
PERSONAL DATA

Age: 48

Sex: Male

Education: University Graduate (Qinghua, chemistry), 2 yrs. post-grad.

Total Years Relevant Experience: 26

Last Year of Relevant Experience: 1979

Year Left China: 1979

Initial Immigration Status: Legal

Native place/Overseas Connections: Hebei/wife Thailand OS

Class Background/Political Designation: staff (zhiyuan)

OCCUPATIONAL HISTORY SUMMARY

Positions Held: 1) Instructor, Lecturer, Peking Petroleum Institute, 1954-61

2) Chemical Engineer, Peking Light Industrial Bureau, 1961-79

a) Staff engineer, Bureau Technology Department, 1961-62

b) Vice Department Head, Planning-Technical Department, Peking Furfural Factory, 1962-65.

c) Staff engineer, Research office of Technical Department, Peking Household Chemical Plant, 1962-65

d) Production worker, Peking Household Chemical Plant, 1966-72

e) Research engineer, Light Industry Bureau Research Institute, 1972-79

Administrative Level of Work Unit/(No. of employees)

1) Ministry

2b) @300

2c, 2d) 600

Experience in Full-time Manual Labor (for non-worker occupations):

Shop production worker, 1966-72

APPOINTMENTS: 12

TOTAL HOURS: 21.5

PAGES TEXT: 23

Occupational History (11/16/79, 2 hrs.)

His father was a teacher at a technical school, taught engineering, and had earlier graduated from Peking Univ. His family chengfen is zhiyuan (staff). He also has two brothers who went to universities in Peking. One is a scientist, another is an artist and musician who works in the Ministry of Education. He lived with his family in Peking--was comfortable, but not rich. He went to middle school in Peking in the 1940s, during the Japanese occupation. He attended a school run by Christian missionaries from the US, and the principal was a Harvard Ph.D. From 1941-45 the middle school had a Japanese political officer in charge, and the missionaries, who had fled earlier, returned after 1945. In 1947 he graduated, and tested into 3 different universities--Yanjing, Zhongfa (Sino-French), and Qinghua. He attended Qinghua, and had completed 3 terms by the time the CCP marched into the city in February 1949. He graduated in 1951 from the Chemical Engineering Department. He entered graduate school, studying for 2 years from 1951-3. By 1954, he graduated from the College of the Petroleum Industry which had in the meantime split off from a Qinghua department. He has reading knowledge of English and Russian. He had Russian professors during this period who taught engineering courses in Russian.

From 1954-56 he was an assistant instructor at the Petroleum Industry college, where he had earlier graduated. In 1956 he was promoted to lecturer, where he also began doing laboratory experiments, and lectured on petroleum refining. He taught, published papers. His responsibilities in the Petroleum Ministry were to translate books into Chinese for publication, and to do planning work on how to develop the petroleum industry over the long run. The results of conferences on this topic, and position papers, were sent to the Ministry in charge.

In 1957 the government changed. Politics became more important. This is because the 20th congress of the CPUSSR made criticisms of Stalin that gave China a shock. Thereafter they had to spend more time on politics, reading and discussing. In the anti-rightist campaign many of his friends were criticized, because during the 100 flowers period they had criticized the Party's faults. They were subsequently criticized in groups in their college. At that time China's intellectuals, formerly quite approving of the CCP, began to have their doubts about the Party. Each day intellectuals had to spend time on politics in addition to business responsibilities. They couldn't just do their work, they would be criticized.

In 1958 the Great Leap Forward started. It had no achievements, because it was impossible to raise suggestions or criticisms of it once it was underway. Also, the CCP exaggerated the accomplishments in the midst of the GLF. Also, if you did your work to the exclusion of politics you would once again be criticized. In 1961 his industrial college was reorganized, and many were sent to the Northeast, to Daqing. He asked to be transferred to a factory in Peking, because he didn't want to leave his family. They agreed, and transferred him to the Peking Light Industry Bureau.

From 1961-66 he worked in the city's light industry system as a chemical engineer, and moved around to several different factories in the system, as needed by the bureau. He worked in several different chemical factories as an upper-level technician.

In 1966 until 1972 he was not allowed to do technical work. He kept the title of engineer, but worked in workshops at manual labor in the Peking Detergent and Soap Factory. At that time he was the head of the research department, but the department ceased work entirely. He was a special worker. When they needed a technician they asked him to help out.

In effect, he was an engineer without title. From 1972-79(March), he returned to office work. During 1972-3 he worked in a technical office in the factory, but in 1973 he returned to a research institute in the system, where he still had frequent contacts with factories in the system. He came to Hong Kong legally in mid-1979.

Industrial College Experience, 1954-61

His industrial college was under the Education Ministry, while the factories he had contact with were under the Petroleum Ministry. There were connections between the college and the petrochemical factories and refineries in the Ministry system. First, some graduates of the college worked in these factories later as technicians. Second, students studying often went to these factories to practice in production, and get practical experience. (This often disrupted production because there were too many students at once, but the industrial ministry ordered it). Third, students and teachers together went to these factories to study production problems, come up with suggested solutions. To do this, they often held meetings with workers. Prevalent form was to have shop leaders convene meetings and solicit suggestions from workers and students. Usually about 10 workers, 10 students. Leaders of shops have the power to decide when to implement suggestions. But after 1958 this situation changed gradually in different parts of the country. Power went to the Party in 1958-66, and there was a transitional period here where the party branch of the shop decided such technical questions. Fourth, experts from the college went to the ministry to attend meetings and discuss various aspects of the development of the petroleum industry. Meetings included representatives from factories, ministry planning departments, and research institutes and colleges.

Great Leap Forward

There were actually 2 great leaps forward. One in 1958 when they built a small steel furnace in the institute courtyard, and one in 1960 when he often went to factories with his students. During this period factories were in disorder, workers using native methods were messing things up. They built steel furnaces in courtyards, worked very hard but with no results. They wasted a lot of time and effort.

Things that went on in factories, according to his knowledge: Shop leaders were ignored when it came time to implement the mass movement. The shop party branch simply overrode their orders. The party committee and branch secretary therefore made decisions about plans, product changes, etc. without consultation. Their decisions didn't fit scientific principles. Workers and cadres were making decisions based on thin understanding of science, under the guise of "sweeping away superstition" (pochu mixin). This was a prominent political slogan of the time.

There were many meetings. If a shop head or a technician opposed a certain innovation or change, they would be criticized in these meetings. If the person continued to insist his criticisms were correct, he would be relieved of his duties (stand aside--kaobian zhan). He still received his salary, had his post, but there was no way to do the work he was trained to do. No power, no work. Nothing to do--just read books, attend meetings, etc. But people very rarely went this far in their opposition. Political pressures were too great.

Political pressure (zhengzhi yali). By this he means the political atmosphere (qihou) that pervades the small group study meetings. You can't oppose suggestions, or you will be criticized. Yet you can't keep silent if you disagree. If you keep silent, the group leader will point out your

non-participation, and direct criticism your way, trying to draw you into committing yourself. So basically, you have to approve. But there are two ways to approve. First, you can become an activist--volunteer to speak, approve actively. Or you can just acquiesce, in which case you will still be criticized for supporting too passively. Most intellectuals opposed this sort of method, but didn't dare speak out.

Workers usually broke down into three groups of opinion during this movement. First were those who had the same opinion as most intellectuals. These were experienced or skilled workers who knew these kinds of 'technical reforms' would not work, but could not speak out. Second, there were those who just did not care, they collected their pay checks and went home. Third, there were the activists (jiji fenzi) and backbones (gugan) who, because of ignorance, naivete, youth, and sometimes opportunism, agreed with the party and actively take part in the technical reform movement. Opportunists are those who get promoted to group head, section leader, shop leader, and vice plant director after proving their worthiness in these way over a period of time. There were not many of these types during the GLF, but they became more important during the Cultural revolution. But this was the period when this situation began to develop. These were people who aimed to 'crawl upward' (xiang shang pa). Opportunists in leadership positions did not have any technical knowledge, so they survived in office by exploiting the knowledge of two kinds of people: 1) those with technical expertise and scientific knowledge; 2) experienced workers. They 'made use of' these people (liyong). Most workers and intellectuals did not like the opportunists, but the opportunists nonetheless used their abilities to get by.

