

## PERSONAL DATA

Age: 39

Sex: Male

Education: University graduate (mechanical design)

Total Years Relevant Experience: 11

Last Year of Relevant Experience: 1974      Year Left China: 1974

Initial Immigration Status: Legal

Native place/Overseas Connections: Guangdong native/unknown

Class Background/Political Designation: unknown

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## OCCUPATIONAL HISTORY SUMMARY

Positions Held: 1) Shanghai Heavy Machinery Factory, 1964-74  
a) Technician, Design Department, 1964-66, 1969-74  
b) fitter, workshop, 1966-68

Administrative Level of Work Unit/(No. of employees):

1) Municipal Bureau/(@8,000)

Experience in Full-time Manual Labor (for non-worker occupations):

fitter in workshop, 1966-68

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APPOINTMENTS: 8

TOTAL HOURS: 18

PAGES TEXT: 15

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No. 3

Occupational History: 12-5-79 2 hrs.

Informant was born, raised, and educated through middle school in Linghui, Guangdong province, the same village that was the hometown of Liang Qichao. In 1959, after graduating from middle school, he entered Huanan Gonxue Yuan (South China Industrial Institute), and studied for five years in the mechanical engineering department. He explains that the department had two specialties--machine design(jiqi sheji) and mechanical technology(jiqi gongyi). The first, that which he majored in, is concerned with the design of the parts of a machine; more or less how they are put together. The second has more to do with the actual operation and principles of machinery. (the implication is that the second would deal more with technological innovations, the first with how to produce a given machine).

With this training, he was assigned to the Shanghai Heavy Machinery Plant, which was under the Shanghai Bureau of Machinery and Electricity (jidian ju), which in turn was under the leadership of the Number 1 machine building Ministry in Peking. When he first arrived, in 1964, he worked in the designing department (sheji ke) as a mechanical engineer, designing machines which produced precision parts for machines. These machines were produced in one of the shops in the plant, and were also used in Shanghai's shipyards and sent throughout the country. In 1966 he was transferred to do manual labor in a tool shop (gongju chejian). There he worked as a fitter (qian gong), and did this exclusively for 2 years. The job involved moving around to various spots in the plant to do any project that needed to be done. Around 1968 he began to work as a designer again, half time, and continued the manual labor half time. In 1969 he returned full time to designing work. He left in November 1974 and came to Hong Kong.

12-16-79 2 hrs.

The day's output is contained in four organizational charts, three of which I brought in with him, the other of which resulted from questions I had about the first three, and which was drawn up in the course of the interview. The first shows the line of command from the plant party committee down to the small group I worked in in the tool shop. The second shows the overall structure down to the shop level, with notes about changes which took place at the end of the cultural revolution. The third shows the internal structure of two shops with which I was familiar. The fourth shows the Party's political organization within the factory. All are attached.


12-21-79 1.5. hrs.

Meetings, Technical Innovation Groups

During the Cultural Revolution, they had political study every day, for 1/2 hr. before the shift started. Afterwards, they changed to twice a week, after the shift, for 1/2 hr.. They had 1-2 production meetings per week, after the shift, for one hour. The frequency depends on the problems in production. The personnel in departments and technical groups had business (yewu) not production meetings.


Sanjiede--the three-in-one technical innovation groups. These were special, short-term small groups, usually for technical innovations or to solve production problems in shops. They are composed of workers, technicians, and leading cadres. Usually workers were in the majority, but it depends on what particular item they want to solve or work on.. Sometimes if workers are very busy, it is

SHANGHAI HEAVY MACHINERY PLANT



PARTY ORGANIZATION

厂党委 (党委書記、付書記、党委)



SHANGHAI HEAVY MACHINERY PLANT, PRE-CULTURAL REVOLUTION

厂党委

厂长

总工程师

科室

辅助生产车间

直接生产车间

(冷加工车间) (热加工车间)

安全科

劳动工资科

人事科

保卫科

医务室(幼儿园)

供销科

生产调度科 (X)

检查科 (☆)

财会科

基建科

工艺科 (X)

设计科 (X)

运输科

煤气站

中央试验室

工具车间

设备动力科(修理车间)

