

PERSONAL DATA

Age: 47

Sex: Male

Education: University graduate (machine building)

Total Years Relevant Experience: 16

Last Year of Relevant Experience: 1977 Year Left China: 1977

Initial Immigration Status: Legal

Native Place/Overseas Connections: Guangdong native/OS relatives

Class Background/Political Designation: OS/Landlord-KMT (sister 1957 rightist)

OCCUPATIONAL HISTORY SUMMARY

Positions Held: 1) Fushun Petroleum Machinery Plant, Liaoning, 1962-77

- a) Staff technician, Technical Department, 1962-63
- b) 'borrowed' by Industrial Department of Petroleum Ministry, Peking, to work on Ministry Standards Handbook, 1963-65
- c) Staff technician, Technical Department, 1965-68
- d) shop worker, 1968-69
- e) Staff technician, Technical Group, 1969-70
- f) 'borrowed' by Fushun Municipal Planning Commission, Staff work, 1970-71
- g) Staff technician, Technical Department, 1972-77

Administrative Level of Work Unit/(No. of employees):

1) Ministry until 1970s, then Municipal/(2600)

Experience in Full-time Manual Labor (for non-worker occupations):

shop worker, 1968-69

APPOINTMENTS: 5

TOTAL HOURS: 11

PAGES TEXT: 13

Occupational History (2/13/80, 2.25 hrs.)

The informant worked in a centrally-administered petroleum machinery plant, under the Petroleum and Petrochemical Ministry (shiyou huagong bu). His enterprise employed 2600 people. He was an engineer in the technical department. After middle school in Guangdong, he tested into University at Dalian, Liaoning province. He entered in 1957 and graduated in 1962 from Dalian Industrial College (Dalian Gongxue Yuan). He studied machine building, a five year course. After graduation, he was assigned to the Fushun Petroleum Machinery Plant in Liaoning as a practicing (jianxi) technician. After one year, he was made into a regular technician. In 1963 he was 'borrowed' (jieyong) by the Industrial Department (gongchang chu) of the Ministry in Peking. He was still attached to the plant in a formal sense. They needed people in Peking that knew technology, and they were short of staff. So they borrowed a few people from each plant under them. They worked at compiling product standards for publication in the Ministry's standards handbook (bu ban biao zhun-- 部颁标准). This was the first standards handbook for the ministry, since it was only established around 1956 after the discovery of Daqing. Previously, they only had oil fields in Yumen and Xinjiang, and it was only a bureau (ju). In 1965, after the completion of the standards handbook, he returned to the technical department as an engineer and worked at product designing. He drew up designs for new products, which were sent to shops for production.


In 1968, during the Cultural Revolution 'xiafang' of cadres, he was sent to shops for manual labor. The Revolutionary Committee was established in October 1968, and finally in 1969 he was transferred back to the technical department with one other engineer to do designing work again. In 1970, from the last half of the year to the first half of 1971, he worked, again on a 'borrowed' basis, at the Fushun Municipal Planning Commission (jihua weiyuanhui). This was the general leading body for all city-run industries. He did both office work and travelled around to various plants on inspection.

In 1972, because he had overseas relations in the US and Hong Kong, and because he had a bad class background (landlord-KMT), he went back to his factory. He was in close with the Chairman of the Planning Commission, who was also a vice-Mayor (fu shizhang), and he wasn't really willing to have the informant transfer back to his plant, since he did good work. But I figured that if he stayed in such a high position, before long he would be dragged out when the next movement came. Political requirements were very strict at that high level. So he used the opportunity of his plant director's request to go back to his old job. So he went back to his old unit from 1972-77, and once again worked in the technical department. His job was to check over the designs of the younger designers in the department. He did this until he left in 1977.

Wages and Promotions (3/1/80, 2 hrs.)

