

No. 139 (Cambridge)

Background (5/24/90, 3 hrs.)

The informant attended Xuancheng Middle School, in Anhui province. At that time the town was a county seat. The school had about 900-1000 students, combined junior and senior levels. The town had about 100,000 people in 1966.

His father died in 1959, had suffered an injury in a fall while working for a landlord before revolution, and his health was bad thereafter. After 1949 he became a veterinarian in the countryside. He had a bad heart, and while doing manual labor on a work team he died of a heart attack. Our family had no money, my mom almost committed suicide in the hope that I would be adopted by a family better able to provide for me. Mother eventually remarried an electrical worker in 1963. We were still poor because my stepfather had already had 3 kids by a previous marriage. Often had no food in the house, so after I went away to school I didn't feel like coming home very much.

Had finished the second year of junior high, was 13 years old in 1966. This was the top school in Anhui province. A long history going back to the 1890s, started by missionaries. Excellent record on the college entrance examinations. Over 90 percent were getting into college on the national exams in the late 1950s. One of the best middle schools in the country by that standard. Our principal met with Lu Dingyi, Minister of Education during that time. Very strong sense of elitism in the school. If your child got into junior high school there, you could be assured of getting into the senior section, for the most part, and if you graduated from the senior section, you had an excellent chance to go on to college.

I had poor peasant chushen, it went back 3 generations. My father, aunt, and grandfather had all been beggars for a period of time, and grandparents were so poor and uneducated they didn't even have proper names. I know this because before I went to the Institute of Marxism, Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought in 1982, Fudan University did a very thorough background check on me, and found that my grandfather was called Ding Laocu (old rough Ding), and my grandmother was Pan Yatou (servant or slave Pan). This class background gave me a real boost in school admissions that year, probably would not have gotten into this school otherwise.

Before the CR, I was a good student academically but bad in terms in discipline and conformity. Ha been a dsciplinary problem beginning in grade school. Received a "serious warning" once (this is one step short of suspension, which is in turn one step short of expulsion, the most serious punishment). Fought with other students, made fun of activist student leaders, formed a clique with the other bad students.

About June or July 1966, I was formally denounced in public by my class counselor for being arrogant and self-important. Said I looked down upon teachers, read prohibited materials. Still, got straight A's in the required classes, but was continually warned and punished by the teachers. Still, a few months before this, the teachers nominated me to the student council (xuesheng hui), even though junior school students were rarely nominated. I guess the class counselor nominated me because of my academic record. Some of the members from the senior school were already candidate members of the party. This was considered a great honor.

Only about 7 percent of the students in the junior school were in the youth league, and only about 10 percent of the senior school. They were very selective. Students generally had good class background and high scores on tests in the key point

schools. So they didn't have much interest in politics, not much activism. We had very little political education, study, manual work. Basically, if you are obedient to the teachers, your politics were good. Everyone was most concerned with college entrance examinations.

Our school was so elite, our teacher said we should take Einstein (boys) and Marie Curie (girls) as our models. A very intense, very academic place. They told us our goal should be not just to get into college, but to get into Beijing, Qinghua, or Fudan Universities. Of course, during the CR this was criticized as the white expert road.

In the big cities, many of the students in keypoint schools were children of higher cadres or leading intellectuals. Most of us in the county school came from ordinary families. This probably is why academic performance was stressed so much.

Beginnings of the Cultural Revolution

The CR came to us via the newspapers. Late spring 1966. All our finals were over, all assignments had been made for the next year and the college exams were over, fees paid for next term and the textbooks for the fall had already arrived.

The big loudspeakers at the schools said please pay attention to the following important article from Renmin Ribao. It was about old ideas, old values, bourgeois academic authorities. It was June, already quite warm. We weren't surprised by this. It was common to have some kind of political campaign going on. The 4 cleans had not yet formally been concluded there. We thought it was just part of a new stage of the 4 cleans.

They cancelled summer vacation to have us stay at school and concentrate on political study. I was happy I didn't have to go home to do manual work. When the CR began I could now stay in the dormitory, unlike before (if you lived too close to school, like I did, you couldn't stay there, at least until the regulations were all abolished months later). Students were mostly not active in the CR, but I became very active. In the beginning, no differences among students in their involvement. Just sat around, read articles, discussed, biaotai.

Around August and September, then things began to change. By September should have begun the fall term, but the party documents said ordinary classes were cancelled, still in the process of the CR and political study. This disappointed many students, especially seniors anxious about preparations for the college exams. In late September or maybe early October, students were organized to go to a village around 14 kilometers away to help peasants do the harvest, read newspaper articles to the peasants. We worked there about 4 weeks, then back to the school.

After we returned, we got ahold of leaflets from Beijing and Shanghai discussing the Red Guard movement. We didn't get them through school authorities, they came back with travellers, through the mail. Then we began to learn what was going on in Beijing and Shanghai. School authorities developed a very full program of activities for us not to become Red Guards. Sent us to the mountain districts 40 km away to work on river bank shoring. Tried to isolate us; there was no radio, no mail, no papers. This was even more remote than the village.

The school appointed the potential troublemakers, like me, to be heads of brigades on the riverbank conservation project. I was appointed head at this time; they figured if I didn't give them trouble then no one would. In this period I was pretty well behaved and I didn't do anything wrong, didn't want to run off.

Beginning about the 3rd week there, trucks came from other cities to bring other

students from other schools and also equipment and materials. The drivers brought along newspapers, handbills, news by mouth. We heard about other students travelling on revolutionary linkups, and the truck drivers said "why do you kids stay here?" We kids got all excited and wanted to go off too. They came to me to ask what to do; I said I couldn't leave now because I had responsibilities. Other students told me that I was a fool, that they just appointed me because they wanted to control me. I thought about it and later that night decided to go in the morning. School authorities knew very well what was going on outside, so when I told them I was leaving, they didn't use their usual harsh criticism to stop me. They were very nice, polite. Then I realized they knew about the red guard movement and were worried. The next day I left with another 12 students, went back to town. They sent us back on trucks.

Chuanlian: Wuhu, Nanjing

Up to this point, nobody had tried to chuanlian in the town. Parents were worried; we were so young and had never travelled before. The major problem for me was money. I had none, and my family was poor. I went to my father's old apprentice; wrote to him about the historical significance of the CR, the necessity of participating, etc., and asked for money. He was poor; he wrote back anyway and lent me 8 yuan. We didn't realize then that you could get these things for free on the road.

So 13 of us set out. The school gave us a red flag, with hongweibing changzheng dui printed on it. And we had red guard armbands with the following embroidered on it: Yun Xiao zhan xiao (Xuancheng zhongxue) [Yun and Xiao were the surnames of old CCP revolutionaries from the 30s who died at the hands of the KMT, and who were alumni of the school].

The red guards in Xuancheng were already involved in po sijiu. Because Xuancheng was historically important, it was rich in cultural heritage. Many famous writers and painters were born in or lived in Xuancheng, like Li Bo and Xie Tiao, both great poets. There were many historical monuments, temples, and so forth that were completely destroyed. Many good private collections of old books, calligraphy, and paintings. The red guards searched door to door and carted all of these things away. Even in villages peasants might have some good copies of the Confucian classics; they were often destroyed too. Streets with historical names were changed. They even tried to change the name of the county to Hongwei Xian. But the state council disapproved the request. This was what all the red guards did then. Did nothing against the authorities. Everybody in the city called themselves red guards then--workers, students, white collar workers. Later the term became more restrictive. Then being a red guard became a political privilege.

On our "long march" we walked to Wuhu, and there saw many red guards who were out for tourism, not to steel themselves with hardship. But we also read many dazibao and handbills that attacked leaders and individuals in units and schools, and in the government. I was very impressed with their radicalism and self-confidence. The red guards talked like they were important officials--about national affairs, the interests of China. Very impressive. Also their courage--in attacks on powerholders, use of all resources like paper, ink, flour (to make paste). I was impressed with their ability to get material resources to carry out propaganda. They just went to government offices and demanded things: offices, cars, printing presses, material supplies, food. Wherever they went, they got what they demanded. This was a realization of what it meant to be the masters of China. Before this I never dreamed of getting anything from the government

without paying. Suddenly I realized everything belonged to us and everything would be at our service.

By the time we got to Nanjing we tried to get money from the government. We went to the hongweibing jiedaizhan of the city government. It was crowded with red guards. That was the first time I ever went into a heated building. That really impressed me. I asked the official for 45 yuan, but he said he could give us no more than 20, so I immediately accepted, and wrote out an i.o.u., leaving my student i.d. card number. This was very revolutionary, I thought. First time in my life I asked for money from the party. The first time I did this I asked for money as if I were a petitioner. The second time I demanded it as a right. When they tried to refuse me, I said "how dare you obstruct Chairman Mao's CR!" And of course they would then give us what we wanted. I used this method to get accomodations in Nanjing later on. So from this point on I demanded things from the party wherever I went. If they turned me down I felt that my rights were violated and that the official was trying to obstruct the CR.

Political Thinking and Motivation (5/28/90, 3 hrs.)

So at this point in Nanjing I began to identify myself with the revolution. Before the CR seemed remote, but suddenly I became a part of it. I felt that I was the revolution. At this point I began to realize that the CR had close connections with everyday concrete aspects of a person's life. It had to go with the government organizations you had to depend on, people you knew for a long time. In your life, not just in the newspapers. Direct links existed between your life and unit and events in Beijing. If Wuhu red guards can denounce school authorities, the party secretary of the city, and their neighbors, why can't we do this in Xuancheng? So the CR became tangible to us.

Motives came from many different directions and levels. In terms of the school itself, for a long time I felt I was mistreated, and all other students with same kind of personality, politics, and intellectual orientation. The good boys always would tinghua. By mistreated, I mean that even if you are a true believer in the party, Mao, the revolution, if you fail to follow the smallest order from teachers or administrators, you were regarded as a bad person, a moral deviant. I really hated when they criticized you and gave you moral pressures.

For example, there was a good library in the school. It had good novels, Chinese fiction and foreign literature in translation. Informally, a norm existed that students of certain ages aren't supposed to read certain kinds of books; but there was never any formal regulation about this, or any clear standards, really. There were two sections of the library, one for students and another for teachers only. But what I'm talking about is just the books on the student side. When I was in the first year of junior school, I took out and read Gorky's history of Russian literature in the study hall. The class counselor, who I realized later wasn't really a bad guy, was a Chinese literature teacher. He was curious about the book I was reading, since it was very thick and looked different from the books we normally read, and had vertical lines since it was published in the 1950s. I said, "Gorky". He asked why I was reading it. I said I liked Russian novels and I was interested. He said no, this book is for college concentrators, not you. Can you understand it, he asked? I said, some of it, but its ok. He got a really disgusted look on his face, as if I had violated some hidden moral law.

Another example. Calligraphy was mandatory. You had to practice at least 1

page a day. They had two standard zhengkai models from the Tang dynasty, very straight and clear, that we were all supposed to emulate. But beginning in my 3rd year I practiced the art of calligraphy. Many people had told me that I was at a fairly high level, and had even begun to develop my own style. I began to borrow different, more flowing styles to copy and learn from. So this teacher comes to my desk and sees my characters are different from the others and change from week to week as I try out new styles. He actually liked my calligraphy very much. But he didn't want me to depart from the types of characters he was using in the class. I thought, why can't I change styles and write as I like?

Also, in political study, reading Mao's works and so forth, I always had my own individual perspective, interpretation, of the writings. These things were immediately reported to the teachers, and sometimes the teachers would report even higher on what I had said. Then when the whole class met, the teacher would warn you without naming you, and all the other students would turn their eyes to look at you, because they all knew who he was talking about. The students who got the best treatment were obedient but just average intellectually. The most hateful thing was they were always making reports on you. I hated all this so much that I wanted to change it.

A second reason for my activism, based on what I saw in Wuhu and Nanjing: the political threat to the country, the revolution, and to Mao. I hadn't had much contact with officials at my age, little sense of them. Had little idea how much they deviated from the ideals we were taught in school. When I read posters I was really surprised at how official behavior deviated from these ideals. These revelations really affected me and I felt I must also apply these lessons to Xuancheng. For example, how little time officials devote to the study of Mao's works; how small a percentage Mao's works and the classics of Marxism are in libraries; how Mao's works are not prominently displayed in bookstores; how many cadres do not go to the countryside or factories to work; what kinds of living standard they have, cars, fine clothes, servants, etc.

Now everything began to make a lot of sense to me in political terms. Now if one person was bad, I had a framework for understanding why--a framework provided by Mao Thought. This intellectually and psychologically was very important to me. I now had a framework for relating all these facts together. Now everything made perfect sense, you could see beneath the surface to the real meaning.

Of course, I saw this all was connected to my treatment in the school. The teachers only wanted to train obedient tools (xunfu gongju), as I now saw. But Mao wanted to train revolutionary successors. So I came to the conclusion now that all these things were connected together into one big, huge, hidden, secret plot--to turn China away from the revolutionary path, to change China's color. So everything I did and would do would make a difference for this cause.

A third reason, also very powerful in influencing me and I think many of my friends: we were discontented with the backwardness of our locality, with the negative side of daily life in our locality. Before my revolutionary trips I had never been outside of Xuancheng. Nothing to compare it to. But after reading posters in Wuhu and Nanjing, I got a framework in my mind. Why was Xuancheng so backward still? Why so few factories? Why still manual labor for carrying heavy loads? Why so backward technically? Why so few rural roads, so few tractors and other machines? Why no public buses? Why so little good housing? The fundamental reason, I concluded, was that officials did not follow Mao's correct line and didn't do the revolutionary job properly, didn't develop Xuancheng's industry and agriculture, welfare system. All

caused by political and ideological misorientation. The standard was whether you were devoted to building a strong, great, more advanced China with a better life for the people. A better life both materially and morally or politically as well, where people are the masters of the country. If cadres misuse their power they mistreat the real masters. They took things that really belonged to people. Now you should take them back. This was our standard in assessing leaders.

Red Guard Movement in Hefei Observed

After Nanjing, since it was extremely difficult to cross the river by ferry to Pukou to get the train to Beijing (still no bridge across the Yangzi there yet), I decided I could go to Beijing anytime, and I should go back to Xuancheng and carry out the revolution. I was gone only for about two weeks or 20 days or so. Spent almost all of my time reading wallposters, not seeing the sights or shopping as many red guards were doing. I didn't have any money anyway. So I went back to Xuancheng very briefly. I distributed all the handbills, papers, and other materials I had collected in Nanjing and Wuhu, and told the students what was going on outside.

Things had already begun to change in the school. It was now early December. Before I left, most posters in school criticized the three family village. But now there were many on campus that attacked specific individuals by name. And in the city itself, there were many posters directly attacking officials. The city was said to resemble a turtle, with the school at the high point, the head, and the city center on the second, lower hill. There were two main roads, about 2 km in length each that crossed the turtle's back diagonally, connected opposite feet. Where they crossed was the city's center, and that's the intersection where all the wallposters were put up. I guess that red guards from Hefei and Shanghai and other towns had come through to spread the revolution. You see, Xuancheng was on the road to Huang Shan.

