

Universitatea “Alexandru Ioan Cuza” din Iași
Facultatea de Informatică



LUCRARE DE LICENȚĂ

Multilinear Maps over Ideal Lattices

propusă de

Student: Ciprian Băetu

Coordonator științific: Prof. Dr. Ferucio Laurențiu Țiplea

Sesiunea: iunie - iulie
2017

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Introduction

Usually, cryptographic primitives are constructed under the assumption that several problems are intractable, i.e. there exist no polynomial-running time algorithm to solve them. Vercauteren [24] realized an extensive research regarding the intractable problems that are most used in cryptography, such as integer factoring, discrete logarithm, computational Diffie-Hellman, shortest vector problem and many others.

In the last ten years, bilinear maps proved to be very useful in cryptography. Making use of the interesting properties of such maps, cryptographers managed to construct schemes for one-round three-party key exchange [18], identity based encryption [4] and many other applications. After the moment that bilinear maps proved to be undoubtedly useful, researchers have tried to generalize the concept. Thus, multilinear maps were defined and the search for their applications has begun. Boneh and Silverberg [5] showed that symmetric multilinear maps can be used to realize a one-round multi-party key exchange scheme but, after their attempts to construct such maps failed, they drew the conclusion that "such maps might have to either come from outside the realm of algebraic geometry, or occur as 'unnatural' computable maps arising from geometry."

Garg, Gentry and Halevi [11] proposed a construction based on lattices that approximate the multilinear maps in hard-discrete-logarithm groups. Using this candidate, they could construct an application to multipartite Diffie-Hellman key exchange scheme and also the first construction of Attribute-Based Encryption for general circuits [13]. A short period after the aforementioned candidate was proposed, Coron, Lepoint and Tibouchi [9] created a similar construction, based on integers instead of lattices.

However, these construction proved to be susceptible to attacks, and a devastating zeroizing attack for the integer construction is presented thoroughly in [7]. Numerous fixing tentatives of these schemes were designed, but for each of them there was found at least another attack. Therefore currently, new methods of constructing multilinear maps and Graded Encoding Schemes still constitute an open field, very interesting for cryptographers.

Contribution

This work represents a survey over the bilinear and multilinear maps and their applications. Furthermore, in this paper is presented the concept of *Graded Encoding Scheme*, a modality of approximating multilinear maps. The core of the thesis is represented by the review of the lattice-based construction, designed by Garg, Gentry and Halevi in [11], preceded by presentation of the useful mathematical concepts. Also, attacks on the construction are disclosed and explained thoroughly in the last part of the work.

Organization

The paper is divided into four chapters. The first chapter presents notions that are indispensable for understanding the thesis, such as bilinear maps, cryptographic multilinear maps and *Graded Encoding Schemes*. For each of the mentioned concepts, various results are pointed out, along with hard problems in each structure.

The second chapter is also vital for a good understanding of the paper. It encompasses definitions and results in both algebra and statistics. The properties of lattices are presented in Section 2.2, in order to emphasize their importance in cryptography and to justify their usefulness in presented scheme.

In the third chapter, an instance of *Graded Encoding Schemes* is revealed, with the same settings as [11]. All the procedures that are necessary for the instance to become viable are explained and proved to be correct. Also, the analogues to hard problems in multilinear maps are presented. Furthermore, a complete application of the construction, represented by one-round multi-party key exchange protocol, is disclosed at the end of the chapter.

The final chapter treats the security assured by the construction. Various attacks are analyzed, both in the general case and when the attacker has some previously-known information. Finally, the general security of *Graded Encoding Systems* is discussed, as an end of the paper.

Chapter 1

Multilinear Maps and Graded Encoding Systems

In this chapter, multilinear maps are defined and also, the particular case of bilinear maps is discussed, along with results concerning self-bilinear applications. Thereafter, *Graded Encoding Schemes* are defined, as an approximate to multilinear maps.

Observation: Regarding the multilinear applications and Graded Encoding Systems schemes, and also for the lattice-based candidate designed in [11], the paper encompasses one subsection of efficient procedures, and another one of hardness assumptions. The reader should be aware of this detail and realize the analogy and differences of the mentioned schemes.

1.1 Notations

Throughout the paper, the following notations will be used, as mentioned in [5]:

1. The set of all finite length binary string is denoted by $\{0, 1\}^*$. Also, for any positive integer n , the notation $\{0, 1\}^n$ denotes the set of all binary strings of length n .
2. Let \mathcal{D} be a probabilistic event. Then, the **probability** of the event is denoted by $\Pr[\mathcal{D}]$.
3. Let m be an arbitrary positive integer. A **randomized algorithm** \mathcal{A} is a function of two parameters, $x \in \{0, 1\}^*$ - the input of the algorithm and $r \in \{0, 1\}^n$ - a sequence of random bits used by the algorithm. Also, for an input x , $\mathcal{A}(x)$ denotes the random variable $\mathcal{A}(x, R)$, where R is uniformly distributed in $\{0, 1\}^m$.
4. Let S be a finite set. Then, by $x \leftarrow S$ is defined a random variable x that picks an element of S at random, i.e. $\Pr[x = s] = \frac{1}{|S|}, \forall s \in S$.
5. Let \mathcal{A} be a randomized algorithm and let $x \in \{0, 1\}^*$. Then, $y \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(x)$ denotes the random variable y that represents the output of the algorithm \mathcal{A} on input x .
6. Let X and Y be two distributions over domain D . Then, the **statistical distance** between X and Y is:

$$\Delta(X, Y) = \frac{1}{2} \sum_{d \in D} |\Pr[X = d] - \Pr[Y = d]|.$$

7. A function $f : \mathbb{Z}^+ \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^+$ is said to be **negligible** if:

$$\forall c > 0, \exists n_c \in \mathbb{Z}^+ \text{ such that } f(n) < \frac{1}{n^c}, \forall n \geq n_c.$$

1.2 Bilinear Maps

As stated before, bilinear maps are a specific case of multilinear maps. They proved to be a highly useful tool in cryptography, with many applications, such as: tripartite protocol [18], identity based encryption [4] and Attribute-based encryption scheme for monotone boolean formulas [17]. In this section, bilinear maps are only defined, while next section presents a relationship between self-bilinear maps and multilinear maps.

Definition 1 (Bilinear Map [2]). *Given the cyclic groups G and G_t (written additively) of the same order p , a (symmetric) map $e : G \times G \rightarrow G_t$ is said to be bilinear if the following properties hold:*

1. **(Bi-linearity)** $e(g_1^{x_1}, g_2^{x_2}) = e(g_1, g_2)^{x_1 x_2}$, for any $x_1, x_2 \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ and any $g_1, g_2 \in G$;
2. **(Non-degeneracy)** If $g_1, g_2 \in G$ are generators of G , then $e(g_1, g_2)$ is a generator of G_t ;
3. **(Efficient computability)** There exists a polynomially-bounded algorithm to compute $e(g_1, g_2)$, for any $g_1, g_2 \in G$.

1.3 Cryptographic Multilinear Maps

Definition 2 (Multilinear Maps [23]). *Let $k \geq 2$ be an integer number and $G_1, G_2, \dots, G_k, G_T$ be $k + 1$ cyclic groups (written additively), of same order p . Then, a k -multilinear map is a mapping $e : G_1 \times \dots \times G_k \rightarrow G_T$, with the following properties:*

1. **(Linearity)** For every $g_1 \in G_1, \dots, g_k \in G_k$, every $i \in \{1, 2, \dots, k\}$ and every $\alpha \in \mathbb{Z}_p$, it holds that:

$$e(g_1, \dots, \alpha \cdot g_i, \dots, g_k) = \alpha \cdot e(g_1, \dots, g_k)$$

2. **(Non-degeneracy)** If $g_1 \in G_1, \dots, g_k \in G_k$ are generators of their respective groups, then $e(g_1, \dots, g_k)$ is a generator of G_T .

1.3.1 From Self-Bilinear to Multilinear Maps

Definition 3. *A self-bilinear map is a bilinear map where the domain and target groups are the same.*

Proposition 1. *Let G be a cyclic group of order p and $e : G \times G \rightarrow G$ be a self-bilinear map. Therefore, a k -multilinear map $e_k : G^k \rightarrow G$ can be constructed from e , for any $k \geq 2$.*

Proof. The proof is realized by induction. First, for the base case $k = 2$, it is trivial to observe that e itself is a 2-linear map. Then, suppose that an n -multilinear

map $e_n : G^n \rightarrow G$ can be constructed starting from e , and it can be easily shown that a $(n + 1)$ -multilinear map $e_{n+1} : G^{n+1} \rightarrow G$ can be constructed, as follows:

$$e_{n+1}(g_1, \dots, g_n, g_{n+1}) = e(e_n(g_1, \dots, g_n), g_{n+1}), \forall g_1, \dots, g_{n+1} \in G.$$

Indeed, from the fact that e_n is multilinear it follows that, for any $g_1 \in G_1, \dots, g_n \in G_n$, any $i \in \{1, \dots, n\}$ and any $\alpha \in \mathbb{Z}_p$, $e_n(g_1, \dots, \alpha \cdot g_i, \dots, g_n) = \alpha \cdot e_n(g_1, \dots, g_n)$. Using the bilinearity of e , it results that e_{n+1} respects the **linearity** condition.

Let g_1, \dots, g_n be generators of G . Then, using the fact that e_n is n -multilinear, it follows that $e_n(g_1, \dots, g_n)$ is also a generator of G . Corroborating the last result with the non-degeneracy property of e , it ensues that e_{n+1} respects **non-degeneracy** condition, from which the conclusion that e_{n+1} is a $(n + 1)$ -multilinear map can be drawn. \square

However, Cheon and Lee [8] proved that self-bilinear maps on prime order groups do not exist, except that the computational Diffie-Hellman problem is easy. That is the main motivation of [2], which analyzes the existence of self-bilinear maps on groups of composite order.

1.3.2 Efficient Procedures

In order to use the cryptographic multilinear applications in a real-world environment, efficient procedures must be designed, to be evaluated by computers. Therefore, as specified in [11] a cryptographic multilinear map scheme is a 5-uple $\mathcal{MMP} = (\mathbf{InstGen}, \mathbf{EncTest}, \mathbf{add}, \mathbf{neg}, \mathbf{map})$ that is described below:

- (a) **Instance Generation.** A procedure with a "factory" role must exist, in order to instantiate the parameters of the scheme. This procedure is **InstGen**.
 - **Input:** λ - the security parameter and $k \geq 2$ - the multilinearity parameter.
 - **Output:** (**params**, g_1, \dots, g_k), where **params** = (G_1, \dots, G_T, p, e) . Here G_1, \dots, G_k, G_T represent the groups, $p \in \mathbb{Z}$ is their order, e is the representation of the multilinear map and $g_i \in \{0, 1\}^*$ is the representation of a generator of G_i , for every $i \in \{1, \dots, k\}$.
- (b) **Element Encoding.** A procedure that decides if a sequence of bits represents an encoding of an element in one of the groups must be defined, and it is named **EncTest**.
 - **Input:** **params** - the instance parameters, $i \in \{1, \dots, k + 1\}$ - index of the desired group and $x \in \{0, 1\}^*$ - encoding of the tested element.
 - **Output:** True, if x is a valid encoding of an element in G_i , False otherwise.
Note: The extension $G_{k+1} = G_T$ is performed.
- (c) **Group addition.** The procedure **add** simply applies the group operation upon two provided elements representations.
 - **Input:** **params** - the instance parameters, $i \in \{1, \dots, k + 1\}$ - index of the desired group, x, y - representations of elements to be added.
 - **Output:** the representation of $x + y \in G_i$.
- (d) **Group negation.** The procedure **neg** returns the inverse representation of the element provided as parameter.

- **Input: params** - the instance parameters, $i \in \{1, \dots, k+1\}$ - index of the desired group, x - representation of the element to be negated.
 - **Output:** the representation of $-x \in G_i$.
- (e) **Map computation.** The procedure **map** returns the representation of the multilinear mapping over the elements given as parameters.
- **Input: params** - the instance parameters, $x_1 \in G_1, \dots, x_k \in G_k$ - elements in domain groups.
 - **Output:** the representation of $e(x_1, \dots, x_k) \in G_T$.

1.3.3 Hardness Assumptions

For the multilinear map to be used in cryptography, it is inquired that at least the Multilinear Discrete Logarithm problem (MDL) and Multilinear Decisional Diffie-Hellman problem (MDDH) to be hard in the used groups. The specified problems are reminded below:

1. **Multilinear Discrete Logarithm (MDL [11]).** It is said that the MDL problem is hard for a multilinear map scheme \mathcal{MMP} if, for any $k > 1$, any $i \in \{1, \dots, k\}$ and all probabilistic polynomial running time algorithms, the discrete logarithm advantage of an adversary \mathcal{A} ,

$$\text{AdvDlog}_{\mathcal{MMP}, \mathcal{A}, k}(\lambda) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \Pr[\mathcal{A}(\text{params}, i, g_i, \alpha \cdot g_i) = \alpha : (\text{params}, g_1, \dots, g_k) \leftarrow \text{InstGen}(1^\lambda, 1^k), \alpha \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p],$$

is negligible in λ .

