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PERSONAL DATA

Age: 43

Sex: Male

Education: Industrial College graduate

Total Years Relevant Experience: 17

Last Year of Relevant Experience: 1977      Year Left China: 1977

Initial Immigration Status: Legal

Native Place/Overseas Connections: Guangdong native/ OS ties unknown

Class Background/Political Designation: unknown

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## OCCUPATIONAL HISTORY SUMMARY

Positions Held: 1) Technician, Technical Department, Canton Heavy Machinery Plant, 1961-64  
2) Vice-head, Technical Department, Mining Machinery Plant, Guangdong, 1964-65  
3) #1 Machinery Plant, Hainan Island  
a) Department Head, Production Dept., 1965-67  
b) Acting Plant Director, 1967-71  
4) #2 Machinery Plant, Hainan Island  
a) Department Head, Production Dept., 1971-77

Administrative Level of Work Unit/(No. of employees):

- 1) Municipal/(3500)
- 2) Province/(500)
- 3) County or town/(300)
- 4) County or town/(250)

Experience in Full-time Manual Labor (for non-worker occupations):

none mentioned

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APPOINTMENTS: 3

TOTAL HOURS: 6.5

PAGES TEXT: 7

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Occupational History (3/30/80, 2 hrs.)

The informant graduated from South China Industrial College (Huanan Gongxue Yuan) in 1961. He studied machine building technology and equipment. This was a four year course of 1957-61. In September 1961 he was assigned to Canton Heavy Machinery Factory, where he worked in the technology (gongyi) department as a technician. After one year of practice, he became a grade 13 technician. This plant had 3500 employees, and was under the city of Canton. He worked here for four years, until 1964. In this department he did mechanical drawing, designed prototypes, derived specifications for materials, cutting procedures, temperature for heat treating, etc.

During 1964-65 he worked as a vice-head of the technical department (jishu ke) of a mining machine building plant in Guangdong. He oversaw the technical work, while the department head handled general policy. Actually, since this was a small plant, his department was referred to not as ke but as gu or zu (section or group). There were 500 employees in all, and the plant was under provincial administration.

In 1965 he requested to go to Hainan Island to work, because his wife had been assigned to work there and it would be much easier for him to move down there than it would be for her to get back to the Canton area. He was transferred to the production department (shengchan ke) of a machinery plant with 300 employees, and was department head from 1965 to 1967. This was the No. 1 Machinery Plant of his town. In 1967, at the height of the cultural revolution, he was pressed into service as plant director, because the previous one had stepped aside. He acted as plant director from 1967-71.

In 1971 he was transferred out of the leadership position (he was not a party member) and sent to the No. 2 Machinery Plant to be the department head of the technology (jishu) department. He was department head from 1971-1977. This plant was somewhat smaller than the first, and had about 250 employees. This plant, like the first, was under the administration of the Hainan Region (diqu). In 1977 he came to Hong Kong legally.

Wages

Wages for all cadres are handled by the organization department. Wages for workers are handled by the labor department of the enterprise. There were readjustments in 1957, 1963 (for 40% of employees after assessment in groups, according to years of service criteria), and in 1977, a big one. These were the major ones. They used criteria both on years of service and performance. They also had smaller readjustments in 1969(?), 1974(?), where people who had low wages and worked for a long time without raises were raised one grade. They did not use piece rates in his plants, and they didn't really use them in state-run plants very often, this was a collective industry scheme.

Bonuses

They had a bonus system in his plants from 1961-66 (he started work in 1961). After 1966 they gave each employee a supplemental wage of 7%. The pre-CR bonus system was monthly, and separated into 3 grades after assessments in small groups. The amount for each varied by factory, depending on the state's assessment of the plant's contribution. The system had not been restored in Hainan by the time he left in 1977. But it was rather well known in Canton that the Canton Steel Factory had been using bonuses since 1975.

### Motivation, Discipline among Administrators and Workers

There were problems with wages in the factories. It was hard to get people in leadership positions to take on responsibilities, and work hard, because often their wages were lower than regular experienced workers or nurses in factory nurseries. They thought this was an unreasonable situation.

There was also a problem with people being transferred to various kinds of jobs, with various levels of expertise. In later years there was the problem of people being transferred upward and promoted without qualifications. It was a mess. But pay was the same whether you were transferred to a demanding or undemanding job, regardless of your training. So people of course were dissatisfied.