I stayed in Xuancheng very briefly, only a couple of weeks. By this time the red guard groups were very well developed. So I got back with so much material and information, they decided I was really serious and decided to send me as their liaison person (lianluo yuan) to Hefei. They had sent out a number of liaison persons and they never seemed to return. So, still in December, I left for Hefei. I stayed there about two weeks or so. I stayed at Hefei teachers college, with a guy from Xuancheng. Two schools there were most active in the CR, that school and Hefei Industrial College (gongyi daxue), the one I would attend in the future. I went every day to the headquarters of the red guard organization and to the offices of their newspaper, which was already of pretty high quality.

We categorized CR papers according to two types: qianyin (lead type letterpress) and youyin (mimeograph). The latter was very primitive. You cut a wax paper stencil with a steel pencil on a metal plate by hand. Then you rolled the ink over the stencil onto the paper. If you were skilled at it, you could make 1000 copies with one stencil. If you weren't, it might break after only 50 copies. I learned this process very quickly, and also how to get supplies. The most valued people in red guard organizations were those with the skills to cut the stencils and roll the ink.

Already in Hefei the red guard organizations were very well developed and rationalized. They had a newspaper editorial section, which usually got highest priority. They also had, in addition to this xiaobao bianji bu, a guangbo zhan, both of these were under the xuanchuan zu. They had a houqin zu (for supplies), a zuzhi zu (membership), baowei zu (security, more important later on when the fighting began), a lianluo bu

(liaison work, divided into subgroups according to the target: other student red guards, workers, peasants, regular urban dwellers, regular office workers), a shouji ziliao zu (for collecting material published by other red guard organizations), a zhuan'an zu (for investigations, important later on). They even had separate sections for xiaonei douzheng and xiaowai douzheng. They were already pretty active outside their schools, even though the authorities in Beijing said to emphasize within the school. The big cities were more advanced.

So in Hefei I learned printing and the methods of organization for red guard groups. I also learned the skills of coordination with other red guard organizations. They often held lianxi huiyi to which they send xietiao zu or xietiao yuan. They went to meet and discuss who would be the main targets in the next stage of the movement. There were many universities in Hefei, so coordination work of this kind was very important. There was also coordination work to be done with high school red guards.

I went to establish liaison with the college, and not high school red guards of Hefei for a couple of reasons. First, Hefei was a big city and an important place, and we all worshipped universities and university students. Also, I knew the student from Xuancheng, and could stay in the dormitory with him. That was of great practical importance.

So I learned one big thing on this trip: there's no limit to what you can do or try. No door should be closed to you. When I reached this level of consciousness, whole relationship between me and others, between me and other organizations totally changed. I now had a very clear sense that I would be the one to carry out the changes and make things happen. If I failed to do this, I failed to carry out the revolution and be a revolutionary successor. Before the CR, everywhere there were limits on what you could do. Now all the limitations were lifted. If you failed now, nobody else's fault, not the teachers', administrators, or the xuesheng ganbu, whom we hated most of all.

My greatest experience in Hefei was when we surrounded the provincial party committee building. This was an eye opening experience for me. The main participants were red guards, but also some workers and urban dwellers from different units. Surrounded it for 3 days near the end of the year. Thousands of red guards participated. The compound and building is very big, and the square in front is very large too. Students surrounded the building and demanded that Li Baohua, First party secretary of the province and member of the party central committee, 3rd party secretary of the east China military district (2nd was Chen Peixian, 1st was Ke Qingshi but post empty now because he died). Also he was first commissar of the Anhui military district. He was the son of Li Dazhao. Red guards demanded he come outside and confess before them. This really was a radical demand at this stage, many people didn't support it, because Li was really considered to be one who really cared about the welfare of local people, one who would risk himself to challenge above levels to protect his locality, and was not corrupt and ran a clean administration. Anhui was one of the 4 worst provinces during the 3 lean years. So many people died. It was ruled then by Zheng Xishen, a very tough and ruthless leader who caused much suffering. My mother's older sister, for example, had 34 people in her family in an Anhui village; only 5 survived the famine.

Li Baohua was appointed in 1962; when he came he did 3 things: allow peasants to fentian dangan (sanzi yibao), allow the opening of rural free markets, and rehabilitate the cadres who had opposed the extreme leftist policies of Zheng Xishen. Like a good Qing official, Li often dressed as an ordinary person to go to small places and see what was really going on. There were many legendary stories about this: his moral stature,

his care for the people.

But now the red guards demanded that he confess, because all of these 3 things are considered as evidence that he followed Liu Shaoqi's revisionist line. This actually was probably true. He was sent down to right the suffering caused by the ultra-leftism of the GLF. He had been first deputy minister of Water Conservation and Power before being sent to Anhui.

When peasants around Hefei heard there were some crazy students demanding that Li Baohua confess, this hit them like a bomb. There was also a very strong reaction from urban workers, who became the relatively conservative baohuang pai, they were called the laochi, or chiwei dui. Their organization was full of activists, party members, union organization workers who benefitted from pre-CR policies.

All students surrounded this typical, heavy, gray, Soviet style building of about 6 stories, maybe the biggest in town. For 3 days and nights nobody came out, and even though it began to snow, students refused to leave. Some even threatened a hunger strike. There were rumors in town that thousands were starving themselves and that many students had already died. But that was an exaggeration, there was no such thing there. But the scene really was something; snow-covered students shouting slogans.

Right before noon, two red guards appeared on the balcony above and announced: "Quiet, we got him!" (We had heard earlier that his aides were planning to send him to a military base to protect him. Those rumors led to the surrounding of the building.) When we heard that, the shouting of slogans got louder and louder. Then a man came out, without a hat, totally expressionless, with two red guards holding his arms behind him. He was wearing a long cotton olive drab coat, military style. Very white face, soft skin, slightly fat. You could tell he had a good life. No emotion on his face, eyes downcast to the floor. The whole square suddenly became absolutely quiet, because this man had been respected, worshipped, loved. He came from Beijing, from the central committee, and was #1 in the entire province. His father was one of the party's founding fathers. Now here he is like this, humiliated. The silence lasted about 3 or 4 seconds, then everyone started yelling "Down with Li Baohua! If he refuses to surrender, we'll finish him off! We oppose Liu Shaoqi, we support Chairman Mao!" and slogans like that.

Li Baohua was still silent. He refused to speak. No violence at this point of the red guard movement. We just used pressure on people to get them to confess. The whole thing last only 10 to 15 minutes, so the red guards on the balcony were embarrassed and sent him back inside.

But meanwhile things were happening elsewhere in town. Groups of suburban peasants were said to be marching on the city to support Li. They were said to be from Siji Qing Commune (Four Seasons Green). A very conservative commune of vegetable marketers, several main conservative organizations had their stronghold there. I didn't actually witness this.

But I did witness the conflict among the workers. The streets in the area of the provincial headquarters were full of people, many standing on the street corners arguing with one another about Li Baohua, whether he was good or bad. These were mainly workers. It was most crowded near the compound. There some chiwei dui members were trying to push students away from the building. But some radical workers were trying to resist them and protect the students. The radicals and conservatives were yelling and threatening to beat one another up. There was a lot of pushing and shoving, but no beatings or drawing of blood. A huge shouting and shoving match. After seeing

all of this, I felt my mission in Hefei was fulfilled. Now the secret of making revolution was in my hands.

I learned two significant things about these 3 days. First, you can challenge and disgrace any individual in authority, because you have Mao's direct support. Second, class struggle is more complicated than you had thought before. Even though we struck at Li Baohua, so many students were trying to protect him. This meant he was very sophisticated and crafty. He could mobilize peasants and workers to protect his mistaken line, and that they can even engage in violence. And the closer the struggle gets to the party center, the headquarters of revisionism, the more dangerous and tricky the struggle becomes.

This is what I felt at the time. But later I felt that the Hefei red guards did this to Li Baohua not because of anything he did himself, but just did this to imitate what the red guards did in Beijing. This is because later, when we started to do similar things in Xuancheng, I began to have some inner doubts about what we were doing to the officials. I realized that we really didn't have any evidence at all, we just had the idea that officials were bad and then tried to force them to confess. But I began to wonder myself, and admitted to myself we didn't really have any evidence, and thus to myself I rethought what I had seen in Hefei. This was just a big process of apeing, from one level down to another.

Qingyang Incident of January 14 (5/30/90, 3 hrs.)

He arrived back just before New Year's Day. When he got back he started to upgrade the material base of the Red Guard organization. When he got back he brought a simple mimeograph machine to upgrade the paper. He got money in the way suggested by the Hefei red guards. He suggested his group hold roundtable discussions with the school leaders to establish budget agreement about the amount they would give monthly for their support; offices for the organization; dormitory spaces for the organization's people (different organizations were given different dorms); red cotton cloth for armband; red silk for flags, a bi-weekly allotment of paper of different qualities and sizes; ink; flour for paste; medical supplies for first aid; equipment for indoor/outdoor p.a. system; guaranteed supply of electricity. He learned these practical methods from the red guards in Hefei. Schools in general were much more willing to give supplies in kind rather than cash. Each unit, according to regulations, had to establish a wenhua geming jijin, a fund from which they were to supply equally various red guard organizations without prejudice, according to their membership base. I gave them suggestions to do this. At this stage of the CR the organization of the movements was still very vague, no clear organizational divisions. There were a few students really active (about 1/4) and the rest were passive. By active, I mean they came to the organization's office every day, and if they were assigned a task, they would do it willingly, and would take some initiative.

This was about the first week of 1967. At that time we heard there was a big conflict in Qingyang county, in a mountain district near the border with Hubei. Isolated place, very important in explaining these events. The Qingyang county students, which there as everywhere represented the most radical section of the population, just came back from the big cities where they had seen advanced stages of the CR. The rest of the population had not seen these advanced stages. So there was conflict between the population and the students. The Qingyang student red guards had demanded that county leaders confess, and tried to capture them for a struggle meeting. The

population, isolated from the rest of the country, thought this was outrageous. How can you do this to the leaders, things usually done only to class enemies and landlords? The leaders fought back with words, but the peasants resisted with arms. They used the poles used for carrying loads on their shoulders in the mountains. Normally these poles (biandan), in other parts of China, are just of bamboo. But in this region, which is not in the plains, the poles are made of heavy, hard, strong wood, and on each end is a steel tip used to pierce a bundle of brush that has been cut for carrying to the market.

So thousands of these shanmin, or mountain men, carrying these steel tipped poles, surrounded the county seat. The student red guards, who had surrounded the county headquarters, were in turn surrounded by the peasants. The county authorities had sent out an s.o.s. to the villages through the commune and brigade governments, who mobilized their village militias. They threatened the red guards, who told them if they went any further, they were dead. So the red guards sent out an s.o.s. of their own, to Xuancheng, Anqing, Wuhu, Jiujiang, and even Hefei for help for the radical students.

A big support team was organized by radical students and workers in these places to rescue the students of Qingyang. More than 80 trucks were mobilized from Wuhu and Xuancheng region. Wuhu was the stronghold of the radical rebels early in the CR and had a lot of factories, each factory had its own trucks. We brought medicine, food, propaganda materials, broadcasting equipment, etc., just like a rescue force. Xuancheng supplied 20-30 trucks, each one with 20-30 people on it.

I was on one of the first trucks, was active in propaganda section so we were put up front. We got there about 8pm, already dark, since it was winter. We got there and turned on all the headlights. The peasants had never before seen so many trucks lined up like this, so many headlights, roar of the engines, loudspeakers blaring slogans. It looked like a huge loud dragon winding its way along the side of the mountain. The local peasants were frightened and without a fight let us through into the town. As we passed, we told them there were more trucks coming. After we got into town, the county authorities sent out another s.o.s. for more peasant militiamen. Theings become more and more tense. The peasants said, "laozi bu wen ni shiliu shiqi tiao, laozi zhi you biandan yitiao". In other words, we don't care if you have 16 articles or 17 articles, we have our one article, our poles. They said this because we were telling them wendou bu yao wudou and we quoted them the 16 articles of Mao and the central committee.

More peasants came out and again blocked the road. I heard then that the second wave came with guns. The militias task was to protect the party and government, which were now in danger. We were very scared, not just because they had guns, but because these were mountain men. The peasants said, we run into tigers all the time up in the mountains, but we take care of them, are you more dangerous than a tiger? They also said, "with words, I can't take you, but with fists, I can take five of you!"

We decided to pressure the county leaders to order them back. The county leaders said they didn't come because they were ordered, but because the poor and lower middle peasants have high revolutionary consciousness and love the party. They said, "talk to them, not us." We decided one evening after dinner about 7 pm, if the county leaders refused to order them back, we would begin a hunger strike at midnight. This was called the yiyiba shijian, or the January 14 incident. There was already developing a food shortage because of the blockade. Peasants were already telling us that if we stayed we would starve because we didn't belong there. This was my first and last

hunger strike. Lasted 2 1/2 days. We all sat on the ground facing the party headquarters, about 1500. Most of us were students. Workers stood around outside to guard against peasant attacks.

Early afternoon on the third day, the leaders of the rescue team and the local students came out and said we had obtained victory. The cultural revolution small group in Beijing, with Chen Boda as chief, Jiang Qing and Kang Sheng as first deputies, sent telegraph to the county party committee, ordering them to meet immediately all the demands of the students and guarantee their safety and prevent violence. It stressed one principle, that it is absolutely forbidden to mobilize peasants to storm the towns. The CR was begun by Mao himself and the red guards are teams under his leadership. To harm them is to attack Chairman Mao and is by definition anti-party, anti-revolutionary, and anti-Mao. So from that time forward throughout China, it was forbidden to use peasants to protect local leaders from red guard criticism. Leaders must always go to struggle sessions. They must never mobilize the peasants or army to protect them. This was one of the first such incidents that led to this policy statement.

Then the county leaders said they had misunderstood, that the red guards didn't just want to make trouble, that they wanted to educate them. They then broadcast the order that peasants should return home, along with the red guards and rebels from other cities. Don't know what happened after we left between the local red guards and the local cadres. The telegram was our victory, so we went home. I guess that the leaders would have submitted to struggle session though, because a telegram from Beijing is a pretty big thing.

Political Mentality at this Point in the Movement

From this point through August, early September, is when we developed our organization and factional conflicts developed. By summer 1967 there was real warfare, that was an important turning point in the movement, but we'll get to that later. But at this point the main activity was to establish a link between local leaders and Liu Shaoqi. Red guards in other areas had already compiled extensive cases against Liu Shaoqi, his history, personal relations, pre and post 1949 activities and speeches, policy lines, everything. We similarly tried to establish links between Liu Shaoqi and Li Baohua, between Li and cadres at the prefectural capital in Wuhu, and the local leaders in Xuancheng. The last part of this work was done by us. We tried to develop extensive case of connections between local leaders and the revisionist line to show that there had been a comprehensive revisionist program in the ideological and organizational levels. And that Liu Shaoqi, through this extensive network, worked against Chairman Mao's line of making China a more revolutionary country.

At an earlier point, we were against individual leaders, not necessarily the system. But now all these organizational links are established in the minds of red guards, but increasingly now we were coming to see what we opposed as a hidden, vast network, a conspiracy that had links nationwide to Liu, and even internationally between Liu and Khrushchev, Kim IlSung, and other leading revisionists. Kim IlSung was especially resented by the red guards because he also dared pretend that such a small leader of an unimportant country could be like Mao, with his own selected works and theories declaring him a great theorist and marxist-leninist. At one point in Beijing the red guards burned Kim's works and portraits, and criticized him for not quoting Mao in his own writings, and not basing his theories on Chairman Mao's principles. This created some real frictions diplomatically at that time. Our purpose in attacking individuals at

this point was now to separate the real party from the abstract party, because the real party was riddled with this hidden, organized conspiracy. No longer is the party the embodiment of Chairman Mao's line. This was a very important development.