2. **Multilinear DDH (MDDH [11]).** The MDDH problem is hard for a symmetric multilinear map scheme \mathcal{MMP} (with $G_1 = \dots = G_k = G_T$) if for any probabilistic polynomial running time algorithm \mathcal{A} , the advantage of \mathcal{A} in distinguishing between the distributions:

$$\begin{aligned} & (\text{params}, g, \alpha_0 g, \alpha_1 g, \dots, \alpha_k g, (\prod_{i=0}^k \alpha_i) \cdot e(g, \dots, g)) \text{ and} \\ & (\text{params}, g, \alpha_0 g, \alpha_1 g, \dots, \alpha_k g, \alpha \cdot e(g, \dots, g)) \end{aligned}$$

is negligible in λ , where $(\text{params}, g) \leftarrow \text{InstGen}(1^\lambda, 1^k)$ and $\alpha, \alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_k$ are uniformly random in \mathbb{Z}_p .

1.4 Graded Encoding Systems

Garg, Gentry and Halevi formally defined the Graded Encoding Systems in [11]. Using the mentioned system, the authors managed to realize an "approximation" of the sought after multilinear maps in groups in which the DL problem is hard.

They generalize the conventional constructions, by replacing the usual exponent space, \mathbb{Z}_p , with a generic algebraic ring or field R . Also, the system is non-deterministic, with the significance that the same element can be encoded in plentiful of ways. Another difference is that the system offers the possibility of "partial mapping", i.e. multiplying any

number of encodings, not only k , as in the multilinear map case. Thus, the structure of the system is much richer, revealing the opportunity to encode the same element on many different levels.

In the current section, the general settings of the system are discussed, following that the construction of an instance of Graded Encoding Systems (GES) to be approached in a subsequent chapter.

Definition 4 (k – Graded Encoding System). *Let $k > 1$ be an integer. A k – Graded Encoding System is formed by a ring $(R, +_R, \cdot_R)$ and a system of sets $\mathcal{S} = \{S_i^{(\alpha)} \subset \{0, 1\}^* : \alpha \in R, i \in \{0, 1, \dots, k\}\}$, with the properties:*

1. *For any $i \in \{0, 1, \dots, k\}$, the sets $\{S_i^{(\alpha)} : \alpha \in R\}$ are disjoint;*
2. *An associative binary operation $'+'$ and an unary operation $'-'$ can be defined on $\{0, 1\}^*$, such that for any $\alpha_1, \alpha_2 \in R$, any $i \in \{0, \dots, k\}$ and any encodings $u_1 \in S_i^{(\alpha_1)}$, $u_2 \in S_i^{(\alpha_2)}$, it follows that $u_1 + u_2 \in S_i^{(\alpha_1 +_R \alpha_2)}$ and $-u_1 \in S_i^{(-_R \alpha_1)}$;*
3. *An associative binary operation $'\times'$ can be defined on $\{0, 1\}^*$, such that for any $\alpha_1, \alpha_2 \in R$, any integers $0 \leq i_1, i_2$ such that $i_1 + i_2 \leq k$ and any encodings $u_1 \in S_{i_1}^{(\alpha_1)}$, $u_2 \in S_{i_2}^{(\alpha_2)}$, it results that $u_1 \times u_2 \in S_{i_1 +_R i_2}^{(\alpha_1 \cdot_R \alpha_2)}$.*

1.4.1 Efficient Procedures

(a) **Instance Generation.** Again, **InstGen** is a randomized procedure that has the task to instantiate the parameters of the scheme.

- **Input:** λ - the security parameter and $k \geq 2$ - the multilinearity parameter.
- **Output:** $\text{InstGen}(1^\lambda, 1^k) = (\mathbf{params}, \mathbf{p}_{zt})$, where **params** completely specifies the k –GES, and \mathbf{p}_{zt} is a zero-test parameter, as described below.

(b) **Ring Sampler.** **samp** is a non-deterministic procedure that returns a "level-zero" encoding of a nearly uniform element of R .

- **Input:** None
- **Output:** $\text{samp}(\mathbf{params}) = \mathbf{a} \in S_0^{(\alpha)}$, with $\alpha \in R$ - nearly uniform.

(c) **Encoding.** The procedure **enc** computes an encoding on any level of a given "level-zero" encoding.

- **Input:** **params** - the instance parameters, $i \in \{0, \dots, k\}$ - the index of the desired level of encoding and $\mathbf{a} \in S_0^{(\alpha)}$ - the "level-zero" encoding of an element $\alpha \in R$.
- **Output:** $\text{enc}(\mathbf{params}, i, \mathbf{a}) = \mathbf{v} \in S_i^{(\alpha)}$ - a level- i encoding of the same α previously specified.

(d) **Addition.** The procedure **add** computes an encoding of the sum of two same-level encodings.

- **Input:** **params** - the instance parameters, $i \in \{0, \dots, k\}$ - the index of the level of encoding, $\mathbf{v}_1 \in S_i^{(\alpha_1)}$, $\mathbf{v}_2 \in S_i^{(\alpha_2)}$ (where $\alpha_1, \alpha_2 \in R$) - encodings of the elements to be added.

- **Output:** $\text{add}(\text{params}, i, v_1, v_2) = \mathbf{v}_1 + \mathbf{v}_2 \in S_i^{(\alpha_1 + R\alpha_2)}$.
- (e) **Negation.** The procedure **neg** computes an encoding of the inverse of a provided element.
- **Input:** **params** - the instance parameters, $i \in \{0, \dots, k\}$ - the index of the level of encoding, $v \in S_i^{(\alpha)}$ (where $\alpha \in R$) - an encoding of the element to be negated.
 - **Output:** $\text{neg}(\text{params}, i, v) = -v \in S_i^{(-R\alpha)}$.
- (f) **Multiplication.** The procedure **mul** computes an encoding of the multiplication of two elements, which may be on different levels of encoding.
- **Input:** **params** - the instance parameters, $0 \leq i_1, i_2$ - the indexes of the encoding levels of the elements (with $i_1 + i_2 \leq k$), $\mathbf{u}_1 \in S_{i_1}^{(\alpha_1)}$, $\mathbf{u}_2 \in S_{i_2}^{(\alpha_2)}$ - the encoding of the elements to be multiplied.
 - **Output:** $\text{mul}(\text{params}, i_1, \mathbf{u}_1, i_2, \mathbf{u}_2) = \mathbf{u}_1 \times \mathbf{u}_2 \in S_{i_1 + R i_2}^{(\alpha_1 + R\alpha_2)}$.
- (g) **Zero-test.** The procedure **isZero** verifies if the given parameter is a "level- k " encoding of 0.
- **Input:** **params** - the instance parameters, \mathbf{u} - a "level- k " encoding of an element in R .
 - **Output:** $\text{isZero}(\text{params}, u) = \mathbf{1}$, if $u \in S_k^{(0)}$, $\mathbf{0}$ otherwise.
- (h) **Extraction.** The procedure **ext** realizes the "selection" of a unique "level- k " representative, for every ring element. Also, the elements returned are almost random over $\{0, 1\}^\lambda$.
- **Input:** **params** - the instance parameters, \mathbf{p}_{zt} - the zero-test parameter, \mathbf{u} - the "level- k " encoding of a ring element.
 - **Output:** $\text{ext}(\text{params}, \mathbf{p}_{zt}, u) = \mathbf{s} \in \{0, 1\}^\lambda$, such that:
 - (i) $\forall \alpha \in R, v_1, v_2 \in S_k^{(\alpha)}$, it holds that $\text{ext}(\text{params}, \mathbf{p}_{zt}, v_1) = \text{ext}(\text{params}, \mathbf{p}_{zt}, v_2)$;
 - (ii) The distribution $\{\text{ext}(\text{params}, \mathbf{p}_{zt}, v) : \alpha \in R, v \in S_k^{(\alpha)}\}$ is nearly uniform over $\{0, 1\}^\lambda$.

Remark 1. *In practice, due to the limitations of computers, the zero-test and the extraction procedures requirements are lessened. Therefore, the zero-test procedure may output 1 for encodings of non-zero elements, with negligible probability in λ . Also, the extraction procedure may output different "level- k " representatives of the same ring element, again with negligible probability in λ .*

Remark 2. *To test if two elements, $u, v \in S_k$, encode the same element $\alpha \in R$, it is sufficient to verify if $\text{isZero}(\text{params}, \text{add}(\text{params}, k, u, \text{neg}(\text{params}, k, v)))$ returns 1, i.e. $u - v \in S_k^{(0)}$.*

1.4.2 Hardness Assumptions

The current subsection presents the analogues of **MDL** and **MDDH**, discussed in the previous section.

1. **Graded Discrete Logarithm (GDL [11])**. It is said that the GDL problem is hard for a Graded Encoding System GES if for all probabilistic polynomial running time algorithms, the discrete logarithm advantage of an adversary \mathcal{A} ,

$$\text{AdvDlog}_{GES, \mathcal{A}, k}(\lambda) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \Pr[\mathcal{A}(\text{params}, \mathbf{p}_{zt}, u) = a : (\text{params}, \mathbf{p}_{zt}) \leftarrow \text{InstGen}(1^\lambda, 1^k), \alpha \in R, u \in S_k^{(\alpha)}, a \in S_0^{(\alpha)},$$

is negligible in λ .

2. **Graded DDH (GDDH [11])**. The GDDH problem is hard for a Graded Encoding System GES if for any probabilistic polynomial running time algorithm \mathcal{A} , the advantage of \mathcal{A} in distinguishing between the distributions :

$$(\text{params}, \mathbf{p}_{zt}, a_0, \dots, a_k, \mathbf{enc}(\text{params}, k, \prod_{i=0}^k e_i)) \text{ and } \\ (\text{params}, \mathbf{p}_{zt}, a_0, \dots, a_k, \mathbf{enc}(\text{params}, k, \mathbf{samp}(\text{params})))$$

is negligible in λ , where $(\text{params}, \mathbf{p}_{zt}) \leftarrow \text{InstGen}(1^\lambda, 1^k)$ and for every $i \in \{0, \dots, k\}$, the referenced elements are: $e_i = \mathbf{samp}(\text{params})$, $a_i = \mathbf{enc}(\text{params}, 1, e_i)$.

The intuition behind GDDH is that, given $k + 1$ level-one encodings of random elements, one could not easily distinguish a level- k encoding of their product from random.

Chapter 2

Mathematical Background

The purpose of this chapter is to remind the reader basic notions regarding algebra and statistics, but also to analyze in detail concepts and algorithms concerning lattices, especially integer lattices.

2.1 Algebra

The notions of group, cyclic group, ring and polynomial are considered to be previously known by the average reader. More information about the mentioned structures can be found in [16], chapter 2. For a mathematical perspective over groups and polynomial rings properties, and also for a deep incursion in field extension theory, the reader can explore [3].

1. Ideals and Quotient Rings.

Definition 5. Let $(R, +, \cdot)$ be a commutative finite ring. An **ideal** of R is a nonempty set $\mathcal{I} \subseteq R$ that is closed under addition and $ax = xa \in \mathcal{I}, \forall x \in \mathcal{I}, \forall a \in R$.

Let $(R, +, \cdot)$ be a finite ring and \mathcal{I} be an ideal of R . Also, let " \sim " be an equivalence relationship on R , defined by $x \sim y \iff \exists a \in \mathcal{I}$ such that $x = y + a$. The equivalence class of an element $x \in R$ is usually noted with \hat{x} , and it represents the set $\{y \in R : y \sim x\}$. The equivalence classes generate a partition of the set R , named *quotient set*, and denoted by R/\mathcal{I} . It is known that $(R/\mathcal{I}, +, \cdot)$ is also a ring, and it is called the **quotient ring** R/\mathcal{I} .

Remark 3. An example of a quotient ring is the well-known ring $\mathbb{Z}_p = \mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}$.

2. Cyclotomic polynomials.

Definition 6 [3]. Let $n \geq 1$ be an integer and P_n be the set of all the n^{th} primitive roots of unity. Then, the n^{th} **cyclotomic polynomial** is $\Phi_n = \prod_{\xi \in P_n} (X - \xi)$.

Remark 4. Using the fact that $\Phi_{p^k}(X) = \Phi_p(X^{p^{k-1}})$, for any positive integers k, p , with p -prime, it can be proved that $\Phi_{2^k}(X) = X^{2^{k-1}} + 1$, for any integer $k \geq 1$.

3. Vector spaces.

Throughout the paper, vectors and matrices are thickened, e.g. \mathbf{v} . Also, every vector space is considered to be contained in R^m , with $m \geq 1$, integer.

Definition 7 [16]. Let m be a positive integer. A **vector space** V is a subset of \mathbb{R}^m , such that for every $\alpha_1, \alpha_2 \in \mathbb{R}$ and every $\mathbf{v}_1, \mathbf{v}_2 \in V$, it holds: $\alpha_1 \mathbf{v}_1 + \alpha_2 \mathbf{v}_2 \in V$.

