MANAGING FAMILY MEMBERS: HOW MONITORING AND COLLABORATION AFFECT EXTRA-ROLE BEHAVIOR IN FAMILY FIRMS

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In a study of family firms that included survey responses from both family CEOs and family member employees, we examined the roles that collaboration and CEO monitoring play regarding the prevalence of extra-role behavior, an important human resource outcome that can impact job performance and firm performance. Results indicated that an integration of stewardship and agency theories (manifested through interactions between family harmony and adaptability with monitoring) helps explain the level of extra-role behavior displayed by family employees. The findings lend some support for the argument that effective human resource practices in family firms should be balanced between instrumental governance mechanisms that reflect a monitoring approach and normative mechanisms that focus on collaborative efforts among family employees. When this balance is achieved, an environment of fairness and accountability rather than a tone of distrust and forced compliance may prevail in family firms, thus addressing a key human resource issue in this hybrid form of organization.

Keywords: agency theory, corporate governance, entrepreneurial/small business, organizational citizenship behavior, employee relations

Grounded in a mixed ancestry of family and business, the family firm is perhaps the most commonly studied type of hybrid identity organization (Whetten, Foreman, & Dyer, 2014). Although its hybrid identity can create unique strengths, the family firm can also create unique human resource challenges because its family and business identities are not necessarily compatible (Sundaramurthy & Kreiner, 2008). Whereas the family identity fosters strong commitment and altruism among family members (Eddleston & Kellermanns, 2007; Tagiuri & Davis, 1992), it can also lead to problems associated with nepotism, the consumption of unearned perks, and moral hazard when combined with the business identity (Chrisman, Chua, & Litz, 2004; Madison, Holt, Kellermanns, & Ranft, 2016; Sundaramurthy & Kreiner, 2008). Part of the complexity in managing family employees is due to contrasting norms that govern the family and business domains. In a family, individuals are expected to nurture and

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care for one another regardless of their contributions; in a business, individuals are expected to contribute to the firm and to earn rewards (Lansberg, 1983; Van der Heyden, Blondel, & Carlock, 2005). The recognition of this hybrid identity and the divergent norms of family and business have led to two very different views of family involvement in the firm: one based on stewardship theory, which stresses the collaboration and reciprocal altruism of family employees, and the other rooted in agency theory, which stresses the need to monitor and control family employees (Davis, Allen, & Hayes, 2010; Kidwell, Kellermanns, & Eddleston, 2012; Madison et al., 2016). These opposing views offer very different advice for how family firm leaders should manage family employees.

Rather than debate the superiority of stewardship theory versus agency theory in managing family employees, we suggest that it is beneficial to investigate a balanced approach that integrates the advice of both theories given the hybrid identity of family firms.

Family firm research drawing from stewardship theory typically characterizes family employees as stewards who significantly contribute to the family firm (Corbetta & Salvato, 2004; Eddleston & Kellermanns, 2007; Eddleston, Kellermanns, & Zellweger, 2012). Research in this tradition demonstrates that family commitment to the business (Zahra, Hayton, Neubaum, Dibrell, & Craig, 2008) and positive family relationships (Eddleston & Kellermanns, 2007; Eddleston, Kellermanns, & Sarathy, 2008) contribute to family firm success. Family members are seen as intensely dedicated and committed employees whose shared family identity motivates them to pursue firm goals (Sundaramurthy & Kreiner, 2008) and to continuously search for new avenues for growth and firm improvements (Eddleston, Kellermanns, & Zellweger, 2012; Miller, Le Breton-Miller, & Scholnick, 2008; Zahra et al., 2008). In managing family employees, proponents of stewardship theory therefore advocate for greater emphasis on participation, adaptability, and family bonds (Eddleston & Kellermanns, 2007; Eddleston et al., 2012; Madison et al., 2016; Zahra et al., 2008).

The stewardship theory view of family involvement and how best to manage family employees is in stark contrast to research rooted in agency theory. Agency theory research highlights the difficulties family firm leaders encounter in monitoring and disciplining family employees (Chrisman, Chua, Kellermanns, & Chang, 2007; Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino, & Buchholtz, 2001). Due to asymmetric altruism, family firm leaders are often overly generous toward family employees, particularly their adult children, offering them jobs and promotions regardless of their qualifications, and refraining from disciplining their poor performance or dysfunctional behaviors (Dawson, 2011; Eddleston & Kidwell, 2012; Kidwell et al., 2012; Schulze et al., 2001). As a result, agency theory stresses how family involvement can create significant problems for human resource management (HRM). Therefore, in managing family employees, proponents of agency theory tend to advocate for greater controls and monitoring (Le Breton-Miller & Miller, 2009; Schulze et al., 2001).

Rather than debate the superiority of stewardship theory versus agency theory in managing family employees, we suggest that it is beneficial to investigate a balanced approach that integrates the advice of both theories given the hybrid identity of family firms. Accordingly, we propose that family firms emphasizing collaboration as advocated by stewardship theory and monitoring as advocated by agency theory may experience higher levels of extra-role behavior by family employees. Extra-role behavior (ERB) is defined as discretionary behavior that is (1) not specified in advance by the job role, (2) not recognized by a formal reward system, and (3) not a source of punishment if the job holder does not perform it (Van Dyne & LePine, 1998). We focus on predicting ERB because it is commonly associated with stewardship (Davis, Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997; Eddleston & Kellermanns, 2007) and is a key human resource linked with job performance (Colquitt, 2008; Van Dyne & LePine, 1998). ERB is also believed to reflect effective human resource practices and to contribute to firm performance (Elorzaa, Aritzetab, & Ayestaránc, 2011; Gavino,Wayne, & Erdogan, 2012; Organ, 1988). Additionally, because the norms of the family emphasize altruism and helping those in need (Lubatkin, Ling, & Schulze, 2007; Van der Heyden et al., 2005), ERB can be seen as a positive outcome from the family firm's hybrid identity because it reflects family employees' helping behavior in the firm.

Our study contributes to the family business and human resource management (HRM) literatures in several ways. By extending the hybrid identity concept to HRM in the family firm, we recognize the unique challenges family firm leaders face in managing employees who are also family members. In so doing, we answer recent calls (Le Breton-Miller & Miller, 2009; Le Breton-Miller, Miller, & Lester, 2011; Madison et al., 2016) for more research addressing a desired equilibrium between monitoring mechanisms that reflect a control approach (business results first) and normative mechanisms that reflect the collaborative efforts of family employees (family stewardship first). We fill a gap in the literature by relating agency and stewardship perspectives to the HRM outcome of family employees' ERB, as reported by the family firms' CEOs. We also contribute to the literature on organizational citizenship by identifying antecedents of ERBs in family firms and by explaining the potential impact of supervisor monitoring on the presence of ERB in the firm. Unlike research on nonfamily firms (e.g., Brewer & Ridgway, 1998; Ghoshal & Moran, 1996; Niehoff & Moorman, 1993), our study reveals that monitoring can enhance ERB in family firms when situational factors that foster stewardship-like behaviors are also present. Specifically, we show that monitoring can actually increase the prevalence of ERB when other conditions, such as family harmony or adaptability, are present in family firms. Thus, we demonstrate that elements of control and collaboration can operate in concert to affect behavior, extending extant knowledge of HRM and ERB in family firms. Finally, our data include multiple respondents from different family firms, strengthening confidence in our findings. More specifically, while family firm CEOs, all of whom were family members, provided information on the need to monitor family employees' work and their levels of ERB, family employees provided information on the stewardship indices, constructive confrontation, family harmony, and adaptability, within the family firm.