(11/19/79, 1.5 hrs)

In fact, at the beginning of the GLF, a lot of workers and intellectuals approved of it, but experience proved otherwise, and quickly had doubts. Afterwards they learned that one formula does not work for the whole country. When the first bad results became apparent, people were sorted into several categories based on their opinions. First, were the good people, the 'promoters of progress' (cujin pai). The party wanted everyone to be like this. Then there were three bad groups. The 'retreaters' (cutui pai), the 'watchers of the tide' (guan chao pai), those who just watched, didn't participate actively or offer opinions, and the 'qiuhou suanzhang pai', those who didn't believe in the GLF and wanted to 'settle accounts after the autumn harvest'--these last people typically said they would not commit themselves to an opinion until after seeing final results. The good group were referred to as people who wanted to stay "atop the horse" (shangma), while the bad groups were those who wanted to 'dismount' (xiama). Although political pressures were applied during the GLF, they were not too severe. There was no firing, no lowering of salary, but there was a lurking fear that one's opinion would place them in the category of "enemy-people contradiction".

Political pressure was applied in political study groups, in everyday work, neighborhoods, and wherever interaction is thick. Reports on individuals are made by cadres and entered into files. Everybody lives together communally in many institutions. Social isolation is a great fear for those who do not conform. The lack of ability to leave and go to another unit makes it possible for the party to control people. If you're isolated there is no way out, you cannot move to another job, neighborhood, or city.

The effect of the GLF on college work was that they went more often to the factories to gain knowledge of actual conditions (shiji). It was

stressed that intellectuals should not cut themselves off from actual conditions. They made factory visits with increased frequency. A higher proportion of the college's teachers went to factories to visit and participate in manual labor, even math teachers. During the high tide of the movement about 10% of the college staff was outside in factories participating in labor, tempering themselves in labor and reforming their thinking (laodong duanlian gaizao sixiang). This started in 1957, but was irregular thereafter. It was more frequent during 1958 and 1960. During the GLF when teachers and students went to factories to meet with workers and discuss problems with them, they went as common laborers, and not as experts.

Wages, Promotion (1-11-80, 2 hrs.)

After 1957, Party membership became more important for upward mobility, especially in being promoted to becoming an official. But from 1957-66, things weren't too severely limited to Party members. From 1966 to 1975, this requirement became more severe. There was no other way to move upward except to join the Party; you can't accumulate capital as in capitalist countries. If you want to be shop director, kezhang, etc., you must first be a Party member.

The scale of pay for all administrative cadres in China includes all Party officials, all state officials, and cadres within enterprises all the way down to the shop or section head level. First there is the administrative cadre (xingzheng ganbu) classification system. It goes from grade 1 (top) to 24. One through 13 are considered high level (gaoji) cadres, 14-17 are middle level, and 18-24 are ordinary (putong). Depending on the size of the unit and its importance, factory officials at certain levels will be assigned higher or lower grades. The Plant director of an Anshan-size company can be grade 6 or 7, while a small plant's director can be around 17 or 18. Then also depending on the size of the unit, department heads or shop directors can get as high as 14, as low as the 20s.

Wages vary by region, and according to the cost of living, much as do worker wages. In Peking, as far as he was familiar, the wage levels went something like this: 13) 170¥...16) 112¥, 17) 99¥, 18) 87 ¥, 19) 78¥, 20) 70¥, 21) 62¥, 22) 56¥, 23) 48¥, 24) 43¥.

Special Privileges: There are certain privileges assigned to certain grades. Grades 1 to 7 can read internal Party documents which are denied to grades 8-13, and 8-13 can read documents which are denied to 19-24. The general dividing line for special privileges is level 13. The administrative cadre route to higher position was preferred, especially since the intellectual route through technical expertise was so politically dangerous--they were considered the 'stinking 9th category' later on (chou laojiu).

For housing, grades 18-24 have housing similar to workers, but this varies, grade 14-17 has slightly nicer housing, while 1-13 definitely have larger, nicer places. In transportation, grades 1-13 can go 1st class on trains, can take planes. Lower cadres can only take planes on special occasions, while they can't go 1st class on trains.

These are the legal sides of special privileges. There are also the non-legal. Since high-level cadres know one another so well because they are few, they can call one another up on the phone to have their children placed in good jobs, get university placement. It is easier to have children accepted into the army, and once in the army it is easier to get promotions to the officer corps. This is all done through guanxi. The cadres also have better local schools for their children, and their children have less household chores to do since their family position is better, so they have more time to devote to study. But during the period 1966-77 when there were no tests, it was easier for cadres children to get in through guanxi, despite

their qualifications. It is also easier to get desirable marriage partners for children, can get better hospital care, can buy things that are rationed for others, and at larger quantities, like TV sets. But here we have moved back into the legal area. Also, ability to attend certain meetings requires that you have a certain grade level.

Cadres of middle level and above don't do concrete work, they lead others and give orders. They don't do accounting, planning or other administrative work. Thus grades 17 and above have somewhat easier jobs. Almost all people grade 13 and above are Party members. It is very rare for an individual in such a high position to be a non-party person. Sometimes a member of the National People's Congress from a democratic party, or someone like Ba Jin, but very few. Therefore there is very little contradiction involved in the rules about reading internal Party reports, because almost all these people are Party members. At any rate, non-party people cannot read these documents regardless of their grade.

Technical Cadres: Again, pay depends on locality, also on whether or not you teach in a university, or work in a bureau or an enterprise. The system ranks technical experts from grade 1 to 16. High-school level technicians usually start out at grade 16 and can advance to grade 10, college graduate technicians start at 13 and can advance to 7. It is rare to advance to grades 1-6, these are usually reserved for pre-49 graduates or special cases of contributions to the state--not by law but by general practice. Grades 14,15, and 16 are called assistant technicians in enterprises. Grades 10,11,12, and 13 are assigned to technicians in enterprises, and to assistant teachers in universities and institutes. Grades 6,7,8, and 9 are usually assistant engineers (or lecturers in universities), grades 4,5 and 6 are vice-engineers or assistant professors, while grades 1-4 are engineers or full professors. The pay scale in Peking runs as follows:
1) 360¥, 2) 300¥, 3) 240¥, 4) 200¥, 5) 170¥, 6) 146¥, 7) 126¥, 8) 105¥, 9) 90¥, 10) 79¥, 11) 70¥, 12) 62¥, 13) 55¥, 14) 49¥, 15) 44¥, 16) 38¥.

Promotion Opportunities and the Politics of Promotion

Promotions were slower during periods of economic hardship. They stopped altogether with the Cultural Revolution, when the entire system of promotion halted. After that changes of work without changes of pay grade were commonplace. People moved up and down without changes in scale or pay. Then around 1973 they started to restore the promotion system, first in the Steel system and then in the Petroleum system. They raised work title then, but still did not raise pay--so only restored half the system. Earlier they had abolished titles. Not until the end of 1977, and then again in 1979, did they have a national readjustment where both grades, titles, pay raised.

There were three periods where promotion opportunities were different. First, 1949-57, when China's economic progress was very rapid, and there were so many opportunities for technical promotions. At this time, university educated technicians could be promoted within 3-5 years to assistant engineer. Only 2 kinds of people failed to be promoted. 1) people who had been sick and stopped work for extended periods; 2) people with political mistakes, or people who did terrible work, or stole things. Both of these exceptions were rare. This meant, depending on where one started in scale, that you could get a raise once every year or 2 of at least 1 grade. At that time, technicians were few and universities still were not producing enough people to fill the job slots. There were regular promotions, and all had opportunities. I says that at that time intellectuals were quite happy, and thought well of the government.

Second, 1958-65, where some important changes began. Raises became

rather rare. A larger supply of trained people were being turned out from the universities. In 1960 and 1963 a small number of people were able to get promotions and raises, and these were done after appraisals and discussion within small groups. The final decisions were made by the Party. In 1960, and in 1963, some factories began to employ the practice of promoting without raise. Raises title, but not scale and pay.