The lecturer is expected to master the concepts of *linear combination*, *linear independence*, *basis*, *vector orthogonality*, *basis orthogonality*. For a quick review over the mentioned concepts, visit [16].

The only algorithm regarding vector spaces to be presented in the current paper is the **Gram-Schmidt Algorithm**. It receives as input a basis $\{\mathbf{v}_1, \dots, \mathbf{v}_n\}$ of the vector space V and outputs $\{\mathbf{v}_1^*, \dots, \mathbf{v}_n^*\}$ - an orthonormal basis of V . The algorithm is presented below:

The Gram-Schmidt Algorithm

- 1: Set $\mathbf{v}_1^* = \mathbf{v}_1$
- 2: **for** $i \leftarrow 2$ **to** n **do**
- 3: Compute $\mu_{ij} = \mathbf{v}_i \cdot \mathbf{v}_j^* / \|\mathbf{v}_j^*\|$, for $1 \leq j < i$
- 4: Set $\mathbf{v}_i^* = \mathbf{v}_i - \sum_{j=1}^{i-1} \mu_{ij} \mathbf{v}_j^*$
- 5: **end for**

Intuitively, μ_{ij} represents the length of the projection of \mathbf{v}_i over \mathbf{v}_j^* . Therefore, the substraction $\mathbf{v}_i - \mu_{ij} \mathbf{v}_j^*$ generate the projection of \mathbf{v}_i over the orthogonal complement of \mathbf{v}_j^* , which leads to the desired output.

2.2 Lattices

2.2.1 General Influence

Lattices have been studied by mathematicians such as Gauss, Lagrange or Minkowski since 18th century, and have been used to prove theorems in number theory and the field extensions. Even though lattices confirmed their significance in mathematics, they were not used in computer science until the 1980s, when Lenstra, Lenstra and Lovász proposed the basis-reduction algorithm **LLL**. It represented a major breakthrough in cryptography, and was used to break several cryptosystems, such as RSA (in a low exponent setting) and NTRU.

Since the proposal of **LLL** algorithm, lattices became appealing to the world of cryptography. Thus, since then they have been used in the construction of cryptographic schemes, such as Attribute Based Encryption [6], Fully homomorphic encryption [14] and Graded Encoding Systems [11].

2.2.2 Basic Concepts

Definition 8 ([16]). Let n, m be two positive integers and let $B = \{\mathbf{v}_1, \dots, \mathbf{v}_n\} \subset \mathbb{R}^m$ be a set of linearly independent vectors. The **lattice** generated by B is the set:

$$L^{\text{not}}(B) = \{a_1 \mathbf{v}_1 + a_2 \mathbf{v}_2 + \dots + a_n \mathbf{v}_n : a_1, a_2, \dots, a_n \in \mathbb{Z}\}.$$

Also, a lattice that contains only vectors with integer coordinates is called an **integer lattice**. The **dual lattice** is denoted by $L^* = \{\mathbf{y} \in \text{Span}(L) : \forall \mathbf{x} \in L, \langle \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y} \rangle \in \mathbb{Z}\}$.

From a visual point of view, the elements of a lattice are structured as a net, with massive holes between the nodes, as it can be noticed in Figure 1.

Definition 9 ([16]). Let L be a n -dimensional lattice and $B = \{\mathbf{v}_1, \dots, \mathbf{v}_n\}$ be a basis for the lattice L . The **fundamental domain** for L that is associated with B is:

$$\mathcal{F}(\mathbf{v}_1, \dots, \mathbf{v}_n) = \{t_1\mathbf{v}_1 + \dots + t_n\mathbf{v}_n : t_i \in [0, 1], \forall i \in \{1, \dots, n\}\}.$$




Figure 1: A bidimensional lattice L and the associated fundamental domain \mathcal{F} .

Proposition 2. Let n be a positive integer and $L \subset \mathbb{R}^n$ be a lattice of dimension n . Then, for every basis B of L , the volume of the fundamental domain associated with it is the same.

Definition 10. Let n be a positive integer and let $L \subset \mathbb{R}^n$ be a lattice of dimension n . The **determinant** of L is the volume of any fundamental domain for L , and it is denoted by $\det(L)$.

Definition 11. Let i be an integer, $i \geq 2$. Also, let n be a positive integer, let $L \subset \mathbb{R}^n$ be a lattice of dimension n and let B be a basis of L . Then, the i^{th} **successive minimum** is the smallest r such that rB contains i linearly independent lattice points, and is denoted by:

$$\lambda_i(L) = \min\{r : \dim(\text{span}(L \cap rB)) \geq i\}.$$

Lemma 1 ([21]). Let n be a positive integer, let $L \subset \mathbb{R}^n$ be a lattice of dimension n and let $\epsilon > 0$. Then, the following property holds:

$$\eta_\epsilon(L) \leq \sqrt{\frac{\ln(2n(1+1/\epsilon))}{\pi}} \cdot \lambda_n(L).$$

2.2.3 Hard problems

In order to be able to use lattices in the design of cryptographic schemes, it is required that hard problems related to them to be known. Some of the most important hard problems related to lattices are presented below [16]:

- **Shortest Vector Problem (SVP).** Let n be a positive integer and L be a lattice of dimension n . The problem to find a vector $\mathbf{v} = \operatorname{argmin}_{\mathbf{w} \in L \setminus \{\mathbf{0}\}} \|\mathbf{w}\|$ is referred to as **SVP**.
- **Closest Vector Problem (CVP).** Let n be a positive integer and L be a lattice of dimension n . Also, let \mathbf{w} be a vector in $\mathbb{R}^n \setminus L$. The problem to find a vector $\mathbf{v} \in L$ that satisfies $\|\mathbf{w} - \mathbf{v}\| = \min_{\mathbf{u} \in L} \|\mathbf{w} - \mathbf{u}\|$ is called **CVP**.
- **Approximate Shortest Vector Problem (apprSVP).** Let $\psi : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ be a function of one parameter and let $\lambda_1(L) \in L$ be one of the shortest vectors in L (i.e. a solution to **SVP**). The problem to find a vector $\mathbf{v} \in L \setminus \{\mathbf{0}\}$ such that $\|\mathbf{v}\| \leq \psi(n) \cdot \|\lambda_1(L)\|$ is called **apprSVP**.
- **Approximate Closest Vector Problem (apprCVP).** Let $\psi : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ be a function of one parameter, let $\mathbf{u} \in \mathbb{R}^n \setminus L$ be a non-lattice vector and let \mathbf{w} be a solution to **CVP** associated with \mathbf{u} . The problem to find a vector $\mathbf{v} \in L$ such that $\|\mathbf{v} - \mathbf{u}\| \leq \psi(n) \cdot \|\mathbf{w} - \mathbf{u}\|$ is called **apprCVP**.

Remark 5. *apprSVP is known to be hard to solve, even for polynomial approximation functions ψ . Also, it is resistant to quantum computing attacks, as opposed to integer factorization problem, which becomes easy in a quantum computing environment, using Schor's algorithm.*

2.2.4 Results concerning short vectors

In order to verify how accurate is the returned solution of an approximation algorithm, it is needed to have an estimate of the desired result. Therefore, an approximative value of the shortest vector length in a lattice is necessary for testing the result of an algorithm solving **apprSVP**.

The current subsection only states the most important results regarding shortest vector length in a lattice. The lecturer who is interested in the proofs of the following results may find them in [16].

Definition 12. Let n be a positive integer and L be a lattice of dimension n . Also, let $B = \{\mathbf{v}_1, \dots, \mathbf{v}_n\}$ be a basis of L . The **Hadamard ratio** is defined by:

$$\mathcal{H}(B) = \left(\frac{\det(L)}{\|\mathbf{v}_1\| \cdot \|\mathbf{v}_2\| \cdot \dots \cdot \|\mathbf{v}_n\|} \right)^{1/n}.$$

The Hadamard ratio is a real number in the interval $(0, 1]$ and it represents a measure of the orthogonality of the basis B , with the understanding that the closer the Hadamard ratio is to 1, the more orthogonal are the vectors in B .

Theorem 1 (Minkowski's Theorem [16]). Let n be a positive integer and $L \subset \mathbb{R}^n$ be a lattice of dimension n . If $S \subset \mathbb{R}^n$ is a symmetric convex set with the property that

$\text{Vol}(S) > 2^n \det(L)$, then S contains a nonzero lattice vector. If S is also a closed set, then it is sufficient to verify that $\text{Vol}(S) \geq 2^n \det(L)$.

Theorem 2 (Hermite's Theorem [16]). *Let n be a positive integer. Then, for every lattice L of dimension n , there exists a vector $\mathbf{v} \in L \setminus \{\mathbf{0}\}$ such that $\|\mathbf{v}\| \leq \sqrt{n} \cdot \det(L)^{1/n}$.*

Remark 6. *The Hermite's Theorem is a consequence of Minkowski's Theorem, where the set S is considered to be a hypercube in \mathbb{R}^n centered at $\mathbf{0}$. Considering S to be a hypersphere instead of a hypercube, centered at $\mathbf{0}$, the upper bound in Hermite's theorem is lowered by a factor of $\sqrt{\frac{2}{\pi e}}$.*

Proposition 3 ([16]). *Let n be a positive integer and $L \subset \mathbb{R}^n$ be a lattice of dimension n . The **Gaussian heuristic** affirms that the length of the shortest nonzero vector in L is expected to be $\sigma(L) = \sqrt{\frac{n}{2\pi e}} (\det(L))^{1/n}$.*

The vigilant reader may note that the *Gaussian expected shortest length* is two times smaller than the upper bound presented in *Remark 6*.

2.2.5 LLL Algorithm

The hard problems **SVP** and **CVP** may become easy if an orthogonal basis for the lattice is known in advance. It can be quickly verified that a solution to **SVP** is in fact the shortest vector in the orthogonal basis.

The result is usually accurate even for quasi-orthogonal basis, i.e. basis with a Hadamard ratio reasonably close to 1. Babai designed an algorithm that solves **CVP** in a setting in which a quasi-orthogonal basis is known. **Babai's Algorithm** receives as input a quasi-orthogonal basis $B = \{\mathbf{v}_1, \dots, \mathbf{v}_n\}$ of the lattice $L \subset \mathbb{R}^n$ and a vector $\mathbf{w} \in \mathbb{R}^n$. It outputs a vector $\mathbf{v} \in \mathbb{R}^n$, solution to **CVP** problem. The algorithm is presented below, based on [16]:

Babai's Algorithm

- 1: Find $\alpha_1, \alpha_2, \dots, \alpha_n \in \mathbb{R}$ such that $\mathbf{w} = \alpha_1 \mathbf{v}_1 + \alpha_2 \mathbf{v}_2 + \dots + \alpha_n \mathbf{v}_n$
- 2: **for** $i \leftarrow 1$ **to** n **do**
- 3: Set $\beta_i = \lfloor \alpha_i + \frac{1}{2} \rfloor$
- 4: **end for**
- 5: $\mathbf{v} = \beta_1 \mathbf{v}_1 + \beta_2 \mathbf{v}_2 + \dots + \beta_n \mathbf{v}_n$

Therefore, solving **SVP** or **CVP** for a lattice L reduces to finding a quasi-orthogonal basis for L . The **LLL** algorithm managed to fill this gap, for lattices of low dimension (i.e. less than 300). Hence, the algorithm had a colossal success among the cryptographers, and it represented the first step to include lattices in the world of cryptography.

Presented in [19], the **LLL** algorithm was initially conceived to provide a polynomial-time algorithm for factoring polynomials with rational coefficients. Two necessary conditions were formulated for a basis $B = \{\mathbf{v}_1, \dots, \mathbf{v}_n\}$ in order to be considered *LLL reduced*:

- **Size condition:** $|\mu_{i,j}| = \frac{|\mathbf{v}_i \cdot \mathbf{v}_j^*|}{\|\mathbf{v}_j^*\|^2} \leq \frac{1}{2}, \forall 1 \leq j < i \leq n;$
- **Lovász Condition:** $\|\mathbf{v}_i^*\| \geq \left(\frac{3}{4} - \mu_{i,i-1}^2\right) \|\mathbf{v}_{i-1}^*\|^2, \forall 1 < i \leq n,$

where $B^* = \{\mathbf{v}_1^*, \dots, \mathbf{v}_n^*\}$ is the orthogonal basis returned by the **Gram-Schmidt** algorithm and $\mu_{i,j}$ refers to the constants defined in the same algorithm.

Proposition 4. (LLL reduced basis apprSVP [16]). *Let n be a positive integer and let $L \subset \mathbb{R}^n$ be a lattice of dimension n . For any **LLL reduced basis** $B = \{\mathbf{v}_1, \dots, \mathbf{v}_n\}$, the following property holds:*

$$\|\mathbf{v}_1\| \leq 2^{(n-1)/2} \cdot \min_{\mathbf{v} \in L \setminus \{\mathbf{0}\}} \|\mathbf{v}\|.$$

As it can be easily observed, using the **LLL** lattice-reduction algorithm leads to solving **apprSVP** by a factor of $2^{(n-1)/2}$.