Hypothesis Development

Perspectives on Control and Collaboration

Although research on the effects of family involvement in the firm tends to draw from agency theory or stewardship theory and assumes that family employees are either opportunists or stewards (Chrisman et al., 2007; Davis et al., 2010; Madison et al., 2016), a hybrid identity approach to family firm governance stresses the need to consider both the strengths and weakness of the family and business in concert (Whetten et al., 2014). This is because hybrid identity organizations combine two separate social categories that persistently remind family employees that they are both family members and employees of the business. As a result of this hybrid identity, family firm leaders can make decisions that put the business first, put the family first, or strike a "balanced integration of these mutually exclusive social categories" (Whetten et al., 2014, p. 481).

A family firm leader who emphasizes the needs of the business rather than those of the family would likely take a control perspective toward HRM. Agency theory explains how conflict between owners and managers creates agency costs (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). When agency theory is applied to family firm management, researchers argue that due to altruism, family firm leaders have difficulty monitoring and disciplining family employees (Chrisman et al., 2007; Schulze et al., 2001). Focusing on weaknesses of family involvement such as nepotism, consumption of unearned perks, moral hazard, and entitlement, it is thus recommended that family firm leaders heavily monitor the behavior of family employees (Chrisman et al., 2004, 2007; Eddleston & Kidwell, 2012; Kidwell et al., 2012).

Conversely, stewardship theory research emphasizes the strengths of family involvement in the family firm such as organizational citizenship behaviors, open communication and participation, family harmony and bonds (Corbetta & Salvato, 2004; Eddleston & Kellermanns, 2007), and strategic flexibility and adaptability (Eddleston & Kidwell, 2012; Miller et al., 2008; Zahra et al., 2008). Stewardship theory focuses on the family's emotional attachment and commitment to the family firm and argues that the family's identification with the business encourages family employees to serve the firm. As a result, stewardship theory focuses less on formal governance mechanisms and more on "relying on mutual trust, intrafamilial altruism in its purest sense (i.e., unselfish concern and devotion to others without expected return to oneself), and clan-based collegiality" (Corbetta & Salvato, 2004, p. 356). It therefore recommends that family firms harness the benefits of family involvement by encouraging collaboration.

Family business researchers have long questioned whether agency theory or stewardship theory is more applicable to the management of family firms. For example, in a review by Siebels and Knyphausen-Aufseß (2012), the existence of a control versus collaboration dichotomy was found, but whether one mode or the other was more effective in managing family employees could not be determined. Similarly, Giovannini's (2010) study of Italian family firms showed that in some firms a control perspective had stronger explanatory power, but in others a collaborative approach prevailed. He concluded that "a 'one size fits all' solution does not exist, even in firms where ownership structure and size are similar" (Giovannini, 2010, p. 164).

However, bringing these disparate elements—control/collaboration, business/family—together may allow family firms to benefit from both the discipline and service orientations of family involvement. Whereas it seems that agency theory's emphasis on control and stewardship theory's emphasis on collaboration are in conflict, they may have complementary effects on an organization's HRM when the family firm is viewed from a hybrid identity perspective. That is, unlike nonfamily firms, the hybrid identity of family firms may call for a more complex approach toward HRM whereby both control and collaboration need to be integrated. Thus, our study examines how these two different perspectives create synergies that affect family employee behavior in family firms, indicating how elements related to control work with elements of collaboration to promote a dedicated and committed family workforce that goes beyond expected role performance.

Extra-Role Behavior

Extra-role behavior is defined as "behavior which benefits the organization and/or is intended to benefit the organization, which is discretionary and which goes beyond existing role expectations (Van Dyne, Cummings, & McLean Parks, 1995, p. 218)." Thus, an employee (or family member) engages in ERB when the individual goes beyond expected activities associated with a given position or a job. ERB is a key human resource variable that can serve as a measure of job performance (Organ, Podsakoff, & MacKenzie, 2006; Van Dyne & LePine, 1998). As such, ERB has been classified as promotive (encouraging or promoting actions to occur) or prohibitive (protecting those with less power or keeping inappropriate acts from happening) as well as affiliative (strengthening relationships through cooperative activities) or challenging (emphasizing ideas and being change oriented) (Van Dyne & LePine, 1998). ERB in organizations has been studied in the contexts of organizational citizenship behavior, pro-social behavior, whistle blowing, and principled organizational dissent (LePine, Erez, & Johnson, 2002; Van Dyne et al., 1995).

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In a family firm, a family employee may engage in affiliative/promotive extra-role behavior by helping others so as to promote cooperation beyond a formal job description. A challenging/promotive extra-role behavior is seen when a family employee suggests that a new, innovative practice be instituted in the firm. An affiliative/prohibitive extra-role behavior is illustrated when a family employee works with others to stop a questionable act from occurring. Finally, a challenging/prohibitive extra-role behavior occurs when a family employee offers an idea that would prevent a harmful act from occurring. This study applies a generalized view of ERB that focuses on the general tendency to display a wide range of proactive, helping behaviors at work rather than specific dimensions or outcomes (LePine et al., 2002; Motowidlo, Dunnette, & Carter, 1990; Pearce & Gregersen, 1991a).

A common theme in ERB research is how employees' relationships with their supervisors and perception of organizational procedures influence their behaviors (Gavino et al., 2012; Henderson, Liden, Glibkowski, & Chaudhry, 2009; Settoon, Bennett, & Liden, 1996; Sparrowe, Soetjipto, & Kraimer, 2006). For example, Tremblay, Cloutier, Simard, Chênevert, and Vandenberghe (2010) concluded that HRM practices can increase ERB when such practices are seen as reflecting procedural justice and support. Gavino et al. (2012) also highlighted the importance of perceived support to ERB by demonstrating that discretionary HRM practices associated with participation and decision making enhance employees' ERB. In the family business literature, it has also been argued that the strength and quality of the relationship between a family firm leader and family employee can affect the degree to which the family employee behaves as a good organizational steward or as an opportunist who looks out for self-interests first (Eddleston & Kidwell, 2012).

