
PERSONAL DATA

Age: 40

Sex: Male

Education: University graduate (auto technology)

Total Years Relevant Experience: 16

Last Year of Relevant Experience: 1979

Year Left China: 1979

Initial Immigration Status: Legal

Native Place/Overseas Connections: Singapore OS, returned 1955

Class Background/Political Designation: OS

OCCUPATIONAL HISTORY SUMMARY

Positions Held: 1) Shanghai Auto Chassis Plant, 1964-79

a) Staff technician, Technical Department, 1964-67,
1971-79

b) Shop technician, 1968-71

Administrative Level of Work Unit/(No. of employees):

1) Municipal/(1000-1400)

Experience in Full-time Manual Labor (for non-worker occupations):

none

APPOINTMENTS; 6

TOTAL HOURS; 16

PAGES TEXT: 20

Occupational History (8/5/80, 2 hrs.)

The informant was born in Singapore, and returned to China in 1955, and went to middle school there. He graduated in 1959, went to university and studied in the automotive department, graduating in 1964. He was assigned to an automobile factory in Shanghai, a state-owned plant, the Shanghai Automobile Chassis (dipan) factory, part of a chain of auto plants which divided labor in the auto production process, all under the direction of a bureau, under which there were several companies, one of which led his plant. He was a technician in the technical department, and did designing work. He did one year of manual labor after graduation since this was during the four cleans movement. When he first started working, it had 1000 employees. In 1968 the plant was combined with a technical middle school, and soon thereafter the students stopped coming. The unit then had 1400 people and absorbed the equipment and technicians and skilled workers. In the cultural revolution they changed the administrative structure and he was sent to the shops for a while, still as a technician. Later he returned to the departments, as they were re-established. He worked in the shops from 1968-71. Then he returned to the technical department in 1971, and worked there until he came out legally in June 1979.

Wages

When he first graduated from college, he was assigned to a four cleans work team, and did this for half a year in the countryside. Since he was a university graduate and Shanghai was a type 5 wage area, he got 48¥ his first year, and after one year raised to 58¥. If he was a technical college (dazhuan) graduate, he would have gotten 43¥. For a technical school graduate (zhong zhuan), the wage was 39¥ to start. He was first assigned to his plant, but soon thereafter he was pulled out for the campaign. After he returned he did a year of manual labor. He was set at grade 21 administrative cadre, which was equal to grade 14 on the technical cadre scale. The technical cadre scale goes from 1-16, the administrative scale from 1-26. Most of them, since they were to be staff workers in departments, were given administrative grades.

He was a jianxi technician for the first year, and automatically raised and made a regular technician. He did not get another raise until the readjustment of 1978. Before the cultural revolution they normally had readjustments once every three years or so. But his third year was 1966, so he was out of luck. Then he was raised 6¥ to 64¥. Some people were raised 6¥, some 3¥. This was according to assessments of performance, usually decided by above. Of course this confused the grade system, but they view this as a transitional period and the main purpose is to raise work motivation.

This 1978 readjustment was the only one they had in the plant from 1964-79. They did not have one in the early 1970s. Basically no one in the plant got a raise the entire period. In 1978 they raised preferentially those who entered before 1964 and had gone so many years without a raise. Then they appraised people's work attitudes, attendance, etc. Not everyone who started before 1964 got them, but most did. Those about whom there were some problems did not get raised. Also they considered family situations and needs. About one third of the employees got raises.

The workers' situation was different. Beginning in the fall of 1975, right after pilin pikong, they began to give raises to young workers with wages in the 30s. This was only in Shanghai, it was Chang Ch'un-ch'iao's

idea and was not given permission by Peking. Shanghai was rather special in this respect and workers in other areas were unhappy. Older workers didn't really get upset about this, they figured it was right. These young workers only had wages of around 30+¥ and already had a wife (also getting about 30¥ usually) and children, while most of the workers before the cultural revolution era were getting around 50-60¥. Technicians were not included in this. But this did also include workers in collectives run by street committees, also in the city. Their wages were only 20+¥.

Bonuses

They had quarterly bonuses with quarterly assessments and payments, as well as year-end bonuses before the cultural revolution. This was for both workers and technicians. They assessed according to standards for monthly attendance (no more than 3 days sick leave). They divided people into 3 grades-- 9¥, 6¥, 3¥. Each group assessed their own employees in group meetings. Most got grade 2 bonuses. Only a few did not get bonuses, mostly because of poor attendance.

Many contradictions broke out among the masses over the assessments for bonuses. Those who didn't get them were upset, usually because of favoritism. Those who were 'ass kissers' (pai mapi), who had good relations with leaders, and who were activists requesting to join the party, got preference and usually would get the grade 1 bonus. The leaders had the last word on who would get what bonuses. People who were honest, hardworking and good performers, but who were not activists or flatters just got average bonuses, it is hard for them to get grade 1. Also, some groups argued, even came to blows over bonus assessments. So when the cultural revolution came these contradictions came out in political movements, and they criticized the bonus system, saying it destroyed worker unity and relations, that there was favoritism. So they cancelled the bonuses.

The year-end bonuses were based on the profit situation in the plant, and how much money for bonuses could be taken out from it. They assessed about the same as in the quarterly bonus. The average amount was about 20¥. The highest was 30¥ or so, the lowest 12¥.

Starting in the cultural revolution, they changed to a supplementary wage system. They gave 5¥ to each worker per month, and 4¥ for administrative cadres and technicians. There were no longer assessments of performance. They also had year-end bonuses which were distributed on a completely equal basis as a fixed percentage of the year's profit. If you were absent for more than a set number of days you were deducted equal to the number of days you were absent, and this was taken from the supplementary wage. They docked 1/26 of the monthly wage from the supplementary wage for each day absent. For over five days, no supplementary wage. Also, if you were absent for over a certain number of days in a year, there was no year-end bonus. Now that they have started to have bonuses again, they have retained supplementary wages as part of the basic wage, and have bonuses in addition. New workers after the cultural revolution also got supplementary wages, except for apprentices, who were not assessed for bonuses before the CR anyway. Beginning in 1974, they had year-end bonuses which were equal, since the plant started to recover financially. It was based on equal distribution of leftover funds, about 10¥ per person.

Before the cultural revolution they had assessments of advanced workers and labor models every year. These were workers who had good attitudes, overfulfilled quotas, listened to orders, were rarely or never absent. They assessed at the factory level, bureau level, city or province, and national level. Once you were selected, if there was no change, then you would be selected every year. You could also be selected a representative to a

district or city people's congress. About 2-5% of workers or cadres could be picked in a factory. Labor models (laodong mofan) and advanced laborers (xianjin laodongzhe) were equal in status. Only workers were model workers, while cadres could be chosen as advanced laborers. Before the CR and after 1977, in addition to trips and special privileges, they would usually double the year end bonus which averaged 20¥. They did not assess for this during 1966-70, there was too much disorder. They began after the arrival of the Mao Thought propaganda team in 1969 or so.