In October 1962, after graduation from college, he started work. He was a practicing technician (jianxi jishuyuan), equivalent to grade 14, at 46¥. After one year he became a formal technician. This was automatically done unless one made a serious political mistake. They all wrote "practicum reports" (shixi baogao) about what they had learned during their year. In 1963 he therefore became a grade 3¹ technician, 55¥. In 1963 they also had a general raise for workers and staff in the country. After that there were none. They allowed raises for 60% of the workers, 40% of the technical cadres, and 35% of the administrative cadres in Fushun City. The evaluations were


石油化工部 (→ 1963)



- 1) 抚顺石油机械厂 (★)
- 2) 南阳机械厂
- 3) 宝鸡第一机械厂
- 4) 西安仪表厂
- 5) 宝鸡钢管厂
- 6) 济南柴油机厂

石油工业部 (1963-71)

部 (北京)



carried out according to several criteria: 1) previous low wages, 2) work performance, 3) political performance, which meant relations with coworker and relations with leaders--guanxi was very important, and 4) class background. In his department they held meetings, decided how many (according to the fixed proportion) could get nominated. Then they discussed, appraised, and made sure people agreed with the selection. But in the last analysis it was the department head who decided. The key factor was the decision of the leader of the unit involved--department or production group. Informant received no raises until he left in 1977, despite his various transfers and promotions.

Around 1972 or 1973 (before the criticism of Lin Biao and Confucius) there was a readjustment based on years of service and wage grade. It was decided that all who worked continuously in the plant from before 1956 would be raised to grade 4, and a small percentage would be raised only to grade 3. Those who entered between 1956 and 1958, but were still at grade 1 or 2, would be raised to grade 3. Those who entered between 1958 and 1964 who were still grade 1, would be raised to grade 2.

Wage Scales: Administrative cadre scales went from 24 up to grade 1. Technical cadres went from grade 16 up to grade 1. Workers went from 1 up to grade 8. The workers' wage spread went as follows: 1) 34¥, 2) 40¥, 3) 47¥, 4) 56¥, 5) 67¥, 6) 70+¥, 7) 90¥, 8) 108¥. The vast majority of workers were in grade 2. Everyone became grade 2 after going through their apprenticeship. This was for skilled workers. But they also had mine workers (kuang gong), whose wages on the 8 grade scale were somewhat higher. They also had construction workers (jianzhu gong), who were also a bit higher at each grade. They also had service workers (fuwu gong), like cooks, ditch diggers, etc., who made a little less at each grade. Generally speaking, in a factory the vast majority are 'skilled' workers. There are also supplements for steel furnace workers and for other types of hard labor of less than 1¥ per day.

Technical Cadres: The highest engineers, grades 1, 2, and 3, made 360, 280, and 240 ¥ respectively. The lowest engineer, grade 10, made 106¥. Regular Technicians, grades 11, 12, 13, made 99, 87, and 55¥ respectively. Practicing technicians and assistant technicians were put at grade 14, at 46¥, while assistant technicians were put at grades 15 and 16 at 42 and 37¥. Assistant technicians graduated from middle-level technical schools (zhong zhuan). This is an alternative to the normal middle school degree. The 'practicing' technicians (jianxi) had just graduated from technical university or industrial college.

How to get promoted? First there is work output, ability, but relations (guanxi) with leaders and coworkers is very important. The highest wage grades for technical personnel were reserved for pre-1956 graduates who had been working continuously since then. But in effect, post-1956 graduates who had worked continuously could not get raised above grade 10. There was a de facto limit. 'Worker engineers' were not technical cadres but old, experienced workers with little education but with good knowledge of planning, technology, and could do some drawing. They were grade 7 or 8 workers, and were allowed to work in department offices. This is part of what is meant by the 'triple combination' (sanjie he).

Apprentices

This is a 3 year training period for skilled workers. During the first year, they get 20¥, second year, 24¥, and third year, 28¥. After that, they are turned to regular workers (zhuan zheng), and go to grade 1. These raises are given practically automatically each year, unless an apprentice does terrible work, or has a political problem. There are tests at the end of the period, but only the worst don't pass.