In general, four categories of antecedents of ERB are identified in the literature: employee characteristics, task characteristics, organizational characteristics, and leadership characteristics (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Paine, & Bachrach, 2000), with particular emphasis on the effects of social exchanges in predicting ERB (Takeuchi, Bolino, & Lin, 2015). Yet in developing a model of family employees' ERB in family firms, the complexity of their hybrid identity needs to be taken into account, which suggests that antecedents of ERB may be unique in family firms. In family firms, the lack of boundaries between family and business roles results in vague lines of authority that complicate family members' interactions in the firm (Cruz, Firfiray, & Gómez-Mejía, 2011). With norms of the family encouraging equality, family firm leaders can struggle to create and maintain authority with family employees (Lansberg, 1983). A paternalistic culture in a family can also transfer to the family firm, thus hampering family employees' willingness to participate in decision making and take initiative (Dyer, 1988; Lubatkin, Durand, & Ling, 2007). As such, the management of human resources in family firms is unique (Lubatkin, Durand, & Ling, 2007) and needs to be considered when investigating family employees' ERB. A model of ERB in family firms that recognizes their hybrid identity therefore calls for an appreciation of their family identity as well as their business identity. We begin by first considering how monitoring by family firm leaders affects family employees' display of ERB. This is in line with studies rooted in agency theory that emphasize the need for family leaders to control and discipline family employees (Chrisman et al., 2004, 2007; Schulze et al., 2001). Drawing from stewardship theory, we then investigate how factors associated with collaboration can work in concert with monitoring to encourage family employees' ERB. Specifically, we argue that constructive confrontation, family harmony, and adaptability help foster an environment where stewardship-like behaviors can flourish amidst high monitoring. Therefore, in proposing a framework seeking to balance control and collaboration in family firms, we begin by examining the family firm leader's approach toward monitoring family employees' behavior and then consider the moderating effects related to collaboration.

Monitoring Family Employees' Behavior in the Family Firm

Agency theory, anchored in economics and finance, is based on assumptions of individual self-interest, focusing on how firms must act to control opportunism on the part of their members (Corbetta & Salvato, 2004; Sundaramurthy & Lewis, 2003). Agency theory's view of human nature is reflected in McGregor's (1960) classic Theory X, which portrays employees as passive, lazy, opportunistic, and not intrinsically motivated (Tosi, Brownlee, Silva, & Katz, 2003). As a result, firm leaders are called on to control employee behaviors. At the heart of a control perspective as applied to HRM is *monitoring* the actions and behaviors of employees to ensure that their jobs are effectively performed and that they do not engage in self-interested behavior such as shirking duties and free-riding on the work of others (Brewer & Ridgway, 1998; Kidwell & Bennett, 1993; Stanton, 2000).

Monitoring is defined as the gathering of information about the work effectiveness and productivity of employees (Larson & Callahan, 1990) and is seen as an important task of firm leaders (Brewer, 1995). Monitoring is believed to improve employee performance by reducing shirking and social loafing (Jones, 1984; Karau & Williams, 1995). It also improves performance because it directs employees' attention to valued aspects about their jobs (Brewer, 1995; Stanton, 2000). For example, monitoring allows firm leaders to detect job performance problems and, subsequently, to help correct them (Brewer, 1995). Additionally, monitoring permits firm leaders to provide recognition and positive reinforcement to high-performing employees and to offer corrective feedback and reprimands to those performing poorly (Brewer, 1995). Indeed, research on family firms stresses the need for monitoring to curb agency costs associated with family involvement (Chrisman et al., 2007). However, whereas research suggests that employee performance on *observed* tasks improves with greater monitoring (Brewer, 1995; Larson & Callahan, 1990), it also reveals that greater monitoring damages an employee's intrinsic motivation (Brewer & Ridgway, 1998; Deci & Ryan, 1985; Enzle & Anderson, 1993; Ghoshal & Moran, 1996) and frequency of ERB (Niehoff & Moorman, 1993).

Monitoring may minimize ERB because management that reflects a control perspective stresses discipline rather than service (Sundaramurthy & Lewis, 2003). That is, employees are encouraged to focus on tasks being monitored as opposed to identifying additional or new ways to contribute to the organization. Additionally, extensive monitoring can be seen as an indicator of distrust, which thereby leads employees to reduce their effort (Frey, 1993) and willingness to help others (Sundaramurthy & Lewis, 2003). Feeling distrusted at work appears particularly detrimental to family employees because those feelings are likely to spill over to the family domain, thereby intensifying fairness concerns (Rosenblatt, de Mik, Anderson, & Johnson, 1985). As such, a high degree of monitoring may lower family employees' motivation to behave as stewards and display helping behaviors. Accordingly, we hypothesize that in family firms where the CEO reports a high degree of monitoring, family employees' level of ERB will be low.

Hypothesis 1: Monitoring by family firm leaders is negatively related to family employees' extra role behaviors.

Balancing Control with Collaboration

Stewardship theory, rooted in sociology and psychology, depicts organizational members as pro-organizational, collaborative, and trustworthy (Davis et al., 1997). Stewardship theory's view of human nature is reflected in McGregor's (1960) Theory Y, which portrays employees as intrinsically motivated, trustworthy, and with a high capacity to assume responsibility (Tosi et al., 2003). When applied to management, stewardship theory advocates for a high-involvement approach that is characterized by participation, open communication, empowerment, and trust

(Davis et al., 1997). Here, a collectivistic culture is encouraged whereby harmony and long-term relationships are fostered.

Stewardship theory research recognizes how helping and citizenship behaviors, sometimes referred to as reciprocal altruism in the family business literature, contribute to family firm performance (e.g., Corbetta & Salvato, 2004; Eddleston & Kellermanns, 2007; Eddleston et al., 2008). When family employees assist other employees and help them accomplish organizational tasks, they can be seen as stewards of the family firm (Kellermanns, Eddleston, Sarathy, & Murphy, 2012). ERB is important to family firms because research findings suggest it contributes to entrepreneurship and firm performance (Eddleston et al., 2008, 2012; Kellermanns et al., 2012; Miller et al., 2008). For example, while Eddleston et al. (2008) showed that reciprocal altruism, measured with an organizational citizenship scale, is positively related to family firm performance, they also showed that such ERB is most beneficial to performance when the family firm's environment was rich in technological opportunities. Although the benefits of ERB to family firms have been acknowledged in the literature, it is also recognized that not all family firms are able to nurture these behaviors. Chrisman et al. (2004, p. 338) noted that in some family firms it is more likely to "observe children shirking than working." Yet research has not explored why some family firms experience greater family employee ERB than others.

Our general thesis is that control and collaboration can work in concert in family firms to promote ERB, reflecting in part the hybrid identity of family firms.

Previous research suggests that family firms reflecting stewardship principles encourage open communication and participation in decision making (Eddleston & Kellermanns, 2007; Eddleston et al., 2012); strong, harmonious family bonds (Corbetta & Salvato, 2004; Davis et al., 2010; Kidwell et al., 2012); and a future orientation that resists stagnation and promotes strategic flexibility and adaptation (Miller et al., 2008; Zahra et al., 2008). This is in line with stewardship theory's characterization of an involvement-oriented philosophy as fostering participation; open communication; and strong, trusting relationships, with the primary objective of enhancing performance (Davis et al., 1997). Because ERB is associated with innovative and spontaneous behaviors (Katz, 1964) that reflect an employees' desire to help and be involved in the organization (Rioux & Penner, 2001), in investigating family employees' perception of stewardship principles we considered constructive confrontation, family harmony, and adaptability.

