

# **UK blackout on 9<sup>th</sup> of August: How should we operate a low-inertia power grid?**

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# What happened on 9 August?

A lightning strike caused the outage of a gas plant and an offshore windfarm.

## Consequences


- 1.1 million electricity customers were without power for between 15 and 50 minutes.
- Significant disruption in the rail network.
- Some other critical facilities affected: Ipswich hospital and Newcastle airport.

# What happened on 9 August?

## nationalgridESO Interim Report

First generation  
outage


5 min to restore frequency



# Why is it difficult to operate a grid with renewables?


## Challenges of Renewables

### Uncertainty




*Difficult to forecast  
when the wind will blow*

### Variability



*Clouds cover the sun*


### Low Inertia



# What does “low inertia” mean?

“Inertia” means physical inertia, a **rotating mass**

*Thermal generators  
(nuclear, gas, coal...):*



*Most renewables:  
no inertia*



**Inertia is related to frequency:**  
the rotating speed of these masses is what sets the electrical frequency at 50Hz.

- *After a generation outage, the rotating masses slow down as they spontaneously release kinetic energy. Therefore frequency decreases.*

# Why is frequency important?

**Devices can be damaged** if frequency falls too low: protection mechanisms disconnect generators and loads if they detect low frequencies.

**Risk of frequency instability has increased** due to low inertia: the kinetic energy stored in the rotating masses gave us time to contain the frequency drop!

**So, would the outage not have happened if there were no renewables?**

Renewables increase the risk, because frequency drops faster when there is less inertia available. But **the outage could still have happened** if there were no renewables (see [outage of 2008](#)).

# My research: “insurance” to prevent outages

**Swing equation:**

$$2H \frac{d\Delta f(t)}{dt} + D \cdot P_D \cdot \Delta f(t) = -P_{\text{Loss}}^{\text{max}} + \sum \text{FR}(t)$$

*Loss of largest  
power infeed  
(N-1 requirement)*

*Power injection  
following loss,  
increases over time*

## Nomenclature


$H$ : System's inertia

$D$ : Load damping factor

$P_D$ : System's demand


$P_{\text{Loss}}^{\text{max}}$ : Largest possible power loss  
in the system

$\text{FR}(t)$ : Frequency Response



## My research

**Goal:** to optimise the cost of ancillary services that are needed because of low inertia



Achieve **minimum cost** while keeping the **system stable**



## Could things have gone better on August 9?

Enough “insurance” had been bought to cover the *N*-1 outage (typical approach in most countries), but **the event was a rare *N*-2 loss.**

**Should we pay for *N*-2 insurance then?**

It makes economic sense to risk having an outage of this size roughly every ten years: the **operating cost of the grid would increase by more than £300M/year** for reaching this level of security.

In the future, with increasing renewables, much more insurance would be necessary for covering the *N*-2 contingency.

## Could things have gone better on August 9?

Actually, **things went quite well**, this being a highly unlikely event: frequency was restored in 5 min, all load was restored within 50 min.

A **national blackout was avoided** due to disconnecting this 5% of the total load.

**What could have been done differently?**

Probably **prioritising load**, as the rail service disruption took much longer to be solved.

For more **info on the outage of August 9**:

- Prof. Tim Green's [blog entry](#)
- Prof. Keith Bell's [blog entry](#)
- National Grid's [report](#)

Want to know more on **optimising the provision of this “insurance”**?

- Check my website <https://badber.github.io/>

Topics like Stochastic Programming, Convex Optimisation, Chance constraints...