Misperceptions about perceptual bias
Annu Rev Polit Sci, 2 (1999), pp. 189-210
View in Scopus ↗ Google Scholar ↗

18 B.A. Bettencourt, D. Hume
The cognitive contents of social-group identity: values, emotions, and relationships
Eur J Soc Psychol, 29 (1999), pp. 113-121
View in Scopus ↗ Google Scholar ↗

19 R.B. Cialdini, N.J. Goldstein
Social influence: compliance and conformity
Annu Rev Psychol, 55 (2004), pp. 591-621
View in Scopus ↗ Google Scholar ↗

20 R.B. Cialdini, M.R. Trost
Social influence: social norms, conformity and compliance
D.T. Gilbert, S.T. Fiske, G. Lindzey (Eds.), The handbook of social psychology, McGraw-Hill (1998), pp. 151-192
Google Scholar ↗

21 P.C.L. Heaven
Group identities and human values
J Soc Psychol, 139 (1999), pp. 590-595
Crossref ↗ View in Scopus ↗ Google Scholar ↗

22 D. Kahan
Fixing the communications failure
Nature, 463 (2010), pp. 296-297
Crossref ↗ View in Scopus ↗ Google Scholar ↗

23 Z. Kunda
The case for motivated reasoning

Psychol Bull, 108 (1990), pp. 480-498

View in Scopus ↗ Google Scholar ↗

24 C. Taber, M. Lodge

Motivated skepticism in the evaluation of political beliefs

Am J Polym Sci, 50 (2006), pp. 755-769

Crossref ↗ View in Scopus ↗ Google Scholar ↗

25 D.A. Reinero, E.A. Harris, S. Rathje, A. Duke, J.J. Van Bavel

Partisans are more likely to entrench their beliefs in misinformation when political outgroup members fact-check claims

(2023)

https://psyarxiv.com/z4df3/ ↗

Google Scholar ↗

26 A. Jern, K.K. Chang, C. Kemp

Belief polarization is not always irrational

Psychol Rev, 121 (2014), pp. 206-224

Crossref ↗ View in Scopus ↗ Google Scholar ↗

27 J.N. Druckman, M.C. McGrath

The evidence for motivated reasoning in climate change preference formation

Nat Clim Change, 9 (2019), pp. 111-119

Crossref ↗ View in Scopus ↗ Google Scholar ↗

28 B.M. Tappin, G. Pennycook, D.G. Rand

Rethinking the link between cognitive sophistication and politically motivated reasoning

J Exp Psychol, 150 (2021), pp. 1095-1114

Crossref ↗ View in Scopus ↗ Google Scholar ↗

29 S. Rathje, J.K. He, J. Roozenbeek, J.J. Van Bavel, S. van der Linden

Social media behavior is associated with vaccine hesitancy

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. Nexus, 1 (2022), p. pgac207

View in Scopus ↗ Google Scholar ↗

30∗∗ S. Rathje, J. Roozenbeek, J.J. Van Bavel, S. van der Linden

Accuracy and social motivations shape judgements of (mis) information

Nat Human Behav, 7 (2023), pp. 892-903

Crossref ↗ View in Scopus ↗ Google Scholar ↗

Financial incentives for accuracy improved people's accuracy at discerning between true and false news headlines. Incentivizing people to identify news that would be liked by their political allies, by contrast, decreased accuracy.

31 H. Kapoor, S. Rezaei, S. Gurjar, A. Tagat, D. George, Y. Budhwar, A. Puthillam

Does incentivization promote sharing “true” content online?

HKS Misinfo Rev (2023), 10.37016/mr-2020-120 ↗

Google Scholar ↗

32 F. Panizza, P. Ronzani, C. Martini, S. Mattavelli, T. Morisseau, M. Motterlini

Lateral reading and monetary incentives to spot disinformation about science
Sci Rep, 12 (2022), p. 5678
View in Scopus ↗ Google Scholar ↗

33 M. Prior, G. Sood, K. Khanna
You cannot be serious: the impact of accuracy incentives on partisan bias in reports of economic perceptions
Quart J Polit Sci, 10 (2015), pp. 489-518
Crossref ↗ View in Scopus ↗ Google Scholar ↗