Constructive confrontation refers to communication patterns and decision-making norms that embrace open expression, cooperation, and personal acceptance (Kellermanns, Floyd, Pearson, & Spencer, 2008; Tjosvold, 1985). Family harmony captures the bonds and compatibility among family members (Beehr, Drexler, & Faulkner, 1997; Kidwell et al., 2012). Finally, adaptation reflects the proactiveness and flexibility that a stewardship approach to family firm continuity and entrepreneurship advocates (Eddleston et al., 2012; Miller et al., 2008; Zahra et al., 2008). In considering these three sources of "collaboration," our intention was to focus on the stewardship principles of open communication, collectivistic bonds, and pro-organizational behaviors so as to forward a framework that balances control with collaboration in family firms. Given our aim to propose a balanced view of control and collaboration in family firms, we chose factors that would likely temper the effects of monitoring and not compete with the occurrence of monitoring in a family firm. In other words, we attempted to choose indicators of collaboration that could be found alongside indicators of control and would thereby foster an environment where ERB could flourish. These three indicators of collaboration also reflect a family firm perspective of stewardship theory that emphasizes participation and open exchange in decision making, strong family relationships (Eddleston & Kellermanns, 2007; Eddleston et al., 2012), and strategic flexibility (Miller et al., 2008; Zahra et al., 2008). Thus, we propose that when monitoring is accompanied by these stewardship behaviors, family employees' perceptions of monitoring will be altered, thus encouraging ERB. These arguments are illustrated in Figure 1, which shows the sources of data for the study.

Our general thesis is that control and collaboration can work in concert in family firms to promote ERB, reflecting in part the hybrid identity of family firms. This thesis is in line with Sundaramurthy and Lewis's (2003) call for a balanced view of control (agency) and collaboration (stewardship) whereby researchers move beyond an either/or thinking of each theory to explore how they can operate side by side. It also captures the hybrid identity of family firms and the contrasting views of family involvement by recognizing that whereas some family firms have access to a collaborative, harmonious, and committed family workforce, at the same time norms from the family may spill over to the business, creating agency costs associated with nepotism,



FIGURE 1. Hypothesized Model

the consumption of unearned perks, and moral hazard. As such, a balanced view of control and collaboration acknowledges the need for both discipline and service in family firms to ensure that family employees fully contribute to the firm.

Indeed, Le Breton-Miller and Miller (2009) argued that when agency theory is applied to the study of family firms, other theories should be considered so as to respect the complexity of family involvement. They argued that stewardship is one such theory because it goes beyond the assumptions of agency theory to recognize that family members may be strongly committed to each other and the family firm. Yet, there may also be family members who expect employment, perquisites, and privileges regardless of their contributions to the firm (Chrisman et al., 2004; Schulze et al., 2001). As a result, some family firm leaders may view monitoring as a way to protect family relationships and to maintain the trust of various stakeholders (Steier, 2001). Whereas trust scholars recognize that trust and controls can substitute for one another, they also suggest that the effectiveness of monitoring can be enhanced in the presence of collaborative and trusting relationships (Gulati & Nickerson, 2008; Puranam & Vanneste, 2009). Rather than setting a tone of coercion, distrust, and forced compliance, instead an atmosphere of fairness and accountability may be created when a family firm balances control *and* collaboration.

Firms that embrace control and collaboration may foster learning and proactive behaviors (Sundaramurthy & Lewis, 2003). For example, it has been proposed that when employees feel positive and trustworthy of management, they are less likely to view monitoring as threatening or coercive (Stanton, 2000). Further, research shows that perceptions of justice influence the effect of monitoring on ERB (Niehoff & Moorman, 1993), and perceived leader supportiveness increases ERB (Organ & Ryan, 1995). Therefore, when family employees reflect greater stewardship toward the firm, the family leader's monitoring may increase the family employees' display of ERB.

Constructive confrontation reflects family employees' perception of open communication and willingness to offer new and diverse viewpoints. Family employees that report high constructive confrontation likely feel their viewpoints are valued and taken into account when making decisions (Eddleston et al., 2012; Kellermanns et al., 2008). When paired with strong monitoring by the family leader, the family employees' attention should be directed toward additional tasks that warrant effort but are outside of their typical job requirements. Strong monitoring may also help family employees identify new avenues for collaboration that help the family firm to achieve its goals. In such a scenario, family employees may therefore view monitoring as a way to promote involvement and accountability rather than as a sign of distrust.

Strong monitoring may also help family employees identify new avenues for collaboration that help the family firm to achieve its goals. In such a scenario, family employees may therefore view monitoring as a way to promote involvement and accountability rather than as a sign of distrust.

Conversely, in family firms with little constructive confrontation but higher levels of monitoring, family employees may feel that their input is not wanted or valued. Here, the family employee is likely to view monitoring as a form of "babysitting" and "parenting" rather than a source of direction and guidance. Because of the hybrid identity of the family firm, polarization between the family leader and family employees can thus occur that results in disenfranchised family employees who withhold effort (Eddleston & Kidwell, 2012). Thus, we predict that while strong monitoring will be associated with low ERB in family firms that lack constructive confrontation, in those with higher constructive confrontation ERB will be high.

Hypothesis 2: Constructive confrontation and CEO monitoring interact to affect extra-role behavior. Specifically, as constructive confrontation increases, the relationship between monitoring and extra-role behaviors becomes positive.

Regarding family harmony, a similar relationship between monitoring and collaboration is expected. Family harmony captures the degree to which family members working in the firm get along with each other and possess a sense of compatibility (Beehr et al., 1997). Family harmony may alter monitoring's effect on ERB by helping to legitimize the family's role in the family firm. Rather than viewing the firm as existing for the family and as a resource for the family to consume (Lansberg, 1983), the presence of both high family harmony and monitoring instead should help the family understand their importance to the business and the leader's expectation that they contribute to the family firm. Because strong family bonds can lead a family to favor family utility as much as business utility (Le Breton-Miller & Miller, 2009), greater monitoring should ensure that strong family harmony elicits commitment to the business. Therefore, in family firms with high monitoring and family harmony, family employees should be encouraged to demonstrate their legitimacy and bond to the family firm through greater levels of ERB.

In contrast, a lack of family harmony paired with higher levels of monitoring may prevent family employees from working together to reach firm goals and may spur distrust that undermines the family firm (Steier, 2001).