They also had workers called 'skilled workers' (shulian gong) who were paid at grade 1 when they started, and after one year or so (the period was not fixed) they would be raised to grade 2. The difference between apprentices and these 'skilled' workers was years of age. The apprentices were primary and middle school graduates, young people who had just entered the plant. The 'skilled' workers were older and it was not fitting for them to be apprentices. (The terms shulian gongren and jishu gongren can both be translated as 'skilled worker' and might lead to confusion. Shulian implies being practiced in something, while jishu means technically trained. So shulian might best be translated 'skilled', while jishu might be rendered as 'technical worker'.)

Temporary Workers

Temporary workers can be fired, get no union benefits, and only get 50% sick pay. 'Registered' (zai ji) workers are a) temporary workers who have been turned into permanent ones, and b) workers transferred from other plants, as in newly built plants. They can't be fired, and get at least 60% of sick pay, while after 8 years, they get 100%.

Temporary worker wages were about the level of a grade 1 or 2 worker, but most were around grade 2 level. Some up to the level of a grade 4 or 5 worker. These last were workers who had transferred from other plants to try out on temporary basis to see if they really have skills. There are very few of these. Temporary workers are recruited by the labor bureau of the city for informant's plant. Plant cadres notify the labor bureau of how many workers they need, and the labor bureau looks through the registration rolls and assigns workers as needed. Some of the temporary workers sign contracts specifying pay and duration of service. But informant is not clear on the distinction between temporary and contract labor. There were very few temporary workers in the plant, less than 100 in a total plant of 2700.

Before 1966, they had temporary workers, but during the CR they rebelled and then the center sent a document saying they could hire no new temporary workers. New workers had to be registered, permanent ones. But they maintained their leftover group of temporary laborers. After the CR when they hired people on a temporary basis they called them 'family dependent' workers (jiashu). These were relatives of workers and staff who came in and were paid even less than the original temporary workers. This was also a way to raise the income of families--give the wife or son a job. These kinds of temporaries did unskilled work--moving articles, sweeping and cleaning, etc.

Demobilized Soldiers. They built the plant in 1958, and they needed workers. So these demobilized soldiers were assigned to the factory. They had no technical standards, so they very rarely got above grade 2. Around 30% of the workers in his plant were demobilized soldiers.

Firings

They fired people who had killed others during the CR. Also if you had committed serious mistakes you could be fired, for example, for repeated stealings despite warning. No one was ever fired for bad work in his factory. Nor were people's wages lowered for poor work. Occasionally workers can be give more difficult kinds of labor if their work is not up to standards. Also people can be transferred to their home villages if they make serious political mistakes.

Bonuses

They had bonuses before the cultural reovlution. Every year, if the plant finished the plan, each person would get 20% during the spring festival.

Every month they appraised workers for bonuses if the entire plant finished their quotas. They split into three grades, and 80% of the workforce got some bonus. The highest was 10¥, then 7¥, and 5¥. Seven Yuan was the most common. This took place in every office. If you were absent for more than 4 days per month, there was no bonus, and if work was bad, no bonus. If you were punished for making an error--political, stealing, causing accidents or making costly mistakes--no bonus.

Each unit was differentiated within the plant. If the entire plant lost money, none of the departments would get bonuses, but shops can if they finish their quotas. If the plant as a whole meets targets, then all the departments will get them, but shops will only get them if they meet their own quotas. Quotas--the two major ones were output (chan liang) and output value (chan zhi). They also had targets for assortment (pin zhong) and profit, but if you didn't meet these, it didn't matter. If you did meet them, you were just considered to have completed your tasks even better. Assortment targets were the hardest to meet among these, because some things were harder to make, and profit was a bit easier to meet.