34 Z. Epstein, N. Sirlin, A. Arechar, G. Pennycook, D. Rand
The social media context interferes with truth discernment
Sci Adv, 9 (2023), Article eabo6169
View in Scopus ↗ Google Scholar ↗

35 J.J. Van Bavel, S. Rathje, E. Harris, C. Robertson, A. Sternisko
How social media shapes polarization
Trends Cognit Sci, 25 (2021), pp. 913-916
View PDF View article View in Scopus ↗ Google Scholar ↗

36 W. Hart, D. Albarracín, A.H. Eagly, I. Brechan, M.J. Lindberg, L. Merrill
Feeling validated versus being correct: a meta-analysis of selective exposure to information
Psychol Bull, 135 (2009), p. 555
Crossref ↗ View in Scopus ↗ Google Scholar ↗

37 J.A. Frimer, L.J. Skitka, M. Motyl
Liberals and conservatives are similarly motivated to avoid exposure to one another's opinions
J Exp Soc Psychol, 72 (2017), pp. 1-12
View PDF View article View in Scopus ↗ Google Scholar ↗

38 G. Pennycook, J. McPhetres, Y. Zhang, J.G. Lu, D.G. Rand
Fighting COVID-19 misinformation on social media: experimental evidence for a scalable accuracy-nudge intervention
Psychol Sci, 31 (2020), pp. 770-780
Crossref ↗ View in Scopus ↗ Google Scholar ↗

39* C. Pretus, A. Javeed, D.R. Hughes, K. Hackenburg, M. Tsakiris, O. Vilarroya, J.J. Van Bavel
The Misleading count: an identity-based intervention to mitigate the spread of partisan misinformation
Phil Trans Roy Soc Lond B (2023), p. 376
Google Scholar ↗

Crowdsourced accuracy judgments were five times more effective in reducing misinformation sharing than the accuracy nudge among liberals and conservatives in the US and the UK. Accuracy judgments were more effective when they came from the ingroup compared to strangers in the US.

40 R.K. Merton
Science and the social order
Philos Sci, 5 (1938), pp. 321-337
Google Scholar ↗

41 L. Buchak
Can it be rational to have faith?
J. Chandler, V. Harrison (Eds.), Probability in the philosophy of religion, Oxford University Press (2012), p. 225
Crossref ↗ View in Scopus ↗ Google Scholar ↗

42* M. Gill, T. Lombrozo
Seeking evidence and explanation signals religious and scientific commitments
Cognition, 238 (2023), Article 105496
View PDF View article View in Scopus ↗ Google Scholar ↗

Pursuing further inquiry about science or religion was associated with a greater perceived commitment to science, while forgoing further inquiry about religion was associated with a greater perceived commitment to religion. Seeking or not further inquiry is subject to scientific and religious norms.

43 D.M. Kahan
Ideology, motivated reasoning, and cognitive reflection
Judgm Decis Mak, 8 (2013), pp. 407-424
Crossref ↗ View in Scopus ↗ Google Scholar ↗

44 D. Kahan, E. Peters, E. Dawson, P. Slovic
Motivated numeracy and enlightened self-government
Behav Public Policy, 1 (2017), pp. 54-86
Crossref ↗ View in Scopus ↗ Google Scholar ↗

45 P. Connor, E. Sullivan, M. Alfano, N. Tintarev
Motivated numeracy and active reasoning in a Western European sample
Behav Public Policy (2020), pp. 1-23
View in Scopus ↗ Google Scholar ↗

46 E. Persson, D. Andersson, L. Koppel, D. Västfjäll, G. Tinghög
Apreregistered replication of motivated numeracy
Cognition, 214 (2021), Article 104768
View PDF View article View in Scopus ↗ Google Scholar ↗

47 M.N. Stagnaro, B.M. Tappin, D.G. Rand
No association between numerical ability and politically motivated reasoning in a large US probability sample
Proc Natl Acad Sci USA, 120 (2023), Article e2301491120
View in Scopus ↗ Google Scholar ↗

48 G. Pennycook, D.G. Rand
Lazy, not biased: **susceptibility to partisan fake news is better explained by lack of reasoning than by motivated reasoning**
Cognition, 188 (2019), pp. 39-50
View PDF View article View in Scopus ↗ Google Scholar ↗