They began with 'red vanguards' (hongse jianbing), who were people with advanced political thought. The worse production became, the easier it was to get selected as one of these. It had nothing to do with production--no material incentives were attached. They had these until 1977, when they revived the previous system of assessment of advanced workers. They assessed the 'red vanguards' according to the needs of the current campaign and there were no fixed time periods. After the pilin pikong campaign, for example, they assessed the most active workers for these awards.

When they restored the bonus system in 1978, it was the same as before the CR. Still quarterly bonuses. But they used a rotation system for receiving the highest bonus to avoid the arguments that were a problem in the earlier system. They continued using this system right up until the time he left in 1979. Bonuses could be earned by leading cadres, but not by cadres in the factory leadership level. Vice-directors, directors, and party secretaries of the plant could not receive them.

Promotion (8/7/80, 2.5 hrs.)

They usually kept old cadres in the top leadership positions, except right after the CR when they transferred a lot of leading cadres back and forth because their contradictions with the masses were great. When they were short on plant-level cadres, they would raise up a middle-rank leading cadre, about 90% of which were party members. The top leader (zheng) in shops and departments were always party members, but sometimes vice-heads were not party members. Sometimes an old pre-liberation engineer who had an overseas education might be vice director. Technical department heads usually came from among staff members except the production department, which almost always came from among shop leadership. Shop directors came from among the leaders of production groups and sections.

The major source of leading cadres was demobilized soldiers. The army was a training ground for cadres. The security department was always and certainly led by demobilized soldiers, but any department head, plant director, or vice director, and any party secretary could be from the army. Most were. But some leading cadres were also labor models and party members who gradually had been promoted upward over the years, while some department heads were university graduates who had been party members even while in college.

Another source of leading cadres was a person from above--the company, for example--who had made a mistake and was demoted (jiangzhi).

Discipline, Punishment

The punishment depended on the nature of the mistake. Usually there was criticism (piping) after which a written self examination was made. This was the lightest. Next serious was a warning (jinggao), which was a warning by the director's office and an announcement of the person's name at a mass meeting. This goes on the file. Next was a minor reprimand (xiao guo) on the permanent file, and above that was a major reprimand (daguo). The next step was expulsion (kaichu). Depending on how serious the mistake is, you start at one or another level, and as you repeat the offence or fail

to improve, they move up the scale of seriousness.

The most common punishment was criticism. There were a few workers who were expelled, usually for disrupting public order or committing crimes. Wounding someone or killing them, speculating, gambling. These are the kinds of things you can be expelled for. Also they have had a number of people who were removed for political mistakes. These people usually went to jail or to labor camps. They do not expel workers for bad work. This would be called 'firing' (jiegou) and they do not have firings in China.

Short of expulsions, employees are punished usually for stealing, bad work attitudes and showing up late for work, absenteeism without leave, illicit sex. There are no standards applying punishments to different behaviors. Illicit sex is usually treated very seriously, at least a warning. The second time, a major reprimand or probation (liuchang chakan). This means putting a person on observation for a year to see if his behavior improves. If not after one year, they will expel. But Chinese people know that illicit sex is serious, they all know because it is traditionally known as immoral behavior. So one kind of standard is fixed in people's heads--they know what is serious and what is not. The punishment also depends on the person's attitudes after he is caught. The small group has to discuss the person's case, and if the person admits guilt and does a self-criticism, usually the group will recommend leniency, and will just give the person 'help' and education. Usually this is enough, because this is embarrassing to people. But if the person does not criticize himself, does not recognize his mistake, the group can report the case to the upper levels and raise an opinion on punishment. It also happens sometimes that someone in the group, the group leader, will have a contradiction with the person and use this for revenge, and try to assure some kind of punishment. This is called 'grasping the queue' (zhua bianzi). By the same token, in addition to your attitude, admission, self-confession when caught, a lot also depends on your relations with the rest of the group members. If your relations are good, they are more likely to be lenient and not report to above and recommend punishment. For less serious mistakes, the group could have a choice of whether or not to report. For more serious things, they had to report them. But generally speaking, if you confessed and gave a sincere self-criticism, and were not a repeated offender, they would be lenient with you.

These were the administrative measures. There were also economic sanctions. The main one was to dock the bonus. If you were absent over a certain number of days, they would deduct from the basic wage. If through negligence a worker caused a big accident or economic loss, they would deduct some of the wages as a token of repayment for a period. There was a worker in their plant who was not authorized for a test drive, and took the car out just for fun and crashed it. The damage was over 4000¥. This was equal to 5-6 year's wage for him. So they took 15-20¥ out of his wage for 10 years until it was paid back.

Cadres who made serious mistakes can be suspended in order to think over their mistake (tingzhi fanxiang). They sweep the floors, clean out toilets, and depending on the seriousness, can have wages lowered. Cadres can also be demoted (jiangzhi). There are also economic punishments for repairing damages caused by corruption, as for workers who cause damage through negligence. It depends on how much money is involved. For large amounts, usually there is a token repayment. For small things, complete repayment. But for speculation and profiteering (touji daoba), you have to pay back all the money you earned illegally.

Work Motivation

From 1966-78, the effect of the wage and bonus situation on work activism and efficiency was extremely large. At best, plants got workers to all come to work and be on time, and maintain the work efficiency of the pre-cultural revolution period. But most factories got worse in this respect, and workers got lax, chatted, or in the case of cadres, read newspapers and drank tea in the offices. This was especially serious in departments from 1968-73. Workers also were lax at work, even though they came to work. Some of the old experienced workers who were used to hard work kept at it because they felt uncomfortable if they were idle, they were used to being hard workers. But young workers had thought problems and did not have good work habits, so they were worse.

People came to work, put in their time, and were sure not to do any more than others. There was no overtime supplement after the cultural revolution up to 1978, so they left promptly at the end of the shift. Since the restoration of bonuses this situation was improved greatly, especially since they have also restored the overtime supplement. Also if you work overtime it makes it easier to get a bonus. So workers now work harder and are more willing to put in overtime. You could even say that workers activism is even better than before the cultural revolution, because the incentives are even more plentiful and bonuses larger, and linked more closely to performance than before the CR.

