

## PERSONAL DATA

Age: 40

Sex: Male

Education: Industrial College graduate (machine technology)

Total Years Relevant Experience: 19

Last Year of Relevant Experience: 1979

Year Left China: 1979

Initial Immigration Status: Legal

Native Place/Overseas Connections: Tianjin native/OS relatives

Class Background/Political Designation: capitalist

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## OCCUPATIONAL HISTORY SUMMARY

Positions Held: 1) Staff Technician, Electrical Equipment Department,  
Tianjin #1 Machine Building Bureau, 1961-67, 1973-79

2) Worker, Hot Forging Workshop, Machine Building Plant,  
Tianjin, 1967-73

Administrative Level of Work Unit/(No. of employees):

1) Municipal/(400)

2) Municipal/(2000)

Experience in Full-time Manual Labor (for non-worker occupations):

worker in hot forging workshop, 1967-73

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APPOINTMENTS: 3

TOTAL HOURS: 7

PAGES TEXT: 7

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Occupational History (4/5/80, 2.75 hrs.)

The informant is a former resident of Tianjin, son of a capitalist, and a relative of Wang Guang-mei. He worked in Tianjin's industrial system from 1962-1979. He studied machine technology at an industrial college for 4 years, graduating in 1961. After graduation he was assigned to work at the Tianjin #1 Municipal Machine-Building Bureau as a technician in their electrical equipment department (dongli shebei ke). The companies under this bureau would send requests for major repairs up to his office. His job was to look over the applications, investigate the plant's equipment in question and decide what measures needed to be taken, and how much the renovation will cost, and how long the factory should be permitted to stop production in order to finish the repairs. This was for large capital equipment. Enterprises needed to report to the Bureau to get permission for all major overhauls.

He did this kind of work until 1967, when he was sent down to a factory within this system. There were over 2000 workers in this machine-building factory which manufactured heavy machinery. He worked in a hot-press forging workshop (reduanya chejian), where the production process was to forge parts for heavy machinery. He worked in a production group as an ordinary worker. He operated a forging press (duanya ji).

In 1973, when they began to implement the Party's cadre policy, he returned to his previous work in the electrical equipment department of the city bureau. From 1973 until July 1979 he did this work. The major difference from before the CR was that he went down personally to inspect machinery in the factories more often. He came to Hong Kong legally.

Wages

The first year after graduation he got 46¥ per month, as was national policy for university graduates. He had no fixed wage grade during this year. After one year, he was given a raise to 55¥. Although he was a technician, since he worked in the bureau he was assigned to the administrative cadre scale, grade 21.

Up until 1978 he got no raise, and his wages did not change during the period when he was in the factory. They decided who would be raised this time according to years of service and current wage level. If you started before 1958 and were not grade 4 (worker), they would raise you to grade 4. If you started from 1958-64 and were not yet grade 3, they would raise you to that level. They also had a provision, aside from these stipulations, for others to be raised according to their work contributions and skill levels. This was about 20% of all those remaining. Also if people had been promoted before to leading positions without being given raises (which was common), they would adjust their salaries accordingly.

Within the bureau, they sent down targets for the percentage of people who could be raised. Then they would hold meetings in the offices to appraise. They also would readjust the wages of those who had been raised from the company and enterprises during the past decade. There were a lot of these.

As he remembers, there were national wage readjustments in 1956, 1963, 1972 or thereabouts, for a small number of workers, 1978, and one which began in 1979 around the time he left for Hong Kong.

Bonuses

They had bonuses before the cultural revolution in the bureau offices, basically a fixed sum, fairly equal, and tied to attendance. They also had

a bonus for 100% attendance.

There was no bonus system in his factory from 1967-73, when it was replaced by a supplementary wage. These were much lower than the bonuses workers got before. They got 10¥ per month, everyone, and this was higher than in most other factories. All the workers and staff got it every month. Administrative cadres did not get them, but technical cadres did.

#### Temporary and Contract Labor

They had these kinds of workers during the cultural revolution and afterwards in his enterprise. They did irregular kinds of work--moving, construction. They came both from the street committees, and contract workers came from the communes. If you wanted to hire them, you had to notify the labor bureau of the city to get the temporary workers. They would notify the streets to arrange for the workers. If you wanted a construction team from a commune the plant would send people out to search for them directly. They can't raise the labor payroll so they have to get temporaries, because the bank won't allow you to pay unless the amount of wages fits the number of workers specified in the plan.

