
PERSONAL DATA

Age: 34

Sex: Male

Education: lower middle school graduate, one year upper middle school

Total Years Relevant Experience: 10₁₂

Last Year of Relevant Experience: 1973 Year Left China: 1973

Initial Immigration Status: Legal

Native Place/Overseas Connections: Singapore OS, returned 1952

Class Background/Political Designation: OS/Revolutionary Martyr

OCCUPATIONAL HISTORY SUMMARY

- Positions Held: 1) Auto Building and Repair Plant, Canton, 1962-64, 1967-73
- a) Apprentice/repair worker, repair shop, 1962-64
 - b) Vice Head of Revolutionary Committee, Head of Special Investigation Group, 1967-71
 - c) Repair worker, Assistant Group Leader, Repair Shop, 1971-73
- 2) Machine Building Plant, Canton, 1965-66
- a) Repair worker, Assistant Group Leader, Repair Shop, 1965-66

Administrative Level of Work Unit/(No. of employees):

- 1) Municipal Transport Bureau/(900)
- 2) Municipal Transport Bureau/(300)

APPOINTMENTS: 8

TOTAL HOURS: 22

PAGES TEXT: 18

Occupational History (7/24/80, 3 hrs.)

The informant was born in Singapore in 1946. His father was Dai Ziliang, a wealthy capitalist and leader of the overseas Chinese community in Singapore-Malaya. He was invited back to Nanking in 1948 by the KMT, but refused. He went to Peking in 1949 to participate in the Committee for National Construction, and was the 12th ranking delegate to the National Political Consultative Conference. His father died in 1952, however. The CCP declared him a revolutionary martyr and gave a signed certificate from Mao Zedong himself sent to his widow. At that time the state took care of the costs of raising the children of revolutionary martyrs, so his older sister brought him and the rest of the children back to China in 1952. All the children were covered by this 'martyr's certificate' which was signed by Mao, and it gave each of them 20¥ per month as a pension until the age of 18, as long as they were in school and not working. He attended school in Canton until age 16, at which time he became an apprentice after the first year of upper middle school (in 1962). He had a very special background (chushen)--both the best and worst possible. On the one hand, he was a son of a revolutionary martyr, while on the other hand he was an overseas Chinese. So they never completely trusted him.

His first work unit was the Canton Auto Building and Repair plant, about 900 employees, under the municipal transport (yunshu) bureau. After 2½ years, he was promoted from his job as a repairman on auto chassis to a technical worker earlier than was usual because of good performance, and was transferred to a new machine building plant under the same transport bureau, where he was a worker in a repair group, and assistant group leader. He was not formally transferred to the unit but 'borrowed' (jieyong) with the understanding that he would return to the original unit. The machinery plant had over 300 workers.

He worked in this new unit until 1967. He had been active in the rebel faction--Red Flag--but was not really an extremist. His thinking gradually moved toward a middle of the road position by the end of the movement. In late 1967 he was chosen to be a member of a worker propaganda team by the members of the Military Control Group (junshi guanzhi xiaozu). Then he went to a local middle school for about 6 months. They chose who they thought were reliable people and trained them. He was the vice-head of the team.

In early 1968 he returned to his original unit, and was elected as one of two vice heads of the revolutionary committee. He was also the head of a special investigation group. He was a leader of the cleaning of the class ranks campaign, the anti-May 16 elements campaign. His power was very great at that time, though he was only 23 years old. He was vice-head of the revolutionary committee, and concentrated on work as the head of a special investigation group. Then in 1970, when the yida sanfan campaign began, he stayed in the office every day for about 7-8 months to write a document, a history of the plant, to prepare for the struggle, criticism, and transformation part of the movement. He is rather proud of the fact that nobody committed suicide in the unit while he was head of the special investigation group, but later during the yida sanfan, when he was not directly involved, 3 people killed themselves.

He gradually became disenchanted with this, and his thinking changed over time. He did not like investigating people for all kinds of small things and then accuse them of serious crimes, and see them commit suicide. He was upset about this, but the Party leader in the plant made light of this, saying

"10 deaths is just a single wound", meaning that in a revolution people die. Also, about this time his younger sister, a university student, went insane as a result of being struggled as a capitalist's child during the cleaning of the class ranks campaign. This had a strong affect on his thinking. He no longer had a taste for this kind of thing. So after he turned the document in to the special investigation group hward and the revolutionary committee head, he told him he had seen the movement through to completion, and didn't want to be an official, and volunteered to return to the shop floor. So he went back to the group whose leader was his old master from his apprentice days, and he was chosen assistant group leader. This was 1971.

In 1972, he applied to leave China. Since his status was special and he had family connections with people in the National People's Congress like Liao Chengzhi, and the head of the Democratic League, Hu Yuzhi, both of whom knew his father and family. His father had also been a member of the democratic league. So he wrote letters to these people, as did his older brother who was now head of Singapore's overseas Chinese organization. So in November 1973 his application was approved and he came to Hong Kong. His application was pushed through in Peking, not by his unit.

Wages (7/25/80, 3 hrs.)

Apprentices, when they first start, are paid 20¥, 22 and then 25¥ over the next two years. Each year they must be assessed in their small groups. The results are written down in a report and then given to the shop party branch secretary, who discusses the case with the shop director. Then he has to approve, but he rarely overturns the group's discussion. After that you are a grade 1 worker. The wages depend on the wage region, city, and industrial sector, with heavy industry being a few yuan higher than light industry. In his plant this was 39.5 ¥ for a grade 1 worker.

From 1956-59, after the apprenticeship period was finished, they assessed people's ability and could set them at grade one or higher. After the Peng Dehuai affair and the beginning of the three years of economic hardship, they had everyone set automatically at grade 1. Actually, the document that came down in 1960 or so did not actually change the previous policy, it just said you can't increase total wage bills in plants. So in effect this prohibited setting people any higher. There was also a regulation saying that after one year they should be given a technical test by the technical department, and then raised another grade if they passed. But after 1960 there was nothing to test, since everyone would certainly pass. The definition of a grade one technical worker in the wage grade technical standards handbook was that the person could finish a job under the direction of the master. Grade 2 was that they could finish the work if the master handed it over to them. So in effect everyone would easily pass, so they just gave up testing and raised people automatically. After four years of working they could certainly reach grade 2 requirements.