二金工车间

一金工车间

粗加工车间

金结构车间

热处理车间

锻锤车间

第二水压机车间

第一水压机车间

铸钢车间

铸造车间

(X) ABOLISHED DURING CR, PERSONNEL SENT TO SHOPS, RESTORED IN 1971

(☆) ABOLISHED DURING CR, NOT RESTORED UNTIL 1978

easier to get cadres, who are often less busy. Members of these groups are chosen by the leading group in the production group, which is a shop level office in charge of production. When a problem pops up, the shop director chooses a person, usually a cadre, to lead the 3-in-1 group, but sometimes technicians, for example I, were chosen as leaders. Depending on the problem, from 3-10 people were appointed to the group. Small group leaders then meet with the shop director, and they discuss which workers to select. Then the shop director asks permission to select certain persons. The group works during the shift, and each group usually lasts from weeks to months. The group that I took part in took about 2 months. But for most of this period I did most of the actual work himself, while others returned to work in the shops, and only came to give opinions when I had come up with proposed solutions.

(12-29-79) 2 hrs.

In 1964-5, before the cultural revolution, they didn't have these '3-in-1' groups, but had workers and technicians work together in technical innovation. In the CR they clarified the policy, added cadres. The difference with the later triple combination was that this practice before the CR meant that technicians did designing work in the offices, and then later when to the shops to discuss with the workers. There were two forms: 1) Technicians just went to the shops and met with workers involved in various groups. There were no fixed members of a group, no special group appointed; 2) "attack difficulties groups" (gong guan zu), which would be groups of workers and technicians working closely together for a brief period on a problem. Sometimes this would also include cadres, but not specified in policies.

The main difference between the pre-cr and the later '3-in-1' method was that before the cultural revolution, it was not clear whether the group had the power to put their innovation into practice. The members of the group couldn't be sure whether the cadres would support their solutions. But after cadres were appointed on these groups, they would know whether or not they would be supported because the leading cadres are right there. Upon reflection, I says that you could also say the pre-CR system could be considered san, not Liang jie he, since the branch Party secretary was always quite concerned with the outcomes and exercised leadership over the group, but did not actually participate.

The Party leadership in the shops decided when to form these groups. There were differences between technical innovation groups and 'attack difficulties' groups. The latter were far more important because they deal with problems which directly affect production. So leaders pay more attention to them. Technical reform deals with new methods, the future--not pressing, immediate problems, so less attention is paid to them. The gong guan groups arise as situations present themselves, but technical innovation groups are always in existence, and they membership does not change very quickly. In one of the groups that I participated in, they came up with a new kind of metal saw from old parts and machines. But the party secretaries didn't support the innovation, so it was not popularized, and they wasted all that time, effort, manpower.

#### Wages

There were three kinds of technicians in the factory. 1) University graduates, who had studied for 4-5 years; 2) higher technical school graduates (da zhuan biye), who studied 2-3 years after middle school; and 3) graduates from middle school level technical schools (zhong zhuan). When the last

two kinds graduate and begin work, they are not called technicians, but assistant technicians (zhuli jishuyuan). University graduates are 'practicing' technicians (jian xi) for one year, and after one year they are turned into regulars (zhuan zheng). After this year, they hold a discussion about each individual in the small group, and if the person has no political problems, they automatically promote to grade 13 technical cadre, the lowest for university grads. The higher technical school grads are also on probation for 1 year, after which they are promoted to assistant technicians, a lower pay grade. The same is the case for the middle school grads.

When I was a practicing technician in Shanghai he made 48.5 Y. After being turned into a regular he made 58 Y. This was in 1965. Until he left in 1974, he got no-other raises. Generally, grades 15 and 14 (48.5Y) were for the new students and assistant technicians, while grades 13 (58Y), 12 (64Y), 11 (72Y), and 10 (84Y) were technicians. Above grade 10, one was considered an engineer. Grade 9 (grade 3 engineer), made 92Y; grade 8 (grade 2 engineer) made 116Y; grade 7 (grade 1 engineer) made 126Y.

#### Supplements 1-6-80 2 hrs.

There were a range of 'nutrition' supplements (yingyang buzhu) which only workers received, and not cadres or technicians. There was a nutrition supplement, 5-8Y, mostly for milk, high temperature supplements, poisonous work materials supplement (ie for workers who handled acids), and radiation supplements. There were transportation supplements for everyone. People would be reimbursed for the equivalent of the cheapest available means of public transport (bus). If they ride bikes, then they get a flat 3Y per month because they use energy to ride. In I's plant, they could ride trains free and still get supplements before 1965. From 1965-67 they could still take buses, but not trains (trains were more convenient). In 1967, transport fees stopped for a while because the union was not operating and the supplements weren't distributed, but they were quickly restored thereafter.