In 1972 there was a national document which specified that temporary workers be turned into permanent ones. Not all of them were given permanent status. Only those who had worked there a full year. But some were not willing--they wanted money and not fringe benefits. Temporary workers in his factory got between 1.57¥ and 1.99¥ per day. This was between grade 3 to grade 5 worker's salary. Usually if you were made a regular worker, you would be set at grade 2, 39¥, and if you had technical skills you would be set at grade 3, 43¥. Of course these figures differed by industry. The standard contract for all temporary workers was 3 months. You could not fire them whenever you wanted, you just waited until the contract expired and then did not renew.

#### Discipline, Firings

If one's work is bad, usually there is no punishment, they just give you education. If one is expelled from the plant, this is because you have violated state laws--like the purposeful sabotage of production, or assault on other people. Then you would be dealt with by the security department and removed from the plant. Usually the handling of problems was through education--they hold a meeting to criticize you. For stealing, which was quite common after the CR, you could get criticized, or you could have a warning (jing gao) written into your file, which disqualifies you from a bonus for a period of time. This also stays on your permanent record. Stealing was an important part of what they called 'anarchism'. Generally punishments were divided into two sorts: 'criminal sanctions' (xingshi chufen), and 'administrative sanctions' (xingzheng chufen). The first was connected with the legal system and the public security bureau, the second was internal to the enterprise. The first was more serious because it involved expulsion from the factory and labor reform. The second involved various warnings, docking of bonuses, etc.

The prevalent attitude in the 1970s was that you would get the same amount of money whether you worked hard or not, so why bother? They tried to stimulate worker enthusiasm with slogans but it didn't work. Worker attendance slipped, they would leave early, sneak off during work hours, would steal, work slowly. It was very serious. Worker enthusiasm and work discipline was much worse in the 1970s than in the early 1960s.

But problems in fact began earlier, after the anti-rightist campaign in 1957. With each political campaign workers became less enthusiastic.

The purpose of the political campaigns was to stimulate production, but the effect was just the reverse. When they ran all these campaigns they forgot that it is in a worker's nature to work, not to study Marxism-Leninism and discuss, criticize.

#### The Tianjin #1 Machine-Building Bureau (4/9/80, 2.25 hrs.)

The municipal bureau was under the #1 Machine-Building Ministry in Peking, which gave it production plans, and quotas. It gives directions on new products, arranges supplies of materials and parts. Below the bureau were 5 companies (gongsi), an electrical machinery company, a machine tools company, a machine tool repair company, and agricultural machinery company, and a machinery transport company.

The bureau had several administrative departments, which had responsibilities, as he describes it, of taking orders from above and relaying them below. There were over 400 employees in his bureau offices. Production matters were led by the Ministry, while administrative matters were led by the municipal government. This was what was meant by 'dual leadership' (shuangceng lingdao) and 'difang guoying' (local state management).

Administrative matters led by the city include; 1) personnel transfers, changes, labor force matters, 2) political work under the leadership of the party committee, campaigns, movements, 3) the city can also make demands for tractors for their suburban communes, and machines for public facilities. This amounts to a small proportion of the plan, but not a negligible one.

The bureau protects itself against these local demands for productive output by keeping excesses over the quota of output and holding on to it in order to a) trade with other units for needed materials, parts, and products; b) reporting along with the next quarter's output, in case it came up short. This practice has no special name. Everyone knows about it, but they don't talk about it, but still everyone does it. If you have to put a name on it, you could just say that it is considered a "flexible" (linghuo) method of management.

The bureau was divided into several departments. Technology (jishu), Technical Planning (gongyi), Electrical Equipment, Labor and Wages, Safety (anquan jishu), Statistics (tongji), Security, (baowei), Political Work (zhenggong), Health (baojian). Each of these departments had corresponding relations with their counterparts at the company and enterprise level. There was also a Union office, and an 'external affairs' office (nuanwai bangongshi), which assists other areas in the surrounding counties with technicians and equipment. It also sometimes helps other areas of the country and in some cases foreign countries. The department was led by a Party Committee, a Bureau Head, and 3 assistant Bureau Heads. Before the CR the bureau head was also the Party Secretary. Most of the vice-heads were party members.

#### Post-CR Administrative Changes in the Bureau

After the cultural revolution, several departments were combined into one, and some were abolished. The union department was abolished, the Technology, Technical Planning, and Electrical Equipment Departments were all combined into one. The office of the Bureau Head was changed into a Revolutionary Committee. The safety and health departments were combined into one.

About 50% of the personnel were sent down to "strengthen basic-level leadership", and to engage in production. The leaders of the bureau went to a May 7 cadre school, while the staff almost always went to factories to become workers. New cadres, especially younger ones who were politically active and had good class backgrounds, moved up into the bureau offices.