During the period 1966-71 there were some workers who were stuck at grade one, but were ordinary workers or were skilled workers set at grade 1 who had not gone through the apprenticeship period. They were in bad luck because there were no readjustments during this period, yet there was no document covering them as there was for workers going through the apprenticeship program. They simply fell between the rules and had bad luck.

The proportion of skilled workers to ordinary workers depended on the technical nature of production. Eighty percent of the workers in his plant were skilled workers. The ordinary workers did heavy manual labor and service work like moving and sweeping. No technical skills were required. There were a few young workers who were ordinary workers. These were older workers who never had any technical skill, or were women from households. As time

goes by the ordinary workers became fewer. There are more of them in light industry.

They had a readjustment around the time he came in 1963, and did not have another one until 1973, when years of service (gongling) was the most important criteria. So most workers were grade three and below, the largest amount at grade 2. From 1963-73 nobody got a raise at all. So age was the best indicator of one's standard of living. And the best off were the middle-aged technical workers.

Contract and Temporary Labor

They never had any contract workers in their factory, even though it was quite common for them to be hired from the communes. They also had contract workers come from service stations (fuwu zhan) on the streets. They did have temporary workers, they were assigned by the labor bureau. After the cultural revolution they had even more, because of the young people returning from the countryside. These people were 'registered workers' (dengju laodong ren yuan). They are assigned by the Canton labor bureau, which handles work assignments of all those people without work or educational units. If you don't have a unit, they handle your case. These registered workers include returned youth, overseas chinese, people who had moved from other cities, people who have turned down work assignments. They register at street service stations, and the names go to the bureau.

They usually don't work for more than a year. But if they work longer it is because they are good and have a good chance of becoming a regular worker during the next time the factory gets permission to expand its labor force. They did ordinary work mostly, but there were some technical workers among them. Some made more than others, largely due to skills. They usually made around 40¥. There were very few of these workers in the plant, less than 5%, and there was no basic change in the system while he was there. It was not cancelled during the cultural revolution.

Punishments, Discipline

Punishments depend on the nature of the problem. They had legal violations, also political violations. For these two things, the security department of the factory, not the shops and groups, handled the problem. The others were work-related problems--attendance, work attitude. Others had to do with violating the technical responsibilities of your job (zeren), and also carelessness (shuhu) on the job. Technical responsibilities include quality, following specifications. The second includes forgetting to do things like fasten down a part of the auto, forget to put oil back in the motor. Finally, there are morals (daode) problems. This includes lifestyle problems, sex, cheating others.

For moral problems, the first step is the self-criticism, second is the shop offers opinions in your case to the plant, then the plant decides whether or not to give a warning (jinggao). This is a form with spaces filled out by the plant director and the head of the security department. It is affixed with the seal of the security department and plant director, then put into the person's file. This stays in your file all your life, and even after you die this file remains on you, they never destroy it. The final punishment is to turn the case over to public security, in which case the legal system handles you, and you can be sent to labor reform, but they didn't call this firing. The workers' files are handled by the security department. The cadres' by the organization department.

You cannot lower a worker's wage. You can only remove a worker from the plant on criminal offenses. So in effect you can't expel a worker. There are also workers who are under control (guanzhi), they continually have to report all their movements and behavior to security of the plant

for a period of time. This is the lightest criminal punishment, and this does not include expulsion.

For carelessness or violating technical responsibilities, first is a written self-criticism, then it is read to the group. Then the group expresses their opinions and criticisms about his behavior. Then a report goes to the shop director, who will write a commentary (pishi) on it, usually saying 'his work is usually good, no need for punishment'. These kinds of things do not go into the file. The most common types of punishment in the plant was self-criticism in the small group.

Small Group Management (7/26/80, 3 hrs.)

There are three leaders. A group leader, assistant group leader, and a political study leader (called the gonghui zuzhang). The group leader is almost always a party member and is usually over 30. The assistant group leader is usually an experienced worker, but not necessarily a party member. The political study group leader is usually a youthful activist who is either a party member or youth league member. The shop leadership appoints all three of these people.

The group study leader leads all political study meetings. He sets the agenda after getting orders from the branch secretary, leads the discussions, writes up reports to the secretary on the results. In effect he is under the leadership of the shop branch party secretary. The informant held this position while he was an apprentice. The reports they send to the party secretary are the notes they have taken on what everyone says in the meetings. If there is no young party activist in the group they will transfer one in from a group that has two.

The group leader and vice-leader are to make sure that the quotas are fulfilled. The group leader takes part in manual labor, but does not have a fixed post. Sometimes he fills in for absent workers. Sometimes he is busy solving problems, helping run the group, but has no concrete tasks. He has no quota to fulfill. Sometimes the same is true for the assistant group leader, but this depends on the group's work. The group leader also has another responsibility, that is to take care of technical problems with machines in the shop. He is to keep an eye on situations and solve them if he can. The assistant group leader works with the leader, helps him in the same kind of work. He usually is someone who the Party is training for future promotion.

They had worker 'yuan' in his production group before the cultural revolution. But they only had group leaders, the study leader, and a security person (zhi an baowei yuan 治安保卫员), who was under the security department, before 1963 or so. Around 1964 or so they expanded to several more yuan in the groups.

The security worker (zhian baowei yuan) was the eyes and ears of the security department. He did basic level investigation work for them. The work of the security department began to increase around 1961 when Mao started to raise slogans about class struggle. When this started, security department personnel had low grades, low status, and little power.

In each shop there was a worker who was appointed 'security chief' (zhibao zhuren), which was not a full time office position but something he did in his spare time. He led all the security workers in the small groups. He in turn reported to the security department. None of these people got out of their normal work responsibilities, were not cadres, just informants. All of these workers were considered politically reliable, and were party members.

Why is a person unhappy with the amount of food he has to eat? Why is he expressing contrary opinions about things? The security department

would hear these things and put the material in people's files. They did not come to any conclusions, they just put their doubts and suspicions down on paper and put it in the dangan. He knows this because during the cultural revolution, as leader of the special investigation group, he read many of these kinds of things. This kind of material was used during the four cleans and cultural revolution and it was very intimidating then when people were confronted with things they said five years before.