During the Cultural Revolution, they cancelled this bonus system and changed to a system where every person got 5¥ per month, and each day you were absent they would dock your wages .20¥. (This must mean unexcused absences and excessive sick and personal leave). Around 1975 or 1976, after Deng came back for the first time, they restored bonuses for less than one year. This time they used the pre-CR formula except there was more money involved--the assessment criteria and methods were the same as before. The highest was 15¥, middle 10¥, and lowest 8¥. When Deng fell in 1976, they cancelled the bonuses again. In 1977, they restored bonuses once again by the time he left in May 1977. But this was a bit later than elsewhere because this was Liaoning and Mao Yuanxin was in power there. They went back to the system which had been cancelled a year earlier. They still had not started the wage readjustments when he left.

Four Cleans Movement (3/7/80, 2.25 hrs.)

Early in 1964, the four cleans work team of over 20 people came to their plant. They were from several factories in Fushun city. The first thing they did was to investigate the plant director and 3 vice-directors. Then they looked at the department level cadres. They had meetings where cadres were to confess their errors. If they didn't confess their past history they would get in trouble because they could look into the files and check.

The things they were investigating included both recent mistakes and also historical problems, class background. When they interrogated the informant they asked him about a brother of his who had allegedly been executed years earlier for a political crime. He said he didn't know and had 10+ brothers of his own, possibly they guy they referred to was a cousin--he had so many relatives he didn't know. They repeatedly asked him whether or not his brother had been executed--they were looking for an expression of doubt on his part. If he vacillated, then they would investigate him and cross examine him even further and more fiercely. This took place in the office. The work team members came to the office for interrogations, and took him away to another room. He had quite a suspicious historical background. He had brothers in Taiwan and the USA, his father was a KMT military commander and a landlord, another brother had studied in the US on a KMT scholarship, and his sister had been labelled a rightist in 1957. In addition to historical problems of this sort, they were looking for petty corruption.

Results of the movement--they transferred one vice-party secretary to another plant because they found he didn't get along with the Party secretary.

There were two cases of corruption in the finance department. They also found four people in the departments with serious historical problems that previously had gone unrecorded. They sent these people down for labor. They also found a few others with minor problems. They told the Party Committee to handle their cases as they saw fit. In the middle of 1965 the work team was withdrawn on orders from Peking (it is possible that these dates are one year early).

Cultural Revolution

In 1966, the red guard movement began. A group of 20+ red guards from the Peking Petroleum College came, and they called themselves the 'Daqing Commune' (daqing gongshe). They organized meetings and said we should oppose capitalist roaders. They also aroused workers to organize into rebel group. This group later left. It made the rounds to all the local plants in the petroleum ministry system.

Later workers began to organize into 'red worker rebel groups' (hongse gongren zaofan tuan). This was the first group, called hong gong lian for short. Later, they established a 'revolutionary masses alliance committee', called gelian for short. They had relations with factions of the same name elsewhere in Fushun city. There was another faction organized by middle of the road people, called the 'grasp revolution, promote production faction'. These were people who were older workers, people of bad class background who didn't dare to rebel. So they stuck close to work and continued at their posts.

The gelian were the conservatives, they supported the Party secretary. Among them were a high proportion of party members, people of approved class backgrounds, and people with good political records. They were the largest of the two factions. The hong gong lian were the rebels. The membership was 'complex'. These were people who were not trusted by the leadership. They dared to do things. These were people who didn't take orders well, and young workers were heavily represented here. People with truly bad class background, like the informant, did not dare to rebel. It was people of middling class backgrounds or small problems in their records or backgrounds who rebelled. I repeats that it was complex.

A number of these rebels were cleaned out during the 'cleaning of the class ranks' campaign. Among them were two who had killed people during the CR, and they were dragged off to jail. There were also people who had stolen things. Informant's own 'grasp revolution' group was considered the 'unattached' group (xiaoyao pai).