In contrast, a lack of family harmony paired with higher levels of monitoring may prevent family employees from working together to reach firm goals and may spur distrust that undermines the family firm (Steier, 2001). For example, when the values between the family and firm are not congruent, the ability to manage the family firm effectively erodes, and leaders are often torn between following the norms of the family and those of the firm (Lansberg, 1983). Additionally, a lack of family harmony is often associated with perceptions of inequity and unfair treatment in the family firm (Bennett, Thau, & Scouten, 2005) that when combined with greater monitoring may lead family employees to feel the family firm "owes" them rather than they "owe" it. Indeed, equity and fairness concerns are intense in family firms because family employees compare their status and contributions with other family members at work and at home (Rosenblatt et al., 1985). As such, high monitoring with low family harmony may lead family employees to focus more on what other family employees are doing instead of identifying ways to assist the family firm through ERB. Therefore, while high monitoring will be associated with low ERB in family firms that lack family harmony, in those with higher levels of family harmony ERB is expected to be high.

Hypothesis 3: Family harmony and CEO monitoring interact to affect extra role behavior. Specifically, as family harmony increases, the relationship between monitoring and extra role behaviors becomes positive.

Finally, when monitoring is accompanied by strong adaptability, family employees should feel accountable for the sustainability and future health of the family firm. Adaptability reflects the firm's willingness to challenge outmoded traditions and demonstrate strategic flexibility (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004; Zahra et al., 2008). Because many family firms can become fixated on a previously successful strategy and resist change (Allio, 2004; Upton, Teal, & Felan, 2001), adaptability can be seen as a pro-organizational behavior aimed to support the long-term survival and growth of the family firm (Zahra et al., 2008). Family employees' adaptability may alter the negative effect of monitoring on ERB by offering support and guidance to family employees as they search for new opportunities in their environment and recognize the need for changes. Here, monitoring is less likely to be viewed as coercive and more likely to be seen as supportive and directive, thus promoting greater family employee ERB. Furthermore, in family firms that encourage adaptability and demonstrate more monitoring, family employees may feel encouraged to search for ways to improve the business and that their participation in the family firm is vital to its success, thereby fostering ERB.

In contrast, when monitoring is high but adaptability is low, family employees may feel a lack of empowerment that impedes their search for ways to contribute to the family firm. In such a scenario, family employees may focus the majority of their attention on performing their specific jobs rather than searching for ways to improve the family firm. Indeed, high monitoring tends to direct employee effort toward tasks being monitored and to diminish intrinsic motivation (Brewer & Ridgway, 1998; Deci & Ryan, 1985; Ghoshal & Moran, 1996). Accordingly, we predict that while strong monitoring will be associated with low ERB in family firms that lack adaptability, in those with higher levels of adaptability ERB will be high.

Hypothesis 4: Adaptability and CEO monitoring interact to affect extra-role behavior. Specifically, as adaptability increases, the relationship between monitoring and extra-role behaviors becomes positive.

Methodology

In this study, we aimed to prevent problems generally associated with same-source bias (Podsakoff, Mackenzie, Bachrach, & Podsakoff, 2005) by collecting multiple responses from each family firm in our study. The family firm CEO and the family employees received different but largely overlapping questionnaires. Specifically, we sought responses from the family firm CEO and family employees from each firm to aggregate data in our analysis. Consistent with recommendations from prior research (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004), we obtained data on some of the independent variables from family employees or, in the case of multiple respondents from the same firm, aggregated scores of the family employees (constructive confrontation, family harmony, adaptability). Additionally, we obtained data regarding monitoring and the dependent variable (extra-role behavior) from the family firm CEO. Whereas interaction effects cannot be artificially created from same-source bias (Evans, 1985), our approach should also minimize social desirability concerns.

We utilized three family business centers in the United States to identify family firms, which included both members and nonmembers, and mailed 650 surveys to the CEOs of family firms; CEOs were identified by the family business center as a family member. In addition to the CEO survey, four additional surveys for family employees were included. In the cover letter, the CEO was asked to distribute the additional surveys to family employees. To ensure confidentiality of the responses, a separate return envelope was attached to each questionnaire. Overall, 280 surveys were returned from family firm CEOs and family employees. However, as our research design required matched respondents (at least one family employee and a CEO), our final sample included 81 family firms, which were represented by 81 family firm CEOs and an additional 138 family employees across the firms.

We conducted multiple tests for potential response biases. First, we tested for nonresponse bias. As late respondents are more similar to nonrespondents, we differentiated our respondents into early and late respondents and investigated if there were significant differences between the groups (Oppenheim, 1966). As no significant differences were observed, we do not believe that nonresponse bias is a significant concern. As the majority of family firms are not publicly traded, no statistics exist that can confirm the representativeness of our sample. Yet two national surveys were conducted that included household businesses in addition to larger firms, to which we can compare our current sample (Winter, Danes, Koh, Fredericks, & Paul, 2004; Winter, Fitzgerald, Heck, Haynes, & Danes, 1998). Not surprisingly, the firms in our sample are slightly older, with 30.24 years versus 17.7 and 16.5 years in the national samples, and slightly larger with sales between $1 million and $2.5 million versus around $915,000 in the national samples. Yet the average age of our CEOs was 52.13 years, which is in line with the 2003 study (52.8 years) and slightly older than the 1997 sample (46.1 years).

We further assessed the potential for multicollinearity in our sample. The condition index (all < 2.83) and variance inflation factor (all < 11.78) were within acceptable levels (Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2010). We investigated whether the different geographic locations of the family business centers that facilitated the data collection affected the means of our variables of interest. This was not the case, mitigating concerns about the potential geographic impact on the results. In a last step, we conducted a power analysis, which indicated a power level of .91 assuming large effect sizes, an alpha of .05, and 14 predictors (which includes the interaction effects). This compares favorably to other studies (for an overview see Mazen, Graf, Kellogg, & Hemmasi, 1987). Indeed, power concerns are more of an issue for nonsignificant findings (Aguinis, 1995) and since moderation effects are difficult to detect (Evans, 1985), our findings suggest that at least moderate effects are present (Aguinis, 1995). In a last step, we estimated a confirmatory factor analysis for our multi-item constructs. Considering the small sample size, which can negatively impact fit indices, our analysis showed a fit at the lower acceptable bounds, that is, comparative fit index (CFI) = .881 and root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) = .085 for the full model (without any parceling) (Iacobucci, 2010)2010.

Measures

The independent, dependent, and control variables were measured based on established scales in the literature, which were adapted to the family firm context as necessary. Specifically, we changed the referent from a more general context to "family member" or "family firm." In all cases, it was made clear that the constructs were related to the family firm and to family members working in the firm. All items, reliabilities, and applicable interrater reliabilities are displayed in the appendix. All constructs displayed satisfactory reliabilities; yet, the alpha for CEO monitoring was at the lower acceptable end, with .65.

CEO monitoring was measured using three items from McAllister (1995). The items were taken from the "monitoring and defensive behavior" scale and adapted to the family firm context. *Constructive confrontation* was measured with a five-item scale adapted to a family firm context from Kellermanns et al. (2008). *Family harmony* was measured with a four-item scale from Beehr et al. (1997), which has frequently been used in the realm of family firm research. *Adaptability* was measured with three items from Gibson and Birkinshaw (2004). Finally, our dependent variable *extra-role behavior* encompassed six items adapted from Pearce and Gregersen (1991b).