We often faced the question, if all these party organizations are mistaken, wrong, then where is the party? Those we struggled against would defend themselves in this way. We responded in this way. First, the party is not an organization, the party is an ideal, a thought, a theory. Lenin said without a theory there could be no party or revolution. Mao said without theory you cannot talk about organizations or parties. We said while its true you participate in an organization, this does not mean in your work and thought you represent the spirit of the party and revolution, the thought of Chairman Mao. Mao's party works, but it works not through you, but through his ideas.

So our task was, even though we weren't in the party, we are the personal carriers of the party's spirit, because we represent the essence of Mao Zedong's thought. In these debates we always won over the party cadres. This was not just rhetoric to win debates. I genuinely believed this. I really believed there was an actual conspiracy. What had first most impressed me about the red guards in Wuhu was their power of intellectual penetration; they could see through the surface to the actual conspiracies hidden underneath the surface. This was a powerful insight and now I was practicing it too. I was really convinced there was a secret conspiracy against Chairman Mao. Given this conviction, I would find political crimes everywhere. I lost my trust in people, because if such high individuals as Liu and Li Baohua could do all these terrible things, then can't all the people who surround you too? If you can't see the bad intentions, evil things, behind the attractive face, it only demonstrates that you are a fool, a political dupe. If you can discover all the bad intentions and evil plans hidden beneath the surface, you prove yourself as a true Marxist, a man of insight, of true revolutionary spirit, among the best people to lead the country's future and indeed the whole human race. This conviction gave me and my close friends a restless spirit--no matter what harsh words we have used, we were convinced that there were still more hidden crimes to uncover. You should go step by step to uncover them and leave nothing uncovered. With this spirit, we go to every office, every leaders' home, every personnel archive, to uncover the hidden revisionist elements, the conspiracy against Mao, the false revolutionaries, the sugar-coated bullets. So we were never satisfied with what we did to the party leaders. We felt satisfied that we had the highest wisdom; we could understand everything, no matter how complicated, with this theory in our hands. Red guards like me had unlimited confidence in our correctness and insight.

I would not say that at this time we consciously thought this, but this is my description now of the way we felt, even though it was not so self-reflective at the time.

Xuancheng Red Guard Movement

In the earliest stage of the red guard movement, late July and early August to October, it was a top down movement, like the youth league. Each classroom had its own red guard activities. Students from red family backgrounds with good records within the school. At this point the red guard movement was not that exclusive. 70-80% were red guards in my class of 47. The sense of exclusiveness and selectiveness developed when the CR in the locality launched attacks on concrete persons. At this point we only attacked novels, movies, authors.

Around November-December, the red guards decided after the revolutionary trip to organize themselves differently because the old ones were established and manipulated by

the school leaders, who should now be the targets of the movement. So naturally we just set aside the old organizations and nobody stuck around to try to defend it. Now we began to build up our own organizations based on our own decisions of would could join, who would be leaders, what the name will be.

The names of the red guard groups were important symbolically to us. We all had distinctive names. At this point you could judge the degree of radicalism of an organization by its name. Dongfang hong (east is red), xiangyang (facing the sun), chaoyang (ditto), gongnongbing (worker-peasant-soldier), hongqi, these were conservative organizations with close connctions to the pre-CR politics and indoctrination. The stranger and rarer the names, the more radical the group. The most radical groups had names beyond the understanding of ordinary people. For example, gui jian chou (loosely, demons who see us worry). Now if ordinary people saw these characters together, they would think it was a very odd name. Good names are supposed to be positive, not negative and odd like this.

There were also in-between names. The symbolism was like the difference between early 20th century realism and Picasso's abstract art. There's a kind of change in the mentality, anti-traditional, expressed in the odd, anti-traditional, anti-common sense names of the most radical organizations. Our name was also anti-traditional: ba yi ba baodong tuan (August 18 Insurrectionary Corps). There was also a danxiao gui (timid demons), which is virtually the oposite of what the meaning should be. Another one: qitian dasheng, another name from the Journey to the West, it means, great sage high in the heavens. A friend of mine had his own organization, he alone was in it, and he published his own newspaper. he claimed his own funds and vote based on his membership of one. His organization's name was typical of the symbolism, the monkey challenged the emperor as being on the same level as him. The implication is that this organization (or person) has the nerve to challenge anybody, he is trying to show he is very anti-traditional.

You could usually tell how far the organization wants to go by their names. If symbols or terms of the pre-CR period are used, we can tell they don't want to rebel against the authorities or give the authorities the impression they want to make trouble. Conservative names showed continuity with the pre-CR period and the current CR period. But the more odd radical names showed the rupture between the pre-CR and the contemporary era. Shows we are in a completely new era. Our organization's name was the first radical organization, so it was a radical name for its time. Once the rebellion became accepted, the names got much stranger. But we kept our organizations name because we had our own history and fame by that time. There was another group that we used to put up our wallposters, zhonghuo dui, or "arson brigade". That was a real radical name. These were all names of organizations in our school, except for gujian chou.

When we tried to build our own red guard organization, one thing was very funny. All the previous red guard memberships were over. We were a small group sitting together in the classroom. About 2/3 of my class seemed very reluctant to join us. They were all happy to abolish the old red guard organizations, but they were not willing to join the new one we were trying to organize. I guess in their eyes, students like me would naturally do strange things, so they were reluctant to join. But after they saw we had our own armband and our own flag at the rallies, some students in the class became interested. The first who came up to us were the students who were not favored by the school authorities in the past. They felt they had something in common with

those of us who organized the group: we weren't good boys of the teachers in the past, we didn't report on you, we weren't activists. The most brave troublemakers established the organization, the second rung of troublemakers would them join, and others stayed away. There was a guy who came to us to apply whose Dad was a vice president of Anhui Labor University, which moved in 1962 from Hefei to Xuancheng's suburbs. This was a big deal to have such a high rank, grade 11 or 12. His dad already was under attack by red guards at his university. We told him if he wanted to join, he had to biaotai about his dad's problem. He in the past had been criticized as a troublemaker by the teachers. He said he thought his father had made a mistake, the CR could help him be educated. We said ok, you want to join you need to show your commitment to the CR, you don't sound really committed to revolution. you have to draw a clear class line between you and your father. Politically, you are your father's enemy, even though biologically, he is your father. We told him to stand up before the whole class and yell "Dadao Zhu Minzhi" several times. He really was reluctant but he finally did it, even though he was nervous and embarrassed at the beginning. This was the first time we ever saw his face turn red. That showed what pressure it created within him to do this. (This guy was a good friend of mine. He committed suicide in 1978 for unrelated reasons. He failed the college entrance exams and his father criticized him very harshly. He went to a mountain and hung himself on a tree. They found his decomposed body 4 days later).

Red Guard Organizations (6/7/90, 3 hrs.)

During CR, I was not heavily involved in organizational issues. I was very young, most of red guard leaders were senior high students. Second was because of my personality. I was so impatient and ideological I couldn't compromise. So I stayed away from organizational issues.

From early 1967 to the summer is the stage I'm talking about now. First half of this year the organizations changed a great deal. First, there is a new base for the membership of red guards I talked about last time. Second there was a real organizational split between radical students and the others. The others were mainly xiaoyao pai, some in organizations passively, about 1/3 to 1/2 were members, but largely on papers. As far as I could tell, the xiaoyao pai included many of the academically outstanding students, especially in the senior section. I often asked them why they stayed away, because the CR was so important. They replied that they just wanted to concentrate their time on studying, because they figured that when the CR was over they would reopen the universities and competition would begin again. They wanted to prepare themselves.

That was the first type of xiaoyao pai. The second type are not academically outstanding, but they came from families with problems. Like a rightist father, zhai maozi you pai, a rightist with the cap removed. They feared that their activism in CR might generate new troubles for their families. Same goes for rich peasant, landlord families. These were the families of dead tigers silaohu, their fathers had been killed several times already in the various movements. The third type of xiaoyao pai are children from elite families. Xuancheng middle school drew widely in admissions, from 8 counties and two cities. In some cases this extended to areas in the north of Anhui, like Hefei. But most students came from area surrounding Xuancheng, both sides of the Yangzi River. This was called an all province recruitment school. So quite a number of students came from families of county officials, leading cadres in prefecture and city.

From Wuhu, Anqing, Ma'anshan, and from the military. These students at the beginning of the CR were either members of the official red guards and were appointed leaders in the beginning, or were regular red guard members. They felt their future was guaranteed, so they kept quiet, and were conformist. But by the stage when students began to organize on their own, and began to develop their own political lines, especially when local officials began to be attacked, these people stayed away.

But this kind of xiaoyao pai, their feelings and gestures are very different from the second kind of xiaoyao pai. Different in two ways. The potential political threat of a political campaign is an old story to children of the black categories. They had long been discriminated against, so psychologically they were well prepared. But the cadre kids were totally shocked. Whenever their parents taken away to struggle meetings, they would get very upset, cry, couldn't eat or sleep. Second difference is that with the development in the CR of the radical mentality, the dead tiger family kids became more and more released, in contrast to the cadre family kids, who became more and more threatened and humiliated, discriminated against. The reason is that with the local development of the political process, red guards turned their attention away from the dead tigers of the CR, who weren't the main target of the CR, according to Mao. The cadre family kids were finding that more and more of their family members were getting in trouble. And the words against them became harsher and harsher in the handbills and wallposters. And accordingly, the social status and political reputation of these students in the school became that of a symbol of the new enemies. Privately, students from dead tiger families even celebrated the increased pressure and humiliation of the cadre families. They felt that now the noble lords, tu huangdi, were finally getting a taste of what it means to be criticized and discriminated against and treated as an offspring of an enemy of the people. So privately, they were very happy. So that was the xiaoyao pai.

The baohuang pai were the other faction. In the first stage of the red guard movement, baohuang pai meant what it literally says. Certain red guards are closely identified with certain local leaders, with local policies of those leaders. And when other students or red guards criticized these leaders or policies, these so called baohuang pai students would come out to defend them. There was a very direct link between the leaders and the students. But when the local red guard movements became more radical, the term baohuang pai became more and more misused. If I don't like certain individuals or groups, even though they are within the radical camp, we would call them baohuang pai. In this way, only the most radical and extremist were safe against this charge. They would look at everyone more moderate than them and call them baohuang pai. So by 1967 the meaning of this term changed.

At this point very few red guards were defending leaders of the school or the town. No one was so foolish at this point. What makes them different from us is that they just do things strictly within the limit of the official newspapers or documents from the center. We, on the other hand, just wanted to push things beyond the limits, to use our own terms. We said they were led by policies, we lead the policies. The more appropriate term for them is not really baohuang pai but simply less radical. They supported their activities by quoting specific documents, articles, etc. We legitimized our activities by quoting from the writings of the early Mao, like his writings when he was himself a radical student leader in the Xiangjiang pinglun. And also his later writings on the peasant movement, and so forth. We also began to explore new legitimating sources from Lenin, Stalin, Marx and Engels. First, from Lenin, whose writings were

clear and had fighting spirit, and harsh in words. Especially his debate with Kautsky and the revisionists of the second international. We liked these because we were convinced there were revisionists both within the red guard movement and in the party and government.

An example. At this point there are two channels of documents from above. First from the established institutions like party central committee and state council. Second channel was from the central cultural revolution group. On the whole, and I'm speaking very generally here, we preferred documents from the latter channel. More importantly, among all the documents passed down, some which seemed more supportive of our radical imagination we just loved, quoted widely. The documents advised moderation and self-restraint, especially those emphasizing production, not disrupting industry and agriculture, transportation. The mood in this kind of document were quite contrary to us and we didn't like them. But all these documents were issued by authorities at the highest level. We can't denounce the party center or the state council, but we tried to denounce certain documents or certain lines or tifa. We criticized these tifa by quoting Lenin in his debate with revisionists and Kautsky. That is why we particularly liked the writings of Lenin in the internal conflicts of the international communist movement. These seemed much more relevant to us in mentality, mood, spirit. Sometimes we quoted Stalin's writings but we were not particularly interested in his works. The language and style seemed quite boring, not stimulating or psychologically exciting. But Lenin's works were much sharper. Also, ideologically, Lenin was greater than Stalin. The level or standard of red guard radicalism is established by how far they are willing to depart from the standard texts in supporting their stands. The more radical the red guards, the more resourcefully they tried to explore other, especially earlier writings. If a red guard can quote Lenin or Stalin or Engels, it is better, more radical, more appealing, and if you can quote Marx, especially the young Marx, it is more fascinating for a red guard readership. In the inner-red guard debates, those who can quote Marx always got the upper hand, because most didn't know Marx at all well, and didn't know how to respond.

For Stalin, the most frequently quoted work is "Problems of Leninism." Also the work, "On the Opposition". From Lenin, most frequently quoted were on Kautsky and the second international. We didn't quote from criticisms of Trotsky by Stalin, because Trotsky was so radical it didn't seem to fit our purpose. But we didn't think very clearly about what Trotsky was all about then. We mainly worked just with quotations from Lenin, and so forth, not the original works. There was too much of it. Another source was Lu Xun. He was definitely more quoted than Stalin. In some ways, even more than Marx and Engels.

So by this time there really were very few of the original baohuang pai in the school, and not so many of the latter kind of baohuang pai either. Because the direction of the movement was clear by this point. If you were the most active, you were the most radical in our school. So 80-90% of the active students in the school were on our side, the most radical. Only 10-20% were on the other side, the less radical ones, which we called baohuang pai.

Another development was the cross-danwei affiliation. There emerged two great alliances, and a divide between them. This occurred in every locality. Each side was a unified alliance of small organizations under one banner. In Xuancheng, the two great general headquarters were the Geming zaofanpai zhihuibu, our side, and the Geming zaofanpai zongbu, or zhihuibu vs. zongbu. Each side had all varieties of affiliated small

organizations: workers, students, artists, actors, residents, peasants, low ranking cadres, office workers. Each side claimed to have more than 50% of the population. Each side had a very comprehensive system of communication, transport, material supply, finance, propaganda. Each side occupied half of the county town, like two different states, a very clear sense of territory. The two big factions in Xuancheng were ideologically and organizationally connected with the two big factions in Wuhu, and they in turn connected to the two big factions in Hefei and other cities. So in entire Anhui province two great divisions, the haopai or good faction, and the pipai (the pi from fart). The name comes from this. After the provincial authorities were denounced, Li Baohua, in early 1967, the radicals tried to seize power. They succeeded, but afterward they discovered that the formation of the power structure they didn't like. So a faction withdrew in protest, while they others stayed in power. So one side said this power seizure is good, the other side said "haode pi", or its no good. So the pipai were more radical. They were not only against the old authoriites, but the new rebel government after the power seizure. I was in the pipai. The pipai left the revolutionary alliance because they weren't given enough seats. But there was a political issue as well, the other side wanted to keep a number of older officials on, but the pipai wanted to overthrow all of them.