Third, 1966-76, no one got raises, unless it was secret and due to guanxi. They often raised a person's job title, but did not change the wage. Also during this period a number of cadres were asked to 'stand aside'. They lost their powers, were sent to manual labor but kept their titles and wages. In many cases, after a department head or similar leading official stepped aside, then his place was taken by someone who was not called kezhang, but 'responsible person' (fuze ren). There were many old cadres in this position. About 70-80% stood aside for at least some stretch during this period. Nobody exactly took their places in most cases, but a lot of leading authority was shifted to revolutionary committees and military control committees (jun guan hui). The people who had 'stood aside' had two duties: 1) participate in manual labor, 2) be criticized.

The return of these kinds of people to office and leading work took place over a prolonged period, gradually. Some were restored to their posts as early as 1969, others took all the way until 1977, but this still was a period of continuing, gradual rehabilitation. If you were not rehabilitated fairly early, then your situation was described as 'left hanging' (guaqilai). Some of the cadres doing manual labor had their wages lowered, but actually they were just held back. For example, a 120¥ wage might be reduced to 40¥, but the remaining 80 would be kept back, set aside and paid to the person when his name was eventually restored. Basically speaking, from 1966 to 1977, there were no wage raises or promotions, just changes in jobs.

Promotion criteria: Before 1957, this was based entirely on ability and performance, not on political mistakes or one's thinking. Unless totally incompetent or sick, or huge political mistakes, then one had a chance to be promoted. During 1958-65 still had the old criteria, but political showing (biaoxian) entered more into the equation. For example, if one were criticized during the anti-rightist movement, then your chances were slim. But also, there was a shrinking number of people being promoted overall. Party membership still was not clearly a key criteria for promotion among technical cadre, but was already becoming so for administrative cadres, especially for promotion to leading positions.

As far as being promoted into administrative positions, technical cadres had few chances. I was an engineer, not a party member, and was promoted to be assistant department head. But this was rare. He estimates that less than 20% of the leaders were non-Party before 1966. During the same period less than 1% of plant directors or assistant directors were non-Party. But during the Cultural Revolution people with titles had no real power. It was very confusing. China has a special characteristic. Its rules are very clear and precise, but rules are not emphasized. This is a result of the rapid reforms and attempted reforms of recent years.

There were several reactions by educated cadres to this situation. First, a rather large group lost hope, and decided that all they would do was watch movies, pass the time. They decided it was no use in studying or working hard. Not only was it useless to do this, but it might also get you criticized. Second, an equally large group couldn't accept the situation. They still thought that study and hard work was good, but they did not dare say so, so they had a contradiction in their minds, and therefore found it hard to study and work. Third, a smaller group didn't accept criticisms, kept working hard, and were not afraid of criticisms even though they received them from time to time. They persisted in working

hard, studying and raising their level of expertise.

Experience in Light Industry Enterprises, 1961-65 (5/17/80, 1.5 hrs.)

In 1961, he transferred to the Light Industry Bureau of Peking Municipality, and worked for a while in the Technology Department (jishu chu). After half a year, because he didn't like office staff work, he asked to be transferred to a factory. So he was sent to the Chemical Household Products Plant in the light industrial system. This was to help them set up a new shop. Later he was transferred to a Furfural Factory (kangquan chang) which made a chemical used in drugs and plastics. They just produced the chemical and sold it to other factories or to export companies. Furfural is made from corn cobs. He worked here from 1962-65. During that period he was vice department head of the planning-technology department (this was a small plant, so the two were combined). Most of what he did was lab research, not management work.

He was transferred back to the Chemical Household Products Plant in early 1965. This was now a 'general plant' (zong chang), since there had been a structural reorganization of the bureau, and they were building up 'trusts' of several smaller plants under the city bureau. So more people were needed at this general plant, and he was transferred.

He didn't participate directly in management work during this period. He didn't have much interest in it and was concentrating on technical work, especially his experiments. But the general impression he has of this period was that they emphasized management systems, rules and regulations, quality control--the regular and rational systems of the pre-Great Leap period.

Enterprise Political Departments

In 1965 they established a political department in the plant, under the Party committee. Previously, most work of the Party was done by the cadre, propaganda, and security departments. Previously, the cadre and security departments were run by the plant director, while the party committee had a propaganda dept. (bu) and an organization department (bu).

When the political departments (zhengzhi bu) were established, they took over all the work of the cadre department, propaganda and security departments. The biggest effect of this change was that this greatly interfered with the plant director's ability to transfer and promote people. In the concrete, this meant that political standards tightened for transferring in new people, promoting people to new positions. The political department would investigate a candidate's class background (chushen), political attitudes and showing, etc. This intensified the conflict between people with expertise and those who the party people would prefer to have, based on non-professional criteria.

This meant that the chief engineer of the plant had less power to assign work to the technical personnel, and that their decisions had to pass through Party approval. This was another step in a gradual increase in Party power in daily management since the beginning of the Great Leap Forward. The personnel for this new political department came not from higher bureau, but from the people who staffed the previous party offices.

"Four Cleans" Movement (5/20/80, 1 hr.)

The 'four cleans' was one movement which affected the informant very little. He says in many others--the anti-rightist and Cultural Revolution, for example--he was a yundong yuan (someone who is habitually made a target of a campaign, also means athlete). But in this one, he had no 'economic' problems, since he didn't handle money or goods, no historical problem, no

problem with bad class background. The '4 cleans' were clean economics, politics, organization, and thought. Preceding this movement was the Socialist Education Movement, launched after the 6th plenum of the 8th central committee. But the main emphasis of this movement was the rural areas. In the countryside it was education aimed at truly bad practices and corruption, because after the lean years of the early 60's there was a good deal of corruption among cadres in the villages. In schools and factories, the movement was more positive--they were just there to propagate the proper political line: uphold the socialist line, the 3 red flags, etc. But there was some struggle of bad elements, but not as much as in the countryside.

The '4 cleans' evolved, but after January 1965 it became aimed at rectifying people in power taking the capitalist road. The movement did not affect management like the CR, they held meetings after work hours, and did not interfere with management systems. A work team (gongzuo zu) came to their plant. They were cadres from other units, but from where was considered a secret. The work groups that came was two people at first, and later grew to 3. It changed in the midst of the movement. This work team did not come to take over the Party Committee's power (like the PLA teams did during the CR), but to work along with it. Their activities were aimed at investigating cadres. They did this in two ways: 1) they established a work group to investigate every leading cadre in the plant, all party members. They looked at their history, and their files. 2) They asked people to give reports and inform on others--"what kinds of bad things has this person done that reflect the capitalist road?"

They held mass meetings of all the plant employees to examine people under suspicion. They asked them to talk about their past, and interrogated them. After the masses listened, each group met, and made a study report, and gave their opinions about that person. They had a saying at the time "cadres come downstairs" (ganbu xialou). It was equivalent to passing this examination. If after examining one's case, the leading cadre was invited to 'come downstairs' and be with the masses, then he was OK. (This term may refer in part to the construction of many restaurants in China, where the upstairs rooms are for officials and foreigners, while the downstairs are for the average citizen--AW). The idea of the movement was to have the masses examine each leading cadre in the Party and to decide whether or not he deserved to "be with the masses" or not.

This was the earliest stage of the movement, and it concentrated on the leading Party cadres. But later, according to the 23 points, they also went after problems among the masses. They had a secret report box where people could inform on fellow workers anonymously--for stealing, other anti-social behavior. One management cadre (non-party) and 2 workers were the main targets of this part of the movement. The workers were both accused of stealing plant property. The cadre was accused of corruption, because he had bought extra meal tickets for use in the canteen. This was against the rule because they were supposed to be rationed and money not used.

At the meetings where they were examined it was best to admit guilt quickly and be done with it, because if they doubted you despite protests of innocence, things could get difficult. They didn't use wallposters, they just held meetings during this movement. The movement did not affect a lot of people personally. The only ones in this plant of 600 were these 3. His plant was a peaceful one. But he heard that in other plants things were a lot rougher. They did investigate people's class backgrounds, come to think of it--they discussed this at meetings. But if you had no suspicions about your behavior, then there was no problem. During this stage of the movement they found out that one of the staff members who had claimed staff (zhiyuan) background, had actually owned a private enterprise before 1956, and was

receiving interest, but he didn't admit it. So he was kicked out of his union membership, because capitalists can't belong to the union. They changed the chushen in his file, but there was no criticism or other punishment. This was in the furfural factory, before he was transferred to the Chemical Household Articles Plant (huaxue riyong pin chang).