At first, the rebels took out after the plant director to criticize and struggle him. The conservatives at first weren't critical, but supported him, and later saw that the director couldn't stay in power, and they began to criticize him too. They also struggled people who were known to have bad class backgrounds. Farmers, rich peasants, landlords, and people who had been in the KMT government, army, or youth organizations. They took these people and lined them up outside the plant gates, where they had to chant, "I've erred, I ask Chairman Mao's punishment, etc." Workers could give them a good slap across the face as they walked by if they felt like it. They also had criticism and struggle meetings with the plant director and with those people with bad histories. They were put on a stage, chanted that they had committed crimes, asked for punishment from Mao and the revolutionary masses. They were routinely beaten and roughed up during these meetings. There were two incidents where people were beaten to death, both workers. Both had minor historical problems and refused to talk under investigation. This was not at a meeting but just an isolated incident, and they were beaten more fiercely the more they refused to talk. They both died.

The department head of the finance department committed suicide right before he was to be struggled in a meeting. He committed suicide by hanging himself from a tree. The Party secretary was also struggled, as were all plant-level leading cadres. Part of the department head-level cadres were struggled also.

Who stood aside among these cadres? First, there were those who had been struggled against. They stopped work but this was not called 'standing aside' (kao bian zhan). Then there were those cadres who joined mass organizations. They were called 'revolutionary cadres'. Then there were those who were left over--they 'stood aside'. At this time nobody did any work. During a period of intense physical combat in 1967 between factions, people didn't even dare come to work. All these organizations had guns. Production completely stopped for a period in 1967. But from the end of 1966 to 1968 (september), at least some of the shops stopped working intermittently.

For seven months in the midst of all of this all cadres in the plant from the department level up just came to the factory and had study meetings all day. There was absolutely no work for them to do. They had to come to the plant, but could not do any work. Later, almost all the cadres from the departments were sent down to do manual labor. They would leave only one or two behind in the offices to handle the work. His technical department had only one cadre left in it out of the original 20. The 30 or so workers who did common drafting work, etc., stayed. No one took the place of the missing technical cadres. It took a long time to restore production.

Revolutionary Committee

In 1968 the PLA propaganda team built a 'great alliance', then helped to form the Revolutionary Committee, and left. The RC contained 1) revolutionary cadres, 2) revolutionary masses, and 3) PLA. But the PLA didn't actually sit on the RC, they used the head of the security department instead.

The members after formation: The head of the RC was a former vice-plant director, who was a party member. There were four vice-heads. One was the head of the security department. One was the head of the administration department, and there was one mass representative from each faction. The other members were more mass representatives and revolutionary cadres.

This leading group didn't work out. The chairman of the RC was formerly on good terms with the plant director. The mass representatives didn't like him, so the leading group was split. Then in 1970 PLA representatives came again to clear up the situation. They took over the leadership of the RC and had all the real power. Then they transferred the former head to another plant in the system, to a new plant being run by the ministry in Langfang, Hebei. Later, a number of the other cadres were transferred out of the plant to other leadership posts, like that of party secretary. But at this time the leading cadres who had been struggled still hadn't been liberated, and were still being struggled against regularly.

Production still wasn't fully restored. The PLA men brought a good deal of power with them. When they gave orders, people listened, and the masses were afraid of them. Starting in 1970, shortly after they came, the cadres working in the shops gradually were transferred back to office work. I was the first of 2 people sent back to the technical department in 1970. The PLA representatives left at the end of 1971.

During the two years the PLA representatives were there, the former plant director became the chairman of the RC, and 2 of the former vice directors became vice-heads of the RC. One other former vice-director had been transferred.

There was also one vice-head of the RC from each mass faction, and 2 vice-heads were also department heads (administration and security). Also a number of members of the RC were from among the masses and also cadres. All of the people in this standing committee of the RC were Party members except for one of the mass representatives.

