

# Dark Control: A Unified Account of Default Mode Function by Control Theory and Reinforcement Learning

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## Abstract

The default mode network (DMN) is believed to subserve the baseline mental activity in humans. Its highest energy consumption compared to other brain networks and its intimate coupling with conscious awareness are both pointing to an overarching function. Many research streams support an evolutionarily adaptive role in envisioning experience to anticipate the future.

The present paper proposes a *process model* that tries to explain *how* the DMN may implement continuous evaluation and prediction of the environment to guide behavior. DMN function is recast in mathematical terms of control theory and reinforcement learning based on Markov decision processes. We argue that our formal account of DMN function naturally accommodates as special cases the previously proposed cognitive accounts on (1) predictive coding, (2) semantic associations, and (3) a “sentinel” role. Moreover, this process model for the neural optimization of complex behavior in the DMN offers parsimonious explanations for recent experimental findings ~~in animals and humans~~.

**keywords:** systems biology, mind-wandering, cognitive science, artificial intelligence, Markov decision process **XXX: Maybe the keywords “systems biology” and “cognitive science” are too broad. I would also remove “reinforcement learning”, which is already in the title. The keywords are the occasion to enhance reachability through web and bibliography search. What about “process model”, “Markov decision processes”, or “Bellman equation”?**

## 1 Introduction

In the absence of external stimulation, the human brain is not at rest. In the beginning of the 21st century, brain imaging may have been the first technique to allow for the discovery of a unique brain network that probably maintains baseline mental activities (Raichle et al., 2001; Buckner et al., 2008; Bzdok and Eickhoff, 2015). The “default mode network” (DMN) continues to metabolize large quantities of oxygen and glucose energy to maintain neuronal computation during free-ranging thought (Kenet et al., 2003; Fiser et al., 2004). The baseline energy demand is only weakly modulated at the onset of defined psychological tasks (Gusnard and Raichle, 2001). At the opposite, during sleep, the decoupling of brain structures discarded

the idea of the DMN being only a passive network resonance and rather supported an important role in sustaining conscious awareness (Horovitz et al., 2009).

This dark matter of brain physiology (Raichle, 2006) begs the question of the biological purpose underlying DMN activity. What has early been described as the “stream of consciousness” in psychology (James, 1890) found a potential neurobiological manifestation in the DMN (Shulman et al., 1997; Raichle et al., 2001). We propose that this set of some of the most advanced regions in the association cortex (Mesulam, 1998; Margulies et al., 2016b) are responsible for higher-order control of human behavior. Our functional account follows the notion of “a hierarchy of brain systems with the DMN at the top and the salience and dorsal attention systems at intermediate levels, above thalamic and unimodal sensory cortex” (Carhart-Harris and Friston, 2010).

### 1.1 Towards a formal account of default mode function: higher-order control of the organism

The human DMN is responsible for a large part of the baseline neural activity, which typically decreases when engaged in psychological experiments (Gusnard and Raichle, 2001). The standard mode of neural information maintenance and manipulation has been argued to mediate evolutionarily conserved functions (Brown, 1914; Binder et al., 1999; Buzsáki, 2006). Today, many psychologists and neuroscientists believe that the DMN implements some form of probabilistic estimation of past, hypothetical, and future events (Fox et al., 2005; Hassabis et al., 2007; Schacter et al., 2007; Binder et al., 2009; Buckner et al., 2008; Spreng et al., 2009). This brain network might have emerged to continuously predict the environment using mental imagery as an evolutionary advantage (Suddendorf and Corballis, 2007). However, information processing in the DMN has also repeatedly been shown to directly impact human behavior. Goal-directed task performance improved with decreased activity in default mode regions (Weissman et al., 2006) and increased DMN activity was linked to more task-independent, yet sometimes useful thoughts (Mason et al., 2007; Seli et al., 2016). Gaining insight into DMN function is particularly challenging because this network appears to simultaneously modulate perception-action cycles and maintain probabilistic contemplations across time, space, and content domains (Boyer, 2008).

The present work adopts the perspective of a human *agent* faced with the choice of the next actions and guided by outcomes of really happened, hypothetically imagined, and expected futures to optimize behavioral performance. Formally, a particularly attractive framework to describe, quantify, and predict intelligent systems, such as the brain, is proposed to be the combination of control theory and reinforcement learning (RL). An intelligent agent improves the interaction with the environment by continuously updating its computation of value estimates and action predispositions through integration of feedback outcomes. Henceforth, *control* refers to the influence that an agent exerts when interacting with the environment to reach preferred states.


Psychologically, the more the ongoing executed task is unknown and unpracticed, the less stimulus-independent thoughts occur (Filler and Giambra, 1973; Teasdale et al., 1995; Christoff et al., 2016). Conversely, it is known that, the more the world is easy to predict, the more human mental activity becomes detached from the actual sensory environment (Antrobus et al., 1966; Pope and Singer, 1978). Without requiring explicit awareness, these “offline” processes may contribute to optimizing control of the organism. We formalize a *policy matrix* to capture the space of possible actions that the agent can perform on the environment given the current state. A *value function* maps environmental objects and events (i.e., states) to expected rewards. Switching between states reduces to a sequential processing model. Informed by outcomes of performed actions, neural computation reflected in DMN dynamics could be constantly adapted in feedback loops shaped by prediction error. **XXX: “could be constantly adapted in feedback loops shaped by prediction error” =<sub>i</sub> “are constantly shaped by prediction error through feedback loops”** Such an RL account of DMN function can naturally embed human behavior into the tension between exploitative action with immediate gains and exploratory action with longer-term gratification.

We argue that DMN implication in many advanced cognitive processes in humans can be recast as prediction error minimization based on probabilistic mental simulations, thus

maximizing action outcome across multiple time scales. Such a purposeful optimization objective may be solved by a stochastic approximation based on a brain implementation of Markov Chain MCMC (MCMC) sampling (Tenenbaum et al., 2011). Even necessarily imperfect memory recall, random day-time mind-wandering, and seemingly arbitrary dreams during sleep may provide blocks of pseudo-experience to iteratively optimize the behavior of the organism. It has indeed been proposed that the human brain's energy budget is largely dedicated to "the development and maintenance of [a] probabilistic model of anticipated events" (Raichle and Gusnard, 2005). This idea has been invigorated by empirical evidence from neuroscience experiments (Körding and Wolpert, 2004; Fiser et al., 2004). The present paper proposes a process model that satisfies this contention.

## 2 Known neurobiological properties of the default mode network

We begin by a neurobiological deconstruction of the DMN based on experimental findings in the neuroscience literature. This walkthrough across each node of the DMN will outline the individual functional profiles, paving the way for their algorithmic interpretation in our formal account (next section).



**Fig 1. Default mode network: key functions.** Neurobiological overview of the DMN with its major constituent nodes and the associated functional roles relevant in our functional account.

### 2.1 The posteromedial cortex: global monitoring and information integration

The midline structures of the human DMN, including the posteromedial cortex (PMC) and the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), are probably responsible for the highest turn-over of energy consumption (Raichle et al., 2001; Gusnard and Raichle, 2001). These metabolic characteristics go hand-in-hand with neuroimaging analyses that suggested the PMC and mPFC to potentially represent the functional backbone of the DMN (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010; Hagmann et al., 2008).

Normal and disturbed metabolic fluctuations in the human PMC have been closely related to changes of conscious awareness (Cavanna and Trimble, 2006). Indeed, the PMC matures relatively late (i.e., myelination) during postnatal development in monkeys (Goldman-Rakic, 1987), which is generally considered to be a sign of evolutionary sophistication. This DMN node has long been speculated to reflect constant computation of environmental statistics and its internal representation as an inner "mind's eye" (Cavanna and Trimble, 2006; Leech and Sharp, 2014). For instance, Bálint's syndrome is a neurological disorder of conscious awareness

that results from medial damage in the parietal cortex (Bálint et al., 1909). Patients are plagued by an inability to combine various individual features of the visual environment into an integrated whole (i.e., simultanagnosia) as well as an inability to direct action towards currently unattended environmental objects (i.e., optic ataxia). This can be viewed as a high-level impairment in gathering information about alternative objects (i.e., exploration) as well as leveraging these environmental opportunities (i.e., exploitation). Congruently, the human PMC was coupled in two functional connectivity analyses (Bzdok et al., 2015) with the amygdala, involved in significance evaluation, and the nucleus accumbens (NAc), involved in reward evaluation. Specifically, among all parts of the PMC, the ventral posterior cingulate cortex was most connected to the laterobasal nuclei group of the amygdala (Bzdok et al., 2015). This amygdalar subregion has been proposed to continuously scan environmental input for biological relevance assessment (Bzdok et al., 2013a).

The putative role of the PMC in continuous abstract integration of environmental relevance and ensuing top-level guidance of action on the environment is supported by many neuroscience experiments. Electrophysiological recordings in animals implicated PMC neurons in strategic decision making (Pearson et al., 2009), risk assessment (McCoy and Platt, 2005), outcome-dependent behavioral modulation (Hayden et al., 2009), as well as approach-avoidance behavior (Vann et al., 2009). Neuron spiking activity in the PMC allowed distinguishing whether a monkey would pursue an exploratory or exploitative behavioral strategy during food foraging (Pearson et al., 2009). Further, single-cell recordings in the monkey PMC demonstrated this brain region's sensitivity to subjective target utility (McCoy and Platt, 2005) and integration across individual decision-making instances (Pearson et al., 2009). This DMN node encoded the preference for or aversion to options with uncertain reward outcomes and its spiking activity was more associated with subjectively perceived relevance of a chosen object than by its actual value, based on an "internal currency of value" (McCoy and Platt, 2005). In fact, direct stimulation of PMC neurons promoted exploratory actions, which would otherwise be shunned (Hayden et al., 2008). Graded changes in firing rates of PMC neurons indicated changes in upcoming choice trials, while their neural patterns were distinct from neuronal spike firings that indicated choosing either option. Similarly in humans, the DMN has been shown to gather and integrate information over different parts of auditory narratives in an fMRI study (Simony et al., 2016).