These two big factions also established relations with their counterparts in other places like Shandong, Hebei, Shanghai, and even Beijing. Each side would reprint articles in their papers from only their favored faction in other cities, and would only reprint the materials of one of the factions in Beijing. We would only distribute material from Kuai Dafu's sansi organization (3rd headquarters). The di pai Beijing was more radical than the tian pai, both were within the 3rd HQ. We wouldn't distribute anything by the 1st headquarters, or Nie Yuanzi's rump organization. But even within the 3rd headquarters, we preferred di to tian. There was no such faction in Shanghai to ally with, since Wang Hongwen had already crushed it, but we did like the chai liansi, or the organization of hardliners that held out for a while at the Diesel Engine Factory.

If you look at the major groups of each of the two large factions, by which I mean the adults from workunits, you can see that on the zhihuibu side there are much less model workers, party members, cyl members, fewer people from average cadre family background. In contrast, the zongbu had many more of the models of the preCR period, people from model factories and communes, model villages, party members and lower ranking party officials, pre CR activists at all levels. This was very clear. We knew because when the two sides used posters to attack one another, the zongbu side used the charge that we had a lot of class enemies, rightists, rich peasants, etc. in our organization. Of course this was an exaggeration, but it indicated that the class background of our side was not so clear as the other side. We really didn't have a lot of people from black categories, but we didn't have a lot from model backgrounds or the PLA, and so forth. When we attacked them, we called them running dogs of the revisionists, of Li Baohua; you are models of revisionism xiuzheng zhuyi yangban, or that you are small Khrushchev's, you are the bodyguards of Liu Shaoqi and the revisionist headquarters. So it was generally known that this applied to the entire membership of these organizations. But it not really true that we had a lot of landlords and other old class enemies in our organization, just people who weren't models and who often did not have truly red backgrounds. On our side there were more pre-CR troublemakers, people who didn't ting hua. Before the CR, bu tinghua was equivalent to being a troublemaker, someone of low political consciousness who didn't stand closely with the party. On the radical side you could also find a lot of people with strong grievances about their

treatment before the CR. Their workunit leaders had been unfair toward them, or had gotten revenge on them for a criticism, or who were angry about corruption or nepotism in the factory, and so got in trouble with the unit leaders and got criticized and their careers blocked because of this. When I heard these kinds of complaints from the adults in our organization, I became uncomfortable. I had a vague sense telling me that their motivation for participating in the CR was different from mine. I took part because I was interested in lofty principles and ideals, the higher things. But when I listened to the adults, they seemed to be taking just part because they had some personal advantages before the CR. Their motivation was more material than idealistic. That's why I felt uncomfortable. When we were just among ourselves, we often discussed how the motivations of the others were not pure, only the students motivations were pure. In fact, these are exactly the same words the students used in TAM square last year about the workers, and also exact words that the party and government used in trying to tell the students that while their motivations were pure, the people in society at large were not so pure and that the students could be manipulated by people with bad motivations; so their motivations are good but they don't understand the consequences.

I found it very difficult to accept then that some people participated in the CR because of matters having to do with their own lives. I refused to realize this. The acceptance of this fact would have been very embarrassing and humiliating for me; it would have been wrong for me to fight together for these people. And perhaps my activities are being used, and I am being manipulated by these people. It also would have meant that what older people told us at the beginning of the CR, be careful your idealism isn't used by bad people, was after all true. I began to feel now and then that maybe we are being used by some people and didn't realize how complicated that revolution is. To fully face up to this though, would have negated our extreme radical stand. Up to that point, we were brave enough to go beyond all limits and take great risks because, in part, we felt that only we knew the real spirit of revolution, and only we could carry it through properly. We thought we had this higher wisdom, higher insight, and this gave us powerful psychological support to do the things we did. I often tried to avoid listening to these people when they came back to complain about these things. I didn't want their complaints to have an impact on me and pollute my mind. I was worried that if I listened I might become motivated by self-interest.

In my school at this stage, red guard leaders in my faction, five of them, none were not the best students. One, a basketball player and senior, Duan Shuanglin, was my best friend during the Cultural Revolution. According to his classmates, he spent very little time on learning and studying. He came from poor urban dweller family, a label equivalent to lower middle peasant in rural areas (chengshi pinmin). But this is not a red background, since it is a fairly complicated social position. It is average chengfen. Another guy, Ji Yebao, came from low ranking rural party cadre family. He was a junior year student, was not a good student at all. Just wasn't that bright, didn't read much, had awful handwriting, but he was very self-confident. The reason was that in his village or hometown he was the only person who could enter this school, his father was a party member and official and he was poor peasant stock. Without the CR, he wouldn't have had much of a future given his grades, he probably could have gotten into a low level college like agricultural or geological school. A third guy, Xu Xiong, was a sophomore, came from a geological team background, father was a cadre in a geological team. He was very radical from the very start, very energetic, self confident, good putonghua (very few people in Xuancheng spoke good putonghua), so he was good in

debate and was leadership material. But when his father was criticized in his unit, not heavily, really, he immediately stopped speaking out so loudly in public meetings. Then later his father was labelled a pantu, or traitor, the worst of the bad labels. When this happened his style totally changed, he became so depressed, his whole appearance and action changed fundamentally. The other side criticized us for having a pantu gouzhaizi in our organization. In the public debates, Xu Xiong normally loved debating, ran to the front and enjoyed it. But now, with his father's political tragedy, he stayed in the back of our group, and didn't speak out. He felt now he was a son of a traitor, its not his place to go to the front. It was so painful for him, and of course we had to ask him to step down from the leadership, even though he refused to quite and he still said he was still a true radical and follower of Chairman Mao, no matter what happened to his father. But his disgrace caused so much damage to our organization, we had no choice even though we trusted him still. The pressures came from the members of our organization, not from the leaders who were his friends. He was just an average student academically.

A fourth leader, Bai Zimin, was not actually a formal leader like the above three. Bai was only in the first year of junior high, but was very big and strong, and could speak only broken Chinese. But he was very stubborn. Academically, he was a nobody. His chance of getting into the senior school was no better than 50%. It was very likely that he would have gone back to his village after junior high, I suspect, if not for the CR. A fifth leader, Shang Chaoliu, was a junior and the best academically of this bunch. His father had long ago died and he had been living with his older sister and her husband. The husband was party secretary of a commune. Shang was a leader only for a short period, only because he was academically superior. All his ideas were based on what he had read, and were often unrealistic. He was not really a man of action and was really quite moderate, so he was pushed aside as being too moderate.

So my impression is that in the leadership, by which I mean both elected leaders and the backbone elements, or core elements, unelected--the latter were really more radical and crucial in pushing things forward--the better students were not the formally elected ones, but the core elements. The core elements at this stage were those who were relied on to write, argue, debate, so they needed the better students in these posts. Later on when warfare began fighting prowess became an additional characteristic of the core elements. In the school, two people were considered to be the best in propaganda, Wang Jingfu, from a poor urban dweller background. He loved literature and especially the kind of things written by Lu Xun. He was very fast in writing commentaries and essays. He was definitely university material, and in fact years later did become one of the first to enter university among all of us red guards. He was a 1970 gongnongbing student. He was good academically but also very clever. That's why he had good connections with the commune leadership and got sent to the university. I was also considered among the best in terms of propaganda, by the end of the CR people were thinking I was number 1 and he was number 2. Most of the things published under the name of our organization were published either by him or me, during the 2 1/2 years that we were active. (We weren't disbanded until summer 1968). Another guy, Liu Jun, was also a core element. His parents joined revolution before the war, and served in the New Fourth Army and father was wounded. So in terms of political background, he was the best. He was very smart, was good in making radio receivers; was very good in physics. Before the CR, you had to buy some of the radio parts with your own money, and some was provided by the school and the time to use it limited.

At this stage of the CR our group became the masters of the school, and he and I took the keys from the guy who was in charge of the building, and he set up in four rooms a big shop for making broadcasting and radio receivers from the parts there. He had a lot of people working under him there. He was like Einstein, absent minded, and devoted all of his energies and time for making these things that were so crucial in competition with other groups in propaganda. He was later engaged in making bombs from scratch when the open warfare broke out. He stopped making radios and started making weapons: cannon, nitroglycerine. Once we were mixing nitroglycerine together and it blew up on us, and I got a very painful burn on my hand. After that I stayed away from him. Later he made a radio controlled airplane and hung a time bomb from it. While he was making it, the bomb exploded and he lost four fingers on his left hand, and his face was disfigured. At the end of the CR he was put in jail because he made a broadcasting radio and was called a spy trying to send out messages to the enemies.

So core elements began such by virtue of their personal qualities, whereas the formal leaders were often people who were popular, could compromise. They didn't necessarily have to be those with the best academics. There were also people who were most radical early on in speaking out, daring to hold the teacher's hands behind his back during a struggle session, they often dropped out of the leadership later on in favor of people who knew more about personnel, by which is meant personal relations, also those who were more mature and could listen to criticism from other red guards.

The head of the zhihuibu in the city of Xuancheng was Wu Tianzhu, a discontented cadre who had been a lower ranking official in the handicrafts administration bureau of the county. He was about 36-38 when the CR began, a smart man, he had trouble with his boss before the CR. Probably it came during the 4 cleans movement; he probably criticized his boss and the boss got vengeance on him, so it came out in the CR. So he was a target for criticism at the outset of the CR. So he ended up being the first person to speak out against his boss in the CR. So his reputation was established. He was good in debating and speaking. At this point in the CR the workers were not that important, they became more important when the armed warfare began.

Another guy, named Xiao, one of the top leaders in zhihuibu, was man of strategy, was rumored he had 1 or 2 years of university but was kicked out for some reason. He was a graduate of a technical middle school in Hefei. So locally he was considered something. He was a technician in Xuancheng bureau of electrical power. He had big trouble with his unit leader before the CR, though I don't know the real reasons. So he was defined as a bad element at the beginning of the CR. I saw him being paraded through the streets to a struggle meeting, with a hat on and a placard around his neck, being pushed roughly toward the struggle session. This later became evidence of his anti-leadership stand early on and he became a leader because of this.

A third leader, a Xie, was a low ranking cadre in some bureau, I can't remember. He also had trouble in the four cleans. This was a very sophisticated man who on surface was very hamble and caring toward comrades, very cautious. So he became the No. 2 leader in the citywide organization. So at this point the 3 most important leaders on our side were ordinary cadres.

Student Red Guard Activities (6/14/90, 2 hrs.)

During the first half of 1967, the political activities of the student red guards changed completely. Before the turn to activities outside of the school, there was a lot of

activities inside the school. Red guards concentrated on teachers and party officials in the school. But when red guards developed organizational links with nonstudent rebels, when the society as a whole was divided into two large factions, the interests shifted to issues outside the school. This took place early 1967.

During this half year, very few red guards were interested in organizing struggle meetings within the school. The so called black teachers were almost totally ignored during this stage. They may be doing some manual work building roads or cleaning toilets or dining rooms, but that was about all the punishment they got. Red guards had almost no interest in getting confessions out of the black teachers.

Before the beginning of 1967, the red guard activities, probably 2/3 are school related. The targets were mostly school personnel, according to the official definition of the central authorities. Every unit's red guards and rebels were required to concentrate activities within the danwei, and to investigate the bad people in the units, resolve all problems within the danwei before you go outside. Because if you don't clean up your danwei, nobody knows who is the good guy, who is the capitalist roader. You could not just let them escape.

Beginning late 1966, when the outward tendency began to develop, the central authorities already began to remind the red guards that they shouldn't think that the job is completely done in the unit. They told them to search all the dead angles (sijiao) in the unit. In spite of these repeated directives and suggestions, the red guards became less and less interested in these dead tigers. They weren't interesting, nothing novel about it. The black teachers, all those with bad political backgrounds, or people with foreign ideas promoted in classroom, or had trouble in previous political campaigns, or very bad family backgrounds. I can't recall that any teacher was beaten in our school. Students just forgot about them. But the school principle was still under pressure as a capitalist roader. His personal background was more interesting, very complicated.

Wang Long was our principal and party secretary. He joined revolution in 1937 and went to Yenan. When he arrived there, he got into political trouble in the rectification campaign of 1942. He was tortured severely because before he went to Yenan from his home province of Shanxi, he worked as a low ranking official in Yan Xishan's army. He was political director of a small unit in his army. He was beaten and forced to confess, and he was imprisoned. He had education equivalent to senior high school, pretty good for his generation. Right after 1949, he was a county party secretary of Hexian, near Ma'anshan. But he was demoted for repeated extramarital affairs. Then he was sent to our school. His official rank in early 1950s was 13, but he was 15 when he was sent to us. He was a typical tu huangdi. He was very rough and assertive, scared people. This is why the red guards still had an interest in punishing him because his case was so interesting. He knew Jiang Qing in Yenan and said she was one of the most beautiful women there, everybody wanted to have her, but when they found out Mao liked her they laid off. He said he had once seen Jiang Qing's legs and they were really nice.

During the CR Wang Long was beaten, I did see him getting beaten. He was the most mistreated person in the unit. Many people hated him because of his leadership style. A second person was a teacher named Li Xiaochang. In 1952, he was second in the party hierarchy in the school. But in 1954, they discovered that he had a bad political background, he was some sort of spy. He came from very rich Shanghai family, and at age 16, in late 1940s, he got to know many important military, political and businessmen in Shanghai. In 1948, it was discovered that he secretly went to Taiwan,

and then came back to the mainland quickly. According to his own admission, he was assigned to go to Taiwan by the underground party organization. But all the individuals he mentioned for proof couldn't verify his story. This guy had a lot of love affairs too. He was very handsome, had a lot of style, was more cosmopolitan. So he developed love relationships with three of the most beautiful girls in the school. The last one he married, a gymnast who was really beautiful. He was abused physically, pushed to the ground, in the struggle meeting. It was mainly rough handling, not actual beating and torture though. There was sometimes pretense of rough handling for show, but not in the cases of these two men. Wang Long got the worst treatment. For a couple of weeks he couldn't walk, he was beaten so badly.

I was personally involved in the interrogation of both these men. I never had the courage to beat them physically. I was frightened by the possible consequences later on. Also, I thought that the CR was a revolution to touch men's soul, not their body. To beat people contravened directives of CR. Some red guards were very interested in searching people's homes; they took some valuable items away for themselves. A minority, not many. At this point the corruption among the red guards was still very minor. But later on the red guards became very corrupt, I'll talk about this later. Wang Long had good calligraphy collection in his home; some of the red guards wanted his calligraphy. This was the only thing that Wang Long really wanted to keep, but he didn't dare say this to the red guards. I could tell by looking at him, and felt a little sympathy for him because I liked calligraphy too. I convinced the others to keep the calligraphy and not destroy it, later they turned it all over to me and I later returned them to Wang Long. Because of this we later became friends after 1968--this was when he told me the stories about Jiang Qing.

Two types of students were most involved in beating the victims. First were the big athletic students, second were people who were academically poor. The good students did not take very active part in beatings. The leader who was a basketball player, Duan, liked to beat people, also the guy whose father was in a geological team, and the guy whose father was a commune secretary also liked to beat people. Most beatings took place in the struggle meetings. So many people are there at the meetings, if you beat the people too hard, you can get criticized by other red guards. There was slapping, pushing to the ground, etc. That was the most common practice. But in my school I never saw anyone beaten to the point of bleeding, unconsciousness, or physical injury. Wang Long couldn't walk for several weeks because the duration of time he stood there bent over with a heavy placard around his neck was too long. Students really loved asking him questions about his love affairs.