They also had the power to organize investigations about people who they had doubts about--into their family history and class backgrounds. Generally, the security department was to guard the buildings, fixed capital and state property, also to make sure the constitution and laws were followed in general. As an indication of the power of the security department: if the head of the production department asked him where he went after work, he wouldn't have to answer, but if someone from the security department asked, he did not dare not answer, he had to. His major point is that this organization, originally established to enforce the laws, later began an organ for suppressing people. Since the death of Mao they have reduced in power.

Other 'yuan': The 'production safetyman' (shengchan anquan yuan) is responsible for safety work in the group. If you can't smoke, he is supposed to remind workers. He is supposed to know safety regulations and see that they are followed by the remaining workers. He also is supposed to raise suggestions for new safety rules. He raises suggestions at meetings. This was the way it was supposed to be. In reality these people were not particularly active or outstanding in their work. They got no extra money for this, no supplement or favors.

The quality inspector (zhiliang jiancha yuan) raises opinions and suggestions about completed product quality. He has a fixed inspection routine. At the end of each day he would pull out selected pieces from the completed lots, and subject them to simple tests for quality. He is not under the leadership of the group leader--he couldn't be. But he was under the leadership of the quality inspection workers at the shop level who were under shop leadership. This person has a fairly high technical level.

The cost accountant (chengben hesuan yuan). Every day in the auto repair group, each worker in the repair group filled out a form saying how many hours they worked on each car, and they signed it. The accounting person takes all these forms from workers, adds them up on a form for the entire group which summarizes the number of worker-hours (gongshi) spent on each car. He uses about half an hour work time on this, starts about 4:30 in the afternoon right before the end of the shift. Then he sends the forms to an accountant at the shop office who fills out a report for the entire shop. The form filled out by the workers also includes non-production time spent in performing special 'yuan' duties, talking over quality problems with workers, etc. This is one category filled in on the form. Workers generally did not write false figures in these reports because there was no reason to, you wouldn't be penalized. He did not calculate materials used, just took hours. You can also call this man the 'timekeeper' (laoqin yuan 老勤员).

Some groups do not need to calculate costs or work hours like this. They don't need small-group level economic calculation. This is the case for production lines, chemical and steel plants. When this is the case, this person becomes a timekeeper (laoqin yuan, or attendance keeper).

These yuan are selected after group discussions, and approval of the shop. But the shop usually does not overturn these nominations. Usually if workers object strongly to someone, they will not be selected. But the group leaders are all appointed by the shop leadership. And the security worker in the group is also appointed, by the security department itself.

Meetings

At the very least, there are production meetings at the beginning, end and middle of the month. The meetings center around the completion of the group's production quotas for the month. The beginning of the month meeting is to discuss the month's quotas and prepare for completion. At the middle of the month they assess progress and if they are behind, they discuss problems and what is wrong. At the end of the month they sum up their work and experience, and analyze their performance.

These meetings are held during off-hours, from 5pm to 6pm, after the shift. Other than this, there were no other fixed meetings, but they did have meetings for birth control now and then, and they also had special meetings for different purposes--for campaigns to practice economy, for example. Campaigns for safety were held from time to time, and also on quality. It depended on the particular problem at the time. There were meetings for wage readjustments, and meetings to get workers to support the job assignments of their children who have just graduated from school. The more he thinks about it, the more he remembers all kinds of extra meetings, besides production and politics. There were usually 3-4 meetings per week for one hour after work.

Quotas

The quotas for groups were set at the shop level and given to the groups. The group leaders knew ahead of time what the quotas would be, had already gone to meetings with other group leaders and shop directors to distribute the quota. If there were any objections, they were ironed out beforehand by discussions with shop leaders. These group leaders are not stupid, they know they have to check out these quotas beforehand and ask opinions. Sending down quotas is a process, they just don't send down orders. That way contradictions between shop and group leaders will not arise. The shop leaders have to make quotas based on knowledge of conditions in the group. He feels this is a good method, very effective, it eliminates problems.

Quotas are set at the group level, not at the individual level. This was true both for his auto repair group and his machinery factory. They couldn't set them at the individual level because workers were at different pay grades, some were older than others, and the age and wage criteria contradict one another. Young workers are paid less, but can do more. So how can you set a quota? Also, it was not necessary because the individual bonuses were so small. They did have individual quotas in collective factories.

Because the quotas are set by the month, people concentrate on finishing by the end of the month. Often production is fairly slack at the beginning of the month. Often they are waiting for materials and parts. Near the last 7 to 9 days of the month things speed up. This is a widespread situation. Especially in the machinery factory, they put on a big push after the 27th of the month or so. They would often work 12 hours a day if they were behind in the quota. If they work overtime, they were paid proportionately to their regular hourly rate. But this only if the factory got permission to pay overtime, then workers would later be entitled to compensation leave during the next month when they asked for it, equal to number of hours of overtime worked. Workers usually did not refuse overtime, but could if they had a good reason in occasional individual cases.

If the group doesn't finish, the group leader has to explain why, but there is no punishment.

Inspections (7/30/80, 3 hrs.)

At irregular intervals, all the quality inspectors of the small groups meet with the shop director and the technician which the technical department stations in the shop. When they had important quality problems in the repair shop, the group leaders would attend also. The technicians in the shop is under the orders of the department, and is there to help the shop director, mostly with quality problems.

In factories like machine building, they have a system where every product must be inspected before they leave the factory, usually several times. And they have specialized inspection personnel who are stationed in the shop. When they hold quality meetings, the shop director leads them, and the shop's technician, group leaders, and the groups' quality inspectors take part. If the problem cannot be solved, then they notify the chief engineer or the technical department and ask them to help solve the problem. Most of the shop directors are familiar with most technical problems because they are promoted from among old skilled workers. Earlier they were usually grade 6,7,8, but more recently they have been promoted from among grades 3,4,and 5. The highest authority on technical matters was the plant engineer, in a middle-sized factory, and a chief engineer (zong gongchengshi) in a large scale factory. These are university graduates with at least 20 years of experience or so, not always party members. But the special characteristic of China's system is that the technical system has a secondary status. The head of the technical department does not always have specialized training, and certainly his experience and grade is not as high as the engineer, but he is always a party member. So he gets to lead a department, while the engineer is like an advisor, with no real leadership powers which are fixed. They can either listen to him or not as they please. The directors of the factory mostly were old skilled workers who had joined the party and been promoted over the years, while a smaller proportion were intellectuals who had joined the party after middle school and had moved up in the party.