Moreover, the retrosplenial portion of the PMC could support representation of action possibilities and evaluation of reward outcomes by integrating information from memory recall and different perspective frames. Regarding memory recall, retrosplenial damage have been consistently associated with anterograde and retrograde memory impairments of various kinds of sensory information in animals and humans (Vann et al., 2009). Regarding perspective frames, the retrosplenial subregion of the PMC has been proposed to mediate between the organism's egocentric (i.e., focused on sensory environment) and allocentric (i.e., focused on world knowledge) viewpoints in animals and humans (Epstein, 2008; Burgess, 2008; Valiquette and McNamara, 2007).

Consequently, the PMC may contribute to overall DMN function by monitoring the subjective outcomes of possible actions and integrating that information with memory and perspective frames into short- and longer-term behavioral agendas. Estimated value, that differs across individuals, probably enriches statistical assessment of the environment to map and predict delayed reward opportunities in the future. In doing so, the PMC may continuously adapt the organism to changes in both the external environment and its internal representation to enable strategic behavior.


## 2.2 The prefrontal cortex: stimulus-value association and action consideration

Analogous to the PMC, the dorsomedial PFC (dmPFC) of the DMN is believed to subserve multi-sensory processes across time, space, and content domains to exert top-level control on behavior. Comparing to the PMC, however, dmPFC function may be closer to a "mental sketchpad" (Goldman-Rakic et al., 1996), as it potentially subserves the de-novo construction and manipulation of meaning representations instructed by stored semantics and memories (Bzdok et al., 2013c).

The dmPFC may subserve inference, representation, and assessment of one's own and other individuals' action considerations. Generally, neurological patients with tissue damage in the prefrontal cortex are known to struggle with adaptation to new stimuli and events (Stuss and Benson, 1986). Specifically, neural activity in the human dmPFC reflected expectations about other peoples' actions and outcomes of these predictions. Neural activity in the dmPFC indeed explained the performance decline of inferring other peoples' thoughts in aging humans (Moran et al., 2012). Certain dmPFC neurons in macaque monkeys exhibited a preference for processing others', rather than own, behavior with fine-grained adjustment of contextual circumstances (Yoshida et al., 2010).

Such highly abstract neural computations necessarily rely on the construction of probabilistic internal information drawing from memory recall, mental scene elaboration processes, and stored knowledge of world regularities. Moreover, in a computational neuroimaging experiment, dorsomedial PFC activity preferentially processed the consequences of action choices that were considered but not actually executed, whereas ventromedial PFC (vmPFC) activity processed especially value outcomes of actions performed on the environment (Nicolle et al., 2012).

Comparing to the dmPFC, the vmPFC probably subserves subjective value evaluation and risk estimation of relevant environmental stimuli (Fig. 2). The ventromedial prefrontal DMN may orchestrate adaptive behavior by bottom-up-driven processing of what matters now, probably drawing on sophisticated value representations (Kringelbach and Rolls, 2004; O'Doherty et al., 2015). Quantitative lesion findings across 344 human individuals confirmed a substantial impairment in value-based action choice (Gläscher et al., 2012). Indeed, this DMN node is preferentially connected with reward-related and limbic regions. The vmPFC is well known to have strong axonal connections with the NAc in axonal tracing studies in monkeys (Haber et al., 1995). Congruently, the gray-matter volume of the vmPFC and NAc correlated with indices of value-guided behavior and reward attitudes in humans (Lebreton et al., 2009). NAc activity is thought to reflect reward prediction signals from dopaminergic neurotransmitter pathways (Schultz, 1998) that not only channel action towards basic survival needs but also subserve reward processing, and thus perhaps RL, in humans more broadly (O'Doherty et al., 2015). Consistently, diffusion MRI tractography in humans and monkeys (Croxson et al., 2005) quantified the NAc to be more connected to the vmPFC than dmPFC in both species. Two different functional connectivity analyses in humans also strongly connected the vmPFC with the NAc, hippocampus (HC), and PMC (Bzdok et al., 2015). In line with these connectivity findings in animals and humans, the vmPFC is often proposed to represent triggered emotional and motivational states (Damasio et al., 1996). Such real or imagined arousal states could be mapped in the vmPFC as a bioregulatory disposition influencing cognition and decision making. In neuroeconomic studies of human decision making, the vmPFC consistently reflects an individuals subjective value estimates (Behrens et al., 2008). This may be why



**Fig 2. Morphological coupling between reward system and default mode network.** Based on 9,932 human subjects from the UK Biobank, inter-individual differences in left NAc volume ( $R^2 = 0.11 + / - 0.02$ ) and right NAc volume ( $R^2 = 0.14 + / - 0.02$ ) could be predicted from volume in the DMN nodes. These out-of-sample generalization performances were obtained from support vector regression applied to normalized node volumes in the DMN in a 10-fold cross-validation framework. Consistent for the left and right reward system, NAc volume in a given subject has an especially close relation to vmPFC and HC. Code and data for reproduction and visualization:



performance within and across participants was related to state encoding in the vmPFC (Schuck et al., 2016). Such a “cognitive map” of the action space was argued to encode the current task state even when states are unobservable from the sensory environment.

### 2.3 The hippocampus: memory, space, and experience replay

The DMN midline has close functional links with the HC in the medial temporal lobe (Vincent et al., 2006; Shannon et al., 2013) —a region long known to be involved in memory operations and spatial navigation in animals and humans.

While the HC is traditionally believed to allow recalling past experience, there is now increasing evidence for an important role in constructing mental models in general (Zeidman and Maguire, 2016; Schacter et al., 2007; Gelbard-Sagiv et al., 2008; Javadi et al., 2017; Boyer, 2008). Its recursive anatomical architecture may be specifically designed to allow reconstructing entire episodes of experience from memory fragments. Indeed, hippocampal damage is not only associated with an impairment in re-experiencing the past (i.e., amnesia), but also imagination dedicated to one’s own future and imagination of experiences more broadly (Hassabis et al., 2007). Mental scenes created by patients with HC lesion exposed a lack of spatial integrity, richness in detail, and overall coherence. Single-cell recordings in the animal HC revealed some constantly active neuronal populations whose firing coincided with specific locations in space during environmental navigation. Indeed, when an animal is choosing between alternative paths, the corresponding neuronal populations in the HC spike one after another (Johnson and Redish, 2007). Such neuronal patterns in the HC appear to directly indicate upcoming behavior, such as in planning navigational trajectories (Pfeiffer and Foster, 2013) and memory consolidation of choice relevance (De Lavilléon et al., 2015). Congruently, London taxi drivers, humans with high performance in spatial navigation, were shown to exhibit increased gray-matter volume in the HC (Maguire et al., 2000).

There is increasing evidence that HC function extends beyond simple forms of encoding and reconstruction of memory and space information. Based on spike recordings of hippocampal neuronal populations, complex spiking patterns can be followed across extended periods including their modification of input-free self-generated patterns after environmental events (Buzsáki, 2004). Specific spiking sequences, which were elicited by experimental task design, have been shown to be re-enacted spontaneously during quiet wakefulness and sleep (Hartley et al., 2014; O’Neill et al., 2010). Moreover, neuronal spike sequences measured in hippocampal place cells of rats featured re-occurrence directly after experimental trials as well as directly before upcoming experimental trials (Diba and Buzsáki, 2007). Similar spiking patterns in hippocampal neurons during rest and sleep have been proposed to be critical in communicating local information to the neocortex for long-term storage, potentially also in the nodes of the DMN. Moreover, in mice, invasively triggering spatial experience recall in the HC during sleep has been shown to subsequently alter action choice during wakefulness (De Lavilléon et al., 2015). These HC-subserved mechanisms probably contribute to advanced cognitive processes that require re-experiencing or newly constructed mental scenarios, such as in recalling autobiographical memory episodes (Hassabis et al., 2007).

Thus, the HC probably orchestrates re-experience of environmental aspects for consolidations based on re-enactment and for integration into rich mental scene construction (Deuker et al., 2016; Bird et al., 2010). As such, the HC may impact ongoing perception of and action on the environment (Zeidman and Maguire, 2016; De Lavilléon et al., 2015).

### 2.4 The right and left TPJ: prediction error signaling and world semantics

The DMN emerges with its midline structures early in human development (Doria et al., 2010), while the right and left TPJs may become fully integrated into this major brain network only after birth. The TPJs are known to exhibit hemispheric differences based on microanatomical properties and gyrification pattern (Seghier, 2013). Globally, neuroscientific investigations on hemispheric functional specialization have highlighted the right versus left cerebral hemisphere as dominant for attentional versus semantic functions (Seghier, 2013; Bzdok et al., 2013b, 2016a).

The TPJ in the right-hemispheric DMN (RTPJ) has been shown to be closely related to multi-sensory prediction and prediction error signaling. It is probably central for action initiation during goal-directed psychological tasks and for sensorimotor behavior by integrating multi-sensory attention (Corbetta and Shulman, 2002). Involvement of this DMN node was repeatedly reported in multi-step action execution (Hartmann et al., 2005), visuo-proprioceptive conflict (Balslev et al., 2005), and detection of environmental changes across visual, auditory, or tactile stimulation (Downar et al., 2000). Direct electrical stimulation of the human RTPJ during neurosurgery was associated with altered perception and stimulus awareness (Blanke et al., 2002). It was argued that the RTPJ encodes actions and ensuing outcomes, without necessarily relating those to value estimation (Liljeholm et al., 2013; Hamilton and Grafton, 2008; Jakobs et al., 2009). Additionally, neural activity in the RTPJ has been proposed to reflect stimulus-driven attentional reallocation to self-relevant and unexpected sources of information as a circuit breaker that recalibrates control and maintenance brain networks (Bzdok et al., 2013b; Corbetta et al., 2008). Indeed, patients with RTPJ damage have particular difficulties with multi-step actions (Hartmann et al., 2005). In the face of large discrepancies between actual and previously predicted environmental events the RTPJ acts as a potential switch between externally-oriented mind sets focussed on the sensory environment and internally-oriented mind sets focussed on mental scene construction. For instance, temporally induced RTPJ damage in humans diminished the impact of predicted intentions of other individuals (Young et al., 2010), a capacity believed to be enabled by the DMN. The RTPJ might hence be an important relay that shifts away from the internally directed baseline processes to, instead, deal with unexpected environmental stimuli and events.