There were also livelihood (shenghuo) supplements available to anyone in the plant whose family per capita income dipped below 12Y. There were temporary (linshi) supplements for a death in the family (funeral expenses), hospitalization or prolonged illness, emergency childbirth expenses. Generally speaking, the supplement system remained intact and did not change during I's years in the plant.

#### Bonuses and their evolution

Before the cultural revolution, bonuses were divided into three grades, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and also no bonus. Every quarter, the small group would hold a meeting for assessing for bonuses (ping jiang xiaozu hui), led by the group leader. They discussed three criteria; political thought, work, mutual relations and cooperation with fellow workers (tuanjie huzhu). This method was used for all units in the plant, including those with cadres, technicians, and workers. All units did this once a month despite output. The amount at each grade varied by profitability of the entire plant for the quarter. But variation in bonuses from high to low profit months rarely made a difference of more than 2-3Y at each grade, paid each month as bonus for the rest of the quarter.

After the awards were appraised, then the money would be given out at monthly intervals for the next 3 months. For workers, the awards were usually 1) 12Y, 2) 10Y, 3) 8Y, with little variance from quarter to quarter. The highest amount was rarely over 15Y, the lowest rarely under 6Y. Most workers got grade 3, some got nothing if they made political mistakes or if they were sick and didn't come to work over a certain number of days.

Usually, about 60-70% got grade 3 bonuses, 25% grade 2, and 5% grade 1.

For technicians, office workers, and all non-leading administrative cadres (he doesn't know about kâzhang, plant directors, party secretaries), grades 1,2, and 3 run about 9,7, and 5Y respectively. Their bonuses were less than those of workers because workers participate directly in production and influence output more; but cadre bonuses do vary by profit of the plant.

There was also an end of the year bonus (nian zhong jiang). Everyone in the plant would get the same award, which varied from 18-32Y. Some people who had made political mistakes did not get one. Cadres supplements were about 4Y less than workers.

Around 1967, the bonuses were abolished, and were not revived until after I left in 1974. Then bonuses were changed into supplementary wages (fujia gongzi). This is because material incentives were criticized as capitalist methods which would gradually lead to the restoration of capitalism. As the saying went at the time, "yue ping, yue jiang"--the more they appraised people for bonuses, the worse things became. Their work became worse, they argued about bonuses, and then workers would become unhappy. So they abolished the bonuses and put the supplementary wages in their place. Supplements were equal for both cadres and workers. Everyone got an extra 8Y in their monthly pay packet. If you were absent more than 20 days out of a month, then you would forfeit the supplement. Also if you had committed a political mistake, the supplementary wage would be taken away.

The appraisals of workers after the abolition of the bonuses took place in "democratic life meetings" (minzhu shenghuo hui), where workers would engage in criticism and self-criticism, mostly of their thought (sixiang). They chose advanced workers (xianjin gongzuozhe). There were different names, the most common were biaobing and biaoфан. They met for this purpose once a month, and sometimes once every 2 weeks--it varied. There were three conditions for being named a model worker. 1) good political thought: this depends on one's activism in meetings and campaigns, in study and criticism sessions. It helped to make speeches and actively participate in political study. 2) good production, good work. 3) good relations with coworkers--tuanjie huzhu (literally, unity and mutual help). This was for all workers and staff. The prize was a copy of Mao's quotation, but later this was changed into a certificate. If you were chosen advanced worker for the entire plant or shop, you would get all 4 volumes of Mao's selected works. You would also get publicity in big character posters, pictures would be posted on the wall, certificates would be put up next to your work place, you could be commended at all-plant meetings, and sometimes you would be asked to give a speech. Wall posters formed a system of communication, and were posted at different locations in the plant. They were changed once every 1-2 weeks, but the advanced workers publicity would remain on the blackboard for an entire month.