LLL algorithm is presented below, in the version illustrated by the book of Hoffstein, Pipher and Silverman, [16]. The input of the algorithm is a basis $B = \{\mathbf{v}_1, \mathbf{v}_2, \dots, \mathbf{v}_n\}$, and the output is the basis B , modified as a **LLL reduced basis**:

LLL Algorithm

```

1: Set  $k = 2$ 
2: Set  $\mathbf{v}_1^* = \mathbf{v}_1$ 
3: while  $k \leq n$  do
4:   for  $j \leftarrow k - 1$  downto 1 do
5:     Set  $\mathbf{v}_k = \mathbf{v}_k - \lfloor \mu_{k,j} + \frac{1}{2} \rfloor \mathbf{v}_j$  ▷ Size Reduction
6:   end for
7:   if  $\|\mathbf{v}_k^*\|^2 \geq \left(\frac{3}{4} - \mu_{k,k-1}^2\right) \|\mathbf{v}_{k-1}^*\|^2$  then ▷ Lovász Condition
8:     Set  $k = k + 1$ 
9:   else
10:    Swap  $\mathbf{v}_{k-1}$  and  $\mathbf{v}_k$ 
11:    Set  $k = \max(k - 1, 2)$ 
12:   end if
13: end while

```

Theorem 3 (LLL Correctness and Running Time [16]). *Let n be a positive integer, let $L \subset \mathbb{R}^n$ be a lattice of dimension n and let $B = \{\mathbf{v}_1, \dots, \mathbf{v}_n\}$ be a basis for L . Then, the **LLL algorithm**, presented above, returns an **LLL reduced basis** for L , and also it terminates in a finite number of steps.*

Remark 7. *The algorithm executes the steps [3]-[13] no more than $\mathcal{O}(n^2 \log n + n^2 \log D)$ times, where $D = \max_{\mathbf{w} \in B} \|\mathbf{w}\|$. Thus, LLL is a polynomial-time algorithm.*

LLL proved its utility in cryptanalysis, its applications covering attacks on the family of knapsack public-key cryptosystems, but also on GGH and NTRU cryptosystems.

2.2.6 Ideal Lattices

Let k be a positive integer and let $n = 2^k$. Using *remark 4*, subsection *cyclotomic polynomials*, it can be easily proved that $\Phi_{2n}(X) = \Phi_{2^{k+1}}(X) = X^{2^k} + 1 = X^n + 1$. Let $R = \mathbb{Z}[X]/(X^n + 1)$ be the $(2n)^{th}$ cyclotomic polynomial ring and let $R_q = \mathbb{Z}_q[X]/(X^n + 1)$.

One of the possible representations of the elements in R is using its vector of coefficients. For example, a polynomial $P(X) = a_{n-1}X^{n-1} + \dots + a_1X + a_0 \in R$ may be uniquely identified by the vector of coefficients $(a_{n-1}, \dots, a_1, a_0) \in \mathbb{Z}^n$. Addition of polynomials in the mentioned representation is realized component-wise, while multiplication requires a bit more complicated rule, that should output the desired result.

Let $g \in R$ be an element of R . The **principal ideal** in R generated by g is denoted by $\langle g \rangle = \{g \cdot x : x \in R\}$.

Definition 13 (Ideal lattice). *Let n be a power of two and let $R = \mathbb{Z}[X]/(X^n + 1)$ be the $(2n)^{th}$ cyclotomic polynomial ring. Also, let $g \in R$ be an element of R . Then, the principal ideal generated by g is called to be an **ideal lattice**, accentuating the duality of the structure: it is at the same time an ideal and a lattice.*

Let $g \in R$ be an element of R and let $B(G) = \{g, gX, \dots, gX^{n-1}\}$ be a basis of $\langle g \rangle$. Also, let $v \in R$ be an arbitrary element in R . The **reduction modulo the fundamental domain** of $B(g)$ is denoted by $[u]_g$, and it represents the unique $v' \in R$ such that $v - v' \in \langle g \rangle$ and $v' = \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} \alpha_i X^i g$, with $\alpha_i \in [-\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2})$.

Proposition 5 ([20]). Let n, m be positive integers, with $m \geq 2$ and $n = \varphi(m)$. Also, let \mathcal{I} be an arbitrary ideal of the m^{th} cyclotomic ring. Then, $\lambda_n(\mathcal{I}) = \lambda_1(\mathcal{I})$.

2.3 Probabilities and Statistics

The construction of the Graded Encoding Scheme exposed in [11] requires in-depth results concerning probabilities and statistics, mainly due to the nondeterministic character of the encodings of elements. Therefore, the current section presents the essential results regarding discrete Gaussian distributions over lattices, the sum of discrete Gaussians and the smoothing parameter for a lattice.

1. **Gaussian distributions [1].** The ellipsoid, continuous n -dimensional Gaussian distribution, with mean $\boldsymbol{\mu}$ and covariance matrix $\boldsymbol{\Sigma}$ is denoted by $\mathcal{N}^n(\boldsymbol{\mu}, \boldsymbol{\Sigma})$, and has the density function $f(\mathbf{x}) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{(2\pi)^k |\boldsymbol{\Sigma}|}} \exp\left(-\frac{1}{2}(\mathbf{x} - \boldsymbol{\mu})^T \boldsymbol{\Sigma}^{-1}(\mathbf{x} - \boldsymbol{\mu})\right)$.

Definition 14. Let m, n be two positive integers, let $S \in \mathbb{R}^{m \times n}$ be a rank- n matrix and let $\boldsymbol{\mu} \in \mathbb{R}^n$ be an n -dimensional vector. The **ellipsoid Gaussian function** over \mathbb{R}^n , centered at $\boldsymbol{\mu}$ and with parameter S is denoted by:

$$\rho_{S, \boldsymbol{\mu}}(\mathbf{x}) = \exp\left(-\pi(\mathbf{x} - \boldsymbol{\mu})^T (S^T S)^{-1}(\mathbf{x} - \boldsymbol{\mu})\right), \forall \mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{R}^n.$$

For the particular case $\boldsymbol{\mu} = \mathbf{0}$, the short version $\rho_S(\cdot)$ is used. Also, the **spherical** case is achieved when $S = \sigma I_n$, with $\sigma \in \mathbb{R}^*$.

Definition 15. Let m, n be two positive integers, let $S \in \mathbb{R}^{m \times n}$ be a rank- n matrix and let $L \subset \mathbb{R}^n$ be an n -dimensional lattice. The **ellipsoid discrete Gaussian distribution** over L , centered at $\mathbf{0}$ and with parameter S is:

$$\mathcal{D}_{L,S}(\mathbf{x}) = \frac{\rho_S(\mathbf{x})}{\rho_S(L)}, \forall \mathbf{x} \in L,$$

where $\rho_S(L) = \sum_{\mathbf{x} \in L} \rho_S(\mathbf{x})$.

2. **Smoothing parameter [21].** Intuitively, the *smoothing parameter* of a lattice represents a lower bound for the value of the radius of a discrete Gaussian distribution \mathcal{D} with the property: if a noise vector is extracted from \mathcal{D} and is reduced modulo the fundamental domain of the lattice, then the resulted distribution is close to uniform. Formally, the smoothing parameter is defined below:

Definition 16 (Smoothing parameter [21]). Let n be a positive integer, let $L \subset \mathbb{R}^n$ be an n -dimensional lattice and let ϵ be a positive real number. The **smoothing parameter** for L and ϵ is denoted by $\eta_\epsilon(L)$ and represents the smallest $s \in \mathbb{R}$ such that $\rho_{1/s}(L^* \setminus \{\mathbf{0}\}) \leq \epsilon$.

Lemma 2 ([1]). Let m, n be two positive integers, let $L \subset \mathbb{R}^n$ be an n -dimensional lattice, $\epsilon \in (0, 1)$ and let $S \in \mathbb{R}^{m \times n}$ be a rank- n matrix such that $\sigma_n(S) \geq \eta_\epsilon(L)$. Then,

$$\Pr_{\mathbf{v} \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_{L,S}} (\|\mathbf{v}\| \geq \sigma_1(S)\sqrt{n}) \leq \frac{1+\epsilon}{1-\epsilon} \cdot 2^{-n},$$

where $\sigma_1(S), \sigma_n(S)$ denote the largest, respectively the least singular values of S .

3. **Sum of discrete gaussians.**

Theorem 4 ([11]). Let n be a positive integer, let $L \subset \mathbb{R}^n$ be a lattice of dimension n and let B be a matrix whose rows form a basis of L . Also, let $w = \frac{\sigma_1(B)}{\sigma_n(B)}$, let ϵ be a constant negligible in n , and let m, s, s' be parameters such that $s \geq \eta_\epsilon(\mathbb{Z}^n)$, $m \geq 10n \log(8(mn)^{1.5}sw)$ and $s' \geq 4mnw \ln \frac{1}{\epsilon}$.

Then, when choosing the rows of an $m \times n$ matrix X from the **spherical Gaussian** over L , $X \leftarrow (\mathcal{D}_{L,s})^m$, it is true with all but probability $2^{-O(m)}$ over the choice of X that the **statistical distance** between $\varepsilon_{X,s'}$ and the **ellipsoid Gaussian** $\mathcal{D}_{L,s'X}$ is bounded by 2ϵ . Here, $\varepsilon_{X,s'} = \{X^T \mathbf{v} : \mathbf{v} \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_{\mathbb{Z}^n, \sigma}\}$.

Chapter 3

GGH13 Encoding Scheme

Garg, Gentry and Halevi constructed a Graded Encoding Scheme based on ideal lattices, in [11]. Their construction was the first candidate to approximate multilinear maps, therefore had a tremendous impact in the world of cryptography. The current chapter intends to present the system designed by the three aforementioned authors, in an in-depth manner.

3.1 Overview

To start with, the ring R denotes the cyclotomic polynomial ring $\mathbb{Z}[X]/(X^n + 1)$, for some integer n - power of two. The ring R is often considered to be the lattice \mathbb{Z}^n , because a correspondence between the two structures is obvious. Also, $g \in R$ is a short ring element and $\mathcal{I} = \langle g \rangle$ is the principal ideal generated by g . Additionally, an element \mathbf{z} is extracted randomly in R_q .

The elements to be encoded by the scheme are the equivalence classes (or **cosets**) of the quotient ring $QR = R/\mathcal{I}$, denoted by \hat{e} , for some $e \in R$.

A level-zero encoding of a coset \hat{e} is a short vector in that coset. The existence of a small vector in any coset is assured by the fact that g is a short element, therefore the basis $B(g) = \{g, Xg, \dots, X^{n-1}g\}$ has all elements small - only circular permutations of the vector g , eventually with a changed sign. Hence, the fundamental domain itself of $B(g)$ is small and because for any $e \in R$, there exists an element $e_g \in \mathcal{F}(B(g))$ such that $e_g \in \hat{e}$, the result follows immediately.

For any $i \in \{1, 2, \dots, k\}$, the set of all level- i encodings of a coset \hat{e} is $S_i^{\hat{e}} = \left\{ \frac{c}{\mathbf{z}^i} \in R_q : c \in eh, \|c\| < q^{1/8} \right\}$. The value $\|c\|$ will be referred to as the **noise level** of the encoding.

3.2 Efficient Procedures

The procedures to be presented are a specific case of the efficient procedures introduced in Subsection 1.4.1. Thus, in this section only the implementation of the mentioned functions will be exposed, as in [11], with a high-level algorithm exposed in the beginning of every procedure, and the in-depth explanation afterwards. Note that R may be identified by \mathbb{Z}^n , and R_q by \mathbb{Z}_q^n . Also, K denotes the field $\mathbb{Q}[X]/(X^n + 1)$.

(a) **Instance generation:** $(\text{params}, \mathbf{p}_{zt}) \leftarrow \text{InstGen}(1^\lambda, 1^k)$.

InstGen $(1^\lambda, 1^k)$

- 1: Choose $g \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_{\mathbb{Z}^n, \sigma}$ (encoding of the generator, element kept **private**).
- 2: Choose $\mathbf{z} \leftarrow R_q$ (encoding of a **private** element, used for encoding elements on level higher than 0).
- 3: Choose $a \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_{\hat{1}, \sigma''}$, then compute a **public** level-one representation of $\hat{1}$, $\mathbf{y} = \left[\frac{\mathbf{a}}{\mathbf{z}} \right]_q$.
- 4: Choose $\mathbf{b}_i \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_{\hat{0}, \sigma'''}$, $\forall i \in \{1, 2, \dots, m\}$ and compute $\mathbf{x}_i = \left[\frac{\mathbf{b}_i}{\mathbf{z}} \right]_q$, $\forall i \in \{1, 2, \dots, m\}$, **public** level-one representations of $\hat{0}$. Also, set $X = (\mathbf{x}_1 | \mathbf{x}_2 | \dots | \mathbf{x}_m)^T$.
- 5: Choose $\mathbf{h} \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_{\mathbb{Z}^n, \sqrt{q}}$ such that $h \notin \mathcal{I}$, then compute the zero-testing parameter $\mathbf{p}_{zt} = \left[\frac{\mathbf{h}\mathbf{z}^k}{\mathbf{g}} \right]_q$.
- 6: Choose $s \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}$.
- 7: **Output:** $\text{params} = (n, q, \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{x}_1, \mathbf{x}_2, \dots, \mathbf{x}_m, s), \mathbf{p}_{zt}$.