The TPJ in the left-hemispheric DMN (LTPJ), in turn, has a close relationship to Wernicke's area involved in semantic processes, such as in spoken and written language. Neurological patients with damage in Wernicke's area have a major impairment of language comprehension when listening to others or reading a book. Patient speech preserves natural rhythm and normal syntax, yet the voiced sentences lack meaning (i.e., aphasia). Abstracting from speech interpretations in linguistics and neuropsychology, the LTPJ probably mediates access to and integration of world knowledge, such as required during action considerations (Binder and Desai, 2011; Seghier, 2013). For instance, LTPJ damage in humans also entails problems in recognizing others' pantomimed action towards objects without obvious relation to processing explicit language content (Varney and Damasio, 1987). Inner speech also hinges on knowledge recall about the physical and social world. Indeed, the internal production of verbalized thought ("language of the mind") was closely related to the LTPJ in a pattern analysis of brain volume (Geva et al., 2011). Further, episodic memory recall and mental imagery strongly draw on reassembling world knowledge. Isolated building blocks of world structure probably get rebuilt in internally constructed mental scenarios that guide present action choice, weigh hypothetical possibilities, and forecast future events. The LTPJ may hence facilitate the automated environmental predictions by incorporating experience-derived building blocks of world regularities into ongoing action, planning, and problem solving.

### 3 Reinforcement learning: a process model for DMN function

We now argue the outlined neurobiological properties of the DMN nodes to be sufficient for implementing all components of a full-fledged RL system. Recalling past experience, considering candidate actions, random sampling of possible experiences, as well as estimation of instantaneous and expected delayed reward outcomes are key components of intelligent RL agents that are plausible to functionally intersect in the DMN.

RL is a problem-solving technique in which, through repeated interactions with an *environment*, an agent learns to reach goals and optimize reward signals in an iterative trial-and-error fashion (Fig. 3). At a given moment, each taken *action*  $a$  triggers a change in the *state* of the environment  $s \rightarrow s'$ , accompanied by environmental feedback signals as *reward*  $r = r(s, a, s')$  collected by the agent. If the collected reward outcome yields a negative value it can be more naturally interpreted as *punishment*. In this view, the environment is partially controlled by the action of the agent and the reward can be thought of as satisfaction—or

aversion —accompanying the execution of a particular action.

The environment is generally taken as *stochastic*, that is, changing in random ways. In addition, the environment is only *partially observable* in the sense that only limited aspects of the environment's state are accessible to the agent's sensors. (Starkweather et al., 2017). We assume that volatility of the environment is realistic in a computational model which sets out to explain DMN functions of the human brain. We argue that a functional account of the DMN based on RL can naturally embed human behavior in the tension between exploitative action with immediate gains and explorative action with longer-term reward outcomes (Dayan and Daw, 2008).

In short, DMN implication in a diversity of particularly advanced cognitive processes can be parsimoniously explained as probabilistic mental scene of experience simulations coupled with prediction error minimization to calibrate action trajectories for reward outcome maximization at different time scales. Such a purposeful optimization objective may be solved by a stochastic approximation based on a brain implementation of MCMC sampling (Tenenbaum et al., 2011).

### 3.1 Markov decision processes


Model-free RL has had great success in real-world problems including robotics (Ng et al., 2004; Abbeel and Ng, 2004), super-human performance in complex video games (Mnih et al., 2015) and Go (Silver et al., 2016), etc., just to name a few. We emphasize that the brain in general, and the DMN in particular, is a physical system governed by the laws of physics and can be formally described by Markov processes at a sufficiently coarse scale. It has indeed been previously proposed (Tegmark, 2016) that any system obeying the laws of classical physics can be accurately modeled as a Markov process as long as the time step is sufficiently short. The process has *memory* if the next state depends not only on the current state but also on a finite number of past states. Rational probabilistic planning can be reformulated as a standard memoryless Markov process by simply expanding the definition of the state  $s$  to include experience episodes of the past.

In artificial intelligence and machine learning, a popular computational model for multi-step decision processes in such an environment are *Markov decision processes* (MDPs) (Sutton and Barto, 1998). An MDP operationalizes a sequential decision process in which it is assumed that environment dynamics are determined by a Markov process, but the agent cannot directly observe the underlying state. Instead, the agent tries to optimize a *subjective* reward signal (i.e., is likely to be different for another agent in the same state). This is performed alongside each transition in the state space of the environment and maintains a probability distribution over the set of possible states. This is a minimal set of assumptions that can be made about an environment, and is characteristic of so-called *model-free RL*.

Model-free RL can be plausibly realized in the human brain (O'Doherty et al., 2015). Indeed, a core property of human intelligence has been proposed to underlie improvement of expected utility outcomes as a strategy for action choice in uncertain environments (Gershman et al., 2015), a situation perfectly captured by the formalism of MDPs. It has also long been proposed (Dayan and Daw, 2008) that there is a rather direct mapping of model-free RL learning algorithms onto aspects of the brain. The neurotransmitter dopamine could serve as a “teaching signal” to better estimate value associations and action policies by controlling synaptic plasticity in the reward-processing circuitry, including the NAc. In contrast, *model-based RL* would start off with some mechanistic assumptions about the dynamics of the world. These can be assumptions about the physical laws governing the agent's environment or constraints on the state space and transitions between states.

In our adopted model-free RL framework, an agent might represent such knowledge about the world as follows:

**Fig 3. Reinforcement learning in a nutshell.** Given the current state of the environment, the agent takes an action by following some policy, receives a consequential reward and observes the next state. The process goes on until interrupted or a goal state is reached.





- $r(s, \text{"stand still"}) = 0$  if  $s$  does not correspond to a location offering relevant resources.
- $p(s'|s, \text{"stand still"}) = 1$  if  $s' = s$  and 0 otherwise.
- etc.

**Definition.** Mathematically, an MDP is simply a quintuplet  $(\mathcal{S}, \mathcal{A}, r, p)$  where

- $\mathcal{S}$  is the set of states, such as  $\mathcal{S} = \{\text{happy}, \text{sad}\}$ .
- $\mathcal{A}$  is the set of actions, such as  $\mathcal{A} = \{\text{read}, \text{run}, \text{laugh}, \text{sympathize}, \text{empathize}\}$ .
- $r : \mathcal{S} \times \mathcal{A} \times \mathcal{S} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$  is the reward function, so that  $r(s, a, s')$  is the instant reward for taking action  $a$  in state  $s$  followed by a state-transition  $s \rightarrow s'$ .
- $p : \mathcal{S} \times \mathcal{A} \times \mathcal{S} \rightarrow [0, 1]$ ,  $(s, a, s') \mapsto p(s'|s, a)$ , the probability of moving to state  $s'$  if action  $a$  is taken from state  $s$ . In addition, one requires that such transitions be Markovian. Consequently, the future states are independent of past states and only depend on the present state and action taken.

### 3.1.1 Accumulated rewards and policies

The behavior of the agent is governed by a *policy*, which maps states of the world to probability distributions over actions. Starting at time  $t = 0$ , following a policy  $\pi$  generates a trajectory of action choices as follows:

**choose action:**  $a_0 \sim \pi(a|s_0)$   
**observe transition:**  $s_1 \sim p(s|s_0, a_0)$  **and collect reward**  $R_0 = r(s_0, a_0, s_1)$   
**choose action:**  $a_1 \sim \pi(a|s_1)$   
**observe transition:**  $s_2 \sim p(s|s_1, a_1)$ , **and collect reward**  $R_1 = r(s_1, a_1, s_2)$   
 $\vdots$   
**choose action:**  $a_t \sim \pi(a|s_t)$   
**observe transition:**  $s_{t+1} \sim p(s|s_t, a_t)$ , **and collect reward**  $R_t = r(s_t, a_t, s_{t+1})$   
 $\vdots$

We assume time-invariance in that we expect the dynamics of the process to be equivalent over sufficiently long time windows of equal length (i.e., stationarity).

Since an action executed in the present moment might have repercussions in the far future, it turns out that the quantity to optimize is not the instantaneous rewards  $r(s, a)$ , but a cumulative reward estimate which takes into account expected reward from action choices in the future. A common approach to modeling this accumulation is the time-discounted *cumulative reward*

$$G^\pi = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \gamma^t R_t = R_0 + \gamma R_1 + \gamma^2 R_2 + \dots + \gamma^t R_t + \dots \quad (1)$$

This random variable<sup>1</sup> measures the cumulative reward of following a policy  $\pi$ . Note that value buffering may be realized in the vmPFC. This DMN node has direct connections to the NAc, known to be involved in reward evaluation, and the amygdala, known to be involved in evaluation of biological significance.

The goal of the RL agent is then to update this action policy in order to maximize  $G^\pi$  on average (cf. below). In (1), the definition of cumulative reward  $G^\pi$ , the constant  $\gamma$  ( $0 \leq \gamma < 1$ ) is the *reward discount factor*, viewed to be characteristic for a certain agent. On the one hand, setting  $\gamma = 0$  yields perfectly hedonistic behavior. An agent with such a shortsighted horizon is exclusively concerned with immediate rewards. This is however not compatible with coordinated planning of long-term goal that is potentially subserved by neural activity in the DMN. On the other hand, setting  $0 < \gamma < 1$  allows a learning process to arise. A positive  $\gamma$  can

<sup>1</sup>Random as it depends both on the environment's dynamic and the policy  $\pi$  being played (which can be stochastic).

be seen as calibrating risk-seeking trait of the intelligent agent, that is, the behavioral predispositions related to trading longer delays for higher rewards. Such an agent puts relatively more emphasis on rewards expected in a longer-term future. Precisely, rewards that are not expected to come within<sup>2</sup>  $\tau := 1/(1 - \gamma)$  time steps from the present point are disregarded. This reduces the variance of expected rewards accumulated across considered action cascades by limiting the depth of the search tree. Given that there is more uncertainty in the farsighted future, it is important to appreciate that a stochastic policy estimation is more advantageous in many RL settings.