But they lacked expert knowledge. They came from the companies and enterprises, and most were originally workers. These people simply didn't understand technical matters, the plan, how to implement it. Many kinds of work simply stopped.

An example of the kinds of problems caused: During one year there was a severe drought. The bureau decided that it needed to produce water pumps fast to serve the local farmers. But they didn't know which factory to send the order to, and tried first the machine tool company. They tried to say it was a political responsibility to produce these pumps. Then they decided later that the machine tools company was an inappropriate choice, so they went to the agricultural machine company. After wasting a lot of time this way, trying to decide who could produce these pumps, the agricultural machine company finally agreed to produce them, but too late to help the drought.

Another example: In 1969, during the period when they were tense about war with the USSR, the party raised the slogan "move industry to the third line". So they decided to build a new, large iron plant in a small county town in Hebei called She Xian (涉县), in the far southwest corner of the province. But the production leadership group of the bureau didn't think about water supply, transport costs required to move materials in and out. All the different factories in Tianjin were supposed to donate equipment, supplies, machines, and transfer workers for the project. They tried to build this plant for 9 years. It never produced much. They couldn't get enough water, transportation links were poor, and there were no mines nearby for raw materials (coal and ore). There was a rail line, but no rolling stock for the job. Finally, in 1978, Tianjin City gave up on the plant and turned the whole thing over to Hebei province metallurgy bureau. This huge plant with the best equipment was achieving the output of a small plant. It lost money each year, and when they planned every year they gave the enterprise a target for loss, not profit.

### Cultural Revolution

Machinery Bureau: The bureau had 2 factions, formed from among the unit's own personnel. They had conservatives and rebels. The differences between the factions were over attitudes toward the leading bureau cadres and municipal leaders. Why did people join factions? Patriotic reasons. People wanted to make a contribution to the nation. The '16 points' and other documents told the people that there was a group of capitalist roaders in the party, and that they wanted to drag them out.

There were no real differences in the membership composition of each faction. Youth were in both, and all had good class backgrounds. For example, one group in Peking, the Lian Dong (联东), was an organization of the sons and daughters of higher level cadres--He Long's and Chen Yi's children were members. This organization was conservative.

About 20-30% of the staff did not participate in the movement. This was because their class backgrounds were bad. They were high level technicians which wasn't very good to start with, in addition to having historical problems due to their parentage. They were the targets of the movement. There were all kinds of people who pulled down--both staff with historical background problems and leading cadres accused of being 'capitalist roaders'. They were dragged out, struggled, and put in 'cowsheds'. "Technical authorities" were also criticized.

They put hats on them during struggle meetings, beat them, made them recite things. Later, they were made to sweep floors, and went through regular rituals where they apologized to Mao and the masses. There were quite a few

suicides (jumped in the river), and also some people who were beaten to death.

He says he saw the handwriting on the wall, made a self-confession of his own background, making as full a self-examination as possible, then demanded to be sent down to do manual labor and be reeducated. After he got to the factory, he demanded to be sent to the most bitter type of labor. He was able to avoid being struggled. He was sent down to a heavy machinery factory in the electrical machinery company.

(4/12/80, 2 hrs.)

In the Enterprise: He went to a factory that produced heavy machinery, Hot Forging Presses (reya ji). There were over 2000 workers there. At the time he arrived in the factory in 1967, they had not yet formed the revolutionary committee, and had no one really running the place. In reality, the two faction's leaders were running things. The plant leaders were supposed to keep production up in the midst of revolution, but couldn't--they were paralyzed (tanhuan).

At the time he arrived, he went straight to the shop. They came to the factory 6 days a week, but the employees did little actual work. They wrote wallposters, held meetings, struggled cadres, and left with their faction members to participate in outside activities. The former leading cadres were put in a cowshed if they had bad class backgrounds, as were some workers who, it had been discovered, had bad class backgrounds or historical problems like having been KMT soldiers or policemen. Those in the leading group that had good class backgrounds--particularly workers and poor and lower-middle peasants, were allowed to keep their positions, but didn't really have any power (youming wu quan). By that time the faction leaders were running things.

The plant director had been head of the CYL before 1958 (all-China is the implication), but because of illicit sexual affairs he was sent down to be plant director/party secretary. In the CR the rebels went after him, found out his past, called him one of Liu's henchmen and a member of the capitalist headquarters, and struggled him. One evening the man was secretly taken away by the conservative faction in the plant who wanted to protect him, and relying on connections with the city-wide conservative organization, put him on a plane to Shanghai, and protected him. Afterwards he was put in a position as an advisor to the Shanghai Municipal Production leadership department (Shanghai Shi Shengchan Zhihui Bu), which was under the revolutionary committee. His name was 冯文彬 (informant writes the first character incorrectly).