1: The uniform extraction of g from the spherical Gaussian distribution $\mathcal{D}_{\mathbb{Z}^n, \sigma}$, with $\sigma = \sqrt{\lambda n}$, is performed repeatedly, until the following conditions are met:

- $\|g\| \leq \sigma\sqrt{n}$ and g is invertible in R_q ;
- g^{-1} is a short vector;
- $\mathbf{N}(g)$ is a prime $\geq 2^{O(n)}$, where $\mathbf{N}(g)$ denotes the norm of the ideal $\langle g \rangle$, as defined in [10], chapter 5.

The last condition implies that $\mathcal{I} = \langle g \rangle$ is a **prime ideal**. Also, **Lemma 6.1** from [10] proves that the algorithm above completes in polynomially many trials.

- 2: \mathbf{z} is chosen uniformly from R_q , thus with overwhelming probability is not "small". Using [10] (*Lemma 5.20*), it follows that with overwhelming probability, \mathbf{z} is invertible in R_q .
- 3: Parameters \mathbf{y} and X will show their usefulness during the **higher-level encoding** procedure. Also, \mathbf{p}_{zt} is used as a zero-testing parameter, while s is used as a seed for a strong randomness extractor.

(b) **Sampling level-zero encodings:** $d \leftarrow \text{samp}(\text{params})$.

samp(params)

- 1: Choose $d \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_{\mathbb{Z}^n, \sigma'}$.
- 2: **Output:** \mathbf{d} .

It can be proved that, if $\sigma' \geq \sqrt{\lambda n} \|g\|$, then the distribution $(\mathbf{d} \bmod \mathcal{I})$ is statistically close to the uniform distribution over $(\mathbb{Z}^n \bmod \mathcal{I})$. Therefore, the coset to be sampled is close to uniform.

To prove it, firstly it can be stated that, because $g \in \mathcal{I}$, then $\lambda_1(\mathcal{I}) \leq \|g\|$. Also, knowing that \mathcal{I} is an ideal of the $(2n)^{th}$ cyclotomic ring, with n a power of two, it follows from **Proposition 5** that $\lambda_n(L) = \lambda_1(L)$. Corroborating the two results, it results that $\lambda_n(L) \leq \|g\|$. Therefore, applying **Lemma 1**, it follows that:

$$\eta_{2^{-\lambda}}(\mathcal{I}) \leq \sqrt{\frac{\ln(2n(1+2^\lambda))}{\pi}} \cdot \lambda_n(L) \leq \eta_{2^{-\lambda}}(\mathcal{I}) \leq \sqrt{\frac{\ln(2n(1+2^\lambda))}{\pi}} \cdot \|g\| \leq \sqrt{n\lambda} \|g\|.$$

Since $\sigma' \geq \sqrt{\lambda n} \|g\|$, it is obvious that $\sigma' \geq \eta_{2^{-\lambda}}(\mathcal{I})$, therefore the proof is complete.

Also, the size of \mathbf{d} is bounded by $\sigma' \sqrt{n}$, result proved by **Lemma 2**.

(c) **Encodings at higher levels:** $\mathbf{u}_i \leftarrow \text{enc}(\text{params}, i, \mathbf{d})$.

enc(params, i , \mathbf{d})

- 1: **if** $i == 1$ **then**
- 2: Choose $\mathbf{r} \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_{\mathbb{Z}^n, \sigma^*}$.
- 3: Set $\mathbf{u}_i = \left\lceil \frac{\mathbf{y}\mathbf{d}}{\mathbf{z}} + X^T \mathbf{r} \right\rceil_q$.
- 4: **else**
- 5: Set $\mathbf{u}_i = [\mathbf{d} \cdot \mathbf{y}^i]_q$.
- 6: **Output:** \mathbf{u}_i .
- 7: **end if**

The necessity of publishing a level-one representation of an element is obvious, from the inherent structure of the construction. The "lifting" of a representation, from a lower level to a higher one, may be performed only using another representation of an element, on a higher level.

In order to preserve the element to be encoded and to change only the level of encoding, the public element \mathbf{y} is an encryption of element $\hat{1}$ - the neutral element at multiplication in QR . Also, because \mathbf{y} is a level-one encoding, multiplying another element by it results in "lifting" the representation only one level. Therefore, combining the two arguments, it follows that multiplying any level- i representation of an element $\alpha \in QR$ by \mathbf{y} , it results a level- $(i + 1)$ representation of α .

More formally, given a level-zero encoding \mathbf{d} , then the level-one representation of \mathbf{d} is $\mathbf{u}_1 = [\mathbf{d}\mathbf{y}]_q = \left\lceil \frac{\mathbf{d}\mathbf{a}}{\mathbf{z}} \right\rceil$, where $a \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_{\hat{1}, \sigma''}$, therefore an element $\mathbf{x} \in \mathcal{I}$ exists such that $a = 1 + \mathbf{x}$. Then, $\mathbf{d}\mathbf{a} = \mathbf{d} + \mathbf{d}\mathbf{x}$, with $\mathbf{x} \in \mathcal{I}$, so $\mathbf{d}\mathbf{a} \in \hat{\mathbf{d}}$. Also, $\|\mathbf{d}\mathbf{a}\| \leq \|\mathbf{d}\| \cdot \|a\| \cdot \sqrt{n}$, which is a polynomial in n . Thus, $\mathbf{u}_1 = [\mathbf{d}\mathbf{y}]_q$ is a valid level-one encoding of \mathbf{d} .

Generally, in order to generate a level- i encoding of \mathbf{d} , one can simply multiply \mathbf{d} by \mathbf{y}^i , and get: $\mathbf{u}_i = [\mathbf{d}\mathbf{y}^i]_q = \left\lceil \frac{\mathbf{d}\mathbf{a}^i}{\mathbf{z}^i} \right\rceil$. It can be seen that, for a similar reason as above, $\mathbf{d}\mathbf{a}^i \in \hat{\mathbf{d}}$ and also $\|\mathbf{d}\mathbf{a}^i\| \leq \|\mathbf{d}\| \cdot \|a\| \cdot n^{i/2}$, therefore \mathbf{u}_i is a valid level- i encoding of \mathbf{d} .

Usually, the applications of Graded Encoding System require that a level-one representation of an element to be made public, without the possibility to recover a level-zero representation of that element. Thus, the process of generating \mathbf{u}_1 requires a more extensive technique. That is because in the setting above, one can easily recover \mathbf{d} by simply dividing \mathbf{u}_1 to \mathbf{y} in R_q , which is unacceptable.

Therefore, every level-one encoding of an element is randomized, in order to prevent easy recovery of plain-text. The procedure is as follows: given \mathbf{d} , a level-zero representation of an element, the first step is to extract an element \mathbf{r} from the spherical discrete Gaussian distribution $\mathcal{D}_{\mathbb{Z}^m, \sigma^*}$, for a large enough σ^* . Then, the result is:

$$\mathbf{u}_1 = [\mathbf{y}\mathbf{d} + X^T \mathbf{r}]_q = \left[\mathbf{y}\mathbf{d} + \sum_{i=1}^m \mathbf{x}_i \cdot r_i \right]_q = \left[\frac{a\mathbf{d} + \sum_{i=1}^m r_i \mathbf{b}_i}{\mathbf{z}} \right]_q.$$

Knowing that $b_i \in \hat{0}, \forall i \in \{1, 2, \dots, m\}$ and that $a \in \hat{1}$, it easily follows that $a\mathbf{d} + \sum_{i=1}^m r_i \mathbf{b}_i \in \hat{\mathbf{d}}$. Also, the length of the numerator is upper-bounded by $\sigma^* \cdot \text{poly}(m, n)$. Also, if the parameters \mathbf{b}_i are chosen from a fairly wide enough spherical Gaussian distribution, then from **Theorem 4** it follows that the distribution of $B\mathbf{r}$ is close to a wide ellipsoidal Gaussian. Hence, the distribution of $a\mathbf{d} + B\mathbf{r}$ is nearly independent of $a\mathbf{d}$, so the encoding is truly randomized.

Remark 8. *Randomization may be performed at any level, not only the first one. Besides, other versions of Graded Encoding Schemes (e.g. [9]) include a procedure for randomization at level-one, denoted **reRand**. The current setting is more restrictive, but has the advantage that it realizes a randomization for every level-one encoding of an element, reducing the implementation errors due to negligence.*

(d) **Adding encodings:** $\text{add}(\text{params}, i, v_1, v_2)$

$$\text{add}(\text{params}, i, v_1, v_2)$$

1: **Output:** $[v_1 + v_2]_q$.

The addition in the current settings is a very simple operation, as it can be observed from the one-lined algorithm presented above. To verify the correctness of the addition algorithm, one may consider v_1, v_2 , two level- i encodings of the cosets \hat{e}_1 , respectively \hat{e}_2 . Therefore, there exist two elements $c_1 \in \hat{e}_1, c_2 \in \hat{e}_2$ such that $v_1 = \left[\frac{c_1}{\mathbf{z}} \right]_q$ and $v_2 = \left[\frac{c_2}{\mathbf{z}} \right]_q$, and c_1, c_2 are short vectors. Adding the two encodings yields:

$$[v_1 + v_2]_q = \left[\left[\frac{c_1}{\mathbf{z}} \right]_q + \left[\frac{c_2}{\mathbf{z}} \right]_q \right]_q = \left[\frac{c_1 + c_2}{\mathbf{z}} \right]_q,$$

with $c_1 + c_2 \in \widehat{e_1 + e_2}$ and $c_1 + c_2$ a short vector in R . Thus, the exposed addition operation is correct.

Remark 9. *Addition operation can be extended to support the summation of many elements simultaneously. It can be effortlessly seen that the size of the numerator*

remains small, even though addition is performed many times (e.g. a number of times polynomial in n).

(e) **Multiplying encodings:** $\text{mul}(\text{params}, v_i, v_j)$.

$\text{mul}(\text{params}, v_i, v_j)$

1: **Output:** $[v_i \cdot v_j]_q$.

Multiplication operation is as simple as the addition one. The proof of correctness follows immediately.

Let v_i be a level- i encoding of a coset \widehat{e}_1 and let v_j be a level- j encoding of a coset \widehat{e}_2 , with $0 \leq i, j$ and $i + j \leq k$. Then, using the properties of the construction, one may note that there must exist two vectors, $c_1 \in \widehat{e}_1, c_2 \in \widehat{e}_2$, such that $v_i = [\frac{c_1}{\mathbf{z}^i}]_q$ and $v_j = [\frac{c_2}{\mathbf{z}^j}]_q$. Performing the multiplication of the encodings, as presented in the algorithm, the result is:

$$[v_i \cdot v_j]_q = \left[\left[\frac{c_1}{\mathbf{z}^i} \right]_q \cdot \left[\frac{c_2}{\mathbf{z}^j} \right]_q \right]_q = \left[\frac{c_1 \cdot c_2}{\mathbf{z}^{i+j}} \right]_q,$$

with $c_1 \cdot c_2 \in \widehat{e_1 \cdot e_2}$, and $c_1 \cdot c_2$ a short vector in R (thus unchanged in R_q). Hence, the multiplication operation exposed in the algorithm is correct.

Remark 10. *Usually, the applications of Graded Encoding Systems will require to multiply k level-one encodings, thus the property stated at **Remark 8** also holds true for multiplication operation. As a result, it can be easily noted that the product of k level-one encodings represents a level- k encryption of an element.*

(f) **Zero testing:** $\text{isZero}(\text{params}, \mathbf{p}_{zt}, u)$

$\text{isZero}(\text{params}, \mathbf{p}_{zt}, u)$

1: **if** $\|\mathbf{p}_{zt} \cdot u\|_\infty \leq q^{\frac{3}{4}}$ **then**
 2: Set $result = 1$
 3: **else**
 4: Set $result = 0$
 5: **end if**
 6: **Output:** $result$

In order to test if two encodings represent the same element (obviously, on the same level), it is sufficient to subtract them and compare to zero. The zero testing procedure involves a so-called zero-testing parameter and may be used only for level- k encodings. However, despite the fact that the procedure always returns the correct answer for encodings of zero, it also may return (with negligible probability) a false answer for a non-zero encoding.