#### Raises, Promotions (1-13-80, 2 hrs.)

First, he stresses that raises and promotions are two separate things. There were two readjustments during his experience where personnel were raised and promoted at the same time. In 1959 there was a general readjustment for workers and cadres both. This was before he began working, he heard it was a relatively large one. In 1962, again before he started working, he heard there was another general wage raise and promotion. Generally, all these were promotions of one grade. All those who met conditions were raised. After 1962, there were generally no raises or promotions until the time he left in 1974. I, for example, had a wage of 58Y in 1965 after becoming a regular technician. This didn't change until he left in 1974. In 1973, people with wages which were very low



could be raised. No change in wage scale was involved. They just gave workers with real low wages--ie. 42Y or so--an extra 6Y per month. But higher paid workers got nothing. This wage readjustment had set conditions. Workers had to work for a certain length of time and still be at a certain pay level. No change in wage grade, just an increase in wage level. This is not the same as a promotion (tisheng), which is a formal raise in scale with a raise in pay. The readjustment applied to workers and some basic-level cadres, but not to most of cadres. So generally speaking, tiaozheng and tisheng are different, in that tiaozheng is set by state policy, and tisheng is on an individual basis, and decided within factories.

There are different criteria for tisheng and tiaozheng. Tisheng is related to one's technical ability and work performance, while in a tiaozheng one has only to meet state-set requirements about length of service and wage level. Also with tisheng, people with already high wages, like engineers, can get raises.

So in his experience there was only one tiaozheng (1973). A number 1 grade worker, for example, could be given wages equivalent to #2, but he was still in reality a grade 1 worker--he only got the higher wage. He had heard of general readjustments earlier, in 1959 and 1962. But apart from the 1973 readjustment, there was no chance for a raise during the entire decade of his experience. He had a friend who in 1964 was promoted to be an engineer, but no raise was given. He had been an outstanding technician, so was given a higher position in 1964, but without a raise in pay. This was referred to as 'ti ji, bu ti xin' (rise in rank without pay raise).

Many were dissatisfied with the process of raising positions, but not wages. Responsibilities were increased, but not compensation. This had some effect on people's diligence, but not that much, since everyone was in the same boat.

### Firings and Demotions

Under very special circumstances, one can be fired. To do this, one has to commit a major mistake. After this, one can be demoted and have wages lowered. This happened some in the Cultural Revolution. For example, a shop director, married, had sex with several young girls in his shop. His technical level was high, and made 126Y per month because he had been a worker since before 1949. This man used his power as shop director to give raises to the women he had relations with. So he was criticized in the cultural revolution, and made a regular worker, and had his wages reduced to 80Y. He had also been a party member, and at this time he was kicked out of the Party. In another case, a grade 2 worker who was caught stealing was reduced to grade one.

If a worker is very lazy, comes late, works poorly, then they have small group criticism, and do educational work on him. However, if a worker doesn't come to work for 3 months, and if he has no excuse and doesn't ask leave, then it is possible to be fired. This is called kuanggong (AWOL). I can't remember anyone ever being fired for poor work. But criticisms can get pretty severe, and embarrassing if hauled in front of the entire shop for criticism. If the worker persists, is really incorrigible, can be sent to the public security department, maybe go to labor reform. But before taking this final step (which he never saw happen), can put the worker under supervision (liuchang chakan). This is a kind of probation

in the factory for one year, to see if a worker's behavior improves before labor reform might be applied.

Workers were of course dissatisfied with the wage situation. But since the cultural revolution was so long, they could do nothing. They ended up by working a little slower. If they were happy, they would work fast, but if they felt unhappy, they would just work slower. Workers would also refuse to do certain kinds of work because they were stuck at low pay scales. If asked to do a relatively skill-demanding job they sometimes would refuse and say: "give it to a grade 5 worker!". This happened.

They tried often during this period to remedy the problem by political education and study, reading Mao's exhortations to work hard, but its effect was not that great. There was really nothing they could do about this problem until 1977. There was no assessment for raises until 1977, and they had not had any since before the cultural revolution. In 1977 a person's wages were raised based on performance and skill. Not until this time could raises be tied to work performance.

#### Four Cleans Movement

The movement started in his plant in March 1965, and continued right up to the cultural revolution. It was also mixed in with the socialist education movement, which was really a part of the four cleans. They formed a four cleans work team, of which I was a member, and the head of their team was a judge from the highest court in Shanghai. In small factories, the team (dui) was called a group (zu). The purpose of the work team was to 'further socialist education', and the goal was gradually changed into the '4 cleans'--clean thought, clean economics, clean history, and he forgets the fourth.

I was a Communist Youth League member, so he was able to participate. Almost all members of the work team were party members or league members. The job of the group was to find out the background, ideological thinking, and problems with individuals, and to find out the cause of their problems and solve them. Among their work was to investigate historical problems. They sent people out to investigate the past of certain people, and report on their past behavior and crimes. They also were allowed access to people's files (dangan).