## 3.2 The components of reinforcement learning in the DMN

Given only the limited information available from an MDP, at a state  $s$  the average utility of choosing an action  $a$  under a policy  $\pi$  can be captured by the single number

$$Q^\pi(s, a) = \mathbb{E}[G^\pi | s_0 = s, a_0 = a], \quad (2)$$

called the  $Q$ -value for the state-action pair  $(s, a)$ . In other words,  $Q^\pi(s, a)$  corresponds to the expected reward over all considered action trajectories, in which the agent sets out in the environment in state  $s$ , chooses action  $a$ , and then follows the policy  $\pi$  to select future actions. For the brain,  $Q^\pi(s, a)$  defined in (2) provides the subjective utility of executing a specific action. Thus, it answers the question “What is the expected utility of taking action  $a$  in this situation?”.  $Q^\pi(s, a)$  offers a formalization of optimal behavior that may well capture processing aspects of the DMN in human agents.

### 3.2.1 Optimal behavior and the Bellman equation

Optimal behavior of the agent corresponds to a strategy  $\pi^*$  for choosing actions such that, for every state, the chosen action guarantees the best possible reward on average. Formally,

$$\pi^*(s) := \operatorname{argmax}_{a \in \mathcal{A}} Q^*(s, a), \text{ where } Q^*(s, a) := \max_{\pi} Q^\pi(s, a). \quad (3)$$

The learning goal is to approach the policy  $\pi^*$  as “close as possible”, that is to solve the MDP. Note that (3) presents merely a definition and does not lend itself as a candidate schema for solving MDPs with even moderately-sized action and state spaces (i.e., intractability). Fortunately, the *Bellman equation* (Sutton and Barto, 1998) provides a fixed-point relation which defines  $Q^*$  implicitly via a sampling procedure, without querying the entire space of policies, with the form

$$Q^* = \operatorname{Bel}(Q^*), \quad (4)$$

where the so-called Bellman transform  $\operatorname{Bel}(Q)$  of an arbitrary  $Q$ -value function  $Q : \mathcal{S} \times \mathcal{A} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$  is another  $Q$ -value function defined by

$$\begin{aligned} \operatorname{Bel}(Q)(s, a) &:= \mathbb{E}_{s' \sim p(s'|s, a)} [r(s, a) + \gamma \max_{a' \in \mathcal{A}} Q(s', a')] \\ &= r(s, a) + \gamma \mathbb{E}_{s' \sim p(s'|s, a)} [\max_{a' \in \mathcal{A}} Q(s', a')] \\ &= \text{instantaneous reward} + \text{expected reward for acting greedily thereafter} \end{aligned} \quad (5)$$

The Bellman equation (4) is a temporal consistency equation which provides a dynamic decomposition of optimal behavior by dividing the  $Q$ -value function into the immediate reward and the discounted rewards of the upcoming states. The optimal  $Q$ -value operator  $Q^*$  is a fixed point for this equation. As a consequence of this decomposition, the complicated dynamic programming problem (3) is broken down into simpler sub-problems at different time points. Indeed, exploitation of hierarchical structure in action considerations has previously been related to the medial prefrontal part of the DMN (Koechlin et al., 1999; Braver and Bongiolatti, 2002). Using the Bellman equation, each state can be associated with a certain value to guide action towards a preferred state, thus improving on the agent’s current policy. Note that in (4) the random sampling is performed only over quantities which depend on the environment. This aspect of the learning process can unroll off-policy by observing state transitions triggered by another (possibly stochastic) behavioral policy.

<sup>2</sup>N.B.:  $\frac{1}{1-\gamma} = 1 + \gamma + \gamma^2 + \gamma^3 + \dots$

**Neural correlates of the Bellman equation in the DMN:** Relating decomposition of consecutive action choices by the Bellman equation to neuroscience, specific neural activity in the dorsal prefrontal cortex (BA9) was linked to processing “goal-tree sequences” in human neuroimaging experiments (Koechlin et al., 1999, 2000). Sub-goal exploration may require multi-task switching between cognitive processes as later parts of a solution frequently depend on respective earlier steps in a given solution path, which necessitates storage of expected intermediate outcomes. As such, “cognitive branching” operations for nested processing of behavioral strategies are likely to entail secondary reallocation of attention and working-memory resources. Further neuroimaging experiments (Braver and Bongiolatti, 2002) corroborated the prefrontal DMN to subserve “processes related to the management and monitoring of sub-goals while maintaining information in working memory”. Moreover, neurological patients with lesions in this DMN node were reported to be impaired in aspects of realizing “multiple sub-goal scheduling” (Burgess et al., 2000). Hence, the various advanced human mental abilities subserved by the DMN, such as planning and abstract reasoning, can be viewed to involve some form of action-decision branching to enable higher-order executive control.

### 3.2.2 Value approximation and the policy matrix

As already mentioned in the previous section, Q-learning optimizes over the class of deterministic policies of the form (3). State spaces may be extremely large, and tracking all possible states and actions may require excessive space. The need of maintaining an explicit table of states can be eliminated by instead using of an approximate  $Q$ -value function  $\tilde{Q}(s, a|\theta)$  by keeping track of an approximating parameter  $\theta$  of much lower dimension than the number of states. At a time step, the world is in a state  $s \in \mathcal{S}$ , and the agent takes an action which it expects to be the most valuable on average, namely

$$\pi^{\text{hard-max}}(s) = \operatorname{argmax}_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \tilde{Q}(s, a|\theta), \quad (6)$$

This defines a mapping from states directly to actions. For instance, a simple linear model with a kernel  $\phi$  would be of the form  $\tilde{Q}(s, a|\theta) = \phi(s, a)^T \theta$ , where  $\phi(s, a)$  would represent a high-level representation of the state-action pairs  $(s, a)$ , as was done proposed (Song et al., 2016), or a eural network as recently proposed by in the breakthrough works (Mnih et al., 2015; Silver et al., 2016) for playing complex games (atari, Go, etc.) at superhuman levels. In the DMN, the dmPFC would implement such a hard-max lookup over the action space. The model parameters  $\theta$  would correspond to synaptic weights and connection strengths between brain regions. It is a time-varying neuronal program which dictates how to move from world states  $s$  to actions  $a$  via the hard-max policy (6). The approximating  $Q$ -value function  $\tilde{Q}(s, a|\theta)$  would tell the DMN the (expected) usefulness of taking an action  $a$  in state  $s$ . The DMN, and in particular its dmPFC node, could then contribute to the choice, at a given state  $s$ , of an action  $a$  which maximizes these approximate  $Q$ -values. Such a mapping from states to actions is conventionally called *policy matrix* (Mnih et al., 2015; Silver et al., 2016). Learning consists in starting from a given table and updating it during action choices, which take the agent to different table entries. An additional layer of learning concerns the addition of new entries in the table (i.e. state and action). The framing of the policy matrix is not described here but could be supported by synaptic epigenesis (Gisiger et al., 2005). Indeed, the tuning of synaptic weights through learning can stabilize additional patterns of activity by creating new attractors in the neural dynamics landscape (?). Those attractors will then constrain both the number of factors taken into account by decision processes and the number of behaviors at reach by the agent (?).

### 3.2.3 Self-training and the loss function

Successful learning in brains and computer algorithms is not possible without a defined learning goal—the *loss function*. The action  $a$  chosen in state  $s$  according to the policy matrix defined in (6) yields a reward  $r$  collected by the agent, after which the environment transitions to a new state  $s' \in \mathcal{S}$ . One such cycle yields a new *experience*  $e = (s, a, r, s')$ . Each cycle represents

a behavior unit of the agent and is recorded in replay memory buffer—which we hypothesize to be the HC—, possibly discarding the oldest entries to make space:  $\mathcal{D} \leftarrow \text{append}(\mathcal{D}, e)$ .

At time step  $k$ , the agent seeks an update  $\theta_k \leftarrow \theta_{k-1} + \delta\theta_k$  of the parameters for its approximate model of the  $Q$ -value function. This warrants a learning process and definition of a loss function. The Bellman equation (4) provides a way to obtain such a loss function (9) as we outline in the following. Experience replay consists in sampling batches of experiences  $e(s, a, r, s') \sim \mathcal{D}$  from the replay memory  $\mathcal{D}$ . The agent then tries to approximate the would-be  $Q$ -value for the state-action pair  $(s, a)$  as predicted by the Bellman equation (4), namely

$$y_k := y_k(s, a, s') = r + \gamma \max_{a'} \tilde{Q}(s', a' | \theta_{k-1}), \quad (7)$$

with the prediction of a parametrized regression model  $(s, a) \mapsto \tilde{Q}(s, a | \theta_{k-1})$ . From a neurobiological perspective, experience replay can be manifested as the re-occurrence of neuron spiking sequences that have also occurred during specific prior actions. The HC is a strong candidate to contribute to such a mechanism, as neuroscience experiments have repeatedly indicated in rats, mice, cats, rabbits, songbirds, and monkeys (Buhry et al., 2011; Nokia et al., 2010; Dave and Margoliash, 2000; Skaggs et al., 2007).

At the current step  $k$ , computing an optimal parameter update then corresponds to finding the model parameters  $\theta_k$  which minimize the following mean-squared loss function

$$\mathcal{L}(\theta_k^Q) = \mathbb{E}_{(s,a,r,s') \sim \mathcal{D}} \left[ \frac{1}{2} (\tilde{Q}(s, a | \theta_k) - y_k)^2 \right], \quad (8)$$

where  $y_k$  is defined in (4). A recently proposed, practically successful alternative approach (Mnih et al., 2015; Silver et al., 2016) is to learn this representation using a deep neural network, leading to the so-called *deep Q-learning* family of methods which likely are state-of-the-art in RL. The set of model parameters  $\theta$  that instantiate the non-linear interactions between layers of the artificial neural network may find a neurobiological correspondence in the adaptive strengths of axonal connections between neurons from the different levels of the neural processing hierarchy (Mesulam, 1998; Taylor et al., 2015).