As presented in the instance generation algorithm, the zero-testing parameter is $\mathbf{p}_{zt} = \left\lfloor \frac{\mathbf{h}\mathbf{z}^k}{\mathbf{g}} \right\rfloor_q$, where $\mathbf{h} \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_{\mathbb{Z}^n, \sqrt{q}}$. Also, from the inherent structure of the construction it follows that there exists a short element c , such that $u = \left\lfloor \frac{c}{\mathbf{z}^k} \right\rfloor_q$. To prove the *general* faultlessness of the algorithm, it is required to remark that:

$$w = \mathbf{p}_{zt} \cdot u = \left\lfloor \frac{\mathbf{h}\mathbf{z}^k}{\mathbf{g}} \right\rfloor_q \cdot \left\lfloor \frac{c}{\mathbf{z}^k} \right\rfloor_q = \left\lfloor \frac{\mathbf{h} \cdot c}{\mathbf{g}} \right\rfloor_q.$$

- If u is an encoding of zero, then $c \in \hat{0}$, therefore $c \in \mathcal{I}$. Because $\mathcal{I} = \langle g \rangle$, it follows that $c = g \cdot \alpha$, for $\alpha \in R$. Thus, the element $\frac{c}{\mathbf{g}} \in R$ is the same element as $c \cdot \mathbf{g}^{-1} \in \mathbb{K}$. It follows that $\|w\| \leq \|\mathbf{h}\| \cdot \|c\| \cdot \|\mathbf{g}^{-1}\| \cdot \sqrt{n}^2$. Then, using **Theorem 3** for the case of choosing $\mathbf{h} \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_{\mathbb{Z}^n, \sqrt{q}}$, it can be easily noticed that $\|\mathbf{h}\| \leq \sqrt{q} \cdot \sqrt{n}$. Corroborating the last two results with the fact that $\|\mathbf{g}\|$ is small (validated by the generation algorithm), it follows that:

$$\|w\| \leq q^{\frac{1}{2}} \cdot \sqrt{n} \cdot q^{\frac{1}{8}} \cdot \|\mathbf{g}^{-1}\| \cdot n \leq q^{\frac{3}{4}}.$$

- If u is an encoding of a non-zero coset, then $c \notin \hat{0}$. In order to prove that the value $\|w\|$ is larger than $q^{\frac{3}{4}}$ with overwhelming probability, one more result must be settled below.

Lemma 3 (Lemma 6.5, [10]). *Let $w = \left\lfloor \frac{c\mathbf{h}}{\mathbf{g}} \right\rfloor_q$, with the properties: $\|g\mathbf{w}\| \leq \frac{q}{2}$ and $\|c\mathbf{h}\| \leq \frac{q}{2}$. If $\langle g \rangle$ is a prime ideal, then either c or \mathbf{h} is in the ideal g .*

Using the same reason as in the first situation, it can be easily seen that $\|\mathbf{h}\| \leq \sqrt{q} \cdot \sqrt{n}$, with overwhelming probability. Then, because $\|c\| \leq q^{\frac{1}{8}}$ (from the intrinsic structure of the construction), it follows that:

$$\|c \cdot \mathbf{h}\| \leq \sqrt{n} \cdot q^{\frac{1}{2}} \cdot q^{\frac{1}{8}} \cdot \sqrt{n} = q^{\frac{5}{8}} \cdot n < \frac{q}{2}. \quad (1)$$

Supposing that there exists $\epsilon > 0$ such that $\|w\| \leq q^{1-\epsilon}$, then $\|w\mathbf{g}\| < q^{1-\epsilon} \cdot \|\mathbf{g}\| \cdot \sqrt{n}$ and because $\|\mathbf{g}\|$ is polynomial in n , it directly results that:

$$\|w\mathbf{g}\| < \frac{q}{2}. \quad (2)$$

Using the results (1) and (2) in collaboration with **Lemma 3**, it follows that either c or \mathbf{h} is in the ideal $\langle g \rangle$, which is a **contradiction**, because $c \notin \hat{0}$ and $\mathbf{h} \notin \mathcal{I}$. Then, for any $\epsilon > 0$, $\|w\| \geq q^{1-\epsilon}$, therefore $\|w\| \geq q^{\frac{3}{4}}$.

Remark 11. *The zero testing algorithm could have been written in a more condensed (and elegant) manner. However, in order to keep the same structure of the algorithm throughout the chapter, the current version was adopted.*

(g) **Extraction:** $r \leftarrow \text{ext}(\text{params}, \mathbf{p}_{zt}, u)$

$\text{ext}(\text{params}, \mathbf{p}_{zt}, u)$

1: Set $M = \text{msbs}_{\frac{\log q}{4} - \lambda}([u \cdot \mathbf{p}_{zt}]_q)$

2: **Output:** $\text{EXTRACT}_s(M)$

The extraction procedure is fairly simple. First, given u , a valid level- k representation of a coset, multiply it with \mathbf{p}_{zt} (in R_q). Then extract the most significant

$\frac{\log q}{4} - \lambda$ bits of *each* of the coefficients of the result. Finally, apply a strong randomness extractor on the resulted bits. The algorithm was divided in two steps in order to stress its dual importance.

The first step realizes a *canonicalization* of cosets representation (the extraction procedure, applied to two different encodings of the same coset, must return the same result). On the other side, the second step performs a *randomization* of the result, so that an external observer will not be capable to generate a valid standard representation of a desired coset.

The correctness of the first step is further discussed. Let $\widehat{e}_1, \widehat{e}_2 \in R/\mathcal{I}$ be two cosets, let $u_1 = \left[\frac{c_1}{\mathbf{z}^k} \right]_q$ and let $u_2 = \left[\frac{c_2}{\mathbf{z}^k} \right]_q$, with $c_1 \in \widehat{e}_1, c_2 \in \widehat{e}_2$.

- If $\widehat{e}_1 = \widehat{e}_2$, then u_1 and u_2 are **encodings of the same coset**. Then, using the results from *zero-testing procedure*, it follows that $\|\mathbf{p}_{zt}u_1 - \mathbf{p}_{zt}u_2\| = \|\mathbf{p}_{zt}(u_1 - u_2)\| \leq q^{\frac{3}{4}}$. Therefore, with overwhelming probability, the most significant $\frac{\log q}{4}$ bits of every coefficient of $(\mathbf{p}_{zt}u_1 - \mathbf{p}_{zt}u_2)$ are equal to 0, hence $\mathbf{p}_{zt}u_1$ and $\mathbf{p}_{zt}u_2$ have the same most significant $(\frac{\log q}{4} - \lambda)$ bits for each coefficient. So, the same result is returned by the procedure for u_1 and u_2 .
- If $\widehat{e}_1 \neq \widehat{e}_2$, then u_1 and u_2 are **encodings of different cosets**. Therefore, it is known from *zero-test procedure* that for every $\epsilon > 0$, $\|\mathbf{p}_{zt}(u_1 - u_2)\| \geq q^{1-\epsilon}$. It is now obvious that $\mathbf{p}_{zt}u_1$ and $\mathbf{p}_{zt}u_2$ do not have the same most significant $(\frac{\log q}{4} - \lambda)$ bits for each coefficient, hence the procedure returns different results for u_1 and u_2 .

Remark 12. *The element given as parameter to the Extract procedure must be a valid level- k representation of a coset in R/\mathcal{I} . This information is used within the proof of correctness for the procedure, hence on other levels of encoding, the behavior is undefined.*

3.3 Parameter constraints

All of the above procedures rely on appropriate settings for the parameters, especially regarding the width of the Gaussian distributions. The constraints will be explained in-depth for every choice of parameter value.

- $\sigma = \sqrt{\lambda n}$. The parameter σ defines the width of the first involved Gaussian, used for extraction of the generator \mathbf{g} . The parameter must satisfy $\sigma \geq \eta_{2^{-\lambda}}$, so setting $\sigma = \sqrt{\lambda n}$ is safe. Note that, using **Theorem 3**, $\|g\| \leq \sigma\sqrt{n} = n\sqrt{\lambda}$, with overwhelming probability.
- $\sigma' = \lambda n^{\frac{3}{2}}$. In the paragraphs reserved for *sampling* procedure, it was explained why σ' should be lower bounded by $\|g\| \cdot \sqrt{\lambda n}$. Using the upper bound for $\|g\|$, it follows that $\sigma' = \lambda n^{\frac{3}{2}}$ is a good parameter choice.
- $\sigma^* = 2^\lambda$. Parameter σ^* defines the width of the Gaussian distribution used to draw the randomization vector \mathbf{r} from *higher level encoding* procedure. In order to apply **Theorem 4**, σ^* must satisfy: $\sigma^* > \text{poly}(n, m, \lambda)$. Also, for the numerator of the randomized encoding to become independent of the numerator before the

randomization, it suffices that $\sigma^* = 2^\lambda$. With this value for σ^* , a level-one encoding of a coset takes the form $\left[\frac{c}{z}\right]_q$, with $\|c\| \leq 2^\lambda \cdot \text{poly}(n)$.

- $q = 2^{8k\lambda} \cdot n^{O(k)}$. Usually, applications of *Graded Encoding Schemes* compute a level- k encoding of a coset by multiplying k level-one representations of cosets. Using the result above regarding the upper bounds for numerators of level-one encodings, it follows that the numerator of a level- k representation will be upper bounded by: $(2^\lambda \cdot \text{poly}(n))^k$. Thus, in order for the product to be considered a valid encoding (which means that the size of numerator should not exceed $q^{\frac{1}{8}}$), it is necessary that: $(2^\lambda \cdot \text{poly}(n))^k \leq q^{\frac{1}{8}}$. Finally, by setting $q = 2^{8k\lambda} \cdot n^{O(k)}$ it is ensured that the value of q is big enough for all the operations to be performed in a safe manner.
- $n > O(k\lambda^2)$. For the scheme to assure a security level of λ , it is needed that $q < 2^{\frac{n}{\lambda}}$. Therefore, using the above restriction for q , it immediately results that $n > O(k\lambda^2)$.
- $m = O(n^2)$. In order to apply **Theorem 4** during *higher level encodings* proof of correctness, it is needed that $m > n \log q$. From the previous bounds for q and n , it yields that $m = O(n^2)$.

3.4 Hardness Assumptions

This section is linked directly to **Subsection 1.4.2** by presenting the **GDL** and **GDDH** problems and their implications in the current settings.

1. **Graded Discrete Logarithm (GDL)**. *It is said that the GDL problem is hard for a Graded Encoding System GES if for all probabilistic polynomial running time algorithms, the discrete logarithm advantage of an adversary \mathcal{A} ,*

$$\text{AdvDlog}_{\text{GES}, \mathcal{A}, k}(\lambda) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \Pr[\mathcal{A}(\text{params}, \mathbf{p}_{zt}, u) = a : (\text{params}, \mathbf{p}_{zt}) \leftarrow \text{InstGen}(1^\lambda, 1^k), c \in R, u = \left[\frac{c}{z^k}\right]_q, a \in \hat{c},$$

is negligible in λ .

Remark 13. *The vigilant reader may note that the **GDL** problem is only defined for level- k encodings of cosets. That is because if the element u is a valid level- i representation, with $1 \leq i < k$, the problem may become weak, as explained in [11], Section 4.4.*

In order to introduce the **GDDH** problem, it is required to define an algorithm that generates a **GDDH** instance, as the one presented in [10], Section 7.1:

genGDDH(params, \mathbf{p}_{zt})

- 1: Choose $\mathbf{f} \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_{\mathbb{Z}^n, \sigma}$. ▷ Level-zero encoding of a random coset
- 2: **for** $i = 0$ to k **do**
- 3: Choose $\mathbf{e}_i \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_{\mathbb{Z}^n, \sigma}$ ▷ Level-zero encoding of a random coset
- 4: Choose $\mathbf{r}_i \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_{\mathbb{Z}^m, \sigma^*}$ ▷ Randomization vector
- 5: Set $u_i = [\mathbf{e}_i \mathbf{y} + \sum_{j=1}^m r_j \mathbf{x}_j]_q$ ▷ Randomized lvl-1 encoding of \mathbf{e}_i
- 6: **end for**
- 7: Set $u^* = [\prod_{i=1}^k u_i]_q$ ▷ Level- k encoding of last k elements product
- 8: Set $v = [\mathbf{e}_0 \cdot u^*]$ ▷ Level- k encoding of the $k + 1$ elements
- 9: Set $v' = [\mathbf{f} \cdot u^*]$ ▷ Level- k encoding of other $k + 1$ elements
- 10: **Output:** $(u_0, u_1, \dots, u_k, v, v')$.

2. **Graded DDH (GDDH).** *The GDDH problem is hard for a Graded Encoding System GES if for any probabilistic polynomial running time algorithm \mathcal{A} , the advantage of \mathcal{A} in distinguishing between the distributions:*

$$(\text{params}, \mathbf{p}_{zt}, u_0, \dots, u_k, v) \text{ and } (\text{params}, \mathbf{p}_{zt}, u_0, \dots, u_k, v')$$

is negligible in λ , where $(\text{params}, \mathbf{p}_{zt}) \leftarrow \text{InstGen}(1^\lambda, 1^k)$ and $(u_0, u_1, \dots, u_k, v, v') = \text{genGDDH}(\text{params}, \mathbf{p}_{zt})$.

3.5 Applications

Many of the applications of multilinear maps can be reproduced using Graded Encoding Schemes. Particularly, the system of Garg, Gentry and Halevi from 2013, presented in [11], could easily be used as a replacement for multilinear maps in applications such as *one-round N -way secret key exchange* protocol, presented in [11], *indistinguishability obfuscation* (which has the objective to make a computer program unintelligible while still preserving its functionality), depicted in [12] or *Attribute-Based Encryption for general circuits*, detailed in [13].