The members of the work team were sent by the municipal 4 cleans office. I's work team had the following members: the leader was the high court official in the Shanghai court. There were people from 3 performing arts troupes in Shanghai, a student from Jiaotong University, and representatives from the army. Most of these people were party members. Later I was selected to take the student's place because after one year of this the student had to go back to classes.

(1-27-80 2.5 hrs)

The four cleans work team came in Feb or Mar 1965, and stayed until mid-July 1966. The members came from 3 different departments. 1) 3 cultural and acting troupes, 2) Air force, 3) students from Jiaotong Univ. The head was the court official from Shanghai, and the vice-head was an air force vice-commander (fujun zhang). The team had 250 members in all. The leaders of the team were set up in a central office in the plant, and the rest were split up into groups and assigned to shops, departments, etc. as their size and proximity dictated.

They began by calling study meetings. Each production group selected one or two people with good class backgrounds, and good political performance, who were also Party or CYL members to participate in 'materials groups' (cailiao zu). When the work team decided someone had a historical problem, they would dispatch the 'materials group' made up of these workers, to investigate.

The historical problems they were investigating were cooperation with the Japanese before 1949, and mostly pre-liberation problems. The work group had access to files on individuals, as did the materials groups. But only the party members within these groups could read them, and then only could read the files of people below the shop director rank. But they could also only read the files of people who it had already been decided had problems.

These files (dangan) were held in an office controlled by the personnel office (renshi ke). They were collected in an office at the all-plant headquarters. Every employee had a file, but the cadre files were thicker. When the work team came, they attached one or 2 people to this office to mediate access to the files. The work team members had final authority after they came--the people in the dangan office cooperated.

There were several stages to the movement. First, they aroused the masses to study and discuss. Second, people began to be criticized. People with historical problems, former counterrevolutionaries (people who helped send plans to the USSR, who had distributed foreign materials, who had opposed Mao thought), people who had sabotaged production (purposefully made mistakes and cost the state money), and corruption and theft.

The method was to bring people to struggle and criticism meetings and to force them to confess. They presented them with the facts they had collected and criticized them. If they refused to confess after repeated criticism, they would send a materials group out to investigate wherever the alleged activities were committed. The participants in these criticism meetings were the immediate members of the production group, excluding people of bad chushen, and including people from the work team.

I estimate that in each production group of about 10+ people, 1 or 2 were criticized. Usually these were not severe problems. They usually just criticized and confessed in the group and that was it. The most common kind of problem was within the small group. Party leaders who had 'borrowed' 10Y or so of dues money got criticized and had to pay back. Few with major problems.

The big problems were the historical ones. If you confessed quickly then your punishment would be light. But if you didn't confess and the problem was serious--ie. if you had killed people for the KMT, then you could be turned over to the public security bureau and be put in jail. So after stages one and two--arousing the masses to meet and study, then holding investigations and criticism sessions, they held the third step--'organizational building'. This was the transfer, demotion of cadres, and the punishment of other offenders.

How did one get labelled a counter-revolutionary during the 4 cleans? An example: One guy in I's technical group didn't talk much to others, and didn't speak up much at political meetings. He knew Japanese, some English, listened to foreign broadcasts (possibly from Taiwan and the US). He also had Hong Kong relatives with whom he corresponded. So he was suspected of being a secret counter-rev. There was an incident where a letter was written from Shanghai and addressed to the US consulate in Hong Kong, and it contained description of the situation in China during the three lean years of the early 1960s. It criticized the Great Leap and was written in English--had happened some years ago. So they investigated this man for this crime, but he was finally exonerated.

### Cultural Revolution

At the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, they had criticisms of the 4 cleans movement and how it was handled, especially at the Taoyuan production brigade, where it was led by Liu Shao-qi. They said it had been too

severe, and that it had represented a counter-revolutionary line. They wrote wallposters, criticisms. Especially unhappy about the 4 cleans were those people who had been criticized or investigated.