There were real problems, as a result, with quality of work and with attendance. I knew of workers who would just come in to report at various times of the day, then take off on a bicycle. This was a very serious problem. You can't punish these workers. After the CR a cadre didn't dare discipline or punish a worker. The workers were considered revolutionary. Also, when a movement came the next time, this kind of cadre would certainly be out of luck (daomei). This was also true for worker suggestions about technique. They didn't really dare to tell workers that suggestions would not work. No one wanted to be struggled against, and go do farming. No one wanted to be accused of putting technology and production in command, or of taking the capitalist road.

### Temporary Workers

Before the CR they had temporary workers. They had 'trial workers' (shiyong gong) who were tried out for 1 year to see if they were OK before being turned regular (zhuanzheng). They had more temporary workers before the CR than after. They also had them after the CR, but many of them were turned to permanent workers. When temporary workers were turned into permanent ones, their grades were usually set at grade 1, but if they were skilled they could be set higher. These temporary workers were needed when absenteeism was high.

They also had contract workers, usually when they had a fixed project to finish. They would fix the length of service, and there was no chance to be turned into a permanent worker. These were real legal contracts, they specified everything, and they signed them. They abolished the contract worker system after the CR, since this was associated with rebellion in the CR.

### Canton Heavy Machinery Plant, 1961-64 (4/3/80, 2 hrs.)

His technical (gongyi) department had 13 people working in it. There was one department head, one vice head, and two group leaders. The gongyi department included the functions usually referred to as jishu, since this was a small plant. The work within the department was divided up according to product--they made sugar crushing machinery, chemical fertilizer machinery, etc. The department head handled all political matters, and the vice-head handled all business.

The general task of the department was to take design diagrams and turn them into technical diagrams which specified the actual technical steps in the production process. They would take a design drawing, and 1) make a list of raw materials needed to produce the piece; 2) decide which of these materials were on hand in the plant and which needed to be ordered; 3) then decide and specify what raw materials must be used for each component part to be produced, and specify the technical operations of a) cutting, b) drilling, c) welding, d) turning, etc.

For each of these processes they specified the measurements, speed, specifications of raw materials, temperature of processing, what machine to be used or what tools, what the rough finish should look like after each step, and what machines are used at each step. When making up these plans, they take into consideration a balance of costs and quality--there is a continual trade off here. Also, for each process, they set a time standard for producing it (ding e). Within a normal shift, figures are added up for machines/shift and quotas are arrived at. The final task of the department was to investigate and attack key problems in the technical process of production (gong guan--'attack the pass').

The department was divided into 2 groups, based on the different products they made. One group was for the sugar cane crushing machines, the other for the chemical fertilizer equipment. The group leader (zuzhang) handled the diagramming and oversaw operations for the entire product. At that time the leading cadres in the plant were mostly intellectuals with university educations and few of them were in the party, because in the early 1960s it was still hard for intellectuals to enter the party, especially if they had bad class background or overseas connections.

Departmental Structure: The production department handled the planning and management of the production process. The shops were directly under the production department. This department handled the speed and balance of production, and assured a balanced rate of progress which assured the completion of plans on time. This included deciding what to produce, when, how much, and assigning and distributing labor power to different areas. They drew up short-term plan for the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd 10 days (xun) of the month.

The political department (zhengzhi chu) was under the party committee. It handled education, and the stimulation of worker enthusiasm for production. They distributed materials and documents, printed things up and made sure everybody knows policies and the plan targets. They plan meetings, etc. There were only 2-3 people in this department.

The organization department (zuzhi bu) was also under the party committee. It handles cadre personnel matters. It takes care of records, transfers, and assignments for all people in the plant who are not workers. There were only 2-3 people in this department.

Supply department orders new materials and takes care of materials and products in the plant's stores. They ran four different warehouses (canku), one for spare parts (bearings, etc.), one for raw materials (iron, steel, alloys), one for semi-finished products, one for finished products. They have cadres who worked in the warehouses and also accountants and administrators. The warehouse general office was responsible for the procurement of needed parts, materials, and machines in the warehouses. They arrange for buying needed parts and materials but not for selling--this is taken care of by the plan. This is a larger department.

The security department was under the party. It protected the plant and guarded against theft. The guards are armed and mostly are demobilized soldiers. They protect public order. The union organizes and manages welfare for workers and their families in the unit's housing. They also did propaganda and educational, ideological work among workers to stir up labor enthusiasm and mediate quarrels. They ran vacations, activities, blackboard newspapers.

The finance department handled money for the entire plant. They decide when to ask for credit, when to pay back loans, draw on money from the plants accounts, keep track of profits and loss, and monitors purchases. They have the power to disapprove of purchases. They generally make sure that finances

are available to finish plans each month. They allocate money to the different sub-units of the factory.