There is a contradiction between people who work in quality inspection and on product fulfillment. The group leader and shop director tend to say "Oh, that's just a small thing. Forget it!" when a quality inspection worker makes a suggestion. There is also a contradiction sometimes for the same reason between the shop director and the head of the technical department. So since they are of equal grades, they have to refer the dispute to the plant director to solve. The technician in charge of quality inspection at the shop level is under the department's leadership, and he has no power himself. He too is only an 'advisor' to the shop director.

Four Cleans Movement

They had it, but it was very short. The movement, according to what he knows, started earlier in commercial and business organizations, and in light industry and food processing. This is because this is primarily a movement for clean economics. This was Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, and An Ziwen's policy. An was head of the organization department of the party. But these people did not bring up the issue of 'enemies'. They treated the contradictions uncovered as 'among the people'.

In the first stages of the movement, it was like the san fan campaign of the 1950s. Mostly against corruption, and they treated things like 'internal' contradictions among the people. But after a few months they changed to the opinion that some economic problems could turn into political problems--a contradiction with the enemy. This is the difference between the early and later 20 points. Deng Xiaoping was party secretary then, and Kang Sheng was probably drafting these policies. But if you read these documents they are really theoretical and not very concrete. So Deng probably

figured "how am I supposed to run this campaign? There are no concrete measures of problems here." This is probably also what happened when the documents reached the units.

Their factory, around 1965, had a work team come in which was cadres assigned by the bureau. These cadres were at the city district or department head level. They came to the plant and just held study meetings. These cadres may have previously worked in the bureau, while some may have come from other factories. But all were assigned by the bureau. The head of the group was at the plant director level.

They had a meeting to introduce the 4 cleans policy, a mass meeting (jiaodai zhengce), after which they had small group discussions. The second stage, they had meetings where members of the group went to talk with workers and cadres, asked them to confess and give self-examinations or reveal problems of others. after which they would get those reported on to do self-examinations. Most of the problems involved were economic ones. There were no criticism meetings or wall posters.

They did find two to three people with problems. The most serious was a man who engaged in corruption, skimming money off the canteen's operations. He had sold grain ration tickets to workers. It totaled over 1000¥. He was given three years of labor reform. They were easy on him because he had a good attitude and confessed fully.

Another person was caught planning an escape to Hong Kong, and another was a cadre in trouble for illicit sexual relations. They put the first under control (guanzhi) by the security department, while the second was given internal party criticisms, and transferred to another factory where he continued as a shop director.

The influence of this movement was not great. But there were some interesting things happening. For example, there was a grade 3 skilled worker who worked in the tool storeroom. He had taken a tool and written "Long Live Khrushchev!" on the wall of the factory. When this was discovered, and reported to the security department, they called an all-plant mass meeting immediately. They demanded that the person responsible confess. If he confessed that day, they would be lenient. If they caught him later, they would be severe. So the next day the guy went to the security department to confess. So the public security department sent three people over to investigate. They suspected that his attitude was that since Khrushchev was for material incentives and high bonuses, this man was protesting his wage level and was dissatisfied. So upon investigation, they found that he had good class background, father was a worker, and he had no other problems, had been active in criticism and political study, so they ended up being lenient and simply recording in his file the incident (jiguo). This punishment (jiguo) is between an oral warning and expulsion. After three such written reprimands, you could be expelled. Since he had confessed freely and was of good class background, he was lucky. If he hadn't confessed or had a bad chushen, he would at least gotten 2 years of labor reform.

Cultural Revolution

At the beginning of the cultural revolution, the city party committee pulled a number of cadres out of each bureau and transferred to others temporarily to be members of work teams. They shifted them out of their old units because they didn't want the movement to be stalled by people trying to save face (qingmian) for their friends. This was in 1966. The work teams, when they went to the factories, used the same basic measures as the four cleans work teams, but the document they were working with specified that their object was to uncover 'capitalist roaders within the party'. So when they came to plants they tried to get people to reveal problems and behavior of cadres who were party members, but not worker party members.

They were looking at people's 'party morals' (daode). They wanted to find out if these cadres had said anything suspicious or done anything suspicious in the past, for example saying that there were too many rightists labelled in past campaigns. On this account they also went after the worker party members. But for the cadres, they also looked at personal morals. Whether they had violated any laws, whether they had illicit sexual relations, borrowed money but did not repay, whether they had encouraged favors or gifts from workers, taken special privileges for themselves.

Just like during the four cleans, they held meetings, investigated, and collected materials and information on people. But the people in top positions were able to protect themselves, even though in many areas their problems were the greatest--in their currying of favor with the bureau level and other factory directors, in their use of repaired cars for their personal business or for friends. But the middle and lower level cadres were the ones who got attacked, mostly for minor things. So they got a few shop directors, department heads and staff members. The leading cadres would not allow themselves to be cross-examined.

So they investigated people, had them write self-examinations. There were only about 5-6 people caught during this stage. An example: there was a man, the vice-head of the materials department, who had entered the party some years before after having reported seven years of education in his village. But they found out he really had only five years. Also he had a high income (170¥), no dependents, so he really liked to live well, wear nice clothes. So they accused him of false reporting and rich lifestyle unbecoming a Party member. He was given internal party discipline.

There were wallposters put up by activists among the workers. They wrote wallposters criticizing the middle-level cadres based on materials given them by the work team. They were activists and young party members. This situation lasted about two months. This was during the period when Mao left Peking and swam the Yangzi river, but he forgets the time of the year exactly. They did have criticism meetings after problems were uncovered, but these were within the small groups in the departments, and were not mass meetings or struggle sessions. They did also investigate worker party members who did not have leading positions, but they had never gotten around to criticizing them. But these middle and lower level cadres were all workers who had been raised. This gave rise to dissatisfactions in the next stage and accusations that work teams had suppressed the working class.

First Stage of the Cultural Revolution (7/31/80, 3 hrs.)