There were some leftover influences of the CR period. For example, when they first started to restore bonuses, many people were afraid another campaign would come and they would be criticized for economism. People didn't dare. At first the documents said it was allowed to use material incentives. But moral incentives were to be primary. They were still upholding Mao's Thought, saying they could use it to run factories well. It was not until they began to de-emphasize Mao thought and say "practice is the sole criterion for truth" that people dared to handle these new incentives well. So there was a transition period which resulted from over 10 years when these things were criticized.

Temporary and Contract Labor (8/8/80, 2.5 hrs.)

Temporary and contract workers were especially active in rebelling during the cultural revolution. They felt that the system was unfair and unequal, so very gradually after the CR they were turned into permanent workers until basically they had none at all.

Before the cultural revolution, contract workers came from collective plants which had developed close relations with their factory, almost like a branch plant, so some workers may be asked to come over on a non-permanent basis. This is one source of contract workers. Another source is when an employee of the plant--a cadre or a worker--has dependents or relatives in suburban communes. They can open up the back door and get their relative a job as a contract worker. The plant did not go out and sign contracts with communes.

Temporary workers were from the 'social youth' (shehui qingnian), youth who failed entrance examinations to the university and refused work assignments to other provinces. They stay at home and live off their families. Most of them who get jobs go to street-run collectives. But some can use connections to get into state-run factories as temporary workers. Also some of these 'social youth' are those who were sent down (chadui luohu), but returned to the city. As of 1979, after the State Council said all these youths could return, there were over 300,000 of these returned youths in Shanghai. So most of the temporary workers were young people. They registered at the labor bureau if they returned to the city legally.

If not, they used some sort of connections.

The period when temporary workers were most plentiful was 1970-75. During that time they had their own organization, the 'temporary worker rebel committee', which pushed for the changing of the temporary labor system, and the changing of temporary workers into permanent workers. Of course it was legal, and had government permission. This was an all-city organization, not the same as all the small factions and organizations of temporary workers during the CR. This organization did not include contract workers. Contract workers were relatively older and more conservative, often from the countryside. They were not middle school educated youths who were rebellious.

The main disadvantage of being a temporary worker was that you did not get retirement benefits. So this organization existed to further the interests of the temporary workers. So the organizations of temporary workers during the cultural revolution movement was made into a permanent organization which survived, just like the Rebel General Headquarters. It had a name but not much power or concrete activities. It occasionally raised opinions to the city RC. But generally they did not get changed to permanent workers unless they went through the back door, or other special circumstances.

They also continued to maintain the contract worker system, hetong gong or waibao gong, throughout the period, especially for basic construction. In both systems, they did not carry out any basic reforms. They couldn't because they needed these kind of workers.

These non-permanent workers could have their jobs discontinued, so their interest was to prolong their jobs. The teams of contract workers were paid according to the job, and they distributed the proceeds among themselves. The treatment of these workers generally was not as good as regular workers, especially in areas of medical insurance, but it was certainly better than that of village units, so they generally were eager to get these jobs.

The jobs these contract workers did were different than those of regular workers. They did kindsof work outside the normal work experience of formal workers, especially construction work .

During the cultural revolution, the contract and temporary workers were active and had their own mass organizations, but they were separate from each other. The people in them were different. These were two different kinds of systems. The contract workers were older and often had some skillls, or were from the countryside. The temporary workers were usually young, unskilled, social youth. The contract workers were a bit conservative in comparison with temporary workers. The temporary worker organizations were closer to the rebels, they declared the system to be unfair, said they were treated as stepchildren in the labor system.

In fact, he is not aware of any organizations of contract workers. As work stopped during the CR they were realeased and sent back to their original units. What they did in their original units he is not clear. But the temporary workers had their own organizations and they were famous. They had small groups in each plant, and they built coalitions first within companies and bureaus, and then at the city level. They criticized the dangquan pai, 'the faction in power', for running an inequitable system. The all-city organization was called the 'red rebel revolutionary committee' (hongse geming weiyuanhui). This was the organization which survived into 1975. Their organization's goal in the movement was like that of all mass organizations in the cultural revolution--to further the collective interests of the group members. They demanded the same treatment as permanent workers, and secondarily wanted to be made permanent workers. The temporary workers had more of a complaint because they did the same kind of

work as regular workers, but the contract workers, on the other hand, did work which was much different, usually construction. If you went to a factory you could usually pick out who was a contract worker, but this was not true for the temporaries.

Temporary worker's wages were lower a bit than permanent workers, but they still got free medicine, bonuses, and supplements. The main difference with permanent workers is that they are not eligible for promotions, can be severed, they are not under the plant but the bureau, so they don't get any retirement. But this last one provision is very important and workers were always thinking about provisions for their retirement.

Technical Department before the Cultural Revolution

The head of the department was appointed by the plant director, or the party committee, which amount to the same thing. He was an old party member from pre-liberation days, and had done underground work in the unions. But he had no technical training. He handled political thought work in the department in a general way. He was a member of the party general branch in the top factory leadership. He was an 'amateur' (waiheng).

Then there were 3 vice-heads. One was a worker who was sent to college, was a party member before, sent to an industrial college in Nanjing, and then sent to Shanghai and to their plant. He had technical training in machinery, which included tractors and autos. The other two were not party members, had been engineers before liberation, but they didn't have training in the auto industry either, but in machinery.

The department was divided into groups. There was a design group, technical (gongyi) group, and a lab (shiyanshi). Each group had a group leader (zuzhang). There were about 60 staff members in all the groups.

The department head handled thought problems among the staff, kept an eye on people who wanted to enter the party, watched their development. He also held general meetings, about the new plan for the year. The party member vice-head handled designing and technical work, but leaned toward designing. Another vice-head concentrated on leading the technical group. The third vice-head handled the collection of technical materials in foreign languages. But the group leaders handled the actual concrete arrangements of their work. The vice-heads of the departments only oversaw things in a general way.

Two of the group leaders were university graduates since liberation, early in the 1950s, and one was an engineer. The group leader of the laboratory was a worker. The designing group designed the parts which were new or being improved. They studied parts designs and were to improve them. They had to design parts for new products ordered by the company or bureau. They also had to analyze and study the most advanced foreign technology and concepts, had to translate these materials into Chinese. They also were to analyze foreign motors imported and take them apart to copy them. The technical group prepared the technical cards for the production process of each part, and had to set technical standards. They had to design clamps, cutting and measuring tools, for the production of the parts demanded. They also were responsible for assuring the standardization of their parts, and had to study advanced foreign equipment and techniques. The laboratory was mainly responsible for pulling out and testing at fixed times the finished products for reliability and durability under stress and wear. This was different than the work of the inspection department which inspects the specifications of each part.