So during the beginning of the CR, many of the wallposters criticized forced confessions and pressures on innocent people, and the compiling of 'black materials'. Some of the first people criticised in I's plant were the former leaders of the work teams. They were dragged back to the plant from their own work units and denounced at mass meetings. They were forced to kneel, bow their heads, 'do the airplane', etc. One fellow, in later 1966 or early 1967--the junzhang from the air force unit--was dragged back to the plant and denounced at an all-plant mass meeting. The student Red Guards who had come from Peking were active in this, I says they were really lihai. These red guards were mostly children of high cadres. Anyway, when this happened the bodyguards of the officer, standing helplessly behind him, began to cry in the middle of the meeting. Later it was decided that it was not permitted to struggle and criticize a military officer like this anymore.

The Red Guards from Shanghai were less lihai, and there were few Peking Red Guards in the plant anyway. Many of the Red Guards came to the factory at the time to look at the famous '10,000 ton water pressure mill', which had been publicized throughout China in the immediately preceding period. But there were no real meetings or speeches at first. At that time 40 men from the plant were specially chosen to meet with the many red guards coming to the plant for exchanges of experience.

From the beginning of worker activism inside the plant, there were 2 factions. The zaofan dui, and the chiwei dui (the rebels and the 'crimson' guards). Both groups thought they were revolutionary, and both thought they were carrying out the cultural revolution. The chiwei dui tended to think that the top party leadership was basically correct, and opposed dragging them out, and had the same attitude toward the municipal party committee. The rebels tended to think that the top party leadership was taking the capitalist road.

Differences in membership: the young tended to be highly represented in the rebel ranks, and these were mostly permanent workers. The 'crimson' faction, or conservatives, tended to have old workers, CYL and Party members, and basic level cadres heavily represented in their ranks. In I's plant during this early period each faction had competing wallposters put up in different places, criticizing one another. The leaders of each group, and there were many, participated in these activities full time, and stopped working.

There were no mass desertions of workers during this period. Most workers participated in the movement after work, in the evenings. This was a big, important plant, and also not many workers were active, and the strength of the factions not great. Not many workers from his plant were members of the fighting groups to help other factions in armed combat in the city. But they had them, they had names like 支持工人造反联络站(五联站)、工人造反联合队. For example, at the Shanghai Diesel Engine Plant such fighting was serious, and many factions in other plants sent fighting groups to help. But there was none of this kind of fighting in his plant, and the number of workers who left to fight was small.

In I's plant, in the beginning, there were many smaller groups. For example, there was a group of demobilized soldiers called the 'red guard army' (hongwei jun), and there were other small groups with names like 'oppose to the end' (fan dao di), the 'oppose revisionism brigade' (fan xiu dui), and there were also the 'red guards' (hong wei bing) from the technical school attached to the plant. (These last were middle school graduates who were doing 3-4 year courses in technical training. Most of them were assigned to the plant after graduation.)

Some of these small groups aligned with one city-wide faction or another, but some would not accept the leadership of any alliance.

Participation rates: At the beginning, few participated, but the size of the factions grew during the course of the movement. Finally about 70% of the employees were aligned with one group or another, finally, this proportion of the people were all members of the rebels, after the conservative factions were defeated. The non-participants just continued to work. These people were referred to as the 'free and unfettered faction' (xiaoyao pai). There were all kinds of people in this group. Some were married and had families, some thought it was just too much trouble.

I, since he helped to do four cleans work in the later stages of the movement, didn't join any faction at first. Later, he joined the 'oppose revisionism brigade' (fanxiu dui), a group which had its own newspaper and was led by a demobilized PLA soldier and party member, an ordinary repair worker. They aligned with the rebels at the city level, and later accepted their leadership.

(2/4/80, 2.25 hrs.)

Production situation: The leaders of the factions left for their political activities, but generally speaking, most workers stayed at their posts, and continued to work. The entire plant never stopped work, but certain shops did stop for a period of a few months, because of a problem with the supply of raw materials, especially coal.

At that time, the plant was being led by a few of the old leaders, but there weren't many left. Also labor discipline was very poor--lots of 'anarchism'. This was not any self-proclaimed theory--it just happened because there was a political movement going on. For example, if someone pasted up a big wall poster lots of workers would put down their tools and stop work to read it. No one dared to say anything to the workers about it.

Even before the formal seizure of power, members of the rebels had already exerted a great deal of power in management. Many ended up doing things formerly done by the branch party secretary. At that time, most shop-level cadres had stood aside and been struggled against--not so many section leaders, nor production group heads. Some could continue to work, some would be forced to step aside--they would often have no work, and would just write self-criticisms or do nothing; sometimes they would do manual labor. Almost all branch party secretaries stood aside. Somewhat fewer of the shop directors did so. Those who continued working often had to ask faction leaders ahead of time before making a decision. The conservatives (chi wei dui) were dispersed soon after their establishment. They only lasted 2-3 months. So they were never established in leadership roles. The rebels would assign a member to a shop to be in charge, usually one person who was familiar with production. This person would be in charge of propaganda and also in supervising (jiandu) the work of the shop director.