At this time, there was no Party Committee. This was re-established only in 1973. At that time the head of the RC died suddenly of an illness (he implies that it was from a beating he received during the CR). So the city sent in four officials--a party secretary who was also to be the RC head, two vice-party secretaries who were to be vice-heads of the RC, and one member of the party committee, who was also to be a vice-head of the RC. So power was effectively in the hands of the party. After the party committee was restored in 1973, they also restored Party life and organization, the branch secretaries in the shops, etc.

Post-CR Administration (3/10/80, 2 hrs.)

The departments were still there, but smaller, and combined together in related groups, called 'groups' (zu). After the party committee was re-established, they speeded the rate of return of cadres to the offices from the shop floor, and began to rebuild the former departmental structure.

The departments were changed to groups (zu), and the shops were changed to "revolutionary leadership groups" instead of the former shop director's office, but in reality it was the same as the previous leadership method. The departments were restored after 1971, and the shops were returned to their former names too. At this time, many of the department heads were new ones. Some were workers, some former rebels. While most department heads before the cultural revolution were now doing manual labor, newer and younger leaders were taking their place. The leadership changed, there was no three in one combination. (revolutionary leadership groups is geming lingdao xiaozu).

But the situation in the workshops was different. They had a revolutionary leadership group with mass representatives--workers, former rebels, and headed by the former shop director. The head of the group, and the vice-head, were half separated from production. The members who were workers just came up for meetings, and were still production workers. The heads of these groups were basically former shop directors or branch party secretaries. One would be the head, and the other vice-head. Besides these two leaders there were also several full time office personnel in the shops. They had a technician, a statistician, a personnel clerk (renshi yuan), a materials clerk (cailiao yuan), and a shop union head.

The revolutionary leadership group did not meet regularly. It met a lot right after it was first established, at the time when the revolutionary committee was just established. But later it was as if they were abolished without being formally declared abolished. They gradually stopped meeting, and all decisions were taken over by the head of the shop. The same was true for the revolutionary committee of the plant as a whole. Even if they met it would be of no use. The members of the RC had no special qualifications nor did they have power. The head and vice-head of the RC could make decisions by themselves. They were the first party secretary and vice party secretary. This was true after the Party's organizational life (zuzhi shenghuo) was restored in 1971, at about the same time as the RC was established.

The gradual rebuilding of the departments returned a number of former cadres from shop floor labor to office jobs again. This caused an overall increase in the number of cadres in the plant. Before the cultural revolution, they had about 140 cadres, where afterwards they had about 200 formally designated

cadre positions, and another 80-100 workers assigned informally, "borrowed" from shops. They were called 'black cadres' (hei ganbu). Why did the number increase? The old cadres were sent to manual labor, and new younger people from rebel organizations took their place as cadres in the offices. Later the cadre policy was implemented and the old ones returned to their departments.

The new cadres were younger, tended to be rebels, and didn't really have qualifications to handle the work. But they were very good at making criticisms, and at running political movements. When the old cadres returned to their former units, they did not remove the newer ones. This is because there were many leaders at the center who viewed this as a restoration (fubi), and would not stand for the removal of the revolutionary cadres in addition to the return of the old ones.

But the old cadres, after their return, still were afraid to work too well or too hard. They were aware that many people thought their return was a restoration and feared criticism. So they worked slow and didn't do too much. Also, the new cadres were unable to perform much of the required work. So they had to add a number of these 'black cadres', or temporary cadres borrowed from shop workers, to take up the slack of unfinished work. The result was that the bureaucratic structure enlarged. This outpaced the growth in the number of production workers. Before the CR, they had 2000 workers, and during the 1970s they increased to about 2600. But there were 140 cadres before the CR, and about 200 thereafter plus many more informally attached temporary cadres. They also had black cadres before the CR, they always had 'borrowed cadres'. But they increased in number greatly after the Cultural Revolution.