### 3.2.4 Optimal control via stochastic gradient descent in the DMN

Efficient learning of the entire set of model parameters can effectively be achieved via stochastic *gradient descent*, a common solver algorithm for finding local minima based on the first derivate of the optimization objective. Stochastic here means that the true gradient is estimated from batches of training examples samples (in our case blocks of experience from the replay memory):

$$\delta = -\alpha_k \nabla_{\theta_k} \mathcal{L}(\theta_k) = -\alpha_k \mathbb{E}_{(s,a,r,s') \sim \mathcal{D}} \left[ \underbrace{(\tilde{Q}(s, a | \theta_k) - y_k)}_{\text{prediction error}} \underbrace{\nabla_{\theta_k} \tilde{Q}(s, a | \theta_k)}_{\text{aversion}} \right], \quad (9)$$

where the positive constants  $\alpha_1, \alpha_2, \dots$  are learning rates. Thus, the next action is taken to drive reward prediction errors to percolate from lower to higher processing layers to modulate the choice of future actions. It is a standard result that under special conditions on the learning rates  $\alpha_k$  (namely that the sum  $\sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \alpha_k$  diverges while  $\sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \alpha_k^2$  converges) over time (i.e., in the limit  $k \rightarrow \infty$ ) the thus generated approximating sequence of  $Q$ -value functions

$$\tilde{Q}(\cdot, \cdot | \theta_0) \rightarrow \tilde{Q}(\cdot, \cdot | \theta_1) \rightarrow \tilde{Q}(\cdot, \cdot | \theta_2) \rightarrow \dots$$

are attracted and absorbed by the optimal  $Q$ -value function  $Q^*$  defined implicitly by the Bellman equation (4).

### 3.2.5 Does the hippocampus subserve MCMC sampling?


In RL, MCMC simulation is a common means to update the agent's belief state (Silver and Veness, 2010). MCMC simulation provides a simple method for evaluating the value of a state. They provide an effective mechanism both for tree search (of the considered action trajectories) and for belief state updates, breaking the curse of dimensionality and allowing much greater

scalability than an RL agent without stochastic resampling procedures. Such methods have scaling as a function of available data (i.e., sample complexity) that is determined only by the underlying difficulty of the MDP, rather than the size of the state space or observation space, which can be prohibitively large.

In the human brain, the HC could contribute to synthesizing imagined sequences of world states, observations and rewards (Aronov et al., 2017; Chao et al., 2017; Boyer, 2008). These simulations of experience batches would be used to update the value function, without ever looking inside the black box describing the model's dynamics (De Lavilléon et al., 2015). This would be a simple control algorithm by evaluating all legal actions and selecting the action with highest expected cumulative rewards. In MDPs, MCMC simulation provides an effective mechanism both for tree search and for belief-based state updates, breaking the curse of dimensionality and allowing much greater scalability than has previously been possible (Silver et al., 2016).

### 3.3 Putting everything together

The DMN is today known to consistently increase in neural activity when humans engage in cognitive processes that are detached from the current sensory environment and this network was proposed to be situated at the top of the brain network hierarchy (Carhart-Harris and Friston, 2010; Margulies et al., 2016b). Its putative involvement in thinking about the past, hypothetical experiences, and the future appears to tie in with the implicit computation of action and state cascades as a function of what happened in the past. A policy encapsulates the repertoire of possible actions on the world given a current state. The policy matrix encodes the probabilities of choosing actions to be executed in a certain situation. The DMN may subserve constant exploration of possible future actions and estimation of their cumulative reward outcomes. Implicit computation of future choices provides an explanation for the evolutionary emergence and practical usefulness of mind-wandering at day-time and dreams during sleep in humans.



**Fig 4. Default mode network: neurobiological implementation of reinforcement learning.** Overview of how the constituent nodes of the DMN map onto computational components necessary for an RL agent.

The HC may provide perturbed action-transition-state-reward samples as batches of pseudo-experience (i.e., imagined, hypothesized, and recalled mental scenarios). The small variations in these experience samplings allow searching a larger space of model parameters and possible experiences. Taken to its extreme, stochastic recombination of experience building blocks can further optimize the behavior of the RL agent by model learning from scenarios in the environment that the agent might only very rarely or never encounter. An explanation is thus offered for experiencing seemingly familiar situations that a human has however never actually encountered (i.e., déjà vu effect). While such a situation may not have been



experienced in the physical world, the DMN may have previously stochastically generated, evaluated, and adapted to such a randomly synthesized situation. In the absence of environmental input and feedback (e.g., mind-wandering or sleep), mental scene construction allows for pseudo-experiencing possible future scenarios and action outcomes. Our formal account of DMN function thus acknowledges the unavoidable stochasticity of computation in neural systems (Faisal et al., 2008).

From the perspective of our model-free RL agent, *inference* in the human brain reduces to generalization of policy and value adaptations from sampled experiences to successful action choices and reward predictions in future states. As such, plasticity in the DMN arises naturally: if an agent behaving optimally in a given environment moves to new, yet unexperienced environments, reward prediction errors will massively increase **Please check/simplify sentence**. This will lead to adaptation of the policy until the system converges to a new steady-state of optimal action decisions in the volatile environment.

## 4 Relation to existing cognitive accounts on default mode function

### 4.1 Predictive coding hypothesis

Predictive coding mechanisms (Clark, 2013; Friston, 2008) are a frequently evoked idea in the context of default mode function (Bar et al., 2007). Cortical responses are explained as emerging from continuous functional interaction between higher and lower levels of the neural processing hierarchy. Feed-forward sensory processing is constantly calibrated by top-down modulation from more multi-sensory and associative brain regions further away from primary sensory cortical regions. The dynamic interplay between cortical processing levels may enable inferences about the world by reconciling gaps between fresh sensory input and expectations computed based on stored prior information. At each stage of neural processing, an internally generated prediction of aspects of environmental sensations is directly compared against the actual environmental input. A prediction error at one of the processing levels incurs plasticity changes of neuronal projections (i.e., adapting model parameters) to allow for gradually improved future prediction of the environment. In this way, the predictive coding hypothesis offers explanations for the constructive, non-deterministic nature of sensory perception (Friston, 2010; Buzsáki, 2006) and the intimate relation of motor action to sensory expectations (Wolpert et al., 1995; Körding and Wolpert, 2004). Contextual integration of sensorimotor perception-action cycles may be maintained by top-down modulation using a-priori information about the environment.

In short, predictive coding processes conceptualize updates of the internal representation of the environment to best accommodate and prepare the organism for processing the constant influx of sensory stimulation and performing action on the environment. There are hence a number of common properties between the predictive coding account and the proposed formal account based on MDPs. Importantly, a generative model of how perceived sensory cues arise in the world would be incorporated into the current neuronal wiring. Further, both functional accounts are plausibilized by neuroscientific evidence that suggest the human brain to be a “statistical organ” (Friston et al., 2014) with the biological purpose to generalize from the past to new experiences. Neuroanatomically, axonal back projections indeed outnumber by far the axonal input projections existing in the monkey and probably also human brain (Salin and Bullier, 1995). These many and diverse modulatory influences from higher cortical areas can inject prior knowledge at every stage of processing environmental information. Moreover, both accounts provide a parsimonious explanation why the human brain decreases processing load devoted to incoming information when the environment is predictable. This is because the internal generative model only requires updates after discrepancies have occurred between environmental reality and its internally instantiated representation. Increased computation resources are however allocated when unknown stimuli or unexpected events are encountered by the organism. The predictive coding and MDP account naturally evoke a mechanism of brain plasticity in that neuronal wiring gets increasingly adapted when faced by unanticipated environmental challenges.

While sensory experience is a constructive process from both views, the predictive coding account frames sensory perception of the external world as a generative experience due to the modulatory top-down influence at various stages of sensory input processing. This generative top-down design is replaced in our MDP view of the DMN by a sequential decision-making framework. Further, the hierarchical processing aspect from predictive coding is re-expressed in our account in form of nested prediction of probable upcoming actions, states, and outcomes. While both accounts capture the consequences of action, the predictive coding account is typically explained without explicit parameterization of the agent's horizon and has a tendency to be presented as emphasizing prediction about the immediate future. In the present account, the horizon of that look into the future is made explicit in the  $\gamma$  parameter of the Bellman equation. Finally, the process of adapting the neuronal connections for improved top-down modulation takes the concrete form of stochastic gradient computation and back-propagation in our MDP implementation. It is however important to note that the neurobiological plausibility of the back-propagation procedure is controversial (Goodfellow et al., 2016).

In sum, the present MDP account of DMN function may serve as a concrete implementation of the predictive coding account from cognitive neuroscience. MDPs have the advantage of exposing an explicit mechanism for the horizon of future considerations and for how the internal representation of the world is updated, as well as more explicitly reconciles sensory input processing and action considerations. Recasting DMN function in terms of MDPs therefore naturally incorporates a majority of aspects from the prediction coding hypothesis.

## 4.2 Semantic hypothesis

Another frequently proposed cognitive account to explain DMN function revolves around forming logical associations and abstract analogies between experiences and conceptual knowledge derived from past behavior (Bar, 2007; Binder et al., 1999; Constantinescu et al., 2016). Analogies might naturally tie incoming new sensory stimuli to explicit world knowledge (i.e., semantics) (Bar, 2009). The encoding of complex environmental features could thus be facilitated by association to similar states. Going beyond isolated meaning and concepts extracted from the world, semantic building blocks may need to get recombined to enable mentally envisioning non-existing scenarios. As such, semantic knowledge would be a prerequisite for optimizing behavior by constantly simulating possible future scenarios (Boyer, 2008; Binder and Desai, 2011). Such cognitive processes can afford the internal construction and elaboration of necessary information that is not presented in the surrounding sensory environment by recombining building blocks of concept knowledge and episodic memories (Hassabis and Maguire, 2009). Indeed, in aging humans, remembering the past and imagining the future equally decreased in the level of detail and were associated with concurrent deficits in forming and integrating relationships between items (Addis et al., 2008; Spreng and Levine, 2006). Further, episodic memory, language, problem solving, planning, estimating other others' thoughts, and spatial navigation represent neural processes that are likely to build on abstract world knowledge and logical associations for integrating the constituent elements in rich and coherent mental scenes (Schacter et al., 2007). Such scene construction processes could contribute to interpreting the present and foretelling the future. Further, mental scene construction has been proposed to imply a distinction between engagement in the sensory environment and internally generated mind-wandering (Buckner and Carroll, 2007). These investigators stated that "A computational model [...] will probably require a form of regulation by which perception of the current world is suppressed while simulation of possible alternatives are constructed, followed by a return to perception of the present."