We used multiple control variables, which have been consistently employed in family firm research. We controlled for family firm size, as ERB by family employees may be more impactful in smaller organizations (Wright & Kellermanns, 2011). On average, our firms employed 104.59 employees (standard deviation = 312.48). As this variable was not normally distributed, we used the natural log in our analysis. We used firm age to assess the potential problem with rigidity developing as the venture ages (e.g., Durand & Coeurderoy, 2001). We also controlled for industry; specifically, we captured whether the businesses were active in service, manufacturing, or retail. Finally, to capture family firm–specific elements, we controlled for how many generations were currently working in the firm and the number of generations that own the firm (with three response options: one generation, two generations, multiple generations). These family firm–specific variables have been identified as important constructs that can affect processes in family firms (e.g., Eddleston, Kellermanns, Floyd, Crittenden, & Crittenden, 2013).

Results

The means, standard deviations, and correlations for all of the variables are presented in Table I. We utilized OLS regression and standardized the variables prior to entering them so as to minimize multicollinearity concerns (Aiken & West, 1991).

Table II shows the results of the analyses. We used a stepwise regression approach. We first

TABLE I Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations

	Mean	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
1. Size (Employees)[a]	2.26	1.44											
2. Firm Age	30.34	27.82	.171										
3. Industry 1 (Service)	.33	.47	−.127	−.116									
4. Industry 2 (Manufacturing)	.07	.26	.237*	.300**	−.200†								
5. Industry 3 (Retail)	.25	.43	−.109	.096	−.405***	−.162							
6. Generations Working	1.87	.60	.267*	.212†	−.158	.060	.026						
7. Generations Controlling	1.40	.51	.179	.255*	−.090	.151	.003	.245*					
8. Monitoring	3.02	1.34	.135	−.205†	−.024	−.004	−.059	.084	.141				
9. Adaptability	5.21	1.03	.013	−.126	.084	−.086	−.234	.026	−.110	.075			
10. Harmony	4.99	1.29	.008	−.320**	−.079	−.081	.122	.035	−.150	−.118	.234*		
11. Constructive Confrontation	5.32	.97	.106	−.195†	−.056	−.166	.084	.051	−.198†	−.220*	.500***	.592***	
12. Extra-Role Behavior	5.76	.81	.056	−.119	.152	−.192	.030	−.027	−.040	−.267*	.233*	.190†	.349***

Notes: [a]Logarithmized

$N = 81$; † $p < .10$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .01$

TABLE II Regression Results

Extra-Role Behavior	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Controls				
Size (Employees)	.141	.169	.130	.178
Firm Age	-.084	-.025	.018	.060
Industry 1 (Service)	.168	.153	.173	.211†
Industry 2 (Manufacturing)	–.150	–.187	–.142	–.188
Industry 3 (Retail)	.097	.066	.095	.122
Generations Working	–.013	–.014	–.042	-.094
Generations Controlling	-.004	.020	.072	.060
Independent Variables				
Monitoring		–.280*	—.255*	–.343**
Adaptability			.160	.102
Harmony			.021	–.002
Constructive Confrontation			.184	.153
Interaction Terms				
Adaptability * Monitoring				.441**
Harmony * Monitoring				.331*
Constructive Confrontation * Monitoring				–.423*
R^2	.076	.148	.234	.376
Adjusted R^2	–.013	.053	.111	.243
ΔR^2	.076	.72*	.086†	.142**
F statistic	.854	1.563	.1911†	2.836**

Note: $N = 81$; † $p < .10$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .01$

entered the control variables in model 1. None of the control variables were significantly related to extra role behavior ($R^2 = .076$). In the second model, we entered monitoring, which was significantly negatively related to extra-role behavior ($\beta = –.280$, $p <.05$), supporting Hypothesis 1. The overall R^2 equaled .148. In the third model, we entered constructive confrontation, family harmony, and adaptability. None of these variables were significant. In a last step, we entered the interaction terms. All three interactions were significant ($\Delta R^2 = .142$, $p < .01$, $R^2 = .376$). Below, we describe the three interaction effects in more detail and, to facilitate the interpretation of each, plot the interactions (Aiken & West, 1991; Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003).

Hypothesis 2 proposed that constructive confrontation and CEO monitoring interact to influence ERB. Although the interaction effect was significant ($\beta = –.423$, $p < .05$), as Figure 2 shows, the relationship was not as predicted. Rather than alter monitoring's effect on ERB, constructive confrontation was shown to exacerbate its negative effect on ERB. In contrast, both Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 4 were supported. Hypothesis 3 proposed an interaction between family harmony and CEO monitoring ($\beta = .331$, $p < .05$), and Hypothesis 4 proposed an interaction between adaptability and CEO monitoring ($\beta = .441$, $p < .01$). These interactions are depicted in Figures 3 and 4. The figures reveal a similar pattern between high monitoring and ERB when family harmony and adaptability are also high. More specifically, Figure 3 shows that high monitoring has a positive effect on ERB when family harmony is high. Similarly, Figure 4 shows that high monitoring has a positive effect on ERB when adaptability is high. Additionally, both figures demonstrate that when family harmony and adaptability are lacking, high monitoring significantly hurts ERB.

In a post-hoc analysis, we reestimated our results by aggregating our dependent variable using responses from both the family firm CEO and family employees. While utilizing different respondents for the independent and dependent variables is considered a stronger research design, it could be associated with social desirability concerns, particularly for a variable like ERB. To address this concern, we first estimated the coefficient of



FIGURE 2. Interaction Between Constructive Confrontation and Monitoring



FIGURE 3. Interaction Between Harmony and Monitoring

agreement on ERB among all respondents, which was satisfactory (James, 1982). We then reestimated our model, as described above, with the aggregated ERB variable. The results remained largely the same, both statistically and practically, confirming the robustness of our results.



FIGURE 4. Interaction Between Adaptability and Monitoring

Discussion

By extending the concept of a hybrid identity to human resource management in family firms, this study provides evidence that a balance of monitoring and collaboration can encourage family employees to contribute more to their family firms through ERBs. Utilizing survey data that included multiple respondents from 81 family firms, we found that monitoring and elements of collaboration can act together to influence family employee behavior, thus demonstrating that advice from agency theory and stewardship theory should both be implemented to ensure that the family firm benefits from discipline as well as service of family members. The findings also contribute to our understanding of potential antecedents of ERB in general and the conditions in which these behaviors are more likely to occur in a family firm. We showed that whereas monitoring is associated with lower ERB, it can actually increase the prevalence of ERB when other conditions, such as family harmony or adaptability, are perceived to be present in the family firm. Our results suggest that creating an equilibrium between business results and family stewardship is crucial to the successful functioning of family firms. Achieving such a balance can allow the family business to maximize the degree of ERB in the firm, which previous research has shown to benefit family firm performance (e.g., Eddleston et al., 2008).