The workstyle of veteran cadres changed in two ways under these conditions. First, they tended to evade tasks in order not to be criticized in movements for making mistakes in their work (ie sabotage). Second, they tended not to make decisions with the speed and assuredness that they did before. Generally speaking, they were afraid and tried to protect themselves from criticism. It was commonly said at the time that workers were the leading class and should climb up into the superstructure, so they were afraid to make mistakes in their work. If they did, they would be criticized later and their mistakes would be used to prove that the cadres could not handle things as well as the proletariat. Also, political currents were very unstable. One day Lin Biao is up, next down. One day the Gang of 4 is pushing a movement, and then later the leadership changes and says something different. They just couldn't be confident.

The temporary, or 'black' cadres were usually workers, and usually young. The argument was that they were training new cadres from among the working class. They were usually suggested by a department director with whom the particular worker had good relations (guanxi). Then the department head would notify the personnel department, and say that they didn't have enough people to do their work and please transfer this person over. The shop director involved has to approve--even though he might need the worker. But if he refuses then he might disrupt his relations with the department head, and make it more difficult for him to get favors in the future. So often it is not wise to refuse. The whole process is smoother if the guanxi is good all the way around. This is called going through the back door to get a transfer (from the worker's point of view), and it is quite prevalent in China.

Who ended up doing most of the department's work? Veteran cadres, usually of bad class backgrounds, who did not dare to do things badly or to refuse work. But people with good class backgrounds did refuse work, and could get away with it. But they still didn't work as hard or as well as before the CR. Before they wanted to work well, to be noticed so they could

get promotions and raises. But afterwards, promotions were of no use because they did not come along with a raise in pay. Also, after the CR the former, professionally trained and supportive department head was no longer in office.

What of important issues, or difficult problems? How could the newer, less experienced cadres solve them? They would ask the expert veterans what to do before making a decision. But the others would have a certain "posture" (jiazi) that they were the department heads and no stinking intellectual need tell them what to do. So often they made bad decisions. So despite the fact that there were more cadres in the plant, proportionately, after the Cultural Revolution, work efficiency was far lower. There had previously been state regulations that they could not have more than 8% of total personnel in cadre jobs, but in later years they surpassed this figure. (According to the figures he gives, before the CR some 7% of the personnel were cadres, while afterwards 11.5% of the personnel were either cadres or 'black cadres'.)

The revolutionary committee made decisions and sent down orders just like the former plant director's office. But there was one big difference. The chairman of the RC was a party secretary who also had powers of the former plant director in day to day operations. This is referred to as 'unitary' (yiyuan hua) leadership. Before the CR the Party secretary could not directly lead production. Before the party organization was restored the leader of the RC was in effect the combination of these two roles. Later he formally became so, after the party committee was restored.

Workers' Management Committees (3/24/80, 2.5 hrs.)

The 'workers management committees' (gongren guanli qiye weiyuanhui) were established at the same time as the revolutionary committee. It was under the revolutionary committee and the workers' congress (zhigong daibiao dahui), and called the 'union' (gonghui) for short. So this is a subordinate committee. It is made up of veteran workers selected by the shop directors. The real power in the gong guan hui was held by the revolutionary committee head or vice-head, who was concurrently head of this committee. The vice-head of this committee was the union head for the plant. The union had been criticized and abolished. Later it was renamed the gong dai hui rather than simply gonghui. It was in effect the standing committee of the union (although the leadership was changed during the CR), and changed the name of the union to gong dai hui, while the chairman of the union committee was no longer called zhuxi but zhuren.

The gongguan hui was in fact a body which was convened irregularly when the chairman of the RC (who was also the first party secretary after 1973) wanted a technical innovation campaign, or wanted to criticize and reform irrational regulations. He would convene this committee to study the issue.

The workers' congress still kept meeting after the CR, and the selection method for delegates was known as deng e xuanju (等额选举), which meant that the final election list has the same number of nominees as positions. You can then check the name if you approve, or put an X if you disapprove and write in another. He says this is just a way of having the upper levels decide, since the write-in vote is never enough to get a person elected.

