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FINAL REPORT

Lista DAO
USDT Distributor

December 2024

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1. Project Details

Important:

Please ensure that the deployed contract matches the source-code of the last commit hash.

Project	Lista DAO - USDT Distributor
Website	Lista.org
Language	Solidity
Methods	Manual Analysis
Github repository	https://github.com/lista-dao/lista-token/blob/fd80e186716de76ff22e4dcec89768e4e4ebecffe2/contracts/dao/USDTLpListaDistributor.sol https://github.com/lista-dao/lista-token/blob/fd80e186716de76ff22e4dcec89768e4e4ebecffe2/contracts/dao/CommonListaDistributor.sol
Resolution 1	https://github.com/lista-dao/lista-token/blob/bf2ad135baeecfb722c32818996982543080b910/contracts/dao/USDTLpListaDistributor.sol https://github.com/lista-dao/lista-token/blob/bf2ad135baeecfb722c32818996982543080b910/contracts/dao/CommonListaDistributor.sol

2. Detection Overview

Severity	Found	Resolved	Partially Resolved	Acknowledged (no change made)
High	2	2		
Medium				
Low	5	2		3
Informational	9	6		3
Governance				
Total	16	10		6

2.1 Detection Definitions

Severity	Description
High	The problem poses a significant threat to the confidentiality of a considerable number of users' sensitive data. It also has the potential to cause severe damage to the client's reputation or result in substantial financial losses for both the client and the affected users.
Medium	While medium level vulnerabilities may not be easy to exploit, they can still have a major impact on the execution of a smart contract. For instance, they may allow public access to critical functions, which could lead to serious consequences.
Low	Poses a very low-level risk to the project or users. Nevertheless the issue should be fixed immediately
Informational	Effects are small and do not post an immediate danger to the project or users
Governance	Governance privileges which can directly result in a loss of funds or other potential undesired behavior

3. Detection

CommonListaDistributor

The `CommonListaDistributor` contract distributes `Lista` rewards from the `ListaVault` to users in the UDST Distributor mechanism. It implements a staking vault similar to the Synthetix system, managing user deposits, withdrawals, and rewards.

The vault handles only `Lista` tokens. Weekly, the `ListaVault`'s `allocateNewEmissions` function specifies the `Lista` tokens available for distribution, which are gradually released over one week. While `ListaVault` handles token transfers, the distributor contract tracks pending rewards, updates reward debts during deposits/withdrawals, and informs the `ListaVault` of the exact reward amounts.

Users can claim rewards directly via this contract or through the `ListaVault`, which calls this contract to disburse tokens.

Appendix: Reward mechanism.

The reward per share is tracked in the `rewardIntegral` variable. This is a monotonously increasing quantity which goes up by the amount of dispensed rewards per unit supply.

```
rewardIntegral += (duration * rewardRate * 1e18) / supply;
```

The system records the `rewardIntegral` of each user during their deposits or withdrawals. The amount of rewards to be given out is calculated from the difference between the global and user-specific stored reward integrals.

```
(balance * (rewardIntegral - rewardIntegralFor[account])) / 1e18;
```

Appendix: Core Invariants

INV 1: The rewardIntegral must increase monotonously

INV2: Users cannot claim rewards for the same duration multiple times

INV3: Total claimable incentives must not exceed incentives added

INV4: Incentives must be distributed to users based on their balances

INV5: Rewards for a week can only be fetched once

Privileged Functions

- vaultClaimReward
- notifyRegisteredId
- togglePause
- pause

Issue_01	<code>claimReward</code> doesn't implement <code>whenNotPaused</code> check
Severity	Low
Description	<p>The contracts handle two rewards: CAKE and LISTA. The Cake handling vault implements a <code>whenNotPaused</code> check in the <code>claimStakeReward</code> function, preventing the reward collection on pause. However the same is not present in the <code>claimReward</code> function handling Lista rewards.</p> <p>Thus pausing the contract will prevent CAKE rewards from being distributed, but will not pause the LISTA rewards.</p>
Recommendations	Consider adding the <code>whenNotPaused</code> check in the <code>claimReward</code> function.
Comments / Resolution	Fixed by adding the <code>whenNotPaused</code> modifier to the <code>claimReward</code> function.