The biggest problem with the work teams was that when they investigated party members they took no heed of your class background. Also, each work team had to come up with one or two people with political thought problems, called 'sanfan fenzi', three-anti elements. This meant anti-party, anti-socialism, and anti-Mao thought. This was just to show that they were doing their jobs. These were not necessarily party members who were being caught. But when you add together all the thousands of units in the city of Canton with a couple of such victims in each, you're talking about over 10,000 people, many lower-level cadres, and many ordinary people among the masses, who were labelled as having political problems.

So there were two directions taken by the work teams: 1) investigating party members (mostly cadres, 'capitalist roaders within the party'), and 2) investigating people of all sorts who had political problems, the 'three anti elements'.

This second part of the task was to root out the 'new class enemies' (xin jieji diren). In his unit they were only preparing to implement the second stage. They were investigating things people said to friends, looking

at people's activities, asking friends to reveal things, getting people to make small self-criticisms. Everyone was fearful during this period that somehow they might be caught in some sort of error. In his plant, right before the work teams were withdrawn, they appeared to be zeroing in on three ordinary workers for 'opposing socialism'. One of them, he remembers, had said some nasty things about his neighborhood committee small group leader who he had personal problems with. These were reported, and then they investigated his behavior in the plant and found that he sometimes came in late, left early, and broke things--a pattern that indicated that he really opposed socialism. They were investigating him very closely. In general, they investigated anything that might indicate that you were 'dissatisfied with socialism'--work habits, speech, personal relations, and lifestyle, anything.

Second Stage of the Cultural Revolution

Mao returned to Peking and didn't like the way Liu Shaoqi had been 'preparing the tea', even though he had been doing so according to long practiced campaign methods from the sanfan, wufan, and anti-rightist campaigns of both 1957 and 1959. So Mao demanded an immediate withdrawal of the work teams.

The work team suddenly left their factory. Then about 50 Red Guards from middle schools came to the factory to participate in production and encourage workers to form their own mass organizations. They were spread fairly evenly through the plant, and at their height there were about 100 students there.

The earliest worker's organization to form were the "Worker's Scarlet Guards" (gongren chiwei dui), and he thinks most of the early organizations in factories at this time had this name. These people were mostly the activist workers who were the 'security workers', under the leadership of the plant security department, in the small groups. They were loyal to the plant director. They were the leaders. They demanded that people had to have a class background under the 'five red categories', and have been loyal activists all along, very often also group study leaders, union group leaders. Since these were people who were loyal and under the leadership of the plant director and the security department, they were under the informal leadership of the security department head, and listened to his opinions. They did not want to 'five black categories' to participate and disrupt things.

But later there was a directive from Mao which said that the object was not 'people in the party' (dangnei) taking the capitalist road, but 'people in power in the party' (dangquan). When this happened, the people who had been suppressed earlier and prevented from organizing, began to form all kinds of mass organizations.

These people in the second organization ignored class background, claimed that the object of struggle was leading cadres and not the masses. The basic difference between these two organizations was attitude toward the status quo (xianshi). The first group was satisfied, they were the activists of twenty years standing. The others were dissatisfied. The reaction of the authorities to them was that their class backgrounds were bad, and that they were therefore counter-revolutionary organizations. There were about 7-8 organizations of this second kind of faction in the plant. They had many names--worker rebels (gongren zaofan dui), and many others. They were helped by the students in organizing. They did not organize according to shop lines, they were fairly spread out. These were people who were earlier turned down by the Scarlet Guards. At this early stage, there were no party members or Communist youth league members in these groups. As time went on, however, these kinds of people began to join, but this was in later stages of the movement. Most of the early members had some sort of historical problem

or bad class background.

At this stage, there were still about 1/3 of the people in the shops who did not participate. But the amount uninvolved shrank as time went on, and the second group of newer organizations were not so choosy about member's backgrounds, so they grew larger. The Scarlets became fairly passive (beidong) after the orders to go after the 'people in power'. Since they were conservative, how could they go after the leaders they had been loyal to?

The second group of organizations freely struggled the leaders for a number of months. They could struggle just about any leader they wanted. So by this time most of the leaders either had 'stood aside' or simply didn't dare do any work. Leaders at all levels didn't dare take responsibilities, didn't dare lead. They held a lot of meetings with workers instead of giving orders.

Another problem which became important during this period was that materials supply became very tight. Also labor disruption became very lax. Workers left early, came late, walked around in other shops smoking cigarettes and drinking tea. Things were really 'liberalized' (ziyou hua).

PLA Involvement in Canton

In the beginning of 1967, the PLA dispatched "PLA support the left groups" (jiefang jun zhizuo xiaozu) to the factories. As soon as they arrived, they announced that the Scarlets were the 'revolutionary' organization. After this happened the PLA and the scarlet members started to hold struggle meetings against former leaders. But the struggle and criticism they gave them was not as fierce as the other organizations did before. He thinks the Scarlets may have started holding struggle sessions to convince the PLA that they were really revolutionaries.

The PLA at the time was the only organization that Mao could rely on. They did not want to revive the party organization. So this was the second time that those satisfied with the status quo were in power. He says that this was the situation in Guangdong, and also in Hunan, Hubei, and Sichuan. After the PLA group came, the more radical organizations retreated and didn't dare oppose what was going on and became more inactive and passive. Also, a number of people dropped out of membership in these organizations, and more people began to join the scarlets. So the PLA, concerned about the small size of the Scarlets, ordered them to 'further develop' their organization and not be so strict about member's class backgrounds. The PLA told them they would not let them seize power unless their membership was larger, a majority of workers.

In his factory, the PLA had not declared any of the organizations 'counter-revolutionary', but in the city at large they had already declared about 10 or so to be such, and had arrested some of their members. But in his factory they just didn't support the other organization. But they knew what was going on outside and they knew the PLA was not joking around, and were quite serious.

Under these conditions, the Scarlet organizations and those like them were supported by the PLA after March 1967 were formed into a city-wide faction called 'East Wind' (dongfeng). They said that the PLA's actions in support of the left were correct, but others dissented and sympathised with those 10 organizations that were declared counter-revolutionary and broken up. So they organized themselves into the 'Red Flag' faction. In Hunan, Fujian, and Guangxi during this period, the PLA opened fire on groups that opposed it, but this did not happen in Guangdong. They were more civilized.

