# **Swap Regret and Strategic Learning**

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### Recruiting

#### Known



Applicants (Strategic) Optimizer

change features

University

Learner

## Setting: Optimizer and Learner

Optimizer / Learner's action sets: [m] and [n]

Optimizer / Learner's utility:  $u_O(i,j)$  and  $u_L(i,j)$ ,  $i \in [m], j \in [n]$ 

For t = 1, 2, ..., T:

Optimizer choose  $x_t \in \Delta_m$  and Learner chooses  $y_t \in \Delta_n$  (simultaneously)

Draw actions  $i_t \sim x_t$ ,  $j_t \sim y_t$ 

Optimizer gains  $u_0(i_t, j_t)$  and Learner gains  $u_L(i_t, j_t)$ 

Reveal  $(x_t, y_t)$  to both players

Optimizer knows  $u_0$  and  $u_L$ ; Learner only cares about  $u_L$ Optimizer knows Learner's **algorithm**  $A_L$  where  $A_L(x_1, x_2, ..., x_{t-1}) = y_t$ 

## No-Regret (NR) Learner

Regret = 
$$\max_{j \in [n]} \sum_{t=1}^{T} u_L(x_t, j) - \sum_{t=1}^{T} u_L(x_t, j_t) = o(T)$$

Many natural and standard algorithms are no-regret. For example,

Gradient ascent:  $y_{t+1} = \prod_{\Delta_n} (y_t + \eta_t u_L(x_t, \cdot))$ 

**Exponential weights:**  $y_{t+1}(j) \propto y_t(j) \exp(\eta_t u_L(x_t, j))$ 

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## Mean-Based No-Regret (MB-NR) Learners

 $y_{t+1}$  is an increasing function of  $\sum_{s=1}^{t} u_L(x_s, j)$ ,  $j \in [n]$ 

Follow the Regularized Leader: 
$$y_{t+1} = \underset{y}{\operatorname{argmax}} \left\{ \sum_{s=1}^{t} u_L(x_s, y) + \frac{1}{\eta_t} H(y) \right\}$$

Follow the Perturbed Leader: 
$$j_{t+1} = \underset{j}{\operatorname{argmax}} \left\{ \sum_{s=1}^{t} u_L(x_s, j) + \frac{1}{\eta_t} \operatorname{perturb}_t(j) \right\}$$

## No-Swap-Regret (NSR) Learner


SwapRegret = 
$$\max_{\sigma \in [n] \to [n]} \sum_{t=1}^{T} u_L(x_t, \sigma(j_t)) - \sum_{t=1}^{T} u_L(x_t, j_t) = o(T)$$

Regret ≤ SwapRegret

∴ a NSR algorithm is also a NR algorithm.

NSR algorithms are NOT as natural as the NR algorithms we see previously.

There are general reductions to convert an NR into an NSR.



### **Overview**

**Optimizer perspective:** Optimizer can gain higher  $u_0$  easier when playing with a MB-NR Learner than playing with a NSR Learner.

Yuan Deng, Jon Schneider, Balusubramanian Sivan. Strategizing against No-regret Learners. NeurIPS 2019.

**Learner perspective:** Optimizer can cause lower  $u_L$  easier when playing with a MB-NR Learner than playing with a NSR Learner.

Eshwar Arunachaleswaran, Natalie Collina, Jon Schneider. Pareto-Optimal Algorithms for Learning in Games. EC 2024.

Optimizer can lead to higher  $u_0$  and  $u_L$  easier when playing with a MB-NR Learner than playing with a NSR Learner.

Guruganesh et al. Contracting with a Learning Agent. NeurIPS 2024.

EC 2025 "Swap Regret and Strategic Learning" Workshop (link)

# **Optimizer's Perspective**

## Stackelberg Value for the Optimizer

$$V = \max_{x} \max_{y \in BR(x)} u_0(x, y)$$

where 
$$BR(x) = \left\{ y: \ u_L(x, y) = \max_{y'} u_L(x, y') \right\}$$

$$u_O(A_O, A_L) = \lim_{T \to \infty} \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^T u_O(x_t, y_t)$$

#### **Theorem**

If 
$$A_L \in NR$$
 then  $\max_{A_O} u_O(A_O, A_L) \ge V$  for any game

If 
$$A_L \in NSR$$
 then  $\max_{A_O} u_O(A_O, A_L) \le V$  for any game

If 
$$A_L \in \mathsf{MB}\text{-}\mathsf{NR}$$
 then  $\max_{A_O} u_O(A_O, A_L) \ge V + \mathsf{const}$  for some game

Consider a fixed Learner's action  $j \in [n]$ :

Define  $\alpha_j \in \Delta_m$  as the Optimizer's action distribution when Learner chooses j:

$$\alpha_j = \frac{\sum_{t=1}^T \mathbb{I}[j_t = j] x_t}{T_i} \quad \text{where } T_j = \sum_{t=1}^T \mathbb{I}[j_t = j]$$

$$\frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^{T} (u_L(x_t, \sigma(j_t)) - u_L(x_t, j_t)) = \sum_{j \in [n]} \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^{T} \mathbb{I}[j_t = j] (u_L(x_t, \sigma(j)) - u_L(x_t, j))$$

$$= \sum_{j \in [n]} \frac{T_j}{T} \left( u_L \left( \alpha_j, \sigma(j) \right) - u_L(\alpha_j, j) \right)$$

As  $A_L$  has No Swap Regret, for  $j \notin BR(\alpha_i)$ , we have  $T_i = o(T)$ 