#### Building of the Revolutionary Committee

The RC was not established until early 1969, and the PLA reps. came in late 1968. So for almost 2 years there was a situation where the rebels led production. They had abolished several of the departments concerned with inspection and planning: the planning department, the technology department, the inspection department, and the dispatching (diaodu) department. These were completely abolished, and their members were sent to perform manual labor, or were dispersed to shops to continue performing technical or administrative work. In most cases the power of the ke were delegated to the shop, and the former department personnel were sent to the shops to help out. They established technical groups (jishu zu) in the shops, which handled all aspects of technical work, and similarly established a production group

which handled all aspects of administrative work. These two groups would handle all the work formerly done by the shop office--so this was a change largely in name.

The leading group of the plant no longer did its work. Directors, party secretaries, chief engineers, did not do work. The plant director and 2 engineers were put in a cowshed (niupeng) pending investigation. This was for 6mos to one year, but he doesn't remember clearly. The two engineers, for example, had historical problems. One had been a CCP organizer in KMT areas--underground Party. He was therefore suspected of being a spy and traitor. All of the above named were CCP members--both the chief engineers and the plant director. The plant director also had done underground work before 1949.

The party secretary also stood aside, so the entire leading group was out of business, and the rebel leaders led the plant. At that time no Party committee existed. For about two years there were no fixed administrative structures.

They criticized leading cadres during the period. They had criticism sessions in mass meetings. No hitting, but had to bow the head, do the 'airplane', confess to all the accusations, etc. But they were definitely manhandled, if not actually beaten. The shop director in I's shop, for example, was criticized for using powers over wage raises to get sexual favors from female workers. They made these people 'do the airplane' a lot at first, but as time went by, this was reduced.

During this period production continued, and I think they were completing their plans, but not well. What does 'not well' mean? For example, the machinery they were turning out was of poor quality. No one paid attention to quality, just wanted to work fast, get the output target met. So some bad goods were being sent out of the plant. I call this 'exaggeration' (fukua)--including not up-to-standard goods in the 'completed' category. This continued during the CR and after. Finally in 1973, the central authorities distributed an order on this quality control problem, saying that it was not correct practice to include bad goods in the complete category.

How did rebels run such a large plant? Many of them knew production well. One leader in particular was formerly a staff member in the diaodu ke. He knew about basic problems of running the entire plant, others also knew about production. They divided up the tasks in leading production. Some of the highest factional leaders supervised the entire plant's work, some in the leading group handled production, some politics, etc. And at each level of administration the leading cadres had mostly stood aside and were replaced by rebel leaders or were at least supervised by them. So a kind of informal structure of power laid over the plant leadership. Faction leaders at each level listened to leaders above. At the top were leaders divided into two groups--production and propaganda.

The rebel zaofan dui was Wang Hongwen's group in the city, and were by far the largest group in the plant and they were the ones to lead production during this period. Also there were several other smaller factions aligned with the zaofan dui, but they had their own names and organized identity, and their own opinions on matters. They disagreed and argued in wallposters about cadres' worthiness. This affected production because there were always meetings to iron out differences of opinion, and this took away production time for those who attended. Also, leaders of each faction did not take part in production, they were tuochan and spent all their time doing leadership work or attending meetings.



(2/8/80, 1.5 hrs)

### Military Representatives

In 1968, during the second half of the year, a team of military representatives, about 10, came to the plant to establish a great alliance. They had a fairly smooth time of it, since the rebel faction was already very large, and there were no great factional conflicts. No "military management committee" was established (junguan hui); they didn't need one because there was no great disorder in the plant. The great alliance was basically a process where all rebel organizations were unified into one. The PLA representatives went around and had talks with all the different faction heads, convinced them to unite, then later made propaganda about unity and the great alliance. This often meant criticism and self-criticism sessions to overcome old conflicts among these smaller groupings.

They established a 'great alliance study group' (da lianhe xuexi ban). The PLA reps called them together, established this group composed of various faction leaders (of these small groups). They were led in the study of central directives on unity among factions by the PLA reps. Different factions had criticism, self-criticism, and also apologized to other factions and acknowledged their past errors. Around 1970, about half the military reps left. The remaining 5 withdrew in 1971.