In comparison, both the semantic hypothesis and the present formal account based on MDPs expose mechanisms of how action considerations could be mentally explored. In both accounts, there is also no reason to assume that predictions of various levels of complexity, abstraction, timescale, and purpose rely on mechanisms that are qualitatively different. This concurs with DMN activity increases across time, space, and content domains demonstrated in many neuroimaging studies (Spreng et al., 2009; Laird et al., 2009; Bzdok et al., 2012; Binder et al., 2009). Further, the semantic hypothesis and MDP account provide explanations why HC damage does not only impair recalling memories, but also hypothetical and future thinking (Hassabis et al., 2007). While both semantic hypothesis and our formal account propose

memory-based internally generated information for probabilistic mental models of action outcomes, MDPs render explicit the grounds on which an action is eventually chosen, namely, the estimated cumulative reward. In contrast to many versions of the semantic hypothesis, the MDPs naturally integrate the egocentric view (more related to current action, state, and reward) and the world view (more related to past and future actions, states, and rewards) on the world in a same optimization problem. Finally, the semantic account of DMN function does not offer a mechanistic explanation *how* explicit world knowledge and semantic analogies thereof lead to prediction of future actions and states. The semantic hypothesis does not explain why memory recall for scene construction in humans is typically fragmentary and noisy instead of accurate and reliable. In contrast to existing accounts on semantics and mental scene construction, the random and creative aspects of DMN function are explained in MDPs by the advantages of stochastic optimization. Our MDP account provides an algorithmic explanation in that stochasticity of the parameter space explored by MCMC approximation achieves better fine-tuning of the action policies and estimation of expected reward outcomes. That is, the purposeful stochasticity of policy and value estimation in MDPs provides a candidate explanation for why humans have evolved imperfect noisy memories as the more advantageous adaptation. In sum, mental scene construction according to the semantic account is lacking an explicit time and incentive model, both of which are integral parts of the MDP frameworks.

### 4.3 Sentinel hypothesis

The DMN regions have been associated with processing the experienced or expected relevance of environment cues (Montague et al., 2006). Processing self-relevant information was perhaps the first cognitive account that was proposed for DMN function (Gusnard et al., 2001; Raichle et al., 2001). Since then, many investigators have speculated that neural activity in the DMN may reflect the brain's continuous tracking of relevance in the environment, such as spotting predators, as an advantageous evolutionary adaptation (Buckner et al., 2008; Hahn et al., 2007). According to this cognitive account, the human brain's baseline maintains a "radar" function to detect subjectively relevant cues and unexpected events in the environment. Propositions of a sentinel function to underlie DMN activity have however seldom detailed the mechanisms of how attention and memory resources are exactly reallocated when encountering a self-relevant environmental stimulus. However, in the present MDP account, promising action trajectories are recursively explored by the human DMN. Conversely, certain branches of candidate action trajectories are detected to be less worthy to become mentally explored. This mechanism, expressed by the Bellman equation, directly implies stratified allocation of attention and working memory load over relevant cues and events in the environment. Further, our account provides a parsimonious explanation for the consistently observed DMN implication in certain goal-directed experimental tasks and in task-unconstrained mind-wandering (Smith et al., 2009; Bzdok et al., 2016b). Both environment-detached and environment-engaged cognitive processes may entail DMN recruitment if real or imagined experience is processed, manipulated, and used for predictions. During tasks, the policy and value estimates may be updated to optimize especially short-term action. At rest, these parameter updates may improve especially mid- and long-term action. This horizon of the agent is expressed in the  $\gamma$  parameter in the MDP account. We thus provide answers for the currently unsettled question why the involvement of the same neurobiological brain circuit (i.e., DMN) has been documented for specific task performances and baseline house-keeping functions.

More specifically, environmental stimuli especially important for humans are frequently of social nature. This is probably unsurprising given that the complexity of the social systems is a likely to be a human-defining property (Tomasello, 2009). According to the "social brain hypothesis", the human brain has especially been shaped for forming and maintaining increasingly complex social systems, which allows solving ecological problems by means of social relationships (Whiten and Byrne, 1988). Indeed, social topics amounted to roughly two thirds of human everyday communication (Dunbar et al., 1997), while mind-wandering at daytime and dreams during sleep are rich in stories about people and the complex relationships between them. In line with this, the DMN was argued to be specialized in continuous processing of social information as a physiological baseline of human brain function (Schilbach et al., 2008). This view was later challenged by observing analogues of the DMN in monkeys

(Mantini et al., 2011), cats (Popa et al., 2009), and rats (Lu et al., 2012), three species with social-cognitive capacities that are supposedly less advanced than in humans.

The principal connectivity gradient in the cortex appears to be greatly expanded in humans compare to macaques, suggesting a phylogenetically conserved axis of cortical expansion with the DMN emerging at the extreme-end in humans (Margulies et al., 2016a). Neurocomputational models of dyadic whole brain demonstrated how the human connectivity topology, on top of facilitating processing at the intra-individual level, can explain our propensity to coordinate through sensorimotor loops with others at the inter-individual level (Dumas et al., 2012). DMN is moreover largely overlapping with neural networks associated with higher level social cognition (?). For instance, the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, the posterior cingulate/precuneus, and the temporo-parietal junction (rTPJ) play together a key role in bridging the gap between self and other by integrating low-level embodied processes within higher level inference-based mentalizing (?).

Rather than functional specificity for processing social information, the present MDP account can parsimoniously incorporate the dominance of social content in human mental activity as high value function estimates for information about humans (Baker et al., 2009; Kampe et al., 2001; Krienen et al., 2010). The DMN may thus modulate reward processing in the human agent in a way that prioritizes appraisal of and action towards social contexts, without excluding relevance of environmental cues of the physical world. In sum, our account on the DMN directly implies its previously proposed “sentinel” function of monitoring the environment for self-relevant information in general and inherently accommodates the importance of social environmental cues as a special case.

## 4.4 The free-energy principle and active inference

In Friston’s free-energy principle (FEP) (Friston, 2010) and active inference (i.e action under the FEP) (Friston et al., 2009) theories, the brain is portrayed as biomechanical inference engine dedicated to minimizing the long-term average of surprise: the log-likelihood of the observed sensory input –or more precisely, an upper bound thereof– *relative* to the expectations of, and the internal representations the brain has about the external world. It does this by actively generating hypothetical explanations or predictions of its sensory input. Precursors of this theory can be traced back to (Dayan et al., 1995) in which they introduced the so-called *Helmholtz machine*, a hierarchical factorial *directional deep belief-net*. According to the FEP account, the goal of the brain is then to optimize over a generative model  $G$  of sensations: to iteratively modify its internal representation  $p_G(\mathbf{z}|\mathbf{x})$  about objects in the world, their interactions and dynamics, so as to minimize surprise when these representations are confronted with sensory input  $\mathbf{x}$  during perception cycles (i.e., the *generative* model). The FEP also postulates a dual model called the *recognition* model, which works in tandem with the generative model  $p_R(\mathbf{z}|\mathbf{x})$ , to accomplish approximate inference. The recognition model dreams imaginary worlds  $\mathbf{z}$ , while the latter tries to generate sensations  $\mathbf{x}$  which match these dreams!

Because surprise is intractably difficult to optimize (since we would need to sum over all hidden causes of the sensations), FEP sets out to instead minimize an upper-bound thereof, namely the free-energy  $F_G^R(\mathbf{x})$  given by

$$\begin{aligned} \text{generative surprise} &:= -\log(p_G(\mathbf{x})) = F_G(\mathbf{x}) \\ &= \underbrace{F_G^R(\mathbf{x})}_{\text{accuracy}} - \underbrace{D_{KL}(P_R(\cdot|\mathbf{x})||P_G(\cdot|\mathbf{x}))}_{\text{complexity}} \\ &\leq F_G^R(\mathbf{x}), \text{ with equality if } p_R(\mathbf{z}|\mathbf{x}) = p_G(\mathbf{z}|\mathbf{x}) \text{ for all } \mathbf{z} \end{aligned} \quad (10)$$

### 4.4.1 Criticisms of the FEP

Despite its popularity, a number of criticisms against the FEP have surfaced over the years. We outline the most notable ones here.

**The wake-sleep algorithm is not neurobiologically plausible.** The main algorithm for minimizing free-energy  $F_G^R(\mathbf{x})$  is the *wake-sleep algorithm* (Dayan et al., 1995).

As noted already in (Dayan et al., 1995), a crucial drawback of the wake-sleep algorithm is that it postulates a pair forward (generation) and backward (recognition) models, which together do not correspond to optimization of (a bound of) the marginal likelihood, because of the incorrect KL used therein, etc. Thus the brain could not possibly be running such an algorithm, not even in principle! To the rescue, we note that the recent theory of *variational auto-encoders (VAEs)* (Kingma and Welling, 2013) might provide an efficient alternative to the wake-sleep algorithm, as it overcomes the technical limits of the former, by using a reparametrization trick. For instance, unlike the wake-sleep algorithm for minimizing free-energy, VAEs can be efficiently trained via back-propagation of prediction errors.

**The “dark room” experiment.** Since FEP-based theories (Friston, 2010; Friston et al., 2009) postulate that all ongoing intelligent behavior in an organism is geared towards reaching the grand goal of minimizing surprisal, an organism which enters a *dark room*<sup>3</sup> (Fig. 5) would strive to remain there as its sensory input would be perfectly predictable in such a state (Friston et al., 2012). However, such a tendency is definitely not what is observed, neither in humans nor in animals: if you get into a dark room, you try to figure out where the light switch is, so as to *explore* this mysterious room, or simply get out of it! Defenders of the FEP have retaliated by advancing the ‘full package’ (Friston et al., 2012): FEP is multi-scale, and there would be a meta-scale at which the organism would be *surprised* by such a *lack of surprise*. According to this argument, a dark room is thus paradoxically, a state of extremely high surprise. Driven by the zeal to always diminish surprise, the FEP agent would eventually bootstrap itself out of such saddles, to explore more interesting corners of the environment. Recourse to this argument is equivalent to invoking a *halting oracle* (Chaitin, 2011), an arbitrarily powerful machine which can solve the *halting problem* (an arbitrarily difficult computational problem which cannot be solved under any reasonable *model of computation*, not even in principle!). But this is problematic as it sucks up the problem (that of decision-making and active agency) the theory intends to elude in the first place.