49 S.M. Bowes, T.H. Costello, A. Tasimi
The conspiratorial mind: a meta-analytic review of motivational and personalogical correlates
Psychol Bull, 149 (2023), pp. 259-293

Crossref ↗ View in Scopus ↗ Google Scholar ↗

50 G. Pennycook, Z. Epstein, M. Mosleh, A.A. Arechar, D. Eckles, D.G. Rand
Shifting attention to accuracy can reduce misinformation online
Nature, 592 (2021), pp. 590-595
Crossref ↗ Google Scholar ↗

51 M. Petersen, M. Osmundsen, K. Arceneaux
The "need for Chaos" and motivations to share hostile political rumors
Am Polit Sci Rev, 117 (2023), pp. 1486-1505
Crossref ↗ View in Scopus ↗ Google Scholar ↗

52 W.J. Brady, M.J. Crockett, J.J. Van Bavel
The MAD model of moral contagion: the role of motivation, attention, and design in the spread of moralized content online
Perspect Psychol Sci, 15 (2020), pp. 978-1010
Crossref ↗ View in Scopus ↗ Google Scholar ↗

53 N. Rogers, J.J. Jone
Using twitter bios to measure changes in self-identity: are Americans defining themselves more politically over time?
J Social Comput, 2 (2021), pp. 1-13
View in Scopus ↗ Google Scholar ↗

54 J.J. Van Bavel, D.A. Reinero, E. Harris, C.E. Robertson, P. Pärnamets
Breaking groupthink: why scientific identity and norms mitigate ideological epistemology
Psychol Inq, 31 (2020), pp. 66-72
Crossref ↗ View in Scopus ↗ Google Scholar ↗

55 C.W. Leach, M. van Zomeren, S. Zebel, M.L.W. Vliek, S.F. Pennekamp, B. Doosje, J.W. Ouwerkerk, R. Spears
Group-level self-definition and self-investment: a hierarchical (multicomponent) model of in-group identification
J Pers Soc Psychol, 95 (2008), pp. 144-165
Crossref ↗ View in Scopus ↗ Google Scholar ↗

56 H. Tajfel
Experiments in intergroup discrimination
Sci Am, 223 (1970), pp. 96-103
Crossref ↗ Google Scholar ↗

57 M. Vlasceanu, M.J. Morais, A. Coman
The effect of prediction error on belief update across the political spectrum
Psychol Sci, 32 (2021), pp. 916-933
Crossref ↗ View in Scopus ↗ Google Scholar ↗

58 B. Gawronski, N.L. Ng, D.M. Luke
Truth sensitivity and partisan bias in responses to misinformation
J Exp Psychol Gen, 152 (2023), pp. 2205-2236
Crossref ↗ View in Scopus ↗ Google Scholar ↗

59 M.B. Brewer
In-group bias in the minimal intergroup situation: a cognitive-motivational analysis
Psychol Bull, 86 (1979), p. 307
View in Scopus ↗ Google Scholar ↗

60 H. Tajfel, M.G. Billig, R.P. Bundy, C. Flament
Social categorization and intergroup behaviour
Eur J Soc Psychol, 1 (1971), pp. 149-178
Crossref ↗ View in Scopus ↗ Google Scholar ↗

61 L.K. Globig, N. Holtz, T. Sharot
Changing the incentive structure of social media platforms to halt the spread of misinformation
Elife, 12 (2023), Article e85767
View in Scopus ↗ Google Scholar ↗

62* S. Rathje, J.J. Van Bavel, S. Van Der Linden
Out-group animosity drives engagement on social media
Proc Natl Acad Sci USA, 118 (2021), Article e2024292118
Google Scholar ↗

This paper analyzed large datasets of tweets and Facebook posts from US congress members and partisan news media sources, finding that posts that were negative about the political out-group were much more likely to go “viral.”