This study contributes to the family business and HRM literatures by demonstrating how elements of control and collaboration can interact to influence the ERB of family employees. Family firm research predominantly applies an agency theory lens (Corbetta & Salvato, 2004; Eddleston & Kellermanns, 2007), with research in this tradition showing that the monitoring of family employees increases firm performance (Chrisman et al., 2007). However, studies investigating whether agency or stewardship principles better explain the family's contribution to the family firm have not been consistent; research has not revealed whether control or collaboration is better in managing family employees (Giovannini, 2010; Siebels & Knyphausen-Aufseß, 2012). In line with the HRM literature that emphasizes the damaging effects of monitoring on intrinsic motivation (e.g., Enzle & Anderson, 1993; Frey, 1997; Niehoff & Moorman, 1993), our study first shows that monitoring is negatively related to family employees' ERB. Yet regarding

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the balance of control and collaboration, our study shows that monitoring has a *positive* effect on ERB when accompanied by strong family harmony and adaptability. These results highlight the distinct HRM needs of family firms and suggest that antecedents of ERB may be unique in family firms. As we predicted, the stewardship orientation that is reflected in these variables alters how family employees respond to monitoring. When the family behaves as stewards, cooperating with each other and proactively searching for ways to adapt to competitive pressures, monitoring appears to motivate and direct family members' efforts toward greater ERB. In contrast, when family harmony and adaptability were lacking, high monitoring significantly impeded family employees' ERB. As such, because of the hybrid identity of family firms that brings together two very different social contexts—business and family, it appears that family firm leaders need to be mindful of how monitoring is perceived by family employees. Our results suggest that without elements of collaboration, monitoring may be viewed as coercive by family employees and direct their attention away from opportunities to perform ERB. The presence of family harmony and adaptability altered the effects of monitoring on ERB, suggesting that these elements of collaboration offer encouragement and a sense of stewardship that allow family employees to identify additional ways to contribute to their family firms.

These results highlight the distinct HRM needs of family firms and suggest that antecedents of ERB may be unique in family firms.

However, the results regarding constructive confrontation were not as hypothesized. The findings revealed that high constructive confrontation further lowered family employees' ERB in family firms with higher levels of monitoring. Only in family firms with low monitoring was constructive confrontation shown to encourage ERB. Because constructive confrontation allows organizational members to see disagreements and problems as requiring collaborative efforts rather than as problems of competing interests (Kellermanns et al., 2008), perhaps the presence of strong monitoring leads to politicking and greater effort placed on "winning" that thereby minimize ERB. Thus, control and collaboration appear to be at odds when considering constructive confrontation. Future research should further explore when elements of control and collaboration tend to balance each other and encourage positive employee behaviors versus when they do not. Given the hybrid identity of family firms, such research is important in developing more effective HR practices that aim to ensure the family makes effective contributions to the family firm. Of course, our data is correlational and does not imply that the combination of monitoring with family harmony or adaptability is an appropriate choice for every family business. As such, future research should identify additional conditions in which monitoring and other control mechanisms can lead to positive organizational outcomes for family firms when accompanied by elements that support collaboration. It would also be interesting to compare how the balance of control and collaboration affects employee behaviors in family firms versus nonfamily firms.

Finally, our study shows interesting correlations pertaining to the age of the firm. While we do not believe that firm age is generally tied to a stronger presence in manufacturing, the negative correlation with family harmony and constructive conflict and positive correlation with multiple generations controlling the firm suggest that at later stages of the organizational life cycle, family firm functioning may become more difficult. Indeed, it has been shown that at later stages, different branches of the family have divergent interests (Gersick, Davis, Hampton, & Lansberg, 1997) and that family firm performance declines once the founder is no longer involved (Miller, Le Breton-Miller, Lester, & Cannella, 2007). Future research should therefore extend our framework to consider how monitoring and collaboration may need to be adjusted depending on the age of the family firm and the generations involved in the business.

Implications for Practice

Our study has multiple practical implications for family businesses. Consistent with prior research, our study suggests that contingencies are important. Whereas earlier research indicates that monitoring family employees can reduce costs and enhance family firm performance (Chrisman et al., 2007), our study is the first to link monitoring to a nonfinancial performance-related consequence. As family firms have a variety of economic and noneconomic goals (Chrisman, Chua, Pearson, & Barnett, 2012; Chrisman, Memili, & Misra, 2014), family firm CEOs and human resource managers need to be very careful in implementing control processes. Whereas these processes may facilitate performance, they can have undesirable effects on the overall portfolio of organizational goals and the degree to which family employees contribute to the family firm. Our study suggests that monitoring can have a strong negative effect on ERB. Furthermore, we found that monitoring can mitigate the positive effect of some processes associated with collaboration (i.e., constructive confrontation). Thus, from a practical perspective, management needs to make an assessment about the utility of different goals in the firm portfolio and consider how monitoring may dampen behaviors driven by stewardship. Indeed, our findings suggest that monitoring may "crowd out" stewardship behavior and thus should be used wisely in family firms.

This is particularly true as growing family firms attempt to implement high-performance HRM systems (Becker & Huselid, 2006), a strategic HRM approach that can enhance a firm's bottom line results. As family firms grow, they may be more likely to establish HRM practices that include greater levels of employee participation and empowerment, job redesign, team-based production, extensive employee training and pay for performance (De Kok, Uhlaner, & Thurik, 2006). These practices have been linked to improved firm performance (e.g., Becker & Huselid, 1998, 2006; Huselid, 1995), but include challenges that must be addressed in the implementation process. For example, these HRM practices have been connected to negative outcomes such as higher levels of turnover, absenteeism, and employee dissatisfaction (e.g., Frick, Goetzen, & Simmons, 2013). Some research suggests that this may be due to perceptions in the workforce of abusive supervision and distrust as these systems are implemented (Martinko, Harvey, Brees, & Mackey, 2013). Thus, a proper balance of control (monitoring) and collaboration (family harmony, adaptability) can be crucial in ensuring that the workings of a high-performance HRM system yield positive outcomes and are not perceived as hostile or abusive by family employees.

Future Research and Limitations

There are several potential avenues for future research that flow from the results of this study and highlight the uniqueness of HRM in family firms. One obvious avenue of inquiry would be to include additional variables that capture the heterogeneity among family firms. For example, we included family harmony to capture the compatibility among family members, but there are additional family-specific variables that could shed light on differences in HRM practices among family firms and help to explain why some family firms report higher levels of ERB than others. One interesting phenomenon to examine at the firm level is the presence of an entitlement culture in which family members, regardless of their job performance, believe they are entitled to enjoy all of the resources of the firm and to receive extra privileges because of their family status (Schulze et al., 2001). The impact of an entitlement culture on the presence of ERB in the family firm and how family employees view their role in providing ERB in this context would be a fruitful area for future research. Additionally, it would be interesting to explore how HRM practices associated with control and collaboration affect ERB of nonfamily employees working in family firms.