Issue_02	whenNotPaused modifier is missing on fetchRewards
Severity	Low
Description	<p><i>function fetchRewards() external</i></p> <p>The fetchRewards function is missing the whenNotPaused modifier, allowing it to be called during a paused state. The function includes a call to updateReward which is blocked by other functions except fetchRewards in the paused state.</p> <p>Most of the time, exploits happen due to arbitrary user inputs or users invoking functions which are not meant to be invoked by users, one can argue that a large user flexibility is a great seed for exploits. Therefore, at BailSec, we are of the opinion that codebases should never provide more user flexibility than necessary during the normal business logic.</p>
Recommendations	Consider adding the whenNotPaused modifier to the fetchRewards function.
Comments / Resolution	Fixed by adding the whenNotPaused modifier to the fetchRewards function.

USDTLpListaDistributor

The **USDTLpListaDistributor** contract extends **CommonListaDistributor**, handling token transfers for deposits and withdrawals. It also manages **CAKE** token rewards earned by providing and staking LP in **PancakeSwap** pools. Using a Synthetix-like mechanism, it tracks reward debts and pending **CAKE** rewards, enabling independent tracking and disbursement of both **Lista** and **CAKE** tokens.

This contract facilitates depositing and staking in **PancakeSwap** pools. **CAKE** rewards are harvested hourly and distributed over a week. While **USDT** deposits and withdrawals are managed here, **CAKE** tokens are stored and distributed by the external **StakingVault**, based on data from the distributor contract.

Users can claim **CAKE** rewards directly from this contract or via the **StakingVault**, which interacts with this contract for disbursement.

Appendix: External Vaults

Two external vaults are used for handling reward tokens: The **ListaVault** and the **StakingVault**. The **ListaVault** contains the **Lista** tokens, and informs the distributor contract the allocated rewards for the coming week. When rewards are to be paid out, the distributor calls the **ListaVault** with the information, and the **Lista** tokens are then moved from the **ListaVault** to the user.

Similar to the **ListaVault**, the **StakingVault** handles the **CAKE** tokens. Accrued **CAKE** rewards are sent there and the **StakingContract** updates the distributor contract with the allocated rewards and keeps a fee. When the rewards are to be paid out, similar to the **ListaVault**, the distributor calls the **StakingVault** which transfers the tokens to the user.

The contracts can be found here:

Staking Vault:

<https://github.com/lista-dao/lista-token/blob/fd80e186716de76ff22e4dcec89768e4ebecffe2/contracts/dao/StakingVault.sol>

ListaVault:

<https://github.com/lista-dao/lista-token/blob/e570e131a886a617f15522ed05e0526cfc5acd35/contracts/dao/ListaVault.sol>

Appendix: PancakeSwap

The liquidity is provided to PancakeSwap stableswap pool. This pool accepts single sided liquidity, so it is possible to provide liquidity with only USDT tokens. The LP tokens received are then staked in the V2Wrapper contract, which drips CAKE rewards. A PancakeStableSwapTwoPoolInfo contract is also used to pre-calculate the token amounts before deposit/withdrawal.

The contracts can be found here on the BNB chain:

StableswapPool: `0xb1da7d2c257c5700612bde35c8d7187dc80d79f1`

StableSwapPoolInfo: `0x150c8AbEB487137acCC541925408e73b92F39A50`

V2Wrapper: `0xd069a9E50E4ad04592cb00826d312D9f879eBb02`

Stableswap LPToken: `0xB2Aa63f363196caba3154D4187949283F085a488`

Appendix: Emergency mode

The contract implements an emergency mode. This is to be enabled if the underlying **PancakeSwap** mechanism breaks for some reason and leverages the **emergencyWithdraw** mechanism of the **PancakeSwap** vault. This forfeits all pending rewards and withdraws the underlying tokens from the pancake vault. This mode also bypasses all reward calculations done in the contract.