In contrast, operating under our RL-based theory, an organism would quickly notice that this dark room is a local minimum. Indeed, hippocampal experience replay (see 3.2.3) would set it and the organism would sample memories or fantasies of alternative situations in which there was reward to mine. Such considerations would artificially generate *internal* sensory input for the DMN and eventually let the organism to explore the room, for example look for and find the light switch, or simply leave the room.


#### 4.4.2 RL reinterpretation of FEP and active inference

FEP and active inference can be reinterpreted in our model-free RL framework by postulating that the reward signal maximized by the DMN is the negative of surprisal, i.e the log-likelihood of sensory the current priors the agent has about the world. This is worth writing down explicitly,

$$r^{\text{FEP}} = \underbrace{\log(p_G)}_{\text{—FEP generative surprisal}}. \quad (11)$$

Such a surprisal-based reinforcement learning scheme has been advocated for in (Schmidhuber, 2010; Mohamed and Rezende, 2015) under the equivalent framework of information compression. However, we note that though relevant, minimization of surprisal alone is

<sup>3</sup> *Dark* is used here as an allegory to indicate the complete absence of any *external* sensory input.



**Fig 5. The *dark room* experiment.** The adjective *dark* is used as an allegory to indicate the complete absence of any *external* sensory input.



insufficient to explain intelligent behavior observed in humans and other “intelligent” animals. The dark-room experiment, for example, provides a formidable argument against in favor of the insufficiency of the FEP and active inference theories to explain intelligent behavior in humans: when a human is put in a dark room, they don’t just sit down in a corner forever, what would be the FEP-optimal thing to do; they actively search for the light switch, and start exploring the depths of the room, possibly looking for food or the way out!

## 5 Conclusion

Which brain function could be important enough for the existence and survival of the human species to justify constantly high energy costs? MDPs motivate an attractive formal account how the human association cortex might implement multi-sensory representation and control of the environment to optimize the organism’s interaction with the world. This idealized process model explains a number of previous experimental observations in the DMN by simple but non-trivial mechanisms. From the view of a Markovian sequential decision process, human behavior unfolds by integrating action outcomes from stored past events and extrapolation to upcoming events for guiding action choice in the present context. MDPs also provide a mathematical formalism how opportunity structure in the environment can be recursively exploited when confronted with challenging decisions. This functional interpretation may be more compatible with the DMN’s poorly understood involvement across autobiographical memory recall, problem solving, abstract reasoning, social cognition, as well as delay discounting and self-related prospection. Improvement of the internal world representation by injecting stochasticity in the recall of past actions and the estimation of action outcomes may explain why highly accurate memories have been disfavored in human evolution and why human creativity might be adaptive.

The proposed artificial intelligence perspective on DMN biology is hence practically computable and yields falsifiable neurobiological hypotheses. Neuroscience experiments could be designed that operationalize the set of action, value, and state variables that govern the behavior of intelligent RL systems. At the least, we propose an alternative vocabulary to describe and interpret experimental findings in neuroscience studies on the DMN situated at top of the brain network hierarchy. Ultimately, DMN activity may instantiate a holistic integration ranging from real experience over purposeful dreams to anticipated futures for continued refinement of the organism’s fate.

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**Remark 1.** Given a system  $(S, A, r, p, \mu)$  satisfying all the axioms for an MDP except the Markov property, we can always transform it into an MDP by considering a compounded version of the states

$$S_t \leftarrow (S_0, A_0, R_0, S_1, A_1, S_2 \dots, S_t, A_{t-1}, R_{t-1}, S_t)$$

made of the system's history up to an including time  $t$ .

## A More on RL in the brain

### A.1 Does hippocampal replay equal inverse reinforcement-learning?

Given the trace  $s_0, a_0, s_1, \dots$ , of an optimal agent's strategy  $\pi^*$  in an MDP (called a *teacher's demonstration*), can we figure out what is the (instantaneous) reward function  $r : S \times A \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$  that the agent is optimizing over a prescribed class of reward functions (e.g., linear rewards  $r(s, a) \equiv \theta^T \phi(s, a)$ )? For instance, given traces of motor actions from an adult to grab a cup on a table, can an observing child figure out what “langragian” functional is being minimized by the former? How? Can they reproduce this optimal behavior? Such questions are of course pertinent to our decision-making theory for the DMN. In the general artificial case, the problem has been extensively studied and partially solved by (Abbeel and Ng, 2004). They are also been rigorously studied in general optimal control literature under the name “inverse optimal control”, but in model-based certain (where the physical dynamics are known, etc.)...

IRL is is suited for problems in which it's hard to define what the reward function could be (e.g., car-driving, drone maneuvering, etc.) ...

## B Free-energy principles!

The so-called free-energy principle in its present form (including notions like “generative density”, “recognition density”, etc.) can be traced back to works of Dayan & Hinton (Dayan et al., 1995) in which they introduced the so-called *Helmholtz machine*, a hierarchical factorial directional deep belief-net (DBN). In this subsection, we will develop from first-principles, the bare-bones minimalistic ideas needed to build a free-energy principle for general decision-making. This ideas were first developed by Hinton et al. in the early 90s in building their Helmholtz machine. Theories like Friston's free-energy principle and active-inference will then emerge as particular instances of this general framework, with particular design choises. For instance, the Friston theory axiomatizes that the brain uses a (problematic, as it implicitly assumes that posterior of each hidden unit is factorial) wake-sleep algorithm to train the underlying Helmholtz machine, etc.

## B.1 Helmholtz free-energy and the generative model

symbol	description
$\langle X \rangle_p$	Expectation (a.k.a average, a.k.a mean value) of the random quantity $X$ w.r.t to the probability density $p$ , formally defined by $\langle E \rangle_p := \sum_z p(z)X(z)$ .
$\mathcal{H}(p)$	Information-theoretic entropy of a probability density $p$ , formally defined by $\mathcal{H}(p) := -\sum_z p(z) \log(p(z))$ , with the usual convention $0 \log(0) := 0$ .
$D_{KL}(q  p)$	The Kullback-Leibler divergence between the probability densities $q$ and $p$ respectively, formally defined by $D_{KL}(q  p) := \sum_z q(z) \log(q(z)/p(z))$ .
$\mathbf{x}$	Observations. In Friston's free-energy principle this has a decomposition in to two terms: the brain's internal state $b$ and sensory inputs $s$ , i.e., $\mathbf{x} = (s, b)$ .
$\mathbf{z}$	Hidden variables. This should be understood as the unobservable states of the external environment (to which the brain is trying to adapt by learning).
$p_G(. \mathbf{x})$	Generative density for ...
$p_R(. \mathbf{x})$	Recognition density for ... Does some kind of predictive coding (?)
$F_G(\mathbf{x})$	Helmholtz free-energy for a model $p_G$ of generating the observation $\mathbf{x}$ . This measures the surprise incurred upon observing $\mathbf{x}$ generated by the model $G$ .
$F_G^R(\mathbf{x})$	Variational Helmholtz free-energy from model $G$ to $R$ . Note that $F_G^G = F_G$ .

**Table 1.** Table of notations.

Our starting point will be to build an approximation  $p_G$  for the true density  $p$  of the observations, so that this approximate density corresponds to the partition function of thermodynamic system. So,

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{generative surprise} &= -\log(p_G(\mathbf{x})) = -\log(p_G(\mathbf{x})) \times 1 = -\log(p_G(\mathbf{x})) \sum_{\mathbf{z}} p_G(\mathbf{z}|\mathbf{x}) \\
 &= -\sum_{\mathbf{z}} p_G(\mathbf{z}, \mathbf{x}) \log(p_G(\mathbf{x})) = -\sum_{\mathbf{z}} p_G(\mathbf{z}|\mathbf{x}) \log(p_G(\mathbf{z}, \mathbf{x})/p_G(\mathbf{z}|\mathbf{x})) \\
 &= \sum_{\mathbf{z}} p_G(\mathbf{z}|\mathbf{x}) \log(p_G(\mathbf{z}|\mathbf{x})) - \sum_{\mathbf{z}} p_G(\mathbf{z}|\mathbf{x}) \log(p_G(\mathbf{z}, \mathbf{x})) \\
 &= -\langle \log(p_G(., \mathbf{x})) \rangle_{p_G(.|\mathbf{x})} - \mathcal{H}(p_G(.|\mathbf{x})) \\
 &= \langle E_G(., \mathbf{x}) \rangle_{p_G(.|\mathbf{x})} - \mathcal{H}(p_G(.|\mathbf{x}))
 \end{aligned} \tag{12}$$

where  $E_G(\mathbf{z}, \mathbf{x})$  is the energy at *macrostate*  $\mathbf{z}$  of a fictive thermodynamic system defined by setting

$$E_G(\mathbf{z}, \mathbf{x}) := -\log(p_G(\mathbf{z}, \mathbf{x})), \tag{13}$$

The last quantity in (12) is nothing but *Helmholtz free-energy* (at unit temperature!), defined formally by

$$F_G(\mathbf{x}) := \langle E_G(., \mathbf{x}) \rangle_{p_G(.|\mathbf{x})} - \mathcal{H}(p_G(.|\mathbf{x})). \tag{14}$$

Thus,

**Fact B.1.** *Generative surprise and generative Helmholtz free-energy are different views on exactly the same object.*

The goal of the brain is then to optimize over the generative model  $G$ : to iteratively or analytically modify the generative density  $p_G(.|\mathbf{x})$ , so as to minimize surprise. It turns out that a direct attempt to attack this optimization problem by gradient descent on the free-energy  $F_G(\mathbf{x})$  is futile: the parameter update steps are not “very clean”, and require rather

cumbersome and heavy computations. A workaround is then to introduce a second density  $p_R(\cdot|\mathbf{x})$  called a *recognition* density to work in tandem with the generative density  $p_G(\cdot|\mathbf{x})$ , as a trick for doing approximate inference. The former dreams / fantacizes whilst the latter tries to generate sensations which match these dreams! This primal-dual idea, first proposed in Hinton et al. 1995, is at the heart of the general free-energy principle that we will introduce shortly.