Cultural Revolution (1/22/80, 1.5 hrs.)

From the end of June, 1966, until August, there were work teams in his factory. There were 20 members in the team. They were not Peking people, they came from Henan. Since the Peking Municipal Party Committee had already been discredited, they moved people in from outside, and they swallowed up the original Party committee, formed a work group (zu). When they came to the plant they began to mobilize the masses in meetings, and began looking up and doing investigation in people's dossiers. They criticized one assistant plant director and one vice-secretary of the party committee. These people promptly 'stood aside', probably because they were vulnerable to criticism as followers of 'those in power', since they had done most of the work over the past few years. The assistant director was an engineer. The work team had 3 jobs--to criticize those in power, based on their investigations, to paste up wallposters, and to investigate individuals by talking to workers and by looking at files (dangan).

But when Liu Shaoqi was first criticized at the end of August 1966, he was in trouble for this work team policy. So the work team just disappeared from the unit. Then things changed. The Red Guard movement emerged from among the '5 good elements' among the workers, and they came out to smash the four olds--thought, culture, customs, habits. They went after the '5 black categories'--they criticized and struggled them, searched their homes, etc. About 4 or 5 people in his plant were actually struggled then, which meant that they were put on a platform, and whipped with a belt during a public interrogation. None were hurt very badly. More than 40 people were sent to their home villages over the next few months. This was decided largely by looking at people's dossiers. At this time, even though the Party committee existed in name, it was no more. There still were party members in power, however, and they were helping these red guard organizations, although this was not apparent.

At that time, I was the vice-head of the research department. A young technician and a young worker in the research department wrote a wallposter criticizing him for bourgeois thinking, and revisionism. At that time he went to work at manual labor. Most of the leading cadres at that time were doing so, and many of the staff. They asked him to volunteer for this, but of course he had no choice but to volunteer. The work of the research department stopped at this time.

The production situation didn't change much, even though many of the staff were doing full-time labor. This is because: 1) work efficiency of the staff was low anyway, there were too many people--overstaffed; 2) the political pressure at that time was so intense that workers did not dare be lax at work. They didn't want to be accused: "you worked for Liu's bonuses, but now that there's no bonus, you don't work--you're a revisionist!" It was just too dangerous. November and December 1966 were relatively stable times within the factory, even though there were a lot of red guard activities in the streets.

After the events of January 1967 in Shanghai, the situation changed. There were seizures of power throughout the country. The red guard movement was declared misled. Now everyone was forming 'fighting groups' (zhan dou dui) for the purpose of seizing power. They began with a small number of factions, then there were efforts to unite and seize power because of the Party center's

to do so. But usually the groups coalesced into two large groups in conflict. There were no armed conflicts among the two factions in I's factory, although there were in others.

The factions invaded the plant director's office, and stole the chop (tuzhang) of office. This was their method of seizing power. They also fought over the chop once it had been seized. At that time, production was not too badly disrupted. The rebel groups did not fight all day, and only about 10% were missing at any one time. Peking was not disrupted as much as other places during January to June 1967--places like Anhui, Shanghai (for a short while), Sichuan, Hebei (particularly Baoding), Yunnan, Guizhou, and Wuhan. (1/24/80, 2 hrs.)

In his plant a small number of workers left the plant for either factional fights or for rests. About 10-15% of the plant members did this sort of thing. At that time a small number of cadres who did not get sent down for labor continued to work--in the finance department, the planning department, the department heads stayed on the job. Supply procurers also stayed on the job. During 1965 three leading cadres--2 vice-directors, and the first Party secretary--had gone to the Party school and been assigned to other organizational matters in Peking. This had been a temporary transfer. When they finally returned at the end of 1966, and saw what was going on, they were unwilling to take up responsibilities. They saw that the people who had done the best management work were being attacked, so they decided not to work. They did three things: 1) labor, 2) study, 3) rest at home. So they really didn't stand aside, they just didn't work. The substitute Party secretary had already stood aside, and was engaged in manual labor. The plant director was also doing manual labor and political study, and had stood aside. These two didn't have any real practical knowledge of production anyway, so the plant didn't suffer too badly from their absence. Three former department heads were running things.

At that time it wasn't too bad to work in the shops because there was much free time at work, because coordination between factories was disrupted and it threw off their production schedule, so many groups could do nothing but sit in the plant and wait. Often supplies didn't show up, or the water supply was cut off, or electricity was cut off. So they just sat and rested. Other times, transport was blocked, so their products piled up and they had no place to put things, so again they had to stop production. This situation occurred with the greatest frequency in the first half of 1967, but things were never completely restored thereafter, and had these kinds of brief disruptions up until 1973 or so. When they stopped work, sometimes they chatted, sometimes they rested, talked, sometimes did political study.

Fate of the Original Leading Cadres

In the first half of 1967, the 6 top leading cadres were in the following situations: 1) Plant director--he didn't do much work anyway, and had no real talent. So he just read newspapers, walked around and asked in the shops how things were going. The largest faction (bao huang pai, or conservatives) supported him, while the smaller one (zaofan pai, younger workers) opposed him. So he kept 'on the job'. But since he didn't do much real work before, it was hard to criticize him for revisionist practices. 2) First Party Secretary--this was the man who was substituting for the one transferred out temporarily in 1965-66. He saw the conflict between the factions and decided not to come to work in his office. He put on work clothes and mixed with the workers in the shops, wandering about and trying to blend in. He had no fixed work post. 3) Second Party Secretary--this was a substitute secretary also. He had 'stood aside', and had been criticized at a mass meeting. But he received no beatings, this was still reserved only for

'monsters and demons' (niugui sheshen). He was sent down to work in the shops, and had a fixed work post. His job was to take lead-tin alloy plates out of a bin and cart them over to a machine which stamped out toothpaste tubes.

4) Assistant Director (Chief Engineer)--he was criticized and had a lot of ability, so was criticized severely. Although he had fairly high technical ability, he was sent to do the simplest labor possible in order to remold his thinking. In fact, he was criticized precisely because he was so talented and had worked so hard. He was given a job chipping cement off of used bricks from an old building being demolished. 5) and 6) had been transferred out of the plant in 1965 to do other work in the Peking bureau, and when they returned in 1966, and saw what was going on they, like the first Party secretary, decided to stay away from the offices and do manual labor. They floated around the plant in work clothes, helping out and talking, largely because they had nothing to do.

So only 2 or 3 leading cadres in the plant were criticized and made to 'step aside'. The others did not 'step aside', they were just doing manual labor. There is a difference. Kao biao zhan means that you have been criticized and officially removed from all posts. Most people who did good work and a lot of work earlier were certainly criticized and made to step aside.

Formation of the Revolutionary Committee

About March or April 1967, the PLA representatives came to the plant. They were called 'Mao Tse-tung Thought propaganda teams'. Although they were called a 'propaganda team' they were really there to seize power, and they had considerable authority. About 7 PLA soldiers came and formed a group (zu). First they went around and chatted, and to find out about the plant's situation. Their objectives; 1) to decide who were the real rebels, and who should seize power, 2) to decide among those who had stood aside, who were really capitalist roaders and who were not, and 3) to find out about the production situation from those cadres who were still running things.

Then the PLA went around spreading propaganda that not all cadres were bad, only 'those in power'. Those who were judged to be without problems were told to 'stand up' (zhanqilai). At least this was the slogan. It never really happened. During this period, for about 8 months to the end of 1967, there was a lot of study. There was also a movement to 'repudiate self, criticize revisionism' (dousi pixiu). They also had a campaign where they criticized unnamed people who did not 'give prominence to politics' (tuchu zhengzhi).

During this entire period, from late 1966 to the end of 1967, there were no formal Party committee activities. Papers said 'the party is paralyzed' (dangwei yijing tanhuan). But this seems strange--there still must have been some behind the scenes power because there were many militia guns under party care, and many secret materials, but these were protected throughout the movement. The Party Committee was not formally rebuilt until 1971-72 or so, possibly after the death of Lin Biao, although I can't remember. In February or March 1968, the Revolutionary Committee was finally established. The army led preparatory meetings leading up to its formation, and seemed to control the entire process of selection, as well as the RC itself, after it was established. There were no real elections of members, but 'democratic consultation' (minzhu xieshang). It wasn't really democratic.