But they did not solve the factional problem. There were still factions and many opposed the PLA, city-wide, although not in his plant. At this time the informant was a member of the Red Flag faction and had been a member of the earlier organization in the plant before the PLA came. He was a member of the 'Red Flag worker rebel group'. Their group supported the old plant director, and wanted him to be in the new leading group, while the East Wind favored the old Party secretary. This was the most disorderly period in Canton, and after the two organizations formed and opposed one another in Canton and in his factory, they closed down production for about 2-3 months. This was in the summer of 1967. They didn't go to work, all public buses were shut down. People occupied key buildings and there was armed struggle.

After this they shifted around the PLA teams, and theirs was removed and a new one came to the factory. This is because the faction problem had become so large. When the PLA came their goal was to resolve this contradiction, conciliate the two factions, which Zhou Enlai had recently declared as both revolutionary. So the new policy was that both organizations were revolutionary.

But another problem occurred during this period. Guns were leaking out of the factory arms stores and into the hands of East Wind. So the Red Flag was making pellet guns from steel tubing. So an important question became who would manage the arms stores. These were the kinds of problems the PLA faced in trying to restore production and reconcile the two factions. At this time they started the organization of the Revolutionary Committee.

Revolutionary Committee (8/1/80, 2 hrs.)

Through this entire period of disorder, basic-level organizations, like the small groups with their leaders and group members, still existed and operated on those days when people came to work. The political atmosphere was very strict, the security organs were still operating and sending down documents (like the '6 points on public security'--gongan liutiao, of 1967), people had to continue to do their everyday work or else they might be accused of being non-revolutionary. Actually the security department had been paralyzed, but the PLA group took up its functions. They handled the personnel files then. In reality, the people who have management authority (guanli quanwei) in China are those who control the files. The files for the plant-level leadership, shop directors, department heads and party branch secretaries are kept in the bureau offices. He realizes how great the power is of those who control the files because he was in control of them for a period in the last stages of the CR, and everyone was extremely polite to him then.

The PLA group organized groups, starting at the small group level, to discuss and nominate people for the revolutionary committee. Then the entire shop votes for the 16 or so, and chooses 4-5. These are secret ballots. Then, in the six shops there are over 30 candidates, and they had another secret ballot to select 13. So there was a three-level election process. At each step the candidates went through criticism and examination sessions, where they gave self-criticism. The people gave self-examinations orally and were cross-examined. After that, they cast ballots. The ballots were divided into sections. You had to vote for leading cadres, workers, ordinary cadres (staff) and also women's representatives. You have a choice within each category.

During the process the PLA tried to assure that there would be fairly equal representation of the two factions, in order to reduce factionalism as an issue. They had the power to cancel the results of the elections if they were not properly representative, but they never had to exercise this

power. The PLA did not sit on the committee. The committee only had these 13 members. After the RC was formed, the PLA 'support the left' group left a few months later. The process went fairly smoothly in their plant, and he thinks the elections were a success. They were one of the first factories to be able to form a revolutionary committee. This was in the last half of 1967. But factional feelings continued strong until 1968.

The head of the RC was the former plant director. The PLA group supported him because they found that the majority of the people of the plant supported him. There were three department-level cadres: the former head of the finance department (a woman), the former vice-head of the production department, and a shop director. There were two ordinary cadres, staff members from the materials and technology departments. There were two vice-heads, both mass representatives. One was the informant, and the other was a former member of the East Wind. They were both workers and very active from early in the movement. They had made no mistakes. There were four other mass representatives, all workers and participants in a faction.

The members who were elected from among the masses were those who were especially good at giving speeches, convincing people, and thinking well on their feet. The two that were chosen were those in the 'masses' section who got the most votes. Also, those who got the least votes were those who were not very good at public speaking.

They also selected two mass representatives, one to be on the bureau RC, one on the city RC. They were both party members, both early activists, and both, like Kuai Dafu in Peking, had been labelled by the work teams in the first stage of the cultural revolution. They were opponents of the first PLA 'support the left' group and the East Wind faction. One of them had been the technical department head, another a vice-head of the materials department. One of them had a father who was an official in the KMT in Canton--a workers' representative on the city committee.

The RC had not yet divided into core leading group and regular members--this would come a year later. The members still did their regular work in the shops. At that time the bureau did not exercise very close supervision over them, their RC was still split and had not yet settled down. This would take another year or so before they began to supervise the factory. But in the meantime the RC organized itself for a series of campaigns. This was their main work for the ensuing period. The PLA was still there during the beginning of the period, they stood and watched the new RC operate and wanted to make sure they handled well the work of rooting out class enemies. They ran the 'cleaning of the class ranks' campaign, the 'campaign of party consolidation and party building' (zhengdang jiandang), the 'yida sanfan', and 'dispersion in preparation for war' (zhanbei shusan gongzuo)--this meant banishment of bad elements to the countryside, people who were under the categories specified by the '6 points on public security', and an 'anti May 16 elements' campaign which was largely propaganda, but which had no real concrete effect on the unit.

After Lin Biao died in 1971, there were a series of movements to restore the administrative structure, transfer in new department heads and directors, and get mass representatives to hand over power to these returned cadres. This was when Deng came back to power again. At this time the mass representatives wanted very badly to enter the Party and have their authorization (bianzhi) changed from worker to cadre. As long as they were not party members and still had a worker designation, they could be sent back to their shop floor to workers jobs at any time. This started around 1972, and in some respects even in 1971.

Campaigns and Investigations (8/2/80, 3 hrs.)

After the RC was formed the PLA support-the-left group was fairly passive. At this time they still had not established the city revolutionary committee. In fact all the campaigns in their factory after the establishment of the plant RC were led by the Military Control Group in the bureau (junguan hui). Power was held mainly by them at this time. They forwarded documents down to the plant, and approved all the reports of the RC on their activities, gave comments and orders.

The first order of business after the establishment of the RC was the cleaning of the class ranks campaign. The first to be grabbed were six people, four of whom were activists in the Red Flag, and two of whom were people with historical problems--old 'yundong yuan' (as he refers to them, the common slang term for habitual targets of movements and campaigns, it is a pun which means athlete). One of them had a father who was in the KMT. Of the four Red Flag activists, one was one of the 13 members of the revolutionary committee. Why did they grab these six people? Because the leader of the factory's PLA group told them they were ordered by the PLA control group in the bureau to choose six people. The PLA group in the factory was the representative of the bureau. They had to listen to them, and the PLA group, under the influence of the East Wind faction, chose these six people.