When special problems popped up, they would leave their offices and go down to the shops and discuss what the cause of the problem is, how to solve it. Sometimes there was a contradiction with the shop director and

the technicians in the department offices, often over the technical standards being too stringent for them to be able to produce the given amount within the period of time. These contradictions between the people in production and staff offices sometimes became quite striking. The arguments over standards might result in taking the conflict to the plant director for resolution. The production people would think the standards were too high, while the office people felt they were entirely reasonable. These contradictions burst forth in the cultural revolution when the people in the shops pasted up wallposters that demanded that the staff members all come down for manual labor, and find out about the realities of production.

The Four Cleans Movement

In 1964-65, the companies organized four cleans work teams to go to different factories in the city. Before the work team came the factories all did preparatory work to mobilize the masses and expose problems in the plant (clean thought, economics, organization, politics). The most important problem they went after was economics--corruption. And they also criticized some cadres for leadership workstyle and bureaucratism. The party general branch secretary would start by asking workers to 'help' him, criticize his shortcomings. Well, they would not because they were afraid of revenge. Then they would examine other cadres, sometimes also workers who had been accused of speculation.

If they found a lot of problems or some particularly serious problems, the company would dispatch a work team. The work team would mobilize the masses, urge them to reveal shortcomings of each and every cadre. They all had to 'come downstairs' and be with the masses, be washed through criticism meetings. But there were also meetings where the cadres weren't present and they asked the masses to reveal shortcomings to the work team of cadres and workers. When the cadre went through criticism meetings, he had to make a self examination and satisfy the work team and masses. Sometimes people were criticized for historical problems--participating in KMT organizations, being a labor traitor before liberation, etc. Also for people who complained during the 3 hard years, who expressed doubts about the party, about the country's future, about becoming a party member. Then in the 'jiefu' meetings their friends, or people who overheard them say these things would reveal them and this would start the doubts and the investigation. The same process was followed in revealing economic problems and corruption, except this was easier to detect.

Most of the people who had problems that were discovered were considered contradictions among the people. They did self-examinations, underwent criticism. But usually they kept their jobs and there were no punishments. But there was a quota set for people whose problems were more serious, 5%, set by Mao himself. This was like the 1957 anti-rightist campaign, where they had to get a certain number of people and label them rightist, strip them of their offices and party membership. In the four cleans, Mao had said that 95% of the cadres were 'basically' all right.

The people who received punishments: the party secretary, the top cadre in the plant, was caught in illicit sexual relations and had to be transferred to another factory to be party secretary. The heads of the basic construction department and finance department were caught in corruption, taking kickbacks (the first from teams of contract workers). They were not kicked out of the party but were demoted and became ordinary staff members. These people were not given labels but were objects (duixiang) of the four cleans movement. No leading cadres were given labels.

But three among the masses were given labels. One a bad element, two counter-revolutionary. The last two had engaged in secret organized

political activities, were accused of being Taiwan agents, inciting other workers to take part in their organization, and said things against the leadership. The bad element had been caught stealing things outside the plant. They were all put in jail by the public security bureau. He thinks there was proof that these charges were true. There were other people who were investigated and suspected of things, but never got proof and no punishments, no labels. But these doubts were put on their files. Later during the CR when they went through the files they dragged these people out to struggle them and force them to confess.

Cultural Revolution (8/9/80, 3 hrs.)

Before the four cleans movement could be concluded, they had to meet certain standards. The masses had to be satisfied, and also the company, and the work team. Then they had to reorganize the leading group, leave the plant. They ran this movement in their plant for about a year. It lasted from september 1964 to september 1965. But before a few months passed, the cultural revolution had begun.

When the CR started, they did not have a new work team come to the plant. The masses were encouraged to put up wallposters and bombard the leading cadres. Some of the leading cadres tried to deflect attacks away from themselves by pointing to people who had bad backgrounds or who had labels, and encouraged the masses to criticize them. It also happened that wallposter criticisms went up as an attempt to get at old enemies, and this at times led to an escalating wallposter war between people or cadres who had contradictions with one another.

The first mass organization began as a result of the policy of 'exchange of revolutionary experiences'. Activists would come in from elsewhere and ask why the unit was so conservative, why so few wallposters, no organizations. In August 1966 was when these exchanges started. Factories stopped working, classes in the schools halted, and people went elsewhere for experiences. Also this was a rare chance to get to travel for the masses, so they overloaded the transport system trying to travel. In their factory, by August-September 1966, all of the young workers left for exchanges of experience, and they were about 50% of the workforce. Almost all of the older workers, over 30 with wages around 60¥, stayed in the plant. Most of the technicians and staff members stayed in the plant. But just because they stayed does not mean they didn't engage in activities, put up wallposters, criticize. If they didn't they might be attacked themselves for not supporting the cultural revolution. So beginning in September 1966 production in their factory was already paralyzed, and things were not completely restored again until 1968.

At the end of 1966, around the time of the Anting incident, they started to have rebel organizations in the factory. The plant leaders had no choice but to support the rebels with funds for exchanges of experience--if not they could be accused of not supporting the cultural revolution. They did not want to make a mistake. The only people left were older ones who had to think of their families.

At this point they already had the beginnings of factionalism. Some workers were relatively conservative, some relatively rebellious. Near the end of 1966 they ordered workers back into the factory, and said only students could travel on exchanges of experience. So a lot of the workers returned to the plant then, except for a minority. This is when the rebel organization began to form. But when they first returned there were no formal organizations yet. Those who had remained in the plant were those whose thought was relatively conservative. Their wages were higher, they had vested interests (jide liyi) and felt the past years had been socialist and

revolutionary, not capitalist. The younger ones were less happy with their wages, their futures, their lack of position and power. Their wages were not docked during this period if they came back to the plant in time. By January 1967, the 'January Revolution', the two factions had formed and become really prominent.

In his factory there were between 10-20 activists who had participated in a 30-day sit-in at the Municipal Party Committee office on Kangping Street, and who later went on to participate in the Anting incident at the railway station. They wanted officials to resign, and recognise their right to rebel. They became leaders of rebels later on in the factory. Wang Hongwen, Chen Ada, Pan Guoping, Geng Jinzhang, and people like that were the organizers of the Anting incident and the effort of go to Peking and demand removal of the entire Municipal Party Committee. Wang Hongwen was a cadre in his factory's security department and was a demobilized soldier. These people would later split and fight among one another.