## B.2 Variational Helmholtz free-energy and the bottom-up recognition sub-model

In this subsection, we will present an insightful upper bound for the generative surprise (i.e., generate Helmholtz free-energy), called the *variational* (Helmholtz) free-energy. As an avant-gout of what is to come shortly, let's just note that the well-known *free-energy principle* is simply a workaround whereby the minimization surprise (intractable) is replaced with the minimization a carefully chosen upper bound thereof.

Invoking (13) and applying Bayes rule, we get the Gibbs distribution

$$p_G(\mathbf{z}|\mathbf{x}) = \frac{p_G(\mathbf{z}|\mathbf{x})}{p_G(\mathbf{x})} = \frac{\exp(-E_G(\mathbf{z}, \mathbf{x}))}{Z_G(\mathbf{x})} = \frac{\exp(-E_G(\mathbf{z}, \mathbf{x}))}{Z_G(\mathbf{x})}, \quad (15)$$

where  $Z_G(\mathbf{x}) := \log(p_G(\mathbf{x})) = \sum_{\mathbf{z}'} \exp(-E_G(\mathbf{z}', \mathbf{x}))$ , the normalizing *partition function* for the model 13. Whence, for any macrostate  $\mathbf{z}$ , we have  $p_G(\mathbf{x}) = Z_G(\mathbf{x}) = \exp(-E_G(\mathbf{z}, \mathbf{x}))/p_G(\mathbf{z}|\mathbf{x})$ , and so it holds that

$$F_G(\mathbf{x}) \stackrel{(12)}{=} -\log(p_G(\mathbf{x})) = -\log(Z_G(\mathbf{x})) = E_G(\mathbf{z}, \mathbf{x}) + \log(p_G(\mathbf{z}|\mathbf{x})). \quad (16)$$

Now, in the above equation, the LHS only depends on the generative model  $G$  and the data point  $\mathbf{x}$ : it doesn't depend on the hidden variable  $\mathbf{z}$ , etc. So, taking expectations w.r.t an arbitrary density<sup>4</sup>  $p_R(\cdot|\mathbf{x})$  yields

$$\begin{aligned} F_G(\mathbf{x}) &= -\log(Z_G(\mathbf{x})) = \langle E_G(\cdot, \mathbf{x}) \rangle_{P_R(\cdot|\mathbf{x})} + \sum_{\mathbf{z}} p_R(\mathbf{z}|\mathbf{x}) \log(p_G(\mathbf{z}|\mathbf{x})) \\ &= \langle E_G(\cdot, \mathbf{x}) \rangle_{P_R(\cdot|\mathbf{x})} - \mathcal{H}(p_R(\cdot|\mathbf{x})) - \sum_{\mathbf{z}} p_R(\mathbf{z}|\mathbf{x}) \log(p_R(\mathbf{z}|\mathbf{x})/p_G(\mathbf{z}|\mathbf{x})) \\ &= F_G^R(\mathbf{x}) - D_{KL}(P_R(\cdot|\mathbf{x})||P_G(\cdot|\mathbf{x})), \end{aligned} \quad (17)$$

where  $F_G^R(\mathbf{x})$  is the *variational* Helmholtz free-energy from  $R$  to  $G$  defined by

$$F_G^R(\mathbf{x}) := \langle E_G(\cdot, \mathbf{x}) \rangle_{P_R(\cdot|\mathbf{x})} - \mathcal{H}(p_R(\cdot|\mathbf{x})) \quad (18)$$

and  $D_{KL}(P_R(\cdot|\mathbf{x})||P_G(\cdot|\mathbf{x}))$  is the Kullback-Leibler divergence between the  $p_R(\cdot|\mathbf{x})$  and the generative density  $p_G(\cdot|\mathbf{x})$ . Note that  $F_G^G = F_G$ .

## B.3 A general free-energy principle

We can resume the situation as follows<sup>5</sup>:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{generative surprise} &:= -\log(p_G(\mathbf{x})) = F_G(\mathbf{x}) \\ &= \underbrace{F_G^R(\mathbf{x})}_{\text{accuracy}} - \underbrace{D_{KL}(P_R(\cdot|\mathbf{x})||P_G(\cdot|\mathbf{x}))}_{\text{complexity}} \\ &\leq F_G^R(\mathbf{x}), \text{ with equality if } p_R(\mathbf{z}|\mathbf{x}) = p_G(\mathbf{z}|\mathbf{x}) \text{ for all } \mathbf{z} \end{aligned} \quad (19)$$

<sup>4</sup>conditioning in  $P_R(\cdot|\mathbf{x})$  is because this density is selected from a world in which the sensory inputs and internal brain state vector  $\mathbf{x}$  is assumed already observed.

<sup>5</sup>Where we have used the fact that KL divergence is always nonnegative.

## B.4 Helmholtz machines and the wake-sleep algorithm

**Assumption:** In both generative and recognition components of the network, there is conditional independence of neurons in the same layer, given the data (i.e., input from lower more primitive layers). Precisely

$$p_G(\mathbf{z}^{(l)}|\mathbf{x}) = \prod_{k=1}^{h_l} p_G(\mathbf{z}_k^{(l)}|\mathbf{x}), \quad p_R(\mathbf{z}^{(l)}|\mathbf{x}) = \prod_{k=1}^{h_l} p_R(\mathbf{z}_k^{(l)}|\mathbf{x})$$

## B.5 Friston’s active-inference and agency

This is nothing but an application of the Dayan’s wake-sleep algorithm for training a Helmholtz machine model of the brain...

The following critics can be made:

- As noted by Dayan et al. (*Variants of Helmholtz machines*), the inter-neuronal intra-layer independence assumption which is at the center of the HM becomes severely problematic as it is agnostic to the known organization of cortical layers...
- A drawback of the wake-sleep algorithm is that it requires a concurrent models (generative and recognition), which together do not correspond to optimization of (a bound of) the marginal likelihood (because of the incorrect KL used therein, etc.).
- Also, note that the wake-sleep algorithm doesn’t do backprop! This is due to technical difficulty in getting derivatives of loss function w.r.t recognition weights  $\mathbf{W}^R$ ).
- This difficulty was removed in the 2010s by (Kingma and Welling, 2013), and other groups, via a “reparametrization trick”.

## B.6 Minimizing free-energy via backprop: variational auto-encoders

Here, we present a way to alleviate some conceptual and computational issues with the free-energy framework presented thus far, by using the recent *variational auto-encoder* (VAE) theory (Kingma and Welling, 2013). Define the data-dependent auxiliary random function

$$f_{G,R}(\cdot, \mathbf{x}) : \mathbf{z} \mapsto \log(p_G(\mathbf{z}, \mathbf{x})) - \log(p_R(\mathbf{z}|\mathbf{x})). \quad (20)$$

Then we can rewrite the variational free-energy as

$$\begin{aligned} F_G^R(\mathbf{x}) &:= \langle E_G(\cdot, \mathbf{x}) \rangle_{p_R(\cdot|\mathbf{x})} - \mathcal{H}(p_R(\cdot|\mathbf{x})) = \langle E_G(\cdot, \mathbf{x}) + \log(p_R(\cdot|\mathbf{x})) \rangle_{p_R(\cdot|\mathbf{x})} \\ &= \langle -\log(p_G(\cdot, \mathbf{x})) + \log(p_R(\cdot|\mathbf{x})) \rangle_{p_R(\cdot|\mathbf{x})} \\ &= -\langle f_{G,R} \rangle_{p_R(\cdot|\mathbf{x})} \approx -\frac{1}{M} \sum_{m=1}^M f_{G,R}(\mathbf{z}^{(m)}), \text{ with } \mathbf{z}^{(1)}, \dots, \mathbf{z}^{(M)} \sim p_R(\cdot|\mathbf{x}), \text{ and } M \rightarrow \infty. \end{aligned}$$

**Problem:** How do we sample from the recognition density  $p_R(\cdot|\mathbf{x})$  in such a way that the sampling process is differentiable w.r.t the weights of the recognition network  $\mathbf{W}^R$  ?

**Solution: the reparametrization trick.**

- Choose  $\epsilon \sim p_{\text{noise}}$  (noise distribution, independent of  $\mathbf{W}^R$ !)
- Set  $\mathbf{z} = g(\mathbf{W}^R, \mathbf{x}, \epsilon)$ , where  $g$  is an appropriate class  $\mathcal{C}^1$  function
  - results in a sample  $\mathbf{z} \sim p_R(\cdot|\mathbf{x})$ , from the correct posterior

The mapping  $g$  should be taught of as a “blurring” function which produces noisy versions  $\mathbf{z}$ , called *sensations*, of the true world state  $\mathbf{x}$ . The result is a scheme for training DBNs via good-old backprop! Refer to Fig. vae.pdf. Some examples of the reparametrization trick for a number of choices of the posterior distribution are given in Tab. 2.

Posterior	$p_R(. \mathbf{x})$	noise	$g(\mathbf{W}^R, \mathbf{x}, \epsilon)$	Also
Normal	$\mathcal{N}(\mu, \sigma)$	$\epsilon \sim \mathcal{N}(0, 1)$	$\mu + \sigma \odot \epsilon$	Location-scale family: Laplace, Elliptical, Students t, Logistic, Uniform, Triangular, ...
Exponential	$\exp(\lambda)$	$\epsilon \sim \mathcal{U}([0, 1])$	$-\log(1 - \epsilon)/\lambda$	Invertible CDF: Cauchy, Logistic, Rayleigh, Pareta, Weibull, Reciprocal, Gompert, Gumbel, Erlan, ...
Other	$\log \mathcal{N}(\mu, \sigma)$	$\epsilon \sim \mathcal{N}(0, 1)$	$\exp(\mu + \sigma \odot \epsilon)$	Gamma, Dirichlet, Beta, Chi-squared, F, ...

**Table 2.** Reparametrization trick (Kingma and Welling, 2013) for a variety of models.

## B.7 GANs and other likelihood-free methods

...