Before this, the army had organized a 'great alliance committee' in which the factional leaders participated reluctantly. They prepared to 'seize power', but they were not really seizing power. Everyone knew it was impossible to oppose the army, because all they had to do was call on the phone and scores of army men would arrive.

This 'alliance committee', composed of the army people and representatives of mass organizations who were selected by the army, got together to form the Revolutionary Committee. They had discussions in each shop and group about this. The resulting RC had 11 members. The top factional leaders in the plant had hoped to become appointed as members, but they were disappointed, and became very angry, because not one was chosen from the 'great alliance committee'. But there was nothing they could do.

They used the 'triple combination' principle in forming the RC--workers, revolutionary cadres, and PLA. The members: the former plant director, who never did any work before and was never criticized, two department heads, one shop director, 3 or 4 military representatives, and several old and experienced workers. In all, almost every member of the RC was a Party member. The old plant director, most of the experienced workers, cadres, and of course the PLA were all party members. People generally didn't like the RC. The intellectuals didn't like it because they didn't think it could manage production well. The former factional activists were even more dissatisfied because they were not represented--this was still the same old Party in power.

(1/26/80, 2 hrs.)

Informant does not know how the RC ran production, and how they met, etc., because he did not participate. After the RC was established, the old plant director was on the RC, the old first party secretary was working in the shop, the second party secretary had 'stood aside' and was working in the shops, the assistant director (engineer) also stood aside, and was doing manual labor, and the other 2 assistant directors were still doing manual labor.

Among the 15 department and vice department heads, only 3 or 4 remained at their original posts. The rest did manual labor in the shops. They did not formally 'step aside', but it was the equivalent. The difference was that they were not criticized at meetings, or formally forced to step aside. They just did so quietly in order to prevent criticism--but there was no choice. The ones who remained in their positions were those who handled important departments--planning, finance, supply, and administrative departments. But at that time people did not want to continue to do leadership work. Things were in such disorder that it was very hard to do a good job, and there was lots of overtime, and it was dangerous to exercise power at that time. They had no clear idea of what constituted mistaken leadership but they were in constant fear of making a mistake. Their behavior, as a result, was to be careful (xiaoxin) on the one hand, while trying to maintain the status quo (weichu xianzhuang) on the other. They were afraid to be on the political right. They thought "better left than right" (ningzuo wuyou-- 宁左勿右). For example, they were afraid to give out bonuses, because that appeared rightist.

The people who took the places of the rest of the old department heads and their assistants were usually old workers who had since become staff workers in departments, or Party members working as staff members. These new leading cadres of course didn't have the same qualifications, but it didn't matter anyway because things weren't being run properly otherwise, and management still wasn't on track. "On track" means that of the "8 technical and economic standards", only 2 were being grasped at that time--output (chan liang), and output value (chan zhi). The other 6 aspects (profit, quality, etc.), were considered revisionist and not handled as a result. This is still a problem with China today. So the practical effect of cadre timidity was that the other 6 regulations were not handled well. I think that the following were the '8 standards': 1) output, 2) output value, 3) materials consumption, 4) profit, 5) costs, 6) labor productivity, 7) equipment utilization rate (shebei wan hao lu),

8) Utilization rate of liquid capital. They tended to ignore the last 6 standards, because to mind them too closely was to risk criticism as a revisionist. Only output was safe.

Enterprise Reorganization

For a while after the establishment of the revolutionary committee, they implemented a PLA-inspired form of organization, to replace the former departmental system of staff organization. They put it into effect after the 9th Party Congress in April 1969--around September. The departments were reorganized and consolidated into 3 groups (zu): the political group, the production group, and the logistics (houqin) group. 'Logistics' meant administration of livelihood matters, a combination of former general affairs and administration departments. This conception came from the organization of the army, which was based on a division's organization into a political department, an advisor's department (canmou), and a logistics department. Also, there was a renaming of the lower level units, a 'militarization' of organization. Shops were renamed 'companies' (lian), sections were named 'platoons' (pai), and production groups were called 'squads' (ban).

In 1972, the PLA representatives were withdrawn from the plant, and the military names were dropped. They returned to the system of departmental organization gradually. The political groups (zu) were changed back to the old political departments (bu) of pre-CR times (1965). These political departments were still there when I left in 1979. Political groups established and directed special investigation groups (zhuan an zu) to investigate the cases of people who had 'stood aside' and those attacked during the 'cleaning of the class ranks' campaign. There were not many changes right after the CR in shops organization, and the shop directors themselves tended to do manual labor less often because they became more vital to production with the abolition of departments. This was also true for asst. shop directors and branch Party secretaries.

'Cleaning of the Class Ranks' Campaign

In May 1968, after the establishment of the RC, they began a movement called 'cleaning of the class ranks'. The PLA controlled this movement. The slogan of the movement was to remove class enemies from the ranks of the people. This means the following people, who had bad class status (chengfen). All of the 'nine bad categories' were included as targets except the intellectuals, 'the stinking ninth category'. This usually meant people who long ago had been labelled as bad elements in the 1950s. These people were already well known in their units. But the essence of the movement was to drag out people who had already been given labels in their dossiers and thrown into cowsheds. It was also the object to investigate people about whom there were suspicions. These people under suspicion were always those who belonged to the 8 categories of bad class status (chengfen). They investigated their cases, and then confronted these people in large criticism meetings, forced them to confess, then threw them into a "cowpen", and not allow them to come out. These were people who had politically questionable backgrounds, but who had never been given labels. This was a way of 'rooting out hidden class enemies'.

Special investigation groups (zhuan'an zu) were set up for all cases in doubt, and they were even set up to investigate people further who already had been labelled in the 1950s. The people who participated were predominantly young workers of good political standing, and were chosen by the PLA representatives. People of bad class status who had been sent to their home villages as punishment earlier in the Cultural Revolution were dragged back to their factories to be criticized again in this part of the movement.

An example: there was another engineer in the plant who had graduated

from university before liberation. At that time, after graduation, he could not find work. So he went to Taiwan to look for work, and found it, working for 2 months. But he was dissatisfied, and returned to Peking shortly before the liberation of Peking. At that time Taiwan was not a KMT base. This part of this man's past was not a secret. He had already written it down in his personal history he wrote for the CCP shortly after liberation, and it was in his file. Everybody knew this in the plant, at least among his friends. During this campaign, they dragged him into the cowshed and he could not return home. They established a special investigation group of 6 people, many of whom worked in the same group--some technicians of lower status, some young workers, and the PLA sent someone from among their midst to be chairman of the group. Among these 6 people, two were Party members.

This investigation group worked very hard. They had a three shift system to guard this man in his 'cowpen'. This was a small room in an office building on the ground floor. He was in isolation, no one else was there, since he might have been a spy. When the man went to the bathroom, to eat, he always had to be accompanied by someone. If he got sick and went to the hospital, they would still go with him. During this period, about once every 2 weeks, they dragged him out to the shop floor to criticize him. He 'did the airplane', was forced to confess his crimes, etc. He refused to confess to crimes, of course, because he had not gone to Taiwan to consort with the KMT's spies, he just told the truth. But of course these young workers and technicians didn't know any history. They didn't know there was such a thing as people looking for their own jobs, and that the KMT did not always occupy Taiwan. So from May to December of that year he stayed in his cell, since he would not confess. The investigation group went to his house, searched his clothes, etc. They also picked things up for him. He washed his own clothes--but he was usually pretty filthy and disheveled.

They didn't give him wages for 3-4 months. But they gave him 15¥ per month temporarily in order for him to eat. The investigation group continued to take him to the shops to criticize him, and continued to study and investigate his case. Why? I am not too sure. Generally, they have investigation both inside and out of a unit (neicha, waidiao). This means reading one's personal file and questioning coworkers about his activities. Second, they go outside to investigate. People were sent to his hometown in Fujian to question people, ask the local Party committee about his family background, his past behavior. They would seek out people that the suspect said could verify his story (zhengming ren).