There were two main reasons for such struggle meetings. First, to fulfill your duty to search out capitalist roaders and show you had correct orientation. Second, for fun, sometimes we did it because there wasn't enough action. The first few struggle sessions and interrogations were done by the core leaders of the red guards, but they would get bored with it and later they would let the ordinary red guards do it; they thought it was more fun.

There were other within-school activities, not really sanctioned by the authorities. We opened the school library by force and took whatever books we wanted, and we took them home. So the school library was literally cleaned out. Purpose was to get something to read; this was done under cover of destroying bourgeois, feudal, and foreign heritage. In reality we were looking for interesting reading. One guy took about Whitman, Shakespeare, Yeats, Tagore. Mostly the books left over, often put in trash,

were philosophy, history, political theory. That is what I ended up reading; I liked astronomy but you need a teacher to understand this. This was the beginning of my interest in Marxism. I got a history of philosophy put out by the Soviet Academy of Sciences. Several volumes of Lenin, Stalin, Lu Xun, Diderot. Neibu books were not in our library, they were in the county propaganda department. Not even our teachers could read them, only Wang Long. In 1970, when I was appointed to be a low ranking person in a county revolutionary committee, I started to get access to these other kinds of books. It was there I read the Yugoslavs, Bernstein, Kautsky, Khrushchev.

Interest gradually shifted to matters outside of the school. There was plenty to do outside; the school itself was getting boring. First, to get more and more equipment. The school budget was limited, it's not a production unit. About all you could get was paper, pen and ink. But we needed things like large silk flags, higher-quality armbands, transportation (sanlun che), horns, drums and gongs for meetings, cash. So we concentrated on higher ranking officials; to force them to confess, to search their homes, to investigate them and get them to write confessions was much more interesting. In March or April 1967 we did a thorough investigation of people in the county cadres compound, a beautiful building put up by Spanish missionaries long ago. We were very interested in this beautiful place, which before we had no chance to enter. So we were interested and did a thorough investigation of it. But we were pretty disappointed, we couldn't find much interesting stuff in the offices. But we went up into an old attic that had probably not been open since 1949; we found a lot of crosses, robes, bibles. We also found a dead shriveled up baby's body, wrapped up in cloth.

There was also a lot of factional competition. Debates. After shift from within school to outside school, there was another shift from capitalist roaders and black teachers to struggle with the other red guard faction. People were fascinated with factional struggle. We made a lot of colorful and elaborate accusations against one another. This was very interesting and became increasingly important. By mid-1967 some 70-80 percent of our energies were invested in factional fighting. Not yet violent, not yet armed. But roots of this began at this time. People began to carry knives with them to the great outdoor debates during this time. The debates were attended by thousands and went on for many hours, sometimes all night long. The factions would fight for the best place for their wallposters and broadcasting stations. We would tear down one another's posters. At this point, the factional fighting itself became more important than any substantive issues.

The Movement July-December 1967 (6/20/90, 3 hrs.)

Two main trends. The red guards and rebels begin to attack military establishments. The factionalism among red guards and rebels turned violent and used arms.

Beginning of June, red guards in Xuancheng got some material from big cities like Chengdu, Wuhan, Zhengzhou. This material carried a new message: the CR now faces a very dangerous, powerful enemy. Not in the party, not in the government, and not in the society, but in the army, in the secret institution. The first important speech about the danger in the army was given by Jiang Qing. She used the term "dai qiang de Liu Deng luxian". Before this point, the target was the Liu and Deng line in the civilian organizations, now the target would be the military.

When we first got this message, we were shocked. The reason was that the army had been an institution admired and prized by Mao himself, Jiang Qing, Chen Boda and

otahear CR radical leaders. Also worshipped by the red guards. If you look at the fashion among red guards, you can sense in a vivid way how much respect and worship the red guards had for PLA. We red guards dressed in army uniforms and had army hats. The older the type of uniform you have, the better, more prestigious it was. Older ones had insignia of rank, some yellow trim, more form fitting. The bleached out color was more fashionable too. If you wore an old uniform it meant that someone in your family had been in the army early on, which indicated honorable status for your family.

Now we are suddenly told that the revisionist line in the army is more dangerous than among civilians. We were shocked, but also excited. For over the last half year, all the enemies had been attacked and criticized many times. There was nothing new, nothing untouched or unchallenged. So the process of struggle meetings and criticisms became more routinized, less interesting, less exciting and stimulating for the red guards. We took people to struggle meetings more for form than content, just to show that our orientation was correct, because that was what we were supposed to do.

Now we immediately faced a new enemy. We had never fought them before, never had the chance. Since the enemies were armed, this means the fight would be more dangerous and more stimulating. So the red guards were excited.

Since late 1966 early 1967, wherever the red guards turned, there were simply no forbidden areas. Whoever you wanted to attack, there were no prohibitions. Nowhere you go would you be stopped--except the army. The military establishment was the only forbidden area. When we heard Jiang Qing talk about the most dangerous and cunning enemies being in the army, psychologically this was new for us, but intellectually and politically, the red guards were quite ready to accept this point of view. Our experience had taught us that in many localities, when you investigate high ranking party officials, many lines of connection go to the army. When the investigation begins to touch upon something related to the army, it reached a dead end. Many high ranking party officials were of course former political commissars in the army. So many of them would run to military bases after they were attacked to hide from the red guards. They would only be turned over to the red guards if the upper levels ordered them turned over. All these experiences and evidence now came together, and we now found some underlying thing to explain all of this.

In July there was the Wuhan incident. Local rebels and red guards attacked Chen Zaidao, who was chief commander of Wuhan military district and central committee, military affairs commission. When Wuhan had its conflict between rebels and the army, the provinces around Hubei had similar conflicts. These events went hand in hand with another trend. The increase in the factionalism among red guards and rebels. There were I think 3 reasons for intensified factionalism. First, after the Shanghai January Revolution, which set up a new model of power seizure and new structure of local government, the 3-in-1 principle, and Mao in national papers and radio sent out a nationwide call for rebels to unite and seize power from all capitalist roaders and form revolutionary committees in every province and city. In the 3-in-1 principle, one was military representatives, one from revolutionary cadres, one from united mass organizations. Among the 3, only the delegates from the army were out of our reach, we couldn't influence who the military representatives would be. But the other two types of delegates we could influence and bargain over.

For example, on the provincial level, there are 15 cadres. Some are more favored by one faction, some by another. Some due to family or personal relations have more contact with one faction. Some cadres politically would favor one faction over another.

To put who into what position made a big difference. And the criteria to choose "revolutionary" cadres was very vague. It was supposed to mean that they had honestly been transformed by the experience of the CR, and now honestly supported Mao's policies. But how can you measure it? There was no objective standard. Now the informal and personal yardstick became more important in selection.

Selecting delegates from mass organizations caused even more conflicts. If you say in one county or city that 4 seats are reserved for mass delegates, and the posts are not all equal. From which organization to select people for different posts caused a lot of distrust, envy, dispute, anxiety among rebels and red guards. So this was a universal phenomenon everywhere. When the power seizure began, there occurred more and more fighting between factions than between the radicals and the old officials.

I could sense how bitter was the factional conflict between red guard organizations once there occurred the opportunity to enter into the power structure. Except for a very few individuals, the great majority of red guards and rebels had no thought of entering into institutions of power to be leaders. They were rebels, wanted to attack the government, they weren't prepared to become leaders. When the opportunity arose, it created a very complicated set of conflicts among the mass organizations who had a chance to gain a share in the power structure.

The so called great alliance was a very important policy redirection from Chairman Mao. He sensed very well that all these rebel organizations were fragmented and divided against one another. If the side of the revolutionaries, the side of the people, are so disorganized, how can you seize power from the revisionists, the capitalist roaders. So Mao called upon us to stop fighting with one another and establish a great alliance before seizing power. You could not seize power until you united. But in fact the power seizure itself caused more conflict and factional fighting than before.

A second reason is that since the whole society was everywhere divided into two big factions, each side had all kinds of people in them, all ages, occupations, work units. Class background probably was not the same. During the period when there were two great factions, one society divided into two. The territory of Xuancheng was divided into areas for each faction. The membership of each faction became very complicated. On every issue, each faction grew more out of control, couldn't decide which issues were the most important. The only thing that they were sure of is that whatever the other side is for, we are against. So if side A is for cadre Liu, if they find out that he has contacts with side B, they might decide to be against him.

The third reason was psychological. The accumulation of distrust, hatred, suspicion of the other faction. In the beginning, when the two great factions came into existence, people could still get together and talk about things other than the CR. The two factions could still talk. But over time, the relations worsened, pushing and shoving would take place. Then some would start to use knives, spears and clubs and organize fighting groups. When armed conflict broke out in the big cities, the story spread very quickly and was of course exaggerated as it was passed on. E.g. if 5 people are killed in the fighting, by the time the story gets 200 miles away, there will be 20 dead. When violence was involved, it was only naturally to get arms to protect yourself. The first kind of weapon would be to get knives and things from home. Then they would turn to factories in their territory and order them to make arms from their material. Workers went back to their factories to make weapons for their faction. Each side had a material base and stable resources for fighting.

After the self-made equipment stage, each side began to search for real guns, first

from the militias. When the two sides began to arm themselves, a big change occurred. The less radical side had better connections with the old cadres, and the pre-CR networks. All the military equipment was controlled by the old network, the old militias. And the militias were controlled previously by the old party network. The more radical side had fewer connections with the old network, so they had to seize weapons. But the more conservative side would actually be given the weapons, or be allowed to "seize" them. They already had a secret deal with the local militias to be allowed to cart off the guns; they were told where the materiel were stored. So all their actions succeeded. But the rebels would often come up empty handed, or would get guns with pieces missing, or no ammunition.

So the more the radical side was disadvantaged in this process, the more radical and violent they became in getting their weapons, because they felt they could only get weapons by force. They felt they were getting more and more insecure. Everyday they would hear that the other side was getting all kinds of weapons.

So all three of these things were going on at the same time, and this is what led to the increasingly violent factional struggle in Xuancheng. During this period a kind of military intelligence service grew up among the factions to spy on the others, detail their arms and plans. We developed secret networks of spies and informers. We were getting information back and this information caused us to react.

In July we were informed that there was a province wide conspiracy among all the baohuang pai in Anhui, to prepare a bloody attack on the radicals. The purpose of the attack was to clean out all the radicals. We got the information from Wuhu, and they probably got it from Hefei. At this moment our side had very few guns, maybe ten or twenty. According to the report, the other side had hundreds or even thousands. So we had an urgent meeting. Since we could not confront the other side militarily, we had to send a small number of core people to a safe place. If armed fighting takes place in Xuancheng, this way we still would have people to come back, reorganize, and continue the revolution. It was at this point, when the armed conflicts began, that we began to get more interested in the province wide counterrevolutionary conspiracy.

Now we felt we really were getting a taste of counterrevolution, and that we really were tasting the reality of class struggle. We got more and more excited, felt more and more that we were laying down our lives for a lofty course. We were encouraged by the danger and by the relative weakness of our organization. We had read all the time that all revolutions had begun with a small minority of weak revolutionaries, who would eventually fight on and on to victory. Russia, China, America, even ancient Rome, all had the same kind of revolution. Now we felt that we were lucky to be involved in one ourselves. I could tell when we had meetings that others had read a lot of revolutionary stories from historical novels or histories that we had read. Everybody would quote from Marx, Robespierre and Danton, other stories. So I think we were influenced by all the stories we read earlier.

So we chose about 20-30 people for temporary sanctuary, and I was one of them. We went to Nanjing, since nowhere in Anhui would be safe for us. In Jiangsu province, they also had two big factions, but strangely both factions supported the pi faction, ours. So we felt safe there. At midnight one night in late July we went by truck secretly to Nanjing. On the road, we met groups from other cities and counties who were doing the same thing.

In Nanjing, we stayed at the Nanjing hangkong xueyuan. I was told by red guards there that they were trying to break into the warehouse in which the airplanes

were stored. They were trying to get airplanes for their struggle. Zhou Enlai had sent several directives saying that no one was allowed to take airplanes. And the PLA would guard the hangars. If you dared to break in, the PLA would use any means to deal with you. Even so, they were still talking about getting at the planes. We were also told that the red guards there were making time bombs, guided missiles and other fancy weapons for themselves. They had a comprehensive strategy whereby all communications and public services would be taken over in a military action, full scale warfare. They even prepared to destroy the bridges around Nanjing in case of an emergency.

In Nanjing I witnessed two battles. One at the railway station. Several thousands of workers had their hardhats on, carried steel pikes. They beat each other. I didn't see any deaths, but plenty of injuries. There seemed to be a gentlemen's agreement between the two sides. They didn't strike at the head, only at the body. And the battle was very short, less than ten minutes, stopped by the army because it threatened to disrupt the train station. The second battle was much smaller, at the campus next to the aeronautics institute. A technical school, all the students were fighting each other. I crossed the wall and watched from about 50 meters away. One side occupied a three storey building, the other side attempted to take it over. At this stage the fighting was not with guns but with clubs and axes. If you were wounded, the other side would stop attacking you. It was violent but still somewhat civilized. The attackers used firefighting equipment to get up on the third floor. So I got the idea when we got back to Xuancheng we should raid the fire stations for their equipment. The attackers won, they took over the building, and allowed the losers to go back to their dorms.

While in Nanjing we also had secret meetings and agreements with the factions in Jiangsu about the kinds of help we could get from them if we were to lose in Anhui. We discussed various forms of cooperation. While in Nanjing also we surrounded Xu Shiyou's headquarters in Nanjing. We demanded that the Nanjing military district support the radical rebels now in danger in Anhui, and that only they had the power to reverse the imbalance, and that PLA should support the leftists. We demanded that Xu and Du Ping, the political commissar, come out and meet us. In 2 1/2 days, of course, no one of their rank came out to meet us, and of course we couldn't get in. But eventually a staff member came out, told us that Xu and Du were very busy because they were responsible for facing Taiwan and guarding the socialist motherland. So the comrades are spending all their time on military duties, so you should not disturb national defense and send your demands through me. It was later reported that Xu Shiyou was very angry at our surrounding of his headquarters, and considered using military force against us. He had a reputation as a very hard and fierce man. He had asked for permission to do this from Beijing and was reportedly refused. So we left without getting anything.

When we got back to Xuancheng, we had decided that we should go to the army for weapons, since they had better weapons than the militias. We collected information on military arms depots and how they were guarded. We chose 3 targets. One was an underground weapons depot about 20 km from Xuancheng in the mountains. We got the information from the people who lived out there. We were told that this depot was directly under the Nanjing military district headquarters; it was so important that the commander was a colonel. But two km from the entrance, they had electrified fence, and since it was a military warehouse, the army had the right to shoot you if you attacked it. So we decided against the target.

In collecting this intelligence we operated just like a guerilla unit. Our people

disguised themselves as peasant who were delivering food to the base and observed the situation in disguise.

The second target was a military base close to an important prison, where Ding Ling had been held, and later Huang Yungsheng. But we decided against this because we might allow the counterrevolutionaries in the prison to escape.

The third target was next to Xuancheng middle school. Among the 3, this was the smallest, but seemed safer to attack. Some children of the officials in this unit attended local schools, and since it was located in the town, it was more connected with the local people. So the security there was not so strict. We knew that the best time to attack would be in the early morning when the soldiers had just gotten up, were washing and eating, and the watches were changing. We decided to attack here, about 1000 red guards and workers. Our leaders put us student red guards in the front, because they thought the military was less likely to attack us than the workers and older rebels.