The administrative department handles the physical plant--housing, medical care, and equipment repairs. It also handles the canteen and the food for it.

Shop Structure: Below the production department were the shops. The shops were divided into groups according to the production process. The shop director was the head, and at times there were also vice-directors. Below them in the shop office were several people who did office work. They had a materials 'yuan', who handled the ordering of parts and materials from warehouses. Some shops had their own storerooms, in which case he would also be responsible for this. The shop technicians were responsible for taking the production diagrams produced by the technical department and making sure workers understood them. They also have to solve normal problems as they pop up in production.

Below the shop office are several production groups. Each group had a group leader and vice-leader. They also had 'wu da yuan' (5 personnel). These were workers responsible for 1) materials, 2) propaganda, 3) safety, 4) output statistics (jindu tongji), which also included simple quality inspection, and 5) labor attendance (laoqin), within each group.

#### Quality Inspection System, 1961-64

There were three points of inspection. 1) Workers were responsible for inspecting their own products, and tossing aside those they knew were mistakes. 2) The statistician in the production group, one of the worker 'yuan', was responsible for making a simple inspection of pieces as part of their statistical work--they can only count good articles in the count of 'completed'. 3) There were also several quality inspectors in the technical department who did nothing but inspect products.

The workers, after turning out a piece, would take measurements with their calipers of each piece they turned out, so they usually know whether their work is up to standard. They are responsible for making sure that each piece they turn in is up to standard.

The statistician visits each worker and makes sure that the work is up to standard. He just checks one or two at random, does not have time to check every piece. Mainly this man's task in connection with quality control work is to remind the workers in the group of their responsibility to turn in only up to standard pieces. Workers put their individual quality control code numbers on each piece after they are produced. Thus it is possible to trace the worker responsible for each part.

The specialists in the technical department responsible for quality control select workers to carry out inspections for them of selected parts while they are still in the shop. This is for small parts. For completed engines, they sent teams of engineers from the department to give a thorough inspection. There are also technicians in the shops who are also responsible for quality matters, among their other responsibilities. So after a complete lot of parts is finished, and ready to be sent out of the shop, he is responsible for checking them over again. Of course, actual arrangements for inspection varies by the product and the technical process in the shop, whether it is the turning of parts, assembling of engines, welding, etc. There was never any special quality control station directly under the leadership of the technical department.

The informant adds that as far as administration goes, the bureau set an upper limit on the amount of cadres (non-productive) in the plant of 7%.

#### Record Keeping and Statistics (4/6/80, 2.5 hrs.)

Part of the reporting system was to sort products into grades by their quality. The top grade was 'up to standard', second grade was flawed, but usable, and the third grade was 'waste'. This refers mainly to parts. As far as finished machines went, the products were sorted into five grades which had different sales outlets and users. The top grade items were for export. Second grade items went for national defence. Third grade items went to other plants according to the state plan. Fourth grade items went to locally run industries (as opposed to national, ministry-run industries referred to by third grade items). Fifth grade items went to local units and were not administered by the state--they were bought, sold, and exchanged freely outside the plan.

Every day, the materials and statistics 'yuan' in the small groups would fill out a table called the "production statistics report" (shengchan tongji biao). This included figures on production output, waste, materials consumption, output quality, personnel used for each machine. They also would specify in detail each worker's performance, including the percent completion of monthly plan, both daily and cumulative.

These daily production reports were sent to the shop offices, where there is a statistician or, depending on the size of the shop, another person responsible for handling these reports. They then fill out a daily shop report along the same lines, summarizing shop production situation. These tables all go to the planning department and they hold onto daily reports for the purpose of making monthly production reports to the bureau.

This entire system was abolished in factories during the CR and has only recently been re-established. Yes, it was abolished, not just handled poorly. But in 1972 they did start to make efforts to restore this system, but they were not very successful until more recently. In the early 1970s when they tried to restore the basic-level statistical system it didn't work out because workers were dissatisfied with the wage and promotion situation, and also because the testing system had long ago been abandoned as a criteria for promotion. Therefore there was a lack of training for this kind of work, while at the same time the lack of worker activism at the time meant workers were not willing to put in the extra work.

The statistical system was also put into disorder during the Great Leap Forward. This is because the people who reported bad results could be labelled rightists and capitalist experts. Also the output quotas increased suddenly, and the products like steel that many units were not equipped to produce. So there were two kinds of pressures: 1) just plain exaggeration on reporting to upper levels, and 2) the inclusion of waste articles and second grade (cipin) goods in the first grade (cheng pin) reports. This exaggeration mainly occurred at the upper levels of the factory, not at the work group.