Five people from the revolutionary committee were members of the campaign office. The members were the RC head, two vice-heads (including the informant), and two party members who were on the RC. They also formed a 'special investigation group' (zhuan'an zu), the only one in the plant since it was a small plant, had 11 members. Then the group divided labor according to who was being investigated. The heads of the special investigation group were the RC head and the informant, who was vice-head of the RC. But since the head of the RC did not have time to lead the group's concrete work, and since he didn't want to, the informant was in charge of the special investigation group's work.

They established a 'cowshed' during this period. They had one once before, earlier in the movement to keep '3-anti' (sanfan) elements, and it was run by the security department. They investigated the cases of each person under suspicion, and sent people to all the places where these people had grown up, and cross examined people about this person's behavior and history. It was really a headache and a lot of work. And they had to pay the expenses of all these investigations, so it was expensive too. The whole process took 1-2 months. After their investigation was completed they filled out a long report on each person. While these investigations went on, these people were kept in the cowshed, wrote self-examinations, were taken out for struggle-criticism sessions. Two of these people were older and were attacked largely for their class backgrounds, and the other four, members of the Red Flag, were accused of armed struggle, which they tied together with historical problems they investigated.

The special investigation group set the punishments and decided all the cases. At the end, they couldn't come up with any real crimes. So they did not come to a conclusion in their cases, and just let them return to work after two months as if nothing had happened. Except the one who was a member of the RC, who was removed from that position.

There were another 10 people who were put in cowsheds and investigated during this period. Some people were declared counter-revolutionaries because they said that the PLA had decided to end the CR. This was declared to be opposition to Mao's Thought. There were also a number of people who had just criticized the movement, wondering why so many people had been killed.

(The informant estimates several hundred thousand in all China). They were attacked for opposing the movement. This whole process took about six months.

How did they decide to investigate people? Usually oral reports from the masses. People would report something someone had said or done, doubt would grow, then an investigation might start. Members of the East Wind faction often reported on Red Flag members. Also units from outside would report on people, ask about them (because their relatives also had problems, or someone had made a report on them), or simply the PLA leader would order the special investigation group to investigate someone.

The people who had bad class backgrounds (the five black categories) would be put under control of the special investigation group, meaning that they had to report to them every day. The others were declared 'present day counter-revolutionaries' (xianxing fan geming fenzi) if they did not have bad class backgrounds. None were sent to labor camps or put in jail at this point. But they all were put in a cowshed, struggled. Most of them were workers. Most of them were just released after a couple of months, denied leadership positions, wrote self-examinations, but there was no formal conclusion in their cases. But all the materials written down in the course of investigation had to be put in people's files. This was the principle they worked on, and could not violate it.

Only two people were given formal conclusions to cases. They gave them a formal paper to sign, said they had uncovered major errors, put the confession in the file. Most were told that they couldn't find any big mistakes, only small mistakes, so they were told they were being released. But the third category was the worst, because they didn't come to any conclusion at all, they just did not come to a conclusion. But they didn't say whether or not the person had a problem. They just let him go.

Basically speaking, those who were attacked in this campaign were people that the PLA group were dissatisfied with, whose biaoxian in the CR they were not pleased with. Then they went after bad class backgrounds and other mistakes. If the PLA group was pleased with your biaoxian, then they would not investigate you.

This was just part of their work, their main point of concentration (zhongdian). They also had a general investigation (pucha). All the files on every worker in the plant were gone over by people in the special investigation group. They looked at a) family background, b) personal class designation, c) political history, d) work history, and e) history of other family members. They were looking to see if there were any doubts about the person. Were there any gaps in the years accounted for in the file?

Before the cleaning of the class ranks campaign was completed, they had already begun the campaign of 'party consolidation and building' (zheng dang jian dang). This new movement meant that attention would be turned towards party members in the course of these investigations. They immediately focused on five people, had them halt work and work on self-examinations. One was a leading cadre who had been criticized in the four cleans movement. One had said things which were critical of the PLA. At that time it was illegal to criticize PLA people except to their faces. If you said something outside the presence of the PLA, this was called 'spreading rumors', 'resisting the PLA', and was against the law, a crime. Two others had built their own arms for use in armed struggle. One was the former head of the security department.

They didn't put these people in a cowshed, they still had the freedom to leave the plant. But a lot of the workers wanted the old security department head put in a cell, because he had suppressed workers so much before the CR. They put up a lot of wallposters at this time demanding this.

But since the informant was fairly moderate, he was able to convince the others that you shouldn't just throw everybody in a cell.

This former security department head was very grateful to the informant, and only six months later he was transferred by the bureau to be security department head of the Canton tram company. He thanked the informant and made a sworn brotherhood (yiqi 义气) statement to help him out in the future if he needed it later on. Security departments are very powerful. Wang Hongwen had been vice head of his factory's security department before the CR. After being demobilized from the army he had been a worker, and later was promoted to this work even though he still had a worker's designation (bianzhi). Of course he was a party member.

These people hadn't broken any laws. They were given no punishments, but they wrote self-examinations. They did not really engage in any concrete party building, this was largely an ideological campaign. But at this time they were beginning to rebuild basic-level party organizations--the branches in the shops.

At this time the informant was still a member of the 'campaign office' of the plant RC. There were three party members, and two non-party members or 'mass representatives', of which he was one. But when they started the yida sanfan movement in 1969 he thought of a way to get out of the leadership. By this time the special investigation group had grown to over 20 people, and there were several demobilized soldiers who recently had been assigned to the plant and were on the group, leading the yida sanfan. The informant started to write a long document on the 'criticism, struggle, transformation' which was a plan to carry out this movement in the plant. It contained a history of the plant, the recent class struggles in the plant, the current stage and how to implement the process of 'struggle, criticism, transformation' (dou, pi, gai). This included plans for reforming and building up shop leadership and various inspection systems. Other people were taking up active leadership of the investigations and campaigns. The document explained how to apply the Anshan charter and the content of various editorials, strengthen the dictatorship of the proletariat, get rid of bureaucratism, unite the masses, in view of the special conditions of their own factory. For example, they sent down the power of ordering spare parts from the shop director to the group leaders. They would no longer require shop director permission for this. They set about in this way to cut through red tape and simplify regulations.