Appendix: Core Invariants

INV 1-4: Same invariants 1-4 from CommonListDistributor

INV 5: Harvest calls need to be at least 1 hour apart

INV 6: Deposits need to always be withdrawable even in emergency mode

Privileged Functions

- notifyStakingReward
- vaultClaimStakingReward
- setStakeVault
- stopEmergencyMode
- emergencyWithdraw
- setHarvestTimeGap
- setIsActive

Issue_03	<code>_updateStakeReward</code> uses incorrect balance for updates
Severity	High
Description	<p>The lista distributor calls <code>_updateReward</code> on the balance and <code>totalSupply</code> before updating them during the deposit/withdrawal. However, the <code>_updateStakeReward</code> call is done in the <code>_stakeLp</code> function, which is after the balance updates are done by the <code>_deposit</code> function. So when the stake reward is being updated, the contract uses the balance and supply after the update, not the one before the deposit/withdraw.</p> <pre><code>_withdraw(msg.sender, lpAmount); _unstakeLp(msg.sender, lpAmount);</code></pre> <p>This leads to issues since according to the staking logic the initial values need to be used. The impact can be shown via a complete withdrawal, where the balance of the user drops to zero. In this case, the <code>_withdraw</code> function updates the Lista reward state based on the old balance and <code>totalSupply</code>, and then the balance changes to 0. Now when <code>_unstakeLp</code> is called, the balance of the account is already 0, and so the <code>_updateStakeReward</code> function calculates the <code>stakeStoredPendingReward</code> value with the current balance (0) and is thus 0.</p> <p>Thus all the staking rewards accrued were lost and set as 0.</p>
Recommendations	<code>_updateStakeReward</code> should be using the pre-update balances and supplies, like in the Lista staking contract. Log the initial balance and <code>totalSupply</code> , and use that to update the staking state instead of the current balance after the storage update.
Comments / Resolution	Fixed by updating reward state before balance change using the <code>updateStakeReward</code> modifier.

Issue_04	<code>emergencyMode</code> breaks reward accounting
Severity	High
Description	<p>When in emergency mode, <code>_unstakeLp</code> is not called. So if a user withdraws some tokens during the emergency mode, their balance will decrease but their reward debt will not be updated. So if a user had 100 tokens and withdrew 50 during emergency, and then deposited 50 again after the emergency mode was over, they would have accrued yield on their initial balance of 100 even though they had reduced their stake sometime in between. This way the user can get more rewards than they were owed.</p> <p>The issue is primarily because the <code>stopEmergencyMode</code> function does not update the reward debts and the contract keeps operating with the older reward debts logged before the start of the emergency mode. Any deposits/withdrawals in the emergency period thus break the accounting.</p> <p>Therefore the current version of the contract does not support coming out of the emergency mode and resuming normal operations, even though the contract implements a <code>stopEmergencyMode</code> function.</p>
Recommendations	<p>Going into emergency mode has bad consequences on staking accounting. Before normal operations, the reward debts of all the users need to be set correctly, which is not done in the current <code>stopEmergencyMode</code> implementation. Re-deployment of the distributor contract may be necessary in order to reset the reward debt of all users.</p>
Comments / Resolution	<p>Fixed by updating reward state even during emergency mode with the <code>updateStakeReward</code> modifier.</p>