#### Hainan Machinery Plant Experience, 1965-77

He transferred to a small machinery plant in Hainan in 1965. In 1967 he was raised to the position of factory director because the old director had landlord background and was knocked down during the CR. He was picked to replace him because if he didn't nobody would manage the plant. He was not a party member, though. It was just that they needed someone who could do the job.

Cultural Revolution: The factions that arose during the CR had different opinions toward the leading cadres both within the plant and nationally. The organizations in Hainan had connections with those in Canton, and those in Canton with those in Peking. The fight between them completely disrupted production in his plant. A lot of workers were killed in some plants, but none in his. There were a lot killed in places like Guizhou, Hunan, Guangxi.

They did have armed battles in the streets in Hainan; workers in his plant had arms, and were often out on the streets fighting. From 1967-68, a year and several months, production stopped completely. I was scared to death at this time. When arguments started, fighting started, and he ran home. He really had no plant director's work to do then. He had been selected by the factions after the old plant director had been struggled against and sent down to do manual labor. The old plant director was rehabilitated in 1971, but became an ordinary staff member when he returned to the plant.

Production was restored only gradually. In 1966 a 4 cleans work team which included PLA soldiers came to the plant (November), but nobody listened to them, and they left. In 1968 the military control committee (junguan) came to the plant. The four cleans movement, in other words, came very late to Hainan, so this is the source of the confusion about 'military representatives'.

When the military control committee came, their major task was to get groups to stop arguing and fighting, and to disarm them. But they ended up supporting one side and opposing the others, and suppressing them. There were about 7-8 PLA members at first. Generally they were not armed because they felt that would harm their propaganda work.

Revolutionary Committee: They established a revolutionary committee around October 1968. It was formed according to the demands of the upper levels. They had elections for representatives, but they were nominated by the PLA, screened beforehand, and did not cast ballots but put everyone in a room and had a show of hands. PLA members were not members of the RC, but they had to be consulted on all matters. The informant, since he was plant director, was a member of the RC, and was chairman of the 'grasping production group'.

There were 7 members of the RC. A party member who earlier had been a secretary in the Plant director's office was the head. Since I was not a party member, he could not be in the leading position. The vice-head was an old worker, and another vice-head was an administrative cadre. They had a union representative, formerly a union worker. A woman's representative, who was the head of the women's association, and a CYL leader. The previous party secretary had already been transferred out of the plant. Actually the head of the RC was in charge, because most of the other representatives were still production workers. The committee met frequently. They talked over problems in the plant--production, livelihood, etc.. They would discuss how to complete plans.

They revived the Party Committee structure after 1969, gradually. They restored party branches, but not many party cadres stood aside. They mostly were transferred elsewhere.

#### Administration and Production Situation, 1969-77

Below the RC were a finance and accounting group (zu) and a production group. Some of the old personnel of the departments were now in the shops, and new people were transferred in. They had a rotating system of participation in labor for cadres. At this point they still hadn't restored the statistical reporting system, and the previous rules and regulations, although they were preparing to do so. They tried to rebuild them when Deng first came back in 1973, but then it was opposed. It was never really carried out well. Not until 1977-78 did they begin to restore these systems.

After he left in 1971, a new plant director was transferred in from Peking, and he was being sent down to his old home town--it was a punishment for him. The PLA finally left the plant in 1972-3.



During 1968-71 production was totally disrupted. People would make decisions without talking out problems. The decisions arrived at could not really be carried out well. In 1971-77 things were not yet back to normal. Material procurement was not stable, and people's thinking was still unsettled. Another big problem was that the materials and parts provided in the plans simply were not enough to meet the targets they were given. So enterprises had to 'go through the back door' (zou houmen), and get materials by barter or production from other units outside the plan. This practice increased much more after the CR.

Also, worker's thinking was unsettled. There was a common problem of being dissatisfied with wages, so workers would drag out their tasks, and slow down. This problem, called daigong, was very widespread.

In sum, the biggest difference in workstyle of management before and after the CR was that before the decision could be carried out. After the CR systems of regulations and leadership were unstable and unconsolidated. Before the CR, if managers came to work, they did work. After the CR, people 'put in the time but didn't put out effort' (chu qin, bu chu li). They talked, held meetings, but finally nothing was accomplished in the end. They had systems on paper, but they were not adhered to.