


Threat Detection with GuardDuty

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Introducing Today's Project!

Tools and concepts

The services I used were GuardDuty, CloudFormation, s3, cloudshell Key concepts I learnt include SQL + command injection, using linux commands like wget, cat and jq and malware protection.

Project reflection

This project took me approximately 2 hours The most challenging part was getting access to the victim AWS environment using a profile. It was most rewarding to reveal the victim's protected file as the attacker.

We did this project today to learn about threat detection and GuardDuty + techniques like sql/command injection. This project certainly met my expectaions and was a good challenge!




Project Setup

To set up for this project, I deployed a CloudFormation template that launches an insecure web app (OWASP Juice shop). The three main components are the web app infrastructure, an s3 bucket and GuardDuty protecting our environment

The web app deployed is called OWASP Juice Shop. To practice my GuardDuty skills, I will attack the JUice Shop, and then visit the GuardDuty console to detect and analyze its findings - does it pick up on our attacks to our web app?

GuardDuty is an AI-powered threat detection service, which means it is designed to help me find and security attacks or vulnerabilities that affect my AWS resources/environment. Once it detects something unusual, it's up to us to investigate.






SQL Injection

The first attack I performed on the web app is SQL injection, which means injecting malicious sql code that manipulates a results from my web app. SQL injection is a security risk because it can let attackers bypass logins, delete/edit data

My SQL injection attack involved entering the code ' or 1=1;- into the email field of the web app's login page. This means the login query will always evaluate to true(i.e our database is manipulated into telling my web app this login exists).





Command Injection

Next, I used command injection, which manipulates the web app's web server to run code that has been entered e.g. in a form. The Juice Shop web app is vulnerable to this because it does not sanitize user inputs i.e. does not block scripts.

To run command injection, I entered Javascript code in the username field of the web app's admin console. This script will tell my webserver to expose the server's IAM credentials and save them in a publicly accessible JSON file.

The screenshot shows the 'User Profile' form in the Juice Shop admin console. The form has a dark grey background with white text and blue buttons. On the left, there is a placeholder for a user profile picture, represented by a black silhouette of a person wearing a hat and sunglasses, with the text '[object Object]' below it. To the right of the profile picture, the 'Email' field is filled with 'admin@juice-sh.op'. The 'Username' field contains the command injection payload: `#(global.process.mainModule.require('child_process')).` Below the username field is a blue button labeled 'Set Username'. At the bottom of the form, there is a 'File Upload' section with a 'Choose file' button and the text 'No file chosen', followed by an 'Upload Picture' button. Below this is an 'Image URL' section with a text input field containing a placeholder URL: `https://www.gravatar.com/avatar/525703ac2bd7cd675e672383a0744bf6`, and a 'Link Image' button.



Attack Verification

To verify the attack's success, I visited the publicly exposed credentials file. This page showed us access keys that represents my EC2 instances's access to the dev aws environment. I can use those keys to get the same level of access

```

{
  "AccessKeyId": "ASIAQ3EGTF3H3T7HU6GX",
  "Code": "Success",
  "Expiration": "2025-01-25T03:55:12Z",
  "LastUpdated": "2025-01-24T21:29:37Z",
  "SecretAccessKey": "kKFaj1q+8g4z24vuhcBxNVnFpx5CjmACeczJ4PW",
  "Token": "
IqoJb3p2Z1uX2VjEBYaCW1LXd1c3QtMiJIMEYCIQDzigKZGgwTn8XKgs6s1xIEI2L61o+yrnszg5ca7XusoUgIhALs+08HygmKJc0CutMSmSKZUC/rrQmugmZGc14dNoF1KrKFCB8QABoMMDU4MjY0
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CBBjQwAZWb1Gupa3D2D2wSyPPTwYDguZLcApmJ7R152W8ucwXQEJr2HnF5X+1dIgM79nUT1hNpoasu3oAERFt9CVGwB4H0F8zBzFqm+t1yo/3DPhbaXShqknXo1606INT+X3jy7p3DMI7T2Suak1F/n+1
QK9zrm2Y+cNufj/OOHkjLmmRkv46uAI2mkt5yJtxjy5g0Rw67sxy5ck67FwmvZiz57IDr0Xpy2FNvTM0NLY9XINZ",
  "Type": "AWS-HMAC"
}
```



Using CloudShell for Advanced Attacks

The attack continues in cloudshell, because this is a command-line tool I can use to run AWS commands that uses the credentials I've stolen. Cloudshell will be my medium for doing suspicious things like stealing data from an S3 bucket.

In CloudShell, I used `wget` to download the exposed credentials file into my cloudshell environment. Next, I ran a command using `cat` and `jq` to read the downloaded file and format it nicely so the credentials (in JSON) are easy to understand.

I then set up a profile using all of the stolen credentials. I had to create a new profile because the hacker doesn't inherently have access to the victim's AWS environment. I will need to use the profile to switch permission settings.

```
~ $ cat secret-information.txt  
Dang it - if you can see this text, you're accessing our private information!  
~ $
```




GuardDuty's Findings

After performing the attack, GuardDuty reported a finding within 15 minutes. Findings are notifications from GuardDuty that something suspicious has happened, and they give you details about the who/what/when of the attack.

GuardDuty's finding was called

UnauthorizedAccess:IAMUser/InstanceCredentialExfiltration.InsideAWS which means credentials belonging to an EC2 instance were being used in another account. Anomaly detection was used because this was unusual behaviour

GuardDuty's detailed finding reported that an S3 bucket was affected, the action that was done using the stolen credentials (GetObject); and the EC2 instance whose credentials were leaked. The IP address + location of the actor was also available.





Extra: Malware Protection

For my project extension, I enabled Malware protection for s3. Malware is file that contains threats e.g opening the file will cause a data breach or a deleteion of resoruces.

To test Malware Protection, I uploaded an EICAR test file into a protected bucket. The uploaded file won't actually cause damage because the test file is only designed to alert antivirus software.

Once I uploaded the file, GuardDuty instantly triggered a finding called Object:S3/MaliciousFile. This verified that GuardDuty could successfully detect malware. it also mentioned that the threat type is EICAR-Test-File (which means not a virus)