The head of the Tianjin conservative faction was named 林启预. During the establishment of the revolutionary committee in Tianjin, he became the head of the union (gongdai hui), which replaced the old union (gonghui) in the revolutionary committee setup. They also had a nongdaihui for peasants and a xuedaihui for students. (Gongdaihui could perhaps be translated as workers committee). In 1970 he was sent to be the leader of the new iron and steel plant in She Xian referred to in the previous interview. In 1973, when they revived the union (gonghui), he returned to be Chairman of the Tianjin Municipal Union. In 1975 he was transferred to be the head of the Tianjin Municipal Earthquake Bureau--of course he had no training in this, but heads of organizations in China rarely have such expertise, they don't need it. At the end of 1977, he was arrested, in part because of activities in armed struggle during the CR, and early this year the informant says that he read in the Hong Kong papers that he has been sentenced to labor reform.

## Revolutionary Committees

In 1967 both factions, imitating the January experience in Shanghai, had established so-called revolutionary committees. When the PLA representatives came, sometime from May to September that year, they had to deal with this. They got the two faction leaders to participate in the Mao Thought Study Class (xuexi ban). They participated in study all day, and forgot about production. At that time the PLA was the highest power holder in the factor--a 'Military Control Committee' (junguan hui). Remember the slogan, "san zhi liang jun" (三支兩軍), which means support the peasants, students, and workers, be an army for both struggle and production.

This Mao Thought study group was run for half a year, right up until they finally established the RC. Also the PLA representatives were in charge of political study during the period. Production did not improve during this period. The revolutionary committee was established in 1968 (he says 1969, but is certainly mistaken, since he thinks Shanghai's January Revolution was in 1968). Right after its establishment, its membership included: the head of the military control committee, who was also the head of the RC; two vice-heads, each of whom was the leader of a faction in the plant; and the rest of the members were the leaders of various factions. This was not yet the "formal" (zhengshi) revolutionary committee, this came later in 1969. There was an almost equal representation of the two factions on this version of the committee.

The departments were abolished and combined into a handful of groups (zu). They had a 'production group', a 'political work group', and a 'logistics group' (houqin zu). Each of these groups had leaders who were members of one or another faction. After a year, they decided that most of the cadres were revolutionary and should 'stand up' (zhanqilai).

At this time, a number of former cadres were sent back to leading positions, but not the same leading positions as before. If you were a plant vice-director before, you might be a shop director, if originally you were a shop director, you might now be a group leader or section head.

When they carried out the 'formal' establishment of the revolutionary committee, they had a campaign called 'yi da san fan' (一打三反), where they established study groups in each bureau, company, and municipality. They sent factional leaders of a rotating basis to study in these groups. When these faction leaders left to 'study', the old cadres who had stood up took their place 'temporarily', but it turned out to be permanent, because these faction leaders rarely came back to their original leading positions. Some were transferred to other factories, some returned but to non-leadership positions, and some were found to have committed mistakes. These last went to do labor reform. Some actually did return to their leading positions, but these were in a minority.

After this the composition of the RC changed. The head was still the PLA deputy, but the vice-heads were now former plant-level leading cadres. The number of other leading cadres from before the CR increased, and the number of former mass organization leaders on the RC decreased. By that time it didn't matter how many representatives there were, they exercised no power anyway. This was 1970.

Shortly after this, at the end of 1971, before Lin Biao died, they had a movement called the 'anti May 16 elements'. The purpose was to criticize, and removed from power or even send to labor reform the bad (huai) leaders from the cultural revolution factions. This means that they had beaten people, broken state laws, killed. So as part of checking on the leadership qualifications at every level during this campaign, they investigated the past histories of these people. "Not a few" (bushao) lost their leading positions, and leading cadres from before the CR by then came to

occupy the majority of positions. They also had 1 or 2 people on the revolutionary committee itself who were removed during this campaign. The PLA left in 1973, and after that the head of the RC became the original plant director/party secretary.

In 1975, they finally restored the names of the departments, and the original administrative structure was completely restored. During the time he was working on the shop floor, they did have the '8 personnel' system, but they really didn't do anything (youming wu shi). They had them only in name but not in reality. These people had titles but no work. In 1978, after they restored the bonuses, they strengthened this system, because if they didn't do their jobs of checking attendance, quality, etc., then they couldn't carry out the new bonus system.