When these kinds of workers returned to their units they began to organize mass rebel organizations in their original units. Very quickly they organized an all-city headquarters. When this happened the more conservative workers began to create their own organization. They were mostly older workers, and their heads were two labor models, Yang Fuzhen and Cai Zuquan. The organizers of the conservative organization were heads of the city's union organization. But by very early in 1967 the city government was paralyzed. From top to bottom it existed only in name. When in early 1967 they organized the Rebel General Headquarters, Pan Guoping was the 'general commander' (zong siling), and Wang Hongwen, Chen Ada, and Geng Jinzhang were the vice-commanders. Pan was the most famous. He was referred to as 'commander Pan' (Pan siling). But later he did not last as top man because he had a bad class background and bad work-style. Pan really had guts, and wasn't afraid of anything. Before the Cultural Revolution the leaders in his factory had him marked down as a 'hooligan' (liumang).

So the rebels were mostly the young, with people who got wages below 50¥, often not married. They had no qualifications for leadership promotion. So they wanted to use the opportunity of the cultural revolution to improve their futures. They were often people who did not work hard and didn't listen to authority, often had been in trouble before the CR. Because of their economic situations, dim futures, and the fact that they had been punished, they were more often the active ones in criticizing leaders. There were of course some among the rebels who were able and willing to learn, hard working, but they were the minority. But generally they were not, and they wanted to get the dang quan pai or bad elements, they just didn't care.

The other side, conservatives, had more old workers, model workers, Communist Youth members, ordinary party members, activist backbone types, and a lot of workers in leading positions like group leaders and section heads. There were many grade 3's, 4's, and up among them. Wages were around 60¥ and up.

At the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, the conservatives raised revolutionary slogans and went along with the tide of the CR, but were basically fairly passive, not active in attacking leading cadres. The rebels, on the other hand, wanted the whole leading group of the factory, company, bureau, and city to stand aside. The informant was a member of the xiaoyao pai (lit. 'free and unfettered' faction), the centrists, as were most intellectuals. They ignored both factions and pasted up wall-posters that were fairly quiet and measured, pointed out some shortcomings of cadres, but did not wildly accuse people of being capitalist roaders. But their opinion toward the rebels was one of quiet disapproval. They

did not like their workstyles, felt they were too unreasonable. But they didn't really like the conservatives too much either. They considered them too conservative. They were the kinds of people who would put rightist labels on the intellectuals who didn't agree with them.

At that time, most of the department head leading cadres and above stood aside. They were being physically struggled at meetings, did the airplane, knelt down. They were passive and paralyzed very quickly. For one thing, they were confused. They supported Mao, thought of him as a god, but here they were being attacked in a movement obviously approved by Mao. They were confused and didn't know what to do. They couldn't oppose the movement because they didn't want to get in trouble for that. This happened to the security department heads also. So all leading cadres stood aside.

There were many small 'fighting groups' in the plant. Some in each shop. They had one in each department. One in the technical department, one in the quality inspection department. Even before the RC they got together and formed leading groups of all the rebel leaders in the plant. By this time the conservative faction had dispersed. They basically worshipped Mao and it became apparent as time went along that they were going against the tide of the Mao-supported movement, and were being accused by rebels of being lackeys and running dogs of the capitalist roaders. They mostly ended up in the middle of the road faction, although some joined rebels with their permission.

There was a 'fighting group' among the technicians in the technical department. About half of them joined the group. Mostly the younger ones, like the informant himself who joined. They were often those who had no families, were just out into society. There were also many who just ignored everything. They put in their eight hours and went straight home. There were also a few of the older ones who had been rightists and were afraid to participate for fear that they would be in big trouble for opposing the Party after the CR was finally over. Their group was 'middle of the road'. This meant that they had criticisms of leaders, but felt that the rebels were too extreme and did not like their workstyles.

None of the leading cadres participated in any organization, except for the head of the quality inspection department, who supported the rebels enthusiastically. So later he was welcomed by them. But most cadres just came to work, made a show of reading and copying wallposters, and went to whatever struggle meeting was being organized against them. But basically they didn't know what to do. Some of them felt it was wise to sweep the floors or engage in manual labor. But whatever they did they still got criticized. If they did manual labor all the time, they were accused of ignoring politics, if they read and copied wallposters, they were accused of collecting materials for later revenge, if they stayed in their offices they would be accused of liking the comfortable cadre life.

The leaders of the rebels took over power before the official power seizure. They sealed off the director's office, took out his seal of office. They took over the office where the files were kept. There were two rebel leaders who read through all the files, and this made everyone angry. Before only the party secretary, deputy heads of personnel and security could read this material, which was stored in their plant in the personnel security department (renshi baowei ke). The head of the department was usually a party committee member. When the rebels went through the files and found 'black materials', accusatory or suspicious things in the file, they burned it. They did this for their own factional members.

The finance department did release funds to fighting groups for exchanges of experience. The first party secretary signed the slips and the

rebels went to the cashier to get the cash. The cadres were afraid of being struggled at that time and they would release funds if demanded. If he didn't sign, the first secretary would be locked up in a room and not allowed to eat or drink until he gave in. After this was done, they gave in later on fairly easily.

There were other groups active in raising economic demands. The temporary workers had their own organization, and they wanted to be made regular workers. Apprentices (banji gong) wanted money given to them and be turned into grade one workers. There was no organization of contract workers active in their plant. By this time the contract workers work had stopped and they had returned to their original units to take part in the movement.

At that time the leading cadres in reality had already stood aside. The rebel leaders held power in the plant but did not do any management of production. They just had political power because they were leading the movement. Since many of the fighting groups aligned with the Rebel Headquarters were demanding money and economic rewards, they did not oppose these demands, sometimes encouraged them. Later Wenhui Bao labelled this the 'wind of economism' and criticized this behavior.

Revolutionary Committee

They started first by seizing power at the city level. They formed a revolutionary committee small group in which the Rebel General Headquarters participated. For a while it was called a Commune, but this was just a difference in name. Mao told them to change the name to revolutionary committee. After that they organized RC's from the bottom up, starting with enterprises, then moving up to companies and bureaus. It became harder at each progressive stage because as they moved up they had to please more leaders and small organizations.

When the call came in Wenhui Bao to seize power in units, they already had a 'cultural revolution leadership group' in their factory made up of rebels leaders. By far the biggest faction was the rebel headquarters faction (Zong Gong Si 總工司). They also had a formal organization and branches at every level of the city at that time. There were also a couple of other fighting groups left over in their plant, but they usually listened to the rebel faction. But they were rebels too--the conservatives had already disbanded. No longer had them. For a while Geng Jinzhang split off the 'second regiment', and there was also the 'August 1st Army', which united against the Workers' General HQ. Their strength was also very large. They had some August 1 faction members in their plant too. But these groups finally decided to listen to the Workers' General HQ and the revolutionary committee. Only a few units, about 10%, had armed struggle between factions at this time.

Their own factory was able to establish a Revolutionary Committee quickly and smoothly. So no Worker Propaganda Team was sent in to establish one. In fact, their factory sent worker propaganda teams out to other units.