At the individual and group levels of analysis, the impact of the parent-child exchange and how it translates to leader-member exchanges (Eddleston & Kidwell, 2012) is likely to have a profound impact on the effectiveness of HRM practices in family firms. Although little research has considered differences in family employees' behavior within a family firm, recent findings suggest that family employees differ in their contributions to their firm (Kidwell et al., 2012). In applying a hybrid identity perspective, it may be worthwhile to explore how the identity profile of family employees, and specifically their emphasis on family versus business norms, predicts differences in their behaviors. In addition, the role of trust in mediating and moderating relationships between control mechanisms and outcome variables such as ERB should be a greater focus in future research. For example, the level of trust in firm leadership might explain why monitoring increases ERB when certain elements of collaboration are also present. Finally, while we focused on a dependent variable that reflects stewardship theory, future studies should consider variables that reflect agency theory such as opportunism and workplace deviance.

> *Thus, a proper balance of control (monitoring) and collaboration (family harmony, adaptability) can be crucial in ensuring that the workings of a high-performance HRM system yield positive outcomes and are not perceived as hostile or abusive by family employees.*

There are several other areas in which this study can serve as a springboard for future research. For example, it would be an important contribution to frame a future study of control and collaboration in family firms in the design and implementation of high-performance work systems. Earlier research (De Kok et al., 2006) has indicated that firms with family ownership and/or management are less likely to use professional HRM practices and that cultural variables play a role in whether family firms are more or less likely to adopt such practices (Thach & Kidwell, 2009). Therefore, future studies should revisit the issue of growing family firms and strategic human resource management (cf. King, Solomon, & Fernald, 2001) to determine if certain types of family firms are more likely to adopt professional HRM practices than others and how positive (improved financial performance) and negative (higher turnover and absenteeism) outcomes are affected by the balance of control and collaboration.

The presence of ERB may add to the human resource advantage that is said to be enjoyed by family firms due to the prevalence of strong human and family social capital (Danes, Stafford, Haynes, & Amarapurkar, 2009). Family social capital may be one of the factors that provides tacit abilities that families use in managing human resources successfully (Sorenson, 2013), turning HRM into a source of competitive advantage (Astrachan & Kolenko, 1994). The extent to which ERB among family employees develops and strengthens family social capital and creates value across generations (Salvato & Melin, 2008) for the family and the firm would be an important topic for future investigation. Linking the presence of family employee ERB to employee voice, employee engagement, procedural justice, and commitment would help extend earlier HRM research to the family business domain (e.g., Alfes, Truss, Soane, Rees, & Gatenby, 2013; Farndale, Van Ruiten, Kelliher, & Hope-Hailey, 2011; Gagné, Sharma, & Massis, 2014). Indeed, as noted earlier, different facets of ERB exist (e.g., Van Dyne & LePine, 1998) and future research could explore a more nuanced investigation of ERB.

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Our study is not without limitations, yet these also provide opportunities for further research. First, this study is cross-sectional in nature. Therefore, we cannot make causal claims about the relationships tested here. But, due to the theory employed, we are confident that we correctly argued the directionality of the proposed relationships. However, future research may employ longitudinal or experimental designs to validate and expand on our findings. Furthermore, by obtaining data from both family employees and the CEO for different parts of the study, we are able to mitigate potential common method bias (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003). Indeed, Monte Carlo simulations have shown that even in the presence of common method bias, interaction effects cannot be artificially created by this bias (Evans, 1985). Accordingly, as our study focuses on interaction effects, we are confident that they are not biased by our research design. Additionally, while different respondents provided responses for different variables in our model, future research is encouraged to conceptualize the variable measurement in our model differently. For example, one could estimate how all variables are measured via family employee perceptions, nonfamily employee perceptions, and the top management teams' perceptions. It would be interesting to explore if the relationships are consistent. We conducted a first step in this direction with a robustness test that utilized an aggregated measure of family employee and CEO perceptions of ERB. The results were similar in significance and practical relevance to the findings of our study.

We should also mention that the sample included only 81 matched responses from family firm CEOs and family employees. However, we hope concerns related to sample size are mitigated by our power analysis that showed sufficient power. Indeed, since all of our interaction effects were significant, power should not be a concern. In this context, we also need to mention the reliabilities of some of our measures. Specifically, the coefficient alpha for the abbreviated monitoring scale was lower than desirable. Thus, we suggest that future research utilize the unabbreviated six-item scale (McAllister, 1995). Furthermore, because lower reliabilities are associated with larger standard errors, significance is more difficult to detect. As such, the fact that we found strong relationships throughout our model should lessen both measurement and power concerns.

Conclusion

The family firm represents a classic example of a hybrid identity organization, and this has a strong impact on how its human resource functions are designed, implemented, and managed. Because of the competing roles and norms that emanate from the family and business, family firm leaders face several unique challenges in managing employees who are also family members. Whereas some family firm scholars advocate advice drawn from agency theory, others are proponents of stewardship theory principles. Rather than debate the superiority of agency theory or stewardship theory, our study develops a balanced view of control and collaboration in family firms, which helps to reconcile the competing views of family involvement in the firm. While we found some support for our balanced view, our findings also revealed that in certain circumstances control and collaboration can be at odds and that excessive monitoring can crowd out family employees' ERB. Therefore, this research demonstrates the complexity of HRM in hybrid identity organizations and highlights the need to go beyond an either/or perspective of control and collaboration in family firms.

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APPENDIX Scales, Items and Reliabilities

Construct	Items	α	r_{wg}[c]
Independent Variables			
Monitoring[a]	The quality of work produced by some family members requires constant monitoring.	.65	—
	Rather than just depending on certain family members to come through when I need assistance, I try to have a backup plan ready.		
	I find that I need to monitor most family members.		
Adaptability[b]	Our firm's leadership encourages people to challenge outmoded traditions/practices/sacred cows.	.76	.73
	Our firm is flexible enough to allow us to respond quickly to changes in our markets.		
	Our firm is able to evolve rapidly to changes in our markets.		
Harmony[b]	My family seems to get along with each other better than most families do.	.92	.89
	People in my family agree with each other on most issues.		
	The people in my family are very compatible with each other.		
	In my family, we almost never quarrel with each other.		
Constructive Confrontation[b]	In my family firm, there is useful give and take.	.86	.90
	In my family firm, there is constructive challenge of ideas, beliefs, and assumptions.		
	In my family firm, people are comfortable about raising dissenting viewpoints.		
	In my family firm, different opinions or views focus on issues rather than on individuals.		
	In my family firm, even people who disagree respect each other's viewpoint.		
Dependent Variable			
Extra-Role Behavior[a]	Family members make especially helpful suggestions to improve the organization.	.83	—
	Family members work before or after regular working hours in order to finish a task.		
	Family members' standards of work quality are higher than the stated standards.		
	Family members actively and constructively seek to get their suggestions adopted by the organization.		
	Family members make special attempts to gain more knowledge about job-related techniques and skills.		
	Family members look for additional responsibilities and/or tasks despite the fact that it increases their work.		

[a]Captured from the family firm CEO
[b]Captured from family members working in the business
[c]r_{wg} reported for family firms with multiple family member respondents