Informant knows about this method because a friend of his in another work unit had named him as a guarantor to verify his story. So someone came to his workplace to question him about his friend. The person wrote down his responses and had him sign the transcript afterwards. This method took a lot of time, and cost a lot of money, and employed a lot of people. The hotels were full of these investigators at this time.

After all this, they couldn't find out any new things about this engineer. So after the beginning of 1969, they still had nothing to show, and they began to loosen their control, their guard over him, but still didn't let him go home. They wouldn't let him go because the PLA representatives and the investigation group were embarrassed. After all the wallposters, all the criticism and charges, they were just embarrassed--this is I's guess as to their reasons. They didn't want to admit that the movement was unreasonable. They were unable to 'back down in good grace' (xiabuliao tai). Despite the fact that the movement had built up a certain momentum (sheng shi) of its own, the group gradually loosened control over the man.

As preparations for the 9th Party Congress of 1969 neared, this man, along with the others, were gradually released. This was around February. So not until the top leadership ordered it could these people be released, because the people within the plant were not willing to back down, it would be too embarrassing. Finally they backed down when a Central Committee document ordered it. A total of 20-30 people in his plant had received this kind of treatment, where they were put in total isolation except for people in the investigation group. If the family came, they could only visit with the investigators present.

In the end, according to the model experience of 6 factories and 2 schools in the Peking area whose PLA representatives (military control commissions, jun guan hui), they settled the case by writing out a document to put in the person's file. In his engineer friends case, they hadn't found anything, but their conclusion was "this man's counter-revolutionary spy activities in Taiwan have to this day not been uncovered", meaning that later he was in danger of being dragged out again. Gradually, back wages were paid to these people. These people often returned to their previous work. But this was a gradual process, because often there was a period of manual labor first. But these things often dragged out. Even though most cases had been cleared up and people returned to their jobs, some people's cases were left hanging for as much as 4-5 years. They were 'left hanging' (guaqilai).

Downward Transfer of Cadres (xiafang ganbu)

In the month before the 9th Party Congress, they had two movements: rectify the party (zheng dang), and simplification of administration and downward transfer of cadres (qingjian jigou, xiafang ganbu). They continued the simplification and reorganization of administrative structures along PLA lines. They began to send all cadres--Party and non-Party, to do manual labor, some in May 7 schools. They reorganization and simplification of administration has been discussed before. They renamed the different levels of organization according to a military model, and also divided up the departments and other staff sections into three, which combined the following former department functions: The political work group (zheng gong zu) did the work of the former personnel department, propaganda department, and security department. The production group (shengchan zu) did the work of the former labor department, planning and finance department, and technical department. The logistics (houqin) group did the work of the administrative department, and had the union's former functions. During this period one-half to two-thirds of the cadres were sent to do manual labor. Those cadres who worked in factories were sent to shops, but some were sent to May 7 cadre schools. Those from Ministries, Bureaus, Schools, etc. mostly went to May 7 cadre schools.

(2/5/80, 1.5 hrs.)

After the 9th Party Congress, in April 1969, they began to send large numbers of cadres down for manual labor. In I's plant, this was more than were sent down during the CR, since at that time it was only the 'stinking intellectuals' (chou lao jiu) who were sent down. During 1968, up until May or June, production was not very good. It didn't stop, but really suffered. But after the 'cleaning of the class ranks' campaign, where there was a very strict political atmosphere, political pressures on employees were very high. They were putting labels on people and it was dangerous not to listen to the orders of the PLA leadership to produce and work hard. So they relied on political appeals and political pressure to stimulate workers, since there were no bonuses at this time. So this was the way that production was restored.

They also used the appeal of 'preparing for war', since there was a border conflict with the USSR in 1969, also. So if you sabotaged production you could be accused of aiding the enemy.

Who was sent down for labor? Revolutionary Committee cadres did not go. Some of the cadres in the political work group (zheng gong zu) were sent, and also cadres from other groups. Who decided who went? They made up a list of all cadres. Then, depending on the jobs they did (more political cadres were sent down than logistics cadres), and depending on whether or not they had already been down for a stint of labor, they chose those who were to go. About 20% of the cadres had already done manual labor during 1966-68. Some had returned to work, but few. So during the 'xia fang' of cadres in 1969-70, they sent down about one half to two thirds of the remaining cadres. So if there were 100 cadres in September 1966, 20 would have been sent to the shops during 66-68. This would leave 80 cadres. Then during 1969, they send another 40 to the shops, leaving 40 to work in the 3 leading groups described before.

But there were degrees of being 'sent down', depending on the situation and the period. Only 2 high level cadres formally 'stood aside'--the two described previously who were thrown into the cowshed during the cleaning of the class ranks campaign. About 20% were in the same boat as the informant--not really struggled against, not put in a cowshed, no real punishment. But they didn't have model backgrounds, were intellectuals, so were driven by the political situation to do manual labor. Political pressures intimidated them. One or two cadres were forced to go to their native villages by Red Guards earlier because they had KMT connections, etc. They were called 'bad elements' (about 30 workers were sent down during the same period, also). About 10 cadres were placed in a cowshed during the cleaning of the class ranks, awaiting investigation by a special investigation group. Those with serious problems couldn't leave their cells. But those with less serious problems did labor during the day and stayed in their cells at night (also about 10 workers were involved in the same treatment). The 40 or so sent down during the 'xiafang' of cadres in 1969 were not people accused of having problems, but they tended to be people with less than favorable class backgrounds--overseas ties, capitalist parents, non-proletarian or non-peasant backgrounds. The criteria, however, was not Party membership, chushen was more important. If you were a member of the '5 red categories', then you were unlikely to be sent down then. It depended on ability, chushen, 'public opinion' expressed in "struggle, criticism, transformation" meetings. When these cadres were sent to fixed units for manual labor--all units, canteen, shops, warehouse--it was full-time with no time limit given. It was considered permanent. Their former departments were being abolished with the simplification of administration. So this was to be a permanent transfer. Of course, they all kept their original grades and salaries.

So this was a 3-fold movement. They had criticisms of Liu Shaoqi and a small number of cadres in the unit who had gone the capitalist road. At this point people were not actually present when being criticized--not like during the CR. But there were a lot of criticisms of "stinking intellectuals" in the abstract, so political pressure was intensified, even if criticism was not directed at individuals. Three parts-- 1) the simplification of administration and the abolition of departments, reorganization into 'groups'. 2) the xiafang of cadres described above, and 3) Party rectification--this included the criticisms and the xiafang, and included steps described below.

Party Rectification and Rebuilding

After the 9th congress, the Military Control Commission (jun guan hui) appointed a Party Rectification Study Group (zheng dang xuexi xiaozu).

This group organized meetings, invited selected mass representatives (those with good class backgrounds), and examined each former Party member one by one, examined their past actions, whether or not they had followed Liu Shaoqi, whether or not they had revisionist thoughts, etc. If Party members had overseas connections, or poor class backgrounds, then they would have a longer series of discussions on the person. But almost all Party members were restored to active membership in Party life (zuzhi shenghuo). After this they were considered recitified Party members. By 1970 they had, through this gradual process, established a temporary Party branch committee in various shops (linshi dang zhibu). Not until after Lin Biao died did they restore the Party Committee for the plant.

The "Anti May 16th Elements Movement" (5/13/80, 1.5 hrs.)

This movement took place after the cleaning of the class ranks campaign, and was run by the Military Control Committee. There was evidence, or at least a claim was made that the 'May 16 Group', which had gotten into trouble in mid-1967, had a nation-wide secret organization which rebels joined. Lin Biao declared this group counter-revolutionary and called for a movement to smash the 'secret members' of this group (qingcha wu yao liu fenzu). So they began to investigate people who they suspected of belonging. But did every unit have members of this group? Unlikely, because there were so many units, and many small ones, unimportant ones. So how did they decide someone was one of these elements? Basically, since this was an ultra-leftist group, they determined whether you were not a secret follower by any past behavior which indicated extreme radicalism on your part--especially during the period of the seizure of power. This was especially the case for those who had challenged security departments, public security bureaus, the people's militia, and the PLA.