Issue_05	Short-duration updates could cause precision loss
Severity	Low
Description	<p>Reward integral updates involve multiplying the duration by the reward rate and dividing it by the current total supply. Even though the numerator is normalized to 1e18 decimals, there is possible precision loss if the duration is too short, depending on the total supply and the reward rate. For the given example:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. We have a period of 1 week - 604_800 seconds and 100_000e18 rewards, giving us a reward rate of 165343915343915330 and a staker before the reward notification with 10_000 deposit 2. At the half point, 302_400, we deposit 10_000 more tokens, making our reward integral $302_400 * 165343915343915330 / 10_000 = 5000000000000000000$ 3. At an uneven timestamp before the end of the period, eg 302_327 seconds since step 1, the first depositor decides to claim and gets a new interval of $302_327 * 165343915343915330 / 20_000 = 2499396494708994600$ <p>The period finishes, the first depositor claims again and gets an interval of $73 * 165343915343915330 / 20_000 = 603505291005290.9$, which due to precision loss in solidity will become 603505291005290, leaving some rewards unclaimed when the reward calculation <code>integral * balance</code> occurs</p>
Recommendations	Consider keeping this issue in mind and having a governance-controlled recovery function in the vault holding CAKE tokens so any dust can be recovered.
Comments / Resolution	Acknowledged.

Issue_06	Rewards accrued before the first deposit will be left unclaimed
Severity	Low
Description	<p>The reward mechanism present in both Lista and Cake reward accrual mechanisms are inspired by the Synthetix reward mechanism, which contains a flaw regarding reward calculation if no stakes happen in the same block that the rewards are notified - https://Oxmacro.com/blog/synthetix-staking-rewards-issue-inefficient-reward-distribution/</p> <p>In the current context of the codebase, the Lista/CAKE rewards can get fetched/notified before the first stake happens, which can lead to the following sequence:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Rewards get fetched before any stakes occur at timestamp X. 2. At timestamp Y somebody stakes for the first time. Due to the <code>supply > 0</code> clause for updating the supply, we cannot increase the reward integral. However the <code>lastUpdate</code> variable gets set to Y <p>Any consequent stakes after Y will increase the integral, however the rewards for the X-Y period (between X and Y) will never get distributed to the stakers</p>
Recommendations	Consider keeping this issue in mind and having a recovery function in the <code>StakingVault</code> contract to recover any unused <code>CAKE</code> tokens.
Comments / Resolution	Acknowledged.

Issue_07	CAKE rewards can remain inaccessible for the first depositor under certain conditions
Severity	Low
Description	<p>stakeReward is only updated in notifyStakingReward i.e. when cake rewards are earned. For the first depositor, there will be no CAKE rewards being dripped to them, since no rewards have been collected yet.</p> <p>In this situation, if the first depositor decides to exit their position, with no other deposit, withdraw, or harvest function calls in between, they will receive no rewards no matter how long they stay in the vault. This is because notifyStakingReward will never get called, so the stakeRewardRate will stay at 0.</p> <p>So the first user can enter a vault, spend a week and then exit a vault with no CAKE rewards, if no other function calls take place in between.</p>
Recommendations	<p>The rewards are always dripped in the future, so this is inherent to the design of the system.</p> <p>To mitigate this loss to an extent, the governance should consider setting up a bot to regularly call harvest on the vault. This will keep the rewards up-to-date and make sure the users get the maximum of rewards possible even if there is low activity in the vaults.</p>
Comments / Resolution	Acknowledged, governance has set up a bot which will call harvest every 2 hours to mitigate the impact.

Issue_08	noHarvest timestamp inequality is not consistent with other timing-based functions
Severity	Informational
Description	<p>The noHarvest function will return true if</p> <pre><i>lastHarvestTime + harvestTimeGap > block.timestamp;</i></pre> <p>However other timestamp-based functions in the codebase use <code>>=</code> when evaluating the boolean value, such as fetchRewards.</p> <pre><i>require(getWeek(block.timestamp) >= getWeek(periodFinish),</i></pre> <p>As we can see here we are using <code>>=</code> to determine the boolean value.</p>
Recommendations	Consider changing <code>></code> to <code>>=</code> in noHarvest .
Comments / Resolution	Fixed following recommendation.