I joined the action. I was very stupid. Before joining, I was given a big German WW2 era handgun from weapons gotten from the militia. I carried the handgun with me. I rushed forward and was at the very front. We knew what rooms to go to to get the guns. A thousand of us jumped the wall and rushed in, all shouting slogans and waving Mao's red book. The soldiers were dumbfounded. I got two new handguns of Soviet design. Our people pushed their way into the room trying to get guns, but I could have gotten crushed. Since I was one of the first in, I was one of the first to try to leave. By that time the soldiers were prepared. Two soldiers caught me and asked me what I did. They asked what I did, and I said nothing. So they picked me up and found the 3 guns, and took all three. I was so angry and upset, but I couldn't fight with these two big guys. But a lot of us got weapons out; we got handguns, AK 47s;, heavy machine guns and an anti-aircraft gun. Since the latter was missing a piece, we used it to decorate the entrance to our school to frighten our enemies.

After we got weapons, some tragedies started to happen. There was a 14 year old named Jin. He didn't know his gun was loaded, accidentally killed a 6 year old kid and was put in jail. There were many incidents of this kind because the students didn't know how to handle guns.

From this time on, the CR became totally military warfare. From about September until May or June of 1968.

Workers and Students

During this period, the division of labor within factions was decided mainly by military considerations. Up to this point, workers had played a minor role in the big factional organizations. The workers had served as numbers to fill up big rallies and hold up flags and yell slogans in disciplined way. But when the armed fighting began, the workers became the major part. And the worker leaders became more important.

So beginning in June, all the factions were organized into two sections, wengong, or attack with words, and wuwei, or defend with arms. Came from a formulation of Jiang Qing. Attack with words and defend with arms. I was a member of the attack with words section, and the defend with arms section was filled with workers, many of whom had military training, and the bigger students, often athletes. Up to this point, the people who were most looked up to were those who could give speeches and write essays. But now those with physical strength and fighting ability were the ones most admired. In our big faction, the military duties were carried out mainly by dockworkers. Dockworkers were mostly not state employees, they were jiti. They were paid only when

they worked, by the piece. Poor benefits, most were illiterate, but the pay was pretty high because the work so hard. In bigger cities this work was often mechanized and the benefits were better. But in small counties people moved things by hand or by handcart. These men were very strong but very simple. Even at the time I felt bad for these men, because they really didn't understand all of what was going on. Clearly, they were being used as tools by others.

Traditionally the dockworkers were very solidary. Each area controlled its own opportunities and protected their own turf. They were used to fighting for turf, and often were harrased by policemen and criminals in the old China. So dockworkers had a very strong sense of self-defence and mutual loyalty. The dockers joined our side instead of the other side may possibly be because of their poor social position, but I can't really say for sure. But the direct reason was that their leader joined us and they were loyal to him. They had a simple way of selecting leaders. The guy who was the strongest became the leader. So their leader joined, named Yang, and all his people joined too. And they took orders from nobody except their leader. They were very disciplined and followed their leader without questioning. Most of those killed in a year's fighting were dockers in our organization. The scenes when we brought their bodies back, and their relatives fell all over their corpses weeping, was really pitiful. The state wouldn't take care of their families, since they had no insurance.

Our dockers were very brave fighters. The main fighters on the other side were construction workers, and their situation was similar. You are paid if you work, no insurance and other benefits. No work or sick, no pay. Though when you worked, the pay was high. Injuries, no benefits. So their economic situation was about the same so you can't say that economic situation determined which faction you would join. The construction workers were very violent, less disciplined than the dockers. On their side, the most important worker leader, named Mao, a very strong and rough guy. When fighting began, Yang and Mao became two of the most important leaders of the two factions. Before this, we didn't have much respect for workers, but when they began to fight and die for us, we began to respect them a lot. I asked them often what they were fighting for, and they always just said "for the revolution". I don't think they really knew. From economic point of view, the construction workers and dockers should have united, but in fact they mainly fought one another.

Among workers from other industries, generally speaking the better the education of the worker, and the better the social welfare benefits, the less active the workers were in the fighting. For example, my stepfather worked for the electric power company, where the benefits were great, and the workers there participated in everything but the fighting. Workers in the better factories were reluctant to join the fighting. This was also true for the other side as well.

In Xuancheng, some workers did raise material demands in late 1966 after they saw materials from other cities. This was a nationwide movement. Two kinds of workers organized and raised demands then: temporary workers and workers laid off from 1962 on who had been hired first in the Great Leap Forward. From about October 1966 to January or so 1967, these workers continually demanded a change in their employment status. They were the most organized national group. These in fact were the first people to send a delegation to Beijing to lodge their grievances. In the beginning, we were very sympathetic to them, because they said they were the victims of Liu's revisionist line. But then immediately Zhou Enlai and Jiang Qing declared their demands illegitimate, and their nationwide organizations were counterrevolutionary. But

we didn't really understand why they were suppressed, it seemed they had a justified grievance.

Workers' Role, Continued (6/27/90, 3 hrs.)

One thing I wondered about during the fighting was how these workers could make their livelihood when they were fighting all day. These kinds of workers didn't make a wage unless they came to work normally. The entire county at this time was divided into two zones, controlled by the big factions. In these zones, the state sector workers still continued to get their salaries, even if they weren't there on payday they could have someone pick up their envelope for them. But the collective and handicraft industries did not give you your wage bill no matter what. If you don't turn over your profit to the state on time they bank won't give you money for the wages. This question troubled me because for our side the main military force was made up of dockworkers, and the other side, construction workers. These were collective sectors, so both sides were relying exclusively on collective sector workers for fighting. How did they get their money? I don't know, but there must have been some arrangement because otherwise they wouldn't have been able to keep on. We had four or five banks in Xuancheng, but after a short while they were all taken over by the military. Right after the bank office workers started to take part in the movement, the army moved in immediately. Later there was a central document that required all bank workers to stay away from the CR, and not participate in either of the large factions in society. But it didn't work, because some employees still participated, though not very actively. In Huainan, Wuhu and some other places red guards broke into banks and took away money. After that they protected the banks.

From mid-1967 to spring 1968, all the regular businesses ceased to function in Xuancheng. Lots of workers just lived in their factory compounds in this period, or in buildings they had taken over, and got free food and other things. Still, they had to have cash, and I don't know where the money came from. I noticed that rebels from units that had better finances in fact donated more money to the factions at the high point of the fighting. The ones that were financially poorer donated less money, and sent more people to engage in fighting. Among the red rebels, there was an understanding that the people from the better off units were unwilling to go to the front lines to shoot. So others in the faction looked down on them. But this was counterbalanced by the fact that everyone knew they were donating more money. So we still relied on them for funds. It was also said in wallposters put up by both sides that workers in collective enterprises were illegally using the gongji jin to reinvest in production. And the rebels were also using the gongji jin for their movement activities. At this point the leaders had stood aside, and the rebels controlled the units. The rebels ran the workunits themselves. But they did abuse their power, though in a limited way. They knew that the violation of financial regulations could result in serious punishments later on.

Role of Student Red Guards in the Citywide Alliance

To understand the role of the red guards, we have to understand the conspiracy theory. One theory played a very big role throughout the CR: this theory of conspiracy. In the party and government establishment there has been a secret network, and many officials who on the surface obeyed chairman Mao and worked for the people, in reality opposed Mao and worked against the people. According to this theory, the network of

enemies was not limited to the party itself; it spread also out into society in a quiet and hidden way. We used this theory to guide most of our actions. Of all the central leaders, Jiang Qing used this theory most of all. I read virtually all of her speeches during the CR; and she used this theory in a very impressive way. She always told the students that they should never be misled by the appearance of any official or person in society. The conspiracy could have been there for many years without you being able to see it. Chairman Mao asked you red guards to make revolution by yourself because he wants you to understand the complexity of class struggle and gain experience in understanding the secret enemies. Mao already knows the enemies at the top. But if Mao just tells you, you will not get any revolutionary experience.

So from this theory there developed a policy: regardless of what terrible things the red guards have done, the red guards themselves are not responsible, only the cunning secret enemies, the black hands and manipulators are responsible. If there is violence between factions, or bank robberies, or disruption of public transport, or raiding military bases for weapons, the common practice was to hold the red guards innocent because of their youth, inexperience, and political zeal. Their intentions are always good. Then why did they make all these bad mistakes? There are manipulators behind the scenes, or they are being mislead by black hands. This theory was repeated from time in time in all of the provinces. When I read speeches by Jiang Qing, Kang Sheng, and Qi Benyu when they met with students who had come from provinces where terrible things had happened, you could always hear one of them talking about the pervasiveness of conspiracy.

This conspiracy was so influential on us radical young red guards. We began to look at people, to judge them, not by their appearance or deeds or words or class backgrounds, political status, because all of these things are phenomenal, not the essence. The essence is something secret and unknown, unaccessible to you, something you can never see or feel. So we red guards became very suspicious of anybody and everybody.

Without this theory, the red guards would not be so interested in doing all the things they did. The conspiracy theory first destroyed people's common sense, it destroyed their empirical mentality. It destroyed trust among people and within the community. Otherwise, they would not have done all these terrible things to one another. The conspiracy theory was responsible for this; it undermined the basis of decency between people. It was crucial that red guards were more and more encouraged by older people within their factions to do terrible things. For example, if the larger faction has designed an attack on a military unit to seize weapons, who should go first? Who should break the gate, and who should surround the guards, break the locks? The older people would tell the red guards that this is what they were to do, because whatever red guards do, they can always be excused for their youth and good intentions. But if older people do such things, they can always be accused of evil intentions.

So red guards were encouraged or assigned to do two kinds of things by the big alliances. First, a lot of terrible or violent things that were against the law. Like attacking the bank, raiding the secret party archives in party committees. Early in the CR the central authorities had issued documents prohibiting people from entering the archive (dang'an) offices. It was often useful to get people's file, if you wanted to attack them for their pasts. So red guards were assigned for these breakins. Such breakins were used at this stage especially to get materials on cadres. Some other people also broke in to look at their own dang'an; people who had gotten in trouble in past or who were not trusted by the leaders. But the students didn't have dang'an until their senior

year. But even these dang'an were very short and simple. Since red guards were excused by Jiang Qing and other leaders, they were misused by the older and more mature rebels. So red guards were appointed to do things that the older people were afraid to do because they might get in trouble for this, while red guards could get away with it.

The second kind of use that was made of students by the large factional alliances was propaganda, or wengong. Red guards carried out propaganda and wrote posters not only for themselves, but for other rebel organizations, like workers. For examples, if a group of workers was given orders by the alliance to engage in an armed attack. The central cultural revolution group prohibited organizations whose sole purpose was armed conflict. They said that armed conflict was only a secondary part of the CR, the major part was attacks through words, wengong, of top leaders. So when two factions are formed, there is a division of labor. Some people are organized for exclusively military activities, while students are assigned to write wallposters, paper articles, handbills, and make broadcasts in the name of the workers. After the two great factions were formed, most of the things issued under workers' names were actually written by red guards. Because red guards were so young, energetic, and naive, very few of them could enter the core leading groups of the major factional alliances. Also, student red guards did not accept orders from headquarters without questioning. So the alliance heads were reluctant to issue orders to students because they knew they might not be obeyed. When they wanted students to do something, they would call over the more mature red guard leaders for a meeting, say a lot of flattering things, and then give them advice about how to do something or what to do. Then the orders were actually given through these red guards themselves.

Why was the game played this way? Two reasons. The red guards were very arrogant and self-confident. They felt that only they could grasp the spirit of the CR and understand its true direction. Second, the older people did not what to be identified later as instigators of red guard misdeeds. The adults were very conscious of the need not to get involved openly, publicly, and in an observable way in red guard deeds. The faction leaders also found it difficult to restrain the red guards, especially during certain strategic projects were launched. When larger strategies were being formulated, the red guards would often blow the strategy by acting too early, on their own. And in so doing they would reveal the strategy in advance. When the faction leaders ran into this, they would have to call in the red guard leaders in for a polite talk. They would try to convince the red guards of the importance of strategy, in addition to bravery and commitment. The red guards hated all compromises of this sort made by their faction leaders with the adults. And sometimes the red guards got suspicious of the intentions of the faction leaders, especially of secret contacts between the faction leaders and cadres. But the faction still held together until the army moved in to seize back weapons around June of 1968.

Black Hands Behind the Movement

There are different levels of black hands. What is a black hand? In general, any person who is more experienced, sophisticated or mature and who manipulates the process of the CR. In terms of red guards, the faction leaders, or the more mature members of the same large faction could be black hands of the red guards because they were giving them advice and suggestions. If the advice they give them in private is different from what they say in public, they could be called black hands. But during the

period of factional struggle, the term is used to refer to the former cadres who work behind the scenes to give advice to mass organizations. When the two factions were prepared for full scale warfare, both sides needed individuals who did have battlefield experience, especially in command positions. Training, strategy, etc.

For our side there were two principal military advisors, a man named Huang, in his early 50s, he was a regimental commander during the Korean War. His unit was on the front line against the American army. He got in trouble after we won one victory after another because he was such a good commander and won so many victories. So the North Korean side sent a lot of delegations to show their thanks, and he had an affair with a Korean actress in a troupe that had come to entertain him. The army severely restricted this at the time, and according to regulations, he should have been executed. But the Koreans petitioned the high authorities to reduce his punishment because he was a hero. He was then asked to choose his punishment: to be kicked out of the party, or kicked out of the army. He had been a soldier for more than two decades, and loved the military life, he said without hesitation that he would give up the party. This was a dumb move, because without party membership, how could he stay in the army? After a few months he was kicked out of the army to head a small state farm near Xuancheng, and his rank was moved from 13 down to 18. By the time of the CR, he was isolated from politics in the locality. We all knew that he was a great soldier but had gotten into serious trouble. People used to say that his small head harmed his big head. He still got military benefits but no political privileges at all. For our side it didn't look good to have this kind of person as our advisor, but after a couple of weeks of debate. We red guards opposed, but the older leaders argued that we were in a life and death struggle and needed people with military experience, and that unless we had a better candidate, we would have to take him.

After thinking about it for a couple days, Huang put forward a couple of preconditions. First, he was fully in charge of military issues, and his say is final. He wouldn't interfere with political decisions, but he would not tolerate intervention in his decisions. He would quit immediately if this happened. Second, they cannot let the other side know that he is working for them, because this was against regulations, cadres can't get involved in the mass organization's fighting. He knew that being a black hand was a serious crime. He also wanted the secret kept from the rank and file in the faction itself. Third precondition was to protect his family. Fourth, if there is a future investigation of this, you have to tell them that you came to me, I didn't come to you. So don't lie to the higher authorities later on. Our side accepted all the conditions. He was put in an office at the top floor of our headquarters, a building that belonged to a flour mill, about six stories tall.

The second black hand was a man named Xiao. He was deputy head of county government handicraft industry bureau. He had Navy experience, had retired in late 1950s. He was a senior captain when he retired. Before he joined Navy, though, he had fought in the PLA infantry. Xiao in fact had recommended Huang as a superior strategist.