63 J.J. Van Bavel, E.A. Harris, P. Pärnamets, S. Rathje, K.C. Doell, J.A. Tucker
Political psychology in the digital (mis) information age: a model of news belief and sharing
Soc Issues Policy Rev, 15 (2021), pp. 84-113
Google Scholar ↗

64 J.J. Van Bavel, D.A. Reinero, E. Harris, C.E. Robertson, P. Pärnamets
Breaking groupthink: why scientific identity and norms mitigate ideological epistemology
Psychol Inq, 31 (2020), pp. 66-72
Google Scholar ↗

65 J. Lees, M. Cikara
Inaccurate group meta-perceptions drive negative out-group attributions in competitive contexts
Nat Human Behav, 4 (2020), pp. 279-286
Google Scholar ↗

66 J.S. Mernyk, S.L. Pink, J.N. Druckman, R. Willer
Correcting inaccurate metaperceptions reduces Americans' support for partisan violence
Proc Natl Acad Sci USA, 119 (2022), Article e2116851119
Google Scholar ↗

67 K. Ruggeri, B. Većkalov, L. Bojanić, T.L. Andersen, S. Ashcroft-Jones, N. Ayacaxli, P. Barea-Arroyo, M.L. Berge, L.D. Bjørndal, A. Bursalıoğlu, V. Bühler, M. Čadek, M. Çetinçelik, G. Clay, A. Cortijos-Bernabeu, K. Damnjanović, T.M. Dugue, M. Esberg, C. Esteban-Serna, E.N. Felder, M. Friedemann, D.I. Frontera-Villanueva, P. Gale, E. Garcia-Garzon, S.J. Geiger, L. George, A. Girardello, A. Gracheva, A. Gracheva, M. Guillory, M. Hecht, K. Herte, B. Hubená, W. Ingalls, L. Jakob, M. Janssens, H. Jarke, O. Kácha, K.N. Kalinova, R. Karakasheva, P.R. Khorrami, Ž. Lep, S. Lins, I.S. Lofthus, S. Mamede, S. Mareva, M.F. Mascarenhas, L. McGill, S. Morales-Izquierdo, B. Moltrecht, T.S. Mueller, M. Musetti, J. Nelsson, T. Otto, A.F.

Paul, I. Pavlović I, M.B. Petrović, D. Popović, G.M. Prinz, J. Razum, I. Sakelariev, V. Samuels, Sanguino, N. Say, J. Schuck, I. Soysal, A.L. Todsen, M.R. Tünte, M. Vdovic, J. Vintr, M. Vovko, M.A. Vranka, L. Wagner, L. Wilkins, M. Willems, E. Wisdom, A. Yosifova, S. Zeng, M.A. Ahmed, T. Dwarkanath, M. Cikara, J. Lees, T. Folke
The general fault in our fault lines
Nat Human Behav, 5 (2021), pp. 1369-1380
Google Scholar ↗

68 J.G. Voelkel, J. Chu, M.N. Stagnaro, J.S. Mernyk, C. Redekopp, S.L. Pink, J.N. Druckman, D.G. Rand, R. Willer
Interventions reducing affective polarization do not necessarily improve anti-democratic attitudes
Nat Human Behav, 7 (2023), pp. 55-64
Google Scholar ↗

69 A. Sternisko, A. Cichocka, J.J. Van Bavel
The dark side of social movements: social identity, non-conformity, and the lure of conspiracy theories
Curr Opin Psychol, 35 (2020), pp. 1-6
Google Scholar ↗

70 S. Van Der Linden
Misinformation: susceptibility, spread, and interventions to immunize the public
Nat Med, 28 (2022), pp. 460-467
Google Scholar ↗

Cited by (22)

Susceptibility to online misinformation: A systematic meta-analysis of demographic and psychological factors ↗
2024, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America

Political polarization and health ↗
2024, Nature Medicine

Understanding the Impact of AI-Generated Deepfakes on Public Opinion, Political Discourse, and Personal Security in Social Media ↗
2024, IEEE Security and Privacy

Engaging with Conspiracy Believers ↗
2024, Review of Philosophy and Psychology

What Is Unique About Acceptance and Correction of Misinformation? Insights From Work on Attitudes, Persuasion, and Beyond ↗
2024, American Psychologist

For Palestine or for us too? Examining Indonesian youth's willingness to buy local products amid the Israel boycott ↗

2024, Journal of Islamic Marketing

View all citing articles on Scopus ↗

View Abstract