In their factory, the Workers' Rebel HQ sent some leaders down to their factory to help them establish an RC, and also they had directives from Wenhui Bao. First they organized a plant RC. After that they dispatched leaders to the shops and departments to form branch RC's in each subunit.

The RC members, at first, were not elected. The leaders of the Rebels and their backbone activists, and one middle-level cadre (the department head of quality inspection mentioned earlier). But most were just leaders of the Rebel HQ faction all along. Later, it was required that they combine with some of the leading cadres to help with management because these rebels did not have any management experience. So they took some of the

relatively young cadres who were willing to make a thorough self-criticism and who were willing to support the rebels before, and allowed them to join the rebels and the leading group. They were called 'liberated cadres', while the older cadres were still standing aside. These people had earlier been ordinary staff or group leaders within departments. By 1969 they began to 'liberate' some of the older cadres, too. When these cadres were added, they were appointed by the people who led the revolutionary committee.

The head of their RC was the rebel leader. He was a young worker, only 23 years old. This was not unusual, Pan Guoping himself was only 24, Chen Ada only 21! Most of the rebel leaders in the RC in their plant were under 30. They had 3 vice-heads, all rebel leaders, all young workers. None of them were party members. They had some relatively young middle level leading cadres who acted as advisors, but only one was a party member (the Quality inspection department head). The three vice-heads divided labor. One led production, one livelihood, one security. The head of the RC acted as the old plant director. They were all young but their leadership and speaking abilities developed very fast during this period. The rest of the members of the plant RC were representatives from the shop and department RC's. Almost all were young workers, only a couple of staff members.

The old department boundaries had been abolished and leading cadres stood aside. They all were still in the offices, the leading cadres being detained in the plant and brought out for struggle. They organized groups among the staff members, like the production group, logistics group, technical group. In fact they were the same thing as before but they didn't like the old system then and the names connected with it. Later they organized a campaign to simplify administration (jingjian jigou), and at that time they drastically reduced the number of people in the offices, and the number of groups and departments, and sent most office workers and leading cadres to do manual labor.

Simplification of Administration (8/11/80, 3 hrs.)

During the simplification of administration movement, the labor and wages department, quality inspection department and production department were combined into one. And the amount of people was reduced to 6. The departments originally had 4, 10, 22 respectively. Most of the normal operations of the former departments were suspended, and they just handled day to day operations. All the rest of the people were sent to the shops to perform manual labor. They could not handle things like sales, procurement, setting of quotas very well.

Their technical department was entirely abolished during this period. They did not even maintain a technical group. All the technicians were in the shop, usually handling technical work at least part time. Ordinary staff members usually ended up doing manual labor. The former department head stood aside, and was undergoing struggle and criticism. The two vice-directors who were non-party members and about whom some doubts were expressed during the four cleans movement were also undergoing criticism and struggle. But the vice-department head who was a party member was made the head of the production group. All of the 3 group leaders in the department were sent down to do manual labor in the shops.

The technicians were sent down to ones that were appropriate given their specialties. Since the informant designed parts in the department, he was sent down to a shop that produced parts. The purpose was for them to get practical experience and contact with the workers. He feels this

policy was reasonable, and he gained advantages from it. He got to talk with workers about practical problems with part design, and developed a better relationship with the workers. So this year was not a waste. After this period he feels his designing work and ability was enriched. It was a valuable period. They continued this policy for technicians in the technical department right up to the present. But they modified it. Only 1-2 people went on a rotating basis to the shops for a months' period at a time. They did manual labor but were also responsible for solving any technical problem that popped up during the month. Technicians can benefit from this kind of experience.

The simplification of administration started in 1967. They had a production group, a finance group, logistics group, security group, basic construction and equipment group (jijian dongli zu). In 1969 they began to return former staff workers to the offices to do former jobs, with the exception of the technical department, all of whom stayed in the shops. They found that the amount of people was not enough. Also, they started to appoint some workers from the shops to jobs in the staff offices. These were people who were active in the rebel movement, had good relations with the leaders. Or very often it was simply a case of appointing your dependents, relatives, or friends to an office job. You used personal guanxi to get out of the 'first line of production' which was more difficult work. This was what the reality was, but of course they didn't say this. They said they were putting workers into the offices or into leading positions.

They did not begin until the end of 1971 to restore the old staff departments. But they never restored the old name of 'department' (ke), but always held onto the new name 'group' (zu). About half the former staff workers returned to offices during the 1969-71 period, the first period. They were usually selected based on their attitude exhibited toward the rebels during the CR. There also were always the 'revolutionary intellectuals' who had supported the rebels from the start and had stayed in the offices all along. But they were few. The rest were 'stinking intellectuals'.

Behavior of New Leaders

There was a lot of use of special privileges. It was an 'open secret'. But not many people knew about it outside China. People were 'new officials' used their new powers to gain favors for themselves and their families. They assigned themselves and families better housing (even relatives) or gave themselves many supplements. When they said 'fight self, repudiate revisionism' (dousi, pixiu) this is what they were really talking about. This was very interesting, given the ideology of 'revolution' of the cultural revolution. This is left over from the thousands of years of Chinese history--people think of 'self', which includes ones own family. These new 'rebels' were worse than the old cadres. The old cadres of course were not completely innocent of this, but at least they tried to hide it, but these young ones were not afraid of anything." With one hand, they grasped revolution, with the other, they grabbed for personal gain." This was a very widespread problem at the time, not just in his unit or in factories, but also in companies and bureaus. These new leaders could do this because they had a lot of power, and no one dared say anything about it.

Two quick examples from his unit. The young leaders of the RC, very young, had not gotten married because there was no housing. But after they got these positions (these were the ones that were in their early 20s), they used personal connections with the rebel leader of the Housing

Management Bureau, who was also a veteran of the Anting incident, to get them very nice housing indeed. The same head of the RC took his wife, who earlier was a worker in a grinding shop, and transferred her to an office job in the production group office. These leaders also had ways of getting cash from various supplement funds. They suddenly had watches on their arms and TV sets in their homes, even though their basic wages were still the same as when they were workers.

Changes in Technical System & Production after 1967

There were also changes in the technical system and production responsibilities between 1967-71. They decided that there would be new revolutionary products. Their sedans were considered bourgeois. So they were told to produce jeeps and 32-ton dump trucks for mining. But they had no technical department, how could they design and create technical cards for these new products? Not only that, they wanted to do it fast. They began turning out these new products in 6 months. They did not use old methods of designing and testing. They wanted proletarianized products turned out fast. The same was true of other units--the 'East Wind' ship at the dockyards. They simplified the entire process.