The function of these two black hands was to design military strategies for all possible outcomes and circumstances. They were responsible for defending against any possible guerilla attack from the other side. They were also responsible for all military supplies, how to get what from where. Our ideas about where to go to get weapons came from them. They were also responsible for preparing for the worst, a situation where the other side had overwhelmingly superior force. Drew up detailed plans to take

over specific buildings throughout the county. Selected targets and plans of attack. Control of transportation too. Should block what roads, take control of what roads. Also emergency plans to destroy bridges. In two months they had drawn up all the comprehensive plans for all kinds of violent conflicts.

There were also black hands not involved in military conflicts but in nonviolent factional struggle between the two sides. After society was divided into two large factions, the upper levels were always warning cadres to stay away from involvement on any side. But cadres got involved nonetheless. They did so for three reasons. First is family members who are involved in faction in an important role. Second reason is old colleague connections from work units. These cadres have had loyal subordinates before the cultural revolution; sometimes these connections are kept in the CR movements. Third reason is more interesting. After society divided itself into two factions, they spent all their time fighting each other, and the cadres were forgotten. They didn't have to attend struggle session and write confessions all day. They had a lot of free time. So they went out onto streets to read the wallposters. Sometimes they enjoyed the polemics so much that after reading so many wallposters, they became sympathetic toward one side or another. Also, these cadres sometimes didn't have good relationships with their bosses before the CR. When their bosses were attacked, sometimes cadres who worked under them were willing to stand up and provide evidence. And other cadres would like to do this to clear up their own cases.

When it came time to form the new revolutionary committees and great alliances, the attitudes of the cadres changed. Before that, some cadres had got involved, but very small proportion. But when it was time to set up new revolutionary committees, all the cadres, or practically all, took the initiative to come to rebel groups to talk with them, and prove their political preference and ideological orientation. They wanted to be understood. Because now they had a new chance. Before this, the majority of cadres were very passive. Now they were becoming very active. Which side they approached depended on their connections, their family members' opinions, their calculation of which side would win out, his relationships with the higher authorities and the factional leaders relations with higher authorities.

The interesting thing is that while the red guards were out in front of all the other activities of the CR, they were kept from knowing much about the process of forming the revolutionary committees. The older comrades in the large factions consciously kept red guards in the dark about the negotiations toward forming the revolutionary committees. This is one reason for red guards' subsequent critical reflections on the CR. As an activist in the red guards, I recall that I was always informed of important matters in the large faction. Many matters closed to ordinary members were open to me. But at that time I felt that when the cadres came around to talk with the big faction leaders, there developed an uncomfortable feeling between faction leaders and red guards. The faction leaders didn't want us to know their relation with old cadres. We had good relations with them, they relied on us in the past, and they felt the need to explain things to us. But we could tell that whatever they told us they told us reluctantly. At this point, the workers were out of the process, and the red guards were out of the process. Only those factional leaders who were lower ranking cadres before the CR are key people in these negotiations and relationships. So the red guards felt that these faction leaders, more experienced and sophisticated, were not as pure as the red guards, they were not as selfless.

Among the leaders who had been workers or ordinary employees before the CR,

the red guards had heard from them the mistreatment they had experienced in their units about promotion, pay raises, housing, joining the party, and so forth. And red guards like me were already unhappy that there appeared to be a causal relationship between these selfish complaints and their activism in the CR. We didn't like it because it seemed they were fighting for selfish reasons, not pure ones. So first we found self-interested workers early in the movement, and now we find self-interested cadres, who are interested in how they come out in the newly forming power arrangements. When we found this out, we found once again that the CR was even more complicated than we thought before. And I was quite disappointed, sometimes even angered.

There were longstanding divisions among cadres. In south Anhui, there was a Hebei bang, and an Anhui bang. The Hebei cadres had come down with the PLA in 1949, in Hebei the party had been very strong before 1949. The competition between the two factions in Xuancheng had been fairly balanced. Neither side had predominated. The head of our school was in the Hebei bang. Mr. Xiao was also a Hebei man. Xiao had not been very successful politically before CR, so perhaps that was a motivation for him to join in. In early 1968 Li Desheng moved into take over the provincial government in Hefei with the 12th army. This was the stage when a lot of officials began to give factions a lot of political advice. At this time, cadres started to play a very sensitive role, telling the factions about the relations between various cadres in the leadership, who had gotten in trouble in previous campaigns, who is experienced in what kind of politics, who is vulnerable on what issues, whose daughter married whose son, and so forth. All these things started to come out from the cadres during this period; they sought to give us some information to use in the upcoming negotiations.

Factional Politics, Late 1967 to Summer 1968 (7/2/90, 3 hrs.)

There was not much street fighting in the summer of 1967, but as explained above, both sides were preparing for warfare. The capitalist roaders and bad elements in the work units, to repeat what he mentioned before, were no longer of great interest to the rebels. Since they were forgotten, they didn't receive physical mistreatment and torture. They would dress in ordinary clothes, wear the placard with big cable around their neck, and stand to the side of the street with their heads down. Ordinary people would walk past them. Early on people were curious and would make fun of them as they passed by, but with the passage of time people became accustomed to it and didn't pay much attention. After a half hour or hour of confession and self-criticism in the morning, the targets would go home for lunch, then would go to clean public toilets, dining room, street to do some manual labor. Every once in a while the red guards would remember them and come back and demand new confessions, but to a great extend these targets lived in peace. People like Jiang Qing and Zhang Chunqiao always reminded us that these old capitalist roaders were benefitting from the factional fighting and that red guards should concentrate on problems in their work units. This is why, after the factional fighting period, the central authorities turned attention back to these old targets in the cleansing of the class ranks, yida sanfan, dou pi gai (which included anti May 16 elements campaign).

The first major incident of armed confrontation took place right around New Year's day of 1968. This was sparked by our side. We heard intelligence reports that the other side had very advanced weapons and had planned a full scale military attack for around January 1. When we hear this, Mr. Huang our military advisor decided to send out two reconnaissance teams. One team was mainly dock workers, they carried

heavy weapons, like machine guns and semiautomatic weapons. The other team were student red guards. They were sent out to the other faction's headquarters at the city power station. Our headquarters was at the east end of town, at the rice flour mill, theirs at the north end of town. The distance between the two buildings was about 2 km. The teams reached the power company at about midnight. The red guards team used loudspeakers to yell slogans, hidden behind embankments in a field. The other side started to shoot as soon as they heard the loudspeakers. And the guys with military experience wrote a map of where the fire was coming from. Neither side had any casualties. But the other side realized by the next morning that they had been fooled into revealing their positions.

So they sent an expedition out to our headquartesr. This was the last couple of days of December. They sent people with heavy weapons to Xuancheng Normal School, second best school in town, most of students there on our side. When they attacked the campus, they intended to attract a rescue team from our side. Mr. Huang realized this was a trick. He decided to send a rescue team just to feint at the Normal School, but sent a much larger force to another one of their strongholds, the party and govt. compound. He wanted to attack there because the road to Wuhu and Hefei went by there, and this would be a strategic position. About 30 heavily armed dockworkers were sent to the normal school, but more than 100 were sent to the government compound. When the larger force heard the shooting at the normal school, they began their attack. We took four casualties in the small team early, but Huang said to continue with our plan. Turned out 4-5 dead workers there. But our side had already destroyed the governemnt compound walls. But we could only take some of the smaller buildings iu the compound, the larger one defended with machine guns. We took more than 10 casualties. I was in the headquarters at this time so all this information was coming into; the headquarters.

Early the next afternoon (the attack had begun at midnight), Huang ordered all his troops to retreat. We lost more than the other side; 5 dead workers and more than 10 wounded. Other side 2 killed and several wounded. Up to this point Xuancheng had had no killings. The next several days our propaganda section was busy publicizing the deaths we suffered at the hands of the other side. To get sympathy from the other side we organized a large public funeral march through the town. The five dead workers were so mutilated by bullet holes that some you couldn't recognize, their clothes were tattered to shreds. I felt so sorry for them; their families were wailing and climbing all over them. We made large steel wreaths, fancy wooden coffins. The wreath was steel, 12.25 meters tall, took four trucks to transport it (12/25) was the date of the battle. We used black and white to decorate all the main streets in town. We put up slogans condemning the other side in their own territory. The other side was so frightened by all of this, they didn't even resist when we put up things on their turf. NOrmally they would have given us a big beating for this.

Before the deaths, everyone was preparing for casualties, but after the actual deaths, both sides got very frightened. After this event, public support went overwhelmingly to us, whereas before it was about evenly split or indifferent. The funeral was so impressive, with the huge wreath and the grieving family members. A huge crowd collected and wore mourning clothes, black or white armbands and headbands. We designed and made traditional mourning clothes for the families made of burlap. Its odd that we used the traditional mourning clothes because in the earlier stages of the CR this was considered to be one of the four olds. But we wanted to

appeal to the general public so we used the traditional garb. Some even suggested that we have a ceremony to release the souls of the dead (chaodu). We marched across all the main streets of town.

Mr. Huang said we had to prepare for the worst, but today was our day. He prepared for more serious attacks on that very day. The most important members of our faction did not attend the funeral; they prepared for further fighting. To my mind this was the most dangerous day of the entire period of warfare; Huang was preparing for a bloodbath if the other side attacked. The other side, though, did not act at all.

I myself experienced danger in the second military action, which was before the spring festival, early February 1968. By this time the other side had set up a headquarters right in the middle of town, which had not had any military installations up to this point. They occupied the department store building, 3 stories, in the middle of town. We became so angry because previously we had left the center of town for ordinary citizens. So we decided to; occupy our own buildings downtown, otherwise we would be weakened strtegically. Acording to; the original plan, to take over these strategic building was the task of the workers. TAhis time the red guards took the initiative and went to Mr. Huang. We told him that the last time the workers paid too high a price, and that we should do something. Huang really approved of this, thought it was great.

There was a two storey department store across the street. We eight red guards volunteered to take it over. So we went out. We all had guns, but we didn't have enough bullets. I had an automatic rifle with bayonet, and a handgun. But only 30 bullets. We broke into the store in the middle of the night; but it was so dark one of our people broke some glass inside and then the other side starated to shoot do;wn randomly at the building. The bullets went right through the thin wooden doors of the building, and the bullets hit the concrete floor creating sparks. When the shooting stopped we made our way up to the second floor; there was more light up there. We were so dumb that we didn't even bring any food or water with us, in addition to few bullets. After a few hours we got hungry, and since this was January it was very cold. We decided not to eat the cookies and crackers in the store, because that was stealing state property (we were still ideologically pure). But eventually we decided that this was a special situation and our survival was at stake. We decided to put down our names and the quantities and type of food we had taken, with a promise to repay.

In the morning, we didn't even dare to look out the windows. So I used a mirror to hold up to the window and look. Immediately a hail of bullets smashed the mirror, cutting up my hand and face with the splinters. The other side didn't know we only had a couple of students there with few bullets. They had several machine guns and plenty of bullets; and they continually strafed the buildings. But we never shot once all day. On the second evening, the headquarters sent workers to relieve us and we went back. This was my only combat experience. When we returned to the headquarters, we were treated like heroes. Before this, students had not taken the initiative in military actions.

After this, there was not much intense fighting in Xuancheng. By this time, people were very concerend and frightened about armed combat. Both sides became much more restrained after this point. There were still a few casualties after this, but mainly from long distance firing, not from hand to hand combat. I guess that the town was so small and close knit that people thought that if you did something bad and someone saw you, eventually you would get in trouble someday for this. During this

military period, both sides tried to avoid face to face confrontations. They would shoot out from buildings but no direct engagements. Firing from buildings was safer because they couldn't see you and you really couldn't see them. In large cities like Wuhu, Huainan, and Bangpu there was much more violent. In large cities it is much harder for people to identify and recognize one another. So in these places the combat was more fierce. The density of social life in Xuancheng, I think, helped to limit the most bloody violence. This was true even in the earlier stages when people used fists and shoving to fight. People would warn one another not to get too rough because they would say that they knew you and would report you later on. When people started to talk like that, the violence of the confrontations immediately was reduced.

During spring festival one afternoon I went home to pick up some clothes. Home was territory of the enemy. I had just sat down to eat lunch. Just then we heard a lot of noise out on the street, and saw a squad from the other side, coming from their headquarters, going down the street and shooting. I didn't go out to see what they were shooting at; people on the streets were screaming and running away. My stepfather came back in and said they probably were coming to look for me. He asked what I had with me; I had my organization's armband and gun. He immediately took them away from me, wrapped them in dirty clothes and hid them in an underground jar. He told me to take off my glasses, change my clothes and hide. I was so afraid I thought they were going to hang me. Within minutes, a squad came to my home. My stepfather went out to talk to them, he knew the construction worker head of the team, Mao, personally. They went away, and about 10 minutes later I took my things and ran away. This was the greatest danger I was ever in. Mr. Xie, a leader of our faction had been captured by them before, and in order to force a confession they used a huge steel pot to scare him with being boiled alive. Xie confessed and nothing happened to him; he divulged all our secrets though.

End of Factional Struggle: Xuexi Ban and Anti May 16 Elements

The xuexi ban was set up when Li Desheng moved his 12th army from north Jiangsu, at the order of Chairman Mao, to impose martial law in Anhui. He had most trouble in Wuhu. He realized that the key places to restore order were Wuhu and Huainan, where the fighting had been most violent. In Huainan his army surrounded all the major strongholds of the armed rebels, forced them to give up and surrender their weapons. In Wuhu he did things differently. By this time Mao and Lin Biao had issued a directive to surrender all weapons. In Wuhu, after this document was read out, the two sides reduced their armed confrontations, but neither side would turn in their weapons first. They were afraid of being left defenseless. Li Desheng himself went out in his uniform, wearing straw sandals and leggings of the preliberation army. He personally visited the strongholds of both sides, and did not bring a large team of bodyguards with him in order to show he was trustworthy, and didn't carry a gun. When he visited the headquarters of the red rebels, the doors and windows were already blocked up and reinforced, so he had to use a ladder to get in, and all the bodyguards were left behind, scared to death for their commander, since random shooting was still taking place. But both sides were impressed with his bravery and commitment, that both sides agreed to stop shooting, take down their street blockades. He tried to establish relationships with the heads of both sides; both sides began to trust him. He succeeded in stopping the fighting where many other commanders had failed. He was praised at the 9th party congress for this; Mao singled him out for praise and had him

stand up. Mao told him that he had understood the essence of political work. He was promoted from Central Committee to Politburo at that time, and eventually became ranked No. 5 in party, behind Mao, Zhou, Lin, and Kang Sheng.

In Xuancheng when the army moved in, all the big cities had already been quelled, so both sides surrendered their weapons without resistance. There were some weapons, however, maybe about 10-15% that were never accounted for. Chairman Mao had a directive to send peasants down to the villages to be reeducated by the peasants. In August 1968 we had a huge rally right in front of the Xuancheng middle school. Each of us was given a copy of the four volume Mao's collected works, with two farm implements, and a big red paper flower. Students 18 and older should go to countryside; younger could stay home. I was only 16 so I could stay home. But I didn't, for two reasons. One, my family was so poor; I felt such psychological pressure every time I went home to eat; I figured I could support myself in the countryside. Second, I still believed in the revolutionary spirit, and thought I should temper myself in the countryside. During the rally I wrote two lines in the Mao's works: "go to the countryside to train yourself as a great revolutionary and fight for the liberation of all mankind". I really meant this; I believed this very sincerely at that time.