This was in 1970-71, after the establishment of the Revolutionary Committee, but before the re-establishment of the Party Committee. The movement had not concluded by the time Lin Biao was killed, so it was dropped after that. They began with a big mass meeting, and tried to get people to reveal the past behavior of former activists during the CR. They explained what the May 16 organization was. This was the "mobilizational meeting" (dongyuan dahui), held to get things moving. In reality, however, this was not mobilization but giving orders (xia mingling)--but they still used the term mobilization. This was a common manner of speech for leaders.

When they uncovered a suspect, they threw them into a niupeng, a room set aside for keeping these people. They could not leave, were put into a study group "xuexi ban". They were forced to study and write confessions. This process took place over the year from Spring 1970-Summer 1971. But during the entire period only about 4 people were put into the cowpens, and most were released after the fall of 1971. Of course, everyone confessed, in accord with the common principle: "tanbai congkuan, kangju congyan", which means, basically, leniency to those who are honest about their crimes, and harsh treatment to those who refuse. After a period, all of these people returned to their work after Lin Biao died.

The movement was not too severe in his plant. But in others they put a lot of people away, and went after rebels who had made their way onto the RC during the CR. But in his plant no former rebels made it into the Revolutionary Committee, so none were put away. Of the four people targeted in his plant, 3 were members of one faction, one a member of the opposing one. They had all been factional leaders during the CR. So nobody on the Revolutionary Committee was touched. His general impression of the results of this movement is that it succeeded in getting rid of most factional leaders on Revolutionary Committees and in leading positions. After this, the 'mass representatives'

ceased to be the factional leaders, and began to be people like labor models, union representatives, youth league leaders, women's committee representatives, etc. But by this time there was no actual power being exercised by the RC, the Party or at least a faction within it controlled all decisions. But these representatives of the masses were placed on revolutionary committees like 'filling in the blanks' (zhen kong). They had formula for filling out the RC membership and the leaders chose these members, there were no elections. These people were just chosen incidentally, not as a result of leadership or election. You could call these people 'trusted followers' (qin xin), or 'lackeys' (zhaoya). They came to approve totally of all policies, and liked the gang of 4, and naturally did not challenge authority. So the revolutionary committee was gradually turned into a committee filled with these kinds of 'lackeys'. They didn't need people with the ability to rebel, they needed 'docile tools' (xunfu gongju). Lin Biao used them, but he did not like the former rebels.

May 7 Cadre Schools (2/7/80, 2 hrs.)

Factories and industrial bureaux did not set up May 7 cadre schools. Large universities, public health departments, commercial departments and organs of government, like ministries, did set them up. They were established on the outskirts of cities, but national ministries could usually establish them far away. A small number were established during the CR, but most were established during 1969 during the 'xiafang' of cadres for manual labor. No cadres from his plant went to May 7 schools for labor, they all went to the shops in enterprises.

Military Control Committees

Shortly after the seizure of power in Shanghai, military teams came to his plant. But at this time they were called Military Propaganda Teams, and they tried to unite the various factions. In fact they held power from the moment they entered the factory. Around March 1968, they changed the name to the Military Control Commission (jundui guanzhi weiyuanhui--perhaps in this context, 'Committee' is a better translation), and shortly thereafter formed the revolutionary committee. Who were these people? They were middle and lower level officers. They came from the Logistics Department of the PLA headquarters, but he doesn't know from what region. There were less than 10 officers in all. After they first came, they got to know people and their political stands, class backgrounds, who had been attacked, who had stood aside, who were the activists. After they got to know the situation, they began to go to work.

After the establishment of the RC, some of these officers were members of the RC, one was a vice-head. Afterwards the Military Control Committee put all their efforts into organizing the 'cleaning of the class ranks' campaign. This was from May to December 1968 or thereabouts. Afterwards in 1969, they ran the campaign to rectify the party, simplify administration, and send cadres down for manual labor. Near the end of 1971, Party Committee was re-established, and was under the control of the Military Control Committee until the officers left in late 1972.

They re-established the Party branches in various shops in 1970 and led them themselves until they established the all-plant Party committee in late 1971. As the Party committee was re-established, the Party committee took over leadership of the branches, re-established control over personal files and other secret materials. Many former leading Party cadres who had been criticized and had done labor were transferred to other plants to resume leading positions there. So many new Party cadres moved into the plant at that time.

Production in early 1970's

Not until 1973 or so did production really revive. By 'really' he means all sides of production--quantity, output, quality, waste, cost efficiency. After 1966 straight up to 1972-73 they didn't really have good production, even when they fulfilled output targets. I says that quality was bad for all products during this period, since regulations were not being adhered to. Bicycles bought during this period were terrible compared to before 1965. In 1973 they reorganized the factory structures, did away with the Cultural Revolution '3 group system' (san zu zhi)--political work, production, logistics. They re-established the old staff departments. They also gradually returned the 'sent down' administrative and technical cadres to staff the revived departments and laboratories. By 1973 this process was largely completed.

Informant's Personal Experience at Work, 1966-73

Before the Cultural Revolution, he had headed the research lab of the plant and was an engineer. In late 1966 he went to do manual labor in a number of different shops, and also went to other factories within the Peking Light Industrial System for a while. He was also sent for short periods on a rotating basis to afforestation projects in the hills around Peking. He also did some labor digging bomb shelters during the 1970 war preparations period. He digged, help make bricks. But for most of this period he worked in the chemical products shop--surfactins were the product, used in the making of toothpaste and cosmetics. The main job in the shop was the installation and maintenance of equipment. During the entire period he was asked to help with more complicated things; calculations, drawings and plans, He was asked by the shop director to help for a while, and worked for short periods in the shop office at a desk. He also did arc welding, torch cutting, installed instrumentation and did electrical wiring. He also translated English materials into Chinese--materials related to chemical products in the plant library. 1969 and 1970 were the years where he did the most manual labor in the factory.

In March 1972 he returned to office work in the 'production group' staff office. There he worked on scientific information and research. But at this time he was not formally restored to the title 'engineer'. They just told him to return to office to work. He read Russian and English journals, especially reading patent information to keep up with the latest innovations. By this time the 'groups' in this administrative system had become fairly large, since they had gradually increased in size after cadres returned from the shop floor. They divided up labor, with 2 or 3 responsible for certain jobs, so it was like having departments without formally calling them that. Around 30 staff members worked in the production group when he was there, and it was increasing all the time. In the summer of 1973, they were establishing some new industrial research institutes in Peking, and were emphasizing scientific research. So he was sent to a household chemicals research institute in the industrial system of Peking city. It was small, really a 'group'. But he was still in close contact with the various small plants in the same light industrial system, of which this small research institute was an integral part.

Industrial Administration after 1971

They started to re-establish staff departments out of the production group in his plant at the end of 1972. They first re-established the planning, finance departments, and later established the labor department and others. This process stretched out into 1973.

Had he ever heard of the slogan 'reorganize leading groups' (zhengdun lingdao banzi)? Yes, this was probably around 1973, but the 'soft, lazy, and

disunited' (lan, ruan, san) slogan used by Deng Xiao-ping to describe administrative leadership at the time (which the informant brings up spontaneously at this point) was not until 1975(yes, he repeats that he is sure of this date). Informant heard of this effort not through newspapers, but in meetings in his unit. The slogans were circulated in internal Party documents which he was not allowed to read.

Was Deng's characterization of leading administrators correct? Absolutely. Why? Because the ones who were criticized most heavily during the cultural revolution, and removed, were those that worked the hardest. So those that were left in leading positions were the less energetic and active, and those who were removed from leading positions were often the most energetic and daring administrators. The ones that were left didn't really dare to lead. Also a lot of the new leaders were not very capable. Add to this the fact that the leaders weren't united, and that they quarreled over the best methods, and leadership was really ineffective.
(3/1/80, 3 hrs.)

Why were so many people in the unit leadership 'soft, lazy, and disunited' during 1973-75, as Deng's characterization suggests? There were 2 reasons. First, leaders often didn't have that much power. Second, leaders were afraid to exercise that power they did have. This was largely because they had been criticized during the CR, but also because workers had gotten into the habit of ignoring orders. Also, the Mao quotation was on everyone's mind in the leadership--"There will not be only one Cultural Revolution, but will be several; one is needed perhaps once every 5 years". So everyone was being quite careful not to do things that could be interpreted as capitalist road.