So the young head of the RC pulled out a few 'revolutionary intellectuals' he had good relations with before the CR and formed two temporary groups of technicians, just a handful in each, to do all the technical work for the new products. The informant worked in the jeep group. At the beginning there were two people. He was chosen because he was young and hadn't worked long. They did not design new parts from scratch. They used parts from their old products--like the generators, drive trains, steering systems, brake systems, old engines. All were parts from before, a universal design. The only things they designed were the things that could not be adapted to the new requirements--like the suspension system. Using this method they designed the new car in 59 days. They did it fast, they were already fighting with the Soviets on the border and they were preparing for war. As soon as they finished the designs, they didn't re-check them or anything. They immediately gave them to the shops.

Then they pulled out a group of 5 highly skilled workers, all grade 6 or over. They could read diagrams, had run all kinds of machines. They read diagrams, and produced the parts directly. They did not go through the stage of making technical cards. The purpose here was to build a prototype jeep. During the entire period they did not go home. There were 21 days where they worked without sleep. At other times they just laid on the floor when too tired to go on, or ate as they worked. The other shops stopped production during this period and did everything they could to serve those who were working on the new products. But they did not think about the next step--how to enter into mass production without technical cards, supplies, retooling, etc. They had a test car and a name, the 'zhengqi' (bring credit 争气). The test car was OK. It moved. It did fairly well when they tested it in the hilly areas.

They sent the jeep to Wang Hongwen, and he approved it. He had demanded jeeps in the first place. Wang demanded 10 more immediately. So again they went at it the same way, and the entire plant supported them again for six months. In six months the entire output of the plant was 10 jeeps! At this time, they didn't calculate the financial costs, they only calculated the political value. This was the time that they combined with the technical school--and for this reason. They told Wang Hongwen that they didn't have enough people to do these 10 jeeps, so they took the technical schools' personnel and put them to work, and used the school building for new shops, because their plant was small and previously didn't build entire cars, just the chassis. All the new equipment and materials they needed

were transferred in from other units by the city revolutionary committee. During this entire period the rest of the 1000+ workers helped on the project when needed, but most of the time they didn't have anything to do. They stopped producing their old bourgeois sedans entirely. They also were working on the 32-ton dump truck, but this was done in cooperation with several other factories in the system.

As they began to produce these extra 10 jeeps, the group began to go over their designs to improve them, and the 'technical groups' made up of technicians in the shops began to produce technical cards. But they still didn't calculate costs, they still hadn't set time quotas, materials consumption quotas. In 1969 they were given the task of producing 200 of these new jeeps, but in the end they only finished 50-60. The reason they failed was because the prototypes were done with the best skilled workers working round the clock. But with larger production they had to rely on less skilled labor, and it didn't work. This was right after the school was combined with theirs.

During 1969-72, their target was 200 a year. In 1969-60, they did 50+, in 1971 60+, and 1972, 90+. In 1973 they finally finished close to 200. They had finally solved a number of problems with regard to equipment and production planning that they hadn't solved before. So in 1974 their target was raised to 500, but the most they ever finished was 240 in 1976. In 1977 they shut down the jeep operations, and began to prepare for producing mining machinery. During this period the departments had been almost fully restored, from about 1974-76. By this time they were almost the same as before the CR. During the entire period they continued to improve the design of the jeep, until by 1976, when the last jeep rolled out of the plant, the only thing that was still the same was the engine. The factory from 1967-73 was completely different from before the CR. But by the end of 1973 and continuing up to 1976 the plant's administrative system looked more and more like the pre-CR system. The plant lost money from 1966-75, and each year the state made up the losses with supplementary funds. But it got better each year. Their plant, however, in comparison with others, was not too bad during this period.

Campaigns and Investigations (8/13/80, 3 hrs.)

The first campaign they had after the establishment of the RC was the 'repudiate self, fight revisionism' campaign (dousi, pixiu), which was directed in part at the special privileges being taken by new rebel cadres, but also was in order to assist the worker propaganda teams in units that suffered from serious factionalism, where it was hard to unite the factions. Since their auto plant had already established an RC fairly smoothly, no serious factionalism, the main thing they did was send out workers to participate in these worker propaganda teams and help other units establish RC's. These were 'Mao Thought Worker Propaganda Teams'. Factionalism was a difficult problem in other plants because the rebel leaders knew that whoever took leading positions in the plant would be able to have special privileges. So they raised the slogan of dousi pixiu to combat this. When they met with repeated difficulties in some units in establishing RC's and alliances, they began to say that the problem was that some 'class enemies' had entered the revolutionary ranks. This is the background of the 'cleaning of the class ranks' campaign.

The cleaning of the class ranks campaign grew out of the difficulties in some units in establishing a revolutionary committee. It was decided that there were no contradictions within the working class, so the problem of factionalism must be due to the intrigue and sabotage of class enemies. They looked among the leadership, among the masses, and within the rebel HQ

for class enemies. The new leaders had already read through a lot of files, and knew the situation of a lot of people. They ended up going after those kinds of people who had been under suspicion or investigation during the four cleans. They looked at people with historical problems--participation in the KMT youth, labor, or government organizations, who had been in trouble before for corruption and speculation, or illicit sexual relations. So in the movement they went after the 'old yundong yuan'. They also went after a couple of the new leaders who had been abusing their new privileges--two people who were in the RC and were leaders in the rebel organization, one of whom was now a shop leader. They were removed from the RC. The masses also demanded that the company send down a worker propaganda team and investigate the new leaders, who the masses were very dissatisfied with. This was the same method as during the four cleans. The masses didn't dare speak up as long as the leading cadres of the plant were in charge of the movement. About 90% of the new cadres were examined and criticized, but only the above two were punished. The worker propaganda team contained workers, company officials, cadres from other factories. There were no PLA cadres or teams which came to his factory. Basically in Shanghai they did not dispatch PLA teams to factories unless they were large and suffered from serious factional problems. They were usually sent to companies and bureaus.

They put one of the old cadres attacked during this movement to work in a shop, declared him a counter-revolutionary. He was the vice-head of the technical department previously. Another shop leader who had landlord background was sent back to his home village. There were three people from among the workers who were given labels and punishments because of their activities during the cultural revolution--they had raped women, engaged in speculation. They were given a variety of punishments, ranging from being kept in the plant under supervision to being sent to jail. Generally, the old cadres were attacked for historical problems and class background, the new cadres for taking special privileges after getting in power, and the masses for things they had done during the cultural revolution. The movement was fairly short in their plant--a little less than 6 months--because the RC was established fairly fast and no serious problems there. In all, about 10 people were punished.