### Revolutionary Committee

The first condition for the creation of the RC was the great alliance, and the second was the liberation of cadres (jiefang ganbu). They established special investigation groups (zhuan an zu) for those cadres accused of having historical problems, and other serious questions, and they investigated these people's past activities. Other cadres were quickly 'liberated'. These cadres were able to sit on the RC. This liberation process only referred to leading cadres. At the branch party secretary level and above. There were also some from administrative, non-party positions, but almost all of these people were party members anyway.

The revolutionary committee had 32 members, and a standing committee of 11 members. The chairman of the RC was chosen by the Party committee of the municipal machinery and electricity bureau (ji dian ju). He was transferred in from another plant. There were two vice-heads, one mass representative, and one PLA representative. The original Party secretary of the plant was transferred to another unit at this time. The original plant director had stepped aside, and still was not liberated. They were investigating his case. He stayed in office, wrote self-criticisms there. He was too old to do manual labor. Later he became a member of the RC after being liberated, but he was just a member, not a chairman.

The revolutionary committee was so large because they had to have representatives from each shop, there were many shops and also many small factions in each shop. The mass representatives were people who had no historical or background problems, and who were nominated by their factions. The standing committee of the RC led all political and production work in the plant. The entire RC met about once a month, only when a special matter came up.

There were several 'groups' (zu) under the RC, made up of some of the former cadres from technical and administrative departments. There was the political group, doing the work of the former propaganda department; the organization group, doing the work of the former personnel department, security department, and labor and wages department; the production leadership department (shengchan zhihui bu), and the logistics (houqin) group; which took care of all livelihood and welfare matters, and ran the mess hall. These new groups,

formed after abolishing and combining the former departments (ke), lead the shops directly.

Some of the old staff members of the departments were in the shops, while some stayed at their plant-level administrative jobs. Some new members of the administrative staff came up from among the ranks of the rebel groups. They had originally attached themselves during the conduct of investigations during the CR, and many just stayed in the offices thereafter. The old departments were gradually re-established one by one. They re-established the technology (gongyi ke) and the designing departments in 1969, fairly early, soon after the PLA arrived.

There were no congresses of workers and staff. These stopped in 1966, and were not revived when I left in 1974. The Party Committee was re-established about 1 year after the re-establishment of the RC, in 1970. But first they re-established the Party's organizational life (zuzhi shenghuo), and re-established the offices of the branch secretaries in the shops. Only later was the top committee, the Party Committee with the party secretary's office, established. Right after the establishment of the great alliance study group there was a movement to 'grasp revolution, promote production', which was directed against the anarchism of the CR and which was led by this study group.

#### Informant's Personal Cultural Revolution Experience

Up until 1967, he was still a staff member, a technical cadre in the designing department. He requested to be sent down to the shops during that year. He selected a shop where the kind of work was interesting, and technically demanding. He knew the people who worked in this shop, he had good relations with them, and arranged for them to invite him to work there. He thought it was best to volunteer and get to pick your shop than being set down to a bad job. He worked in the tool shop's technical innovation small group (jishu gexin xiaozu). He spent part of his time during these years in the office, and part time on the shop floor. He designed machine parts, then used tools to fabricate them himself. He also helped out with problems of a technical nature at various points in the shop.

He did this work until 1972, when was transferred to the same shops technical group (jishu zu). This was an office job equivalent to a shop-level department, and was a staff office. He did designing work and other technical problem solving. He decided what steps were to be taken in the production of new parts, procedures, requirements, specifications, and the required amount of time to produce the piece. During this entire period, despite job changes, his wages did not change, nor did his classification on the wage scale.

#### Small Group Management

He does not remember much in concrete detail about small group management practices, since he did not work in a production group, but he is sure that there were no 'worker managers' in addition to group leaders in the production groups during 1967-71, while he was close to the shop floor. He did hear of people like 'safetyman' (anquan yuan) in small groups before the cultural revolution, but does not think they existed during and after.

There were some factional problems after the CR, mostly among people on different sides who had criticized one another. Later they might use any opportunity that arose to criticize these old enemies, especially if they were promoted to a position of power where they could get at their nemesis. But these were individual things, there were no overarching factions or striking conflicts in the plant in the early 1970s.