In the current section, only the first mentioned application will be illustrated. The *one-round N -way key exchange* protocol is initially explained in [5]. Shortly, the protocol is used in order to allow N users to set a common key, which is known only by the N parties. This process involves two phases. In the first one, each user must broadcast a value to all the other users, and all broadcasts are realized concurrently. During the second phase, every party must collect the values broadcasted by the other users and compute the shared key.

From a high-level perspective, the $N - 1$ Graded Encoding Systems may be utilized in the aforementioned protocol, as it follows. In the first phase, each of the users may extract a level-zero representation of a random coset (kept secret) and broadcast a randomized level-one encoding of it. During the second phase, each user multiplies all the $N - 1$ public level-one representations of other users with his level-zero encoding, resulting in a level- $(N - 1)$ cryptogram of the product of all N cosets. Formally, the protocol consists of three algorithms, presented below:

1. **Scheme setup:** $(\text{params}, \mathbf{p}_{zt}) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^N)$.

<p>Setup$(1^\lambda, 1^N)$</p> <p>1: $(\text{params}, \mathbf{p}_{zt}) \leftarrow \text{InstGen}(1^\lambda, 1^{N-1})$.</p> <p>2: Output: $(\text{params}, \mathbf{p}_{zt})$.</p>

The **Setup** algorithm is fairly simple, instantiating the parameters of the scheme with the parameters generated by *InstGen* algorithm for $N - 1$ GES. Also, it is required that the order of R/\mathcal{I} is a large prime, or that all its prime divisors are large.

2. **Parameter broadcast:** $w_i \leftarrow \text{Publish}(\text{params}, \mathbf{p}_{zt}, i)$.

<p>Publish$(\text{params}, \mathbf{p}_{zt}, i)$</p> <p>1: Choose $\mathbf{d}_i \leftarrow \text{samp}(\text{params})$. \triangleright Secret key of user i</p> <p>2: Set $w_i \leftarrow \text{enc}(\text{params}, 1, \mathbf{d}_i)$. \triangleright Level-one encoding of \mathbf{d}_i</p> <p>3: Output: w_i.</p>
--

The **Publish** procedure is the analogue of the mentioned first phase. Each user must extract a level-zero encoding of a random coset, using **samp** procedure of the GES instance, then return a randomized level-one representation of it.

3. **Shared key reconstruction:** $sk \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(\text{params}, \mathbf{p}_{zt}, i, \mathbf{d}_i, \{w_j\}_{j \neq i})$.

<p>KeyGen$(\text{params}, \mathbf{p}_{zt}, i, \mathbf{d}_i, \{w_j\}_{j \neq i})$</p> <p>1: Set $v_i = \mathbf{d}_i \cdot \prod_{j \neq i} w_j$. \triangleright Level-$(N - 1)$ encoding of all cosets product</p> <p>2: Set $sk \leftarrow \text{ext}(\text{params}, \mathbf{p}_{zt}, v_i)$. \triangleright Standard representation of element</p>

The **KeyGen** procedure is the correspondent of the second phase. Therefore, each user must multiply the published parameters of the other users with his secret parameter, in order to generate a level- $(N - 1)$ encoding of the product of all N cosets. Finally, the key is represented by the canonical level- $(N - 1)$ encoding of the result.

The correctness of the construction is obvious for the attentive user, who read the entire chapter. Also, the system is secure in the assumption that **GDDH** problem is hard for the GES instance.

As mentioned at the beginning of the section, the current GES setting has many other applications, and the interested lecturer may read the related papers, given as bibliography.

Chapter 4

Security

In order to realize an implementation of the GES scheme presented at **Chapter 3**, it must be proved to be secure, at least in a theoretical manner. The security study started even from the original paper of Garg, Gentry and Halevi, where the weaknesses of Discrete Logarithm on level smaller than k , along with averaging attacks are discussed.

Furthermore, after the publication of the paper, there followed a sum of attacks on the scheme, that would break some security assumptions, such as *Subgroup Membership* (*SubM*) or *Decision Linear* (*DLIN*). The initial ones, known as "zeroizing" attacks, used the public level-one encodings of zero in order to crack some assumptions. Then, extended weak Discrete Logarithm attacks were set up even in constructions without public encryptions of zero. One of the latest results over the security of the scheme is represented by the *annihilation attacks*, exposed in [22].

As depicted in the previous chapter, one of the applications of the scheme is *indistinguishability obfuscation*. One of the main advantages of iO is that they do not require the existence of public encodings of zero. Because most of the attacks over *GGH13* scheme are based on the presence of the aforementioned public representations of zero, it follows that iO schemes remain secure.

However, a new kind of attack was presented in 2016 by Miles, Sahai and Zhandry in [22]. They conceived the first polynomial-time cryptanalysis of candidate iO schemes over *GGH13*, using *annihilation attacks*. Therefore, even the future of iO implementations may become dark, and further analysis and fixes are required.

The first attack to be presented in the current chapter is a "zeroizing" one, followed closely by attacks that could be mounted in the assumption that some elements could be found. Finally, the principle of *averaging attacks* is overviewed, as an ending of the chapter and as the paper as well.

4.1 A zeroizing attack

The "zeroizing" attack is also called *weak discrete logarithm attack*. It was discovered soon after the publication of GGH construction [11], and it lead to the break of *SubM* and *DLIN* problems, considered to be secure in the initial paper. As no similar attack was designed for CLT13 scheme [9] very fast, the analogue system designed by Coron, Lepoint and Tibouchi was thought to provide secure *DLIN* and *SubM* instantiation. However, in [7] an attack was designed for the CLT scheme, so powerful that lead to a total break,

i.e. all private parameters could be efficiently recovered.

Zeroizing attack (Weak Discrete Logarithm)

- 1: **for** i from 1 to l **do**
- 2: Given $u_i = \left[\frac{\mathbf{d}_i}{\mathbf{z}^{s_i}} \right]_q$, with $1 \leq s_i < k$, compute $\mathbf{f}_i = [u_i \cdot \mathbf{x}_j \cdot \mathbf{p}_{zt} \cdot \mathbf{y}^{k-s_i-1}]_q$.
- 3: **end for**
- 4: Using $\mathbf{f}_1, \mathbf{f}_2, \dots, \mathbf{f}_l$, compute a basis of \mathcal{I} .

The zeroizing attack is based on the existence of public encodings of zero, namely $\mathbf{x}_1, \dots, \mathbf{x}_m$ and the public encoding of one, \mathbf{y} . Particularly, for any fixed $j \in \{1, 2, \dots, m\}$, consider the level-one representation of zero, $\mathbf{x}_j = \left[\frac{\mathbf{b}_j}{\mathbf{z}} \right]_q$, with $\mathbf{b}_j \in \hat{0}$. Because $\mathbf{b}_j \in \hat{0}$, therefore there exists a short c_j such that $\mathbf{b}_j = c_j \cdot \mathbf{g}$. Thus, $\mathbf{x}_j = \left[\frac{c_j \cdot \mathbf{g}}{\mathbf{z}} \right]_q$.

Then, if the attacker may obtain valid representations of elements on levels lower than k (and for each encoding, he knows the specific level), he may succeed in his attack. Suppose the attacker knows l valid elements, $u_i = \left[\frac{\mathbf{d}_i}{\mathbf{z}^{s_i}} \right]_q, \forall i \in \{1, 2, \dots, l\}$. Then, for each element, he can compute, as exemplified in [10]:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{f}_i &= [u_i \cdot \mathbf{x}_j \cdot \mathbf{p}_{zt} \cdot \mathbf{y}^{k-s_i-1}]_q = \left[\frac{\mathbf{d}_i}{\mathbf{z}^{s_i}} \cdot \frac{c_j \cdot \mathbf{g}}{\mathbf{z}} \cdot \frac{\mathbf{h} \mathbf{z}^k}{\mathbf{g}} \cdot \frac{\mathbf{a}^{k-i-1}}{\mathbf{z}^{k-i-1}} \right]_q = \\ &= [\mathbf{d}_i \cdot c_j \cdot \mathbf{h} \cdot \mathbf{a}^{k-i-1}]_q \stackrel{(1)}{=} \mathbf{d}_i \cdot c_j \cdot \mathbf{h} \cdot \mathbf{a}^{k-i-1} \equiv (\underbrace{\mathbf{d}_i \cdot c_j \cdot \mathbf{h}}_{\Delta_j}) \pmod{\mathcal{I}}. \end{aligned}$$

The equality (1) holds because the value: $\mathbf{d}_i \cdot c_j \cdot \mathbf{h} \cdot \mathbf{a}^{k-i-1}$ is significantly lower than q , therefore the element reduced modulo q has the same representation as the element without the reduction. The vigilant reader may note that Δ_j is invariant of \mathbf{x}_j . Thus from a level- s_i encoding of \mathbf{d}_i represented by u_i , an attacker could compute the value $\mathbf{f}_i \in \widehat{\mathbf{d}_i \cdot \Delta_j}$.

Consider that $\|\Delta_j\| \approx \|\mathbf{h}\| = O(\sqrt{q})$, therefore $\|\mathbf{f}_i\| > q^{\frac{1}{2}}$ with overwhelming probability. Thus \mathbf{f}_i is not upper-bounded by the correct value in order to represent a valid level-zero encoding of an element.

Hence, applying this procedure for all the public \mathbf{x}_j 's, the attacker will have at discretion many elements from the ideal $\langle \mathbf{h} \rangle$. From all the elements recovered, he may recover a basis of the principal ideal lattice $\langle \mathbf{h} \rangle$. Therefore, it will be fairly easy to construct a basis for the fractional principal ideal $\langle \frac{1}{\mathbf{h}} \rangle$ in \mathbb{K} .

Using a similar algorithm as the one presented above, the attacker may recover a basis for the principal ideals $\langle \mathbf{h} \cdot \mathbf{g} \rangle$ and $\langle \mathbf{h} \cdot \mathbf{a} \rangle$. Utilizing the found basis for $\langle \frac{1}{\mathbf{h}} \rangle$, then a basis for $\langle \mathbf{a} \rangle$ and $\langle \mathbf{g} \rangle = \mathcal{I}$ may be easily found.

The conclusion of the current subsection is that the ideal \mathcal{I} cannot remain entirely hidden, but also that finding a small basis for it is still hard, therefore the construction is viable, as its complete break is realized by finding the small generator \mathbf{g} of \mathcal{I} .

It must be noted that the zeroizing attack does not affect **GDDH** assumption, as the level of the known elements must be less than k in order to take part of the algorithm. However, it is obvious that the presence of the public level-one encodings of zero represent a vulnerability of the construction. Therefore, in order to be able to ensure *SubM* and *DLIN* security, the system must provide different methods to randomize the encoding procedure at level one, without the usage of the aforementioned public parameters.

4.2 Attacks with known elements

As the title suggests, the section will evaluate the amount of damage that could be realized to the security of the construction, in the assumption that several particular elements could be available to the attacker.

The analysis is performed regarding the **GDDH** problem, with the known parameters of the scheme, but also with the parameters bound to the **GDDH** instance, which are similar to the output of **genGDDH** algorithm:

- $u_i = \left[\frac{e_i}{z} \right]_q$, for $i \in \{0, 1, \dots, k\}$ - $k + 1$ level-one encodings of random elements, with $\|e_i\| < 2^\lambda \sigma \sqrt{n}, \forall i \in \{0, 1, \dots, k\}$;
- $w = \left[\frac{c}{z^k} \right]_q$ - the challenge element, which represents the level- k encoding of $\prod_{i=0}^k e_i$ or of a random coset of R/\mathcal{I} .

4.2.1 A short element of the ideal \mathcal{I}

Attack with a known short element of \mathcal{I}

(Suppose that the known element is **dg**)

- 1: Set $\mathbf{p}'_{zt} = [\mathbf{dg} \cdot \mathbf{p}_{zt}]_q$.
- 2: Set $v_1 = [\mathbf{p}'_{zt} \cdot w]_q$.
- 3: Set $v_2 = \left[\mathbf{p}'_{zt} \cdot \prod_{i=1}^k u_i \right]_q$.
- 4: Set $e_0^{sup} = v_1 \text{ div } v_2 \pmod{\mathcal{I}}$. ▷ Element to be compared to e_0
- 5: Compute $u_0^{sup} = e_0^{sup} \cdot \mathbf{y}$. ▷ Level-one encoding of e_0^{sup}
- 6: **Output:** **isZero**(params, \mathbf{p}_{zt} , $u_0 - u_0^{sup}$).

The flow of the algorithm is fairly natural, as it can be observed from the step-by-step explanation above. The proof of correctness follows immediately.