The next campaign was early in 1970, the yida sanfan, and its content was not really distinguishable from the cleaning of the class ranks. It was pointed mainly at the 'dangquan pai'. It was aimed at those new cadres who were taking all kinds of special privileges--this was still a serious problem. This was the time when they got rid of people in the city revolutionary committee that were formerly prominent--like Pan Guoping. It was against corruption, speculation, stealing. They criticized some new cadres for corruption and using control over housing allocation to their own advantage. They revealed and criticized these practices, but no one in the factory was removed from office. This was not a campaign where people were grabbed in the factory.

The Anti May 16th Elements Campaign was run immediately afterward. The movement was fairly light in Shanghai. The workers were mobilized to expose members of this organization, but they couldn't find any. So they changed the criteria to people who spoke 'as if they were members' of this counter-revolutionary organization. This meant expressing dissatisfactions about the CR, saying that it made losses for the revolutionary cause. So they criticized a few workers who had expressed dissatisfaction with the CR over the past few years, and had been reported for doing so. Those with 'vested interests' (jide liyi) were never attacked as May 16 Elements. This campaign was even more severe in other areas of China. Aside from the two RC members

unseated during the cleaning of the class ranks, the leading group was undisturbed by this series of post-CR campaigns.

Restoration of Administration, 1972-76

In 1972, after six years of anarchy, where there basically was no management system, they decided that they should 'build up' (jianli) and restore (huifu) necessary rules and regulations. This was said to be part of building up a proletarian management system. They started to analyze and criticize all the old regulations and systems, and build up new ones. They criticized the old 'one man management' (yizhang zhi), said it deprived workers of their rights. They said workers should supervise management. They said that intellectuals should not lead the proletariat. So they established what they called 'systems of responsibility' (gangwei zeren zhi) which workers were to follow voluntarily, not because they were being forced to. This includes things like quality standard inspections. So on the one hand they criticized the old system, while they started at the same time to restore some of these systems except with different interpretations of them. So they used new names. "Systems of responsibility" rather than "rules and regulations" (guizhang zhidu). They started once again to re-establish quotas for individuals after 6-7 years where there were none.

Also, they began gradually to re-establish the old departments with the same division of labor as before. But they called them 'groups' not 'departments'. Most were led by old cadres put in charge of some departments. So they recalled most of the former staff members from the shops to work in new departments. But the technicians and designers from the technical department stayed in the shops doing technical work there. They did not restore the technical department until 1976-77. They restored the quality inspection (jianyan) department early, in 1972, but the people in offices were only 1/3 as many as before. They put the inspection workers in the shops back under the leadership of the inspection department. They had been under the shop director leadership for past 6 years.

They began to implement the party's cadre policy at the same time they began to rebuild the departments, in 1972. They wanted to make use of their skills. So the cadres went through a 'washing' process just like during the four cleans, where the cadres made a self-examination and expressed what their true feelings were toward the CR, and after which they were liberated. They had to discuss the mistakes they had made, how the masses had helped them to realize them during the CR, what they had learned. In 1972, 80-90% of the middle-level leading cadres (departments and shops) were rehabilitated. Most were made vice-heads of their shops or departments, while new cadres were the top problems. They were made, for example, vice-head of shop revolutionary committees. A little later, the end of 1972, early 1973, they began to rehabilitate and investigate a few old plant-level cadres to be on the plant RC. But most stayed in the shops doing manual labor.

It was natural that there would be contradictions between the old and new cadres. They tried all kinds of methods to resolve it--'criticize self, repudiate revisionism', reading Mao's thoughts. The new cadres were people who handled politics, while the old ones had handled business. When the old cadres raised opinions about the new ones, the new ones felt it was an attempt at 'restoration'. So when the new cadres criticized the old ones it was an attempt to counter this attempt at restoration. But there was no factionalism like before the establishment of the RC. There were no mass organizations of any sort, just the rebel HQ. They just had their

contradictions between the old and new cadres.

These contradictions came out in the criticisms during the campaigns of the 1972-76 period: Pi Lin Pi Kong, Criticize Water Margin, Criticize Deng Xiaoping. They would criticize one another in an indirect way. In some cases people would be put on a stage in a meeting and criticized. In some cases old cadres lost leading positions for the second time. This was how these contradictions came out. The new cadres represented the influence of Deng and Zhou. During these several study campaigns they would often stop production to study a few days. They also established special study groups (xuexi ban) for cadres to go to full time for a few days to a couple of weeks. Sometimes they went to the company, sometimes to the bureau offices for these.

Changes After 1976

After this time almost all of the new cadres in leading positions lost their positions--99%. Not all of a sudden, but gradually. Some lost their positions almost immediately and automatically. Later the old cadres discussed the cases of those left over, and only kept one new cadre on the RC, the vice-head, and he later became vice-plant director. The whole thing was resolved within 2 months after the fall of the Gang of four. They all went back to the pre-CR workers jobs. They also had young officials from the company and bureau offices sent back down to their plant to be workers once again.

They began to call the departments 'ke' once again. They sent almost all of the workers who had been moved into staff positions since the CR back to the shops, and brought all the rest of the original personnel back into the offices. They completely restored the pre-CR system and regulations.

In 1978 they abolished the RC, about a year after the Gang of Four fell. The old plant director and party secretaries were put back into their positions. The old department heads and vice-heads also. About 99% of the people in these positions were those who had held the same posts before the CR. It was as if the 10 years of the CR was all a big joke. It was worse than a joke, they retrogressed (daotui) during that period. They had elections for union chairman and union committeemen, but no other leading cadres were elected, they were all appointed. They never raised this suggestion either. The Party is still in command, just like before the CR. In the kind of society they have in China, it is not possible to have genuine elections. They still first consider your activism, class background, party membership, how many years you have been in the party. China has been like this for over 2000 years, it will not change so easily. Some units, a very few, tried elections beginning in 1977, but in reality China is not carrying these elections out.

They began to run business study classes for cadres, especially party secretaries and branch secretaries, technical study. Some couldn't even read very well, so they gave them cultural study classes also. But these are only part time, since these leaders are busy. Also, some of them just aren't able to learn.

They also began to promote technical cadres to engineer and then to leading positions, like chief engineer (zong gongcheng shi). One was raised to chief engineer, and they restored this office with leading powers over production. They promoted another to a vice-director's position in charge of technical work. They are now putting experts (neihang) into leading positions. The old 'native cadres' (tu ganbu) are just not very helpful in the four modernizations. Now they are appointing not only the old cadres,

but also young ones with business knowledge and technical training, to positions where they are being groomed for leadership. And they don't have to always be Party members. One was even a member of the KMT before Liberation. So in many ways they are going much further than restoring to the pre-CR situation. They are doing things now they wouldn't dare do in the early 1960s.