The nominees are chosen as follows. The workers' congress meets once a year at least. Delegates are selected once a year. The RC decides how many representatives can attend from each shop, and the departments each get 2-5 representatives. Then the leading cadre will select the people and send up their names. The top levels of leadership then approves or tells the lower-level leaders to change the name, after which they come up with a list of nominees.

Union

Before the CR, the union handled propaganda and labor insurance. They also did this afterwards, and also led cultural activities. Before the CR it was a department level organ under the Party Committee. After the CR, under the revolutionary committee for a short while and then went back to being under the party committee once it was re-established. The union just changed its name and the title of its leader (see above), and also added the worker's committee for the first time after the CR. Not until after he left in 1977 did they revert to calling the union gonghui, but they still called its leader zhuren. The gong dai hui, or union, was established the same time as the revolutionary committee. It was made up of a head, and several vice-heads. The head was a cadre, and the vice-heads and 4-5 other office workers were nonproduction cadres, in effect full-time cadres. Before the CR there was a chairman, several committee members (weiyuan), who could be workers or cadres, all without production posts.

Post-1973 Politics

During the Pi Lin, Pi Kong campaign they just studied, and did not criticize anyone who worked in the plant. They criticized Confucius a lot harder than Lin Biao in Liaoning province. They removed leaders from the Army and from the provincial leadership, but no one from his factory. The same was basically true for the Pi Deng campaign, where they criticized the adverse current (huichao) of bonuses, and management systems. But again, no individuals were criticized in the plant. There were no major efforts during this period to elevate workers to cadre positions. This happened immediately after the CR but there were no great efforts thereafter.

After the Gang of Four was knocked down, the two vice-heads of the revolutionary committee who originally were mass faction representatives were immediately sent back to do workers' jobs. They did not abolish the RC before he left. There were also a number of leading cadres from the department who had been promoted since the cultural revolution who were sent back to the shops to become workers once again. The older cadres who had become workers for a while during the CR, and who had gone back to become regular technicians in shop or department offices after the implementation of the cadres party policy, were once again placed in leading positions in their departments. There was a lot of mild criticism (piping) during this period, but not serious criticisms (piban).

Decentralization within the Ministry after the Cultural Revolution

The ministry leadership and bureau heads were seriously struggled during the Cultural Revolution, and the work of the system in effect stopped. So the six plants under his bureau were sent down (xia fang) to the local municipal leadership. They 'simplified the structure' of the ministerial system, as the slogan of the time went.

The concrete meaning of xiafang in this context--the ministry still arranged for the parts, raw materials, and supplies, they still determined the products and the targets, and the products were still sent to the bureau. Personnel matters were still handled by the ministry, both cadres and workers. This work was still handled by the bureau staff. The Party Centre, particularly Mao, raised the suggestion of simplifying the structure. Zhou Enlai, and Yu Qiuli, the head of the petroleum ministry, opposed this gutting of the ministries. Also the plant directors opposed, because if the ministries were crippled it made it very difficult to get supplies and parts.

What did the localities manage if all of this was still handled by the ministries? First, the party committee chairman of the locality

directly led the revolutionary committee of the plant, whereas the Party committee of the ministry or bureau led them earlier. Also, the City could borrow personnel from the plant offices, as was the case when the informant went to work for the Fushun Municipal Planning Commission for a while.

But his own plant was not in reality sent down to the locality. Some were, and in these cases they were really managed by a municipal industrial bureau, or a provincial industrial bureau. But his plant did not revert to local control because Yu Qiuli was formerly the minister of the Oil Industry, and was now vice-minister. Zhou Enlai was premier. Neither really supported the xiafang, so they dragged their feet in the important oil ministry. Kang Shi'en at that time was the Minister of Oil. He also supported Zhou and Yu, and opposed this kind of xiafang. They could get away with this because the oil industry was a key one, and was also very profitable.