But they never really implemented any of these reorganization measures. Soon after he left the RC, the personnel of the RC underwent a big change, including the head of the RC who was transferred. But you have to be clear, the main reason these kinds of reforms were not really implemented was that these were secondary issues. The key ones were politics and power. With personnel being transferred and people moving up and down, trying to help their friends and help out one another, these kinds of proposals were often forgotten.

(8/4/80, 2 hrs.)

At this time the PLA support-the-left group appointed a number of demobilized soldiers to the special investigation group (about half the membership), and also some leading cadres from other factories who had been attacked in their original units and lost power. They did this because these people had no factional ties and they had just come from elsewhere. All of these people who participated in the special investigation group were full-time investigators, no longer participated in production. They used a lot of people for this, more than a department's worth before the cultural revolution. Every problem that arose meant two people had to be assigned to investigate.

They established a Mao Thought Study Group (xuexi ban) for the 'yida sanfan' movement, in which about 50 people participated who had a variety of problems. They studied and wrote self-criticisms, ate and slept in the factory, and were not allowed to return home at night. They were not controlled as strictly as people under investigation during the cleaning of the class ranks--no one was watching them 24 hours a day, and they were not forbidden to talk to others or write things down on paper. Of these 50 people, three were middle-level cadres, four were party members, and the rest were masses, or non-party workers.

This 'yida sanfan' was 'strike out against a handful of counter-revolutionaries who sabotaged the socialist revolution' and 'oppose corruption, speculation, and extravagance'. The people who were attacked in the movement were anyone about whom any doubt occurred, either in reports, conversations, or behavior. It did happen that people who simply did not listen to leaders were attacked. All that was necessary was for a doubt to be raised, and there would be an investigation. There was no clear document specifying and analyzing the direction of their work in the movement. Three people attempted suicide in this movement, and two of them died. All were workers, one was a woman. The most serious punishment to come out of the campaign was a man who was given the label of counter-revolutionary. His father had been a military official in the KMT who had executed communists before 1949, and he was accused of consorting with young people of bad class backgrounds who opposed Mao's thought. He was also caught with a portrait of Mao which had been defaced. He was put on probation and kept in the factory (liuchang chakan). Two of those who committed suicide were a man and woman who were accused of having a sexual affair. The man had a landlord father, and the woman was a widow. So they were struggled against in this movement. The woman couldn't stand it and killed herself. The man was so upset he killed himself a couple of days later.

Finally, they had an Anti May 16 Elements campaign which was mainly study because they didn't have any of these people in their unit. Also, there was a campaign to 'disperse the population in preparation for war' in 1969, where they sent people who had been given labels during the campaign down to agricultural villages.

Evolution of the Revolutionary Committee

The committee changed after the yidan sanfan campaign. There were several reasons why. First, a lot of people on the RC asked to be sent back to their original work units and return to their worker status. RC members were not ever given cadre status, nor were they supposed to be full-time administrators and office workers. But they had meetings every day and for a long time they did not participate in their manual work.

Another factor was that there was a lot of transfer of people who had been cadres since before the cultural revolution. Some were transferred out, new ones transferred in. In their plant they sent in two new vice-heads of the RC, so the mass representative vice-heads were not really needed in the office all the time after that. So gradually they stopped doing work and returned to their original production groups.

Another factor was that some workers in leading positions were transferred to other factories. And in other cases, members of the RC were given formal punishments and stripped of RC membership. (Only one person like this, described above). Finally, workers could be appointed later to be new members of the RC. So there was a gradual change. By 1976, according to his friends letters, there were only four mass representatives left of the original 12 elected during the CR. They had all since joined the party. Of course there

were other mass representatives, but these had been appointed since that time by the new leaders. There had been no elections since the original one during the cultural revolution.

Rebuilding the Party Organization

The party organization began to be restored in 1969. Around 1971, shortly before the death of Lin Biao, the PLA support-the-left group left the plant. But they remained in the bureau for a while, and eventually the head of the bureau PLA control committee became the first party secretary of the bureau.

They started with elections in the shops, by a show of hands, of a list of people who formerly were leading party cadres at the shop level, and a list of activists prepared by the top leadership. They voted on these prepared lists by a show of hands. Most of the people in the branch committees were people who had been full time cadres before the cultural revolution. Workers, people without administrative cadre standing, could not be elected to branch secretary positions. But there were two non-party activists who were elected to the branch committee from this list, and they were admitted into the party within a week. There were a number of such activists approved by the leadership at this time who were able to enter the party. There were two older party cadres in the shop over 55 who retired at that time.

Later, they restored the party committee for the entire plant. The leading group of the plant prepared a list of candidates for party committee and sent down to the shops for discussions. Through this period of fermentation (yunniang), they sent this list down for comments and revised it again about three times, then came up with a final list of candidates. Finally, they held an election. But it was hard in this process to discuss and evaluate the top leading cadres in the party because their files were all held in the bureau and you don't know their history. At this end, they held an all-plant meeting where they had an election. The leader of the plant read out the names on the final list and one at a time asked for a show of hands, 'yes' and 'no' on each person. At this point these were people who had been selected by the top leadership and were top party cadres in the factory. Few dared oppose the list of candidates at that point. Of the 20 candidates, 11 were elected. This was 1970 or 1971, before Lin Biao died. Also, the bureau assigned and transferred Party Committee members in and out between plants at this time. Their plant party committee had about 11 members in all, 5 on the standing committee.

After Lin Biao died, the Party committee re-established, and Deng Xiaoping back in power, they started to return people with cadre designations back to leading positions in the plant and departments. There was a big transfer of cadres between units. These old cadres began to run things and the mass representatives stopped occupying leading positions. They did not understand these top management questions. All cadres were returned to their office jobs unless they had violated the law. They did not get rid of the mass representatives, they did not lose their positions. It just happened gradually that the old cadres assumed more and more responsibility and more leading work. They just had a lot of 'vice-heads', but among the vice-heads, the ones who were party members with high cadre grades were those that began to take on power and handle most leading work.