Workers not listening to orders? What does this mean concretely? At that time one's work level had no connection with wages. Whether or not one worked hard or listened to orders, the result was the same for ones income. A mile example: In one case, a worker was asked by his production group leader and by the shop secretary to switch to another machine the next week, because there was no more work for his machine to perform. But the worker refused the switch, saying he couldn't operate the other machine, well knowing that if he stayed on the first machine he would get to rest. People would also refuse transfers to other plants, and would do so by claiming family problems. These kinds of refusals to follow orders were never direct refusals, but usually excuses, devious ways to insist on getting one's own way. In these kinds of situations, since they could not cut wages, reduce bonuses, and could not punish, there was nothing one could do. They could just increase the number of workers, and this was very wasteful.

Why lazy? (lan) Because leaders knew if they worked real hard, they would be more likely to be criticized, and also knew that whether they worked hard or not, would get the same income. How could people get away with this? Because after 1957 they gradually developed a situation where leaders got by not because of qualities but because of their speaking abilities--they knew what to say when party secretaries, plant directors and other leaders came by. How did these unqualified leaders get by in their jobs? They made use of those with qualifications who didn't know how to talk politics. This became a regular practice in enterprises.

Why disunited? (san) There was remaining factionalism among the administrators. They had old cadres who had previously stood aside, and then younger cadres who had climbed up from the ranks, and also others who were new and had been transferred in. Factionalism was a lot like that in universities and other units. In some plants all the workers from a certain province would stick together. These kinds of factional ties were related to

the possibilities for promotions. One's actual power depended on these kinds of ties. A vice-director recently transferred into the plant had a difficult time getting orders followed because he had no connections. It took a long time for him to build up these ties before people would listen to his orders. Friendship facilitated the carrying out of orders, kind of a form of helping out friends by carrying out their requests. This was called being a member of a 'group' (banzi), or an informal group of friends like this. If the members of a banzi needed something, others would carry out orders more quickly than those of other people who weren't in the group.

This happens in other professional groups--schools, institutes, etc. Groups formed on the basis of where you received your education, what province you are from, etc. The chief of these sorts of contradictions was that between the older cadres and younger ones who had 'climbed up' over the backs of others during the CR. These groups didn't get along together, the younger ones, the 'climbers', were referred to by the following two phrases: "attack others, raise yourself" (daji bieren, taigao ziji), and "climb upwards, standing on the shoulders of others" (tazhe bie ren de jianbang, xiang shang pa). In other words, the older cadres didn't think too highly of these people at all. It was felt to be a major injustice and inequality. They also had a group of new people transferred in recently, they often formed another group, complicating the factional situation.

This was a normal situation in plants, called 'factionalism' (paixing). The more serious, political factions related to issues of higher importance were called by a different term: zongpai (this means faction in the sense of sect, which implies shared beliefs--AW). They had this sort of non-political, everyday factionalism before the Cultural Revolution, but not as seriously, since the personal conflicts of the CR era were added in. Political factionalism was not particularly strong in the Cultural Revolution sense, since many of the old factions were done away with after the CR.

Lin Biao and Confucius Campaign

This was in 1974. During this period he was mainly in research institutes, but was also in factories sometimes for visits. This campaign was most active in the Spring of 1974. It was largely theoretical, generally in study groups where workers and staff would just say whatever was printed in the newspapers. The materials to study were never really clear about just who was being attacked, but everyone had a general idea that this was against Zhou Enlai. They formed a "Movement Office" (yundong bangongshi) for each of the major campaigns during this period. They were supposed to be temporary, but they had so many campaigns during this period that they ended up being semi-permanent offices. They were responsible for leading the campaign, but really were under the Party leader.

They formed study groups of various types in different levels--shops, plant-level, departmental, research institutes--to study the campaign materials. They used up a lot of time--work time--and a lot of personnel to do this. The people who participated were more often than not the 'activists'. Also many people were willing to leave their everyday work to do this. They did not have overtime to make up for lost hours. The political work departments in each unit were very powerful at that time. They just called up X, Y, and Z shops and said, "pull out 2-3 workers from their jobs, people with good politics and a bit of education, and send them over to form a study group". Then these people would meet full time in an office for 6 months or longer to 'study'. But I feels that since so few of them ever produced any real articles, that they spent most of their time 'resting', smoking cigarettes. There was no overtime, work just didn't get done.

Nobody in I's institute or in the factories he was familiar with was attacked during this movement, but he did hear that in other provinces when this movement started, the political workers in enterprises were happy, thought that a second cultural revolution was coming, and that their positions would be even more powerful and prominent. Also, at that time many technicians and engineers were afraid that the movement might turn critical of them, but this never actually happened. In other provinces, he heard that intellectuals were attacked, and so the intellectuals in his unit had the impression that their value would soon fall.

Later, beginning in March 1975, the campaign to study the Dictatorship of the Proletariat began, and had roughly the same influence on production as did the anti-Lin movement, and for the same reasons. But this movement didn't have as large an influence on production as did the 1974 movement. 1975 was the busiest time of the 1970s for his unit, while 1974 was a time when they rested a lot. In 1976 the factional struggle 'exploded'.

1976, Conflict Surrounding Succession

During 1976, they did very little work in his institute, they just came in and chatted, read the newspaper. The leaders didn't have time to attend to both politics and production, and production came last. Also a lot of them were just waiting to see the outcome of factional struggles before they acted. Everyone was well aware of power struggle at the top, and after the Tiananmen incident of April 5, some were afraid that the Gang of Four would rule China after Mao's death. So in 1976 there was basically no work in the institute, and production slowed in factories--first they had criticism of Deng, later criticism of the Gang of 4 too.

The criticism of the Gang of 4 was not very thorough in Peking, since Wu De was still the Party Secretary of the city. The criticism campaign was less energetic than the Pi Lin campaign and the criticism of Deng. They had 2 leaders in their institute who were basically followers of the Gang of 4, their methods and thought were the same. But they weren't criticized at all. I says that scientists were all pretty unhappy about this, but among his friends they would only criticize them in private. But in other plants and institutes run by the National Government, where he had friends working, this movement was carried out better; they directly criticized cadres and put up wallposters. Cadres in his institute were never actually criticized.

New Wage Adjustments and Bonuses

Near the end of 1977, they had a wage adjustment which went on until 1978. About 40% of employees were given a raise. According to the State Council Document, there were 3 conditions. He can't remember them all clearly. One important one was the level of ability and work contribution. Political showing was also to be a part, but not stressed. But there were flaws in implementation. People were to be assessed by the masses for these raises, and in form they were, but the Party Committee could control the proceedings of these appraisals to a considerable extent, and in fact did so.

In fact, people were appraised highly for other, non-work related reasons. The people who were especially favorably evaluated were those who were not Party members but were preparing themselves for admission by getting close with Party committee members, being active politically, listening to the party line. These people had a better chance, given rough equality in other areas. So at times the raises boiled down to whether or not the Party secretary thought you were a good person--whether your name stuck in his mind when winnowing down the list of nominees.

They didn't set up any strict year lines for raises, but the older workers tended to be favored over the younger.

In the last half of 1978 they began bonuses in the factories, and in I's institute they had one in 1979 before he left. Had levels 1,2, and 3 into which people were appraised, and also those who got no bonus at all. These were usually people who had made major work or political mistakes in the past. Otherwise, these bonuses were appraised quarterly in the institute. Most people were grade 2. Grade one was 20¥, grade 2 was 10¥, grade 3, 6-8¥. But people felt the differences were too small. Some said that 10¥ per every 3 months was nothing to work hard for. But others wanted higher grade bonuses, for purposes of reputation. So in a sense these 'material' incentives were more 'moral' than anything else.

Also, material incentives had limits because even if they had a lot of money, commodities were still hard to buy. There were chronic shortages of minor articles. This was especially bad in 1976 and early 1977. There were shortages of matches, cooking pots, bowls, etc. So some people still find bonuses uninteresting because it is difficult to buy so many things. The situation with commodities got a little better during 1978-79, but still there were a lot of things that were hard to buy, like books.