Issue_09	vault address cannot be reset after initialization
Severity	Informational
Description	The Lista reward vault address is set in the initialize function. There is no way in the contract to change or reset this value. In contrast, the stakeVault value is also set in the initialize function but can be reset later with the setStakeVault function.
Recommendations	Consider adding a setter for the vault address as well.
Comments / Resolution	Acknowledged.

Issue_10	No zero check on _pauser address
Severity	Informational
Description	Missing 0 address check on the _pauser address in the initialize function can result in an erroneous pauser being set.
Recommendations	Consider implementing a check for the 0 address when setting the pauser.
Comments / Resolution	Fixed by adding a 0 address check for the _pauser address.

Issue_11	Inconsistent use of access controls
Severity	Informational
Description	The CommonListaDistributor contract uses role-based access control for reward claims from vaults, while the USDTLpListaDistributor contract uses direct address-based checks.
Recommendations	Consider using similar setups for access control for both types of reward claims from vaults. Alternatively, this issue can be acknowledged.
Comments / Resolution	Acknowledged.

Issue_12	Inconsistencies in slippage checks
Severity	Informational
Description	<p>The slippage checks in withdraw can be seen below</p> <pre>require(minLisUSDAmount <= expectLisUSDAmount, "Invalid lisUSD amount"); require(minUSDTAmount <= expectUSDTAmount, "Invalid USDT amount");</pre> <p>However, in the same function, the second slippage check is as follows</p> <pre>require(lisUSDAmountActual >= minLisUSDAmount, "Invalid lisUSD amount received"); require(usdtAmountActual >= minUSDTAmount, "Invalid USDT amount received");</pre> <p>While the check is essentially the same in its function, it may mess with the code uniformity.</p>
Recommendations	Consider changing the slippage checks to match the same inequality

	to make the code more uniform.
Comments / Resolution	Fixed following recommendation.

Issue_13	<code>setStakeVault</code> does not check <code>rewardToken == v2 wrapper rewardToken</code>
Severity	Informational
Description	<p>in the <code>initialize</code> function there is the following check</p> <pre>v2wrapper.rewardToken() == IStakingVault(stakeVault).rewardToken()</pre> <p>However when setting a new stakeVault in <code>setStakeVault</code>, no such check exists, it simply checks if the stakeVault address is not 0.</p>
Recommendations	Consider adding the same check that is included in the initialize function to the <code>setStakeVault</code> function as well.
Comments / Resolution	Fixed following recommendation.

Issue_14	<code>setHarvestTimeGap</code> does not check if the value to be set is already set
Severity	Informational
Description	<code>setHarvestTimeGap</code> is a setter function which allows the manager to set the value of the harvest time gap. However currently the function allows the manager to set a value which may already be set as the harvest time gap.
Recommendations	If the value being set is already the value that is presently set as the harvest time gap, revert the call.
Comments / Resolution	Fixed following recommendation.

Issue_15	<code>updated</code> is unnecessarily cast to uint32
Severity	Informational
Description	in the <code>_updateStakeReward</code> , the <code>updated</code> variable is unnecessarily casted to uint32.
Recommendations	Consider not casting the <code>updated</code> variable to uint32 as it is not needed.
Comments / Resolution	Fixed by removing casting.

Issue_16	Redundant check in <code>deposit</code> function
Severity	Informational
Description	<p>The code checks for slippage thrice. Once with the <code>poolInfo</code> contract,</p> <pre>uint256 expectLpAmount = getLpToMint(usdtAmount); require(expectLpAmount >= minLpAmount, "I");</pre> <p>again with the actual stableswap deposit, which also takes the slippage parameter,</p> <pre>IStableSwap(stableSwapPool).add_liquidity([0, usdtAmount], minLpAmount);</pre> <p>and another time in the end.</p> <pre>require(actualLpAmount >= minLpAmount);</pre> <p>Checking the same thing 3 times is unnecessary and leads to excessive gas use.</p>
Recommendations	Consider removing the first check (with <code>expectLpAmount</code>). The last check can be left in the code as a final sanity check.
Comments / Resolution	Acknowledged.