But unfortunately most of the other red guards went immediately to the countryside, while I stayed in the school. The school was now run by the military propaganda team and the workers propaganda team. All the government positions, including public security system, was taken over by the 12th army. When the two propaganda teams were sent to Qinghua University in early 1968, the two sides were still fighting, and some members of the teams were shot to death--this was the workers' propaganda team, not the army. I guess that the first team to come was the workers' teams, unarmed. So from this I guess Mao decided that with unarmed workers' teams alone, the fighting couldn't be stopped, so they sent out military teams with the workers' teams to Xuancheng later on.

There were only two or three members of the military team that came to the middle school, low ranking officers. They didn't stay very long. By end of 1968, soldiers had already withdrawn to their units. But county government was still run by the army. The main work was done by the workers' team. Altogether they had 7 or 8 members. They came from the tea factory and the agricultural machinery factory, where I would later work for five years. Military team members had to be party members, and had to be model soldiers or model officials. And you had to have some education, and no family ties in the locality. For the workers' team, first you had to be a worker in a state owned factory, second, you had to have basic education, third, party membership preferred but not required (some were not party members), and you should not have been xiaoyao pai in the CR. This implied that some worker team members had been members of former factions. Fortunately most of the workers in our school's team were previously in our faction, so they were more sympathetic with us than the other side. After the soldiers returned to their units, the workers' team moved onto the campus and became a permanent part of the school authorities. They stayed in place as a regular institution of school leadership, even though its members might be changed, until the fall of the gang of four in late 1976. For eight years they ran the school, finally sent away by Deng Xiaoping who didn't like them.

The Xuexi ban began in October 1968, through the end of the year. About 30 students in our school were asked to stay in school and take part in the xuexi ban, from both factions. The participants were informed that our responsibility was to tell the

truth: who was behind all the factional fighting and seizing of weapons from the army. Who organized us, who supported us, who gave us information, supplies, plans. Who took part, did we witness any killing, did we know anything about various incidents--usually killings, attacks on banks, military bases, government buildings, etc. Who wrote the influential articles, especially those attacking the PLA (mentioned in earlier interview), and articles stimulated armed conflict. Who had participated in events in Nanjing, who had attacked Zhou Enlai, who had reprinted May 16 propaganda material, who took valuable items either from individuals or the state. We all confessed everything.

The members of the teams talked to each of us individually, said they already had plenty of evidence about us and other things; if we would confess and tell the truth, our problem would be reduced; if we had done something terribly wrong, we can get credit for turning someone in about something they had done.

Our school in the mean time had organized a "masses dictatorship team" (qunzhong zhuanzheng dadui), members appointed by the propaganda teams, who had their own armbands and all carried wooden clubs about two meters long with red and white stripes. Most of the bad things during the Cleansing of the Class ranks campaign later on was done by them. They really engaged in terror during these later campaigns. During this period so many persecutions and investigations were being carried out that the official jails couldn't handle them. Every unit had their own dictatorship team and cells.

When we had a meeting of the Xuexi ban, a man from the public security bureau would read out an official charge against one of us, and order us to be put under arrest. The members of the dictatorship team would rush up, grab the guy, force him to kneel, handcuff him and then drag him away. We began with 30 members, and as each week passed, our numbers were reduced, and nobody knew who would be dragged away next. All of the people in the study group had been leaders of various red guard organizations; and the purpose of the xuexi ban was to settle accounts with red guards for doing all the things they had been encouraged to do;. This was the period when many of us began to think critically about the entire cultural revolution. This was the first time I faced the possibility of arrest.

Victims during the Campaigns (7/11/90, 2 hrs.)

The first one arrested in 1968 from my school was Duan Shuanglin, early autumn, during the time we were in the xuexi ban. It was funny, he was arrested in early September 1968. At that time the formal prison system had not yet been restored. So the county junguan xiaozu and the newly reestablished public security bureau chose the county cultural hall as the jail for people arrested for CR reasons. The surrounding yard was a large compound, and inside could hold more than 200 people. I had to send him some cigarettes and food. He was released after about 50-60 days. He was terribly frightened when first arrested, but after a week, when I delivered food to him, he said he wasn't worried because there were so many people there who had much worse problems than him. There were others in the county also arrested, several workers, including Mr. Yang, the dockworker who headed the military group in our faction, along with the two black hands, Mr. Huang and Mr. Xiao who had been military advisors, and another Mr. Xiao, who was one of the leaders of my large faction, he worked at my father's power plant. Mr. Mao, head of military section of the other faction, was also arrested. I can't remember many names from the other side, but my impression was

definitely that more were arrested from our side than theirs, about 2 to 1.

Duan said that the one thing he couldn't handle, though, was the torture. The first thing they did to you was to a yard in the compound with concrete floor, make you kneel down on the concrete at noon for half an hour or an hour, temperature was over 100 degrees and very humid. If you had a bad attitude, up to two hours. This was called xiam wei, a traditional way of new Chinese rulers frightening subjects with the awe of your power. If you sang songs in jail, they put metal handcuffs on you and tightened them until it cut into the skin, or force you to carry a heavy board with the cable around your neck all day long. Food was terrible, too little and very poor quality. The rice was already a little rotten, taken from the bottom of the state warehouses. Not dry rice but xifan, mostly water. Rotten vegetables, no meat. He said the worst thing was the hunger. If you didn't behave badly, they would let your family send you food and cigarettes; if you behaved poorly, they took away this privilege. Quickly everyone gave up resistance and conformed.

After being released, after about 3 weeks Duan was arrested again. They told him that this was because other people were revealing things about him in their interrogations that meant he had to go over everything all over again from the beginning.

Bai Zimin, the guy from the countryside, was also arrested. He was arrested for one reason. In early 1968, during the spring festival, a lot of peasants and even escaped prisoners began to gamble regularly. They started to call themselves wuhu sihai zaofan dui. They made trouble in the communities where they gambled, including robbery, rape, beating, vandalism. Local peasants hated these people so much that in some places they organized themselves for self-defense. But the gamblers had learned a kind of guerilla tactics from reading Mao's works in jail. They moved all over from county to county. Nobody knew where they would strike next or when. There was no public security bureau in operation them and they had to organize in self-defense.

They even came to us to plead for protection, because we red guards had arms and people were afraid of us. We ran off to a village about 15km away and surrounded a big group of people gambling. We took back two of them who had raped women, and were going to hand them over to the military the next day. But in the middle of the night two peasants snuck in and hanged them on a tree outside. Bai Zimin was held responsible for this, and was put in jail for half a year.

The main charge against all the people arrested was that they had engaged in some kind of violence. The official definition of bad elements to be arrested was fourfold: 1) murderers, 2) rape, robbery, vandalism of state property, esp. banks and transport system, 3) destroying or stealing official archives or disclose state secrets, 4) acting as black hands who directed violent factional activity.

They interrogated everyone to reveal what they had done and seen, but they were really looking for black hands and bad leaders. The more you could reveal things about these people, the better they would treat you. Duan said they had asked a lot of questions about me, especially the articles I had written attacking capitalist roaders in the army. He said he denied that I had any links with others in the big cities in relation to the attacks on the military establishments. If he had admitted I had done something wrong, I could have been put in jail.

There were also two students arrested from Xuancheng Normal College. During the whole period, there were really few students arrested. Most of those arrested were urban workers and suburban peasants, because they had been most active in the fighting.

They also concentrated on urban residents who did not have fixed employment. These were temporary and contract workers. They had never organized themselves as contract as temporary workers, because such organizations were declared counterrevolutionary in December 1966. But they were active in the large factions, joined the rebel organizations in the residents committees. People were quite suspicious of them because they had the most complicated and suspicious class backgrounds. They didn't really have bad class backgrounds, just complicated; they had worked as casual laborers, servants of rich families, owned small shops, peddlers and middlemen, forced labor in KMT army. Too complicated, neither clearly good or bad. These people couldn't be easily categorized in the official categories, so their cases were complicated.

During the Xuexi ban they urged us to reflect carefully on the activities of people who had complicated backgrounds. They said we students were young and easily mislead, but certainly didn't want to overthrow Mao and the socialist system. They were especially suspicious of the motives of people with complicated backgrounds, because they might have a motive to attack the system. They told us to give them more information about these people and they would be more satisfied with that. They also were very interested in the relations between the black hands and the red guards. What were their motives? What did they promise? Did they want to become an official in a new government? Who organized and gathered the intelligence for the attacks on army bases?

Anti May 16 Elements Campaign

This campaign was funny, since the vast majority of the students were aligned with our faction, and most of the violence was committed by us. The other side was very small and there wasn't much they had to account for. But we tried to report on the other side to make sure it was not only our people who would be punished. We reported Gao Enlai for bringing back documents from Nanjing and copying them. They got him for being a May 16 elements, because they figured he had got in touch with the organization in Nanjing. He was only in jail for 3 weeks, I think because he was not involved at all in violence. So far as I know in the county, no one else was arrested in this campaign. The worst things happened during 1970, when I was already working in the factory. They investigated a number of college students who had been sent down to our factory for being possible May 16 elements. This was in 1970 and 1971. But they were never charged or punished.

Critical Reflections on the Cultural Revolution

My own critical reflections on the CR began by accident when I read a red guard newspaper from Anqing, published by students at the Anqing Normal School, November 1967. The article was an editorial that discussed the confrontation between red guards and the conservatives in the military nationwide. The conflict between the red guards and army was very tense because of influence of Hubei and Wuhan, where the first big confrontation between rebels and the army took place in mid-1967. There was a large daily ferry service between Wuhan and Anqing, so the influence of Wuhan upon Anqing was very large, and students in Anqing had a strong reaction against the military.

The editorial tried to explain why the red guard/army confrontation emerged in mid-1967, and more importantly why this confrontation was immediately suppressed. Why couldn't the hated capitalist roaders in the army be exposed, why such violent suppression of those who had raised the issue? The editorial explained that there is a

strong vested interest network linking capitalist roaders in the army and certain top political leaders in Beijing who still pretend to be CR leaders. The article was impressive; it quoted a lot of passages from Marx, and a few from Lenin.

After I read this article, I felt much clearer about the situation than before. I was very convinced by the solid logic of the analysis. I not only read it myself but showed it to all around me, told them that we face the same situation in Xuancheng. I also showed it to some of my teachers. I felt that it was reading Marx that gave this author such an ability to understand things. From this point on, I read a lot of Marx. And from this point on, my view of the CR changed. For the first time I was able to distance myself from the CR, and view the whole thing from above. I began to question the Cultural Revolution itself and moreover Mao's intention, and Mao's political and moral qualities. Later I heard that the authors of this article were arrested by the military in Anqing.

By the time the leaders were arrested in the xuexi ban, all of our illusions were gone. We felt we were being discriminated against. Jiang Qing herself had instigated our actions, and the violence that followed. It wasn't fair. We had the idea to get weapons from the army before, but not until Jiang Qing encouraged it openly did we dare to do so. When we received her approval for this kind of action, we finally acted. During the entire xuexi ban period, nobody ever mentioned Jiang Qing as the reason for our actions. They always asked us who encouraged us to act this way, but nobody dared to attribute this to Jiang Qing in front of the interrogators. So we felt totally manipulated at this point. When we red guards in the xuexi ban got together alone to talk, we would curse people, we had Jiang Qing in mind but of course we never dared say it openly, though we all felt the same way.

During this same period I also found that some of my friends from my faction were singled out as hated class enemies and had to carry heavy boards around their necks and stand by the road. I remember one, a Mr. Xu, who was a cadre in the supply and marketing cooperative. During the period of violence, we lived several months in the cooperative's building. In the spring festival of 1968 we stayed in their offices. At that time there were central directives ordering us to give up our weapons, disperse our organizations, and go back to our original units. When we heard this we all felt sad and discouraged. Xu wrote a moving poem to express his disappointment at the way we had been betrayed. All our efforts, commitment, blood over 2 1/2 years came to nothing in the end. We all loved this poem deeply. He pasted up the poster on the inside wall of the yard, but we copied it and put it up all over. But by the autumn of 1968, his unit had its own xuexi ban, and Mr. Xu was "dug out", it was charged he was a rightist in 1957 and was still a rightist even though his cap was later taken off. They said his motive in participating in the CR was to gain revenge on the party for that. His poem was said to show sentiments of the class enemy and was to prove his evil intention to make rebels and red guards kill one another. When we saw this humble, friendly, kind man become disgraced, called an enemy and now dressed so scantily in the winter. He was used and betrayed and we felt just the same. We thought in our hearts about Mao and Jiang Qing: "when you needed us, we did so much for you, and now at this crucial point, you betray us and jail us, without a single word of admission of your own responsibility. What kind of people are you?"

What added to our feeling is that more cadres were coming back to their old positions. Things came to a big circle: those in power before the CR were still in power, and those powerless before are still powerless. Those privileged before are still

privileged; those who had nothing before still had nothing: guanren de hai guanren; bei guande hai bei guan.

Background (1969-80, 8 1980)

The informant graduated from junior high school in 1969 and worked in the countryside for two years. In 1972 was assigned to work at a factory as a hired worker. He worked there until the end of 1978, then he was sent to work at the metal coating shop at Chongqing. He worked there until 1980, then he was sent to work at the shop office, calculating costs of production, etc.

Wages

He started as an apprentices in 1972. First he got 10 yuan per month. Then he got 12 yuan per month up to third year. Then became grade 1 workers at 15 yuan per month. In 1973, because he got credit for the two years he was sent to the countryside, he got 15 yuan per month, not until 1979. After one year he got grade 1 workers at 18 yuan per month. The next readjustment was in 1980. They gave 18 yuan per month. They gave 18 yuan per month early on. The state said you could promote if certain performance standards were met. They gave out quotas to each shop and group. They would give a quota to each person. They would give the quota to the headmen, section heads and then to the workers. Above 100% as he remembers in the beginning. Then they would give the quota to the shop director.

After the 1979 readjustment they gave raise to 18 yuan per month. They gave raise to 18 yuan per month after a term absence. This was because for a long time there was no raise. According to needs, productivity, wage level, finally became 18 yuan per month. They gave another raise in 1981. They gave 20 yuan per month. They gave it to each person. They also gave a floating wage. If you worked more than 100% per month, they could change a floating wage away. They would give a floating wage to each person by the manager. It could change, and it could change from day to day. Different people. They could change the basic wage. They could change the basic wage per person, and even their family temporarily. The manager would have to get the factory approved. But it doesn't usually change.

Some places have the pinren zhi, where only the workers can buy things. Some places don't have it. Some people, and they become hired workers. Their wages are higher than the pinren zhi workers. And so forth. But we don't have it and so there is no pinren zhi. There are some workers who are not workers arguing their superiors, or poor work attitude. They are not workers. Because the managers are so worried about topics like that, they have to find time to carry it out. But they also have to think about the workers' welfare in our factory. Not necessarily so. The workers are not workers for the sake of the system, they just want to work and make money. They don't care about the system. They could be punished as they probably would not like to do that. They could not participate in politics, read newspapers, and things like that. They could not discuss them and talk about them. They don't have freedom to do that. That will not happen. Few workers sit down and think things out. They just work hard, work hard, work and go home. They visit a factory that pays more, and they think that they will make more. This they do think about. Workers in our factory are not as good as other workers, but they don't think about this in our factory.