First, suppose that w is a level- k encoding of $\prod_{i=0}^k e_i$. Thus, there exists a vector c

such that $w = \left[\frac{c\mathbf{g} + \prod_{i=0}^k e_i}{\mathbf{z}^k} \right]_q$. Let the short element in \mathcal{I} be $\mathbf{d}\mathbf{g}$, with \mathbf{d} a small vector. Then, a modified zero-test parameter will be computed, $\mathbf{p}'_{zt} = [\mathbf{d}\mathbf{g} \cdot \mathbf{p}_{zt}]_q = [\mathbf{d} \cdot \mathbf{h} \cdot \mathbf{z}^k]_q$. Multiplying \mathbf{p}'_{zt} by both w and $\prod_{i=1}^k u_i$, it yields:

$$\begin{cases} v_1 = [\mathbf{p}'_{zt} \cdot w]_q \\ v_2 = \left[\mathbf{p}'_{zt} \cdot \prod_{i=1}^k u_i \right]_q \end{cases} \implies \begin{cases} v_1 = \mathbf{d} \cdot \mathbf{h} \cdot \left(c\mathbf{g} + \prod_{i=0}^k e_i \right) \\ v_2 = \mathbf{d} \cdot \mathbf{h} \cdot \prod_{i=1}^k e_i \end{cases} \quad (1).$$

Next, it can be easily seen that the quantity $e_0^{sup} = v_1 \operatorname{div} v_2 \pmod{\mathcal{I}}$ must be congruent with $e_0 \pmod{\mathcal{I}}$. In order to calculate e_0^{sup} , one must compute the Hermite Normal Form (HNF) of the lattice, using the basis found using the zeroizing attack. Knowing that the HNF basis has the first element of the main diagonal equal to $N(\mathcal{I})$, the attacker could easily find the norm of the ideal.

Let $\mu_1 = v_1 \pmod{N(\mathcal{I})}$ and let $\mu_2 = v_2 \pmod{N(\mathcal{I})}$. Because $N(\mathcal{I}) \in \mathbb{Z}$, then $\mu_1, \mu_2 \in \mathbb{Z}$. Also $N(\mathcal{I}) \in \mathcal{I}$, thus:

$$\mu_1 \equiv v_1 \pmod{\mathcal{I}} \text{ and } \mu_2 \equiv v_2 \pmod{\mathcal{I}}. \quad (2)$$

Using relations (1) and (2) and the fact that $\mathcal{I} = \langle \mathbf{g} \rangle$, it follows immediately that:

$$\begin{cases} \mu_1 \equiv v_1 \equiv \mathbf{d} \cdot \mathbf{h} \cdot \prod_{i=0}^k e_i \pmod{\mathcal{I}} \\ \mu_2 \equiv v_2 \equiv \mathbf{d} \cdot \mathbf{h} \cdot \prod_{i=1}^k e_i \pmod{\mathcal{I}} \end{cases}.$$

Using the relations above, it can be easily seen that $\mu_2 \cdot e_0 \equiv \mathbf{d} \cdot \mathbf{h} \cdot e_0 \cdot \prod_{i=1}^k e_i \pmod{\mathcal{I}}$, therefore:

$$\mu_2 \cdot e_0 \equiv \mu_1 \pmod{\mathcal{I}} \quad (3).$$

Supposing that $\mu_2 \in \mathbb{Z}_{N(\mathcal{I})}^*$, let $\eta = \mu_1 \cdot \mu_2^{-1} \pmod{N(\mathcal{I})}$. Then, $\eta \cdot \mu_2 \equiv \mu_1 \pmod{N(\mathcal{I})}$ and knowing that $N(\mathcal{I}) \in \mathcal{I}$, it follows that:

$$\mu_2 \cdot \eta \equiv \mu_1 \pmod{\mathcal{I}} \quad (4).$$

Using relations (3) and (4) and the fact that μ_2 is coprime with $N(\mathcal{I})$, it results that $\eta \equiv e_0 \pmod{\mathcal{I}}$. Reducing η modulo the short rotation basis of $\mathbf{d}\mathbf{g}$, which is obviously small, because $\mathbf{d}\mathbf{g}$ itself is small, it results a short element $e_0^{sup} \equiv e_0 \pmod{\mathcal{I}}$.

Therefore, an attacker could recover a valid level-zero representation of the coset \widehat{e}_0 , and immediately compute the level-one representation of it, $u_0^{sup} = e_0^{sup} \cdot \mathbf{y}$. Then, the result of **isZero**($u_0 - u_0^{sup}$) is returned, which is **true**, in this case. In the case that w is not a level- k representation of the product $\prod_{i=0}^k e_i$, the same argument as above may be applied to observe that $e_0^{sup} \notin \widehat{e}_0$, therefore the procedure **isZero** will return **false**. Thus, the algorithm is correct and it may be mounted by an attacker in order to solve the **GDDH** problem in the GGH13 construction.

4.2.2 A small multiple of $\frac{1}{h}$

Attack with a known short multiple of $\frac{1}{h}$
(Suppose that the known element is $\mathbf{v} = \frac{\mathbf{d}}{h}$)

- 1: Set $\mathbf{p}'_{zt} = [\mathbf{v} \cdot \mathbf{p}_{zt}]_q$.
- 2: Set $\mathbf{p}''_{zt} = [(\mathbf{p}'_{zt})^2 \cdot \mathbf{x}_0]_q$. ▷ Zero-test parameter for level $2k - 1$
- 3: Set $w' = [w \cdot \mathbf{y}^{k-1}]_q$. ▷ Lift w with $k - 1$ levels, therefore w' is on level $2k - 1$
- 4: Set $p' = \left[\mathbf{y}^{k-2} \cdot \prod_{i=0}^k u_i \right]$. ▷ Lift p with $k - 2$ levels, therefore p' is on level $2k - 1$
- 5: **Output:** $\text{isZero}(\text{params}, \mathbf{p}''_{zt}, w' - p')$. ▷ Test for zero on level $2k - 1$

An ingenious attacker may note that the availability of a zero-test parameter on any level higher than k would lead to a simple, yet devastating attack. Suppose that \mathbf{p}'_{zt} is a level- k' zero test parameter, with $k' > k$. Then, the attacker may lift the challenge element w to level k' by multiplying it with $\mathbf{y}^{k'-k}$. Soon after, he may also lift the product $\prod_{i=0}^k u_i$ to level k' , by multiplying it with $\mathbf{y}^{k'-k-1}$ (note that the condition $k' > k$ is essential). Therefore, the attacker knows a level- k' representation of the desired product, but also a level- k' representation of the challenge element. Thus, he may use the zero-test parameter on level k' to decide whether or not the two elements encode the same coset.

It can be shown that a level- $(2k)$ zero-test parameter can be constructed from a small multiple of $\frac{1}{h}$, as presented in [11]. Let $\mathbf{v} = \frac{\mathbf{d}}{h}$ be the small multiple of $\frac{1}{h}$. The attacker may compute the quantity $\mathbf{p}'_{zt} = [\mathbf{v} \cdot \mathbf{p}_{zt}]_q = \left[\frac{\mathbf{d}\mathbf{z}^k}{\mathbf{g}} \right]_q$ and afterwards $\mathbf{p}''_{zt} = [(\mathbf{p}'_{zt})^2 \cdot \mathbf{x}_0]_q = \left[\frac{\mathbf{d}^2 \mathbf{z}^{2k} \cdot \mathbf{b}_0 \mathbf{g}}{\mathbf{g}^2} \right]_q = \left[\frac{(\mathbf{d}^2 \mathbf{b}_0) \cdot \mathbf{z}^{2k-1}}{\mathbf{g}} \right]_q$. Therefore, reminding that a level- k zero test parameter is some $\mathbf{p}_{zt} = \left[\frac{h\mathbf{z}^k}{\mathbf{g}} \right]_q$, it follows that the constructed \mathbf{p}''_{zt} is a valid level- $(2k - 1)$ zero-test parameter.

Thus, an attacker that knows a short multiple of $\frac{1}{h}$ may construct a level- $(2k - 1)$ zero-test parameter and then mount an attack that solves **GDDH** in polynomial time.

Remark 14. *The algorithm is correct for $k \geq 2$. However, the case $k < 2$ is impractical, and even $k = 2$ refers to bilinear maps, which may be constructed in a different way (e.g. using Weil-Tate pairings).*

Remark 15. *The paper [11] contains a **mistake** in Section 6.3.3, by considering $\mathbf{x}_0 = [\mathbf{b}_0 \mathbf{g}]_q$, which is not the way the element is constructed. In the current paper, the mistake is rectified, therefore the zero-test parameter is valid for level $(2k - 1)$ and not for level $2k$, as stated in [11].*

4.2.3 A small multiple of hg^r

Attack with a known short multiple of hg^r
(Suppose that the known element is $\mathbf{v} = \mathbf{d} \cdot \mathbf{h}g^r$)

- 1: Set $\mathbf{v}' = \sqrt[r]{\mathbf{v}}$. ▷ An approximation of \mathbf{g}
- 2: Recover \mathbf{g} from \mathbf{v}' .
- 3: **Output:** Found \mathbf{g} .

Suppose that that attacker knows the quantity $\mathbf{v} = \mathbf{d} \cdot \mathbf{h}g^r$, for a large value of r . Because $\mathbf{d}\mathbf{h}$ is independent of g^r and fairly random, then the value $\sqrt[r]{\mathbf{d}\mathbf{h}}$ tends to a constant, as r increases (to infinity).

Therefore, a large value for r may imply that \mathbf{v}' represents a reasonable approximation of \mathbf{g} . Using the algorithm used for solving the Closest Principal Ideal Generator problem, presented in [10], Section 9.5, the attacker may recover the generator \mathbf{g} , thus breaking the entire scheme.

However, the attack is somewhat implausible for the GGH13 construction, because in practice n is very large compared to k , hence the condition that r is much larger than k is not sufficient (taking into consideration the bounds presented at **Lemma 2**). It is presented though, because there exists a small risk that an attacker may implement an efficient version of the algorithm.

4.3 Averaging attacks

Averaging attacks refer to algorithms that are capable to compute the invariant \mathbf{h} , by observing many elements that have the structure $\mathbf{h} \cdot \mathbf{r}$, with a random \mathbf{r} . Otherwise, after seeing many elements, they may return the "common" part of all the input encodings.

Averaging attacks may be used together with the zeroizing attack. It is reminded that during the aforementioned attack, numerous elements that have the form $\alpha \cdot \mathbf{g}$ are available to the attacker. Therefore, if she could mount an averaging attack using the found encodings, the construction would be completely broken.

Garg presents in his PhD thesis, [10], Chapter 9, four versions of averaging attacks. The first one is used to recover the quantity $\mathbf{h} \cdot \bar{\mathbf{h}}$, where \mathbf{h} is the invariant of the encodings. Then, a way to recover \mathbf{h} from $\mathbf{h} \cdot \bar{\mathbf{h}}$, using the Gentry-Szydlo algorithm is exposed. The last two attacks are extensions to the previous ones, designed by Nguyen-Regev and Ducas-Nguyen.

Luckily, in practice there is not a sufficient number of public level-one encodings of zero such that the mentioned attack to succeed. However, it is important that the awareness of the existence of such attacks is raised, and to already find methods to defend against this type of attack.

Conclusions

As exposed many times throughout the current paper, *multilinear maps* may bring various advantages, proving to be very useful in cryptography. They were defined for the first time by Boneh and Silverberg in [5] and afterwards numerous applications of cryptographic multilinear maps were designed. However, valid implementations of such functions are not yet designed and it is long-thought that such constructions are fairly unnatural.

Therefore, approximations of multilinear maps usually suffice for most of the applications. Garg, Gentry and Halevi defined the concept of *Graded Encoding System* in [11] and afterwards presented a method for implementing the system, based on *ideal lattices*. This construction, referred to as *GGH13* throughout the paper, served as a foundation stone for two other implementation of *Graded Encoding Systems*, such as *CLT13* [9], based on integers or *GGH15* [15], based on directed graphs.

The current paper represents an overview of the GGH13 construction. However, in order to start to expose the construction itself, the reader must become acquainted with various concepts.

The first two chapters are required in order to immerse the lecturer in the right environment. Therefore, in first chapter, several results of Băetu, Cehan and Mărculeț [2] on bilinear maps of composite order are mentioned, then multilinear maps are defined, as a natural extension of the mentioned functions. Afterwards, the concept of *Graded Encoding System* is introduced, as a method to approximate the desired multilinear constructions. In the second chapter, the required mathematical notions are reminded to the reader.

The GGH13 construction is exposed in the third chapter, along with the problems that are supposed to be hard in the presented implementation and with a simple application of the scheme. Finally, the security of the application is analyzed in the last chapter. Therefore, various attacks are presented, based on the existence of some public parameters or the ability of the attacker to compute specific elements. The conclusions are not very encouraging, because most of the applications become insecure to the presented attacks. Only *Indistinguishability Obfuscation (iO)* schemes seem to benefit from the construction, thanks to their inherent structure. However, recent research [22] showed that even iO may become insecure to a new kind of attack, namely *annihilating attacks*.

The paper is designed so that even the reader with no previous knowledge in the domain can easily understand the presented information. The level of difficulty is gradually raised from chapter to chapter, so that the unexperienced lecturer may not become discouraged by the multitude of new concepts.

However, in the last chapter of the paper, it is subtle remarked that new methods

for implementing Graded Encoding Schemes are required, as the attacks become more and more ingenious. The ambitious reader is therefore invited to propose new encoding schemes, or to nominate original defenses against existing attacks.

In conclusion, *Graded Encoding Systems* are still opened to further research, one of the major issues being represented by construction of secure applications of such schemes.

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