#### Optimizer utility

$$=\sum_{j\in[n]}\frac{T_j}{T}\;u_O(\alpha_j,j)$$

$$= \sum_{j: j \in BR(\alpha_j)} \frac{T_j}{T} u_0(\alpha_j, j) + \sum_{j: j \notin BR(\alpha_j)} \frac{T_j}{T} u_0(\alpha_j, j)$$

$$\leq \sum_{j: j \in BR(\alpha_j)} \frac{T_j}{T} \times V + \sum_{j: j \notin BR(\alpha_j)} \frac{T_j}{T} \times 1$$

$$= V$$

If  $A_L \in \mathsf{MB-NR}$  then  $\max_{A_O} u_O(A_O, A_L) \ge V + \mathsf{const}$  for some game

	Left	Middle	Right
Up	0, ε	-2, -1	-2, 0
Down	0, -1	-2, 1	2, 0

The Stackelberg value is V = 0: (½ Up + ½ Down, Right)


## Against mean-based algorithm

	Left	Middle	Right
Up	0, ε	-2, -1	-2, 0
Down	0, -1	-2, 1	2, 0

#### **Cumulative Utility**

Play *Up* for T/2 rounds

- learner plays Left
- earn 0 per round



time

## Against mean-based algorithm

	Left	Middle	Right
Up	0, ε	-2, -1	-2, 0
Down	0, -1	-2, 1	2, 0


#### **Cumulative Utility**

Play *Up* for T/2 rounds

- learner plays *Left*
- earn 0 per roundthen

Play *Down* for T/2 rounds

- learner plays *Right*
- earn **2** per round (for most rounds)



# Learner's Perspective

### Pareto Dominance

$$u_L(A_O, A_L) = \lim_{T \to \infty} \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^{T} u_L(x_t, y_t)$$

For a Learner utility  $u_L$ , we say  $A_L$  is Pareto-dominated by  $A_L'$  if for all  $u_O$ ,

$$u_L(\mathrm{BR}(A_L'), A_L') \ge u_L(\mathrm{BR}(A_L), A_L)$$
 (\*)

where  $BR(A_L)$  is an Optimizer algorithm  $A_O$  such that  $u_O(A_O, A_L) \ge \max_A u_O(A, A_L)$  (breaking ties in favor of the Learner)

and the inequality  $(\star)$  holds strictly for at least one  $u_0$ .

#### **Theorem**

There is an  $u_L$  such that any  $A_L \in MB-NR$  is Pareto-dominated.

For any  $u_L$ , any  $A_L \in NSR$  is NOT Pareto-dominated (i.e., Pareto-optimal)

# **Geometric Interpretation**

### Menu

#### Given Learner's algorithm $A_L$

- Any Optimizer sequence  $(x_1, x_2, ..., x_T)$  induces a correlated strategy profile (CSP)  $\frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^{T} x_t \otimes y_t \in \Delta_{mn}$  (recall that  $y_t = A_L(x_1, ..., x_{t-1})$ )
- The menu  $M(A_L) \in \Delta_{mn}$  produced by  $A_L$  is defined as

$$M(A_L) = \text{ConvexHull} \left\{ \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^{T} x_t \otimes y_t : \text{ all possible } x_1, \dots, x_T \right\}$$


By selecting  $x_1, ..., x_T$  (essentially selecting a point  $\phi \in M(A_L)$ ), the Optimizer can control the CSP induced by the players

CSP directly affects utility  $u_{L/O}(A_O, A_L) = \sum_{i,j} \phi_{ij} u_{L/O}(i,j)$ 

### Menu

#### Lemma

All  $A_L \in \text{NSR}$  induces the same menu  $M(A_L) = M_{\text{NSR}}$ All  $A_L \in \text{NR}$  induces a menu  $M(A_L) \supseteq M_{\text{NSR}}$ 



## **Proof of the Lemma (1/2)**

**Claim:** For any  $A_L \in \mathbf{NSR}$ ,  $M(A_L)$  is the convex hull of all CSPs of the form  $x \otimes y$ , with  $x \in \Delta_m$  and  $y \in \mathrm{BR}(x)$ .

#### **Proof:**

- 1. Any CSPs of the form  $x \otimes BR(x)$  is contained in  $M(A_L)$
- 2. Any point  $\phi \in M(A_L)$  can be written as a convex combination of  $x \otimes BR(x)$

$$\frac{1}{T}\sum_{t=1}^{T}x_t\otimes y_t \approx \frac{1}{T}\sum_{t=1}^{T}x_t\otimes e_{j_t} = \sum_{j\in[n]}\frac{1}{T}\sum_{t=1}^{T}\mathbb{I}[j_t=j] x_t\otimes e_j = \sum_{j\in[n]}\frac{T_j}{T} \alpha_j\otimes e_j$$

As  $A_L$  is NSR, either  $\frac{T_j}{T} \to 0$  or  $j = BR(\alpha_j)$ 

$$\Rightarrow \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^{T} x_t \otimes y_t = \sum_{j=1}^{T} \frac{T_j}{T} \alpha_j \otimes BR(\alpha_j)$$

$$\alpha_j \triangleq \frac{\sum_{t=1}^T \mathbb{I}[j_t = j] x_t}{T_j}$$

$$T_j \triangleq \sum_{t=1}^T \mathbb{I}[j_t = j]$$

## **Proof of the Lemma (2/2)**

**Claim:** For any  $A_L \in \mathbf{NR}$ ,  $M(A_L)$  contains all CSPs of the form  $x \otimes BR(x)$ 

## **Summary**


 The correlated strategy profile (CSP) induced by any Optimizer and a NSR Learner is always of the form:

$$\frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^{T} x_t \otimes y_t = \sum_{x} c_x \ x \otimes BR(x) + o(1)$$

This makes the time-averaged profile just like one-shot Stackelberg game.

This leaves less room of manipulation (good or bad) by the Optimizer.

## Reduction: NSR to NR



Blum and Mansour. From External to Internal Regret. JMLR 2007.